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1. Arquero vs. CA
Petitioner was appointed as the principal of the PNS. In addition, she was
designated as the OIC of the PINS. Said designation was, however, withdrawn. Private
respondent was, thereafter, designated as the new OIC. This prompted petitioner to file
the quo warranto petition before the court a quo.

WON petitioner has the right to the contested public office and to oust private
respondent from its enjoyment?
Held: NO
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is
brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held
or exercised the public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by
the person claiming to be entitled to such office.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that
he is entitled to the subject public office. In other words, the private person suing must
show a clear right to the contested position.[46] Otherwise, the person who holds the
same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be
dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue
of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.
As aptly observed by the CA, the law created two positions the VSS and the principal or
secondary school head teacher of each of the units or branches of the integrated school.
The legislators clearly intended that the integrated schools shall be headed by a
superintendent. Admittedly, petitioner did not possess the qualifications to hold the
position and she was merely designated by the DepEd as the OIC of the PINS. At that
time, she held in a concurrent capacity, the permanent position of principal of the PNS.
Having been appointed as OIC without the necessary qualifications, petitioner held the
position only in a temporary capacity. The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is
to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to
discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. An
acting appointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of office is not
fixed, but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority. The essence of an acting
appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the
appointing authority. Thus, under RA 6765, petitioner can only insist on her security of
tenure as principal of the PNS but not as OIC of the integrated school. Upon the
withdrawal of her designation, her right to the contested position ceased to exist.

2. Moro vs. Del Carmen

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Generoso, Chief Accountant of the AFP
General Headquarters Accounting Center with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the service. By virtue of AFP Special Order 91 dated April 1, 2006, , the AFP
reassigned Generoso to the PAF Accounting Center. His position was taken over by Danilo,
then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy. On August 30, 2006, Generoso was place
under preventive suspension. He was eventually dismissed from the service on February 5,
2007, which he appealed to the Court of Appeals. After the lapse of his six-month
suspension (April 2, 2007), Generoso attempted to reassume his position at the AFP
General Headquarters but was unable to do so, since Danilo declined to yield the position.
Generoso then filed an action for quo warranto before the Regional Trial Court, alleging
that Danilo was merely detailed at the GHQ Accounting Center when he placed under
preventive suspension, hence after the lapse of his suspension, he is entitled to reassume
the position being held by Danilo, who is a usurper. On his part, Danilo claimed that his
assignment to the position was a permanent appointment, Generoso having been assigned to
the PAF Accounting Center even before his suspension.
WON respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of Chief
Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center that he once held.
Held: NO
The Supreme Court ruled that an action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court may be filed against one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the
person claiming to be entitled to such office. In this case , Del Castillo brought the action
for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after the Ombudsman ordered his
dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. that dismissal order was immediately
executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo
warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.
3. Vilando VS HRET
On May 25, 2007, Limkaichong was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8062[3] issued on May 18,
2007. On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.
Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification (citizenship) or the proclamation
of Limkaichong were filed before the COMELEC which reached the Court. On April 21,
2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto
Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions
for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were
consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same
respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for
the office she was elected and proclaimed. On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both
petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of


WON HRET erred in not disqualifying Limkaichong

Held: NO
Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial
interference. The only instance where this Court may intervene in the exercise of its socalled extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the decision or resolution of
the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to
constitute a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to
be a remedy for such abuse.[26] In this case, there is no showing of any such arbitrariness
or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed
the quo warranto petition.
In fine, the Court found sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which
resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of Limkaichong.

