“Thai-Style Democracy”

A Conservative Struggle for Thailand’s Politics

Thanks to:

 Dean for introduction

 Professor Amara for her excellent supervision of Kengkij Kitirianglarp,
who worked on the original version of this paper.

I have seldom presented papers in Thailand. The principal reason for this is that I have always
considered myself a student of Thai politics, learning from the work of Thai scholars and
researchers. Indeed, in the something like 30 years that I have been learning about Thailand,
it has been the faculty in the Department of Political Science, together with those in the
Faculty of Economics here at Chula, who have been my respected teachers.

Today I feel like a student presenting some of his ideas to his professors and hope that you
find it a useful paper that might stimulate discussion and some critical commentary.

The topic is “Thai-Style Democracy”. I did have a sub-title which referred to something
about “A Royalist Struggle for Thailand’s Politics.” You can understand that with a topic like
this, I am going to have to speak in English as, for reasons that are all too well known, I need
to be careful in what I say. For the same reason, I will read my paper.

Let me begin with two disclaimers.

First, in this presentation, my emphasis is almost solely on TSD (prachathippatai baep thai).
In making this my focus, I do not wish to imply that this is the only discourse on the nature of
governance in Thailand. Indeed, the point of focusing on TSD is to highlight a set of ideas
that has, over 5 decades, continually been reiterated in on-going struggles over political
power. Each time it has been repeated or revised, it has been a contested discourse. That TSD
has been – and continues to be – challenged and debated should be kept in mind as I focus on
TSD.

The second disclaimer is that I recognize that the ideas outlined here as TSD have
considerable resonance in other places and in other times. TSD is not a set of ideas that is
unique to Thailand, despite the designation used here. However, by focusing on the particular
form and history of TSD I hope to highlight how this set of ideas has been developed in
Thailand and how it has been politically contested.

In this presentation, I hope to examine the conservative foundations of TSD both in terms of
its development and also in the context of recent attempts to embed various political and
ideological forms associated with TSD. The most recent reinvigoration of TSD has been
associated with the political struggles following the so-called good coup of 2006.

THAI-STYLE DEMOCRACY’S HERITAGE IN POLITICAL CONTESTATION

Let me begin by locating the origins of TSD in the political contestation that followed the
1932 Revolution. This might not be the conventional place to begin, for the idea that there
could be a Thai-style of government (kan pokkhrong baep thai) is usually associated with
Kukrit Pramoj, who became a prolific and influential propagandist of this notion from the

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early 1960s. While Kukrit’s ideas may be seen as the foundation of the TSD discourse, the
conservative ideas that he brought together, and which may be seen as defining TSD, have
their origins in a long and bitter struggle over power from the moment of the 1932 overthrow
of the absolute monarchy.

Thongchai Winichakul (2005: 19), writing of Thai historiography but in a comment that can
be more generally applied, argues that, at least until 1973, the “stories, plots, meanings and
ideological values” of Thai history have been dominated by an “elitist nationalist” paradigm.
In a later article, written in response to the 2006 coup, Thongchai (2008) identifies a
“conventional historiography of democratization.” Examining this conventional approach is
useful for the light it throws on the development of TSD as a political concept.

Associated in its origins with a royalist political resurgence following the end of the Second
World War, Thongchai (2008) points out that the “conventional” view of Thailand’s
democratization presents a story that runs from the Chakri kings of the middle of the 19 th
Century to the 1932 Revolution and then to the October 1973 and May 1992 uprisings. The
absolute monarchs are portrayed as having prepared the country for a democratic transition,
with King Prajadhipok, having already considered a limited constitution, being willing to
accede to the demands of the People’s Party revolutionists in 1932. However, where the king
had wanted to move slowly on democratization, the People’s Party was too hasty and so the
birth of democracy was premature. This premature birth inevitably led to military dictatorship
(see Office of the Prime Minister, 1979: 117-40; Prajak, 2005).

This view of history, while now “conventional,” was, like TSD, an outcome of political
struggle.

The basic contention of People’s Party dominated governments in the immediate post-1932
period was that while the constitution limited the power of the king it was placing him under
the law. Prime Minister Phahon explained that a constitutional monarchy meant that the
Chakri dynasty would be stable because the king under the constitution could not be
considered responsible for political decisions (Bangkok Times Weekly Mail, 12 December
1936; see Noranit, 2006: 13).

Royalists and their supporters, however, opposed this new political arrangement through
rebellions, plots and attempted assassinations, as well as through more regularized political
means.

Initially, People’s Party opponents focused their attention on demands for increased powers
for the king. For example, King Prajadhipok wanted to appoint second category members of
the national assembly. He also demanded that the government show obvious respect for the
king, prevent members of the assembly from criticizing the monarchy and punishment for
those who criticized him (Ramphai Barni, 1978: 15, 27-8). When the king abdicated, in what
has become a foundational statement in the discourse on democratization, he claimed that he
supported democratic and constitutional government, stating that he abdicated his “powers …
to the people as a whole,” adding “… I am not willing to turn them over to any individual or
any group to use in an autocratic manner without heeding the voice of the people”
(Prajadhipok, 1984: 317).

In fact, though, the king was a contingent democrat. For example, when the royalist groups
were politically weak, in 1933, he opposed the formation of political parties, arguing that the

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people were politically immature (Murashima, 1991: 23-4). When royalists seemed likely to
gain from enhanced democratization, he supported political parties.

As Murashima (1991: 3) has observed, it was only in the lead-up to the 1946 elections that
competitive party politics finally emerged. One of the first parties – the Progressive Party
(phak kaeo na) – was formed by royalist politicians grouped around Kukrit Pramoj.

