RULE 130

Opinion Rule
Section 48. General rule. The opinion of witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the
following sections.

Section 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to posses, may be received in
evidence.

Section 50. Opinion witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person.

Character Evidence
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character
which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability
of the offense charged.

(b) In Civil Cases:

Evidence of the moral character of a party in civil case is admissible only when pertinent to
the issue of character involved in the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14

CASE # 1
CASE TITLE:
AUTHOR: Gabby
TOPIC:

G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING
CORPORATION, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly
proved. 1Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be
capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof. 2 The claimant is duty-bound to
point out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. 3 A
court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages 4 as well as hearsay 5 or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect. 6 Such are the
jurisprudential precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the instant petition.
The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned
by private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island
in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the
vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard Commandant
Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the
Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, 7 private respondent sued the LSC and
the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City,
paying thereto the docket fee of one thousand two hundred fifty-two pesos (P1,252.00) and the legal
research fee of two pesos (P2.00). 8 In particular, private respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00,
allegedly representing the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia

XV,with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's fees. Meanwhile, during the pendency of
the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as
it had already acquired ownership of the Petroparcel. 9
For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its complaint on the ground that the
original complaint failed to plead for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia
XV. 10 Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia
XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance payment of P200,000.00,
the amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The amended complaint also alleged that
inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the
hull of the vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there should be a reasonable determination
thereof. Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred
unrealized profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be proven. 11
Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include petitioner as a defendant 12 which the lower
court granted in its order of September 16,
1985. 13 After petitioner had filed its answer to the second amended complaint, on February 5, 1987, the
lower court issued a pre-trial order 14 containing, among other things, a stipulations of facts, to wit:
1. On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat "M/V MARIA EFIGENIA" owned by
plaintiff was navigating in the vicinity of Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas, on its way
to Navotas, Metro Manila, said fishing boat was hit by the LSCO tanker "Petroparcel"
causing the former to sink.
2. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an investigation of this marine accident and on
21 November 1978, the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, the Honorable
Simeon N. Alejandro, rendered a decision finding the cause of the accident to be the
reckless and imprudent manner in which Edgardo Doruelo navigated the LSCO
"Petroparcel" and declared the latter vessel at fault.
3. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO), executed in
favor of PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation a Deed of Transfer involving several
tankers, tugboats, barges and pumping stations, among which was the LSCO Petroparcel.
4. On the same date on 2 April 1979 (sic), defendant PNOC STC again entered into an
Agreement of Transfer with co-defendant Lusteveco whereby all the business properties
and other assets appertaining to the tanker and bulk oil departments including the motor
tanker LSCO Petroparcel of defendant Lusteveco were sold to PNOC STC.
5. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among others, that PNOC-STC assumes, without
qualifications, all obligations arising from and by virtue of all rights it obtained over the
LSCO "Petroparcel".
6. On 6 July 1979, another agreement between defendant LUSTEVECO and PNOC-STC
was executed wherein Board of Marine Inquiry Case No. 332 (involving the sea accident
of 21 September 1977) was specifically identified and assumed by the latter.

7. On 23 June 1979, the decision of Board of Marine Inquiry was affirmed by the Ministry
of National Defense, in its decision dismissing the appeal of Capt. Edgardo Doruelo and
Chief mate Anthony Estenzo of LSCO "Petroparcel".
8. LSCO "Petroparcel" is presently owned and operated by PNOC-STC and likewise Capt.
Edgardo Doruelo is still in their employ.
9. As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia caused by the reckless and imprudent
manner in which LSCO Petroparcel was navigated by defendant Doruelo, plaintiff
suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing nets, boat equipments (sic) and cargoes,
which went down with the ship when it sank the replacement value of which should be
left to the sound discretion of this Honorable Court.
After trial, the lower court 15 rendered on November 18, 1989 its decision disposing of Civil Case No. C9457 as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the
plaintiff:
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat
with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint at the rate of 6%
per annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
c. The costs of suit.
The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Likewise, the case against
defendant Edgardo Doruelo is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence presented by private respondent
consisting of the testimony of its general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario. Private
respondent's witness testified that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was owned by private respondent per Exhibit
A, a certificate of ownership issued by the Philippine Coast Guard showing that M/V Maria Efigenia
XV was a wooden motor boat constructed in 1965 with 128.23 gross tonnage. According to him, at the
time the vessel sank, it was then carrying 1,060 tubs (baeras) of assorted fish the value of which was
never recovered. Also lost with the vessel were two cummins engines (250 horsepower), radar,
pathometer and compass. He further added that with the loss of his flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of
fourteen (14) vessels, he was constrained to hire the services of counsel whom he paid P10,000 to handle
the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and P50,000.00 for commencing suit for damages in the lower
court.
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court took into account the following
pieces of documentary evidence that private respondent proffered during trial:

(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the certificate of ownership

of M/V Maria Efigenia XV;
(b) Exhibit B a document titled "Marine Protest" executed by Delfin
Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977 stating that as a result of the
collision, the M/V Maria Efigenia XVsustained a hole at its left side that
caused it to sink with its cargo of 1,050 baerasvalued at P170,000.00;
(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler
issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong Engineering and
Construction on January 26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that
construction of such trawler would cost P2,250,000.00;
(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV issued by E.D.
Daclan of Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20, 1987 to Del
Rosario showing that two (2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine model
N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would cost P1,160,000.00;
(e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc. on
January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that a unit of Furuno Compact
Daylight Radar, Model FR-604D, would cost P100,000.00 while a unit of
Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so
that the two units would cost P145,000.00;
(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. on
January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2) rolls of nylon rope
(5" cir. X 300fl.) would cost P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope (3"
cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1) binocular (7 x 50), P1,400.00, one (1)
compass (6"), P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or a total of
P197,150.00;
(g) Exhibit G retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F.
Sumulong Associates Law Offices stipulating an acceptance fee of
P5,000.00, per appearance fee of P400.00, monthly retainer of P500.00,
contingent fee of 20% of the total amount recovered and that attorney's
fee to be awarded by the court should be given to Del Rosario; and
(h) Exhibit H price quotation issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated April
10, 1987 to Del Rosario showing the cost of poly nettings as: 50 rolls of
400/18 3kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts.
100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 8kts. 100md x
100mtrs., P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md x 100mtrs.,
P146,500 and baera (tub) at P65.00 per piece or a total of P414,065.00.
The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the fishing boat and all its
equipment would regularly increase at 30% every year from the date the quotations were given.

On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator
at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not bother at all to offer any
documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations submitted by
private respondent were "excessive" and that as an expert witness, he used the quotations of his suppliers
in making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of prices from his suppliers, saying
that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his estimates as it was "a sort of secret scheme." For
this reason, the lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff relative to the replacement
value of the fishing boat and its equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00 which were lost
due to the recklessness and imprudence of the herein defendants were not rebutted by the
latter with sufficient evidence. The defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro
relied heavily on said witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said is excessive or
bloated, but they did not bother at all to present any documentary evidence to
substantiate such claim. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth
of the credible witness, but it must be credible in itself. (Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. Bus
Co., Inc. L-26810, August 31, 1970).
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the lower court's decision contending that:
(1) the lower court erred in holding it liable for damages; that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case by paying only P1,252.00 as docket fee; (2) assuming that plaintiff was entitled to damages,
the lower court erred in awarding an amount greater than that prayed for in the second amended
complaint; and (3) the lower court erred when it failed to resolve the issues it had raised in its
memorandum. 16 Petitioner likewise filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration expounding on
whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case despite therein plaintiff's
failure to pay the prescribed docket fee. 17
On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined reconsideration for lack of merit. 18 Apparently not having
received the order denying its motion for reconsideration, petitioner still filed a motion for leave to file a
reply to private respondent's opposition to said motion. 19 Hence, on February 12, 1990, the lower court
denied said motion for leave to file a reply on the ground that by the issuance of the order of January 25,
1990, said motion had become moot and academic. 20
Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which,
however, affirmed the same in toto on October 14, 1992. 21 On petitioner's assertion that the award of
P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals
ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of the lost
vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment
installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel. Considering the documentary evidence presented as in the
nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, the Court of Appeals
held, thus:
Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the
admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence, the reception of these
documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of the
trial court. In fact, where the lower court is confronted with evidence which appears to be
of doubtful admissibility, the judge should declare in favor of admissibility rather than of
non-admissibility (The Collector of Palakadhari, 124 [1899], p. 13, cited in Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court, Evidence, Volume VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p. 18). Trial courts

are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement of the rules of evidence which crystallized
through constant use and practice and are very useful and effective aids in the search for
truth and for the effective administration of justice. But in connection with evidence
which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or admissibility, it is the
safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that
their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are thereafter
found relevant or competent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding or ignoring
them. (Banaria vs. Banaria, et al., C.A. No. 4142, May 31, 1950; cited in Francisco, Supra).
[Emphasis supplied].
Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily rebutted by
appellant's own sole witness in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate court found that petitioner
ironically situated itself in an "inconsistent posture by the fact that its own witness, admittedly an expert
one, heavily relies on the very same pieces of evidence (price quotations) appellant has so vigorously
objected to as inadmissible evidence." Hence, it concluded:
. . . The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at the trial on the basis of
appellee's documentary exhibits (price quotations) which stood uncontroverted, and
which already included the amount by way of adjustment as prayed for in the amended
complaint. There was therefore no need for appellee to amend the second amended
complaint in so far as to the claim for damages is concerned to conform with the evidence
presented at the trial. The amount of P6,438,048.00 awarded is clearly within the relief
prayed for in appellee's second amended complaint.
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court held that following the ruling in Sun Insurance
Ltd. v. Asuncion, 22 the additional docket fee that may later on be declared as still owing the court may be
enforced as a lien on the judgment.
Hence, the instant recourse.
In assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner posits the view that the award of P6,438,048 as
actual damages should have been in light of these considerations, namely: (1) the trial court did not base
such award on the actual value of the vessel and its equipment at the time of loss in 1977; (2) there was no
evidence on extraordinary inflation that would warrant an adjustment of the replacement cost of the lost
vessel, equipment and cargo; (3) the value of the lost cargo and the prices quoted in respondent's
documentary evidence only amount to P4,336,215.00; (4) private respondent's failure to adduce evidence
to support its claim for unrealized profit and business opportunities; and (5) private respondent's failure
to prove the extent and actual value of damages sustained as a result of the 1977 collision of the vessels. 23
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction
of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are
designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose
a penalty. 24 In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. 25 There are two kinds of actual or compensatory
damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure
to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). 26 Thus:

Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to
their value at the time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would
have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case
damages for the loss of use during the period before replacement. In other words, in the
case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its
owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the
case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and pending engagements, . . .
. . . . If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is in any case virtually certain of
profitable employment, then nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters
actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice over. On
the other hand, if the ship is valued without reference to its actual future engagements
and only in the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to
the value thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other engagement which it
was unable to fulfill. What the court has to ascertain in each case is the "capitalised value
of the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract but in view of the actual
circumstances," without, of course, taking into account considerations which were too
remote at the time of the loss. 27 [Emphasis supplied].
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is
required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence available. 28 The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if
no evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence
which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. 29 In other
words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that
could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. 30
In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of private respondent's general
manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. Except for Exhibit B where the value of the
1,050 baeras of fish were pegged at their September 1977 value when the collision happened, the pieces
of documentary evidence proffered by private respondent with respect to items and equipment lost show
similar items and equipment with corresponding prices in early 1987 or approximately ten (10) years after
the collision. Noticeably, petitioner did not object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation
of the lost goods and equipment. In objecting to the same pieces of evidence, petitioner commented that
these were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on
the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof. 31 Clearly ignoring
petitioner's objections to the exhibits, the lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them
due weight to arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosario's testimony. Private respondent did
not present any other witnesses especially those whose signatures appear in the price quotations that
became the bases of the award. We hold, however, that the price quotations are ordinary private writings
which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered along with the testimony of the
authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings even
though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price
quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to
those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge.

