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11. 9 years later, Saura filed the present suit for damages against RFC, alleging that
it failed to comply with its obligation in releasing the amount of the loan after it
had been approved
12. The trial court held in favor of Saura, citing that there was a perfected contract
between RFC and Saura and that the former was guilty of breach thereof
ISSUES:
1. WON there was a perfected contract in this case
2. WON Saura is entitled to damages
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes, there is a perfected consensual contract as provided in Art
1934 NCC: An accepted promise to deliver something, by way of Commodatum
or simple loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or simple loan
itself shall not be perfected until the delivery of the object of the contract.
There was undoubtedly offer and acceptance in this case: the application of Saura for a
loan of P500k was approved by RFC and the corresponding mortgage was executed
and registered. However, this alone does not resolve the claim that RFC did not comply
with its obligation.
SECOND ISSUE: No. RFC entertained the loan application on the assumption that the
factory to be constructed will utilize locally grown raw materials. This imposition was by
no means a deviation from the terms of the contract, but a step in its implementation;
the condition did not contradict RFCs resolution approving the loan.
The action taken by both parties (Sauras request to cancel the mortgage) was in
the nature of a mutual desistance (mutuo disenso), which is a mode of
extinguishing obligations. It is derived from the principle that since mutual
agreement can create a contract, mutual disagreement by the parties can cause
its extinguishment.
CAB: Saura did not protest any alleged breach of contract by RFC when it insisted on
using locally sourced raw materials. Its request for cancellation did not carry any
reservation of whatever rights it believed to have against RFC for the latters noncompliance. It was only after 9 years that Saura initiated the action for damag es. All
these circumstances demonstrate beyond doubt that the said agreement had been
extinguished by mutual desistance and that on the initiate of the petitioner itself.
that Lozano did not collect from the respondent bank on the date it was executed is
immaterial. A contract to loan being a consensual contract, the herein contract of
loan was perfected at the same time the contract of mortgage was executed. The
promissory note is only an evidence of indebtedness and does not indicate lack of
consideration.
Petitioners argument that the mortgage was void for being executed by one who is not
owner of the property is likewise untenable. Petitioners failed to consider the provisions
of the Deed of Mortgage which prohibits the sale, disposition or mortgage of the
property without the written consent of the mortgagee and in spite of said provision if the
mortgaged property is sold, the vendee shall assume the mortgage in the terms and
conditions under which it was constituted. These were expressly stipulated in the Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
In the case at bar, petitioners did not secure the consent of the bank to the sale
with assumption of mortgage. Since the sale/assignment was not registered, the
title remained in the name of the spouses Lozano insofar as the respondent bank
was concerned.
The bank had every right to rely on the certificate of title. It was not bound to go
behind the same to look for flaws in the mortgagors title, the doctrine of innocent
purchaser for value being applicable to an innocent mortgagee for value.
Moreover, a mortgage follows the property whoever the possessor may be and
subjects the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. It
can also be said that petitioners voluntarily assumed the mortgage when they
entered into the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. As such, they are
stopped from impugning its validity.
ON THE FORECLOSURE
1. Respondent bank, not being a party to the Deed of Sale, can validly claim that it
was not aware of the same and as such, it may not be obliged to notify
petitioners.
2. Honesto was not entitled to any notice since he had assigned all his rights and
interests over the property in favor of Raoul and that PBCOM was also not
informed of the same
3. Raoul is not entitled to notice for the same reason
4. Act no 3135 does not require personal notice on the mortgagor. The requirement
is that the notice shall be published once a week for at least 3 consecutive weeks
a in newspaper of general circulation in the city/municipality
NOTE: To be a news paper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the
dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription
list of paying subscribers, and that it is published at regular intervals.
Petitioners had no right to redeem the property since they were not validly substituted
as debtors since the consent of PBCOM was not secured to the sale with assumption of
The loan of petitioner corporation from PCIB were supposed to become due only at the
time that it receives from NIDC and PDCP the proceeds of the approved financing
scheme but this did not happen. NIDC refused to release the balance of the loan after it
had made two release amounting to P200,000. The efficacy or obligatory force of a
conditional obligation is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain
event so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would
stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.
Moreover, there was no demand on the part of PCIB prior to filing the present complaint
for the collection of petitioners indebtedness. For an obligation to become due, there
must generally be a demand. Default generally begins from the moment the
creditor demands the performance of the obligation. Without such demand,
judicial or extrajudicial, the effects of default will not arise. This issue had not
been properly determined by the lower court.
