Today is Monday, January 20, 2014

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 117574 January 2, 1997

CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRISCILA S. AGANA, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24, and VIVIEN S. SORIGUEZ, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Does Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court require a party to respond to a Request for Admission of matters raised
in his pleadings? Will his failure to place under oath his denials in his response to the request be deemed an
admission of the matters sought to be admitted?
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling Bituminous Concrete Mix,
Ready Mix Concrete and other construction materials. It has several plant sites in the country one of which is the
Cebu plant site situated in Tuyan, Naga, Cebu. Private respondent on the other hand is engaged in the business of
providing security services to various establishments under the name and style 101 Security and Detective Services.
Sometime in October 1990 petitioner retained the services of private respondent for its Cebu plant site. On 8
November 1991 it terminated the services of private respondent alleging that it was dissatisfied with the latter's
services because she failed to prevent and promptly investigate a theft case which occurred in its Cebu plant site.
On 6 October 1992 private respondent Vivien S. Soriguez instituted an action with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu 1 for collection of unpaid fees for her security services rendered to petitioner. She also claimed that the termination
of her services was unlawful so that she should be awarded moral damages.
Petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was justified because private respondent was answerable for the losses it
incurred arising from the theft attributable to her fault. Petitioner thus claimed that there was legal set-off or
compensation regarding the unpaid fees due private respondent and the amount of the stolen articles owned by
petitioner.
On 30 August 1993 petitioner sent private respondent a Request for Admission by the latter of her responsibility of
the theft that occurred on 5 June 1991 at the Cebu plant site. 2 Thereafter private respondent through counsel filed a
Manifestation and Reply to the Request for Admission. 3 It was not under oath.
On 8 October 1993 petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment positing that private respondent impliedly
admitted the matters set forth in the Request for Admission by failing to respond under oath as required under Sec.

2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court. 4 Petitioner contended that the manifestation and reply not being verified was
ineffectual and thus should be stricken off the records. Private respondent countered that her reply although not under oath
effectively denied the matters set forth in the request.
Public respondents ruled in favor of private respondent holding that the circumstances warranted a relaxation of the
rules in the interest of justice. 5 The trial court rationalized that
While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not
be so strict about procedural lapses as in this case which do not really impair the proper administration of
justice. Considering that the protection of the substantive rights of the parties is paramount over mere
technicalities, the court elects to deny defendant's motion for summary judgment. 6
Respondent courts further ruled that a summary judgment was improper because the dispute involved factual issues
which could only be resolved in a full-blown hearing. 7
After the trial court denied its motion for reconsideration petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in a
special civil action for certiorari but the latter likewise denied the petition for lack of merit; hence, the instant petition.
The pivotal issue in this case is the effect of the Request for Admission filed by petitioner and, consequently, whether
private respondent may be considered to have impliedly admitted the matters referred to in the request when she
filed a manifestation and reply that was not under oath. 8
We deny the petition.
The Request for Admission of petitioner does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As we held in Po v.Court
of Appeals 9 and Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, 10 Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that
would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It does
not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings.
A cursory reading of petitioner's Request for Admission clearly shows that it contains the same material averments in
his Answer to respondent's Complaint in the trial court. Petitioner merely recopied or reproduced in its Request for
Admission its affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleged in its Answer. As we held in Bo v. CA, 11petitioner's
request constitutes an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which the respondent should not be subjected to.
In the first place, what the petitioner seeks to be admitted by private respondent is the very subject matter of the complaint.
In effect, petitioner would want private respondent to deny her allegations in her verified Complaint and admit the
allegations in the Answer of petitioner (Manifestation and Reply to Request for Admission). Plainly, this is illogical if not
preposterous. Respondent cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Answer of petitioner just because she
failed to have her response to the request placed under oath since these are the very matters she raises in her verified
Complaint in the court below. The following allegations specifically contained therein are self-evident
9. That, in compliance thereto (sic) (referring to the request for investigation), herein plaintiff, through her
authorized representative, went at (sic) the place and conducted the necessary investigation and found out
that the herein plaintiff was not responsible for those alleged losses simply because of the following, to wit:
a. Those alleged losses like Blower, Oil Filter, transmission and others were taken and
brought outside the guarded place by certain Danny Baterna, driver of defendant, as reflected
in the Log Book of the plaintiff . . . 12
Clearly, therefore, private respondent need not reply to the Request for Admission because her Complaint itself
controverts the matters set forth in the Answer of petitioner which were merely reproduced in the request. In Uy
Chao v. De la Rama Steamship 13 we observed that the purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts
and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be
disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
In the aforesaid cases of Po and Briboneria we held that
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning
which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his