In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through
a direct action for its nullity.
4. General v. Urro
PGMA appointed the petitioner as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner on July 2008
in place of Roces, the former commissioner, who died. On the same date, PGMA appointed
Escueta as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice
Chairman. Later, PGMA appointed respondent Urro in place of the petitioner. She also
appointed Constancia de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escuetas as permanent
NAPOLCOM Commissioners. When respondent recceived their congratulatory letter for
their appointment(March 2010), petitioners then filed the present quo warranto petition
questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it
violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.
On July 30, 2010, Pres. Benigno S. Aquino III, issued E.O. No. 2 "Recalling,
Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in
Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments." The petitioner argues that
the appointment issued to him was a regular appointment and he cannot be removed from
office except for cause. He further claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of
six years counted from the date of her appointment. Since she failed to finish her six-year
term, the petitioner claims that he is entitled to serve this unexpired portion. The parties
also dwelt on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents appointments in light of E.O.
No. 2.
WON the Quo Warranto is proper


Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a

public office. Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (expired acting
appointment), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition.
The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent
revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto
proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal
deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his
petition must fail.
Thus, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed
office as a condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the
respondents appointments. The petitioners failure in this regard renders a ruling on the
constitutional issues raised completely unnecessary. Neither do we need to pass upon the
validity of the respondents appointment. These latter issues can be determined more
appropriately in a proper case.
5. Munder vs. COMELEC
Petitioner Munder ran as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and filed his
certificate of candidacy (CoC) on 26 November 2009. The last day for filing the
certificate of candidacy was on 30 November 2009. On 13 April 2010, Sarip filed a
Petition for Disqualification[5]with the Comelec on the ground that Munder was not a
registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and that the latter's application for candidacy
was not accomplished in full. In the 10 May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, thus proclaimed Munder as
mayor on 15 May 2010. On 29 June 2010, the Comelec Second Division held that the
grounds invoked by Sarip were not proper for a petition for disqualification, and that the
latters petition was actually seeking the purging of Munders CoC. The outcome was,
however, different when the Comelec En Banc, upon Sarips Motion for Reconsideration,
[12]reversed the ruling of the Second Division and disqualified Munder in its 4 October
2010 Resolution. The Comelec ruled directly on the substantive merit of the case, and not
on the propriety of the remedy taken by Sarip. It thus ruled on the question of the
continuing possession by Munder of one of the qualifications of the office of the Mayor
being a registered voter of the municipality where he runs as a candidate.
The Comelec En Banc decided the case on a single issue whether the person
described in the CoC and in the Certificate of Live Birth referred to the same person in
the Voters Certification, petitioner Alfais Tocalo Munder. The Comelec En Banc ruled on
this factual issue, stating that the said persons were not one and the same, as they had
different birth years. The Comelec also disregarded the fact that Munder had already
been proclaimed as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, it ruled against him and
proceeded to declare him disqualified to hold the office of the mayor, for which he had
been elected. The Comelec En Banc held:
The Supreme Court has time and again ruled that qualifications for an elective
office are continuing requirements and once any of them is lost, title to the office is

forfeited. Munder lacking the requisite qualification of being a registered voter, should be
removed from office. It ordered Munder to vacate the Office of the Mayor, and the
elected vice-mayor to assume the position of mayor. It further directed the Department
of Interior and Local Government and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to implement the
Resolution against Munder. From this Resolution originated the two petitions filed by the
two rivals for the mayoral position.
At the instance of Munder, we issued on 18 January 2011, a Temporary
Restraining Order against the Comelec, DILG and PNP from implementing the 4 October
2010 Resolution of the Comelec removing Munder from the office.[15] The impending
execution of the Comelecs Resolution created divisiveness and disorder in the municipality
of Bubong such that even the military attested that they were on red alert due to the
volatile political situation in the area brought about by the possible ouster of Munder. The
Vice Mayor also prematurely assumed the office of the mayor and allegedly withdrew the
Internal Revenue Allocation without a resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan. This
aggravated the tension that had already been created by the election dispute between the
petitioners of these consolidated petitions. The Court, thus, deemed a TRO justified to
prevent disorder and bloodshed in Bubong.
In his petition, Munder argues that the Comelec acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Sarips petition which was filed beyond the
reglementary period provided by law. Munder claims that Sarip should have instead filed a
petition for quo warranto after the formers proclamation as the winning candidate. Munder
likewise asserts that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in effectively ruling
upon his right to vote, when it attacked his status as a registered voter, in order to
disqualify him from the mayoralty office.