B. Reciprocal Obligations
The loan agreements between Rose Packing and PCI are reciprocal obligations,
i.e. the obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for that of the
other. A contract of loan is not a unilateral contract as PCIB thinks it is. The promise of
petitioner to pay is the consideration for the obligation of PCIB to furnish the loan
PCIBs designation of its own choice of people holding key positions in petitioner
corporation tied the hands of petitioners board of directors to make decisions for the
interest of the corporation, in fact, undermined the corporations financial stability.
During the 18 months of Ledesmas management, Rose Packing produced only
P200,000 worth of canned goods which is only equivalent to its normal production in 3
weeks.
C. Elements of a contract: Consideration
It is apparent that it is respondent bank practically managing petitioner
corporation through its representatives occupying key positions therein. Thus, if
ever petitioner corporation was in financial straits, it was because of the
mismanagement of the PCIB through its representatives in petitioner corporation.
In a similar case, it was held that where the lending institution took over the
management of the borrowing corporation and led the corporation to bankruptcy
through mismanagement or misappropriation of the funds, it is as if the loan was never
delivered to it. Thus, there was failure on the part of PCIB to deliver the consideration
for which the mortgage and assignment of deed were executed.
D. Foreclosure of the Pasig properties
As a consequence, the real estate mortgage of petitioner cannot be entirely foreclosed
to satisfy its total debt to PCIB. The rule of indivisibility of a real estate mortgage under
Art 2089 provides:
Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the debt may
be divided among the successors in interest of the debtor or of the
creditor.
Therefore the debtor's heir who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for
the proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or mortgage as the debt is
not completely satisfied.
Neither can the creditor's heir who received his share of the debt return
the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of the other heirs who
have not been paid.
From these provisions is excepted the case in which, there being several
things given in mortgage or pledge, each one of them guarantees only a
determinate portion of the credit.
The debtor, in this case, shall have a right to the extinguishment of the
pledge or mortgage as the portion of the debt for which each thing is
specially answerable is satisfied.
This rule, however, is not applicable to the instant case as it presupposes several
heirs of the debtor or creditor which does not obtain in this case. Furthermore,
granting that there was consolidation of the entire loan, the rule of indivisibility of
mortgage cannot apply where there was failure on the part of respondent bank for
the mismanagement of the affairs of petitioner corporation and where said bank
is in default in complying with its obligation to release the amount of P710,000. In
fact, the real estate mortgage becomes unenforceable. And as already stated, the exact
amount of petitioners total debt is still unknown.
b. The loan was actually released on March 31, 1871 when BPIIC issued a
cancellation of the mortgage of Roas loan
9. Private respondents maintained that following Art 1934 NCC, a simple loan is
perfected upon the delivery of the object of the contract, hence a real contract.
The ruling in Bonnevie should be construed to mean that while the contract to
extend the loan was perfected on March 1981, the loan itself was only perfected
upon the delivery of the full loan on September 13, 1982.
a. Even if the loan contract was perfected on March 31, 1981, their payment did
not start a month thereafter, so no default took place.
b. Private respondents contended that a perfected loan agreement imposes
reciprocal obligations. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs a delay if
the other does not comply or is not ready to comply with his obligation.
Applying this, private respondents did not incur delay since it was only on
September 13 that BPIIC fully complied with its obligation under the loan
contract
ISSUE: WON a contract of loan is a consensual contact in the light of the rule laid down
in Bonnevie v. CA
HELD: No, a loan contract is not a consensual contract but a real contract. It is
perfected only but the delivery of the object of the contract. Petitioner misapplied
the ruling in Bonnevie. The contract in Bonnevie falls under the first clause of Art 1934,
it is an accepted promise to deliver something by way of simple loan.
As held in the case of Saura Import v. DBP, a perfected consensual contract can give
rise to an action for damages. However, said contract does not constitute the real
contract of loan which requires the delivery of the object of the contract for its perfection,
and which gives rise to obligations only on the part of the borrower.
CAB: The loan contract between BPIIC and ALS and Litonjua, was only perfected on
September 13, 1982, the date the full loan was released. As such, the obligation of the
private respondents to pay commenced only on October 13, 1982, a month after the
perfection of the contract.
Moreover, a contract of loan involves a reciprocal obligation, wherein the
obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for that of the other. Here,
the promise of BPIIC to extend and deliver the loan is upon the consideration that ALS
and Litonjua will pay the monthly amortization beginning May 1, 1981. It is a basic
principle in reciprocal obligations that neither party incurs in delay, if the other
does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is
incumbent upon him. Only when a party has performed his part of the contract can he
demand that the other party also fulfill his obligation. As such, BPIIC can only demand
payment after September 13, 1982 and the starting date for foreclosure is October 13,
1982.
