Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 32

The Simmering Cauldrons of Madhya Bharat

an account of left wing terrorism

Genesis
It is commonly accepted that domestic terrorism based on a
political ideology is defined by the genesis of the Naxalbari incidents of
1967.

Charu Mazumdar, leading a break-away faction of the

Communist Party of India (Marxist), {CPI (M)}, with Kanu Sanyal as


his activist collaborator, is deemed the originator of the violent,
extremist Naxalites.
The term itself comes from the village of Naxalbari, in the
Darjeeling district of north Bengal, where hired ruffians beat up a tribal
peasant who had been granted land owning rights by the local court.
The court had merely upheld the land tenancy Acts. In retaliation the
tribals arose and attacked the landlord's hired men, and the incident,
the 'Naxalbari Incident' as reported by the press coined the term
Naxalites.
It would be pertinent to note that the earliest evidence of some
form of grass roots revolt against established authority can be traced
to the then new state of Madras in Jul 1948 for the establishment of a
separate Telugu speaking state.
In 1967, C Pulla Reddy revived the agitation, this time for the
Telengana region to split from Andhra Pradesh to form a separate
state. A peasant revolution with several; incidents of violence erupted
in the Srikakulam district of the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh.
Srikakulam has, since, been synonymous with violent rural unrest
tenuously linked, by the simultaneity of the rural uprisings, with
Naxalbari.
The original inspiration for violent protest against established
authority is Marxian thought, morphed by the social revolutions in

Russia and China. The undivided Communist Party of India (CPI) was
the source for the basic ideology, though not directly responsible for
the resultant actions.

In fact, Charu Mazumdar split from the CPI

(Marxist){CPI(M)}, and created the CPI(Marxist-Leninist)){CPI(M-L)},


because he objected to the CPI(M) in West Bengal agreeing to
participate in a coalition government and taking part in the electoral
process.
In the late 1960s and through the 1970s, the Naxalites had an
aura which attracted the bright and brilliant from all walks of life,
particularly young idealistic students of universities

(see Hazaroan Khwaishen

Aisee a recent art film from Bollywood).

The professed morality itself was magnetic to idealists a dj


vu of the 1848 French Revolution with equality, fraternity and liberty
echoing

the

aspirations

of

the

landless

under-privileged,

and

condemning the vested interests of the rich oppressors. Popular for a


couple of decades, the image of the Naxalites became tarnished with
the dimming of the vision of the original principles. However left wing
terrorism still has a constant stream of recruits whose beliefs are fresh
and vigorous.
Established authority in the Indian political system, the elected
government, has always opposed Naxalites, or more generically named
nowadays left wing extremists (LWE).

This opposition has no

exceptions through the whole range of political parties, rightist and


conservative to leftist and revolutionary. In the case of West Bengal
itself, the CPI (M) was the harshest in its actions to suppress the
movement, in active collaboration with the Congress party, itself in
power in Delhi.
An unintended consequence of the armed protests by the
underprivileged has been the birth of many local (vigilante) gangs,
nurtured and armed by the rich and privileged. These span the entire

social spectrum and are political in nature. Typical examples are found
in Bihar and Jharkhand with the likes of the 'Ranvir Sena'.
Growth and Development
Violent, armed action by peasantry, starting with the incident at
Naxalbari sought to highlight two aspects of rural India. One was the
complete lack of development activities by the elected government and
the established administration. The second was the inequality in land
holdings and the absence of any move towards effective land reform.
These two factors inevitably led to exploitation of the lower social
classes and the perpetuation of the feudal lord peasant serf
relationship. The very identification of the stratification of society itself
was one of the factors of the growth of the unrest.
To add more heat to the simmering discontent, the early (1967)
broadcast from Radio Peking seemed to support the cause of the
downtrodden by hailing 'the commencement of the revolutionary
struggle by the people of north Bengal'.1
At the

outset

there

were

charismatic

leaders

like

Charu

Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal in Bengal and C Pulla Reddy, K Seetharamaiah


in Andhra Pradesh. With their leadership and the factors enumerated
cadres strengths continued to rise with the surge of popular support
during the years 1967 1971.

However, soon thereafter, the entire

left wing extremist movement suffered a decline.


The first and foremost reason for this decline was the strong
action taken by the police with the full support of the state and union
governments. Many of the leaders of the movement were pursued and
killed in encounters.

The decimation of the leadership severely

affected the coordinated growth of the LWE.