answer to the complaint. 14

To this we add that a party should not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint. At this point, it is
necessary to emphasize what this Court laid down in the same Po and Briboneria cases
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting
party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and
exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. 15
Since the answer of private respondent to the request is no longer required in the instant case, it therefore becomes
unnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an answer that is not under oath. Even assuming that a
response to the request is needed, private respondent had already substantially complied with the requirement of the
law when she specifically denied the material allegations of the petitioner in her Manifestation and Reply to the
Request for Admission. Although not under oath the reply to the request readily showed that the intent of private
respondent was to deny the matters set forth in the Request for Admission. That the reply is not under oath is merely
a formal and not a substantive defect. This procedural lapse may be dispensed with if the circumstances call for the
dispensing of the rule in the interest of justice. While we commend petitioner's zeal in promoting faithful adherence to
the rules of procedure we cannot ignore the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed
as to do substantial justice. 16
There being genuine issues of fact between the private parties, public respondents correctly denied the motion of
petitioner for summary judgment. Where facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested proceedings for
summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. 17 Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments
and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. 18 Verily, there is a need to determine
by presentation of evidence if respondent is really liable for the stolen articles and for violating its contract for security
services with petitioner. Until these issues are determined no legal compensation can take place between the parties. This
factual dispute can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits, a process which need not take long to conclude. 19
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, as well as by the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu, the instant petition is DENIED and the records of this case are remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Presided over by Judge Priscila S. Agana, RTC-Br. 24, Cebu City.
2 Id., p. 67.
3 Id., p. 70.
4 Id., p. 73.
5 CA Decision penned by Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices Emeterio C. Cui and Fermin A.
Martin Jr. concurring.
6 Id., p. 43.
7 Id., pp. 8, 43.
8 Manifestation and Reply to Request for Admission, Rollo, p. 70.

9 No. L-34341, August 22, 1988.

10 G.R. No. 101682, December 14, 1992.
11 See Note 9.
12 Rollo, p. 47.
13 No. L-14495, 29 September 1962.
14 See Notes 9 and 10.
15 Ibid.
16 Sec. 6, Rule 7, Rules of Court.
17 Archipelago Builders v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75282, February 19, 1991, 194
SCRA 207, 212, citing the cases of Auman v. Estenzo., No. L-40500, 27 February 1976, 69 SCRA
524; Lorenzo v. Estenzo, No. L-3306, 29 October 1976, 73 SCRA 630; Viajar v. Estenzo, No. L45321, 30 April 1979, 89 SCRA 684.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Monday, January 20, 2014

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34341 August 22, 1988
PRISCILLA SUSAN PO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JULIAN LUSTRE, AND JOSE P. MANANZAN, respondents.
Panganiban, Linsangan & Associates for petitioner.
Antonio M. Chavez and Benjamin C. Santos & Fortunato Gupit, Jr. for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This case demonstrates the adage that sometimes "haste makes waste." Seventeen (17) years after the petitioner
Priscilla Susan Po filed a motion for summary judgment in the damage suit which she filed against the private
respondent, her refusal to abide by the trial court's order and the Appellate Court's resolution denying her motion,
has kept her complaint waiting in the wings to be called for pre-trial. Had she been less intransigent, the case might
have been finished long ago.
The petitioner filed in 1971 a complaint for P35,000 damages against the private respondent Jose P. Mananzan as
operator of a banca service for shooting the rapids at Pagsanjan Falls, arising from an accidental spill into the water,
which she and her friend suffered when the banca in which they were riding capsized during their trip back to town.
After Mananzan had answered the complaint, petitioner served upon him a request for admission.
On February 27, 1971, Mananzan asked for an extension of time to answer the request for admission. The petitioner
opposed the motion for extension of time on account of alleged defects in the notice of hearing.
On March 4, 1971, the petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there exists no genuine or
substantial controversy on any issue of fact raised in the complaint because the defendant, by failure to answer her
request for admission within the reglementary period (Sec. 2, Rule 26, Rules of Court) is deemed to have admitted
the facts set forth in the request.
Mananzan answered the request for admission and sent a copy of his answer to the petitioner. He filed an opposition
to the petitioner's motion for summary judgment.
On April 16, 1971, respondent Judge Lustre denied the motion for summary judgment, observing that "the
interrogatories ... are nothing but a reiteration of a portion of the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint, which have
already been answered and denied by the defendant in his answer" hence, they "need not be answered again if

