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This essay presents an answer to the question What does an omen mean?, with particular reference to celestial
omens. I argue that the answer that seems most straightforward to us, namely a prediction of the future, does
not tally with ancient usage. A change of perspective is required. Such a methodology was aptly summed up by
B. Landsberger:
What is required is a familiarity with the nature of language as language, of religion as religion, of law as law. The
individual scholar, however, cannot possibly have such wide experience. He must get in touch with people who have
studied these disciplines as they relate to other peoples and, where possible, living ones: such viable exchange is vital for the
application of this method.
(Landsberger, 1974, p. 7)
In order to proceed, one must therefore categorise omens as a whole. One option is to view the omens as a
science. S. Maul argues that Omina only cease to be detected empirically when a firm conceptual link has been
established between the observed and the future which then allows omina to be construed by the application of
regularities (2007, p. 361).
Attempts to view astrology as a science, and to cast it in terms of astronomy, are an important corrective to the
dismissive or patronising approach of earlier scholarship. This essay will take the opportunity to put forward an
alternative, interpreting omens as religion. In using terms like astrology, I do not seek to undo this corrective.
Rather, I wish by the term to emphasise a robust, subtle, and cohesive system of logic distinct from other modes
of thinking.
That Mesopotamians were clever and rational does not mean they were scientists. Properly defined, rationality
is the logical movement from attitudes to actions (Kolodny & Brunero, 2013). As these are two intensional
concepts (Fitting, 2014), rationality is internal to a system of thought. For example, science cannot be said to be
rational, but good science can.
Astrology may be defined in Wittgensteinian terms as a language game within the family group of religion. In
Wittgensteins view, the meaning a statement has should not be sought with reference to the referents of each
term out in the world, but rather in the use to which the utterance is put. This is summed up in Wittgensteins
assertion that the teaching of language is not explanation, but training (1958, p. 4). The term game is used
to connote a mutual yet particular set of rules defining the meaning of certain moves, and not any aspersions of
triviality. All uses of language are Wittgensteinian games (1958, p. 3). Such language games are untranslatable
(Wittgenstein, 1966, p. 71): we can only understand by playing their game (1966, p. 55).
For a grammar of the astrological language game, I was pre-empted by D. Brown, whose concepts of Rules
and Code fit neatly into this interpretation, and to whom it is better to refer the reader than compete (Brown,
2000, pp. 126-152). But, even assuming the grammar laid out by Brown, playing the game involves more than
any such translation. For example, the morning watch may mean Elam (Brown, 2000, p. 141), but we are no
closer to understanding what bad for Elam means.
Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of religious beliefs lies in the mode of thinking they represent. For
example, recourse to a doctrine judgement in guiding behaviour is more meaningfully contrasted to an absence
of such a recourse than a belief that there will not be a judgement (Wittgenstein, 1966, p. 54f.). In fact, the latter
should in actuality be seen as a different manifestation of the same religious thinking. The mode of thought
represented by the omens is recourse to divine will. On this view, to be cognisant of the divine will is to be
pious, and omens are an attempt at piety. This is a game used not to predict the future, but to be pious. It is not
that such predictions have an air of piety. Rather, uttering an omen constitutes piety, being a moment of
reflection upon the divine will.
This reflection is equally valid for the many celestial omens that are scientifically impossible (Brown, 2000, p.
106; Rochberg, 2010, p. 20). For example, one omen states:
1
2
3
Such omens forcibly remind one of Biblical apocalyptic literature, as defined by scholars such as C. Rowland.
Rowland insists eschatology does not deserve to become the focus of attention in the study of apocalyptic to
the exclusion of the other secrets which the apocalypses claim to reveal (1982, p. 26). Rather, its main point is
to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the majestic, indomitable divine in the world of the mundane (1982, p. 189).
I shall refer to this as the divine beneath all. A passage from II Kings 6:15-18 demonstrates this well:
The attendant of the man of God got up early to go outside, and
there surrounding the city was the army, with horses and
chariots. The young man said to Elisha, Woe, my lord! What
can we do?. He replied, Do not fear: the multitude that is
with us exceeds all those with them. So Elisha prayed to
Yahweh, saying, Yahweh, open the eyes of this young man!.
Then he saw, there the mountains were full of horses, and
chariots of fire surrounded Elisha. And as they came down
toward him, Elisha prayed to Yahweh, saying, Strike this
people with blindness!, and they became blind as Elisha spoke.