Secondly, ideological differences splintered the movement and


further

dissipated

the

effect

of

mass

government and established administration.

unrest

against

elected

Thirdly, apart from the

initial verbal support, material support from the two bulwarks of


Communism the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of
Soviet Socialist republics (USSR). The CPI party cadres in India had
linkages and exchanges with the Soviets and the Chinese factions, but
this did not result in any tangible advantage to LWE. There was also
significant land reform effected in West Bengal, by its government
under MR SS Ray, the Chief Minister.
Resurgence
In spite of the decline of the movement and the resulting
uncoordinated splintering of the armed groups, there was a slow but
steady resurgence in the years that followed, especially in the 1980s
and the 1990s.

Some of the factors responsible for the continuing

existence of LWE and its growth in the last few years are touched upon
in subsequent paragraphs.
Land Rights and Ownership.

Land reform was hardly made

effective by legislation and follow up action in enforcement.

The

holdings of big landowners were curtailed but the distribution of the


holding did not benefit the majority of the landless. The burgeoning
rural landless population, combined with the inheritance laws made
doubly sure that subsequent generations held ever decreasing portions
of land.
Social Stratification.

The ideal of equal opportunity as

envisaged by the Constituent Assembly was given form by the


Schedules appended to the Indian Constitution itself. The schedules,

in effect, codified and modernized the traditional caste system in


perpetuity. Recent events starting from the Mandal Commission, and
culminating perhaps in the Arjun Singh policy, have only accentuated
this stratification and given license to protest and agitation against
inequality.
Administrative Defaults.

The 'steel frame' erected by the

Indian Civil Service2, upon which the strong administrative network of


British Indian rested had a deep and robust foundation.

This strong

foundation was the effective and impartial delivery to the governed


masses of development and justice. In the last three decades of the
twentieth century, both development and justice have been withheld
from those who need it the most, and the foundation of governance
has eroded. Development is now entirely dependent on patronage and
therefore directed towards favoured constituencies, particularly urban.
The district administration and its development plans and funds are
dismal, thereby fueling rural discontent and resentment.
Terrain Drawbacks.

The twin factors of stratification of

society and the lack of development makes many areas of rural India
inaccessible (though many times inaccessibility is cited, by the
administration, as the cause of poor progress). Moreover, much of the
interior areas of Jharkhand, Orissa, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and
Andhra Pradesh are rugged, hilly and forested offering ideal refuge to
the militant groups of LWE(also=left wing extremism).
Cadres and Groups
These factors have aided the proliferation of a multitude of
armed groups and cadres which constitute LWE in India.

There are

around thirty such militant groups, each professing allegiance to some

local leader and also to one of the splintered offshoots of the


communist parties. It will suffice to detail the major ones, and outline
the way ahead envisaged by them.
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC).

The split in the CPI (M),

leading to the formation of the CPI (M-L) under the leadership of


Charu Mazumdar united several dissident groups at that time.

One

such group, the Dakshin Desh, did not merge but determined to
continue its independent existence. This Dakshin Desh renamed itself
in 1975 as the MCC.

Names associated with MCC are Amulya Sen,

Kanhai Chatterjee (died 1987), Shivenji, Ramadhan Singh, Pramod


Mishra and Sanjay Dusadh3. Though initially active in five districts of
southern West Bengal, the MCC is now present and active in eight to
ten districts of Bihar, fourteen districts of Jharkhand and three districts
of Uttar Pradesh. The declared objective of the MCC is to establish a
government of the people through armed struggle a 'peoples' war'.
Peoples War Group (PWG).

Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, a

leading light of the CPI (M-L) and well known in the state of Andhra
Pradesh, formed the PWG in Apr 1980 4.

The group commenced its

initial activity in the Karimnagar district of the north Telengana region


of

Andhra

Telengana.

Pradesh,

but

soon

spread

its

influence

throughout

The PWH wants to emulate Mao Tse Tung's peasant

revolution and aims at obtaining political power through protracted


guerilla warfare. It calls this process the New Democratic Revolution.
A central committee heads the PWG as the policy making
nucleus. It consists of 21 permanent members, plus an additional, it is
understood, six co-opted from localities which are more active.

The

general secretary is one M Lakshmana Rao, also known as Ganapathi.


The PWG demarcates

clearly the division between

its

political

organization the hierarchy of central committee, regional, zonal,

district and squad committees and the military wing.

The military

wing is led by Ganapathi, as the head of the central military


commission, being its general secretary.

The parallels with the

Chinese model are clearly intended. The political hierarchy is mirrored


by the military organisation at each level with the lowest being the
village defence squad mirroring the village governing committee. The
fighting component of the military wing is organized as the Peoples
Guerilla Army (PGA), formed in Dec 2000.
Peoples Guerilla Army (PGA).