This emergence of political parties coincided with the promulgation of the 1946
Constitution. This basic law is generally recognized as a more democratic document than
anything that had gone before it but it also represented something of a victory for the
royalists. While the king’s constitutional role in legislation was essentially unchanged,
lower-ranked princes and their families were legally permitted to re-enter the political fray
(Blanchard, et al., 1958: 156). Immediately, they joined politicians like Khuang Aphaiwong
in vigorously attacking the government led by Pridi Phanomyong (see Thawee in Ray, 1972:
116). The results of this political struggle are well-known, with Pridi fleeing the country.

Following the military coup, the resulting Provisional Constitution and then the 1949
Constitution expanded considerably the powers of the throne. Kobkua (2003: 49) observed
that this constitution represented the royalist interpretation of what the constitutional
monarchy should be. A critical element of this was a provision for the monarch to have a role
in appointing members of parliament. While an editorialist at the Bangkok Post (18 January
1949) described the notion of appointing the senate as “… conservative and even
reactionary,” it was central to royalist political models.

The reasoning informing this push for appointed parliamentarians seems to hinge on a
conservative perspective that the will of the people could not be trusted. In 1949, the prolific
royalist commentator who wrote as “Hermit” warned against too much representation: “Do
not give too much trust to the will of the people who are not … capable of expressing their
common will…” instead suggesting that “… we [should] have faith in the traditional grace
and goodness of our Kingship…” (Hermit, 1949).

At the same time, it is worth noting that this most pro-royal of constitutions to this time did
not sail easily through parliament (see Bangkok Post, 17 and 18 January 1949). There was
considerable opposition amongst the elected members of the assembly, the majority of whom
rejected the constitution. It was only with the support of appointed members – nominated by
the throne – that the new constitution was passed (Kobkua, 2003: 50).

The 1949 Constitution was eventually thrown out just days prior to the current king’s return
from Switzerland in 1951. The coup was led by Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram’s military-
based political faction, who are usually considered to have wanted to pre-empt an alliance
between pro-royal parliamentarians and the young king (see Neher, 1974: 30-1).

It is noteworthy that the sections of the new constitution dealing with the monarch, while
drawing on some elements in the 1932 Permanent Constitution, retained considerable
congruence with the 1949 Constitution. This was a compromise. The regent, Prince Dhani,
had refused to recognize the coup and the resulting government. A compromise was
negotiated where in exchange for the loss of some of the powers by the monarchy, the palace
regained control over its own affairs (Kobkua, 2003: 47, 54).

Under Phibun, the royalists were again checked and a kind of stand-off developed with the

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the government seen by royalists as essentially anti-monarchy (Morell, 1974: 90). As Phibun
allowed party politics to develop, royalist versus anti-royalist camps of politicians were
mobilized. The royalist Democrat Party (that included Seni and Kukrit Pramoj and Khuang
Aphaiwong) vigorously attacked the government while the government in turn accused the
Democrats of receiving palace funds (Bangkok Post, 6 September 1957).

In election speeches, made in 1956 but sounding very 2009, Police General Phao Sriyanond
attacked “aristocrats,” asserting that Thailand was held back by the “aristocratic system” and
claiming that he wanted to rid the country of the last vestiges of the “privileged aristocracy”
(Bangkok Post, 4 December 1956). When Phibun claimed that Kukrit’s Siam Rath newspaper
was “supporting the King...” Kukrit fumed. Demanding that the premier declare that he held
no prejudice against the king, Kukrit preached that the king was loved by all and those who
did not show “devotion and loyalty” were of “abnormal mentality (Siam Rath Weekly Review,
7 June 1956).

It was no surprise that the February 1957 election saw the government’s party victorious.
Most commentators consider that the government meddled in the campaign to ensure that its
party trounced the Democrats (Thak, 2007: 72). Bangkok’s middle class was also unhappy,
believing that the elections had been rigged elections. A protest movement soon developed.
Remarkably, General Sarit Thanarat spoke at a student-led rally attacking “dirty” elections
and agreed not to prevent student-led demonstrations against the government. Sarit’s coup
shortly after was not a surprise (Thak, 2007: 73).

The coup was a breath of fresh air for the formerly besieged royals. As is explained in Thak’s
classic study, the Sarit period of strict authoritarian rule saw the re-establishment of the
monarchy as a significant political institution. That the young king appreciated the efforts of
Sarit as a loyal father figure was indicated time and again. For example, in one public
address, the king called on the assembled people to cheer Sarit, and stated: “This is an
expression of thanks for his administration of our country which has brought happiness and
content[edness] to everybody...” (Siam Rath Weekly Review, 2 February 1961). Well might
the king have cheered the prime minister, for Sarit effectively made the king sovereign, in
place of the previous notion that the people were sovereign (Kobkua, 2003: 57; see also
Borwornsak, n.d.: 2).

It is in this period of military government that we see the defining characteristics of TSD
established.

THAI-STYLE DEMOCRACY DEFINED

It is interesting that TSD is defined during a period of massive political repression that
establishes a political system that Thak (2007: 10) describes as “harsh, repressive, despotic,
and inflexible.”

While Sarit’s political philosophy is not defined in any particular document, the modern
genesis of TSD may be seen in his approach to political rule.

Thak (2007: Ch. 3) outlines Sarit’s “search for legitimacy,” and considers it founded in a
series of beliefs about the nature of Thai society. As Saichol (n.d.: 2) notes, Sarit’s need for a
new legitimacy, resulted in the development of notions concerning “Thainess” – including
ideas about TSD – as a response to the dilemma that faced Thai society in a period where the

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previous ruling elite – associated with the People’s Party – and its ideology was overturned
and where a new ideological cement was required for a society that was to be ruled by a
military leadership that had no particular links with the previous regime.