asked in the form of interrogatories." (p. 10, Brief for Respondents, p. 151, Rollo.)
After the trial court had denied her motion for reconsideration of its order, the petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 00220-R entitled, "Priscilla Susan Po vs. Hon. Julian Lustre,
et al.") which the Court of Appeals likewise denied on September 23, 1971 for lack of merit. The pertinent
observations of the Court of Appeals are quoted hereunder:
... With the absolute denial of private respondent in his answer to the complaint, petitioner's
subsequent request for admission of the same facts already denied does not serve the purpose of
Rule 26 as a mode of discovery. As aptly stated by respondent Judge, Rule 26 contemplates
interrogatories that would clarify and tend to show light on the truth or falsity of the allegations of the
complaint, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has been alleged in the complaint and
unconditionally denied in the answer. Petitioner's request constitutes an utter redundancy and a
useless, pointless process which private respondent should not be subjected to and which the lower
court should not countenance as the respondent Judge rightfully did. Respondent Judge did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction nor has he unlawfully deprived
petitioner of any right in concluding that petitioner's request for admission does not fall under Rule 26
and that therefore the same need not be answered by private respondent. The allegations of facts in
the complaint remain to have been controverted by the answer of private respondent to the complaint.
There being genuine issues between the parties, respondent Judge correctly denied petitioner's
Motion for Summary Judgment. Unless it is shown that respondent Judge has committed a palpable
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court will not issue the writs prayed
for. (pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
Nothing daunted, the petitioner appealed to this Court.
An examination of petitioner's complaint and her request for admission confirms Judge Lustre's finding (which the
Court of Appeals upheld) that the "fact" set forth in the request for admission, including the amount of damages
claimed, are the same factual allegations set forth in her complaint which the defendant either admitted or denied in
his answer.
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which
there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d 752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor should he be required to make a
second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to
merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish
said party's cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a mere redundancy."
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with costs against the petitioner. This decision is
immediately executory, hence no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration will be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Gangayco, J., is on leave.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS
G.R. No. 186979
REYES and SPOUSES ROLANDO DELOS
Present:
REYES and EUGENE DELOS REYES
Petitioners,
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
- versus PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES and
ARWENIA R. ODONES,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 11, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the August 14, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. GR.
SP No. 97668 and its Resolution[2] dated March 9, 2009 denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
The impugned Decision affirmed the resolution dated November 16,
2006[3] and Order dated January 5, 2007[4] of the trial court, which respectively
denied petitioners Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing the Special and Affirmative
Defenses[5] and motion for reconsideration.[6]
The antecedents:

On June 17, 2005, private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and Arwenia

Odones, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against
petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes and Spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and
Eugene Delos Reyes, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-33 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68.
The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the owners of a 940- square
meter parcel of land located at Pao 1 st, Camiling, Tarlac by virtue of an Extrajudicial
Succession of Estate and Sale dated, January 29, 2004, executed by the surviving
grandchildren and heirs of Donata Lardizabal in whom the original title to the land
was registered. These heirs were Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo,
Rogelio Lagasca Razalan and Dominador Razalan.
It took a while before respondents decided to register the document of
conveyance; and when they did, they found out that the lands Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) was cancelled on April 27, 2005 and replaced by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 329427 in the name of herein petitioners.
Petitioners were able to secure TCT No. 329427 by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and her husband Francisco
Razalan on April 18, 1972.
Petitioners then subdivided the lot among themselves and had TCT No. 329427
cancelled. In lieu thereof, three new TCTs were issued: TCT No. 392428 in the names
of Socorro Limos and spouses Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, TCT
No. 392429 in the names of Spouses delos Reyes and TCT No. 392430 in the name
of Rosa Delos Reyes.
Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the ground that the
signatures of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan in the 1972 Deed of Absolute
Sale were forgeries, because they died on June 30, 1926 and June 5, 1971,
respectively.[7]

