Complexity and Intersubjectivity: Towards The Theory of Niklas Luhmann

Complexity and Intersubjectivity: Towards the Theory of Niklas Luhmann
Author(s): John Bednarz Jr.

Source: Human Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1984), pp. 55-69
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008898
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Human Studies 7:55-69 (1984)

?Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands
COMPLEXITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY: TOWARDS THE

THEORY OF NIKLAS LUHMANN
JOHN BEDNARZ, Jr.

Seton Hall University
It is, perhaps, inevitable that powerful and original thinking will under?
go
changes
even
radical
ones
in the
course
of
its development.
This is certainly true in the case of as powerful and original a thinker

as Niklas
Yet
Luhmann.1
idea has
fixed
remained
one
the unavoidable
developments
despite
all
for him as a theme unfying
and constant
his studies from the beginning to the present. This idea is expressed as
the ultimate function of social systems: the grasping and reduction
of complexity.2
complexity
other
that
social
that distinguishes
systems
grasp
and reduce
them significantly
from all
now certain key con?

to explore
systems.
Sievers
in his presentation
and demonstrate
how it, in Burkhard
as
an
as an a-sociological
well
"...requires
a-cybernetic
theory
kinds
cepts
words,
of world
how,
dental
believes
Luhmann
in a way
of
interpretation."3
in some
world
I should
of his
phenomenology
interpretation.
like
In so doing I hope to be able to indicate
believes
that transcen?
Luhmann
writings,
means
is an indispensible
this
of uncovering
In order
to demonstrate
this phenomenological
earlier
investigations, both of the later Husserl and Schutz, will be introduced

to
the connection
of social com?
between
Luhmann's
concept
and
the
constitution
the
social
of
world.
plexity
intersubjective
a history
We can begin with
the concept
of system
itself. It possesses
its own,
of
to Luhmann,
which
in
four
according
stages,
develops
?
?
a
in
The
first
"classical"
cybernetic
interpretation.
culminating
form
concept of system reaches back to antiquity. Both Plato (1964, p. 484)

and Aristotle (1963, p. 194) employ the word sy sterna in the sense of
a whole
of several parts or members.4

And Aristotle
compounded
hat which
p. 280), for instance,
(1961,
says that a, "'Whole' means...[t]
so contains
its contents
that they form a unity;
and this in two ways,
56
sense
in the
either
that
is composed
of
unity
as a mere
understood
each
them
of
In the
them."
is a unity, or in the sense that

cannot
latter sense the whole
the
be
sum of its parts.5 The parts are, as

a
be properly
im?
that it would
way
together"
for them to exist otherwise.
state
of
Aristotle
this
expresses
as the priority
to its parts. The whole
of the whole
is prior be?
it were,
arithmetical
in such
"held
possible
affairs
cause it possesses or is endowed with an arche (first principle) which

alone forms the basis of their unity, just as the heart is the arche of
the
living
(whole,
organism
system)
according
to Aristotle.
A whole
- both
(system), then, is a collection of parts which exist
individually
-
as a whole
and
of a first
agency
its attention
As
principle.
the
upon
is completely
solely
environment
latter's
insofar
only
ignored.
the pervasiveness
In order
to appreciate
one must
realize
system
as they are related together

the
through
can be seen, this interpretation
focusses
of the system. The
internal organization
that,
of
the
first
of
conception
the second
stage
to Luhmann,
according
of development occurs only in this century. It is introduced with the

theory of equilibrium which still views the system as originating out
of
the unification
in the
of
of
functioning
as a set of
its parts. A
the parts.
resides
difference,
however,
significant
are inter?
the parts of a system
Now
or operate
some?
which
function
when
?
in its environment
threatens.
For W.B.
conditions
?
the system
thing outside
can be traced,
to whom
Cannon
this innovation
the
p. 24),
(1967,
"The
coordinated
which
maintain
are,
processes
"parts"
physiological
preted
most
the
of
states,
states
steady
in the
He refers to the
organism..."
and the constant
conditions
as homeostasis
in general,
steady
(phy?
as equilibria.
of the organic
The
processes,
siological
"parts"
system)
latter must
not only merely
in order for a system
be present
to exist
occur.
but
also must
when
function
external
disturbances
actually
?
the external
under
this interpreta?
disturbances
Indeed,
precisely
?
cause them to operate
tion
in order to preserve
Cannon
the organism.
then finds it easy to transfer this model

social
domain.
that
organism
"To
has
assure
been
the
same
attained
in
of stability
in the
degree
the animal
the
organism
suggests such control of the fluid matrix

maintained.
continuous
That
would
delivery
by
(Cannon,
1967, p. 314).
of warmth,
shelter, means
help
minimum
conditions.
But warns
organism
the
animal
to the
social
latter
that its constancy would be
in the first instance,