It appears, from uncorroborated

reports, that the formation of the PGA was a coordinated reaction to


the decision of the Union and state governments to launch joint
operations by various police forces in the states in which LWE were
present. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the formation of
the PGA in Dec 2000 was timed to coincide with the first centenary of
the death of the top PWG members (one or two also featuring in the
central committee) at the hands of the Andhra Pradesh police.
purported

organisation

is

appended

below:

Central Military Commission

Regional Military Commission

Zonal/State Military Commission

Main Force

Secondary Force

Peoples Militia

Military platoons

Special guerrilla squads

Local guerrilla squads

Central Military Commission

Regional Military Commission

Zonal/State Military Commission

Main Force

Secondary Force

Peoples Militia

Military platoons

Special guerrilla squads

Local guerrilla squads

Fig 1

The modus operandi encompasses killings, abductions and destruction


of property.
An interview was published on the website of rediff.com on 1 Feb
2000, now available in their archives 5.

Some notable quotes which

summarize the PWG aims and activities are:


".. Their murders in an encounter shall be avenged

one always

repays ones blood debts."


" they spent the most part of their revolutionary lives in areas of
class struggle, amidst guerilla squads and oppressed masses

..

firmly adhering to Marxism-Leninism Mao Tse Tung thought.(sic)"


"The revolutionary movement constantly replenishes itself from the
masses new blood is produced every moment. So long as we stick
to the correct line and adhere to the masses, new leaders are made
continuously."

"Our movement develops through many ups and downs, many


defeats, until we achieve final victory.

Such is the nature of our

protracted war"
Communist Party of India (Maoist) {CPI(Maoist)} The MCC
and the PWG merged on 21 Sep 2004, although the merger was
announced by the 'state secretary' of the Andhra Pradesh PWG on 14
Oct, the eve of the talks of the LWE with the government of Andhra
Pradesh in Hyderabad.

The united groups named themselves the

CPI(Maoist).
Though the merger culminated in 2004, the events leading to
the union and the creation of this amalgam started in the 1980s.
Since the beginning , the PWG had a vision of a coordinated and
comprehensive politico-military organisation comprising all the existing
factions (fractions really numbering around 40) of the LWE.
The initial thrust of the PWG was to attract the MCC and
amalgamate. As with all organisations, turf battles and the perceived
precedence of the leaders came in the way of progress towards unity.
Internecine quarrels and a struggle for dominance preoccupied much
of the time of the leaders of both groups, and at times the rank and
file too. In undivided(at that time) Bihar, the rival groups fought each
other murderously and suffered numerous casualties.
Realisation slowly dawned on the antagonists that the real
gainers of this internal conflict were the state security forces. The two
factions

gradually

reduced

the

physical

conflicts

cooperation, recognizing the unity of purpose.

and

increase

Initially in 1981,

though Kanhai Chatterjee of the MCC had met with K Seetharamaiah


of the PWG, stressing the unity of purpose, the death of Chatterjee in
1982 and the arrest of Seetharamaiah at about the same time made

the twelve day meeting fruitless.

In the late 1980s, with increasing

confidence in each other and seeing the need for coordination amongst
all the factions, the PWG, MCC and the Bihar CPI(M-L) decided to step
up revolutionary activity(namely violence) in the Madhya Bharat
states.

By 1993 this wave of violence had reached a crest.

These

groups also constituted the All India Peoples' resistance Forum to


intensify the struggle of the proletariat.

But once again internal

rivalries frittered away the initiatives taken and by 1996, cooperation


was at an end.
In the years between 1998 and 2003, the cycle of distrust,
violence and mutual belligerence, feelers for compromise and talks
was repeated several times. Finally in Feb 2003, various definite steps
were taken towards union of cadres and unity in action.

The union

was hastened by the creation of Jharkhand and the increased effort by


the administration of this new state against LWE. A truce between the
PWG and the MCC was announced in 2002-3.
Many meetings were held and a series of written documents
emerged, of which five are known: Marxism Leninism Maoism
Ideology; Party Programs; Strategy and Tactics; Political resolution of
the International and Domestic Situation; and the Party Constitution.
Further talks and meetings at high levels including the central
committees of both groups continued, till agreement was reached and
the announcement of the merger in Oct 2004, and the formation of
one central committee.
Communist

Party

of

India

(Marxist){CPI(M)}

Janashakti. LWE in India has had several splinter groups through the
last fifty years. In 1992, a merger of seven such splinter groups took
place, resulting in the emergence of the CPI (M) Janashakti.

The

seven merging groups were: the CPI(M-L) resistance; one faction of

the Unity Centre of the Communist Revolutionaries of India (MarxistLeninist); CPI(M-L) Agami Yug; Paila Vasudev Rao's CPI(M-L); The
Khokan

Mazumdar

Committee

of

faction

Communist

of

the

CPI(M-L);

Revolutionaries;

the

Coordination

and

Communist

Revolutionary Group for Unity6.