May a petition filed as a Petition for Disqualification properly invoke, as a ground,

that the candidate sought to be disqualified was not a registered voter and thus not be
barred by the earlier prescriptive period applicable to Petition to Deny Due Course to or to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy?


Munder alleges that Sarips petition with the Comelec should be considered as one
to deny due course to or to cancel a CoC, and not for disqualification. One of the important
differences between the two petitions is their prescriptive periods. For a Petition to Deny
Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy, the period to file is within five days
from the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but not later than 25 days
from the filing thereof. On the other hand, a petition to disqualify a candidate may be
filed at any day after the last day of filing of the certificate of candidacy, but not later
than the date of proclamation.
It has been argued by Munder, who was earlier sustained by the Comelec Second
Division, that the petition for disqualification should be treated as a petition to deny due
course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, which had already prescribed.

We agree with Munder as to the nature of the petition filed by Sarip. The main
ground of the said petition is that Munder committed dishonesty in declaring that he was a
registered voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, when in fact he was not. This
ground is appropriate for a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the [Omnibus Election Code], or Section 40 of the [Local Government
Code]. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be
grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false.
The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section
68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if
he/she never filed a CoC.


1. NPC Spouses Samar
Civil Case No. IR-2243
Sometime in 1990, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case No. IR2243 with the RTC, seeking to expropriate respondent spouses Luis and Magdalena
Samar's 1,020-square meter lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 30573 and situated in
San Jose (Baras), Nabua, Camarines Sur which NPC needed for the construction of a
transmission line. In an August 29, 1990 Order, the RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of
Condemnation in favor of NPC. Accordingly, NPC entered the subject lot and constructed
its transmission line, denominated as Tower No. 83. However, on July 12, 1994, the trial
court issued another Order dismissing Civil Case No. IR-2243 without prejudice for failure
to prosecute because after almost three (3) years since the said order was issued, the
Committee has not met nor deliberated on said matter and the parties in this case have not
exerted efforts in pursuing their claims despite so long a time.
Civil Case No. IR-2678
On December 5, 1994, respondents filed with the same trial court a Complaint, 7
docketed as Civil Case No. IR-2678, for compensation and damages against NPC relative to
the subject lot which NPC took over but for which it failed to pay just compensation on
account of the dismissal of Civil Case No. IR-2243. The complaint prayed, among others,
that the defendant compensate the plaintiff of [sic] the lot they are now occupying in
accordance with the current market value existing in the place. After conducting their
appraisal, the commissioners submitted their individual reports. Atty. Wenifredo Pornillos,
commissioner for the respondents, recommended a valuation within the range of P1,000.00
to P1,500.00 per square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense, commissioner for NPC, did not set an
amount, although he stated that the lot should be valued at the prevailing market prices of
agricultural, and not residential, lands within the area. The court representative, Esteban
D. Colarina, proposed a P1,100.00 per square meter valuation.

On February 21, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision pegging the value of the subject
lot at P1,000.00 per square meter and the CA, on NPCs appeal, affirmed the same.
Further, the CA held that in the resolution of Civil Case No. IR-2678, the principles and
rules of procedure in eminent domain cases under Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court
cannot apply; thus, the rule that just compensation shall be computed from the time of the

In this case, Records show that sometime in 1990, NPC filed an expropriation case
docketed as Civil Case No. IR-2243. However, in an Order dated July 12, 1994, the
expropriation case was dismissed by the RTC for failure of NPC to prosecute.
Subsequently, or on December 5, 1994, respondents filed Civil Case No. IR-2678 which is a
complaint for compensation and recovery of damages. Considering the dismissal of the

taking or filing of the expropriation case is inapplicable, since the case is not one for
expropriation. Instead, Civil Case No. IR-2678 should be treated as a simple case for the
recovery of damages. Finally, the CA held that the trial court properly exercised its
judicial function of ascertaining the fair market value of the property as just
compensation. NPC thus instituted the instant Petition.