the certainty
of
involve,
stream
the moving
of the necessities
of exis?
tence"
like
from the biological
organism
The
in case
latter
of
includes
of
food,
clothing,
kind as the
any
injury
"The
p. 315),
(1967,
is subject
to disturbances...,"
Cannon
social
both
57
like droughts
and floods etc.
natural,
etc.
tions and economic
catastrophes
clearer
A
of
the
development
the
to both
can
system
(whole)
In contemporary
of
the relation
of
itself. Common
cept
of
picture
of
system
these interpretations
exist
only
terminology
is understood
system
the first
between
concept
like war,
and man-made,
now
and second
the
begins
as closed.
The main
conservation
that
stages
to present
is the belief
through
this means
revolu?
of
for both
stages
difference
that the
its parts.
the con?
between
them resides in a static (ontological) understanding of the integration

of the parts for the first stage and a dynamic understanding in the
at the second
second.
Even the introduction
of the environment
stage
this aspect
does nothing
to change
of the understanding
of system
viz. its closedness
to make
of course,
the integration
of
except,
the parts fluid, changeable. Only

does
the concept
of open
at the third stage of development
occur.
system
The concept of system openness distinguishes the third from the

second
of the concept
of system. As the intro?
stage of development
a
of this concept
turn
is taken in the rela?
decisive
suggests,
tion between
at the second
and environment.
Whereas
system
stage of
duction
the
development
system
to changes
reacts
merely
at the third stage the system genuinely

now, are truly
environment,
The concept
of the open
who
that
talanffy6
suggests
Bertalanffy,
ond
interdependent.
can be
system
traced
there
are, "...many
in view of the
are paradoxical
which
systems
in its environment,
interacts with it. System and

back
to L. von
characteristics
Ber
of living
laws of physics..."
(von
1956, p. 3). And he has in mind here specifically the sec?
law of
which
states that, "...in a closed system,
a
thermodynamics
must
called
to a maximum,
increase
and
quantity,
entropy,
comes
the process
to a stop at a state of equilibrium."
eventually
The
here exists between
certain
(von Bertalanffy,
1956, p. 3).
paradox
which
the second
law of thermodynamics
and tend
systems
obey
certain
towards
maximum
never
which
exist,
i.e. maximum
and other
entropy,
disorder,
"...in a state of chemical
and thermodynamic
systems
equi?
librium but (are) maintained in a socalled steady state which is distant

from the latter" (von Bertalanffy, 1956, p. 3). If all systems indeed
tend
elements,
a "state
towards
inexorably
their
of maximum
of most
distribution"
of
probable
then the model
of the closed
entropy,
system would be sufficient for all analysis.7 But this is obviously not
the
case
system,
for
von
living
systems,
Bertalanffy
for
believes,
instance.
has
Hence
to be
the model
supplemented
of a closed
by
a model
of a system in which not only the breaking down of its material com
58
occurs
but also
ponents
curs through
the process
their building
of metabolism.
In living
up.
this oc?
organisms
the living
Thus, paradoxically,
can
at the
to the laws of thermodynamics
be subject
while
organism
same time, as it were,
says,
(1968)
them, as Schroedinger
forestalling
its
environment
from
"...by
continually
drawing
negative
entropy...."
And
in order to do this a system must have open boundaries
otherwise
The
final
system
and
cannot be delayed.8
disorder
probable
occurs when
the relation
between
stage of development
in terms of a difference
is understood
of
environment
complexity.9
This is the cybernetic stage. It incorporates the findings
the state
of most
of the third
themselves
stage, i.e. systems, when open, maintain
through
now
the
their
environment
of any
with
environment.
exchange
Only
means
as
it al?
which
that
is
viewed
system
complex
overwhelmingly
?
can actualize
more
in?
than the system
contains
ways
possibilities
into
corporate
itself.
This
the
forces
to make
system
selections.
They
are aided in the process of making selections through development

structures
and
environment
eo
which
processes
and contribute
to
ipso reduce
the system's
the
of
the
of
complexity
own
The
complexity.
itself by
maintains
stage of development,
?
a
Ash
into
relation
of correspondence
?
that of its environment.10
with
at this
therefore,
its own complexity
bringing
law
of
by's
variety
requisite
system,
With a certain amount of overlapping this is the way in which

concept
considers
the
says Luhmann.
He,
therefore,
developed,
system
actually
the understanding
of the concept
of
towards
it a "trend"
as serving the reduction
of complexity
the stabilization
through
of
system
of an inner/outer
difference.
In this interpretation
the
because
importance
any
complexity
overwhelming
this is particularly
ever,
assumes
of complexity
concept
raison d'?tre is the
system's
case
in Luhmann's
important
the
of
reduction
to a manageable
the world
of
central
format.
How?
because
only
through this concept does a sociology which understands itself as the

of social
theory
the a-cybernetic
? as
Luhmann's
systems
and a-sociological
theory
does
manifest
of world
its basis
interpretation
in
al?
ready mentioned.
According
"...islands
environment"
fers
to
the
(1970,
p.
116) systems are essentially,
a
precisely,
maintains
itself as iden?
existing...that
actually
"...anything
?
? as a
whole
unmanageable
changing
complex,
extremely
re?
1977, p. 7). In this sense every
(Luhmann,
system
as its ultimate
it can
because
horizon
environmental
world
of
system
is,
tical in an
to Luhmann
only maintain
lesser
itself
complexity
through
in
the
interchange
world...."
with
More
its environment.
In order
59
to do
every
however,
this,
must
system
the complexity
reduce
the
of
world.
Various kinds of systems reduce the complexity of the world in dif?

