FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSO PHY

SrwJin in ItulUtn ,,,u/ TilNtAn BruiJhism

provick I forum for PII~

liahifll ouaundinS new contributions 10 tchoIanhip on

THU I UIU.AI CONCUVW to

Indian...d 1ib.un 8..odA.iun ..... .I.e.o ......... ,""_i

bk tcminaJ mc:atda

widely

outside I IWl'O'IO'
~iK ludicI'!. indudin& uuulatlot. of Ippcopoi.alt
molIoppbi alId c.olIa;ciotu of anido from Olha WiJUIpS. 11w wries Rriva to.-brd Iit;hl on dIt IndJc BudDO(

dbilc ITldiboni by ClIpoNnc them 10 hUlorJc:.l-eririeal

inquiry, iUwninllillJ through COIIICluwliudon and
anaIysU thac U'adilkNu' unique bcriup: and the
at'Ia' of their contribution 10 the world ', rdipow and

.iIi.

philo.opMal ~IJ.

Tom Tillcnwu (chaU). UNwrri,, -/r.-IW

JUM! C lbQOn, UlUllmi,,#fc.Jifi-iA. s.Gwctp Imyfu.. WiPic.. C,ol'. M-'-ta

n.,..,.

J"'"" c,..o. H.,... U";'-';7

Paul Ham-. UrUwrri7 t{Cnrtmru,. N,., ZtJn.J
Toni Huhn-. V".-..rV U.wn.u,. N,.,ZaltuJ
Shotyu KaIJUA, Hi~ UttiWl'1iIJ
Thuprm JinIN Lanpi. J,.sri_ t{TiWu.t et.ain, M_.I
Frank RqnoIds. u.mtlU, U";wrrilJ #/ OK.
E. Gene Smilh, Tija"ff &MbiJ.t RllIm c",ItT, NtMI Y. ,.t
Cristina Schcrm.sdu.ub, U,.;.".pIJ.fUu.ffM
Enuc Swnkdlncr. u"illmu, #!V"wro".
Leonard van du Kuijp. H_'" UIIiwni'J

STUDIES IN I ND IAN AND T IB ETAN BUDDHI SM

FOUNDATIONS OF
D HARMAKI RTI 'S
PHILOSOPHY
John D. Dunne

Wisdom PubliC2tions Boston

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PublislNrj Aclmowkdgmmt

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Coments
Preface
Abbcniarions

I'

A Note 0 0 Ibe Sanskril and TIbetan Tnmlarjoru

INTR OOl!CT ION

III

,
I

"
I

PUMAI:fA Ttu:ou:
DHAIlMAItIllTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

1.1 TIN l'rocf!U lI(Knllwirt,,znJ lu Instn""4'rIt

1. 1

IS
IS

Two Ubiquitous lrutrumenu: Peraylion and Inference

l.Z

Sham:!. No6oru Concerning PerccpruaJ A-wareneq

Z}

Slwod Notions Concerning Inference

The Basic SrnJcmre ofInfttma:

zs

16

The Evidence-PrMicue R&don and 1[5 Exemplifiation

1.8

The Evidence-Subject Relation

A Restatement

Pramera; 1M -&.r

The Simplicity of [he RaJ and a Fundamental Difference

]7

I.' l'u'l!M

Cmtat

1S

14

P4i"ts4Diwr:m: TlNAcriD""IUiA,nll

I. S

Sumnwry

DHAIlMAItIllT I'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

1..1

1M Sub ofANIiysis. DJu.mutkirtii Mnh6ti

.11

49

CONTENTS

~"

External Realism as a l...cvd of Analysis

Divergent Ince!prmtions of External Realism

6,

79

1.)

79

MQrt D1I P.rtit:14ltm

The PC'rcqnibk as Ultimacdy Real

8.

The U\cimardy Real as Inaprasiblc and Momentary

Do Paniculan: Have Sp:atw

1.1

The Two PrIlmf1i14 The Two Rc:a1irics

ExtC'nsion~

"

,8

Utliwrs;t/s

II}

Summ2ty of Oturmakini's ApDh.-Thtory

u6

Concerning Sameness or Effect

Art I lniycrsa ls Pcrmaocnr>

116

Three Ways of Coruuuing ApQIM

1,1

SVABHAVAPRATlB.ANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFIIRENCI!

, .1 &/atilUl U,rollth Svabhava:

&YO"" ~u,.Prt:sma.

The Two ScRSC$ of $lMbIMw

IS)

Swbh411t1 as Propeny-

IU

SWlbhillfJU

Naru~

Naturc-Jl!/tbhilllf and the Dusal Complex

The Subit (Jbtt,.",;,,) and SlNIhblilNl as -Nawrc"
p TIN PrwIllCtum-mDtit ({the Svabhavapratibandha
Some Igoes in the: Applicacion of me Production-mode
Concerning Necessity

' oj

LIS

158
161

169
171

In
181

The Detcrmilllllrion of the Production-mode

191

0" tbr &1A1i4nship Jmwn.n ITIpmyilnd MUJI"

19)

Some HeuristK Tunu

196

The Subordination of Propcny TO Narure

198

H Svabluva-l'ViMna."" tiN IJmti".mk

A Few Pmblems

10)

118

CONTEN TS
..

4.1

I NSTRUMENTALITY:
JUSTIFYINC THI1. SOU RCIlS OF KNOWLEDC E

22}

PrimiJ:aya III

U}

~/nstrllmmJ4lity"

Purpox and Instrumentality

1.19

The Role of Scripture

1)1

A 5:ming Ci:uluity

2.})

SaipturaJ Inference and Dharmakini's

Rtjecrion of C redibility
Axiological Concerns: Murual Rtslrunl of Path and Goal

1)9

l..4S

.p DIMmuJtirti on /nstrJlmenllWl]:
71N &rlinl CtllnmcnllJr;.u A(W..",

2.,:2-

Some Basic DdinilMJn5

1S)

-rdie Funaion" (IfT'lhUriJ ll)

156

lrutrumentality (prtlm4l!Ji1) in Terms ofTwo Efftnl

160

lruuumentality in T emu of Ihe Mediated Effect

instrumenwity in Tctnu of the Unmcdiated Effect

161.
168

The Two Effeca and the Two ScnICS of AnlMJrriy4

171

The Primacy of hrrqlirthil

178

Instturncnra.liY in Terms of Human Aims:

Some Problems and Solutions

280

A Disparity in T ime

181

ObstruCled Action

2.85

PctCCplion and Confirmation

Perception as Motivalor (prilll{lnAJ:t,):

The Question ofNovdty
Infcrcncc. Error. and TnufWOnhines.s
Ultimale and Conventional PrilwUM
CONCLUSION

Nlfturr. P""!'tUn. ifNi RLfi_mr

187
198
)10

)4
]t9
)10

CO NT ENTS

Appendix ofTransladons

)31

A Nott 0" UK TTllmlAh'om

HI

I.

PVSVad PV'.J<f -j7

1.

PVSVad PV,.68-7J

H9

). PVSVad PVl.IJJ-1<f1

PVl.~14-U.J

)61

4. PVSV ad

S. PV1.1-4 with SrImiOI'lS fmm PVP llNi PVT

l7<

6. PVJ.l- IOwith Srlmiom fmm PVP llNi PIT

39'

7. PVJ.l9<f- ll4 with SrItiOflS fiom PVP lind PIT

396

8. INmmmtlltiry ill tk Herubindu (HB: ~ . lJ-j . t6)

."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

4'9

Preface

HP.N I FIRST P.NCOONTUtlD BUDDHIST thought some ~f1[y

years ago, the Buddhist analysis of identity especially caught my
anention , and this soon Iw me to a study ofN:igirjuna. k is
perhaps common, my first artempa at reading Nigirjuna wc:tt confused
and confwing, but ali is leu common, I abo was able to consull two fine
Buddhist thinkers: Tara Tulku Rinpoche, a well-known scholar in the
Tibetan Gdug (Dtt [II!') U'adirion, and Robe" Thunnan, who had invited
Tara Tulku to teach lit Amherst College at the time. Both Thurman and
Tara Tulku encouf'llgN me to study me woru of Je Tsongkhapa (Rje
T song kha pa; 1357- 1419), whose reading of Nagarjuna fo rms the philosophical bedrock of the Gelug tradition.
On Tsongkhapa's interpretacion, the Uy to understanding N;igirjuna
lies largely in the proper USC of a certain style of reasoning: namely, the
system of inferential reasoning devdoped by Dharmakini, :a renowned
South kian Buddhist of the stvenm century (CE.). T uming, to DharmaIdni's works. I 500n encountered a host of compet:ing--cven incompacible--interpretations among the numerous commentluors on Dharmalcini's
thought in Tibet. An :attempt to :accoum for these differences. along with
the ,hetr interest and difficulty of the m:areri:a1. soon drew me into an
intense study of Dharmmni during my gl'llldwte work at Harvard Uni-

W,

versIty.

Under the guidance of M2S2toshi N:ag:atomi and M. If-wid Eckel, the:

focus of my rescuch on Dh21malcirti moved to the South kian interpretations Wt prt'CC'dc: and inform the: highly disp:aflue re:ad.ings of Tibetan
cxc:getes. I mwt :admit that. at first, I sought to determine which Tibetan
reading was "the correct~ intc:rpretUKm in light of South Asian predena.
but it did nOt take long for this approach to strike me ali hopelessly nme
and. in the end. entirdy uninteresting. Instead, I sought to conrcxrualiu the

"

'"

PREFACE

divergence of TIbetan opinion by understanding the history of the interpretation of Dlwmakini's mouglll in South Asia iuclf-:a shift encour
aged by my gradu;nc work with Charles Hal.I~. A grant from
American In5(irulc oflndian Studies enabled me to spc:nd (W() years at the
Ccmrallnstitute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Samath, where I read commentaries on Dhannaldrti's works with Prof. Rim SaJ'!l1w Tripi~i. and
this pt:riod in India was crilical lo my resorch. E~n in the Sanskrit works
of South Asia. howcvtt. the inu:rprttation ofDhannUim's thought develops and diverges (0 a wide alent; hence. with the mnaned hdp o(Tom
Tillcmans, I setded t'VCl'Ltwdly on a focused accoUnt of the c:arlie:st South

me

Asian interpretations of Dharmwrti as the subjm- of my doctoral d~r

alion (1m), which is dftttively the fim draft of this book.
As I was completing my doctoral work. Gco'ld Dreyfus's !WopW'"
Rt~lilJ,

an eltmsivc study of the Tibetan interpretations of Dharmakini,

appeared in print. ThaI work, along with numerous conversations with
Dreyfus. aided me considerably in my research. While tremendously helpful , Dreyfus's study of the Tibetan interpm::ations also highlighted the nttd
fo r a similar, historical KCOUiU that focuses on a specific South Asian iiUerpm::adon. This book contributes to fulfilling that nttd.
My dissemtion built on Int work of numtrous sc:holan, and in tht
course of the substantial revision) that led to mil book, many res:pond<ed
with helpful comments and suggestions. Tom TiUmwu conrinued to p~
vide the son of advice wh~ pel'$picuous practicality is matched by the
keen philosophical insighu on which it resu. Ernst Steink.ellner, whOK
work figures prominendy at crucial juncrures of my argumem, took the
trouble: to go through the enure text- His critiques. suggestions. and encouragement have added greatly to this book. ShOryU Kabura likewise provided
a number of luggcnions, some through an attnded and entertaining
debate about paniculars. Brendan Gillon's careful and detailed respofUCJ
wen: esptcia.lly hdpful for darifying my analysis ofDharmakini', ontology.
Eli Franco provided a comprehensive response 10 my discussion of justificatinn or -inslrumenCiliry- (p,..lfIIirrJNV that heipM me to clarify my interpretation. HcJmut ~r dirr:ctcd me to some important passages and
provided welcome encouragement. And Richard Hayes's pithy remarks
proved especially helpful in reconceiving the overall COnten of my interptetatlon .
Many others who work on Dh:um.akini and related iuuc:s aided me in
varimu ways. A few ,hal enme ~ily to mind are T ab.d!i Iw:ao. Birgit
Kellner, Horst Lasic, Parim.al Pam, Ernst Preu, and Mark Sideriu. In this

PREfACE

regard. I must especiallytlunk Mardt Mtjorand Piotr BaIcrrowicz.ofWar

uw Univen:i(),', Orienr:a.l Irmitute for organiz..ing in 1001 a mOl( fruidul
seminar where, amid the beauty of the Polish countryside, debates on Ohar
malUni (and much d5c besides) went on through the night. O n that occa
sion, and on others as well. I am sure thar some critic:a.l comment or quiet
suggestion has proved helpful in ways mat I ha~ failed to notice. To all
rhosc mar have grme unrhanlcM. I apnlngiu lOr my lOrgrrfi.llnes.,.
Having joined the faculty of the University of WISCOnsin Madison in
1999, I began to work intensively with students. and although various
responsibilities nude ir difficult to begin any se:rious m-isions before 100).
I managed to usc the early VttSion of my manuscript in a ft:w of my semi
nars. Students. I ha~ learned, arc cxcdlent reachers, and their questions and
arguments

::add~

much to my thinking. ~ thl!' manulCrip( movll'd more

rapidly rowvd its final form . twO graduate students assisted me as editors.
Eddy Falls read me manuscript with an ~ to the arguments. and his com
menu hdped to sharpen my discussion on a number of points. Q uisuan
Hmcn: went through the whole work. including noubly me Sanskrit and
Tibetan citations. and his contribution was likcwUc welcome. ThroughoUt
all (hil timf', my publiJhl!'r Tim McNeiU and editor David Kittelnromalong with Tom Tdknun$ as series edi[Qf-a:en;:ised great patimce. Ln \II
hope mat the dday was wonhwhile.
Last and foremost, I must honor and thank the contributions of Sara
McClintock. my chief editor. critic, supponcr. and spowe ro hcr I owe
more thanks than I could ever cxprcu. Despite being a RCW mother with
an academic (i.e . ~rworked and somcwnat erratic) husband, she some
how ~ ro oomplete her own d.isHrtation. begin an academic Cln!U,

maintain her equanimity and fundamental cher:rinw, and still give me the
most hdpful comments on dll!' nunuscript. Perhaps I am spoiled by such
acdlcnt CXImpanionship. reple[e with the finest edirorial advice and schol
arly insight. But when in the care of a bodhisattva. how can one really be
spoiled?
Madison. WlKOrWn
May 19. l.OO<t

uu

Abbreviations

1,1, }, etc.

Immedi:l.tdy following any abbrevi.arion, :I. numer.al indicates a chapter or SIion number (fO r example, PVI indicates rhe first chapter of PY). Verse numbers fOllow the
chapter or Stttion number (for aample, PVI.lS indicates
VC'IX lS in chapler I ofPy).

-0

Following any abbreviuion, "-0- indicates the Tibetan

translation of the tat in question :as found in the Sde dge:
roitiou.

AI<

AbhidhRrmIllwi4:as pres<:rvcd in AKBh.

AKBh

AbhiJhllmfllltoi4bhlg:t. 5C'C author V:asubandhu (1970).

AS/FA

AsiAtiKht 5tuJim I ElUIic AsiAtUfllc.

BCA

&Jhullryi.Jilfira. 5C'C author Simideva.

BKGA

Scinigc zur Kultur- und

Gno1i's edition of Prami!'lllH1rttikit, 5I1irtJu/",mlinllp4rihu4. and PVSV.

HB

HttllbiNiIl. 5C'C author OMrmwni (1967) .

Gcist~jchte kiens.

HDT

JAM

jOUmAloftht AmniC41l A(mimt] of&lipon.

JAOS

jOllmAl oflIN Amm(1I7I OrUnw!>in}.

JIABS

jOllrnlll oftlH Int~tionlll AmKiArjon for BlIlitihul Stwiin.

lIP

J.nmuJ "['''''MIn PhiluwpllJ.

ABIIRE.VIATIONS

~,

Karl)akagomin, author of Pralflli!lllwiTttiu.w.vrtt(lilul.

LPP

LApprtinuil!Jllf4ri/q4. Sec author Dharmottar:l h99lc).

MMK

M{j/~mJllutlUrilrl.

NB

N]4y4binJll. Sec author Dhurnaki"ni (1994).

NBh

NJiytlb~

NBT

NJti14bintiMfiltl. See aumor Oharmouara.

NS

NJi1J4n4trlU.. See :luth~ r Gauwna.

NY

NJIiJ4wirtti.ltlL Sec author Uddyoahr.a.

NVTT

NytlyttlNimiilIl4tptt"..t ikl. Scc author Vkaspatimiira h98s).

POS

PaJ4rtlNuJhamuJSil~t;raha.

PS

Pramd!'lJSilmlllXllJIL For PSI, sec author Digniga (11}68: edition by Hattori). For other chapters. sec: author Dignig2

Sec author Nagirjuna.

Scc author Viuyiyana.

Sec author PrUampada (1994).

h9ss--6ta; translation of Kanahvannan and Dad pa'i shes

rab).

PSV

~~

For PSV on PSI, sec: author DigtUg:a

(14)68). For other panions of PSV. Itt author Digniga
(19H-6l b).

PV

Pr.",ui!"'VlirttiJUL .Xc author Dharmakirri under the dater of

(hesc editions; PYI Cnoli edition (1960); PVl.
S2rp1r.rtyiy:..na edi [~ n (1938-40): PVJ ToWci cdirion
(1979. 1985); PV.p -t4B Tillcmaru edition (1000);
PV+149ff . Sarplqtyipna edition (1938-40).

PVin

PrIl""'!"l";lIik~

Sec author Dharmakini under the dates

of these editions: PVinl Vett~r edition (1966); PVinl

Steinkellner editio n (1979); PVin) PVin-D (199lb).

PVinT

Pr.m41)IWinikltJll!i!ti. Stt author Dhacmott:ara (199lb).

PVP

PrIlm4!1'lwirtti!Japllftj iU S: author ~abuddhi (1991).

PVSV

Pram4!J1lNrttiltltWDpajMvrtti; also called SlHIvrni See

author Dharmwni (1960).

I'vr

1'r1lm41)11wirttlkllfilr4. Set' author $akyabuddhi (1991).

ABBREVIATIONS

PVT-p

Peking edition of PVT. See aumor ~buddhi (r9Ss-60).

PVT-,

Satulcrit fragmena ofPVf. Sec author Sakyabuddhi (.991).

PW

Prrl1l'W!fIIlJirttikllvrffl. See author Manorathanandin.

PW-n

VibbDticandra', notes to PW; induded in SiIp./qtyiyana

edilion ofPV (r9J8-,.o).

IN
TS
TSP

SU,klllA4rttikil. See author KumiIila (I99J).

VN

VidanJ4Jot. See aumor Dlwmakirri (1991C).

WSTB

Wttnn ShHiim UP" Ti#Hul6t;it

WZKS

Wttnn Lit:Khrifi for Jit KliNk SwJ.uims.

WZKSO

WJmt"I' LitKhrifi for JU KliNk SU-

YO

y,&tiJipiki. Sec aumor "Unknown."

TllltwUII'r'trllhll. Sec author Sintara1q.ita.

TllltwUII'!'t;rilh4p4iijjJtll.

Sec: author Kamala.ftla.

II"" BJUidhimruslnuuU.
II"" Otuuints.

A Noce on the Sanskrit and Tibetan Translations

Tibetan tC'XO appear throughOUt this book. Most of these umsIations arc also included in the appendix. where they art ~mOOided in the largtt pusages from which I have
extracted th~m . For convenience. th~ titles of most Samkrit and TIbetan
texa arc abbreviated in accord with th~ tabl~ of abbrrviadons, which is also
a key to th~ various roitions of Sanskrit and Tibcran tatS that I have
employa:l for the translations. As with most philosophical works in Sanskrit. Dharmakini's taa often employ II dialogic modd, whereby Dh:umakini argues in response to critiques apressed in the voice of an objector
(Pjjrw~), whether actual or hypothtt:icaL To represent this convention,
I have used quotation nudes to indicate the beginning and end of an objection in a nanslated passage. Another feature of thu textual tndirion is me
interweaving of tats, such mil( a commentator's prose often includes
phr:ues from the veiW or commemary mat he u discussing. [n some ca.scs,
it is especially hdpful (0 know which phrases in a commentary a~ supplied from a verse or anomer commentary, and in such instances, I have
italiciz.ed the phr:ues in question. Finally, a.s a plaincd in me inuoducrion,
I have avoided to me greaten at~n t possible me use of square brackeu to
indicate irucrrions in uaruJacions. When brack.ru remain, th~ inscmons arc
particularly lengthy, or mey arc less dearly supponc:d by commentaries or

NPOJ:L\NT PA$SAC E.$ fROM s...NS"JJT and

grammar.

Introducrion

UDDHIST PHILOSOPHUS

often spcU of beginninglcuncss. It is

daimN. thai !he minds o f livin g bcoi"Sl> for e>ample, have no Mgin-

ning. and mat OUf current universe is only one in a beginninglcu

cycle of expansion and dcoy. Some Buddhuf minkus would claim that
even me mon mundane tuk can have no true beginning. That is, if a
beginning OCCUr$, there mUSt be some moment, some -now," in which it
occun. For the present to exist, howcvu, there must be a pm and a fuNfe,
for what wo...kl - now" mean if there WlI;re no lime o ther than now~ And
of COU lX, if there is a pUt, then how could now be a bcsionin!j? Now
mould instead be the end of the past. Each beginning. in short, must iudf
have a beginning.'
In a more a:mcrct:e senK, this book also sam ITom bcginningle5$neu, for
it arises from a need fOf a point of dcparture----a pl:llct: from whtch to
begin-in my work on the thought of Dharma1c.lrti, a South Asi2n Buddbul philOlOphcr of the KVCnth "011.11')' (c.a.).' ThaI Dharm.a.ltirri U wor-

my of OUf attention SttmJ sc:ucdy ncttUaJy to justify. Following upon me

work of his pmf:euor Dignlga, Dharmwni addressed at length numerous quesrions that are ofcentral conct:m to Buddhist thought and practict:.
The impact of his views on Buddhist throries of ~roeption, infettnct. and
I For ~ ~ modd, _ AKBh .J AK).19 (.,,...J.4). A phibophical a:ot.iIIl ill
found ill tbt ~''''''NMp~and ~oINipj"""'. MMK.

2 Tbc: cblaofot....nuIdni I n r. from~, bul in tbt abtmaof anythi", _dcfin

iriYf" I follow Fra~'1 wrlI-known &nick ([961). Conmi", lindmd. (1910) propoW or an earlier cbu, hill UUlIIM:nl ill ~ Oft the prabkmaril: aluibution or the
M~""""",,MIi,.1O BniV1lYittdca, and ill thw dubiow. II ill auci:al1O IIOIr WI. on
my~, tbt preciK dan", oiDbarmdlm and hlIcommcnUIOtI is r. '- impoI'WI1 than
wod: tN.t Iocala thc:M

fi&ura in I rd.uivc 1mK. In thil rtpnI. KraNoer',

fiM uampk.

work (1m) ill

FO UNDATIONS O F DHAlMAKIRTI 'S PH ILOSO PHY

language is difficult (0 overestimate. [ndttd, it would not 1x: outlandish to

claim that his ideas arc: repeated in twry Mahiyina Buddhist philosophical work written aftcr his time in South Asia. To this day. the TIbetan
m.ns1arions orrus Sanskrit tau arc m:ired. swdkd. and debalCd by Tibetan
monastic scholars to such an r:xtcnt that, in the ctntraJ monasteries of the
largest Tibetan tradition, a It.ngthy monastic holiday is devoted cnrirdy to
debate on the
of Dharmmni.'

'NOm

The difficulty in beginning a com'Crsarion on the work of Dharmakirti

nems from a problem that ohen plagues systemuic philosophy and theol
ogy: the demma of tbe system art so righdy intmwined that
first word
of an argument appc:an: to prcsuppox the system in iu entirety.' In Ollar-

me

makirri', case, twO circumstances render this hermeneutical circle paniculally vexing. First, the systcmaticity of his thought is matched by itS
complaity and a rrant concision. And second. the BuddhiSt traditions of
Sotllh Asia and Tibn. in their revert:nct For Dharmakini, have reappr()+
priated his works through Suca:s5ive generations of commentaries such that
we encounter a sometimes dauling variety of ways to read Dharmakini. Al
a result. WI: often And a striking lack of consensus on the mOSt basic issues
in me contemporary study ofDhunWdni 's thought.
A lack of corucruw is not itsdf a problem: Dominick Lau pra ius noted
that one: frequendy acknowledged sign of a great work is its resistance to
ddlnitive interpteation.' Ncvenhcless. in the case of a systmtatic thinker
such as Dharmakini. some of out most useful readings must emphasize the
tighdy woven fUrore of the web of idc:a.s that constitute his thought. and
without a consensus on even his most basic positions, such readings bome
impossible. Instead. WI: And ourselves arguing over the dcta.ib of a paniculu position---5uch as his notion of an entity's fUrure (.fVIlbhatw)-without
3 1 am .mrnns 10 eM J."l tip" tWt, the ~ lup holiday of which L..obans GyIIIO PI.,.
vida fucin,rilll and moin& account ;n bia mtmOin (I".). Gcorp Drqfus pva an
=ended...d ~riw iiIIXOlIIIl of lhe ewtIt (1OO}:'Wf). and he libiK diJcw.a; eMOe\"'
&II pbtt of DlunnalrJni in I>F lup cduaOOn.

.. G.W.F. H.-F. 1Oc CDmpk. ~l\Ilhe nWn body orhis IcctUICJ on rdipon of 181, with
thil

art:U

(r9IBa l}):

The qtlCJ{ion with wIUch _ haw 10 bcpn is: How 1m.." 10 ~ , IwgiMins?" FOI
il is of CIOUlX at Ieaa , IOrmal requilCnlml of aU .oa-.rific: knowkdsc. and ~
phiJo.opby. thai noct.illl should O\XW it. it that hal noc fCI been po_cd. AI the bcsin.
nin"
<a . _ haw noc fCI pro_ed l~ytbin&i and we annoc fCI appcaIlO

.0.,

thins anlrc:nlcnl.
, l..aCapra h !JIj:}I).

an,.

INTRO DUCTIO N

the point where we ask how theories about an entity's nature

relate to orner issuC$, such as the questions of rational jwtification and
authority. The central aim of rnis book iI thus 10 conuibure 1Ow:mi the
devdopment of a COI\SMSUS by presenting the foundations ofOharmakini's
philosophy in terms of a consciously coruUUcted starting point.
In speaking of the "foundations" of Dharmakini's philosophy, I mean
rnose issues that repeatedly surhcc: throughOUt his work: they arc the fundamental demena of his conceptual system mat, on my view, make all of
hi, argumenu pos.sible. I have otg2Jliw:! mose demenu under thrte broad
categories; (z) ontology, (1) me "natunl rdation" (swiJhilJllprlftihllnJh.)
in inference. and
the issues ofjwufication and authority, which I place
under the rubric of instrumentality" (prlim4?tJ11). These broad categories,
which structure this book. encompass all me demenu that enable one 10
understand and appreciate any argument made by Oharmwni. At the
same time, these categories include what is most difficult-and hcna:, most
controversial--in Dharmakini's though!. Thus, somewhat to my surprise.
I have written a book that is both an in-depth introduction to Oharmakini', philosophy and a detailed intcrprctluion of certain difficult poinu
in his work. t
~ coming to

u)

A Quntion ofMtthod: A Point ofDqJarrurt

The central concern of my approach to Dharmakirti', thought is my intercot in developing interpma.lions that attend to iu systematicity: the manN!f'

in wh ich o~ tt-,~icaI

poJitio~

d~ uniq~..u

of partieu6n

(1VII't.':w?W')-is mutually constr.:l.ined md enabled by numerous omen.

such a5 the ultimate irrealiry of universW (1Iim4~?W') or the role of
habi.ruation in perceptual judgment. Above: all, one intetprnive pt2Ctice
initially led me to read Dharma.kinis work in this fashion : namdy, my
inelucuble reliance on t~itional commentaries. But while I learned this
v:aIU.lhl., leuon fmm ,h., .u yle of re:>.<oning employ.M by traditional com
6 In ~ _

. I 5pUk of tM -founcbrioos" of Dharmaklrri'. phibophy to U 10

:illude In ,he _1 in whid! his rdmd_ punW. of rain\)' (~JUgaU an intriplinS

form of foundaDonali.Jm rhl! it ~ rdotiYiIll. Such an inluprrtalion. ~r,
~uira eon.idcnbk ~.ion 10 OIwmUlrti'. ~cmaticity. and , I thus pl'CMl~ ~
ciIdy .he I)'JX of KUdy thai corutirulClIhiJ book. Hroer:, I will !OUCh on rhis iAuc: aplicidy
",>11 ito tI ........cl........" ....... "''''';..,. tI.. <[uaUuol vfDh.or....J.J"i. xani"5

mU>t remain a IUbrat. albn. an imporranl OtW, of thill .study.

~;n..li.m

FO UN DATIONS OF DHAIMAKIII.Tl'S PHILOSOPHY

m~ntafors,

thor practices and ccrain fearurc:s of their texts likewise posed

a set ofhismrica1 problems thaI compdlcd me to construa a scuti.ng point.
In sum, I will focus on only Dharmakini's earliest tUts, me PrIlm4!U1"
INirttilt" and SVtI"!'fh, and I will resort only [0 the earliest commentators,
IXvc:ndrabuddhi (c:a.. 67S C E.) and ~uddhi (ca. 700 c.E.). To undernand my rea501U for restricting this srudy in the aforementioned f.uhion.
I should first aplain why I was kd to rely on commmwies.
In dlC: several yean: of research that went into this book. twO reasons
compelled me to resort frequently to commentaries. First. in practical

terms, any reader of Dharmakini's Sanskrit (au knows mat his dliptica.l
and intricate statements often remain im~nttrablc without commentarial
elucidation. Spcalc.ing in general of Dharmwni's style. Rkhard Hayes
rttm to - the tortUow writings of this highly compla: thinker.'" And referring specifically to Ihe SlIIJurtti (PVSV), a tat that is especially imporuru
for my analysis. Hayes and Bundan Gillon together nOle:, -Dtwmakirci',
styk is 50 rerse mat it is nor always immcciiatdy clear what philosophical
points h~ intends 10 make... I would add dUll . leave alone th~ question of
its philosophical conl~nt. evm th~ straightforward meaning of a sentence
sometimes seem utterly obscure in Dharmakirti's sparse 5l)'1~. The f'CIuh is
that. unless one wishes to argu~ from highly conjm:unl int~rpreutions,
one mwt rcftt 10 commemaric:s. wbm: missing phn.scs:ll~ supplied and the
dcgandy IOnuous relations of Dharmwrti's grammar ar~ plausibly
re$laled. Thus, for purdy practical reasons. comm~nwjes become an
jnevi(2.bl~ companion on any foray into Dhannaldrri's texu.
Beyond pr:r.ctK:al conUrN. however, lies another compcUing reason for
my rdial\Cr: nn oomm~ntaries: my larger airn-.n~ dut extends beyond
Ihe prescnt work-is not 10 understand Dharmaldni's thought in and of
itself, bul rather th~ 5ubscquenl '"' of his thought throughout the hislO!)'
of Mahiyina Buddhism. Thus, cvm if one could somehow undentand
Dharmakini's works in a manner mal ignored the history of their intc:r*
prctalion, such an approach would thwart me in my goals. In part, an:abir
.nrical ~ing would be useless becl.U5C it is a fanrasy masquer.Wing :IS
truth: my a.ssumplion h~rc is thar my own undemanding is historica.lly
condilioncd, and thus, an ahistorical reading of Dh:umaldrti would be at
besl ddudcd. 8uI setting uiclc questions of ddusion, onc of my central
aims in attending 10 the UK of Dhannakini's thougiu in particular hislOf'*
7 HJ)'ft (191")19).
8 Hlya iUld

Gillon

!10K

(1991:1).

INTROOUCTIO N

ical momCf1ts is to creat(: an awattMSS of my own location by rdkaing on

me way omen ITom a diffeunt time and piau appeu ITom my perspective
to be conditioned by meir circumst.:lnccs. I do not C-nvision that such an
awattllCSS wiU awaken me from the nightmare of history so thai I mighl
move beyond my own contingent arrangements.- InStead, by gaining a
greater awattncss of dut contingency, I hope to ante a more dkctive
agency therein.
Thus, in consulting commentaries, I have not used them as unc;:onrcsted
rtStliltermnts of Dhumwni's tau. Instead. I have sought to learn and
even to employ me style of reasoning dut they bring to the interpretation
ofDharmakirti's thought." In doing so, I am nO( only able to USI! this ....-ork
as a foil to the styles of reasoning available to me in my own milieu. but I
also hope to have offered an interpretacion of Dharmaldrti's thought that
readily enables ooe to more deeply apprmate its relevanct in the history of
Buddhism.
Having chosen 10 rdy on commentaries, I eventually encountered thrtt
featurtS of their style of reasoning thai are especially relevant here. lbc first
is the S)'Stetnattaty that we have already mentioned. Put simply, for modirinnal commentalors. the hen interpretation of the mailer at hand is one
that allows for the grearest rohercn~r al lean- produces minimal ren _
sion-with any and all other issues addressed by Dharmakini, One: upshot
of this sysrematic :approach is that it inadvertcndy highlights the pieces Uul
do not fil readily into Dharmaldni's philosophical punic, Among the
str2rcgics used to cope with such inc;:onsinencies is the second rdevant fea(UJ'C of this style of rc:asoning. namely, that meaning res.idcs in the author',
infennon. noc in his ccxu, and. mat in most CUCII the author', intention
remains the J2/T1e over the enrirt corpus of his ....-ork. Finally, the third fearure of the style of reasoning employrd by tflld.itional comrnc:nt.:ltors is
straightforward: Dharmakini, to pur it Mundy. can never be wrong,
, I dnw tht notion of "coolingm :ur:ancanmu" fi-om Quentin Sk.inna (I~), Oapir.r
SkinntT'l probkmaric mlplwil on authorial inrenl, M doqucndy ~ III IV .tIow
laa &om ochn- timet ro di'f'l, OW' own _ptionl. In tone. Skinner'. ~
taembIa 1..aCapn'l (191,), and it coouva with the monolithic: (and --'vol hubrisric)
notion of one'l own lUaorialloacion due is implied by the "re-fIlClIion- m:jwmt by
Ridwd Rony'l mnbod of"nlional -oon" (1914),

mill

10 In

uans tht notion of ...yk of lftIOIIi"" I om rdrrrins 10 the - " of Ian Hadins

(1911), In brief, Hadcin" poine,...nidl mill\! Ix c:onaiveI! micldk way Ix.. .. incom
~ity and iD<klaminacy, is dw OW' COIItti II with a oryk of lUIIKIincdoa not CO&urn uulh Yaluc: ' " N, but ruMr Ulal which II\IUJ proposlllon up for pabI. ill a
c.ndidat~ for brin& ttuc: or~" (19141),

f OUN DATIONS OF OHARMAK IIlTI 'S PHILOS OP H Y

In combination, these three features-systematiciry, me appeal (0 authorial inlenl , and Dh.atmakIni's inviolable corrcaneu-lead {O several concrete practices among tnditional commentators. Fo r o ur purposes. the most
relevant practices roncc.m the resolution of inconsincncics eyc when::

nt.

pieces of the puzzle do not perfecdy Spifically, if :I. commenclltor con

fronts an inconsistency fo r which he can formulaiC: a solution, he will feel
free (0 supply arguments that. if nec.cssary. move bqrond the tal; from the
comment:UO[S' standpoint, movement beyond the text is justi fi~ because
the: locus of meaning is not the (61 but Dharmakini', intention. Neverthdes.s. even though Dharmakinj's comment;uors fed free 10 move beyond
the tO:l, their arguments will nor contradict the problematic or inconsislent
passage at hanc:!.. Instead. commentators mnntua ugumcnu in the semantic ,pace thaI is ldT opcn by the t a l itself. In some cases, a passage's ambiguity O1XN it to multiple l'C2dings, and this ambiguity constituteS thc: SpilCC
where such arguments may be created. In most castS, however, me strict
and highly inflected slyle ofDharmal:ini's Sanskrit-along with a precisely
defined technical vocabulary-leaves linle room for such semamic maneuvering. As a result, commentators must onen depan from the text altO~ her to eompose, in dfect:, a statement of the unsaid that supplies the
rtquisite argument. lbe hermeneutica.l principle that enables a commentator to supply such ~denda is the appeal to Dharmakini's intention: one
is simply revealing his intention.
For a oontemporary academic intetpmer, these various fearures and practices of traditional commentaries lead to two clear advamages and some
notllble problems. We have a1ttldy (Ouched on one advantllge, namdy, the:
anention to systematiciry, which permits questions that are impossible if
one anends only to minutiae.II As a second adwntage, the: commentarial
practices offer the contemporary interpreter an opportuniry to a :mside:r the
regnant intdlectual problems and contributions in each commentator's historical era. That is, since the commenta(Ors arc most ooncemed with resolving inconsinencies, and since resolutions to old problems lead to nl:W
critiques, each generation of commentators is thus responding to a nl:W set
of concerns rypical of that era. Hence, by providing access to the concerns
thaI arc distinctive of each generation, the commentaries can se~ as an
impotum tool fo r the won: of intdiectual history.
While the uaditional oommentarial apprcnch offers these adwnrages to
the contemporary interpreter, the "ery same features and practices also
I I Fo r me on

mil iJsuc, I ,he oondo.uion 10 dlis book.