The merger was followed, as with most of the LWE factions, by
splits caused by internal rivalries. The first split in 1996 was followed
by seven more.

Of these, the K Rajanna faction was dominant and

inherited the mantle of the CPI (M-L) Janashakti. This dominant


Rajanna faction too suffered a split with seven senior leaders falling
out, accusing Rajanna of the misuse of funds. Suffice it to say that, in
since 2004-5, the CPI (M-L) Janashakti Rajanna faction is the most
active LWE group after the CPI (Maoist) and is predominant in the
Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh.

It is also active in two more

states viz. Maharashtra and Chattisgarh.

There are ongoing talks

between the CPI (Maoist) and the governments of several of the


thirteen to fifteen states in which it is active.
Ideology
The left wing ideology, across all the factions, is similar though
the rhetoric expounding it varies in tone, timbre and context. All share
their belief in the "annihilation of class enemies" and in the use of
violence in achieving organizational goals.
The main difference was always between Leninist ethos (Soviet
style) and Maoist action (Chinese example), but Maoism has now
prevailed. In the words of the self styled state secretary of the PWG in
Andhra Pradesh, it is the ".. the higher stage of Marxist-Leninist
philosophy. Marxist-Leninist-Maoism will be guiding our thinking in all

spheres of activity." The goal therefore is ultimate state power in full.


Not the local control of land, districts or areas.

In this plan,

participation in the electoral process of the prevailing, as they put it


"bourgeois democracy" is rejected unanimously. The concentration is
on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power by
force.
Objectives and Aims
Ideology defines the aims and objectives of LWE and that being
so, the ultimate driving objective is to further the cause of revolution
in India.

The thoughts and pronouncements of the main factions,

documented, published and publicized by our media are too numerous


to quote here.
phrases

like

The jargon is stereotyped and is full of words and


'democratic

revolution',

'imperialism',

'feudalism',

'bureaucratic capitalism', 'ruling classes', 'aspirations of the masses',


'proletarian revolution' etc., etc.
The patterned advance of their plans is to seize control of remote
parts on India through terror induced by violence; raise armed groups;
increase guerilla actions and gradually control larger and larger areas
by arousing and organizing the people; finally morphing into the
governing entity.
The documents published by the CPI(Maoist) define, in their
jargon, the purpose and plan of actions.

The increase in fire power,

areas of activity of LWE and the growing sophistication of equipment


only serves to highlight the fact that the threat to the existing
democratic polity is enormous.
Magnitude of the Threat

A glance at the daily news in print or in the electronic media


is sufficient to illustrate the omnipresence of the LWE. It is estimated,
and this is a matter in the public domain, that LWE is an active threat
in 156 districts of 13 states of the Indian Union.

These states are:

Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala,


Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh,
Uttaranchal and West Bengal.

Some other contiguous states like

Gujerat, Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh are


targeted by the LWE for extension of their influence and activities.
Commonality in planning and coordination of action is still in the
formative stages, and therefore, a pan-Indian plan of revolutionary
activities in a pre-determined schedule is still not a reality. However
the formation of the CPI (Maoist) as a result of the merger has made it
a pan-Indian revolutionary organisation, and its central committee is
closer to the declared objective of control over a revolutionary zone.
Yet, in spite of the merger, the MCC and PWG cadres retain dominance
over certain districts and states.

The MCC is based and oriented

towards the northern and eastern parts of India, whereas the PWG
dominates in the southern states. The map below gives a vivid visual
impact of the spread of the influence of LWE.

Conflict Map
Fig 2 (reproduced with permission from www.satp.org)

The areas highlighted by colour also give a vivid reality to the


term mentioned in one of the CPI (Maoist) manifestos the Compact
Revolutionary Zone (CRZ). The media has also coined a phrase the
Red Corridor and the core area in the conflict map in Bihar,
Jharkhand,

Chattisgarh,

north

Andhra

Pradesh

and

the

land

connectivity to the Maoist groups in Nepal amply illustrates the phrase.


The magnitude of the problem faced by the organisations
responsible for law and order, the police forces as well as the district
administration, can also be quantified in the tabulated datasheets
compiled by the Institute of Conflict Studies and put on the same
website. Some of these datasheets are reproduced below to elucidate.
2006

States

Civilian

SF

Naxal

Total

Andhra Pradesh

52

60

Bihar

11

19

32

Jharkhand

18

16

40

Chhattisgarh

112

45

30

187

Maharashtra

13

16

31

Orissa

11

West Bengal

10

Uttar Pradesh

154

75

143

372

Total*

* Data till May 28, 2006


(Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional)

Table 1 (with permission from www.satp.org)