or
and organic
do this through
built-in
ways.
systems
Physical
structures
and processes.
and
social
do
Psychological
systems
to Luhmann.
this through
In any event,
the use of meaning,
according
? as
a relation
to the world
the limit
every open
presupposes
system
as a difference
is expressed
in degree
of its own environment
which
is con?
of
open
system
Every
complexity
(Komplexitaetsgefaelle).
ferent
natural
an overwhelmingly
fronted with
it must
to exist.
in order
reduce
complex world whose

term
The
complexity
"overwhelming
complexity"
refers to the fact that the world excludes no possibility. Therefore it

can never
be
as a system
interpreted
because
every
system
as having an outside?
is never a system
Because
the world
ened. This, of course,
does not mean
an
implies
outside and how can anything which excludes no possibility
ever be
conceived
can never
its existence
that
the world
be threat?
is unproblematic
for Luhmann, only that it is unproblematic from the point of view of

its existence. The world is only a problem from the point of view of
its complexity.
In other words,
more
contains
possibilities
react"
(Luhmann,
successfully
is always a problem
because,
to which
can
the system
case
of physical
and
p. 5). In the
the world
"It
than
those
1973,
organic systems the complexity of the world is reduced by the built-in

or natural
and
structures
which
processes
eliminate
what
is not
rele?
vant.11
The
of the world
forces systems
to make
overwhelming
complexity
no system
can ever accept
because
all the possibilities
that
the world
are made
as
has to offer.12
Selections
it
were,
automatically,
in the case of some systems which
therefore
eliminate
irrelevant world
one comes
to psychological
and social systems
Only when
complexity.
selections
does
the
conscious
situation
of
the
reason
The
change.
complexity
tivity of his environment which

self-maintenance.
He
and his
sibilities,
can
ignorance
for
the world
of
grasp
himself
decide. Both his concept of the world

become
identity
the foundation
who
actually
ing him with

an object
is that, "Man alone

is
therefore
of the selec?
thereby becomes
thematically
and know
a determinate
this
and
part
of his
a problem of his
the world,
as someone
mere
who
pos?
must
(Weltentwurf) and his own

own
system-structure
and
of his behavior through his experiencing other men

what
experience
is only
a possibility
for him,
thus present?
the world. At the same time other men identify him as
so that he
can
assume
their
range
of vision
and
identify
him
60
self
the introduction
of man,
1973, p. 5). With
however,
to the complexity
is added
dimension
of the world
itself as dependent
upon
presents
complexity)
the, "...expe?
(Luhmann,
new
entirely
an
(social
rienced and understood

mann,
1973,
egoicity
It is, therefore,
p. 5).
subjective
accomplishment.
reflection
phenomenological
{Ichhaftigkeit) of other men"

not
According
is needed
an individual
(Luh?
but rather an inter
to
Luhmann,
to demonstrate
transcendental
this.13
II
central
concept
concerns
?
the main
theme of Husserl's
is the
later works
perhaps
one
of transcendental
Here
of
his
major
intersubjectivity.14
is to demonstrate
as the
that
transcendental
subjectivity
source of all objectivity and meaning - including that of the world

itself - is transcendental intersubjectivity. By reflecting upon the
contents
he
for
of
discovers
these
own
one's
a world
other
egos
whose meaning
phenomenologically
of other
consisting
in the
same way
and objectivity
egos,
in which
is constituted
reduced
a world
it exists
consciousness
which
exists
for me
and
by them. The other
to my
themselves
reduced
present
phenomenologically
do so, at first,
The reason
for this, ac?
anonymously.
is that the subjectivity
that presents
to Husserl,
itself to trans
cording
as
can be investigated
reflection
both
cendental-phenomenological
am
I
and
"In
the
of
subject
object.
subject
perception
self-perception
egos which
consciousness
a difference
and at the same time the perceived
It makes
wheth?
object.
er I genuinely
turn reflection
upon my
subjecthood
{Subjekt?
purely
as an object
I take myself
life or whether
in the
sein) and conscious
world, as a thing among things" (Husserl 1954, p. 456). Only in the

former of these two attitudes {Einstellungen) is the subjectivity which
as man
distinguishes
itself
subjectivity
remains
all subjectivities,
among
appear
ed by
as such uncovered.15
anonymous
until
another
Precisely
reduction
because
this
uncovers
it
including its own, appear to it as objects, "as things
says. Thus other egos, and not just my own,

things" as Husserl
at first only as objects,
i.e. anonymously.
This is further prompt?
men
can only be observed
the essential
that
other
necessity
through their bodies. There is no direct access to the closed sphere of

interiority which is the pure subjectivity of other men. Other egos
i.e. as embodied
in the world,
appear as men,
egos, objects
things.
men
can only,
have pure subjectivities
for Husserl,
be uncovered
The essential
of the initial
through
investigation.
subsequent
necessity
first
That
61
men
of other
appearance
as objects
confers
them
upon
their anonymi?
ty.
The concept of the anonymity of other men is exploited by Heideg?