ON MORAL DAMAGES
Following the ruling in SSS, BPIIC cannot be declared to have acted in bad faith as
such, the award of moral and exemplary damages is improper.
However, BPIIC was negligent in merely relying on the entries found in the Deed of
Mortgage, without checking and adjusting its records on the amount actually released to
respondents. Such negligence resulted in damage to private respondents, for which an
award of nominal damages is proper.
c. Debtor is liable even for a fortuitous event when the obligation is to deliver a
determinate thing
2. Mora accipiendi delay on the part of the creditor without justifiable reason to
accept the performance of the obligation
Requisites:
a. An offer of performance by the debtor who has the required capacity
b. The offer must be to comply with the prestation as it should be performed;
and
c. The creditor refuses the performance without just cause
ISSUE: WON respondent bank committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon as
cardholder
HELD: Yes.
Usually the relationship between a credit card provider and its cardholders is
understood to be that of creditor-debtor, with the card company as creditor extending
loans and credit to the cardholder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the creditor.
However, it is more sensible to regard the card company as debtor/obligor insofar as the
obligation to the customer as creditor/obligee to act promptly on its purchases on credit.
If there was delay on the part of the card company in its normal role as creditor to the
cardholder, such delay would not have been in the acceptance of the performance of
the debtors obligation (i.e., repayment of the debt), but it would delay in the
extension of credit. Such delay would not fall under mora accipiendi, which
contemplates that the obligation of the debtor, such as the actual purchases on
credit, has already been constituted. Here, the establishment of the debt itself had
not yet been perfected, as it remained pending the approval of the respondent
card company.
CAB: A total time lapse of 1 hour and 18 minutes occurred and even then, the approval
was conditional as it directed the store to ask for positive identification of cardholder.
One hour appears to be awfully long, patently unreasonable length of time to approve or
disapprove a credit card purchase.
Thus, the failure of the respondent is not the failure to timely approve the petitioners
purchase, but the failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably.
MORAL DAMAGES
Moral damages are due in cases of breach of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. The respondent bank acted in bad faith when it failed to
timely act on the authorization of the purchase. This amounts to a wanton and
deliberate refusal to comply with is contractual obligations, or at least abuse of its rights,
under the contract.
It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is entitled to damages is not
simply because respondent incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability
lies under Art 1170, led to particular injuries under Art 2217 for which moral damages
are remunerative.
What is involved here is a loan of transaction. On the sale was perfected. But the
contract of loan was not perfected because there was no delivery of money to the credit
card holder.
COMMODATUM
REPUBLIC V. BAGTAS, 6 SCRA 262 (1962)
EN BANC; J. PADILLA
FACTS: In May 1948, Jose Bagtas borrowed from the Republic, through the Bureau of
Animal Industry, 3 bulls for a period of 1 year from May 1948 to May 1949 for breeding
purposes subject to a breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the bulls. The three bulls
were valued as:
a. Sindhi P1,176.46
b. Bhagnari P1,320.56
c. Sahiniwal P744.46 (died during a Huk raid)
1. Upon the expiration of the contract, Bagtas asked for a renewal of another 1
year. However, the Secretary of Agriculture approved the renewal thereof of only
1 bull and requested the return of the other 2.
2. As such, Bagtas notified the Director of the Animal Industry of his intention to
purchase the bulls subject to depreciation. The Director, however, advised him
that the value of the 3 bulls could not be reduced and they either be returned or
pay the book value not later than October 1950.
3. Bagtas failed to pay the book value or to return the bulls. As such, the Republic
filed an action against Bagtas for the return of the 3 bulls loaned to him or the
payment of their book value amounting to P3,241.45 and unpaid breeding fee,
both with interests and cost.
4. Bagtas averred that he could not return the bulls nor pay their value because of
the bad peace and order situation in Cagayan Valley, and pending the appeal he
filed before the Secretary of Agriculture to deduct depreciation costs from the
book value of the bulls
5. The trial court held in favor of the Republic and ordered Bagtas to pay the total
value of the 3 bulls plus breeding fees with interests on both sums at the legal
rate from the filing of the complaint
6. As the surviving spouse of Bagtas, Felicidad filed a motion alleging that the two
bulls were returned to the Bureau of Animal Industry sometime in November
1958 and the third bull, died from a gunshot wound during a Huk raid
7. Respondent alleged that she could not be held liable for the two bulls as they had
already been returned. Respondent alleged that the contract was a commodatum
and as such, the Republic retained ownership or title to the bull should it suffer
loss due to force majeure
ISSUE: WON the respondent is liable for the loss of the bull even if due to a fortuitous
event
HELD: Yes.