I NTRODUCTION

prove problematic in a way that has led me to place: strict limits on the
prescnt srudy. The attention to SYSlematicity, inasmuch as il is coupled
with an appal to Dharmakini's intenrion. pennia commentators to move
freely among Dharmwni's tc:xU, and since: DharmaXini composed eight
philosophical works, Il a contemporary interpmer would encounter significant problenu if she were 10 uncrilically accept the commentators'
approach. In pf1lCtical terms. the shc:tt size ofDharmak:itti 's written corpus
would require a contemporary hinorian to apply the ament, highly focwcd
standards of historical interprc:t:ation over an unmanageable :amount of
matc:ri:al. BUI more imporwu, a hilurc: to attend to the: diffc:renc::es in Dharm:akini's lau c:ffc:aivcly leads o ne [Q :adoptlhe same: Stance: :as the tndition:al commentators, namc:iy, th:al meaning resides in Dharm:akini's
inlemio n. nOl in the tau. In orner words. if! choose: to aplain rne meaning of:a passage in Dh:armakini', Pra1Ni!fllwirttW" for c:xample. by recourse:
to any other passage: in any orner ofDharm:akirti's tau, I mWI da.im th:at
something beyond Wt tCXt itsclflinks it ta thO$C othe:r tc::lU. For the: tr.;J dilaon:al commentators, that link is provided by rne: intendons in Dh:armw"i's mind, and unless I affirm:an cvc:n more: obscure: link:agc:, I tOO
will evcnru.:ally rtSOn to the notion ofauthorial intention. ~nd the pmh..
lent.. anc:nd..:anr upon any a tte mpt" to u ncrlVc:r inrc:tuion , oJ thc: main diffiallry
here is Wt, in constructing my own versio n of Dharmwni's mind, I will
fail to Itt the version presc.nled by the commentaries :at hand. In olher
words, as the particularities of the tau themsdves fade from coll5idencion. 50 too will the distinroon bt:two:... my own imagined Dh:armaki:ni and
the: commennu ors' venian.
My ~pon~ to mil problem il not to rejc:.cr m e: c:omme:nr,uiCf; in favor
12 Dhannaldnflcaruc. won. io poobably rho: Pr.tu~ rCom~wyon rho: lNCf\I'
menu of ~,. wbo.c lOur dIipca1 covn iNucs of ir.fm.oa. IUlhority and justili",lion. puc:cprion. and upunm', rapti..... y. n.c,., topic. COcr rho: enriK nnB" of rho:
usual iIIun ~ by PramlI;Y ThcorJ. ~ otykof diK:oww in whid. Dhannakini parlicipa.cd
chapt.... I). Another early _ .... i. !be s..fMi~ 0\" simply SI/ftllf1li r AIlIOam~wy' knpIycommenwyon rho: """"~Ilint dupl..... which di-o. I
,nfnma. In tffmI of u....... Ur.o:. rho: s-."m iI probt.bly Dhannakini"1 IuJm woriI: it it
eenainIy rho: 100ft diffiadt. Two lam 100tI, !he Ptw~tti/uytI and ~Iti_ C<:I"I'n lhc.
AmC wpia u rho: Pr~ and u AIda m.,. ottenaibly ~ rho: proUI of Iopia
prop 10 Pramio).. Theory. a1t1oousk .he NWIti..... it quile "-on. To diKl IM fiuthn _
lOpicl addraacd in Ihae man cmenI works. Dtwmakini aOO CGrrIf*C'd four odoa leW:

<_

rho:~~ rAnal~ol R...blionl). Hm.#iM. rQuin~olRconilll"

~1IU1fbIu,.,;,w,;

rproof of om.... Minda1. and V.u.."""" (" Proadutel b [)d:,ue"),

which it probably hit bs!

J) The ~I

wont.

praenud by O,..td Hoy (1971) iI &rnOnJ.he _lucid in Ihil repd.

FO UNDATIO NS O F DHAkMAkIRTI 'S PHI LOSO PHY

of some pu~ reading of Dhannakini, nor to rtjt alrognhcr the intenexrualiry of Dhmnakirti's work. Inslod, I havt chosen to restrict my focus
10 DharmalUrti', earliest and most atcnsivc wooo, namely the p"",u/t;UIVtirttilt. and me SVIIIJ!ffl,
lengthy prose commentary on the first chapIcr of the Prllmi!l4NrthkiL In ~ry~, I move beyond these tau only
when the commentators themselves prompt me to do so. This technique

me

allows me

to

avoid both the: practical and methodological problems ass0-

ciated with an attempt to speak in [emu of Dbannakini's entire philo-

sophical corpus.
Another challenge prCSUlred by traditional commentaries is the manner
in which they arc layered. ~ nOled a~, the rnppropriation of Onarmakini in each commenwial gcncntion makes it possible to appreciate
the intellectual interests and contributions of each commentator, but we
create that possibility only ifwe discern dcu-ly the distinctions among commentarial 5U':1I:2. A3 is already MdcnI, on my vitw each COmment:lfOt constructs an imagined Dharmakirti who replaces the text as the reposiwry of
meaning. and in this imagined Dha.rm.akini's mind. all S)'1temic inconsistencies find their resolution. In rmny cases, commentaries from the same
generation largc:ly ague their Dhannwni-s can be treated as on~d
those: commentaries therefore form a single commenwial stratum. When,
however, one moves on to another generation (or f O another line of interpretation). a new Dhumakini appears. And since Dharmakirti', fOIts arc:
taken by the commentawrs (0 be the inviolable account of all that mauc:rs
in regard to issues such as perception. inh:reorial reasoning. and sc:nwuia,
the history of Buddhist theories on these: issues in South Asia is embodied
by a line of imagined Dhumaldrri-s, each corresponding to the inrerprttalion of a panirular commentarial stntum."
The chief challenge: for a contemporary interpreter is the work of sc:paradog commcntarial S[rata. In shon_commentaries tend 10 build one upon
the other, and they thus dc:vc:lop historical byers, often expressed in terms
ofthc accrued rcpcrition ofkc:y phra5eli or ideas from their prM.essors. At
least some inrerprttarions-and c:vc:n many phnCCI of Dcvcndrabuddhi,
the fi rst commentlltor on DharmWni', Pr,,,"41,MvirttiJtIl, appear to be
rq>eated. in all subsequent commentaries on that work. no matter how Late
those: commentaries might be." The: next commcnt:ltor, Sakyabuddhi, nat-

I 5 h "f'pc.oo.. th.. in cad. of hi. ...... n <>Ommen" on .he "".- o r ...... p..,wJ'!"'u, .......

Manoc-adwwldin (o:wdfrl,.( ~l Drury), theautbor olf'VV. recotdr1lUb.cim INIl)' olJXen.

IN TR.ODUCTION

uraily repeaa Dcvendrabuddhi's commentary. since part ofhU work is a

subcommenwy on Ikvt:ndrabuddhi's tat. But Sikyabuddhi also expands
upon Devcndrabuckihi's work by adding his O'NO insighu. When we then
come to later authon such as Santaralqira (71.S~-788) and Dhannottafa (A.
ca. 800), we find that the ideas and often verbatim phrases.----of both
Ikvt:ndrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi are repeated in their worla without any
indication as (0 their origin. " This trend continues even in Tibet, where
ideas and phrases of South Asian commentators are repeated without identification by Tibetan authon."
It is worth reiterating that the Iayaing of commentaries does not come
about bccau.sc commenta(Ors, in some slavish adherence (0 tradition, fail to
be original. Indeed, the layering of commentaries indicates exactly the
opposite: each maNm rcpresenu a new set of innoV2tions and insighu
brought to the issue at hand by that generation's commentaton in response
to the various developments of their times. Considt:r. for example. the fol lowing comment or Sikyabuddhi . Here he summariu:s a passage from
Dharma1cini's SVdl!J'ffi that addresses Dhannakirri's philosophy orlan~
The idea in this passage is that since expressions take as their
objccrs a cnnceprual appearance fhat i.s o:dudcd from other
appearances, they are therefore established to have other-cxclusions as their objectS."
drabuddhi'.commma. And nm PrajMbncupu, ...... won iI: Ilriki.. for h.iI ~dy
ddilMnu dtricion to ~ ..... prmou. (:(IIJUnmwil:$, _ ~'I -0. from lime
10 rime. Sec, r...r insona, hili . . of doc eampk of doc twlns.I PVJ.n. (~u
lor'l"u...., 9).lj; PYP:U9aI) and me nocion of Wlivnais as _1Ur.f ( h'-~U
~,,. .); PVP: I )l~} in flil commala on PV).I9-l.I .
16 Slntanktita. for eumpk, dttm::J hil: notioa of tho! three ~ of constrvin& me tmn
rrs" OO:HOO)J from ~buddhi ~ bdow. 1)11f, and abo PVr".2b-I4D K:l~. Dharmoan (PVIIIT. 5mnkdlMt and Krua.tr 1919,,).)11) adopu ~'.
notion of mIriaM" (_r./!J and auinPc ~) inamunmtaliJ}' (10, In IICICOIlIII of lhoeK

IUIJi1 ,

norioona. _

bdow.

~f~lI). ~ .....

(PVi"T. S...<nkdtn........t Kn-

'~:'.I If)

.dopa, albric wUh _

rnocIifiaUon, ~nbuddhi'l noc:ioN of"....."... and "y.M
(for ~i'I.,jew, I bdow, 166ft). n- I Oldy. rn.. 01 numeroou Qampk$.
17 See, for Qamplc. ~ Md.os Idan'. dioOnction beno" Il\ISfwonhi,- (.""''!'..u.)
in IcnN 01 AIh;m and ob;ea (Drcyfuti I~). This dioOnaion b in fJo: 6", prescnltd
by ~ (PVP"~ , , poilU dw Siky. Md.os &dan doa noc: niK. Of count"
wbm Tabaan coau:nmOll)($ repeal !be WOfdI oflhrir South AlAn praLl
- s, Ihry do 10
in librtan tnndadon.

18 PVT(78b41.JPVSV .JPVI .6~ l""lti!hJi' plM" J.u J.,,.i",", "",.,.,,.

j-,

10

FOUND ATI ONS OF DHARMIIKIRTI'S PH I LOSOPHY

Tht: basi< poinl here is dul2l1 objca (1lnJu, ~)of 211 apress.ion (iIlbJll)
such as "cow" is actually a spt:cific type of nt:glUion dut Dhnmakini calls
an "olhcc-o:dusion" (Imyiipohll). Words, in short, have ncg:uions as meir
objt:ru.
Wim Ihis p:w;age in mind, let us turn 10 the much bttt commenttry' of
l<an)akagomin (ft. ca. 9(0). Al is so often the c:ase:, hc repc:au vt:rb:!.tim Ihis
comment of Sakya.buddhi. bOl hc makes 211 important ch2l1~:
The idea in mis passagc is that since expressions take as thcir
object a conceptual appcarantt thar is excluded from other
appear.tncc:s, thq-:m therefore tstablishcd 10 have 4firmllriom /U

mnr objtm. 19
For Dlwmaldrti, the pos.ilion dul c:pressions have affirmations (llitihi)
as their objt:ru is directly opposed 10 Ihe claim thai apressions rake otheraclusions as rneir objectS. Thw, when Karl)akagomin repeats Silcyabuddhi's commcnt. hc cnds it wilh :II conclwion thlU is Dum" opposiu 10
Sakyabuddhi's. In allmng ~i's condwK>n. Kar~min clearly
had a specific problem ro address." bUI we can only become aware of Ihal
problcm if we 110M and rake as significant Kar~akagomin'J modification
of Sakya.buddhi. And we can only do $0 if we resisl the apparenl synchroniciry of the commenraries.
Attention to commenrarial strant-a kind of tatual archaeology-is
ntraJ to my interpretation of Dhannakini. Specifically, I aim 10 ptUenl
an interpretalion Ihat focuses on Ihe earliest commentarial S[llIItum as
formed by the inlerprttalioru ofDcvendrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi." Thc

/IV.,."". ~,.

N. 'P .....

......,.Ji"_.

PVI.4
";,iI,i.,.,.,..,,.*' sMJIw",
in

19 K(11P7-1I) MJ PVSV

.y.,;m,..
iii,.
. . .

tk'/ !hJir [roj l

pIN.. ,,{ IM i "" (... ,,"" J. tn4,. ~

~uU (i",..~~ ,,;w,.,...,.'~

;~ ,,~.

"'..."

N()(c WI me, nnphasir in the Inrul..

lion .. mlM.

20 In ~ Irrms. his plObkm ir .... one fim tUtcd by UddyoWwa {NY .... NSl.l.66;
617.1-4; lruubud below, 1)7}-namdy, WI the conlmi of an a:pra.>on Of c:oncqx....m
U -CIM'" iI JUbjccriYdy apcricnad U an affimuolion , 10 how can ,he ob~ of sud! an
a:prcstiort or C""lXpt be MPlion1

21 Ginn mar hinorial i",pon1IKC, " ir ,,,,nw; ....... Inn aIonc any deu.ila of II".;. Ii..,.
or Uutitulional afIil.i:olionl, _ CilIInOI na.1U the priK dales of theM: twO aucialIy impoe
.... , conunen<a<on on ~m.akin.i '. ~ ,,,, .~

w. can only _ e .....

~.

b..ddh.i "'taM~. and dw Silcy.buddhi muse puotde KanulaIiI&. KamaWiIl.,

INTRO DUCTION

"

panicular version of ~ Dharm.aldrtt procntcd here thus arises in dialogue

with their venion. It is only by developing a resrrictcd interpretacion in
this manner thar we can begin the painnaking cask of separ.tting commenr:uial byers so as to learn the insights [lut chancteritt each commenclIor's work. U And, as noted above, my aim in doing so is to get lOme IC'nK
of tbe historical <kvdoplTlC'nI of Buddhist thought ill well ill my own historiallocn ion. The archaC'Ological metaphor that I have employM. however, can k highly misleading, in Ihat it might suggest an almost lUive
objectivity that beliC'S my approach 10 reading Dharmwni.
To be mores specific, the archaeological metaphor of-commentuial
strata wdUJ.ly describC"s some constraints that I have placed on my interpretation of DhlIrmalcini', thought, but this metaphor doa; not capture
the: way I have anemptcd to read and think throuah the problemt therein.
That is, by constraining my approach in historical tC'mu, my aim is not: to
uncover the nw:aning of the tat as if it were an unearthed object. Rather,
I hope to create the conditions that enable me to pmicipate in the vibrancy
of the Buddhist uadition', tevcren for such an influential thinker. I do
not mean that I will bow unconditioru.lly at Dharmwrti's fttt-:n:ain
resavations about his thought prevcnl me from doing so. But by locning
my interpteD.tion within :a paniOJI:ar runoric:aJ reading from :a p:anlcul:u
nyk: of reasoning, my goal is to enact in im:agin:arion the :aporias found (if
somerimes then obscured.) by the system:atic :approach employed by the
commen(:ll.tors on whom I h:ave relied. ThO$C often complo: and intricate
:aporias :are precisely the inconsislencies around which the chaptetS of this
book have been organi7.ed: problems in ontology, infert:ntial reb.rions, and
jtlJrificarinn. Thmughout I h:avc :arTemprM. 10 emplny :a hermenatria: nf
charity that gi:vo me best possible :argument fiv", within If hiJlllricllll] Ia.utJ
sty" 4 r'tilSDnint . I will nOI theteby resolve the inconsistencies that we

.m

mooco.er, wnMC COIT\mCIItarioon (and ~lsrudicd dirccdy under) SinW'llqit:J. Siner

T.bcun -.n:a allow ... 10 pbWbIy daim Wt ~waIctUa _ aai~ in the mid
emnuy. we m.... hnc rdatic duin& thai pbca Dcw:ndnbuddhi and $&y:.buddhi noc bdOn::
1M ICWCIIth cmnuy, b.n noc afia' tIM- atfy cipltl. This type of rdaUOOf. appro1illUte datin&
it I)'pieaI in !he ~ ofSO.JlD Alian thinkrn. but ro. ow pu~ a hiMorieaI uW)'$U Mcdo
only !he rrYliw duos of !Mae thinkcn in rrlarion 10 ada odw:r.
22 In addilion 10 {"" "~oric1I ~Iio", ,hat underlie dw intnp~rion of DIwmMirti, work. one can also poinllO a pnaical CIUIaIt"M of approoKhins his wOOt in me Whion. SpffiaIIy, ;1 mabIa one {O pba timiu on !he- wcondaJy mamUl lO ..nid. one: rrkn..

I. .. pn:ciody b.ru. n::uon thaI we ...w.,.y rdaridy KUlI .'~Iion 10 _ _ I. bud

1<1"_.

olok or' .."

vb ... .t- Q{ 0 .,.,... to,,1) .ond
(.".)-d,..o, """'. oohuwiK be
CONidm:d rdcnn .. WCtC '"' 10"udy Dhumaki"f. thou&h. io an a/Wroric:tJ fashion.

11

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTI'S PH I LOSOPHY

tnoounter in DhilfTTlakini's thought, but I do hope that I have come (0 an

interpretation Wt is -good- in that it - reactivates the process of inquiry,
opening up new avenues of invcsrigation, cri6cism, and sdf.reflection." 1)

Som~ Suggtstio1ll for th~

&tUkr

Because: this book has various ainu. it also has various audiences. My over
all aim is to make the content and ityie of Dhannakini's reasoning-u
interpreted by Dcvendr.abuddhi and ~buddhi-available to all my
readen, and this goal thus applies to alIaudienco: of this book.. I also hope.
however, to speak directly (0 specialists in an attempt 10 encourage a his-.
lorica.lly focused consc:nsus on at least some centr.al issues. Hence, I aim to
proem an argument Wt is of sufficient rigor and deW! 10 maint:ll.i.n a specialist', atttntion. In doing so, however, I wish to avoid the risk wr, in its
technic:ality and minutiae. my presentation will become impenetrable to
readers not activdy tngaged in this fidd.
Balancing me nccd.s of Jpecialisu and more broadly inleltSti readers has
iu dangcn:. Those tngagcd dirtttfy in rtscaICh on Dhacmakirti or Pramitta
Theory might occasionally ask for (Yen greater abundanee of deu.i.l and
citation, while thost: nOI dircaly tn~ in such research will find addi
tKnal dttail supttfluous or evtn overwhdming. To allay some of this risk,
I have taken ~ral st~ FiBI, I haY(: plaud all innoduaory materia.! in
the tint chapter, when I prestnt an overvi~ of the style of discouI'U
fOcused on Pram~ Theory. Second, when we tum in the remaining chapten 10 a deuikd cuminalion of Dlwmakini's own views. I offer a sustained bUI
overly rechnic:al argument in the body of the lat, while
providing greater technical detail in the nottS. Third. ,0 provide all read
en with ,he most nlevant primary source material, I have included an
aleNive appendix of cr.ansluions from key passages in Dhumaluni 's
works. Finally, I have auempled to avoid 10 lhe greuesc extenl possible the
use of sqU:lll! br.ackeu in my tr:rnsl.arions of primary ( att. In the academic
study ofPram~ Theory. the u.sc of (square] brackets has bewme a standard pr.lctice as a means 10 indicate words or phrases in me translation
mat. while implied by the source text or supplied by a commenwy. art nor
actually presenl in the soura: lal. This pracria leads to an atmndy lit-

no,

13 UCopn. (')'IIB'). <l-Ia H~ (UJU4} nuIu:r. tho: 1W.d ul "",.JU..awU---"..!,a

hiRoric:aIIy \oaI;ed--.di1ll INI I un wg " jnc ~.

INTRODUCTI ON

'J

enlist notion of translation. where: the mark of an "accurate- translation is

its ability to be rtad as a simulacrum or the original. By ignoring the way
in which !ranslation involvca: ;I dialogue with the tat, such an approach
produces tl'aIU!3rions wr wiU IlO( enable;l rc:ader to dUnk through Oharm;l
Idni's works in the way that I ho~ to enoourage! ' Brxkcu, moreove:l, are
obviously directed only at specialists. sino: onlY;l specialist could son OU!
the: philoJogK:aI implications of such imcrtioru:. For orner readers. brackets
arc: at besl:;I disuxtion, and at worst they exclude nonspecialists by rc:mind
ing the:m wt the trarulation is simply a aib for the source tat, rather than
a translation pn It. A crib--a 1001 10 case the reading of Sanskrit and
libw.n--nuy have its uses. but it obviously is irrdevanllo those who can
nor read thrx languages. For thrx reasons, I have: decided to eschew brack
cu. except where the inserted !ext is unusually lengthy or not clearly
implied.. My assumption is that, even without b~ specia1isu can read
ily determine which phrases and words have been supplied by context or
commcnary.
With the above proudurcs in mind, I am able to ofttr some practical
suggestions on how;l rader mighl best applOKh this material. For th~
x:t.ivdyenrgM in t.he study nf Dh;lrmaKini or Prami-:ta Throry. Ihe
ove:rview of Prami~;I Theory may provokc $Ornc lucful rcf1~nru, hut if
these readers choose to move direct.ly to the discussion of Dharmakirti',
method and onlology (chapter 2), they will 1101 lack any material c:uenti.al
to my intcrprttation. Scc:ond. I would remind specialists that many notes
may be of panicular interest to them. since the notel often contain
atcnded. technical arguments. Other readers may also find the notes of
coruKknhlc inlcreJ:l, bur I would SU88'51 Ih:u if thc an~rivc rcchniali3
prove tiresome. the argument in the body of the tat m;ly rc:main both
intelligible and useful, even if me not:es arc not consulted. Fin.ally. 1 remind
all readers Wtthe appendix contains lengthy translations of lOme relevant
primary tats. My interpretation succteds only to the extent tb;ll th~
texts, perups initially !hunting. become vibrant and intriguing scums of
cMl'Igc.

24 Paul Griffiths ",...:,1). in hia wry dUawion of &Buddhisl: Hybrid English: PUff rho:
iJIue in mrlt ICmII: "'l1loert is abtoluldy no fQJCn why8uddholocr sIMKLId bemI,~ &II her
mail: trldition, JaIed from rho: Wlinilia~ and pwed down from maNn 10 pupil by mpli
.... II i

.. . ......, --'1 lica cati.."ti.." . ....

mmmuniry." .5 aOO c"bnOn (' m ).

~.

I.c.oM od(t.....u.lUlIC'I" r,urn the: ....;.k, .:.da..it:

Pramiil)a T heory:
D harmakirti 's Co nceptual Context

F WE A1E TO ENGAGE wi th Dharmakini'l philosophy in;ll manner that

enables us to think through his style of reasoning, then we must learn

to speak Dha.mu.lOni's language thai is, we must bomc skilled in the
discourse WI makes Dharmaldni's philosophical choices pou.iblc. Since
thai philosophicallangwgc is highly complex and prccisdy inflected. some
rcadcn may find it helpful to have a primer of sora. With those readers in
mind. I have provided in this chapler a basic overview of Dharmalcirti's
conceprual conte:n .' Tn do so. the du.prer cmphnittS some JigniflClnl

poinu of convergence among South Astan philosophers of Dharmakirti's

era who participated with him in a styie of discourse 'MIT call apramil)a
Theory.- ThUl, in a secondary sense, this chaprer will also alert readers to
some of my presupposirions. for any :lUcrnpt at a synoptic overview
inevitably ~ea.ls at lean some of iu author's assumptions.

J. I TIN

Proem ofKnowing And In Instrumml

To undersllUld Dharmakirti's concqltual COntal, WI: mw t a pp recialC~ that

his location within Ihe Buddhist traditton is only part of a morc complex
l:a.ndu:::lfW!. Alrhollgh he cle:..iy Owe!! much

fa

his Buddhin pd~n: . his

work aIJo draws from other traditions. In some Cl$('$, Dharmakirti appcan
to adopt olhers' theories, but most notably he adopts a particular mode of

PIn_I'"

1 R.c:adm. who Kdt more cxtetW.., inuodunion lIl.lIy I1nd Jorwdon Ganon',
ill
a.maJ lNii4 (wo. ) 10 tM, api:ally bdpNl. A 11..., inlrodlKlOl}' work fOcwnI on 1M rdc'+'Iftl 8l1ddhi" phUotophalndilioru il raul Wil1ianu ' B...uJnn T1.pr (1000). for
........ >11:1 . _ _

hill ...tHl'a"n ..-noicW" ut ..........iuno oha.m! ...-.,

M:arilaI (.,u:U-16. l' and n - )7).

.j

Pn.m~

1bcvriau,

KC

16

fOUNDATIONS O F DHAlMAKIRTl 'S PHILOSO PHY

discourse in which subject maner, technical vocabulary, meroricaluyle,

and approach 10 reasoning are all slured by numerous philosophers from
several traditions. We a n J'(:fcr to this style of discourse as Prami~a Theory,or ~ thcory of the innrurnena ofknowled.ge_-, It is me kind of phil<.
ophy praCliccd by Ihe mOll! important of Dharmooni 's principal
inlerloanors, induding the Naiyiyib Uddyol2kara, the V~b Pralasta
p:1da, and the Mimi'!'lsala. Kumirila.' The primary concern of PllllTIilJ.a
Thcory is me determinacion of what constitutes indubiable or indisputable
knowkdgc and Ihe rdiable means of attaining il.' While many South Asian
philosophers cnmine knowledge in a general fashion, P~a Theorists
discuS5 this issue in grcar detail rhrough a shared lechnical vocabulary thai
permits and encoura~ dialogue across traditions.
Thar is, philosophers who focus on the study of prllmli!"l deliberately
en~ with other philosop~th from their own philosophical lineage {JN1f'11MJ'Ilrd} as well as other tr:a.dilion~r spcci6c questions within
a larsa-. shared conIO((. To some: e:ncnt. this larger COntext consisa of a par.
ticubr style of Samlai! VttK and p r~, bUI it also stems from inccssarll
atte.nlion 10 an ongoing dialogic contal. HrnOl:, these thinkers continually
refer not only to previous tau within thei, own rr.r.ditions. bUI also in olh
ers' traditions. In employing such ddibt:rale inlcnomwity, PramiJ:la The2 In lfICUin, of Pram11p 11Icory: I am foIlowinc Malibl (J~: u), Iu for W Inm
"~." iu 11K in dVa COlli", is a INnerof IOfl1C dispulC (_aPWIY Poem '91-.:,..,
Ii",). Ho_e>u, thr anini iauc lxR is ".,,urathn- ~jfIbu, lnCIu POIf (1914:)11) has
indialtd, a .-.dispcxitionalllK ol " ~" ;. acupubIc fOr,,.,,,,,,, ~~l1r if"knowIedge" ;' UKd fOr doc cinaminalc (Olllm i dt2! is n-nJy tho- n:suJ1 of a ,UN!"...nm il
is ukcn 10 iu fullest alml---tNol is,...ncn il lUida action r,,.,,1If1ti) rdati~ to. hUlT\l.O aim
r,.~ Sft, 01 t::lWtlpk. NBh s and I I ""NSu.l. 5 alto doc diKuwion in dupea
4, whar I Wo diKlI. II Imp !he IUC oftbt tam irutrwnall,"

J TIw: Ib.,a of thac philCHOpkn Ut l,Inc=ain, bill tMy ,'.."" all active al _
bttwem SSO and 6'1. l'hdr INlivt

ch~

poinl

orda' is: Prdauaplda, Uddyoubn,

""""'"'-

me

" MMiW o.andmwwIs PfIII'LIl)a Theory 10 be bated IIpon whal he ails

"Nyiya method.."
H" IIO(ft "urlhis mtthod ' aimed at ..:quiri n& uidl'ncc tOt IUppon;l\f;' hyporhcsia ... and
thus nunins I dubiny 10 oauinl)'" (191':69). He abo nons, -n.. pi of the Nylya method
is a ";.,.,.,.a philotophic dcasion or. c:ondw>on which U certain." Evm a eunory pane.,
II thr 1i1cn.11,I~ wimin this uyIc of diKounc Ihows mal iu philotophcn wnl' wno:mcd
...;m certainI)' (a/thou&" _ wiU '" ill d>apur 4 thai aru.inl)' nd noc entail ...mdical il)').
II is imporWll 10 /IOIe thai fix thac philoiophcn. W puquil of rUinl)' ~uin:s IOITIC' il'1i!W doub< (l6~or dai~ 10 know (jij....j u ia rllCMmahon .5 NBh
""NSI.I,I,
U7t..pJ.btIJN .... 1I;'l'i" ;u.. .,.,.; "...-" iii,!, 16n,; 1I'!fII!i" .... DtwmaItirti (fOr
~, P\'SV .... PVI... 6) ........................... ie-. S ...... M .a.J b'U," ) ..... 8..-.._

u,)

bngo:r ('996:164-)66)

PRAMA~A THEORY, DHAIlMAKIRTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

17

orists do not simply note what had been thought in the past: rather, they
anmlpt ( 0 justify a particular imerprttarion by rC$ponding to the criticisms
of others, whether within or outside their own traditions. Each ~nm.tion
of philosophers thus represents a n~ layer of interpretation formed by
new criticisms and rebuttals. Already by Dharmakini's time, me debates
bctwttn various traditiON had gone bacIc and forth several times, and his
war\- "- thus thoroughly .. ng;n~ ;n rh~ cnn laT formed hy eI.rlier criri.
cisnu and his own an:empt to justify what he sees as the Buddhin view. One
up$hot of all this is that, in some ways, DharmalUni shares more with
thinkers from other traditions than he does with Buddhists such as Sthiramati or Candralcirti, who do not en~ in pramli,!" discourse.s
The general contoun of PraIJW:la Theory that delimit Dharmwrti's
own thought find their fint systemni( er:p~l;on in the NyliyllJiitTllI!> of
Gauwna (ca. I SO c.!!.).' Even at this early stage, a notable charactaistic of
Pra.mir)a Theory is the development of 1 technical vocabulary that aliialer
Pra.milp. Theorisu inherit and share, A cenlral theme in this vocabuhuy i.s
the usc of what J callihe ~
system. ~ a formulaic way of analyzing the
"functional e1emenb~ or It.raltll5 that contribute to an action (1triy4J.' Following Gautama'r lead, Vitsyiyana (0. .. n ), the eul.iest oeomment:;ltor on
the NJ'liytUiitrta, applies the /u1,iJk4 system to the verb P'IIma, " 10 know
indubitably, ~' Of the possible Itir.us or elements in an action, thltt are
panicularly relevant (0 the analysis of the act oflmowing: the agenl (Itim!)
who acts on :ut objt or ~pati~nt~ (ltllfflllln) by means of:ut instrUment
(U'II'!"). Adding to these three: the action (mp) iudf. Vitsyiyana and all

"rd.

, ,., dear CQrnpk of ad! di,o,,",," iI the ~ 10 ..:ripIur:lI citation. ~ ~

wc:h ,..Sthinm#i o n: Budd.hisc lYIr.on many ."..",.iont. and.arne Buddhiu dUnUn wd.
u Candnklni employ Kriprunwim grm: frequency, This appeal to wha, an: in dfca lita'
aryolOUras is
entirdy absenl in OIwmaIdtti't W'Ofk, and he dwes th it zmenllen
dcncy with iflOIt Pramlq.a Thcorim in non &ddhitc tnditions.

w-

6 or alUlK, the qumionl concani", dw naNn: and maN of,lUin;", inchibitabk knowI
edce an: catily IJ"IC:t;d 1'0 mud. ~
induding _
early Upanipcb .. wdI ,.. Bud
dl.l.oo ....... -.I"'''"'''P''' '-"c bee.. ......de ... ~ doc ~ hl.o<y of ..... .......ck of '*-'t;h.
(-. foraampk. ]l)'a.tilLeV). For our put'fI<*'. ~ltCla. wIw it of prinwy immsr an: !he
~ of sud> phi'-'PhY tN.tdiJm1y I"orm!he oontm for DharmUlrti'. woc-k. For
IIUsroriaIIt1IIUIW'1 ofNyty.. IUIhon and worb. _ Porm' (l97T-1- 11).

won:..

7 The Iw rt.uinu of the

U~ f)'SfCtn

is ,h( KmUhIfiU of Pacalljali',

M.hi~

I-+l}lf.
8 This

of;

..mo', aymoIosy yiddI meani,.. IUCh 111 "1'0 rncatuJ1O" Of "10 <kf~ the c:>"mt

bu. in KnW we il OOIlC)'l meaninplUdl III -' 0 uanaln" "[O know indubitably, -10

know without !he poaibiliry of mul," and fO on. Sec, for aampk, MaliW h9l6,J6j,

18

FOU NDATI ONS O F DHAIlM""IIlTI ' S PHILOSOP HY

subKqucnt Prwlil}a Theorists apply this W.irillM analysis 10 mc verb p,"mIl

so as to dcriyc four tcmu: prllmA'!. pramiti (or prllwu1J . prllmlJll. and
prlll1lli!l"-' These tcrms refer to thc agem who knows (p1"llIMf!), the action
of knowing (pnm,;,; or prami). me object known (prllmfJ")' and tM irutrumcnt used to acquire that knowledge (p,..mi!l"). Using me:sc four terms.
Prwlil;la Theorisu devdopcd a fourfold style of analysis 10 ana1yu knowled~ events. That is. their overall analytical framtwork assumed that every
knowledge cycm inyolved thc event as an IUti#II, an IIpt engaged in mal
action, a mtll1U for 11K- production of that action, and an ~bjm to which
mat action is principa.lly rclated. An:alyses of thc process of knowing
through mesc four tenns became sW\dard among Prwlil}a Theorists. "
Before we continue with our discuuion ofthesc four fams oflcnowing.
we musl first m:ocniu that rc:Idm familiar with mc cpistemological tM..
ories developed in the Euroammcan philosophicaltraditioru may fl that
out use of the term "knowledge" herc is somewhar irregular. On most
Euroameria n accounu, MknowledgC is a belief or attitudc that is true
(under somc set of candidons or rruth theory). k a bdicf or artitude,
Icnowled~ is dispositional, and illhcrd'orc a nnot be an act in itself. But
on the accou nt ofPr.uniQa Theory thaI we have given above. "knowiedgc
(prami,; or pwd) is the act (1triytlJ of "knowing indubitably" thai is con$Iituted by a process in""ving the imcr.lction of an agent, instrument, and
object of knowtedge. This modd requires that the Maction of knowing"
(prilIM or prllmiti) be a cognitive t'VCnt occurring in a particular person's
mind within a particular set of circumsrances. A theory of knowledge must
therefore rUe into account any rdevanl aspect of those circumstllnOCf that,
for aamplc. mighl disto" a cognilive ev~m in such a mann~r thai we
should not consider it knowledge. In e:umining distortions diat prevent a
cognitive cw:m from being a knowledge event, these theorists shared a gencral conception of the relation bcl'tOiCCil body and mind. Hence, lhcy :all
think it relevant to discuss at length the way in which physical infirmitKs
such as jaundice or CltanClS migJu dinoH cognitive evenu: a person with
jaundice will sec conch shells ali yellow: a person with Clt:atactS thinks mat
his water-jug is filled with sma.ll picco of hal,. They also generally maintain that intcnse emotions such as intense anger or lust so srrongly affect the
' NBh:u-l.4 and,..w_
101M l.lbiquiry of this praaia- rdIoxu tho: influence ofSansluio: gamnw on Pnmi~ The.... ,.. Fu. "" iMAoOUn. uI ..... ...... uI r""'" ;~ <I... ..... ..J. "'" "-bo.il.oI ('!I'I"J7~-~). Fvo
~ opifK -udr in rdulon co P~u/ljali'l M,.~~ _ Biatdcal.l (194)0-61).

