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The current bull market is 85 months old and is becoming extended. Recently, investors have been lulled into complacency as the S&P 500 has been trading in a band
from approximately 1820 to 2135 that was established back in 2014. A lot of investors
cannot remember a mul -year sideways stock market. A couple of round trips to the
bo om of the trading band and back to the top have le investors with the overwhelming feeling that everything will work out. A er all, the S&P 500 is close to its
all- me highs. The general belief is that the stock market will resolve its current consolida on phase by rallying substan ally above its old highs... and that it is important
to just be in the market.
It all sounds a bit Pollyannaish. There are mes when a buy-hold-and-close-your-eyes
approach works well...but not now. A buy and hold approach works well when the
stock market is substan ally underpriced and the economic and earnings backdrop
has a strong growth trajectory. We do not have the necessary condi ons to support a
strong rally above the all- me high for the S&P 500. The macro economic fundamentals and earnings are not suppor ve for a strong rally. Currently, the stock market is
priced for perfec on.
Investors have been condi oned to believe that the U.S. Federal Reserve will have
their backs. Who can blame them? For many years, if the economy started to turn
down and the stock market corrected, the U.S. Federal Reserve would step in with
s mula ve monetary policy to help prop up the stock market.
rect in the next month or two. A bull market can keep going a lot longer than investors an cipate. Despite the lack of immediate predic ve power, the length of a bull
market can s ll provide a sense of whether the stock market is suscep ble to fading
in strength.
Historically, since 1929, S&P 500 bull markets have averaged 31 months and have produced an average gain of 107%. The current bull market that started with the bo om
on March 9, 2009 has so far been running for eighty-ve months and has produced a
gain of 205%. Both measurements have approximately doubled the long-term averages. The only three bull markets that have produced greater gains are the 1949 to
1956, 1982 to 1987 and the 1987 to 2000 bull markets.
Although the current bull market stands out against the average since 1929, the
results are not quite so stellar when compared to the average bull market since 1949,
but s ll above average. Post WWII, on average, bull markets have lasted longer and
produced greater returns. There are a host of reasons of why this phenomenon may
have occurred, including: the rapid rise of U.S. industry, technological advancements,
the advent of the do-it-yourself investor and Federal Reserve suppor ve ac ons for
the stock market. Even compared to the more recent bull markets since 1949, the
current bull market has become extended and is suscep ble to a correc on.
Exhibit 2: S&P 500 Bull Market (20%+) Performance Since 1929
1929 to 2016
31.8
107%
1929 to 1948
9.6
64%
undervalued market and others an overvalued market. Everyone has their favorite
models. At this me, I am having trouble nding any models that point to the stock
market being undervalued. Most investors would agree that either the stock market
is either fairly valued or it is overvalued. And in the la er group, most investors would
agree that the stock market is on the rich side.
Stock market valua on metrics should not be used for short-term market ming:
April 11, 2015
Pre-1990s, the price to earnings ra o (P/E) was a favorite indicator of many investors
to determine if the stock market was undervalued/overvalued. Investors measured
the trailing twelve month price of the S&P 500 to its earnings and compared it to the
long-term average. In the late 1990s investors became frustrated with this measurement as the P/E resided for an extended period of me, at a much higher value than
its long-term average. At the end of September 2015, the trailing twelve month P/E
ra o was 21.4 (Exhibit 3), which is above the long-term average of 15.6 (since 1880).
Wall Street has managed to convince investors that the forecasted twelve month
P/E is more relevant than the historical earnings. A er all, it was Wall Streets job to
forecast the earnings, so they should know (sarcasm intended). Even the forecasted
twelve month forward P/E has lost favor as investors have been unable to envision its
usefulness and do not fully trust the abili es of Wall Street analysts to forecast based
upon informa on from the companies they are covering.
More recently, the Shiller Cyclical Adjusted Price to Earnings ra o (CAPE) has a racted
a en on. The ra o uses smoothed real per share earnings over a ten year period and
helps to adjust for cyclical eects. It is an indicator that helps to value the likelihood
of stock markets returns over the long-term. The higher the ra o, the more likely that
the next ten year returns in the stock market will be lower and vice versa. The ra o
does not predict impending stock market crashes, but in the past, high P/E values
have coincided with major stock market correc ons.
Professor Shiller made his mark with the investment community a er he wrote a
book published in March 2000, tled: Irra onal Exuberance. The book hit the bookstores just as stock markets were peaking. The tle of the book was an echo of irra onal exuberance statement that the Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan
made in late 1996, as he commented on the valua on of the stock markets at the
me. Coincidentally, Professor Shiller has just released the third edi on of his book
(revised and expanded) in January 2015, claiming that stock markets in the U.S. and
other countries are overvalued once again, just not to the same degree as the me
when his rst edi on was released. In addi on, Shiller has also been credited with
correctly predic ng that house prices were too high before the 2007 crash.
A er a string of Shiller correct major predic ons, investors have been paying more
a en on to the recent high values of the Shiller P/E ra o. Looking at the data since
1880, the Shiller P/E is currently close to an all- me high and is above its 1 standard
devia on range. Accordingly, the indicator is poin ng to an overvalued stock market.
