Safety of Navigation

Section 7-7
A clear view in all directions is preferred, but it is essential to be able to see ahead, and
especially directly ahead.
There should be no blind sector caused by cargo forward of the beam which obstructs
the view of the sea surface as seen from the navigating and manoeuvring workstation
to exceed 10 degrees on each side of the bow and two ship lenghts or 500 meters from
the stem.
Question 12:
Can the master and watch keeping officers concerned with the operation of the
steering gear demonstrate the change over procedures and operation of steering
systems?
Reg. 26 applies to all ships, which proceed to sea. Regulation 26 summarizes the
requirements for:
A simple operating instructions with a block diagram showing the change over
procedures for remote steering gear control systems and steering gear power units
where applicable, be permanently displayed on the navigating bridge and in the
steering gear compartment.

For testing steering gear prior to departure.

Requirements for instructions.
Officers competence in steering gear operation / maintenance.
Requirements for testing emergency steering gear drills.
Recording of tests and drills

The checks and tests shall include:

The full movement of the rudder according to the required capabilities of the
steering gear.
A visual inspection for the steering gear and its connecting linkage; and
The operation of the means of communication between the Navigation Bridge
and steering gear compartment.
Masters, and all watch keeping personnel must be familiar with the procedure for
changing over from automatic to manual steering as required by Regulation 26, and
must ensure that sufficient time is allowed for the operation. The changeover from
manual to automatic steering and vice-versa should be made by, or under the
supervision of, the officer of the watch or the master.
All ships' officers concerned with the operation and/or maintenance of steering gear
shall be familiar with the operation of the steering systems fitted on the ship and with
the procedures for changing from one system to another.
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*

CONCENTRATED INSPECTION CAMPAIGN ON LIFEBOAT LAUNCHING ARRANGEMENTS

Inspection Authority:
Port of Inspection:
Date of Inspection
Ship Name:
IMO Number:
Flag of Ship:
Call Sign:
Ship Type:
Port
On-load release Manufacturer:
On-load release model:
On-load release date of manufacture:
Starboard
On-load release Manufacturer:
On-load release model:
On-load release date of manufacture:
Yes
1

Does the ship have davit-launched lifeboats?

No

N/A

Maintenance and Records

2

Do records indicate that lifeboats have been launched and manoeuvred in the
water in accordance with SOLAS requirements? (2025)

Do records indicate that the dynamic tests of the winch brake have been carried
out? (0696)

4*

Do records indicate that the launching arrangements (falls, lifeboats, on-load

release and davits) are regularly maintained? (0696)

5*

Are the means of attaching the lifeboat hook assemblies to the lifeboat in
satisfactory condition? (0696)

Operational Safety
6

Have the hazards associated with the launching and recovery of lifeboats been
identified (ISM)? (2535)

Are any procedures or instructions implemented on-board relating to the

hazards identified in Q6? (2535)

The CIC on lifeboat launching arrangements was conducted during period of September-November 2009.

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Yes
8*

No

N/A

Are all key personnel familiar with the procedures for the launch and recovery of
lifeboats? (0695)

Is the crew familiar with relevant IMO documentation and guidance including
MSC Circulars 1205 and 1206? (0695)
On Load Releases
3

10

Are on load releases fitted?

11*

Can the ships crew describe an understanding of the operation of the on-load
release, including interlocks as appropriate? (0695)

12

Are clear operating instructions for use of the on-load release, in the working
language of the ship, provided with a suitably worded warning notice? (2055)

13

Is the release mechanism designed so that crew members in the lifeboat can
clearly observe when the release mechanism is properly and completely reset
and ready for lifting? (0630)

14

Is the release control clearly marked in a colour that contrasts with its
surroundings? (0630)

15*

Are the hooks and release arrangements, including any interlocks, correctly set?
(0630)

16*

Are lifeboat on-load releases in satisfactory condition? (0696)

Davits and Winches

17*

Are the davits in satisfactory condition? (0696)

18*

Do all the sheaves and other moving parts, including limit switches, operate
correctly? (0696)

19*

Is the centrifugal winch brake operating satisfactorily in freefall mode and the
manual brake automatically reapplying upon release? (0630)

Drill
20*

If conducted, was a drill performed satisfactorily? (2025)

(If not conducted enter N/A)
Detention

21

Was the ship detained as a result of this CIC?

