1

Implementing Distance Line Protection

Schemes among IEC61850-Enabled Substations
Bamdad Falahati, Member, IEEE, Zahra Darabi, Member, IEEE, and Mehdi Vakilian, Member, IEEE

Abstract- As digital technology has developed, relays have

evolved from simple electro-mechanical devices into robust
microprocessor-embedded intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).
Distance protection, one of the most important and sophisticated
forms of substation protection, quickly and selectively detects and
clears phase faults in sub-transmission and transmission lines.
The installation of a substation automation system (SAS) involves
implementing control, monitoring, and protection logic by
programming the IEDs and providing an appropriate
communication network. IEC61850 has gradually satisfied the
need for a standard communication protocol so that IEDs from
different manufacturers can communicate with each other. The
study reported in this paper investigated the applicability of
IEC61850 for distance protection. The benefits of and
requirements for establishing reliable distance protection through
the SAS are discussed, and detailed information about data
structures and data communication is presented.

Index Terms Distance protection, substation automation,

IEC61850, logical node.

I. INTRODUCTION
Distance protection is the most important and sophisticated
form of protection for transmission lines. At the
subtransmission and transmission levels, distance protection is
the main protection function because other line protection
functions, such as overcurrent relays, are not fast, intelligent or
selective enough to detect and clear faults. The key advantage
of distance protection is that its coverage is not affected by
source impedance [1].
Substation Automation System (SASs) have relied on the
development of digital technology. Relays have evolved from
simple electro-mechanical devices to robust microprocessorembedded intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). The
installation of an SAS involves implementing control,
monitoring, and protection logic by programming the IEDs
and providing an appropriate communication network.
Recently, the need has arisen for a standard communication
protocol so that IEDs from different manufacturers can
communicate without requiring peripheral devices, such as
B. Falahati is with the Operation Technology Inc. (Etap), Irvine, CA,
92603, USA (e-mail: bamfal@ieee.org).
Zahra Darabi is with SNC-LAVALIN CONSTRUCTORS INC.
Binghamton, NY 13904 USA (e-mail: zahra.darabi.us@ieee.org).
M. Vakilian is with Sharif University of Technology, Department of
Electrical Engineering, ,Tehran, Iran (email:vakilian@sharif.edu)

978-1-4799-3656-4/14/$31.00 2014 IEEE

protocol converters.
IEC61850 is a state-of-the-art standard that specifies classes
for all SAS functions, e.g., protection, control, and
communication. The objective is to facilitate interoperability
and cost-effective implementation of SAS in a multi-vendor
substation environment. A process bus improves protection
and control flexibility because any changes only require
modifications in the subscription of the protection IEDs, which
receive the sampled values (SVs), rather than requiring
hardwiring modifications, as was the case in the past [2].
Two main concerns regarding the implementation of
protection functions in IEC61850 are reliability and latency
[3]. In non-time-critical protections, reliability is the only
concern, but the delay is not determined. The application of
IEC61850 in non-time-critical protection functions was
examined previously, and the performances of those functions
were compared in both conventional protection systems with
hard-wired copper connections and in SAS using IEC61850
[4], [5]. The SAS was able to maintain the desired level of
reliability by implementing redundancies and fault tolerance
techniques. Nevertheless, the major concern regarding the
implementation of time-critical protection functions is the
intrinsic data latency of digital communication systems. This
concern intensifies when data communication with remote
substations is required.
Distance protection requires data communication with
remote substations for decision making. IEC61850 is a leading
standard that designates specific semantics and syntaxes for
data communication regarding protection and control tasks [6].
The study presented in this paper investigated the applicability
of IEC61850 for distance protection. The benefits of and
requirements for establishing reliable distance protections
through the SAS are discussed, and detailed information about
data structures and data communication is presented.
II. IEC61850 DATA STRUCTURE OF DISTANCE PROTECTION
According to the data object model in IEC61850, each IED
is composed of one or more servers and applications. The
server contains one or more Logical Devices (LD), and each
LD contains Logical Nodes (LN). LNs are located physically
in various relays distributed over the SAS network to provide
interfaces between high-voltage equipment and the SAS
network. Voltage and current measurements are reported to the
relays (which require the values) through the process bus, a
dedicated Ethernet communication channel [6]. In the