Many investors respect Warren Buet for his successful common sense approach to
inves ng. In 2001, Warren Bue revealed his favorite stock market valua on indicator as the stock market capitaliza on to GDP ra o. If the ra o is signicantly below
the long-term average, then it reects that the stock market is cheap to buy and vice
versa. At the macro level, it makes sense that the U.S. stock market should not have a
substan ally high value rela ve to GDP (value of all of the goods and services produced in the U.S.). As of October 2015, the indicator was registering 1.2, represen ng
a stock market valua on of 120% of the economy (Exhibit 5). Since 1970, this is the
highest level other than the year 2000. In other words, according to the Bue indicator, the stock market is extremely overvalued and is suscep ble to a correc on.
So why are investors s ll in the game pushing the stock market up when they realize that the stock market is not a bargain? It mainly comes down to fear the fear of
missing out. The music is s ll playing and there is s ll some dancing to be done. With
interest rates around the world at record lows and o en at nega ve rates, investors
feel they have no alterna ve but to invest in the stock market. This group think has
produced stock markets that have reached giddy levels and the party goes on.
It is important to note that stock market valua on metrics used above should not be
used as market ming tools. They are broad trend indicators that can stay overvalued
or undervalued for a long me, much longer than what most investors would expect.
Nevertheless, they do have value by indica ng if the stock market us suscep ble to a
correc on or rally. When the valua on metric is stretched to the extreme upside, the
stock market is suscep ble to a correc on.
There are dierent ways to measure investor enthusiasm for the stock markets, but
one indicator that is registering extreme over op mism is the level of real investor
debt margin. Exhibit 6 shows the posi ve rela onship of real margin debt to real S&P
500 levels from 1985. The real margin debt level is at an extremely high level. Low
interest rates can explain part of this phenomenon, as investors can borrow money
cheaply to invest, but it does not account in total for the extreme level.
The problem is that if investors are already borrowing heavily to invest, where are
addi onal funds going to come from for inves ng? It is true, that the average person
is not ac vely inves ng in the stock markets like they were in the late 1990s, but
they may not be coming into the stock market this me around. The stock market has
bought some me, with corpora ons buying their stock back at higher than average
levels. Companies with extra cash have not been using it for expansion, but instead
having been buying back their own stock. This can keep going on for a while, but it is
hard to keep a stock market supported on this ac on.
One of the reasons that corpora ons have been able to buy back their own stock has
been the extremely high prot margins that U.S. corpora ons have been earning. Exhibit 6 shows that prot margins are at a high level, well above the 1 standard deviaon range. Although, it is possible that the high prot margins are some what derived
from structural changes, there is no ques on that the ra o is at elevated levels.
Expanding prot margins have been able to support an expanding P/E ra o. Many investors argue that prot margins tend to regress to their mean over me. When and
if prot margins regress to their mean, the eects would nega vely impact the P/E
ra o and consequently stock prices.
April 11, 2015
With U.S. corporate prot margins above their standard devia on range, they are
poised to correct and move back to their long-term average. There is no reason for
U.S. corpora ons to make substan al prot margins above their average over the
long-term. Nothing has changed over the last few years for this to be jus ed. In fact,
over me, it would be expected that compe on would bring down prot margins
to adjust for the proper risk adjusted returns for owners of businesses. The very high
levels of prot margins are temporary and have been largely driven by cost cu ng,
share buy-backs and low interest rates.
1950/51
1951/52
1952/53
1953/54
1954/55
1955/56
1956/57
1957/58
1958/59
1959/60
1960/61
1961/62
1962/63
1963/64
1964/65
1965/66
1966/67
1967/68
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
1987/88
1988/89
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
1994/95
1995/96
1996/97
1997/98
1998/99
1999/00
2000/01
2001/02
2002/03
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Unfavorable
Period
May 6 to
Oct 27
Favorable
Period
Oct 28 to
May 5
8.5 %
0.2
1.8
-3.1
13.2
11.4
-4.6
-12.4
15.1
-0.6
-2.3
2.7
-17.7
5.7
5.1
3.1
-8.8
0.6
5.6
-6.2
5.8
-9.6
3.7
0.3
-23.2
-0.4
0.9
-7.8
-2.0
-0.1
20.2
-8.5
15.0
0.3
3.9
4.1
0.4
-21.0
7.1
8.9
-10.0
0.9
0.4
4.5
3.2
11.5
9.2
5.6
-4.5
-3.8
-3.7
-12.8
-16.4
11.3
0.3
0.5
3.9
2.0
-39.7
17.7
1.4
-3.8
3.1
9.0
4.1
15.2 %
3.7
3.9
16.6
18.1
15.1
0.2
7.9
14.5
-4.5
24.1
-3.1
28.4
9.3
5.5
-5.0
17.7
3.9
0.2
-19.7
24.9
13.7
0.3
-18.0
28.5
12.4
-1.6
4.5
6.4
5.8
1.9
-1.4
21.4
-3.5
8.9
26.8
23.7
11.0
10.9
1.0
25.0
8.5
6.2
-2.8
11.6
10.7
18.5
27.2
26.5
10.5
-8.2
-2.8
3.2
8.8
4.2
12.5
9.3
-8.3
6.5
9.6
12.9
6.6
14.3
7.1
6.5
Oct28May5>
May6Oct27
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Japan and China. Japan has been constantly been implemen ng itera ons of loose
monetary policy. Japan has no choice but to keep releasing more and more monetary
s mulus to support its failing Abenomics policies. At this point, if it reversed course,
the results would be disastrous for Japan. Although they have had a posi ve impact
on the stock markets around the world, the marginal eect of the Japans latest iteraons have been decreasing and somewhat ephemeral.