For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount of
P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion,
it should be supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was the owner of private
respondent corporation 32 whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its
equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest therein. We agree with the Court
of Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be
given credence 33 considering his familiarity thereto. However, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that
his valuation of such equipment, cargo and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. 34We must,
therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del Rosario's claim as regards the
amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the
persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. 35 Any evidence, whether oral or documentary,
is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the
knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to
the hearsay evidence rule. 36 On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the
exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130. 37
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to "commercial lists and the like" under
Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals considered
private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It added, however, that these exhibits should be
admitted in evidence "until such time as the Supreme Court categorically rules on the admissibility or
inadmissibility of this class of evidence" because "the reception of these documentary exhibits (price
quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of the trial court." 38 Reference to Section 45, Rule
130, however, would show that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on the matter was arbitrarily
arrived at. This rule states:
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons
engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if
that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is
generally used and relied upon by them there.
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters
of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register,
periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons
engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same
occupation.
Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H 39 are not
"commercial lists" for these do not belong to the category of "other published compilations" under Section
45 aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "(w)here general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned." 40 The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued
personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the ones lost at the
collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on
the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market reports or quotations" within the purview of

"commercial lists" as these are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday
professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation." 41 These are simply letters responding to
the queries of Del Rosario. Thus, take for example Exhibit D which reads:
January 20, 1987
PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV
MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION
Navotas, Metro Manila
Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO
Gentlemen:
In accordance to your request, we are pleated to quote our Cummins Marine Engine, to
wit.
Two (2) units CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M,
195 bhp. at 1800 rpm., 6-cylinder in-line, 4-stroke cycle,
natural aspirated, 5 1/2 in. x 6 in. bore and stroke, 855
cu. In. displacement, keel-cooled, electric starting
coupled with Twin-Disc Marine gearbox model MG-509,
4.5:1 reduction ratio, includes oil cooler, companion
flange, manual and standard accessories as per attached
sheet.
Price FOB Manila P580,000.00/unit
Total FOB Manila P1,160,000.00
TERMS : CASH
DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of order.
VALIDITY : Subject to our final confirmation.
WARRANTY : One (1) full year against factory defect.
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To be sure, letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are, however, subject to the general
principles of evidence and to various rules relating to documentary evidence. 42 Hence, in one case, it was
held that a letter from an automobile dealer offering an allowance for an automobile upon purchase of a
new automobile after repairs had been completed, was not a "price current" or "commercial list" within
the statute which made such items presumptive evidence of the value of the article specified therein. The
letter was not admissible in evidence as a "commercial list" even though the clerk of the dealer testified
that he had written the letter in due course of business upon instructions of the dealer. 43
But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the admissibility of those letters or
communications when it held that unless "plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent," evidence should
better be admitted rather than rejected on "doubtful or technical grounds," 44 the same pieces of evidence,
however, should not have been given probative weight. This is a distinction we wish to point out.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
considered at all. 45 On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or
not it proves an issue. 46 Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary
weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should
be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the
contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its
contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.
Thus:
The courts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay evidence admitted without
objection. Some hold that when hearsay has been admitted without objection, the same
may be considered as any other properly admitted testimony. Others maintain that it is
entitled to no more consideration than if it had been excluded.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one. Our Supreme Court held that
although the question of admissibility of evidence can not be raised for the first time on
appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has no probative value and should be disregarded
whether objected to or not. "If no objection is made" quoting Jones on Evidence "it
(hearsay) becomes evidence by reason of the want of such objection even though its
admission does not confer upon it any new attribute in point of weight. Its nature and
quality remain the same, so far as its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to satisfy the
mind are concerned, and as opposed to direct primary evidence, the latter always
prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence,
like hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rules of res inter alios acta, or his
failure to ask for the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative
value. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value. 47
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. 48

Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally deprives private
respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court
of Appeals, 49 the Court said:
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is
"entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered."
[Emphasis supplied].
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or in every case where property right has been
invaded. 50 Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude
further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or
their respective heirs and assigns."
Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are
not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical
injury. 51However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate
to the injury sustained by private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such
damages. 52 The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may also depend on certain special reasons
extant in the case. 53
Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact that petitioner's
vessel Petroparcelwas at fault as well as private respondent's complaint claiming the amount of
P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria
Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that the vessel had an actual value of
P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed
only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total
value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that such payment is
causally related to the loss for which it claimed compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in
the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal
damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. 54 Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.
With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the amended
complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private respondent paid the docket fee
corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its
increased claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed
the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v.
Asuncion, 55 the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though private
respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint.
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground
of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended
complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court after it had
received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 56 participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority

in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the court's
jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16,
1985, 57 petitioner did not question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was only on December 29,
1989 58 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the
question of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of
jurisdiction by its own inaction.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No.
26680 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED
insofar as it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the
amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1)
technically petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and properly proved,
and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) 59 in favor of private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.

CASE # 2
CASE TITLE:
AUTHOR: Gabby
TOPIC:

EDWIN TABAO y PEREZ,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 187246

Present:

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION,
PERALTA,** and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 20, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:

Edwin Tabao (petitioner) seeks reconsideration of our Resolution, dated June 8, 2009, denying
his petition for review on certiorari for failure to show any reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals
(CA) decision to warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and for raising
substantially factual issues.

The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts:

At around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, the petitioner was driving his Toyota Corolla car
bearing plate number PCH-111 along Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street towards Nagtahan when it
suddenly ramped on an island divider, bumping Rochelle Lanete who was crossing the street. As a result
of the impact, Rochelle was thrown into the middle of the road on her back.[1]Thereafter, Leonardo Mendez
speeding blue Toyota Corona car with plate number PES-764 ran over Rochelles body. Bystanders armed
with stones and wooden clubs followed Mendez car until it stopped near the Nagtahan Flyover.
[2]
Francisco Cielo, a newspaper delivery boy, pleaded with the bystanders not to hurt Mendez. Cielo went
inside Mendez car, sat beside him, got his drivers license, and ordered him to move the car backwards.
Mendez followed his order, but his car hit the center island twice while backing up. [3] Cielo went out of the
car and approached the sprawled body of Rochelle; he and the petitioner brought Rochelles body inside
Mendez car. The three of them (the petitioner, Cielo and Mendez) brought Rochelle to the UST Hospital,
[4]
where she died on February 6, 1993 due to septicemia secondary to traumatic injuries.[5]
The defense presented a different version of the incident.
The petitioner narrated that at around 10:00 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he was driving along
Governor Forbes corner G. Tuazon Street when his car ramped on an island at the foot of the Nagtahan
Flyover. He tried to move the car backwards, but failed to do so. He alighted from his car and then saw
that its two rear wheels had been elevated. [6] He returned inside his car to turn off its engine; he then
noticed that many people were approaching his car.[7] He again alighted from his vehicle and saw a person
lying on the road.[8] He looked at his left side and saw a car that was running fast like a wind pass by. He
approached the person lying on the road, and noticed that she was still breathing and moaning.
Afterwards, he saw Mendez car backing up; he carried the victim towards that car. [9] Thereafter, he,
Mendez and Cielo brought the victim to the UST Hospital.[10]
Mendez, for his part, testified that at around 9:00 to 9:30 p.m. of January 21, 1993, he left his
girlfriends house in Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As he was driving along Governor Forbes corner G.
Tuazon Street on his way home, he saw a vehicle that had ramped on an island divider. Suddenly, another
vehicle overtook his car from the right and cut his lane. He slowed down his car when he saw a rug-like
object fall from the car that overtook him, [11] and stopped when he realized that what had fallen was a
persons body. When he moved his car backwards to help this person, many people approached his car. He
alighted from his car and inquired from them what had happened. The people replied that someone was
run over; some of them pointed to him as the culprit. He denied having run over the victim when they
tried to hurt him. The petitioner carried the victim and placed her inside Mendez car. Thereafter, the two
of them brought the victim to the UST Hospital.[12]
The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and thereafter charged the petitioner and
Mendez with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
39, Manila.[13] The RTC, in its decision[14] dated September 15, 2003, found that it was very clear that both
accused are responsible for the death of Rochelle Lanete, [15] and convicted the two (2) accused of the crime
charged. It found that the petitioners car first hit the victim, causing her to be thrown into the road on her
back, and that Mendez car ran over her as she was lying down. It held that the two failed to observe the
necessary precaution and due care in operating their respective vehicles, to wit: the petitioner was not
attentive to his driving such that he failed to see the island divider and bumped Rochelle; Mendez was
driving his car too fast at nighttime such that he was unable to avoid running over her as her body lay
prone on the street. The RTC sentenced them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four months and one
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 10 months and 20 days of prision correccional, as
maximum. It also ordered them to pay the heirs of the victim the following amounts: (a) P478,434.12 as
actual damages; (b) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages.[16]
The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 28401. The CA, in its
decision[17] dated July 27, 2007, agreed with the factual findings of the RTC, and affirmed its decision with
the modification that the petitioner be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four months and

one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years, nine months and 10 days of prision correccional, as
maximum.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution [18] of
March 17, 2009.
The petitioner filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the courts a
quo erred in convicting him of the crime charged. As earlier stated, we denied this petition for failure to
show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision to warrant the exercise of our discretionary appellate
jurisdiction, and for raising substantially factual issues.
The petitioner now comes to us via the present motion for reconsideration, raising the following
arguments:
I.

THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ARE HIGHLY SPECULATIVE, MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE [ON RECORD;]

II.

[THE] COURT OF APPEALS [ERRED IN UPHOLDING HIS] CONVICTION

[ON THE BASIS OF THE] INCREDIBLE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY OF x
x x VICTOR SORIANO[; and]

III.

THE [SUPREME] COURT DISREGARDED

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.[19]

[HIS

CONSTITUTIONAL]

In its Comment, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays
that the motion be denied for being pro forma; the petitioner merely advanced the same arguments which
he raised in his appellants brief and motion for reconsideration before the CA.
After due consideration, we resolve to DENY the motion.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive upon this Court; we will not normally disturb these factual findings unless they are
palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[20] After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to overturn the lower
courts factual findings that found the petitioner guilty of the crime charged.
Reckless imprudence, generally defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place. Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the
necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen.[21] Thus, in order for conviction to be
decreed for reckless imprudence, the material damage suffered by the victim, the failure in precaution on the
part of the accused, and the direct link between material damage and failure in precaution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt. We are morally convinced that all three were established in this case
in accordance with the required level of evidence in criminal cases.
The petitioner was positively identified by an
eyewitness
The fact of Rochelle Lanetes death was stipulated during pre-trial, as well as duly established during trial.
[22]
What remain to be proven beyond reasonable doubt are the inexcusable lack in precaution on the part
of the petitioner and the direct link of his negligence to the victims death.

An eyewitness account established that the petitioners vehicle actually hit Rochelle Lanete.
Eyewitness identification is vital evidence, and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the
prosecution.[23] One of the prosecution witnesses, Victor Soriano, unfortunately for the petitioners cause,
saw the incident in its entirety; Victor thus provided direct evidence as eyewitness to the very act of the
commission of the crime.[24] In his September 1, 1994 testimony, Victor positively identified the
petitioner as the person who drove the car that ramped on an island divider along Governor Forbes
corner G. Tuazon Street, and hit Rochelle. To directly quote from the records:

ATTY. ALICIA SERRANO:

Q: Mr. Soriano, do you remember where were you on or about 10:00 oclock (sic) of
January 21, 1993?
VICTOR SORIANO:
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Where were you?
A: I was at the corner of Governor Forbes and G. Tuazon.
Q: What were you doing at the corner of Governor Forbes and G. Tuazon at that time?
A: My sidecar was parked there because I was waiting for my wife, maam.
Q: And when you were there at the corner of G. Tuazon and Governor Forbes at the said
time and place, was there any unusual incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was that unusual incident?
A: I saw an accident involving a speeding car which ramped over the island
and bumped a woman who was crossing the street.
Q: When you saw that the car ramped over the island and hit and bumped a
woman, what happened to the woman that was hit and bumped by the
car which you said ramped over the island?
A: The woman was thrown at the middle of the road on her back, maam.
Q: When you saw this woman after being hit and bumped by the car that
ramped over the island and was thrown at the middle of the road,
what else happened?
xxxx
A: The woman was no longer moving at that time when I saw another car coming.
xxxx
Q: What else happened when you saw the car coming very fast?
A: The woman sprawled at the middle of the road was ran over by the speeding car and
that car stopped while going up to the flyover.
xxxx
Q: You said you saw a car that ramped over the island and that the car that
ramped over the island was the car that hit and bumped the victim
that was thrown at the middle of the street. Now, will you be able to
identify before this court the driver of that car that ramped over the
island and hit and bumped the victim?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If that driver of the car that hit and bumped the victim is inside the
courtroom, would you be able to point to him before this Honorable
Court?
A: Yes, maam, he is here.

Q: Will you kindly point before this courtroom who is that driver of the car that hit and
bumped the victim? Although, Your Honor, there was already a stipulation at the
start of the pre-trial admitting that the accused Tabao is the driver of the car
which ramped at the divider.
INTERPRETER:
Witness approaching a man seated inside the courtroom and who stood up
and identified as Edwin Tabao, the accused in this case. [25] [emphases
ours]
On cross-examination, Victor further elaborated on what he saw of the incident:
ATTY. ESTEBAN NANCHO:
Q: Mr. Soriano, you said that the first car ramped over the island and bumped a woman,
and as a result of that, the woman was thrown at the middle of Forbes Street. Do
you confirm that?
VICTOR SORIANO:
A: Yes, sir, that is true.
Q: And can you tell us how the woman was hit, was bumped by the car that ramped over
the island?
A: The woman was crossing the street and when she saw the on-coming car, she tried to
avoid that but the car [which] ramped over the island bumped the woman.

Q: In other words, the car first ramped over the island before it hit the woman?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What part of the car bumped the woman?
A: The bumper of the car, the left side of the bumper.
Q: What part of the body of the victim was hit by the car?
A: Her left side of the body.
Q: Are you saying that the victim was facing the car when the car bumped her.
A: Yes, sir, she was facing the car. She was about to avoid that car.
Q: How was the woman thrown at the middle of Forbes Street?
A: She was thrown backwards.
Q: And what part of the body of the victim first hit the pavement?
A: The back of her head.
xxxx
Q: And you said after the woman was thrown at the middle of the street[,] another
speeding car ran over the body of the woman?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Now, from the time the body of the victim was thrown at the middle of the street, how
much time had lapsed when the second car ran over the body of the victim?
A: Not more than one minute. When I saw the car, it was a little bit far then I saw the car
running very fast. It did not take more than a minute.
xxxx
Q: Now, did you point at any person gathered at the scene of the accident that it were (sic)
the 2 accused who were responsible for the accident?
A: I told Cielo about that and I told him that whoever brought the victim to the hospital is
the one who ran over the victim.[26]
The petitioner nonetheless claims that Victor is not a credible witness due to inconsistencies between his
affidavit and court testimony. He harps on the fact that Victor declared in his affidavit that the petitioners
car first hit Rochelle before it ramped on an island divider; while he testified in court that the petitioners
vehicle ramped on the island divider before hitting the victim.
We find these arguments unmeritorious.
Discrepancies and/or inconsistencies between a witness affidavit and testimony in open court do
not impair credibility as affidavits are taken ex parte and are often incomplete or inaccurate for lack or
absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. [27] At any rate, Victor was able to sufficiently
explain the discrepancies between his affidavit and court statements. Victor reasoned out that the
secretary who typed his affidavit made a mistake; and explained that he signed the affidavit despite the
inaccuracies in paragraph 2 because the secretary told him, kasi ho magugulo ang naimakinilya na.
[28]
Accordingly, when Victor informed his lawyer during the first day of the hearing about the inaccuracy,
the latter told him to state the truth regardless of what was written in his affidavit.

The general rule that contradictions and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness and his
statements in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him is not without exception, as when the omission
in the affidavit refers to a very important detail of the incident that one relating the incident as an
eyewitness would not be expected to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn statement
substantially contradicts the testimony in court.[29] In the present case, we see no substantial contradiction
in Victors affidavit and in his court statements as he declared in both that he saw the petitioners car ramp
on the island divider and bump Rochelle. As to whether the car ramped on the center island before or
after it bumped the victim does not detract from the fundamental fact that Victor saw and identified
the petitioner as the driver of the car that ramped on the island divider and hit Rochelle. As
earlier discussed, Victor sufficiently explained this inconsistency during the trial.
Victor, who stood only seven meters from the incident, clearly and in a straightforward manner
described how the petitioners car had bumped the victim. We thus see no reason to overturn the lower
courts finding regarding Victors credibility, more so since the petitioner did not impute any ill motive
that could have induced Victor to testify falsely. The fundamental and settled rule is that the trial court's
assessment regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal, especially when the assessment is affirmed by the CA.
The positive identification in this case, coupled with the failure of the defense to impute any illmotive on the eyewitness, to our mind, works to dispel reasonable doubt on the fact that thepetitioners
car had in fact hit Rochelle. The eyewitness account provides the necessary link between the petitioners
failure to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle and Rochelle Lanetes death.
The petitioner failed to exercise precaution in
operating his vehicle
The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation to other motorists is mutual,
coordinate and reciprocal.[30] He is bound to anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the
street or highway are equal to his own.[31] Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or
property, it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution
under the circumstances for the safety of others as well as for his own.[32]
The petitioner repeatedly admitted that as he drove his vehicle on his way home from work on
January 21, 1993, he did not notice the island divider at the foot of the Nagtahan Flyover. As a
result, his car ramped on the island so that both its rear wheels became elevated from the road and he
could no longer maneuver the vehicle. [33] The petitioner even testified that his car had to be towed.
[34]
Later, during cross-examination, he admitted that all four wheels of his car, not just the two rear
wheels mentioned in his earlier testimony, lost contact with the ground. [35] The entirevehicle, therefore,
ended up on top of the island divider. He puts the blame for the ramping and, essentially, his failure to
notice the island on the darkness of nighttime and the alleged newness of the island.[36]
To our mind, the fact that the petitioners entire vehicle ended up ramped on the island divider strongly
indicates what actually happened in the unfortunate incident. The vehicle could not have ended up in that
condition had the petitioner been driving at a reasonable speed. We are not persuaded by the petitioners
rather simplistic account that mere darkness, coupled with the traffic islands alleged newness, caused his
car to veer off the traffic trajectory of Governor Forbes Street and to end up jumping on top of the traffic
island intended to channel vehicular traffic going to the Nagtahan Flyover.
A motorist is expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate
with all the conditions encountered, [37] to enable him to keep the vehicle under control and,
whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.[38] It
has not escaped our notice that the intersection of Governor Forbes Street and G. Tuazon Street is
adjacent to the vicinity of the incident. A driver approaching an intersection is generally under duty,
among others, to keep and maintain his vehicle under control so he can, if needed, stop at the shortest