2005
States

Civilian

SF

Naxal

Total

Andhra Pradesh

132

21

167

320

Bihar

25

29

52

106

Jharkhand

49

27

20

96

Chhattisgarh

52

48

26

126

Orissa

13

17

Maharashtra

17

27

Karnataka

12

Uttar Pradesh

West Bengal

281

150

286

717

Total*

*Compiled from news reports and are provisional

Table 2 (with permission from www.satp.org)

2005
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India Data
States

Deaths

Incidents

Andhra Pradesh

206

532

Bihar

94

183

Chhattisgarh

165

380

Jharkhand

118

308

Madhya Pradesh

20

Maharashtra

53

95

Orissa

14

42

Uttar Pradesh

10

West Bengal

14

Other States

10

669

1594

Total*

* Deaths include security force (SF) personnel and civilian fatalities only
516 civilians, 153 SF personnel and 223 Naxalites were killed, taking the total for the year to 892.

Table 3 (with permission from www.satp.org)


Revolutionary activity of LWE can broadly be divided into four
categories, namely abductions (leading to ransom in cash or kind),
damage or destruction to (public or private) property, setting off of
improvised explosive devices ( as intimidation as well as inducement)
and armed confrontations with policing forces (a show of strength as
well as intimidation).

All four categories of violence contribute

substantially to the collected revenue of all left wing groups.

The

ransoms yield bulk sums on occurrence, whilst the act of abduction


itself ensures a steady flow of funds from the local population as well
as businesses in the area as tax and protection money (also the
subject of a serious Bollywood movie named Apharan). An illustrative
example of the trend of these for broad categories is depicted in the
graphs below.

Fig 3

Fig 4

Fig 5

Fig 6

Analysis and an Action Taken Review


The Institute of Conflict Studies hosts a variety of papers on
their website, which is aptly designated at the South Asia Terrorism
Portal. Many of these pertain to India, amongst the many nations of
South Asia being addressed, and the text contained is detailed and
coordinated.

In addition, other centres of study also have published

material accessible by those interested. The Ministry of Home Affairs


of the Government of India is the core agency for internal security, and
their analyses are numerous, and available for researchers, after a
fashion.
While it would be repetitive to analyse the causes of LWE in
India, it would be worthwhile to keep in focus some of the conclusions
which are common in these analyses.

Two of the common ones are

lack of good governance and the ineffective judicial system.

It is

interesting to see the consequences of such conclusions.


Acts and Ordinances.

Much before LWE was recognized as

such, there existed on the statutes two Acts, dealing with activities
subversive to the State. The Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act of
1911 was one of them and it still is on the statutes. The second one
dates to 1967, when the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was
passed by parliament.

With LWE gaining ground, a barrage of laws

(Acts and Ordinances) were instituted in the late 1970s and later.
Some of them are:
1976

The Disturbed Areas Special Courts Act

1980

The National Security Act

1982

The Suppression of Unlawful Activities against Safety of


Civil Aviation Act
The Anti-Hijacking Act

1984

Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Act

1987

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (prevention) Act

1988

The

Religious

Institutions

(Prevention

of

Misuse)

Ordinance
1993

The Protection of Human Rights Act


The SAARC Convention (Suppression of Terrorism) Act

1995

The Criminal Law Amendment Bill (later passed)

1999

Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act

2001

The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance

2004

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment


Ordinance
The Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Ordinance

As

is

evident,

one

of

the

major

reactions

of

the

government, regardless of the party in power, has been to add to


the statutes, seemingly in an effort to strengthen the means of
enforcement.

A fair assessment of this measure would be to

term it a double-edged weapon, prone to inflict more damage to


the system than to those it was meant to control.
The Home Ministry of the Union Government has also
made considerable effort to coordinate the approach to the LWE
problem at the level of the states. This has resulted in progress,
or expression of intent at least, in many areas such as the one
listed below.

Modernisation of state police forces by way of equipment,


vehicles and communication.

Coordination of intelligence collection efforts between


states and between the Union Government and the states.

Better sharing of intelligence between states.

Training of police forces in counter insurgency operations.


Notable the establishment of a specialized school for such
training

in

Chattisgarh,

under

the

leadership

of

an

experienced Army brigadier.

Maintenance of data banks.

Creation of village defence organisations (often counter


productive, fatally so in the recent case of Chattisgarh)

It must be recognized that these efforts have induced a sense of


urgency in state organisations dealing with LWE. The urgency is given
additional impetus by the desire of ruling parties to stay in power.
Sadly, the demand from the top seems to require intelligence analysts
to tell the government that on Monday next, Borivli railway station will

be bombed! Or some such exact prediction.

