2AC BLOCK SOLITARY

CONFINEMENT

Topicality
US Department of Justice - February 10th 2016
Not all segregation is truly solitary, and many prison systems, including the Bureau, often house two
segregated inmates together in the same cell, a practice known as double-celling. For the purposes
of this report, we define restrictive housing as any type of detention that involves: (1) removal from
the general inmate population, whether voluntary or involuntary; (2) placement in a locked room or
cell, whether alone or with another inmate; and (3) inability to leave the room or cell for the vast
majority of the day, typically 22 hours or more. Even this definition, however, leaves substantial room
for variation. Restrictive housing takes many forms, and an inmates experience in segregation can
vary considerably depending on certain external factors, such as the length of stay, conditions of
confinement, and degree of social isolation, as well as factors specific to each inmate, such as age and
psychological resiliency. As this report makes clear, it is not enough to say that an inmate is in
restrictive housing (or solitary confinement, for that matter); it is just as important to know the
details of the placement.

Extra T

Effects T
CX Questions:
-

Will you explain why we dont fit to the resolution reasonably?

What is your proof that our affirmative is untopical?
Would you say this aff is blatantly untopical? How so?
Can you explain to me three other affs that would be considered topical
under your exact t shell?

If they say that it is effects t because of the need for violating an amendment in the
plan text, than say that you cannot make a court case without the violation of an
amendment and that because we pass through courts it needs to be in our plan
text. We put how we pass in the plan text to help the aff be understood, I think it
makes us more topical to prove why it should be passed through courts.

United States Federal Government

(USFG)
US Department of Justice 2015
About the Federal Bureau of Prisons

The Federal Bureau of Prisons was established in 1930 to provide more progressive and
humane care for federal inmates, to professionalize the prison service, and to ensure consistent and centralized administration of the 11 Federal prisons in
operation at that time. Today, the Bureau includes 121 institutions, 6 regional offices, a Central Office (headquarters), and 26 offices that oversee
residential reentry centers. The regional offices and Central Office provide oversight and administrative support to the institutions and offices. The Bureau
is responsible for the care and custody of more than 208,000 federal inmates, as of spring 2015.1 About 81 percent of these inmates are confined in
federal correctional institutions or detention centers, and the remainder are held in secure privately managed or community-based facilities and local jails
under contract with the Bureau. The Bureau protects society by confining offenders in prisons and community-based facilities that are safe, humane, costefficient, and appropriately secure, and by providing inmates with programs and services to assist them in becoming proactive law-abiding citizens when

most important resource is its staff. All Bureau staff are

expected to conduct themselves in a manner that creates and maintains respect for
the agency, the Department of Justice, the Federal Government, and the law.
they return to their communities. The Bureaus

We meet: Correctional officers are hired by the United States Federal

Government in Federal Prisons and solitary confinement cells are within Federal
prisons.

Counter Standard: Source

This source is provided by the federal government itself and should be upheld, no
evidence better suggests the whereabouts of solitary confinement and its staff.
Counter Voter:

Substantial

Curtail
We Meet: We are getting rid of solitary confinement as a method of surveillance by
the federal government, however we cannot guarantee that the government wont
surveil inmates in another way. With this aff, we have to think of just curtailing
solitary not prisons as a whole.

Domestic

Surveillance
Counter definition: Oxford 2016
noun
Close observation, especially of a suspected spy or criminal: he found himself
put under surveillance by military intelligence

Wu, Chung, Yamat, Richman 2008 Stanford

Information was combined from well-known professors and politicians.

Surveillance is, simply put, the observation and/or monitoring of a person. Coming from the
French word for "looking upon," the term encompasses not only visual observation but also
the scrutiny of all behavior, speech, and actions. Prominent examples of surveillance include
surveillance cameras, wiretaps, GPS tracking, and internet surveillance. One-way
observation is in some ways an expression of control. Just as having a stranger stare at you
for an extended period of time can be uncomfortable and hostile, it is no different from being
under constant surveillance, except that surveillance is often done surreptitiously and at the
behest of some authority. Todays technological capabilities take surveillance to new levels;
no longer are spyglasses and "dropping" from the eaves of a roof necessary to observe
individuals - the government can and does utilize methods to observe all the behavior and
actions of people without the need for a spy to be physically present. Clearly, these
advances in technology have a profound impact with regards to the ethics of placing
individual under surveillance&emdash;in our modern society, where so many of our actions
are observable, recorded, searchable, and traceable, close surveillance is much more
intrusive than it has been in the past.

Surv. Tech/Cams
Extend sub point A of advantage 1, which says quote technological advances, such as
the development of intercoms and video surveillance cameras, have made possible a level
of social isolation that was simply unthinkable in earlier times and A video camera rather
than a human eye monitors the inmate's movements

No Voter: Lit Checks Abuse, making is so T is not a voter in this debate.

Because this is specified in our affirmative text, and read in the 1AC, we therefore
meet to every aspect of the T shell. These inmates are under surveillance with
technology.

We Meet because Lit Checks Abuse, therefore there is no

violation.

Inherency Extensions
Solitary has had a rapid expansion in federal prisons
David Cole 2015 September
David Cole is the Honorable George J. Mitchell Professor in Law and Public Policy at the Georgetown University Law Center

George Ruiz, a seventy-two-year-old inmate in California, has spent the last thirty-one years
in solitary confinement, most of it in Pelican Bay State Prison. He has been held in a
windowless cell, with virtually no human contact and no phone calls absent an emergency.
He is let out for, at most, sixty to ninety minutes each day, during which periods he is kept in
complete isolation. Ruiz has endured this inhuman treatment not for any prison misconduct,
but solely because he is said to be affiliated with a Mexican gang. One expert who studied
these conditions aptly termed them social death. Since the rapid expansion of highsecurity prisons in the 1980s, solitary confinement has become pervasive across the United
States in both state and federal prisons, involving, according to recent estimates, more than
75,000 inmates at any given time. It is imposed by prison officials for security and
disciplinary reasons, but often with little oversight and on the basis of minor infractions. In
California, it is often based, as in Ruizs case, on suspected gang ties, on the theory that
gangs are the source of much prison violence. It is a preventive measure, but its preventive
effects are unproven. Many other countries maintain secure prisons without resorting to prolonged solitary confinement. Now, thanks to the case of George Ruiz,
along with recent criticism of the practice by Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, President Barack Obama, and prison officials themselves, America may finally be changing its
ways. In 2011, before the Center for Constitutional Rights took on a lawsuit on behalf of Ruiz and a number of other inmates, California had been holding more than five hundred
prisoners in solitary confinement for more than ten years at a single facility, Pelican Bay State Prison. Seventy-eight of them had been in solitary for more than two decades. Across
California, thousands of inmates were held in such isolation. Last week, in a landmark settlement of Ruizs class action lawsuit, California agreed to fundamentally change its system,
which is one of the most severe in the nation. Where it previously relegated prisoners to solitary confinement indefinitely for gang affiliation, it now will limit solitary confinement to
defined periods of time, not to exceed five years. It will do so not on the basis of suspected status as a gang member, but only on the basis of serious prison misconduct, such as murder,
violent assault, attempted escape, weapons possession, and the like, which must be adjudicated in a hearing that satisfies due process requirements. California also agreed to release
immediately into the general prison population nearly all of the inmates, like Ruiz, who had been in solitary confinement for more than ten years. And it agreed to transfer to the general
prison population all those currently confined on the basis of gang affiliations, unless they have committed one of the serious infractions that is now a prerequisite to solitary
confinement. In response to the lawsuit, the state has already released more than one thousand inmates from solitary, and it expects to release many more. Californias settlement does
not create a binding precedent for other states, but it does offer a model for reform. And it comes on the heels of a groundswell of criticism of Americas overreliance on solitary
confinement, which is increasingly out of step with incarceration practices in nearly every other advanced country. In early May, a court in Ireland blocked the extradition to the United
States of Ali Charaf Damache, wanted on charges of providing support to terrorism, citing the risk that he would face solitary confinement in the federal supermax facility in Florence,
Colorado. As the Irish court found, relying on the Irish Constitution: The institutionalization of solitary confinement with its routine isolation from meaningful contact and communication
with staff and other inmates, for a prolonged pre-determined period of at least 18 months and continuing almost certainly for many years, amounts to a breach of the constitutional
requirement to protect persons from inhuman and degrading treatment and to respect the dignity of the human being. Damache, who had been held for two years while he fought
extradition, has now been released. In June, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, who had previously criticized solitary confinement in testimony to Congress, took the highly
unusual step of writing a [separate opinion](http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinions.aspx under 6/18/15) in a case involving another matter entirely to condemn solitary
confinement and invite a constitutional challenge. He predicted that the Court may be required to determine whether workable alternative systems for long-term confinement exist, and
if so, whether a correctional system should be required to adopt them. And since Kennedy is very often the decisive swing vote on the Court, his predictions are worth taking seriously.
In July, President Obama ordered the Justice Department to review the federal prisons use of the punishment. In a speech at the NAACP annual convention, Obama asked: Do we really
think it makes sense to lock so many people alone in tiny cells for 23 hours a day, sometimes for months or even years at a time? That is not going to make us safer. Thats not going to
make us stronger. And if those individuals are ultimately released, how are they ever going to adapt? Its not smart. Even American prison officials themselves have begun to question
the practice. Last week, one day after the California settlement was announced, the Association of State Correctional Administrators, which includes the directors of all the state prison
systems and many jails in large cities, called for ending or radically limiting the use of extended solitary confinement. In doing so, they followed the lead of Colorados prison director,
Rick Raemisch, who last year introduced major reforms in his state after voluntarily spending twenty hours in a seven-foot-by-thirteen-foot prison cell. Since then, the state has cut its
solitary prison population by 50 percent. All of this is welcome news. Depriving people of all human contact for extended, and in Californias case, often indefinite periods of time is by
any modern standard inhumane. Human beings are social by nature; we are defined by our families, friends, and communities. To be deprived of any contact with other human beings is
to be denied an essential element of ones identity and humanity. It can also literally drive men mad, as Justice Kennedy told Congress last year. Consider this example, cited by the
Irish court, drawing on an Amnesty International report: Quite disturbingly, they report a lawsuit on behalf of an inmate sent to the ADX who repeatedly self-harmed but after brief
periods of referral to the federal medial facility for psychiatric review was returned to the Control Unit at the ADX. He variously lacerated his scrotum with a piece of plastic, bit off his
finger, inserted staples into his forehead, cut his wrists and was found unconscious in his cell. After 10 years and 5 months in the Control Unit, he was placed in the General Population
Unit in the ADX where he sawed through his Achilles tendon with a piece of metal. He later was placed on anti-psychotic medication following mutilation of his genitals. In many cases,
the extreme isolation seems gratuitous. Why, for example, would prisons deprive individuals in solitary confinement of the ability even to talk to another human being? Yet even phone
calls to family members are strictly limited. One inmate in the California case had been permitted to speak to his mother only twice in twenty-two years. Merely attempting to
communicate with other inmatesfor example by yelling through thick concrete walls or ventshas been treated as a prison infraction. If deemed an attempt to converse with another
putative gang member, it has been used as evidence to support continued solitary confinement as a suspected gang member. So far, many of the reforms voluntarily adopted by prison
officials involve cutting back on, not eliminating, solitary confinement. The practice has unquestionably been overused, like incarceration itself, and the easiest solutions are to end it for
those who pose the least danger. But what about those who are a demonstrable threat to other members of a prison population and have repeatedly violated prison rules or endangered
fellow inmates? If solitary confinement is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and by international principles of human rights because it is cruel and inhumane, isnt it equally cruel and
inhumane when imposed on the hardened violent inmate? Here, too, the California settlement might provide a way forward. The state has agreed to modify conditions even for those
who, because of serious violence and the like, require heightened security. These prisoners will be permitted more phone calls and visits with family in which they are permitted human
contact. And they will be allowed to exercise in small groups when let out of their cells. Ohio adopted such an approach for its most problematic prisoners some years ago, and found
that it was more effective in maintaining security, precisely because inmates had something valuable to lose. But solitary confinement is only a small part of the challenge. Its roots lie in
Americas unduly harsh approach to criminal justice. And from those roots grow a multitude of problems: police forces that too often resort to violence because they have forfeited
legitimacy in the communities they serve; mandatory minimum and three strike life sentences for drug and other felony offenses that warehouse people for far too long; mass
imprisonment, which makes us the world leader in locking up human beings; and the death penalty, a sanction every other Western country has long abandoned as barbaric. Even
without solitary confinement, conditions for many jail and prison inmates are extraordinarily and unnecessarily severe; most of the general population in Californias prisons are locked
down in their cells for twenty-two hours a day. Whats needed is a sea change, not an isolated fix

Solvency Extensions

Courts will solve:

No solitary solves harms:

EXTRA CARDS FOR ADVANTAGE

1

Mental Illnesses in the incarcerated:

Mentally ill are more likely subject to solitary confinement
Lithwick-16
(Dahlia Lithwick, Journalist and editor specifically writes about the courts and the
law for Slate, and hosts the podcast Amicus, 1-5-2016, Prisons Have Become
Americas New Asylums,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/01/prisons_hav
e_become_warehouses_for_the_mentally_ill.html, Slate)
Americas prisons have become warehouses for the severely mentally ill. Under the guise
of punishing criminality, these inmates may be subject to cruelty from corrections staff,
physical constraint up to and including lockdown or solitary confinement, and shocking
physical and sexual abuse from other prisoners. They may receive inadequate treatment
and poor supervision, and many will commit suicide while in prison. A 2014 report by the Treatment
Advocacy Center notes bluntly that prisons and jails have become Americas new asylums. Ten times more mentally ill people are now in jails
and prisons than in state psychiatric hospitals: In 2012, approximately 356,268 inmates with severe mental illness were in prisons and jails, while
about 35,000 severely ill patients were in state psychiatric hospitals. Many of these inmates would have been in hospitals prior to the
deinstitutionalization movement of the 1960s, but now there are not enough beds, and many mental health hospitals have been closed down.
According to one report, the number of state psychiatric beds in the nation declined from a high of approximately 550,000 in 1960 to 40,000 today.
So extremely sick people are locked up, often for trivial offenses, frequently without treatment, as their illnesses worsen. Upon release, they are

Prisons often cannot provide inmates with

psychiatric medications or treatment. They may turn to brutal alternative options,
including solitary confinement or restraining devices. A recent Florida report shows that prison staff take pains to
more likely than other prisoners to recidivate and be incarcerated again.

ensure mentally ill prisoners are fit for trial. Once the prisoners are convicted, they are cut off from all services. The stories of prisoners mental
health declining in prison are predictable but awful. According to the Treatment Advocacy Center report, a mentally ill man held in Montana tried to
drown himself in the jail toilet, and in California, inmates tried to escape by smearing themselves with their own feces and flushing themselves
down the toilet. A schizophrenic man in Georgia, who was jailed after wandering into traffic and knocking on doors late at night, gouged out his
own eyes in his cell. Sexual abuse is rampant. A 2007 prison survey revealed that about 1 in 12 inmates with a mental disorder reported at least
one incident of sexual victimization by another inmate over a six-month period, compared with 1 in 33 male inmates without a mental disorder.
Among female inmates with a mental disorder, almost 1 in 4 are sexually victimized. Suicides and suicide attempts are common. A study of 132
attempted suicides in the King County, Washington, jail system found that 77 percent of the prisoners had a chronic psychiatric problem,
compared with a rate of 15 percent among the rest of the jail population. Prison time does nothing but exacerbate the underlying problem. This
2015 study from the Urban Institute cautions that mentally ill inmates, who are typically jailed for trivial offenses such as trespassing, disorderly
conduct, or drug use, tend to stay in jail longer than nonimpaired inmates, recidivate and return to jail more frequently, and cost local jurisdictions
more to incarcerate. The crisis has become particularly horrifying in the U.S. Virgin Islands, where more than 25 percent of the prison population is
reportedly mentally ill. An NPR report from 2007 notes that the U.S. Virgin Islands also has the distinction of incarcerating people who were found
not guilty by reason of insanitywhich means they were too mentally ill to be convicted. As the American Civil Liberties Union points out, the
Virgin Islands is unique in its treatment of the mentally ill: In other systems they are hospitalized, so they can receive a level of treatment that
[they] simply cannot get at a jail. In St. Thomas, these men remain prisoners, housed in a unit plagued with prisoner-on-prisoner assaults, as
overworked and undertrained staff members are overwhelmed by a toxic mix of predatory and acutely ill prisoners. The government of the U.S.
Virgin Islands has been involved in a protracted class-action lawsuit, filed by the ACLU more than two decades ago, called Carty v. Mapp,
challenging unconstitutional conditions at two correctional facilities. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in October 1994. The court
order required the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections to hospitalize acutely and chronically mentally ill prisoners. Again, that was in 1994. Since
that time, the court has held the defendants in contempt four times. The territory continues to pledge to fix the problems but has made no
substantial progress. At this point, the government has finally begun to formalize some changes to a handful of policies. According to Prison Legal
News, back in December 2003 the court ordered the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity (NGRI) prisoners to be moved to a forensic facility. Thats when
it got even more Kafkaesque: What has transpired since can only be described as more than three years of subterfuge and unfulfilled promises. First,
territory officials said they were seeking a psychiatric facility outside the Island because no adequate facility existed on the Island. While they made
inquiries with a few facilities, they made no actual transfers despite a Puerto Rico facility agreeing to accept two of the NGRIs. Territory officials have
since promised the court that they were near completion of their own forensic facility. On the eve of a February 2005 contempt hearing, the NGRI
patients were transferred to a psychiatric unit at the Juan E. Luis Hospital (JLH) on St. Croix. In January 2006, the NGRIs were moved back to [the
adult correctional facility] without notice to the court or class counsel. While at JLH the NGRIs conditions improved drastically; one was even
recommended to be discharged. After returning to ACF they began to deteriorate and again became a threat to themselves and others. In March
2006, the court ordered territory officials to move the NGRIs to a psychiatric forensic facility. By February 27, 2007, however, the defendants still had
not taken any action on the order. The governor of the U. S. Virgin Islands, Kenneth Mapp, declared in his State of the Territory address on Jan. 27: It
is no secret that this territory has taken a backward step on the issue of mental health, leaving those who need care to walk the streets, languish in
our prisons, or enter the revolving door of a criminal justice system that is ill-prepared to address their needs. As a community, we have earned an
F-minus in the care and services we provide to the mentally ill. A year later, almost nothing has changed. A new expert report was filed in August in
this same class-action suit by the court-appointed psychiatrist, Kathryn Burns. It makes for chilling reading and paints a picture that evokes
Victorian-era brutality. Burns, who had assessed the same facilities a year earlier, noted that despite her earlier recommendations, No medical or
mental health care policies or procedures had been adopted. She writes: There is no appropriate safe housing for mentally ill inmates or those
requiring placement on suicide precautions. Actual therapeutic treatment space for individual and group interventions is lacking. Incident reports
and logbooks continue to reflect the use of use physical force, steel restraints and lock down for persons with serious mental illnessalmost always
without consultation from mental health to de-escalate situations and often without notifying mental health staff even after the fact to determine
whether a treatment intervention would be helpful. Burns concluded at the time that the government had failed to comply with every mental
health provision, more than 60 in all, in the settlement agreement it entered into a year earlier. Perhaps most heartbreaking, Burns details the

suicide of a woman who was mentally ill, delusional, and who went without treatment for nearly two years before she was found hanging in her cell a
year ago. The womans name was Heather Turfley. She was 38. She had a history of bipolar disease and schizophrenia and of saying she was born to
be Jesus and that God spoke to her. She had twice been placed on suicide watch. Yet seemingly nobody was watching her before she committee
suicide, as Burns wrote: For many of the days on watch, there is no officer observation sheet at all. The amount of brutality experienced by the
mentally ill prisoners is also set forth in Burns reports. She writes that the prisons mental health unit is filled with reports of inmate-on-inmate
physical fights, assaults and attacks requiring emergency transport to the outside hospital for physical care. Some of these incidents involve the use
of shanks and other weapons. Eric Balaban, senior staff counsel with the National Prison Project of the ACLU, who represents these prisoners, warns
in an email that this violence will only worsen: This violence is directly related to the territorys failure to hospitalize the most seriously mentally ill.
The longer they stay at the jail, the more at risk they are of being beaten by fellow prisoners or staff. I asked Balaban how its possible for a U.S.
territory to be under a court order to protect its most vulnerable prisoners for more than two decades, yet nothing changes. He points out that there
is a new judge presiding in the case and a newly appointed Bureau of Corrections director who shows some sense of urgency to fix the lifethreatening problems. But, Balaban cautions, This will require a new mindsetone that sees that torturing the seriously mentally ill through neglect
not only places their lives at risk, but endangers the officers who work at that jail, and the citizens on St. Thomas, if these seriously ill men and
women are released untreated. This is not just about a handful of seriously mentally ill prisoners in the U.S. Virgin Islands, however. The abuse,
neglect, and tragic lack of foresight in that system is emblematic of a problem that exists throughout this country. Its a problem that will only
worsen unless we distinguish between mental illness and criminality and return to policies that actually treat inmates who are ill, rather than
brutalize them.

Correctional Officer Abuse:

Spare Harms:

EXTRA CARDS FOR ADVANTAGE

2

Biopower Bad:
This biopolitical structure created by the aff establishes a killto-live mentality that justifies massive conflict and violence in
the name of protection and promotion of life.
Lundborg and Vaughn-Williams, 2011
[Tom, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Nick, Associate Professor of
International Security at the University of Warwick, Resilience, Critical
Infrastructure, and Molecular Security: The Excess of Life in Biopolitics.
International Political Sociology, Vol. 5. Issue 4. December 2011, 367-383, Accessed
Online via Wiley Online Library
liberalism as a systemic regime of... power
relations, which, although committed to peace-making, is nevertheless marked by an
equal commitment to war, continuous state of emergency, and constant preparedness for conflict (Dillon
and Reid 2009:7). From this perspective, war and society are mutually constitutive and the liberal way of
rule can be understood as: a war-making machine whose continuous processes of
war preparation prior to the conduct of any hostilities profoundly, and pervasively, shape the liberal
way of life (Dillon and Reid 2009:9). As such, the liberalismwar complex acts as a grid for
the production of knowledge, preoccupations, and political subjectivitie s. Taking their
lead from Foucaults later work, Dillon and Reid argue that the basic referent object of liberal rule is
life itself. From this perspective, the liberal way of rule/war is inherently biopolitical: its referent object is
biological being and its governmental practices are themselves, in turn, governed by the
properties of species existence (Dillon and Reid 2009:20). They stress, however, that [they] the
properties of species existence are not givens, but rather subject to changes in
power/knowledge. Over the last 20 years, the Revolution in Military Affairs, accompanied by developments in
the life sciences, has changed the way that life is viewed and understood. The move to
informationalize life has led to the reduction in what it means to be a living being
to a code, and as a result: the very boundaries which long distinguished living from
not living, animate from inanimate and the biological from the non-biological have
been newly construed and problematized... (Dillon and Reid 2009:22). The corollary of this account
Dillon and Reid begin their book by characterizing

is that the informationalization of life has, in turn, changed the way in which war is waged by liberal rule: The

new
knowledge about the complex emergent adaptive processes and properties of open living systems,
has transformed the ways in which liberal regimes have come to understand that
very nature of war, and of the relation of war to complex adaptive evolutionary models of rule and order.
development of the life sciences in general, and of complexity science in particular, comprising

(Dillon and Reid 2009:111) The military is as interested now... in life-creating and life-adaptive processes as it is in
killing, because, like the liberal way of rule and war more generally, it locates the nature of the threat in the very
becoming-dangerous of the vital signs of life itself. (Dillon and Reid 2009:125) In other words, development in the
life sciences has been embraced by liberal regimes, which, in turn, has affected the way that they view and fight

The move in life sciences away from Newtonian physics to complexity has enabled new
biopolitical technologies of governance . Complexity science stresses the anteriority of radical
wars.

relationality, the dynamic and mobile nature of existence and the contingencies of bodies-in-formation (Dillon
and Reid 2009:72). Liberal biopolitical rule takes these problematizations of life as a starting point for securing its

Thus, in a development of Foucaults account of biopolitics as making live and letting die, Dillon
that liberalism only promotes the kind of life that is productive for its
own enterprise in light of new power/knowledge relations . A liberal biopolitical
own existence.

and Reid argue

security practices that can pre-empt the emergence of life

forms in the life process that may prove toxic to life (Dillon and Reid 2009:87). For these
reasons, as set out in the lengthy quotation above, the perceived nature of threats has changed along
with the emergence of alternative problematizations of life. Threats are no longer viewed as straightforwardly
actual, but what Dillon and Reid refer to as virtual: the very continuous and contingent emergency
of emergence of life as being-information; becoming-dangerous (Dillon and Reid 2009:44).
To put it differently, the threat with which liberal biopolitics is obsessed is the potentiality
of some life to become dangerous and therefore detrimental to what living should
involve. It is in this context that Dillon and Reid uncover a paradox of liberalism: the
fact that according to its own logic it needs to kill in order to make life live.
problematization of life entails

Biopower Link:
This type of surveillance is a panopticon, which is biopower
Taunton 08
Taunton, Matthew. "Escape From Panopticon." New Statesman 137.4889 (2008): 48.
Academic Search Premier. Web. 10 Feb. 2016.
Michael Foucault was influential in propagating the notion that power in modern
societies is based on surveillance, and his work remains a cause of acute paranoia
and depression among countless humanities students. In Discipline 0711 Punish,
Foucault argues that Jeremy Bentham' Panopticon -a prison designed so that all
inmate are potentially under constant surveillance b} an unseen official - is a
template for modern society, "a society penetrated through and through with
disciplinary mechanisms".
Bentham's prisoner gradually internalizes the feeling of being watched, and in effect
begins to police himself; he "becomes the principle of his own subjection". Foucault
uses this to argue that liberal societies are at heart profoundly authoritarian: even
when we think we are acting freely, we are probably obeying the tenets of
oppressive power structures that we have unwittingly absorbed through
surveillance.

Biopower Impacts

Disciplinary Power:
The expansion of biopower via disciplinary power is what
triggers genocide
Goodhart 01 Michael Goodhart, U Pittsburgh, 2001 (POLITY, Winter 2001 v34 i2
p241(17))
Foucault's own discourse maintains an ambivalent relationship to this "war of the races." On the one hand, it
serves as an example of a subjugated knowledge to be resurrected. This is a discourse of opposition and
represents an alternative to the still dominant discourse of sovereignty visible, according
to Foucault, in Hobbes and Machiavelli, and persisting in many Marxist notions of power circulating during

centering upon the

purification of the species with the institution of the regime of biopower in the next two
centuries to reach its horrifying apex with the Holocaust. (He suggests also that class struggle" is
certainly not free of such fascist dangers.) Hence Foucault simultaneously promotes and evidently practices
an animation of war and antagonism in discourse and in practice to counter the pacifying and
subjugating effects of disciplinary normalization and the rhetoric of sovereignty
where power purports to function monolithically and seamlessly outside of rather than within
subjects; and warns that one must not accept these racialized divisions, instituted
through the so-called "sciences of man," which aim to classify the abnormal, mad,
homosexual, neurotic, or other problematic elements of the social body.
Foucault's time. On the other hand, the war of the races" takes on new forms

Disciplinary biopower is the foundation of the holocaust,

Milchman ND D. Milchman, Philosophy Professor, Queens, PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL
CRITICISM, v. 22, 1, p. 106
Where does Nazism fit in the development trajectory of technologies of domination, and bio-power, that have

For Foucault, Nazism is the culmination point (paroxysne) of the

of the new mechanisms of power set in place since the 18th century...disciplinary
power, biopower, all that traverses and sustains every aspect of Nazi society . But let us
not forget about Foucaults allusion to thanatpolitics. War, and mass murder, too becomes an
imperative for a regime based on biopower: War? How can one not only make the war on ones
adversaries, but expose ones own citizens to war, making them kill by the millions...if not, precisely, by
activating the themes of racism? Here, the role of the Nazi regime is clear in Foucaults discourse: You
shaped our late modernity?
development

must understand, then, in these conditions, how and why the most murderous states are, at the same time,
necessarily, the most racist. Surely, here we must refer to the example of Nazism. Here, the role of the Nazi regime
is clear in Foucaults discourse: You must understand, then, in these conditions, how and why the most murderous
states are, at the same time, necessarily the most racist. Surely, we must refer to the example of Nazism. For

the lethality of Nazism was heightened by its infusion of a hyper-modern

analytics of sexuality (concomitant with biopower, and racism in its modern,
biologizing, statist form) and a more ancient symbolics of blood, an overlapping that characterizes the
Foucault,

instantiation of regimes of power: Nazism was doubtless the most cunning and the most nave (and former

A
eugenic ordering of society, with all that implied in the way of extension and intensification of micropowers, in the guise of an unrestricted state control (etatisation) was accomplished by the generic
because of the latter) combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of a disciplinary power.

explanation of a superior blood; the latter implied both the systematic genocide of theirs and the risk of exposing
oneself to total sacrifice. The fantasies of blood incarnated in

Nazism, however, could only assume so

massively lethal a form because of the technologies of domination, and the biopower, within which they were firmly ensconced.

Biopower eliminates any value to human life. The human lives

the plan saves are meaningless. You can vote on presumption
Boleau 2k Boleau, Philosophy Professor, Seattle U, GENUINE RECIPROCITY AND
GROUP AUTHENTICITY, 2000, p. 27
bio-power, there is a strong voice in our culture that views the
body as a resource or a machine. Knowledge of the body causes the bodys dispersion
into a complex myriad of political strategies and techniques. In contrast to Aristotelian man,
who was (for some) self- grounded, Foucault sees modern [people] as animal whose politics
places [their] existence as a living being in question . In other words, Foucault sees individuals as
social creations: no individual is [their] own ground.
According to Foucault, in the current era of

Panopticon POC
The scientific panopticon preys on POC without their consent
in the name of better managing life the 1AC enactment of
surveillance is an endorsement of that oppression
Kim 14 Social Media and Academic Surveillance: The Ethics of Digital Bodies
by Dorothy Kim for Model View Culture; Assistant Professor at Vassar College,
Fullbright Fellow, Ford Foundation Fellow, Frankel Fellow at U of Michigan;
https://modelviewculture.com/pieces/social-media-and-academic-surveillance-theethics-of-digital-bodies
The scientific and academic history of disregarding rights and ethics in relation to the
bodies of minorities and especially women of color is seen in other high profile lawsuits. For
example, Nature has reported that the use of patients biological information for previously
undisclosed purposes has been the subject of several high-profile cases. There is the incredibly
famous case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study in which 600 black men were used as
medical subjects to study syphilis without consent, information, and even medical
treatment for their actual illnesses. The article US agency updates rules on sharing genomic data describes
yet another case: In 2010, the Havasupai tribe of Arizona won a US $700,000 settlement
against Arizona State University when blood samples originally provided for a study
on diabetes were used in mental-illness research and population studies . More
recently, and in relation to digital bodies, there has been a major ethical and procedural outcry about Facebooks
experimentation with users in relation to Facebook posts and mood. As this article discusses, there were major
violations of IRB and ethics that even when dealing with a corporation and the authoritative journal the Proceedings
of the National Academy of the Sciences of the United States (funded by the US Government), the consent of any of
the users in the experiment (over 600,000 unsuspecting Facebook users) in order to research mass-scale

academics
are looked upon as part of the academic-industrial-government-military panopticon
experimenting (without permission or consent) on their public citizens ? Why should
digital bodies on Twitter trust academics and their ethics and methodologies when the methodologies
and ethics (particularly of government-funded and thus government-vetted projects) continue
to think of Twitter as a way to enact surveillance on their future research subjects?
emotional contagion sounds straight out of a twisted dystopian movie. So is it any surprise that

Surveillance is a cornerstone of the forced commodification of

bodies of color
Harry 14 Everyone Watches, Nobody Sees: How Black Women Disrupt
Surveillance Theory by Sydette Harry for Model View Culture; writer for social
justice for Dissent, Salon, and Model View Culture;
https://modelviewculture.com/pieces/everyone-watches-nobody-sees-how-blackwomen-disrupt-surveillance-theory
Surveillance is based on a presumption of entitlement to access, by right or by
force. More importantly, it hinges on the belief that those surveilled will not be able to reject
surveillance either due to the consequences of resisting, or the stealth of the
observance. They either wont say no, or they cant. Discussions of stolen celebrity selfies often miss the by
force aspect of the breeches, instead focusing on salacious details. Surveillance is part of the information age,

but it has always been part of abusive dynamics. As opting into surveillance becomes increasingly
mandatory to participate in societies and platforms, surveillance has been woven into the fabric of our lives in ways

Being watched is not just an activity of Big Brother-style

surveillance, but also fannish adulation and social enmeshment. As Black women have
been historically denied the ability to consent to surveillance, modern discussion of
watching and observing black women needs better historical context. When Inasah
we can not readily reject.

Crockett points out how black women online have constantly been portrayed as raving amazons, one of the

media, even on the left, believes dissecting black

women, tracking their online habits, consuming illegally obtained images of them ,
and demanding education is a right. Black women cannot say no, and do not need to be
in any way respected or fully informed about how they will be studied or used . Media
collects the data of black activity and media production as a weapon, without black participation.
unspoken through lines is how easily

The lack of black participation can be unintentional or intentional, but usually ends in gross appropriation, clumsy
admiration, willful erasure or a troublesome combo of all three. Combined with historical blindness, racist

the modern surveillance of black women too often

results in the same historical abuse and erasure of black women.
condescension and content desperation,

Disadvantages
Remember, framework answers all impact oriented DAs if
counter framework is not run.

Politics:

No Uniqueness:

No Link:
Extend Sub point B of solvency, which says prisoners have little voice in the political
process making it so Solitary Confinement wouldnt affect the political capital or any
process of politics.

No tradeoff between courts and prez: This aff is built on the constitutional
right against cruel and unusual punishment. It would be wrong to let one person decide the
fate of thousands and to decide what is constitutional. This job is preserved for the courts.

No Impacts:

No Political Capital:
Obama has no political capital as of 2016, and barely ever did
Jared Keller 2016 pacific standard
Jared Keller is a journalist living in Brooklyn, NY. His work has appeared in the Atlantic, Bloomberg Business week, Al
Jazeera America, the Los Angeles Review of Books, and the Verge.
The presidential farewell has no real precedent in America's political history outside of George Washington's legendary letter to the nation. Published in
Daved Claypole's American Daily Advertiser on September 19, 1796, and later re-worked into a pamphlet, Washington used his "farewell address" after
nearly 20 years of service to remind the young nation of the pitfalls and possibilities facing the republic: the divisiveness of political factions, the
importance of the separation of powers, the necessity of avoiding foreign entanglementsall topped by a request that he be forgiven by the American
people for his failings in office. Washington, who'd already set an informal rule of the American executive branch by declining to seek the presidency for a
third term, resigned to his plantation like the one-time Roman dictator Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, his obligation to faithfully protect the republic met
with one final, tender rallying cry. There have been few memorable presidential farewells since then. Outgoing presidents rarely deliver final homilies like
Washington's ahead of their successor on Inauguration Day, and late-term joshing in the White House press poolor even George W. Bush's poignant East
Room farewelllack the same gravitas and panache as a joint session of Congress. Nixon's departure from the White House is the most vivid in recent

the closest thing modern presidents get to a real

Washingtonian farewell address is their final State of the Union , constitutionally mandated
memory, but for all the wrong reasons. In this sense,

but politically insouciant amid the cacophony of the presidential and congressional contests on the horizon.
Unencumbered by political calculus, the president, cloaked in the apex of his constitutional power (minus standing
on the battlefield), can leave the American polity with one final swan song on the future of the republic.