In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars[8] claiming

ambiguity in respondents claim that their vendors are the only heirs of Donata
Lardizabal. Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court denied the same and
ordered petitioners to file their answer to the complaint.[9]
In their answer,[10] petitioners pleaded affirmative defenses, which also
constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. These grounds were: (1) failure to
state a cause of action inasmuch as the basis of respondents alleged title is void,
since the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was not published and it
contained formal defects, the vendors are not the legal heirs of Donata Lardizabal,
and respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question the title of petitioners,
because no transaction ever occurred between them; (2) non-joinder of the other heirs
of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parties; and (3) respondents claim is barred by
laches.
In their Reply, respondents denied the foregoing affirmative defenses, and
insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid. They
maintained their standing as owners of the subject parcel of land and the nullity of the
1972 Absolute Deed of Sale, upon which respondents anchor their purported title.
[11] They appended the sworn statement of Amadeo Razalan declaring, among other
things that:
(2) Na hindi ko minana at ibinenta ang nasabing lupa kay Socorro Limos at
Rosa delos Reyes at hindi totoo na ako lang ang tagapagmana ni Donata
Lardizabal;
xxxx
(4) Ang aming lola na si Donata Lardizabal ay may tatlong (3) anak na
patay na sina Tomas Razalan, Clemente Razalan at Tomasa Razalan;
(5) Ang mga buhay na anak ni Tomas Razalan ay sina; 1. Soledad Razalan;
2. Ceferina Razalan; 3. Dominador Razalan; at 4. Amadeo Razalan. Ang mga buhay
na anak ni Clemente Razalan ay sina 1. Rogelio Lagasca (isang abnormal). Ang
mga buhay na anak ni Tomasa Razalan ay sina 1. Sotera Razalan at 2 pang kapatid;
x x x x[12]

Thereafter, petitioners served upon respondents a Request for Admission of the

following matters:

1.
2.

That the husband of the deceased Donata Lardizabal is Francisco Razalan;

That the children of the deceased Sps. Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan
are Mercedes Razalan, Tomasa Razalan and Tomas Razalan;

3.

That this Tomasa Razalan died on April 27, 1997, if not when? [A]nd her heirs are
(a) Melecio Partido surviving husband, and her surviving children are (b) Eduardo
Partido married to Elisa Filiana, (c) Enrique Razalan Partido married to Lorlita
Loriana, (d) Eduardo Razalan Partido, (e) Sotera Razalan Partido married to James
Dil-is and (f) Raymundo Razalan Partido married to Nemesia Aczuara, and all
residents of Camiling, Tarlac.
That Amadeo Razalan is claiming also to be a grandchild and also claiming to be
sole forced heir of Donata Lardizabal pursuant to the Succession by a Sole Heir with
Sale dated January 24, 2000, executed before Atty. Rodolfo V. Robinos.
That Amadeo Razalan is not among those who signed the Extra[j]udicial
Succession of Estate and Sale dated January 29, 2004 allegedly executed in favor of
the plaintiffs, Sps. Francisco/Arwenia Odones;
That as per Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo Razalan which was submitted by the
plaintiffs, the children of Tomasa Razalan are Sotera Razalan and 2 brothers/sisters.
These children of Tomasa Razalan did not also sign the Extra[j]udicial Succession of
Estate and Sale;
That there is/are no heirs of Clemente Razalan who appeared to have executed the
Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale;
That Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca Razalan
and Dominador Razalan did not file any letters (sic) of administration nor declaration
of heirship before executing the alleged Extra[j]udicial Succession of Estate and Sale
in favor of plaintiffs.[13]

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

Respondents failed to respond to the Request for Admission, prompting

petitioners to file a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and
Affirmative Defenses,[14] arguing that respondents failure to respond or object to
the Request for Admission amounted to an implied admission pursuant to Section 2
of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As such, a hearing on the affirmative defenses had
become imperative because petitioners were no longer required to present evidence
on the admitted facts.
Respondents filed a comment on the Motion, contending that the facts sought
to be admitted by petitioners were not material and relevant to the issue of the case as
required by Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. Respondents emphasized that the only
attendant issue was whether the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale upon which petitioners
base their TCTs is valid.[15]