following subsections, the fundamental LNs of distance

protection are introduced, and the principles of data
communication in distance schemes are discussed.
A. Distance Logical Nodes
IEC61850 implements distance protection with a group of
logical nodes. Each logical node is assigned a certain task.
Table I lists the LNs involved with distance protection. For
each LN, a corresponding class with various attributes is
defined.

LN Name
PDIS1
PDIS2
PDIS3
RPSB1
RPSB2
RPSB3
PSCH

TABLE I
LOGICAL NODES FOR A DISTANCE RELAY
Meaning
Zone 1 of distance protection
Zone 2 of distance protection
Zone 3 of distance protection
Power swing detection/blocking for Zone 1
Power swing detection/blocking for Zone 2
Power swing detection/blocking for Zone 3
Carrier wire protection

1) PDIS Logical Node

According to IEC61850-7-4, the PDIS is the main LN for
distance protection. When modeling the distance function, one
instance of PDIS per zone is implemented, i.e., PDIS1 for
Zone 1, PDIS2 for Zone 2, etc.
The class definition contains three types of data, i.e.,
identification data, status information, and setting data. When
distance protection detects a fault, even outside the zone, it
first starts (Str status), and then it changes to Op status and
operates. The setting attributes refer to the characteristics of
the line, load, and starting values for different types of faults
[7]. Table II lists select attributes of the PDIS LNs.
TABLE II
DEDICATED CLASS FOR DISTANCE [8]
Attribute
Name
Class
OpCntRs
Str
Op
PoRch
PhStr
GndStr
DirMod
PctRch
Ofs

distance relay operates based on impedance, reactance, or

admittance, the fault location cannot be identified precisely.
Fig. 1 shows the operating zones of the two distance
protections installed on two sides of a transmission line. There
is noticable overlap between these distance relay zones.

Fig. 1. Three protection zones of a distance relay

PDIS1 operates instantaneously, while PDIS2 and PDIS3

operate with predetermined delays (OpDITmms) as backup
protection. The problem of distance protection is the
selectivity at the terminals neighborhood. When a fault occurs
at 90% of line 1 (F1 in Fig. 1), relay B distinguishes it as a
Zone 1 fault and operates instantaneously, but the fault will be
fed through the other side until reaching operating time Zone 2
of relay A. Nevertheless, the desired scenario is for the
protection to be selective enough to diagnose the fault location
and for both relays to operate instantaneously.
2) RPSB Logical Node
During switching, major load changes, or any considerable
system disturbance, the impedance presented to the distance
relay may differ from the load impedance. In such cases, the
distance relay should not trip and allow the power system to
return to a stable condition. Power swings are detected by
monitoring the rate of change of a positive impedance
sequence. When the relay detects a power swing condition, the
operation of the PDIS can be blocked by assigning
RPSB.BlkZn=true.
TABLE III
DEDICATED CLASS FOR PSCH [8]

Explanation
Identification Data
PDIS
Resettable operation counter
Status Information
Start, timer running
Operate
Settings
Polar Reach is the diameter of the Mho diagram
Phase Start Value
Ground Start Value
Directional Mode
Percent Reach
Offset

Distance protection has three operating zones, which are

defined based on percentages of the line length. PDIS1 covers
80% of the transmission line, PDIS2 reaches 20% of an
adjoining line section, and PDIS3 protects the next line
section, which is selective with PDIS2 [B2479]. However, the
fault impedance and the local ground impedance are the most
important factors in determining the fault zone. Either the