If a NO answer is selected for questions marked with * the PSCO should use their professional judgement to
determine whether the vessel should be considered for detention.
1

For free-fall lifeboats answer NO

For vessels without lifeboats answer NA and answer questions 2 19 NA

For free-fall lifeboats answer NA

If No questions 11-16 should be marked NA

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Guidance Notes
Headers:

On-load release Manufacturer, Model and Date of manufacture only to be

completed for on-load release equipment fitted to davit-launched lifeboats.
For free-fall lifeboats, davit launched lifeboats with conventional (off-load only)
release hooks and where the vessel has no lifeboats as allowed by SOLAS
III/31.1, the fields are to be marked N/A.

Question 1:

Answer will be Yes for conventionally launched open or enclosed lifeboats.

Answer will be No for free-fall boats.
Answer will be N/A where the vessel has no lifeboats as allowed by SOLAS
III/31.1.3. Where the vessel carries no lifeboats, questions 2-19 are to
be marked N/A.

Question 2:

Records should indicate that drills have been conducted in accordance with
SOLAS III/19.3 with the exception that the operating crew need not be onboard
during the lowering of the boat if the ship chooses not to do so.

Question 3:

Dynamic tests of the winch brake are not required for free-fall lifeboats (Q.1
marked as No) and should be answered NA if applicable.
For lifeboats where Q.1 has been marked as Yes look for evidence/records of
tests carried out as required by SOLAS III/20.11 and LSA Code ChVI as
detailed below;
SOLAS III/20.11
11 Periodic servicing of launching appliances and on-load release gear
11.1 Launching appliances shall be:
.1 maintained in accordance with instructions for on-board
maintenance as required by regulation 36;
.2 subject to a thorough examination at the annual surveys required
by regulations I/7 or I/8, as applicable; and
.3 upon completion of the examination referred to in .2 subjected
to a dynamic test of the winch brake at maximum lowering
speed. The load to be applied shall be the mass of the survival
craft or rescue boat without persons on board, except that, at
intervals not exceeding five years, the test shall be carried out
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with a proof load equal to 1.1 times the weight of the survival
craft or rescue boat and its full complement of persons and
equipment.
MSC Circ.1206 also recommends that a dynamic test of the winch brake, using the
empty boat, be conducted at each annual inspection. As this is a recommendation and
the circular is not mandatory, a deficiency for this may not be warranted.
LSA Code Ch VI

6.

6.1.2.5 The winch brakes of a launching appliance shall be of sufficient strength to

withstand:
.1 a static test with a proof load of not less than 1.5 times the maximum
working load; and
.2 a dynamic test with a proof load of not less than 1.1 times the
maximum working load at maximum lowering speed.

Question 4:

Maintenance to be carried out in accordance with SOLAS III/20.4 as per

Resolution MSC 216(82) from 01st July 2008;
For lifeboats where Q.1 has been marked as Yes look for evidence of
maintenance carried out as required by SOLAS III/20.3, 20.4, 20.6 and 20.7
and 20.11; as detailed below;
SOLAS III/20.3
3 Maintenance
3.1 Maintenance, testing and inspections of life-saving appliances shall
be carried out based on the guidelines developed by the Organization*
and in a manner having due regard to ensuring reliability of such
appliances.
* Refer to the Guidelines for periodic servicing and maintenance of lifeboats,
launching appliances and on-load release gear (MSC/Circ.1206).
3.2 Instructions for on-board maintenance of life-saving appliances
complying with regulation 36 shall be provided and maintenance shall be
carried out accordingly.