PRAMAI':-IA THEO RY: DHAR MAKIRTrs CO NCEPT UAL CON T EXT

19

mind that all cognitions occurring with those emotions are necessarily distoned. This way of apprmching cognitive distonion--4fld numetOld othtr
ruch wues dearly indicates [hat an accoUnt of the cognitive cyent or act
called ~knowlcdgt" (prllmiti or pwni) is ooncemed largely with the proa:ss
of producing that cyent. And the mood that we have cited- involving the
imeraaion of agmr, object, and instrument- provides the ~15tructure
fOr Pramil}a ThMriu..' :anal"..is nf that pmcr:n;. 11
When Gaur:ama, Vitsyi}'Ula, and subsequent Pramil)a TheoriSIl used
this modd to give an accoum of knowiedge-f:Venu, their works address
especi:illy me "rll~ or "insu'UlTICDu ofknowkdge, and it is for this reason that Marilal and omen!'der to this genre of philosophicalliu:rarure as
Pr:uniI)a Theory. Bur why tlike an analysis of the instrument ali one', themuv: foc1ls 1 Why nor foell.( ;n..,e:ad on the agent. obj~ , o~ evenr itJdf?!J
To answer such quenions in a somewn:ar speculative manner, we might
give a historical argument mat borrows a principle of Prami .c:ta Theory
iudf: if two persons arc to have an argument. they must fin:t share many
poinu of agreement, TIut is, if any TWO discussanu arc to disagrtt mono
ingfully on some poim. their discussion must be framed within some uo
of ag~ment . " When d i$CUiling rhe acquiJirOon of indisput:oble knowledge, Pr.unil)a Theorisu geMn.lly agree o n many basic noriofU about the

instrumenu of knowledge (prllmJi!'llJ. wherC2S they gc-nerally enoounter

fewer UC2I of agrttmcnr on other aspca.s of that proct:SS. Since they (end
(0 agree more readily on issues related to the instrument or means in the
process of knowing, the instrument naturally becomes the focus-the
propositionallubjecr-of their discu.uions. The difficult probl~m we face
in making this type o f argumem is that we cannot rudily ezplain why it is
that these thinktn tended to agree more readily on issues related to th~
instrument ofknowledgeoWe may suspect mat some luge pool of oommon
assumptions underlies the emphasis on the instrumenu of knowledge. or
perh:aps that an emphasis on the instrument most readily affirms their
approam by aduding other styles o( discourse. Somewhat ironically. these
II Mari1al h !1i6:los) wccincly poinu 10 lk proca.s in qual;on as aUA.!: "In the tam
o
o
~ the notion of a llJC and lxalUC ~ inlO OM. "
12 For lhole already funilw .nIh p~ n-y. om m.ly ~mply uk: Why doa
."..tId Iilu: a ~ moniker for mit atyk of discount. ....... UJ ,,--ritiJ,btr, and 1".,,"~,.:IUnd ridicuIow!

r~,lh

IJ On I p~ 'Th.roty 3C"IWII, Ont CItI only lfI\H" :aboul 1M Inllh of. p"""",rion
{yttdjUJ If om bepns by accq>tinz (II lax provisiotWIy) W Cl:Uimu of dill piopo5i
tion ' ....bjm " . . , tIM",..,,).

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPUY

suspicions require US to acknowled~ that PtaJTliJ:Ia ~rins would not

oplicidy discuss sh:a.rcd assumptions or coven oclusions, since all such
issues would be obscured by their vcry givenness. Hence, due to the rela
ti~ lack of research in this area, the subtler fonn of this historical argument
an only be suggestive at this point. ,.
Putring aside co~n notions, one can also point to argumcntl made by
the thcorisu themselves. Among these are lWO distina arguments that
oplicitly acknowledge:lfl emphasis on the importance of the i flltnllfWftof
knowledge (prAwui'}ll), rather than the agent (prtlwuitr), object (prtlmt}'l.), or
W action of knowing itself (prAmit;). The first argumCOt is suggested by the
compannivdy early works ofV:1ts)iyana and Uddyoakan." This argument
amounu to the claim that the emphasis on analysis of the instrument of
knowledge derives from its primaq in the process of knowing. To U.K the
analogy of a person oming a tft'C with an axe: the person and the tift can
be identified as the cutter" and the "cut object" only when the action of
cutting occurs, and m..t action can only occur when a culung Uuuumel1lthe axe-is employed. It is only by changing the type of instrument used
that the action then becomes a dilfcttnt aaion. That is, if we replace the
with some other penon, or if we can direct the att apinst some other
object. the action is nill the action of cutting. In mononeither the agent nor
object can changt: the chanctcr of the action. If. however, some other kind
of instrument. such as a yardstick, is used, then the agent (" the cuuet'J.
objea (" m..t whK:h is CUt) and action ("cutting") all take on a diff"ttmt
chancter: they become the "mcasurtr," the "measured" and the action of
"measuring." Hence, inasmuch as the chancIer of the instrumenl determines the chanacr of the olher th~ factors. the innrument is primary.
This way of undersClnding the instnuncnr a.s primary appears to have been
widely accepted among PramiJp Theorists. induding Dharmaldrti ..

.111

ounlnu.,

14 Poutt", ~n.III.rI"J;.~ ~fIN1 (I~J) is o ne any lnemplll

10_ UllStalro usumpciom. Rucg b~ ud 1001) .... no.P!ftI in I oimilat diJcwaion
throusb the moeif of tIx "tdipolu iII!.tnNm." In tl:l"mII of aMmprioN, I am rdftrins 10
thr '""'" ofig,
_IOlpciono:of lN;ttcr. dw body. dw; CXNmOa. and 10 -w. would bc:u
dj ,rcdy on choius mD in I phibophial argummt. H~, m:ent work IXI ~~
(Z~ '991 and 199)), lOr e:ampk, advanca OUt unOenrandilll illihis rcprd.

ms

15 Sec N8h (4)0-4.4 j) and NY (4)0-4.4d ..

1.1.11- 16 .nd CIpialI)' NY (16-10). Vicpatimim'scommcna (NVIT: I6-IO)'~ UJdi.oI Jo,m" a1d.ougl dwycomc mud. 1011:1" in rhc:
hiscoric:allkvdoj:llllft1l olNrtra- A nujor COl"""" of thrsc pM 8' is dw conranulity of
the u....t. and rhc: ddinidon of :an inatntrt>ml (u"ruJ as d..- " _ prominent cauAI &c.un"

(...o,./u~

16 1M arl"mml for rhc: primaqo of INN!",

th~t

I ht"" summMiud ho:K if !'rom th.:

PIlAMA~A THEORY: OHARMAICI I.T1 'S CONCEPTUAL CON T EXT

1"he semnd set: of :arguments due o:pUcicly acknowledge th~ emphasis on

the instrumentS ofknowl.cdgt are adduced only by Buddhist philosophers,

beginning with Digniga and Dharmakini. ThC:K philosoph~n reject th~
notion of an ag~m, and on their view, the cogniriv~ ev~m identified as
knowledF is ontologically identical to the instrument, which they conttivc [0 be a mental image. In some comau, they also regard the object or
p::!ti~n t :u dq>endent in ~nv. ~nSt! nn rh~ in_
ttmmenr, either bcca~ it i5
not onrologicaJly distinct from the instrument, or because: the chancu:r of
that object is determined by the character of the instrument iadf. Hence:,
on their view, the instrument is clearly primary, since: all of the other functional dementi in a knowledge CY'Cm arc either unreal or detennined by the
instrument. In subsequent chapters, ~ will have an opponuniry to cxamin!!' DhumaJcirti's vll!'WS on,.jl t.h eSt! i~m~ in grea tl!'\"" ckr.r.il.
Finally, one can also note that the emphasis on the instrumentS of
Irnowlcdgt allows (or even requires) Pnmil)a TheoristS to discuss at length
the place: of scriptute: (tif,llmil) or verbal testimony as such an instrument,
In all p~ Theories, scripture plays a spttial role, in that it is an ;flJtTW",nll (pramtit;Jll) or means dut enables one to obtain Irnowlcdgc that is otherwiR un!!'dy bI!'yond on!!", ke .... M2ClYcbinu verifi,.bl~ only by sc:ripru~
on!!'n bI!':u directly o n th!!' sotl!'riological go<tIs of the tr.&dition in question.
If ~ assume that Pf'lI.lTIiJ).a Theorisa took those soteriologicaJ goals seriously, we would cxpect them to be especially concerned with Irnowledge
derived from scriptute:, since: scriplUre is the means to dut soteriologically
rdenm but otherwise unobtainable knowledge. For this reason as well,
p~ TheoristS might be inclined to think dut the instrument is the
moe{ imporcun ::u;pcct in lit!!' procaa.
Regardless of thc historical and philosophical reasons, twO issues remain
dear: first, that Dhumakini's cooceprual COntCXt is formed by an intensive
analysis of the process of knowing u embodied by the aforementioned
model; and SI!'COnd, dut il is espccially a knowtcdgc-n'Cnt's instrumenland not iu object, agent, or the event it5Clf-that most concerned the meoruu ~r DharmalUni directly add. . -. h we h.:ave nored, ir u likely w{

"..u..-trr,

uniq~ of the inarwncnI (i.e., NV:I<}.r. ~" ~~

d.
the rdromi arpmmt ac NV:W .I: , ..~~twIfll. This is only ~ ollC'l'-

era! P""f"Vd by Udd,oukan (I-if) in IoiJ lIIaIysit of ~wrun>& Othu arswnenlJ

indudr: I) YViatioN 00 d~ buic lhmx W I abe apt and ob;ca Q!I only ~ roNidc~ VI
a,pIr and ob;ea when abe insawnml iI funaionin& (i.e., IIMw~ ~ "',IIIN'."
J,drt~ ki4: and~) 0'Uia1iona 00 lhc claim ihaltM inmumml II prinwy beallK ir COIllO
jtm bJon, abe aauaI producDon of dx action (i~. rmw_"""'''".m~ ~",).

11

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKtRTI'S PHILOSOP HY

this sharm ~mphasis on th~ import2fttt of the irutrum~nt is encoul"28ed by

a host of ~n and obscul1: assumptions. Nevenhdm, wt can still summariu a rather large number of quite clear and a plicit assumptions offered
by th~ theorists themselves.
With this in mind, I begin this sketch of the conceptual context ofDhumalOni's thought by discussing the pra~ or "instruments of knowledge~ so as to highlight th~ notions thar he shared with other Prami.c)a
Throrisu:. I will move on to aamine some shared notions oonttrning
ilUuummral objects (prllmtJII), and after highlighting the importance of
purpose, I will conclude with some brief I1:muks concerning the agent
(prllmAtr) and knowied~t itself (pramA or pmmiri).
T_ Ubilpi_11IStnlmnJU: Purqn.".,.J Irr.frraur

When speaking of the ilUtruments of knowledge, the various traditions of

South Asian philosophy and the individual philosophers within those traditions disagree considerably on metly what ways of knowing should be
considered instrumental (i.e., insta.nces of pramA!IIl) , and what forTll5 a.re
spurious or faulty. They also di$:lJf"' about the criteria through which one
can adjudicate wheth~r a panicuJar form of knowledge is instrumenra.l or
not. Despit~ these: and other disagrccmenu:, they find considerable common ground on a number of other wuesY The foremost of these: is simply the notion tha.t the inSlruments afknowledge must be investigated: for
most of th~ philosophers, Ihis need stems from the ttntrality of knowled~ in the search for spiritual frdam or mD~ That is, to be:com~ free,
one mwt rei,. upon correct knowledge. but if one is unable to distinguish
correct from incorrect knowledge, how could one recognize one's knowledge a.s correct!"
With lhe renowned but compar1lti\'C!y sp.use exception of the lokiyata or
Cirvika tradition,If :ill Pramir)a Thmr1sts respond to the nd for a means
of obtaining indubira.l>le knowledge by positing lit killt twO basic insuu17 Indeed. IIx Nlliyiyilw. ar InA. aplicidydia:wa thr noOOn Uuol dim: ~ am.in philotOpIUaI principls dial an: shared by philolophcrs: i"of Ihtm ..u of
principLes an: aspecu
of p....w:,... n-ry (_ NSu.1l wilh NY ud NBh If4 rit. (l6))).

me.

18 Thr:daim Uuo. COITCCI knt:noicdp: iI indispcnAbk for !he awnmcnl ol llbttation iI ma<k
by a number of authors, indudinS Pnhsupkb cPOS:!). Cauuma (NSI.I .). Vluyt~
and UddyooIan (NShand NY;~ ..Ji). Dlwmakini (PVu7)-l741. and 100ft.
I~ S F",nco ('917) for
philwophy.

C)n~

of me,

fey,

In-&plh WOfU on Ihl' form

or Sou,h ~an

PRAM.J.~A THEORY: DHARMAKIRTI' S CONCEPTUAL CONTE.XT

1)

menn: perceptual awarencu (pratya/tpt) and inference (anumlitul).a Of

course, me virrua1ly ubiquitow accq)(~ of perception :and infcttnoe docs
not prevent these thinkers from disagreeing on c:xacdy how these insuuments
of knowing o~(t. Ntvetthdess, in accq>ting JXrctption and infcrmct as
instruments ofknowligc. PramiJ).a Theorists share amin prauppositioru
and basic doctrines conccming the instruments oflenowkdge.
SNrwl NorU"u Cn.crmi1f1 Pnupnu.JAtL'IIrnuu
When spealcing of perceptual awareness. PramlQa Th~risu agree. first of
all, that this way of lenowing dqJCnds dirtly on the sc:nso:. Indeed. the
centnlity of the senses in this way of knowing is implied by the term
1'....7"'~ i~lr. ....... ich iJ oF.:.e:n

con!rn~ "Y"'0logioJly

ro m.e::ln -briOre the

senses:)' We must ~ careful. ho~. to rocalJ that in addition to the five

senses familiar to Euroamerican traditions, these philosophm also stipulare
a sixth sense: the mental facu.lty (maNIJ). Hence, any instance of-JXIUptual awarencss- may be an awareness of a mental object. rather than a visible form. sound. smdl. taste. or tactile object. Prami~ Thcorisu neany all
2Srft" on the .tipul:uion of a .i%th serue. and they :lJ12Srft" on the' n-nu-ality of the senses in perceprual awu~e$S. u
Another general point of agreement concerns rhe manner in which JXrceptual awareness occurs. AU PnuniQa Th~rists agrtt that ~fC<"ptuai
awareness necessarily involves the contaCt (w,,,,i*,,'f4. spark etc.) of an
objcct (vi,urya, .rtha, etc.) with a sense faculty (i"Jriyil). lJ And except in the
case of mental objecu. rhey generally assume it appropriate [0 consider
this cont2(:t

fO

involve' a relatio n involving matter (,...,.,) or , ubscance

20 Many ~xcepc odw::r f"omuof ~ W ... .m4J,.m (pruwnptM induc.tion). II~ (an&lopal indlKrion), and . - ~ thtou&h ICripcun:). FOI an
o'(I'iew of dw Y&ri ..... tOmu of
_lhr~." dLaptnJ ill B~".

"'-!fiI.

21 For cumplc, NBh (81 iii NSf.l.j): ~ ,rui~,!, ..",i!J ' ...~~M; PDS
b}-4):
tif7MlN'9 .. in ''''Y''''w: and ~''''W {. I: .,.....-'f.o..

(II"'",,,,.,,, , ...

,....... ___ ;'; ,,..~... (d'. r.!lcrn&RS ' ,,0' &740 n. ,&7).

II A1tbou&h Kwnirib ill Sv I.!~ 169) mainwru Wi dxrc an: only five ItIlK organa.
.1.:.'"'41) nota Ihll in !.smuli,iIt41lw mind iI lila poxilcd ... I IenIC. Gal,IWI\I
(NS:I.I.,. ) mo spoke of ooIy Ii." ICtUa, bu. UddrouJan (NYuJ MiNS:u .... ) and Mlbtcquml Naiyiyiku aeeqxed me mind ... IItIlK (1ft Di~'1 cnficiun oflhil illoCOlUiSletlC)'
ill PS:.,&I:I94 and 195: Hattori 196I:}l-J9).

JIu ("

2J 5, for cumple: YO (1:11, 161; lhu). NV <9 ...,.,. "" N$:I.I . I. and Sv liNt.
J'I'Ik;Ioc}ll n lb:and l I1.a1-1!J) ~rti docs I'lOl offn any al.....vr c::ommmu on Itw
Ihco.y of KnK faculty conlXt (iMiri,.,.,."iu".), bu.... ir cvidm. in other coo.au (i.e..

fOU NDATION S O F DIIARMAKI RT I'S PH ILOSO PHY

(4f11.".). They also agree: th:U physica.l (i.e. m:attrial

or fubstanti:a1) defecu

in th~ ",nse: facu lties can contribute to c~rt:ain types of errors in pt:rttptual
awa~nw. as when a person with ataracu appauntly sees small hairs or
bugs in front of mdr eyes." Another important point of 2grttment is mat
perttprual awarcnw is either the most vivid or thc least mediated form of
awarenw. and that in this x nsc it wes precedence over oth~r instruments of knowing. luch as inferencc.11 Most of these philosophcrs also
agree Wt me basic building blocks of matter ar~ itreducibl~, pmkss aronu
or "infinitesim:al panicles" (plmIWll~II). According to the philosophers
who accept this notton, infinitesimal panicles:m t OO small to bc pt:rttiYed
by ordinary pt:1'$01U; in5lcad. the maner perceived by ordinary pt:noN
consists of particles that ha~ somchow bccn aggregated into:an entity of
perttptible size.
Although thc:sc points of agrccmcnt :m ccrt:ainly significant. it is important to noc~ that Prami~ Thcorisu often disagree upon m~ prccisc contcnt of perceptual awarcness. ~imcr because mdr ontologies conRia, or
because they differ ov~r thc d~ to whKh perceptual awareflCSS is deterr...,. ,~). loio Il ...... T.,( ""'_I""~.lo ""welT ~ ........ v...t-..Jl ............. ..Iuo'li ..,11
..... (qui.., cig>ifica,,,) rnodi6a .......
~
PS,). lf _........., WI. in rho:
awe.:u wbm, DhannaIdni admiu D.femal JC!\R obju. M IOIIowt Vuubo!.ndhu1 wofk
",t.c,( ... il " nor $UprncdnI by D~ hi< tMory of _ orpn QOtIIK1 would bo: simi.
br to the one f'wnd in V.ubandhu. A~~ (AK:J.)O and AKNo M tir.).

po.,_ ... ""

24

(_

Sc... PV (p,J). Sv (~SH4). YO (l1:P.7). and NY (114 MlNS:I.I .41.

25 For Viuyiyana and UddyoaIwa. pctc<ptaullWU'mCSI is what finally puu all doub! 10
1ft( and dimilWl:I an)' lUnha "dcJift 10 know" (fijtUslJthal objea (NBh and NV:'1-9J MI
}.IS:......). Fu. DIwr"..Io..Eni. unlr po:n:qot .... ~"-""'1OO" -.;.;u" (~_d"""ft .. jO .....
in t(lnlfUC to infnmcc and other OCNICCplual copoilions. l'hU: iIMK bc:cumc. paniaoluIy Alieni lOr DtwmWrti in his diK'IMiM of,.ope pclutpUoo (PV,.zll- 1I7).
Kwnirib doa nof mdonc an)' lIOlion ol..mdne.. pctMps in tuppon ofhU ftjUon of
~ pc'ccpliQn (SV. "'~16-17) ..+.ich ~d ~ SUppiUlI the VcdM u a
InC2N ofknowi",.o--.. H~ doI:I maintain. ho..( ... . thaI Qt/xr i/Quummu of~
(such ill in(nma) an MutIA.riIy Ph:a ded br ptl utpt,w lwarmat (SV. """"""',,-n). 1
ID: IhiI notion of j>i(Cdc...... whido if; Wcm kwpnlfll by aD ~ 'J'h..oNu{Mohan()'
1 "1:1)1-~J. u an epUwnlC panJld 10 mot'I: ~IC conom\I with VlVMinea.

n.,.).

16 5. for aamplc. PDS (1),). wbeft the ipCOfocalions ~~ arc in

put mUnt \0 dOO,.w.h dw r>tlUfKioru of ordirwy pcnons. who c:annoc pacti." inIiniIc:firrW panicb. fioto thai of'-';'" who an deJcribed u bcilll eapahM: of PClut;.;", Wm
(PDS:",, ). Sc... abo NBh (497) MlNS 1.1.}4: -Sub.uncc in the lUll: of an infinileti.nu,J pMliI;k il nor lhe object of pcrap!lon (J..&.u) beawc putKWs arc: beyond the wnsca."
11-,..~

___ thi~ . . . urW_~ _ w...." .ti...m,.u.u .!'iiM,. 01. DIw

Ii_.

..>AI"i... hoc" ~ns

doc [.un ..... R.c.d ..........up.,;n'. cap.aoca the. ___ <>pinion
(c:.s.. at PV).I,..Rl. Sc... bdow.,s.

P RAMA ~A T H EO aY: OHAIlMAKIU" S CO NCEPTUAL CO NTEXT

l.S

minate, We will consider some of ,hoc debates when examining Dharmakirti', particular theory of pcrccplion, but for now, let us rurn to an
overview of inference (.",u,ul1lA),
SlMmJ NQritlru CortUr1lj,.,/ltfirm
Infercnn:al knowWg-e:md the topics rcl:.rcd to it:arc p:uticubrly importam

to Pramil;la Thcorius,J1 One can point to three basic reasons fo r the importanCe ofinfcrmcc: first, it provides:acxcu to entities mat arc to some degree
unavailable to the 5etl5CS, and such entities arc onen under dispute. Second,
it is closely tjed to me understanding ofianguage, an iS5ue mat is cssmtial
[0 the 5UC:CCSS of the South AsWl philosophical enterprise.II And third, it
provideJ the fftmoewoft. for formal duputation. an undeniably crucial aspen
of South AsWl philosophy.
As Manlal hill noted, the carlie$[ theories of inference probably arose
out of a co~rn with the codificuion of philosophical debate. but propedy spcalcing. what is mant by inferencc here is not a Mryllogism or some
other argument. Ramer, an infettllCC produces or constirutes a knowlcd~
even! that IcnQWl iu object by mcanl of Icnowledge about another object
that is invariably related to that object. A node aample is the inferential
cognition that knows fire is present in a particular locus by I1lC2ru of pcrccptual knowledge of smoke in mat same Iocw. Inference dearly involves
some steps. for in providing knowled~ of one thing by means of knowing
something innriably related to it, the aa ofinferellCC requires a sequential
structure, which oIC will disaw below. Nc.omdcss. the central concern for
these thinkers is nOl the fonna.lUm of lhat struct\lrc: itself; instead, they ate
most conamcd with the way in which that suucture supplies the ncsmy
conditions for an inference.
PramlJ:1a Theorists generally speak of two forms of inft:rencr: MinferenceM
for-oncsdf' (svdrth4"ltnuiM) and MinfemKr-for-othcrs (p4r4rtMlIw1ltll1lll),
M

27 Tho: nst majority of ~ l tell:iact ~ ~t more amOOn to infdtliOL and iu tdau:d.

ropia (wch u the 1Il.tuJ'e of conupru.aI ocoptitiool than to pu"ptlUl awumat. Noel abo
Mohanty'l obM::o ..tioft: - In a work do:vored ro doc c:ot>CXpt of I'QIOO. a t.hoeory ofinlftmoo
m ... oc:aopr. CftItni ~- (1" 1:100),

28 Many South AAan phiL. ,Nn 0II'tft awa.ft that if 01>1' a;ouId lIOI ~ an adequau- aa:owu
of~ tbt arWrur.m1 of opirirual fidom (~moaplKil pi of nearly aU ~
South AIiln pftiIoIopbm of this period, would bt impouibk. To pnl C'%ttD1. tbt c:rucial
rolf of~ in tbt analnmenc oflibaetion raG on ia \lie u. tool dw allows one to 1UppU.n1 faIK bdir& ( ";~"""" m.I]tI. ctt.) wid. indubitabk knowkdsc.

16

FO UNDATIONS OF OIiARMAKIll.TI 'S PHILOSO PHY

The former is simply an infCmcial cognition: one looks at a smoky room, for
C'Umple, and (with other conditions in plaao). one infm that fire is present.
In COntrast, an infermcr-for-othm is one that is stared verbally 50 as to indue:
an inferential cognition in another penon, In other words, this laner ~infa
encc" (which is aauaI.Iy a series of stalCfTlcrUS and not an inferma:) is meant
to result in another penon having his own infcrenct-for-oncsdf with regard
10 the question at hanci. In this sense, infettna-for-oncsdflies al the core of
these: thinkers' inferential throry. But ironically, the I[rucrural dements tholt
are neccssary for one to have an infertfltt-for-onesdf are primarily aplorod
in di5Cll.S5ions ofinmncr-for-others, To avoid w confwion that this overlap incurs, bdow I will often speak simply of "inkrena:: with me understanding that OUf main focus is the enminarion of the conditions no "pry
for a correct (as opposed to a spurious) inferential cognition to oc:cur.
THE BAsI c SnUCTUIl OF iNFEIlN CIE

A5 one might expect. the afomnentioned importanO: placed on infen:nce

promptS considcl'2ble disagrccmenr among Prami.r)a Throrisn, bur their
analyses of inferenCA: always indude Ihe same basic. minimal structure,1t
Schemaljaljy, I render il as follows:
S is P because E

A typical C'Umple of Ihis type of inference is:

The hill (S) is a Iocw offire (P) because of the presence ofsmoke
(E).-

Here, S is Ihe "subject," called the uiJh.yaJJ1iIl7t1i" or pt&,4 in Sanskrit;JI P

291M cliapano:nlJ amoII& p~ TMacisa focwon lM.,y in wIUch mil baicll:rucru~ mlU'l Ix IUppomd
c:WJoruni. ThiI: amounlS ta an ~I .bow 1M ckmo.na
r...r,..J'" an ;n~ Khan (.919'llI9-1.<il oKftlI. cbr IWftmary allM nriaw pooiu.an.
on mil Wue. Thac diffoermca will Ix IUmmariud bMw ("-4S).

30 Sprri.liKI wiD naK Tiql!he mirUmal ilruttuft I praJII)M' hm: iI I'IOX !"ttMaled in. fann
admil~ by m y ~ n-.isc ntiler, ;1 il lM IJ1X olinkm>a anc finds in commc ....
wi:IIli~l\I~, .. Qttnpl.ilVd by dw; oIt.dda~ Malctnml, ',dri.frynilJ"Ul"l'f! iruUtIItb.
My mluennan is tIuc 1M 1U\K'fU~ of mil _m>enl iI IIx b.io; mn:: oflUl"""" P'apuiy

""""""'.

.ho. th.c """" fd!- h.u been ...cd ... iocc !>etc; on .0 ,da- .0 the ...t.;<ct 01 the
P'opottlton,
~ 10 rdtr 10 ~nlbmya(~ P'opoAlian. ~ otwmaldni mnallu ill
) 1 NOIC

PRAMA~A THEORY, OHAkMAKIRTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

17

is me predicl.[e.- known as the ~rma: and E i.s the Mevidence'known as the hmt or /ingll. The fi rsl (wo clements. the subject and prnli
cate, together form me ~ p ropositjo n ' (prillijlill or J14*!4), -S i.s P.- )I Hayes
and others have employed an alternative terminology, where the subject
is called me Mquali ty.possesso r" and the predicate the quality."JJ This ter'
minology has me advantage of conveying more literally the sense of the
Sanskrit term5 (uiJbya.)JJu,rmin and (uiJbya.)dhtzmlll. and it avoids any

hu SwIlf11i (PVSV,. lliPVI.I).in iu rrirrwr Kme ,.u:,.dmota the propoAlioo. CDnWI:'

in, oflt~ 4 '4r&t,..",i" and ~ ~. sina!he iJ"'!H""j" it. PM'
f~ of !lw ptopolilion, the Itrm ,..,. (propoMlion) mly be wed II I ma:lphor
lOr d>t" 0, hi! M .... 01" ...u,jca..

f"""""""

lZ n ....... J ..... E,,&i;.t......... '",upuoOu...n' r... "."j IWVt ,...1 ... run with --...... i,_
icism, moH l1O(ably from Mohan!), 11991-"09"-" 0, '( .. orkl", of '98ll. Mohanry', pGfnl ia
thaI " 1 Ius! 0f>C' of dw: oerua of'ptOP<I'iUon ~ don not accumdy dwaaeritt ' !he mtllml
011 mmw act ill unoXncood in dw: Indiul ~. SptOfiaUy. Oft thu ImK of"propoti'
Doc1.' il ,,'mal tntil)' lowania which rmny numcrially II well as qtWitarivdy dilfeml1 am
Nda:and xu, bdon&i", 10 the AI!>t" or 10 d'inml Kivu. may be di~ In other "fI'Of"1h.
il iI"an abruaa rncl)' rowards which one< INy We difum ll mitudo. or !he wnc Ittirudc
II d.ifkrml times.' On his vn, tt.iI..:nwof~ion' io not ~ ...... i.ro.c 10 dw: " I ndian
Iopa. - bcaIUC in ~ to thcmtltcnt of a mrntal act {as dcsenbcd br the Nytya. II
kaoc) p<op.-i.iun in ,I,;. KfiK ' ; ' ou< 4 find, inr,li~;J ....<al ~ .... ~ 01 "uri",
propoIilionai aJtituda." In orba wonb.. lhe NySya (and other ')'I1m1' CDOIXfncd with
Pnm1I)a llorory) disti ......... he, .. ou, Ihr nriow mock. in which .... C"OnImI 01. menial
act iI pracnmi. bul despite' dorir rnocbI dilftrmea, all
menu! XU would Ix- nJlWlr
directed 10 dw: arM ' p!opOlirion,~ in the ICI\K" wed above. MaNnI)' prOida funhcr .upprwt lOr dUo: when he IKKCS !NI' I"oposition, ~ ' an abotrxl mtiry lowWs whid. mal'
t&! act ildiKa.-d.' is ' indqomdent of ...d tnruc.cnda.IllY [mmull oa d'm:<c:d 1OWIr<U i,:
HOW.""I, Oft the South A$ian (by which he ~rinwily nIQIU Ihr Nylya) ne..., Ihr mtllml
011 mental oa iI WI aa'IIINCnlre, not III object, not a If"IlIJOmIIrnI enn!)'.'
Part of MaNn!)" , :tim in !hie: arpomcnl iI .o poinl oul the utdUI upU of tht~.
op.m ofPnmJ.r:la Theory. He nota !luI tht.~ lMKion of a ptopo.;lion if an impovtt
iIhc:d ~y of CIWIlining mmw mIlltnl, and il thus impo.erilha ont', approach 10 infCftllOt

m-

in~.

II is pouibk. ~.o. (.tl , 10 mlploy ' propotirioo' in anocnn KnK". llocanut MaNnI)' hu
focwc:d on is ClIlmsionaI. bul - propolilion' may also Ix- wed in an inte'nlional KIIK. when
;1 no IonfP ~ 10111 ".I:ow.c rn.il)" W . Or; AOrndlOW inckpcndrnt of ~ mental ",,', COOl
(uII, bul nthe. coruUu of thai conlent itad! oqjtJ,.,.~
1U1nn dun ctClIt ,

rnwftI,.,.

illfi IIIWntkntandin&- thU W2'J of ~ "ptopo'ilion' QfI be helpfUl when Wicd to the
"tUiju/~ of an infncna, for it 'lig .. the MnKtUrc thai is specifIC 10 wch eo
rwndy, doc li/wmrti1llJJ.wmM ~ pualld in imprwtanl "'"")'110' p<opoIition conunied .... prcmiK. MofCOftf , in the won. of DhannUirti and his 8nhmaniesl
cooofcrpartJ. il is hud 10 UI'IC fOr any "individualion in the "ran" of propolilioml ani
rudeI applied to tN.lllrucn.orc. For m- 1ftMXIl, dw: IUC of'propooIition" doc. nol .... m
quilt 10 probkmat.ic: in tIw: conm" 01 ."InfIiNI .. MohanI)' ~ ~ US bd~.
t

" Sct-, fOr irucuocc, H~ya h9lla:,a.wi"'),

FO UNDATION S OF DHAR,MAKI II.TI S PHILOSO PHY

potential misunderstanding COrKZming the notion of a proposition. Neverthdess, qualitypos5C$$Or~ is quite cumbe:rsome:, and inasmuch as the English term "quality" can also be: misleading. "subject- and "prediCiUe:" appe:ar
to be: the: best choices.)Io
TH E EVIDEN CE- PIlED/CATE RLATI DN AND ITS ExEM'U'ICATION

According to Dharmakirti and his fdIow PramiJ:)a 'Ibe:otisu. any meory of

inkrena: must contain at least the: relations implicit in the: baste model
presented above. The: first such relarion is ge:nerally called the IIJIipti or
"pervasion - it is the relation bttwttn the e:vide:n~ (E) and me predicate:
(P)." In our aample:. this is the relation h<:rween fire and smoke. Prami.!)a
Theorisu generally consider this relation (Q have rwo aspU: me positive
co ncomitan~ (,lnwtYA) and the negative concom itan~ (VJIlti"uJ.- 'I~
positive concomitana is a Stare: of albin; such mat wherevt'f me: eviden~
(E) is present. the predk:ate: (P) must be: present. In our example. mis would
be: Stated, "wherever mere: is smoke:, there is necessarily fire:." The negative
/In addioo.w problem b= is dut. in I Eurounnican phiIotophical OOOtal. ~qualitKs~
~ undcmood to br rq>n.tabk. bt.. m.. EncUsh ICt1'II ~qwlicy" iI onm uwd to Irvubl..
~

~ wIUch

tdns to ~ q~jl)'-ituto.na:.

JS Althou&h dx Saruluil Imn ".,ti and odxr. rebud tmJU (lOCh af 7"u.. .,."., and
~ OCCUr ift dx worIa of UddrouJw;a (..." . NV" ..... and ;als ..-.;.) and Pnh,tap"h
(q., PDS:I1'), dxw pbibopben do nuc M,.. dc.cribe dw: rdMMJa bu."" pmIia~
and ~ ~ indcul. in ftW1r_ Itxy make only implicil rrkrmc:c 10 the reb.
lion.. In COIIUUI , both Kumlrib (... " , Sv, ,,,....._ ,-i-) and Dhannulrti (PV. HD.
PVift. ND: ,.m...) ~ dx tmn ",.,n I)'ICmIWc:alIy to dcxribr dw: pmlial~na: fda
lion. and foilowift, DipIIp'1 1ead, dxy a.ppar 10 be dw: fine. Pnmlq.a l1xoNu 10 nnploy
""',,; wnsiRall.l,........ ~ia: rna. -... bo:ame m.. 00I1D.
J611w: un .....ldr tranJiuiO<\. " pot;iti~ ~ ilo.ncc" r.nd "MpIM ammmiWK:c" ha""
become lruldard (or .....H]olII .,..'''l and
[)upit .. I~ ' irw:kpn. I
haw ct.o.cn ,0 .. mploy m..... ,nn,u,tionl hm:: 1'0 as to.ovid dw IIftnaAr)' confwion of
introducill,_ talnS.. For ...,.. Oberiwnmer n aI. (1"1:61) ~lMIId "Gcmcin
......... Vorlwmmc:n [von Grund lind FoIlCl." 00, il is IlOI II all dnr how thiltum--'d
~ diMinpilhai from
(co-oa:uncna). Althoupl ......,.. docs it>dcN amount

.,..rimi.tl.-.,..,,,l.

I." ..'. .

