MAIQUEZ, Preciosa Angela O.

POLSC 163 Seminal Essay

2006 – 13330 March 23, 2010

Rationality, Political Cognition, and Non-Voting in UP Diliman: Why the Act of Not Voting

is Rational.

I. Background

There are a lot of venues where an individual can engage in political participation.

However, it has been generally viewed that political participation is tantamount only to voting in

elections. As this is the case, people tend to generalize that those who vote are the ones who are

participating actively, and those who do not cast their vote are often labeled as apathetics.

This is also the case when one describes the University Student Council Elections in the

University of the Philippines-Diliman. If one were to count the people who actively participate

and those who are “concerned” to the University, they will simply look at two things: the number

of UP students who joined demonstrations and the voters’ turnout of the USC Elections, both of

which is not overwhelmingly high, though I choose not to elaborate on the former.

As I have been in the University for the past four years, I observed that the voter’s

turnout in the USC Elections has always been low. For the last 3 years, it turns out that not even
1
50 percent of the population partook in the USC elections. Thus, certain groups in the

University accuse UP students as apathetic and that they do not care for the University.

1
According to the Philippine Collegian, voters’ turnout this year was only 43.11 %, slightly higher from last year’s
42.96 %. (http://www.philippinecollegian.net/?p=200). Retrieved March 10, 2010.
 Such claim, I think, does not do justice to UP students who chose not to vote. Though I

won’t deny that some who did not participate are indeed apathetic, it would be wrong to

generalize all of those who did not vote as such.

This paper will look at this case of non-voting in the University of the Philippines-

Diliman. It will argue that some of the people who chose not to vote in the USC elections are not

apathetic. Furthermore, it will argue that, as a result of the voter’s thorough thinking, the act of

not voting in their part is the MOST rational thing to do.

This paper aims to propose a theory that suggests such claims by taking into account the

voter’s level of political cognition. This paper will exhaust the ideas of Dalton (2000) regarding

cognition and sophistication and will also adopt and develop the existing theories of voting done

by scholars in order for it to account for the explanation of rational non-voting. And to validate

the theory of non-voting that will be formulated, the paper will apply it in explaining the case of

non-voting in the University of the Philippines. The paper will also identify the limitations of the

voting theory in terms of explaining non-voting. And lastly, the paper aims to propose a solution

to address the issue of non-voting.

II. Definition of Terms

A. Rationality

Rationality is defined as one’s ability to order preferences and to choose the more

preferred actions to the less preferred ones. (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968: 2007)

B. Political Cognition or Sophistication

The study of political cognition focuses on various aspects of 'political information

processing'. It essentially deals with the acquisition, uses and structures of mental
 representations about political situations, events, actors and groups. (Van Dijk, (undated):

206)

C. Non-voting

Defined simply as the act of not voting

III. Statement of the Problem

Since one’s view of political participation is sometimes limited only to voting, it is

generally assumed that non-voters are apathetics. However, I argue that it is not necessarily the

case. This essay primarily aims to vindicate non-voters from such accusations.

Furthermore, it is also widely considered that the act of not voting is irrational. This

claim will also be refuted in this paper. I will argue that not only non-voting is rational, but given

certain circumstances, it is the best action that a voter could do.

This essay will basically point out the reasons why the act of not voting is rational. To do

this, the essay will argue that an individual’s level of political knowledge plays a role in shaping

his decision whether he will vote or not.

IV. Theoretical Framework and Assumptions: Review of Related Literature

As what has been stated above, this essay recognizes the role that cognition plays in

shaping an individual’s decision whether he will vote or not. This essay will argue that the

information known to the voter (dimension of political cognition) has a positive relationship with

his vote choice, that is, an individual with a high level of information are more likely to vote than

the people with low level of information. (Palfrey and Poole, 1987: 511) (See Fig. 1) Given this

relationship between political cognition and voting choice, this paper will assume that a rational
non-voter chooses not to vote in the event that he doesn’t have adequate information about all the

candidates.

Voting Choice (Y)

f(x)

Level of Political Information (X)

Figure 1. The Relationship between political cognition and voting choice.

This paper will adopt Riker’s and Ordeshook’s theory of the calculus of voting (1968) as

its framework. This framework came about as an effort to “reinterpret the voting calculus so that

it can fit comfortably into a rationalistic theory of political behavior”. This theory basically

states that the reward (R) that an individual voter receives from his act of voting is equal to the

probability that the citizen will bring about the benefit by voting (P) and the differential benefit

that an individual receives from the success of his preferred candidate (B), minus the costs of the

act of voting (C), plus a direct utility gain from the act of voting (D) (Riker and Ordeshook,

1968: 25):

This is what they call the expected utility hypothesis, wherein it is reasonable for the

voter to cast a vote if R > 0, and not reasonable if R ≥ 0.

 Though this theory is primarily used to explain the rationality of the act of voting, this

paper also recognizes its significance in explaining the rationality of not voting. As such, it will

be one of the basic assumptions of this paper that a voter gains a certain utility in the practice of

not-voting. Taking all these into consideration, this paper will also assume that the rational voter,

in this case, is after the reward of knowing that he voted for someone who he thinks is best for

the position.

However, there is a need to modify this theory as it only takes into consideration that

there are only two parties competing for the position (it would be wrong to adopt it as such as the

paper is going to apply it to the situation of USC elections in which there are three parties

competing for council posts). Furthermore, the theory deals with much economics to the extent

that there is no more room for psychological explanation (Note that the inquiry of

cognition/sophistication is in the field of psychology). In order for this theory to cater to the

topic, restructuring it is recommended, and I will do this by combining it with other theories.