possible notice.[39] Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an intersection would
naturally require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway. [40]
The fact that the petitioner was driving near the Governor Forbes Street and G. Tuazon Street intersection
gives rise to the expectation that he would drive at a speed that anticipated or would have anticipated that
other persons are on the road, whether as pedestrians or as motorists. The facts show, however, that the
petitioner was driving his car at an inappropriate speed for a vehicle crossing an intersection. Otherwise,
he should have been able to put his vehicle to a complete stop or, at the very least, at a speed that would
have prevented his car from climbing entirely on top of the island divider. That the
petitioners entire vehicle landed on top of the traffic island body, chassis, four wheels and all sufficiently
indicates his speed at that time. The force that propels an entire car off the street and on top of a traffic
island could only have been inordinate speed, or at least speed beyond that of a motorist coming from or
going to an intersection. In short, the ramping of his vehicle demonstrably indicates to us that the
petitioner failed to observe the duty to maintain a reasonable speed. We therefore believe Victors
testimony that the petitioner was speeding when he bumped the victim.[41]
We are likewise not persuaded by the petitioners claim that darkness and the traffic islands alleged
newness justify his failure to notice the island. The petitioners admission that he did not notice the traffic
island is in itself an indication of his failure to observe the vigilance demanded by the circumstances.
Ultimately, it shows the criminal recklessness for which he has been convicted. The record shows that
pedestrians were present in the vicinity at the time of the incident. The CA even pointed out that the
vicinity is near residential areas, while we pointed out its proximity to an intersection. The darkness and
these circumstances should have caused the petitioner to be more alert and more vigilant, to say nothing
of slowing his car down. Newly constructed or not, the island divider should have received the petitioners
due attention. His bare allegation that the island lacked markers or reflectorized marks is likewise not
persuasive. As the trial court correctly observed, many other vehicles passed the same road that night but
only the petitioner failed to notice the island divider. [42] We thus find the trial court to be correct when it
held that the petitioner failed to exercise precaution in operating his vehicle on the night of the incident.
The location of the victims injuries vis--vis
the position of the petitioners vehicle
The petitioner insists that his car could not have bumped the victim because his car was coming
from the right side (i.e., from Espaa), while the victim was hit on the left side of her body. He argues that if
the victim was on her way to her house on Mabini Street coming from the corner of Governor Forbes
Street and G. Tuazon Street (where she alighted), then the responsible vehicle could only have come from
the left (i.e., from Nagtahan) as only those vehicles coming from this direction could hit the victim on the
left side of her body. He further claims that his car had no dents or scratches.
The petitioners arguments are misleading.
Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., the attending physician, testified that the victim suffered multiple injuries
compatible and consistent with a vehicular accident. [43] He did not state that the injuries suffered by the
victim were only on her left side. In fact, a perusal of Dr. Altezas initial medical report shows that the
victim suffered injuries both on the left and right sides of her body. In addition, Dr. Floresto
Arizala, Jr., the National Bureau of Investigation medico-legal officer who conducted an autopsy on
Rochelles body, confirmed that the victim suffered injuries on various parts of her lower right and left
extremities as a result of the initial or primary impact.
The petitioner relies heavily on Dr. Altezas statement allegedly declaring that the victims injuries
on her lower left leg and left thigh were the primary impact injuries. However, this statement was not
based on the actual incident but on Dr. Altezas presumptions. For clarity, we reproduce Dr. Altezas
testimony:
ATTY. SERRANO:

Q: Now doctor, you said that these injuries you found x x x on the body of the victim are
compatible and consistent with a vehicular accident. Would you tell this court
how these injuries were sustained?
xxxx
Doctor, what would be the possible situation when you use compatible and consistent
vehicular accident?
DR. ALTEZA:
A: If I would be allowed to make some presumptions, if the patient was standing
up at that time he was hit by a vehicle, I would presume that the primary
impact injuries, injuries hit first by the vehicle are the injuries of the
lower leg and the left thigh considering that the height of the injuries are
approximately the height of the bumper as well as the hood of the car.
Q: There are several kinds of vehicles, doctor?
A: Yes, Your Honor, I was thinking of a car. Now, after being hit by [a] car, under normal
condition, the victim is normally thrown at the surface of the street. [44] [emphases
ours]
From this exchange, we find it clear that Dr. Alteza was merely making a hypothetical statement
that a person who is presumed to be standing when hit by a vehicle would suffer primary impact injuries on
his lower leg and left thigh. He never declared that Rochelle suffered primary impact injuries on her lower
left extremities. At any rate, it was not improbable for the victim to have been hit on the left side of her body as
Victor testified that she (victim) tried to avoid the petitioners car, and was in fact facing the car when she
was hit.
We likewise do not believe the petitioners claim that his vehicle was not involved in the incident
due to the absence of dents or scratches. As the petitioner himself admitted, his vehicle was not subjected
to any investigation after the incident. Moreover, the pictures of the car, presented by the petitioner in
court, were taken long after the incident and after a repair had already been done to the vehicle. There was
therefore no way of verifying petitioners claim that his car did not have any dent or scratch after the
incident. At any rate, the absence of a dent or a scratch on the petitioners car, assuming it to be true, does
not conclusively prove his non-participation in the incident. The absence of any dent or scratch is
influenced by several factors: the type of paint, the speed of the car, the points of impact, and the material
used on the cars exteriors.
Weight of expert testimony
The petitioner likewise claims that the CA violated Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court when it disregarded the testimony of defense witness Police Senior Inspector Danilo Cornelio who
testified that the petitioners car could not have bumped the victim because the latters body was not
thrown in line with the car, but on its side. The petitioner argues that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio is highly
qualified in the field of traffic accident investigation, and as such, his statements are backed-up by [the]
principles of applied physics, engineering, and mathematics.[45]
The petitioners arguments fail to convince us.
Section 49, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court states that the opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training, which he is shown to possess, maybe received in
evidence. The use of the word may signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and
not mandatory on the part of the courts. Allowing the testimony does not mean, too, that courts are bound
by the testimony of the expert witness. The testimony of an expert witness must be construed to have been

presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination
of the issue before it, and is for the court to adopt or not to adopt depending on its appreciation of the
attendant facts and the applicable law. It has been held of expert testimonies:
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever
weight they may choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case.
The relative weight and sufficiency ofexpert testimony is peculiarly within the province of
the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions
upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact
that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the
matters about which he testifies, and any other matters which deserve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered
by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect. The problem
of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of
abuse of discretion.[46]
We emphasize that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio was not an eyewitness to the incident; his testimony was
merely based on the Traffic Accident Report prepared by SPO4 Edgar Reyes who himself did not witness
the incident. At any rate, nowhere in P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios testimony did he conclusively state that the
petitioner could not have been involved in the incident. For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of
P/Sr. Insp. Cornelios testimony:
ATTY. SERRANO:
Q: When you said in line with the motor vehicle that bumped the victim, is it that when a
victim is bumped by the motor vehicle, the victim would be thrown in line with
the vehicle?
P/SR. INSP. CORNELIO:
A: Yes, Maam. Usually, that is the outcome of the incident.
Q: He cannot be thrown sideward?
A: Maybe if another vehicle would hit the pedestrian because that also happened. When a
pedestrian is hit by a vehicle and another vehicle hit the pedestrian, it will be
thrown somewhere else.
Q: Mr. Witness, you are testifying as far as the vehicle of Tabao is concerned. You said that
the line of vehicle that bumped the victim would be in line. Are you telling us that
it is not possible that when the vehicle of Tabao hit the victim, the victim would
be thrown sidewards?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What do you mean, yes, Maam?
A: He can be thrown either in front of the vehicle that hit the victim or slightly offset with
the car of Tabao. It [may be] but not far from the side.
Q: But he would be thrown sidewise[,] not frontal?
A: Slightly to the side but not considerable length of distance away from the car. It is
sidewards.

Q: In your Mathematics, do you consider that if a vehicle is speeding fast, he could have
thrown anything that is bumped by that vehicle far away from the vehicle?
A: Yes, Maam, possible.
Q: So, that probability is also possible aside from the probability that you
said the victim is thrown in line or in front. So, you are now saying it
could be said that the victim can be thrown sidewise?
A: It [may be] thrown sidewise. As I said [a while] ago, it might be slightly
offset with the vehicle that hit the pedestrian but not too far from the
side of the bumping vehicle.

Q: So, it could depend on the speed of the vehicle that bumped the object bumped?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Whether it is forward or sidewise, the distance of the object thrown would
depend on the speed of the vehicle that bumped?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: So, if it is speeding, it could be thrown farther?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Sidewise or frontal?
A: It should be frontal.
Q: You said it could be thrown sidewise do I take it correct[ly,] it can be
thrown sidewise also?
A: Maybe. As I have said [a while] ago, it [may be] slightly offset with the line
of the vehicle.
xxxx
Q: So, do we take it from you that your basis only of telling the court that Tabao is not in
[any way] responsible is the distance of the victim from the car that bumped?
A: I am not saying categorically that the car of Tabao is not responsible. But as
I can see in the sketch presented today in this Honorable Court, the position of
the victim is too far from the vehicle of Mr. Tabao. If I were the investigator in
this particular case, I should indicate the measurement of the victim from the car
and this sketch [does] not indicate the distance.
Q: Now, failure of the investigator to indicate the distance, would that show that it was not
Tabao who bumped the victim?
A: I cannot say categorically that the car of Tabao indeed, hit the victim. Because the
distance is very significant in this sketch for proper evaluation.
xxxx
Q: So, it cannot be said that when an object is bumped by a vehicle, it will be
thrown forward. It will all depend on which portion of the bumper hit
by object bumped?
A: Yes, Maam.[47]
From the foregoing, it is clear that P/Sr. Insp. Cornelio did not discount the possibility that the
victim could have been thrown on the side. He likewise admitted that the location of an accident victim in
relation to the vehicle would also depend on the speed of the vehicle and the point of impact.
The defense of denial
The petitioner denied that his car had bumped the victim, and insists that he just saw the victims
body sprawled on the road after his car had already ramped on the island divider.
The petitioners defense of denial must crumble in light of Victors positive and specific testimony. We
reiterate that the petitioner, aside from merely alleging the inconsistency between Victors affidavit and
court testimony, did not impute any ill motive on Victors part to falsely testify against him. The petitioner,
in fact, admitted that he and Victor did not know each other prior to the incident. We have consistently
held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent, and without any showing of
ill-motive on the part of the testifying eyewitness, should prevail over the denial of the accused whose
testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. [48] A denial is negative evidence. To be

believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, the denial is purely selfserving and has no evidentiary value.[49]
We significantly note that the petitioner claimed for the first time in his present petition that he
saw a rug-like thing[50] being thrown out of a passing car as he was about to alight from his car after
turning off its engine; he later discovered that the thing thrown was a persons body. He reiterated this
claim in his motion for reconsideration before this Court. This assertion was a clear rip-off from his coaccused Mendez version who likewise claimed to have seen the same thing. To our mind, the modification
of the petitioners story was a belated attempt to cover up his failure to convincingly explain the presence
of the victims slumped body on the road near his car and a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself. Nowhere
in his affidavit or earlier court testimonies, or even in his previous pleadings with the lower courts, did he
ever state that a passing car had thrown a rug-like thing [51] on the street. The petitioners sudden change of
story at this stage of the proceedings casts doubt on the veracity of his claim.
In addition, we are baffled by the petitioners act of frequenting the hospital after the incident.
Amanda Ycong, the victims aunt, testified that she saw the petitioner several times at the hospital when
the victim was confined there; but would immediately leave whenever he saw members of the victims
family. We find it highly unusual for a person who allegedly had no participation in the incident to be
overly concerned with the victims well-being. What puzzles us even more is why the petitioner would
evade members of the victims family whenever he was seen by them at the hospital.
All told, we see no reason to overturn the lower courts findings of fact and conclusions of law
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to DENY the motion with FINALITY,
no substantial argument having been adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought. Costs against the
petitioner.