President Obama recognized this on Tuesday evening when he told the assembled
members of Congress that he didn't want to discuss a slate of policy proposals (a
comment that, if accidentally, diminished the criminal justice platform that's been in the national conversation for
the last year). "I don't want to talk just about the next year," Obama said. "I want to focus on the next five years, 10
years, and beyond." Despite Obama's emphasis on the future, his subsequent address made clear that the days of

It was expected
that Obama, politically emboldened by a hot streak on disparate issues from Cuba
to international trade to LGBT rights, would take something of a victory lap around
the United States Capitol. And he did: His tone was relaxed and casual, jokey but impassioned,
Washington's finale, where the State of the Union was once a political treatise, are long past.

cognizant of his limitations as a lame-duck president while still patently aspirational, with an authenticity that
echoed a Kennedy or a Clinton. We sort of expected Barack Obama, inspiration figure; if not that, at least Barack

despite his accomplishments, Obama still faces the question of his legacyand,
more importantly, the task of bringing closure to the political message that put him in
the White House in 2008. This is the same politician who, eight years after "hope and
change," has found his inspirational rhetoric deflated by the realities of politics in
Washington, from the lack of political capital in the aftermath of his health-care reform
fight to the weight of crisis after political crisis . Al Jazeera's Gregg Levine puts it best: Appearing before the nation
Obama, orator. But

unburdened, Obama faced questions about both if "change is still possible in the final year of his presidency, and whether anyone in the voting public
believes he changed anything at all." Obama had one final chance to make the case for his legacy, a long goodbye from a weary but hopeful servant
praying that he fulfilled his rhetorical promise to the nation. This was painfully obvious in Obama's appeal to the singular force that helped get him elected
the message of change: We live in a time of extraordinary changechange that's re-shaping the way we live, the way we work, our planet and our place
in the world. It's change that promises amazing medical breakthroughs, but also economic disruptions that strain working families. It promises education
for girls in the most remote villages, but also connects terrorists plotting an ocean away. It's change that can broaden opportunity, or widen inequality. And
whether we like it or not, the pace of this change will only accelerate. America has been through big changes beforewars and depression, the influx of
immigrants, workers fighting for a fair deal, and movements to expand civil rights. Each time, there have been those who told us to fear the future; who
claimed we could slam the brakes on change, promising to restore past glory if we just got some group or idea that was threatening America under
control. And each time, we overcame those fears. We did not, in the words of Lincoln, adhere to the "dogmas of the quiet past." Instead we thought anew,
and acted anew. We made change work for us, always extending America's promise outward, to the next frontier, to more and more people. And because
we didbecause we saw opportunity where others saw only perilwe emerged stronger and better than before. Yes, the Obama administration has been
consequential on an impressive slate of matters both foreign and domestic, but only time will tell what its long-term consequences actually are. Yes, the
Obama administration has created 14.1 million jobs in the past seven years, but American wages remain stagnantand an entire subset of society has been
left adrift by the decimation of manufacturing jobs. Yes, the uninsured rate has fallen from 15.4 percent to 8.8 percent, but Obamacare will always be
remembered for its bungled rollout and the long-term impacts on the deficit are still unclear. Yes, the number of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan dropped
from more than 180,000 to less than 14,000, but how many militant Islamists have joined the Islamic State since then? And even if American soldiers have
been replaced by drones, the Obama administration's hidden regime of death from above leaves much to be desired in the way of moral and legal
legitimacyespecially when 90 percent of the people killed by drone strikes are not the target. This isn't to condemn President Obama as a Machiavellian
liar, or even as a hypocrite; after all, all politicians are hypocrites, especially when they have the privilege of Teddy Roosevelt's infamous Bully Pulpit. But
his appeal to the politics of hope and change baked into a desperate victory lap feels hollow and empty, an attempt to shore up his legacy by convincing
America that he delivered on his impossible rhetorical promises of the 2008 election. We can see this in his appeal, toward the end of his address, to a
better form of politics, the "politics of hope": A better politics doesnt mean we have to agree on everything. This is a big country, with different regions
and attitudes and interests. That's one of our strengths too. Our founders distributed power between states and branches of government, and expected us
to argue, just as they did over the size and shape of government, over commerce and foreign relations, over the meaning of liberty and the imperatives of
security. But democracy does require basic bonds of trust between its citizens. It doesn't work if we think the people who disagree with us are all
motivated by malice, or that our political opponents are unpatriotic. Democracy grinds to a halt without a willingness to compromise; or when even basic
facts are contested, and we listen only to those who agree with us. Our public life withers when only the most extreme voices get attention. Most of all,

democracy breaks down when the average person feels their voice doesn't matter; that the system is rigged in favor of the rich or the powerful or some
narrow interest. Too many Americans feel that way right now. It's one of the few regrets of my presidencythat the rancor and suspicion between the
parties has gotten worse instead of better. There's no doubt a president with the gifts of Lincoln or Roosevelt might have better bridged the divide, and I
guarantee I'll keep trying to be better so long as I hold this office. But this transcendent form of politics that's infused Obama's optimism indicates that he
learned the wrong lesson.

It's

Obama's naivete, his coolness, his ambivalence to the muck of Washington politics, that

have hamstrung his legislative ambitions. Blowing all his political capital on health-care reform ,
despite the legislation's myriad benefits, doomed the Obama administration to a cycle of thrust and parry with the
Republican Congress on everything from budgets to immigration reform,

reducing him to a lame duck

president by the end of his second year in office . Where most presidents enjoy a 100-day mandate (thanks, FDR)
and an embattled lull before the freedom of their twilight months, Obama has spent the majority of his presidency protecting his mantra of "hope and
change" and his legacy of transcending politics to the point of political intransigence. Yes, Obama has accomplished a lotopening relations with Cuba,
forging the TPP, fighting Ebola in West Africa, killing Osama bin Laden, striking a deal with Iranbut time will tell how these projects turn out. With his final
State of the Union, Obama demanded his legacy now, early, like the Nobel Peace Prize he never should have been awarded as an incentive. Despite the
soaring rhetoric, the narrative was clear: You voted for the messiah, and I sort of delivered. It resembled the "Mission Accomplished" banner George W.
Bush flew on the USS Abraham Lincoln in 2003. This brings me back to George Washington. Yes, any comparison to Washington is inherently nonsense,
because it's like comparing a president to Jesus Christ. But where Washington used his final "address" to the nation as a moment of political philosophy,
Obama's return to the language of hope and change betrays a modern selfishness that undermines the noble intentions of rising above the dirty politics of
D.C. A better use of the State of the Union would have been to say, well, less: to recognize and analyze the constraints of the executive, the realities of
politics (beyond allusions to the hateful rhetoric of Donald Trump), and make a Washingtonian plea rather than litigate the veracity of hope and change in
the context of his accomplishments. President Obama delivered a full-throated defense of his legacy in lieu of a slate of policy proposals, as he should
have; according to Al Jazeera, the White House "long ago acknowledgedinternally and eventually externallythat his tenure is in a post-legislative

While all presidents fixate on their legacy,

Obama's feels a bit more precarious. We can expect to see more tears, like the ones he shed over gun
phase." We can call this period of his presidency a "long goodbye," perhaps :

control in recent weeks, more fiery speeches on the routineness of mass shootings, and more rawness and realness

But
in an effort to deliver a Washingtonian farewell, the president's message of progress
fell flat. History will be the final judge of Barack Obama but if his final speech is any
than we've ever seen from our commander-in-chief as a reminder that, yes, he is hope and change embodied.

indication, history might find that the president's mantra of change left us filled more with doubt than hope.

Obama is spending the small amount of political capital he has

left on gun control
Charles C.W. Cooke 2016
Charles C. W. Cooke is a writer at National Review and a graduate of the University of Oxford, at which he studied
modern history and politics. His work has focused especially on Anglo-American history, British liberty, free speech,
the Second Amendment, and American exceptionalism. He is the co-host of the Mad Dogs and Englishmen podcast,
and has broadcast for HBO (Real Time with Bill Maher), the BBC, MSNBC, Fox News, The Blaze, CNBC, CTV, ABC, Sun
News, and CBS. He has written for National Interest, the Washington Times, and the New York Post.

Obamas executive-led gun control push is finally underway.

Per NPR: ATF will play a central role in

the administrations move, by clarifying what it means to be engaged in the business of selling guns. Until now,
some collectors and hobbyists have been able to avoid that designation. As a result, they havent needed a federal
license to sell and they havent been required to conduct background checks on their customers. The new guidance
from that Bureau is designed to require more such sellers to conduct background checks, even if theyre doing
business only at gun shows or online. Moreover: The administration is also working to improve the quality of
background checks by encouraging states and government agencies to share more information about criminal
histories, domestic violence, and mental illness that could disqualify a person from buying a gun. And the FBI is
hiring 230 additional staff people to speed the processing of background checks. Under current law, a gun sale can
go forward if a background check is not completed within three days. Arguendo, lets presume that all these
changes are legal (given, how tightly the laws are written, Im skeptical). Has Obama lost his mind? This is a man,
remember, who is supposed to be admirably dispassionate; a man who is supposed to understand how the game is

hes
going to use a good deal of his last years political capital in order to tweak a few minor rules
around the edges? Why? Even if were generous and presume that every single one of these regulations finds
played; a man who is supposed to reflexively refuse to be taken in by the emotion of the moment. And yet

its way permanently into the law, he will nevertheless have done nothing substantial to further universal
background checks; he will have instituted none of his coveted magazine limits; and he will have banned none of

he will have set no meaningful precedents whatsoever. In other

words: Even if he wins this round, he will have done precisely nothing of merit except perhaps
the weapons that he disdains. Further,

to have pleased his base and to have convinced the most ignorant parts of the electorate that he has finally stuck
his finger into the NRAs eye. Were these serious measures, I would be squealing. Instead, Im amused. These are

Obamas behavior is not at all rational. As far as I can see,

the president has announced these initiatives for no other reason than to satisfy his burning
desire to say that he did something to advance gun control. That he in fact did nothing of note is
the dampest of squibs. Which is to say that

neither here nor there. He needs the applause line both now, and in his retirement and hes determined to get
it. When I say he did nothing of note, of course, I mean nothing of note to advance his agenda. As it happens,
the president has done something of note tonight:

He has hurt his own side.

Were I a gun control advocate Id be livid

with him. Livid. Why? Two reasons: 1) In order to make his actions appear meaningful, Obama is going to have to pretend that they represent serious
change. If he does that, though, hell permit his opponents to say, look, we just did big gun control by executive order, we have other things to do, and
were not doing it again. That matters. The Left makes great hay out of the we never do anything line, and its more effective advocates use our present
inertia to justify the need for experimentation. Insofar as there is any, Obama has slowed the momentum for further gun-control. This is not how you win
the argument. 2) By taking this route, Obama will help to entrench Americas gun culture and for little in return. Ceteris paribus, the United States will
play host to at least another 20 million guns by the end of December 2016 many of them so-called assault weapons. In addition, the country will
welcome another million or so concealed carriers, and another half-million or so NRA members. Every time the president talks about gun control, these
numbers increase, and, in consequence, the presidents opponents are strengthened. Not only will this maneuver make it more likely that a Republican
presidential candidate will make inroads with pro-gun voters the ads write themselves: you dont want another anti-gun would-be King, do you? but
it will likely damage the long-term prospects for change. By his own account, Obama wants to reduce, not increase, the number of guns in circulation. If
history is anything to go by, this action will do precisely the opposite. And for what? A minor change to the way in which firearms are sold on the private
market? Obama has let his emotion get the better of him here. He and his fellow travelers will likely pay a price.

Prez Powers:

No Uniqueness:

No Link:
Judicial Power is placed upon the Supreme Court to prevent concentration of power
and to maximize freedom. Since the president is a single person, they should not be
the one to decide what is constitutional and it is not his power to extend.

No Impacts:
US power is sustainable no challengers
Noah Berlatsky, writer at the Atlantic, 6-17-2014, The Moral Argument for
American Restraint in Iraq and Beyond,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/the-moral-argument-forrestraintin-iraq-and-around-the-world/372933/
Barry Posen, a professor of political science at MIT and a foreign-policy realist,
advocates a different approach. The title of his new book, Restraint, succinctly
expresses his policy recommendation. The U.S., he argues, needs to stop trying to
do more and more. Instead, it needs to do less. Or, as he puts it, "Efforts to defend
everything leave one defending not much of anything." Posen rests his discussion
on two basic arguments. The first is that the United States is, by any reasonable
metric, an incredibly secure nation. It is geographically isolated from other great
powersa position that makes invading or even attacking the U.S. mainland
prohibitively difficult. U.S. conventional forces are by far the most powerful in the
world. Posen notes that the U.S. "accounted for a little more than a third of all the
military spending in the world during the 1990s," and has increased the percentage
to about 41 percent of all military spending in the world today. On top of that, the
U.S. has a massive nuclear deterrent. It is simply not credible to argue that Iran,
North Korea, Iraq, Pakistan, or even Russia or China have the combination of
dangerous capabilities and malign intentions to pose a serious existential threat to
the United States in anything but the most paranoid neocon fantasies.

No impact to reduced presidential powers but an

unrestrained executive creates wars to justify power
Gene Healy, vice president at the Cato Institute and author of the Cult of the
Presidency, 6-2011, Book Review: Hail to the Tyrant,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/book-review-hail-tyrant
Fair enough in the abstract but Posner and Vermuele fail to provide a single
compelling example that might lead you to lament our allegedly atavistic
tyrannophobia. And they seem oblivious to the fact that those same irrational
biases drive the perceived need for emergency government at least as much as
they do hostility towards it. Highly visible public events like the 9/11 attacks also
instill dread and a perceived loss of control, even if all the available evidence shows
that such incidents are vanishingly rare. The most recent year for which the U.S.
State Department has data, 2009, saw just 25 U.S. noncombatants worldwide die
from terrorist strikes. I know of no evidence suggesting that unchecked executive
power is what stood between us and a much larger death toll. Posner and Vermuele
argue that only the executive unbound can address modernitys myriad crises. But
they spend little time exploring whether unconstrained power generates the very
emergencies that the executive branch uses to justify its lack of constraint.
Discussing George H.W. Bushs difficulties convincing Congress and the public that

the 1991 Gulf Wars risks were worth it, they comment, in retrospect it might seem
that he was clearly right. Had that war been avoided, though, there would have
been no mass presence of U.S. troops on Saudi soil Osama bin Ladens principal
recruiting device, according to Paul Wolfowitz and perhaps no 9/11. Posner and
Vermuele are slightly more perceptive when it comes to the home front, letting drop
as an aside the observation that because of the easy-money policy that helped
inflate the housing bubble, the Fed is at least partly responsible for both the
financial crisis of 2008-2009 and for its resolution. Oh, well I guess were even,
then. Sometimes, the authors are so enamored with the elegant economic models
they construct that they cant be bothered to check their work against observable
reality. At one point, attempting to show that separation of powers is inefficient,
they analogize the Madisonian scheme to a market in which two firms must act in
order to supply a good, concluding that the extra transaction costs of
cooperation make the consumer (taxpayer) no better off and probably worse off
than she would be under the unitary system. But the government-as-firm metaphor
is daffy. In the Madisonian vision, inefficiency isnt a bug, its a feature a check on
the facility and excess of law-making the diseases to which our governments are
most liable, per Federalist No. 62. If the firm in question also generates public
bads like unnecessary federal programs and destructive foreign wars and if the
consumer (taxpayer) has no choice about whether to consume them he
might well favor constraints on production. From Franklin Roosevelt onward, weve
had something close to vertical integration under presidential command. Whatever
benefits that system has brought, its imposed considerable costs not least over
100,000 U.S. combat deaths in the resulting presidential wars. That system has also
encouraged hubristic occupants of the Oval Office to burnish their legacies by
engaging in humanitarian war an oxymoron, according to Posner. In a sharply
argued 2006 Washington Post op-ed, he noted that the Iraq War had killed tens of
thousands of innocents and observed archly, polls do not reveal the opinions of
dead Iraqis.

Executive flexibility causes misguided wars

Martin Indyk, vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program, 6-202013, The Road to War: Presidential Commitments and Congressional
Responsibility Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/06/20-warpresidential-power
Ever since WWII, Kalb said that history has led us into conflicts that we dont
understand because presidents do not seek approval from Congress for
declarations of war. The country has reached a point now where presidential power
is so great, words out of his mouth become policy for the United States. Kalb used
the Syrian civil war and President Obamas red line policy as an example of how a
presidents words become strategy for the United States. Kalb argued that this
presidential flexibility in foreign policy decision-making has repeatedly led the
country into one misguided war to the next such as the Vietnam and Iraq wars. To
nullify these poor decisions, Kalb believes that formal congressional declarations of

war will help trigger the appreciation for the gravity of war and assist in unifying
the nation behind a strategic military intervention, resulting in more positive
outcomes for the United States.

Presidential power ends all Congressional restraint on

warmaking conflicts become inevitable
Ivan Eland, Director of the at The Independent Institute and Assistant Editor of
and former Director of Defense Policy Studies @ CATO, 4-3- 2007, Bush Out of Link
in Scolding Pelosi Consortium News,
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2007/040307a.html
Curiously, although the expansion of executive power in foreign policy has not
served the nation well, it often has the counterintuitive effect of serving the
interests of Congress. If the President is always in charge of U.S. foreign policy,
members of Congress can duck responsibility for tough issues that might pose risks
to their paramount goalgetting reelected. For example, by allowing presidents to
fight even major conflicts without constitutionally required declarations of wara
phenomenon that began when Harry Truman neglected, with a congressional wink
and nod, to get approval for the Korean Warthe Congress conveniently throws
responsibility for the war into the Presidents lap. The founders would be horrified at
the erosion of a major pillar of their system of checks and balances. To fulfill their
constitutional responsibility as a check on the President, members of Congress do
have a responsibility to be heavily involved in U.S. foreign policy. Instead of publicly
condemning Speaker Pelosi for carrying out the bipartisan Iraq Study Groups
heretoforelanguishing recommendation of actually talking to Syria to resolve
bilateral issues, the President should be happy that someone in the U.S.
government is willing to take risks with one of Americas major adversaries in the
region.

Rights Malthus DA

No Uniqueness
CO2 emissions prevent the next Ice Age which would inevitably
lead to extinction
Didymus 12(John Thomas Didymus, journalist from the Digital Journal, Human
carbon dioxide emissions could prevent next Ice Age, Digital Journal, January
2012.)Accessed online at:
http://digitaljournal.com/print/article/317605#ixzz1w2W7dBCR
A team of scientists say that

high levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere could prevent the

next Ice Age. The scientists say that even if carbon emissions stopped today, enough has accumulated in
the atmosphere to prevent the next Ice Age glaciation. The Telegraph reports that according to the team of
scientist, in a study published in Nature Geoscience, high levels of

carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that

has been source of concern among environmental scientists could prevent glaciation. The scientists
said that at the next Ice Age, the climate will cool down, but not as severely it could have with normal carbon
dioxide levels. According to scientists, the Earth will probably not experience glaciation. The team included
scientists from University College London, the University of Florida and Norway's Bergen
University. BBC reported that paleoclimatologist Luke Skinner, from Cambridge University, said: "At current
levels of CO2, even if emissions stopped now we'd probably have a long interglacial duration determined by
whatever long-term processes could kick in and bring [atmospheric] CO2 down." The current level of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere is 390 parts per million. The scientists say that carbon dioxide levels in the
atmosphere will need to drop down to 240 parts per million for glaciation to take place. Some groups, according
to BBC, are citing the study as evidence that

beneficial for humankind.

human carbon dioxide emission may be

The UK lobby group Global Warning Policy Foundation, refers to an essay by

Sir Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, that said: " The

renewal of ice-age conditions would

render a large fraction of the world's major food-growing areas inoperable, and so would
inevitably lead to the extinction of most of the present human population. We must look to a
sustained greenhouse effect to maintain the present advantageous world climate. This
implies the ability to inject effective greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, the opposite of what
environmentalists are erroneously advocating."

The warming pause is real -dont trust other research - it

manipulates data
Lott 15
(Maxim Lott [Writer for FoxNews.com and producer for John Stossel], 6/10/15,
"Climate scientists criticize government paper that erases pause in warming," Fox
News, www.foxnews.com/science/2015/06/10/climate-scientists-criticizegovernment-paper-that-erases-pause-in-warming/, MX)
Until last week, government data on climate change indicated that the Earth has
warmed over the last century, but that the warming slowed dramatically and even
stopped at points over the last 17 years. But a paper released May 28 by researchers at the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has readjusted the data in a way that makes the
reduction in warming disappear, indicating a steady increase in temperature
instead. But the studys readjusted data conflict with many other climate
measurements, including data taken by satellites, and some climate scientists arent buying
the new claim. While Im sure this latest analysis from NOAA will be regarded as

politically useful for the Obama administration, I dont regard it as a particularly

useful contribution to our scientific understanding of what is going on , Judith Curry, a climate
science professor at Georgia Tech, wrote in a response to the study. And in an interview, Curry told FoxNews.com that that the adjusted data
doesnt match other independent measures of temperature. The new NOAA dataset
disagrees with a UK dataset, which is generally regarded as the gold standard for
global sea surface temperature datasets , she said. The new dataset also disagrees with ARGO buoys and satellite
analyses. The NOAA paper, produced by a team of researchers led by Tom Karl, director of the agencys National Climatic Data Center, found most of its
new warming trend by adjusting past measurements of sea temperatures. Global ocean temperatures are estimated both by thousands of commercial
ships, which record the temperature of the water entering their engines, and by thousands of buoys floatation devices that sit in the water for years. The
buoys tend to get cooler temperature readings than the ships, likely because ships engines warm the water. Meanwhile, in recent years, buoys have
become increasingly common. The result, Karl says, is that even if the worlds oceans are warming, the unadjusted data may show it not to be warming
because more and more buoys are being used instead of ships. So Karls team adjusted the buoy data to make them line up with the ship data. They also

The paper

double-checked their work by making sure that the readjusted buoy readings matched ships recordings of nighttime air temperatures.
came out last week, and there has not been time for skeptical scientists to independently check the adjustments, but some are questioning it because of
how much the adjusted data vary from other independent measurements. First, it

disagrees with the readings of more

than 3,000 ARGO buoys, which are specifically designed to float around the ocean and measure temperature. Some scientists view
their data as the most reliable. The ARGO buoy data do not show much warming in surface temperature since they were introduced in 2003. But Karls
team left them out of their analysis, saying that they have multiple issues, including lack of measurements near the Arctic. In an email, Karl told
FoxNews.com that the ARGO buoy readings may be added to his data if scientific methods can be found to line up these two types of temperatures
together (of course after correcting the systematic offsets) This is part of the cumulative and progressive scientific process. Karls study also clashes
with satellite measurements. Since 1979, NOAA satellites have estimated the temperature of Earths atmosphere. They show almost no warming in recent
years and closely match the surface data before Karls adjustments. The satellite data is compiled by two separate sets of researchers, whose results
match each other closely. One team that compiles the data includes Climate Professors John Christy and Roy Spencer at the University of Alabama in

The study is one more example that you can get any
answer you want when the thermometer data errors are larger than the global
warming signal you are looking for, Spencer told FoxNews.com.
Huntsville, both of whom question Karls adjusted data.

Scientists manipulate data to suit their trends

Tracinski 6/8
(Robert Tracinski [a senior writer at The Federalist. He studied philosophy at the
University of Chicago and for more than 20 years has written about politics,
markets, and foreign policy], 6/8/15, "Global Warming: The Theory that Predicts
Nothing and Explains Everything," The Federalist,
thefederalist.com/2015/06/08/global-warming-the-theory-that-predicts-nothing-andexplains-everything/, MX)
A lot of us having been pointing out one of the big problems with the global
warming theory: a long plateau in global temperatures since about 1998. Most
significantly, this leveling off was not predicted by the theory, and observed
temperatures have been below the lowest end of the range predicted by all of the
computerized climate models. So what to do if your theory doesnt fit the data?
Why, change the data, of course! Hence a blockbuster new report: a new analysis of temperature
data since 1998 adjusts the numbers and magically finds that there was no
plateau after all. The warming just continued. Starting in at least early 2013, a number of scientific and public
commentators have suggested that the rate of recent global warming has slowed or even stopped. The phenomena has been variably termed a pause, a

a team of federal scientists report today in the prestigious

journal Science, there may not have been any pause at all. The researchers from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrations National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI) adjusted their data on
land and ocean temperatures to address residual data biases that affect a variety of measurements,
such as those taken by ships over the oceans. And they found that newly corrected and updated global
surface temperature data from NOAAs NCEI do not support the notion of a global
warming hiatus. How convenient. Its so convenient that theyre signaling for everyone else to get on board. One question
slowdown, and a hiatus. But as

raised by the research is whether other global temperature datasets will see similar adjustments. One, kept by the Hadley Center of the UK Met Office,

Before this update, we

were the slowest rate of warming, said Karl. And with the update now, were the
leaders of the pack. So as other people make updates, they may end up adjusting
upwards as well. This is going to be the new party line. Hiatus? What hiatus? Who are you going to believe, our adjustments or your
lying thermometers? The new adjustments are suspiciously convenient, of course. Anyone
who is touting a theory that isnt being borne out by the evidence and suddenly tells
you hes analyzed the data and by golly, what do you know, suddenly it does
support his theorywell, he should be met with more than a little skepticism. If we look,
appears to support the global warming hiatus narrativebut then, so did NOAAs dataset up until now.

we find some big problems. The most important data adjustments by far are in ocean temperature measurements. But anyone who has been following this
debate will notice something about the time period for which the adjustments were made. This is a time in which the measurement of ocean temperatures
has vastly improved in coverage and accuracy as a whole new set of scientific buoys has come online. So why would this data need such drastic
correcting? As climatologist Judith Curry puts it: The greatest changes in the new NOAA surface temperature analysis is to the ocean temperatures since
1998. This seems rather ironic, since this is the period where there is the greatest coverage of data with the highest quality of measurementsARGO buoys
and satellites dont show a warming trend. Nevertheless, the NOAA team finds a substantial increase in the ocean surface temperature anomaly trend

NOAA corrected the ocean temperature measurements to be more consistent

with a previous set of measurements. But those older measurements were known to
be a problem. Scientists relied on measurements from merchant vessels, which had
slowly switched from measuring water in buckets dipped over the side to measuring
it on its way through intake ports for cooling the ships engines. But that meant that
water temperatures were more likely to be increased by contact with the ship,
producing an artificial warming. Hence the objection made by Patrick Michaels, Richard Lindzen, and Chip Knappenberger: As
since 1998.

has been acknowledged by numerous scientists, the engine intake data are clearly contaminated by heat conduction from the engine itself, and as such,
never intended for scientific use. On the other hand, environmental monitoring is the specific purpose of the buoys. Adjusting good data upward to match
bad data seems questionable. Thats putting it mildly. They also point to another big change in the adjusted data: projecting far northern land
temperatures out to cover gaps in measurement over the Arctic Ocean. Yet the land temperatures are likely to be significantly warmer than the ocean

the warmists are desperate, but they might not have thought through
the overall effect of this new adjustment push. Weve been told to take very, very
seriously the objective data showing global warming is real and is happeningand
then they announce that the data has been totally changed post hoc. This is meant
to shore up the theory, but it actually calls the data into question. Anthony Watts, one of the chief
questioners of past adjustments, points out that to make the pause disappear, they didnt just increase
temperatures since 1998. They also adjusted downward the temperatures
immediately before that. Starting from a lower base of temperature makes the
adjusted increase look even bigger. Thats a pattern that invariably shows up in all these adjustments: the past is always
temperatures. I realize

adjusted downward to make it cooler, the present upward to make it warmeran amazing coincidence that guarantees a warming trend. All of this fits into

the global warming theory has been awful at making predictions about the
data ahead of time. But it has been great at going backward, retroactively reinterpreting the data and
a wider pattern:

retrofitting the theory to mesh with it. A line I saw from one commenter, I cant remember where (update: it was David Burge), has been rattling around in
my head: once again, the theory that predicts nothing explains everything. There is an important difference between prediction before the fact and
explanation after the fact. Prediction requires that you lay down a marker about what the data ought to be, to be consistent with your theory, before you
actually know what it is. Thats something thats very hard to get right. If your theory is going to be able to consistently predict data before it is gathered,

But explanations of
data after the fact are a lot easier. As they say, hindsight is 20/20. Its a lot easier to
tweak your theory to make it a better fit to the data, or in this case, to tweak the
way the data is measured and analyzed in order to make it better fit your theory.
And then you proclaim how amazing it is that your theory explains the data. The whole
it has got to be pretty darned good. Global warming theories have a wretched track record at making predictions.

political cause of global warming is based on the theorys claim to make predictions before the fact. If this difference between prediction and explanation
seems merely technical, remember that the whole political cause of global warming is based on the theorys claim to make predictions before the fact
way before the fact, projecting temperatures for the next century. Were supposed to base the whole organization of our civilization, at a cost of many
trillions of dollars, on those ultra-long-term predictions. So exulting that they can readjust the data for the last few years to jibe with their theory after the

Anyone with the slightest familiarity with science ought to

be immediately skeptical of this new claim, so naturally mainstream media science reporters repeat it with complete
fact is not exactly the reassurance we need.

credulity and even pre-emptively inoculate us against the sin of doubt. The Washington Post report/press-release-transcription has a nice little passiveaggressive twist, sneering that The details of the data adjustments quickly get complicatedand will surely be where global warming doubters focus their
criticism. Those global warming doubters, always finding something to kvetch about! What are you gonna do? Worse, the Post ends by passing along a
criticism of mainstream scientists for even discussing the global warming pause before now. Harvard science historian Naomi Oreskes recently coauthored a paper depicting research on the hiatus as a case study in how scientists had allowed a seepage of climate skeptic argumentation to affect
the formal scientific literature. Of the new NOAA study, she said in an e-mail: I hope the scientific community will do a bit of soul searching about how

they got pulled into this framework, which was clearly a contrarian construction from the start. Remember that everybodys data was showing a plateau
in global temperatures, and many of the studies focused on this were attempting to uphold the global warming theory in the face of that evidence. Yet
now some of the theorys own supporters are going to be thrown under the bus for showing too much faith in the data and too little faith in the cause.

That gives us a pretty

good idea of what is going on here. Because any field where people say this sort of
thing is by that very fact not a field of science any longer.
They will get the message stated bluntly by Oreskes: science must never be contaminated by skepticism.

climate change is a scam alarmists are unqualified and self

interested
Starck, PhD, Feb 2015, (Walter, "The Climate Scam's Meltdown" Ausmarine 37.4:
26-27. Proquest. search.proquest.com/docview/1666284048?pq-origsite=gscholar)
"A conspiracy does not require secret planning"
An argument is often made that the climate-change threat must be real because a
conspiracy involving an overwhelming majority of the world's scientists is simply not
credible. This is disingenuous in that the climate threat, as exemplified by the
IPCC's scare machine, is far from representing a scientific consensus, even
a majority. Global scientific opinion on this matter is highly mixed with the alarmist
position concentrated in Europe and the Anglosphere. Even here thousands of
dissenters exist, including many highly qualified and respected researchers with
very relevant expertise. The core alarmist proponents only comprise a few dozen,
mostly third-rate, academics whose scientific reputations are minimal outside of
climate alarmism. They co-opted the niche, little known interdisciplinary field of
climatology, proclaimed themselves to be the world authorities, declared a global
crisis, received lavish funding to research it and gained global attention. They have
been aided and abetted by sundry fellow travellers who see advantage for various
other agendas. A conspiracy does not require secret planning. It can be
implemented just as easily with a wink and a nod when the aims and methods are
apparent to all the participants. It is time to recognise the climate scam for what it
is: a conspiracy to defraud on a monumental scale. Although climate itself is
presenting its irrefutable opposing argument, failed prophets never willingly
concede defeat until their mouths are stopped with the dust of reality. In this
instance gob-stopping reality seems likely to take the form of severe winter weather
leading to a widespread collapse of electrical power in an overloaded grid suffering
from underinvestment, malinvestment, restraints and neglect. All these stem from
years of misguided climate policies. Until the crunch comes, the rent-seekers and
their useful idiots in the press will rant and rage without pause, their livelihoods and
careers hanging on their ability to perpetuate the hoax they foisted on the rest of
us. As so often, Shakespeare said it best: "A tale, told by an idiot, full of sound and
fury, signifying nothing."

Global warming is a liberal lie

McFarlane15

(Bonnie McFarlane, 6/19/15, [Totally serious standup comedian], "Global warming is

totally a lie liberals tell to distract us from their commie agendas," The Guardian,
www.theguardian.com/environment/commentisfree/2015/jun/19/global-warming-lieliberals-tell-distract-us, MX)
Everybody is talking about global warming. Clearly, its got a great publicist. My guess is its the same one that Amy Schumer uses. However, unlike Schumer whom I have on good authority is real

Warming is a big fat lie

Global

. Now, before you spit out your fair trade coffee and start yelling about carbon emissions, let me assure you that this is not a conclusion that came easily to me. I

thought about it a lot. Just this morning I was in the shower for a good two hours debating the pros and cons of dating someone with a giant global footprint. Once the water went cold and I dried myself off with a hair dryer, I knew I

This so-called environmental Armageddon is a fictitious

construction cooked up by the left so well spend all our time
changing out our light bulbs and flattening cardboard and completely
overlooking their pinko/commie/socialist agendas .
The planet doesnt need saving. After all, its
been around for almost 2,000 years. It was fine before you got here, and itll be fine
after the apocalypse destroys most of humankind
had my answer.

(or at least a half hour a week)

Im on to you, liberals! Youre trying to be heroes to humanity. You want

everyone to pat you on the back and say, Oh, look who saved the planet! Well, I have news for you.

for the sins of homosexuality and shellfish consumption. God hates Shrimp Scampi, but He

doesnt seem to have a problem with littering. (Leviticus 10:10) I wish people would stop incessantly asking, Dont we care what kind of planet were going to leave our children? First of all, Im pretty sure any child psychologist
would agree that leaving a whole planet to a kid is an appalling idea. I wouldnt dream of spoiling my daughter with an entire planet. You dont have to give your kids the world; just spend some time with them once in a while. Thats

I wish scientists would stop blaming us humans for causing

global warming. This is patently false, since global warming is not real!
weve
just experienced the coldest spring on record
my sister went to Greenland and never saw any polar bears stranded
on tiny ice floes.
But the most telling sign that global
warming is not an actual threat is this: the Republican presidential candidates arent
trying to scare us with the prospect that were all doomed to die from toxic air and
scorching temperatures. And Republican presidential candidates love scaring the
public. Its their passion
despite the
numerous scientific claims and all those hockey-stick graphs
I dont
think theres any truth to this whole global warming thing. At the very least, the
declarations are exaggerated and we have nothing to worry about for at least a
decade.
what they really want. That, and a Mercedes SUV for their sweet 16.

If the fact that

isnt enough to sway you, Ive got other anecdotal evidence that should be plenty convincing. For

example:

In fact, my sister didnt see any live polar bears at all, so there.

. If they could put a gun to each of our heads individually and say, Vote for me or else you die, I think they would. Thats why,

showing the sharp rise in temperatures,

*Democracy more sustainable than authoritarianism- transition

not inevitable
Davis 15 (Davis, Michael C has an LLM from Yale and teaches at the University of
Hong Kong. "East Asia After the Crisis: Human Rights, Constitutionalism, and State
Reform." Human Rights Quarterly 26.1 (2004): 126-51. ProQuest. Web. 29 June
2015.)
In assessing the debates over political and economic reform, it becomes apparent
that constitutionalism has a central role to play. Studies in the political economy
literature appear to verify that regime type ultimately matters in the achievement
of economic development goals.96 While authoritarianism with proper
developmental institutions can do reasonably well at early-stage development, this
is not invariably so. Furthermore, as economic development proceeds the
developmental potential of the authoritarian model may be exhausted. Recent
studies have shown that the developmental achievement of authoritarian regimes
in East Asia is not uniformly positive. Latent costs are just now being appreciated. In
addition to the deficiencies of authoritarian practices in respect to democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law, there have also been high levels of corruption.

Corruption appears to be a consequence of both early predatory practices and a

lack of transparency, and subsequent incapacity of authoritarian regimes to respond
to the interests that economic development creates. Rent-seeking evolves from a
top-down predatory behavior in the authoritarian period when the state is strong, to
a bottom-up predatory behavior in the early stages of democracy as business
becomes stronger and the state weaker. Corruption may serve as a substitute for
adequate state institutions. Democratic consolidation will aim to curb corruption by
affording greater transparency and stable institutions for checks and balances.
Greater dispersal and open competition in the society should accompany this
consolidation. Local institutions shape investor confidence. Either extreme
concentrations of power or extreme dispersal appears to have worked poorly; the
former is too volatile and the latter too rigid. Liberal constitutionalism, including
democracy, human rights and the rule of law, appears to provide the tools to
engender the degree of public engagement and political reliability needed for
sustained development. Finding the proper institutional balance is by no means an
easy task. The constitutional fundamentals are essential. Minimally maintaining the
protections embodied in human rights and the rule of law is important to achieving
transparency and accountability, while sustaining confidence in political and legal
institutions. Constitutional institutions must be shaped to the local condition. This
reality is demonstrated by the varied consequences of importing similar institutions
into different countries. Constitutional systems deeply influenced by the American
model work very differently in Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. Getting
the fit just right is the challenge of local politics.

Democracy inevitable- More sustainable than authoritarian

regimes
Slater and Bennis 90 (Philip Slater and Warren Bennis Democracy is
Inevitable Harvard Business review. THE SEPTEMBEROCTOBER 1990 ISSUE.
Democracy has been so widely embraced not because of some vague yearning for
human rights but because under certain conditions it is a more efficient form of
social organization. (Our concept of efficiency includes the ability to survive and
prosper.) It is not accidental that those nations of the world that have endured
longest under conditions of relative wealth and stability are democratic, while
authoritarian regimes have, with few exceptions, either crumbled or eked out a
precarious and backward existence. Despite this evidence, even so acute a
statesman as Adlai Stevenson argued in a New York Times article on November 4,
1962, that the goals of the Communists are different from ours. They are interested
in power, he said, we in community. With such fundamentally different aims, how
is it possible to compare communism and democracy in terms of efficiency?
Democracy (whether capitalistic or socialistic is not at issue here) is the only system
that can successfully cope with the changing demands of contemporary civilization.
We are not necessarily endorsing democracy as such; one might reasonably argue
that industrial civilization is pernicious and should be abolished. We suggest merely
that given a desire to survive in this civilization, democracy is the most effective
means to this end.

Democracy is the only system capable of adapting to change- that

makes it sustainable
Slater and Bennis 90 (Philip Slater and Warren Bennis Democracy is
Inevitable Harvard Business review. THE SEPTEMBEROCTOBER 1990 ISSUE.
And here we come to the point. For the spirit of inquiry, the foundation of science,
to grow and flourish, there must be a democratic environment. Science encourages
a political view that is egalitarian, pluralistic, liberal. It accentuates freedom of
opinion and dissent. It is against all forms of totalitarianism, dogma, mechanization,
and blind obedience. As a prominent social psychologist has pointed out, Men have
asked for freedom, justice, and respect precisely as science has spread among
them. 2 In short, the only way organizations can ensure a scientific attitude is to
provide the democratic social conditions where one can flourish. In other words,
democracy in industry is not an idealistic conception but a hard necessity in those
areas where change is ever present and creative scientific enterprise must be
nourished. For democracy is the only system of organization that is compatible with
perpetual change.

Democracy is the most sustainable- history proves- if we choose to

stay committed, it will expand over the next century
Diamon 3 (Diamond, Larry. "Universal Democracy?" Policy Review.119 (2003): 3.
ProQuest. Web. 29 June 2015.)
The fully global triumph of democracy is far from inevitable, yet it has never been
more attainable. If we manage to sustain the process of global economic integration
and growth while making freedom at least an important priority in our diplomacy,
aid, and other international engagements, democracy will continue to expand in the
world. History has proven that it is the best form of government. Gradually, more
countries will become democratic while fewer revert to dictatorship. If we retain our
power, reshape our strategy, and sustain our commitment, eventually - not in
the next decade, but certainly by mid-century - every country in the world can be
democratic.