Attribute
Name
Class
OpCntRs
Str
Op
BlkZn
SwgVal
SwgRis
SwgReact

Explanation
RPSB
Resettable operation counter
Status Information
Start, timer running
Operate
Blocking of correlated PDIS zone
Settings
Power Swing Delta
Power Swing Delta R
Power Swing Delta X

IEC61850 does not merge the power swing

detection/blocking module in the main PDIS class; instead, a
separate class, RPSB, is dedicated for each zone. The blocking
command for each zone depends on that zones settings and
variables. Each PDIS has a corresponding power swing
detection/blocking module (BlkZn). Therefore, the number of
RPSBs equals the number of PDISs per zone (RPSB1 and
PDIS1, etc.). Table III lists select attributes of the PSCH LN.

3) PSCH Logical Node

IEC61850 has provided a special LN to handle wide area
intercommunications for protection purposes. This class is
abbreviated PSCH and works alongside the main protective
LN. For distance protection, PSCH coordinates PDIS
functions on both sides of the line and issues a trip to the local
circuit breaker (XCBR). It also controls the communication
between two line ends. Table IV lists select attributes of the
PSCH LN.
TABLE IV
DEDICATED CLASS FOR PSCH [8]
Attribute
Name
Class
OpCntRs
Str
Op
ProTx
ProRx
RvABlk
SchTyp
OpDlTmms
CrdTmms

Fig. 2. Distance permissive underreach scheme

Explanation
PSCH
Resettable operation counter
Status Information
Start, timer running
Operate
Teleprotection signal transmitted
Teleprotection signal Received
Block signal from current reversal function
Settings
Scheme Type
Operate Delay Time
Coordination timer for blocking scheme

Fig. 3. Distance permissive overreach scheme

B. Distance Protection Schemes

When a protection element detects an abnormal condition, it
may operate and issue a trip command to clear the fault
according to the basic distance protection scheme. Advanced
distance protection schemes are used to accelerate or adapt the
relay in order to change its configuration or the system
conditions. Next, the implementation of various schemes in
IEC61850 will be illustrated.
1) Permissive underreach scheme
In the permissive underreach scheme, when PDIS1 detects
the fault, issues a trip and sends a signal to the remote end via
PSCH simultaneously. If PDIS2 detects the fault, it is
permitted to trip in zone 1 time, providing it receives a signal
from the remote end (PSCH.ProRx=true). Thus, in this
scheme, both PDIS LNs trip in Zone 1 time for a fault
occurring between two relays, as shown in Fig. 2. To set the
active scheme to permissive under-reach, the variable
PSCH.SchTyp must be set to 3.
2) Permissive overreach scheme
The permissive overreach scheme enables the PDIS in the
other end of the line to detect Zone 1 faults that are seen in
Zone 2. In the case of fault F2, as shown in Fig. 1, both relays
A and B may see the fault in Zone 2, depending on the fault
impedance (Zf) value, but the relays must trip in Zone 1 time.
If the relays send signals to the remote ends
(PSCH.ProTx=true), they will be permitted to trip in Zone 1
time. Signaling is essential for relays to be selective enough to
trip in Zone 1 time for faults. When PSCH.SchTyp=4, the
active scheme of the PSCH is the permissive overreach
scheme, the logic diagram of which appears in Fig. 3.

Fig. 4. Distance blocking scheme

3) Blocking scheme
The logic of the blocking scheme is similar to overreach in that
the relay must be selective enough to operate for the fault that
the relay detects in Zone 2 but that actually occurs in Zone 1.
The blocking scheme uses the reverse zone of the relay so that
PDIS2s always are permitted to trip for Zone 2 faults in Zone
1 time, unless they receive a blocking signal
(PSCH.RvABlk=true) from the remote relay. This blocking
signal indicates that PDIS3 of the remote relay detects the fault
in its reverse zone because the fault actually occurred in Zone
2 of the relay. To enable the blocking scheme, PSCH.SchTyp
must be set to 5. Fig. 4 shows the logic diagram of the
blocking scheme.
III. DATA COMMUNICATION FOR DISTANCE PROTECTION
Data communication for distance protection is subdivided
into local and inter-substation data communication, as the
distance relays must be connected to both the internal LAN
and WAN for data communication. Depending on the selected
scheme, distance protection needs to send/receive signals

to/from the remote end relay to make a trip decision and

communicate with local IEDs in order to send trip commands
to local breakers.

delay and to increase network scalability [10]. This pattern is

best suited for data communication that does not require
delivery acknowledgement.

