DUS2022

LECTURE5
The Contro\of WeaPons
of MassDestruction

All ri! ht5.ese^'ed.

e Oxfod UnileBityPrcss,20l0.

&
Weaoonof MassDestruction
ArmsControl
WMD = A collectiveterm which usedfor
- three classesof weaponssystems:nuclear
weaDons. & chemicalweapons.
bioloqical
Also'a.k.a ABClatomic,Biological &
Chemica l)
' WMD distinquished from conventional
weaoonin tErms its collateral
of damage
ooteintialalsoDotential as deterrent
botential.
. Arms Control=the reductionor abolitionof
armaments.It may be unilateralor
multilateral;qeneralor local;
comorehensiie or partial;controlledor
unccintrolled.
OOxlordUni!e*ity Pres.?010.Allrightsrcsctued.
 &
Weaoonof MassDestruction
ArmsControl
. Restraintinternationallyexercisedupon
arms policv- character,
level, deployment
oI use,
- the exerciseof restraintin acquisition,
deDlovment & useof militarycapaDi.lltles'
Mdasures that enableactorsto conduct
thEmse[ves in a morerestrained way. E.g.
developing technicalof crisismanagement'
Knownas persistencefeaturesof IR &
- deterrencd policyare valuable& positive
meansof coercivediPlomacy'
issueof disarmament & non
- Rise
oroliferation.
P,cst 20l0 All.i9htsrcscNcd.
O OxlordUnivcr5ily

Armscontrol
wit harms
- Gr o w i n gd i s i llusionment
controI
'. Disarmament vs. armscontrol
agreements
.' L a te1 9 5 0 s" newt hinking" andarms
controltheorY
more
- Makingthe systemof deterrence
effective

Pres,:0l 0 All fiqhtsrescrved

e OxlordUniversity
 Crisis
TheCubanMissile
. Cr is ishighlig h te d th e d a n g e ro f
es c alat ion& m i s c a l c u l a ti odnu ri n g
militaryconfrontation& intense
polit ic alins t a b i l i ty
- P r ov idedadd i ti o n am l o m e n tu mfo r
arms control
-"Hot line"agreementbetweenthe
superpowers (Moscow& Washington
)
- PartialTest BanTreaty(1963)

?010.Allrightsrese^,ed-
O Oxfod UnivcsityPress,

TheCubanMissile
Crisis
- Highlight ed is s u eo f n u c l e a ter s ti n g .
'' US, Britain,SU agreedon partial
Test Ban Treaty in Aug, 1963.
. ' P r ohibitall nu c l e a rte s t i n th e
at m os pher eb u t a l l o wi t
under qr oun d .

Prts. 2010.All,iqh!srcscrvcd.
cOxford University
 armscontrol
ColdWarnuclear
.. SALTI
Arms Limitation Talks
- Strategic
Treaty(1972)
Missile
- Anti-Ballistic
- Controversy issues
overqualitative
. S A LTI I ( 1979 )- u n ra ti fi e da n d
r rm s ra c e
f ailedt o s t em th e n u c l e a a
. I NF ( I nt er m e d i a te -R a n N
g eu c l e a r
ForcesTreaty)1987
,9OxlordUnivcrsity
Pre$.2010.Allright5rcservl]d.

ColdWar nucleararmscontrol
. AC theoristintendto work within the
prevailingsystemof nuclear
deterrenceratherthan try to abolish
it .
.,Arms controlwas designedto
"strengthenthe oPerationof the
balanc eof m il i ta rYPo w e ra g a i n s t
disruptiveeffectsof arms dynamics'
E s p.ar m s c om p e ti ti o na,rm s ra c i n g
& t ec hnologi c adle v e l o P m e n t
CO x f or dU iv e15it y Pf es 5, 2010. A l l r i q h t \ r e s e N . d .
 Keypoints
' The lated1940s and early1950ssaw a
in
wit h dis ar m am ent
o rowin q isillu s ionm ent
dealingiwith the problemsposedby WMD.
"new thinking"& the
' The late 1950sbrought
development of the theoryof armscontrol.
. The aims of armscontrolwasto makethe
preva\\\ngsystem mork more effecttve\y'
crisisusheredin a new
' The Cubanmissile
'goldenage'of armscontrolagreements.
. By the late 1970s,howeverarmscontrolas
an approachto peace& securityfaced
increa sinpgrob lem s .
o OxtordUnivctsilyPrcs, ?010.Alltighrtrcrcn'.d

ArmscontrolandPeace
contributeto the
- Didarmscontrol
" l o n gp e a c e "?
- Case that armscontrolagreements
p l a y e da r o l ein est ablishing
and
m a i n ta i n i nnqormsof st at ebehaviour

!n i v e B i tyP.e s ,2 0 1 0A. l l r i qht!rcre^' .d.

I O x fo rd
 OtherColdWararmscontrol
- BiologicalWeaponsConvention
(BWc)
in Tension
Reduction
' Graduated
(GRIT)-type initiatives

sOxfod Univc6ity 2010.Allriqhts.eserued.