The principles of Sarit’s political philosophy begin with a generalized notion that Western-
style democracy does not fit Thailand or that it was transplanted into the country prematurely
(Thak, 2007: 100). Thai society was considered rather more amenable to strong leadership
through a figure of great authority who could unify the country. That leader would uphold
notions of samakhitham or unity based in moral principles (Thak, 2007: 100-1). As a
conservative political conception, social hierarchy was emphasized, with an expressed desire
to maintain the rural base of society as a way of limiting social mobilization and keeping
traditional institutions strong (Thak, 2007: 104-5).

The nation was viewed as a patriarchal family and the unity of this family-nation had
considerable weight. The father of the family-nation was required to uphold notions of
samakhitham (Thak, 2007: 101, 105-6). Indeed, “representation” was defined as a process,
not of election, but of the father-leader going out to visit his children, learning of their
problems and their needs (Thak, 2007: xiii). Finally, Sarit recognized the importance of
science and considered that learned people should have a role in administration (Thak, 2007:
108).

Whilst this is not the place to discuss it, the similarities between Sarit’s views and those
expressed by King Bhumibol over the past 5 decades are striking. Sarit appears to have had a
deep and lasting impact on the king’s ideas.

Sarit was a master political manipulator and not a grand ideologue, As already mentioned, it
was Kukrit Pramoj who became the chief propagandist for Sarit’s authoritarianism through
the development of a coherent set of ideas about Thai-style government.

Kukrit claimed that “under the military regime, people should be confident that the country
[was] ruled by a ‘good man’ and that this is very different from being governed by politicians
who seek only their own interest” (Saichol, 2007: 69). Kukrit’s version of “Thai-style
government” was constructed during Sarit’s time as an attack on, and an alternative to, liberal
notions of democracy (Saichol, 2007: 31-2).

This anti-liberal heritage is an important feature of current conceptions of TSD and links this
idea to other conservative political ideas about governance.

Kukrit began to talk seriously about a Thai-style politics in 1962, asserting that TSG
“corresponds to Thai traditional institutions and also to state of mind of Thai people...”
(Saichol, 2007: 31). Arguing that Thais were are not ready for (Western-style) democracy,
Kukrit claimed that determining government through elections was not appropriate for Thais.
In fact, Kukrit considered that the coups of 1957 and 1958 resulted from failed attempts to
impose Western-style electoral politics on the Thai populace. But, for Kukrit, coups were not
such a bad thing if they got rid of awful politicians and ghastly parliamentary politics and
resulted in social peace and political stability.

In this sense, the coup becomes a mechanism for changing governments that do not have
good or moral leadership and have brought harm to the people (see Saichol, 2007: 32-4, 54).

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Kukrit portrayed Thai society in conservative functionalist terms, as an organism, in which
the king is the head and the government and bureaucracy are its organs. Society was strictly
hierarchical and structured in a way that has every person fulfilling particular functions and
where social mobility was limited, if not impossible (Saichol, 2007: 46, 53). In terms of
governance, the Thai style was “a political regime where the leader had absolute power” so
that “order, peace, security and progression” could be sustained. Western-style democracy, on
the other hand, just led to chaotic politics (Saichol, 2007: 38-9).

In Kukrit’s view, the king’s political role is to control and watch over government in the
people’s best interests, with the king as the benevolent and moral father of the family-nation
protecting his people.

Thus the monarchy is not an obstacle to democracy, but the very center of a Thai-style of
government that has come to be known as TSD. The king is effectively the moral check and
balance on government, acting in the best interests of his children-people. For Kukrit this
means that all good political leaders will display respect to and loyalty for the king and must
be his defenders (Saichol, 2007: 40-7, 61).

Of course, Kukrit was not just supporting Sarit’s military authoritarianism. He was also
promoting the long-held royalist desire – at the centre of the struggles that I briefly
mentioned earlier – to return the monarchy to its pivotal political position. Sarit’s coups
permitted this political outcome.

The logical conclusion to the development of ideas about TSG and TSD is to establish the
monarchy as an inherent element of any Thai democratic system. Hence we see accounts that
claim that TSD has actually existed for centuries under benevolent monarchs whose rule is
tempered by Buddhist principles and moral righteousness. Indeed, it is claimed that the
monarchy has always been a kind of “constitutional monarchy” in the sense that no king was
ever really absolute. Some suggest that the monarchy’s benevolent but law-abiding
paternalism, emphasizing harmony, prosperity and the well-being of the people, means that
Thailand has always had an “unwritten constitution” (Kobkua, 2003: 20-2).

THE 2006 COUP AND THAI-STYLE DEMOCRACY

Let me now leap forward to the present and talk briefly about how ideas of TSD were
interpreted following the 2006 military coup.

Immediately following the coup, some attention was given to ideas about TSD. Writing of the
intellectual impact of the 2006 coup, Surin (2007: 340) asserts that TSD had emerged as “a
legitimate alternative to Western-style democracy.” His views drew liberally from those of
Pattana Kitiarsa (2006) who discussed the coup and TSD in the context of a dichotomy
between a Thai “localist” response (or “community of interpretation”) to the coup and a
“Western” perspective.

I focus on these two writers – Pattana and Surin – because they did most to interpret the coup
for an international academic audience.

Pattana’s discussion of the Thai “community of interpretation” is essentially a discussion of

the divergences between what he identifies as Western interpretations – that the coup was not
necessarily a good outcome for Thailand or for democratic development – and a “Thai”

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position – that this was a “good coup,” getting rid of an increasingly authoritarian
government.

Evidently, in such a dichotomous perspective, Pattana has also to include those Thais who
opposed military intervention into the “Western” camp and presumably those Westerners who
supported the coup must be included as exhibiting a “Thai” perspective.