CASE # 3
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE v. LEE
AUTHOR: Gabby
TOPIC:

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of murder ( with treachery and evident
premeditation, shoot one JOSEPH MARQUEZ y LAGANDI). Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.

Prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a) Herminia Marquez, the mother of the victim; (b) Dr.
Darwin Corpuz, a resident doctor at the Manila Caloocan University (MCU) Hospital; (c) PO2 Rodelio
Ortiz, a police officer who examined the crime scene; and (d) Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, a medico-legal officer
of the PNP Crime Laboratory.

The prosecution established the following facts:

At 9:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, Herminia Marquez, 46 years of age and her son, Joseph, 26
years of age, were in the living room of their house located at No. 173 General Evangelista St., Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. The living room was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent lamp in the ceiling.
Outside their house was an alley leading to General Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling
with people and activity. There were women sewing garments on one side and on the other was a store
catering to customers. In their living room, mother and son were watching a basketball game on
television. Herminia was seated on an armchair and the television set was to her left. Across her, Joseph
sat on a sofa against the wall and window of their house and the television was to his right. Herminia
looked away from the game and casually glanced at her son. To her complete surprise, she saw a hand
holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up and saw accused-appellant
Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him,
Joseph turned his body towards the window, and simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting Josephs
head. Joseph slumped on the sofa. Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant fired a
second shot at Joseph and three (3) shots more two hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no
more shots were fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a blue sando, flee
towards the direction of his house. Herminia turned to her son, dragged his body to the door and shouted
for help. With the aid of her neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital
where he later died.
Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired about the shooting incident. Herminia told
them that her son was shot by Noel Lee. From the hospital, Herminia went to the St. Martin Funeral
Homes where Josephs body was brought. Thereafter, she proceeded to the Caloocan City Police
Headquarters where she gave her sworn statement about the shooting.[2]
Upon request of the Caloocan City police, a post-mortem examination was made on Josephs body.
Dr. Rosaline O. Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service made the following
findings:
FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity at the dependent
portions of the body. Conjunctiva are pale, Lips and nailbeds are cyanotic. A needle puncture mark was
noted at the dorsum of the right hand.
HEAD:
(1) Gunshot wound, frontal region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm, just right of the anterior midline, 161 cm from
heel, with an upbraded collar, measuring 0.2 cm superiorly and laterally, 0.1 cm medially and inferiorly
directed posteriorwards, downwards and to the left fracturing the frontal bone, lacerating the brain. A
deformed slug was recovered embedded at the left cerebral hemisphere of the brain.
(2) Gunshot wound, occipital region, measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm, 2 cm left of the posterior midline, 162 cm
from heel, with a uniform 0.2 cm upbraded collar, directed slightly anteriorwards, downwards and
lateralwards, fracturing the occipital bone and lacerating the brain. A deformed slug was recovered at the
left auricular region.

(3) Contusion, right eyebrow, measuring 3 x 2 cm, 3 cm from the anterior midline.
There are subdural and subarachnoidal hemorrhages.
Stomach is full of partially digested food particles and positive for alcoholic odor.
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of gunshot wounds. Head.[3]
At the time of his death, Joseph was employed as driver by the Santos Enterprises Freight Services
earning P250.00 a day.[4] He left behind two children by his live-in partner who are now under his
mothers care and support. Herminia spent approximately P90,000.00 for the funeral and burial expenses
of her deceased son. The expenses were supported by receipts[5] and admitted by the defense.[6]
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against accused-appellant. The complaint, docketed as I.S.
No. 96-3246, was however dismissed for insufficiency of evidence in a Resolution dated December 4, 1996
by Prosecutor Dionisio C. Sison with the approval of Caloocan City Prosecutor Rosauro J. Silverio.
[7]
Herminia appealed the order of dismissal to the Secretary of Justice. In a letter dated March 16, 1998,
Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III reversed and set aside the appealed Resolution and ordered the City
Prosecutor of Caloocan City to file an information for murder against the accused-appellant.
[8]
Accordingly, the Information was filed and a warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant on June
8, 1998. On October 16, 1998, appellant was arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).
Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending
against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in
1989.[9]
For his defense, accused-appellant presented two witnesses: (a) Orlando Bermudez, a neighbor; and
(b) himself. He denies the killing of Joseph Marquez. He claims that from 8:00 to 10:00 in the evening of
September 29, 1996, he was in his house located at 317 M. de Castro St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. He
was having some drinks with his neighbor, Orlando Bermudez, and his driver, Nelson Columba. They
were enjoying themselves, drinking and singing with the videoke. Also in the house were his wife, children
and household help. At 10:00 P.M., Orlando and Nelson went home and accused-appellant went to sleep.
He woke up at 5:30 in the morning of the following day and learned that Joseph Marquez, a neighbor, was
shot to death. To appellants surprise, he was tagged as Josephs killer.[10]
Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two blocks apart.
Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days before his death,
on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car stereo.
Joseph scampered away. As proof of the victims bad reputation, appellant presented a letter handwritten
by his mother, Herminia, addressed to Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of Caloocan City, and sent through PO3
Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter, Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for
rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared
that eventually Joseph might not just steal but kill her and everyone in their household because of his
drug habit.[11]

The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal cases filed against him in 1984 and 1989.
The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victims desistance while in the
frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and admitted his crime.[12]
In a decision dated June 22, 1999, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him
to the penalty of death. The court also ordered appellant to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity
of P50,000.00, actual damages of P90,000.00, moral damages of P60,000.00 and exemplary damages
of P50,000.00 and the costs of the suit. Thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and the prosecution having established beyond an iota of
doubt the guilt of accused NOEL LEE of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, this court, in view of the presence of the generic
aggravating circumstance of dwelling and without any mitigating circumstance to offset it, hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the legal heirs of the
deceased civil indemnity of P50,000.00; to pay the private complainant actual damages of P90,000.00
plus moral and exemplary damages of P60,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively; and to pay the costs.
Consistent with the provisions of Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, let the entire records hereof including the complete transcripts of stenographic notes be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment, within the reglementary period set
forth in said section.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Hence, this appeal. Before us, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE SELF-SERVING
AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY OF THE MOTHER OF THE VICTIM, HERMINIA
MARQUEZ, WHOSE NARRATION OF THE CHAIN OF OCCURRENCE THAT LED TO THE
DEATH OF JOSEPH MARQUEZ WAS BEYOND BELIEF.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HASTILY TAGGING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT,
NOEL LEE, AS THE ASSAILANT BASED MERELY ON THE BIASED DECLARATION OF THE
MOTHER WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE SHADY CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM AGAINST
WHOM OTHERS MIGHT HAVE AN AXE TO GRIND.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS DECISION OF FINDING GUILT ON THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT EVEN RAISING A FINGER IN SATISFYING ITSELF
THAT THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBTAINING IN 1996 ARE STILL PREVAILING IN 1999
WHEN THE CASE WAS TRIED ON THE MERITS SO AS TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF
THE ASSAILANT BEYOND DOUBT.

IV
THE COURT A QUO GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING WITH LENIENCY HERMINIA
MARQUEZS VACILLATION WITH RESPECT TO THE BUTAS NG BINTANA AS CONTAINED
IN HER SWORN STATEMENT AND THE BUKAS NA BINTANA AS PER HER REPAIRED
TESTIMONYA SERIOUS PROCEDURAL ANOMALY THAT ASSAULTED THE SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH
UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE OBVIOUS REASONABLE DOUBT. [14]
The assigned errors principally involve the issue of the credibility of Herminia Marquez, the lone
prosecution eyewitness. Accused-appellant claims that the trial court should not have accepted Herminias
testimony because it is biased, incredible and inconsistent.
Herminias testimony on direct examination is as follows:
xxx
ATTY. OPENA: Now who was your companion, if any, at that time?
WITNESS: Me and my son, Joseph Marquez, and the wife upstairs putting the baby to sleep.
Q: What were you and your son, Joseph, doing then?
A: Watching TV.
Q: Will you please tell us your position, I am referring to you and your son in relation to the television
set where you are watching the show.
A: We were facing each other while watching television which is on the left side.
Q: Will you please tell us where exactly was your son, Joseph, seated while watching television?
A: At the end most of the sofa.
Q: The sofa you are referring to is the one near the window.
A: Yes, sir. Dikit lang po.
Q: Will you give us an idea or describe to us that window which you mentioned awhile ago?
A: Transparent glass.
Q: How high is it from the ground?

COURT: Which one?

ATTY. OPENA: The window glass?
WITNESS: About three feet from the ground.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: You said three feet. What do you mean by that? Is that window elevated from the ground?
A: The same height as this court window which is about three feet from the ground, and from one
another about four by four window [sic], three feet by the ground.
Q: Now, you demonstrated by showing a portion, you mean to tell us that window was mounted on a
concrete or hollow block?
A: Hollow block, po.
Q: How high is that hollow block that you were referring to?
COURT: She said three feet.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: Which is higher, that sofa which is posted near the window or the hollow block?
A: Hollow block.
Q: By how many inches or feet?
A: About half a foot.
Q: You said the sofa was long. Will you please tell us in what portion of your sofa your son Joseph was
seated?
ATTY. VARGAS: Already answered, your Honor. She said dulo, end of the sofa.
COURT: Sustained.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: When you said end of sofa which portion, the left side or the right side?
A: The right.
Q: Now, while you and your son were watching television, was there anything unusual that transpired?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Tell us what was that all about.

