Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 12

CIR vs. CA, Atlas Consolidated 242 SCRA 289 GR No.

104151 March 10, 1995


"Assessments are prima facie presumed correct and made in good faith. So that, in the
absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of official duties, an
assessment will not be disturbed."
FACTS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue served two notices and demand for
payment of the respective deficiency ad valorem and buiness taxes for taxable years
1975 and 1976 against the respondent Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation (ACMDC). The latter protested both assessments but the same were
denied, hence it filed two separate petitions for review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The
CTA rendered a consolidated decision holding, inter alia, that ACMDC was not liable for
deficiency ad valorem taxes on copper and silver for 1975 and 1976 thereby effectively
sustaining the theory of ACMDC that in computing the ad valorem tax on copper
mineral, the refining and smelting charges should be deducted, in addition to freight and
insurance charges. However, the tax court held ACMDC liable for the amount consisting
of 25% surcharge for late payment of the ad valorem tax and late filing of notice of
removal of silver, gold and pyrite extracted during certain periods, and for alleged
deficiency manufacturer's sales tax and such contractor's tax for leasing out of its
personal properties. ACDMC elevated the matter to the Supreme Court claiming that
the leasing out was a mere isolated transaction, hence should not be subjected to
contractor's tax.
ISSUE: Is the claim of the private respondent, with respect to the contractor's tax,
impressed with merit?
HELD: No. It is being held that ACMDC was not a manufacturer subject to the
percentage tax imposed by Section 186 of the tax code. However such conclusion
cannot be made with respect to the contractor's tax being imposed on ACMDC. It
cannot validly claim that the leasing out of its personal properties was merely an
isolated transaction. Its book of accounts shows that
several distinct payments were made for the use of its personal properties such as its
plane, motor boat and dump truck. The series of transactions engaged in by ACMDC for
the lease of its aforesaid properties could also be deduced from the fact that during the
period there were profits earned and reported therefor. The allegation of ACMDC that it
did not realize any profit from the leasing out of its said personal properties, since its
income therefrom covered only the costs of operation such as salaries and fuel, is not
supported by any documentary or substantial evidence. Assessments are prima facie
presumed correct and made in good faith. Contrary to the theory of ACMDC, it is the
taxpayer and not the BIR who has the duty of proving otherwise. It is an elementary rule
that in the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of official duties, an
assessment will not be disturbed. All presumptions are in favor of tax assessments.
Verily, failure to present proof of error in assessments will justify judicial affirmance of
said assessment.

cir vs philam life


The Philippine American Life Insurance Co. (Philamlife) as a corporation has been paying
quarterly income taxes. In 1983, it paid the following:
a)

Quarter 1 (May 30, 1983) P3.2 million

b)

Quarter 2 (August 29, 1983) P396k

c)

Quarter 3 no payment as it was entitled to a tax credit

d)

Quarter 4 no payment as it incurred losses

Philamlife, due to its losses in said year, determined that it actually had no income at the
end of the year hence it is not liable for income tax. It then filed for a tax refund but it only
filed the same in December 1985. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) denied
the claim on the ground that it has been filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period to
file such refund claim. The CIR contends that the 2-year prescriptive period should be
reckoned from the date of the quarterly payment. Hence, Philamlifes refund claim for the
quarterly payments it paid in 1983 had prescribed in May 1985 and August 1985,
respectively.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CIRs argument are correct.
HELD: No. It is true that the counting of the two-year prescriptive period shall begin to
run from the date of payment. But in the case of corporations which are paying quarterly
taxes, there is a qualification to be made. The prescriptive period for taxpayers paying
quarterly shall commence from the time the refund is ascertained or from the time a final
adjustment return has been accomplished. The rationale behind this is that, a taxpayer
paying quarterly, like Philamlife, at the time it paid the quarterly taxes is not expected to
ascertain if a tax refund is feasible. It could not have known in May and August 1983 that
at the end of the year it will be incurring losses.
In the case at bar, the final adjustment return is deemed accomplished on April 16, 1984
this is the date upon which the prescriptive period shall commence running. Hence, the
refund claim filed in December 10, 1985 is well within the two year prescriptive period.

Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (GR
L-23501, 16, May 1967) En Banc, Reyes JBL (J): 8 concur
Facts: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, through the Director of Regional District
3, issued a letter dated 18 April 1961, to Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation,
assessing against the latter the sum of P5,007.00 as advance sales tax on an
automobile which it purchased from a tax-exempt individual, plus P300.00 as
compromise penalty, or a total of P5,307.00. Believing itself not liable therefor, the
Company, through counsel, disputed the above assessment in a letter dated 15 May
1961, and requested that the same be cancelled and/or withdrawn. Meanwhile, BIR
Assistant Regional Director Toledo followed up said assessment with a demand letter
dated 21 June 1961, to which the Company replied, calling the formers attention to its
letter of 15 May 1961 which contested the assessment and has not yet been acted
upon. The Commissioner denied the companys request for cancellation and/or
withdrawal of the assessment in a letter dated 17 August 1962, which was sent to the
Company. The record does not, however, show when the Company received this letter
of denial; but, in a letter dated 28 September 1962, which the Commissioner received
on 1 October 1962, the Company reiterated its request that the said assessment be
cancelled and/or withdrawn. In the meantime, the BIR record of the Company was
transmitted, on 24 September 1962 to its Collection Branch for collection by summary
remedies; and pursuant thereto, Regional Director Tagle sent directly to the Company
(not to its counsel) another demand letter dated 25 September 1962, enclosing
therewith a copy of the letter of denial of 17 August 17, 1962. On 18 October 1962, the
Compnay answered the letter, and on 23 January 1963, the Company, through its
counsel, further moved to reconsider the denial of its original request for cancellation
and/or withdrawal of the assessment. On 22 July 1963, the Commissioner again denied
the Companys requests (of 28 September 1961 and 23 January 1963) for
reconsideration of the assessment; which letter of denial, the Company received on 12
August 1963. On 11 September 1963, the Company filed its petition for review in the
Tax Court, (CTA Case 1450) disputing the legality of the imposition of advance sales
tax on the purchase and subsequent sale of the said automobile. The Commissioner
moved to dismiss on ground that the petition was filed beyond the 30-day period fixed in
Section 11 of Republic Act 1125. On 8 August 1964, the Tax Court, after finding that
petitioner consumed 33 days in filing its petition for review from the date of receipt of the
Commissioners ruling on the disputed assessment, issued its resolution, sustaining the
Commissioners motion to dismiss. Not satisfied, the Company appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed resolution; with costs
against the Company
1. Nature of the letters The Commissioners letter-assessment of 18 April 1961 became
a disputed assessment when the Company requested for the cancellation and/or
withdrawal of the same in its letter of 15 May 1961 (St. Stephens Association vs.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 104 Phil., 314). The Commissioners letter of 17 August
1962, denying the Companys request for cancellation constitutes the decision on the
disputed assessment, which is appealable to the Tax Court as contemplated under
Sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act 1125. The Companys letter of 28 September 1962
which the Commissioner received on 1 October 1962 is a mere pro-forma request for

reconsideration of the letter-decision of 17 August 1962 and did not adduce new facts or
arguments. The Commissioners letter of 22 July 1963 which the Company received on
12 August 1963 is the resolution on the said request for reconsideration (North
Camarines Lumber Co., Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, GR L-12353, 30
September 1960).
2. Letter-decision of 17 August 1962 touched upon allegation of 15 May 1961 letter The
contention, that the letter-decision of 17 August 1962 did not touch on its allegation in its
preceding letter (of 15 May 1961) that the automobile had passed through three
previous non- tax exempt owners before reaching the Companys hands, is not tenable.
The Commissioners letter expressly declared that, According to the findings of our
examiners, your client is the first non-tax exempt entity to acquire ownership over the
car in question; and these words directly contradicted and overruled the Companys
pretense.
3. Petition properly dismissed; Period of appeal jurisdictional and non-extendible
Considering that the period to appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to the Tax Court under Republic Act 1125 is jurisdictional and non-extendible,
and that a taxpayer may not delay indefinitely a tax assessment by reiterating his
original defenses over and over again, without substantial variation, the Tax Court
correctly dismissed the petition for review filed by the Company.