In its Resolution dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the Motion and
held that item nos. 1 to 4 in the Request for Admission were earlier pleaded as
affirmative defenses in petitioners Answer, to which respondents already replied on
July 17, 2006. Hence, it would be redundant for respondents to make another denial.
The trial court further observed that item nos. 5, 6, and 7 in the Request for
Admission were already effectively denied by the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate
and Sale appended to the complaint and by the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Amadeo
Razalan
attached
to
respondents Reply.[16] Petitioners
moved
for
reconsideration[17] but the same was denied in an Order dated January 5, 2007.[18]
Petitioners elevated this incident to the CA by way of a special civil action for
certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the
impugned resolution and order.
On August 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition ruling that the affirmative
defenses raised by petitioners were not indubitable, and could be best proven in a
full-blown hearing.[19]
Their motion for reconsideration[20] having been denied,[21] petitioners are
now before this Court seeking a review of the CAs pronouncements.
In essence, petitioners contend that the affirmative defenses raised in their
Motion are indubitable, as they were impliedly admitted by respondents when they
failed to respond to the Request for Admission. As such, a preliminary hearing on the
said affirmative defenses must be conducted pursuant to our ruling in Gochan v.
Gochan.[22]
We deny the petition.
Pertinent to the present controversy are the rules on modes of discovery set forth
in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Request for admission. At any time after issues have been
joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the
admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document
described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and

relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be
delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.
SEC. 2 Implied admission. Each of the matters of which an admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request,
which shall be not less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such
further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is
directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement
either denying specifically the matters for which an admission is requested or setting
forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters.
xxxx

Under these rules, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission
shall be deemed to have impliedly admitted all the matters contained therein. It must
be emphasized, however, that the application of the rules on modes of discovery rests
upon the sound discretion of the court.

As such, it is the duty of the courts to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each
case and to determine the applicability of the modes of discovery, bearing always in
mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of justice.[23]
The determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to
comply with the modes of discovery also rests on sound judicial discretion.
[24] Corollarily, this discretion carries with it the determination of whether or not to
impose the sanctions attributable to such fault.
As correctly observed by the trial court, the matters set forth in petitioners
Request for Admission were the same affirmative defenses pleaded in their Answer
which respondents already traversed in their Reply. The said defenses were likewise
sufficiently controverted in the complaint and its annexes. In effect, petitioners
sought to compel respondents to deny once again the very matters they had already
denied, a redundancy, which if abetted, will serve no purpose but to delay the
proceedings and thus defeat the purpose of the rule on admission as a mode of
discovery which is to expedite trial and relieve parties of the costs of proving facts
which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by

reasonable inquiry.[25]
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the
allegations
of
the
requesting
partys
pleading
but
should
set
forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact described in the request, whose

purpose is to establish said partys cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that
purpose, it is pointless, useless, and a mere redundancy.[26]
Verily then, if the trial court finds that the matters in a Request for Admission
were already admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the
latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting party
cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and thereafter, assume or even
demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.
In this case, the redundant and unnecessarily vexatious nature of petitioners
Request for Admission rendered it ineffectual, futile, and irrelevant so as to proscribe
the operation of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court. There being no implied admission attributable to respondents failure to
respond, the argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its point.
Moreover, jurisprudence[27] has always been firm and constant in declaring
that when the affirmative defense raised is failure to state a cause of action, a
preliminary hearing thereon is unnecessary, erroneous, and improvident.
In any event, a perusal of respondents complaint shows that it was sufficiently
clothed with a cause of action and they were suited to file the same.