Environmental authoritarianism isnt uniquely key in solving

ecocide, status quo can solve with the right efforts.
White, 10 (Micah, Senior editor at Adbusters and an award-winning activist, An alternative to the
new wave of ecofascism, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifgreen/2010/sep/16/authoritarianism-ecofascism-alternative)

Environmentalism is currently marketed as a luxury brand for guilty consumers. The

prevailing assumption is that a fundamental lifestyle change is unnecessary: being
green means paying extra for organic produce and driving a hybrid. The incumbent
political regime remains in power and the same corporations provide new "green"
goods; the underlying consumerist ideology is unquestioned. This brand of
environmentalism only emboldens ecofascists who rightly claim that shopping green
can never stop the ecological crisis. And yet, ecofascists are wrong to suggest
that the suspension of democracy is the only alternative. Humanity can

avert climate catastrophe without accepting ecological tyranny. However,

this will take an immediate, drastic reduction of our consumption. This requires the
trust that the majority of people would voluntarily reduce their standard of living
once the forces that induce consumerism are overcome. The future of
environmentalism is in liberating humanity from the compulsion to consume.
Rampant, earth-destroying consumption is the norm in the west largely because our
imaginations are pillaged by any corporation with an advertising budget. From birth,
we are assaulted by thousands of commercial messages each day whose single
mantra is "buy". Silencing this refrain is the revolutionary alternative to ecological
fascism. It is a revolution which is already budding and is marked by three
synergetic campaigns: the criminalisation of advertising, the revocation of corporate
power and the downshifting of the global economy. In So Paulo, the seventh largest
city in the world, outdoor advertising has been banned. Meanwhile, artists in New
York City and Toronto are launching blitzkrieg attacks on billboards, replacing
commercials with art. Their efforts have put one visual polluter out of business.
Grassroots organisers in the US are pushing for an amendment to the constitution
that will end corporate personhood while others are fighting to revive the possibility
of death penalties for corporations. The second international conference on
degrowth economics met recently in Barcelona. In Ithaca, New York a local, timebased currency is thriving. Buy Nothing Day campaign is celebrated in dozens of
nations and now Adbusters is upping the ante with a call for seven days of
carnivalesque rebellion against consumerism this November. And, most important of
all, across the world everyday people are silently, unceremoniously and intentionally
spending less and living more. Authoritarian environmentalists fail to imagine a
world without advertising, so they dream of putting democracy "on hold". In
Linkola's dystopian vision, the resources of the state are mobilised to clamp down
on individual liberty. But there is no need to suspend democracy if it is
returned to the people. Democratic, anti-fascist environmentalism means
marshalling the strength of humanity to suppress corporations. Only by
silencing the consumerist forces will both climate catastrophe and
ecological tyranny be averted. Yes, western consumption will be
substantially reduced. But it will be done voluntarily and joyously.

Link Turn/ No Link

All we do is stop solitary confinement, without
solitary confinement prisoners still have limited
rights, they are just not denied their eight
amendment rights
Cornell Law DictionaryNo Date- "Prisoners' Rights." LII / Legal Information
Institute. N.p., n.d. Web. 02 Mar. 2016.
Federal and state laws govern the establishment and administration of prisons as well as the rights of the inmates.

Although prisoners do not have full Constitutional rights, they are

protected by the Constitution's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment (see Amendment VIII). This protection requires that prisoners be afforded a minimum
standard of living. Prisoners retain some other Constitutional rights, including
due process in their right to administrative appeals and a right of access to the parole process. The Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment has been held to apply to prison inmates. Prisoners are therefore
protected against unequal treatment on the basis of race, sex, and creed. Additionally, the Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act provides that a confined person has a protected interest in freedom from discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex.

Prisoners also have limited rights to

speech and religion. State prisoners have no rights to particular classifications under state law.
Courts are extremely reluctant to limit the discretion of state prison officials to classify prisoners. (Classification, as
it is used here is meant to describe the custodial classification of a prisoner once he or she is convicted -- i.e.:
maximum vs. minimum security, solitary confinement, etc.) Congress has given federal prison officials full
discretion to control prisoner classification as affecting conditions of confinement. Generally, such matters are left
to the control of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Courts tend to give deference to prison officials regarding prisoners'
rights. So long as the conditions or degree of a prisoner's confinement are within the sentence and not otherwise
violative of the Constitution, the due process clause does not require judicial oversight. For prison regulations that
do impinge on inmates' constitutional rights, the strict scrutiny test does not apply. Rather, the rational relationship
test is used (the lowest level of judicial scrutiny -- the test is whether there is a rational relation to a legitimate
state interest). THIS FILE IS NOT USED AND IS HERE AS A STARTING POINT FOR CUSTOMIZATION ONLY. See
http://api.drupal.org/api/function/theme_field/7 for details. After copying this file to your theme's folder and
customizing it, remove this HTML comment.

Authoritarianism isnt coming

If Beeson card is read

The card says that eco authoritarianism is a possible reaction

to ecological challenges, no proof that guaranteed there is
going to be a transititon to eco authoritarianism, this collapses
their DA.

Dehumanization Outweighs
Extend the Berube card dehumanization outweighs the impact
of the DA, and we get solvency for the worst impact in the
round. Vote Neg on this issue

No Impact
No impact to the environment
Easterbrook 95 (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow @ The Fullbright Foundation and
Reuters Columnist, A Moment on Earth, p. 25, 1995)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is
prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like

the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly

wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them
is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages;
bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than
the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global
air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the
"aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But

rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of
ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons
caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of

asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's

Yet hearts beat on, and

nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts.

petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the
industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous,
are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to
resisting.

No impact to biodiversity loss

Sagoff 97 Mark, Senior Research Scholar Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs
U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS
JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N Note Colin
Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of
London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge. Simon Levin = Moffet
Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008
Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010
Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on the brink
of an episode of massive extinction, it may not follow from this grim fact that human beings
will suffer as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain
why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-

Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other
elimination of all but a
tiny minority of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota." n344

produce wild systems by 100-fold or more,"

species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the

This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to
ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "The

human species could survive just as well if 99.9%

of our

fellow creatures went extinct, provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346 [*906] The
monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species.
"At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable
consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent
ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over
time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent
ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a
species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem."

species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they

perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function
perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain even if
every threatened organism becomes extinct. n350 Even the kind of sparse and
n349 Other biologists believe, however, that

miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as
people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes
this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical
environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose
interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352 [*907] To make up your mind on the question of the
functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would
fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem
processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the
species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which
ones are they? Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually
every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where
the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, one may wonder why Americans have not suffered
more as a result of ecological catastrophes. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction
is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in
spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen. One might argue that

the sheer number and variety of

creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be
concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic
engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other
parts of the world, however, the number of species has been increasing dramatically, not
decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United
States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more
than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human
action. n354 [*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii
there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic
birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow
there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it
rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of
them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value.
n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain
exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green
crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [*909] with human migration. Everyone
knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of
Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of
our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native
ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by,
species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species
had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date?
Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a
general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and
in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain

Levin
observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties."
biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon

n361 [*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, biodiversity matters

increasing biodiversity is likely to make little

difference." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an
only up to a point; above a certain level,

estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are
extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the
world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced.
Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws,
even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop
consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and
unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants
(including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are
profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would
they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million
or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather
than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice
in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not
naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366
This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and
protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that
they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect,
our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no

reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand
that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for
moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting
human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic,
reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as
objects of use. What is good for [*912] the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for
mankind. The most valuable things are quite useless.

Biodiversity loss wont cause extinction

Lomberg 1 (Bjorn Lomborg, associate professor of statistics in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Aarhus, Denmark, August 9, 2001, Environmentalists tend to believe that, ecologically speaking,
things are getting worse and worse.
We are all familiar with the litany of our ever-deteriorating environment. It is the doomsday message endlessly
repeated by the media, as when Time magazine tells us that "everyone knows the planet is in bad shape", and

We are defiling our Earth, we

are told. Our resources are running out. The population is ever-growing , leaving less
and less to eat. Our air and water is more and more polluted. The planet's species
are becoming extinct in vast numbers - we kill off more than 40,000 each year.
Forests are disappearing, fish stocks are collapsing, the coral reefs are dying. The
fertile topsoil is vanishing. We are paving over nature, destroying the wilderness,
decimating the biosphere, and will end up killing ourselves in the process . The
world's ecosystem is breaking down. We are fast approaching the absolute limit of viability. Global
warming is probably taking place, though future projections are overly pessimistic and
the traditional cure of radical fossil-fuel cutbacks is far more damaging than the
original affliction. Moreover, its total impact will not pose a devastating problem to
our future. Nor will we lose 25-50% of all species in our lifetime - in fact, we are
losing probably 0.7%. Acid rain does not kill the forests, and the air and water
around us are becoming less and less polluted. In fact, in terms of practically every
measurable indicator, mankind's lot has improved . This does not, however, mean that everything
when the New Scientist calls its environmental overview "self-destruct".

is good enough. We can still do even better. Take, for example, starvation and the population explosion. In 1968,
one of the leading environmentalists, Dr Paul R Erlich, predicted in his bestselling book, The Population Bomb, that
"the battle to feed humanity is over. In the course of the 1970s, the world will experience starvation of tragic
proportions - hundreds of millions of people will starve to death." This did not happen. Instead, according to the UN,
agricultural production in the developing world has increased by 52% per person. The daily food intake in
developing countries has increased from 1,932 calories in 1961 - barely enough for survival - to 2,650 calories in
1998, and is expected to rise to 3,020 by 2030. Likewise, the proportion of people going hungry in these countries
has dropped from 45% in 1949 to 18% today, and is expected to fall even further, to 12% in 2010 and 6% in 2030.
Food, in other words, is becoming not scarcer but ever more abundant. This is reflected in its price. Since 1800,
food prices have decreased by more than 90%, and in 2000, according to the World Bank, prices were lower than
ever before. Erlich's prediction echoed that made 170 years earlier by Thomas Malthus. Malthus claimed that,
unchecked, human population would expand exponentially, while food production.

Warming will be slow and the impact will be small

Ridley 6/19/14,

(Matt Ridley is the author of The Rational Optimist, a columnist for the Times (London)
and a member of the House of Lords. He spoke at Ideacity in Toronto on June 18., PCC commissioned models to see
if global warming would reach dangerous levels this century. Consensus is no , [ http://tinyurl.com/mgyn8ln ] ,
//hss-RJ)

The debate over climate change is horribly polarized. From the way it is
conducted, you would think that only two positions are possible: that the
whole thing is a hoax or that catastrophe is inevitable. In fact there is room
for lots of intermediate positions, including the view I hold, which is that
man-made climate change is real but not likely to do much harm, let alone

prove to be the greatest crisis facing humankind this century. After more
than 25 years reporting and commenting on this topic for various media
organizations, and having started out alarmed, thats where I have ended up.
But it is not just I that hold this view. I share it with a very large international
organization, sponsored by the United Nations and supported by virtually all
the worlds governments: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) itself. The IPCC commissioned four different models of what might happen to the
world economy, society and technology in the 21st century and what each would mean for the climate, given a
certain assumption about the atmospheres sensitivity to carbon dioxide. Three of the models show a moderate,
slow and mild warming, the hottest of which leaves the planet just 2 degrees Centigrade warmer than today in

Now two degrees is the threshold at

which warming starts to turn dangerous, according to the scientific
consensus. That is to say, in three of the four scenarios considered by the
IPCC, by the time my childrens children are elderly, the earth will still not
have experienced any harmful warming, let alone catastrophe. But what
about the fourth scenario? This is known as RCP8.5, and it produces 3.5 degrees of warming in 20812081-2100. The coolest comes out just 0.8 degrees warmer.

2100. Curious to know what assumptions lay behind this model, I decided to look up the original papers describing

Frankly, I was gobsmacked. It is a world that is very, very

implausible. For a start, this is a world of continuously increasing global
population so that there are 12 billion on the planet. This is more than a
billion more than the United Nations expects, and flies in the face of the fact
that the world population growth rate has been falling for 50 years and is on
course to reach zero i.e., stable population in around 2070. More people
mean more emissions. Second, the world is assumed in the RCP8.5 scenario
to be burning an astonishing 10 times as much coal as today, producing 50% of its
the creation of this scenario.

primary energy from coal, compared with about 30% today. Indeed, because oil is assumed to have become scarce,
a lot of liquid fuel would then be derived from coal. Nuclear and renewable technologies contribute little, because of
a slow pace of innovation and hence fossil fuel technologies continue to dominate the primary energy portfolio
over the entire time horizon of the RCP8.5 scenario. Energy efficiency has improved very little.

These are

highly unlikely assumptions. With abundant natural gas displacing coal on a huge scale in the United
States today, with the price of solar power plummeting, with nuclear power experiencing a revival, with gigantic
methane-hydrate gas resources being discovered on the seabed, with energy efficiency rocketing upwards, and with
population growth rates continuing to fall fast in virtually every country in the world, the one thing we can say

Notice, however, that even so, it is not a

world of catastrophic pain. The per capita income of the average human
being in 2100 is three times what it is now. Poverty would be history. So its
hardly Armageddon. But theres an even more startling fact. We now have many different studies of
about RCP8.5 is that it is very, very implausible.

climate sensitivity based on observational data and they all converge on the conclusion that it is much lower than
assumed by the IPCC in these models. It has to be, otherwise global temperatures would have risen much faster
than they have over the past 50 years. As Ross McKitrick noted on this page earlier this week, temperatures have
not risen at all now for more than 17 years. With these much more realistic estimates of sensitivity (known as
transient climate response), even RCP8.5 cannot produce dangerous warming. It manages just 2.1C of warming
by 2081-2100. That is to say, even if you pile crazy assumption upon crazy assumption till you have an edifice of
vanishingly small probability, you cannot even manage to make climate change cause minor damage in the time of
our grandchildren, let alone catastrophe. Thats not me saying this its the IPCC itself. But what strikes me as truly
fascinating about these scenarios is that they tell us that globalization, innovation and economic growth are
unambiguously good for the environment. At the other end of the scale from RCP8.5 is a much more cheerful
scenario called RCP2.6. In this happy world, climate change is not a problem at all in 2100, because carbon dioxide
emissions have plummeted thanks to the rapid development of cheap nuclear and solar, plus a surge in energy
efficiency. The RCP2.6 world is much, much richer. The average person has an income about 15 times todays in real
terms, so that most people are far richer than Americans are today. And it achieves this by free trade, massive

globalization, and lots of investment in new technology. All the things the green movement keeps saying it opposes

worry
now in 2014 about a very small, highly implausible set of circumstances in
2100 that just might, if climate sensitivity is much higher than the evidence
suggests, produce a marginal damage to the world economy, makes no
sense. Think of all the innovation that happened between 1914 and 2000. Do we really think there will be less in
because they will wreck the planet. The answer to climate change is, and always has been, innovation. To

this century? As for how to deal with that small risk, well there are several possible options. You could encourage
innovation and trade. You could put a modest but growing tax on carbon to nudge innovators in the right direction.
You could offer prizes for low-carbon technologies. All of these might make a little sense. But the one thing you
should not do is pour public subsidy into supporting old-fashioned existing technologies that produce more carbon
dioxide per unit of energy even than coal (bio-energy), or into ones that produce expensive energy (existing solar),
or that have very low energy density and so require huge areas of land (wind). The IPCC produced two reports last
year. One said that the cost of climate change is likely to be less than 2% of GDP by the end of this century. The
other said that the cost of decarbonizing the world economy with renewable energy is likely to be 4% of GDP. Why
do something that you know will do more harm than good?

Warming is slow no risk of an impact

Michaels and Knappenberger 11/19/13, (*Chip Knappenberger is the assistant director of
the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute, and coordinates the scientific and outreach activities for
the Center. He has over 20 years of experience in climate research and public outreach, including 10 years with the
Virginia State Climatology Office and 15 years as the Research Coordinator for New Hope Environmental Services,
Inc, **Patrick J. Michaels is the director of the Center for the Study of Science at the Cato Institute. Michaels is a
past president of the American Association of State Climatologists and was program chair for the Committee on
Applied Climatology of the American Meteorological Society. He was a research professor of Environmental Sciences
at University of Virginia for thirty years. Michaels was a contributing author and is a reviewer of the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chanage, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, With or Without a
Pause Climate Models Still Project Too Much Warming, [ http://www.cato.org/blog/or-without-pause-climatemodels-still-project-too-much-warming ] //hss-RJ)
A new paper just hit the scientific literature that argues that the apparent pause in the rise in global average surface temperatures
during the past 16 years was really just a slowdown. As you may imagine, this paper, by Kevin Cowtan and Robert Way is being hotly
discussed in the global warming blogs, with reaction ranging from a warm embrace by the global-warming-is-going-to-be-bad-for-us
crowd to revulsion from the human-activities-have-no-effect-on-the-climate claque. The lukewarmers (a school we take some credit

After all, the pause as curious as it is/was,

is not central to the primary argument that, yes, human activities are
pressuring the planet to warm, but that the rate of warming is going to be
much slower than is being projected by the collection of global climate
models (upon which mainstream projections of future climate changeand the resulting climate alarm (i.e., calls for emission
for establishing) seem to be taking the results in stride.

regulations, etc.)are based). Under the adjustments to the observed global temperature history put together by Cowtan and Way,
the models fare a bit better than they do with the unadjusted temperature record. That is, the observed temperature trend over the
past 34 years (the period of record analyzed by Cowtan and Way) is a tiny bit closer to the average trend from the collection of
climate models used in the new report from the U.N.s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) than is the old
temperature record. Specifically, while the trend in observed global temperatures from 1979-2012 as calculated by Cowtan and Way
is 0.17C/decade, it is 0.16C/decade in the temperature record compiled by the U.K. Hadley Center (the record that Cowtan and
Way adjusted). Because of the sampling errors associated with trend estimation, these values are not significantly different from one
another. Whether the 0.17C/decade is significantly different from the climate model average simulated trend during that period of

0.01C/decade in
the global trend measured over more than 30 years is pretty small beer and
doesnt give model apologists very much to get happy over. Instead, the
attention is being deflected to The Pausethe leveling off of global surface
temperatures during the past 16 years (give or take). Here, the new results
from Cowtan and Way show that during the period 1997-2012, instead of a
statistically insignificant rise at a rate of 0.05C/decade as is contained in the
old temperature record, the rise becomes a statistically significant
0.23C/decade is discussed extensively below. But, suffice it to say that an insignificant difference of

0.12C/decade. The Pause is transformed into The Slowdown and alarmists rejoice because global warming hasnt
stopped after all. (If the logic sounds backwards, it does to us as well, if you were worried about catastrophic global warming,
wouldnt you rejoice at findings that indicate that future climate change was going to be only modest, more so than results to the
contrary?) The science behind the new Cowtan and Way research is still being digested by the community of climate scientists and

The main idea is that the existing compilations of the global

average temperature are very data-sparse in the high latitudes. And since the Arctic
other interested parties alike.

(more so than the Antarctic) is warming faster than the global average, the lack of data there may mean that the global average
temperature trend may be underestimated. Cowtan and Way developed a methodology which relied on other limited sources of
temperature information from the Arctic (such as floating buoys and satellite observations) to try to make an estimate of how the
surface temperature was behaving in regions lacking more traditional temperature observations (the authors released an
informative video explaining their research which may better help you understand what they did). They found that the warming in
the data-sparse regions was progressing faster than the global average (especially during the past couple of years) and that when
they included the data that they derived for these regions in the computation of the global average temperature, they found the
global trend was higher than previously reportedjust how much higher depended on the period over which the trend was
calculated. As we showed, the trend more than doubled over the period from 1997-2012, but barely increased at all over the longer
period 1979-2012. Figure 1 shows the impact on the global average temperature trend for all trend lengths between 10 and 35
years (incorporating our educated guess as to what the 2013 temperature anomaly will be), and compares that to the distribution of
climate model simulations of the same period. Statistically speaking, instead of there being a clear inconsistency (i.e., the observed
trend value falls outside of the range which encompasses 95% of all modeled trends) between the observations and the climate
mode simulations for lengths ranging generally from 11 to 28 years and a marginal inconsistency (i.e., the observed trend value falls
outside of the range which encompasses 90% of all modeled trends) for most of the other lengths, now the observations track
closely the marginal inconsistency line, although trends of length 17, 19, 20, 21 remain clearly inconsistent with the collection of

Still, throughout the entirely of the 35-yr period (ending in 2013),

the observed trend lies far below the model average simulated trend
(additional information on the impact of the new Cowtan and Way
adjustments on modeled/observed temperature comparison can be found
here). The Cowtan and Way analysis is an attempt at using additional types
of temperature information, or extracting information from records that have already told their stories, to fill in
the missing data in the Arctic. There are concerns about the appropriateness of both the
data sources and the methodologies applied to them. A major one is in the
applicability of satellite data at such high latitudes. The nature of the
satellites orbit forces it to look sideways in order to sample polar regions.
In fact, the orbit is such that the highest latitude areas cannot be seen at all.
This is compounded by the fact that cold regions can develop substantial
inversions of near-ground temperature, in which temperature actually rises
with height such that there is not a straightforward relationship between the
surface temperature and the temperature of the lower atmosphere where
the satellites measure the temperature. If the nature of this complex
relationship is not constant in time, an error is introduced into the Cowtan
and Way analysis. Another unresolved problem comes up when extrapolating
land-based weather station data far into the Arctic Ocean. While land
temperatures can bounce around a lot, the fact that much of the ocean is
partially ice-covered for many months. Under well-mixed conditions, this
forces the near-surface temperature to be constrained to values near the
freezing point of salt water, whether or not the associated land station is
much warmer or colder. You can run this experiment yourself by filling a glass with a mix of ice and water and then
modeled trends.

making sure it is well mixed. The water surface temperature must hover around 33F until all the ice melts. Given that the nearsurface temperature is close to the water temperature, the limitations of land data become obvious. Considering all of the above, we
advise caution with regard to Cowtan and Ways findings. While adding high arctic data should increase the observed trend, the
nature of the data means that the amount of additional rise is subject to further revision. As they themselves note, theres quite a
bit more work to be done this area. In the meantime, their results have tentatively breathed a small hint of life back into the climate
models, basically buying them a bit more timetime for either the observed temperatures to start rising rapidly as current models
expect, or, time for the modelers to try to fix/improve cloud processes, oceanic processes, and other process of variability (both

Weve also taken a

look at how sensitive the results are to the length of the ongoing
pause/slowdown. Our educated guess is that the bit of time that the
Cowtan and Way findings bought the models is only a few years long, and it
is a fact, not a guess, that each additional year at the current rate of
lukewarming increases the disconnection between the models and reality.
natural and anthropogenic) that lie behind what would be the clearly overheated projections.

Terror

No Uniqueness
Curtailing solitary confinement isnt something that links to a generic DA, opponents
must have a unique DA that deals with prisons.

No Link
Security cameras in solitary arent necessary to prevent
terrorist threats
Rosen 10 (Jeffrey, Law Professor @ George Washington University, "Times
Square, Bombs, and Big Crowds" The New York Times, May 3rd 2010)
Heres what we know about surveillance cameras. Theyre more or less useless in
deterring terrorism before it occurs. The best peer reviewed studies in Britain and
America find no connection between the proliferation of cameras and the
deterrence of serious crime or terrorism. Theyre also not useful in preventing
attacks in progress: the Times Square bombing was detected by alert street vendors
who saw the smoke and called the police. Cameras sometimes play a supporting
role in identifying the perpetrators after an attack has occurred. But in all the major
terrorist attacks since 9/11, including the London bombings, the perpetrators would
have been identified without the cameras. In the Times Square case, there was so
much forensic evidence at the crime scene that the police were able to identify the
former owner of the Pathfinder through the vehicle identification number, leading to
the arrest of the suspect on Monday night without necessarily relying on the
footage from more than 80 surveillance cameras.

They have no effect images are unrealibale and only help

after an attack
Schneier 10 (Bruce, Security Technological and Author, "Times Square, Bombs,
and Big Crowds" The New York Times, May 3rd 2010)
In the wake of Saturdays failed Times Square car bombing, its natural to ask how
we can prevent this sort of thing from happening again. The answer is stop focusing
on the specifics of what actually happened, and instead think about the threat in
general. Our approach needs to be flexible and adaptive, just like the bad guys.
Think about the security measures commonly proposed. Cameras wont help.
They dont prevent terrorist attacks, and their forensic value after the fact is
minimal. In the Times Square case, surely theres enough other evidence the
cars identification number, the auto body shop the stolen license plates came from,
the name of the fertilizer store to identify the guy. We will almost certainly not
need the camera footage. The images released so far, like the images in so many
other terrorist attacks, may make for exciting television, but their value to law
enforcement officers is limited.

No Internal Link

No Impacts

Impact Turn

Fem (Legalism)

No Uniqueness

No Link

Link Turn

No Internal Link

No Impacts

Impact Turn

Counter Plans

Court Extensions
Judicial independence key to SOP Courts have to act alone.
Center for Justice and Accountability 4 Amici Curiae in support of
petitioners in Al Odah et al. v USA, "Brief of the Center for Justice and
Accountability, the International League for Human Rights, and Individual Advocates
for the Independence of the Judiciary in Emerging Democracies," 3-10,
http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/FileUpload500/82/AmiciCuri
ae_Center_for_Justice_Int_League_Human_Rights_Adv_For_Indep_Judiciary2.PDF
Many of the newly independent governments that have proliferated over the past
five decades have adopted these ideals. They have emerged from a variety of less-than-free contexts,
including the end of European colonial rule in the 1950's and 1960's, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the former Soviet
Union in the late 1980's and 1990's, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the continuing turmoil in parts of Africa, Latin America and
southern Asia.

Some countries have successfully transitioned to stable and democratic

forms of government that protect individual freedoms and human rights by means
of judicial review by a strong and independent judiciary. Others have suffered the rise of tyrannical
and oppressive rulers who consolidated their hold on power in part by diminishing or abolishing the role of the judiciary. And still

others hang in the balance, struggling against the onslaught of tyrants to establish
stable, democratic governments. In their attempts to shed their tyrannical pasts and
to ensure the protection of individual rights, emerging democracies have
consistently looked to the United States and its Constitution in fashioning frameworks that
safeguard the independence of their judiciaries . See Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial
Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 91, 92 (2000)
(stating that of the [m]any countries . . . [that] have engaged in fundamental constitutional reform over the past three decades,

Establishing judicial review by a

strong and independent judiciary is a critical step in stabilizing and protecting these
new democracies. See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and
Conceptual Analysis, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 605, 605-06 (1996) (describing the judicial branch as having "a
uniquely important role" in transitional countries, not only to "mediate conflicts
between political actors but also [to] prevent the arbitrary exercise of government
power; see also Daniel C. Prefontaine and Joanne Lee, The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary, International
Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy (1998) (" There is increasing acknowledgment that
an independent judiciary is the key to upholding the rule of law in a free
society . . . . Most countries in transition from dictatorships and/or statist economies
recognize the need to create a more stable system of governance, based on the rule
of law."), available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/RuleofLaw. pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). Although
the precise form of government differs among countries, they ultimately constitute
variations within, not from, the American model of constitutionalism . . . [a] specific
set of fundamental rights and liberties has the status of supreme law, is entrenched
against amendment or repeal . . . and is enforced by an independent court . . . . Stephen
Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 707, 718 (2001). This phenomenon
became most notable worldwide after World War II when certain countries, such as
Germany, Italy, and Japan, embraced independent judiciaries following their bitter
experiences under totalitarian regimes. See id. at 714- 15; see also United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469
nearly all adopted a bill of rights and establishe[d] some form of active judicial review).

(2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (Since World War II, many countries have adopted forms of judicial review, which though
different from ours in many particulars unmistakably draw their origin and inspiration from American constitutional theory and
practice. See generally Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).). It is a
trend that continues to this day. It bears mention that the United States has consistently affirmed and encouraged the establishment

of independent judiciaries in emerging democracies. In September 2000, President Clinton observed that "[w]ithout the rule of law,

America's experience should be put to use to advance

the rule of law, where democracy's roots are looking for room and strength to grow."
elections simply offer a choice of dictators. . . .

Remarks at Georgetown University Law School, 36 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2218 (September 26, 2000), available at
http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/09/2000-09-26- remarks-by-president-at-georgetown-international-lawcenter. html. The United States
acts on these principles in part through the assistance it provides to developing nations. For example, the United States requires
that any country seeking assistance through the Millenium Challenge Account, a development assistance program instituted in

The White House noted that the

rule of law is one of the "essential conditions for successful development" of these
countries. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/developingnations (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).12
2002, must demonstrate, among other criteria, an "adherence to the rule of law."

It is in the supreme courts power to decide constitutionality

over the legislature and the executive
United States Courts Website/No Date
This site is maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary. The purpose
of this site is to provide information from and about the Judicial Branch of the U.S. Government.

Judicial Review The best-known power of the Supreme Court is judicial review, or the
ability of the Court to declare a Legislative or Executive act in violation of the
Constitution, is not found within the text of the Constitution itself. The Court
established this doctrine in the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803). In this case, the
Court had to decide whether an Act of Congress or the Constitution was the
supreme law of the land. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus (legal orders compelling government
officials to act in accordance with the law). A suit was brought under this Act, but
the Supreme Court noted that the Constitution did not permit the Court to have
original jurisdiction in this matter. Since Article VI of the Constitution establishes the
Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land, the Court held that an Act of Congress
that is contrary to the Constitution could not stand. In subsequent cases, the Court
also established its authority to strike down state laws found to be in violation of the
Constitution. Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment (1869), the
provisions of the Bill of Rights were only applicable to the federal government. After
the Amendment's passage, the Supreme Court began ruling that most of its
provisions were applicable to the states as well. Therefore, the Court has the final
say over when a right is protected by the Constitution or when a Constitutional right
is violated. Role The Supreme Court plays a very important role in our constitutional
system of government. First, as the highest court in the land, it is the court of last
resort for those looking for justice. Second, due to its power of judicial review, it
plays an essential role in ensuring that each branch of government recognizes the
limits of its own power. Third, it protects civil rights and liberties by striking down
laws that violate the Constitution. Finally, it sets appropriate limits on democratic
government by ensuring that popular majorities cannot pass laws that harm and/or
take undue advantage of unpopular minorities. In essence, it serves to ensure that
the changing views of a majority do not undermine the fundamental values

common to all Americans, i.e., freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and due
process of law.

Congress
Everything the congress passes must go through the courts eventually, if we save
time and go to the courts directly than we save time and solve for impact time
frame.

Executive Order
Obama is spending the small amount of political capital he has
left on gun control
Charles C.W. Cooke 2016
Charles C. W. Cooke is a writer at National Review and a graduate of the University of Oxford, at which he studied
modern history and politics. His work has focused especially on Anglo-American history, British liberty, free speech,
the Second Amendment, and American exceptionalism. He is the co-host of the Mad Dogs and Englishmen podcast,
and has broadcast for HBO (Real Time with Bill Maher), the BBC, MSNBC, Fox News, The Blaze, CNBC, CTV, ABC, Sun
News, and CBS. He has written for National Interest, the Washington Times, and the New York Post.

Obamas executive-led gun control push is finally underway.

Per NPR: ATF will play a central role in

the administrations move, by clarifying what it means to be engaged in the business of selling guns. Until now,
some collectors and hobbyists have been able to avoid that designation. As a result, they havent needed a federal
license to sell and they havent been required to conduct background checks on their customers. The new guidance
from that Bureau is designed to require more such sellers to conduct background checks, even if theyre doing
business only at gun shows or online. Moreover: The administration is also working to improve the quality of
background checks by encouraging states and government agencies to share more information about criminal
histories, domestic violence, and mental illness that could disqualify a person from buying a gun. And the FBI is
hiring 230 additional staff people to speed the processing of background checks. Under current law, a gun sale can
go forward if a background check is not completed within three days. Arguendo, lets presume that all these
changes are legal (given, how tightly the laws are written, Im skeptical). Has Obama lost his mind? This is a man,
remember, who is supposed to be admirably dispassionate; a man who is supposed to understand how the game is

hes
going to use a good deal of his last years political capital in order to tweak a few minor rules
around the edges? Why? Even if were generous and presume that every single one of these regulations finds
played; a man who is supposed to reflexively refuse to be taken in by the emotion of the moment. And yet

its way permanently into the law, he will nevertheless have done nothing substantial to further universal
background checks; he will have instituted none of his coveted magazine limits; and he will have banned none of
the weapons that he disdains. Further,

he will have set no meaningful precedents

whatsoever. In other

words: Even if he wins this round, he will have done precisely nothing of merit except perhaps
to have pleased his base and to have convinced the most ignorant parts of the electorate that he has finally stuck
his finger into the NRAs eye. Were these serious measures, I would be squealing. Instead, Im amused. These are

Obamas behavior is not at all rational. As far as I can see,

the president has announced these initiatives for no other reason than to satisfy his burning
desire to say that he did something to advance gun control. That he in fact did nothing of note is
the dampest of squibs. Which is to say that

neither here nor there. He needs the applause line both now, and in his retirement and hes determined to get
it. When I say he did nothing of note, of course, I mean nothing of note to advance his agenda. As it happens,
the president has done something of note tonight:

He has hurt his own side.

Were I a gun control advocate Id be livid

with him. Livid. Why? Two reasons: 1) In order to make his actions appear meaningful, Obama is going to have to pretend that they represent serious
change. If he does that, though, hell permit his opponents to say, look, we just did big gun control by executive order, we have other things to do, and
were not doing it again. That matters. The Left makes great hay out of the we never do anything line, and its more effective advocates use our present
inertia to justify the need for experimentation. Insofar as there is any, Obama has slowed the momentum for further gun-control. This is not how you win
the argument. 2) By taking this route, Obama will help to entrench Americas gun culture and for little in return. Ceteris paribus, the United States will
play host to at least another 20 million guns by the end of December 2016 many of them so-called assault weapons. In addition, the country will
welcome another million or so concealed carriers, and another half-million or so NRA members. Every time the president talks about gun control, these
numbers increase, and, in consequence, the presidents opponents are strengthened. Not only will this maneuver make it more likely that a Republican
presidential candidate will make inroads with pro-gun voters the ads write themselves: you dont want another anti-gun would-be King, do you? but
it will likely damage the long-term prospects for change. By his own account, Obama wants to reduce, not increase, the number of guns in circulation. If
history is anything to go by, this action will do precisely the opposite. And for what? A minor change to the way in which firearms are sold on the private
market? Obama has let his emotion get the better of him here. He and his fellow travelers will likely pay a price.

It is not the job of the executive to decide the constitutional

fate of 100,000 persons, this job is for the courts. Making the
executive the actor is simply a bad idea.

Executive Rollback
Huge leeway for future presidents to roll back executive orders
Conor Friedersdorf, staff writer at the Atlantic, 5-28-2013, Does Obama Really
Believe He Can Limit the Next President's Power?
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/does-obama-really-believe-hecan-limit-the-next-presidents-power/276279/
Obama doesn't seem to realize that his legacy won't be shaped by any
perspicacious limits he places on the executive branch, if he ever gets around to
placing any on it. The next president can just undo those "self-imposed" limits with
the same wave of a hand that Obama uses to create them. His influence in the
realm of executive power will be to expand it. By 2016 we'll be four terms deep in
major policy decisions being driven by secret memos from the Office of Legal
Counsel. The White House will have a kill list, and if the next president wants to add
names to it using standards twice as lax as Obama's, he or she can do it, in secret,
per his precedent.

Future presidents can secretly undo the CP

Conor Friedersdorf, staff writer at the Atlantic, 5-28-2013, Does Obama Really
Believe He Can Limit the Next President's Power?
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/05/does-obama-really-believe-hecan-limit-the-next-presidents-power/276279/
There's that same obvious flaw, but everyone seems oblivious to it. The standards
you're setting? The next president can just change them. In secret, even! That's the
problem with extreme executive power: It is capricious, prone to abuse, and difficult
to meaningfully check. Does Obama think the next man or woman will just behold
the wisdom of his approach and embrace it? That error, unthinkable as it seems,
would not be without precedent for this president.

Evidence:
Future presidents will roll back the CP empirics
Vanessa K. Burrows, Legislative Attorney for Congressional Research Service, 425-2010, Executive Orders: Issuance and Revocation,
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20846_20100325.pdf
Illustrating the fact that executive orders are used to further an administrations
policy goals, there are frequent examples of situations in which a sitting President
has revoked or amended orders issued by his predecessor.37 This practice is
particularly apparent where Presidents have used these instruments to assert
control over and influence the agency rulemaking process. President Ford, for
instance, issued Executive Order 11821, requiring agencies to issue inflation impact
statements for proposed regulations.38 President Carter altered this practice with

Executive Order 12044, requiring agencies to consider the potential economic

impact of certain rules and identify potential alternatives.39 Shortly after taking
office, President Reagan revoked President Carters order, implementing a scheme
asserting much more extensive control over the rulemaking process. Executive
Order 12291 directed agencies to implement rules only if the potential benefits to
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society, requiring
agencies to prepare a cost-benefit analysis for any proposed rule that could have a
significant economic impact.40 This order was criticized by some as a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine, on the grounds that it imbued the President with
the power to essentially control rulemaking authority that had been committed to a
particular agency by Congress.41 Despite these concerns, there were no court
rulings assessing the validity of President Reagans order. In turn, President Clinton
issued Executive Order 12866, modifying the system established during the Reagan
Administration.42 While retaining many of the basic features of President Reagans
order, E.O. 12866 eased cost benefit analysis requirements, and recognized the
primary duty of agencies to fulfill the duties committed to them by Congress.
President George W. Bush issued two executive orders amending E.O. 12866, E.O.
13258, and E.O. 13422, both of which were revoked by President Obama in E.O.
13497.43 President Bushs E.O. 13258 concerned regulatory planning and review,
and it removed references in E.O. 12866 to the role of the Vice President, replacing
several of them with a reference to the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) or the Chief of Staff to the President.44 E.O. 13422 defined guidance
documents and significant guidance documents and applied several parts of E.O.
12866 to guidance documents, as well as required each agency head to designate a
presidential appointee to the newly created position of regulatory policy officer.45
E.O. 13422 also made changes to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRAs) duties and authorities, including a requirement that OIRA be given advance
notice of significant guidance documents.46 President Obamas executive order
revoking E.O. 13258 and E.O. 13422 also directed the Director of OMB and the
heads of executive departments and agencies to rescind orders, rules, guidelines,
and policies that implemented those executive orders.