A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. If the breeding is considered a
compensation, then the contract would be a lease of the bull. Under Art 1671 NCC,
the lessee would be subject to the responsibilities of a possessor in bad faith because
she had continued possession of the bull after the expiry of the contract.
Even if the contract is a commodatum, the respondent is still liable under Art 1942 which
provides that a bailee in a contract of commodatum:
1. Is liable for the loss of things, even if it should be through a fortuitous event
2. If he keeps it longer than the period stipulated
3. If the thing loaned has been delivered with the appraisal of its value, unless there
is a stipulation exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of the fortuitous
event
CAB: The original period of the loan was from May 1948 to May 1949. The loan of one
bull was renewed for another one year to end on May 1950. But Bagtas kept and used
the bull until November 1953 when it was killed during a Huk raid. Furthermore, when it
was delivered and loaned to Bagtas, the bulls each had an appraised value and there
was no stipulation in the loan agreement that respondent is exempt from liability in case
of the loss of the bull due to fortuitous event.
Since Bagtas had already returned two bulls, the estate of the decedent is only liable for
the sum of P859.63, the value of the bull which has not been returned.
without any need of judicial pronouncement. Act 627 by its terms is not self-executory
and requires the implementation by the Court of Land Registration. Since its effect is
forfeiture, Act 627 must be strictly construed so as to safeguard private respondents
rights.
Since there is no order rendered by the Land Registration Court, it necessarily follows
that it never become public land through the operation of Act 627. To assume otherwise
is to deprive private respondents of their property without due process of law.
COURT JUDGMENTS CANNOT BE PRESUMED
Court judgments are not to be presumed. If it could be contended that such a judgment
may be presumed, it could equally be contended that Domingo Baloy presumably
seasonably filed a claim, in accordance with the presumption that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns.
On the other hand, private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors
house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and convent were
destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed
its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee.
The bailees failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did
not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust
the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner
came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of
petitioner by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive
prescription because of the absence of just title.
RES JUDICATA
CA did not err in ruling that said findings are res judicata between the parties. They can
no longer be altered by presentation of evidence because those issues were resolved
with finality a long time ago. To ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the
door to endless litigations by continuous determination of issues without end.
Under Art 2180 NCC, employers shall be held primarily and solidarily liable for damages
caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. To hold the
employer liable under this provision, it must be shown that an employer-employee
relationship exists, and that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the act complained of was committed.
CAB: There is no dispute that Atienza was an employee of petitioner. Petitioner also did
not deny that Atienza was acting within the scope of his authority was assistant branch
manager when he assisted Doronilla in withdrawing the funds from Sterelas savings
account and in transfer the funds to Sterelas current. His acts of helping Doronilla were
obviously done in furtherance of petitioners interests, even though in the process,
Atienza violated some petitioners rules.
that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid, in which
case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum.
Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.
Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.
In commodatum the bailor retains the ownership of the thing loaned, while
in simple loam ownership passes to the borrower.
Art. 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible
thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor
an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
In a simple loan or mutuum, as contrasted to commodatum, the borrower acquires
ownership of the money, goods or personal property borrowed. Being the owner, the
borrower can dispose of the thing borrowed and his act will not be considered
misappropriation thereof.
As held in US v. Ibanez, the debtor cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa under
said article, by merely refusing to pay or by denying the indebtedness.
It appears that respondent judge failed to appreciate the distinction between mutuum
and commodatum, when he performed the questioned acts. He mistook the transaction
between petitioners and private respondents to be commodatum wherein the borrower
does not acquire ownership over the thing borrowed and has the duty to return the
same thing to the lender.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act, the Municipal court has jurisdiction over criminal
cases where the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for more than 6 years of a fine not exceeding P6,000 or both.
CAB: the amounts allegedly misappropriated by petitioners ranged from P20,000 to
P50,000. The penalty for misappropriation of such magnitude exceeds prision
correccional or 6 years of imprisonment. As such, even if we are to assume that the
complaints constitute the crime of estafa, the Municipal court had no jurisdiction to try
them on the merits.
despite the rule that in an action for declaratory relief, other than a declaration of
rights and obligations, affirmative reliefs are not awarded to parties
8. CA affirmed the same but deleted the return of the balance of the rental deposits
and of amounts representing the VAT and rental adjustment
ISSUE: WON the amount of rentals due respondents should be adjusted by reason of
extraordinary inflation or devaluation
HELD: No.