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3.3 The Administration may accept, in compliance with the requirements
of paragraph 3.2, a shipboard planned maintenance programme, which
includes the requirements of regulation 36.
SOLAS III/20.4
Falls used in launching shall be inspected periodically* with special regard for
areas passing through sheaves, and renewed when necessary due to
deterioration of the falls or at intervals of not more than 5 years, whichever is
the earlier.
* Refer to Measures to prevent accidents with lifeboats (MSC.1/Circ.1206).
The PSCO may also ask the master for an indication of how such inspections
are conducted and whether there are any flag State requirements. PSCOs
should note that the above SOLAS amendment removed the previous
regulation requiring end-for-ending of falls at no more than 30 months.
SOLAS III/20.6
6 Weekly inspection
The following tests and inspections shall be carried out weekly and a report of
the inspection shall be entered in the log-book:
.1 all survival craft, rescue boats and launching appliances shall be
visually inspected to ensure that they are ready for use. The inspection
shall include, but is not limited to, the condition of hooks, their attachment
to the lifeboat and the on-load release gear being properly and completely
reset;
.2 all engines in lifeboats and rescue boats shall be run for a total period of
not less than 3 min, provided the ambient temperature is above the
minimum temperature required for starting and running the engine. During
this period of time, it should be demonstrated that the gear box and gear
box train are engaging satisfactorily. If the special characteristics of an
outboard motor fitted to a rescue boat would not allow it to be run other
than with its propeller submerged for a period of 3 min, a suitable water
supply may be provided. In special cases, the Administration may waive
this requirement for ships constructed before 1 July 1986;
.3 lifeboats, except free-fall lifeboats, on cargo ships shall be moved from
their stowed position, without any persons on board, to the extent
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necessary to demonstrate satisfactory operation of launching appliances,
if weather and sea conditions so allow;
SOLAS III/20.7
7 Monthly inspections
7.1 All lifeboats, except free-fall lifeboats, shall be turned out from their
stowed position, without any persons on board if weather and sea
conditions so allow.
7.2 Inspection of the life-saving appliances, including lifeboat equipment,
shall be carried out monthly using the checklist required by regulation 36.1
to ensure that they are complete and in good order. A report of the
inspection shall be entered in the log-book.
SOLAS III/20.11
11 Periodic servicing of launching appliances and on-load release gear
11.1 Launching appliances shall be:
.1 maintained in accordance with instructions for on-board maintenance
as required by regulation 36;
.2 subject to a thorough examination at the annual surveys required by
regulations I/7 or I/8, as applicable; and
.3 upon completion of the examination referred to in .2 subjected to a
dynamic test of the winch brake at maximum lowering speed. The load
to be applied shall be the mass of the survival craft or rescue boat
without persons on board, except that, at intervals not exceeding five
years, the test shall be carried out with a proof load equal to 1.1 times
the weight of the survival craft or rescue boat and its full complement of
persons and equipment.
11.2 Lifeboat or rescue boat on-load release gear, including free-fall lifeboat
release systems, shall be:
.1 maintained in accordance with instructions for on-board maintenance
as required by regulation 36;
.2 subject to a thorough examination and operational test during the
annual surveys required by regulations I/7 and I/8 by properly trained
personnel familiar with the system; and
.3 operationally tested under a load of 1.1 times the total mass of the boat
when loaded with its full complement of persons and equipment
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whenever the release gear is overhauled. Such over-hauling and test
shall be carried out at least once every five years.*
Refer to the Recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances, adopted by
the Organization by resolution A.689(17). For life-saving appliances installed
on board on or after 1 July 1999, refer to the Revised Recommendations on
testing of life-saving appliances, adopted by the Organization by resolution
MSC.81(70).

Question 5:

For free-fall lifeboats answer NA

Particular attention should be given to corrosion in the keel area.

Question 6:

Refer to MSC/Circ.1206 which identifies the follow hazards.

i.
failure of on-load release mechanism;
ii.
inadvertent operation of on-load release mechanism;
iii.
inadequate maintenance of lifeboats, davits and launching equipment;
iv.
communication failures;
v.
lack of familiarity with lifeboats, davits, equipment and associated
controls;
vi.
unsafe practices during lifeboat drills and inspections; and
vii.
design faults other than on-load release mechanisms.
The PSCO may be provided with evidence of this question in fleet circulars,
memos or written procedures within the ISM SMS
If the answer to this question is No, then the answer to question 7 is also No

Question 7:

Refer to MSC/Circ.1206 and guidance notes for question 6. If the answer to

question 6 was No, then the answer to this question is also No
It would be expected that any precautions implemented would be included
within the safety management system.