Prcss,

Armscontrolafterthe ColdWar
-STARTI and II
' StrategicArms Reduction
Treaties
- JointStatementon TransDarencv
and
Irreversibility
- STARTII Protocol
- CFETreaty(1990)

eOxto.d Unive6ityPrcs!,2010.Alld9ht5.eeeNed.
 ArmscontrolaftertheColdWar
(cont)
diffi c u l tyi n a c h i e v i n g
- I nc r eas ing progress
arms control in the late
1990sand afterward
- RussianDumaand STARTII and its
Protocol
- US Senaterejectionof the
ComprehensiveTest BanTreaty (CTBT)

Allri!ht5r.ar!.d
O OrfordUnivc6rtyP.css.2010.

ArmscontrolaftertheColdWar
(cont)
a rms c o n tro l
- Ut ilit vof ' t r ad i ti o n a l '
generallyperceivedto havedeclined
bec aus eof c h a n g i n gi n te rn a ti o nI a
env ir onm en t, e s p e c i a l layfte r9 /1 1

- However,StrategicOffensiveReductions
Treaty(SORT)signed
- Slow progress

g OxfordUnive6ityPar, 20l 0 All fightsrcsen'ed

 KeyPoints
- The end of the CWbrouohta maior debate
aboutwhetherarmsconlroldid dr did not
to globalpeace.
contributesignificantly
, Suppo_rtersviewedit as'the high roadto
. Ooponents arouedthat it Dlavedlittle Dart
in keepingthd peaceduringthe coldrdar,
-A lessstark iudomentis that arms control
plavedsomeipait in preventinqall-outwar
but'it did not siqnificantlv
impioves
relationsdurinq-thetime'sof intense
hostilitybetweanEast& West.
O OxfordUni\'c.s'tvPrcsr.1010.
Allri0ht5re!craed.

KeyPoints
.The post CW periodsaw a flurry of
arms controlagreements,
.' Despitethe lesseningof hostility
betweenthe US & Russia,however,
progresswas slow& intermittent.
- G r adually t he u ti l i tyo f a rms c o n tro l
was per c eiv e dto h a v ed e c l i n e di n
t he c hangedi n te rn a ti o nI a
env ir onm ent w h i c he me rg e d
es pec ially
af te r9 /1 1 .
c O x fo rd
u n i l e Bn yP re s ,2 0 1 0Al
. l ri ghl rcs.tucd.
r
 aftertheCold
WMDoroliferation
War
. U s i n gm i l i ta rymeanst o count er
proliferation
- C o n c e r thn a t W MDmaybe usedt o
deterintervention
* USDepartment of Defense Counter
p r o l i fe r a ti on (CPI )- (1993)
I nit iat ive

O OxfordUniveriilyPrest.20l0.AlltightsrcscNcd.

Keypoint
StrateoicresDonse
' those aqainstWMDoroliferation are
involviiromilita-rvmeans.Thissometimes
referredas'co-unterprbliferation'.
. PostCW interestin suchresponses is drivenby a
c o m b i n a t i oonf t h e e m e r q e n ce o f sm a lle rb u t
Dotentiallvmore immedidtethreats,and a sense
that arms'controlmav be of limiteduse.
' Concern about proliferation of WlvlD,particularly
n u c l e awr e a D o n s, d r ive nb v a co n ce r n
is siq n ifica n tlv
that thev mav be used to deter'US-Led
interventions:
- The 1993Counter-proliferation initiativewas an
attemptto developa coherentstrategyto allay
tnoseconcerns.
' cLittle orooresswas madetowardsachievinqthe
a p a b i l i t i 6csa l l e dfo r b y th e CPI
C OxfordUniveAityPrc!s,?010.Allrightsres.^(d.
 Strategic
response to
oroliferation
O s ir ak( 1981 ),th e P e rs i a nG u l fWa r
( 1991) ,and D e s e rtF o x(1 9 9 8 )
Preventivevs. pre-emptivestrategies
Proliferation SecurityInitiative(PSI)
Howto tacklepotentialproliferators

O Oxfo.dUnivc6ityftess,2010.Allr:ghtsrcacNid.

Keypoints
- Preventivestrategiesare directedat
the processof proliferation, and aim to
s nuf fout dev el o p m e not r a c q u i s i ti o o
nf
W M D.
- Preemptivestrategiesare directedat
the deployedweaponsand/orfacilities,
and aim t o pr e v e n tth e i r u s e i n w a r.
- Preventive& pre emptivestrategies
have been usedseparately,or
c om binedas in th e 1 9 9 1Gu l fW a r.
o OxfordUnivcAityPres.2010.Allriqhtsrc\erv.d.
 Keypoints
. Findinga politicallogicinto which
preventiveor pre-emptive actioncan be
fitted has not alwaysbeeneasy.
' Pre emptiveoperations
rationaleand leqitimacv
tend to find their
in the contextof
an ongoingwar,-suchas the 1991Gulf
War oDerations.
Preventiveoperationscan find their looic
- in the international normssurroundino-
WMD,suchas the Proliferation Securiiv
initiative,or in an existinostrateoic
doctrinesuchas Israel's;ttack o-nOsirak.

O OxfordUniversity
Pres5,2010.
Allightr rere .d.