When the parties speak of devaluation as stipulated in the lease contract, they really did
not intend to depart from Art 1250. Thus, the clause should be read in harmony with Art
1250.
Art 1250 reads: In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated
should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the
obligation shall be the basis of the payment, unless there is an agreement to the
contrary.
Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money, or credit or both,
without a corresponding increase in business transaction. There is inflation when
there is an increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods,
resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price level. The SC
explained extraordinary inflation as: There is extraordinary inflation when there exists a
decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the Peso which is unusual or
beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such increase
or decrease could have been reasonably foreseen or manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the obligation.
Based on the facts presented, there is no extraordinary inflation or devaluation that
would justify the application of Art 1250. Absent an official pronouncement or
declaration by competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation
during a given period, the effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied
NATURE OF DECLARATORY RELIEF
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will,
contract or nay other instrument, to determine any question of construction or validity
arising from the instrument, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
The only issue to be resolved in such a petition is the question of construction or validity
of the provisions of an instrument
REQUISITES OF DECLARATORY RELIEF
1. The subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, or other written
instrument
2. The terms of the documents or instruments and the validity thereof are doubtful
and require judicial construction
6. Petitioner also contends that the informations sufficiently alleged all the elements
of qualified theft, citing that a perusal of the informations will show that they
specifically allege that the respondents were the cashier and bookkeeper of the
bank, and that they took various amounts of money with grave abuse of
confidence and without the knowledge and consent of the bank
7. On the other hand, respondents contend that the instant petition is the wrong
mode of appeal because a finding of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest presupposes an evaluation of facts and circumstances.
Moreover, it is the DOJ Secretary who should file the petition for review
considering that the incident was endorsed by the DOJ
ISSUE: WON the bank is the real-party-interest to file the complaint for qualified theft
against Puig and Porras
HELD: Yes.
It is beyond doubt that tellers, cashiers, bookkeepers and other employees of a bank
who come into possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the confidence
reposed in them by their employer. Banks, on the other hand, where the monies are
deposited, are considered the owners thereof. This is clearly not only from the
express provisions of law but from established jurisprudence. The relationship
between banks and depositors has been held to be that of a creditor and debtor
as provided in Art 1953 and Art 1980.
In a long line of cases involving qualified theft, the SC has firmly established the nature
of possession by the bank of the money deposits therein, and the duties being
performed by its employees who have custody of the money or who have come into
possession of it. The SC has consistently considered the allegations in the information
that such employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and
prejudice of the bank, without particularly referring to it as owner of the money deposits
as sufficient to make out a case of qualified theft.
In Roque v. People, the SC held: since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and
the bank places money in the tellers possession due to the confidence reposed on the
teller, the felony of qualified theft would be committed.
Similarly, in the case of People v. Sison, the SC held: (appellant) could not committed
the crime had he not been holding the position of Luneta Branch Operation Officer
which gave him not only sole access to the bank vault. The management of the bank
reposed its trust and confidence in the appellant as its branch operation officer, and it
was this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and
prejudice of the bank.
In People v. Locson, the SC held: When the defendant, with grave abuse of confidence,
removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent of the bank,
there was taking as contemplated in the crime of qualified theft.
In all cases, it is clear that the crime was committed with grave abuse of confidence and
without knowledge or consent of the bank, without necessarily stating the phrase, of a
relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between respondents and
the offended party that has created a high degree of confidence between them, which
respondents abused, and without using the word owner in lieu of the bank were
considered to have satisfied the test of sufficiency of allegations.
In fine, the bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients; and the
employees of the bank, who are entrusted with the possession of money of the bank
due to the confidence reposed in them, occupy positions of confidence. The
informations, therefore, sufficiently allege all essential elements constituting qualified
theft.
ELEMENTS OF THEFT
As defined in Art 308 RPC, there is theft when the following elements concur:
(1) Intent to gain
(2) Unlawful taking
(3) Personal property belonging to another
(4) Absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things
ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED THEFT
(1) Taking of personal property
(2) That said property belongs to another
(3) That said taking be done with intent to gain
(4) That it be done without the owners consent
(5) That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor force upon things
(6) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence
SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION
Sec 6, Rule 110 ROC provides that the information must state the acts or omissions
complained of as constitutive of the offense. Sec 9 also provides that the circumstances
must stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used
in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense as being charged, as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances.
DOJ AS PRINCIPAL PARTY
As held in Mobilia Products v. Hajime Umezawa: In a criminal case in which the
offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party
is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by
the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or
acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect
thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of
an appeal, by the State only through OSG.