In explaining the coup and these communities of interpretation, Pattana defines TSD by
pointing to the failings of Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai Party government.
Essentially, Thaksin and TRT represented a divergence from the norm of Thai politics.
Pattana (2006: 3) asserts a culturally Thai way of doing politics. Drawing on (Western)
structural-functionalist literature, Pattana asserts that the localist perspective sees Thai culture
as essentially incompatible with WSD. The Thai way is based on a rationality that draws on
“Buddhist-based cultural paradigms that emphasize improvisional, compromised, and flexible
adjustments to their [Thai’s] social world.” Pattana argues that the proponents of TSD are
“practical and realistic,” and emphasize the “nation’s integration, security, and spirituality.”

While Pattana asserts that Thais exhibit an “… ambiguous construction of authority…”, this
is not the case when it comes to the king’s dhammic leadership (Pattana, 2006: 5). He
explains that Thaksin was politically doomed when people compared the “amoral capitals of
wealth and power…” represented by Thaksin with the “aura of Buddhist righteous
charisma…” represented in the person and reign of the current monarch.

In assessing the history of Thailand’s democratization, Pattana (2006: 6) is forced to conclude

that “Thailand is too elite-oriented and too hierarchical to be successful in its attempts to
establish strong democratic structures and culture.”

Also adopting this framework, Surin (2007: 349) declares Thaksin’s rule as a case of
“electoral power without moral authority.” Indeed, in the period prior to the coup, a number
of writers had made similar negative comparisons. For example, Nakarin (2007: 220)
argues that the king is a pillar of Thai democracy because his moral power contrasted so
starkly with the corrupt and corrupting practices of politicians like Thaksin.

Surin argues that when General Prem Tinsulanonda, former army chief, former prime
minister and current president of the king’s Privy Council, decided to campaign against the
Thaksin government, Prem “represented the moral order.” Surin (2007: 350) then cites the
authority of 2006 coup conspirator General Saprang in explaining that the putsch was a
mechanism to ensure that the dhamma would prevail. From this perspective, the coup was a
“good coup” because it was restoring a balance to Thai politics. Some coup leaders claimed
they were pressing the reset button for the Thai political operating system.

So it is that Surin (2007: 351) is led to argue that the coup was a setback for democracy in
Thailand “… only if Thai democracy is measured against the standards set by Western
democracies.” TSD is about “placing the king at the centre of politics [which also] is
placing morality at the centre of politics…”.

Ironically, just a few hours prior to the 2006 coup, Privy Councilor Prem was asked how
TSD differed from “Western-style democracy.” The general replied,

We are a kingdom. You [the West] are not. So you have to think some

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 minor different ways to run your country. Normal people love the king
very much, you know that. If you saw what happened on June 9 [60th
anniversary celebrations of King Bhumibol’s reign], you can tell how
much we love the monarch. That’s something … different between
your [country] and mine (cited in Murphy, 2006).

General Prem considered that it was impossible for Westerners to understand this conception
of Thai politics. It also becomes clear that TSD has the role of the monarchy as a central
pillar.

Essentially, Pattana and Surin provide an outline of TSD that is a conservative conception of
politics. This conservative approach, evident over more than 4 decades and continually
reincarnated, has again had increased political traction since the coup.

Of course, the 2006 coup has been interpreted in various ways. Popular accounts view the
coup as little more than the most recent attempt by the military to assert its power over
civilian politics. But this is a perspective that is too limiting. If we look beyond the coup itself
to the period of military rule that led to the promulgation of the 2007 Constitution and the
elections of the same year, we may see the coup as a means to reinforce or even reinstate
TSD.

THAKSIN, THE COUP AND THAI-STYLE DEMOCRACY

This paper cannot recount all of the events leading up to the 2006 coup. Rather, this section
will examine some of the interests involved and how it was that Thaksin – a rich capitalist
and certainly a member of Thailand’s ruling elite – managed to challenge conservative
definitions of governance.

As will be clear from this comment, and it might surprise some, I have some sympathy for
the approach outlined above and especially Pattana’s outline; not for TSD as a political idea,
but for the notion that it can be offended against as an ideology that underpins a definition of
governance.

You may recall that, from April 2006, General Prem, located in a privileged political space,
made highly-publicized speeches criticizing Thaksin. In a struggle for control of the military
(see Ukrist, 2008) and supported by other privy councilors, Prem demanded that military
officers be loyal to the king (The Nation, 15 July 2006). From this point, with powerful
military leaders and members of the Privy Council by Prem’s side, a coup was almost
inevitable if Thaksin refused to give way.

What were the motivations for this high-profile political involvement? Answering this
question requires an analysis of the economic, ideological and political interests involved.
Let me summarize these positions.

In the many criticisms made of Thaksin, one has been that he has attained great wealth
through cronyism and that he fostered cronyism and “big money politics.” Already
fabulously wealthy when he became prime minister, Thaksin used his office to benefit his
supporters and family, and seemed unable to distinguish between personal interests and
those of the nation (see Pasuk and Baker, 2005; McCargo and Ukrist, 2005). Royal
businesses both co-operated and competed with Shinawatra family companies. However,

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Thaksin’s combination of wealth and political power appears to have been especially
challenging for the managers of many businesses.

Also significant was political competition. Thaksin had moved quickly to shake-up the
organisations linked to the what McCargo identifies as the “network monarchy,” especially
in the civil and military bureaucracies, promoting those who supported TRT. This brought
Thaksin into conflict with these organizations, some of whose senior members saw
themselves as the minders of the palace’s political interests.

The most significant political contest was for the hearts and minds of the masses. A central
ideological component of the monarchy’s position is the portrayal of the king as a champion
of the poor, with the palace’s rural development projects the symbol of the monarch’s
connection to the masses (see Borwornsak, 2006). The palace has portrayed the monarchy as
the savior of poor peasants, through notions of sufficiency and palace charity.