and
ger16
explains
mode
to a much
sociologically
the anonymity
of
the
extent
greater
alter ego
by
in terms
of being. He says (1960, p. 221), "[t]he
of
Schutz.17
Schutz
an ideal-typical
alter ego belonging to
whose
alter ego) is anonymous

of my consociates
(Das mitweltliche
?w its being can be posited
only as an individuation
of a typical
in
the
mode
of
the
of being-thus
(Sosein),
presumable,
possible,
is left undecided."
In the anonymous
absence
of contradiction
mode
of
the world
...insofar
mode
other
therefore,
being,
do not
persons
as individuals
appear
but as instances of some type, where the type is defined in terms of

various
Anonymity,
of degrees.
Schutz
admits
but
concept,
tension (content, Inhaltserfuelltheit)

case
of
is not an absolute
however,
this in terms of the in?
explains
of behavior.18
modes
the
anonymity
typified
of the ideal type. In the extreme
persons
changeable. The only thing that connects

are "persons
who
behave
in such
of
etc."
ply "persons
type A,B,C,
"a person
of type A" etc. does
pears to me only as typical modes
and
as completely
appear
inter?
them together is that they
or more
sim?
typical ways"
me
as
who
to
person
appears
such
Any
so as completely
He ap?
anonymous.
of behavior.
Schutz
likes to illustrate
this with
the example of mailing a letter. In mailing a letter I expect
that
are other
there
persons
who
behave
in certain
typical
ways
(hand?
ling the mail) whom I have never met and most likely will never meet,
who will see to it that my letter reaches its destination. My action of
mailing the letter has meaning only upon my expectation that these
other
exist and that they perform

success?
their actions
persons
actually
for me. is consumed
in their being "persons
existence
fully. Their whole
who act in such and such a manner."
I know nothing more of them nor
do
I need
minimal
to know
intension
anything
and every
more.
instance
In this
of
this
case
the
type
ideal
is exactly
type has a
like every
other.
Schutz
also
gives
an example
of
a lesser
degree
of
In
anonymity.
this case I am thinking of an absent friend who has to make important

decisions. Since this person ismy friend I already know certain things
about
of
him.
to me with the same degree

does not appear
therefore,
as the persons
in the first example.
of his
Yet, because
me
as
as
to
or
friend
N
such"
"the
be?
appears
only
"my
He,
anonymity
he
absence,
havior of N confronted
The
tion
with
decisions."19
important
of other persons
is only
eliminated
when my
anonymity
to them
a
from
changes
"you-relation"
(Ihrbeziehung)20
rela?
to
62
"we-relation,"
a pure
especially
In order
we-relation.
to
establish
a face-to-face
relation?
entertain
persons must
however,
must
to
each
and
other
be
present
ship. They
spatially
temporally.
can be one-sided
or reciprocal.
This
I take
When
relation
one-sided,
me
are
aware
not
of
notice
of you but you
It
(for whatever
reason).
"we-relation,"
I are both
is reciprocal
when
you and
is what
The
latter
directly.
In this case both
a common
share
temporality.
of each
They
"grow
we-relation.
pure
"in person"
old
existence
other's
the
by
to each other
are present
persons
aware
means
Schutz
together"
and they
as Schutz
says.
in the case
Only
of pure we-relations
do other
persons
in their full individuality which requires that Imyself

in the
same way.
This
to me
appear
appear to them
a necessarily
intersubjective
else in his full individuality
relation
is, therefore,
someone
To experience
accomplishment.
means
him as anonymous.
He no longer
that I no longer experience
a
a com?
me
as
exists as a mere
for
but
who
object
subject
experiences
mon
world
The
world
with
me
but
always
essential necessity
from
different
Crisis
of European
Cartesian Meditations.
a different
from
perspective.
of the intersubjective
a central
forms
perspectives
and
Sciences
constitution
of the
of Husserl's
theme
Transcendental
within
Operating
and
Phenomenology
the domain
of transcendental
subjectivity, which is, for Husserl, the source of all objectivity and
meaning, there is one objectivity which does not present itself as a
?
?
the lived body, Leib
My body
presents
a unique
It has a, "...completely
ontic meaning..."
way.
unique
in the concept
is expressed
walten.21
serl, 1954, p. 109) which
as lived, as united with my
awareness
of my body
immediate
mere
objectivity.
I am
way.
"similar"
special
bodies
also
aware
to mine.22
The
similar bodies as lived bodies

with
the
experience
has not
of
in an
other
immediate
way
manner
in which
of
itself
in
(Hus?
I have
ego in a
other
lived
I experience
other
is through their behavior.23 Yet even