Judicial rollback:
Courts can rule executive orders unconstitutional
Phillip Cooper, Professor of Public Administration at Portland State University,
2002, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action pg.
77
Despite the apparent deference by the judiciary to the president's orders, this
chapter has plainly demonstrated any number of instances in which the White
House has lost in court. Executive orders, both legal and illegal, can expose officials
to liability. It is an old argument, developed long before the battle over the so-called
Nuremberg defense, that illegal orders do not insulate a public official from liability
for his or her actions. The classic example harks back to Little v. Barreme 13 1
during the Washington administration. Even legal orders can expose the
government to liability. Though the federal courts have often upheld dramatic
actions taken by the president during difficult periods, they have not been hesitant
to support claims against the government later. The many cases that were brought
involving the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation after World War I
provide examples of just how long such postorder legal cleanup can take and how
much it can Cost. 112 Later, in a 1951 case, the Supreme Court subjected
government to claims by business for the damages done to their interests during
the government's operation of the coal mines during World War II after FDR seized
the mines in 1943.133 Thus, the legal issues that may arise are concerned with
both the validity of orders and with addressing the consequences of admittedly
legitimate decrees.

It is in the supreme courts power to decide constitutionality

over the executive
United States Courts Website/No Date
This site is maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary. The purpose
of this site is to provide information from and about the Judicial Branch of the U.S. Government.

Judicial Review The best-known power of the Supreme Court is judicial review, or the
ability of the Court to declare a Legislative or Executive act in violation of the
Constitution, is not found within the text of the Constitution itself. The Court
established this doctrine in the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803). In this case, the
Court had to decide whether an Act of Congress or the Constitution was the
supreme law of the land. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus (legal orders compelling government
officials to act in accordance with the law). A suit was brought under this Act, but
the Supreme Court noted that the Constitution did not permit the Court to have
original jurisdiction in this matter. Since Article VI of the Constitution establishes the
Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land, the Court held that an Act of Congress
that is contrary to the Constitution could not stand. In subsequent cases, the Court
also established its authority to strike down state laws found to be in violation of the
Constitution. Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment (1869), the

provisions of the Bill of Rights were only applicable to the federal government. After
the Amendment's passage, the Supreme Court began ruling that most of its
provisions were applicable to the states as well. Therefore, the Court has the final
say over when a right is protected by the Constitution or when a Constitutional right
is violated. Role The Supreme Court plays a very important role in our constitutional
system of government. First, as the highest court in the land, it is the court of last
resort for those looking for justice. Second, due to its power of judicial review, it
plays an essential role in ensuring that each branch of government recognizes the
limits of its own power. Third, it protects civil rights and liberties by striking down
laws that violate the Constitution. Finally, it sets appropriate limits on democratic
government by ensuring that popular majorities cannot pass laws that harm and/or
take undue advantage of unpopular minorities. In essence, it serves to ensure that
the changing views of a majority do not undermine the fundamental values
common to all Americans, i.e., freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and due
process of law.

States

No link:
No Net Benefit because politics DA doesnt link

Perm:
Perm is an example of cooperative federalism
Salkin and Ostrow 9
Patricia, Touro College - Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, and Ashira, Hofstra
University - Maurice A. Deane School of Law, COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND
WIND: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING SUSTAINABILITY, HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
Vol. 37:1049
Thus, rather than adopt preemptive national policies, federal regulatory
programs have long embraced cooperative regimes that utilize a mix of
federal, state, and local agencies to implement federal law.194 As Philip
Weiser explains: Cooperative federalism programs set forth some uniform
federal standardsas embodied in the statute, federal agency regulations, or
bothbut leave state agencies with discretion to implement the federal law,
supplement it with more stringent standards, and, in some cases, receive an
exemption from federal requirements. This power allows states to experiment
with different approaches and tailor federal law to local conditions.195 By
using a combination of federal, state, and local actors, cooperative federalism
captures the benefits of diversity in regulatory policy within a federal
framework.196

Federalism is only successful when state and federal

government action is combined
Roderick Hills. Hills is a Jr, Professor of Law at New York University School of Law.
2008. [Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative
Process.New York University Law Review, April, 2007 82 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 Lexis]
I take the position in this Article that both the anti-preemption views represented by Candice Hoke and Betsy Gray,
on the one hand, and the pro-preemption theory of Alan Schwartz, on the other, rest on an outdated and mistaken
assumption - the theory, sometimes known as "dual federalism ," that states and the federal government (should)

theories of preemption need to

accept the truisms that the federal and state governments have largely
overlapping jurisdictions, that each level of government is acutely aware of what the other is doing,
and that each level regulates with an eye to how such regulation will affect
the other. n9 Federalism's value, if there is any, lies in the often competitive
interaction between the levels of government. In particular, a presumption
against federal preemption of state law makes sense not because states
are necessarily good regulators of conduct within their borders, but rather because state
regulation makes Congress a more honest and democratically accountable
regulator of conduct throughout the nation. To reverse the usual formula, national values
are well protected by the states' political process. Thus, the benefits of
federalism in the present and in the future will rest on how the federal and state
governments interact, not in how they act in isolation from each other.
operate in different, mutually exclusive spheres. n8 Instead,

Courts Check
Courts check
Nagel 1- Robert F. Nagel, Law Professor, University of Colorado, March 2001,
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, p. 53
the
Supreme Court has recently issued a series of rulings that limit the power of the
national government. Some of these decisions, which set boundaries to Congress's power to regulate
commerce and to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, establish areas that are
subject (at least in theory) only to state regulation. Others protect the autonomy of
state governments by restricting congressional authority to expose state
governments to suit in either state or federal courts and to "commandeer"
state institutions for national regulatory purposes. Taken together, these
decisions seem to reflect a judgment held by a slight majority of the justices that the
dramatic expansion of the national government during the twentieth century
has put in jeopardy fundamental principles of constitutional structure .
In what appears to be an ambitious campaign to enhance the role of the states in the federal system,

Federal Gov has more power CP cant solve

States cant cut off power to federal agencies its
unconstitutional and violates the supremacy clause the
counterplan will get rolled back
Andrew Kloster, 2/12/2014, [Kloster is a legal fellow in the Edwin Meese III
Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage Foundation], The Daily Signal,
Marylands attempts to cut off NSA utilities are unconstitutional,
http://dailysignal.com/2014/02/12/marylands-attempts-cut-nsa-utilitiesunconstitutional/, mm

Since the Edward Snowden leaks to The Guardian began last year, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been a
political hot potato. Yet, whatever you think of

the NSA, it is clearly a federal agency

authorized by federal

Some lawmakers in the state of Marylandhome to the NSAs headquarters in Ft. Meadehave
proposed an unconstitutional fix: They want to cut off electricity and water to
the building. This scheme forgets the basics of our constitutional system. Changes to the NSA must come at
statute.

recently

the federal level: Congress can direct legislative changes; the President can manage the agency consistent with
statute and his Article II authority; federal courts can ensure that the NSAs actions comply with statute and the
Constitution. States, however, have no business discriminating against federal agencies.
Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitutionthe Supremacy Clausereads: This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound

since 1819,
in a case called McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that
the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. Ever

the powers vested in the General Government. Nearly 200 years later it seems Maryland has still not learned that

attempts to
interfere with the NSA by state legislators are clearly unconstitutional . These attempts
are so plainly out of bounds that the taxpayers of the state of Maryland might even be on the hook for
Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys fees when the DOJ inevitably sues in federal court to
keep the power on and the water running.
lesson. If the law authorizing the NSA is constitutionally valid, then such direct, obvious

Federal govt has all the control ever Robb 13

Robert Robb is a columnist for the Arizona Republic and a RealClearPolitics contributor. (Obama and the Death of
Federalism, February 20, 2013,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/02/20/obama_and_the_death_of_federalism_117073.html)

President Barack Obamas State of the Union address illustrated what a dead letter
federalism is among Democrats. Not that further illustration was necessary.
Federalism holds that the national government should limit itself to things of truly
national scope. Things that are primarily of local concern should be left to state and
local governments. Federalism was a big deal to the founders. They wanted an

energetic national government, but one that was confined to enumerated national
functions. The founders also envisioned a bright line between the federal and state
governments, each sovereign within their own spheres. We are a long way from
that. Today, the Democratic Party sees virtually nothing as outside the purview of
the federal government. The Republican Party talks a good game about federalism,
but usually ends up undermining the principle when it acquires national power.
Today, the lines between the federal government and state and local governments
are hopelessly blurred. The federal government spends over $600 billion a year on
grants to state and local governments. Arizona state government receives more in
federal funds than it raises in general-fund taxes. Today, state governments operate
principally as service delivery mechanisms for federal social-welfare programs. This
means that there is no real political accountability for the programs, which is why
they grow and function like a blob. If Medicaid costs are spinning out of control,
whos to blame and who should do something about it? The federal government
that provides most of the funding and sets up the basic rules, or the state
governments that actually administer the program? The food stamp program has
grown astronomically of late. Purely a function of a bad economy, or is there
something else going on? Whose job is it to figure that out? President Ronald
Reagan wanted to sort out the blob with his new federalism initiative, clearly
making some functions, such as Medicaid, fully federal, while making other
functions, including most welfare programs, fully state and local. There were some
Democratic governors at the time, including Arizonas Bruce Babbitt, who were also
interested in a sorting out of responsibilities. But agreement was never reached,
nothing of significance happened. So, the blob endured and grew. Obama proposes
to feed it even more. The federal government should establish manufacturing
innovation institutes in economically distressed areas and provide incentive grants
to states to increase the energy efficiency of homes and businesses. The federal
government should fix 70,000 bridges and create a federal fund to modernize ports
and pipelines. The federal government should have a new grant program to get
high-school graduates better ready for high-tech jobs. And, according to Obama, the
federal government should make sure that every kid has access to high-quality
preschool. The federal government, however, does not have a greater interest in the
recovery of economically distressed areas than the states in which they are located,
or greater insight into how to turn them around. Every bridge in America is located
in a state and local community that has a greater interest in its condition than the
federal government. Every port and pipeline in the United States is located in a
state and local community. If there are gains to be had from modernizing them,
local governments have a greater incentive to get it done and done right than the
federal government. Every kid in America lives in a state and local community that
is more interested in his education and workplace preparedness than the federal
government. What do we really have to show for the increased federal involvement
in education, under George W. Bush or Obama? The federal government is broke,
and broke in a way that threatens the American economy. Proposals that it do even
more are surreal, even if they are supposedly paid for. If theres loose change to be
had, the federal government should use it to reduce the deficit, not further expand
its reach.

Kritiks

Root cause solvency kritiks:

Root cause claims are reductive and create ideological
polarizationkills political productivity and turns the K
Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2013 Ted Nordhaus, Michael Shellenberger,
Wicked Polarization: How Prosperity, Democracy, and Experts Divided America,
Breakthrough Journal, Issue 3, Winter 2013,
http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/issue-3/wicked-polarization/
Ultimately, the authors here are after bigger prey than ideological extremism. They have their sights set on
continuing Rittel and Webbers project of dethroning the dominant mode of expert analysis with its pretenses to

Problem-definition always arises with presumed

solutions. Describing obesity as caused by food environments implies
changing food environments. A larger set of causes (e.g., poor health care, lack of
education) reveals a larger number of potential solutions. To stimulate
cooperation and action, we might proliferate the number of policy choices
we see as legitimate, even if our highest policy priorities are not at the
top of the list. In creating a new pluralism for the post-truth era, liberals
might, paradoxically, find useful counsel from that most illiberal of modern philosophers, Friedrich
Nietzsche. His work undermined the Platonic conceit that the world can be
understood or experienced from something other than a highly particular
point of view. Behind progressive complaints of conservative mendacity ,
writes Nietzsche scholar Kathleen Higgins, is the assumption that if people only knew
the truth, we wouldnt have the problems of global warming, economic
recession, and poverty or at least that such challenges would be far
smaller. There is no going back to older notions of objective expertise , for
as Rittel and Webber noted, there are no value-free, true-false answers to any of
the wicked problems governments must deal with. The problem is not
that we are in a post-truth age but rather that we have not learned to
adapt to it. Perhaps a good place to begin is by recognizing our own biases,
perspectives, and agendas and attempting to hold them more lightly. In the
value-free analysis and policy making.

end, rising affluence, democracy, and complexity can empower partisanship, but they can also destabilize it.

Wickedness creates all manner of opportunity to disrupt the fault lines of

our many intensely polarized debates and to disorient partisans
accustomed to knowing exactly what they are supposed to think about any
issue. If wickedness is the result of framing problems in ways that lend
themselves to familiar and long-desired solutions, then bringing an end to
our ideological arms race will ultimately require that we force partisans
out of their comfort zone by redefining those problems in ways to which
partisans do not already know the answers. It is our hope that the essays assembled here
will do just that.

Perm Kritik:
The perm is net beneficial to the alt only the perm
establishes a praxis for sustainable rethinking
Bilgin 5 (Pinar, Department of International Relations Bilkent University,
Regional Security in the Middle East)
Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches'
conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global
practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about
doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997:114) writes: Thinking about
thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing. Abstract ideas
about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to
engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help
humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense,
providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden
assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first
(albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think
security in both theory and practice .

Ableism

Agamben
Only the permutation is able to realize productive changethe
critique already informs policy
Chandler, IR professor at the University of Westminster, 10
[David, October 2010, The Uncritical Critique of Liberal Peace, Review of
International Studies, Volume: 36, p. 17-1, YGS]

The more ostensibly conservative critics of the liberal peace, drawn

largely to the policymaking sphere, have much clearer political aims in
their critique of the liberal peace. This is manifest in their focus on
institutional reform, understood as a way of reconciling non-liberal states and
societies both to the market and to democratic forms. This, like the transitology discourse before
it, is a radical critique of classical liberal assumptions. In their advocacy of these
frameworks, discursively framed as a critique of the liberal peace, they
have a clear point of reference. Although, as highlighted above, this point of
reference is a fictional one: a constructed narrative of post-Cold War
intervention, which enables them to ground the scaling-back of policy
expectations against a framework of allegedly unrealistic liberal
aspirations. This critique of liberalism is not a critique of interventionist
policymaking but rather a defence of current practices on the basis that
they have not been properly applied or understood. Institutionalist approaches, which have
informed the interventionist frameworks of international institutions and donors since the early 1990s, are explicit
in their denunciation of the basic assumptions of classical liberalism. This critique of liberalism is however an
indirect one, inevitably so, as the institutionalist critique developed at the height of the Cold War.65 This is why,

while the classical concepts of the liberal rights framework remain

sovereignty, democracy, rule of law, civil society they have been
given a new content, transforming the universal discourse of the
autonomous liberal rights-holder from that of the subject of rights to the object of
regulation.66 This new content has unfortunately been of little interest to
the more radical power-based critics of the liberal peace. But, in understanding
the content of institutionalist approaches, it is possible to tie together the superficial nature of external
engagement with the fact that it has a non-liberal content rather than one which
is too liberal. The institutionalist discourse of intervention and regulation is not one of liberal universalism
and transformation but one of restricted possibilities, where democracy and development are hollowed out and,
rather than embodying the possibilities of the autonomous human subject, become mechanisms of control and

Institutionalisation reduces law to an administrative code, politics

to technocratic decision-making, democratic and civil rights to those of
the supplicant rather than the citizen, replaces the citizenry with civil
society, and the promise of capitalist modernity with pro-poor poverty
reduction.67 To conceptualise this inversion of basic liberal assumptions
and ontologies as liberalism would be to make the word meaningless at
ordering.

the same time as claiming to stake everything on the assumed meaning and stakes involved in the critique of the
liberal peace.68

Extend Biopower to answer

Feminism
Analytics:

The Gift

Marxism
**** Use the NeoLib stuff here it is pretty much the same stuff

Link Turn
Re-articulating existing institutions is more effective than
withdrawal their abstract goals ignore contingent
manifestations of violence that can be solved by the plan
Mouffe 9 (Chantal, Political Theory Prof @ Westminster, Westminster political
theory professor, The Importance of Engaging the State)
It is clear that, once we envisage social reality in terms of hegemonic and counterhegemonic practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from
existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge
them. This is crucial; otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation . Moreover, if we do
not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state
completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of systems of authority
and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical)
examples of this. When the Left shows little interest, Right-wing and
authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the state. The strategy of exodus
could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in common between
the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is no longer the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the privileged political
subject. But in both cases the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that cannot be transformed. It has to wither
away in order to leave room for a reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as Ive already noted, others are
often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach supporting new social movements and counterhegemonic practices has

To
acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies
recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated . As far as politics is concerned, this means the
been called post-Marxist by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society.

need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal

successful hegemony fixes the meaning of

institutions and social practices and defines the common sense through which a given
conception of reality is established. However, such a result is always contingent, precarious and
susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic interventions . Politics always takes
and to define the symbolic parameters of social life. A

place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly political intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of
the existing hegemony. It can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims to challenge the existing

Another important aspect of a

hegemonic politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as
environmentalists, feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform them into claims
that will challenge the existing structure of power relations. This is a further reason why critique
involves engagement, rather than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our
societies are often in conflict with each other. This is why they need to be
articulated politically, which obviously involves the creation of a collective will, a
we. This, in turn, requires the determination of a them. This obvious and simple point is missed by the various advocates of the
order, so that it may reidentify and feel more comfortable with that order.

Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity which does not need political articulation. Hardt and
Negri see the People as homogeneous and expressed in a unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts.

Rather, they are what could be called

an ensemble of differences, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a
common adversary. Such as when different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest against a war
Counter-hegemonic practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences.

perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists, feminists, anti-racists and others come together to challenge dominant models

In these cases, the adversary cannot be defined in broad general

terms like Empire, or for that matter Capitalism. It is instead contingent upon
the particular circumstances in question the specific states, international
institutions or governmental practices that are to be challenged. Put another
of development and progress.

way, the construction of political demands is dependent upon the specific relations
of power that need to be targeted and transformed, in order to create the conditions for a new
hegemony. This is clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not critique as
withdrawal, but critique as engagement. It is a war of position that needs to
be launched, often across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a range
of interests. This can only be done by establishing links between social movements ,
political parties and trade unions, for example. The aim is to create a common bond
and collective will, engaging with a wide range of sites, and often institutions, with
the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive the nature of radical politics.

Philanthropy solves their offense

Norberg 3 [Jonah, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a writer, In Defense of
Global Capitalism, Cato Institute (July 31, 2003), p. 189.]
we have more to expect from philanthropic capitalists than from
politics. Capitalism does not force people to maximize their profit at every turn; it
enables them to use their property as they see fit, free of political considerations. Microsofts
Bill Gates, the very personification of modern capitalism, himself devotes more to
the campaign against disease in the developing countries than the American
government does. Between November 1999 and 2000, through the $23 billion Bill and Melinda Gates
Health Fund, $1.44 billion went to vaccinate children in developing countries for common diseases and to
Personally, I believe

fund research into HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB, for example, in developing countries. That is a quarter of what all

the fact that Bill

Gates is worth more than $50 billion should give the poor and the sick of the world
reason to rejoice. Clearly they would stand to gain more from a handful of Gateses than from the whole of
industrialized nations combined devote to combating disease in the developing countries. So

Europe and another couple of WHOs.

Commitment to objective legal reasoning is the only way to

constrain violence any alternative paints the law as
indeterminate which justifies illegality and neoconservative
cooption
Ristroph 9 (Alice, Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of
Law, Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and Existential Anxiety, Constitutional
Commentary Vol. 25, 431-459.
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1457&context=facpub)
law is in crisis concerns our own expectations of the function of law. A possible achievement is to
offer an alternative to violenceas we saw in Levinson and Balkins account of the Constitution as enabling
One reason to care whether

nonviolent dispute resolution.66 This might be called the anti-Thrasymachus view of law. Early in Platos Republic (before Socrates
has tamed him), a young man called Thrasymachus describes justice as the advantage of the stronger.67 The claim is that might
makes right, and Western political and legal thought has produced many efforts to prove Thrasymachus and his heirs wrong. If

law distinguishes right from might, then it becomes important to say what
law is, and to show that it exists. Hence, many ongoing jurisprudential debates
about the criteria for a valid and functional system of law (including worries about legal
indeterminancy) are motivated by worries about arbitrary power and violence .68 To show
Thrasymachus to be mistaken, we want to show that the rule of law is really

different from the rule of (the strongest ) men. In legal theory, we could view John Austins positivism
law as commands backed by threats of punishmentas a descendant of Thrasymachuss claim.69 Here, I want to
examine briefly one of the most influential, and most plausible, efforts to show that law is something more and
different from the commands of a gunman: H. L. A. Harts response to Austin. Hart framed his discussion around the
question, What is law?.70 But perhaps, as the Stoppard passage that opened this essay suggests, beginning with
this question led us to conjure an image of law with various predicates that do not, as it turns out, include
existence. A second form of existential anxiety, one that I suspect shapes present talk of crisis, is the anxiety thast
Thrasymachus and Austin were right and law, if it is anything more than command and force, does not exist. For my
purposes here, the critical features of Harts account are the rule of recognition and the internal point of view. Since, in most of The Concept of Law, Hart
takes laws existence for granted, it is helpful to look at the passages where laws existence, or at least the existence of a particular form of law, is up for
grabs. In his classic discussion of the question, Is international law really law?, H. L. A. Hart deployed the concepts of a rule of recognition and the
internal point of view to conclude that international law was at most in a state of transition toward fully legal law, moving toward law properly so called but
certainly not yet there.71 At the time he wrote The Concept of Law, Hart believed that international law departed from domestic (or municipal) law in
that it lacked a widely accepted rule of recognition and in that states could not be said to take the internal point of view toward international obligations.
(Harts argument has been challenged by many contemporary scholars of international law, but that particular dispute need not occupy us here.72) For
law qua law to exist, Hart argued, there must be a rule of recognition under which the authoritative status of other rules was accepted or denied, and the
officials who would apply the rule of recognition must themselves take the internal point of view toward it. That is, the officials needed to view the rule of
recognition as a binding, authoritative guide to their own decisions. Suppose Hart was right and the rule of recognition and the internal point of view are
conditions for the existence of law. Two questions arise: what is the rule of recognition for constitutional law, and who must hold the internal standpoint
toward that rule? The Constitution itself initially seems a candidate for the rule of recognition, though the fact that the Constitution must itself be
interpreted leads some theorists to amend this account and say that the rule of recognition must include authoritative statements of the meaning of the
Constitution, under prevailing interpretive standards.73 As for the internal point of view, we might hope that all state officials would take this point of view
toward constitutional rules.74 In other words, we might hope that every state actor would comply with the U.S. Constitution because it is the Constitution,
not simply to avoid injunctions, or judicial invalidation of legislative action, or liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. But Harts theory does not demand universal
adherence to an internal point of view. Even if legislators and other public officials complied with First or Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment doctrine only to
avoid invalidation or 1983 liability even if these public officials were the equivalent of Holmess bad manHart might find that constitutional law still
existed in a meaningful sense so long as the judges applying constitutional rules believed themselves to be bound by a constitutional rule of
recognition.75 Here is a possibility, one I believe we must take seriously and one that prompts anxiety about the existence of constitutional law itself:
there is no common rule of recognition toward which judges and other officials take an internal point of view.76 Individual judges may adhere to their
particular understandings of the rule of recognition the Constitution as interpreted by proper originalist methods, for example, or the Constitution as
elucidated by popular understandings. But the fact that individual state actors follow their own rules of recognition in good faith does not satisfy Harts
account of law, and it does not provide a satisfying alternative to Thrasymachus. (There is no reason, on the might-makes-right account, that the mighty
cannot hold the good faith belief that they are pursuing a common good or acting pursuant to rule-governed authority. What matters is that their power is
in fact traceable to their superior strength.) There is reason for academic observers to doubt the existence of a single rule of recognition in American
constitutional law. There are too many core interpretive disputes, as discussed in Part I, and it is now widely accepted that constitutional rules are at least
underdeterminatc. Should there be doubt about this claim, consider this feature of constitutional law textbooks: they include majority and dissenting
opinions, and questions after each case frequently ask the reader which opinion was more persuasive. Those questions are not posed as rhetorical. For
most constitutional decisions, we can say, it could have been otherwise. With a few votes switched, with a different line-up of Justices, the same
precedents (and in some cases, the same interpretive methodology) could have produced a different outcome. Moreover, these suspicions of
indeterminancy or underdetermi-nancy are not the unique province of the academy. Think of the discussions of Supreme Court appointments in
presidential elections. Many voters, law professors or not, understand their vote for president to be also a vote for a certain kind of Justice and for certain
kinds of constitutional outcomes. Discussions of Supreme Court appointments are often framed in terms of judicial methodology I will appoint judges
who are faithful to the text of the Constitution but that language may be more a matter of decorum than of real constitutional faith. Judges, of course,
are not ignorant of the charges of indeterminancy or of the politicization of judicial appointments. And it seems possible that the erosion of constitutional
faith has reached the judiciary itself.771 claim no special insight into judicial psychology, but it seems implausible that the reasons for constitutional
skepticismthe discussions of underdetermined rules, the contingency of outcomes based on 5-4 votes, and the great attention to swing justices such as
Sandra Day OConnor or Anthony Kennedyhave not influenced judges themselves. Here again it seems worthwhile to consider dissenting opinions.
Justice Scalias polemics come to mind immediately; he has often accused his colleagues of acting lawlessly.78 Yet he keeps his post and continues to
participate in a system that treats as law the determinations of five (potentially lawless) Justices. It is possible, I suppose, that Justice Scalias dissents
express earnest outrage, that he is shocked (shocked) by decisions like Lawrence v. Texas79 and Boumediene. It is possible that he believes himself to be
the last best hope of constitutional law properly so called. But it seems more likely that he shares the skepticism of academic observers of the Court.

Though one cant help but wonder whether judges are still constitutionally devout, I should emphasize here that my argument does
not turn on a claim that judges are acting in good or bad faith. Individual judges may well take the internal point of view, in Harts

But it seems clear that American

judges do not all hold the internal point of view toward a single, shared rule of
recognition, given the nature of disagreements among judges themselves . If there
are multiple rules of recognition, varying from judge to judge , then legal outcomes
will depend on which judge is empowered to make the critical decision , and
Thrasymachus is not so far off the mark. Contemporary judicial disagreement is profound, and it is
terms, and strive faithfully to apply the principles they recognize as law.

not just a matter of Justice Scalias flair for colorful rhetoric. Consider Scott v. Harris, the recent decision granting
summary judgment (on the basis of qualified immunity) to a police officer who had rammed a passenger car during
a high-speed chase, causing an accident that left the driver a quadriplegic.80 Like most use-of-force opinions, the
decision applies a deferential Fourth Amendment standard that gives police officers wide leeway. What is unusual
about Harris is that, because the case arose as a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the critical question (whether the
driver, Victor Harris, posed a sufficient threat to others bodily safety such that the use of deadly force was
reasonable) was nominally a jury question, and at summary judgment, the court should have taken the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving partythe injured driver. Thus, in earlier use-of-force cases that reached the
Court as 1983 claims, the Court articulated the Fourth Amendment standard and then remanded the case to the
trial court.81 But in Harris, the Court had access to videotapes of the chase recorded by cameras on the dashboards
of the police vehicles involved.82 In the view of the eight-Justice majority, the videotape spoke for itself: it made
Harriss threat to the public so clear that no reasonable juror could conclude that the officers use of force was
unreasonable.83 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found the officer to be entitled to summary judgment.84

Doubtless there are many instances in which a court grants summary judgment to one party though non-judicial
observers believe a reasonable juror could find for the other party. Harris is of particular interest, though, because
the reasonable juror who might have found in favor of Victor Harris was clearly visible to the majorityin fact, this
juror had a spokesman on the Court. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in Scott v. Harris, viewed the same
videotape and found it to confirm the factual findings of the district court (which had denied the police offic-ers
motion for summary judgment).85 Though Justice Stevens was careful not to base his argument on an actual
determination of the substantive Fourth Amendment question (chiding his colleagues for doing just that and
thereby acting as jurors rather than judges),86 he viewed the video evidence and explained how one might
conclude, perfectly reasonably, that Scott had used excessive force.87 In order for the eight Justices in the Harris
majority to believe their own opinion, they would have to conclude that Justice Stevens lived outside the realm of
reason. Harris is nominally a dispute about what reasonable jurors could conclude, rather than a direct argument
about the meaning of a particular constitutional provision. But the two reactions to the videotape should call to
mind Larry Tribes worry that American constitutional law is plagued by deep and thus far intractable divisions
between wholly different ways of assessing truth and experiencing reality.88 It is not just abortion and assisted
suicide that reveal profound disagreement about what is true and real. A videotape that speaks for itself in the
eyes of eight Justices says something entirely different to the ninth. Looking beyond the judiciary, consider the
consequences of constitutional disagreement and constitutional indeterminancy for other government officials and
for would-be critics of those officials. Earlier I noted that with sufficient constitutional indeterminancy, theres no

with sufficient
legal indeterminancy, theres no such thing as illegality . When John Yoo wrote
the Office of Legal Counsel memos that defend practices formerly known as torture, he
was simply doing to bans on torture what critics had long argued it was possible to
do for any law: he was trashing them.89 This was the spawn of CLS put to work in
the OLC; deconstructions on the left are now deconstructions on the
right.90 And that, of course, is cause for anxiety among those who would like to argue that George W. Bush or
members of his administration acted illegally. As I suggested in the Introduction, this may be the
Pyrrhic victory of critical legal studies: If the crits were correct, then there
is no distinctively legal form of critique. About torture, indefinite
detention, warrantless wiretapping, and so on, we can say I don't like it or
it doesnt correspond to my vision of the good, but we cannot say its
illegal. To argue that the Bush administration violated the rule of law, we need to
believe that the rule of law exists . But for 30 years or more, we have found reasons to doubt that it
such thing as an unconstitutional president. A more extreme version of this argument is that

does.91 Perhaps it will seem that I am overstating the influence of legal realism and critical legal studies, or the doubts about
laws existence. Im willing to entertain those possibilities, but I do want to emphasize that the focus is on constitutional law. Its
easy enough to believe in law when we see it applied and enforced by figures of authority in a recognized hierarchy. That is, the
sentencing judge or the prison warden can believe in lawhe has applied it himself. And the criminal should believe in law he has
felt its force. But these examples illustrate Austinian law: commands backed by force. What remains elusive, on my account, are
laws that are truly laws given to oneself, and especially law given by a state to itself.92 That is why, in Part I of this essay, I

brute force is a poor candidate to distinguish ordinary politics, or ordinary

legal decisions, from extraordinary moments of crisis. What would be truly extraordinary is not the
suggested that

use of force, but its absence: a system of law truly based on consent and independent of sanction. The Constitution, in theory, is a

each
successive generation must give the Constitution to itself: each generation
must adopt the internal point of view toward the Constitution in order for it to be
effective. Even once we have accepted the written text as authoritative, all but the strictest constructionists acknowledge that
law given unto oneself. By this I mean not simply that the Founders gave the Constitution to future generations, but that

many meanings can plausibly be extracted from that text. (And even the strict constructionists must acknowledge that as a factual
matter many meanings have been extracted; they deny only the plausibility of those varied readings.) Any law given unto oneself
requires what Hart called the internal point of view, and what one more cynical might describe as self-delusion: it requires a belief
that one is bound though one could at any minute walk away. It is possible, I think, that we have outwitted the Constitution: that

we have become too clever, too quick to notice indeterminancy, even too postmodern to believe ourselves bound. A third possible explanation for contemporary references to crisis
is professional malaise. It could be, as I suggested earlier, that after too many years of chewing what judges had for
breakfast, professors have lost their appetites. It could be that the problems of originalists and historicists and
popular constitutionalists dont amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world. And if these possibilities have not
crossed the law professors mind, they probably should. We might consider again Larry Tribes explanation of his
decision to stop work on his treatise of American constitutional law. There are two questions of meaning there, one
of which Tribe confronts directly and the other which he brushes off quickly. Most obviously, there is the search for

constitutional meaning, as Tribe acknowledges, a search that cannot be concluded within the Constitutions own
text. I see no escape from adopting some perspective... external to the constitution itself from which to decide
questions not indisputably resolved one way or the other by the text and structure--------9* Tribe goes on to
wonder where these extra-constitutional criteria come from, and who ratified the meta-constitution that such
external criteria would comprise?.94 Supreme Court Justices (and other judges) must struggle with these
questions, given the public authority that they have the enormous responsibility and privilege to wield.95 But
Tribe need not. He can simply decline to finish the treatise. If he declines to finish the treatise, though, we cant
help asking ourselves what was at stake, and what remains at stake. If the law professor lacks the responsibility of a
judge, is his constitutional theory just an amusing hobby? What was the point of the constitutional law treatise, or of
other efforts to discern coherent principles of constitutional law? The significance of a treatise is the question of
meaning that Tribe brushes off quickly: he says a treatise is an attempt at a synthesis of some enduring value and
insists that his decision is not based on doubts about whether constitutional treatises arc ever worthwhile.96 But
Tribes letter leaves the enduring value of a treatise rather underspecified, and it is possible that current
references to constitutional crisis in the academy stem from uncertainty about such questions of value. Is

constitutional theory good for absolutely nothing? Only if we believe that the effort
to resist Thrasymachus is futile or pointless. Constitutional theory is a species of legal and political theory,
and the most intriguing forms of such theory are produced by worries that law and violence are too closely intertwined.97 Thus I
suggested at the outset of this essay that existential anxiety is not always to be regretted, cured, or mocked. Such

anxiety

may be an important indication that we have noticed the ways in which

Thrasymachus seems right, and we still care enough to try to prove him wrong.98
After so much talk of crisis and anxiety, consider an illustration from the dramatic genre. Tom Stoppards play Jumpers
features a troupe of philosophy professors who double as acrobats: Logical positivists, mainly, with a linguistic
analyst or two, a couple of Benthamite utilitarians ... lapsed Kantians and empiricists generally... and of course the usual
Behaviorists... a mixture of the more philosophical members of the university gymnastics team and the more gymnastic members of

The Jumpers seem to practice what we would now identify as post-modern

nihilism: One shoots and kills another, then conceals the murder with cheerful
aplomb. Against these intellectually and physically adroit colleagues, the clumsy and old-fashioned Professor George Moore
the Philosophy School.99

struggles to defend the irreducible fact of goodness,100 the possibility of a moral conscience, and the claim that there is more

He can neither shake nor defend his

faith. Law schools, I think, are filled with moral sympathizers to Professor Moore who possess the skills of modern-day
in me than meets the microscope.101 Is God? Moore wonders.

Jumpers.102 The current discourse of crisis is the latest manifestation of an old struggle between faith and doubt, and it is not one

we
are determined to have law, even if we must make it ourselves. There was at least a smidgen of
truth in John Finniss claim that scholars of critical legal studies were disappointed ... absolutists.103 But it is not just
crits that are disappointed when they look for law and see nothing . Few scholars of
any stripe want to vindicate Thrasymachus. All of this is just to reiterate the
difficulty, and perhaps the necessity, of giving a law unto oneself. If constitutional
law did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.
that we will resolve. On one hand, we have observed too much to believe (in law) unquestioningly. And on the other hand,

Perm
PERM do both - Reformism from with-in solves
Dixon 1 Activist and founding member of Direct Action Network Summer, Chris,
Reflections on Privilege, Reformism, and Activism, Online

To bolster his critique of 'reformism,' for instance, he critically cites one of the examples in my essay: demanding

we need revolutionary strategy that links diverse, everyday struggles and

demands to long-term radical objectives, without sacrificing either. Of course, this
isn't to say that every so-called 'progressive' ballot initiative or organizing campaign
is necessarily radical or strategic. Reforms are not all created equal. But some can
fundamentally shake systems of power, leading to enlarged gains and greater space
for further advances. Andre Gorz, in his seminal book Strategy for Labor, refers to these as "non-reformist"
authentic

or "structural" reforms. He contends, "a struggle for non-reformist reforms--for anti-capitalist reforms--is one which
does not base its validity and its right to exist on capitalist needs, criteria, and rationales. A non-reformist reform is

Look to history for examples: the end

of slavery, the eight-hour workday, desegregation. All were born from long, hard
struggles, and none were endpoints. Yet they all struck at the foundations of power
(in these cases, the state, white supremacy, and capitalism), and in the process,
they created new prospects for revolutionary change. Now consider contemporary struggles:
determined not in terms of what can be, but what should be."

amnesty for undocumented immigrants, socialized health care, expansive environmental protections, indigenous

None will single-handedly

dismantle capitalism or other systems of power, but each has the potential to
escalate struggles and sharpen social contradictions. And we shouldn't misinterpret
these efforts as simply meliorative incrementalism, making 'adjustments' to a
fundamentally flawed system.
sovereignty. These and many more are arguably non-reformist reforms as well.