INTEREST
TAN V. VALDEHUEZA, 66 SCRA 61 (1975)
EN BANC; J. CASTRO
FACTS: In May 1955, a parcel of land was the subject matter of a public auction sale in
which plaintiff Tan was the highest bidder. Due to the failure of respondent Valdehueza
to redeem the said property, the provincial sheriff executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Tan
1. Subsequently, Valdehueza executed two documents of Deed of Pacto de Recto
Sale in favor of plaintiff, over 2 portions of a parcel of land for the amount of
P1,500
2. However, from the execution of the pacto de recto sale, Valdehueza remained in
possession of the land
3. As such, plaintiff Tan filed an action against Valdehueza for the declaration of
ownership and recovery of possession of the parcel of land (one bought at
auction); and consolidation of ownership of two portions of another parcel
(unregistered) of land (subject of pacto de recto)
4. The trial court held in favor of plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay P1,200 with
legal interest of 6% as of August 1966 within 90 days (first action) and; P300 with
legal interest of 6% as guaranty of the said amount of payment (second action)
ISSUE: WON the unregistered deed of pacto de recto is a simple loan
HELD: No. The trial court treated the registered deed of pacto de retro as an equitable
mortgage but considered the unregistered deed of pacto de retro "as a mere case of
simple loan, secured by the property thus sold under pacto de retro," on the ground that
no suit lies to foreclose an unregistered mortgage. It would appear that the trial judge
had not updated himself on law and jurisprudence; he cited, in support of his ruling, Art
1875 of the old Civil Code and decisions of this Court circa 1910 and 1912.
Under Art 1875 of the Civil Code of 1889, registration was a necessary requisite for the
validity of a mortgage even as between the parties, but under Art2125 of the new Civil
Code (in effect since August 30,1950), this is no longer so.
The Valdehuezas having remained in possession of the land and the realty taxes having
been paid by them, the contracts which purported to be pacto de retro transactions are
presumed to be equitable mortgages, whether registered or not, there being no third
parties involved.
INTEREST
The imposition of legal interest on the amounts subject of the equitable mortgages,
P1,200 and P300, respectively, is without legal basis, for, "No interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing." (Art 1956 NCC) Furthermore, the
plaintiff did not pray for such interest; her thesis was a consolidation of ownership,
which was properly rejected, the contracts being equitable mortgages.
6. The trial court ruled in favor of PNB holding IRC and Santos solidarily liable for
the payment of the loan with interests at the rate of 9% per annum from the
maturity dates of the two promissory notes on January 11 and February 6, 1968.
The court also ordered OBM to pay IRC and Santos whatever amounts the latter
will pay to PNB with interest from date of payment
7. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court decision but deleted the judgment ordering
OBM to pay IRC and Santos whatever amount they will pay to PNB
ISSUES: WON OBM should be held liable for interests on the deposit of IRC and
Santos from the time in ceased operations until it resumed business
HELD: No.
It should be deemed read into every contract of deposit with a bank that the obligation
to pay interest on the deposit ceases the moment the operation of the bank is
completely suspended by the Central Bank. This is because what enables a bank to pay
stipulated interest on money deposited with it is that its ability to generate funds.
A distinction must be made between the interest which the deposits should earn from
their existence until the bank ceased to operate, and that which they may earn from the
time the banks operations were stopped until the date of payment of the deposits. As to
the first, it should be paid because such interest has been earned in the ordinary course
of the banks businesses and before the latter has been declared in a state of
liquidation. Moreover, the bank being authorized by law to make use of the deposits
within the limitation stated, to invest the same in its business and other operations, it
may be presumed that it bound itself to pay interest to the depositors as in fact it paid
interest prior to the dates of the claims. As to the interest which may be charged from
the date the bank ceased to do business because it was declared in a state of
liquidation, said interests should not be paid. It is utterly unfair to award private
respondent his prayer for payment of interest on his deposit during the period that the
bank was not allowed by the Central Bank to operate.
INTEREST PAID AS DAMAGES
While it is true that under Art 1956 no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in writing, this applies only to interest for the use of money. It does not
comprehend interest paid as damages. This is true with respect to the stipulated
interest, but the obligations consisting as they did in the payment of money under Art
1108 he has the right to recover damages resulting from the default of OBM and the
measure of such damages is interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the amounts
due and unpaid at the expiration of the periods respectively provided in the contracts.