The theology is parallel to, not the foundation of, the earthly events. Even in the obviously mythologised
Biblical account, the apocalypse is demonstrative of the victory, not is cause. It would have been easy to have
the chariots of fire burn up the army, but that does not occur within apocalypticism. Many have seen the
rudiments of apocalypticism in the mythological literature (Clifford, 2003). N. Veldhuis sees a kind of
parallelism expressed in the cosmogony of the Enma eli (2010, p. 87). After Marduks defeat of Tiamat, we
read:
IV.137
IV.138
mi-i-lu-u-a i-ku-nam-ma
-ma-mi u-al-lil
(Talon, 2005)
(Foster, 1997)
V.55
But the cosmogony here supports ontological monism, not dualism. This is also the case for the injunction in
the Diviners Manual:
39
40
(Oppenheim, 1974)
Both
and
are the same thing across the varied genres. Rather, the religious concept of the divine beneath
all is to be seen in the omen literature in toto; as curiously absent from the Hebrew Bible as true apocalypticism
is from Mesopotamia. Yet omens of all types can remain affirmations of this idea of the divine behind all.
Unobservable omens may even constitute the superlative examples: by saying something you do not see has
divine portents, you are putting the gods before yourself, which in this game constitutes piety. The practical
applications should be put behind a full exposition of the Heavenly Writing (Rochberg, 2004).
Another characteristic more easily accommodated by a religious rather than scientific reading is that, to quote
Brown, the result all depended on the prognostications the Scholars wished to send (Brown, 2000, p. 157).
The following case study provides a good illustration of this, as well as other features, discussed below:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
There is one important caveat to mention: the prestige of unprovoked omens (Freedman, 1998, p. 1) suggests
one is better for not seeking ones own omens. It is not about justifying your own views as the gods views, it is
about a religious or ethical dialogue that brings one into accord with the world. Following Wittgensteins
theories of religion, to be genuinely in the astrological mindset involved always considering the gods will
distinctly from ones own. Failure to do this is, by the rules of astrology, impious. Non-astrological modes of
thought are therefore lacking in this regard, and must be supplemented by astrological (or other theological)
ones whenever their practitioners have a concern for piety. Even where no theological reference is explicitly
made, this void speaks when viewed theologically.
This is clearly shown with the pertinent modern analogy: non-scientific statements such as astrological ones are
assessed scientifically, and are sometimes judged bad science when a scientific void is encountered. This
scientific assessment is correct, but a corresponding astrological assessment of science is also valid. The desire
we experience to translate theological claims into scientific ones is the same kind as that which drove the
ancient translation into astrological terms. In both cases, a solid rationale gives rise to shaky conclusions.
In the case of astrology, such tempting dark alleys may be termed pseudoscience. Astrology is not a
pseudoscience. Any pseudoscientific beliefs are incidental to the process; waste products of asserting the
divine beneath all. The word pseudoscience seems most appropriate, indicating scientific beliefs derived
from an unscientific source. Not only does pseudoscience so defined continue to the present day, but the
corollary phenomenon of pseudoreligion may also be detected. Perhaps the best example from modern times is
eugenics, which creates (in Wittgensteinian terms) a religious recourse to the scientific belief of genetic
selection. In general terms, it may be useful to consider Humes Law in this regard: the distinction of vice and
virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects (Hume, 1739, p. 335). I cannot guess as to the extent of
pseudoscience in Mesopotamian astrology, but can find no omen that necessitates a pseudoscientific
explanation. Bel-uezib, the expert, appears to argue against it.
Line 27 introduces another facet, that of conflicting readings. The king has his interpretation, Bel-uezib offers
another. From the religious perspective, these conflicts must conceptualised as a question of with whom the
gods are in most accord, not what will or will not happen. Of course, in respect to the king the conflict is muted;
the religious authority of the diviner is most seemly.
It is a moral reprimand to have an omen against your course of action, something one could either deny or
accept. All divination therefore had a moral element. Actively accepting a moral flaw through the rituals of
aversion is a morally affirming act of piety on a par with the moral affirmation of a good omen brings. Thus,
both good and bad omens need not affect the final action, and may both be used positively. Namburbi rituals
encompass all omens for all people.
ana UL i-si-it GIDIM TAR-si IKA DU6
UB-i ina A ta!-sk-ma i-sal-la 3U4-mi
ki-is-pa ana GIDIM kim-ti- i-ka-sip
10
[DI S]AG -
GI[6-ma EME- eem-ret ana GIZKIM
GIG GAM]
[If]
his
epigastrium
is
dark and his tongue is
shriveled, he is at an acute stage of
the illness; he will die].
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