as
bodies
lived,
transcendental
inter?
as
experience
to my
"sur?
to my primordial
sphere of ownness,
belongs
as
Husserl
To
be
able
to
reach
transcendental
says.
world,"
rounding
that an alter ego must
itself as such.
present
intersubjectivity
requires
subjectivity
such still
Husserl approaches
been
attained.
The
of
lived-bodies
this difficult problem through an analysis of the
difference
of ego-presentation
the modes
and alter-ego
between
appre?
"I am here somatically,
the center
of a primordial
'world'
oriented
around me.
entire
ownness,
my
Consequently
primordial
as
me
a
to
has the content
not the con?
of the Here
proper
monad,
tent varying with
some
'I can and do', which might
set in, and belong
sentation.
63
ing to some
or other;
There
accordingly,
not
the content
to
belonging
that definite There. Each of these contents excludes the other; they
cannot both exist (in my sphere of ownness) at the same time. But
since the other body there enters into a pairing association with my
the core of an
becomes
given
being
perceptually,
a
core
of
the
of
ego, that
my
appresentation,
experience
co-existing
course
to the whole
of the association,
ego,
according
sense-giving
as an ego now
must
in the mode
be appresented
coexisting
There,
body
here
and,
'such
as I should
given
in constant
to his
longing
be
if I were
self-perception,
Here.
Therefore
there'.
My
is actual
an
the
With
necessarily
appresentative
now
the ego
ego, however,
be?
the content
with
as other
is appresented
ego
mine" (Husserl, 1969, p. 119).
own
experience
of
than
the alter-ego
the level of transcendental intersubjectivity is finally attained because

both my own ego and that of at least one other are "paired associative
to all other egos, a "community
Extended
ly" in one consciousness.24
ever more
of monads"
arises which
to my inexorable
"theres"
supplies
"here."
points
These
of
other
(monads)
and, in this way,
occurs.
I then realize
jective world"
the world
and
Insofar
egos
the world
me with
different
view?
present
a "psychic
constitution
of the ob?
that I alone do not have access to
that my experiences
ones.
of it are not the only possible
are other egos there is, "...in principle
a realm of end?
as there
less accessibilities (to the world), though in fact most other men re?
main horizonal" (Husserl, 1969, p. 131). Even if I am, in principle,
excluded from directly experiencing another ego, still I can know that
he has
experiences
the mode
"there"
never
therefore,
less number
of
these
the
to my perception
of it. There
is always an end?
avenues
access
of
to
the
world
and because
possible
we can say then that the objectively
its objectivity,
shrinks
constitute
constituted
same world
as I, except,
of course, always
in
am
a "there"
and that Imyself
for him.25 The world,
of
world
is a complex
one.
Ill
Transcendental
intersubjective
in Luhmann's
reflection
demonstrates
accomplishment.
Social
words,
only
"anonymous
not present
itself as such.
does
alter-ego
other man
in consciousness
appears
but as an alter ego, as the freedom
that social complexity
is an
complexity,
however,
remains,
as long as the
and latent"
to the extent
that the
"Only
as
an
in
the
world
object
only
to see things otherwise
and to be
not
64
the complexity
of the world
in an en?
...does
appear
differently,
new
the so?
dimension..."
(Luhmann,
1973, p. 19). Uncovering
tirely
new dimension"
cial complexity
of the world
the "entirely
of world
a philosophical,
a phenom?
more
is, therefore,
complexity
exactly,
as
task.
But
is
Luhmann
enological
recognizes
phenomenology
with
concerned
evidences."
The
"ultimate
transcendental
attaining
have
in order
to attain
is performed
epoche
are apodictic).
evidences
which
Precisely
it comes under criticism
from him. According
reflection
upon what
78), "Transcendental
phenomenological
a domain
being,
reason, however,
mann
p.
(1970,
manifests
experience
not
as a way
to ultimate
now
the being of the world,
which
the greatest,
indeterminate
complexity."26
of
theory
jectivism"
(Kant)
mere
descriptions
problematic,
contribution
which
society
or upon
of
according
bases
itself
of
"analyses
experiences,
daily
to Luhmann.
upon
can never
be
just
teriority
itS lived-body.
a theory
of
as such
other
same
as such. We
alter-egos
have
as
transcendental
and
valid
truly
reflection
also
the
understood
life-world,"
misses
the true
The
as
transcen?
Any
an "unavoidable
sub?
has
important
to make
complexity.
We have already shown how social complexity

