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Genesis
It is commonly accepted that domestic terrorism based on a
political ideology is defined by the genesis of the Naxalbari incidents of
1967.
Russia and China. The undivided Communist Party of India (CPI) was
the source for the basic ideology, though not directly responsible for
the resultant actions.
the
aspirations
of
the
landless
under-privileged,
and
social spectrum and are political in nature. Typical examples are found
in Bihar and Jharkhand with the likes of the 'Ranvir Sena'.
Growth and Development
Violent, armed action by peasantry, starting with the incident at
Naxalbari sought to highlight two aspects of rural India. One was the
complete lack of development activities by the elected government and
the established administration. The second was the inequality in land
holdings and the absence of any move towards effective land reform.
These two factors inevitably led to exploitation of the lower social
classes and the perpetuation of the feudal lord peasant serf
relationship. The very identification of the stratification of society itself
was one of the factors of the growth of the unrest.
To add more heat to the simmering discontent, the early (1967)
broadcast from Radio Peking seemed to support the cause of the
downtrodden by hailing 'the commencement of the revolutionary
struggle by the people of north Bengal'.1
At the
outset
there
were
charismatic
leaders
like
Charu
dissipated
the
effect
of
mass
unrest
against
elected
existence of LWE and its growth in the last few years are touched upon
in subsequent paragraphs.
Land Rights and Ownership.
The
This strong
society and the lack of development makes many areas of rural India
inaccessible (though many times inaccessibility is cited, by the
administration, as the cause of poor progress). Moreover, much of the
interior areas of Jharkhand, Orissa, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and
Andhra Pradesh are rugged, hilly and forested offering ideal refuge to
the militant groups of LWE(also=left wing extremism).
Cadres and Groups
These factors have aided the proliferation of a multitude of
armed groups and cadres which constitute LWE in India.
There are
One
such group, the Dakshin Desh, did not merge but determined to
continue its independent existence. This Dakshin Desh renamed itself
in 1975 as the MCC.
Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, a
leading light of the CPI (M-L) and well known in the state of Andhra
Pradesh, formed the PWG in Apr 1980 4.
Andhra
Telengana.
Pradesh,
but
soon
spread
its
influence
throughout
The
its
political
The military
organisation
is
appended
below:
Main Force
Secondary Force
Peoples Militia
Military platoons
Main Force
Secondary Force
Peoples Militia
Military platoons
Fig 1
one always
..
protracted war"
Communist Party of India (Maoist) {CPI(Maoist)} The MCC
and the PWG merged on 21 Sep 2004, although the merger was
announced by the 'state secretary' of the Andhra Pradesh PWG on 14
Oct, the eve of the talks of the LWE with the government of Andhra
Pradesh in Hyderabad.
CPI(Maoist).
Though the merger culminated in 2004, the events leading to
the union and the creation of this amalgam started in the 1980s.
Since the beginning , the PWG had a vision of a coordinated and
comprehensive politico-military organisation comprising all the existing
factions (fractions really numbering around 40) of the LWE.
The initial thrust of the PWG was to attract the MCC and
amalgamate. As with all organisations, turf battles and the perceived
precedence of the leaders came in the way of progress towards unity.
Internecine quarrels and a struggle for dominance preoccupied much
of the time of the leaders of both groups, and at times the rank and
file too. In undivided(at that time) Bihar, the rival groups fought each
other murderously and suffered numerous casualties.
Realisation slowly dawned on the antagonists that the real
gainers of this internal conflict were the state security forces. The two
factions
gradually
reduced
the
physical
conflicts
and
increase
Initially in 1981,
confidence in each other and seeing the need for coordination amongst
all the factions, the PWG, MCC and the Bihar CPI(M-L) decided to step
up revolutionary activity(namely violence) in the Madhya Bharat
states.
These
The union
Party
of
India
(Marxist){CPI(M)}
Janashakti. LWE in India has had several splinter groups through the
last fifty years. In 1992, a merger of seven such splinter groups took
place, resulting in the emergence of the CPI (M) Janashakti.
The
the Unity Centre of the Communist Revolutionaries of India (MarxistLeninist); CPI(M-L) Agami Yug; Paila Vasudev Rao's CPI(M-L); The
Khokan
Mazumdar
Committee
of
faction
Communist
of
the
CPI(M-L);
Revolutionaries;
the
Coordination
and
Communist
In this plan,
like
revolution',
'imperialism',
'feudalism',
towards the northern and eastern parts of India, whereas the PWG
dominates in the southern states. The map below gives a vivid visual
impact of the spread of the influence of LWE.
Conflict Map
Fig 2 (reproduced with permission from www.satp.org)
Chattisgarh,
north
Andhra
Pradesh
and
the
land
States
Civilian
SF
Naxal
Total
Andhra Pradesh
52
60
Bihar
11
19
32
Jharkhand
18
16
40
Chhattisgarh
112
45
30
187
Maharashtra
13
16
31
Orissa
11
West Bengal
10
Uttar Pradesh
154
75
143
372
Total*
2005
States
Civilian
SF
Naxal
Total
Andhra Pradesh
132
21
167
320
Bihar
25
29
52
106
Jharkhand
49
27
20
96
Chhattisgarh
52
48
26
126
Orissa
13
17
Maharashtra
17
27
Karnataka
12
Uttar Pradesh
West Bengal
281
150
286
717
Total*
2005
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India Data
States
Deaths
Incidents
Andhra Pradesh
206
532
Bihar
94
183
Chhattisgarh
165
380
Jharkhand
118
308
Madhya Pradesh
20
Maharashtra
53
95
Orissa
14
42
Uttar Pradesh
10
West Bengal
14
Other States
10
669
1594
Total*
* Deaths include security force (SF) personnel and civilian fatalities only
516 civilians, 153 SF personnel and 223 Naxalites were killed, taking the total for the year to 892.