expropriation case for failure of the NPC to prosecute, it is as if no expropriation suit was
filed. Hence, pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, NPC is deemed "to have violated
procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67,
including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation." Nevertheless,
just compensation for the property must be based on its value at the time of the taking of
said property, not at the time of the filing of the complaint. Consequently, the RTC should
have fixed the value of the property at the time NPC took possession of the same in 1990,
and not at the time of the filing of the complaint for compensation and damages in 1994 or
its fair market value in 1995.

WON Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court should apply to Civil Case No. IR2678; therefore, just compensation should be based not on 1995 market values, but on
those prevailing on the date of taking or the filing of the expropriation case in 1990
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that:
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at
the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the
government. However, if the government takes possession before the
institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of
the time of the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the
complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be
the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the
property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement
of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states
that 'upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken.' However, we held in Republic v. Court
of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent
domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint
is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural
requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67,
including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation.
In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals , we clarified that when
there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint
for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on
ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer
applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable . . . .

2. NAPOCOR vs. Spouses Cruz

An expropriation
proceeding was commenced
respondents Spouses Salvador and Nenita Cruz and several individuals who are the
owners of individual lots located in Del Monte Park Subdivision, Dulong Bayan, San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The complaint filed primarily sought the determination of
just compensation due the respondents after the negotiations for the purchase of
the lots failed.
RTC ordered the Bulacan Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) "to review
and submit an updated appraisal report on the properties to be acquired by Napocor
in order 'to judicially guide the Court in fixing the amount to be paid by the
plaintiff to the defendants." In the meantime, the RTC allowed Napocor to take
possession of the lots, after Napocor deposited an amount equivalent to their
assessed value pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. After considering
the PAC's report, the RTC issued an order fixing the just compensation at
P3,000.00 per square meter.
NAPOCOR filed this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Napocor asserts that the appointment of the PAC as commissioners was contrary to
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, specifically, Section 5. It contends that Rule 67
requires the trial court to appoint three persons, and not a committee like the
PAC. The members of the PAC also did not subscribe to an oath which is required
under Section 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Napocor further alleges that the
CA erred in disregarding the compromise agreement it entered into with the
respondents. The respondents, on the other hand, assert that Napocor's allegations
are unmeritorious.

Whether or not the appointment of the PAC as commissioners was contrary to

Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

NO. In this case, the Court finds that the appointment of the PAC as
commissioners substantially complies with Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
It is immaterial that the RTC appointed a committee instead of three persons to
act as commissioners, since the PAC is composed of three members the Provincial
Assessor, the Provincial Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer. Considering their
positions, we find each member of the PAC competent to perform the duty required
of them, i.e., to appraise the valuation of the affected lots. As correctly found by
the CA, they "are government officials entrusted with the updating and time-to-time
determination of currently assessed, as well as, market value of properties within
their jurisdiction." The mere fact that they are government officials does not
disqualify them as disinterested persons, as the provincial government has no
significant interest in the case.
If Napocor had any objections on the amount of just compensation fixed
in the commissioners' report, its remedy was to file its objections within ten (10)
days from receipt of the notice of the report. However, as with the objections to
the appointment of the PAC, Napocor failed to make a timely objection to the
report of the commissioners and raised them only before the CA.
3. Republic vs. Samonson-Tatad
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by DPWH, filed a Complaint
for the expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the construction of the
EDSA-Quezon Avenue Flyover. Private respondents, Spouses Genato, are the registered
owners of a piece of land.
During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter from
Engr.Gatan, reporting that the subject property was "government land and that the title of
the respondent is of dubious origin and of fabrication as it encroached or overlapped on a
government property. As a result, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint seeking to limit
the coverage of the proceedings.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property
"declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject to conflicting claims. The RTC
admitted petitioners Amended Complaint, deferred the release to respondents the amount
of (P18,400,000) deposited in the bank, equivalent to the current zonal valuation of the
land, and declared the property as the subject of conflicting claims.
While petitioner was presenting evidence to show that the subject property
actually belonged to the Government, private respondents interposed objections saying
that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it constituted a collateral
attack on the validity of their TCT. The RTC then required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda. Upon receipt of the Memoranda, the trial court issued an
Order stating that the issue of the validity of the TCT can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it
was denied.

Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction but it
was denied. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was also denied.
Hence, the instant Petition.

Whether or not petitioner may be barred from presenting evidence to assail the validity of
respondents title.

Held: petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the
subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just
Thus, such findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be
construed as final and binding on the parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the
condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is taking title to and possession of the
property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the property, not to
prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Here, the
attempt of petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an "attack." It must
be emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate private property, and the
contest on private respondents' title arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should
be rightly compensated. Thus, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review on Certiorari and
the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The assailed Decision and Resolution the
CA and RTC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
4. City of Manila vs. Melba Tan Te
Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved Ordinance No. 7951 an
expropriation measure authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation real
property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets where low-cost housing units
could be built and then awarded to bona fide residents. The covered property measures
1,425 square meters, and includes the 475-square-meter lot owned by respondent Melba
Tan Te. Respondent had acquired the property from the heirs of Emerlinda Dimayuga
Reyes in 1996, and back then it was being occupied by families whose leasehold rights had
long expired even prior to said sale. In 1998, respondent had sought before MTC the
ejectment case. The favorable ruling in that case evaded execution; hence, the court,
despite opposition of the City of Manila, issued a Writ of Demolition at respondent's
instance. The City of Manila had instituted an expropriation case thereof. RTC dismissed
the first compliant upon motion by Melba for failure to show that an ordinance authorized
the expropriation and non-compliance with the provisions of Republic Act 7279.
On November 16, 2000, petitioner filed this second Complaint for expropriation
before the RTC, attaching a copy of Ordinance No. 7951 and it had already offered to buy
the property from Melba, which the latter failed to retrieve from the post office despite

notice. The city was thereby compelled to file the complaint, after depositing in trust with
the Land Bank of the Philippines P1,000,000.00 in cash, representing the just compensation
required by law.

in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed
qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all
who need it, all at once.


Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of crowded

1. WON socialized housing falls within the confines of public use.

2. WON petitioner that by virtue of its power of eminent domain included in its charter is
not bound by the provisions of Republic Act 7279

1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled in Sumulong v. Guerrero, citing the earlier case of Heirs
of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes: The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power
of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The
taking to be valid must be for public use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain comes into play. . . . The constitution in at least two
cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of
lands to be divided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The term "public
use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term
signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage. . . . Specifically, urban renewal or development and
the construction of low-cost housing are recognized as a public purpose, not only
because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions
in the Constitution. . . .
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the
general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change because units

makeshift dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in developing countries. So

basic and urgent are housing problems that the United Nations General Assembly
proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus the
attention of the international community on those problems." The General Assembly is
seriously concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local
levels and of international organizations, the driving conditions of the majority of the
people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in developing countries,
continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms." [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook
of the United Nations 1982, Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
2. Congress passed R.A. No. 7279, to provide a comprehensive and continuing urban
development and housing program as well as access to land and housing by the
underprivileged and homeless citizens; uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban areas by making available decent housing at affordable cost;
optimize the use and productivity of land and urban resources; reduce urban dysfunctions
which affect public health, safety and ecology; and improve the capability of local
governments in undertaking urban development and housing programs and projects, among
others. Accordingly, all city and municipal governments are mandated to inventory all lands
and improvements within their respective locality and identify lands which may be utilized
for socialized housing and as resettlement sites for acquisition and disposition to qualified
beneficiaries. Section 10 thereof authorizes local government units to exercise the power
of eminent domain to carry out the objectives of the law, but subject to the conditions
stated therein and in Section 9.