of
appears
the
transcendental-phenomenological
is in uncovering
status of social
the problematic
awareness
this
to Luh?
I actually
but as a
evidences,
even
including
of
problem
dental
itself
for
technique of transforming all evidences into problems
methodological
?
absolute
of
arises through the
seen
that
the
alter-ego
Rather
directly
experienced.
sphere of in
own ego and can only be experienced
like my
through
a
This
essential
central
for
presents
necessity
problem
social
action
which
asks the question,
the
"...whether
it is a closed
sees the
the same things
that I experience,
experiences
lives in the same time, carries
cherishes
the same values,
things,
same history with
seen, this problem
the
be
him"
1970, p. 73).27 As can readily
(Luhmann,
?
the recognition
which
of
only appears with
as such ? can only arise when
it becomes
known
that
is not only an object but a subject too.
the
alter-ego
the alter-ego
Social complexity
sibilities
of
of
men
other
action
expresses itself in terms of other (further) pos?
and
become
of the social world
for me,
experience
own
my
possibilities.28
action
indicated
only possibilities,
ed..."
(Habermas
the
actual
Indeed,
possibilities
the complexity
is constituted by my ability to assume the per?
of others,
"...to
spectives
of
says. The
assumption
a price:
their unreliability.
and
i.e.
see with
as Luhmann
eyes of others,"
exacts
of others,
however,
of
further
"...possibilities
experience
the
the perspectives
The,
in the horizon
therefore
& Luhmann,
they
are
(my own) actual experience
turn out differently
than expect?
is
1971, p. 32).29 This state of affairs
of
can
65
referred
to by
turn out
as social
Luhmann
than
differently
contingency.
for a number
expected
however, have their ultimate
foundation
the alter-ego
The
real
access.
is closed
social
to direct
of
importance
the
us with
to present
indicators
about
these,
the
of
further
pos?
does not reside in their
possessing
certain
and
qualities
it resides in the fact that they supply us with
characteristics. Rather
information
the alter-ego
can
possibilities
reasons. All
in the essential insight that
sibilities (meaning, according to Luhmann)

ability
The
of
the
what
alter-ego
expects.30
The
further
pos?
sibilities of action and experience indicated in the horizon of my actual

are indicated
as the alter-ego's
therefore,
experience,
cause
it is only on this basis that my
expectations
can be protected
the alter-ego
from disappointment.
is not contingent
for me alone.
It is contingent
for
is a necessary
consequence
as such (social
the alter-ego
which
of
is double
contingency.31
if I am able
possible
only
his behavior.
All
social
of
the
structures,
The
interaction,
contingency
is
therefore,
not
the alter-ego's
then,
world
social
the alter-ego
too,
of the existence
recognition
Thus
social
complexity).
social
Meaningful
to expect
be?
expectations
towards
directed
says Luhmann,
expectations,
take the form
of the expectation
Transcendental
has
of expectations.
reflection
of my actual experience
upon the contents
both
social
and
social
Social
complexity
contingency.
as transcendental
is uncovered
insofar
reveals
reflection
revealed
complexity
the existence
possibilities
of
of
the
action
as such presents
who
alter-ego
In this manner
and experience.
becomes
an intersubjective
tingency,
that the
however,
to direct
is that
alter-ego
is uncovered
is a closed
experience
the possibilities
than
(complex)
me
the
accomplishment.
at the same
with
further
social
world
Social con?
time with
the recognition
one not accessible
sphere of interiority,
outside.
The necessary
of
consequence
me with
can always
he presents
turn out
I must
be able to expect
Consequently
from
this
dif?
his
expected.
and not only his behavior
if meaningful
social interaction
expectations,
is ever to occur.
a social
In any event,
to under?
that wishes
theory
stand and analyze
on
social action
the basis of these two main prob?
? as a
lems
and social
(social
complexity
contingency)
cybernetic
?
of social
to Luhmann
must
have
theory
does,
systems
according
recourse
to phenomenological
because
investigations
only in this way
do
these
obtain
clear
The
contours.
problems
transcendental-phe
of social
foundation
is very one referred
to
nomenological
theory
at the beginning
of this paper as the a-cybernetic
and a
by Sievers
ferently
sociological theory of world interpretation.
66
NOTES
1. Significant
Sixel
says,
to develop his ideas by making,
case is the readiness
in Luhmann's
as Friedrich
effort
"...every
to
to and
listen
to
learn
what
from...,"
other have to say, cf. Friedrich Sixel (1976). The person Sixel has in mind here
is Juergen Habermas. Luhmann has even changed significantly with regard to
the content of this paper. In order to avoid the charge of "apriorism" I am sure
that
would
Luhmann
2.
The
from
the
verb
as
terms
such
the
central
even
or
"transcendental"
that
however,
maintains,
of
category
phenomenologically.
?
which
Erfassung
can
which
erfassen
use
today,
still
be uncovered
word
German
not,
He
"intersubjectivity."
can only
meaning
as "grasping"
or "to
include"
take
here
is translated
also
mean
"to
comes
in,"
cf.
The Oxford Harrap's Standard German and English Dictionary,

(T. Jones ed.)
Section E, p. 83. It is in this sense too that Luhmann employs the word.
Social systems for him maintain themselves by including or taking in elements
of their environment,
thereby increasing their own complexity at the expense
of
their
environment.
the idea of system-maintenance