No Impact (Cap Good)

Cap solves environmental destruction
Veer 12

(Pierre-Guy, Independent journalist writing for the Von Mises Institute, 5/2, Cheer for the Environment,
Cheer for Capitalism, http://www.mises.ca/posts/blog/cheer-for-the-environment-cheer-for-capitalism/)

How can such a negligence have happened? Its simple: no one was
the legitimate owner of the resources (water, air, ground). When a property is stateowned as was the case under communism government has generally little incentive to
sustainably exploit it. In communist Europe, governments wanted to industrialize
their country in order, they hoped, to catch up with capitalist economies. Objectives were
set, and they had to be met no matter what. This included the use of brown coal,
high in sulfur and that creates heavy smoke when burned[4], and questionable farming
methods, which depleted the soil. This lack of vision can also be seen in the public sector of capitalist countries. In the US, the Department of
No Ownership, No Responsibility

Defense creates more dangerous waste than the top five chemical product companies put together. In fact, pollution is such that cleanup costs are
estimated at $20 billion. The same goes for agriculture, where Washington encourages overfarming or even farming not adapted for the environment its

In order to solve most of the pollution problems, there exists a

simple solution: laissez-faire capitalism, i.e. make sure property rights and
profitability can be applied. The latter helped Eastern Europe; when communism fell,
capitalism made the countries seek profitable and not just cheap ways to produce, which
greatly reduced pollution[6]. As for the former, it proved its effectiveness, notably with the Love Canal[7]. Property rights
are also thought of in order to protect some resources, be it fish[8] or endangered
species[9]. Why such efficiency? Because an owners self-interest is directed towards
the maximum profitability of his piece of land. By containing pollution as Hooker Chemicals
did with its canal he keeps away from costly lawsuit for property violation . At the same
time, badly managed pollution can diminish the value of the land , and therefore
profits. Any entrepreneur with a long-term vision and whose property is safe from arbitrary government
decisions thinks about all that in order to protect his investment . One isnt foolish enough to sack ones
in[5]. Capitalism, the Green Solution

property! In conclusion, I have to mention that I agree with environmentalists that it is importance to preserve the environment in order to protect mother
nature and humans. However, I strongly disagree with their means, i.e. government intervention. Considering it very seldom has a long-term vision, it is

most environmental disasters are, directly or indirectly,

by a lack of clear property rights

the worst thing that can happen. In fact, one could says that

caused

by the State, mainly

. Were they clearer, they would let each and everyone of
us, out of self-interest, protect the environment in a better manner. That way, everyones a winner.

Cap solves warcapitalist peace theory

Harrison 11 (Mark, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East
European Studies, University of Birmingham, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University,
Capitalism at War, Oct 19
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/capitalism.pdf)
Capitalisms Wars America is the worlds preeminent capitalist power. According to a poll of more than 21,000
citizens of 21 countries in the second half of 2008, people tend on average to evaluate U.S. foreign policy as inferior
to that of their own country in the moral dimension. 4 While this survey does not disaggregate respondents by

many apparently knowledgeable people also seem to believe that, in the modern
world, most wars are caused by America; this impression is based on my experience of presenting
work on the frequency of wars to academic seminars in several European countries. According to the
evidence, however, these beliefs are mistaken. We are all aware of Americas wars,
but they make only a small contribution to the total . Counting all bilateral conflicts
involving at least the show of force from 1870 to 2001, it turns out that the countries
that originated them come from all parts of the global income distribution (Harrison and
educational status,

Countries that are richer, measured by GDP per head, such as America do
not tend to start more conflicts, although there is a tendency for countries with larger GDPs to do
so. Ranking countries by the numbers of conflicts they initiated, the United States,
with the largest economy, comes only in second place; third place belongs to China.
In first place is Russia (the USSR between 1917 and 1991). What do capitalist institutions
contribute to the empirical patterns in the data? Erik Gartzke (2007) has re-examined the
hypothesis of the democratic peace based on the possibility that, since capitalism and
democracy are highly correlated across countries and time, both
democracy and peace might be products of the same underlying cause,
the spread of capitalist institutions. It is a problem that our historical datasets have measured
the spread of capitalist property rights and economic freedoms over shorter time spans or on
Wolf 2011).

fewer dimensions than political variables. For the period from 1950 to 1992, Gartzke uses a measure of external

Countries
that share this attribute of capitalism above a certain level, he finds, do
not fight each other, so there is capitalist peace as well as democratic
peace. Second, economic liberalization (of the less liberalized of the pair of countries) is a more
powerful predictor of bilateral peace than democratization, controlling for the level
of economic development and measures of political affinity.
financial and trade liberalization as most likely to signal robust markets and a laissez faire policy.

Capitalism is key to solving global warming

Whitman, 08 (Janet, February 19, pg. http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?
id=317551)

Global warming may soon get a saviour more effective than Al Gore and his doomsday
Power-Point presentations: capitalism. The former U.S. vice-president, who was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize last year for his work on climate change, is credited with bringing widespread attention to
the issue. But the huge moneymaking opportunity in going green will be the big driver

that leads to the reining in of the release of greenhouse gasses, experts say. Money
already is pouring into environmental initiatives and technologies in the U nited States.
Experts expect investment in the area to explode over the next few years if, as
anticipated, the government here imposes restrictions on the release of gases
believed to be behind climate change. "Capitalism will drive this, " said Vinod Khosla,
founding chief executive of Sun Microsystems and a longtime venture capitalist. Mr. Khosla, speaking
on a panel at a recent investment summit on climate change at United Nations headquarters here,
said getting consumers to curb their energy use has never worked -- unless they've

had a financial incentive. "If we make it economic, it will happen," he said. The expected
government-mandated cap on carbon emissions already is fueling innovation. Venture capitalists,
for instance, are investing in new technologies that would make cement -- a major
producer of carbon emissions -- actually absorb carbon instead. Cement makers could
practically give the product away and reap the financial reward from government carbon credits.

Alt Solvency
alt doesnt solve - Capitalism is inevitablereforms, not
revolution, are the only option.
Wilson, 2000 Editor and Publisher of Illinois Academe 2000 (John K. Wilson,
How the Left can Win Arguments and Influence People p. 15- 16)

Capitalism is far too ingrained in American life to eliminate. If you go into the most
impoverished areas of America, you will find that the people who live there are not
seeking government control over factories or even more social welfare programs;
they're hoping, usually in vain, for a fair chance to share in the capitalist wealth.
The poor do not pray for socialism-they strive to be a part of the capitalist system .
They want jobs, they want to start businesses, and they want to make money and
be successful. What's wrong with America is not capitalism as a system but
capitalism as a religion. We worship the accumulation of wealth and treat the
horrible inequality between rich and poor as if it were an act of God. Worst of all, we
allow the government to exacerbate the financial divide by favoring the wealthy: go
anywhere in America, and compare a rich suburb with a poor town-the city services,
schools, parks, and practically everything else will be better financed in the place
populated by rich people. The aim is not to overthrow capitalism but to overhaul it.
Give it a social-justice tune-up, make it more efficient, get the economic engine to
hit on all cylinders for everybody, and stop putting out so many environmentally
hazardous substances. To some people, this goal means selling out leftist ideals for
the sake of capitalism. But the right thrives on having an ineffective opposition. The
Revolutionary Communist Party helps stabilize the "free market" capitalist system
by making it seem as if the only alternative to free-market capitalism is a return to
Stalinism. Prospective activists for change are instead channeled into pointless
discussions about the revolutionary potential of the proletariat. Instead of working
to persuade people to accept progressive ideas, the far left talks to itself (which
may be a blessing, given the way it communicates) and tries to sell copies of the
Socialist Worker to an uninterested public.

Alt causes violence

Pinker 11 (Steven, the Economist, The violent dangers of ideology; The Q&A:
Steven Pinker, Proquest, jj)

Do you think that capitalist values

have contributed to the decline of violence? I think that communism was a
major force for violence for more than 100 years, because it was built into
its ideology that progress comes through class struggle, often violent . It
led to the widespread belief that the only way to achieve justice was to
hurry this dialectical process along, and allow the oppressed working
You equate Marxist ideology with violence in the book.

classes to carry out their struggle against their bourgeois oppressors .

However

much we might deplore the profit motive, or consumerist

values, if everyone just wants iPods we would probably be better

off than if they wanted class revolution.

Nietzsche Morality
Analytics: Aff solves Alt
Solitary confinement exists because of morals within prisons and the need to punish
the inmates for wrong doings, once solitary confinement is removed then morals
will be removed from prisons. Thus solving for the alt and making the prison
atmosphere immoral

No Root Cause Solvency

Root cause claims are reductive and create ideological
polarizationkills political productivity and turns the K
Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2013 Ted Nordhaus, Michael Shellenberger,
Wicked Polarization: How Prosperity, Democracy, and Experts Divided America,
Breakthrough Journal, Issue 3, Winter 2013,
http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/issue-3/wicked-polarization/
Ultimately, the authors here are after bigger prey than ideological extremism. They have their sights set on
continuing Rittel and Webbers project of dethroning the dominant mode of expert analysis with its pretenses to

Problem-definition always arises with presumed

solutions. Describing obesity as caused by food environments implies
changing food environments. A larger set of causes (e.g., poor health care, lack of
education) reveals a larger number of potential solutions. To stimulate
cooperation and action, we might proliferate the number of policy choices
we see as legitimate, even if our highest policy priorities are not at the
top of the list. In creating a new pluralism for the post-truth era, liberals
might, paradoxically, find useful counsel from that most illiberal of modern philosophers, Friedrich
Nietzsche. His work undermined the Platonic conceit that the world can be
understood or experienced from something other than a highly particular
point of view. Behind progressive complaints of conservative mendacity ,
writes Nietzsche scholar Kathleen Higgins, is the assumption that if people only knew
the truth, we wouldnt have the problems of global warming, economic
recession, and poverty or at least that such challenges would be far
smaller. There is no going back to older notions of objective expertise , for
as Rittel and Webber noted, there are no value-free, true-false answers to any of
the wicked problems governments must deal with. The problem is not
that we are in a post-truth age but rather that we have not learned to
adapt to it. Perhaps a good place to begin is by recognizing our own biases,
perspectives, and agendas and attempting to hold them more lightly. In the
value-free analysis and policy making.

end, rising affluence, democracy, and complexity can empower partisanship, but they can also destabilize it.

Wickedness creates all manner of opportunity to disrupt the fault lines of

our many intensely polarized debates and to disorient partisans
accustomed to knowing exactly what they are supposed to think about any
issue. If wickedness is the result of framing problems in ways that lend
themselves to familiar and long-desired solutions, then bringing an end to
our ideological arms race will ultimately require that we force partisans
out of their comfort zone by redefining those problems in ways to which
partisans do not already know the answers. It is our hope that the essays assembled here
will do just that.

Security

No Link
Dogmatic realism leads us to universal truth- security threats
exist.
Kwan and Tsang 1 (Kai-Man, Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong
Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, Eric W. School of Business
Administration, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A, December,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, No. 12 (Dec., 2001), pp. 1163-1168,
Realism and Constructivism in Strategy Research: A Critical Realist Response to Mir
and Watson,) CH
The problem with Mir and Watson here is again their failure to distinguish
different kinds of real- ism. It is important to distinguish a dogmatic realist from a critical realist.
Both believe that theories can be true or false, and rigorous scientific research can move us progressively
towards a true account of phenomena. Dogmatic realists further believe that current theories correspond
(almost) exactly to reality, and hence there is not much room for error or critical scrutiny. This attitude
is inspired by (but does not strictly follow from) a primitive version of positivism which
believes in indubitable observations as raw data and that an infallible scientific method can safely lead us
from these data to universal laws. In contrast, critical realists, though believing in the possibility of progress
towards a true account of phenomena, would not take such progress for granted. Exactly because they believe
that reality exists independently of our minds, our theories, observations and methods are all fallible. Critical
realists also insist that verification and falsification are never conclusive, especially in social sciences. So critical
testing of theories and alleged universal laws need to be carried out continuously. A more detailed description of
critical realism, which is now a growing movement transforming the intellectual scene.

Link Turn
States are the key actors who solve violence plan accesses
this best.
Weingast 9 (Barry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and \Professor in the
Department of Political Science at Stanford U, Why are developing countries so
resistant to the rule of law, February 2009, accessed 7/10/09,
http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/11173/1/MWP_LS_2009_02.pdf )
All states must control the fundamental problem of violence. In natural states, a dominant coalition of the
powerful emerges to solve this problem. The coalition grants members privileges, creates

rents through limited access to valuable resources and organizations, and then
uses the rents to sustain order. Because fighting reduces their rents, coalition
members have incentives not to fight so as to maintain their rents. Natural states
necessarily limit access to organizations and restrict competition in all systems.
Failing to do so dissipate rents and therefore reduces the incentives not to fight.
We call this order the natural state because for nearly all of the last 10,000 years of human
history indeed, until just the last two centuries the natural state was the only solution to
the problem of violence that produced a hierarchical society with significant wealth. In comparison
with the previous foraging order, natural states produced impressive economic
growth, and even today we can see the impressive wealth amassed by many of
the early civilizations. In contrast to open access orders, however, natural states
have significant, negative consequences for economic growth.

Participating in acts of surveillance ensures security

Huysmans 2011 (Jef, Department of Politics and International Studies @ OU,
Whats in an act? On security speech acts and little security nothings, in Security
Dialogue 42.4-5, 375-378)
Securitizing in contemporary world politics develops significantly through
unspectacular processes of technologically driven surveillance, risk management
and precautionary governance. These processes are less about declaring a
territorialized enemy and threat of war than about dispersing techniques of
administering uncertainty and mapping dangers. A rich body of work exists that analyses the
nature and implications of surveillance, precautionary and pre-emptive security practice, and
governing through risk.6 One of the peculiar elements that is brought out by some of this literature is that
this securitizing process effaces acts: In the dispersed practices of the
contemporary security apparatus, we may never know if a decision is a decision
or if it has been controlled by previous knowledge and programmed. (Amoore and De Goede, 2008b: 180) The
statement can be read in different ways, but I want to bring out two particular characteristics of this securitizing
process that indicate that acts that is, actualizations of decisions as defined in the speech-act approach are a
problematic category for both analysis and political critique of this process .

The speech act of security

works with a notion of gravitation rather than diffusion and with a distinction
between the everyday and the exceptionality of security acts. A process that erodes
decisions challenges both. The securitizing to which Amoore and De Goede refer is a highly dispersed and
dispersing practice. It is heavily mediated by surveillance technologies that associate
people, sites, things and time into risk profiles. As a result, the process is strongly
automated, not in the sense of a machine just doing what it is programmed to do, but in the sense of a

process that associates largely without single critical moments of decision.7 Decisions are taken all the time, but
they are dispersed, and it is relatively difficult to assign critically significant actions to particular actors or to
aggregate sets of actions into a limited group of actors who have the capacity to create an assemblage of security .

Securitizing develops through a wide variety of mediators that connect data,

people, sites and times, but in connecting also change the material they are
connecting (Latour, 2005: 39) for example, programming an algorithm that connects data in a way that
differentiates patterns of travelling in terms of degrees of danger. If mediations are numerous, constantly shifting
and dispersed, it becomes very difficult if not impossible to assess which actions are actualizing a decision that
brings into play the limits of a given order and that has gravity. Gravity refers to a capacity for producing cracks and
can be grounded in institutionalized position, mobilization of bodies, unexpected public action, etc. As argued in the

the concept of act politicizes securitizing processes precisely by

identifying particular moments that concentrate developments into actualizations of
a decision that ruptures normal procedures of practice. If instead of moments of
critical decision we have a myriad of decisions in a process that is continuously
made and remade, then what is left of the analytics as well as political critique of
securitizing that is invested in the notion of speech act? Such a process invites moving from
previous section,

speech acts of security to concepts and methodologies that facilitate studying practices and processes of dispersed
associating. From the perspective of speech acts, this associating will mostly look unspectacular, unexceptional,
continuous and repetitive; instead of speech acts, we get the securitizing work of a multiplicity of little security
nothings. To briefly illustrate the shift in perspective that is implied here, let us re-read Daniel Neylands (2009)
example of how letters, as everyday objects, are transformed into an object of danger.8 In his analysis of mundane
terror, Neyland mentions a webpage on letter bombs that the British security service MI5 had temporarily set up.
The website was one device through which MI5 was securitizing letters. In setting out what a letter bomb is, how to
recognize a suspicious letter, how to deal with it, MI5 appropriated a mundane object in a securitizing process. The
letter bomb is not simply appropriated by a security agency, however. It also stands for a whole set of banal, little
connections (e.g. postal delivery, postal sorting, explosive or incendiary substances, posting, unusual place of
origin, couriers, recipients, the place of origin of the sender, police). Interpreting the website as an action by MI5 to
securitize letters by setting out a set of criteria and guidelines would focus attention on the gravitational force of
this moment and somehow disconnect it from the network of connections in which the website operates as a
mediator. Taking the website as a mediating device connecting things and people among whom suspicion of letters
might or might not already circulate would draw attention immediately to the diffuse associating that is taking
place. The website can be the starting point of the analysis, but it remains one particular thing and moment in a set
of connections and mediations that took place simultaneously, before and after. In the end, the analytics places the
website not as a securitizing moment with critical gravity that is, a moment in which one had a non-security
situation before and a security situation after but as one of several relatively small moments and actions that
invest insecurity in everyday objects and relations .

Securitizing then takes the form of a

scatterred process in which the website and letters connect various things and
persons in a network of suspicion. In such an analysis, the website changes from a security speech act
to one of many elements that from the perspective of speech-act analysis appear as little security nothings that

little security nothings are highly

significant, since it is they rather than exceptional speech acts that create the
securitizing process. This associative interpretation of letter bombs also brings out that the diffuse
is, devices, sites, practices without exceptional significance. Yet, these

processes of securitizing challenge the boundary between security practice and daily life. The letters move through
a wide set of banal relations. Many surveillance practices can be read in a similar way. They are often strongly
embedded in everyday actions and relations, thus coming across as routine and banal, a banality that is reinforced
by the strong technological mediation of data and practice. Writing algorithms is central to the functioning of data
mining. Introducing loyalty cards to track consumption patterns, promoting credit-card payments as the obvious
form of payment thus making it possible to profile cash payments as suspicious, and developing many other datagathering devices are central to turning transactional traces into insecurity profiles. Many of these practices come
about in piecemeal fashion, slip into daily life without much ado and, when connected to the rendition and dispersal
of risks, precaution and control of dangers, fade out the distinction between the everyday and security practice.

The governing of sites and lives through risk calculation, for example, often
operates in diverse areas of life, meshing policing with insurance practice, business
with national security, etc.9 In these securitizing processes, daily life as a realm upon which security
professionals practice protection is folded into the security practice itself . Risk management,
surveillance and precautionary methods work within daily life, as much as upon it.

Credit cards, CCTV, filling in forms for a myriad of services, monitoring workers, consumer data, advertising that
sustains precautionary dispositions and products associated with risks (e.g. fertilizers) intertwine profiling, control

The issue is therefore not simply a securitization of

everyday life that is, making daily life an object of security practice or everyday
objects and practices carriers of risk and danger (Aas et al., 2009: 2) but the
active involvement of daily activities in the process of securitizing itself.10 Many
little and banal daily activities, meetings, regulations are actively part of the
shaping of securitizing processes. The securitizing to which I am referring here is
less an actualization of a critical decision and more a continuous process of
assembling objects, subjects and practices. The loss of decisional gravitation and of a separation
and national security with daily activities.

between the everyday and the exceptional challenges the notion of exceptionalist rupture that is embedded in the
speech act of security. The concept of rupture draws attention to a fixed frame of reference, a given order that has
been able to aggregate a multiplicity of practices, subjects and objects into a whole, expressing a particular
rationale. The rupture is an event that demonstrates the existence of order and its limits by breaking the habitual.
In exceptionalist readings of rupture, power consists in the capacity and practice of aggregating and fixing
multiplicity into a global practice and in the capacity to disrupt the aggregation so as to make new aggregations
possible.

Yet, decisional speech acts and ruptures lose much of their critical
significance in a securitizing process that creates insecurities mainly through
dispersing, through continuously associating, reassociating, tweaking and
experimenting with materials, procedures, regulations, etc. The scene of securitizing is then
not one of expressing or disrupting a given order but of creating things, meanings, subjects in habitual, everyday
innovation in meetings, discussions, regulations, programming, etc. Power is then to be understood as infinitesimal
mediations, as little nothings, dispersed in a continuously developing security bricolage that takes place in practices
of sketching, trials, meetings, regulations, etc. (Latour, 2005). Exceptional rupture gives way to innovations and
controversies that are worked in dispersed sites and habitual every day, ordinary practices of associating.11 In
relation to such processes, decisional speech acts with gravitas have at best limited analytical relevance and at
worst misconstrue the analysis by assigning excessive significance to actions that have limited power that are
themselves simply another little security nothings.

Dogmatic realism leads us to universal truth- security threats

exist.
Kwan and Tsang 1 (Kai-Man, Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong
Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, Eric W. School of Business
Administration, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A, December,
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, No. 12 (Dec., 2001), pp. 1163-1168,
Realism and Constructivism in Strategy Research: A Critical Realist Response to Mir
and Watson,) CH
The problem with Mir and Watson here is again their failure to distinguish
different kinds of real- ism. It is important to distinguish a dogmatic realist from a critical realist.
Both believe that theories can be true or false, and rigorous scientific research can move us progressively
towards a true account of phenomena. Dogmatic realists further believe that current theories correspond
(almost) exactly to reality, and hence there is not much room for error or critical scrutiny. This attitude
is inspired by (but does not strictly follow from) a primitive version of positivism which
believes in indubitable observations as raw data and that an infallible scientific method can safely lead us
from these data to universal laws. In contrast, critical realists, though believing in the possibility of progress
towards a true account of phenomena, would not take such progress for granted. Exactly because they believe
that reality exists independently of our minds, our theories, observations and methods are all fallible. Critical
realists also insist that verification and falsification are never conclusive, especially in social sciences. So critical
testing of theories and alleged universal laws need to be carried out continuously. A more detailed description of
critical realism, which is now a growing movement transforming the intellectual scene.

No Impact

No Alt Solvency
The transition from state structure to global cosmopolitanism
inevitably causes civil backsliding into neo-medievalism and
fails to eliminate power politics
Buzan 4 (Barry , December, Montague Burton Prof. of International Relations @
the London School of Economics and honorary prof. @ the University of
Copenhagen, "Realism vs. Cosmopolitanism" http://www.polity.co.uk/global/realismvs-cosmopolitanism.asp) JC
A.Mc.: Barry, I detected in your argument about globalization and the
democratization of world order that it is not only a question of feasibility, but also
there is a sense in which there are very important normative issues at stake.
Cosmopolitan or global democracy, even if it was feasible, may not be the best way
to proceed in terms of human political organization. Would that be an adequate
representation of your position? B.B.: That is a difficult question. I think that David is
right that posing the counterfactual requires me to sharpen the implications of my
argument. I am not advocating a world of fascists states or totalitarians or whatever
- of course not! I am merely pointing out that democratization should not be seen as
some kind of universal good; it also carries with it a set of problems. I do not claim
to have the answers to these problems, but I would like to comment a little on the
kind of picture that David is painting. It does seem to me (and I am taking my realist
hat off here because at this point I am leaving behind the great bulk of realists) that
there are two things to say. First, as the process of globalization unfolds, deepens
and strengthens - and I don't dispute that this is the world we are living in and
therefore that this is a time of transformation - this is going to raise serious
questions for political structure. I think these questions are going to be answered in
different ways in different parts of the global system. My sense is that in the most
developed and most democratic parts of the system, like western Europe and North
America, there is probably going to be a layering of power so that there will be, if
you like, an unpacking or disaggregation of sovereignty. Political authority will move
upwards and downwards, and will exist simultaneously on several different levels.
Hedley Bull once referred to this as neo-medievalism and that is not a bad
metaphor in some ways. This, however, only accounts for those most developed
parts of the system because what you are looking at here is the interplay between
the political units of the system and the system itself. And what globalization is
telling us is that the system is becoming stronger and stronger in relation to the old
political units within it. Now, the strong political units within the system may survive
by adapting and adopting some kind of neo-medieval framework, but what about
the rest? There are a lot of weak states in the international system and these are
going to have much more difficulty dealing with life in the strong system. Some of
them are already falling to pieces and it would not surprise me, putting on a futurist
hat, if a number of quite substantial unstable zones opened up and became semipermanent features of the system - perhaps one centring on Afghanistan, one in
West Africa, and one in Central Africa. One could imagine there being no effective
state structures, indeed no effective political structures at all in such places except

for some kind of reversion to warlordism, tribalism or gangsterism, or combinations

thereof. In some places this is already the case, and it would not surprise me to see
this phenomenon spread so that one had a part of the world which was very highly
organised, post-modern perhaps, parts of the world which had politically collapsed
and then bits in-between like China, India - the so-called modern developing world.
It is not quite clear to me what is going to happen to these latter states. They have
a really tough game to play. Looking ahead a bit further and trying to wear David's
hat a bit more, I can imagine a world in which there might be no states at all in the
sense that we now understand them. However, one could still wear a realist hat and
say well, all right, we might be in the post-state world, but there will still be plenty
of power politics around. It may be pluralist, it may be democratic, it may be
structured in all kinds of odd ways, but the logic of power politics will go on and to
that extent the realist tradition will remain intact.

They cant eliminate the state and non-statist solutions are

unproductive deployments of power They matter
Buzan 4 (Barry , December, Montague Burton Prof. of International Relations @
the London School of Economics and honorary prof. @ the University of
Copenhagen, "Realism vs. Cosmopolitanism" http://www.polity.co.uk/global/realismvs-cosmopolitanism.asp
A.Mc.: But would not a realist response be that the very issues David seeks to highlight are largely marginal to
the central dilemmas of world politics: the critical issues of war and peace, life and death.B.B.: Again, that is a

because in traditional realism there was a rather clear distinction between

'high' and 'low' politics, high politics being about diplomacy and war, and low politics
difficult question for realism

being about economics and society and many issues like the weather and
disease. And because of the change in the importance of the different sectors that I mentioned earlier,
this becomes problematic for realism. But the realists have been fairly agile. The realist line of
defence would be that in most areas of world politics - again the emphasis on politics - states are still the
principle authorities. And there is nothing that stops them from co-operating with each other. Thus, realists, or at least a
good proportion of realists, can live quite comfortably with the idea of international regimes in which states, as the basic holders
of political authority in the system, get together sometimes with other actors, sometimes just with other states, to discuss
issues of joint concern, and sometimes they can hammer out of a set of policies, a set of rules of the game, which enable them

this certainly does not feel like traditional power politics realism. You can
think of it to some extent in terms of power politics by looking at issue power; who are the big players in
relation to any big issue? Who are the people who have any kind of control? Who loses out?, etc..
to co-ordinate their behaviour. Now,

There is, therefore, an element of power politics in this whole notion of regimes,
and it does retain a strong element of state centrism. I think the realist would say: if you
discount the state, where is politics? Where is it located? You cannot eliminate politics, as some
liberals sometimes seem to do. To wish the state away, to wish politics away, is not going to generate
results. The good dyed-in-the-wool realist would argue that power politics is a permanent condition of human
existence. It will come in one form or another, in one domain or another, in relation to one issue or another, but it
will always be there. It will be politics and it will be about relative power. And at the moment the state is still an
important player in the game.

Critical theory is not able to predict the outcome of

desecuritization the alternative is nothing more than wishful
thinking.
Mearsheimer 95 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994-1995, pp. 5-49)
There is another problem with the application of critical theory to international
relations. Although critical theorists hope to replace realism with a discourse that
emphasizes harmony and peace, critical theory per se emphasizes that it is
impossible to know the future. Critical theory, according to its own logic, can be
used to undermine realism and produce change, but it cannot serve as the basis for
predicting which discourse will replace realism, because the theory says little about
the direction change takes. In fact, Cox argues that although "utopian expectations
may be an element in stimulating people to act ... such expectations are almost
never realized in practice."160 Thus, in a sense, the communitarian discourse
championed by critical theorists is wishful thinking, not an outcome linked to the
theory itself. Indeed, critical theory cannot guarantee that the new discourse will
not be more malignant than the discourse it replaces. Nothing in the theory
guarantees, for example, that a fascist discourse far more violent than realism will
not emerge as the new hegemonic discourse.

Permutations
Perm Do both
Perm Do plan then Alt
Perm- Do Alt then Plan
Perm- Do plan and all non conflicting parts of the alternative
Even highly critical studies of security are open to articulating
alternative visions of security We can perm do both to
effectuate reconstruction of security.
McDonald & Browning 2011 (Matt, Reader in International Relations, Coeditor, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Christopher, Reader of Politics and
International Studies, The future of critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of
security, pp. 240, http://www.bristol.ac.uk/medialibrary/sites/spais/migrated/documents/cssreading.pdf) WH
While articulating a foundational vision of security and advancing a fundamental
critique of traditional approaches, however, human security is ultimately better
understood (in Coxian terms) as problem-solving in orientation (Christie, 2010;
Newman, 2010). Indeed, critical security scholars have been particularly suspicious
of human security, not least given the compromises its advocates have been
prepared to make with state power and established structures of governance . As
Booth (2007: 324) puts it, human security has taken on the image of the velvet
glove on the iron hand of hard power. In this respect, critics suggest that human
security has been co-opted by Western states as a guise for the continued
promotion of liberal forms of governance around the world. Human security has, in
this sense become part of the ideological trappings which have helped foster the
linking together of security and liberal development policies by many Western
states and which at their most pernicious have become a cover and support for neoimperialist policies of military intervention in the developing world (Christie, 2010;
Duffield, 2007; Newman, 2010). As such, some scholarship which directly articulates
a vision of the good regarding security (such as human security) falls outside
reasonable limits of the critical security studies project, while some approaches
within this project (most notably critical constructivism and post-structuralism)
appear reluctant to articulate even a notion of progress regarding security. Despite
the unwillingness of the latter to articulate an explicit conception of progress , such a
conception is evident in the expressed commitment to opening up space for
communities to articulate alternative visions of security in the case of critical
constructivism, or in the commitment to resist the logic of security altogether in the
case of post-structuralism. The latter also largely applies to the Copenhagen
Schools commitment to desecuritization, a point we will return to later. In these
senses, we can indeed talk about engagement with the ethics of security as a core
component of a critical security studies project, even while such engagement has
oriented towards more pragmatic visions of progress than foundational claims
regarding the constitution of the good.

Even highly critical studies of security are open to articulating

alternative visions of security We can perm do both to
effectuate reconstruction of security.
McDonald & Browning 2011 (Matt, Reader in International Relations, Coeditor, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Christopher, Reader of Politics and
International Studies, The future of critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of
security, pp. 240, http://www.bristol.ac.uk/medialibrary/sites/spais/migrated/documents/cssreading.pdf) WH
While articulating a foundational vision of security and advancing a fundamental
critique of traditional approaches, however, human security is ultimately better
understood (in Coxian terms) as problem-solving in orientation (Christie, 2010;
Newman, 2010). Indeed, critical security scholars have been particularly suspicious
of human security, not least given the compromises its advocates have been
prepared to make with state power and established structures of governance. As
Booth (2007: 324) puts it, human security has taken on the image of the velvet
glove on the iron hand of hard power. In this respect, critics suggest that human
security has been co-opted by Western states as a guise for the continued
promotion of liberal forms of governance around the world. Human security has, in
this sense become part of the ideological trappings which have helped foster the
linking together of security and liberal development policies by many Western
states and which at their most pernicious have become a cover and support for neoimperialist policies of military intervention in the developing world (Christie, 2010;
Duffield, 2007; Newman, 2010). As such, some scholarship which directly articulates
a vision of the good regarding security (such as human security) falls outside
reasonable limits of the critical security studies project, while some approaches
within this project (most notably critical constructivism and post-structuralism)
appear reluctant to articulate even a notion of progress regarding security. Despite
the unwillingness of the latter to articulate an explicit conception of progress, such a
conception is evident in the expressed commitment to opening up space for
communities to articulate alternative visions of security in the case of critical
constructivism, or in the commitment to resist the logic of security altogether in the
case of post-structuralism. The latter also largely applies to the Copenhagen
Schools commitment to desecuritization, a point we will return to later. In these
senses, we can indeed talk about engagement with the ethics of security as a core
component of a critical security studies project, even while such engagement has
oriented towards more pragmatic visions of progress than foundational claims
regarding the constitution of the good.

The permutation solves - the desecuritization of the K will

inevitably fail, only including the political and traditional forms
of security through the affirmatives action to manage security
can solve.
Bilgin, 2008 (Pinar, Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, Critical Theory, Security Studies: An Introduction, Routlege, pp. [98100]) AV

Security is what we make of it. It

is an epiphenomenon intersubjectively created. Different worldviews and discourses
about politics deliver different views and discourses about security. New thinking
about security is not simply a matter of broadening the subject matter (widening the
agenda of issues beyond the merely military ). It is possible as Barry Buzan (1991) has shown above all to
expand international security studies and still remain within an asserted neorealist
framework and approach.(Booth 1997: 106) The first analytical move made by the
students of the Welsh School of critical security studies is to deepen our
understanding of security. This reveals the politics behind scholarly concepts and policy agendas, which
allows analysts to de-centre states and consider other referent objects above and below the state level. The
second move is to broaden our understanding of security in order to consider a
range of insecurities faced by an array of referent objects. In this sense, students of
critical security studies do not securitize issues, but politicize security (Booth 2005a).
They do this to reveal the political and constitutive character of security thinking
and to point to mens and womens experiences of threat (Alker 2005: 195) so as to be
able to de-centre the military and state-focused threats that dominate traditional
security agendas. This stance is at odds with the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al .1998)
which calls for desecuritization out of a fear that those issues that are labelled as
security concerns will be captured by state elites and addressed through the
application of zero-sum military and/or police practices, which may not necessarily
help address human insecurities. Critical scholars, while sympathetic to those concerns, prefer to hold
Ken Booth laid out the rationale for critical security studies as follows:

on to security as a concept for scholarly studies while scrutinizing its use in practice. The divide between the two
schools on this issue (whether to seek desecuritization or to use security for raising and addressing the concerns
of referents other than the state/regime) is not one of objectivist vs. constitutive understandings of theory, since
both approaches understand theorizing as a form of practice (see Chapter 5, this volume).

Whereas the

Copenhagen School makes a case for desecuritization (taking issues outside of the security
agenda and addressing them through normal political processes), the Welsh School re-theorizes
security as a derivative concept and calls for politicizing security . Welsh School
scholars preference for politicizing security as opposed to desecuritization rests
on three main arguments. The first argument is strategic. Desecuritization, they
argue, would amount to leaving security as a tool with a high level of mobilization
capacity in the hands of state elites who have not, so far, proven to be sensitive
towards the security concerns of referents other than the state and/or regime. While
the Copenhagen School makes a case for desecuritization for exactly this reason, the Welsh School turns
that argument around and asks: Are existential threats to security simply to be
abandoned to traditional, zero-sum, militarized forms of thought and action? (Wyn
Jones1999: 109). Viewed as such, politicizing security facilitates questioning of the
state elites uses of security and the merits of policies based on zero-sum, statist
and militaristic understandings. The second argument is ethico-political .The fact
that security has traditionally been about the state and its concerns does not mean
it has to remain that way. When defined by the state elite, the definition of security
could include anything and everything depending on their policy agenda. Depending on
the historico-political context, security agendas of states may indeed translate into zero-sum, militarist, statist and,

When defined by some others (as with environmental

NGOs) security may be more likely to be conceived globally and practised locally
with an eye on the future implications of current thinking and practices. While some
are more able than others to voice their insecurities, there nevertheless remain
opportunities to open up room for dialogue, debate and dissent. From this perspective, the
at times, dehumanizing practices.

role of the scholar is viewed, in Edward Saids terms, as one of amplifying the voices of those who otherwise go
unheard (Said 1994; Enloe1996).The

third argument is analytical .Ultimately, the question of

whether it is desecuritization or politicizing security that would help address
those concerns is one that must be answered empirically, historically, discursively
(Alker 2005: 198). Empirical evidence suggests that the framing of HIV/AIDS as a global
security issue has been of immense help in addressing its pernicious effects in
Africa (Elbe 2006). Representing migration to Western Europe in an alarmist language, in turn, while reflecting the
concerns of some, has, at the same time, rendered constructive political and social engagement with the
dangerous outsider(s) more difficult (Huysmans 2006: 57).

Absolute claims about security must be questioned.

Burke 7 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of
New South Wales, Sydney, June 2007, What security makes possible: Some
thoughts on critical security studies)
The Copenhagen Schools analyses open a door, however briefly, to an important insight. Security is
contingent and not universal. However they fail to push beyond that into an analysis that could put the deeper
ontological claims and construction of security into question, that could reveal its wider sociological function
and power, and most importantly, that could be put into the service of a normatively progressive
politics (whether that takes the name of security or not). 49 Put briefly, this is the

critical project which has motivated my own research over the last decade. This
project requires walking a tricky path between what Matthew McDonald has called
the reconstructive and deconstructive agendas in security studies. 50 Many writers
argue that they simply cannot be reconciled. From the reconstructive end, Booth
has been sharply critical of some poststructuralist work on security which he thinks
fails to acknowledge, or create space for, an agenda which resignifies security in
terms of social justice or emancipation. He comments that : the poststructuralist approach
seems to assume that security cannot be common or positive-sum but must always be zero-sum, with
somebodys security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. [Hence] security itself is questioned as
desirable goal They also tend to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a middle-class affront to the truly
insecure.51 In some ways this critiquewhich cites writings by Michael Dillon and

James Der Derian as examplesis appropriate. He might also have included in this
list an article published in 2000 by Costas Constantinou. 52 While in some ways he
misunderstands what they are searching for (a route out of generalised politics of
alienation and fear, which make them as critical of realism as he is) it is important
to remind ourselves of the legitimate and almost universal concern of individuals
and communities for secure and stable lives. It is for this reason that in my own
work I have often endorsed the normative arguments of the Welsh School, Tickner,
the Secure Australia Project or the UNDPs 1994 Human development report. It
might be possible to read Booths comments as a critique of my argument in the
introduction to In fear of security, which challenges realist policy discourses for
generating Orwellian practices of security that sacrifice the security of others. I,
however, am implicitly working with a contrasting human security ideal. This,
manifestly, is not a celebration of insecurity. The power of statist ontologies of
security nevertheless led me to wonder if it might be better to speak of the human
needs and priorities named by security in their specificity: conflict prevention and
resolution, human rights, land and womens rights, the right to control ones own
economic destiny, etc. My concern was, and remains, that securitys perversion

into a metaphysical canopy for the worst manifestations of liberalmodernity has

been too final and damaging.53 We live in a world where security will continue to remain one of the
most powerful signifiers in politics, and we cannot opt out of the game of its naming and use. It must be
defined and practiced in normatively better ways, and kept under continual scrutiny.