The understanding that

trends can be forecast, but hard intelligence is hard to come by


without years and years of dedicated infiltration and development of
sources is slow to dawn on successive executives.
Local reaction and resistance to LWE has been confined mainly to
Bihar, where several organisations have sprung up. Some are financed
by land owners, some form by caste orientation, and some are
sponsored by political parties. The fairly well known ones are:

Ranvir Sena

Lorik Sena

Bhumi Sena

Kunwar Sena

Kisan Sangram Parishad

Sunlight Sena
Success has been limited to the area of influence of the sponsor,

and since action has bee directed at protection of the sponsor, the
ordinary peasant is the victim of both the sides. A similar government
sponsored organisation in Chattisgarh is the Salwa Judum.
An unintended consequence of the acts and ordinances has been
the creation of legal front organisations by the LWE themselves. These
are too many to list in full, many being very short-lived, and many
confined to very small geographical area. Some names are:

Lok Sangram Morcha

Workers Peasant Liberation front

Peoples Liberation Council

Indian Youth Association

Workers Peasant Unity front

Workers Peasant Struggle Association

Peoples Liberation Struggle Front

Naujawan Pratirodh Sangharsh Manch

Krantikari Budhijivi Sangh

Krantikari Sanskritik Sangh

Krantikari Chhatra League

Communist Yuva League

Naari Mukti Sangh

Mazdoor Mukti Sangh

An Assessment
The very nature of the police administration politician
relationship militates against a coordinated and well planned approach
to counter LWE. Frequent change of key personnel frustrates the very
organisation set up to monitor, plan and coordinate action.
A look at the profiles of many of the legislators in the states
affected by LWE reveals that elected government often has a clash of
interest with its own appointed officials.

This bodes ill for anti-LWE

actions and this shows in the results achieved.


The interest and involvement of professionals in the field is
beyond doubt.

However, as mentioned earlier, their efforts are most

often nullified by either inaction at the appropriate level, or a quick


transfer of the official to a lea troublesome appointment.
All anti-LWE efforts depend upon adequate financing, and
thereafter judicious expenditure. States are all strapped for cash, and
very reluctant to allocate the necessary fiscal resources.

Apart from

funding, the anti-terrorist game is entirely dependent on the human


talent concentrated against it.

It is also directly proportional to the

time invested in planning and preparation.

Talented individuals with

long tenures in their specializations, as well as the time invested are


both woefully inadequate.
All the official and other analyses of the causes of the growth of
LWE list the lack of development as one of the primary reasons. A corelation of the conflict map (fig 2) to the backward areas of India
highlights the fact that no developmental activity either agricultural
or industrial has touched these areas for the past fifty years. The
poor, landless, dispossessed and deprived population of these areas
supports LWE, in the hope that the 'revolution' will improve their
prospects. This hope is augmented by the actions of the 'lok adalats'
or the local instant justice system practiced by the left wing groups.
The down trodden feel empowered by joining the guerilla groups.
It is interesting to note that LWE are secular there is no
distinction made by caste, creed or religion.

But it would also be

pertinent to note that the vast majority of the population of these


backward areas of India figures in one of the schedules of the Indian
Constitution.
Linkages
It is reported in the media as well as on the portal cited that an
umbrella organisation called the Coordination Committees of the
Maoist Parties and Organisations was constituted in 2001, comprising:
1. PWG

2. MCC

| since merged into CPI (Maoist)

3. Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (M-L-M)


4. Revolutionary Communist Centre (Maoist)
5. Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (Maoist Punargathan Kendra)
6. Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party

7. Bangladesh Samaywadi party (M-L)


8. Communist party of Nepal (Maoist)
9. Communist party of Ceylon (Maoist)
The impetus in forming this organisation was provided by the PWG and
the MCC, with the aim of unifying and coordinating the activities of the
constituent parties.
Ideological themes are derived from Marxism, Leninism and the
Maoist interpretation of Communism.

However considerable lateral

shifts have taken place and it is generally accepted that the mother
countries (the erstwhile USSR and the PRC) have no direct ideological
linkages with these groups. On the contrary, a glance at the economic
policies of Russia and China today reveals that these countries are now
following the path of what can only be termed as 'authoritarian
capitalism'. Material and monetary support are also in short supply
though weaponry and equipment are available for payment in hard
currency. And the source is not limited to communist regimes.
Yet, for the record, the voice of the 'revolutionary proletariat' is
heard and, occasionally, given some energetic rhetoric. It is believed
also that the PWG has fraternal relations with the Liberation Army of
Peru and the Kurdistan Workers Party.

The PWG sent some

representatives to attend an international seminar organised by the


Workers

Party

of

Belgium

in

May

1995,

in

an

attempt

to

internationalize their cause.