""'P"-'-' (..JuMw-) in i .. "tI .... .... in do. ...... ,.... of inr.r-c,. (d'. Oberhammer. eI al . ,,,,,61), this intcrp~rion or .......,. iI applic3bk 10 .da<ivdy kw IQII.
~ il is Rjcc!nI by dw: Pnmf.J:Ir. l'hcorilUofDhannakirti. lime. orr'lCft bcfoft (Itt below.
ft.)I). My own prcktcna: (or ....",. whm unckmood to mun .....NJII-.,..".. would be
" (nWlmau." Thilla'm apturct both dw: mtI:ophorial ~ ("folIowin, &\oa,") and .1x
JosiaI JIm'" ( ict or nrcc:.a'1 impliationl of tlx Ia'm as it ... UJnt by Prami.qa 'Theorim of Dnumakini'l ,ime Ind mn. For ".ri"br (whm UKd ift Ihe KlIK of
.".,ri.. ~,tiJ. I -.Jd. rccomnwnd "l'C$Iri(tion; ';nee dx ill.ltfltion b= ilto 5bow tNl
" " ' .. """ ... 0 ur <100: ",cd"""e ,",c <>C<.QO;Uil,. n::... i<:.nI ' u ","w,a..:a uf <101: noidaouo;. O ne
of u.... pl'tlblnn, with Inllubtiont: lNt involve tlx EnKlilh word " 1qI'1~~ (u ift "ncp.0 trW

PRAMAf:lA THEORY, DHARMAKIRTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

:'9

concomiunc.e IperiAo that the evidence (E) is present only in the presm tt of the predia.le (P) and not in any other circumstances. Dharmakin i
often States the nqarive concomirana:. or "restriction; in an affirm:uive
statemmt (i.e. a statement that involva no grammatial nqacion). In our
cwnple. me positive statement would read. "There is smoke fUJI] where
there is fire."" Most Pramil).a Theorists. however. formul ate the ncptive
cn ncom it:...a (I f re<tn <;t i(l n in n"V,iV<': 1000fm~ : fo llowing our 6:11 mp10!:. :II
negative statcmem of this concomitanc.e would read, "wherever there is no
Arc, there is necc:ssarily no smoke." For Dharmakirti and Kumaril:a-and
probably also for Uddyotakara and PraWtapida-the positive and negative
concomitance: arc in contraposition: if smoke: is nC$suily presem when
fire is present, thm in the absence of fice. smoke: is abo necessarily absent.A.o:o.-d.ing

10

th.,... philosophcn, in ortkr

10

h:t_ :an inn:ll n ~ of inf~f'

m rial knowlodgc: one musl be aWl of the pervasion-the rwofold rc:I:IItion

consisring of the positive and neg,uivC' concomitance. So too. the pervasion
must be general: it cannot be restricted tO:ll singlC' case. but must pertain to
tift conc.omiWlU") II dw IIJWtirr il noc nec:euarily Ailed I Mplion. Sft. fo, earn
pI~ Oh.,.... lrl"i '. fn'mlll~.;"n n( "7 ",;,.,tll in PVSV .J PVI.I (Co ,s..)) , "J"i~ 1M
"'",UN ihl"",~(" H 8:1' ,]-I),

)7 Stt

m.e pt'c.ioua notc for roo on OhanrWiini', pOliti'" formulalion of Inc n'Sl'M

c:onoomiW'>C.(.

:J8 1 ha", choKn dK ~ Imll "n.CSAriIy" and in tda~ forms 10 aKI'I'C)' fWO rypa of
Sanskri, conRnKt~ lhotc thai nnploy ~ rc:Rricti", ~i<:k tw, and tho.c: thaI nnploy
an ac!-.nb such as iIttwM", (e". Sv, ~1f""'-n.4b) Of """""", (c.". PVSV
PVI.lI:
G:l9,'). 1M usap;t' at "'" rjwc: "onIy1 in me fotmulation of ,ho: mdcnoe-predicalC rd.-o.

*'

do: I
.on P~
'I,Oft
" anIm~"~"P"'<n.

0'nann .......
, ...I """"
' . ...
' . , ..
' en ___
- ~ '- Ibctc pbibopbcn '0 uno,kqw,d ,hal relation as nco;aJaI}' tdation, ",rbft lhan ~
c:opr_nc:c (*Mno.. etc.) , In hil dir,"ina of the hiKoric:al II"I.IUition from throtiet tN,
potitl mct'ecopt'-.u of c.idcnoeand pmlian: 10 rhoK'NI poIil a ,'" "" '')' n:lacion, Poe_
Iei' (1977-"'- ' 94) has;upN thai pbilolophcn ouch ill Uddyoabn. and PnbmpL.b rq>raenl an inlc:nncdulC", btt.w, me rdation wpiUt,U and ~ rebtion ncccauy,
While i. is uuc lhi, Pnh'laptda', work (pru ' 147-~. UI) ahibia ooIYI modeM IIIcmpc
10 $!'lOW beyond tIlCft wpmmoo, UddyoaIwa. in tw aiDqlK ofDi&niP (NV:l6)-167 .J
N$ IJ; ci. H.ya ,,&0,,..,11) &nd eI, .. Iw;..... "PI'"'" 10 ..ndoc........t
And rocy,i...,
oonmmiWltt ill mnuapoliOonal. 1M implication here il tN. the evidence-predicate rdalion is NCn"')'oo hi:!: tboory. UddyoaIan.', rcc:op.ilion ofdK~,c ldation
ill nrusary ill Wo augmed by the faa that. em in cue when; only the MpM conoomiWlOe 0' rauiaion can be acmplihed. dK cvidenc:c-Pftd.ica.c .mtion nill c:onai...
both (NV'I .... - LU).
Ohartn:akirti', RCOS1Iilion of ~ ~pred>ca,c rdltion as rw......my io abuncbndy
dar, and his diat:inaiw contriburion lie in
fotmubtion of. 1N~"UhII (5
SfCinkdlna' '971:101-104 and &110 below, chaplcr J). Dharmaklni nnpIoytan no:n ~ ~
cite UK ai tWI (e" . in hil initial praocnano. of.,qti in PVSV ..tpy,.I; G',-I1-IJ). His
~-- .
. ' ...... T 1ft

p<Ni'' "'

m.e

,0

FOUNDATION S OF OHAIlMAKIRTI 'S PHILO SOPHY

all cases of the kind in question. In ,he dialogical comol of inference-foromers, me5C' twO requirements-dm Oil(' have knowledge: of !he: pmrasion
and thai il be gcncral-an: rdImcd by a frequcnt claim: namely. thaI an
infercncc. for-othcrs must be accompanied by :ltleast a supponing example
(sMlhamr,.a."l.t4nla). MoSt philosophers maintain thai a countC'rexample
(IJIlUDumrJild."',t hla) may also be nessary. at Ins! in SO~ cases. The supponing example is dt:l.wn from the domain of -homologolU insrances"
(UI'p4.4;w}-rumdy. loci thai art similar to the proposition to be provt:n (S

is Pl in Ihal they au qualified by P. In an inference of tire from smoke, a

kitchen (mAhiituUII) il the rypical example. The aim is to appeal 10 a noncontroversial cue that eumplifies the rdationship Ixtwttn the Nidencc
eE) and thc prtdicuc (P): Ooco's pasl aJXricncc of kitchens iIIusuates the
positive: concomiW1CC of smoke with fire, in that onc's om.:rvations conform to a nccessary relation between Ihc presence of smoke and thc prtS*
cncc of firc . Thc countclaamplc is dlllwo from the domain of
hetcrogeneous instances loci thar arc dissimilar to S in that they lack P.
A typical countcraamplc for thc Imokc-fi~ infcrcnce is a lakc. Herc, thc
point is to show that the presence of ,he evidence (E. (he smoke) is not
observed in the absence of the prtciicate, fire; or aitemativdy, dUI smou
is prescnt onl y when Ii~ is present, and not othclWisc.J'I

pofoiIion haJ _
aimibrities with KwnitW.'l, who detaiprioru of ~ jQiln.e and rxpIi", OOIKOIliiW>Ol' ind,,* ~ 1OUowin&:

If ~ pRKOOf of ~ wac: pnv:oda! by ~ prama of fin::, ,hm non-fi~ bet..

ndudtd fivcn f.II:>OU, would be ~I only in ~ c::uc: of ncH\unokc. Thw.. ill ,his
11.. , .. ioU, io "",.-...Jed t..,. .""............... Lilo.c..iK, ;..... ",..;1...
non-fin:: is ~ by I'IOn~. IIrIOkc: g. adlldN from non-fin::: at auch. i, is
N (
p';ly
~ by fin:: bc:a.- " Iw no pouibillry of aisrinl U11CN1W
odw:r non-f,", kKus.1""'"-iIMw pi.l:Wo._ ~/'k iupir III"'1"~ 11.Jhii_ftIf
--1'

II""-r.,~ I-,u,....

rlbno-.v

"*""J
....~ ~""- III,.." III~WJ"'"'
-J<6,..._...JtM.tNJ ",."." JInw ..",

",0,;;_ "'/'k ~ III ... '1"~ 11

~i_ Sv. . ...."u,U,I1w1-I141bj.

r,.n',

J9 WhelM GOt 01' maR a::unpia nmiloo be- ("ed in an '1Ikn:nu-IOr-odont.

rIM
_~ NI_ ...t. in PO" .. ,....,. ...... 'YI'" ~ ... ;.t~ "',. ho-i"'.ddt ......nd in PO" "fW'" m., vV-wot
of tilt- pniloJopha in qucaion.lJddyoW;ara (NV:!+4-'"'s), KUlIIirila (S\!, .....
and
DharmaidRi (1'V,.J6) all n::cosniK INoI in _
infcn:nco:t only me, poIiln.e W"CO",iOOOf
an be- OftIlplihed bta. . lhoe domain 01 ho;,tlOS"_ CIHI iI nnP')'O !lUI iI-. thn-e an:: 1'10
insana:r. of mClies thai do I\OC poACIf tho! propnt)' 10 be prowm. Such cua an:: prim.ily
thoK in wbKh cURal is impoMibk widlOullbe pmiig.IC in q..-ion. For a::unpIc, (Or.
pboo.opha- who !!Wnw", We all raJ tIIinp an:: fM'O'SRrily impm!W'lCnl. an inf=nc:c in
which impmnanmct' is. pmticaw< haJ no M~ ~ ilrC" no aiKml, ptt-

.........,,,'j,

m&roal ..... n5'-

In...do caoca, j, .. . - ...

7'0 p<CKf". C01oIn'en::><ampic. F_ Dh.,..,.
kini Ind Kumi.;b. lbe supnfluif1 of ~ coun'~mpk JWnf fivcn lhoe ~Inr-i,ift

PIlAUAI:<A T HEORY, OHARMAKIRTI' S CON CEPTU AL CONTEXT

}I

In part. the usc of cumples indicates the psychologism within pram4!J1l

discourse.- That is. these philosophen are not intere5ted only in fhe formal
aspects of inferential reasoning; rather, they wish to demonstrate the conditions nccessuy for me occurrecnce of a knowledgc-cvem that is inferential in form. The distinction Mle is broYn the knowledge th,u smoke is
alwa}'l concomitant with fi~, on the: one hand, and dte knowledge lIut a
Imnk"'_protlud ng fi re il prrs.ent in :a p:arricui:a.r CiSf" . on thl! othl!f. For
Pramil)a TheoriSts. the positive concomitana is a rdation thai mw! pertain bnwern me evidence (E) and the predicate (Pl if we arl! fO infer that
dte subjttt (5) is qualified by the predicate (P) beCIIUoC it is qualified by me
evidence: (E). But for thCSl! throrists, it is also crucial that 1M know/dgt of
dtc positive concomitance is a nCttSSary p4lrt of the process that leads to an
infct-ential cognition of fire in :a locus by -..y of:a prrcc-rru:al oognilion of
smoke in that locus."
In addition to me psychologism underlying the usc of examples, one can
also point to ce:rtain ontological concerns that att implicit in claims for the
nuu~ of positive and ncpUve concomiWI('.C (,,~IW)'" and ",.nrrhj. Uddyoulun ""'yalll)
oIurc ..... "'- (NV"+t-'.s). A1thouf!;h Udd,..,.:obn
no<
dar. ;' _ _
likdy thaI for him poIicift concomilVlClt is not I malin of men: copl'CKna, !.ina a theory
thai pmniu -'Iformed infnmca when only lbe posilive coneomiuna is aempiific.d
......w.J n(K be pMXft4fu1 if thaI relation _
DOl ,........,...'Y.
UddyotKan (NV"4<I- 141) ..wnta.iru thaI in JOIDe infermca only dw n<pIM
concomiuna ("",Ii.mvlCln be eumplifitd and thl- poeitM _ i l i n a (-.....,..JQlllDOI
be.. Heft,
prob&tm is Ihat lhe domain of hotmIop.u il\lGflCG (..,."",) ~ atlp!1. Howrva , ullliu CIIa wile",
~~ domain;' ~mpty, the alJIcn.:~ ofbomuLasow
cumpla doc. DOl .... ve to do with an incomp..tiloility btl . c... dlC ~ 0( d.. pmlicalC
in quenion and th.e ............. of ..... ..,b;ec.. I....-t, in ,hae ~ aU poooi&k i....,."",.,. ....
indudc..t in die: wbjcn IlII<kr diJpuOtion.. In
then: H~ no noncOIItl'O'f'alial c:ua in
which die: potilive N\COlIIiunu could be dllfl(>l\$lt'lled,. FOt difkrHlI ttUOfU, both
Ko,unlrw. (SV, ....,,""'-I)I- In) and DlwnWtini (MY ""PVI.I)Ib. G").I- II) rqea this

.-m-;.. en.""'"

me

me

.mn.

type of atp;umnll.

In .adi.ion to allowins I .... ' tilt counrnaatnpk is not ,M

'Y in aU cuoa, Dh.unWtini
(pVl.l7-tJ, PVSV ..., ~ PI as &r as to Ay that 011< 1'211 diJpmx with aampks alto~ if lbe pernsion (~,D) iII"'ready &milg, ,0 lhc in,c.!ocu.on: in...do cuoa, .... JIC"
...-......... doa.- .to<d '''' be ClIplicidr _cd. P... funh.c. __ oua ..... .....Jpu .... "-...d
00wr rda.! ......... _ TIlInnanr {I<nO) .

.a Mohamy (1911 and 1991:101- 111) rmw'u ~I lmgth on ~ in Soulh Amn theoriaofin~.

41 The claim!lw the!t philotopMn a", not i.,em,t<:!" in fOl'mal rnsooinl ""',. KCTIl a
bit n trem., bu, siven the abidin, conccrru wilh praclical application (1,,,"!'1i) Ind

pUfpoK r,r~"") in PramlQ-l Theory, dcvdopilll a J)'Mcm of (<<nW reuonin, would

prob~l,. .ppal poinllCSl, inwnuch II I"orrm! '1'1C1TlI dclitlCntd,. divola IhemlClva
fivm thoK c:ontnJ.

FOUNDATIONS OF OHAkMAKIRTI 'S PHI LOSOP HY

"necessity of cnmples in an infere:nce-for-othcrs. According to many South

Asian philosophers, me (W1)fold reladon betwn evidence and predicate
ClnnOt be $t2ted in :a.bstncrion from the substances that bear ~ predicates. When a dispuram (In us all him - Devadaml attempts to indUtt
another to infer the prew:nu offire: on a mountain from
smoke on that
mo untai n, Dcvadana must dcmonSU;Ji U," 10 his interlocutor that the presence: of smol: is neassarily concomitant with the presence of firc. BUI M
cannot do 50 by appealing to the case at hand----the smoke and fire on the
mountain-preciKly bcc:ausc rhis case is under dispute. Of coune, Dcvadata migtl! simply stal e' m;u rdadon in abnracrion from any given locus
or substance. bur many PraJTlil.u "Throrists, especially those from non-Buddhist traditions. resist this approach. This is duc in part (0 the nOlton that.
if the pd.iCI.[CS in quesrion are tttI, they must Ix insWlriucd in some substance or locus; and if one CUlnOI appeal to any such undispUlcd inst2mi
arion,
dK rWity or rhost ptedicar(S mnains dubious. Hence, fu r some
Pram1r)a ThroriSt5, on~ or the reasoru for insisting upon examples is that
they savt [0 demonstrate the reality or the emines adduced as predK::ate and
n-idena:. This ontological mJuiremem also has a ee:rrain resonana: with an
epinemic rcquiremem-namdy, th:u the relation in quc:stion must have iu
finaJ appal in sense pe.ctption itself. In this smsc, ev~n ir one can logicaUy
adduoe rQSOns why some stat~ or affiairt must hold t~. one's argumenu
arc generally considered unreliable if one cannot appeal to sensory opcti
enee: to suppon that rc:asoning.l

me

mm

~2 \l'hik KwniriJ..

(S\'. --_1))) dearly linlo!lx ..'Unromf of I bomoIopu cumpk

ill..kId)'O(aIw-a who iru4u mal infama m\l$l alto Ix ~

in puajlbon. His cvmmcnlJ, which often SO unnociad. _ wonh aone in dv:ir cnti~.
1M ~t bqiru as I rapol\fe ro I Buddhist opp<M>e1'1 who, duoush.be eottteqUCflttl
of d... Buddhial cmiqur of ...I'rnf;kd CIItities. has bttn pwIxd by UddYIMWn into daim
ins mil all f'(rcqKiocu are inrnmriaJ. UddyoubD (NV:.t67) ~ .. foOows:
10 om"" . . 1 rolltt ..." il

Ir one: ""'tft 10 uh d'le potilion tIw all copilioru ~ inkmuial. !ben Ifxn, ~ be
no in~ II III bec:a~ dx wbjca would flOC ......" been 1XT'iJ.cd Ihrousb ......
apcion.. And if dx ~ .. hOI c:osn= duoo.agI pc ....,pr;on. an inkmoa don noc

oorur. Some: Iu.." AJd that """ a n hotft an infield," of..,pcnnuibk objU. but
do= ~ no ad. infUCb"". .ana " is noc ~ 10 inl"er ..,paxnsibk ob;tcu. Whr,
"8caYlC, as I .... w:;u.. aid, ,be JUb;c:a
noI bam oopIixd.. ["'-111 "'''11__
;ty - ; " " ' . '''IIIIIbUWW-; ~_ ;"""P"w.W tIJ."";!'14- ... ,o"""u'!i

n.

,"'''''n.# I"",." .#~.rtbq. l1li,.",,_

,.".wn"." MiNh.", .. ,,~~ I um.",;# ! JJ.n.i~ '"MI,;.

~,. .,,"'IJittI~ :.u..ulloOlJI

W-.

,.".,..w u,.Ju,.~ .
Uddyoo .......... 50" 001 to.-.. w, .... mini",", qui""",",,, Fo. i.n1i:1U>U ........... "'O;":'
and

,.idcna

puuptibIe.

PlAMA.~A T H EOR.Y: OHAR.MAICIR.TI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

THE EVIDENC E-SUB IECT REUTION

So far we have d.i.scusscd the basic form of inference, :lnd we have discwsed one of the kty relations in this inftrence: the twOfold pervasion
(UJ4pti) consisting of positive :lnd negadve concomitance (IInWl]1I and
vytItirtlttt) thae pcrains bctwccn the evidence and the predicate, One other
kty infcrt'ncial rdation muse also be discussed: the relation caJltd N/H'NlJ4
(":IIpplialition") or, lU Buddhin thin~n rend to call ii , P"~"J..,l"'I9IJftJ
r prescnce of the quality in the subjI"), In some ways. this rdation is
maighrforward: il limply consilu of the relation bctwccn the evidence
and the subject (the t/M"";1I or ,./q;t) of the proposition in question. In
omer words, for p"""JNrmIluito hold (fue, the evidence must be known
to be a quality or predicacc (JIM,.."..) of the proposidon 'J subject. In the
cu.mple of inferring fire on :II mounu.in from th ... prcwnce of $mOke,
~""'1Il would simply mean mat the smoke used as evidence is
present on the mounain. The need fOr this relation is probably quite obvious; after all, it would mm little IenlC to prove that the mountain is on
fire by noring that smoke is prcscm in my pipe. An even more obvious
aample would be the in.fermce: "Joe is a bachelor because: ofbcing unmarried." PIIJr! .n..."""/~ here would .ill1ply mean th:u evidence addl.lCedthe ncr of being unm:arried- peruiru to him , not someone ...11e.
OtherwUc, we might inftr: "Joe is a bachdor because his dog is unmarried." And this docs not make any obvious sense. Thus, the basic poim of
JHI~rmIlt4 is thar one must readily know that the evidence u a predicate or propeny of the subject. Some philosophCfli, such as tht' Naiyiyika
Uddyotakara, claim that this relation must always be known through perCoq'uon," but Dhaz-motkini and IUbscqUCRt Buddhists maintain that this
reluwn may be dt'rmined through anoth~r inftrencc."
A RuTATEMENT
With the above discussKm in mind, In us resate the basic demena ofinftt
~ aa:ording to PrarrW:ta 1bcorisu. This resamncnt combi.nci tht dementi
of both infen:nce-for--o n_lf and infercnce-lOrothcn, and it .. malnt ....

heuristic 0VttVit'W of inkrmcc, r.athcr than the depiction of any philosopher', theory:

43 s... t+w, J" eo ioon """~.

44 DIwmaklrti maka rru. claim ..... noubIy in HB (, ' ,1,).

FOUNDATi ON S OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

ProjJQsiritm (prarijl\i, p~) : Th~ mountain (S) is a locw of fir~

(P).

EvUima (hcru, linga): Bcca~ m~re is smoke (E).

TIN Evit:bnu-PruJi~1I1t Rtlation (vytpti, f'"WU;Dn) and Its Exnnplifi~at;(Jn: Wh~r there is 5mou (E) th~re is fire (P), as in a
kitch~n . And withoUi fire (- P), thert is no smou (-E), u on a
lake.

T1K EvUkncNJlbj't RtiatiDn (pakpdhammi orupanaya): This

mountain (S) is a locus of smoke (E).

All of th~ dements figu re explicitly Of implicitly in every PrarnlJ:la Theorin's analysis of inference. In the case of inferencc-for-oneself, me aemplificnion P" w is SUlXffluous, but tbe principle expressed by thal
exempliflcalion-thal the evidenct-predicate rtl:lIion be generalizable
beyond tbe cast al hand--is niH required. In a 5e1Ut, all the elements art
also only implicit in an infe.rencc-for-onesc:lf, in that they art not explicitly
stared. whereas al least some of the dements must be. explicitly 5t:1.ted in an
inferenc:e-for-odlef1. Numerous disagreements arise, howeYer, on tht details
of infertnce.for-others. We have already noted. for example, thaI th~
philosophm do nOI agree on the degrtt or type of exemplification ndsat)' in an infercnce-for-othen. Similar disagreements abound concerning
which dementS may be. dropped as superfluous to a SCltemenr ofinfe.rence,
or whether some additional st;uemtnts arc required. But these disagreemenu focw primarily upon the a plicit prtStfltacion Of repetition of one
element or an()(her; the implicit prtstnce of these dements in an infertnce
is not a mailer of conrcntion. j ,

45 Conum;nl ...... ieh clemenu m.... be: aplieidy n:ltw. Uddyo.ah.., and his fdlow
Noiyiyikao stand ac 01>( o:nd of dv: ~, ....t.lk Dtwm:oJdni and ..... foIknotn take ~ diamctriaIly oppoKCl ioew. Aaotdilll.o .be sundard NyI,....-kw- dc;fwdcd by Uddyotabra.
dv: poopwirion mid< Ix _mI DOl only ac mr~nnin" bu. ;. m.... Wo Ix tqlt:lml l ' ohm
mil ... conc:huion Of -1Um1N00n" (NpMlUl4). Hma. foo. Naiy.iyiba, .I\ill.~ in/ff.
ma-Ior-odlm Iw fiYe dcrnmu Of "limbo" /.,;p).

I. The mountain q.1ocw offiR (the propoai. ion: ,~lijU,

Beaux ;. iII.1ocw of srnoU (the ~ J.m.)
J.. WhcRO(IIben: il lInlOIu:. then: ill fin:. in ~ banh; without fin:, then: is no omoIu:,
.. in t..b: (~ion and annplificolion: "JtI.......,....)
.... The rroounwn is a Iocw of .mou (!tN: ,pplic uion: "I"''"''Y4 or IUtenlm' of
1.

,...,4,

.toO

I. Tha&'OfC,

me, mountain it ~ Iocw of fin: (oondwion Of swnnwion: "ip_,..,.

PRAMAIiA T HEORY: OHARMAKIRTn CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

J5

W e haW! now owerM rhi!' mou Io:Ilii!'nl vill'WS IMt Pr:a.mil)a Theorisu
share aboul the two ubiquitow forms of instrumenu of knowledge: perccpt:ion (prtl~)and inference 6"'II*nIl). Let us now rum to lO me basK:
views concerning the instrumental objcct (pramry.t), the objca of an
insuumenc of knowfedgt:.

1.2 Pf'2I1leya: Th~ "R~ilr

Al

nOled

pln'iously, the term prafflrya refers

10

the object of the indu-

bitable knowledge derived from an inst rument of knowledge or pf'llmi!f4,

and to clarify that a pra",lJ" is specilically an object of this kind ofknowledge. I will pmly manllali!' ,ra",~:as ~inJt rumen~ objecr ...
For P~a Thcoruu, an inn rwncntal object is ncccssarily what we
might call "rt"a!. in English. I am thinking here especially of the Sambit
tCfm SIlt, a participle fonncd from tht verb ~ tO bdaiu (111). The: connoaIn irs fuJIac forni , this ~ indudel both 1M poei~ and neprivc conc.omiunoe in the
aanplifialion, bul as _ iu.,y 111 , Uddyoubra:Wo:&dm.ia inrerenas thai invohoe only
poIJlM concomitance (Le., I '-'IboMJfI'l) or on.,. nqaUw conoomiu.na: (i.e., a

'-''''"'r

.ri,mflj. For additional mru.rb and ieM on the Nliylyib approach. I ....,....;.lI y Mati.
bI b~:n-7I). Pomr (1977:110-111). and Mohanry (1991:101-106).
In COrIttUllU Uddyoubra. Dhumakini, on his m(-.f rnarun..,ft. prensl panimoniaw
approKh. This panimony Menu &om his rommlion (iMerilcd from DignJp) tNl an illfna-ott thouId OftIy contain the "mcana" (IIIJ}",M) for ..,-..:ruil'll:an inkrmtial WF'irion in the
inrnioculor. As, one tnipl aput . ... th;, b.iJ.DhannUIrti ~ the remlmIC'nl of 1M
.,...-.poArion:ll' tondLUion. bile k rven
the need ro MaU' the propo.;rion 1Il..a. His
poinl is tNl the propotilion is IlOl Klually. 'mc:;lru' ro the immckd inkrmlW coplilion:
n.bcr, the mans it ronKiUlled by Ik "rhmfold e>idma:" (,...;,..,.",Ii,;,p). i.~, n-ickna:
dwaani!ed by iu rdalion 10 the 1Ubjr mel by Ht2bliJbed potili.,y and nepti.,y toncomiWIU.. For this reUI)Il, Dharmaklrti :Wo ~ lbe need 10 IC"~ the IQiOIl xpuudy
(as in, "bcautc it illlocw of ItnOkcl. ~ the: Oft!yekmmu n.eM&ryare: the tuecmc:nl
of the pcmWon (in _ QIC:I..ith ill Icaot pooitivc oemplifiarion) alon@;..irA the~.
of the: cWXnClNubjm: rNlion Gtw!;s'&.....u). Sec Tilkm:ana {'9ii and 1m}.
Kwnlril. lua an inrermedialc IIO'ition buwCCh Udd)Vlabra and Dharnu.ldnL He
mainwnr thai an inkftllCC-fOr-odlcn &houId always induo;k swcmmu of the proposilion.
the
._t.lot ~wb;ca rdacion, and the pcn-.won aanplifio:d by 1l1caot.
poeiiM aampk. The propoIirion nuy be _ed :II ather:an inilial "ilw:si," (~) or I
condoaion (-;'--J. ckpcndins on whnhcr ;1 it Kaled btfotc or Iner the ,.. ir*,,..t.l
and acmplilKd pervuiolL Sec $V (....1OIi_ 107ffl. For an arulloriQ] bul utdid ICIDOUn l.
I Shan b~; ~JR) .

'*""

,,"1'*

<f6 Similar 10 the rrarublion "inMnuncn. orlmowlcd&c" r,r.><t.itMJ, "irunummtal objca:"

fI...-,..J U. convmlml &horthand fof -ftbjr of an uu.cf\U1\Cn1 of~ - Sec du.p'
( t t .. (u}ff) for an alnum ~ of mil ~ or InNblion.

}6

FOONDATIONS OF DHARMAK'RTI'S I'HILOSO I'HY

clons of JIlt converge on the notion of $Omethi.ng that is present in a Jubstantial &shion, be it directly or indircaiy. Such an objCCl is -real- beause
only -the real" an be the conttnt of a correa or indubiClblc knowledgeC'mlr. for Prami/:la Thcorisu, it makes no sense to speak of an indubitable
cognifivt evt:nt whose objttt is unrca.l." Cbrly, this position ruts on $C'Veral assumptions, the most obvious of which i5 me nmion that cognitive
eventS always have ob;cas. This is less [rivial [han if $Oundi, fo r these
philosophers maintain that every mcltal state or form of consciousness is a
cognirive cvmt; in snon. they espouse an imenciona.l meory ofcorucioumcss.
That is, all momcnlS ofconsciousness nCSArily have objccu. and there arc:
thus no instanCeS of contentlw aW'UC:OC$S or momenlS of consciousness
without obj:u. Pr.un1r:la Theorists thus daim that, even in instanCtS where
a cognition is mi.stakt'n, one must niH account for the p~ of an object.
even though mal objt is $Omchow illOOm:cdy cogniud.'"
In addition to claiming dur instrumental objcas
real, these
philosophers also maintain that me -real- is na....ssarily -knowable- (jMyir),
and this is understood to m~ that me -rea.l- ncccuarily an be mkcn as
an instrumental objt." The overall epistemological implication h(rc is
that, for these thinkers. it is absurd to a5SC;n that some cntiry ill real and ~
utterly beyond anyone's knowledge. Or. to PUt it another way, any argumcm for tm reality of some entity must ultimatdy relt on some means to
know that emity indubitably.

r",..",LJl'Jarc:

has DOted: "As krIowabk li~,,.. .,.. OI'.J'tIo;:IooI .. ",;dUn_

d-ococia of,,-.h:w- cquivalmt IG 'e:aismu,' ~t and dnmnin.Jtion cqlUlly Im't II
airma fix o:ziormor.." In hi. ..... on dUs I'nIWk ('996:n.I-4), he c:ommcntI !hal on this MJb.
.ita, ~crisu I YUf lilmlNft from both Indian and WaKm IUthon .. .. 'J1w; poinr Mre ;'
dur if 'p""'(IIIOOXUII, if '. ,urily hM I rollhint; II ia objttt. Hmor,lIIl)'thln& known by
a ~ iI _
lily raJ.. l'hi5 is indc-td a ubtq.u1Olal dWn IlIlOClK PYun1qa lhtorUu; in
Dtwmakirti', tIIW, ic;' rd'.a:tu:! in Ihcdaim. "To aile illO be paca+<d" { _ .,.1,6".
I,;~ .... PVSV ..,/PVI .J>. For _
on Dtwmalcirti, ..w:w, in thi. rqard. _dupm 1 (t.m.
-41

~ ( ,~)6i)

481 rekrMre fO thcnocton oliUusionorth. probkmofoloo_~ (u.r.;,.ti,

.y.mtlljU,.., " .,tM'M, Oc.). N.5. Drmd (t~17) noIet tNl "a11lndim ~ilomph
kaI JdIoob , fO;,.. all thrir doarinal diffcrmcc:t, IK in JClUiliOIt on one pOUII, namely qN1CII'OkIp'a" n:aliIm. llw obja:r of cop>itioa (an " " ' " be an unrtal m ilt)'. - To Aly thlr thit
it tturol"a11 ~ achooI." is an owasaremellL For ownpk. on CandtUinj', nrw,
lhe WIlI",1 of an ordirwy penon', JIftttPlion il Mo...,. an unrnl ",tit)' (M.J},.
JW.-.uow"""~'O?-loI" M~_w.."""I5.lJ; cf. rdlcmalll l!J9Ol'4S.... 9). Nev.
~ OnYid', basic point orrt:a1nly applies 10 p~ Thtorisa: C'Im in _
of ntOr,
...... connor cb.im ,har ~ occun..;thoo.il an objea. For,....dy of _
problems
!har an inlmrional theory of ~ (!Wet for Buddhiat pbilotopMn. I Griffi lh.

h9l6l.
49 See

Pon~

h?61 '9) for _

on thit iMtJe..

PRIIMAf:lA THEORY, DIiARMAJ(IIlTI 'S CONCE PTUAL CONTEXT

}7

Beyond thiJ fundam~ntal ~i.n~mologic:a1 principl~. PramiQ,a Theorists

shared other basic assumptions about m~ rol (lilt). For our purposes, th~
most pervasiv~ and rdcvant :wumprion is
"th~ real" is "simple" (dA)."
A brief c:urniruuion of this shued issu~ wiU also allow us to apprcciat~ a
fundamenw diffttc:nce that distinguishes Dharmakirti', thought from that
ofhiJ opponents.

mat

TIw Simplinty (111M RuJ -.J" FII",umntllll DiffmN

'Simpliciry" tranSlates the Sanskrit [emu (itlltvlf and titlltil, which literally
mean singularity" or "on~nC55." A thing that is qualified by simpliciry is
singular or "o n~" (t"It.r}-it is a .seut1tS5 unit." Simple things sund in conrrur reo r ~ rh"r

"rI'!

qu"lif'ied hy ' mLllriplicity" (...,,/'_14). " r.. rm rh"r

might also be translated as "nonsimpliciry," "complex.iry," or "pluraliry."

When PramiI:'ta 1beorists claim that the real. iJ simple and hence nonplunl, they adduce three genttl.l fomu of arguments. The rust are arguments from experience. Proceeding from the principle that a perceptual
object is real, many philosophers argue that an object of pattption is singular. If WI! mk,. w:r.rer-jug. fOr eumpk. H the objt of our vifu:&l perception. the Wolter_jug :l.ppe2lS H singular in our perception. This lint type
of argumeru often occurs in conjunction with the second type: arguments
from language. In claiming that a water-jug presents iuclf as singuIar in percepcion, lTWly PramiJ:ta Theorists:appeal to peiceprual judgment: the W':ltajug pr~nts iadf as singular bcaust the perception leads to (or includes) a
conccprua1 determination of that perceprual object as a single ming. namely,
:I. w;uer_jug. In short. our peruption a1JOW5 III to correctly think or say.
50 Amons DIwmaklni'. opponena., Kwnirb iI W only phibopher .mo appa.n ..;Ilil\&
10 make lOme conceuiolll.pllll W inruiriGn mat w raJ is oimpk (_~,. Sv.
Ii..,.....w..."lq-Ul). It __ likely, h.o",(~, thai Kwn1tiIa', poinl bm is tbu in ICnnI of
itt copilion by -nriow pn.>ns. a oincle mlil}' may haft man,.. C'f'CfI rnunWI,. CIOf>ltJdiaory
qwdi .... Thif ~Iy IICIa>nb with his pramUlUon of I qwdiry. P'C"" __ (~.) ...
chc paexptL.lal obja;l: (fCC npmi.ll y Sv. '~lfl -IU). 1u ;. ollen the c...c, Kwnirib.
c:onMnIaI of r..!.rionl in ImIlI ofdilfttenoe.nondiffcrmcx" (HwII~ nuke:. a p.....::iM:
UlCUllWftI ofhil pmltion difficuli.
Nou chal, unlike iu .... in rhc conCCXI ofinfa'ma, 'qlYlity_~" iI probably the
Ilea lrandalion or ~i" in mil comm:. Ana tIN,.;.. ;. ~ roug.Jy cquinknl 10 ,he
_.,.. ...." of the Nylp -Vai"fila
' I The tnpw, 'IIO'Ofdt "unil" and "uniry" an tmlpDns tnrulation for mand ~m.&i,
but only ironc .ncndliO their ~ In. rdalni ~tc:n. MatibI (19?1:nl abo \lift
"Ioimpk" for m.