The applicable rule is that legal interest, in the nature of damages for non-compliance
with an obligation to pay a sum of money, is recoverable from the date judicial or
extrajudicial demand is made. In the case at bar, the demand was made by PNB after
the maturity of the time deposit. The measure of such damages, there being no
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon in the
certificate of deposit which is 6.5%. such interest due or accrued shall further earn legal
interest from the time of judicial demand.
OBM IS NOT LIABLE TO REIMBURSE IRC AND SANTOS
It must be noted that their liability to pay the various interests of 9% on the principal
obligation, 1.5% additional interest and 1% penalty interest is an offshoot of their failure
to pay under the terms of the two promissory executed in favor of PNB. OBM was not a
party to the promissory notes. There is no privity of contract between OBM and PNB
which will justify the imposition of said interests upon OBM.
TRANSACTION BETWEEN PNB AND IRC IS A PLEDGE
The facts and circumstances leading to the execution of the deed of assignment yield
the conclusion that it is in fact a pledge. The deed of assignment has satisfied the
requirements of a contract of pledge:
1. It is constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation
2. The pledgor is the absolute owner of the thing pledged
3. The persons constituting the pledge have the free disposal of their property and
in the absence thereof, they may be legally authorized for the purpose
The further requirement that the thing pledged be placed in the possession of the
creditor, or of a third person by common agreement, was complied with by the execution
of deed of assignment to PNB.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
ISSUE: If respondent spouses Aquino were not in delay, what should they have
been held liable for in accordance with law?
HELD: To pay theprincipal and the regular or monetary interest.
Since respondents were held not to have been in delay, they were properly liable only
for:
a) The principal of the loan; and
b) Regular or monetary interest in the amount of 17% per annum.
They were not liable for penalty or compensatory interest, fixed by the promissory note
in Account No. IF-82-0904-AA at 2% per month or 24% per annum.
ART. 2209 of CC provides that the appropriate measure for damages in case of delay in
discharging an obligation consisting of the payment of a sum or money, is the
a) payment of penalty interest at the rate agreed upon; and
b) in the absence of a stipulation of a particular rate of penalty interest, then the
payment of additional interest at a rate equal to the regular monetary interest;
and
c) if no regular interest had been agreed upon then payment of legal interest or 6%
per annum
The fact that respondents were not in default did not mean that they were relieved
from the payment not only of penalty or compensatory interest at the rate f 24%
per annum but also of regular or monetary interest of 17% per annum.
The regular or monetary interest continued to accrue under the terms of the
relevant Promissory note until actual payment is effected. The payment of
regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and thus, until
the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to
accrue since the debtor continues to use such principal amount.
Art. 1256 provides that where the creditor unjustly refuses to accept payment, the
debtor desirous of being released from his obligation must comply with 2 conditions:
a) tender payment; and
b) consignation of the sum due.
Tender of payment must be accompanied or followed by consignation in order that the
effects of payment may be produced. A written tender of payment without consignation
in court of the sum due, does not suspend the accruing of regular or monetary interest.
In the instant case, respondent, while they are properly regarded as having made a
written tender of payment to petitioner State, failed to consign in court the amount due
at the time of the maturity of their loan. It follows that their obligation to pay principal
loan, regular or monetary interest under the terms and conditions of the loan contract
was not extinguished by such tender of payment alone.
For the respondents to continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to
continue to use the same after maturity of the loan without payment of regular or
monetary interest, would constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the respondents at
the expense of petitioner State even though the spouses had not been guilty of delay.
Petition for review is granted. The decision of the CA and the RTC are reversed and set
aside. Ordering the petitioner to immediately release the pledge and to deliver to the
respondent spouses the shares fof stock upon full payment of the principal amount of
loan plus 17% per annum regular interest computed from the time of maturity of the
respondents loan and until full payment of such principal and interest to petitioner.
and in the process, prolong the period within which to deliver the title to the buyer free
from any liens or encumbrances. Additionally, by not issuing or delivering the title to the
private respondent upon full payment thereof, Casa Filipina had already violated the
explicit mandate of the first sentence of Sec 25 of PD 957.
REMEDY AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT
It is clear in the OAALA decision that rescission is being ordered only in the event that
specific performance is not feasible. Moreover, petitioner is already stopped from raising
this issue because when it filed an appeal to HLURB, it prayed that: (a) it be given
period/time to redeem the title; or the demand for issuance of title be suspended from
Comsavings Bank before any deed of absolute sale be executed so that the TCT can be
issued and/or refund be ordered.
It should be noted that OAALA found as a fact that private respondent was ready, willing
and able to pay for the expenses for the transfer of title as stipulated in the contract to
sell.