The PWG is also believed to have a working relationship with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and some arms training for its
cadres in Sri Lanka is reported. It is also believed that some wireless
intercepts in Bihar revealed Tamil being spoken, indicating the

presence of some Tamil speaking individuals though not necessarily


from Sri Lanka.
These linkages and the merger of the PWG and the MCC do have
wider implications. The CRZ mentioned in one of the manifestos of the
CPI (Maoist) does now, de facto, extend from Nepal, through Bihar
Jharkhand Chattisgarh Andhra Pradesh Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra Tamil Nadu

to Kerala.

In the east it reaches out to

Bangladesh, and creates possibilities of cooperation with the militant


groups of Assam and the other north eastern states of India. In the
peninsula the coast is pervious and to the south is the most
resourceful and persistent insurgent group the LTTE ready for
mutual support and help.
Role Play by Government and its Agencies
The various facets of government which address one or more
aspects of LWE are enumerated in a broad classification:
The Union Government
The various State Governments
The State police forces
The Central Reserve Police Force
The intelligence wings
of the central government
of the states
The Armed Forces
A mention has been made earlier of the clash of interests
between individual legislators who form the government (in the states)
and the government itself.

This results in a divorce of policy from

action, to the detriment of the ground forces actually deployed against


LWE.
In addition, there is also the larger interest of some political
parties, particularly when in power. Swinging between inaction against
LWE is the policy at its best, and support, albeit covert, at its worst,
the government in such cases shows up in the public's and media's
view in a very poor light. Such political interests at the state levels
force coalition governments at the centre to approve, often tacitly, the
policy of conciliation adopted by the states in question.
An example is the willing ness of Andhra Pradesh to sit down and
negotiate with the Naxalites, suspending police action.

The LWE

groups welcome this opportunity to regroup and revitalize their ranks


by fresh recruitment attracted by the perceived legitimacy and clout of
the LWE. The governments of Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh also
exhibit some inclination towards negotiation, though issuing verbal
warnings

at

the

same

time,

like

the

Uttar

Pradesh

media

announcement,"The challenge posed by armed activities of Naxalites


shall be met firmly".
In riposte, upon talks with the Andhra Pradesh government
seeming imminent, a Naxalite leader said, as reported by media, "By
going to the talks we are not declaring any cease fire . talks are a
part of our tactical line. Naxalism is not a problem, it is a solution."
The LWE leaders attended the talks with their weapons and left to
return to their hideouts unhindered.
Actions.
coordinating
dissemination.
action.

The Union Home Ministry has now established regular

meetings

for

intelligence

gathering,

analysis

and

These meetings also coordinate police policy and

The meetings are convened, but the attendance is by no

means complete. Far less in quantum is the conversion of policy into


concrete action with relentless follow up.
A policy of control of the Indo-Nepal border is in place, but
mainly left to the states to implement.

Trans-border movement, as

well as trans-migration of segments of the population from interior


regions to the proximity of the border continues unabated.
Of late, several of the states have once again started wooing the
extremists to the negotiating table.

Chattisgarh is the latest, the

Indian Express of 14 Jul 06 reporting that the Chief Minister Mr. Raman
Singh has asked the Naxalites to come to his capital, Raipur for talks.
He is also reported to have said that a determined political party in
power cannot be overthrown by arson, abduction and anarchy.
The fact of the matter is that none of the affected states have
the will to follow through with the required action.

Thorough

knowledge of the insurgents, active monitoring of their activities,


prompt arrest and swift judicial action is essential.

This must be

matched with corresponding devotion to the rural backward areas and


communities.
and

Support for agriculture, establishment of employment

education

avenues,

and

infrastructure must take place.

the

construction

of

adequate

The first requires will, determination

and unity of purpose, the second equal amounts of the same wedded
to adequate financing and probity in execution.
The Armed Forces
It is far too often that recourse is taken by the Indian
Government to the last resort. And that last resort is, of course, the
military. The Armed Forces are used both for policing as well as for
succour, often at the slightest pretext. The nation has seen the

involvement of the Armed Forces in the maintenance of law and order


in the north eastern states for close to fifty years, and in Jammu and
Kashmir for the last twenty five.
Well documented statistics show that Naxalite activities spread
over thirteen states.

The badly affected ones are five or six, all of

them falling within the region of central India (Madhya Bharat). In two
of these states, the elected officials are relatively new in their offices,
and perhaps inexperienced in dealing with a situation which is out of
their control. But in all the states there is a gradual realisation that
their own police forces, augmented by the Union Government's reserve
police forces and para-military units are not in a position to restore
peace and tranquility. They are also aware that the central resources
are stretched already and are not easily made available for Madhya
Bharat areas.
It is but natural that these states will look towards the Armed
Forces as a backup. It would be a disaster if the military were to be
committed to an anti-Naxalite role in central India. The arguments of
why and wherefore are not pertinent to this paper. However, as the
management ethos of the armed forces are based on the 'just in case'
philosophy, there is a lot for them to do in their altogether brief
transient peace time tenures, in the various cantonments and locations
scattered over these thirteen states.
All the three Services, particularly the Army, need to prepare
adequately. First of all their commanders at various levels must fully
understand the local dynamics. They must be familiar with the faces
and appointments in the government dealing with this matter.