}8

FOUNDATiONS OF DHARMAKI RTI'S PHILOSOPHY

"1'h:1.[ is a wal{'r-jug. ~ Since W lerm "water_jug here is singular. it must

refer 10 a single objt. These argumena rest on the daim dul the gramnur
of a:prasions corresponds 10 the rca1 propmies of objcca. More spi6ca1ly.
!he singulariry of an exprc:uion corresponds ( 0 W singulariry (dAt.l, mttJJa)
of me object ( 0 which il is applied. In shon , in Ihis ~rd allan, grammar
and Ontology stand in a relation ci isomcr:ric correspondence.
When combined wilh the nolion dut the real is simple or singular. Ihis
alleged isometric correspondence: })(:fWttn gr.tmmatical and ontological
number leads to Ihe second type of argum{'nt as an imponant corollary,
namdy, that a grammatically plural a prcssion musl in fact rder to mullipie obj{'Ct$ that ar{' ontologically singular or simple. Thus. ifit is meaningful , a grammatically plural expression or concept must correspond
ontologically to numerous, ontologically simple entilies.
This condngcncy of grammarical pluraliry on ontological singularity
poina [ 0 thc third set of argumena in F.tvor of the reaJ as simple. These
arguments rest on lhe we of reduaM analysis (vibh.if., vicar.. etC.) and the
principle rhallhe real is irm:lucibk That is, when we apply the appropriate
form of analysis to a real entiry, we should nOI be able 10 break or anaIyu il
inlOsmaller partS. since a real enlity is simple. If that seemingly real entity
can succmfully be fu nher analyud--broken into para. as it were-then
its simpliciry is only apparent; it K'ttIU 10 be simpl{', but in faa il is compia. and as such. it is not truly real. In this way. onl~ simplicity corresponds [0 analytical irm:lucibiJiry. Thus, if any real thing is nemrily
umple or unitary, il is also neccuarily irm:lucible under reductive anaIysis."
Many Pramif.\a Thcorisu usc (or at least allude to) all mree fonns of vgutnc:n l to c:scablish a real thing as simple. but throughout these arguments. d~
notion thaI the real mus! be simple remains uncontened for Dtwnukirci
and his principle opponents. Their un:mimiry on the issue of simpliciry,
hownn. lcads them to a shared problem, which we can illuslfa[e in [eons
of me aJlcgcd whole du[ is a water-jug. We may daim Ih.U, wbcn we sec: a
ft

S2 Thor qummu pramfcd hom: an: d>OK IOund in dlCworksof'Vlupyana (NBh:.1-111)

and Udd,.oulw:a (NV;461-1 lj .JNS1.I.)I- }6). Sft Mobanry (I99J:&6-9Jl for an 1$P""'i 11lr
lddial.tWllmary of m-~ ... Many.d>OUn haft rrcop>izc.d tt.. impomnco: of pmmar to

Soum AsU.. thougIf. buf tt.. KnI..p

lOon of 1M uzumcnl

mUll fv if fOund ill

nolion of the rnJ:os

t~

BrorIkt-. llm )
S}

AJthough Halbf.ue:

rd'~

Imjuetldylo

I~

"irmillCiblf" in

Vmqilao philolopby (1991.']1. '1, li S. I..). IMI.OOduy lil tflllW'l: 01\ Bnlvnanical ~
11CU01 ....... liu1.: nupI.......... .hi. i ......... "".., .....'U'IUI' oll<l' ''''. 11';' iol""",",," t.a:.. .... ;" .,.
d llCibiliry it .., .tronsfy - Uta! whlI Ruddhilt phiJo.:,phical rnrthod.

PRAMAI:-lA THEORY: DHARMAKJlt.TrS CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

'9

Wolfer-jug. we are Iing II single thing. but we mwt also admit that we can
readily I its paru---the base. me rim around me top. and so on-in the
same fashion. We thw encounter an apparent antinomy: the water-jug is a
tingle: real ming looud in a paniculartime and plllCC and consisring ofa cerrain IImount of mattc1". and ~ in milt very same time. place. and maner. we:
also sec (and can meaningfully speak of) multiple real things such as a base
:lnd rim. Thm. we mll.n Hk: are we sccin& one thing o r many thinp~
The possible rcsponso; :lie perhaps obviow: one can either choose to
defend the simplicity of things that presuppose the aisrence of real pans.
or OM can intist that the simple is ncccw.rily pardcss. The former position
is ch:aracteristic of those South Asian philosophers such as Uddyotakara
who StfCSS the pe.ctprual and linguistic approOKhes 10 simplicity: for these
rhinkenl , :lny :lOXIunr mun

r~rve

the onf"logieol inmir;.,nJ rhar sr.....

from the way we perceive and speak of things such as a water-jug. If a spatially atendcd object such as a water-jug appnrs (0 be onc thing. and if we
can speak meaningfully of it in the singular. then our ontological account
of the Woller-jug must likewise show how II single. real. uniruy w,:uer-jug
docs not 1ose ilS simplicity even though that single entity is disoibuted ovo"
multiple paru that are themsel ves sim ple and 1e:U. With this issue in mind,
phllO$Opherr fum u Uddyot:akar:. ,pc21c of a real "whole" or "part-possessor'" (Ilvayavin): a rttI substanct instantiated or participating in iu real parts.
and yet entirely distinct fTom thcm.
A theory of substantially ainem. unitary wholes that are distiner from
~it pans may satisfy somc intuitions about perception and language. but
even on the view ofiu proponcnu it leads to some difficulties. For narnpl~. given these (hinkenl' view of m:lrter. they must admit that a whol~
water-jug should weigh more than thc total weight of iu pam. That is.
before the twO halves of a water-jug are conjoined. th~ haVC' a certain
wcight. and whcn they arc conjoined. a new. additional substana--thc
W;lrcrjug-comcs into !xing. Since thc conjoining of thc halves creates a
new substanct oVC'r and beyond the halves of the water-jug. one would
eo<pe<:t thu~ to be some :addition:&! W<l!ight from the p~nOl! of (1.:1.1 new

substance. Uddyotakara, in a ramer undistinguished. attempt to deal with

this problcm. dainu that a whole docs indttd weigh more than the total
weight of all iu parts hut that the difference in weight is undettttable."

s.c Uddyocabn nukts thioo:him ~f NV:.9J ("'NS~ I .H) in hil atemivediK'\Wion ofthc

DhwrWtin:.-,

..,.,..,'" (NV'4~I} ~ NS;1..' .JJ-J6). for

rdiuallOO of tIua
cnmple. PV . lfl-16,: 1ft Wo 1Ji&rUp., con:mmu in PSV (4;rt.-47)).

YJcW. 1In'.

for

-40

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAIlMAKIIlTl 'S PHILOSOPHY

In contrast. South Asian Buddhist thinkers utterly rett the teal existence of wholes; indttd. a mereologic:a1 critique of wholes is one of the ear
lieu and mOil paradigmatic forms of rrouctive analysis in BuddhiSt
thought. In their crilique of wholes. Buddhist thinkers mainwn thai entities such as water-jugs may Sttm 10 lK simple. but in fact they are not
because il is not possible for;ill real end), [0 lK distributed over or panicipate in partS that are themselves simple. Many of the arguments that they
adduce for this critique fall into a genre that Tibetan thinkm later called
the " ndthe:r-one-noNnany~ argument. This nyic: of critique rdics on milKlUI tUi llJm.nJllm to demolUlrate Uu.t it is unu:nOlble to maintain that;ill whole
is identical to its real pans Of that a whok is dislinct hom its real pans. And
sinct any rm thing must be: either Ktentical to or distinct hom any other
mtl thing, if the pans are incked real. then one mUSt conclude: that the
whole is unreal." Hena'. on the view of Buddhist thinkers, only panicss
things can be simple. which is 10 Ay that simple things cannot be disuibuted over or instantiated in other simple things. And since they agrtt mal
only the simple can be real. they must insist that only the pardeu-the
undistributed-is real.
Ahhough they reject [he existence of real wholes. Buddhist thinkers
unde:rsruJd thai they mUSt also account for our perceptual and linguistk
practices. whereby ~ believe oursdves to be: pcrcriving and spealUng of
wholes such as water-jugs that are distributed over their parts. This leads
Buddhist philosophers to discuss two "iffirrnt typn of"Illity: an appuent
reality in which things can only Ix called "real- (or -rrue") in conventional,
contingent. or nominal terms (u'!'''.rtiut or PfI'jiillptwu). and a highest
level. of rea1ir:y in terms of which mings are ulrimaldy real (/M,..",.nhtu.I).
This fundamental flOtion of the ~twO realities- or ~ twO truths occurs
throughoUt Buddhist texts, and the works of Dharmakini are flO acepcion. Within the Buddhist context that informed Dhannakini's thought.
the: mosl relevant sratc:mtnt of chest twO levels of reality occurs in the
Ahhitlhttrmttkoill (and bINi.tpt) ofvasubandhu:'"

55 For tht "ncidw:r_,*' lIWIy ~1 ' ln ~. 1IfC rdkrnant (I~l and 1~}). 1Up
.mn (JOO.:."-'IOo4l disa.laa _ o f tht ~ ~ of .bit")'k of ana/ysia.l. is
WORh nocintI m.u tht "1!X'ftI or IUdI arpmmu Pmllfl90Kl a IIOOOM&lU IOrm of1or;ic.

56 Thecommmt;llOf'1 Dewmdnbuddhi (q.. PVJ>o,b "'1'V",U-'I7. and .JPV).I94l

,....1 hJ..yJ ....1.IJ,i (...... t'Vr;.....t.) r.~lOCfl.IT";'" V....L-..J.h .. _ .............u: uf ....... ul
Otwmaklni', thKNia

PRAMA~A THEORY: OHAFlMAKIFlTI 'S CO N CEPTUAL CONTEXT

4'

That of which one docs not have a cognition when it l'las bttn
broken [into parts 6nl"JWw)j is conventionally real (Ul'!'lJ!1isat);
an example is a water-jug. And ilia, of whidt one does not have
a cognition when other [elemenw qualities (dlMmsa)j have bttn
excluded from it by the mind is also conventionally real; an
example is water. Th:l[ which is otherwise is ultimately real
(p'wlwui~t).'7

"",.Iffionw,

S7 AK6.4' ~"" un'flN 114 ".II.. .lJl.ir tI1I]"i,.N Jhryi (II lIf' I
III,!,,,,,",,'
~~ ~bnckl:tcdpbn$Ct inlg puu" (II ...... ,,{.~) and "dnnmwq.w.
itieol" (JNnu..jcome &om VasuhandbU1 own commmtary. .......idI reach (AKBh:&,o):
llIar of which _ doc:t ' - .....~. OOInilion..ben il ...... bf.cn ~ inlo para iI
c:on'lUltionally rcaI. An eumpk iI. w:IIlu_ju," for when J oraler jus il brokm inlo
shards. ont doc:t noc ....."" qnirion of il. And ,....., of which OM doa no! han a
qn.irion when od>n- ckuKnal qualitH:. (.O--) ..... ve bn a d udai (.,.;".,) by
me inrdlca (h@) ilaiIO fO Ix known I I QOIIwntio.u1ly mi. An c:umpk iI-'ler.
for wkn _ nM:nally adudes ia form and 10 on. ont has no CO&Ririon of -.rtl.
Th..ol if. QX1'1U1lional dcsipwioaa art appl~ 10 lhoN: thlnp such II w:IIru jup and
WUtt. Hcn. wkn _ $IIy. by me for oJ COII ...... lion. ~ ill a -.lcrj1.os and
_ ...... _ ...."".poI<- the l<\Od. (~"..,..) (duo ... _ loa..... poIu:n o f ......... ;. r..J
(.... ,A: _ ..... ve noc IIJtcKd. blxbood. H~. it iI caIkd J "c:onwnlional 1I'\llh!or
con...... tionaI talkyl.
11w: aiII~ of dtinp in a """y Other dwo chal illillimue taliry. Th.al of which
one lliU hu. cognition ~ when il hu bttn broken iI .... limaldy rnL And Wt of
which one Ifill has CO&Ririon eftn wbm Olher demmlal qu.ol ilia JI"( menIally
c:xduded is aL.o ....liDUldy real. An aarnplc is form (,.,.; f when chal form is broken into infinilelimal partida. 0lK tIill Iw a CO&Rition of Ihlol raJ !hinS (""',..)
[n.undy . fonnJ . And whcn othcr c1cnM:n,ai qualiriu luch u 1Uf.~ uc IMnwly
_dudod from it. D~"iU ..... ",,!"itio n of ...., -10_ ... nue it fo.m. On. .....uld
Itt thaI Ihit is aJ.o rhe CIJ( wirh KlUalion and to on. Somnhins it laid 10 Ix ....1'
mudy rcaI [oe Ir\IC (....."....... lx<;:au.x il c:zim Wtimatdy. The: prnious JnalU:n Iuove
said thaI the .... liDUIC realiry aim in me w:IIy thaI is apprd1.mdecl by ItalIJatICknl
(~....an:nao 0< by !he mund&nc .-.rcnc&a that is obaincd ...bocquau. 10 !hal
IfWIItmdmt awarcnca. And convmtioml ratiry aisa in me ..,.y thaI ;1 it ~
hcnded by other forms oJ awan:naa.
un,.,., 114 , .a-U".,w,.,1ItIli
...., ....'!'.,n- 1 ~ ~ I "'"" In ufJltI1. Mi'flM fIM~r "" w..1ItIli I
J-"" r...",,, .,..,. .... - . . #1,.. -'Im ,{,{"'~ "" U. ri. _ r~ w'!'",.u.r .",/i

.1

u.-.i",. ,..,...c.

....",.,.. 1 ~ II",h I ~ hi 11,07' ~." ~'fI .r~~r 114

~ I tqII nw ,.. J6'!'~ ~ 1II'!'."nNih ~
d1ri,; ""I1I-!I
....".,...,..."r "" ~ ilJ nIIr ....",."nufJtl", I "" '1f]tUhtJ ,.r~", I "'""

rho'"

"".",., Ii .. ,0" ,'8;, INwwn I .,.,u;..,.#/

"

Ii ""U9i 1111 ,.rmdrrb....,r 1-;'

,i

"',w,..

iii ,..,,-.JllirlWIoi,.,., _ i i i . . . . . "" rll~'J ""

htUbir u.""1J nor I nor,!, .,..,.....".
Jrf!,"'1IJ4 I ruu
,-nu~ M#1fIi, pu....
iii l ,.dM ~~,.,..... lJI?tIu III'
~W.! 'u _ ~ ",tIM pu.1fIhdItIstI"... 1~ ir,Jrou IMIM ....~fJtl",

tU4I*", l _

~ _~

iti"j"'~ .

m..-,.,.

04.1

FOU NDAT IO NS O F DHAIlMAKIATI 'S PHILOSOPHY

V:uubandhu', presentation of the: fWO realities reflc:cts the: Buddhist

me:reological critique: mentionc:d above. Although the AbhUihllrmalttJU is
not aplicit on mu point, V:uubandhu', theory thus rests largely on a critique: of spatial atension. In other words, if a ming is arended in space.
men it nece:ssarily has pam in mat it lt least tw ~sides"-lOp, bottom, left.
righI, and SO on. Since that atended thing an therefore: be: reduced
(mrough acruaI physical fora or mrough analysis) to its pam, it is not simple. And since it is nOI simple, it is not truly or ultimatdy real. In contraSt,
me simple: entities that re:main after analysis arc: ultimately real. On the:
view found in the AbhiJha~ these: simple: entities are infinitesimal
panicles (PNmA!',l)or irreducible
e:ntities and Slates. In a later tat,
V:uubandhu applies a merc:ological analysu to infinitesimal particles of
matter themselves, and he: leads his readers to me: conclusion thai c:vm matter it not ultimately real bc:cause it does not withstand merc:ological analysis." Following V:uubandhu's lead, Dignaga and especially Dharma1cirti
also apply a mc:uologica.l sl)'le: of critique to temporal extension, with Ihe:
muh thal all real entities-whether particles or me:ntal states-are:
"mome:ntary" (I!'iltll), in thai they exist for only an infinitesimal amount
of time."
!u the critique of te:mporal c:xrension suggests, a me:reological analysis of
wholes provides a paradigm for the: critique: of entities that are wholc:--likc::
that is, they ahibit -distribution" (lllllNtJllJ. A whole: is a disrribUlc:d enol)'
in Ihlt it is a singk real thing that is somehow instantiated in other single
real things that are its paru. The: same may be said of a pc:rdur:ul( entity thaI
allegedly endures ovu lime:: to be: teal, it musl be: a single thing distributed
over numerous tc:mporal instances. Dharmakirti likewise alends thit style
of critique 10 universals: if a universal (such as fOtvII or "cow- nt$$~) is to be:
real. il must also be: a single real thing that is dinributed over all the: individuals that W'C call -rows." But perhaps the quintessc:nrial form of this style
of argume:nt is Dharmmni's critique of relarions.
Dharmakini prc:sc:nb hit critique of rdatiom in the S4",bIl1llih4J'1lriJf!il,
where he responds 10 various positions that argue: for the: e:xistence of uhimaU'ly real nobtions. Dharmakirti systematic:aJly rejc:cu all such claims, and
on his viN', a rdation can only ~ rea.I in a conventional or nominal sense:.
His argumenl rab on me uncontested claim that he.shares with his opponenb: namely, thar an ultimately rc:a1 thing must be simple. Hence, if a

menw

581'he 10.1 in

que5lion it!hc v.".fniA-.lano;! iu: V,mi. 5 ~rin ( WOI:191-1(4).

59 S me diIauaion in chapm l (j1A).

PAAMAr:,./A THEORY, DHARMAXI RT I 'S CONCEPTU AL CONTEXT

4}

rd:uion ~ to bt' ultim:udy rt:a.I, then it [00 must bt' a simple. unitary
entity. If a relation iJ hypomsiud in such a uhion, Ihe mereological style
of analysis applies because the relation mwt now be conceived much :IS a
whole: a single thing that. while existent in iudf. is sommow dintibuted
over IU pans.

At various poinu in the SambanJh.1pttri~ Dh.armaIOrti relies on a Mod_

rh er-l)ne-not_mllny" ,..g,,~nr In m:lke hie rooinr. :Inti hie :lrgumenr mnves

b:ack and form across a cc:nrr:U question: if II rel:uion is II real thing. then is
it one wim iu relata. or is it different from tbtm? Noting that II relation presupposes the pr~nce of al lusr twO rdatll. Dharmakini dismisses the
notion that ,he rebtion could be a real thing thllt is one with (i.e. identical to) the rebD over which it is distribured. In orner words. if me relation
aM the rdllr:a ue """. then how can ~ intelligently fpe<tlt of tum n!'bta?""

And in response to me daim mat me rdation could be different from iu

rdaD. he offers a verse that is panicularly helpful for understanding
Dharmmni's ontology;
If twO things are related by virtue of their connection 10 one relation. then ont: may ,.d,-. - What relates those

twO

rebr:a to the

rebtion~"

The re5ult is :on infinite regreu. and the notion of a

rebtion is rhw not correct,"

Dharmakini's poinl is that. if a rebtion is different from the relata. then it

must srill sommow bt' disuibured over them in order to serve iu ~iRClion
:IS II rd:uion. Hence. one may ask whether. by vinuc of being distributed
over the rdatll, the rd:t.tion is thereby one with the rel:!I:!.. or different from

them. If il is one, then there can be no relation. since rdadons presuppose

multiplicity or plur:Uity. And ifi! is different from the rdaD. then we must
argue that there is lOme 5eCOnd-order relarion thar connects the relation to
its relata. We can thw apin ask: is (his second-order relation on~ with irs
60 I:>twmUini makes rhiI UJIlffiCflt at variow; poinu in Ia.t. btu pcrNpi lht most obvi_ ; . in the tOnd >aX: "You may think thu a..mUon is a tomminpins of na'-1,lf'f:L Bill
if the ..mea I~ twO, then how can that be'- (rii~ In _ ......
u ltI~
iIM_). )n hia commmwy. DharmakIrti notcr. "If the mac.a wen: to be one, then una:
~ would nor be: two n:bta. wlu.1 rd:nion would tbcrt bet w~ ask ttW; bea ...... relation
prnuppota [Ill leastl two fdac:.- bs6a: tdt,.O'" M:JII"l 'mI,. til" prJiI-J,.i fhlir
'mI"I""l ~,."", iii";".,..
# rI}.

m_,.

s....,

1M,..,.,
""9"
_"""""'_tis

61
.u.yn.~ 10..4'
",,u;,. liM_tIM t il M

M~"'~t

IItdM.

,.",..,,..u,. """

~f

U!t ""'-

4<t

FOUNDATION S OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILO SOP HY

relau, or different from mem? The infinite regress from this point should
~obviow .

I have cited. Dharmakini's argument by infinite rqrm because it $0

dearly points (0 a theme within his ontology, namely, the rejection of me
notion that an entity could ~ at once one (and thw a simple real) and yet
panicip.m: in what is many. Such alleged. C'mities includC': a wholC' participaring in its pans; a univenal participating in iu particulars; a perdurant
entity participating in its tempo~ insunces; and a rdation participating in
its rdata. Whatn'C'f motives ~ might attribute to him," it is dear [hu
Dharmakini uttC'riy rejecu any possibility of unity wimin plun.1ity, and as
a result. all such entities mwt ~ u1tinutdy unreal for him because they all
can ~ reduced (0 me entities over which they are allegedly distributed.
The argumem by infinite regress is also particularly belpfuJ for understanding Oharmaldni's omo\ogy in iu wider context. In pan, the argumem is hdpful because it presupposes a fundamental area of agreement,
n:undy, that a real thing is simple or one. At me same time, howtVtt, the
argument by infinite regress also points to an especially crucial point of disagreement. That point becomcs dear when W1;: rcc:ogni:te that the regress
suCCtt'ds only under a cenain condition. As Stephen Phillips n()(cs:
The rcgrC'S5 is .sn up by treating the relation as a term, as the
same son of thing. logically, as the mata.. Without an argument
that a relation is a diA'CKnt son of criner. it seems that if a third
rhing is required (0 relate two things. then the third thing
r((juires equally a fourth and a fifth to tie it up with the first twO,
ad infinitum."
PhiUips points OUt that Dharnukini's critique of relations succeeds by treating the relation as the same kind of crinu as the rdata. Without this
assumption, me critique might easily be evaded. We know that if the mation and the relata are real, thC'n each mWf be onC' or simple (~k.). SuppoK.
62 ~ likdy mQII;iv:l [ion;' Dhannakinl'l nlIlO okknd the Buddhitt nocion of....~
(MJI1IUII or IMmtwf]tl). which is anna! 10 hi! _crioIopcaI project. Flpia!ly alta
N~ Ikoddhist ~tI apinst ~ Idf (m-"j ro.:u. DOl 0lI the: imp<l"ibility of
....f ~ N , but "'ther the impoAibility of I whole cWJ of entities, dx Idf brin& within WI
cbsa. AI~ Dlwmakini hi!Nd( t&n no dar critique of the: d , it IftmI' likely WI he
100 would _ the td( as akin 10 l..-hok tWa of muties, rwndy, dIOK WI ~ d$ribuud.
For an iOlctprtUlion aionA!hac lines. 1ft Fm-ooo hood.
63 PhilliPI' h !r.n :I) .

PRAMAt::IA THEO RY, OHAitMAklRTI'S CO NCE PT UAL CON T EXT

4S

however, Wt numbtt does not :apply in me same way to thae emities:

that is, we can point (0 and count the rdal':t, but we cannot coum me relation in that fashion. This me:tIU that. although real. the rdation and the
relata a.ist in difhlc,l ways: a real rebrum canno t mn:ain "one" and be d isuibuled. C'IV'er anomer marum, but the relation can remain "one" and be disuibuled. OVC" its rdat:l. And not only U" a relation be distributro ovt:r in
rdal':t, ir is p~~y the kind nf thing thaI H distrihured oller in relaur..
Indeed, this is pan of what we mClll we say that il is " re:ilr (lilt) :and :an
instrumental object (prilmryll).
If we respond 10 Dh:armakini's :lIRUmcnt against hyposwiud relations
in this fashion. we co~ to a question Ovtt which he:and his opponents fundamentally disagree: can we use the unqualified term "real'" (Sill) to rekr to
thingy that :lR' not ~ in the same ,."y~ Thu is, iF an entity is "ml ," mun
it be real in the same way ali all o ther real entilies ~ Dharmakini's mai n
OpponcnlS will inevil2bly answer thi5 question by affirming the divt:rsity of
ways in which an entity mighl exist and still be Jiltor real. Indeed, in w me
cases th.at affirmative answer leads to a pletho ra o f terms fo r d ifferem ways
of being real," Dharmakini. however. urteriy rejttl5 any such possibility.
In the next chaptCT , we will see th:u, on his view, only spatiotemponlly
irreducible p:uticul:an are "real," and on the mon accut:ate account, they
alone are instrumental objem (prilmtyil). Everything else can be called real
only in a con~ntional o r spurio us (SII'!'IJ!h) 5(n5(.

1.3 Purpouas umiat

Beyond the ontological wumption of simplicity, Prami l)-a Theorists from
all traditions share anomer atca o( considerable agreement: the nOlion of
prlfJOjlNl or "purpose:" ali forming the comat within wh.ich an inst rumental object is known. The first PmniIJa Theorist to establish th.e place
o f purpose ali a tuemAryromponent in the process of kn owing was probably Gautama. Citing p~ at the O UUCt oF h it: N~tr" (NSI.I., ) :LI:a
604 I un rdminc hrn: 111) tho: LUC of the: ramJ - . . . "';IM, ~ Uri... by variow NyJyaVli'qil.. thinkcn.. Ser: Poun (' 97'r.140-141) for an excdkm ~ of mil u.-. For
Ohannakini. thinp mUN be raJ (1M) "ill the ~ Wly" ill mal any lUI nlliry mUN _
the:_criurion of-1M dlicaq-" (~Manyofhi.-OI'f gftCIIU, !.ownu, aR' wiDina; 10 apply di-..: uilaia: _
tb.inp aR' lUI in dUl: they an: dirtly COIIlaClro by tho:
KIlXI, odlCI1 an: tal beaUlC, for Gampk. !hey an: dw objeco 01 ]in~ Of tonapfWl
mpWons. For ~ dnaiIed cfUr:waon of rd-ucd -.-. '" DunM (1999:b -70).

.. 6

FOUNDATIONS O F OHAIlMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

ttnnal topic of his work. he larer defines it: "the purpose is the ll'f1htJ aiming at which one actS . "6) In other words, it is with some purpose in mind
that one ittlu ro act in a manner informed by the indubitabk knowledge
that an instrument of knowledge provKies. In this selUe, purpose is a aucial conrat within which ruch knowledge occurs. Gaucuna'$ definicion,
ho~er, is 5OmeYIM.t difficult to understand, fo r it employs the ambiguous term IInh4. whose many meaninltS include ",oaI," "thing: and
"object." This ambiguiry often awes confusion, but it abo allows one to
make :I. point: when :I. "thing" is being raken a! an "object: one docs 50
bc:cause that "thing" will serve SOIYlC "goal" We see this in the commencuy
offered by me earliest Naiyiyika commentator Viiayiyan:l.;
Having apprdtended mat an Ilrtha is something to Ix: obtained
or diminated, one then impkmenu me mearu for obtaining or
diminating it. One should know that thai (lnhtl is me purpose
bc:cause it awes one to act. TItat is, one thinks '" wiU obain this
(lrriHI " or '" wiU avoid this tI1TiHI~is kind of apprehension of
the IIrrha is what is mQllt by "aiming .111" the II,.,;",. ...
Uddyotahra, one of Dharmakirti's main opponenl:5, clarifies eualy
what one is apprehending:
What is one app rehending~ One is apprehending the causes
(s.idha1Ul)ofM.ppincss and suffering. That is, having undemood,
"This is a cause of happinc:ss." one then Strives so a! to obrun
hll l"l"int:l.~.

And h:l.ving undO':l'Srond,

""' i~

11 rhO': ClIUJOt:

nr ~1Iffi.,r_

ing," one am so as to eliminare suffuing. People arc motivated

(prll:Jlljyau) by the atwnmcnt ofhappincss and the dimination
of suffering. Hence, their purpose is the atrunmcnt ofhappineu
and the dimination of suffering."'"
,S NS ..&.4> JW"' .....,...JJ.i1tr?- rw-"" "-)0j666 NBh (lS6) ...tNSI.I.14'

.-

,.", ",..", ~ 1M",.,.'!' "" .) "')or ~", .....tiP,IMui ~

rM .$",.,.... ,....""u.m.tMfII J i"..", .nJJn. .,.,...i 1MsJJ"'; Wli .".~

67 NV bs6-' f7) ...tNSI.I.l.4'

~
'r
-r
_ ~.t.Inob
. I_ _
~r-F'l'
_ _ ._::;/
.
~.:,.~":;:tt;:':i"'~_;:;'
..
ilijUrMf .....H \"!,P" "..,.",11.
"'.\ Ud*'-"o iii d*ip ...,. .t.H L hl4Jro"',

*'"

PRAMA.~A THEORY: DHARMAKI RTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

47

In shon. ooc's purpose is [0 obtain happines.s and dimin.:ue rulfering; to do

so, on~ implnnena th~ awes of th~ former and dimlnat~ the causes of the
Iatt~r. It is within this contat Wt oncnnploys the inmumena oflmowl
edge. and on~ does so in ol'dcr to gain knowled~ of those instl11lOental
objects (pr.mtytt) Wt will ~nabl~ on~ to obain happint:Sl and avoid $Uf.
fering, An impomnt corollary of this claim is that if an instrument of
lmowlMV iJ: f1~n.rily u~ wirhin [he eo nr~l[( of:lo pu~ , then an
ins(lum~nt ofknowltd~ must result in a Jamni.uumgnition-i,c,. ont:
in a propositional form , such as "This is a au.sc of happiness." Without
IUch dctumin:lotc contcnt, thc cognition could not moriVllltc and guide
action. as Uddyoalwa would have: it do,
But is purpose truly a nmllT] f.aaor in this process an ont: not simply employ lOme means of lcnowlcdse-ucb U:Io form:a.llogi<:-dur i. nor
tied to any purpose? In this regard, Uddyotabra remarla:

Also. it is incorrect to claim that purpose is not a contributing

faaor in reasoning (nJii14nl.)' Incked. thought divorcM from
purpose is not a contributing faaor in reasoning. In contrast,
ptlrpcKC is the ,""",?,conuibuang f:.ewr (p,.UJM1UlIit") for the
procas of invC!nig:arion (pAri~viJJ,j), bec:luse the p rocess of
investigation is rooted in the purpose that it serva:."

By claiming that the

~proccss

of investigation" (i.e., the application of

instruments of knowledge) is rooted in the purpose toward which onc
mives, Uddyotakan. points to the prychologism within diKOUrK on
,,..,,u!M- If. penon baa no purpox: in pining knowledge of lOme object,
then ~ if that object is available to some instrument of knowledge, she
wiU flO( cogniu: it precisely bcausc dtc has no reason to do so: me Iacb the
purpose or motivation mat is a neccssary fxtor in the knowing process.
Although Uddyotalon and his kilo,," Naiyiyilw arc perhaps the dearesc in their analysis of purpose, me same principle appean to be shared by
m(N:t of Dbarmakini'a fellow Pramil)a Theorisu, Pralasc:apida. for c:am-

68 NY (m ) _NSI.I.1<f:

,...,;~ ~.oip.,.,.. ~~ ..."J"Ih-.7i HMJ..";11 -H'

", 1M "~Iip'" jli I ~ no~.,.

~rtU/t.tr

in.

,,,,,.,;._ ...... "",. .yffluJ

iUllto*

.,s

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMA"IRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

pie, does no( ofkr anything approaching Uddyocakara's analysis of purpose;" but at the very ouun of his tcxt he makes it dear that the knowIcdgc
of rea.litythat oneobwlU through a means oflmowledge does indeed serve
a sp:ifie purpose:: it enablrs one to obtain spirirual. liberation."
In Kumirila's philosophy ali wdl, purpose figures prominendy as a
fnlui~ment of knowledge. It is true, of course, that Kumirila's main conttrn is with the purpose that a trealise embodies, but this is merdy a rUla:[ion of tM f.act tim, for him, the only [rue means of obtaining spirirually
relevant knowledge;ltt "te:Xfs": namdy, the Vtd4.r thcmsdves. 71 This point
of view, however. doc:5 nOf prevent him from commenting t"nqucndy on
Inc impornancc of purpose. ali wncn nc remarks:
Even a fool doc:5 not act without being directed toward a purpoK. If he we~ [0 act in that fashion , what would he nced his
intellect for?n
A wilh Naiyiyilw. Kumirila ties purpose with action. One acts so ali to

obtain a purpose. and the role of knowledge is 10 enable 011(: to determine

both the purpose and the means [ 0 Dixaining it. We find much the same
sentiment in Dharmaki"tti's ph ilosophy. but in his cue, purpose takes on a
distinctive role in the determination of what COnstiNteJ an ilUtrumcnt of
knowledge. That distinCtive role is indicated by his usc of the term
arth41tri]i.. Below. we will have an opporrunity 10 examine this lerm and its
meaning in Dharmwtti's philosophy, but here we can note that one ofia
meanings is simply the accomplishment" (Irriyd) of a "goal" (arth.), or
what I call tdie function ." Of course. for Dharmaldni to speak in these:
[erRU is nothing new. The commenu cited above dearly suggest that
Uddyotalcm. also $2W efficacy ali a crucial component of knowlcdgc.." In
69 His two IUCI ofd~ In m

"-for'" in PDS (1S4 and p6'J ~ &r &on. helpf1U.

~~r't~+I1r

700:PD51: ....,......

....".

AJthouch lhc meana of obtainina this knowkdcr

Mj* ....".urltlllljU_'!'''~
coma from !~ 8 D/w,.. nunifC:sco:d

Ihroup lhc ill.jllRl:tions 01 the: Locd(I/N,..u,..~ tiJMndJ ~ on .raWtapida" ""m!I tha! [)N".. (or. moft
ptopc:. l, opnki,,&> lhc matd _ UMS 10 obWn IcnowIecIp- ihroup tNl IN:M, tj . ;' iudf'

..-!'14

~,

71a

.OW( ......... !)-....).

noW. ,.",_Jtti4i.,.,.rihJ.. ss:

,..w-

,. .,uiJ m'lrIi".""...,. iii". ~ H.

_~

-.ttl. .,., ..",.",. f ...... ....

73 Indml u Halbha: Iw nod (1991:7'0). Udd)'Vl2bn. and lid (dkIw NaiyirikM abo wed

PRAMA~A T HEORY: DH ARMAKlilTl 'S COf'lCEPTUAL CONTEXT

-49

Oharmaldrti's philosophy, h~r, IITthahiyd is not rmrdyan aspect of

knowledge: it is. from at lean o ne penpective. me prindpal criteri on in m c
detennination of some cognition as an instance of knowledge. This may
givt sorm readers visions of a preoocious pr2&marism predating Peirce by
more than a millcnnium. but this imctpretation would bt: ovtrsating the
cue. Instead. we need only note that. while most PramiJ:la Theorisu feengni-uod ~ impon:2rlU; of purpous :l Ind gnall in the process of knowing.
Olwmakini iJ willing to place a much stronger emphasis on goals than
any of his conremporarlcs or principll opponenu.

1." Points ofDiwrgmct: Tht Action and Agmt

Up to this point, we havt aamined certain common assumptions and concepts shared by most Pramilp. Theorists in rdation to the instruments of
lmowkdge and the irutrumenDi objeru known thereby. When we e;um ine the remaining two aspectS of the knowing pf('l('ttS i.e. prllmiti (the
aerion of knowing through an innrument ofknowledgc) and prilNtr (the
2r t of mu :w:tion}--~ lind much leu 2gl?CfTlent among t~ thi nk~.
In ~ to pr.",iti., me "action of Imowing" o r Imowled~t th2t
raulu from employing an instrumctlt of knowledge:. there is considerable
diRgrmcnt bmYtm Olwmakini and his opponenu. This disagrffincnt
focuses on two key issues: lim, is the action (kriy4) of knowing dinina
from iu other aspects. cspeci.illy the instrument (laM!"')? Second. if acrion
and irutrurmnt are distinct. do they stand in a causal relation. such that
me instrument is the cause :md the xtton il the eIkct? The Bnhmanical
thinkers to whom Olwmakini appean to aUude-the unknown SiJ!lkhya
author of the yWitlipiu, the V~ib Pramtapida. the Naiy.1yib Uddyotakara.. and the Mimi'!"lWa Kumirila-generally claim dut action and
ifUtrument are distinct." although Uddyotilira does allow for their con
..ergcncc in certain cues." These philosophen also gener.dly daim that the
rd2tio n lw:rwu:n the :ocrion 2nd inJfrnmem i$ OIu~ l ; Ihty do nOl ,

h~f.

agree on how that causal process OpeDtei. Nevenhdcu. sintt the action of

tb. mm ~ Fran<;Q (1m:66) maka

~ WIM'

obtcnation.