introduces
Ashby
(1970, p. 202-209)
through increased system complexity as the "law of requisite variety."
3. Cf. Burkard Sievers (1971, p. 29 footnote
18): "Es scheint, als mache die An?
auf die Sozialdimension
general eine
wendung der allgemeinen Systemtheorie
sowohl
als
ausser-kybernetische
auch
der Welt?
Theorie
ausser-soziologische
erforderlich."
interpretation
Sievers
the
appends
above
footnote
to
the
statement
that,
com?
Luhmann's
as method
and system/environment
bination
of equivalence-functionalism
in
domain in a theory
finds
its
the
theory
metasociological
supplementation
of the intersubjective constitution of meaning which relies heavily on Edmund
Husserl's
transcendental
his
especially
phenomenology,
later work.
(Der
Aequi
als Methode
und die System/Umwelt
Theorie finden
valenzfunktionalismus
bei Luhmann im metasoziologischen
Bereich ihre Ergaenzung in einer Theorie
von Sinn, die sich eng an die transzendentale
der intersubjektiven Konstitution
Edmund
Phaenomenologie
Thus
Sievers'
world
use
of
interpretation"
uncovered
speziell
Husserls,
the
concept
refers to a deeper
i.e.
phenomenologically,
sein Alterswerk,
and
"a-cybernetic
prior
anlehnt).
a-sociological
which
level of meaning
to
any
mundane
theory
of
can only be
(cybernetic,
so?
use to which
it is put.
ciological)
A more complete analysis of the role that meaning plays in Luhmann's
work can be found in "Sinn als Grundbegriff der Soziologie"
in J. Habermas
and N. Luhmann (1971, pp. 25-100).
Luhmann's
concern
with
is not
meaning
how
it is uncovered
phenomenolog?
?
although he does admit that this is the only way in which it can be
ically
introduced. Rather his concern is with how meaning functions within social
that meaning has to be introduced
systems. With the admission, however,
Luhmann
constitution
indicates that an intersubjective
phenomenologically
of
the
tion)
world
(an
necessarily
and
a-cybernetic
underlies
the
a-sociological
interpretation
theory
of
social
of
world
action
interpreta?
as complex
systems.
4. Cf. A Greek-English Lexicon,

ford, 1940, p. 1735.
(H.G. Liddell & R. Scott eds.), 9th edition, Ox?
67
5. Cf. Aristotle (1966, 150a 15-21, pp. 634-636).
6. At least this seems to be suggested by Raporport. Cf. International Encyclo?
pedia of the Social Sciences, (D. Sills ed.), New York, 1968, vol. 15, entry
Bertalanffy
(1956, pp. 1-10) himself in?
"Systems Analysis" pp. 452-453.
dicates
that
the
of
concept
open
was
system
first
used,
in
thermodynamics,
1929.
by Defayin
7. The phrase "the state of most probable distribution" of the elements of a
system can be illustrated with the example of red and black balls in an urn.
It is very improbable in this case that, inside the urn, all red balls would be on
one side and all black ones on the other. Or it would be very improbable that
in an enclosed space all fast molecules would be in one half and all slow ones
would be in the other, i.e. one side of the enclosed space would be hot and
the other cold. No, in each case (of closed systems) the elements (balls, mole?
cules) tend to distribute themselves in a more probable way, until a state of
equilibrium is attained. The "state of most probable distribution," as can be
seen from these examples, is one of disorder rather than order. Entropy is the
measure of this probability.
8.
to
refers
Schroedinger
entropy
negative
simply
as
"orderliness."
Erwin
Cf.
Schroedinger (1968, p. 146). "Indeed, in the case of higher animals, we know

the kind of orderliness they feed upon well enough, viz. the extremely well
order state of matter in more or less complicated organic compounds, which
serve them as foodstuffs. After utilizing it they return it in a very much de?
- not
graded form
entirely degraded, however, for plants can still make use
of
it."
9. Although
the term "cybernetics" was coined by Norbert Wiener, Luhmann
refers to Ashby as the source of his understanding of the fourth stage of de?
velopment. Cf. concerning the concept of complexity Ashby (1970, Chaps.
7, 8, 9, 11). Cf. also Luhmann (1975, pp. 204-220).
10. No system can ever bring itself into a relation of equal complexity with its
environment because this would mean that it would have to be its environ?
Then
ment.
11.
ment
and
The
human
there
neither
eye,
would
for
no
be
would
at
difference
all
between
system
and
environ?
wave
lengths
exist.
instance,
reacts
only
to those
electromagnetic
the visible spectrum. All other wave lengths are irrelevant. It eliminates
them, although they are still there in the world.
To do so would require that the system possess the same degree of complexity
as the world. This would mean, in effect, that the system would be the world,
which is impossible.
Cf. N. Luhmann (1970, p. 73 & p. 78), and N. Luhmann (1973, p. 18).
Cf. especially E. Husserl (1969 and 1970).
Husserl (1954), in Section 29, characterizes this subjectivity as "geistige Ver
laeufe" and distinguishes
them from "bloss Tatsaechlichkeiten
psychophy
within
12.
13.
14.
15.
sicher
Verlaeufe
animals,
for
sensueller
instance.
The
Daten."
former
The
constitute
latter
occur
in
the
meaning-formations
consciousness
of
(Sinngehal?
ten) and are distinctive of man.