Figure 2. Modified Theoretical Framework

 Given this case, this paper will supplement the theory of the calculus of voting by looking

at another tool in explaining voting behavior: the minimax regret criterion (Ferejohn and Fiorina,

1974: 528). This specifies that the “citizen should choose the act which minimizes his maximum

regret”. Under this principle, a minimax regret decision-maker lives by under a simple rule:

He imagines himself in each possible future state of the world and

looks at how much in error each of his available actions could be,
given that state. Then, he chooses that action whose maximum
error over the states of nature at least. If asked why he voted, a
minimax regret decision would reply “My God, what if I didn’t
vote and my preferred candidate lost by one vote? (Ferejohn and
Fiorina, 1974: 535)

Equally important to discuss is the maximin rule which states that “the decision-maker

should ascertain the worst possible payoff associated with each strategy and choose the strategy

whose worst payoff is best” (Ferrejohn and Fiorina, 1974: 535). This paper will assume that the

rational non-voter also possess the same line of thinking that the minimax- and/or and the

maximin regret decision-maker have.

All these theories will be applied in explaining the rationality of non-voting in UP. (See

next chapter)

V. Observation in UP Diliman – USC Politics and the Application of theory.

As what had been said above, voter turnout in USC Elections in the University of the

Philippines-Diliman has not reached 50% for the past 3 years, and it would be wrong to

generalize all of them as being apathetic and that what they did was irrational.

Again, this paper primarily assumes that the act of not voting is rational as the voter

chooses not to vote because he does not possess adequate information about all the candidates.
Why assume such a thing? Dalton has stated that one’s level of political sophistication is affected

by the political environment (2000: 919). Thus, in this case, there is a need to elaborate on the

political environment of UP Diliman.

Basically, there are three parties competing for the seats in the student council. In order

for them to garner the vote of the student, the aspirants introduce their selves, present plans of

actions and impress the electorate, basically and to a certain extent effectively, through room-to-

room campaigning (RTR) and the Meeting de Avance. However, we must face the reality that

given the wide demography of the campus, it would be impossible for the aspirants to reach all

the students through RTRs. In addition to these, there is also a possibility for these aspirants not

to communicate their message(s) effectively as they are only given limited time.

Taking into consideration meeting de avance, not all students can attend this activity as it

is frequently in conflict with their classes. Given all these instances, I believe that it is safe to say

that most, if not all, UP students don’t possess the information they need in order to decide who

they will vote for. In line with the assumption that a voter wants the best aspirant for the post to

be elected in office, he cannot possibly determine who it is as he does not possess the

information that he needs.

As such, according to the theory of the calculus of voting and the assumption that a voter

would vote for someone who he thinks is best for the position, and taking into account the direct

effect of voting to the individual, D (it might not have utility given this case); the costs of voting,

C (which may be high as he lacked the information and the knowledge to discern who is the best

candidate) and the prospect of some uncertain future benefit , PB; the combination of all of these

may result to a value of R which is less than and equal to zero. As a result, the voter will choose

not to vote for any of the candidate.

 Furthermore, in accordance to the minimax rule and given this case, non-voting is the

action that a rational voter must choose in order to minimize his maximum regret. This is the

case because, a rational voter might regret that he voted for someone given that he does not have

enough information of the other candidates, and eventually finding out that this certain someone

is not actually the best one for the position. There is no need to elaborate on the maximin rule as

whatever the situation in this perspective, the only rational thing to do is to abstain.

Thus, in all of these cases, it would always be better for a UP student not to vote in USC

elections if he does not have the adequate information, in contrast to voting which will be viewed

as irrational in this case as the voter’s rewards for participating is negative and that this act of

voting might result into something that he will regret.

VI. Gaps

The theoretical framework that I applied in the explanation of non-voting in the USC

elections is only limited to this situation. This paper does not guarantee that it will hold true for

other situation that will explain voting and non-voting. In example, the theoretical framework

does not account for the act of non-voting that is employed by anarchists and libertarians who

wish to promote a free society.

Furthermore, this paper did not explore on facts to validate the framework; this paper

only made use of assumptions. To further validate this theory, there is a need to base it on

evidences. Thus, for the mean time, the arguments that I made may be inconclusive, and thus,

can also be subject to be rebutted.

VII. Proposed Solution and Conclusion

In general, the article only suggests that we should not hastily characterize non-voters as

apathetic and irrational because, as to what this paper has accomplished, the act of not voting is

not irrational and that, in certain circumstances, it can be the best activity in order to minimize

possible regret.

Furthermore, the theory formulated in this paper is not without flaws, as stated above, the

paper does not guarantee the universality of the theory in situations.

In this section, I would also want to suggest some measures that the UP administration

can take in order to address the issue of non-voting.

One thing that I suggest is a longer campaign period for aspirants. Though it is still

impossible for these people to reach all students, adding more time for them to campaign can

somehow lead to the increase of number of students that they can inform, thus facilitating a

proper dissemination of information. And lastly, I also suggest that the administration suspend

classes during Meeting de Avances in order to encourage participation in such events. All these

suggestions may lead to an increase of voter turnout in the next elections and may somehow

lessen the incident of not voting.

References:

• Riker, William and Peter Ordeshook (1968). “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting”.

American Political Science Review, 62 (March 1968): 25-42

• Ferejohn, John and Morris Fiorina (1974). “The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision

Theoretic Analysis”. American Political Science Review, 68 (1974): 525-536

• Dalton, Russell (2000). “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior”. Comparative Political

Studies, Volume 33, Numbers 6 and 7 (August-September), pp. 912-940.

• Palfrey, Thomas and Keith Poole (1987). “The Relationship between Information,

Ideology, and Voting Behavior”. American Journal of Political Science. 31, 3: 511-530.

• Van Dijk, Teun. (unpublished). Political Discourse and Political Condition.