A. Local Data Communication

Local data communication is data communication that
occurs within the SAS, often via an Ethernet network that
integrates the bay-level and process-level IEDs. For distance
protection, such communication mostly takes place between
current transformer (CT) logical nodes (TCTR), voltage
transformer (VT) logical nodes (TVTR), and the PDISs, as
well as between PSCH, PDIS, and PTRC for the purpose of
issuing the digital trip command to subscriber circuit breakers
(XCBRs). The operate output of the LNs indicates the trip
decision of a protection function; PTRC connects the
operate outputs to subscriber XCBRs.
TCTRs and TVTRs are positioned in a merging unit in the
process level. The values are saved in a SAV (sampled analog
value) file format, as defined in IEC 61850-7-3, and
transferred to PDISs located in the distance relay in the bay
level. Fig. 5 demonstrates the transmission of the analogue
values of the line current and voltage through TCTR and
TVTR LNs, respectively.

CT

TCTR
Data Set and
SAV
Formatting
TVTR
Merging Unit

VT

SAV

GOOSE
C.B

PTRC

GOOSE

PDIS

Line Distance

Fig. 5. Transmission of analogue values to PDIS through SAV file

PDISs receive SAV files from corresponding TCTRs and

TVTRs, and depending on the substation arrangement (a
breaker-and-a-half, double bus, H-type bus), they initiate
PTRC to issue trip commands to one or more XCBR LNs. Fig.
6 illustrates local data communication between PDIS and
TCTR, TVTR, and PTRC. PTRC can send a three-phase trip
command or three single-phase trip commands depending on
the physical architecture of the circuit breaker.
All local data communication, including analogue and
digital, is performed by GOOSE messages. GOOSE uses MAC
addresses to subscribe the subscribers (via a 2-layermulticast
technology) and to convey multicast data messages without
passing through the network layer (Layer 3). GOOSE remedies
the two main concerns regarding digital communication, which
are latency and reliability. It is fast because it abrogates
conventional data acknowledgement; and reliable because it
retransmits messages to overcome data loss [9]. GOOSE uses
the publisher/subscribers pattern to minimize data traffic and

Fig. 6. Distance communication service for process bus in IEC61850 [11]

B. Inter-area Data Communication

All distance protection schemes operate based on the
transfer of signals between remote substations. PSCH is
deployed to implement the logic schemes for distance
protection coordination. This includes the tele-protection
functions of the transmission line, such as permissive
overreach, permissive underreach, and blocking schemes of
distance protection.
GOOSE is appropriate for local data communication.
However, there is a drawback to using GOOSE technology in
inter-area communication for distance protection; it cannot go
outside the local network, and it floods the wide area network.
The transmission domain is bounded by the source broadcast
domain, which is specifically the LAN/VLAN in which the
GOOSE message is initiated. To overcome this problem,
logical nodes in the remote substation must be virtually
integrated into the local Ethernet network. Among all possible
techniques, IEC61850-90-1 recommends tunneling as a fast
technique that can be implemented easily to merge two
separate local networks, to form a unique local area network.
Tunneling is a reliable, high-bandwidth technique that
specifies a certain channel in the existing WAN for connecting
the SAS networks of two substations. Direct access to each LN
in remote stations is available. The incorporation of GOOSE
and tunneling technology overcomes the limitation that
GOOSE can only be forwarded in the local initiator network;
the designated GOOSE message can be delivered via wide
area network to another LAN that the GOOSE message cannot
reach directly.
In such situations, the GOOSE message is encapsulated in
an IP packet and directly conveyed to the PSCH in the remote
substation, and it continues to be forwarded in the LAN of the
remote substation as a local GOOSE message.
The only criterion for configuring the PSCH-PSCH tunnel is
the traffic type. For IEC 61850, the relevant kinds of traffic are
multicast messages on the Ethernet data-link layer (GOOSE
and SV) [12].
The tunnel does not pay attention content of the data inside
the packet. Therefore, no additional reconfiguration is required
when a change in data communication occurs. Possible