Thaksin offered a different approach to the same constituency. Far from urging rural
“sufficiency,” TRT emphasized “getting ahead,” producing for the market and promoted
entrepreneurialism (see Pansak, 2004). TRT’s “populist” policies that established elements
of a social welfare system were immensely popular. Of course, Thaksin had to appeal to the
poor as they voted for TRT (Pasuk and Baker, 2008). Clearly, the conservatives congregated
around the palace were uncomfortable with Thaksin’s mix of social welfare and grassroots
capitalism and feared his immense appeal to the monarchy’s constituency as most vividly
demonstrated in the 2005 election landslide victory.

Thaksin and TRT also challenged long-held ideological positions associated with royalism
and TSD.

Before assessing this challenge, it is important to recall how deeply embedded this
ideological aspect of the monarchy has become. Take Uthai Pimjaichon as an example. Uthai
is a former member of parliament, former speaker of the House of Representatives and
former president of the National Assembly and played an important role in the development
of the 1997 Constitution. Uthai (2006: 307) argues that “we have to accept that the
democratic path was created from above.”

Noranit Setabutr (2006: 3), then Secretary-General of King Prajadhipok’s Institute and the
military junta’s chosen chair for the Constitutional Drafting Assembly overseeing the 2007
Constitution, provided a revision of Thailand’s history, when stating:

When we study in detail the political institution that was created by the
constitution … [in 1932], we see the resulting structure of government
was parliamentary rule with the King as the head of state. This style
has been maintained to this date, despite the 16 changes of constitution
by cancellation, correction, or new drafting. The basic structure has
not changed.

The notion that democracy was delivered from “above” and that the king is the protector of
Thailand’s democracy was challenged by Thaksin and his government. Of course, Thaksin
himself saw elements of democratic politics as an obstacle to his own political agenda (see
Pasuk and Baker, 2008). While Thaksin would later claim that the TRT’s agenda and aims
were no accident, it seems clear that Thaksin was not totally aware of the consequences of his

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approach. Two years ago, Jakrapob Penkair claimed that Thaksin “sleepwalked” into his
challenge against what Jakrapob labeled the “patronage system,” adding “I was with him so I
knew that he didn’t launch those policies philosophically. He simply wanted to do his job. He
wants to be liked.… He wants to be a useful rich man.”

Maybe Thaksin didn’t realize the changes his government unleashed. If it is also recalled that
the 1997 Constitution supported his strong position, the strength of the executive and the
electorate gave TRT unprecedented power, the idea that Thaksin was “sleepwalking” may be
overdone. That his government opened hitherto closed political doors cannot be denied.
People at the grassroots, especially in the north and northeast, began to see that they had
political rights and that they could have a say in who led government. They clearly felt that
TRT was responsive to their needs. But conservatives did not want a political leader with a
national popularity (Ockey, 2004: 183). The idea that the electorate had to be taken seriously
and that voting could make a difference challenged long-held conservative notions about
TSD. Jakrapob (2007) might claim that “… Thaksin didn’t do it to challenge anyone,” but it
is clear that conservatives were unhappy with a strengthening political system based on
elections that confronted the very foundations of TSD.

Fore these conservatives, Thaksin did not unify the country, despite the largest election
victory ever; he was seen as divisive. Moreover, he was branded as lacking the moral
principles the conservatives claimed leaders required. His appeal to the electorate, especially
to the poor, challenged the social hierarchy so prized in TSD. His plans for development
promised a more thorough-going capitalist revolution that would industrialize rural areas and
promised further social mobility. In terms of governance, Thaksin’s style shook up traditional
institutions such as the bureaucracy and the military. Thaksin, through government welfare
policies, was increasingly seen by rural and poor voters as a benevolent leader. And, his
government’s remarkable electoral power and parliamentary domination must have been
identified as diminishing the monarch’s role as the moral “check and balance.”

In the end, this array of challenges was too much for the conservative elite and the 2006 coup
was the result.

CONCLUSION

TSD ideas and images were also used against Thaksin. Much of the PAD rhetoric used to
criticize Thaksin appealed to TSD-like arguments – that Thaksin was not loyal or patriotic
and that he challenged the king – and made a case that Thaksin and TRT did not fit the
pattern of Thai-style leadership.

When the 2006 coup eventuated, it was initially seen by many as a “good coup.” As Kukrit
had argued 5 decades earlier, while electoral politics led to instability, the resulting military
coups were not a bad thing when they could rid the country of bad politicians who did not
display good or moral leadership. If a military-appointed government was led by a “good
man” then people could be confident that the country was in the best hands. Indeed, after the
coup, General Surayud Chulanond was appointed prime minister, presumably seen as a “good
man” as he was plucked from the king’s Privy Council and made prime minister.

When Surayud’s government and the junta set about developing a new constitution, they were
resetting the political agenda, emphasizing TSD as “democracy with the king as head of
state.” The new constitution made it clear that its drafters wanted to prevent any Thaksin-like

10
politician emerging in the future. They did this by increasing security powers, strengthening
the civil and military bureaucracies and reinserting political rules that had long been key
political aims of TSD, such as appointing half of the Senate. Thais were again being told that
they didn’t actually need democracy, and especially WSD, but TSD.

TSD is, at best, “semi-democracy.” Even so, in 2006 and 2007 it appeared to be supported by
the Bangkok-dominated middle class, just as it had been in 1957 when Sarit took over. A
common middle-class refrain has been that the people who supported Thaksin – mainly the
working class and the rural poor – were ignorant, bewildered, bought off, or coerced; as the
proponents of TSD have long claimed, these people were just not ready for Western-style
democracy. Hence they get a TSD that emphasizes traditionalism, nationalism and
paternalism.

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Modern Thai Political Parties, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, Joint Research
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Pye, O. and W. Schaffar (2008) “The 2006 Anti-Thaksin Movement in Thailand: An Analysis,”
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21 September.