CASTELLO V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MILAGROS DELA ROSA, 224 SCRA 180
(1995)
3RD DIVISION; J. FELICIANO
FACTS: In October 1982, petitioners Castello, Banson and Depante entered into a
Contract of Conditional Sale with private respondent Dela Rosa over a parcel of land.
The agreed price was P269,408. Upon signing the contract, Dela Rosa paid petitioners
P106,000 leaving a balance of P163,408
1. the Deed of Conditional Sale stipulated that:
a. The balance (P163,408) shall be paid on or before December 31, 1982
without interest and penalty charges
b. Should the balance remain unpaid, the vendee (Dela Rosa) shall be
given a grace period of 6 months (up to June 30, 1983) to pay the
balance provided that the interest rate of 12% per annum shall be
charged and 1% penalty charge a month shall be imposed on the
remaining diminishing balance
2. Dela Rosa was unable to pay the remaining balance on or before June 30, 1983.
As such, petitioners filed an action for specific performance with damages
against private respondent
3. The RTC ordered the rescission of the Deed of Conditional sale
4. On appeal, petitioners question the trial courts decision in rescinding the deed of
conditional sale. They claimed that rescission of the contract was only an
alternative relief available under NCC, while they prayed for specific performance
with damages
5. CA set aside the trial court decision and ordered Dela Rosa to pay the balance of
the conditional sale with interest and in default thereof, rescission
6. Accordingly, a Sheriffs Notice to Pay Judgment was served on Dela Rosa
requiring her to pay petitioners P197,723.68 based on:
Principal
P 163,408
Plus interest 12% (per contract)
From Nov 21, 1986 to Sept 2, 1988
P 34,315.68
arising from delay in the discharge of obligations consisting of the payment of a sum of
money referred to in Art 2209 is not confined to a loan or forbearance of money. The SC
has, for instance, consistently applied Art 2209 in the determination of interest properly
payable where there was default in the payment of price or consideration under a
contract of sale, as in the case at bar.
The stipulation in the Deed of Conditional Sale requiring the payment of interest is not
unlawful. The validity of the contract of conditional sale itself has not been put to
question by private respondent and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the
same may be contrary to law, morals, good custom and public order or public policy.
Accordingly, the contractual stipulation must be regarded as binding and enforceable as
the law between the parties.
Therefore:
(1) During the period from January 1, 1983 up to June 30, 1983, private respondent
Dela Rosa was bound to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the unpaid
balance of P163,408
(2) Starting July 1, 1983 and until full payment, Dela Rosa was bound to pay interest
at the rate of 12% per annum plus another 12% per annum (or 1% penalty
charge per month), or a total of 24% per annum to be computed on the remaining
diminishing balance.
2 fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama Japan for delivery vessel SS
Eastern Comet owned by defendant Eastern Shipping company under bill of lading.
The shipment was insured under respondents Marine Insurance company.
2. Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila, it was discharged unto the custody of Metro Port
Service, Inc. (arrastre operator) The latter excluded one drum, said to be in bad order,
which damage was unknown to respondent.
3. Allied Brokerage Corp. (broker) received the shipment from Metro Port, one drum
opened and without seal (per request for Bad Order Survey)
4. Allied Brokerage Corp made deliveries of the shipment to the consignees warehouse.
The latter excluded one drum which contained spillages, while the rest of the contents
was fake.
5. Respondent contended that due to losses/damage sustained by said drum, the
consignee suffered losses totaling P19,000 due to the fault and negligence of petitioner.
Claims were presented against the petitioner but the latter refused to pay the same.
6. As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee
P19,000 under the marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all the
rights of action of said consignee against the petitioner herein.
7. Eastern shipping alleged that the shipment was discharged in good order from the
vessel unto the custody of Metro Port Service so that any damage/losses incurred after
the shipment was turned over to the latter, is no longer its liability.
8. Metro port contended that although subject shipment was discharged unto its custody,
portion of the same was already in bad order
9. Allied brokerage alleged that plaintiff has no cause of action against it, not having
negligent or at fault for the shipment was already in damage and bad order when
received by it, it still exercised extra ordinary care and diligence in the handling/delivery
of the cargo to consignee in the same condition shipment was received by it.
10. Issue found by the trial court are:
11.
12.
13.
14.
run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only form the date the judgment of the court is
made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2,above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.
Petition granted. Appealed decision is affirmed with modification that the legal interest
to be paid is 6% on the amount due computed from the decision of the court a quo. 12%
interest, in lieu of 6% shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision
until the payment thereof.