changes include, but are not limited to, changes in the

protection scheme, changes in the configuration, or the
addition/removal of a function or IED.
C. Design considerations
In time-critical protection, latency is a decisive factor that
directly depends on the bandwidth of the communication link.
IEC61850 originally was designed under the assumption that
the latency regarding the bandwidth of the communication
network is trivial enough not to require consideration in the
design stage. For local area networks with a typical bit rate of
100Mbps or more, this postulation is almost true. However, for
inter-substation communication, the actual bandwidth actually
is restricted by many factors. Considering the long distance
between substations, communication latency is absolutely
substantial.
The IEC-61850 limitation for fast trip propagation delay is
5 ms. Regarding the reliability of data transfer, IEC 60834-1
specifies that the probability of a command not being
received within 10 ms should be <104.
IEC61850-90-1 recommends a full duplex fiber-optic link
between two ends of the transmission line. This means that
each substation would have its own channel to transmit data,
therefore eliminating the risk of collision and congestion. Fig.
7 illustrates both local and remote networks for distance
protection.

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[1]

BIOGRAPHIES

Fig. 7. Schematic diagram of telecommunication for distance protection

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Protection systems are imperative for the stability and
reliability of power systems because such systems depend on
correct, rapid, and selective disturbance elimination.
IEC61850 allows the development of new protection schemes
with these aims. In peer-to-peer communication, the digital
status and commands are sent from an LN to the other peer
LNs as messages.
The implementation of distance protection on the IEC61850
standard is challenging because it is time-critical and requires
both local and remote data communication. In this paper,
certain considerations for implementing distance protection in
IEC61850 were discussed.
IEC61850 does not provide detailed guidelines for intersubstation data communication. However, as a design
constraint, IEC61850 entails a minimum time requirement for
distance protection. In future work, a mathematical method
should be developed to simulate data latency for a specific
substation.

Bamdad Falahati (S08, M14) is a Senior Electrical Engineering with

Operation Technology Inc. (Etap). He received his B.S. and M.S. degrees in
electrical engineering from Sharif University of Technology in 1999 and
2008, respectively. He received his Ph.D. in electrical engineering from
Mississippi State University in 2013. From 2004 to 2008, Bamdad worked
with Moshanir Co. as an R&D Engineer. His professional interests include
substation automation systems, power systems reliability, and distribution
grid management.
Zahra Darabi (S08, M13) received her BSc from Iran University of
Science and Technology and her MSc from Sharif University of Technology
both in Tehran, and her Ph.D. in the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering at the Missouri University of Science and Technology. She is
currently working at SNC-LAVALIN as a senior protection and control
engineer. Her research interests are substation automation system, substation
protection system, and power system reliability.
Mehdi Vakilian received his BSc in electrical engineering (1978) and MSc
in electric power engineering (1986) from the Sharif University of
Technology in Tehran, and his PhD in electric power engineering (1993) from
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, USA. In 1986, he joined the
faculty of the Department of Electrical Engineering at the Sharif University of
Technology.
Presently, he also serves as the director of a committee in
charge of restructuring the Electrical Engineering Undergraduate Education at
the Sharif University of Technology and the director of the Electric Power
group in the Electrical Engineering Department. Since 2007, he has worked
as a professor in this department. His research interests include transient
modeling of power system equipment, optimum design of high voltage
equipment insulation, insulation monitoring, and power system transients.