16. Cf. M. Heidegger (1963 25-27, pp. 113-130).
17. Cf. A. Schutz (1960, sections 36-40,
pp. 196-236,
especially section 39, pp.
Schutz's use of the concept of anonymity
is explained by Gur?
220?229).
witsch (1962, pp. 50-72).
68
18. The use of the word "type" in Schutz is derived from Webers's concept of
Ideal types. Cf. Weber (1976,section
l,no. 11).
19. Cf. Schutz (1960, p. 222).
as "they-relation."
20. Walsh and Lehnert
translate Ihrbeziehung
Cf. Schutz
195).
(1967,p.
21. Walten is translated by Carr as "holding sway." Cf. Husserl, 1970, p. 107,
footnote 3 for Carr's explanation of this translation.
22. Cf. E. Husserl, 1969, D. Cairns (trans), section 51.
23. Cf. Husserl (1969, section 52). "The experienced animate organism of another
continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing
but
harmonious
incessantly
behavior."
24. Husserl (1969, section 51), for clarification of what is meant by "paired as?
sociation" which is a concept of critical importance for a theory of transcen?
dental intersubjectivity.
25. The essential impossibility
of experiencing
another ego, except appresenta
tively, is, therefore, not an obstacle for Husserl to the constitution of transcen?
dental intersubjectivity
and the objective world. (Cf. Husserl,
1969, section
54.)
26. Niklas Luhmann (1970, p. 78). "Transzendentale
Reflexion
auf das, was ich
wirklich erlebe, erweist sich dann nicht als Weg zu letztgewissen Evidenzen,
sondern als eine methodische
in Probleme zu ver?
Technik, alle Evidenzen
wandeln - einschliesslich sogar des Seins der Welt, das nun als Problem aeusser
ster
27.
unbestimmter
Luhmann
erscheint."
Komplexitaet
73.
p.
(1970,
der
"...ob
andere
dieselben Dinge sieht, dieselben Werte

dieselbe Geschichte mit sich fuehrt."
28. Cf. N. Luhmann (1972, p. 32).
29.
J. Habermas
lebens
&
angezeigten
lichkeiten
sind,
30. Habermas
meaning
Cf.
his
N.
Luhmann
p.
(1970,
Moeglichkeiten
daher
auch
anders
on meaning
referred
to above
the
concept
of
"double
dasselbe
wie
erlebt
im selben Zeitrhythmus
"...die
Erlebens
ausfallen
31. Cf. T. Parsons & E. Shils (eds.) (1951,

of
32).
weiteren
and Luhmann
(1970, pp.
in Luhmann's
social theory
essay
ueberhaupt
schaetzt,
koennen,
im Horizont
und
aktuellen
nur
Handelns
als erwartet
ich,
lebt,
Er?
Moeg
wurde."
The important question of

63?64).
can only be mentioned
briefly here.
in footnote
pp.
14-16),
3.
for the first presentation
contingency."
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Complexity and Intersubjectivity: Towards The Theory of Niklas Luhmann

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Complexity and Intersubjectivity: Towards The Theory of Niklas Luhmann

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Complexity and Intersubjectivity: Towards the Theory of Niklas Luhmann

Author(s): John Bednarz Jr.

Human Studies 7:55-69 (1984)

COMPLEXITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY: TOWARDS THE

JOHN BEDNARZ, Jr.

This is certainly true in the case of as powerful and original a thinker

now certain key con?

In so doing I hope to be able to indicate

investigations, both of the later Husserl and Schutz, will be introduced

concept of system reaches back to antiquity. Both Plato (1964, p. 484)

of several parts or members.4

is a unity, or in the sense that

sum of its parts.5 The parts are, as

cause it possesses or is endowed with an arche (first principle) which

as they are related together

of development occurs only in this century. It is introduced with the

then finds it easy to transfer this model

suggests such control of the fluid matrix

that its constancy would be

in the first instance,

from the biological

them resides in a static (ontological) understanding of the integration

the parts fluid, changeable. Only

at the third stage of development

The concept of system openness distinguishes the third from the

at the third stage the system genuinely

interacts with it. System and

1956, p. 3). And he has in mind here specifically the sec?

librium but (are) maintained in a socalled steady state which is distant

This is the cybernetic stage. It incorporates the findings

are aided in the process of making selections through development

With a certain amount of overlapping this is the way in which

through this concept does a sociology which understands itself as the

116) systems are essentially,

Various kinds of systems reduce the complexity of the world in dif?

complex world whose

refers to the fact that the world excludes no possibility. Therefore it

outside and how can anything which excludes no possibility

for Luhmann, only that it is unproblematic from the point of view of

organic systems the complexity of the world is reduced by the built-in

tivity of his environment which

decide. Both his concept of the world

ing him with

is that, "Man alone

(Weltentwurf) and his own

of his behavior through his experiencing other men

the world. At the same time other men identify him as

rienced and understood

{Ichhaftigkeit) of other men"

but rather an inter

source of all objectivity and meaning - including that of the world

by them. The other

world, as a thing among things" (Husserl 1954, p. 456). Only in the

including its own, appear to it as objects, "as things

says. Thus other egos, and not just my own,

through their bodies. There is no direct access to the closed sphere of

The concept of the anonymity of other men is exploited by Heideg?

of being. He says (1960, p. 221), "[t]he

alter ego belonging to

alter ego) is anonymous

but as instances of some type, where the type is defined in terms of

tension (content, Inhaltserfuelltheit)

of the ideal type. In the extreme