74 5 YO (Is-I), POS (J.4)- 14S), NV (I$-u .J NSI.I.I). ~ Sv (""""~147-I JI;

~ ....761.

5, for c:QIIIpk, NY (a,).

SO

FOUNDATION S O F DHARMAKIRTl 'S PHILOSOPHY

knowing is in most ClSCS considered the result of the instrument, it is known

as the pfllm#~pJu'--rhe -effect of me instrument" or - insrrument:lll
effect." Thw, for rh~ phiJosophen, pra",iti comes to mean the knowledge th:u results from the functioning of an instrument ofknowlcdge.
In contraSt (0 this position, Dhannakini follows the lcul of his predecmor D~ and rejects;my actual difference between the instrument;md
the dkct; henee, he also denies any causal relation befwcen them. This
eomc:s to be: one of the hallmarks of Buddhiu PDmil),a Theory: m:l.t the
alleged -effccr:- of the inruument's function is nothing but the instrument

ioo. ...
As fo r prllm4rr, the -agent" of knowing, the BrahmOUlic:al thinken

(0

whom Dharmalcini alludes identify it with:ll self (limu:1I)or, in the case of

the Sirpkhya. :IIumor of YllkMipik4, with the Penon {P1ln4f4).71 This issue
rcceiva varying degrees of :l.nention from Dlwmakirti's clostSt intcrlocuton, Uddyocilir.t being the most extensive in his remarks." Nevertheless,
although all these: Brahm:llnical philosophen discuss the agmt as itmll" (or
pllt14f6), they disagree considerably on their interprct:lltions.
lbc diVtt1ity of opinion eoncnning the 1lmu:1I or pllr'llfll as the agent
may hdp expla.in the F..a thaI Dharmalcirri doe5 not uaay any dirca refuution of this notion. But ~n without :II direct reruution of:in Iltmll" or
pllt14f6 as the agent, it is dear that Dharmakini collapses the gramm:uical
category of agent (prllPUirrJ in me process of knowing into the category of
the action (pr"",itiJ, the -rcsulunt" knowtcdge. This follows from the uhim:l.te identity that he assertS of the action/instrUment (lrriyilkllrll!",) relation in all cases: if me categories of action and instrument are unre;al, the
reality of the agent also becomes untenable. For Dharmakini , this also
means dU(, :l.t the highest level of analysis, the rcality of even the instrumenwobject is ultimatdy reducible to the instrument itself."

76 In ~'. work. chc ultinwc idcntiry of !Tt'''''~ and ,nmtili' '''''''!'i9f.d" is di..
CIIDed II in PSV .J PSI.I.Icd- IO (Halloo 1j/6lh8-19; d . Hlnori'. not:5, I.U-67,
PP.9]-I07). Dtwmaklni diJcuaell the AIM \auc II ICYetaI painu, lhe moa Alient
PV).}II-}19 and PVHH-})9. Se... chapccr .. (16IR).

~ for aampIc. PDS (141-141),

bans

SV (~..u...7) and YO (Ill-IU).

78 Stt NY <697-n:} UNS}.1.I-17). lJddyobkan.'. lcnpr ~ on U-fI ao:nWly

cncOO. Myond NSU .17, but chc portion rckrmllO here lOt"" chc (OfT of the: di Kl lllioo.

7'J For IrtdI of analysU, _ chapter 1 (s,ff). TIw; moo: impoltlnl toUKG for me reduction
ot .... ~ .... oIo;.a ... "... ................. ..... PV'. ~I)-a-I f and PV,.~J1O. t d* , dolt in chapccr .. (,aff).

PRAM: Ar;.rA T HEO RY, DKARMAKI RT r S CONCEPTUAL CONT EXT

SI

1.5 Summllty
Since me main purpose of mu chaptet Uto sketch some of me more salient
aspects ofDharmwni's conceptual contat, let us conclude by rd[e(';uing
some of me notions widely sham! by Pram~a Th)ruu. Refra.hing our
memory here wiU aMi us in our endeavors bdow.
The main concern of I'ramil)a Throry is the investigation of the proper
mcaru or irutrumenu (pr.m4!fA) of obaining knowkdgc. 1M act (Itriytl)
of having such knowkdge may be divided into four componenu;
pr.m4!'A (tht: ilUuumenc or means), prllWU}il (me object), prllmJItr (the:
agent), and prII,"itj (the: action or knowledge-cvent iudf).
In lenni of tho!' inrumo!'nt!: ofknowlM~ . nn.rly aU Pr:uni.r)a Th~ri$t!:
accept III u4/I two kinds-perr.eptwl awauncss (pr.~) and infer-

entt (."lItNiNl).

Pr-.ml~a

Theorisu share ~eral nOlions aboul perceptual awart:ncss.

including; the central role of sensory contaCt (j""~,,,,;It.~): the
vividnCD of perceptxm; and the varieties of error. especially thOle caused
by physical defectS.

In rcgan:lto inference, these th~rub marc a large: number of meories,

including the basic suuaure of an infc:rcnct (MS is P because EI and the
types of rcluions among mese (emu (Sub;oa, Predicate, and EvKience)
that must pertain in order for an inkrtntw knowkdge-nent to occur.
In terms of oncology, one centraJ point of :agxee:mC:nt U that any real (1II1)
thing is a knowable ming (jlkyll). and that c:very knowable thing is (or
an be) an instrumental object {J1'lI'"9"}.
Ontologically. a "'realM thing must :We be simple (tit.): it is a singular,
panlC$$ unit. The affirmation of singularity also leads to an importalll
issue that distinguuhes Dharmakini', thought, namely, his insistence:
that a . imple encity cannoc be dinribuced oVo!'r o mer .imple enc.iria.

For all P~a Theomu, purpose {prllJ'flilltlA} forms a cenn'al contat

for ;ill acts of knowing.
Finally, to dose mis chaptet, we should note mat by seeing Dharmakirti's
work within the contat of the: concepts and assumptions mat he shared
with Br.Uunani.c:a1

p~ ~rUu,......, a n moO'\l!

dewiy uncIernand 10.....

ofhis philosophical choices. OUI undcrsttnding is especially e:nIunced if we

Sl.

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAIlMAKIIITI 'S PHILOSOPHY

inttrprct: Dharmakirti as standing in rwo traditions; on WOrK hand, he: is

a Buddhist philosopher, but on the other, he is engaged in intertC'Xruai.
intert"raditionaJ discourse on prtl1M!'4 Iu a Buddhin, Dharrnaldrti'. soteriology commiu him to a form of antirealism, but as a PramiJ:la 1Reorist.
Dharmakirti must uphold some we claims, including the uscnion that
at least percqnion and infttcncc give us accurate Icnowledgc of the world.
Thest: rwo commitmenu--the commitment to critique realism and the
commitmem to defend the usefulness of pelccption and inference u trustworthy sourot'S of Icnowtedgo--are often in rc:nsion. We have noted. for
example. that Dh.arm.:akirti's brand of antirealism requires a rejection of
disrributed entities, while the prn'ailing South lui.an Prama..:a Theories of
his time plUumed conlmonsensc, duuibuted emities as the objeca of perception and inference. Thc:sc issues point to ~ topic of the following chap..
tel', tumdy, the ontology that we find in Dharmakirti'. works.

Dharmakirti's Method and Ontology

H lN WI. EX.UoIIN.l

Dharmakirti's ontology. we immediatdy

encounter a problem: DharmalUrti appears to emptoy ",flilipk

and C\'m w-,.nbkontologies. It is only by undemanding how
this multiplicity ~rves his rhetOrical and prulosopnical mttbod mat wt can
hope to avoid a dismWivc and incompltlc interpretation of IW thoUsflt.
Hence, we will 6rst discuss mal method, and with that diV1!f,ion in twwl.
we will then study the dct:a.ils of his ontology.

Dharmakirti employs a philosophical method that tw caUKd considttablc

confusion among his interprnen. In shon. M employs more than OM 1)'1""
lcmatic description of reality. and it #/~/ln that these descriptions are
muruaUy conuadictory. N~eu. ~ descriptions itt not in fact contradictory bcc:ausc they arc not applied :1.1 the same level of discowx;
irutcad, they fill into a hierarchy of d.iKo\lJ'$Cl-wftar San McOinrock Iw
calkd a sliding scak of analysis"-wht mort accur.lltc dcscriptiow of
what we pelttiVC and dUnk supmcde less accunte ones,' Why would one
ever employ a less accurate description ~ The gcnen.l Buddhist answer is
that in some cues a lest accurate description is didaaic:ally or JOCcriologj-

cally prefuablc.. For Dharmakirti. the purpose of composing philosophiaJ

U'f"3ri"" is [0 dimirultc confusion. 0 .... i,lIy me fundamenaJ spiriwal ignoI Mc.<linmdr. (UIOd'....r'), in brr dirmicr, o(~'.1houpIt. buikk OC'I~'
notion ofDlwmaldni'. -.-ndint; a:aIo: of anaIy.i&.' ~ _
thaI dw: choOco: here j,
....." ~. _ oM. ii:>cu- Uf"'" bod. d.e .. ..I. , """ ...... dw ~ol aieo .....
....dI iINa h",..lj,,,. _ 104).

"

S4

FO UNDAT IONS OF DHAut AKIII..TI 'S PHILOSO PHY

rance: (allidyi) mal pc:rperuues sWftring.' BU[ a ueuiS(: that aceeds the
abilities of its audiCDct would not ~move their confwion; hence:, a composition that is superior in its anaJytical accuracy may be infirior soteriologically in relation to a particular audience.
The notion of a sliding scale of philosophical views is found in numerow 50Urccs before DharmaJdrti'. time. and it was particularly imporwu to
Mahayana thinkers. Early Mwyinists such as Nigirjuna dearly wished to
idcmify tbenudves as Buddhists, but they also sought to introduce new
views or descriptions of realiry that they considered to be more accurate
than those promulgated previously. The problem is that. if a Mahayinist
supplants earlier views with allegcdly more accurate ones, other Buddhists
might argue that the Mwyinist is effectively ~jecting the Buddhist tradition as a whole. The solution to this problem is to accept earlier views provisionally: although they may be inaccur:lte in some regards. these views or
descriptions help beings to free themsdves from lheir confusion. That is.
if deeply confused beings were presemed with only the most accurale
descriptions of reality, mey would reject them OUt of hand. since: those
descriptions are 50 countcnntuitive as to seem prepo,nerous [0 most ordinary persons. Hmo:-. to be most dkaive, Buddhist teachings should be tailored to the audience at hand. In sud! conlan, more acussible descriptions
may be caught. if they help beings to eliminate at least 50me of their erroneous beliefs.'
2 For tIk JIO'ilion Uw liM: putpoK of a ualiK iI to dispd oonfuaion. _ PVLsb (Uur.1fI
"""'-i_..). Confwion (",.J,c) ill aplicidy idmcificd .. ir;nonnec It PVI. lll.-UJ I.!Id
PVSV .J ril. (G:III.IIft), ...bot it ill also apWntd thaI i&oorancz ill the- und.trlyinsaUlt of

...-...

3 Nipj ...... whom I take 10 bot liM: au~ of the /WJtbJi (_ WWe.. lOOJ.), ..as prolNo.
blr liM: lira to o;kfmd an apli(il hio:nrchr of news in Il)'IInnatic oontat.. Sec his RAnwINil
(4.6?....,,) and MMK (IU). Candra1rJI1i '. commentary on MMKJI ,6 ("'-'ItU,..w.,S6-)6)) ;" I nUnc of qoocuiont dw. ht IlKS to dtfmd dlil mahoci. In Jht ~ fTom
/lMJobJi mmDoncd MR. il
dear WI NlprjIaN ill COIMJucd with ~fC:Idg, apr...: liM:
MahlJ'inL 'Tbt; WI: kw __ of lht K'Clion Itt' wonh quocinl in d>eir wumr:

il .

A pmmuian will make _

.ndmts ~ t'CfI the: alphabft. I..ihwik, Iht Bud
dha taua;hl Jht Dharma in acoord with .... dOOpIa' .bilitia.. The Otwma ht COughl
10 II)rN: illi:w liM: putpc* of ROppiIll ntpuYity. TO~. ;1 illimalal the: pracria
of vinuc. And to _
. ht CO.,.n1 one that. ill: baed upoo dual,,,,, H e couchl to 101M
I Dharma flOC bued. on dual,!),. And to II kw, he lIushl a ptOfound DIunna diu In
riM. liM: timid; its Q' lera ill anptincu Ind mmpMAon. and il illhc mc:IlII to IIwn
awahnin" Hena, !be wix JhouLd a:uc to dcspUc the: MIIhl~ and thty should
b.o< ....'" ..-.. f.ithful ..............i ........, """"rk<" ,...""",,ina;. (14m ' Ii 4-~"""
ttanI. in Dunne and McOirllock 199T-7I ). fJouIMi... wi; '~mr!,,~,,; ,-:t !.)ltl

DHARMAKII.TI'S METHOD AND ONTO LOG Y

"
Mahayina thinkm ddend this approach by claiming that the buddhas
themselves have employed it as a rdJl:Ction of their skill in mean?
("~A.J.r~)--dtcir ability to speak or behave in a F.uhion that will be
most beneficial for particuw beings at :I. particular time and place.' In thiJ
regard. Dharmakitti speW of the buddhas as being like d~hants who shut
one qe. This mm.phor t:akes :advantage of the bet that an elephant's eyes
:l.re loc:arM on the sides of its had; henet. if an d~ham doses one eye. she
will not see anything on that side. Likewise. almougb the buddhas have
realized me uhimate narnre of things. mey -dose one eye~ to mat ultimate
reality when teaching beings. because ordinary ~rsons (p.nhAliA1IIl.
ArwltJ4r1irr) annot see the world in mat fashio n.'
Following the pandigm of skill in means, DharrtWtirti's philosophy
eme~ from a hien.n:hy of views in which. as Dreyfus norlS. -more com
monsensical views are subsumed by more critical but more c.ounterinnUtM
views.... This hierarchy amounts to a succmive series of approximations
that draw CV'Ct doser to the most accurate possible description. In each case,
the inaccuracy of a description stems from its origin in an erronrous belief

bJJJN

'..u,14lhJ ~ ..~...,. ,.~_". H ~

1.,"'--".

1"'1 ' ,,;,u~ / ~'~ ' UI;"'''-!r ~iJ~ttiIri"M H~.

_t/tqbftp; oMinf1!'~ /Ri~zWp""1!'~~_

_,.i'riiU...,.1I

Hi'; o.J'.,_~~,~ / "

IJdrUJnjll/t~~

(}bhn 1911.:111-0)0)].

41n opnki",of HI' L.~ I . to ~~ "'""'" of ~ Imn in m. Mahiylna. esprci&Uy in V,.;,1I{)w Iiln'U. ~ Blftl (1991.1 arsuea for. sliBhdy differmo IIAfIt sp:illc fO lhe

Mitt bY"" of ..... ~ ~ __w. Ju P)'" Iua poin ........... . M ~ n-... of

aiIori"lone', n:ao:b.i"l 10 W abiJjUc,: of bcinp oo:aus tbl'O\lghoul $UCb .u1Rl, w best
known aampk beinS lbe "burnint; houK" mnaphor of ,he ~",..,..~ri" (Pyc
,ns:l-'l, )7-41). 11Ie norian of
a mndy a mana fO an end ia a1Jady pt&
em ill arty Imlerial. an obYiow example bc:in& 11K snake and M mcaphon of w AI.

""""'U.."".

l'll"/",_".,{M.jfoi_,.;.",. n :1.17-U9)
5

a. DftyfuI (1997-104). Tbr rdt'nOl Pl'1~ in Dhamuklrti', WOI'k ia PVJ.u I-1.I9:

The uhilmlt: n.al\m of dw copiti...e OOOIUlI (~) in paption ia IWII known by
tbooo:
n.oon iJ no< 1Up<UPf bec:a_ it iJ impoaibk
for than 10 upe.ie_ it
r
wiIhoul W ~ ("~ of JUb;ea and ob;=. 11Ie,b...... 11K bwIcDw. pins w
ullimale (..,n,;~ dolo. one ~ lin an dephanl and plOpaplt: dvotia:
duo involve enanaJ objKu merely ill auord with woridIy conceptions. [~"""',
w.mM
~ui[l / _MtnWt/ """ . " . ~ ;I.... ,,;,z.~ /I
"fdqi_ltIItIrWi/I.".,., p jMiM;z.UM I itNJ6,!, 1n4+,M,.i". ~,...

on-

CII"

,,,.,..ttl.

6 Orryb (1997:104).

S6

FOUND AT IONS O F DHARMAKI RTI 'S PHILOS OPHY

(JIIP.rillljfU1M). whereby something that is non-x is believed to be x

(lIus",i'!fl utdplllM).' It is supersed~ by a dtJCJiption that eliminates

thOK errors, but which nuy itself nill contain inaa:uracics. ~tickv2, p~
ably a comemporary of Dharmakini, describes such a progression in this
fashion :

In IhiJ regard, it is observed that then: art two kinds of pefJORS,

the spiritual ac:kpt (yor;i~) and the ordinary person. Among these,
the: orcfuwy person is muted by the JOlin.. And J'l'tins art muted
by s"a'"sivdy mon: advanctd JOtins through a distinaivc qualif)' of their understanding.'

Although Dharmakini himself ncvrr cxplicidy states his hKnrc:hy of views.

it is dear that he is following a model much like: Sinridcva's, and in examining the details of the progressive stages of analysis, we nuy ckrivc the following tirnplificd hiuarchy from his tau and early commmtarors:'
I.

1'1N- &litfi o/OrrJ;Nlry Pnw1U: The most inaccurate descrip-

tioru of ra.liry stem from ilncmptl ill Prc#rvinl the naive bd~

of ordinary persons.It The most problematic belief is the notion

Nt things composed of spatiotemporal components somehow
7 DlwmakIrti anployt 1M ph~ . _i'!fJ ~ at PVin.l..lc.. Thill a..d other ....::b
pbtue:I piOyidt Kalaln pua it. "~rimebonored ddWtion of error in India b94-u,j.
Oil 6c:cmcJ1t1 abouc rhiaddin.irion. when one inqui... into 1M buU for ~error. For
I>IwmWni conotpnW urorlftlWl copition ilOM thai "aupuimpota" (_
II~' type
.,(~ unu> . . ubj<n ...... Oua """ On r.......... u.... r~'7 (_ .......... .,."
a..d alto PVSV MPVI., I " b; G:.+M1). SolIdo APa phlIo.ophc:n &om ochu rndi .......
often IIIWDC aNI cmM" iI bucd upon lUll similari'1 c:orIMilvtcd br uniualW+-1ocacion. in ipKJt and Iinx hill tomdIooo bn miIconnniocci. For dw: variow approachu.. _
Sdunitha_ (l96s) mcI. Frv.oo (1914).
to

I 8C.A ~)-43Ir.

u_"J.N/JM tIn!-,.,.'n

"'4yllr U 'f,('r.llrJlli~"';_
. ~ . r;.-J.

.... Iiw P- of I.'.. _

,.,.., _

~ 1.

..H

" W
NOfC dIac Pnj6ibrunati pro-

, Wh ik Dhannakll1i doeIlIOI. aplJcidy In lhac Irvds. ~ and ~

dhi do offu dear diftsionJ, apnrially 01 rb.. dUrd and fourth Inda.. For. liM cumpk. ICC
~ I"NIMion ofPV)..I94-1.l.4 in dw ~
10 Her"!'. "'7 UK ofrhc lo:mI "ordilUlJ~" u manl lO rdka apiaII71M ~
.,oolpasliH r onc who u "-'.rcd"). whlch implic:l1IOI. only a belt of ioaipl inlO reiIy. bul a a:n:a.in reUnntt IO aud! insi&hL Buddhia thinkcn ohm ~ bel_bell dw
WK~cd bdicCo of o..i;""'7 pc_ A<><I the ..--... clobon.G bdlcE. or ohcon-.;-; .....
bul 81 !he DIM tinw. cmain mdidoN of dIoupIl. apnrilUy !he Nyl)'l a>d V,; , I' b an:

OHARMAKIIlTI 'S ME.T HOD AND ONTO l OCY

crist in dininction Flom those components. In philosophical

ckbate:. the paradigmadc case of dtis commonsense beUtf is the

notion of a "whole:" (lIWl]tlvi1l) that exists sqnnte: From ia pans.
For IOte:riologica.l purposes. the most important Form of this
belief is ut~ri. according [0 which me:re: aisa an lnMn
or absolutt self mat. while Fully autonomous. is somehow related
to or reliding with in r.ho!' connituo!'flu of rho!' mind and body. All

Buddhist philosophcn seck to eliminate ullki:J'Uir!# and any

beliefs, such as the notion of a whole, that an: corollaries of it.
Hence, this Icvd of description is ncve:r accepted. even proviIionaUy, by any South Asian Buddhist philosopher. It is mentioned only so as 10 refute il. "

1M AbhitJhll/7/fll Typo~; One: can be dissuaded from the

belief that some thinp trulyaist in distinction From their $pati()(emporai constituena by learning more accurate descriptions.
According to these dcscriptioru, which we will ~r to as the
..Abhidharma typology." when we speak of things such as wholes
1.

o r th~ liNfUl". we are j us~ applying nama ~o wha~ are a.c:rualIy

bu.ndla ofin-cducib1~ m~taI and physical dements
At

r,u"" .....).

least three basic ClTOrs. howcvtt, pe:nist in rhcsc ckscriprions: a)

some demcna, such as colors, are: said [0 ha~ spatial atcnsioni
b) some clcmcntl aJ'C' thought 10 ha~ ttmponl cxtcruion (nhin);
and c) the dementi arc rcpcatable-i.c., they require: conceptu.al

a:tcnaion, wch that aU earth patticles, For cumplc.

ha~

some

objeaivc Am~eu that enables one to ickncify them aU as cuch

--. to be rooced

itllhote: uncbbomcd, CO!IUIMXIKIIIC bdic6 dw BuddhiIu take to br; mit-

Weal. See Drqfua U99T-SI-f9).

II ~ mist\! br; wnpced 10 c:onsidu !he olt.ma!ipv:d ViWputrip.;l .. an uccphoP, bul
only if _ ......,toeq...
v''-wid! ~ s...:n Buddhia dUnkcn. 1,4 C'd , . .oduiCUCid
ds.mucha 10 br; re;e.:w,. ~"and InrfiJtI. To
KnIC: 01 d>ci, ~ ~
in dIia ~contidcr.n.- __ of praiIo: 10 the B.ddhaeom~ bran unk~ a ...... ~

re'

When the mlnd CDnmiru die _ _ ", am" (4: . +f.(/. the condouicy olbinN will
noc br; f*ified. "' am" doc. noc IcaC the bean what chm: iI bdid" in the rdf. And
anor no otbcJ rcac:hcr in the world ill proponcnr ofldi'm
theft iI no pull otbcJ
dwI)'DIItvicw, theWrJIOpa. (d'7+ m _
f .IL.
... U-'!"Jllii! M y:1tb.I.w.n.,.,..~" .... 1tIlJIlfl n ."".; Ibu j.tpti
URi
. .......,. 16 / - , . . M IJ~_-'''_IIl.oIlZU+ III . (II.cuHded in

u,..

Ydomim', .tWA

fhk~k,cotdJw.;

""".1119).

Sl

FO UNDATI O NS OF DHAI.MAKlItTI"$ PHILO SO PH Y

particles. For Dharmakirti. th~ Abhidharma rypoIogy is best representN. by Vasuba.ndhu's presentation of th~ Sarvastivada rypoI.
ogy in the AhhUiJM~ Although Dharmakirti oa:asionally
employs the typology of the AbhitJhal'mA/toU, he critiques the
ontology that it presupposes. II

}. "ExtrnuJ ik.Jim. ~-tJx TINory ofExt""'" ThilltJ tIS UIIUJw.

MoftlU1UlUJ P~In: One can be weaned of the erroneous bdief
in spatial, temporal. or conceprual extension by demorutraring
that only paniculan. which lack all such extension. truly aist.
The belief in spatial atmsion arises from a miJa>ru{ruai of {he
mation between the mental image that appcan: in a perceptual
consdousneu and the entities tNt cause: that image. The belief
in t~mporal e:x~nsion is an ~rror that ocxurs due to misconstruing a quick SUCCC$Sion of diKrere momena in which the previow moment causes the nat moment in a causal continuum. AJ
for conceprual extension, the appattnt sameness implicit in our
ability to identify any things as the 5afTle in kind or IlarufC' is just
subjectively constructed on the basis of the observed causal charaaerisria of disaae: particulan. OI"lC' erroneous belief remains in
this description: mat any form of atra-mental ma[(er--cv~n
infinitesimal paniclcs-can resist a mereological analysis. Later
commentatOrs catled this level ()f description the "Sautrintibviev.r. Howevtt. me c:adiest commentators. Devendrabuddhi and
~akyabuddhi . often speak of it simply as the vlev.r that asscns
that thert: arc entities-most notably the objectS of ptteepciontbat aist aternal to any mind (INihyirtlulJl1J.). Along tbese
lines, 'N'C wiU reftt to tbis position as MExternal Realism." This
viewpoint is the one most ofTen adopted by Dharmakirri. appar-

12 The AMj'b...hLr (AI() p..-nQ a SanIairida.,y". (a1lhouch AKBn. VuulMndh ...,

oom c:ommcnwy. include. potiriona idallitlcd u Sa"'~ . Dtwtnoldrli rJen to thor
Abbidhanno I}poiog U. - . I o;on(CQL In doe DOntca ol~.1Or cumpic:. he aU..da
to Vuub&ndhu.diK"uion inAKBh. Hrft hil conam with tIw cypoIog it indicated by hit
dfwn 10 danonItnk thai tIw oquation 01 ~ ...... and .wy. need no!: COGuadiet
whttc IIKh an ~tion iI no!:
cspIic:ic (_
PVSV ..
PVI.1lJ- '11); _ a1J1) PVL1,,..I}6ab. 115O""116b. 119-1~. 191, and 19kd-19hb). ln addi
tion. Dhannakini abo usa thc:Abbidbarmo.,..an lOr the dulifiation oiborh...mw and
..... __ u.I ""'-co (_ r... _pIeo. PVSV ..JPVI . ' J1-'''~). Hi< ...-;.c...... olopct:ial sn.d
mnponl almaon ill daaibed below I9Iffl.

mal I'.........,..

:alWlI)'lI

..,....",11,.

DHARMAKIRTn METHOD AND ONTOLOG Y

~ntly
e2SC

bttaust: it mikes a balma betwttn depth of analysis and

"

of compreh~nsi on. l)

... Epuumic likillism-AU Entitin Ilrt Mtnul: Th~ ~rroneow

belief in lh~ exi.Sl~nce of extra-mental matt~t is eliminated
through the rnlization mal th~ subjectlobjKt duality apparent
in awan:ness ill acrually d~ 10 rhr inRt=\CII! ofignnrancr (1IuUiyd).
As such, mac duality is erroocow, and any dctCrminuions based
upon ie, such as the notion mal the cause of th~ objKtive appearance in sensory awareness is du~ to cua-mental pamda:, is also
false. Since this da:cription is noe iudfbased on any ~rroneow
bdidi, it is th~ most :lCCUl'1Ite, AU TIbetan commentators and
$Omr.la~et'

rd"C'T to miJ '"""POinl :H

the ~Yogicira- view. but the early South Asian commentatol"l
often rc:fer to it as -the view mat objects of awareness are internal - (shn bya nIInlti Jin}NI' ",,'11 ha ... IIntllrj/U:yltWiti4). Oha.rnuIoni, who refers to it as "the view
things are merdy cognitive
content- (lIijfUlprinui""w), ~mplO)" tbis view consist~ndy only
South Mian commentators

mat

in One lignifican1 ceaion of h i.

p,.,1IUl~wl"r;Jr...

To avoid the

conR:llion ofOlurmakirti'. p~nclI!ion with owr philO5Ophirt

identified as Yogicira," we will rc:fcr to this position as -EpiJtemie Idealism,""

13 Fill' J lucid and rcfrahin& approach to dw; term -rnIi$m,- teo: ConCOI (1000), In .ala"
naI R.caIiNn, cbf Icnn -rcaliwn" mm:;we to cbf local 00""''''' .1 c:omnwncrl! Wt lOme peruptu.al objtJ c:Ut1 oulliOc the mind. Hena, when rpaItin& from thil pt:!$ptiV1:
Dlwmaldrri CItI be. -ralia" about am _mmw tbinp: and yn I "roominaliR" in that hoe
~;ea. the a.iunI g(

u.niYnWll. Sumc lNy claim mal _ ahouId jUlI UK the Icm\

"s"lIuinlika," .... ich 1M a.rIy COnIlIlmtilOf ~ docI we 00 I< Ic.t _ O<;CIIDon (u9b), 8m wine "Swuilllika" in dW Whio.:wI CItI lad Ig both hiMora! and philoIOphiaI coaf'uaioa. In a hiauric:al c:onteu, me Ierm INy ubIcun:!he c:ompla td.otioruhip
anxK\I dvtt diIIina bnnds ul ~t: the aplicidy Swutntib.- thcoria aptewd in
VuubandhU'lAlCBh, the ~ RcaliIc Ihcwiag(Dlwmakirri 'I". ' [)f Su~pta,
and Dtwmakitti', own bcerrqJ RaIlM dxoria.ln.bun, it lNIy be hewimaIJy Ilnwilc to
cquarc -Sautdntib- with all puII-Vuubandhll F..amW ReaIiam (1J/s;JtIl riM.wMJ, eV1:D if dw
&tcmaI Ralian if qualified all 1\01 SarriWrida and noc Madhyamaka. TItii bc:k ulhiaOfical datiry ~ 1M pocmti..al lOt ~ c:onfwion, lOt if Eacmal RaIism annat be caoiIy ~_cd wiIb aplio;idy SaUlrIn.iIta ~ an inlnpl'mltioo g( DtwmaIdrti'I
&tcmal RaIiIt qumma in lermt g{ Sauninrib phiboph;w moQnUonJ will be mil!cadi,... II iI ~ IW thiI teaJ(ltt that bo:Kh ~ and Sik,.abuddhi dearly

p.Jcr!he term
14 Hm:, dw;

ICt'Ill

"qmmnic" iI meant to reinforce dw; nocion WI DhmnaJdrti'l critique

60

FO UNDATIONS O F DHAi.MAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

AJ I have mentioned earlier, me aplicit pUrpoK of Dharmakirti's philosopby is to free beings from suffering. and wben we mate his IOteriology
with me hierarchy of views disO'swd above. we can ICC how soteriological
mnurns inform Dharmakini's philosophical method. On Dharm.aJonj's
view, sufft:ring arises from .w:Lf<linging (i~). a disposition cawed by
wkiJtuir!!i. me belief that one's psychopbysical aggregateS (&4ndhtt) :m the
Iocw of an IitmAn or absolute: sclf that aisu above and beyond mOK aggre-p[CS. Thus, to diminate suffering. one must diminate sdf<linging. and to
diminate sdf<linging. one must diminate SIltU,.ar!!i 1)
For Dharma.ldrti, when one speaks of SIltlrlJ4d.,.,p, one is actually speak-

of CllD-mcnw mtitia an- in dx molal of ~l= n ill dill _ know in pe,,:cp-tion (I admil m. "Epismnic: ldc:aJiIm- il llOII'IC..na1
~ bur it is me_
sua
U>d IaA mjdr.!i .. twminoios:ra'llibbk). l:>IwmUirti anployl dUl Yiorwin hill
knghy di...;o., of tM inruwncnw dfea ~II me end oflbe IhUd chapen,
farti,. wim tM pro&opc at 1<).4If. Conamin& the
ti"II,. __ ...

,i,..,

n
.
$ikyabuddhi

(- .~ .
w6as. Vinitadeva &lao

ram.,,,,. ....

LUa

it in ~ pbca; uamplai include "Jt;oNJ and "Jt

u.eet the' term ~I>tndy (~IM:~. The: Sanskril -..rj"",... 54 iI a. rMj. The cquhoalcnl term -..rj~ 0C0ln in ~
(:uo.,!l '" which..., -..Id ~ me libnan tq1.linkn, "- ..... -... ~~~y tJ",J.:
unfortumcdy, the lalla' pM.: is COCI'Uf" in PVf (1 L4bl). N lOr ObarmaIdni'llIKof ~

Ii.....,.,..., PVinD (l66aJ- 1.).

15 Sec PVI.l1lo- U J and PVSV" cit. (G" u.ufF, ~Icd in the: appmdiV; PVa. I. ,....,Ub;
PVu "cd- ",; PV1..JO,cd- JOub. 1M mtwWm or sWi"crinl iI IWnmariud U
PV1..:u]Cd-I'~

One who bdi .u (lilcnlly, "au"] thc IClf' will always dillJ to it ,.. "I." Duo: to dUI
dillli.. Of!( WIRI for pL no. and mal minliUdu the f"aula [of tho.: dUnp mal
aft imacined to 00", pl.euuft1. Seana:!hoIe dUnes .. havina poUU'I'e qualidu. OM
yarN ' " them, and doinllO, _
~optiaIU" "m.iM" thoK IIXInI of ac:mmplilhins the dui,cd pIalu~ Thmfore, q ions as OM iI .1U(bed '0 the Ir
(bltUl1IMti~ _
wW mNin i ll wpdra. And when "'- it I noOon old, dine
if llIIXioon 0I1Mhtt. F...... thcdiJrinaion bdu&i. Jand omaCDn'Oel anxhmanand
neniotI. IJr4' ~ ~ ..mi.", iii ~ nwIM9 n mJ.b...MJq. tr1JMi
'!1~

Mrr' ~ / l"~ ,.,.~. --m UI~ ~ H __

~IIiw""'t"_,. ~ / invIr; _',.,~ ..,.,.,,;6401p1,,.nrr..

, ",.... .01.

Note thai tho: idtnUfic:aclon of,.,., fn!i .. the' f;,,~metu:al eaute 01 d-din&in& it 0ftI1
impliciL Sec, for cumpk. PV1..IJS- I)6ab:
11sc: anridol:t for u.. C&IUC: 01 RLffcrin& it QbbIitbcd by ~ the _liaI
nllllU of du, ClUK. .5uIf"ain&', ClUK iI dinPII8 ~ taka oondirioned Wnp '" iu
ob;a:u; WI dinr;in5 ;' a_cd by_'J fiDtion on the lIOliont of IeIr and miM. Tb.:
-.I;.arion of ~ wftid, motndM:u !hole notiorw. . IGpI the dinr;in&. I ~
~ "Jr,"'''''''. ''-rO:, '

........i,

1+

"t l .-woIJ1'

& ~.,.. , 4s"", "'.