The permutation solves best, the inclusion of the affirmatives

constructivist methodology solves best for the critique.
Constructivist theory promotes the proper learning that
creates the best alternative.
Adler, 1997 (Emanuel, Andrea and Charles Bronfman Chair of Israeli Studies and
Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, Seizing the Middle
Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3, SAGE Publications, pp [345-347]) AV
A dynamic theory of institutional selection is the natural complement of constructivism. Because interpretation is

constructivist theory must be able to

address the question of which interpretations and whose interpretations become
social reality. In other words, why do certain ideas and concepts acquire epistemic, discursive and institutional
involved in the social construction of international reality,

authority (Kratochwil, 1989; Mearsheimer, 1994/95; Risse Kappen, 1994)? More specifically, which norms, and
whose, come to constitute the games nations play (Finnemore, 1996a; Katzenstein, 1996a; Klotz, 1995)? Finally,
how and why do certain collective expressions of human understanding, neither valid nor true a priori, develop into
social practices, become firmly established within social and political systems, spread around the world and become

Critical, postmodernist and poststructural theories are not very

helpful in answering these questions. Although they enhance our understanding of how people go
about creating consensus around meanings,42 they fail to explain why social reality evolves
around one particular set of interpretations as opposed to another. Neorealism (Waltz,
1979) does even worse, because it lacks a theory of institutional evolution and the
state. Drawing on an analogy between organisms and states and insisting that material power is the single arbiter
reified or taken for granted?

of the selection of states, neorealism suggests that states must choose to survive or be marked for destruction by
powerful systemic constraints. George Modelskis long-cycles evolutionary theory (1990, 1996) is not very helpful
either, because it highlights the selection of global political systems by systemic war, that is, only by material

Neoliberals, on the other hand, are not oblivious to institutional selection and
ideas. Following rational choice theory, however, they concentrate on institutional efficiency in providing material
power.

benefits (Krasner, 1983; Stein, 1983). For example, although Peter Hall (1989) develops an elegant explanation of
why Keynesian economic ideas became politically, administratively and economically viable, he remains firmly
grounded in rational choice, because he aims at determining the structural conditions that affected the choice of
Keynesian ideas in different countries. Hendrik Spruyt (1994a, 1994b) suggests a different neoliberal explanation of
institutional selection. Trying to overcome the fallacy that the existence of the institution derives from the functions
it performs (Spruyt, 1994a: 532), he focuses on the selection of the sovereign territorial state from among its rivals.
Spruyt contends that the sovereign state was selected because it proved more effective at preventing defection by
its members, reducing internal transaction costs, and making credible commitments to other units (Spruyt, 1994a:
527).

Spruyts account of selection is still insufficient, however. First, Spruyt reduces

a rich history of the structuration between thinking and judging agents and
intersubjective and social structures to material factors. Second, a true explanation
of the selection of the sovereign territorial state must draw a feedback loop to
cognition. Third, it cannot avoid the notion that intersubjective and social structures
may engineer the selection process in other words, that intersubjective structures may
partly determine the range and the nature of the choices and socially construct the
proof invoked by judging agents to choose among alternatives. Thus, while Spruyt is right
when he points to the empirical usefulness of history, history is needed not only to show what
alternatives could have been chosen, but also how and why human agents arrived

at those alternatives and at the criteria for choosing among them.

A history of the
selection of institutions should include an account of the agents, the innovators, the carriers of collective
understandings who socially construct the alternatives, and the proofs that legitimate the choices. It also should
study the institutions that promote and socialize other actors to collective understandings and help to create social

this history should account not only for processes of emulation , as in

Spruyts work (1994a: 555), but also for processes of active persuasion and recruitment. In
reality. Moreover,

order to answer at least some of the questions raised at the beginning of this section, we need to know how
cognitive and institutional variants make their appearance in the first place, how they display their merits as
solutions to international problems and how given favorable conditions they spread and establish themselves.

This suggests a theory of cognitive evolution. Cognitive evolution is a homologous43 type of

theory; it holds that the way social facts become established in the social world is relevant to the way they exert

cognitive evolution has history and historicity

(Alker, 1996) built into the theory; it is interested in the origins of social or institutional
facts, such as identities, interests, practices and institutions. Cognitive evolution (Adler,
their influence (Gould, 1989; Pasic, 1996). Thus

1991a)44 means that at any point in time and place of a historical process, institutional or social facts may be
socially constructed by collective understandings of the physical and the social world that are subject to

Cognitive evolution is thus

the process of innovation, domestic and international diffusion, political selection
and effective institutionalization that creates the intersubjective understanding on
which the interests, practices and behavior of governments are based. A cognitive
authoritative (political) selection processes and thus to evolutionary change.

evolutionary theory is structurationist to the extent that individual and social actors successfully introduce
innovations that help transform or even constitute new collective understandings, which, in turn, shape the

Collective understandings,
such as norms, are not sufficient cause for actions; individual agents must act
according to their identities and as their interests dictate. Domestic and international politics,
identities and interests, and consequently the expectations, of social actors.

however, may sometimes keep them from acting in this way. Sometimes domestic politics is the arena in which
cognitive structures are politically and institutionally empowered, before they can make their mark on the
international scene. At other times, cognitive structures develop at the international level before leaving their mark

a cognitive evolutionary approach requires

that new or changed ideas be communicated and diffused and that political stakes
be created, which political groups may then help maintain through the use of power.
Cognitive evolution is a theory of international learning, if by learning we
understand the adoption by policy-makers of new interpretations of reality, as they
are created and introduced to the political system by individuals and social actors.
on the domestic scene of individual states. In any case,

The capacity of institutions in different countries to learn and to generate similar interests will depend not only on
the acquisition of new information, but also on the political selection of similar epistemic and normative premises.
The political importance of these premises lies not in their being true, but in their being intersubjectively shared

learning increases the capacity and

motivation to understand competing alternatives to a currently
entertained inference and becomes a creative process through which
alternatives and preferences or interests are generated. For example, 50 years
across institutions and nation-states. Seen in this light,

ago there was no political value, and thus no interest, in arms control, sustainable development and universal
human rights. Today, both the value of and interest in all three are intersubjectively taken for granted
international security has come to depend on arms control practices. Domestic and international economic and
environmental decisions are increasingly shaped by our relatively recent discovery of the finite nature of our
global environment. Human rights have become a central factor in the interests of democratic nations because they
increasingly define their social identities. Because we invent concepts and categories that we use to carve up the
world . . . and find ourselves categorized as well (Kauffman, 1995: 300), the key demand made of the theory of
cognitive evolution is to explain how institutional facts become taken for granted. To be taken for granted,
institutional facts need to be naturalized, that is, to be taken as part of the natural order of the universe. Thus, to
be politically selected an institution must gain legitimacy by being grounded in nature and reason. Next, it
provides its members with a set of analogues with which to explore the world and justify the naturalness and
reasonableness of the institutionalized rules (Douglas, 1986: 112). The taken-for-grantedness process implies that
as certain ideas or practices become reified, competing ideas and practices are delegitimized. Second, unlike
rationalist thought,

a cognitive evolutionary approach maintains that it may not be the

best-fitted ideas, nor the most efficient institutions, that become naturalized or
reified, but those that prove most successful at imposing collective meaning and
function on physical reality. I have in mind ideas that help produce a balance
or temporary consensus between competing trends within governments
and societies, and between them, and that may serve as a rallying point
for the formation of dominant coalitions. Third, to be taken for granted, institutional
facts must be backed by power; in other words, intersubjective ideas must have
authority and legitimacy and must evoke trust .45 Institutional facts are more likely to become
established when agents, acting on their behalf, manage to frame reality around authoritative meanings (scientific
or not) and/or gain control of the social support networks of politics, making it too difficult and costly for opponents

institutional selection is not

an arbitrary act in a subjective sense, nor does it take place in an instant of
rational choice. It is rather the continuous rational institutionalization of a
tradition that provides new or improved understandings of reality. Fifth,
to deconstruct institutionalized intersubjective ideas (Fuchs, 1992). Fourth,

political selection is driven by political leaders intersubjective expectations of progress, that is, by ideas and
institutions that conform to concepts that have been brought to public awareness as involving new and/ or
progressive solutions to critical political problems. Expectations of progress can be based on experience, scientific
understandings and even myths. Thus political selection becomes a function of what is collectively regarded as
better or worse, which in turn depends on intersubjective understandings and prior social agreements about
good and bad. What leaders can see or not see depends on collective normative and causal understandings

institutional
facts acquire prominence when people are collectively aware of the problem in
practical terms. Institutions dispose individuals to follow the rules because they can
intervene in the world to solve a problem. It is only in and through practice that
social facts acquire self-criticism and transformation procedures that
make the whole process rational (Toulmin, 1972). Finally, institutional facts
collectively emerge both from socialization processes that involve the diffusion of
meanings from country to country and from political and diplomatic processes that
include negotiation, persuasion and coercion. Particularly noteworthy is the role of persuasion.
about what is needed and about which needs should be promoted to the level of interests. Sixth,

Persuasion is a struggle to define mutual understandings that underpin identities, rights, grievances, . . . interests,
[and] attempts to control behavior through a wide range of social sanctions, only one of which is the use of force
(Klotz, 1992: 11). When political actors interact, cooperatively or otherwise, they may be able to affect each others
understanding so that they can have a shared definition of their situation; they can collectively identify beneficial
courses of action and recognize them as norms; and they can try to persuade each other to enact such norms
through symbolic communication that threatens or enhances face or dignity (Barnes, 1995: 77). For example, one
of the most relevant roles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe during the Cold War was to
serve as a forum where shared meanings between East and West were socially constructed by means of
persuasion.

Constructivist theory provides an explanation of the

underpinnings of national security, meaning the aff solves
their root cause arguments.
Adler, 1997 (Emanuel, Andrea and Charles Bronfman Chair of Israeli Studies and
Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, Seizing the Middle
Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, European Journal of International
Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3, SAGE Publications, pp [345-347]) AV
a constructivist approach can
be very useful in explaining the normative underpinnings of national security,
primarily security cooperation. This line of research, however, should be
supplemented with the study of the social construction of conflict and war. On this
Peter Katzenstein and his colleagues (1996a) have conclusively shown that

recent scholarship that emphasizes the cultural aspects of decisions about the
use of force in war (Legro, 1995), military doctrine (Kier, 1996, 1997), military strategy
(Johnston, 1995) and war proneness (Ross, 1993) suggests a fruitful research direction for
constructivists to take. Military strategy is a particularly promising field for constructivist research because
the structural situation in which the actors find themselves in a strategic game
situation characterized by interdependent reciprocal expectations (Schelling, 1960:
207) results not only from material objects or independent subjective beliefs, but
also from dynamic intersubjective understandings based on shared historical
experience, epistemic criteria, expectations of proper action and, most important,
the existence or lack of mutual trust. A constructivist reading of Schellings theory should emphasize
issue,

the role played by social communication and by the transfer from nation to nation of meanings, concepts and
norms in socially constructing the intersubjective understandings and the focal points that make a peaceful
solution to the strategic game possible. As Schelling himself remarked the

players must bargain their

way to an outcome. . . . They must find ways of . . . communicating their
intentions. . . . The fundamental psychic and intellectual process is that of
participating in the creation of traditions; and the ingredients out of which traditions
can be created, or the materials in which potential traditions can be perceived and
jointly recognized, are not at all coincident with the mathematical contents of the
game (Schelling, 1960: 1067). Because strategic knowledge can become part of reality and its unfolding,
constructivists should also study the effect of military traditions and military
academic knowledge on the social construction of military strategy and
international affairs. For example, a shared set of epistemic criteria, together with convergence on a
common practice of arms control which Schelling and his colleagues helped to socially construct enabled the
United States and the Soviet Union to develop a coordination game and discover the extent to which its symbolic
contents suggested compromises, limits and regulations (Adler, 1992). In this case, a cademic

theoretical
knowledge was neither just reasoning about an external reality, as positivists
would have it, nor simply a practice produced to discipline society to the rituals of
power, as postmodernists might interpret it. Rather, strategic theory, by contributing
to intersubjective understandings about strategic and arms control practices,
provided reasons to actors and thus affected the material world. It is also remarkable how
little appreciation there is in the International Relations literature of the fact that, like any other social institution,

war is socially constructed and consequently partly depends for its persistence on
collective ideas about the inevitability of war and its desirability for achieving
political gain, riches and glory. Constructivists should be able to test John Muellers theory of the
obsolescence of major war (Mueller, 1989) by showing whether, as a practice, war is collectively being
redefined as inefficient, undesirable and normatively unacceptable. Constructivists
can try to show whether and how changes in nuclear technology (Jervis, 1988) and
values of war (Mueller, 1989) are helping to constitute anti-war identities that promote
the development of war-prevention national interests and strategies (Adler, 1991b).
Finally, although the notion that the social construction of an enemy (the other) is part of the development of
identities of self has been validated by social identity theory (Mercer, 1995) and analysed by postmodern scholars
(Campbell, 1996), constructivists have yet to develop research projects that can show how enemies and military
threats are socially constructed by both material and ideational factors.

Perm do both. In order to have an understanding of security,

one must engage in the self-reflexive historical practices of the
affirmative. This helps us to grasp the genesis of security
threats in order to have a new understanding of the nature of
conflict
Krause and Williams 1997 (Keith- Professor of political science at the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Michael C.Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, Critical
Security Studies Concepts and Cases, pp. 50-51) AM
To understand security from a broader perspective means to look at the ways in
which the objects to be secured, the perceptions of threats to them, and the
available means of securing them (both intellectual and material) have shifted over time.53
New threats emerge; new enemies are created; erstwhile fellow citizens become
objects of hatred and violence; former enemies can be transformed into members of
the same community. The status of Others is uncertain, needing to be deciphered and determined.54 To
comprehend these processes requires an understanding of the problematics of
security as constituted by self-reflexive historical practices. The knightly code of honor, for
example, was both a central structuring practice of late medieval conflict and a central object that was to be
secured. Honor was an integral part of conflict in its genesis as well as its practice. To view the military conflict of
the late-medieval world as a competition between instrumentally rational actors in the modern sense is to

The shift to interpretive models of understanding

(broadly conceived) also yields a different vision of the transformation of practices.
As historically grounded, the practices of security become capable of conscious
transformation through the process of critical reflection. No longer objective in the
sense of a fixed reality that the analyst can only mirror, reality as the realm of
subjective practices and structures becomes self-reflexive. This is most emphatically not to
misunderstand it in both form and content.55

say that security studies needs to move away from studying the role of ideas, institutions, and instruments of
organized violence in political life. In this respect, the continuing defenders of traditional strategic/security studies

But if we are to
understand these realities, we must take them more seriously than the abstractions
of neorealism allow. We must grasp the genesis and structure of particular security
problems as grounded in concrete historical conditions and practices, rather than in
abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods. We
must understand the genesis of conflicts and the creation of the dilemmas of
security as grounded in reflexive practices rather than as the outcome of timeless structures.56 An
approach to security that begins from the foundation of practice provides new ways
of understanding the nature and genesis of particular conflicts and security
challenges. It also, however, provides new ways of thinking about solutions to those
conflicts, and about the conditions of stability, peace, and security. Rather than
remaining within the theory of hegemonic stability or the balance of power,
structures of cooperation and security can be seen as underpinned by deeper
commonalities. They need not depend on the existence of external threats, nor on
the presence of a hegemon in the neorealist sense.
are correct (although this formulation will probably leave them uncomfortable).

The permutation solves, historically reflexive insight is key to

interrogating the assumptions taken by neorealist strategic
studies
Krause and Williams 1997 (Keith- Professor of political science at the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Michael C.Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, Critical
Security Studies Concepts and Cases, pp. 52) AM
A shift from objectivist rational-actor theory to a
focus on historically and reflexively constituted practices provides a more insightful
way of understanding the various forms of conflict and security in the contemporary
world. In this context the almost ritualized neorealists criticisms of alternative approaches as failing to generate
a research program that conforms to prevailing conceptions of theory and method are misplaced. Neorealisms
emphasis on how practical and useful knowledge is to be generated does not
provide an unproblematic standpoint from which other conceptions can be judged. 60
But its underlying claim that some orientation toward practice must be at the heart
of security studies represents a basic challenge for alternative approaches. Included in
this is the question of who or what is being secured, and how change is effected. If an expanded agenda
for security studies moves (at least partly) away from answering these questions in
state-centered terms, then it becomes necessary to think of audiences and forms of
political relevance beyond (but not necessarily excluding) those of state leaders. The
The question here is practical in a dual sense.

experience of Western policy makers in dealing with socalled ethnic conflicts highlights one aspect of this issue.

The question of the relationship of theory to practice is particularly difficult in the

late-twentieth century, when little kindness is shown to grandiose visions of the end
of history or the heroic travels of its chosen agents. Neither nation, nor class, nor civilization
appears up to the task. More recent intimations in support of liberal individualism (democracy), or woman, or even

Equally,
strategic/security studies has hardly provided understanding or guidance for
achieving security in the post-Cold War world. Thinking about security in light of
these alternative conceptions moves the inquiry far afield from the supposed
certainties of neorealist strategic studies, but it is a path that must be followed
further (and with much more sophistication) if we are to develop understandings of
security more adequate to human survival and well-being.
the earth itself as the latest bearer of the historical task are not yet particularly convincing either.

The question of what is being secured comes before the

general question of securitization. If we can win a distinction
between what we try to secure and the examples of
securitization in their evidence, we should win on the
permutation.
Krause and Williams 1997 (Keith- Professor of political science at the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Michael C.Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, Critical
Security Studies Concepts and Cases, pp. 34-35) AM
what security is and how
we study it. Underneath these lurk significant theoretical divergences, which can in part be
What most contributions to the debate thus share are two interrelated concerns:

addressed by asking not just how we study security, but what it is that is being
secured. In the dominant (neorealist) conception, the primary referent for security has been the state. While
many current arguments challenge the adequacy of this state centric conception,
they have rarely examined systematically the implications of so doing. Two
elements are necessary in such a reconsideration. First, one must come to terms with the
reasons why the state centric conception still holds such sway and exercises such
disciplinary authority. To challenge it necessarily involves understanding its claims at
a deeper level, especially because defenders of the neorealist conception have
mounted a spirited defense of the prevailing intellectual order. Second, the construction
of different conceptions of security also requires a retheorization. While many
analyses provide useful insights into areas traditionally ignored, or into new challenges that
need to be taken account of, they have rarely reflected fully on their own foundations. A result
of this disciplinary turmoil is that reconceptualizing security has often come to resemble a grab bag of different
issue areas, lacking a cohesive framework for analyzing the complementary and contradictory themes at work.

Simply articulating a broad range of newly emerging or newly recognized threats to

human survival or well-being will not in itself move security studies away from its
traditional concerns. This is particularly well illustrated in Robert Dorffs reaction to Charles Kegleys attempt
to broaden the agenda of security studies in Kegleys contribution to a recent text, Security Studies for the 1990s.

While he agrees that economic, ecological and social questions represent issues
of real concern, Dorff denies that they represent security issues : There is no
conceptual thread in the Kegley list that holds them all together except that they are
problems. This is not to downplay the serious nature of some of these problems, but
problems is not a concept. It does not help us organize the content of what we teach let alone how we
teach. Problems provides us with no ordering of reality that we can use to create a
common understanding of what it is that we are talking about and the range of
possible policy approaches to addressing those problems. 11
10

Security Good
Security is necessary, it has emancipatory effects that frees
one up to peaceful cooperation.
Bilgin, 2008
(Pinar, Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth,
Critical Theory, Security Studies: An Introduction, Routlege, pp. [91-92]) AV
Understanding security as a derivative concept, thereby recognizing its culturebound character, does not render the search for security any more difficult. This is
because security is also an instrumental value ... that frees people(s) to
some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being (Booth
2005a: 22). While no single universal definition of security may be possible, working definitions are
nevertheless needed to inform our practices. Notwithstanding their differences, all
philosophical worldviews agree on the human need for security, since it
frees possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining
constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored (Booth
2005a: 22). Recognizing security as an instrumental value also guards against the
tendency to treat it as an end-point rather than as a process through which human
beings find anchorages ... as [they] contemplate navigating the next stage of
history (Booth 1995: 119). This, in turn, opens up the possibility for people with
different political outlooks to negotiate with each other and to work
towards finding ways of coexistence without depriving the others of their
life chances (Alker 2005: 203207).

Neolib

Permutation
Rejection fails-leaves people politically immobile due to lack of
vision. Perm solves best because it pragmatically incorporates
neoliberal elements for social good AND our framework is
superior because it promotes experimentation over theoretical
rejection (also a reason to default to specificity)
Ferguson, Stanford anthropology chair and professor, 2010
(James, Toward a left art of government: from Foucauldian critique to Foucauldian
politics,History of the Human Sciences 2011 24: 61, SAGE)

One of the founding premises of this special issue and the conference with which it began is that Foucault has been read, and used,
in different ways in different academic disciplines. In this article I will discuss one common way of using Foucaults thought in my
own discipline of anthropology.

I will suggest that the strategy of using Foucauldian modes of analysis to

critique power (as it is often put) has frequently led to a rather sterile form of political engagement. Attention
to some of Foucaults own remarks about politics hints at a different political sensibility, in which empirical experimentation rather
than moralistic denunciation takes center place. I will reference some examples of such experimentation that come out of my
current research on the politics of social assistance in southern Africa (though I do not have space here to give a full exposition of
these). The sort of use of Foucault that I have in mind is well represented in the anthropology of development (and the related field

the characteristic strategy is to use Foucauldian

reveal the way that interventions, projects, etc., which claim to be merely technical or
benevolent, really involve relations of power. This is a perfectly reasonable thing to do, but too often, in
this field, such a simple demonstration is apparently seen as the end of the exercise . Power has been
critiqued, an oppressive system has been exposed as such, and that seems to be
taken as a satisfactory end to the matter. This impasse in development studies and anthropology is related, I
think, to a wider predicament that progressive or left politics seems to find itself in today. The predicament is that
the left seems increasingly to be defined by a series of gestures of refusal what I
call the antis (anti-globalization, anti-neo-liberalism , anti-privatization, anti-Bush, sometimes even
anti-capitalism but always anti, never pro). The current world system, the politics of the anti- points out,
rests on inequality and exploitation . The global poor are being screwed, while the rich are benefiting. The
powerless are getting the short end of the stick. This is all perfectly true, of course, if not terribly illuminating. But
such lines of argument typically have very little to propose by way of an alternative art of
government. Governing is exercising power over others, which is what the powerful do to the downtrodden. It appears as
something to be resisted or denounced, not improved or experimented with. My first
observation about this sort of analysis is that it rests on what seems tome a very un-Foucauldian idea of the political. Foucault
did, certainly, valorize certain forms of resistance, and worked tirelessly to
undermine and denaturalize taken-for-granted arrangements of power . But he never
of what is sometimes called critical development studies). Here,
analysis to

suggested that power ought not be exercised,

or that it was illegitimate for someto seek to govern the conduct of others.On the contrary, he repeatedly insisted that it made no sense

(in his scheme of things) to wish for a world without power.1 Naive readings of Foucault turned his skeptical analytics of power into a simple denunciation. Thus the question (once posed to him by an interviewer) of whether it would
be an intolerable use of power for a parent to prevent a child from scribbling on the walls of a house. Foucaults instructive answer was: If I accepted the picture of power that is frequently adopted namely, that its something
horrible and repressive for the individual its clear that preventing a child from scribbling would be an unbearable tyranny. But thats not it. I say that power is a relation. A relation in which one guides the behavior of others. And
theres no reason why this manner of guiding the behavior of others should not ultimately have results which are positive, valuable, interesting, and so on. If I had a kid, I assure you he would not write on the walls or if he did, it
would be against my will. The very idea! (Foucault, 1988a: 1113) In the same interview, he complained of those who . . . think Im a sort of radical anarchist who has an absolute hatred of power. No! What Im trying to do is to
approach this extremely important and tangled phenomenon in our society, the exercise of power, with the most reflective, and I would say prudent, attitude. . . . To question the relations of power in the most scrupulous and

) In fact, Foucault
was as fascinated and attracted by power as he was by resistance, and his
fundamental concern was with how (not whether) power is exercised. This led him,
naturally enough, to the problem of government, which he inevitably took up as a
pragmatic puzzle. Some contemporary practitioners of what I have termed Foucauldian critique seem to
think it is some sort of scandal that people should be governed at all supposing it to be
attentive manner possible, looking into all the domains of its exercise, thats not the same thing as constructing a mythology of power as the beast of the apocalypse. (ibid.: 1113

somehow illegitimate that some should seek to guide the conduct of others. But Foucault took a deep and largely sympathetic

he once suggested (in a provocative set of

remarks on neo-liberalism) that while the right had, in the mid- to late 20th century, invented powerful new
arts of government, the left had suffered from the absence of a socialist art of government, and a historic
interest in the development of what he called arts of government. Indeed,

failure to develop an autonomous governmentality comparable to liberalism (Foucault, 2008: 934). This observation leads to a
question that must be a central one for what I am here terming Foucauldian politics. That is :

What might a genuinely

left art of government look like? And where might we find the specific
governmental techniques and rationalities that might enable such an art ? Looking at the
world as a whole and especially at the poorest and most disadvantaged parts of it, in which both I and my discipline have long
taken a special interest it seems evident that we can only answer such questions if we are willing to question some of the
foundational assumptions that have dominated left thought throughout the last century or more. Let me cite just two reasons for

First, in much of the world (and especially in the poorest parts of it), formal wage labor does not
play the central role that so much left thought ascribes to it .
this.

The semimythical figure of the proletarian was, of course, at the

heart of ideologies of state socialism, even as the extraction of labor was foundational to its political economy. But the able bodied worker was hardly less central to the workings of social democracies and welfare states, where
Keynesian policies implied a kind of pact between capital and labor, mediated by the state. Society, in such a scheme, was grounded on the (normatively male) wage earning worker and his family, while social welfare
intervention was available for those left outside the security of labor (whether through injury, old age, or periodic dips in the business cycle). Insurance rationality provided the technical means for universalizing certain sorts of social
citizenship (at the level of the nation-state) on the basis of the non-universal (but sufficiently widespread) social condition of wage labor. This template never really applied very well to Africa, where wage laborers have always been a

. And it applies even less well today, when economic restructuring and
de-industrialization have meant that formal wage employment is ever more the
exception than the rule.
small minority of the population

In the rapidly expanding cities of todays Africa, the great mass of the population is not employed in the usual sense of the word, and increasingly lacks connections

(or rights) to land as well. Neither workers nor peasants, they dwell in the socalled informal economy, eking out a meagre survival through an impressive range of improvised bits of this and that (cf. Davis, 2007). The poverty of our
analytical vocabulary in describing such people and their way of life (Are they the lumpen? The youth? The informal whatever that means?) ismatched by our inability to conceive of forms of politics that would given them a
central place. Certainly, the old left strategy of dismissing such people as a residual and degenerate fringe (Marxs lumpenproletariat) can hardly suffice when we are talking (as we often are today) about the majority of the

. The second challenge I wish to note to conventional left thinking is the rise of
forms of social assistance that bypass nation -states.
population

The usual left stance identifies neo-liberalism as the enemy of the state, and thus of

such social goods as welfare and pensions. But in much of Africa, most forms of social assistance are funded and implemented by non-state agencies. This has long been the case, in many areas, thanks to the key role of Christian
missions in providing education, health care and other social services from the colonial era onward. The NGO revolution of the recent decades has only accentuated the pattern, to the point where many of the key governmental

The most common left

response to this transnationalization of the social has been to oppose such
developments (again, the anti), and to defend the sovereignty o f African states, which are
relations that servicer eceiving Africans have are not with state bureaucracies, but with NGOs funded by transnational philanthropic foundations

imagined as being (at least potentially) the agents of development and resistors of imperialism.

Such stances have sometimes

been justified, but they have not led to very effective forms of politics. Might another sort of left

politics not be possible one that would look forward and try to identify new
possibilities and openings in the current transnational regime , instead of looking back to an
(often misremembered or idealized) era of sovereign developmental states ? And (crucially for my
purposes here), might it not be possible to identify or discover new arts of
government that might take advantage of (rather than simply fighting against)
recent transformations in the spatial organization of government and social
assistance? This is the sort of rethinking that will be necessary if we are to get beyond the politics of the anti and arrive at a
convincing response to Foucaults challenge to develop a true left art of government. Such rethinking will have to
be willing to decenter the two sacred touchstones of 20th-century progressive
politics the worker and the nation-state while finding or reinventing techniques
of government that can gain traction in settings where most of the masses are not
workers, and most social services are not delivered by state s. In such circumstances, simply
attacking neo-liberalism and defending the welfare state is not terribly helpful. What is needed instead is a revitalized
notion of the political good and of what social assistance might mean in a world where so many of the assumptions of the
Keynesian welfare state no longer obtain. In matters of social policy, Foucaults 1983 observation remains true nearly a quartercentury later: We are still bound up with an outlook that was formed between 1920 and 1940, mainly under the influence of
Beveridge, a man who was born over a hundred years ago. For the moment . . . we completely lack the intellectual tools necessary
to envisage in new terms the form in which we might attain what we are looking for. (Foucault, 1988b: 166) My recent work is
concerned with empirical domains in which some of the conceptual innovation that Foucault called for may be under way.

Perhaps the most provocative finding to date is that some of the most interesting
and promising new forms of government being devised seem to be taking market
mechanisms that we are used to associating with neo-liberalism , and putting them
to new political uses.
Consider, for instance, new anti-poverty programs in southern Africa that seek to provide cash support for incomes, and thus (in theory) harness markets to the task of

meeting the needs of the poor. This is happening in several African countries, but also in a great many other postcolonial states from Brazil and Venezuela to Mexico and Bangladesh where leftist and rightist regimes alike have
seen fit to introduce policies that transfer cash directly into the hands of the poor (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; cf. Ferguson, 2010). The South African Basic Income Grant campaign is the example I know best. This involves a proposal
to deal with a crisis of persistent poverty by providing a small unconditional minimum monthly payment to all. The argument goes like this: markets are not working for poor people because they are too poor to participate in them.
Government programs are not working for them because the state is inefficient. So: provide income support directly, in the form of cash, then say to the poor: You are now empowered to solve your own problems in the way you see
best. In contrast to older forms of welfare assistance, the claim is that such grants rely on poor peoples own ability to solve their own problems, without imposing the policing, paternalism and surveillance of the traditional welfare

state. The social of the social welfare state is largely discarded, in this scheme. Assistance is largely decoupled from familistic assumptions and insurance rationality alike, while the state is imagined as both universally engaged (as
a kind of direct provider for each and every citizen) and maximally disengaged (taking no real interest in shaping the conduct of those under its care, who are seen as knowing their own needs better than the state does). (See
Standing and Samson, 2003; Barchiesi, 20007; Ferguson, 2007.) Similar new lines of thought are visible in recent campaigns for an increased role for direct cash transfers in many forms of social and humanitarian policy. For instance,
an increasingly influential argument in the area of humanitarian assistance maintains that hunger is best dealt with by boosting the purchasing power of those at risk, rather than by distributing food aid. The current international
food aid system involves taking excess grain (produced under subsidized conditions in rich countries) and transporting it to places (largely in Africa) where people are at risk of hunger. Following Amartya Sen, critics have long noted
the perverse effects of this: depressing producer prices for local farmers, and damaging the local institutions for producing and distributing food crops. Once food aid has arrived, local food production often never recovers, and the
temporary crisis becomes permanent. As an alternative, Sens followers have pushed for cash payments to be made directly to those at risk of food deficit. People with money in their pockets, Sen points out, do not starve. And the
economic chain of events that is set in motion by boosting purchasing power leads (through market forces) to increased capacity for local production and distribution (Sen, 1983; Dreze and Sen, 1991). The argument recalls Jane
Guyers groundbreaking work on feeding African cities (1989). Consider, Guyer suggests, how food ends up in bellies in the vast mega-cities of West Africa such as Lagos. The logistical task of moving thousands of tons of food each
day fromthousands of local producers to millions of urban consumerswould be beyond the organizational capacity of any state (to say nothing of the less-than-exemplary Nigerian one). Here, market mechanisms, drawing on the
power of vast self-organizing networks, are very powerful, and very efficient. Such forms of organization must appear especially attractive where states lack capacity (and let us remember how many progressive dreams in Africa

Why should relying on this sort of mechanism be inherently rightwing? Well, the answer is obvious: markets serve only those with purchasing power. But the
food aid example shows a way of redirecting markets toward the poor , by intervening not to
restrict the market, but to boost purchasing power. I have become convinced that (at least in the case
of food aid) this is good public policy. Is it also neo-liberal? Perhaps that is not the
right question. Let us rather ask: Are there specific sorts of social policy that might draw on
characteristic neo-liberal moves (like using markets to deliver services) that would also be
genuinely pro-poor? That seems to me a question worth asking. It seems clear that the
governmental programs I have discussed here do draw on recognizably neo-liberal
elements (including the valorization of market efficiency, individual choice and autonomy; themes of entrepreneurship; and
skepticism about the state as a service provider).2 But those who advocate and fight for these policies
would insist that they are, in fact pro-poor , and that they are ways of fighting against (rather than
have crashed on the rocks of low state capacity).

capitulating to) the growing inequality that recent neo-liberal economic restructuring has produced. These claims, I think, are not

And this, in turn, raises the fascinating possibility that the neo-liberal and the pro-poor may
not be so automatically opposed as we are used to supposing. What is of special interest here is the
easily dismissed.

way that certain sorts of new progressive initiatives may involve not simply
opposing the neo-liberal project, but appropriating key mechanisms of neo-liberal
government for different ends. This does not mean that these political projects are therefore suspect
contaminated by their association with neo-liberal rationality. Rather, it means that they are appropriating
certain characteristic neo-liberal moves (and I think of these discursive and programmatic moves as
analogous to the moves one might make in a game) that while recognizably neo-liberal, can be used
for quite different purposes than that term usually implies.
As I have argued in a related paper (Ferguson, 2010), this situation

may be analogous to the way that statistical techniques that were developed in the 19th century for calculating the probabilities of workplace injuries eventually became building blocks of the insurance techniques that enabled the
rise of the welfare state. Such techniques were originally developed in the 19th century by large employers to control costs, but they eventually became the technical basis for social insurance, and ultimately helped enable
unprecedented gains for the working class across much of the world (Ewald, 1986). Techniques have no necessary loyalty to the political program within which they were developed, and mechanisms of government that were
invented to serve one purpose can easily enough be appropriated for surprising other uses. Market techniques of government such as those I have discussed were, like workplace statistics, undoubtedly conservative in their original

To be sure: we need to
be skeptical about the facile idea that problems of poor people can be solved simply
by inviting them to participate in markets and enterprise . Such claims (which often ascribe almost
uses. But it seems at least possible that they may be in the process of being creatively appropriated, and repurposed for different and more progressive sorts of ends

magical transformative powers to such unlikely vehicles as social entrepreneurship or microcredit) are almost always misleading,

it would be a mistake to dismiss the coupling of pro-poor social

policy with market mechanisms out of hand, out of a reflexive sense that the latter
are neo-liberal and thus bad . Again, my interest here is in the potential mobility of a set of governmental
and often fraudulent. But

devices. These devices originated within a neo-liberal project that deserves all the criticism it gets. But they may be in the process

If so, some emergent political initiatives that might appear

at first blush to be worryingly neo-liberal may, on closer inspection, amount to
something a good deal more hopeful. This leaves us with a politics that requires more of us than
of being redeployed in creative ways.

simply denouncing neo-liberalism.

The political demands and policy measures I have mentioned here (whether conditional cash transfers, basic income, or cash-based food aid) do not merit, I

think, either wholesale denunciation or uncritical acceptance. Instead, they call on us to remain skeptical and vigilant, but also curious and hopeful. They leave us less with strong opinions than with the sense that we need to think
about them a bit more, and learn a bit more about the specific empirical effects that they may produce. Are cash transfers, for instance, a device for demobilizing the poor (as some traditional Marxists claim) effectively buying the
political quiescence of those who have the most to gain from radical social change for a paltry sum? Or do they have the contrary effect, as many proponents of basic income argue opening up a new space of mobilization and
political demand by radically decoupling labor and consumption and opening a new domain of decommodification? This is not a question to be answered theoretically or ideologically; the only answer that really convinces is the

. For politics, for Foucault, was

always more about experimentation than denunciation . In an interview on social security, Foucault
empirical and experimental one: Let us find out! Such a stance, I suggest, brings us much closer toward a truly Foucauldian politics

insisted that what was required for a progressive rethinking of social policy was not a theoretically derived line, but, as he put it, a
certain empiricism. We have to transform the field of social institutions into a vast experimental field, in such a way as to decide
which taps need turning, which bolts need to be loosened here or there, to get the desired change. . . . What we have to do . . . is to
increase the experiments wherever possible in this particularly interesting and important area of social life. (Foucault, 1988b: 165)

What this implies is a form of politics that has less to do with critique and denunciation than with
experimentation and assessment. It is a matter not of refusing power, but rather exercising it in a way that would be
provisional, reversible, and open to surprise.

If we are indeed to arrive at viable left arts of

government, we will need to be open to the unexpected, ready to increase the

experiments wherever possible, and attentive to the ways that governmental
techniques originally deployed for nefarious purposes can be appropriated toward
other ends. To do this, we will need to forgo the pleasures of the easy, dismissive critique, and instead turn a
keen and sympathetic eye toward the rich world of actual social and political practice , the world of tap-turning and
experimentation. That is a world still full of invention and surprise, where the landscape of political possibility and constraint that we
have come to take for granted is being redrawn, even as we speak.

Complete rejection of neoliberalism is politically disastrous.