Question 8 & 9:Refer to MSC/Circ.1206 and any documentation given in support of question 6
and 7. Also, it should be expected that procedures should be laid down in the
vessels SMS and manufacturers instructions should be available,
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Personnel on board should be familiar with MSC/Circ.1205 & 1206 as
applicable. As with all the relevant circulars and in accordance with ISM 1.2.3,
applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the
Organization, Administrations, classification societies and maritime industry
organizations should be taken into account.
MSC/Circ.1205 is not a compulsory document, but any ship with lifeboats
should be familiar with the principles outlined within it.
MSC/Circ.1206 is not a compulsory document, but any ship with lifeboats
should be familiar with the principles outlined and maintenance arrangements
should take account of those principles.

Question 10:

If No then answer N/A for questions 11-16. For free-fall lifeboats answer
"No".

Question 11:

It is recommended that this be determined by questions to a crew member

before the lifeboat is lowered or launched and in a manner which DOES NOT
require the gear to be operated. A line of questioning should be taken which
focuses on how the gear prevents an accidental release during recovery of the
boat, including the principles of mechanical protection (interlock) and how the
mechanism is reset. Questioning should be primarily directed at ships staff
who are assigned duties relating to the launching and recovery of the lifeboats
and the operation of the on load release gear as they should have a very good
knowledge of the system in order to fulfil these functions.
The PSCO may also refer to the operating and resetting instructions within the
boat (see also question 12 below.)

Question 12 :

For ships keel laid after 1-7-1998 until 1-7-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.2.2
states: an on-load release capability which will release the lifeboat with a
load on the hooks. This release shall be so arranged as to release the lifeboat
under any conditions of loading from no load with the lifeboat waterborne to a
load of 1.1 times the total mass of the lifeboat when loaded with its full
complement of persons and equipment. This release capability shall be
adequately protected against accidental or premature use. Adequate
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protection shall include special mechanical protection not normally required for
off-load release, in addition to a danger sign. To prevent an accidental
release during recovery of the boat, the mechanical protection (interlock)
should only engage when the release mechanism is properly and completely
reset. To prevent a premature on-load release, on-load operation of the
release mechanism should require a deliberate and sustained action by the
operator. The release mechanism shall be so designed that crew members in
the lifeboat can clearly observe when the release mechanism is properly and
completely reset and ready for lifting. Clear operating instructions should
be provided with a suitably worded warning notice
For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.2.2 states on-load
release capability shall release the lifeboat with a load on the hooks. This
release shall be so arranged as to release the lifeboat under any conditions of
loading from no load with the lifeboat waterborne to a load of 1.1 times the total
mass of the lifeboat when loaded with its full complement of persons and
equipment. This release capability shall be adequately protected against
accidental or premature use. Adequate protection shall include special
mechanical protection not normally required for off-load release, in addition to
a danger sign. To prevent a premature on-load release, on-load operation of
the release mechanism should require a deliberate and sustained action by the
operator
For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.3 states to prevent an
accidental release during recovery of the boat, unless the hook is completely
reset, either the hook shall not be able to support any load, or the handle or
safety pins shall not be able to be returned to the reset (closed) position
without excessive force. Additional danger signs shall be posted at each
hook station to alert crew members to the proper method of resetting
For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.5 states clear
operating instructions shall be provided with a suitably worded warning
notice using colour coding, pictograms, and/or symbols as necessary for
clarity. If colour coding is used, green shall indicate a properly reset
hook and red shall indicate danger of improper or incorrect setting

Question 13:

For ships keel laid after 1-7-1998 until 1-7-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.2.2
states an on-load release capability which will release the lifeboat with a load
on the hooks. This release shall be so arranged as to release the lifeboat
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under any conditions of loading from no load with the lifeboat waterborne to a
load of 1.1 times the total mass of the lifeboat when loaded with its full
complement of persons and equipment. This release capability shall be
adequately protected against accidental or premature use. Adequate
protection shall include special mechanical protection not normally required for
off-load release, in addition to a danger sign. To prevent an accidental release
during recovery of the boat, the mechanical protection (interlock) should only
engage when the release mechanism is properly and completely reset. To
prevent a premature on-load release, on-load operation of the release
mechanism should require a deliberate and sustained action by the operator.
The release mechanism shall be so designed that crew members in the
lifeboat can clearly observe when the release mechanism is properly and
completely reset and ready for lifting. Clear operating instructions should be
provided with a suitably worded warning notice
For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.7.6.4 states the release
mechanism shall be so designed and installed that crew members from
inside the lifeboat can clearly determine when the system is ready for
lifting by:
.4.1 directly observing that the movable hook portion or the hook portion
that locks the movable hook portion in place is properly and completely
reset at each hook; or
.4.2 observing a non-adjustable indicator that confirms that the
mechanism that locks the movable hook portion in place is properly and
completely reset at each hook; or
.4.3 easily operating a mechanical indicator that confirms that the
mechanism that locks the movable hook in place is properly and
completely reset at each hook;

Question 14:

For ships keel laid after 1-7-1998 until 1-7-08. LSA code 4.4.7.6.3 states that
the release control shall be clearly marked in a colour that contrasts
with its surroundings
For ships keel laid after 1-07-2008. LSA Code 4.4.7.6.6 states that the
release control shall be clearly marked in a colour that contrasts with its
surroundings

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Question 15:

The PSCO should visually inspect the arrangements within the lifeboat to
verify the information provided, the PSCO may find it beneficial to refer to
manufacturers manuals and/or the Solas training manual required by SOLAS
III Reg 35. The latter should contain information relevant to the onboard
lifeboat arrangement.

Question 16:

Maintenance and testing to be carried out in accordance with SOLAS III/20.11

as detailed in the Guidance Note for Question 4.

Question 17:

Carry out a general visual inspection taking into account any maintenance
records and Q4 in relation to davits.

Question 18:

For free-fall lifeboats answer NA

LSA Code 6.1.2.7 states Where davit arms are recovered by power, safety
devices shall be fitted which will automatically cut off the power before the
davit arms reach the stops in order to prevent overstressing the falls or
davits, unless the motor is designed to prevent such overstressing.

Question 19:

For free-fall lifeboats answer NA or if answer to Question 1 was No for any

other reason.
Take into account that maximum lowering speed as determined by the
Administration in accordance with LSA Code Ch VI, 6.1.2.8, 6.1.2.9 and
6.1.2.10, is not exceeded. Section 6.1.2.11 of the LSA Code requires that the
brake is capable of stopping the descent of the survival craft or rescue boat
and holding it securely when loaded with its full complement of persons and
equipment. Brake pads shall, where necessary, be protected from water and
oil to facilitate this.
LSA Coded 6.1.2.12 requires that the manual brakes shall be so arranged that
the brake is always applied unless the operator holds the brake control in the
"off" position. In other words the brake must reapply and stop boat movement
when the control is released.

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For the purpose of this CIC, witnessing effective brake operation with an
empty boat is sufficient.

When detention should be considered

Whilst an answer of No will not necessarily mean detention is warranted, as the particular
circumstances will need to be considered, detention should be considered specifically in
respect of the following No answers:
Question 4:

Given SOLAS III/20.11.1 requires maintenance according to Manufacturers

instructions and a thorough examination in conjunction with the CSSE surveys,
where the maintenance required by SOLAS III/20.11.1.1 has not been carried
but the CSSE annual inspection has been completed, or where the CSSE is
invalid due to a failure to carry out the annual or renewal survey, the vessel
should be considered for detention.
Where there is little or no evidence of maintenance and the condition of the
lifeboat arrangements including hooks, releases, davits, falls etc is such that in
the PSCOs opinion suitable maintenance has not been carried out and the
boat may be unsafe for use, detention should be considered. Examples of
conditions that may be considered unsafe are:
i.
Hooks show sign of obvious damage
ii.
Lifeboat damaged
iii.
Davit damaged/significantly wasted
iv.
Moving parts seized, or damaged in a manner that prevents correct
operation
v.
broken wires, kinks, corrosion and bird-caging of falls.