The
Fig 3
Fig 4
Fig 5
Fig 6
It is
such, there existed on the statutes two Acts, dealing with activities
subversive to the State. The Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act of
1911 was one of them and it still is on the statutes. The second one
dates to 1967, when the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was
passed by parliament.
(Acts and Ordinances) were instituted in the late 1970s and later.
Some of them are:
1976
1980
1982
1984
1987
1988
The
Religious
Institutions
(Prevention
of
Misuse)
Ordinance
1993
1995
1999
2001
2004
As
is
evident,
one
of
the
major
reactions
of
the
in
Chattisgarh,
under
the
leadership
of
an
Ranvir Sena
Lorik Sena
Bhumi Sena
Kunwar Sena
Sunlight Sena
Success has been limited to the area of influence of the sponsor,
and since action has bee directed at protection of the sponsor, the
ordinary peasant is the victim of both the sides. A similar government
sponsored organisation in Chattisgarh is the Salwa Judum.
An unintended consequence of the acts and ordinances has been
the creation of legal front organisations by the LWE themselves. These
are too many to list in full, many being very short-lived, and many
confined to very small geographical area. Some names are:
An Assessment
The very nature of the police administration politician
relationship militates against a coordinated and well planned approach
to counter LWE. Frequent change of key personnel frustrates the very
organisation set up to monitor, plan and coordinate action.
A look at the profiles of many of the legislators in the states
affected by LWE reveals that elected government often has a clash of
interest with its own appointed officials.
Apart from
2. MCC
shifts have taken place and it is generally accepted that the mother
countries (the erstwhile USSR and the PRC) have no direct ideological
linkages with these groups. On the contrary, a glance at the economic
policies of Russia and China today reveals that these countries are now
following the path of what can only be termed as 'authoritarian
capitalism'. Material and monetary support are also in short supply
though weaponry and equipment are available for payment in hard
currency. And the source is not limited to communist regimes.
Yet, for the record, the voice of the 'revolutionary proletariat' is
heard and, occasionally, given some energetic rhetoric. It is believed
also that the PWG has fraternal relations with the Liberation Army of
Peru and the Kurdistan Workers Party.
Party
of
Belgium
in
May
1995,
in
an
attempt
to
to Kerala.
The LWE
at
the
same
time,
like
the
Uttar
Pradesh
media
meetings
for
intelligence
gathering,
analysis
and
Trans-border movement, as
Indian Express of 14 Jul 06 reporting that the Chief Minister Mr. Raman
Singh has asked the Naxalites to come to his capital, Raipur for talks.
He is also reported to have said that a determined political party in
power cannot be overthrown by arson, abduction and anarchy.
The fact of the matter is that none of the affected states have
the will to follow through with the required action.
Thorough
This must be
education
avenues,
and
the
construction
of
adequate
and unity of purpose, the second equal amounts of the same wedded
to adequate financing and probity in execution.
The Armed Forces
It is far too often that recourse is taken by the Indian
Government to the last resort. And that last resort is, of course, the
military. The Armed Forces are used both for policing as well as for
succour, often at the slightest pretext. The nation has seen the
them falling within the region of central India (Madhya Bharat). In two
of these states, the elected officials are relatively new in their offices,
and perhaps inexperienced in dealing with a situation which is out of
their control. But in all the states there is a gradual realisation that
their own police forces, augmented by the Union Government's reserve
police forces and para-military units are not in a position to restore
peace and tranquility. They are also aware that the central resources
are stretched already and are not easily made available for Madhya
Bharat areas.
It is but natural that these states will look towards the Armed
Forces as a backup. It would be a disaster if the military were to be
committed to an anti-Naxalite role in central India. The arguments of
why and wherefore are not pertinent to this paper. However, as the
management ethos of the armed forces are based on the 'just in case'
philosophy, there is a lot for them to do in their altogether brief
transient peace time tenures, in the various cantonments and locations
scattered over these thirteen states.
All the three Services, particularly the Army, need to prepare
adequately. First of all their commanders at various levels must fully
understand the local dynamics. They must be familiar with the faces
and appointments in the government dealing with this matter.
The
higher commanders must also see the larger picture and establish
coordinated information gathering and dissemination systems. Regular
and involved interaction with state government the bureaucracy, the
Mr. Gupta
reminds the UPA government of this and asks whether it has allowed
its politics to confuse the security agencies so much that they have lost
all sense of direction. He decries the fact that Naxalites were allowed
to carry their arms to talks, resulting in loss of face and morale for the
government's forces and a boost for the Naxalites.
Mr. Gupta ends his editorial on an optimistic note, stating that
the UPA government has been woken up by the Mumbai blasts and its
public rhetoric is indicative to strong action to come. Yet he hedges his
bets by his last sentence, "Those on the frontlines of these operations,
the heads of his (the Prime Minister's) security forces and intelligence
agencies, would need more convincing from the subsequent actions
and commitment levels that he and his colleagues demonstrate". His
view only reiterates that the determination of government to solve the
problem needs to be demonstrated effectively.
There is indeed urgent need to exhibit this resolve, both from
the Government of India and the State Governments. Once again, the
Indian Express reports8 that Naxalites have chalked out plans for
making their presence felt in urban areas by setting up zonal
committees in four new states. This was revealed after the seizure of
literature from hideouts in Chattisgarh.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naxalite
Mason, Philip: The Founders, Vintage/Ebury (A Division of Random House Group) (December 31,
1953)
3
www.satp.org
4
www.satp.org
5
http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/feb/01pw.htm
6
www.satp.org
7
The Indian Express, Sat 15 Jul 2006
8
The Indian Express, New Delhi, Tue 19 Jul 2006
1
2