A: Mayroon po akong napansin na kamay na nakatutok sa anak ko. Nakita ko po si Noel Lee na
nakatayo sa may bintana.
Q: What do you mean by the word kamay?
A: Hawak hawak po niya iyong baril, nakatutok po sa anak ko.
Q: What did you do with what you saw?
A: Nakita ko pong gumanoon siya, sumilip na ganoon, sabay putok ng baril. Tumingin po siya sa may
bintana, ganoon po, sabay putok ng baril.
COURT: You said he turned the head. Who turned the head? Sino ang gumanyan sa sinabi mo?
A: (Witness demonstrating that the victim peeped through the window).
Q: And then?
A: At the same time the firing of the gun [sic] and I saw my son slumped.
ATTY. OPENA TO THE WITNESS:
Q: And after your son was slumped, what did you do?
A: I went to my son and carried him to take him to the hospital.
Q: How many shots did you hear?
A: Five shots.
Q: That was prior to helping your son?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how many times was your son hit?
ATTY. VARGAS:
Q: Objection, your honor. It was already answered. Because according to her it was five shots.
COURT: It does not follow that the victim was hit. So, the witness may answer.
WITNESS: Twice, Two shots hit my son, two shots on the sofa and one shot on the cement.
COURT: How about the other one?

A: Doon po sa semento.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: And who fired these shots?
A: Noel Lee.
Q: That Noel Lee that you are referring to, will you please point at him if he is around?
A: (Witness going down the witness stand and pointing to accused Noel Lee).
Q: How do you know that it was Noel Lee who shot your son?
A: Kitang kita ko po. Magkatapat po kami.
Q: Will you please describe to us?
A: Maliwanag po kasi ang ilaw. Maliwanag din po sa labas, may nananahi doon. Nandoon po kaming
dalawa ng anak ko nanonood ng television. (Witness sobbing in tears). Napakasakit sa akin. Hindi
ko man lang naipagtanggol and anak ko.
COURT: She was emotionally upset.
ATTY. OPENA: Ill just make it on record that the witness was emotionally upset. May I ask if she can
still testify?
xxxxxxxxx
WITNESS: Masakit lang po sa loob ko ang pagkawala ng anak ko.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: You saw that the light was bright. Where were those lights coming from?
A: Maliwanag po sa loob ng bahay namin dahil may fluorescent na bilog. Saka sa labas may nananahi
po doon sa alley katapat ng bahay namin. At saka po doon sa kabila, tindahan po tapat po namin,
kaya maliwanag ang ilaw.
Q: After trying to help your son, what happened?
A: I was able to hold on to my son up to the door. Upon reaching the door, I asked the help of my
kumpare.
Q: Meanwhile, what did the accused do after shooting five times?
A: He ran to the alley to go home.

Q: Now you said he ran to an alley towards the direction of their house. Do you know where his house
is located?
A: Yes, sir. 142 M. de Castro Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
Q: How far is that from your residence?
A: More or less 150 to 200 meters.
Q: Where did you finally bring your son?
A: MCU.
Q: When you say MCU, are you referring to MCU Hospital?
A: Yes, sir. MCU Hospital.
Q: At MCU, life-saving devices were attached to my son. Later, after reaching 11:00, he died.
COURT: 11:00 P.M.?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Same day?
A: Yes, maam.
x x x x x x x x x.[15]
Herminias testimony is positive, clear and straightforward. She did not waver in her narration of the
shooting incident, neither did she waffle in recounting her sons death. She was subjected by defense
counsel to rigorous cross and re-cross examinations and yet she stuck to her testimony given in the direct
examination. She readily gave specific details of the crime scene, e.g., the physical arrangement of the sofa
and the television set, the height of the sofa, the wall and the window, because the crime happened right
in her own living room. She explained that she was unable to warn Joseph because she was shocked by the
sight of accused-appellant aiming a gun at her son. The tragic events unfolded so fast and by the time she
took hold of herself, her son had been shot dead.
A sons death in his mothers house and in her presence is a painful and agonizing experience that is
not easy for a mother to forget, even with the passing of time. Herminias testimony shows that she was
living with a conscience that haunted and blamed her own self for failing to protect her son or, at least,
save him from death.
Nonetheless, accused-appellant points out inconsistencies in the eyewitness testimony. In her
affidavit of September 30, 1996 given before PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, Herminia declared that while she and
Joseph were watching television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed at her son. The hand and the gun
came out of a hole in the window, i.e., butas ng bintana. On cross-examination, Herminia stated that she

saw a hand holding a gun in the open window, i.e., bukas na bintana. According to accused-appellant, this
inconsistency is a serious flaw which cannot be repaired by her statement on the witness stand.
The inconsistency between her affidavit and her testimony was satisfactorily explained by Herminia
on cross-examination:
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. VARGAS
Q: You said that you saw a hand from a hole in the window with a gun, is that correct?
A: Bukas na bintana. Not from a hole but from an open window.
Q: Madam witness, do you recall having executed a sworn statement before the police, right after the
shooting of your son?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I will read to you paragraph 8 of your statement which is already marked as your Exhibit A in which
is stated as follows: Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang buong pangyayari? Answer: Sa mga oras ng alas
9:00 ng gabi petsa 29 ng Setyembre 1996 habang ang aking anak ay nanonood ng palabas sa TV
ng basketball malapit sa kanyang bintana sa labas at ako naman ay nakaupo sa sopa katapat ko
siya subalit medyo malayo ng konti sa kanya, mayroon akong napansin na kamay na may hawak
ng baril at nakaumang sa aking anak sa may butas ng bintana, do you recall that?
A: Opo.
Q: What you saw from that butas is a hand with a gun, is that correct?
A: Opo.
Q: Madam witness, your window is just like the window of this courtroom?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In your testimony, you did not mention what part of the window was that hand holding a gun that
you saw? Is that correct?
A: Hindi naman po butas, kundi bukas na bintana. Nakabukas iyong bintana namin.
Q: So in your sinumpaang salaysay in the statement that you said butas na bintana is not correct?
A: Mali ho kasi, hindi ko na napansin iyan, kasi ito napansin ko, kinorect ko.
COURT: You show to the witness. There, butas na bintana.
WITNESS: Mali po ang letra, Bukas hindi butas.

x x x x x x x x x.[16]
Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court that she saw the hand and the gun coming
out of the open window, not from a hole in the window. In her direct testimony, Herminia presented a
photograph of her living room just the way it looked from her side on the night of the shooting. [17] The sofa
on which Joseph was seated is against the wall, with the window a few inches above the wall. The window
is made of transparent glass with six (6) vertical glass panes pushing outwards. The entire window is
enclosed by iron grills with big spaces in between the grills. The living room is well-lit and the area outside
the house is also lit by a fluorescent lamp.
Between Herminias testimony in open court and her sworn statement, any inconsistency therein
does not necessarily discredit the witness. [18] Affidavits are generally considered inferior to open court
declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate.
[19]
Oftentimes, they are executed when the affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him
a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident that transpired. [20] They are usually not prepared by the
affiant himself but by another who suggests words to the affiant, or worse, uses his own language in taking
the affiants statements.[21]
Accused-appellant argues that since Herminia declared in her affidavit that she saw a hand coming
from the window, she did not see the person holding the gun, let alone who fired it. [22] A complete reading
of the pertinent portion of Herminias affidavit will refute appellants arguments, viz:
xxxxxxxxx
T- Isalaysay mo nga sa akin and buong pangyayari?
S Sa mga oras ng alas 9:00 ng gabi, petsa 29 ng Setyembre 1996, habang ang aking anak ay nanonood ng
palabas sa T.V. ng basketball malapit sa aming bintanan [sic] sa labas, at ako naman ay nakaupo sa sopa
katapat ko siya subalit medyo malayo ng kaunti sa kanya, mayroon akong napansin akong [sic] kamay na
hawak-hawak na baril na nakaumang sa aking anak sa butas na bintana na nakaawang, maya-maya ng
kaunti ay nakarinig na ako ng putok at ang unang putok ay tumama sa ulo ng aking anak kaya napayuko
siya, pagkatapos noon ay sunod-sunod na ang putok na narinig ko, mga limang beses, kaya kitang kita
ko siya ng lapitan ko ang aking anak at nakita ko itong si NOEL LEE, pagkatapos noon ay
tumakbo na ito papalabas ng iskinita papunta sa kanila.
x x x x x x x x x.[23]
It is thus clear that when Herminia approached her son, she saw that the person firing the gun was
accused-appellant. Appellant continued firing and then ran away towards the direction of his house. This
account is not inconsistent with the witness testimony in open court.
Herminias declarations are based on her actual account of the commission of the crime. She had no
ill motive to accuse appellant of killing her son, or at least, testify falsely against appellant. Accusedappellant himself admitted that he and Herminia have been neighbors for years and have known each
other for a long time. Appellant is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap plastic and
Herminia used to work for him as an agent. [24] She would not have pointed to appellant if not for the fact
that it was him whom she saw shoot her son.

Indeed, the Solicitor General points out that it was appellant himself who had strong motive to harm
or kill Joseph.[25] Appellant revealed that six days before the shooting, he caught Joseph inside his car
attempting to steal the stereo. The alibi that appellant was drinking with his friends that fateful night of
September 29, 1996 does not rule out the possibility that he could have been at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission. The victims house is merely two blocks away from appellants house and could
be reached in several minutes.[26]
The lone eyewitness account of the killing finds support in the medico-legal report. Dr. Rosalie
Cosidon found that the deceased sustained two gunshot woundsone to the right of the forehead, and the
other, to the left side of the back of the victims head. [27] Two slugs were recovered from the victims head.
Judging from the location and number of wounds sustained, Dr. Cosidon theorized that the assailant
could have been more than two feet away from the victim. [28] Both gunshot wounds were serious and fatal.
[29]

Accused-appellant makes capital of Josephs bad reputation in their community. He alleges that the
victims drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the persons from
whom he had stolen. [30] As proof of Josephs bad character, appellant presented Herminias letter to Mayor
Malonzo seeking his assistance for Josephs rehabilitation from drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia admitted
that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied anything about her sons thievery. [31]
Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:-(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.
x x x x x x x x x.
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals,
distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from the
common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation. [32] Good moral character
includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common honesty and
veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that measures up as good among people of
the community in which the person lives, or that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that status
which attaches to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.[33]
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining
a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the issues in the case were

allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to
have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits of the case. After all,
the business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous
cause.[34] There are exceptions to this rule however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both
criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his
good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. When the
accused presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption of innocence, and
where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit
the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good character and high
reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged against him. [35] Sub-paragraph 2 provides that
the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in rebuttal and when
such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid
unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
is a person of bad character.[36] The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the
defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence.
[37]
Once the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer
evidence of the defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would have a
license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.[38]
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of the accused.
And this evidence must be pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged, meaning, that
the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act charged, [40] e.g., on a charge of
rape, character for chastity; on a charge of assault, character for peacefulness or violence; on a charge for
embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity. [41] Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule
refers to the character of the offended party.[42] Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the
offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged. Such evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of selfdefense in an assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case.[43]
[39]