Question 5:

Where the condition of the release connection to the boat is such that in the
PSCOs opinion the boat may be unsafe for use then detention should be
considered. PSCOs should inspect the securing arrangement for hook on the
deck and to the keel of the lifeboat (such as keel bolts and plates) for any signs
of wastage or damaged.

Question 8:

Where crew members are assigned duties related to the launching, operation
and/or recovery of life boats and are not familiar with these duties, this is an
operational control issue and detention should be considered.
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Question 11:

Crew members assigned duties with respect to the operation of the release
arrangements must be familiar with all aspects of the release/resetting
operation and if unable to describe this, then this is an operational control
issue and detention should be considered.

Question 15:

If there is evidence that the hooks and/or the release system, including any
interlocks, are not correctly reset detention should be considered.
Examples of the release system not being reset which should be considered
for detention include:
i.
Cams or interlocks not correctly aligned, including where indicators are
misaligned with each other.
ii.
Hydrostatic interlock unit blocked or not operating correctly
iii. Locking mechanisms of hooks incorrectly set when boat is in the stowed
position . This can be seen visually a the hooks or release handle by
indicators etc

Question 16:

Given SOLAS III requires various maintenance, examination and operational

tests as part of the required maintenance arrangements, PSCO may consider
the following as a guide in consideration for detention:
i.
The maintenance required by SOLAS III has not been carried,
ii.
The 5 yearly over hauling and load test required by SOLAS III/20.11.2.3
has not been carried out;
iii.
Where the on load release system has been overhauled for some other
reasons outside the 5 year period and the load test required by SOLAS
III/20.11.2.3 has not been carried out;
iv.
Morse cables, actuating rods and other such devices forming part of the
system are in poor condition, obviously damaged or not operating
correctly.
v.
There is evidence of unauthorised repair of modification to the system.
vi.
There is evidence that fittings (i.e. covers and guards) forming part of the
approved arrangement are missing.

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Question 17:

Where the condition of the davits is such that in the PSCOs opinion the boat
may be unsafe for use, such as the davit structure being wasted and
weakened, detention should be considered.

Question 18:

Where the condition of the sheaves, limit switches and other moving parts is
such that in the PSCOs opinion the boat may be unsafe for use, detention
should be considered. Examples are:
i.
ii.
iii.

Question 19:

Sheaves, rollers and other fittings seized and/or wasted or weakened

Limit switches missing on non operational
Winch and/or brake arrangement in poor condition

Where the brake is not capable of stopping the boat and/or it does not
automatically reapply when released, detention should be considered.

Detentions under this CIC can be given against the individual SOLAS/LSA Code
requirement or under an element of the ISM Code such as maintenance, emergency
preparedness etc.
PSCOs should refrain from issuing multiple detentions under different deficiency codes
for a single issue.
PSCOs should also be aware that release arrangements should not require excessive
force to be reset and that proper operation in the future may be effected if force is used
to align indicators etc. If detention is given, the PSCO should consider whether an
external technician is required to inspect and service the system.

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Extracts from IMO RES A.787(19) in regard to detention considerations in general:

4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF A SUBSTANDARD SHIP
4.1.1 In general, a ship is regarded as substandard if the hull, machinery, equipment, or
operational safety, is substantially below the standards required by the relevant
conventions or whose crew is not in conformance with the safe manning document, owing to,
inter alia:
.1 the absence of principal equipment or arrangement required by the conventions;
.2 non-compliance of equipment or arrangement with relevant specifications of the
conventions;
.3 substantial deterioration of the ship or its equipment because of, for example,
poor maintenance;
.4 insufficiency of operational proficiency, or unfamiliarity of essential operational
procedures by the
crew; and
.5 insufficiency of manning or insufficiency of certification of seafarers.
4.1.2 If these evident factors as a whole or individually make the ship unseaworthy and put at
risk the ship or the life of persons on board or present an unreasonable threat of harm to
the marine environment if it were allowed to proceed to sea, it should be regarded as a
substandard ship.