Economic and social reforms within capitalism are a better
strategy
Garavito et al., Programa de Justicia Global y Derechos Humanos
director, 2008
(Cesar, The New Latin American Left, pg 20-4)

One of the fundamental reasons that

neo-liberalism has been able to resist the rise of the left and popular discontent is
the inertia of institutions and economic cadres formed during the neo-liberal era . As
The national obstacles to changing economic course are also significant.

Sanchez, Machado Borges Neto and Marques demonstrate in Chapter 2, monetarist economists and other neo-liberal reformers are
firmly entrenched within the Central Bank, the Ministry of Economics, and the Finance Ministry of Brazil. It is for this reason that the
Lula government has maintained an orthodox monetary and fiscal policy that sets these members of the socalled economic team
against members of the PT's political team, who occupy other positions in the government and the party, and who prefer (or
preferred) a decided shift away from neo-liberalism. In this way, in Pierre Bourdieu's terms (1999), the legacy of neoliberalism in the
region is felt today in the tension between a 'right hand' of the state, charged with maintaining economic orthodoxy, and a 'left
hand', generally represented by the ministries of education, health, labour and social welfare, seeking to push policy in a post-neoliberal direction. The Venezuelan case, as Edgardo Lander demonstrates in Chapter 3, vividly illustrates both the presence of these
national and international restrictions and how circumstances can make them less restrictive. Lander points out that Chavez's Fifth
Republic Movement government has generated an unprecedented increase in social spending, channelled primarily through the socalled misiones: programmes to expand the coverage, and improve the quality, of basic public services (health, education, infant
nutrition, etcetera) in poor areas. This social policy~ whose popularity has been evident in the many elections in which marginalised
classes have consistently voted for Chavez, including a recall referendum (see Lopez Maya, 2004) ~ was made possible by the
reorientation toward social spending of Venezuela's oil revenue, which has been exceptionally high in recent years and is without
parallel in other countries of the region. This extraordinary source of foreign exchange has diminished the influence of international
financial institutions and the restrictions burdening other leftist governments that are dependent on international capital. At the
same time, the Venezuelan experience illustrates the tight restrictions produced by national resistance to changes in economic
policy. The redirection of oil income towards social investment took place only after a prolonged strike by the Venezuelan business
class, who were joined by the personnel of the state-owned oil company. While these and other obstacles are recognised by the
parties, governments and movements of the new left, there are profound debates and divisions over the possible room for
manoeuvre within the indicated limits, and the capacity of governments, whether on their own or with the support of social
movements, to go beyond those limits and increase the possible range of economic policies. As Daniel Chavez asks in his chapter on
Uruguay, to what extent are the narrow margins for manoeuvre a product of the decisions of the governments themselves? To what
extent are these governments being more 'fundist' than the International Monetary Fund? Judging by the intense controversy
surrounding the Lula government, both internal and external to the PT - which even led to the December 2003 expulsion of PT
members of Congress who had criticised the government - these questions trace deep lines of division within the new left.6 While
the government and the PT leadership contend that prudence and orthodoxy are necessary conditions for opening space for postneo-liberal policies, their critics call for a change of course and assert that the imperatives of macroeconomic stability are equivalent
to a permanent conversion to neo-liberalism.

This state of things might lead one to conclude that

there is, in effect, 'no alternative' to neo-liberalism, as Margaret Thatcher proclaimed two decades ago.
Nevertheless, the chapters in this book show that the problem lies more in the question than in
the response regarding the existence of an alternative . If the question is whether the
new Latin American left has a fully developed and clear alternatiye to the neoliberal model, the answer is clearly no. Instead, what we find in the case studies
are multiple local or national initiatives with diverse degrees of effectiveness and
originality. The path followed by several 'progressive' governments suggests that
the reconstitution of the Latin American left is no longer defined by radical

changes in institutional politics and macroeconomic policies, but by the

implementation of social reforms. This apparent new left 'agenda' takes for
granted the basic principles of market economics, while promoting reforms such as
the implementation of welfare programmes for the poorest members of society (such
as the Fame Zero in Brazil or the Panes in Uruguay), a renewed concern for public security, a more
active role for the state as regulator and mediator between capital and labour, the
expansion and improvement of public services, and the introduction of a more
progressive tax regime.7 Despite making a positive difference in the lives of the citizens affected by these policies,
they do not add up to a comprehensive alternative model to neo-liberalism. Moreover, these and other post-neo-liberal experiences
are far from consolidated, and the political actors themselves promote them in an atmosphere of considerably greater uncertainty
than that which drove the ideology and programmes of the old left. Indeed, it bears noting that in all the countries governed by the
left, we observe the existence of actors that are not simply anti-neo-liberal but also anti-capitalist and have thus positioned
themselves to the left of the progressive parties in government. This implies growing pressure from both sides of the political
spectrum and a much more complex equilibrium than the bipolar left- right contradiction hegemonic throughout the region. In this
context, we see the left both in government and against the government, with the line separating supporters and opponents not
always clear. As seen in Brazil and Venezuela with the re-election of Lula and Chavez, the poor tend to support the government,
whereas those with higher levels of formal education tend to adopt a more critical stance. At the same time, the economic policies
implemented by some of the progressive governments analysed in this volume are endorsed by social and economic sectors that
not long ago were at the forefront of resistance to the left. In short, the very same governments are seen by some critics as 'sold out
to market forces' and neo-capitalists, whilst others perceive them as not market-friendly enough. For all these reasons, Latin
America is at this moment a privileged laboratory for analysing the identity and future evolution of the left and progressive left
politics in and beyond the region. In one important respect,

the uncertainty characterising the

contemporary Latin American left may be seen as an advance over the old left . Indeed,
as Atilio Boron contends in Chapter 9, the construction of economic and social alternatives never
proceeds in accordance with a manual or a pre-conceived model. Rather, it is a
historical, dialectical and ultimately unpredictable process with multiple possible
outcomes.8 The inflexible pursuit of a pre-conceived model is therefore more likely
to serve as a hindrance to the construction of an alternative than as a reliable
guide. Similarly, in an essay exploring the problems of the transition to socialism, Erik Olin Wright (2004: 17) contends that such
a transition is best conceived as moving in a general direction, rather than toward a specific institutional destination. This approach,
he asserts, is like: leaving for a voyage without a map of the journey, or a description of the destination, but simply a navigation rule
that tells us if we are going in the right direction and how far we have travelled. This is obviously less satisfactory than a
comprehensive roadmap, but it is better than a map whose destinations are constructed through wishful thinking and which give a
false sense of certainty about where we are headed. From this broader perspective, an extensive range of proposals, programmes
and experiments becomes visible, and it becomes possible to analyse and evaluate the extent to which the actors on the left today

rather than a fixed destination, a more useful analytical

criterion consists of determining to what extent these economic initiatives go in the
direction of the values widely recognised by the left itself , such as decreasing
inequality between classes and countries, economic democracy and environmental sustainability. In other words, these
offer alternatives to neo-liberalism. Thus,

aspirations costitute the essential points of reference on the left's navigation rule.

Link Turns
Re-articulating existing institutions is more effective than
withdrawal their abstract goals ignore contingent
manifestations of violence that can be solved by the plan
Mouffe 9 (Chantal, Political Theory Prof @ Westminster, Westminster political
theory professor, The Importance of Engaging the State)
It is clear that, once we envisage social reality in terms of hegemonic and counterhegemonic practices, radical politics is not about withdrawing completely from
existing institutions. Rather, we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge
them. This is crucial; otherwise we will be faced with a chaotic situation . Moreover, if we do
not engage with and challenge the existing order, if we instead choose to simply escape the state
completely, we leave the door open for others to take control of systems of authority
and regulation. Indeed there are many historical (and not so historical)
examples of this. When the Left shows little interest, Right-wing and
authoritarian groups are only too happy to take over the state. The strategy of exodus
could be seen as the reformulation of the idea of communism, as it was found in Marx. There are many points in common between
the two perspectives. To be sure, for Hardt and Negri it is no longer the proletariat, but the Multitude which is the privileged political
subject. But in both cases the state is seen as a monolithic apparatus of domination that cannot be transformed. It has to wither
away in order to leave room for a reconciled society beyond law, power and sovereignty. In reality, as Ive already noted, others are
often perfectly willing to take control. If my approach supporting new social movements and counterhegemonic practices has

To
acknowledge the ever present possibility of antagonism to the existing order implies
recognising that heterogeneity cannot be eliminated . As far as politics is concerned, this means the
been called post-Marxist by many, it is precisely because I have challenged the very possibility of such a reconciled society.

need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal

successful hegemony fixes the meaning of

institutions and social practices and defines the common sense through which a given
conception of reality is established. However, such a result is always contingent, precarious and
susceptible to being challenged by counter-hegemonic interventions . Politics always takes
and to define the symbolic parameters of social life. A

place in a field criss-crossed by antagonisms. A properly political intervention is always one that engages with a certain aspect of
the existing hegemony. It can never be merely oppositional or conceived as desertion, because it aims to challenge the existing

Another important aspect of a

hegemonic politics lies in establishing linkages between various demands (such as
environmentalists, feminists, anti-racist groups), so as to transform them into claims
that will challenge the existing structure of power relations. This is a further reason why critique
involves engagement, rather than disengagement. It is clear that the different demands that exist in our
societies are often in conflict with each other. This is why they need to be
articulated politically, which obviously involves the creation of a collective will, a
we. This, in turn, requires the determination of a them. This obvious and simple point is missed by the various advocates of the
order, so that it may reidentify and feel more comfortable with that order.

Multitude. For they seem to believe that the Multitude possesses a natural unity which does not need political articulation. Hardt and
Negri see the People as homogeneous and expressed in a unitary general will, rather than divided by different political conflicts.

Rather, they are what could be called

an ensemble of differences, all coming together, only at a given moment, against a
common adversary. Such as when different groups from many backgrounds come together to protest against a war
Counter-hegemonic practices, by contrast, do not eliminate differences.

perpetuated by a state, or when environmentalists, feminists, anti-racists and others come together to challenge dominant models

In these cases, the adversary cannot be defined in broad general

terms like Empire, or for that matter Capitalism. It is instead contingent upon
the particular circumstances in question the specific states, international
institutions or governmental practices that are to be challenged. Put another
of development and progress.

way, the construction of political demands is dependent upon the specific relations
of power that need to be targeted and transformed, in order to create the conditions for a new
hegemony. This is clearly not an exodus from politics. It is not critique as
withdrawal, but critique as engagement. It is a war of position that needs to
be launched, often across a range of sites, involving the coming together of a range
of interests. This can only be done by establishing links between social movements ,
political parties and trade unions, for example. The aim is to create a common bond
and collective will, engaging with a wide range of sites, and often institutions, with
the aim of transforming them. This, in my view, is how we should conceive the nature of radical politics.

Commitment to objective legal reasoning is the only way to

constrain violence any alternative paints the law as
indeterminate which justifies illegality and neoconservative
cooption
Ristroph 9 (Alice, Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of
Law, Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and Existential Anxiety, Constitutional
Commentary Vol. 25, 431-459.
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1457&context=facpub)
law is in crisis concerns our own expectations of the function of law. A possible achievement is to
offer an alternative to violenceas we saw in Levinson and Balkins account of the Constitution as enabling
One reason to care whether

nonviolent dispute resolution.66 This might be called the anti-Thrasymachus view of law. Early in Platos Republic (before Socrates
has tamed him), a young man called Thrasymachus describes justice as the advantage of the stronger.67 The claim is that might
makes right, and Western political and legal thought has produced many efforts to prove Thrasymachus and his heirs wrong. If

law distinguishes right from might, then it becomes important to say what
law is, and to show that it exists. Hence, many ongoing jurisprudential debates
about the criteria for a valid and functional system of law (including worries about legal
indeterminancy) are motivated by worries about arbitrary power and violence .68 To show
Thrasymachus to be mistaken, we want to show that the rule of law is really
different from the rule of (the strongest ) men. In legal theory, we could view John Austins positivism
law as commands backed by threats of punishmentas a descendant of Thrasymachuss claim.69 Here, I want to
examine briefly one of the most influential, and most plausible, efforts to show that law is something more and
different from the commands of a gunman: H. L. A. Harts response to Austin. Hart framed his discussion around the
question, What is law?.70 But perhaps, as the Stoppard passage that opened this essay suggests, beginning with
this question led us to conjure an image of law with various predicates that do not, as it turns out, include
existence. A second form of existential anxiety, one that I suspect shapes present talk of crisis, is the anxiety thast
Thrasymachus and Austin were right and law, if it is anything more than command and force, does not exist. For my
purposes here, the critical features of Harts account are the rule of recognition and the internal point of view. Since, in most of The Concept of Law, Hart
takes laws existence for granted, it is helpful to look at the passages where laws existence, or at least the existence of a particular form of law, is up for
grabs. In his classic discussion of the question, Is international law really law?, H. L. A. Hart deployed the concepts of a rule of recognition and the
internal point of view to conclude that international law was at most in a state of transition toward fully legal law, moving toward law properly so called but
certainly not yet there.71 At the time he wrote The Concept of Law, Hart believed that international law departed from domestic (or municipal) law in
that it lacked a widely accepted rule of recognition and in that states could not be said to take the internal point of view toward international obligations.
(Harts argument has been challenged by many contemporary scholars of international law, but that particular dispute need not occupy us here.72) For
law qua law to exist, Hart argued, there must be a rule of recognition under which the authoritative status of other rules was accepted or denied, and the
officials who would apply the rule of recognition must themselves take the internal point of view toward it. That is, the officials needed to view the rule of
recognition as a binding, authoritative guide to their own decisions. Suppose Hart was right and the rule of recognition and the internal point of view are
conditions for the existence of law. Two questions arise: what is the rule of recognition for constitutional law, and who must hold the internal standpoint
toward that rule? The Constitution itself initially seems a candidate for the rule of recognition, though the fact that the Constitution must itself be
interpreted leads some theorists to amend this account and say that the rule of recognition must include authoritative statements of the meaning of the
Constitution, under prevailing interpretive standards.73 As for the internal point of view, we might hope that all state officials would take this point of view
toward constitutional rules.74 In other words, we might hope that every state actor would comply with the U.S. Constitution because it is the Constitution,
not simply to avoid injunctions, or judicial invalidation of legislative action, or liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. But Harts theory does not demand universal
adherence to an internal point of view. Even if legislators and other public officials complied with First or Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment doctrine only to
avoid invalidation or 1983 liability even if these public officials were the equivalent of Holmess bad manHart might find that constitutional law still

existed in a meaningful sense so long as the judges applying constitutional rules believed themselves to be bound by a constitutional rule of
recognition.75 Here is a possibility, one I believe we must take seriously and one that prompts anxiety about the existence of constitutional law itself:
there is no common rule of recognition toward which judges and other officials take an internal point of view.76 Individual judges may adhere to their
particular understandings of the rule of recognition the Constitution as interpreted by proper originalist methods, for example, or the Constitution as
elucidated by popular understandings. But the fact that individual state actors follow their own rules of recognition in good faith does not satisfy Harts
account of law, and it does not provide a satisfying alternative to Thrasymachus. (There is no reason, on the might-makes-right account, that the mighty
cannot hold the good faith belief that they are pursuing a common good or acting pursuant to rule-governed authority. What matters is that their power is
in fact traceable to their superior strength.) There is reason for academic observers to doubt the existence of a single rule of recognition in American
constitutional law. There are too many core interpretive disputes, as discussed in Part I, and it is now widely accepted that constitutional rules are at least
underdeterminatc. Should there be doubt about this claim, consider this feature of constitutional law textbooks: they include majority and dissenting
opinions, and questions after each case frequently ask the reader which opinion was more persuasive. Those questions are not posed as rhetorical. For
most constitutional decisions, we can say, it could have been otherwise. With a few votes switched, with a different line-up of Justices, the same
precedents (and in some cases, the same interpretive methodology) could have produced a different outcome. Moreover, these suspicions of
indeterminancy or underdetermi-nancy are not the unique province of the academy. Think of the discussions of Supreme Court appointments in
presidential elections. Many voters, law professors or not, understand their vote for president to be also a vote for a certain kind of Justice and for certain
kinds of constitutional outcomes. Discussions of Supreme Court appointments are often framed in terms of judicial methodology I will appoint judges
who are faithful to the text of the Constitution but that language may be more a matter of decorum than of real constitutional faith. Judges, of course,
are not ignorant of the charges of indeterminancy or of the politicization of judicial appointments. And it seems possible that the erosion of constitutional
faith has reached the judiciary itself.771 claim no special insight into judicial psychology, but it seems implausible that the reasons for constitutional
skepticismthe discussions of underdetermined rules, the contingency of outcomes based on 5-4 votes, and the great attention to swing justices such as
Sandra Day OConnor or Anthony Kennedyhave not influenced judges themselves. Here again it seems worthwhile to consider dissenting opinions.
Justice Scalias polemics come to mind immediately; he has often accused his colleagues of acting lawlessly.78 Yet he keeps his post and continues to
participate in a system that treats as law the determinations of five (potentially lawless) Justices. It is possible, I suppose, that Justice Scalias dissents
express earnest outrage, that he is shocked (shocked) by decisions like Lawrence v. Texas79 and Boumediene. It is possible that he believes himself to be
the last best hope of constitutional law properly so called. But it seems more likely that he shares the skepticism of academic observers of the Court.

Though one cant help but wonder whether judges are still constitutionally devout, I should emphasize here that my argument does
not turn on a claim that judges are acting in good or bad faith. Individual judges may well take the internal point of view, in Harts

But it seems clear that American

judges do not all hold the internal point of view toward a single, shared rule of
recognition, given the nature of disagreements among judges themselves . If there
are multiple rules of recognition, varying from judge to judge , then legal outcomes
will depend on which judge is empowered to make the critical decision , and
Thrasymachus is not so far off the mark. Contemporary judicial disagreement is profound, and it is
terms, and strive faithfully to apply the principles they recognize as law.

not just a matter of Justice Scalias flair for colorful rhetoric. Consider Scott v. Harris, the recent decision granting
summary judgment (on the basis of qualified immunity) to a police officer who had rammed a passenger car during
a high-speed chase, causing an accident that left the driver a quadriplegic.80 Like most use-of-force opinions, the
decision applies a deferential Fourth Amendment standard that gives police officers wide leeway. What is unusual
about Harris is that, because the case arose as a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the critical question (whether the
driver, Victor Harris, posed a sufficient threat to others bodily safety such that the use of deadly force was
reasonable) was nominally a jury question, and at summary judgment, the court should have taken the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving partythe injured driver. Thus, in earlier use-of-force cases that reached the
Court as 1983 claims, the Court articulated the Fourth Amendment standard and then remanded the case to the
trial court.81 But in Harris, the Court had access to videotapes of the chase recorded by cameras on the dashboards
of the police vehicles involved.82 In the view of the eight-Justice majority, the videotape spoke for itself: it made
Harriss threat to the public so clear that no reasonable juror could conclude that the officers use of force was
unreasonable.83 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found the officer to be entitled to summary judgment.84
Doubtless there are many instances in which a court grants summary judgment to one party though non-judicial
observers believe a reasonable juror could find for the other party. Harris is of particular interest, though, because
the reasonable juror who might have found in favor of Victor Harris was clearly visible to the majorityin fact, this
juror had a spokesman on the Court. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in Scott v. Harris, viewed the same
videotape and found it to confirm the factual findings of the district court (which had denied the police offic-ers
motion for summary judgment).85 Though Justice Stevens was careful not to base his argument on an actual
determination of the substantive Fourth Amendment question (chiding his colleagues for doing just that and
thereby acting as jurors rather than judges),86 he viewed the video evidence and explained how one might
conclude, perfectly reasonably, that Scott had used excessive force.87 In order for the eight Justices in the Harris
majority to believe their own opinion, they would have to conclude that Justice Stevens lived outside the realm of
reason. Harris is nominally a dispute about what reasonable jurors could conclude, rather than a direct argument
about the meaning of a particular constitutional provision. But the two reactions to the videotape should call to
mind Larry Tribes worry that American constitutional law is plagued by deep and thus far intractable divisions
between wholly different ways of assessing truth and experiencing reality.88 It is not just abortion and assisted
suicide that reveal profound disagreement about what is true and real. A videotape that speaks for itself in the
eyes of eight Justices says something entirely different to the ninth. Looking beyond the judiciary, consider the
consequences of constitutional disagreement and constitutional indeterminancy for other government officials and
for would-be critics of those officials. Earlier I noted that with sufficient constitutional indeterminancy, theres no

with sufficient
legal indeterminancy, theres no such thing as illegality . When John Yoo wrote
the Office of Legal Counsel memos that defend practices formerly known as torture, he
such thing as an unconstitutional president. A more extreme version of this argument is that

was simply doing to bans on torture what critics had long argued it was possible to
do for any law: he was trashing them.89 This was the spawn of CLS put to work in
the OLC; deconstructions on the left are now deconstructions on the
right.90 And that, of course, is cause for anxiety among those who would like to argue that George W. Bush or
members of his administration acted illegally. As I suggested in the Introduction, this may be the
Pyrrhic victory of critical legal studies: If the crits were correct, then there
is no distinctively legal form of critique. About torture, indefinite
detention, warrantless wiretapping, and so on, we can say I don't like it or
it doesnt correspond to my vision of the good, but we cannot say its
illegal. To argue that the Bush administration violated the rule of law, we need to
believe that the rule of law exists . But for 30 years or more, we have found reasons to doubt that it
does.91 Perhaps it will seem that I am overstating the influence of legal realism and critical legal studies, or the doubts about
laws existence. Im willing to entertain those possibilities, but I do want to emphasize that the focus is on constitutional law. Its
easy enough to believe in law when we see it applied and enforced by figures of authority in a recognized hierarchy. That is, the
sentencing judge or the prison warden can believe in lawhe has applied it himself. And the criminal should believe in law he has
felt its force. But these examples illustrate Austinian law: commands backed by force. What remains elusive, on my account, are
laws that are truly laws given to oneself, and especially law given by a state to itself.92 That is why, in Part I of this essay, I

brute force is a poor candidate to distinguish ordinary politics, or ordinary

legal decisions, from extraordinary moments of crisis. What would be truly extraordinary is not the
suggested that

use of force, but its absence: a system of law truly based on consent and independent of sanction. The Constitution, in theory, is a

each
successive generation must give the Constitution to itself: each generation
must adopt the internal point of view toward the Constitution in order for it to be
effective. Even once we have accepted the written text as authoritative, all but the strictest constructionists acknowledge that
law given unto oneself. By this I mean not simply that the Founders gave the Constitution to future generations, but that

many meanings can plausibly be extracted from that text. (And even the strict constructionists must acknowledge that as a factual
matter many meanings have been extracted; they deny only the plausibility of those varied readings.) Any law given unto oneself
requires what Hart called the internal point of view, and what one more cynical might describe as self-delusion: it requires a belief
that one is bound though one could at any minute walk away. It is possible, I think, that we have outwitted the Constitution: that

we have become too clever, too quick to notice indeterminancy, even too postmodern to believe ourselves bound. A third possible explanation for contemporary references to crisis
is professional malaise. It could be, as I suggested earlier, that after too many years of chewing what judges had for
breakfast, professors have lost their appetites. It could be that the problems of originalists and historicists and
popular constitutionalists dont amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world. And if these possibilities have not
crossed the law professors mind, they probably should. We might consider again Larry Tribes explanation of his
decision to stop work on his treatise of American constitutional law. There are two questions of meaning there, one
of which Tribe confronts directly and the other which he brushes off quickly. Most obviously, there is the search for
constitutional meaning, as Tribe acknowledges, a search that cannot be concluded within the Constitutions own
text. I see no escape from adopting some perspective... external to the constitution itself from which to decide
questions not indisputably resolved one way or the other by the text and structure--------9* Tribe goes on to
wonder where these extra-constitutional criteria come from, and who ratified the meta-constitution that such
external criteria would comprise?.94 Supreme Court Justices (and other judges) must struggle with these
questions, given the public authority that they have the enormous responsibility and privilege to wield.95 But
Tribe need not. He can simply decline to finish the treatise. If he declines to finish the treatise, though, we cant
help asking ourselves what was at stake, and what remains at stake. If the law professor lacks the responsibility of a
judge, is his constitutional theory just an amusing hobby? What was the point of the constitutional law treatise, or of
other efforts to discern coherent principles of constitutional law? The significance of a treatise is the question of
meaning that Tribe brushes off quickly: he says a treatise is an attempt at a synthesis of some enduring value and
insists that his decision is not based on doubts about whether constitutional treatises arc ever worthwhile.96 But
Tribes letter leaves the enduring value of a treatise rather underspecified, and it is possible that current
references to constitutional crisis in the academy stem from uncertainty about such questions of value. Is

constitutional theory good for absolutely nothing? Only if we believe that the effort
to resist Thrasymachus is futile or pointless. Constitutional theory is a species of legal and political theory,
and the most intriguing forms of such theory are produced by worries that law and violence are too closely intertwined.97 Thus I
suggested at the outset of this essay that existential anxiety is not always to be regretted, cured, or mocked. Such

anxiety

may be an important indication that we have noticed the ways in which

Thrasymachus seems right, and we still care enough to try to prove him wrong.98

After so much talk of crisis and anxiety, consider an illustration from the dramatic genre. Tom

Stoppards play Jumpers

features a troupe of philosophy professors who double as acrobats: Logical positivists, mainly, with a linguistic
analyst or two, a couple of Benthamite utilitarians ... lapsed Kantians and empiricists generally... and of course the usual
Behaviorists... a mixture of the more philosophical members of the university gymnastics team and the more gymnastic members of

The Jumpers seem to practice what we would now identify as post-modern

nihilism: One shoots and kills another, then conceals the murder with cheerful
aplomb. Against these intellectually and physically adroit colleagues, the clumsy and old-fashioned Professor George Moore
the Philosophy School.99

struggles to defend the irreducible fact of goodness,100 the possibility of a moral conscience, and the claim that there is more

He can neither shake nor defend his

faith. Law schools, I think, are filled with moral sympathizers to Professor Moore who possess the skills of modern-day
in me than meets the microscope.101 Is God? Moore wonders.

Jumpers.102 The current discourse of crisis is the latest manifestation of an old struggle between faith and doubt, and it is not one

we
are determined to have law, even if we must make it ourselves. There was at least a smidgen of
truth in John Finniss claim that scholars of critical legal studies were disappointed ... absolutists.103 But it is not just
crits that are disappointed when they look for law and see nothing . Few scholars of
any stripe want to vindicate Thrasymachus. All of this is just to reiterate the
difficulty, and perhaps the necessity, of giving a law unto oneself. If constitutional
law did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.
that we will resolve. On one hand, we have observed too much to believe (in law) unquestioningly. And on the other hand,

Read the question of impacts through the lens of the

empiricist fallacy the attempt to equate specific
instantiations of capitalism with its fundamental nature. Our
vision is distinct it embodies a radically new system that
defies previous examples
Bernstein 06 [Dr. Andrew, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy Pace University,
The Capitalist Manifesto: The Empiricist Fallacy and Straw Man Attacks on
Capitalism, Capitalism Magazine, 6-25, http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?
ID=4708]
A system that consistently protects individual rights, that legally prohibits any
initiation of governmental force, has never existed. The northern states of the United States in the
19th century were the closest to a laissez-faire form of government that mankind has come. But even there, federal
and state authorities often retained the legal power to coercively regulate industry and tradeand to abridge

The historical systems commonly referred to as capitalist

were, in fact, uniformly mixed economies, i.e., systems combining clashing elements of freedom and
statism, individual rights and governmental initiation of force. A consistent, non-contradictory
implementation of the principle of individual rights necessitates laissez-faire; anything
other or less is not capitalism. It is central to a proper understanding of capitalism
that its philosophical essence be distinguished from the flawed historical attempts
to implement it. A related misunderstanding is the belief that the actions and principles of
individual capitalists are necessarily representative of the nature of capitalism. It might as
well be argued that the murderous activities of Hitler and Stalin are necessarily
representative of the nature of government (they are representative of the nature of statism). The
individual rights in other forms.

unfortunate and generally overlooked truth is that capitalists are often neither supporters nor practitioners of
capitalism. Businessmen frequently violate the principles of capitalism. They often yelp for tariffs and other
protectionist restrictions; seek monopolistic governmental franchises; look for subsidies and corporate bailouts;
clamor for anti-trust legislation and other legal constraints to be imposed on their competitors. On a regular basis,
they call for governmental initiation of force to violate the rights of both their actual and prospective competitors.
To take one example: that some businessmen support tariffs (or trade barriers) does not make it a policy congruent
with capitalist principles nor would that change even if all businessmen favored protectionism. Honest individuals

and companies have the moral right to trade freely with other honest individuals or companies regardless of the
specific nationalities involved. No consensus of businessmen could alter the nature of tariffsthat they involve
governments forcing foreign producers to pay a tax on their exportsand thereby impose higher prices on those
who choose to buy imported goods. Similarly, that these same individuals oppose international free trade does not
mitigate, much less negate, that free trade is a direct consequence of the moral principles that constitute the
essence of capitalism. What is or is not capitalistic is a matter of political, economic and, above all, moral principles,

The confusion of the history of capitalism

(or the actions of capitalists) with the systems fundamental nature is an example of what may be
termed the Empiricist Fallacy. Such a cognitive error involves treating the historical facts, rather than the
philosophical essence of a political/cultural phenomenon as the deepest, most significant level of its explanation. In
order to properly assess the nature and impact of capitalism, the Empiricist Fallacy must be
scrupulously avoided. Historical data must be carefully distinguished from
philosophical essence, and the latter used to gain a deeper understanding of the former.
not of the beliefs, actions or policies of specific capitalists.

Link shield: no risk of cap making things worse, it only helps

people
Norberg 3 [Jonah, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a writer, In Defense of
Global Capitalism, Cato Institute (July 31, 2003), p. 153.]
Critics of capitalism point out that per capita GDP is more than 30 times greater in
the worlds 20 richest countries than in the 20 poorest. The critics are right to say that
this inequality is due to capitalismbut not for the reasons they think. The difference is due to certain
countries having taken the path of capitalism, resulting in fantastic prosperity for
their inhabitants, while those choosing to impede ownership, trade, and production
have lagged behind. Factors such as climate and natural disasters are not
unimportant, but most of the gap can still be put down to certain countries having
opted for liberalization and others for control . The 20 economically most liberal
countries in the world have a per capita GDP about 29 times greater than the 20
economically least liberal. If, then, we are serious about closing the North- South divide, we should hope
with all our hearts that the South will also gain access to a free economy and open markets. Developing
countries that have had openness in recent decades have not only grown
faster than other developing countriesthey have grown faster than the
affluent countries too. The worlds inequality is due to capitalism. Not to capitalism having made
certain groups poor, but to its making its practitioners wealthy. The uneven distribution of wealth
in the world is due to the uneven distribution of capitalism . Arguments that
capitalism is somehow to blame for world poverty are oddly contradictory. Some
argue that capital and corporations make their way only into the affluent countries,
leaving the poor ones up the proverbial creek. Others maintain that capital and
corporations flock to poor countries with low production costs, to the detriment of
workers in the developed world. The truth seems to be that they make their way into both. Trade
and investment flows in the past two decades have come to be more and more evenly
distributed among the economies that are relatively open to the rest of the world. It is the
really closed economies that, for obvious reasons, are not getting investments and trade. Moreover, the differences

instead of globalization
marginalizing certain regions, it is the regions that stand back from
globalization that become marginalized.1
between these groups of countries are increasing. Clearly,

Philanthropy solves their offense

Norberg 3 [Jonah, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a writer, In Defense of
Global Capitalism, Cato Institute (July 31, 2003), p. 189.]
we have more to expect from philanthropic capitalists than from
politics. Capitalism does not force people to maximize their profit at every turn; it
enables them to use their property as they see fit, free of political considerations. Microsofts
Bill Gates, the very personification of modern capitalism, himself devotes more to
the campaign against disease in the developing countries than the American
government does. Between November 1999 and 2000, through the $23 billion Bill and Melinda Gates
Health Fund, $1.44 billion went to vaccinate children in developing countries for common diseases and to
Personally, I believe

fund research into HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB, for example, in developing countries. That is a quarter of what all

the fact that Bill

Gates is worth more than $50 billion should give the poor and the sick of the world
reason to rejoice. Clearly they would stand to gain more from a handful of Gateses than from the whole of
industrialized nations combined devote to combating disease in the developing countries. So

Europe and another couple of WHOs.

Impact Turns
Neolib inevitable: knowledge production
Dieter Plehwe (Two-time guest prof at Yale. Rsch Fllw @ NYU, Research Fellow,
Social Science Research Center Berlin) and Bernhard Walpen (The Forschungsund Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt (FORBA) is an independent research institute
specialising in social-science research on work and employment) Neoliberal
Hegemony: A Global Critique. Between network and complex organization: The
Making of Neoliberal: Knowledge and Hegemony. 12/8/20 05.
http://www.forba.at/data/downloads/file/300-Plehwe-Walpen.pdf
a widening and deepening of neoliberal networks of intellectuals
and advocacy think tanks, a considerable increase in reach and scope around the globe as well
as specific national and supranational arenas and discourse areas. 21 Neoliberal
knowledge production and dissemination certainly has not declined in the most
recent period, rather the opposite: A very solid intellectual force and constitutive
part of historical power blocs that defend and maintain neoliberal hegemonic
constellations is strongly entrenched in many (civil and political) societies around
the globe, capable of working on almost any subject of concern, and able to
strategically develop capacities and competencies if needed. Reliable and tested
channels of communication can be used to eventually disseminate the result of the
work, and the neoliberal networks are capable to rapidly change tactics .
We can thus observe both

AND, they just attack a straw mandoesnt solve neolib

Dieter Plehwe (Two-time guest prof at Yale. Rsch Fllw @ NYU, Research Fellow,
Social Science Research Center Berlin) and Bernhard Walpen (The Forschungsund Beratungsstelle Arbeitswelt (FORBA) is an independent research institute
specialising in social-science research on work and employment) Neoliberal
Hegemony: A Global Critique. Between network and complex organization: The
Making of Neoliberal: Knowledge and Hegemony. 12/8/20 05.
http://www.forba.at/data/downloads/file/300-Plehwe-Walpen.pdf
Underscoring this reality is particularly important given the recent attention afforded to the supposed emergence of

World Banks
discovery that institutions matter and ubiquitous references to the importance of good or global
governance, which pervade the international financial institutions discourse today,
should not be interpreted as evidence for neoliberalisms defeat. In fact, many of
the recent critiques of neoliberalism and the proposed reforms, which arise from them, turn out to
be consistent with a pluralist neoliberal agenda . Many neoliberals agree that the state should be
a post-Washington Consensus, representing a kinder, gentler version of globalization. The

strengthened in order to secure the institutional foundation of a market economy. A close look at the statement of

neoliberalisms core tenets cannot be reduced to

vulgar market radicalism, but rather include reflection on the appropriate role of a
limited state. Thus, neoliberalisms opponents do themselves a disservice in defining
their opposition against this straw man .
aims of the Mont Plerin Society reminds us that

Neolib solves war markets create transparency which

encourages cooperation and prevents miscalc
Gartzke 10 (E., Poli Sci Prof @ University of California San Diego, International
Crises and the Capitalist Peace, International Interactions 36(2): 115-145)
How might capitalism change states' preferences or better inform them about the preferences of others? A

trade and other economic activities deter conflict by

making fighting expensive (Bliss and Russett 1998; Gasiorowski 1986; Oneal and Russett 1997;
considerable literature suggests that

Polachek 1980, 1997; Polachek, Robst and Chang 1999). Still, it is difficult to imagine that trade losses would be
large relative to the material and subjective costs of fighting. Warfare is already expensive, even among states with
autarkic markets. Typically, states at war want to impose costs on an opponent. A more plausible set of

markets do, and how they alter the interests of

participating countries. Capital markets have become the crown jewels of the
modern age. Vast wealth is in play each business day. As recent events attest, staggering losses can
occur quickly when investors become frightened or skeptical . Any factor that influences the
value of securities is salient to investors. Leaders who scare the capital markets pay a high
price. Wealth is lost, investors are angered, and the government itself is often affected. The ability of
governments in capitalist countries to service their debts depends on investor confidence. If investors and
the state have slightly different incentives when it comes to political conflict, then
leaders must choose between military aggression and mollifying investors.
Rather than deterring conflict, which choice a leader makes informs observers about
a leader's resolve and/or capabilities. Ceteris paribus, a leader that is willing to anger
the markets to pursue a dispute is more resolved than one who shies away from
financial losses. A leader that is unwilling to anger the markets is probably not
resolved. Markets also transform economies by allowing for more efficient
allocation and accumulation of capital. As labor becomes relatively scarce and
commodities grow cheap, the logic of employing expensive labor to take (versus make or
trade) inexpensive inputs to production evaporates . Rich states are unwilling to deploy
occupying armies to extract relatively cheap goods and services from other states ,
preferring instead to purchase these goods and services. If in addition it becomes widely
understood that a group of prosperous countries no longer threaten one another
directly or indirectly over access to inputs to production, then the security
dilemma is no longer a menace. In contrast, the transition from territorial to globalized
commercial nations makes control of international agendas increasingly critical. Capitalist countries
continue to contemplate war over policies and politics . However, markets also bring a
level of consensus among capitalist states. Letting another country have its way in the realm of
mechanisms can be had by looking at what

policymaking may or may not involve conflict (both nations may want the same thing). Adversaries can be allies
when facing a common problem. If instead two governments have different agendas, then relations can become
fractious. The importance of differences grows with the size of a nation's exposure to the international arena. Table
1 summarizes the admittedly complex processes discussed above. Three types of dyadic relationships are identified
in the left column, developed, developing, and heterogeneous (one developed and one developing state). Each of
the remaining columns in the table refers to a type of good over which conflict might occur. Property disputes are
unlikely among developed states.

Developing states mostly fight over property. In heterogeneous

developed states (which can fight aggressive wars against weaker developing nations if they want to)
have no desire to acquire more territory, while developing countries (which may covet
land or other tangible property assets) are typically too weak or distant to prosecute conflicts
against developed countries. Exceptions occur most often in contiguous heterogeneous dyads, and
dyads,

where developing countries are wealthy. Agenda control can lead to conflict, but only when states disagree about
preferred policies.