+r>4-'-(r"'r4,~ U

6,

DHAR-MAKIR-TI 'S METHOD AN D ONTOLOGY

ing about ignoranc:z (avitiyti) in lemu of me primary role it plays in tbe generacion of suffering." Thus, when one elimin:ues I4JkliyaJmi, one is eliminating a form of ignorance. If we atlend carefully to Dharmakini's
approach to ignorana, we sec that on his lcx:oum ignorance is an ingrained
cogniri~ habit that imputes a unity Of sameness omo thinfrS [hal in bet
bave no such unity or sameness. Allhough Dharmakini does nOI PUI il
quite in these terms. ignorance thus amounts to tbe belief WI a re:a1 entiry
may be disuibuted (alluiw) OVtt space and/or time. 11 Dharmakini proposes
thai ~ eliminate ignorance (and, hence, 14tltiJa4r!.tt) by realiz.ing thaI its
alleged objecr-an enciry distributed over space and/or time-is unrnl. If
this interpreution is correa, then Dharmaltini's 5Oteriology rests upon a
progressively subtler critique of all d.i5tributed entilies.
If we apply Dharmalcini's .KlfC:riologial madl.":1 m (hI.": hil.":r.lrchy of Vlrwll
discussed JUSt above. we sec wtthe hierarchy reflectS the IOteriology. In
short, Dharmakini ainu (0 elevate suffering bein!? from (IJ the completely
erroneous belieh that arise from ignon.nce 10 I-4J the elimination of all
enor, which enables the elimination of all suffering. The progression from
111101-41 is characterUed by a refutation of ever subder fornu of disuibured
enr:iria, lind it corrHpondJ to a sotmological p r~ion from w seate of
an ordinary penon 10 the state of one who has attained spirirwl lii>cnlion
(_}q.). Thus, along the lines of Sintideva's nOtton of luccasively morc
refined levels of undcntanding. the scale of analysis is also a scale of progression toward spiritual perfection.
While d-.e 1MUllllfit", for moving up the scale is 5Oleriological. the mt41U
16 Dlwmakirti'l .,;xuio!otJ edUbia. ddi~ turnudopell imp!ecision dw " ..... &om
an manpc 10 aa:onunodace at laM twa dUfwm .....,.. of ddinll1l* ClIUK of suan."" ,~,
cid>cr .. ~ or .. conNaion (,.J,.), wbac both 1m)' ~ in'nprrlnl ~
(~. The e:rpIicit l'qUItioCI in qllCAion (II"~ - ",.;,. _ .v,.J ia:
KYa'll
pbas. indudin& PVUll_ll).

mack.,

"* ...

17 I but dW inlCfplmtion of ~ upon Dtwma!Wti'. npUd. aafl:mmt duo. isnorsntt q aNKXpc.wiry (PVSV .JPV'.9' n'b; G:,c:l.1O:
",~. This illUpported by 1M claim dut iponna: il
t(It.In:e of.n &,,1 .. {PV,.J.u..-c.: .."..."..".
~1f~p.o;~ /""~, ...d ..... ~ .... .Joo ..... _ _ of ... (.....u
{PVSV .JPVuw, G:lIo.1O-U; II ( . ~/ ." "uWM>lMN!J). Thc.:kat imp/aeion iI
dul Jcnonnotcan be: equated with conaptuIIIiry. 1M
ofDlwmaldrti'nxk on aNI'

u...

roa..

upcu.aliry is iu imputaUoa (,.....~ of an untal i~ (oiU,.)-moa pamcu1ar1y WI of

~ (~-omo Ihinp aJw ~ in faa umrly dQrinn (- . lOr aampk. PVI.A-70
r.nd MY .J m., tnNilled in dw: appendis;..., alao bdow, 1..4). Thc climinxOon ofisnoranc:e can mill ~ undemood all an elimination of 1M Imdrnc:y (.wlli) due 10 which one
cornpuIiidy impum AmnICa omo n";lles dw ue in faa not dw: ame. For enmpll, r<'UI
~

r.a

all <he agJCp'CI"" in

no< IM~, one COftA1I.ICI dIan .. 1hc _
dw: lingk wm - tho: ad" 10 rJn 10 dian.

by l1li"1

61

fOUN DATI ONS Of DHAlMAK I RTI' S PH ILOSOP HY

for moving up the scale is a panicular form of reasoning (pKtI) that enables
one to critique ever subder types of distributed entities_At each lcvcl, this
reasoning is used to analyze some enuties that were taken to be ultimately
existent according to the ontology of the previous level; the result of the
analysis demonnrarcs that some kinds of entities that were thought to be
ultimately existent at the prnious 1C\-eI of analysis arc found to be ,.ot ultimately existent at me next, subtler level of analysis. Generally, the entities
mistakenly thought to exin are thOK mu scc.m to be given in perception,
or in some cascs the existence of such entities is required to explain what
SttmS to be given in ~ption_ For example, at the first level of analysis.
a water-jug exisu as a whole in distinction from iu ~ fo r it seems that
when we see something that we call a ~ watcr-jug. " what we see is a single.
whole, entire thing. But when we move to the next level of analysis, we
diKovu that. in filet, all that truly exisu arc the components of what we
would call a "water-jug"; no "water-jug" exists in distinaion from these
componcots. Rawning (pin) mables one to move from the first level to
the second in that one arrives at the rtjccrion of truly existcot wholes by systematically employing a specific form of JUKU. namely. the mercological
anal~is diKuucd above. What ill most important here is that this lame
form of reasoning moves one not just from the fint to the sond level,
the way to lIN top ofllK Kak. That is, when one moves from
but indttd
one level to the next. in each case the style of argument used to aitique the
entities that were thought to exist at the lower level is the "neither-oncnor-many" analysis mat lies at me core of the critique of wholcs.
To sec how this style of rationality moves one up the scale, let us brieRy
rcsate that movemCDt. In moving from me first to the $Ond level. one
refutCl the real c:xdtence of"wholcs" and similar cotities (such as the .twum).
To do so. one argues that it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of a
whole mat is either truly distinct from or truly identical to ia parts. This
very inability to specify whether a whole is identical to or distinct from ia
pam is thought to be sufficient grounds for rejecting the existence of the
whole. In moving from the second to the third level of analysis, the paradigmatic a.sc is me universa.!, which a.ccouna fo r conceptual extension in
that it is allegedly distributed over the individuals that insWlOate it. Similar enocics include a ttmporal.ly persistent entity that is meant to be disuibuted over ia temporal instances; also included are entitics that arc
thought to be distributed over a spatial extension. Here again, the inability
to specify whether a univt':ral is idenTical to or di.snna /Tom iu insrann:ues
is sufficient grounds for rejecting the rrue existence of univcnals: the same

.u

D HAR.MAKIRTI S METHOD AN D ONTO LOG Y

6,

analysis applies to other distributM entities. mWilNs ",WIlnJis. Only unique.

mommtary. and parrlas partides and mental components rmuin. Finally.
in moving from me mird to the foum level of analysis. the inability to
specifywhnher the image in puttprion is lingular or multiple is me primary
argument against the exinentt of extra-mental objects. " In mis way. variOUi "neimer-one-nor-many argumentS, which arc pennutations of the
meroological critique of wnoles. any one all the w:ly through t~ levd.~.
The style of reasoning employM. however. is not the only continuity in
the levels. We have altcady noted that at eac:h level the entities whose reality is critiqued are pm:Udy those that were taken to be ultimatdy real at the
prrnous level of analysis. Thus. the Icvck of the.scale exhibit continuity. in
that an ontological commitmem at a prrnous level is taken to the next
kvd. with the oOt':(Ki"n thu the d~im i. IIffi""",~t the p~oull~ . but
tinJiuiat me nat level. An additional fC2turt of this continuity, however,
is that even when critiqued at a higher Icvd, .somc aspects of the omological commitment of a previous level mAJ JtiU IN m4ind, but only as contingent or conventional. For eumple. at the second level of analysis (me
Abhidhamu typology) the existence of a water-jug will still be allowed. but
now only ~I ('f"'tJntrimuu, erin~t . "'nher man "lti"","lyaUtcnt. In other
words. the opression "w:ltcr-jug" may continue to be used, :is long :is we
undersW\d that it is merely a oonvenicnt term for a bundle of parrides. And
at the third level, me ultimate existence of univcrsaU is rejca:ed. but one
may continue to speak of them as conventionally aistent. This way of
relating me lcvcU-wncre ultimate ontological commitments at one level
are carried over to the nat all conventional commitmenu--rdlects the
doariM of the

twO

truths. a Ufltr.l! motif of Buddhut thought that ~

have discw.Kd earlier."

While the doctrine of me (Wl) truths helps us to unde:rstand the continuity among the levels, that continuity still involves .som~ significant complaitic:s. One issue is immediately probltmatic. SpccifioJ.ty. it is sometimes
difficult to separ:ate ontological claims that are being relegated (0 a provi, ional n . nu &om those tha, are being rejected outrigh . 'In;' problem ;,

encvbated by the fact that the same belief. such as -a water-jugs aim,"
II Set !he uansbrion of PVJ.I~-l14 and abo tf". cU.a.aion on 'frlaI ataItion t.a--, 981[
"'-ha UJUmonI: in tf". ~rion from ExremaI RaUsm 10 EpistmUc Idcali$m ;. doe notion
m.1I an ExItrlW Ralia cannoc specif)o wbMcr I ~ objcn is idcnOcal (0 or dUtina
from tf". JUbitMry a:IIniIin& it. bu. dU!: ItJUIl'rfI' appc:an 10 be KCOndaIy.
19 Stubo't. p .

6,

FOUNDAT IONS OF DIiARMIlKIRTrS PHILOSO PHY

nuy be preserved wid! one meaning of"w:uer-jus- and "aim" but rejected
with another mooing. If we consider this bdicfin terms of the movement
from me fil1t hcl (the beliefs of ordinary ~rsons) to the K'COnd level (the
Abhidharma cypology). we find that at the second level one will compkuly
rtjt me enstcnce of a water-jug ...ncn, in accord with the nalVC ontology
of me first kvcl, it is concrivro to aist as an entity in distinction from its
pam. However. the existence of a w:llcr-jug can also IN provis;tmaDy lI~uJ
at the second level. bill only ifone construes water-jugs as conventionally
w tent entities thaI arc in fact reducible to their pam.Discriminating continge:ndy preserved ontological claims from those
that arc rtjccttd may at limes be difficult. but we have JUSt hit upon twO
principles that in all cases should guide our interpretations. We have nOted
du[, when w(' critique but uiU renin an ontological commitmem to some

entities thought to be ultimately aistent at a lower level, we only commit

[ 0 the conventional existence of those entities at a higher level. Our first
interprttive key is that [he conventionally existent entities in question must
IIIUN1J1/H rttiucibk to the ultimately existent entities that arc affinned withOUI reservation at thai higher level Our second principle is that, to constitute the final , tnansition.:al position that moves one &om one level [0 the
next, such entities must be at the furthest point of reduction at their own
level. Thus, to the extent that the existence of a water-jug is preserved in the
Abhidharma typology, me conventionally existent water-jug must be
reducible to its ultimately real pam. To the extent thai conventionally existent universaU arc preserved in External Realism. they must be reducible to
ultimately real particulars. And to the extent that the conventional existence of appa~ndy external sc:nsc: obiectS a~ preserved in Epistemic Idealism, they mwt be reducible ( 0 ultimately real mind.
To PUt it another way, what is mmmon about a level is me commitment
(0 the ultimate existence of a dow of things mal exhibit two features: to the
a tent thai any other entities can be accepted as conventionally aistent,
they must be reducible to these ultimately existent things; and in (etou of
a higher level, at least some of those WIle ultimately real mingt will be the
obj:t of oitique. We thus should not apcct that the entities accepted as
ultimately existent at any given level will rcqui ~ any further analytical
reduction within that kw/befo~ they become the objC'C1S of a critique at a
higher level.

20 This is the poinl made in AK' ..... S 1bcM: 40-41.

DHARMAKI RTr5 METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

6,

The question of the levels of analysis in Dharmakini's thought becomes

panicularly important when we consider the third lcvd, aternal RnIism,
for it is at this kvd thac Dharmakini docs the V25t majority of his philo.
IOphical work.. His accounts of p!!rccption, infcrcntt, and philosophy of
langwgc are prescnred almost adusi...dy in temu nf&termll Rc:lllilm. P:m
of what this means, ofcoune, is that Dharmakini docs the vast majority of
his philosophical work from a phiiosophD.l standpoint tMl M krn1l1.1S to '"
folse in the details of its ontology. And we can draw a crucial hermencuticallcsson here: ifDharmak.ini knows that not aU of a particular sraodpoint
is U\IC, then be presumably also knows that he need not defend every aspect
nf thaI .uandpnint.
We will rcrurn to this peculiarity of Dharmakini', method monly, but
Dhannakini's usc of E:.:temal Realism begs another question that we must
fint address: how do we know what conuituta: aternal Realism for
Dhannakini? This question may seem a bit ingenuous, but it is far morc
pcnpicaciOUI than it may appear at first glance:. In most casc5, when we
cumine the woo-Iu of a systcm:uic thinker such u Dhum:alc.ini. ~ get the
dearest sensc of tb:u thinker', philowphy-his coherent SCt of thcori_
when the thinker is obliged to defend the most problematic of his positions; and in most casc5 , such defenses requira: the thinker to reconcile
competing theories within his thought. But while Dharmalcini has a
predilection for systemaricity, he is also almost always operating with a set
of lheorics--utemal Realism---that he is not obliged to defend in all cases
bec:aU$C, in imporunl w:I)'$, he does nor hold Ihou theoria 10 be true. And
for much the same reason , tensions bctwcc.n competing philosophical
cboiCCl within E:ru:mal ikalism need not always be reconciled. Iu interprners, we: are left with an OCCUM)Oal but maddening vagueness: just when
wc: apcct Dharm.akini to re:solvc a problem or reconcile a tension within
E:.:tcmal Rn.iism, he glides over the issue as seemingly unimporunt!'
If we were r~nS Dhumn1ni o n th~ :w;umptio n t~t Extern:a.l Re:a.Iism were his final view, then we would be quite right to object vigorously
ttl this annoying vagueness. Since:, h~, arguments abotn External RnIurn ace only a mcaru to a .$Oleriological end for him, we mWf instead attcnd
21 A Krikins CD.fOpk ;. the :lppeal10 tUf'''1'JII"'If-rUjU". rjudgmml of wnma.l as I
caoual mWf 0( hil philoeophy 0( I~ Wltik "f'PC"Iins 10 \his wrKqI(, Dtwnu1tJni
""" apWns il. 5ft bdow,

",ft'.

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK.I RTI' S PH I LOSOPHY

carefully to th~ implications of wing a philosophical view ror purposes th.:u

mnscend that view in such a way thaI on~ cvenrual.ly acknowledges m:u the
view is f.alse. Our fiBI issue is simply thC' question of how Dhannaki"rti Sttdes on ExtC'rnai Rcalism as a level of analysis. To address this issue, WC'
should recall that a singl~ style of analysis or reasoning is meant 10 carry 01
all the way up the scale of analysis. If ruch is the casc we should ask why we
would ever StOP at a panicular level. Th.u is, if an int~lIigent ~n applies
me analysis properly, should that person not simply continue the analysis
to i15 final condwlon in Dharmaki"ni's Epistemic ldealism~ It is true that
one mwt shift &om one paradigmatic object of negation to the nat- fin,
wholes. then repealable or o tendcd entities, then extra-menu! objects.
Each of these neganda is, in turn, the main object of critique at the vuiow
levels. We might thw apca that a .!hift ITom onC' ncgandum to the nat
would ronn an obviow caesura-a -stopping point- that delineates a level
of analysis, one of which is Extcrn.al Realism. But if moving up the scale is
limply a matter of applying th~ mereological style of critiqu~ to each object
that we believe to be aistent, then a systematic application of
analysis should ('()",~l w to move up the scale. We should, it sccnu, be swept
aJong by the force of our rcasoning. if we assiduously apply the analysis. The
mere nc:cd to chan~ the foci of our critique docs nO( seem to give u.s such
a pawc that we mwt develop an entire ontology, epistemology, philosophy
of mind, and philosophy ofbnguage at a particular level, bUI Dharmakirti
assumes a panoply of such theories at each level; and he especially works
through such theories at the levd of External Realism.
Clearly, then, the f.&a that me analysis pawc:s al each level is not just a
matter of f.&ciliatinl the switch of focus from one object of analysis 10 the
other. Some other facton must be in play, but our greatest problem in
interprning Dharmakirrl is thaI neither he, nor any other Buddhist thinker,
ever tell" u.s what aactly might make u.s stop our analysis to such an atenl
mat we develop a
a morc-or-less unified set of theories on perceprion, bnguagc, and the Iikc-al thaI kvd. Certainly, ifDharmakirti is con
sistent with the discourse of compusion that we fi nd in other Buddhist
thinkers, the tnltrtU reason fo r sropping Ih~ analysis must ~ that maximal
hdpfulnes.s to $Cnticnr beings would be impeded by not Slopping. A5 Drcy
US notes, the problem hC're is that higher levels of analysis become progressively more counterintuilive;U to put it another way, one can bend
bangs' minds only JUSt so far before they snap. But while we may charita-

mat

vi'"

DHAItM AKIItT1 'S METHOD AND ONTO LOGY

"

bly and pbwibly auribu[e mis pm.! reason to Dharmalcirti. our most
slnighrforward explanation is historical: Dharmwrri inherits the levels
from his (primarily Buddhist) prcdccasors. Indeed, most modern interpreten agret: mat Dharmakini praentl his argumcnu in a manner that
genenUy ainu at compatibility with lhc: widest possible Buddhist audience,
and since most arguments are presented in me conten orExtcrnal Rcalism,
that meory is presumably acapable to the broaden audience..
While Dharmakirti employs utun.al Realism as a broadly acccpClble
theory in which he can do most or his philO5Ophical work, we should reiterate mat he is not obliged to defend (or even aamine) all aspcas Oruternal Rc:alism, since he begiN with me undemanding that the theory, while
heurisdcally wdU.l. is Fundamentally Rawcd. And by not being obliged to
k&nd cw.ry Hpcer of rhO'! rlv:ory. Oh,.rrnak:irti ~nfOf'CC5 ~ bro<>d ~_
ability of the meory, Thar is. were he obliged to dcknd all aspects or the
theory. he would find himselr mired in details tMt would lead him to distinguish versions orExtcrnal Realism. Defending jWt one detailed vcrsion,
he would lose mose members of his audience who preftt another vcrsion.
In d&ct, by avoiding a complete :account and defense of External Realism,
Dh,...Trullcirri lilccwi~ noid.c .m y I'I~ to addfft..1 d~iu. dur ~ a martel' of
conrention among Exrem:al Rc::alistS.
A.J interp~crs., hO'Wl:Vtt, we are still k:fi with a fundamental problem: for
Dharmakini, wMt in External Rcalism 4n need to be: defended, and wh:1[
can he let slidr. A.J we Mve jWt noted, put of DharmaJcjni's geniw is his
calculated imprtcisul1l about the views that he works with, in thar this very
imprecision :allows him 10 encompass competing views thar disagree on
what mUJI be fOr DhannaJcini IIlfi""jN'1't.,,' dcn.iI. of an ontologic:a.l posi-

tion. These details are unimporrant in that they are 1'101 relevanl to the
analysis tMI moves one from one Icvd to me nat; in mon, they are unimportant to the sotedological enterprise that me lC:ale of analysis 5etva. And
since
dmils of various 2CtUaI (i.e., hinorically a((ested) or potential disagrttments within External Realism are unimportant, Dharmwni can

offi-. a prnoenr:...ion m ar i. coiYlp:uible -ith ,. bro"" r.angc of ~ and

potential versions or External Rcafum- prccisely by avoiding the unimportant details that would cause disagreement.
What, however, shall we do if we encounter what appc:tr to be competing versions of Extunai Realism in Dharmakini's work? O n rhe intcrpre-ration I Mvc givm here, truly competing theories would be mose that offer
di~rgeru

Vf:I1:iolU of what i. ultim:atdy real ro ruch an """tent du.t differ-

ent uguments would be: required to make the transition from E:.:temal

68

fO UNDATIONS O f DHARM AKIRTr S PHILOS OPHY

Realism to Epistemic Idealism. Especially problematic would be a ClSC' in

which one vel'$ion of Ezternal Realism assertS the ultimate reality of enti
ties thai. according 10 another version . are jwt conventional . In effect. we
would be dealing with a vel'$ion of External Realism whose ultimately exis.tem things mwt first be further analytically reduced to the ultimately ais
tent things of another \'el'$ion of External Realism before the Epistemic
Idealist critique is applied.. If such a reduction were indei necessary. it
would obviously be a case of an imfH'rt4n1 difi'erence among External Real
ist theories. nOI an unimportant one. The theory whose ultimate entilies
must be further reduced would be an incomplere version ofE:nernal Real
ism; the theory that assertS emilia that require no further reduction would
be in me family of throries that art properly called External Re:lIism, in that
they reprcse.nt the position thaI is critiqued by Epistemic Idealism.
Now it may seem that we are just picking nirs ha e after all. Dharmakirri himself does not give a rul.l accoUnt of External Re:lIism. But as inter
prners. WC' at I~t need to know what does not count as an External Realist
mrory for Dh.armwni, since our interplttll.tions will be markedly affected.
mereby. If. fo r e:umple. a water-jug an indei exist fo r External Realism
as an ultimatdy real particular without beinR reduced to its partS, men when
Dharmakini presents his nominalist philosophy of language in terms of
atemal Realism. he faces a f.ti rly straightforward task. But if on External
Realism a water-jug is in fact nothing but the infinitesimal particles that
compose it, then me account of reference in the ClSC' of me term ~water-j ug
becomes f.u more difficuh. Divining me External Realist accoum of a waler
jug's ontological starus-be it ultimately real , conventionally rea1, or utterly
unrW-is obviously crucial m our hermeneurical enterprise. We can add
here that the presence of truly competing throries at the ume level of analysis would also be disastrous to Dharmwrti's own enterprise. By the most
clwiable accoum, his aim is 10 lead us to Epistemic Idealum, 2nd his
method is to prcp:m us (0 accept that position by first convincing us to
accept an omology with a narrow and specific SCI of flaws that he will critique from an Eputcmic Idealist perspective. If, however, he wishes us to
accept an obviously amtr.ldietory and incoherent onmlogy, he will fail. And
WC't(' he to prescnt aterna.! Re:lIum in a manner mat openly acknowledges
and argues equally for incomparible positions, it is not clear how he could
avoid obvious contradiction and incoherence. On the other hand, if WC' can
gain acccu to the Epistemic Idealist critique without a coherem version of
External Realism, men Dharmakini's usc oflevd s of analysis becomes inexplicable. We could, fo r example, bypass External RcaJism ahogtther and

OHARMAKlkT I 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

from rNo, Ahhiclh:lorm:lo rypnlogy dinealy In Ff'i~u':m ic IdelllL,m. w~

would need to hnd MIme other compellins-nd prob;ilily ICSIi charitablereason fo r Dharmakirti's use of E:ftnal Realism. Nevenhdess, while we
may argue that Dharmakini's &:ternal Realism should ('Vinu at lean an
osteruible coherenu , subsequent inferpreten of Dharmakirti have often
fa.iltd to agree on what that coherent position might be.
m~

Diw'X".ll"'U'f'J'rn.tilJru ofExumJ &tJism

~

Dreyfus has skillfully a plained, the history of the interpretation of

Dharmakirti'J thought has witnessed some striking divergenu in what
counts as &:temal Realism, where we undersWld &:ternal Realism to be
tlut philO$Ophic:d nuKe from which Dh:lo rmakini presena :a.nd def~nds
most of his mcories. ~ we will sec: bdow in greater dttail. the crux of the
issue here is what counts as particulars (tlJttW!4~)' the sole uldmatdy real
entities in Dharmakirti's presc:nt:ltion of &:ternal Realism. Among later
TIbetan interprttm especially, the diversiry of opinion on mis issue is striking. Drawing on the analysis of the Tibetan philosopher Sakya Mchog \dan,
Oreyfi.u sketches three over:JI pocitioru,

... (Sakya Mchog ldan] shows that Dharmakirti's analysis ofc:nernaJ objtcts is aniculated arounci three levds of analysis: {t} At :10
commonsense level, objtcts such as jugs and $0 on are said ro exist.
(1) At a dccpcr level, however, these prC2llalytical ideas cannot
stand. When aamined in rdation to 5C1\SIC spheres (tlytIUZNl, sityr
...dHJ), objecu of COmmOflSoenH disap~ and the color offin: i.s
distinguished &om the fire. This is the levd of analysis corresponding to what I describe as the Ilbmutt~ ;m~rrlllriD1J. .. .The ontological analysis, however, cannO! StOP there, for evm entities such
as color:arc not real. TherefOR' (3) at the deepest level, only their
infiniteWnal components:arc real. The third level corresponds to
wful[ I ~"e dacribed:lo& the _tul..,J '-" 'n'frn..b.,..lJ

Siky2 Mchog ldan', analysil iJ useful because it covers the gamut of posi.
tiom found not only among Tihmm interpreters, but also among more
reant interpretm and possibly among $Orne! South ~ian comment:ltors.
Speaking of the first three levels, Dreyfus goes on to note:

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK I RTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

levels (t), h.), and (J) function at differt:nt levels of

analysis. When discussing epistemology. the lim level is wually
prckrred for it is the closest to the way ~ conCC'ive of things. At
this level, ~ conceive of ourselves as perceiving objccu such as
jugs. Such a description is nOf sustainable, however, for commonsense objecu are not lindable under analysis. Hence ~ oem
to move to a higher level, at which our epistemic p~ica art:
redescrilxd as involving only phenomenologically available entities such as colors.. But funher analysis reveals dm even these
entities, which we usuaUy think. we: pcruive. are fiction.a.l. Hence,
~ need to move to a yet higher view, according to which only
momentary particles are rnI (the Standard interprtt:uion) following a nr.uqy of asanrung scales. h is important to r"W.iz.e
that Dharmakirti does not believe that these levels are equ.a.lly
valid. Rather. for him , each level has iu own limited validity
within its own proper context of usc. Ultimately, none of these
thrtt levels is valid, for they all assume the aistence of atemal
objeas, a prcsuppruition mat Dharmakini ultimately rejects,'

Th~ differt:nt

Dreyfus' approach to the levtls of analysis closely ruembles my own:

in<id, my presentation owes much to his thought:fu..l analysis. For the s:ake
of darity, the chan below oudines our twO aru...lyses.
AcrorJi1lK to Drtyfiu
Commonsense'
Alternative Intetpret:uion'
5undard Interpretlltion'

y0 _

AmlrJinK to ONnM
Beliefs of Ordinary Persons
Abhidharma Typology
uternal Rnlism'
Epistemic Idealism

M", 1wu/kJ "Sao"..."........

A major point of con~(jgcuce in OUf int~rp retations is me notion (hI[ thc:sc

I~ are nOI all-equally v:alid: :lS Dreyfus pUts it. In other words. a lower
level is superseded by a higher levet. For example. Dreyfus noteS that entities considered real at level I- narndy, ~co mmonsen$C objecu" such as
smoke or water-jugs an be reduced to me entities considered real at level
1 , narnely, the spatially extended objeas mat 2J'(' the sensible e1emenu or
4]IItll1l" of colOt' and so on. In short, commonsense objects may be reduced

DHIIRMIIKIRTI 'S METHOD liND ONTOLOGY

7'

to their spatially atrnded strWble componems. On thc::sc: oa:uioru. says

D~, commonsense objectS art unreal. But he: goes on to D.y:

1bc::sc: commonJc:fl$C objects:uc: presupposc:d ... to be: real at other

times. For c::nmple:, while: discussing me way in which ausal
rc:lations are undentood [i.e., at: PVt.}4f] , Dharmakirri shows
how w~ und~n:t:lIfld th ~ rebtinn herwN!n fire and lmnk~ hy

observing how smoke follows me prc::sc:ncc: of fire. In thil disawion, ausal rdarions:uc: described as involving commonse:nse:
objccts sud! as smoke dut:uc: thus assumed at mil kvd of analysis to be: real."

DreyfW maks it dear that thil il a full-Aeodsed commitment on Dhann"...

kini's pan to me: reality of commoruc:rut entities (level .), and not simply
a rc:oognition that these: entities:uc: comingcndy aistcnt as coottprual consuucUons. In other words, the Faa ,hat Icvd I (commonsense objc:ca) is
superseded by level 2 (seruible elements) docs not Ic:ssc:n Dharmaldni's
alleged commiuncnt to the reality oflc:vd I (commonsense objects) in thocc
poRiOM of Dharmakin;'s work where it is -allegedly employed. Indeed,
Dreyfus discwsc:s at length some Tibc:t2n minun Iuch. as Mkhu grub Dgc
legs dpal bung who do not c:vm rccognizc the reduction of commonsense
objectS to seruible elements. These thinkers maintain that, on any view
mat presupposes the aistena: of external objectS. at least some commonsense objectS are ultimately real paniculan. The point. then. il dut acoording to the Tibetan thiokm that Drqfus discusses. the reno ~Sa.utrintika
(the ~ Extem,j Realism- in tft'ml of which Dharmakirri does m(HI of his
philosophical work) may apply to If"] of the positions from level I up
mrough kvd}. This mcans that on some Tibetan interpretations. Dharmakini is willing to make a commiancnl to the ultimate reality ofeimer commorutrut objectS {level I) or spatially extendc:d elements (lcvd 2) for w
purposes of arguing From the Sautdntika standpoint. In contrast, t mainrun thai o nly level J mould be c:omidered "Sautr.inrika- o r. in my lerminology. "External Realism. ~
~ a prc:scntlltion of TIbetan interpretations of Dharmakini, Dreyfus'
srudy is immerutly helpful and knly drawn, but Dreyfus :also contends
l S DrqoNs (lm:a,).
26 ~ dar 1tW. In hJi: view, Dhlrmaklni .uows for conf\iain& IICClOUlIIS within thot

Saurttnrib (Le.. &:lcrna.I RalisI) mw: IhfOU!.h

mol(

ofhil......,m DIwmakini prelmU

72.

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

IMt thesc' intttpmlltioru are' at lt2St "pmly right" 2$ d~ictions ofDil2rrnakin:i's vi~ . Th21 is, he maint'2.iru that, especially when discw.sing epinemology. Dharmakini does indttd speak 2$ if oommonsenS(' objecu were
ulrimatdy real. n Al I s ii, Orq.fus makes such renurks in order to defend
the plausibility of the Tibetan intefPrtt.ltions. In other words. he is urging
lU not to dismiss these T ibetan views aul of hand and in$lead to consider
how Tibetan interpreters may have been able to read Oh:armmni's tau in
a manner thai supponed the ulrimate reality of commonsense enlitKs. NcvmhdClS. whik ~ should re'main open-minded aoom lhe pl:ausibility of
Tibetan intetprmtions,:a atd'ul reading ofOhamukini's lOts shows dUll
he n~r oplicidy ,rates Ihal lerms such 2$ "smoke" and "fire''' rcfn lo :any
spaliotemponlly Otlended emilio thac art ultimatdy real.- In the absen
of :any such explicit stalement. it seems far preferable 10 fOllow Oharmakini's a plicil description of [he rtfen:ncc of luch terms. llul is, Oharmakini notes mat a term such 2$ "water-jug" (sh4f4) is simply a linguistic
convention employro as a convenient means 10 indirectly expreu multiple
infinila:imal panicles thaI, due to their proximity. Clusally support each
orher such that mey together perform functions that art of interest to us.
When we are thil'l'ty. cem.inly il is casier 10 say. "Bring a w:uer-jug." than
10 say. "Bring some mutually supponing infinitesimal p2tticles tMI.
through that causal suppon, set"I-C the functions associated wim the conccpr
'w,lIIer jug.'" Dharmakini, especially when m.d through the earliest South
Alian commentaries, goes to great efforts to show Ih21 words for common5Cf\se (fltities should be inlerpmi in Ihis fashion at the level of External
Rnlism; in doing so, he is clearly disrancing himself from :any ontological
oommitmenr 10 such entities. And this makes good 5CflSC. sinC% when he 01tiqud External Realism fro m Ihe perspective of Epinemic Idc:r.lism, he
clorly assumd that Exlernal Rnlism reduces all seemingly orended material encities 10 uncxtended infinitesimal panicles!'
n:alifI; OCInfIIinJ the cr.iHraa of IN cr.ltfrW world. H~ ckfmcI. a ....alkd
Sallirlimilu poai lion. Wi,hin
hi: alto KCmt fie.. 10 mow !:w:IW(n confIinin&
:ICW\UItJ. ~ lor foUoon the.,.rw deoattxd~. reduans mI.t)' to the .nlnK'lion of p;>nkw IWlida and moment:f of ~ AI 00...... rima. hoW"~I . 1:w: i.om
aomckd objlI such as colon Of ,""~ Of f\Im com~ obju" h997:l6). So:.."w
1997:106/[

bUrudf . a

mis"""

27 Dny(w (1997:97).
28 S PVSV ..tPV,.,. (G:I1.I- IJ.lj).

2? Th;,. i.n:rp:g<..... olDb.u-......Jol..

i.

a . D~ ('997:19, n.t... l.
_.~

"""'"

<0

be bao. ...."'d ... .M CAlii.c.c com_

mo:tWilOlS. In Dbannaldrti'l works. dw 1l"I0II1 imponilm 1M..... 1ha1 di.... cs this iMuc if

DHARMAKIRTl'S M ETHOD AND ONTOLOGY

"
(me

In :a vein s.imibr [0 these poinu of divergence with Dreyfus' level I

reality of commonscnlC' objt.c:u), I :also lind myself in disagrmenl with
Drq'fia' claim that Dhannakini also accepts 1<Vd l-{he M:altem:ati~-e int('fpcttll1ion, whereby spatially exlended sensible demenls :arc considered
real, My qualms here are morc complex, but they focus on one balk qUC5tion: dOd Dh:armwrti ~r de:arly admit INII ~n minimally extended
colon :a~ f'lIn:icol:an (J'WII..~~~ Drryn..J cI"imJ ,h", thO! notion of this
kind of sp:ati:ally extended p:anicul:an is - not without suppon in Dh:acmakirti's works ... Drcyfw' argument rests prim:arily on :an analY'it of
PV).1904-2.07, but I will offer a diffuent interpretation of thoc ~ In
mon, my position it thac, especially when read through the e:arly Soum
Asian commenwics, this p:a.ssage offen: no evidence for che nodon chac
puricubn an!' ' p,ui:ally ~tendM. : ind~, th.o p:u.s:age ~ 10 confirm the
opposite nodon--i.e., chat p:artk ulvs mwt not be sp:ati:ally atcndcd. And
~n , it it this position-whereby smingiy atcnded mance is reduced to
infinitesimal panidCS-lhu is the staning point of his Epistemic Idealist
critique."
Should we then conclude that Dreyfus' interpmation of Dharmakini's
loevds of arWysil is i~1 10 our nud)'? NOI "1 all. h would M foolish fO
discount Dreyfus' :m:aiys. b::awe the mociv:atioru behind his :approach help
to clarify our intttprttivc contOI. In temu of Dreyfus' hcrmmculical motivation, he SCCI a significant tcfUM>n bctwttn me Standard Intcrprttation,
which I take to be Drcyfiu' undemanding of Dharm:akirti's final position
on Eztern:al Realism, :and the intcrpremions whereby mticics with spatioccmporal exteruion can be taken as ultimately real. Dreyfus clariliCl:
M

found 1I PVSV Mif'VI.I}1-I.1.. A ()C)nIpku .nru.luion and IIOCQ hom Sikpbuddhi', _

rnmwy VI: found in the ~ (m) .
JO Drqfw (a99r.96l.

s. bdow.'" To thiI; cb.... 1 ........, fou.nd Oftly

an.

ptc ..... in rithn PV or PVSV

""&I>' k .....Jog .........."""'!'t"'" ,le ~ ""'......., vi.- .............. t ...... d'~ .. u. '" Db..
maIdrti'. rdUorion of!he Sirylkh)'1l....,..m of ~ and .-,.. (PVSV IIIIPVI .16)_11o, I lilll) when; at one poin. (PVSV ..... PV r]1c6-17l; G:IO. ~7 . ) be, fqWoICS!he oppono:n'"
notion 01...,. wich hit: nocion 01 !he parti<;ular (~ Since~,... ph~
would IIn&m1:and :an enmckd mlily ,\Kh U I waterJus 10 be whac .bey call """"
(YD:.14,ft), dUs mishl sugest that DhamWdni is abo xapcinSludI an aimo:kd coo ly.
HOHCOcr. sin<;c thc.c: same phiIo.ophe:n do IIOC xapc dsc I>Otion ofinfiniu:tirml panidc/;

31

(_

YD:ln.1pij, ., _

baa, in

(lOW

w ~ of odwr compdlilll t'IicImu. 10 _

Dhar.

rmklm 'l fqlUUon of I1IkftI and _h*",'!'" mcrdy II a meaN of nWulll hll p Oint 10 Iw Inter-

Iocurors. See abo the next chapl:n. n ... , .