APPENDIX 1
GUIDELINES FOR THE DETENTION OF SHIPS
1.2 During inspection the PSCO should further assess whether the ship and/or crew,
throughout its forthcoming voyage, is able to:
.1 navigate safely;
.2 safely handle, carry and monitor the condition of the cargo;
.3 operate the engine-room safely;
.4 maintain proper propulsion and steering;
.5 fight fires effectively in any part of the ship if necessary;
.6 abandon ship speedily and safely and effect rescue if necessary;
.7 prevent pollution of the environment;
.8 maintain adequate stability;
.9 maintain adequate watertight integrity;
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.10 communicate in distress situations if necessary; and
.11 provide safe and healthy conditions on board.
1.3 If the result of any of these assessments is negative, taking into account all deficiencies
found, the ship should be strongly considered for detention. A combination of deficiencies of a
less serious nature may also warrant the detention of the ship. Ships which are unsafe to
proceed to sea should be detained upon the first inspection irrespective of the time the ship will
stay in port.
3 Detainable deficiencies
To assist the PSCO in the use of these guidelines, there follows a list of deficiencies, grouped
under relevant conventions and/or codes, which are considered to be of such a serious nature
that they may warrant the detention of the ship involved. This list is not considered exhaustive
but is intended to give examples of relevant items.
Areas under the SOLAS Convention
5 Absence, insufficient capacity or serious deterioration of personal life-saving appliances,
survival craft and launching arrangements.

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Lifeboat Launching Arrangements

Section 7-8
Lifeboat Launching Arrangements CIC
The purpose of this CIC is twofold to increase awareness of lifeboat related safety
issues and to gather information. The inspections will be carried out in conjunction with
regular PSC. PSCOs should be prepared to distribute a copy of the IMO documents
referred to in the questions.
SAFETY: PSCOs are not to enter lifeboats unless securely stowed with gripes in
position or hanging off pennants in position, any internal inspection by the PSCO
should be conducted at this point. Pay particular attention to ensure that no crew
member inadvertently operates any release mechanism while you are in the boat.
It is not expected that a full lifeboat drill be conducted during every CIC inspection,
although it will be necessary to lower at least one boat to some extent to check the
davit and brake operation.
Should a drill be conducted, refer the Master to MSC/Circ.1206 and make it clear to the
Master that any drill or operation will be conducted under his/her control. If a boat drill is
to be undertaken while you are observing, ask the ships Master to explain the intended
approach. If it is intended to lower the boat with the operating crew on board, ask the
Master to have the boat lowered to near the water level and raised back to the
embarkation level with no person on board first. Check the operation of the davit limit
switches during this operation. During the initial lowering operation ask for the brake to
be applied at maximum lowering speed to check its operation.
If the master intends to hoist a boat fitted with on-load releases with crew on board then
ask how he intends to ensure that the hooks are correctly reset and cannot accidentally
release during the hoisting operation (answer questions 5 & 13 affirmatively before
allowing this operation).
Collect the manufacturers name and date of manufacture of enclosed lifeboats. Enter
this into the CIC comments field.
Where deficiencies are found then these should be recorded on the associated PSC
form B.
Questions 13 and 14 relate to the design of an on-load release to comply with the LSA
Code. Questions 11 and 15 are designed to determine whether issues relating to
release arrangements are primarily operational, design or maintenance related. These
questions are primarily aimed at gathering information for feeding back into our work at
IMO of accidents with lifeboats. In cases where there is obvious non-compliance with
the LSA Code then deficiencies should be issued under the PSC referring the issue to
the Classification Society issuing the Safety Equipment Certificate.

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