Nations have no reason to fight to gain control of an agenda when

victory yields similar policies to those imposed in defeat . Thus, the column for Similar
Interests contains only PEACE. Fighting is possible when national interests differ, though bargains are still common,
as warfare is costly and fighting typically ends in a bargain in any case. Developed states may be more likely to

Conflict resolution among

developed countries may also be aided by better information as capital
markets create transparency.
care about policy differences, but they are less likely to have such differences.

Alt Solvency
No alternative-left has no credibility
Fukuyama, SAIS Foreign Policy Institute Senior Fellow, 2012
(Francis, The Future of History, Foreign Affairs; Jan/Feb2012, Vol. 91 Issue 1,
ebsco)

One of the most puzzling features of the world in the aftermath of the financial crisis is that so far,

populism has taken

primarily a right-wing form, not a left-wing one . In the United States, for example, although the Tea Party
is anti-elitist in its rhetoric, its members vote for conservative politicians who serve the interests of precisely those financiers and
corporate elites they claim to despise. There are many explanations for this phenomenon. They include a deeply embedded belief in
equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome and the fact that cultural issues, such as abortion and gun rights, crosscut

the deeper reason a broad-based populist left has failed to materialize

is an intellectual one. It has been several decades since anyone on the left has been
able to articulate, first, a coherent analysis of what happens to the structure of advanced societies as they
undergo economic change and, second, a realistic agenda that has any hope of protecting a
middle-class society. The main trends in left-wing thought in the last two
generations have been, frankly, disastrous as either conceptual frameworks or tools for mobilization.
Marxism died many years ago, and the few old believers still around are ready for nursing homes. The academic left
replaced it with postmodernism, multiculturalism, feminism, critical theory, and a
host of other fragmented intellectual trends that are more cultural than economic in
focus. Postmodernism begins with a denial of the possibility of any master narrative of history or society, undercutting its own
economic ones. But

authority as a voice for the majority of citizens who feel betrayed by their elites. Multiculturalism validates the victimhood of
virtually every out-group. It is impossible to generate a mass progressive movement on the basis of such a motley coalition: most of
the working- and lower-middle-class citizens victimized by the system are culturally conservative and would be embarrassed to be

Whatever the theoretical justifications underlying the left's

agenda, its biggest problem is a lack of credibilit y. Over the past two generations, the mainstream left
seen in the presence of allies like this.

has followed a social democratic program that centers on the state provision of a variety of services, such as pensions, health care,

That model is now exhausted: welfare states have become big,

bureaucratic, and inflexible; they are often captured by the very organizations that
administer them, through public-sector unions; and, most important, they are
fiscally unsustainable given the aging of populations virtually everywhere in the
developed world. Thus, when existing social democratic parties come to power, they no longer aspire to
and education.

be more than custodians of a welfare state that was created decades ago; none has a new, exciting agenda
around which to rally the masses.

No mindset shift and no successful movements

Lockwood, former Institute for Public Policy Research Climate,
Transport and Energy Associate Director, 2011
(Matthew, The Limits to Environmentalism, 3-25,
http://politicalclimate.net/2011/03/25/the-limits-to-environmentalism-4/)

This brings us neatly finally to the third problem with PWG: politics. Jackson does have some discussion of the need for our old
favourite political will towards the end of the book, and there are some examples of concrete ideas (e.g. shorter working week,
ban advertising aimed at children), but

there is basically no political strategy. Indeed, the argument is

framed in terms of the need for social and economic change and governance,
but not politics at all. The key question is how we are supposed to get from where
we are to where he wants us to be. Jackson acknowledges that at the moment, many people want
growth (or more precisely, economic stability) and so demand it of politicians, who then have a political
incentive to deliver it. The quandary (not really acknowledged) is which strategy to adopt in this situation. Do you first reshape
the economy to deliver economic stability without growth (e.g. by a shorter working week), which then demonstrates to people
socially and politically that growth isnt necessary for a good life, or do you first have to bring about major social change, moving
people away from consumerism, as a precondition for transforming the economy and making the end of growth politically feasible?
The discussion in chapter 11 of the book sort of implies that Jackson is thinking in terms of the latter route, but it actually has no
strategy. He lays out (some quite conventional, even dare I say it, already proposed by economists) policies like carbon taxation and
the aforementioned shorter working week but there is nothing on political narrative. The closest we get to a strategy for social
transformation is banning advertising aimed at children (also a theme of Tom Cromptons) and policies to drive greater durability of
products. A counterview might be that all these changes are needed, and it doesnt matter so much what happens first, that they all

The political party in the UK that comes

closest to offering the Jackson vision is the Green Party. They got 1% of the popular vote in the
2010 general election, and one MP. What stronger evidence can there be that the vision on its own
is not enough? A final point takes us back to equity (see previous post), but this time within rich countries. Certainly within
the US and the UK, a large group of people in the low-to-middle part of the income
distribution have seen their real incomes stagnate or fall over the last decade, as
the rich have got richer. Telling this squeezed middle that economic growth is to
end is not going to go down well unless there is a credible strategy for redistribution .
reinforce each other etc etc. But I dont think thats enough.

Thats why a good initial step for a more sustainable economy might be a set of good old-fashioned social democratic policies on tax
and spend. Prosperity without Growth raises some very important questions, and Tim Jackson shows how tight a squeeze we are in.

ending economic growth in rich

countries would make a solution to ecological limits a bit easier, but this would play only
But the book leaves some even more crucial questions hanging. Of course

a small role. In the absence of radical technological change, only serious de-growth, what Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows call
planned economic recession would be sufficient to bring about the cut in emissions needed. With rapid growth in poor countries

what we should be focusing on is achieving that

technological change. Yes, it hasnt materialised so far, but nor have the policies for low carbon
innovation we need to produce it like Gandhis Western civilisation, the low carbon revolution would be a good idea. And yes,
getting those policies in place will require political effort . But that effort will be as nothing
this conclusion is even stronger. So

compared with the political challenge of replacing capitalism with a new steady state system either lacking
innovation or with a disappearing working week. Perhaps the most fundamental, indeed philosophical issue here is that, despite the

his
underlying message is (pace Obama): No, we cant. But beyond the environmentalist
camp, this message will not work. In the face of the biggest collective challenge that humanity has faced, we need a
fact that Jackson has made a good effort to make an argument about limits into an argument about quality of life,

narrative that has the human potential to solve problems, and overcome apparently unbeatable odds, at its heart.

Beginning from rejection is bad- reform must be gradual BUT

this does not guarantee cooption
Barry, Belfast politics reader, 2007
(John, Towards a model of green political economy: from ecological modernisation
to economic security, Int. J. Green Economics, 1.3/4, ebsco)

Economic analysis has been one of the weakest and least developed areas of
broadly green/sustainable development thinking. For example, whatever analysis
there is within the green political canon is largely utopian usually based on an argument for the

complete transformation of modern society and economy as the only way to deal with ecological catastrophe, an often linked to a
critique of the socioeconomic failings of capitalism that echoed a broadly radical Marxist/socialist or anarchist analysis; or
underdeveloped due, in part, to the need to outline and develop other aspects of green political theory. However, this gap within
green thinking has recently been filled by a number of scholars, activists, think tanks, and environmental NGOs who have outlined
various models of green political economy to underpin sustainable development political aims, principles and objectives. The aim of
this article is to offer a draft of a realistic, but critical, version of green political economy to underpin the economic dimensions of
radical views about sustainable development. It is written explicitly with a view to encouraging others to think through this aspect of

Combined realism and radicalism marks this article, which

must begin from where
we are, with the structures, institutions, modes of production, laws and regulations that
we already have. Of course, this does not mean simply accepting these as immutable or set in stone; after all,
sustainable development in a collaborative manner.

starts with the point that we cannot build or seek to create a sustainable economy ab nihlo, but

some of the current institutions, principles and structures underpinning the dominant economic model are the very causes of
unsustainable development.

We do need to recognise, however, that we must work with (and

these existing

through in the terms of the original German Green Partys slogan of marching through the institutions)

structures, as well as change and reform and in some cases, abandon them as either unnecessary or positively harmful to the
creation and maintenance of a sustainable economy and society. Equally, this article also recognises that an alternative
economy and society must be based in the reality that most people (in the West) will not democratically
vote for a completely different type of society and economy. That reality must also accept that a green
economy is one that is recognisable to most people and that indeed safeguards
and guarantees not just their basic needs but also aspirations (within limits). The realistic
character of the thinking behind this article accepts that consumption and materialistic lifestyles are here to stay (so long as they do

there is little to be gained by proposing

alternative economic systems, which start from a complete rejection of consumption and materialism. The
not transgress any of the critical thresholds of the triple bottom line) and indeed

appeal to realism is in part an attempt to correct the common misperception (and selfperception) of green politics and economics requiring an excessive degree of self-denial and a puritanical asceticism
(Goodin, 1992, p.18; Allison, 1991, p.170178). While rejecting the claim that green political theory calls for the complete disavowal
of materialistic lifestyles, it is true that green politics does require the collective reassessment of such lifestyles, and does require a
degree of shared sacrifice. It does not mean, however, that we necessarily require the complete and across-the-board rejection of

There must be room and tolerance in a green economy for people to

live ungreen lives so long as they do not harm others, threaten
materialistic lifestyles.

Legalism

Permutation
Permutation do Both
Permutation do the aff and the alt in all non-mutually exclusive
instances
Prefer a legal pragmatic approach. Only reform through policy
decisions can effectively reform the legal system all other
approaches fail.
Butler 02 - Thomas Howerton Distinguished Professor of Humanities at
University of North Carolina Asheville (Brian E., Essays in Philosophy, Legal
Pragmatism: Banal or Beneficial as a Jurisprudential Position?, Vol. 3 Iss. 2, Article
14)//DWB
The worry that motivated this paper was that legal pragmatism as a doctrine might be so banal as to be

is legal pragmatism
practical as a jurisprudential position? The first step in answering this question was the identification
uninteresting or functions as a cover for personal agendas. Hence the question -

of a core set of claims made by the legal pragmatist that were explicit enough and strong enough to actually
eliminate or oppose other possible jurisprudential stances. A traditional or classical picture of law was developed
as a model to contrast with the pragmatic conception. Through a survey of legal pragmatist literature I came to a

Legal pragmatists first emphasize the

contextual nature of the process and advocate a "return from abstraction to the
concrete." Second, they dispute the need and/or availability of foundations from which
to deduce legal decisions. Third, the legal pragmatist adopts an instrumental stance
towards reasoning and looks more to the future and therefore , at the same time,
devalues the a priori importance of legal concepts and precedent held central to the
legal model. Fourth, an emphasis in placed upon the multiplicity of perspectives available and
necessary to accommodate within the system. Once these definitional claims were set out, the
working set of claims that characterize the stance.

question became which of the two models (classical v. legal pragmatism) was more descriptively accurate. The

legal pragmatism is a much more empirically sound doctrine than

the rule of law or legal model. First, politicians just do not act as if it is unimportant
who becomes a judge - clearly they think more is determining decisions than just
legal precedent. Second, conceptual studies of the courts have offered up alternative models that seem
conclusion was that

equally plausible. These models, though, dont rest upon use of the paradigm rule of law picture of legal tools as
much as they highlight the less isolated position the courts have in the greater context of political and social life. If
the court functions as a consensus maker or political legitimator the legal model is not only false, but also a
pernicious ideology masking the real function of the court. This was Sheingolds argument.

Legal

pragmatism can adapt to these criticisms and has the descriptive capacity to acknowledge all these
factors and/or roles of Another type of study that vindicates the pragmatists stance over the traditional legal model

many of
the ideals within a law as integrity or legal model are inseparable and contingent
upon context. Whether neutrality becomes an attractive prospect because of the problems with other
political stances or it is the case that law can be used to encourage dominant interests in society , the legal
model once again becomes false and the legal pragmatist is vindicated as to his or
her descriptive accuracy. Finally, empirical studies have shown that adherence to
precedent by judges in making decisions is much less pervasive than the legal
model would require. Factors thought extrinsic under the legal model are much more controlling than
is historical treatment of the legal enterprise. It appears from the conclusions of historical studies that

precedent and legal analysis. The legal pragmatist explains that this is because reasoning, just like the legal
enterprise, is a much more varied and heterogeneous process than usually imagined. The rule of law advocate just
has to claim that really, really, precedent matters; though we just cannot show how it works. So, from a survey of

the legal
pragmatists stance is empirically superior to the stance advocated by the law as
integrity theorist or any other variation on the classical picture of legal reasoning.
But maybe the legal model functions better as a normative stance. This claim was easily disproved as well. The
legal model so distorts what is actually happening in the court system that it results
in lack of effectiveness and unforeseen consequences . The idea that every controversy has a
empirical data analyzing courts' functioning and judicial decisionmaking it seems clear that

"controlling issue" is a legalistic type of reductionism that really amounts to concept mongering. The simplification
such an ideology allows rules out admission of information that could help the court better see the situation at

adherence to the
legal model encourages the judge to adopt a picture of reasoning that ignores the
largely probabilistic nature of life events, therefore further limiting the type of reasoning and
information thought legitimate. The legal pragmatist, because of a lack of one controlling
picture of the legal process, can allow in such considerations and therefore has
tools available to deal with such issues. If litigation goes on in a context where many people in
hand, and would help the court acknowledge future results of any decision. Furthermore,

addition to just the named parties to the action are effected then the admission of more information, and the

points to the legal pragmatists

stance as the normatively more desirable one to adopt . Finally, if a court adheres consistently
conceptual admission of the multiple roles that the court has to fulfill,

to the rule of law model, then the chances that its remedy will be effective are reduced. As Gerald Rosenberg has
shown, the court must have allies from outside its own institutional limits in order to be effective when mandating
significant social change. The strict follower of the rule of law or law as integrity model, though, will not be able to
face such issues and therefore might be completely ineffective. What this means is that even if the court could use
rule of law methods to get to a "correct" decision, not facing institutional limits of the court as a political entity
could have fatal effects upon the implementation of the decision .

Empirical studies of judicial

decisionmaking and the court system both show the flawed nature of the "classical
model" of law as represented most centrally today by Dworkins "law as integrity ."
At the same time, all the data are not only consistent with legal pragmatisms main tenants but
also reflect good reason for adopting legal pragmatism as a normative stance from
which to study and conceptualize judicial decisionmaking and the legal institution
in general. So, legal pragmatism is, indeed, a useful jurisprudential position . Beyond
this, it is a substantive position that promises to be beneficial if adopted in practice and not only in theory. Legal
pragmatism promises to make legal practice a more empirical and less dogmatic
profession. It furthermore promises to force legal professionals and the legal profession as a whole to provide
data in order to justify their claims to social efficacy. Just as Dewey argued that worship of an idealized picture of

worshipping an idealized
conception of Law and Legal Professionalism can get in the way of bringing about a
more effective legal system, characterized as one of many humanly created social
systems aimed at the resolution of social conflicts and the pursuit of justice.
Reason can get in the way of furthering the quest for more reasonable results,

Alt Fails
The alternative jettisons questions of policy because of a risk
of a link, this causes poor decision making and ruins the
process of debate
Pozen 2015 (David E [Associate prof @ Columbia Law]; Privacy-Privacy tradeoffs;
Early draft June 28, 2015 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (2015);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2624281; kdf)
Although it only scratches the surface of debates over surveillance reform, the discussion in Part III demonstrates

privacy-privacy tradeoffs are deeply (if sometimes inconspicuously) woven into the fabric
of these debates. We would find the same thing, Parts I and II indicate, in virtually any area of information
policy. How might we build on these observations? If privacy-privacy tradeoffs cannot be
avoided, how might they be managed? Some basic suggestions emerge from the analysis
above. First, scholars, advocates, and government officials could do a much better job of
identifying and confronting privacy-privacy tradeoffs as tradeoffs. Unless
decisionmakers consider the full set of outcomes associated with each effort to
reduce risk, policy theorists have warned, they will systematically invite [risk-]risk
tradeoffs.76 This warning applies equally in the privacy context. Managing privacy- privacy
tradeoffs requires attention to, and information about, the full range of privacy interests that
may be affected by a decision, the potential conflicts and congruities among those interests, and the
expected distribution and degree of privacy gains and losses. It cannot just be
assumed that because a certain measure causes privacy harm , even serious harm,
privacy would be enhanced overall by jettisoning the measure . Privacy policies and
that

problems cannot be assessed in isolation. Second, the pluralistic turn in privacy theory may need to be qualified or
supplemented in certain respects to accommodate the reality of privacy-privacy tradeoffs .

Pluralistic
theories of privacy, recall, maintain that there are many different valid understandings
of privacy and that none has priority over the others .77 The ability to control ones intimate
relationships is no more or less central to the right of privacy than is the ability to keep secrets or to keep

The danger of this approach is that it increases the likelihood of

intra-privacy conflicts (by recognizing more claims as privacy claims) while simultaneously
depriving us of resources to resolve them (by refusing to supply a hierarchy of
privacy principles). Privacy theory could make itself more relevant to privacy policy
by offering guidance on how to weightor, in cases of incommensurability, how to order various
privacy interests when hard choices must be made among them . These choices
are going to get made, wittingly or unwittingly. The question is not whether
privacy-privacy tradeoffs will be resolved, but whether they can be resolved in a
manner that better serves the ends of privacy, however that ideal is understood and
operationalized. 78 The development of normative frameworks for evaluating
privacy-privacy tradeoffs is an increasingly urgent task for the privacy field.
Third, empirical research could assist in this task. Apart perhaps from situations
where decisionmakers have a strong threshold commitment to one privacy value
over another, they may find it useful to learn how affected parties would assess a tradeoff. And at least in
photographers at bay.

some cases, this information may be attainable. Researchers and regulators can ask people whether and to what
extent they believe an anticipated privacy-privacy tradeoff would be desirable, or design mechanisms that induce
people to reveal their true privacy preferences, and then feed the results into a marginal cost analysis. 79 A pair
of computer scientists recently tried this and found, through a simple survey, that many social network users seem
eager to trade certain forms of personal information for greater control over photographs in which they appear. 80

The very asking of such questions , moreover, may have the salutary effect of raising
anticipated tradeoffs salience and fostering debate .

Adherence to the rule of law is key to ensure stability and

maintain any form of human rights.
ODonnell 04 -- Founding Academic Director and Senior Fellow of the Kellogg
Institute for International Studies (October, Guillermo, Journal of Democracy, Why
the Rule of Law Matters, 15.4, 32-46)//DWB
The rule of law is among the essential pillars upon which any highquality
democracy rests. But this kind of democracy requires not simply a rule of law in the minimal, historical sense
that I will shortly explain. What is needed, rather, is a truly democratic rule of law that
ensures political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in turn
affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state
power. Seen thus, the rule of law works intimately with other dimensions of the quality
of democracy. Without a vigorous rule of law, defended by an independent judiciary, rights are not
safe and the equality and dignity of all citizens are at risk . Only under a democratic rule of
law will the various agencies of electoral, societal, and horizontal accountability function effectively, without

only when the rule of law bolsters

these democratic dimensions of rights, equality, and accountability will the
responsiveness of government to the interests and needs of the greatest number of
citizens be achieved. Although in some of my previous writings readers may find partial attempts at the
obstruction and intimidation from powerful state actors. And

theoretical and normative justification of a democratic rule of law, here I make only passing reference to these
matters. My intention is to contribute to a discussion concerning if and how something called the rule of law, or

the
concluding section of this essay proposes a set of variables for the exploration of
this dimension. Please note that what follows has been formulated with contemporary Latin America centrally
the democratic rule of law, may be conceptualized and, insofar as possible, empirically gauged. To this end,

in mind; it is of course an open question how well it might apply outside this region. The rule of law (like
partially concurrent expressions such as Rechsstaat, tat de droit, or estado de derecho) is a disputed term. For

whatever law exists

is written down and publicly promulgated by an appropriate authority before the
events meant to be regulated by it, and is fairly applied by relevant state institutions including the
the time being, let me assert that its minimal (and historically original) meaning is that

judiciary (though other state institutions can be involved as well). By fairly applied I mean that the administrative
application or judicial adjudication of legal rules is consistent across equivalent cases; is made without taking into
consideration the class, status, or relative amounts of power held by the parties in such cases; and applies
procedures that are preestablished, knowable, and allow a fair chance for the views and interests at stake in each
case to be properly voiced. The following is a minimal but significant criterion: If A is attributed the same generic
rights (and, at least implicitly, the same legal personhood and agency) as the more powerful B with whom A
enters into a crop-sharing arrangement, employment contract, or marriage, then it stands to reason that A has

the right to expect equal treatment from the state institutions that have, or may
acquire, jurisdiction over such acts. This implies formal equality, in two senses. First, it is established in and
by legal rules that are valid (at least1 ) in that they have been sanctioned following previously and carefully

often ultimately regulated by constitutional rules. Second, the rights

and obligations specified are universal, in that they attach to each individual
considered as a legal person, irrespective of social position , with the sole requirement that
dictated procedures,

the individual in question has reached competent legal adulthood and has not been proven to suffer from some
(narrowly defined and legally prescribed) disqualification. These rights support the claim of equal treatment in the
legally defined situations that underlie and may ensue from the kind of acts above exemplified. Equality

all] before the law

is the expectation tendentially inscribed in this kind of equality. There is another

[of

rights and obligations attached to political citizenship by a

democratic regime are a subset of the more general civil rights and obligations
attached to a legal person as a member of a given society. In addition to the well-known
important point: The

participatory rights to vote and run for office in fair elections, I am thinking of the freedoms (of expression,
association, movement, and the like) that are usually considered necessary to the existence of a democratic

In many highly developed countries, these and similar freedoms became

legally sanctioned civil rights well before becoming political freedoms . On the other
hand, strictly speaking there is no rule of law, or rule by laws, not men. All there is, sometimes, is
individuals in various capacities interpreting rules which, according to some preestablished
criteria, meet the condition of being generally considered law . Such a situation is clearly
regime.

superior to a Hobbesian state of nature or the creation and application of rules at the whim of a despot. Yet it is not

certain actions, whether of public or private actors, are secundum legem, that is, in
(interpreted) conformity with what a given law prescribes . For as I illustrate below, an act that
is formally according to law may nonetheless entail the application of a rule that is
invidiously discriminatory or violates basic rights. Or such an act may involve the
selective use of a law against some, even as privileged sectors are enjoying arbitrary exemptions.
enough that

The first possibility entails the violation of moral standards that most countries write into their constitutions and
that nowadays, usually under the rubric of human rights, countries have the internationally acquired obligation to
respect. The second possibility entails the violation of a crucial principle of fairnessthat like cases be treated
alike. Still another possibility is that in a given case the law is applied properly, but by an authority that does not
feel obligated to proceed in the same manner on future equivalent occasions. These cases may be construed as
being ruled by law, but they do not meet the criteria we normally have in mind when using the term rule of

possibilities indicate the absence, or at least serious breaches, of a

reasonable application of what the rule of law is supposed to be.
law. Rather, these

Maintaining the rule of law is key to governmental stability

and legitimacy. Not adhering to the law results in chaos
Licht et al, 03 - Former dean of the Radzyner School of Law,
Lawyer (August, Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt, and
Shalom H. Schwartz, William Davidson Institute at the
University of Michigan, Culture Rules: The Foundations of the
Rule of Law and Other Norms of Governance, Working Paper
Number 605, 1-49) //DWB
Culturally diverse views on the rule of law as a desirable mode of governance date from antiquity. Socrates and

The scholastic debate over the optimal

mechanisms of social order has not subsided since. Collectively referred to as social institutions
(or simply institutions), the rule of law, together with accountability and curbing
corruption, are considered primary mediators for development .1 These principles are the
Confucius expounded the classic and diametrical positions.

central tenets in international institutions policies on good governance and empowerment (IMF 1997, World
Bank 2000, 2001). International bodies are careful to acknowledge that reform programs need to be attentive to
national cultures yet fail to specify ways to achieve this goal. This study seeks to identify the foundations of these
social institutions, in particular, their roots in national culture.

We view the rule of law, curbing

corruption, and accountability as part of a general category of social norms referred to as norms
of governance. Social norms of governance prescribe desirable modes of wielding
political, economic, or other forms of power. We postulate that the potency of such norms depends
upon the prevailing, shared cultural value orientations in a society. We hypothesize that in societies whose
prevailing culture emphasizes the moral equality of individuals and legitimizes

individuals pursuit of their own preferences, we will find greater compliance with
formal legal rules, exercise of discretionary power undistorted by bribes, and
feedback mechanisms of accountability. Societies characterized by such a culture provide a more
transparent normative environment and enable individuals better to plan their moves. But can we measure culture
reliably? To test this broad hypothesis, this study advances a new framework for the discourse of culture and
social institutions. We adopt established theories and empirical data from cross-cultural psychology to
operationalize the cultural profiles of nations. We examine whether profiles of nations on cultural dimensions can
predict perceived national differences in adherence to governance norms. Consistent with our theorizing, we find

Emphases on individual autonomy and egalitarianism in national cultures

correlate positively with better governance. Combining these cultural variables with variables for
that they do.

economic inequality and a history of British rule yields a parsimonious model remarkably predictive of governance

Results of this study enrich our understanding of links

between social institutions and culture. They show how particular types of governance institutions
are intimately related to general cultural characteristics of nations. Crucially, the evidence for such links
is based on rigorous empirical analysis across many nations rather than on
anecdotal speculations about culture and governance in specific nations . We will
and robust to various controls.

address the issue of causal relations among the various factors considered, though we cannot fully resolve it
because these factors interact with one another to engender large-scale social equilibria. We argue, however, that
for better understanding the dynamics of social institutions and for informing policy-making it is crucial to identify
factors that may be more or less susceptible to change. Cultural orientations are relatively stable. They can
therefore impede reform and induce path-dependence in social change. This has implications for development and
reform programs, some of which we discuss.

Disregarding the law invites anarchy.

Brennan 99 - Recipient of the Association Henri Capitant,
Louisiana Chapter award for the best paper on a civil or
comparative law topic at Lousiana State University (Summer,
Maureen F., Louisiana Law Review, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin
Laden Terrorism, the U.S. Response, and the Role of Customary
International Law, Vol. 59 Num. 4, 1195-1223)//DWB
International law protects the fundamental interests of states and their citizens from
abuse by actors in the international system. If the Bradley Goldsmith argument is recognized, the United States

When we disregard
customary international law in our own courts, and allow the Executive to constitutionally violate,
unchecked, international customs with actions like the U.S. missile strikes, we will suffer the
consequences of the precedents we create . As Oscar Schachter has commented, once we
make decisions about the use of force, those decisions "become part of the law-shaping
process, influencing expectations as to the acceptability of future actions influencing
will make a declaration to the world that it has only limited respect for international law.

use of force." 169 The dissent in Alvarez-Machain recognized the risk of treating international law so lightly. The
dissent emphasized the Court's duty to decide according to the rule of law, and cautioned that courts in other
nations would follow the majority's example. 7' It then quoted Justice Brandeis, author of the Erie opinion which
Bradley and Goldsmith rely on so heavily, who foresaw the consequences of a position such as theirs: "In

a
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
observe the law scrupulously... . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy."'

Movement through law good

Incorporating their movement in the law is the only way for
them to solvetheir offense doesnt assume the power that
students have on the legal process
Edwards and Vance 2001 (Pamela [Assistant Professor of Law at CUNY School of Law] and Sheilah
[Assistant Dean for Academic Support and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Villanova University School of Law]; PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: TEACHING SOCIAL JUSTICE THROUGH LEGAL WRITING; 7 Legal Writing 63; kdf)
What issues constitute "social justice"? Social justice is the process of remedying oppression ,
which includes "exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence." n5 Issues of social
justice include problems involving race, ethnicity, and interracial conflict, "class conflict, gender distinctions, ...
religious differences," and sexual orientation conflicts. n6 Social justice also includes public interest work in its

Several important reasons exist that

justify teaching social justice in legal writing courses. Benefits inure to both law students and
many guises. B. Why teach social justice in legal writing courses?

law professors. This section of the article discusses the benefits to law students. 1. Teaching social justice issues
encourages a diverse student body. Some of the benefits of having a diverse student body accrue not only to
members of underrepresented or outsider groups, but also to members of the dominant group or Aingroup.A

by hearing outsider stories, members of the ingroup will develop

the ability to understand the different perspectives and experiences of outsider
groups. n7 These different perspectives and experiences will help to identify and eventually to
eliminate biases in the law. Many times, members of outsider groups are called upon to educate their
ingroup colleagues. Addressing social justice issues in legal writing would expose ingroup
students to alternative perspectives while alleviating some of the burden outsider
students bear to provide this perspective. n8 [*65] 2. Teaching social justice issues maintains student interest.
Scholars have argued that

Students attend law school for a variety of reasons and with differing career aspirations. Even so, most law students
cannot see the connection between first-year mandatory courses and their ultimate careers.

By introducing

issues of social justice early in law school, professors introduce students who entered law school with an
interest in practicing public interest law to situations they will face as attorneys. They especially will begin to
realize the importance of legal writing and research to practitioners by being
exposed to some of the types of writing attorneys engage in on behalf of their
clients. While this is extremely important to professors in schools, such as City University of New York School of
Law, which are devoted to training public interest lawyers, some students in other law schools also desire to
practice public interest law. In addition, law students who come from backgrounds other than white, middle class
backgrounds may find little in law school that bears out their life experiences. In a law review article on his
experiences in school, one Ivy League law school graduate has remarked on "how little of the legal academic world
intersects even with the everyday world of even middle class African-Americans." n9 Although he wrote this in the
context of his property law course, the observation is true in many law school courses. Law professors typically
incorporate in their courses the usually unstated assumption of common experiences that everyone has shared.
However, many outsider students do not share in these "common experiences." 3. Teaching social justice raises and

Issues of race, gender, ethnicity, and

class are central social issues, not marginal ones. As adults, law students can best under-take
critical scrutiny of their personal values and of their individual culture's values,
assumptions, and beliefs. n10 Therefore, faculty should provide students with "disorienting moments" that
will [*66] cause them to question their values and beliefs. n11 This need to expand our students'
horizons is especially critical because legal writing pedagogy silences outsider
voices with its emphasis on an audience of attorneys that is largely white, male and
allegedly "neutral." n12 By raising social justice issues, professors let students know that their prelaw school
addresses issues of race, ethnicity, class, and gender in society.

experiences and concerns have value in the legal profession. n13 4. Teaching social justices supports the creation of

legal writing,
should be reviewed to ensure that course content prepares students to serve a
more sensitive and understanding attorneys. All aspects of the law school curriculum, including

diverse client base. n14 To that end, students must [*67] become more sensitive to, and understanding of,
various cultures and social groups. n15 This sensitivity can arise from making the study of the needs and problems
of clients from underserved communities an essential component of legal education. n16 5. Teaching social justice
broadens students' exposure. In raising social justice issues, a professor helps students develop a broader sense of
the themselves and of the world. Law students are adult learners, and adult learners are in the best position
psychologically to develop a broader sense of self. n17 One of the intellectual challenges of law school should be
students' reassessing their vision of what social justice means to them now and what social responsibility will mean
to them later as attorneys. Raising social justice issues in the classroom is problem-posing education, which is an
adult education theory of challenging learners to critically perceive the world in which they live and their values.

Finally, students should be

exposed to multiethnic and diverse experiences to appreciate fully the pluralism of
contemporary society. n20 [*68] 6. Teaching social justices develops and provides an outlet for students'
n18 Problem-posing education offers possibilities for critical self reflection. n19

voices. Some of the alternative pedagogies that can be used in teaching social justice, such as journals, diaries, or
personal narratives, can provide an outlet for students who feel silenced by traditional legal education. n21

Using
alternative approaches in legal writing teaches the value of both the legal voice and
the personal voice, especially the voice of "outsiders." n23 Perhaps raising multicultural issues
Addressing social justice issues can also minimize the potential for, and damage, of muting. n22

will help those students who, because of their status as outsiders, lose their identity, self-esteem and will to
succeed in law school. n24 Multicultural law students often feel that they are socially isolated in law schools, that
they are invisible, and that they have concerns which are considered unimportant. n25 This has a negative impact
on students' acclimation to law school, their self-confidence, and their academic performance. n26 A number of
articles have discussed the alienation that white women, people of color, gays and lesbians, and other outsiders
face in law schools. n27 One of the manifestations of this alienation is the silencing of alternative voices. n28
Incorporating issues of [*69] importance to these outsider groups in the curriculum will not only encourage ingroup
students to examine the law from another perspective but will also encourage students who are members of
outsider groups to express their ideas and share their experiences in writing, even if they hesitate to speak up in

By
incorporating social justice issues into legal writing classes, legal writing professors will
afford students from outsider groups the opportunity to feel included in law school
class. n29 Students who are members of outsider groups often are made to feel unwelcome in law school.

without a transparent overt effort to do so. The theme of the 2000 Legal Writing Institute Conference was preparing
students for life after the first year of law school. Many schools offer upper level courses on women and the law, on
race relations law, or on legal perspectives, such as critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence. Incorporating
social justice issues into the firstyear legal writing course can help broaden students' perspectives for these courses
by providing a broader foundation for these jurisprudence courses. Moreover, an introduction to alternative schools
of thought on jurisprudence may encourage students to take one of these elective courses. Even students who do
not take one of these elective courses will benefit from an introduction to alternative legal perspectives in the

Writers enthusiastic about their topics are more likely to produce a better
product. Incorporating issues of social justice into legal writing assignments is more
likely to increase student interest in the writing assignment , especially when problems are
curriculum.

based on current events. Examples include the issues of racial profiling by law enforcement officials, or gays in the

teaching
legal writing try to encourage students to focus on the audience who will read the
documents. This approach focuses on predicting how judges and other attorneys expect to receive information;
military and the "don't ask, don't tell" policy. Those professors who use the "process" approach n30 to

however, this focus frequently results in what has been called "regnant" lawyering. n31 Regnant lawyering, the
opposite of client-centered lawyering, puts the attorney's professional expertise ahead of the client's interests. In
teaching law students to think "like lawyers," [*70] professors frequently overlook the client's role in the process.
Some professors try to compensate for this omission by having students draft client letters; however, even in a
client letter, the attorney's expertise is still the focus. Although a client-centered approach may still require
attorneys to translate their clients' stories for other attorneys or judges, this approach encourages attorneys to
focus more on the client as a person rather than solely as a legal issue. However, focusing on the client may result
in a conflict between the client's desires and the attorney's social justice mission. For example, a client's desire to
have his day in court and tell his story may conflict with his attorney believes is the best legal strategy to prevail.
n32 It is never too early to assist students in developing strategies to deal with this type of conflict, including
deciding whether to represent a client and whether to join a particular law firm, law office or other legal

Social justice should be taught in legal writing, before students have

become thoroughly indoctrinated into traditional legal thinking . By the end of the first year,
organization.

many students will have assimilated the language of the law and will be unable or unwilling to see the biases in the

Teaching social justice in legal writing will train students to see the social,
political, and economic implications of the law and the various legal arguments they
make. 7. Teaching social justice introduces students to attorneys' role in developing law. As practitioners,
law. n33

legislators, or judges, attorneys play an important role in developing law, primarily through their writing. Many
people believe that attorneys have a moral obligation to advance the law's justice mission to alleviate the effects of

n34 Attorneys who practice public

interest law (and students who aspire to do so) must consider how the law might be
reinterpreted and reformed to achieve social justice . n35 Legal writing courses are the
perfect place in which to introduce law students to this form of legal analysis. [*71]
oppressive legal and socio-political power structures in society.

No Link
The Greenwald card only talks about things specific to NSA
surveillance, no specific link to the court. Even if there is a link
to the courts in the card it doesnt matter because it is not in
terms of solitary confinement its in terms of NSA surveillance.
Make them read a specific link card about solitary confinement
and the courts or else dont give them the K.

Alt Turn
Constantly demanding that we become critical warriors, that
we join in their game of intellectual masturbation is the nature
of rhetorical criticism. We are never relieved of the duty to
fight the good fight, but because it all exists in our heads,
because the moral spaces and post-modern borders that we
speak of exist only on the pages of books, the K becomes a
method of entrapment and an END to politics.
Mann, 1996, The Nine Grounds of Intellectual Warfare, Postmodern Culture Vol 6 No 2
It would be a mistake to assume that this metamorphosis of discourse as war into discourse on war has occurred

criticism has never been more than a

political effect -- "policy" carried out, and in our case dissipated, by other means.
The long process of seizing politics as the proper object of criticism is one more
tardy phenomenalization of the device . What we witness -- and what difference would it make even if
because criticism has become more political. On the contrary,

I were right? -- is not proof of the politicization of criticism but an after-image of its quite peripheral integration with
forms of geopolitical conflict that are, in fact, already being dismantled and remodeled in war rooms, defense

War talk, like politics talk, like ethics talk, like

all critical talk, is nostalgic from the start. While we babble about territories and
borders, really still caught up in nothing more than a habitual attachment to
disciplinary "space" and anxious dreams of "agency," the technocrats of warfare are
developing strategies that no longer depend on any such topography, strategies far
more sophisticated than anything we have imagined. And we congratulate
ourselves for condemning them, and for our facile analogies between video games
and smart bombs. I would propose two distinct diagnoses of the rise of war talk. On one hand, war
talk is merely another exercise in rhetorical inflation, intended to shore up the
fading value of a dubious product, another symptom of the imaginary politics one
witnesses everywhere in critical discourse, another appearance of a structural
device at the very moment it ceases to operate. On the other hand, war talk might
still indicate the possibility of actually becoming a war machine, of pursuing a military
institutes, and multinational corporate headquarters.

equivalent of thought beyond all these petty contentions, of realizing the truth of discourse as warfare and finally

In the domain of criticism

they function simultaneously, in a perpetual mutual interference; there is no hope of
extricating one from the other, no hope of either becoming critical warriors or being
relieved of the demand that we do so.
beginning to fight. It will be crucial here not to choose between these diagnoses.