14
ภาพรวมของประเทศไทย ที่ตอบคำาถามคุณได้แน่นอน อ่านได้ทุกสีครับ

บทความนี้เป็นเอกสารวิชาการ โดยศาสตราจารย์ เควิน ฮิววิสัน ภาควิชาเอเชียศึกษา มหาวิทยา

ลัยนอร์ทแคโรไลนา-เชเปิลฮิลล์
แปลเรียบเรียงโดย เก่งกิจ กิติเรียงลาภ สำาหรับงานสัมนาวิชาการในหัวข้อ
“Thai-Style Democracy: Royalist Struggle for Thailand’s Politics”
คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย เมื่อวันที่ 26มิถุนายน 2552

ก่อนอื่นเราต้องทำาความเข้าใจTSD(ประชาธิปไตยแบบไทยๆ)2 ประการ คือ

หนึ่ง ประชาธิปไตยแบบไทยๆ(Thai-Style Democracy - TSD) มีฐานะเป็นชุดของความคิดความ

เข้าใจเกี่ยวกับรูปแบบการปกครองในสังคมไทย
วาทกรรมว่าด้วย TSD กลายมาเป็นพื้นที่ของการต่อสู้ ต่อรองแข่งขันทางการเมืองมาตลอดกว่า
4 ทศวรรษจนกระทั่งในปัจจุบัน

สอง แม้ว่า TSD จะมีฐานะเป็นชุดของความคิดความเข้าใจชุดหนึ่ง แต่ TSD ไม่ได้เป็นชุดของ

ความคิดที่มีลักษณะเอกภาพหนึ่งเดียว โดยไม่ขึ้นกับบริบททั้งในแง่ของกาละ และเทศะที่มันเกิด
ขึ้น ซึ่งการนิยามหรือกำาหนดคุณลักษณะของ TSD ในแต่ละยุคสมัย ล้วนแล้วแต่ขึ้นกับการต่อสู้
แข่งขันทางการเมืองที่เกิดขึ้นในขณะๆนั้นด้วย

เป้าหมายของการนำาเสนอในครั้งนี้ก็คือ การชี้ให้เห็นรากฐานของความคิดความเชื่อของ TSD

โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่ง การพัฒนาและบริบทอันประกอบกันขึ้นจากองค์ประกอบที่หลากหลายของ
TSD ซึ่งทั้งหมดนี้จะมีส่วนช่วยในการอธิบายปรากฏการณ์การรัฐประหารที่เกิดขึ้นในปี 2549

เราสามารถย้อนกลับไปหาจุดเริ่มต้นของ TSD ได้ตั้งแต่ยุคของการปฏิวัติโค่นล้มระบอบ

สมบูรณาญาสิทธิราชย์ในปี 2475 เป็นต้นมา แม้ว่า ม.ร.ว.คึกฤทธิ์ ปราโมช จะเป็นคนแรกๆที่นำา
เสนอสิ่งที่เรียกว่า “การปกครองแบบไทย” ในทศวรรษ 1960 แต่เราสามารถย้อนกลับไปดูการ
ก่อตัวของ TSD ก่อนหน้านั้นเป็นเวลานาน โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งการต่อสู้เพื่อสร้างระบอบการเมือง
การปกครองแบบใหม่หลัง 2475 เป็นต้นมา

การต่อสู้ของพวกกษัตริย์นิยมในการเมืองไทยนั้นพัฒนาควบคู่กับการสร้างมโนทัศน์ทางการ
เมืองบางประการที่อาจเรียกรวมๆได้ว่า TSD ผ่านการกลับไปเล่าเรื่องประวัติศาสตร์เหตุการณ์
สำาคัญๆในประวัติศาสตร์เสียใหม่ ไม่ว่าจะเป็นการปฏิวัติ 2475, การต่อสู้ของนักศึกษาประชาชน
ในปี 2516 และพฤษภาทมิฬในปี 2535 โดยการทำาให้ระบอบกษัตริย์กลายมาเป็นสิ่งเดียวกับการ
สร้างและเปลี่ยนผ่านไปสู่ประชาธิปไตย

ด้วยการสร้างภาพว่า พระปกเกล้าต้องการพระราชทานประชาธิปไตยอยู่แล้ว แต่คณะราษฎร

กลับ “ชิงสุกก่อนห่าม” ส่งผลให้ประชาธิปไตยถูกบิดเบือนและกลายเป็นระบอบเผด็จการทหาร
ในที่สุด ข้อเสนอในที่นี้ก็คือ รากฐานความคิดของ TSD เช่นนี้ถือกำาเนิดมาจากการต่อสู้ทางการ
เมืองล้วนๆ

15
ความพยายามทำาให้กษัตริย์อยู่ภายใต้รัฐธรรมนูญของรัฐบาลพระยาพหลฯ ส่งผลให้ฝ่ายกษัตริย์
นิยมพยายามทุกวิถีทางที่จะต่อต้านคัดค้านการกระทำาของรัฐบาล ทั้งหมดก็เพื่อกอบกู้และเพิ่ม
อำานาจของกษัตริย์ในการเมืองไทย

อย่างไรก็ดี กษัตริย์ไทยหลัง 2475 ก็แสดงตนในหลายบทบาทขึ้นกับความเข้มแข็งและอ่อนแอ

ของกลุ่มกษัตริย์นิยมเอง ในยามที่ตนเองอ่อนแอ ก็จะปฏิเสธความเข้มแข็งของระบบ
พรรคการเมืองและการเลือกตั้ง แต่ในยามที่เข้มแข็ง ก็กลับสนับสนุนพรรคการเมืองบางพรรค