Cir vs union shipping


FACTS: In a letter dated December 27, 1974 petitioner assessed against Yee Fong
Hong, Ltd. and/or herein private respondent Union Shipping Corporation for
deficiency income taxes due for the years 1971 and 1972. Private respondent protested
the
assessment.
Petitioner, without ruling on the protest, issued a Warrant of Distraint and Levy. In a letter,
private respondent reiterated its request for reinvestigation. Petitioner, again, without
acting on the request for reinvestigation and reconsideration of the Warrant of Distraint
and
Levy,filed
a
collection
suit
against
private
respondent.
In 1979, private respondent filed with respondent court a Petition for Review. The CTA
ruled in favor of private respondent. Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy is proof of the finality
of an assessment and is tantamount to an outright denial of a motion for reconsideration
of
an
assessment.
HELD: The Supreme Court had already laid down the dictum that
theCommissioner should always indicate to the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal
language what constitutes his final determination of the disputed assessment.
There appears to be no dispute that petitioner did not rule on private respondent's motion
for reconsideration but contrary to the above ruling of this Court, left private respondent
in the dark as to which action of theCommissioner is the decision appealable to the Court
of Tax Appeals. Had he categorically stated that he denies private respondent's motion
for reconsideration and that his action constitutes his final determination on the
disputed assessment, private respondent without needless difficulty would have been
able to determine when his right to appeal accrues and the resulting confusion would
have been avoided.

Yabes v flojo
In May 1962, Doroteo Yabes received an assessment notice from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR) demanding him to pay P15k in taxes. Doroteo filed a protest within
the prescribed period. The protest was initially denied in September 1962 however, a few
days after the denial, the CIR advised Doroteo to execute a waiver of the statute of
limitations (SOL) and to allow the CIR to hold in abeyance the ruling of his case until a
similar case (Cirilo Constantino Case) which involves exactly the same issue would be
decided by the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Doroteo complied but while waiting for the
CTA to decide that case, Doroteo died. The CTA finally decided the Constantino Case
but the same was appealed to the Supreme Court (SC). And so the CIR asked the
successors-in-interest of Doroteo, Elpidio and Severino Yabes, to execute another waiver
while waiting for the SC decision. The waiver was duly executed and it extended the
period of prescription within which the CIR may collect the assessed tax to December 31,
1970.
The Constantino Case was decided by the SC in February 1970. On December 4, 1970,
before the lapse of the extended period (12/31/70), the CIR filed a tax collection suit
against the estate of Doroteo Yabes with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cagayan.
Elpidio et al received the summons on January 20, 1971. Elpidio et al then filed an appeal
with the CTA on February 12, 1971. At the same time, Elpidio et al filed a motion to
dismiss (MTD) the collection suit with CFI Cagayan on the ground that the filing of the
collection suit is a denial by the CIR of the protest; that such denial is appealable to the
CTA; that CFI Cagayan therefore has no jurisdiction over the case. However, Judge
Napoleon Flojo of CFI Cagayan denied the MTD.
ISSUE: Whether or not CFI Cagayan has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The CTA acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case when Elpidio et al
appealed.
But is the appeal filed on time?
Yes. The formal assessment notice (FAN) is considered to have been formally made
when the tax collection suit was filed on December 4, 1970. The FAN is considered
received by Elpidio et al when they received the summons on January 20, 1971. From
there, they have 30 days to file an appeal with the CTA. They filed their appeal on
February 12, 1971 well within the 30 day period to appeal.
Instead of dismissing, is it okay for CFI Cagayan to hold in abeyance the tax collection
suit while the CTA decide on the appeal?
No, because it has no jurisdiction. It cannot wait for the CTA to decide, it must dismiss
the case.

So what will happen to the collection suit?


In this case, the Supreme Court ordered that the complaint of the CIR in the collection
suit be transferred to the CTA as a counterclaim to the appeal filed by Elpidio et al.

Yaokasin vs cir
Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by
petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and
turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District
Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order
was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms
Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated Reorganization
Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases where the decision
is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of
automatic review.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87
contending that these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was
part of P.D. 1 was however published in the Official Gazette.
Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to
take effect
NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an
administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates,
the custom collectors. Said issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly
with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons
(the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, It
need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned.
Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published
in the Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public
nature of Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be
published except when these have no general applicability.
- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/07/yaokasin-v-commissionerdigest.html#sthash.uOZ5j9E9.dpuf

Marubeni vs cir
Facts:
Marubeni Corporation is a Japanese corporation licensed to engage in business in the
Philippines. When the profits on Marubenis investments in Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
of Manila were declared, a 10% final dividend tax was withheld from it, and another 15%
profit remittance tax based on the remittable amount after the final 10% withholding tax
were paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Marubeni Corp. now claims for a refund or
tax credit for the amount which it has allegedly overpaid the BIR.