In an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following
allegations: (1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to
the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and (2) that the
defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of
title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.[28]
Such action goes into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens
title, hence, the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the
lands true owner.[29] Thus, the real party-in-interest is the person claiming title or
ownership adverse to that of the registered owner.[30]
The herein complaint alleged: (1) that respondents are the owners and occupants
of a parcel of land located at Pao 1 st Camiling, Tarlac, covered by OCT No. 11560 in
the name of Donata Lardizabal by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and
Sale; and (2) that petitioners fraudulently caused the cancellation of OCT No. 11560
and the issuance of new TCTs in their names by presenting a Deed of Absolute Sale
with the forged signatures of Donata Lardizabal and her husband, Francisco Razalan.
The absence of any transaction between petitioners and respondents over the
land is of no moment, as the thrust of the controversy is the respondents adverse
claims of rightful title and ownership over the same property, which arose precisely
because of the conflicting sources of their respective claims.
As to the validity of the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale and the
status of petitioners predecessors-in-interest as the only heirs of Donata Lardizabal,
these issues go into the merits of the parties respective claims and defenses that can
be best determined on the basis of preponderance of the evidence they will adduce in
a full-blown trial. A preliminary hearing, the objective of which is for the court to
determine whether or not the case should proceed to trial, will not sufficiently address
such issues.
Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that the nonjoinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added

by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the latter may dismiss the
complaint.[31] In this case, no such order was issued by the trial court.
Equally settled is the fact that laches is evidentiary in nature and it may not be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion
to dismiss.[32]
Finally, we cannot subscribe to petitioners contention that the status of the heirs
of Donata Lardizabal who sold the property to the respondents must first be
established in a special proceeding. The pronouncements in Heirs of Yaptinchay v.
Hon. Del Rosario[33] and in Reyes v. Enriquez[34] that the petitioners invoke do not
find application in the present controversy.
In both cases, this Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only
in a special proceeding and not in a civil action. It must be noted that
in Yaptinchay andEnriquez, plaintiffs action for annulment of title was anchored on
their alleged status as heirs of the original owner whereas in this case, the
respondents claim is rooted on a sale transaction. Respondents herein are enforcing
their rights as buyers in good faith and for value of the subject land and not as heirs
of the original owner. Unlike in Yaptinchay andEnriquez, the filiation of
herein respondents to the original owner is not determinative of their right to claim
title to and ownership of the property.
WHEREFORE,
foregoing
considered,
the
instant
Petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 14, 2008 and
its Resolution dated March 9, 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 40-48; penned by Associate Justice Rosalina Asuncion-Vicente, with Associate Justices
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring.

[2]
Id. at 50-52; penned by Associate Justice Rosalina Asuncion-Vicente and
concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Ramon M. Bato,
Jr.
[3]
Id. at 144-146.
[4]
Id. at 158-161.
[5]
Id. at 126-130.
[6]
Id. at 147-157.
[7]
Id. at 55-68.
[8]
Id. at 69-71.
[9]
Id. at 80.
[10]
Id. at 81-91.
[11]
Id. at 118-120.
[12]
Id. at 121-123.
[13]
Id. at 124-125.
[14]
Id. at 126-130.
[15]
Id. at 132-133.
[16]
Supra note 3.
[17]
Id. at 147-157.
[18]
Supra note 4.
[19]
Supra note 1.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 282-297.
[21]
Supra note 2.
[22]
423 Phil. 491, 505 (2001).
[23]
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97654,
November 14, 1994, 238 SCRA 88, 93.
[24]
Dela Torre v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 130243, October
30, 1998, 298 Phil. 363, 374-75 (1998).
[25]
Laada v. Court of Appeals and Nestle Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 426
Phil. 249, 261 (2002), citing Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 334 Phil. 77 (1997).
[26]
Po v. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 637, 640 (1988).
[27]
Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. v. David, 505 Phil. 181-192
(2005), citing The Heirs of Juliana Clavano v. Genato, 170 Phil. 275-288 (1997).
[28]
George Katon v. Planca, et al., 481 Phil. 169, 184 (2004); Heirs of
Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, 428 Phil. 249, 252 (2002).
[29]
Goco et al., v. Court of Appeals et al., G.R. No. 157449, April 6,
2010; Heirs of Rolando N. Abadilla v. Galarosa, G.R. No. 149041, July 12, 2006,
494 SCRA 675, 688.
[30]
Goco et al., v. Court of Appeals et al., id.
[31]
Plasabas et al., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166519, March 31, 2009,
582 SCRA 686, 687; PepsiCo. Inc. v. Emerald Pizza, Inc., G.R. No. 153059, August

14, 2007, 530 SCRA 58, 67.

[32]
Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil. 569,
571 (2003), citing Santos v. Santos, 418 Phil. 681, 692 (2001).
[33]
363 Phil. 393, 394-395 (1999).
[34]
G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 86.