เราจะเห็นบทบาทของกลุ่มกษัตริย์นิยมในการต่อสู้เพื่อขยายอิทธิพลของตนเอง ไม่ว่าจะผ่านการ
สนับสนุนพรรคประชาธิปัตย์ในสมัย ควง อภัยวงศ์ และการให้ร้ายปรีดีจนต้องออกนอกประเทศ
ทั้งหมดนี้ล้วนแล้วแต่เป็นความสำาเร็จของการต่อสู้ทางการเมืองของฝ่ายกษัตริย์นิยมทั้งสิ้น

ฐานความคิดที่สำาคัญของพวกกษัตริย์นิยมในการเมืองไทยก็คือ ไม่เชื่อมั่นในประชาชน เพราะ

ประชาชนส่วนใหญ่ล้วนแล้วแต่ไม่รู้ว่าอะไรคือผลประโยชน์ส่วนรวมที่แท้จริง ดังนั้นจึงควรให้
ความสำาคัญกับความสูงส่งของกษัตริย์มากกว่าที่จะให้ความสนใจกับการพัฒนาประชาธิปไตยที่
ประชาชนมีอำานาจที่แท้จริง ภายใต้ความเชื่อเช่นนี้ ปัญญาชนกษัตริย์นิยมจึงพยายามพูดว่า
กษัตริย์เป็นที่รักของประชาชนทุกคนโดยธรรมชาติ และคนผู้ใดที่ไม่จงรักภักดีก็คือคนที่มีจิตไม่
ปกติ

การรัฐประหารของจอมพลสฤษดิ์ในปี 2500 มีผลอย่างสำาคัญต่อการเปลี่ยนแปลงขั้วอำานาจใน

การเมืองไทย โดยเฉพาะมันได้เปิดทางให้แก่พวกกษัตริย์นิยมได้มีที่มีทางอย่างชัดเจน ภายใต้
ระบอบเผด็จการของสฤษดิ์ การทำาให้สถาบันกษัตริย์มีความเป็นสถาบันที่มั่นคงกลายมาเป็น
ภารกิจสำาคัญ และกษัตริย์เองก็ทรงให้การสนับสนุนรัฐบาลด้วยในฐานะที่เป็นผู้จงรักภักดี

และในยุคของรัฐบาลทหารเช่นนี้เองที่ความคิดความเชื่อแบบ TSD ได้สถาปนาตัวเองขึ้นอย่าง

มั่นคง

เป็นที่น่าสังเกตว่า นิยามที่เริ่มจะชัดเจนขึ้นของ TSD นั้นเริ่มต้นภายใต้การปกครองที่ดูจะเป็น

เผด็จการที่เน้นการปราบปรามและควบคุมสังคมแบบเบ็ดเสร็จเด็ดขาด

หัวใจสำาคัญของ TSD ประการหนึ่งก็คือ ความเชื่อเรื่อง “ความเป็นไทย” ซึ่งแตกต่างอย่างสิ้นเชิง

จากในสมัยของคณะราษฎร เพราะ”ความเป็นไทย” ในยุคสฤษดิ์นั้นเป็นความเป็นไทยภายใต้
ระบอบทหารที่ไม่เกี่ยวอะไรเลยกับหลักการของการปฏิวัติ 2475

ปรัชญาเบื้องหลังของระบอบสฤษดิ์ก็คือ การเสนอว่า ประชาธิปไตยแบบตะวันตกนั้นไม่เหมาะกับ

สังคมไทย เพราะประเทศไทยยังไม่พร้อม เนื่องมาจากวัฒนธรรมดั้งเดิมของคนไทยยังคงยึดมั่น
อยู่ในผู้นำาที่เข้มแข็งเด็ดขาดมีอำานาจและอิทธิพลเหนือทุกสิ่งทุกอย่างในประเทศไทย โดยเฉพาะ
อย่างยิ่ง ภายใต้สภาวะเช่นนี้ สังคมไทยต้องการลำาดับขั้นทางสังคมที่ชัดเจนตายตัว ไม่ใช่ความ
เปลี่ยนแปลงเลื่อนชั้นทางสังคมที่รวดเร็ว

TSD มองว่า สังคมไทยดั้งเดิมเป็นสังคมแบบ “พ่อปกครองลูก” โดยพ่อจะทำาหน้าที่เป็นผู้ที่คอย

แก้ปัญหาให้กับลูกๆ นี่เองทำาให้ปรัชญาของระบอบสฤษดิ์สอดรับเป็นอย่างดีกับสิ่งที่ฝ่ายกษัตริย์
นิยมได้พยายามต่อสู้ให้ได้มาตลอดหลายทศวรรษ

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และที่น่าสนใจก็คือ ปัญญาชนกษัตริย์นิยมคนสำาคัญอย่าง ม.ร.ว.คึกฤทธิ์ก็กลายมาเป็นผู้ป่าว
ประกาศโฆษณาชั้นดีให้กับระบอบเผด็จการของสฤษดิ์ในที่สุด

คึกฤทธิ์เสนอว่า TSD นั้นสอดคล้องเป็นอย่างดีกับนิสัยใจคอของคนไทย ซึ่งไม่มีความพร้อมเลย

สำาหรับการปกครองแบบประชาธิปไตย “แบบตะวันตก” คึกฤทธิ์พยายามวาดภาพว่า การปฏิวัติ
2475 เป็นเพียงความล้มเหลวของการสร้างประชาธิปไตย “แบบตะวันตก” ในสังคมไทย

สำาหรับ TSD หากการทำารัฐประหารมีเป้าหมายเพื่อกำาจัดนักการเมืองชั่วช้าให้ออกจากการเมือง

ไทยและสร้างเสถียรภาพความมั่นคงแล้ว การรัฐประหารก็ไม่ใช่สิ่งเลวร้ายในตัวมันเอง การ
รัฐประหารจึงกลายมาเป็นเครื่องมือสำาคัญในการเปลี่ยนแปลงรัฐบาลที่ไม่มีศีลธรรม และในการ
ควบคุมประชาชนที่ไม่รู้ว่าความดีที่แท้จริงคืออะไร