The

higher commanders must also see the larger picture and establish
coordinated information gathering and dissemination systems. Regular
and involved interaction with state government the bureaucracy, the

police and regional executives, must be set into an established routine.


At the same time, by spreading an awareness of the implications of
involving the armed forces, make decision makers in government
hesitate from calling upon this last resort.
A Summary and a Prognosis
There is an enemy within.

The existence of over 30 groups

which are revolutionary in ideology and violent to a greater or lesser


degree in their actions is a grave threat to the democratic fabric of
India. The term LWE encompasses all these diverse groups. Amongst
them, unity of purpose is gaining ground, and the old adage of
strength in unity is being proved once again.
This strength, exhibited by the exercise of administrative control
over many remote districts, the imposition of a parallel tax structure,
the establishment of common courts for the dispensation of quick
justice, is augmented by their readiness to commit their armed cadres
wherever the need is felt.
The display of resolve by the LWE is not matched by the elected
government in any of its actions. The CRZ is a reality and there is a
nexus between our indigenous extremists and those of our neighbours.
The world arms trade is more than willing to supply anyone able to
meet their bills.
All of the affected states have, at one time or another,
acknowledged that there is a serious threat to peace and security. The
Government of India admits that there is an internal security problem.
The blasts in Mumbai on 11 Jul 06 only highlight the probability that
such security problems are not confined to interior Madhya Bharat.

It is not sufficient to classify the LWE as a 'law and order'


problem.

The existence of extremism dedicated to violence as a

means of bringing about change is a symptom of bad governance. It


is a great challenge to the democratic polity and the rule of law that
India projects to the developed world.
Some of the ways and means of finding solutions have been
touched upon in passing, but the details have to be executed by the
existing elected and official bodies. The root problems are not being
addressed by a coherent, holistic approach encompassing both the
Central and the State Governments.

The coalition at the centre and

the regional biases of the parties in power in the states do not


generate any confidence that democratic government will be able to
suppress LWE.
Mr. Shekhar Gupta recounts a meeting of his with the head of
the Punjab Armed Police at that time, Mr. KPS Gill immediately after
the Rajiv-Longowal accord.7 Journalists like Gupta covering the Punjab
scene were jubilant and eager to report the return of peace to Punjab.
Mr. Gill's view was quite the opposite. According to him, one makes
peace only when wielding a big stick, when the other side knows there
is no option. The article goes on to draw a parallel with the chaos in
Punjab following Longowal's assassination and the militancy today. He
theorizes that terrorism will match state suppression till a point is
reached when the terrorists realize that the superior resources of the
state combined with the determination to fight to the finish will prevail.
Then a compromise was sought and normalcy restored.

Mr. Gupta

reminds the UPA government of this and asks whether it has allowed
its politics to confuse the security agencies so much that they have lost
all sense of direction. He decries the fact that Naxalites were allowed

to carry their arms to talks, resulting in loss of face and morale for the
government's forces and a boost for the Naxalites.
Mr. Gupta ends his editorial on an optimistic note, stating that
the UPA government has been woken up by the Mumbai blasts and its
public rhetoric is indicative to strong action to come. Yet he hedges his
bets by his last sentence, "Those on the frontlines of these operations,
the heads of his (the Prime Minister's) security forces and intelligence
agencies, would need more convincing from the subsequent actions
and commitment levels that he and his colleagues demonstrate". His
view only reiterates that the determination of government to solve the
problem needs to be demonstrated effectively.
There is indeed urgent need to exhibit this resolve, both from
the Government of India and the State Governments. Once again, the
Indian Express reports8 that Naxalites have chalked out plans for
making their presence felt in urban areas by setting up zonal
committees in four new states. This was revealed after the seizure of
literature from hideouts in Chattisgarh.

Gujerat and Assam are

targeted along with the Bhilai - Kolkata and Ahmedadabad - Vadodara


industrial areas.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite
Mason, Philip: The Founders, Vintage/Ebury (A Division of Random House Group) (December 31,
1953)
3
www.satp.org
4
www.satp.org
5
http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/feb/01pw.htm
6
www.satp.org
7
The Indian Express, Sat 15 Jul 2006
8
The Indian Express, New Delhi, Tue 19 Jul 2006
1
2

Вам также может понравиться