In the Philippine setting, proof of the moral character of the offended party is applied with frequency
in sex offenses and homicide.[44] In rape and acts of lasciviousness or in any prosecution involving an
unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a woman where the willingness of a woman is material, the
womans character as to her chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented to the mans act.
[45]
The exception to this is when the womans consent is immaterial such as in statutory rape [46] or rape
with violence or intimidation.[47] In the crimes of qualified seduction [48] or consented abduction,[49] the
offended party must be a virgin, which is presumed if she is unmarried and of good reputation, [50] or a
virtuous woman of good reputation. [51] The crime of simple seduction involves the seduction of a woman
who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age x x x. [52] The
burden of proof that the complainant is a woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and the
accused may introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of bad reputation.[53]
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as
evidence of the deceaseds aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the accused. [54] The
pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and
peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the deceased or the accused was
the aggressor.[55] When the evidence tends to prove self-defense, the known violent character of the

deceased is also admissible to show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind
of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary. [56]
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was the
aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the deceaseds drug
addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive
eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character he could have been killed by any
one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed
with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, [57] a murder case, the defense tried to prove the
violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the prosecution, the trial
court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:
x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the
probability or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), [58] such
is not necessary in the crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery
or premeditation. The proof of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to
show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the
accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not apply to cases
of murder.[59]
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery and
evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his living room
watching television when accused-appellant peeped through the window and, without any warning, shot
him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against
his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured his death without risk to the
assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing of the victim was attended by
treachery, proof of the victims bad character is not necessary. The presence of this aggravating
circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victims bad character to establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to
murder.
As to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, this cannot be appreciated to increase
the penalty in the absence of direct evidence showing that accused-appellant deliberately planned and
prepared the killing of the victim.[60]
Neither can the aggravating circumstance of dwelling found by the trial court be applied in the
instant case. The Information alleges only treachery and evident premeditation, not dwelling. Under
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint or Information must
specify the qualifying and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the offense. [61] The Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, and Section 8, Rule 110 is favorable to the
accused. It may be applied retroactively to the instant case.
Accordingly, without the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty of death was erroneously
imposed by the trial court. There being no aggravating circumstance, there is no basis for the award of
exemplary damages.[62]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision dated June 22, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City,
Branch 127 in Criminal Case No. C-54012 (98) is affirmed insofar as accused-appellant Noel Lee is found
guilty of murder for the death of Joseph Marquez. The death sentence imposed by the trial court is
however reduced to reclusion perpetua, there having been no aggravating circumstance in the
commission of said crime. Except for the award of exemplary damages, the award of civil indemnity, other
damages and costs are likewise affirmed.

CASE # 4
CASE TITLE:
AUTHOR: Gabby
TOPIC:

[G.R. No. 132164. October 19, 2004]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. ALLYSON BELAGAN, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary
that the reputation shown should be that which existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of
which the litigation arose,[1] or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from
the commencement of the suit.[2] This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still
change or reform himself.
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision[3] dated
January 8, 1998, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 44180, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 966213 dated September 23, 1996 and Resolution No. 972423 dated
April 11, 1997 of the respondent Civil Service Commission are hereby set aside. The complaint against
petitioner Allyson Belagan filed by Magdalena Gapuz is hereby DISMISSED.
The dismissal of petitioner Belagan is lifted and he is hereby ordered to be immediately reinstated to his
position without loss of seniority, retirement, backwages and other rights and benefits.
SO ORDERED.
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz,
founder/directress of the Mother and Child Learning Center, and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher
at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), all from Baguio City. Magdalena charged
respondent with sexual indignities and harassment, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and
various malfeasances.

Magdalenas sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an application with the
DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school. One of the requisites for the issuance of
the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the DECS Division Office. Since the officer
assigned to conduct the inspection was not present, respondent volunteered his services. Sometime in
June 1994, respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of the inspection, while both
were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders
and kissed her cheek. Dumbfounded, she muttered, Sir, is this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman
kayo sa DECS wala ng values? Respondent merely sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no other
people in the area.
Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm respondent,
Magdalena just kept quiet.
Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked respondent, Sir, kumusta
yung application ko? His reply was Mag-date muna tayo. She declined, explaining that she is married.
She then left and reported the matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter Ngabit.
Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application. However, she
was forced to reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the permit has not yet been released.
Thereupon, they went to the office of the respondent. He merely denied having a personal relationship
with Magdalena.
Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his recommendation to approve
Magdalenas application for a permit to operate a pre-school.
Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain female employees
of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official with sexual harassment. Upon
inquiry, she learned that the official being complained of was respondent. She then wrote a lettercomplaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria.
On October 4, 1994, respondent was placed under suspension.
On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions,
respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind and
pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back.
Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers salaries; (2) failing to
release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing to release the teachers uniforms,
proportionate allowances and productivity pay; and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion
Board, as required by the DECS rules and regulations.
The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya. In his defense,
respondent denied their charge of sexual harassment. However, he presented evidence to disprove
Ligayas imputation of dereliction of duty.
On January 9, 1995, the DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision [4] finding respondent guilty of
four (4) counts of sexual indignities or harassments committed against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of

sexual advances or indignities against Magdalena. He was ordered dismissed from the service. The
dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing disquisitions duly considered, decision is hereby rendered in the two aboveentitled cases, finding:
a) Respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the DECS Baguio City Schools
Division GUILTY of the four counts of sexual indignities or harassments committed
against the person and honor of complainant Miss Ligaya Annawi, a Baguio City public
school teacher, while in the performance of his official duties and taking advantage of his
office. He is, however, ABSOLVED of all the other charges of administrative
malfeasance or dereliction of duty.
b) Respondent Baguio City Superintendent Allyson Belagan likewise GUILTY of the two
counts of sexual advances or indignities committed against the person and honor of
complainant Mrs. Magdalena Gapuz, a private school teacher of Baguio City, while in the
performance of his official duties and taking advantage of his office.
Consequently, respondent Allyson Belagan is HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED from the
government service, with prejudice to reinstatement and all his retirement benefits and other
remunerations due him are HEREBY DECLARED FORFEITED in favor of the government.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on September 23, 1996, promulgated Resolution
No. 966213[6] affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in the case filed by Magdalena but dismissing
the complaint of Ligaya. The CSC ruled that respondents transgression against Magdalena constitutes
grave misconduct. Thus:
The acts of Belagan are serious breach of good conduct since he was holding a position which requires the
incumbent thereof to maintain a high degree of moral uprightness. As Division Superintendent, Belagan
represents an institution tasked to mold the character of children. Furthermore, one of his duties is to
ensure that teachers in his division conduct themselves properly and observe the proper discipline. Any
improper behavior on his part will seriously impair his moral ascendancy over the teachers and students
which can not be tolerated. Therefore, his misconduct towards an applicant for a permit to
operate a private pre-school cannot be treated lightly and constitutes the offense of grave
misconduct.
WHEREFORE, respondent Allyson Belagan is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct and imposed
the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with all the accessory penalties. The decision of the DECS
Secretary is modified accordingly.[7]
On October 29, 1996, respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he
has never been charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was
charged with several offenses before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, thus:

1. Criminal Case No. 43416 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (December 3, 1980)
2. Criminal Case No. 45629 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (May 13, 1982)
3. Criminal Case No. 45630 for GRAVE THREATS (May 13, 1982)
4. Criminal Case No. 45914 for GRAVE THREATS (June 24, 1982)
5. Criminal Case No. 51532 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (January 25, 1985)
6. Criminal Case No. 51533 for LIGHT THREATS (January 25, 1985)
7. Criminal Case No. 51556 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 30, 1985)
8. Criminal Case No. 51818 for LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
9. Criminal Case No. 51819 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (March 18, 1985)
10. Criminal Case No. 51820 for MALICIOUS MISCHIEF (March 18, 1985)
11. Criminal Case No. 51821 for UNJUST VEXATION (March 18, 1985)
12. Criminal Case No. 62173 for UNJUST VEXATION (May 29, 1991)
13. Criminal Case No. 62172 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (May 29, 1991)
14. Criminal Case No. 62754 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)
15. Criminal Case No. 55642 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (December 2, 1986)
16. Criminal Case No. 55423 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (October 24, 1986)
17. Criminal Case No. 55846 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (November 4, 1986)
18. Criminal Case No. 55800 for GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION (January 7, 1987)
19. Criminal Case No. 57312 for UNJUST VEXATION (November 29, 1987)
20. Criminal Case No. 55643 for SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES (December 13, 1985)
21. Criminal Case No. 53404 for UNJUST VEXATION (December 13, 1985)
22. Criminal Case No. 55422 for UNJUST VEXATION (October 24, 1986) [8]
In addition, the following complaints against Magdalena were filed with the Barangay Chairmen of
Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, both in Baguio City:

1. Ordana vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 11-19-02-A) for GRAVE THREATS, UNJUST VEXATION,
RUMOR MONGERING
2. Teresita De Los Santos vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 86-8-26-8) for GRAVE THREATS & ORAL
DEFAMATION
3. Mrs. Conchita Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 029) for ORAL DEFAMATION and
FALSE ACCUSATION
4. Mrs. Clara Baoas vs. Gapuz (Brgy. Case No. 030) for HARASSMENT and THREATS
5. GABRIELA SILANG TANOD FORCES vs. Gapuz (Case No. 031) for HABITUAL TROUBLE
MAKER
6. Pablo Ortiz vs. Gapuz (November 1, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
7. C. Ballesteros vs. Gapuz (September 11, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
8. Mrs. Liza Ancheta vs. Gapuz (September 27, 1978) for RUMOR MONGERING
9. Mr. Pananin (Beneco Personnel) (October 8, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
10. Mrs. Minda Valdez vs. Gapuz (November 6, 1978) for ORAL DEFAMATION
11. WOMENS CLUB vs. GAPUZ (February 9, 1979) for ORAL DEFAMATION
12. Vistro Salcedo case (May 8, 1979)
Where Mrs. Gapuz was spreading rumors against Barangay Captain and Police Chief
13. Demolition Scandal (May 10, 1979)
Where she called all the residents of their Barangay for an emergency meeting and
where she shouted invectives against the residents
14. Incident of June 13, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the Barangay Sanitary Inspector
15. Incident of August 25, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz shouted invectives against the servants of Mr. De Leon
16. Incident of August 26, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz terrorized the council meeting
17. Incident of September 2, 1978

Mrs. Clara Baoas was harassed by Mrs. Gapuz

18. Incident of September 9, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz quarreled with Mrs. C. Ballesteros during the council meeting
19. Incident of September 10, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz was hurling invectives along her alley in the early morning
20. Incident of September 13, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz tapped electric wire from Mrs. Tessie de los Santos with the latters
consent
21. Incident of September 21, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting and hurling invectives scandalously around her residence
22. Incident of September 21, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting, complaining about alleged poisoned sardines near the
premises of her residence which killed her hen.
23. Incident of September 23, 1979
Mrs. Gapuz was shouting unpleasant words around the neighborhood. She did not
like the actuations of a bayanihan group near the waiting shed.[9]
Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her character,
integrity, and credibility.
In its Resolution No. 972423[10] dated April 11, 1997, the CSC denied respondents motion for
reconsideration, holding that:
The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor significance
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused of having committed
the offense. This is so because even a prostitute or a woman of ill repute may become a
victim of said offense.
As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is shown to have had cases before the regular courts
for various offenses and was condemned by her community for wrongful behavior does not discount the
possibility that she was in fact telling the truth when she cried about the lecherous advances made to her
by the respondent. x x x
Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. As stated earlier, it reversed
the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalenas complaint.