Unlike Japan, China is not wanton to introduce monetary s mulus unless it is absolutely needed. Nevertheless, Chinas eorts are also suering from the law of diminishing returns. China has been trying to engineer a so landing for the economy (for
quite some me). The ride has been bumpier than expected. At this point, the jury is
s ll out. It is easily possible for China to collapse once again.
Not only are the foreign central banks monetary policies having less and less of an effect on their own cons tuents, but the policies are also producing diminishing returns
in the North American stock. Overall, investors should not expect foreign s mula ve
monetary policy to contribute signicantly to a sustainable market rally.
In the same presenta on, I would then go on and show the table in the side bar,
Exhibit 9, (from Thackrays 2016 Investors Guide, page 57) and ask: if you could only
choose one six month period in which to invest, which period would you choose? I
would then give the audience a few minutes to analyze the data and discuss the results amongst themselves. The answer is almost unanimous, as they would choose to
invest in the six month favorable period.
The audiences viewpoint on inves ng during the year changed when they had to
make a decision between two alterna ves. They were forced to include risk into their
analysis. Average buy and hold investors do not have to make the decision about
being in or out of the stock market. They are already in the stock market and ra onalize why they should stay invested. The bias results with investors fearing that they
will miss out on large returns if they exit the stock market during the unfavorable six
month period.
So what did the six month seasonal numbers from Exhibit 8 reveal? The most obvious
metric is that the favorable seasonal period outperforms the unfavorable seasonal
period more than half the me; in fact 71% of the me (number of YESs in far right
hand column). Not as easily seen, but important are the other metrics:
The unfavorable seasonal period produces an average geometric loss of 0.6%,
compared to the average geometric gain of 7.8% in the favorable period (Exhibit
10).
The frequency of losses equal to or greater than 10% is substan ally higher in
the unfavorable period versus the favorable period, 10.8% and 3.1% respec vely
(Exhibit 11).
The frequency of gains equal to or greater than 10% is substan ally less in the
unfavorable period versus the favorable period, 12.3% and 41.5% respec vely
(Exhibit 12).
In the end, it is easy to see why the audience of the presenta ons would choose the
six month favorable period over the six month unfavorable period in which to invest,
as the favorable period on average produces more gains, bigger gains more o en,
fewer losses and fewer large losses.
ment Policy Statement (IPS) that states a percentage range for dierent asset classes,
depending on risk tolerance and other factors. The overall equity alloca on to the
stock market, typically has a 10-20% range around a specied target value in an
investment por olio. Based upon seasonal trends demonstra ng lower expected risk
adjusted returns in the unfavorable six month period for stocks, seasonal investors
may want to lower their equity holdings within their risk parameters and equity alloca on range for their por olios.
Within the six month unfavorable seasonal period for stocks, there are shorter-term
opportuni es in the broad stock markets for more ac ve investors. For example, the
stock market tends to rally from the end of June, into the rst half of July (see Thackrays 2016 Investors Guide, page 43 and page 73 for details). This summer rally,
tends to be ephemeral and it might be wise for seasonal investors to use ght stops
on their posi ons.
Conclusion
No one can tell you if the stock markets are going to go up or down this summer no
one! That is true for all forecasts, as they are only forecasts based upon probability.
Dierent investment methodologies assign dierent probabili es to dierent events
in order to forecast an outcome. This is true, even for fundamental analysts.
Seasonal analysis looks at historical trends in the market over the long term in order
to develop an investment strategy. Exogenous events can have an impact on any well
founded investment strategy, both posi vely and nega vely. Seasonal analysis is not
immune from these eects. Currently, this year, there is a lack of apparent catalysts to
April 11, 2015
10
Disclaimer: Brooke Thackray is a research analyst for Horizons ETFs (Canada) Inc. All of the views expressed herein
are the personal views of the author and are not necessarily the views of Horizons ETFs (Canada) Inc., although any of
the recommendations found herein may be reected in positions or transactions in the various client portfolios managed
by Horizons ETFs (Canada) Inc. HAC buys and sells of securities listed in this newsletter are meant to highlight investment strategies for educational purposes only. The list of buys and sells does not include all the transactions undertaken
by the fund.
While the writer of this newsletter has used his best eorts in preparing this publication, no warranty with respect to the
accuracy or completeness is given. The information presented is for educational purposes and is not investment advice.
Historical results do not guarantee future results
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