สำาหรับคึกฤทธิ์ สังคมไทยเป็นสังคมแบบอินทรียภาพที่มีกษัตริย์เป็นศีรษะและมีระบบราชการ
เป็นอวัยวะสำาคัญที่รับใช้ศรีษะ ซึ่งหากเกิดความวุ่นวายโกลาหลใดๆขึ้นจากความล้มเหลวของ
ประชาธิปไตย “แบบตะวันตก” การกลับไปหาผู้นำาที่เด็ดขาดก็เป็นทางออกที่จำาเป็น และนี่คือ
หน้าที่ของกษัตริย์ในระบอบ TSD

ดังนั้น กษัตริย์จึงไม่ใช่อุปสรรคของประชาธิปไตย แต่กษัตริย์เป็นรากฐานและแก่นแท้ของการ

ปกครองภายใต้ TSD ที่จะนำาความสันติสุขมาสู่เหล่าปวงประชาชน

กล่าวโดยสรุปแล้ว เป้าหมายของปัญญาชนกษัตริย์นิยมอย่างคึกฤทธิ์ก็คือ การจัดวางสถาบัน

กษัตริย์ในที่ที่ทำาให้พระองค์ทรงมีพระราชอำานาจมากที่สุด (หลังจากที่ต่อสู้มากว่า 25 ปีภายหลัง
2475) และการขึ้นมาของระบอบเผด็จการของสฤษดิ์ก็เปิดทางให้สิ่งที่กลุ่มกษัตริย์นิยมคาดหวัง
สามารถเกิดขึ้นได้ในที่สุด

ในยุคทักษิณ ปัญญาชนกษัตริย์นิยมจำานวนหนึ่งที่ต่อต้านทักษิณตีความ TSD ในฐานะที่เป็น

วัฒนธรรมทางการเมืองที่เชื่อมโยงกับท้องถิ่นและชุมชน โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่ง พุทธศาสนา ซึ่งสอน
ให้เชื่อเรื่องเหตุผล ความไม่ตึงไม่หย่อนเกินไป และความยืดหยุ่น นั่นหมายความว่า TSD นั้นมี
ลักษณะแบบปฏิบัตินิยมและปรับเปลี่ยนได้ตามความเหมาะสมของยุคสมัย

ทักษิณถูกวาดภาพโดยปัญญาชนกษัตริย์นิยมว่า เป็นพวกทุนนิยมที่ไม่มีศีลธรรม ซึ่งตรงกันข้าม

กับบารมีอันชอบธรรมตามหลักการของพุทธศาสตร์ขององค์พระกษัตริย์ไทยในปัจจุบัน และ
TSD ก็คือ การกอบกู้สถาปนาพระราชอำานาจของกษัตริย์ให้อยู่ใจกลางระบอบการเมืองการ
ปกครอง ที่ถูกทำาลายมาก่อนหน้านั้นโดยการปกครองของทักษิณ ซึ่งมาจากประชาธิปไตย “แบบ
ตะวันตก”

ปัญญาชนกษัตริย์นิยมบางคนกล่าวว่า พลเอกเปรมเป็นเสาหลักทางจริยธรรมศีลธรรม ที่ตรงกัน

ข้ามกับทักษิณที่ไม่มีศีลธรรมและเต็มไปด้วยคอร์รัปชั่น ดังนั้น การทำารัฐประหารเพื่อโค่นล้ม
รัฐบาลที่ไม่มีศีลธรรมนั้นจึงไม่ใช่สิ่งที่ชั่วร้าย หากแต่เป็นเรื่องของการกอบกู้ศีลธรรมอันดีงามให้
กลับคืนมา

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การเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองของพันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตยทั้งก่อน และหลังการ
รัฐประหารได้พยายามสร้างภาพของทักษิณให้ดูว่าเป็นคนที่ไม่จงรักภักดีและพยายามท้าทาย
สถาบันกษัตริย์ โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่ง ทักษิณไม่ใช่ผู้นำาในอุดมคติของ TSD

ข้อเสนอในที่นี้ก็คือ เราต้องไม่ลดทอนการทำาความเข้าใจการรัฐประหารในปี 2549 และการร่าง

รัฐธรรมนูญปี 2550 เป็นเพียงการกระหายอำานาจของทหาร แต่เป้าหมายที่แท้ของการทำา
รัฐประหารก็คือ การทำาให้ประเทศไทยอยู่ภายใต้ TSD

เมื่อรัฐบาลพลเอกสุรยุทธ์ จุลานนท์ ขึ้นสู่อำานาจภายหลังการรัฐประหาร เขาได้พยายามสร้าง

แผนการทางการเมืองแบบใหม่ โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่ง การกลับไปหา TSD ในฐานะที่เป็น “ระบอบ
ประชาธิปไตยที่มีพระมหากษัตริย์เป็นประมุข”

รัฐธรรมนูญปี 2550 มีเป้าหมายโดยตรงที่จะกีดกันนักการเมืองอย่างทักษิณ และมุ่งเน้นการเพิ่ม

ความเข้มแข็งให้กับฝ่ายความมั่นคง ระบบราชการทั้งที่เป็นทหารและพลเรือน ดังที่เราจะเห็น
รัฐธรรมนูญฉบับนี้ระบุให้มีวุฒิสมาชิกมาจากการแต่งตั้งครึ่งหนึ่ง เป็นต้น และนี่คืออีกครั้งหนึ่งที่
คนไทยไม่ต้องการประชาธิปไตย “แบบตะวันตก”

แต่สิ่งที่พวกเขากำาลังทำาคือ “ประชาธิปไตยแบบไทยๆ”......
คัดลอกจากคุณรักในหลวงห่วงลูกหลาน บอร์ด ฟดก

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