The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable.
Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not one whom any male would attempt to steal
a kiss. In fact, her record immediately raises an alarm in any one who may cross her path. [11] In absolving
respondent from the charges, the Appellate Court considered his unblemished service record for 37 years.
Unsatisfied, the CSC, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant petition raising the following
assignments of error:
I. The Supreme Court may rule on factual issues raised on appeal where the Court
of Appeals misappreciated the facts. Furthermore, where the findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, the Supreme
Court may review the record and evidence. The Court of Appeals erred in not
giving credence to the testimony of complainant Magdalena Gapuz despite
convincing and overwhelming signs of its truthfulness.
II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it failed to give due
weight to the findings of the DECS, which conducted the administrative
investigation, specifically with respect to the credibility of the witnesses
presented.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent should be penalized
under Sec. 22 (o) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V and not Sec. 22
(e) of said rules.[12]
In his comment, respondent maintains that Magdalenas derogatory record undermines the verity of
her charge and that the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing it.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The pivotal issue before us is whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible. This is a
question of fact which, as a general rule, is not subject to this Courts review.
It is a rule of long standing that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. [13] This Court is,
after all, not a trier of facts. One of the exceptions, however, is when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court or a quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein.[14]
Here, the Court of Appeals and the CSC are poles apart in their appreciation of Magdalenas
derogatory record. While the former considered it of vital and paramount importance in determining the
truth of her charge, the latter dismissed it as of minor significance. This contrariety propels us to the
elusive area of character and reputation evidence.
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a controversy.
One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:
[15]

SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.

(a) In Criminal Cases:

xxxxxx
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it
tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of
the offense charged.
It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to
administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied here, still,
we cannot sustain respondents posture.
Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this provision.
Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged. This means that
the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense
charged.[16] Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for
peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty. [17] In one rape case,
where it was established that the alleged victim was morally loose and apparently uncaring about her
chastity, we found the conviction of the accused doubtful.[18]
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that has
a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats,
unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of
evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they do not establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is Magdalenas
lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge. In this regard, a different
provision applies.
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a
persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. [19] A witness may be discredited by evidence
attacking his general reputation for truth, [20] honesty[21] or integrity.[22] Section 11, Rule 132 of the same
Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against
whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad,or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be
shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of an offense.
Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to
character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in his
own behalf places himself in the same position as any other witness, and may be
impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.[23]

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the character or
reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This leads us to the
ultimate question is Magdalenas derogatory record sufficient to discredit her credibility?
A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts committed in
the 80s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed with the Chairmen of Barangay
Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took place in 1978 to 1979. In the instant
administrative case, the offense was committed in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no longer
reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation. The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in according
much weight to such evidence. Settled is the principle that evidence of ones character or
reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. [24] In other
words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of
the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.
[25]
Hence, to say that Magdalenas credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation existing
almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the
path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change
or reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal cases
specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not
permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or
prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.
[26]
This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a
mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that
innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to
be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or
discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct. [27] Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of
our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular
wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that
would be involved, and because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful
acts.[28] As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the charges
against her listed by respondent.
But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is the fact that it
is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Magdalena testified in
a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is replete with details, such as the
number of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school, the specific part of the stairs where
respondent kissed her, and the matter about her transient boarders during summer. Magdalena would not
have normally thought about these details if she were not telling the truth. We quote her testimony during
the cross-examination conducted by DECS Assistant Secretary Romeo Capinpin and Undersecretary
Antonio Nachura, thus:
Q Was there any conversation between you and Dr. Belagan during the inspection on the first
floor and the second floor?
A There was, sir. It was a casual conversation that we had with regard to my family, background,
how the school came about, how I started with the project. That was all, sir.

Q Nothing about any form of sexual harassment, in words or in deeds?

A Sir, because he inspected the second floor twice, sir. We went up to the stairs twice, sir.
Q Why?
A I really dont know what was the reason behind, sir. But on the second inspection, sir, I told
him that as of that time I had some transients with me. I was making use of the premises
for transients because that was summer then, sir. And I already started paying the place so
I said, Sir, I have some transients with me in the evening and he said, You know Mrs.
Gapuz, I am interested to stay in one of the rooms as one your boarders. But I respectfully
declined saying, Sir, I think for delicadeza I cannot accept you. Not that I dont want you to
be here but people might think that I am keeping you here and that would prejudice my
permit, sir.
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during the first time that you went up
with him or the second time?
A No, sir, on the second time, sir.
Q Second time?
A Yes, sir. We were going down, sir.
Q And you were going down?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you were during the alleged
kissing?
A Sir, on the topmost of the stairs.
Q Before you went down?
A Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base floor going up to the stairs and it
has 16 steps.
Q So, it was not on the 16th step but still on the topmost?
A Yes sir.
Q Part of the floor of the building?
A Yes, sir. Topmost, sir?

ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that time?
A Sir, on the second time that we went up and I mentioned about these transients
that I had then and he wanted to stay in the place in one of the rooms and then
I declined and I was still showing the rooms simultaneously. On the last, the
biggest room that I had, he said, No. Never mind, I am not going to see that
anymore. So he waited for me there and upon reaching the place, as I was to
step down on the first step going down, he placed his arm and held me tightly
and planted the kiss on my cheek, sir.
Q You said that he wanted to stay in one of the rooms?
A Yes, sir, as a boarder.
Q Is that room used for transients?
A During that time, sir, during the summertime, I made use of the time to get some transients.
Q And he was telling you that he wanted to occupy one of the rooms?
A Yes, but I declined, sir for delicadeza.
Q At that time, there were no transients yet.
A When he came over for the inspection sir, nobody was there. [29]
The above testimony does not stand in isolation. It is corroborated by Peter Ngabit, DECS Assistant
Division Superintendent. Ngabit testified that Magdalena reported to him that respondent kissed her and
asked her for a date.
Q I would like to call your attention to Exhibit A which is the affidavit of Mrs. Magdalena B.
Gapuz, particularly item no. 8, and may I read for your information That the Monday after
the incident, I went to the DECS Division Office expecting to get favorable
recommendation from the DECS Regional Office for the issuance of my permit. That I
proceeded to the Superintendent and asked him, Sir, kumusta yung application ko and he
said, mag date muna tayo but I refused and explained that I am married, after which I
proceeded to the Office of Asst. Superintendent Peter Ngabit to relate the incident and then
left the Division Office. Do you remember if Mrs. Gapuz went to your Office on the
particular day?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time was that?
A I cannot remember, sir.

Q Was it morning, afternoon?

A I think it was in the morning, sir.
Q Morning.
A Yes, sir.
Q Early morning?
A About noon, sir.
Q What transpired between you and Mrs. Gapuz in your office?
A When she came to my Office, she was relating about that and she was even insulting me
saying among others that I was a useless fixture in that Office because I cannot do anything
with the processing of her paper or application.
Q It says here that she would relate the incident to you. Did she relate any
incident?
A Yes, she did sir.
Q What was that incident all about?
A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit her school, he stole a kiss
from her and that she was saying that when she asked Supt. Belagan for her
papers, she was asked for a date before the Indorsement. After that, she left. [30]
With Magdalenas positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard the findings of the
DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the Court of Appeals outdated
characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad reputation. There are a number of cases where the triers
of fact believe the testimony of a witness of bad character [31] and refuse to believe one of good character.
[32]
As a matter of fact, even a witness who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of belief, when
he testified in a straightforward and convincing manner. [33]
At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS investigating officials
who are in a better position to determine whether Magdalena is telling the truth considering that they
were able to hear and observe her deportment and manner of testifying. [34]
In reversing the CSCs Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is ample evidence to show
that Magdalena had a motive in accusing respondent, i.e., to pressure him to issue a permit. This is
unconvincing. The record shows that respondent had already issued the permit when Magdalena filed her
letter-complaint. Indeed, she had no more reason to charge respondent administratively, except of course
to vindicate her honor.
Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing respondent for grave misconduct and not
merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one

(1) day to one (1) year for the first offense. [35] Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. [36] To constitute an
administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer.[37] In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest.[38] Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. [39] This is apparently present in
respondents case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for a date, an unlawful
consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondents act clearly constitutes
grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.[40]
We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent has
served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made a steady ascent from an
Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his
life to the education department, he received numerous awards. [41] This is the first time he is being
administratively charged. He is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for
retirement when Magdalena filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing Book V
of Executive Order No. 292 provides:
SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and aggravating
circumstances may be considered. x x x.
The mitigating circumstances are enumerated in Section 53, Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[42] which reads in part:
SEC. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. In the determination of
the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the
commission of the offense shall be considered.
The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
xxxxxx
j. length of service
xxxxxx
l. and other analogous cases.
Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment, [43] and respondents length of
service, unblemished record in the past and numerous awards, [44] the penalty of suspension from office
without pay for one (1) year is in order.
While we will not condone the wrongdoing of public officers and employees, however, neither will we
negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy service in the government.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 8,
1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44180 is REVERSED. The CSC Resolution Nos. 966213 and 972423 are
AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that respondent ALLYSON BELAGAN is SUSPENDED from
office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR, with full credit of his preventive suspension.