Issues and Ruling:


1. Whether or not the dividends Marubeni Corporation received from Atlantic Gulf and
Pacific Co. are effectively connected with its conduct or business in the Philippines as to
be considered branch profits subject to 15% profit remittance tax imposed under
Section 24(b)(2) of the National Internal Revenue Code.
NO. Pursuant to Section 24(b)(2) of the Tax Code, as amended, only profits remitted
abroad by a branch office to its head office which are effectively connected with its trade
or business in the Philippines are subject to the 15% profit remittance tax. The
dividends received by Marubeni Corporation from Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. are not
income arising from the business activity in which Marubeni Corporation is engaged.
Accordingly, said dividends if remitted abroad are not considered branch profits for
purposes of the 15% profit remittance tax imposed by Section 24(b)(2) of the Tax Code,
as amended.

Bpi vs cir
On October 20, 1989, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a formal assessment
notice (FAN) against the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). The FAN demanded BPI to
pay P28k in taxes. In November 1989, BPI filed a protest however the protest did not
specify if it was a request for reconsideration or a reinvestigation. The BIR did not reply
on the protest but on October 15, 1992 (four days before the expiration of the period to
collect or 1095 days [3 years]after issuance of FAN on 10/20/1989), the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued a warrant of distraint/levy against BPI for the satisfaction
of the assessed tax. The warrant was served to BPI on October 23, 1992 (four days after
period has prescribed). In September 1997, the CIR finally sent a letter to BPI advising
the latter that its protest is denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the filing of the protest by BPI suspended the running of the prescriptive
period.
2. Whether or not the governments right to collect the assessed tax has prescribed.
HELD:
1. No. The protest did not indicate whether BPI was asking for a reconsideration or a
reinvestigation but since BPI did not adduce additional evidence, it should be treated as
a request for reconsideration. Under the tax code, a request for reconsideration does not
suspend the running of the prescriptive period. Even assuming that the protest is a
request for reinvestigation, the same did not toll the running of the prescriptive period
because the CIR failed to show proof that the request has been granted and that a
reinvestigation has been actually conducted. In fact, BPI never heard from the BIR not
until the CIR decided the protest in September 1997 5 years after the protest has been
filed.
2. Yes. When it comes to collection, even though the warrant for distraint/levy was issued
within the prescriptive period, it is required that the same should be served upon the
taxpayer within the prescriptive period. This is because it is upon the service of the
Warrant that the taxpayer is informed of the denial by the BIR of any pending protest of
the said taxpayer, and the resolute intention of the BIR to collect the tax assessed. In the
case at bar, BPI received the warrant 4 days after the expiration of the prescriptive period
hence, the right to collect has already prescribed.

Agfha vs cta
FACTS:
Petitioner owns a shipment of bales of text grey cloth which arrived at Manila. It was
processed for forfeiture when it allgedly violated the Tariff and Customs Code. The
issue was held in favor of petitioner.
The CTA issued a writ of execution directing the CIR to effect the immediate release of
the shipment to petitioner. The writ was not implemented as the shipment was lost.
CTA found the CC liable for the loss of the shipment and ordered to pay. After
reconsideration by the parties, the CTA modified its resolution, and ordered that the
taxes and duties on the shipment be deducted from the amount recoverable by
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration which was denied by the CTA and
then filed before the SC.
Meanwhile, the CC filed with the CTA en banc a petition for review regarding the order
of payment to petitioner.
Petitioner, instead of filing its Comment to the petition for review, filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that a petition for review is not the proper remedy to challenge
interlocutory orders and/or orders of execution. The CTA denied the motion. Petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari, thus the other case contending that the CTA should not
have entertained the CC's appeal over an order of execution.
ISSUE: Whether the contentions of petitioners are valid.
RULING:
NO. The resolution of the CTA, ordering the CC to pay, is not an interlocutory order
since it left nothing to be done by the CTA with respect to the merits of the case. It is a
final judgment which fully disposed of the issue appurtenant to respondents liability to
petitioner on account of the loss of the shipment.
Section 18 of RA 1125 provides that "a party adversely affected by a resolution of a
Division of the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for
review with the CTA en banc. Likewise, Rule 8, Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Revised
Rules of the CTA provides that "appeal from a decision or resolution of the Court in
Division on a motion for reconsideration or new trial shall be taken to the Court by
petition for review as provided in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court en banc shall
act on the appeal.
Clearly, it was well within the CTAs power of review to entertain respondents appeal.

NO. Respecting G.R. No. 172051, the same must be dismissed too on the ground that
petitioner failed to show that it has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. Even assuming that the findings
of the CTA are incorrect, the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law which is
reviewable by timely appeal. Rules 65 is not the correct appeal in this case.

Вам также может понравиться