74

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK.IInI' S PHILOSOPHY

Dtspitc ia strength, I bdm mat 1M , tandard interpm:acion docs

1\0( account for.:>mc of Dharmaltirti', idc::u mnccming onrology.
I am suggesting dUll Dharmairti', accoun t is not un i~. ConRicting dements in his vinr.' contndia th~ Sautrintika account
thou h~ adopts in some pamorhi, work. These demeno suggest
an alt~mari~ v~ according to which slually extended ~
a~ to be included within the pwview of the real. According to
this view, materia! reality is not reduci bl~ to in atomic compoMno but also includes atended obju such as shapes and tan
gible ob;cca. I am not arguing that this is Dharmaldni's view.
but, rather, that this view is present in his work. It represents a
Itvd of hi. analysis which is oft~n not rccogniud by scholars who
tend to present his viC'A' as brine mo~ unifi~ man it is,'"
The most significant insigiu her~ is that our intttprtution must not
oonJfrue Dharmaldrtj's philosophy as fully un ifi~, if such unity would
mean that, for example. his entirt epistemology and his entirt ontology
must fully support each other tU1f1S1 kvds oftlnAly1is. In other words. whatever Dhatmakirri', Anal position might be, he need not argue in a manner
thai is fully consistent with that final position. so long as his argumentsthrough a kind of sotcriological syst ema t icity-I~xi one up the sale of
analysis, Ncvt:nhclCS5, if we hd the int~rprtt.illtion of the earliest com
mentalOn, we also must not ign o~ the coherence or systematicity withi"
a levd that we discussro above, And if we do admit such systcm:nicity
within a Icvd, thcn we will be hard put to find any clear instance in which
spatially enended ohjcctt arc 10 be included within ,he purview of thc
rtaI. Why then wou.ld Drqfus hold this pos;ition? He has two basic rea
sons. The first concerns a tension that he 5C'CS in Dharmaldrti's thought
I bcli~e that the~ is a tension within Dharmakini's ontology
bctwccn an atomistic reductionism. which is in accordance with
his overall ontological p:nEimony. and a Ics:s mductioniuic delin.
eation of reality, which aJlows for tb~ reality of extended objects.
This tension is due to the very dO$C connection bctwccn ontology and epistemology in Dbarmakirti', system.... IOharmakirtil
boldJ that perception off"c:n an undistorrcd rdIcccion of reality.
Accordingiy, what is perceived by perception must exist in real

DHARMAKIRTI'S METHOD AND ONTOLOG Y

iry. This aClles a problem for Dharm:akirti', ontology, 1tK-wt: do

seem to perceive extended obj<Ct5. Since this perception is an
undistorted rcAcction of rcaliry. me cucnded object we perceive
ought to c:x.ist."

"

The dichotOmy th:u Dreyfus highligha is one that runs throughout Buddhist thought: it i~ the b.:oPc ~n~ion ~ " n ~rpe:al m the evidener: nf the
senses, on the one hand, and me mgcncies of reductive reasoning. on the
otha. This tension c:m:ainly is relevant ro Dharmakini's work, but I would
maintlin that, based C$pecially on the earliest commenwies. Dhannakini's
thought confomu prinwily to reductive reasoning. and not to me evidence
of the senses. ~ we will ICC in greater detail below. when confronted wim thls
r~)c," in ~ ro ~ ~ ~tiry mch :as" w:a~_j ug. Dh:arm:a.kini ~
flO( choose to somehow defend me commonsense intuition that water-jup
exist. Instead, he gives a detailed cxpbnation that can account for me causal
functionality required fo r the successful reference of the tcnn ~water-jug"
willxnathc c:x.istmcc of any single mtity that 15 the ,d"aem. Rather than supponing a single, spaoor.cmporally c:xtmdcd ,deem, Dhannakirti's apIanation :accounts IW the ieU:iehce of" term such:as "w:ater-;US" only by ~in8
to infinitesinul particles. Moreover. when fpedcing of en:ended entities such
as a waef-jug, Dharmaldni MltTcaIJs them parricuWs (tm4t",,'(IItS). If. now~. we c:n.mine the problem of "foella to ouended entities through the
lens ofLatcrcommenta.ton writing in Sanskrit o r libecm, then we do find ~
eYer increasing tendency to mab: cona:ssions to commonsense inrerprea.tions
of the ev1dence of me senses, to the point mat even entities such:as water-jugs
will be :ulmirted :as p:atticubn prior to any reduction ( 0 infinirsim:al. p:atticia. Since Dreyfus is mgaged primarily in a study of the libean intClprea.tions ofDharmwni. it olMou.sly makes good senJC for him ro heed dosdy

Thia conclusioo lconcernin, .,.acia! aunaioa] ;1 certainly ... rpriJin" for if aoa
apl..... 0N.t....JUm'. ~ ........d.""";mal Oftt060po.i ........ ry. h ...........

,ndicu 01:00 puAp, ~ DtwmalUni _ .... fo imply thaf mafm.! rcali!)' ia

mluc:ibk co .tomic compoomu. . ..This lppam1f inc:l)lUisctney ia dlK. U l:argutd
e:arlic:r. fO, f~ within DhannWrti'. rhou&hf ariAn, OUf of the double pmpccriw: thf" orime. hia thoupt: the ontolopcal and the cpuu:moIop:oL Onm1opa!!y
... awuion ia mIuud co inl1nimimal panidcs. EpUrnnolopcaUy, he :c.el , a.do
I rnluaion is Iwdtr to 1\UWn.. Ac:tordin, 10 hia Ii.ondaa.entallhaia dI.u puption
accurardy rdk.:t.. rcaliry, e:u~ would ttenI to m.... b:u:ruion 'ppc:m, anti" all,
10 paLCption. Thi.

notion of awuion.

oeemJ

10 lad Dharmaklrtl 10 ag;cpllt _

kw:l minimal

76

fOU NDAT IONS Of OHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOS OPH Y

this realist trend toward [h~ accqawa: of ClteOOtd entities. And in doing so,
h~ provKlcs us with a ~ apprKiation for the need ro coma rualiu historically the commentarial im~rpm:l.cions ofOharmakini.
Beyond dirttting our attention 10 Tibcran commentators' appeals for
the rality of cnendtd emitio, Dreyfus also raises an issue based squarely
on Dlumukirti's own way of speaking. Specifically, he noto that Dharmakini himself appc:lrs to speak of atcnded entioo such as water-jugs as if
they were indttd truly ral. Whm speaking in this fashion , Dh:umaldrti
onen uses the tcrm "baWl, which we can translate as "cntity," -cr.iucm
thing, ~ or JUSt -thing," We will not undcnU~ here a detailed cnminarion
of this tenn, but we ClJI agree with Dreyfus
when Dharmakirti uses the
term, he seems 10 mean that "hdllttS arc causally efficient. And since (as we
will sec) only ultimately ral particulan are causally efficient, it v.-ould certainly seem that "hdvlI5 such as water-jugs should be COUnted as ultimately
real particubn. This would, howc:vcr, contradict our omologK:al dictum
that ultimatdy real entities should no< be reducible to other emities. Turning again ro the Tibcun thinker SaJcya Mchog ldan, Dreyfus remarks:

mat

To solve this problem , Sikya Mchog ldan offers the following

solution in parts of his works ... , breaking down the dyadic structure of Dharmakirti's system through the creation of an intermediary category. In addition to real things [particulars) ... and
ineffectivc conceptual conslructions, is a third category, conventional things (Jrun rtko" /II. 'j tln:ru po). Thil category indudo
sensibilia such as color, Wte and tangible objccu as well as commonsense objccu such as jup and 11ttS. These objecu arc generally char.lClcriu:d phenomcna [i.e., universalsl but are
impermanem. They perform a funnien bUl only conventionally. All phenomena thai have a rension in space and time bdong
to this intermediary caregory. They are not reallyefttctivc, for
the performance of their function boils down to the functions
pcrl"ormed by their constitut nt atoms."
In gencral, the iRlerprctation that I adopt in this srudy resembles that of
Sakp Mchog Ichn, since I tOO undcnond Dhannakini to usc the term MaWl
r thing") as way to spaX. of water-jugs and other such extended thinS1 that,
in lCt1TIS of the way~ usc Iangwgc, appear to be camally cfficic:nL I also agree

DHARMAI(IRTI 'S METHOD AN D ONTOLOG Y

that an arcnde.d bh4vtl is flO( ac::tu:I.l1y Clus:illy effic:imt. esptci"lIy sinct Dharrrakini goes to grat lengths to explain how the seeming au.s:al dt.ciency of
, mat~rially atcndl bhiva such :as a wattt-jug is to be c:zplainl only
through th~ ausal efficiency of infinitesimal particles, and not through the
a.istcncc of a real, single ~mi()' that we would call a "Wouer-jug." On this
interpretation, th~ lam "water-jug" rd"ers in a manner that enables on~ to
c:al.ll::l..!ly manipubrr thr, atn _mfilt2l world through me li.mmora ~
by the tcnn "W:l.ter-jug." but this in no way means that "water-jug" must
rder to a singk, real, at:mdr:d mci(), that performs thoK functions.
As Dreyfus poinu out, Sakya Mchog ldan, faces some probl~ms with his
interpretation. Specifically, by spuking of a -water.jug" as a "conventional
thing." he immcdi.a.rdy ensconces hirNdfin a scholastic di50l55wn of omological c:at~rirs. Wr. might unOr.nf:lnd ~Icy:! Mchog ldan's inrerprr:t2tion
as an attempt to resist several centuries of a move toward realism in the
interprttation of Dlurmalcini, whereby the category of conventional reali()' is associated uniqudy with univenals whose <formerly connngenrl realiry becomes ever mort affirmed. Pan of this historical proccsr is a trtnd
toward attributing ~~tiCS to univenals as if they were indeed real things,
and by ,he ti m~ of Mchog ld,.", hi, Tibnan collr.:lgu.ell b.eli~ uni_
venals to be permanmt. Thus, for Silcya Mchog !dan to Ipr:aIc. of a bhim
as a "conventional thing." he nccc:ssarily associates any bhlilJ4 with uoivc:rws, and he thereby appcan to commit himself to a position whettby a
bhillil is pel11W1mt. Dreyfus explains:
The problem with this interpretation is that il makes it difficult
to aocount for the ,tatu, of alended obtecu. Onoe we grant that

they art unreal, we have to admit that they ~ permanent and

incffcctive (since being a nonthing. pel11W1ent, a consuua and
ind:Tective ~ equivalent almost by definition). While it is rtlarivdyeasy to imagine a uoMrsai such a5 existence as pcnmnent,
it is mort difficult [0 gram that colon and shapes a~ permanent
at

well! Most mwrn intoerprftr:n SC'tm

10

ha.voe been unper-

turbed by this prospect, even though it seems 10 complct:dy conmdia our pr.tctical (!Xpt:lience. They ~ rady to assert that for
Dhumakirti coion, tastes and smeUs arc nor cawally produced
and perform no function , Rather they arc conceprual overlays
and a5 such they arc changdcss!1I
35 11Nl

78

FO UNDATI O NS O F DHA1MAKIIlTl'S PHILOSO PHY

A5 a distillation ofTIberan objections [0 Siky.t Mchog ldan's posicion,

Dreyfus' analysis is insightful. But if ~ take mis interpm::uion and place
it in a dilttrent hisrorical contat- namely, that of me earliest commenta[On-the problenu mentioned by Drqfw no longer apply. First, the nd
to ontologically categoriu MlVilS simply appears (0 have been a non-wue
to thc:sc early commentators. urntinly, Dhumakirri himself seems unO)nccmed with such quc:stions. The tew suggest that he and the early commentarors, when diJcussing atended entities. adopt the category of the
conventional from the Abhidharm.a typology, such that atendcd entities
such as a water-jug would continue to be JUS( conventional. Later commentarors, especially in Tilxt, apparendy feel that this approach does not
provi<k a sufficiently f}'5tematic account of the O)nvencional Irutead, lwcd
on a passage in Dbarmalcini's Pn",uI~vinti1i1 (PVj.I-]), they sec aU conventional entities as formally identical ro linguistic universals (141114"1"Wt,A!'4), and lwcd on a striaJy binary notion of definition whettby the
conventional mOlt be the contradiaory of the ultimate, they insist that
conventional entities must be permanent. Dharmakini himsdf. however,
specifically denies that universals art permanent, lina neither the unreal
nor the abstr.act (i.e. the distributed) can bear qualitic:s.Let us now ~iterate the main points of Dhumakini's philosophical
method and its impact on our study. First, in wing a sliding sca.le of analysis, Dharmakini aims to move his readers up that scale, and we shall
assume that even though the demands of systematicity might I'luire the
aploration of some issues, Dharmaidni', neglect of those issues is based
on their irrelevance to th..is soteriological project. Ar the same time, Dharmakini does argue at length from the standpoint of EIlernai Realism ,
even though that sWidpoint is one that he will ultimuely reject. His presentation of E.s:remal Ralism is systanatie 10 the alent dial it comes to a
final position that is the transition point to Epistemic Idealism. T o sustain
that degree of systematicity within Exttrnal Ralism. Dharmwrri makes
no ontological commir.me.nt [0 commonsense objects or ~en [0 spatially
ottnded colors and such. In other words. positions that hold such things
to be ultimately real particulars do 1Iot coum as External Realism , and
Dharmalcirci never argues from such a st2ndpoim. To the atent they are
discussed, they are represented mmly to be refuted by another oplanation that dispenses with any notion of atemion. Thus, whatever might be
the diversity within Dharmwrti's E.s::ternal Realism, tht admiuion of
36 W~:oddr$ dU. in deWl bmw. l1.6ff.

DHAIlMAkI RTI 'S METHOD AND O NTOLOGY

armded object be they commonscruc objccu or just colon and wchis not induded.
Given Dhannakini's reliance on EslCrnai Realism, much of our srudy
will be concerned with that position. It is wonh reiterating that, while h('
generally spt2b: from this st1nce, it is not one that he Stdu to fuUy defend.
Perhaps the best way to iIIwtrate this poinr is by coruidering the faa that.
almnugh F..1u.:mal ReaHn on rn lngy i! bnM on ea u.aliry. Oharmaici"; qu i_

roy admiu that even causality is jwt a nutter of convenuon..v BUI if we

heed Dharma.ldtti's rhetoric, such radial anti-realism is not germane fo r us

now. Fint, we must appreciate Dlwmakini's External Realist onrology,
and to do so, we must tum to the basic d('ments in his ontology, namely,
tht: "insuumenw objccu" (prflmt}ll) of the instruments of knowledge
(p ........!""").

2.2 DhannaJrinii Onfology

TN T",. Pramcyu- TM T",. JWJitin
We have noted that Buddhist phil~phen pas;t IWO levels of reality: me
u1tinutdy rd (pr1l"umh.IIIIIJ) :and the eo nveru ionally real (1II'!'",nuI). On
Vasubandhu', formulation, irreducibility is what distinguishes these cwo
1~1s of reality. Anything that can be reduced either physlcally or analytically into corutituem elements is conventionally real; that which cannOt
be 50 reduced is ultim:ndy real. Thus, on this theory the u1timatdy real
mUlt be an irm:lucible, parrleu. unitary entity."
FoUowing Va&uMndhu in dtia bGsic formubtion, Dh:utn:aJcjrti m ai nwnf
that the ultimately real is nesnrily partlcss. And elaborating on
Varubandhu', charaacrizacion of the ExtemaI Realist position, Oharmakirri
J7Thi1quia bul arikillllCimiaion iI die INin poilll ofDtwmaldni', mponac wan ot.;ec.
Don t.c PVJ-V WI all production is j_ CGnwnrionai. SIICh an ob;eo;tion deady undc:fmina 1M wrimacy of ~icuIats, bu, ntb.:. du.a ~ goualiry, OburrWJrti bronlcalIy
rQPOOCb. "-.. J6M wJtj, "lOr which David Edd in priYlK( communication (,,;, T-shin)
Iw: propooord the hipdy au aM:~. ~t(nf." Sn: PV).I- Io, ,nNlarcd in thc

.........
s.:..

the di.."sfton ~ in chIpm I (J7ffl. I. Mldidon 10 AK:6-4 and AKBh ... nt.. aor
abo VMUbu!dhu'nrJUmall from simplicil)' in dx V;~ (.., ..... LII- I 'l. whnr: it
it; UKd in I Yopdn COftIalIO rdUlC the: reality of alengJ ob;ecu. Note dial it doa IMK
If"PW that Vasubandhu. dil(!'qiolu ol"_ ~ pvticulan" (.,.u_w,.~
}8

~:JO-fJ ...../\Xl.IO) and ~COfIIIomcntcd panida- (~II~fII)(.AJ(Bh: IIo'

AlU.uab) '" 10 be: I.km .. c:hananUcK ol the Sauulnrib pOODon ~ in AKBh. It

80

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

funher maint2iru that simplici[)' is also tempor.tl. In , hon. on Dhumwrti's view the u1timatdy rea.I cannOt be distributed either spatially or
tcmpor.tlly."
Digniga, Dharmakini's predecessor in Buddhist Prm\il)a Theory,
applies an additional stipulation to the ultimately real: it must be inapl"C$Sible. That is, the u1timatdy real cannot be the objocr of concepnw
rhnughr nr I::lngtl~ge. nh2J"m~lli" i ~cO"pu- rhi$" Form., b rion , ~nd ~J is

implicit in Dign1ga's work. he adopts this requirement to cxdude from

ultimate reality the type of distribution associated with language, & noted
earlier, all Prami!)a Theoristf maintain that the object of langua~
(iAbtJdrtlMj nC'O"$nrily indudes a universal, and a universal is necessarily
distributed over multiple instances, Thus, when Dhumaldrti maintains
m 2t the ulrim21dy ~ is nol the ob}ca of l:lllgu:agc, he mc:aru tMl j t hu
no continuity (1II1IHlya) or distribution o\'t:r other instances. The ultimately real thus lacks the type of stmanti, distribution presupposed by
South Asian philosophen in their theories of language. and this in pan
means that universals (Um6#]1'w"'!l4). the objectS of thought and language, an only be rc:a.l in conventional tums (SII'!'IJ!1is4t).'
When take...

Iose'he~.

this re<)uiretne nt-t.e., th"llhe uhim:uely,...,:0.1 be

devoid of spatial, tempor.tl, and semantic distribution--c:an be lumma

riz.cd by st2ting that the ultimately real is utterly unique. That is. each ultimately real entity is. as Dharmakini puts it, completely cxduded or distinct

U lhil UII~ poaition thaI appean co be tM primuy poinl of dcpanun for Dlwmakirti'l
En... Realise onlolop.

39 I>hannUlrti mmlioN tM p;utkunat 01 poanialU.........m.: 10k ulrilNldy rul lhins--'n

Krn1ol pbcu. indudins PYSV .J PVl..... (G:17.1). The ul!.~tabiliry of particulan is

eo.-nuns

...Ied, {oHumpl<-, . PVI.7Uband PVSV ......t. {G: ". ~l.

moma,~
f'ot- a div'lMion in Vuubandhu'. work.. _ W pKIIulion of the: Saulrlntib arpmmu
apirut the four ch.m.c:ttristig of ~~nslO dot VlibhiPb (AKBh:1S?ff
. . AK1.~) and abo his commmlS in AK.4 (a lai h,. Dreyfus 199;.61). Dlwmakilti discwta mocnenunnat al ~ points in dw: S... ",m. inciudinS PVSV "" PVI . I~t.-I96
(G~..6-'UU.4)

"lid lOll Dlmai.... "'SUII""''' ..JP'VLdX>II. TIE ba.t L ........ li. IIM i.., ...........
in HR. wt.n.. the argumenl il one: &om amena: (- J . For an account focwi", on thaI
qumcnl , _ esp:ciaIIyOetkt (199) .

"0 Diptlp dairns WI particubn are inaprasibk in ....0.1" JUCh u PSV . . PSI.I.wI
and npi.Uy PSV .JPSUff(17I7ffi,

41 DtwnWtini IUIIllI up lhiI basic pmniJC in.be phtue ... individual entities nefti' prodUQ1: di.uribu.lcd aWUt:neM wilhoul dcpoetId.ins on , "ninnal' 1M UJlriJ IIJtI!"'Jt&!I
sJttti1rJ'V'irqrltfl ~ ~MI!'~-""'; II'VSV ~ I'V I. I04; G:SJ.-4-1JJ. ~ _ will
dioa.uo f'unt- DharmaIurti'. notion thaI" univmoal. beins, discribu.red mory, c:annoc be
ultim.ndy rnl. Oharrnakirti abo =narka:

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

"

from every other entity (J41V.dt6 hhmNL J41V.dtil vy4vrtliL U4ntll"1'illJ1liL

etC.)." Exprused in mis fuhion. uniqueness points to one of (he rwo basic
constraints on Dharm.alci'ni's ontology, namely, that the real mwt conform
(0 the dictates of reductive reasoning. That is, if an entity wen: distributed
and rnw reducible. it would not be unique, sinCt' it would shaI'(' a spariote:mporallocus or semantic identity with the entities over which it is dUrrlhurM. AI [he .lame rim .... Ihe crilerion of uniqu~eu:l1Mo me:lru rh:lt Ihe

u1timatdy real has a specific {niJAtIl}or restricttd spatiotemporal locus and

nature: it occurs in a specific time and place with specific causal capacities.
Expressed in this fuhion, uniqueness satisfies Dharmakini's sond basic
ontological consmint: mat the real ahibit a kind of regularity (implicit in
me tenn niJ;ttll) such mat our perceptions do nOt appear to be simply random (tlltllmriJ.II)Y

In terms ofOOm irreducibility and regularity, me uniqueness of the ultimately real is reflected by 1Vd~?U'> the term mat Dignaga and Dharmakirti USC: to refer to ultimately real entities. In its earlier wage in
Vasubandhu's Abhidharma works, II. 1Vd1a~~ is II. way of dwacr:crizing an

0..'-' dMJ wb"' ;. <.,.~ '"<Jk fiu.ni- ;, ." .lsi-m, mJ u"',,, ~

MJ"';' For, liS I wiD apbin. wNl ddinaral thinp and unreal thinp it rhci,CIfNC"
it)' 01' incapacity for relic f'unaions. AJOJ . , thinJ (uW) thai it eapabIc ofldic func:.
tionI is _Jimihlnl ftIn -"J ,hi",.. "'- is ... ~II f{." tffia fo",.J"u it
Jisnihrd [PVI.uS61 . 'Thotrd'oft. tina r:hcy:arc i~ of relic fUnaions. no un;'
'Cf'Al it. real thins- Rather. only wUq"" paniaalar (,,;Jq.J u rtaI thins brau..e doc
ldaimil tdK ftuw:Don iI fulfilkd only byl!.... wUqloW: ~ [PYSV .JPVI.I66:
"J4,...nhilt. MIw,. M~-!I !r.s.sabll iM", "'" hi _1H1Whf_

w,.(U'" J*l6rdldf~~1J Mr ~ I "

Mllwri ~ irwri _

~ I ~~

ffIM!r

r.slllh ~""""''''-!r h66cdJI ""'111M _". JhthJ'6'"

_~6_ / lWhfhr

mq. ..... 1IU4 ..... ....,~n4i .

In addition ICC PVI."-70 and PVSV *,PVI.7Iab (G:" .17-1I, tr....l.lIed in tho apptncfu).
ConemUns tho awImrioml ralit)'of univasals. DIwmaIcirti ~y In'Uidt;tny d.iKwof this daim. bul M don KlIIC it aplicidy in PVJ.J. Tlw uniftfUb IK eorm:ntiona1ly
rtaI is alIo dearly impliod by od.rr "~Il,....dI1i dw usnrion in PVI.70 dial un;>'CI'

'*

.... &rc

-commonly oUd to be .cal- (_

,~,.,) o<YUI ~

<hey &rc "..I""",ody _.cal"

(-~.

42 For dbeullJhrrV and 3 <daled UK of dbt,.Wwtf" in tile Ptw~ aM S-;mi.

ICC PVSV .JPVI.67 (G :,lI.7) and *'PVt.I'l (G:Ij . 6) . For _ , . MiIlM,
and rdated ~ __ PVJ.loI and 1)1. PVI.,.o. and PVSV .JPV..... (G :..... , ); *'PVI.f1
(G:p .16); ""PVI.,. (G:)1.0) ; and *,PVI.5'1 (G:4S.I'). Sn: a1to!'Vin (J ~'!}&I ""1.1)
...+.en, dw: panicuI:u u dd"lnft! liS "havinS thelll"',": of. uniqloW: raJ mini" (dttu. _.., ...
71""'; .... ".;,.." kbfll - tISit/hh. .~

",....1IJhrfU

4J lmporunt JOI.Il'ca indlWk HB (u .I1fT: ""!' r .w.UIc'...MJ"usdM~

_"k"'~ hMIm "~rwpdi'" CJ6 ",.-rIn'...m) and HBT (194'.loft)

",e

81

FOUNDATIONS O F DHA1MAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

object in teons of a proprny mat is pcwIiar to the type of entity in qucscion.

When, for exampl~, OM "attends to the SlNI~!I'l (SlNI"'!q4!1'ltnll1UlJlt4r.)

of -matter" (riiptt), on~ understands it to ha~ "the charu:teristic ofOOng

diuurbcd [by oontxt, crc.r (~"?UiJ.!q4!'1'). On this USOlgC.:I. nNl"'~!", is
not uniqu~ to:l. single individuaJ, but is ra.ther the defining ch.anacristic of
:I. single type of entity (dhttTmll) in me Abhidharma typology. In oonmst ,
when "auending" to:a IIlmi1f'Il~~ one is focusing on thinp in terms
of the sixteen.aspects (iltJrtl) of the Nobles' Four Truths. ~ A Slimli1fp
~!I" therefore chanctcrizcs numtfQus types of entirits: form , sensation
and so on have: different SlNIIctt,.~s, but the same shuillJ'f'~s , 5uch
as impermanence."

DigNg2 and Dharmwrti make UK of boch the terms ~!I" and

J#mIi",.~ but they usc them differcndy. We h:l.V'C seen mat, for them,

...tIcft Arap CO<\SU\IQ du. IUImnnlt in rom. of ~ 1"hiI b...ac noOon !hat IQJ mu
ria ~. tptcif.c: If"" , ., iiploc:ut abo ~ IaUrnmD in MV, such ...tP'Vt.nd,
(G'44' MH'(" ,..' IIw ( ow Witfe.,...,.,. -,..,., u.,..'!"l and ..... N1oJfl, ocw: olioe>'
en! pbca: what: DIwmikIrti ~dy ~ w poISibility of randomllCM (G:99.ilff. ...
... , .. f~-'"'1 ""~ \J.J ""' , + .... ~ I _ ,;.,.. """+>1.+-,,,..; ?J.sJ<'.
Anocha _
of du. iAur in PVSV iI ..... P'Vl.n (G:ll.wft). Sa: also the dltcuaion by
Dnyfu&. foIIowina 1M Tibetan Ilithor Go ~ pill bSod nanu ""'" F hm:6~).

rii,.

II ~l'iU"'!Uo .... AXBh 44~ ! . AI for the UAF o(

~!Mo"" thc detcripl:m 01 the ~ fonN ol ~.ttmdin& (_1Mr.)in AKBh
()70) ..... AK1.7l.c:: "IJII _M~ ,...,,~.!i"-~ w,..thi ~iU""'IJII Nftit] nM~ I .......) ,,~ __ ~ ~".,NJtduIJ l .Jhiwu.hi~

+t For 1M ddinilm 01

MIIo' ", I!b"""",,lto!lJi.t...

~s""".-..u..-u.

P F (,\.10".... ....tAKR.. ~N. (,01 .. ill.-rau-of .....

~ and ,."..,,~ I IIied at p1id ~ in thc K.I.:.

W1yin ....Oct.

u-u ,.,,/iuu .,.

dN Ii'" fori " ...;""fiJMII

pm.a ocw:', ~t (";";"Ifl).. How IhouId WI
be- done a, ..Jya", iN ,.,. IJ1n I{"--uno .JrIM NJ,. -n....
~.

H..;., .,w,w

iAK'.~I. OnrdocslG in Ofdtt ro

Mi""
.
.
.
.
l=nt 01 iu pttticvbt and uniYUAI dw

Ibi." tAK6.I-4OIiI. The body ill anaIyud in

oo:teriIOes, IlId 10 100 ~ lmWion. mind and lbiop (A", . ). A particubt dwx
luUric (_I.~""'illhc ~ (_flt...Jof theM: anirio:s Ii.e., the body, n d . l1w
impcrmann-oa of thc tondirioncd, me pUnfUlneII 01 the mncaminatcd. dw cmpnand ~ 01 all dcnKilW tbinp--dae ~ unM:n:al cbaDaaiuia. Whli ill me
/lUUre of thc bodyt II ill thc faa ofbcin@; oomP'*"' of!he tll_nD and dcmauaIlNl

[ .y,..."",," ... c,~ ....?h _ ."",,..tiItlM/JbI..,,,./IIf ,,;,.;,.~

u...,."..lfhrII.. I ~ (W '"~ " . . , . , I H]tIvii~ i lliWt,.!Y~ II u,...,.. ~!fIfbJth!t ~....J.d,!, ti_'!' ihtt~ t.
~IV INifb!o _h+r!""'" I lhfir; h +r!Wf!' til .u~ ~".,,!, ~
In....

..... ,,,..Jt;,,)

'b'

i!wwn'...,..,.... I.

. ... _ . k Iwwl(Oht / .w,...,..'..

-!>U!> .... H+w!t l

lJ,.;;u.

DHAJl.MAKIJl.TI'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

1VIIt.~(III

"

i5 a [erm for an unerly unique. uhimardy rn.I emil)'. Thus.

unlike Vasubandhu's SHU",!,'" on their view a SHI6~!", cannot be

repeated across individuals. They also maintain mac any object of language
or thOughl U a slm41fJ41A~~ regardless of whe!her il ch2fxmittS one
or many types of mtities. To rdlea !his usage. I will trandale IVII~!I" as
- particular" and slm4",.w,.!'4 as universal:"'
In addition to df2wtng on Vasubandhu's notions of simplicil)' and
Dignaga's oommenlS on the il\Cl.prcssibility of the uJ timare, Dharmakini
also introduces a new way of characterizing particulars: a particular mus,
havt- ,die function" (IlnhUriyJ), which for the moment we wi.lll~' only
as a way of speaking about causal dficacy.... At the m05[ refined levd of
analysis, only panicu.lars have tdie function ; mat is, only particulars are
all.Qlly dficient. :and rhi, :appeal to Clltlulity accounts to:a l:arge degTft' for
the non-randomness of perception. H ere. it iI impomnl lo rdtef2te that
Dharmaldrti speaks of spatiotcmporally o:tcndtd bh4wa or entities (such
as water-jugs) that a nOI particulars as if they 100 had Idie function. and
the is mus a rhetorical slippage between talk aboul particulars and talk
aboul thin&, (bh4wa) reducible [0 p:tniculars. O n our inrerprctll[ion.
Dhunulcini inrenru thai things luch all w:lIrer_ju&, may ~ nid f O h.:l"Ve
tcIic function in mat they are reducible to paniculan.- Since we will rerum
to the question of tdic Nnetion below. at thil point we will jusl note mat
since only paniculars have Idic funetioA. only particulars produce effects.
Hence, things mal produce dfectS a particulars (or they 2fe reducible 10

_f,,"'/fII

16lmyNs (lm~ and odIm Iu~ tnnaIare:l

and ~ u "ipific:ally cbarx=iud pbmommon' :and "~11 dwaacriud phmommon," tapKli.cI),.
One pcob&cln wid! rbaot U"&NIarioru is tht- II1II: of"plxnotIKnon." ~ this lerm irnpIieI;.
plxnomeo:..u.. pooition incompatibk wid! &:tnnaI RWiam ~ SuicUJ' ipC'Ikin&. amrW ubjeccsan: noc "phcnomma" in that they an not tnalW mIlW"lI; r.... t ld...........
dKy arc -fc7!W A tcCOnd pr1)bIm:o iI that ">pcrifoc" and .~" Iut moft" in c0mmon with Vii$Ul.ndhU'1 1IIII: of m.:.c IrnTU II. - 1 to di~nria" tht- 1ICOpc= of VI ",Iiris
p' .p" MoO...; ........ -r .,!",,"_ ......... '""1'..-.....;'1'. \Vh.ik "'"" .. _ _ con';"";"'''';n.
this nocion in Dipdp and DharmaJdni. il is ckal thaI tho: qo_io" of daKif1i", pmptr.
ties aoc:onlin, 10 dKU- tc:OfK illUbordiNllt to _ ...... 1" about distincion b.ucd upon per.
apO>ililY. apr-r'libililY and.. for Dt.arm.Wni, dIicxy. "This is QWKiody danonstnled in tho:
Ww:s rl.uit-tu foe- tho: ~ of ,he mini ~!"'f and ~""!"'f in Dharmaldrti.
PV).I..,.

47 'T"Ix dlanaumr.lion of puticulan II capUllt of .die Ii.oncrion is madr <II ~ poinl$,

indudina PVl.l..... and pvsv .JPVI.l70-17! {QI,.r-1l. S aho bdow. M.

48 S bdow, 91.

8<4

FOUNDATIONS OF D HAI.MAKI RTI 'S PH ILOSOPH Y

particulars}, and since only paniculars arc: ultimately real, anything mat
bib to produce an efJ".t is not ultimately real."

2.3

M OlT

on PQrhcularr

TIN Pnuptibk lIS UtnmAu/y R~.J

Th~ prindpl~

mat only particulars produce dfccu ~Iates closely to

Dharmakirti's throry of perception, for he maimains that perception is
ausal. That is, when a perception occun:, a 5Cnsory objt aas as a contributing aUK for the production of a cognition in which an "image"
(lilt.ir.)of that sensory object appears, Thus, in a balic sense, "perception"
(pNtytlJt,.) simply refers [0 a cognition with such an image, and since me
image is a mental event that occun prior to any judgment or in[~rpretation,
th~ usage or the t~rm "imag~" is similar 10 Ihal of "sense datum" in
Euroam~rican philosophy. For Dharmakirti, a perception is a source or
accurate knowledge about the SCIlSOry object because th~ perceptual cognition's image of th~ object corresponds lO the object. That is, inasmuch as
the image is eauscd by the objea:, the image may be said to have "me form
of th~ object" (.nhariip4); and as such. the image has a "similarity" (J4t/rfya)
to that object.:It This mtaJU tiur perceptions accurately rdkct the way their
objectS ailt, but it also means thai a perception is n"'f'C"nrily the effect or

49 The charac:ttriAlion of p"nicllbn U Qp>bk of !die funroon is maoK u ~ poinD,

indocii"l PV).I - J and PVSV ..... PVI.I70-111(C:tr,I- , ), O . Napromi (1 96~). 5 alto.
for cnmpk. PVSV ..... PVI.11Io-I1ub (G:I7,I-4l:
~

.,...tM
an.n.fII; 1Iifw

thai unique individ-w (,;;q.) .ktoo:;, th Hjm r-r""'1tiftJ,

tJm.r/ (i.,., .".,.".11] II,.

;,.,;, r.uN ,It,

I.Ht ,.~J .n.m..JJy

n.Ii~1

'_, '."J IWd.;"" u- it it. ;..mn.iM'(f"'''+'''!WJ.

AJJ MMIU -r",-.tt "NItrtUtOt lit .. m .." ill _ MftWin.II M ~ II{- [PVI.17Iccl71), It 1w.Imdy t-n toleel thar only rlw which it capable of rdie
'tD"r ' ~ .

funcuon .. a rul dunlo II ill unique ilKi'ridual (ICaIfdin& 10 othcn ~J.

1111 u-ry.". klnqwlf'
IIIr
_lt~!V'" itJ-1# f "'lIJiP1ri~ ...~ ,.~",~ ff(PVr"11c,.--qa1
N,u ~Uri wI . . .-.. i" M1nf / ... r-.uq. tfMo1.

[ mq. rw f ... nolrrbIt:f ,.". ."..",..,. ;,nr f

,...,.'!'

50 Dbarmakln:i docs nor dirudy de.cribc tho cut! proc.cu of pcrcqxion. bur IW c:auaI !h0Of}' with iu principk of c.onduioNl ~ (ml be p.:u...d from vuioua _
and
pasuccs. ind~ PV). I09, PVp41-141, rv' ,JOI- }l9. PV).m- }4I. 5ft alJo PYin .....
PVi .... ,.. (10" '>, J-,..i ... "'-f J.w,.. ',Ii . . . J-r 'IN J.o 1M pJ-o 1M,.; '"",.. '""

Jill _

DHARMAKIIlTl 'S METHOD AND O NTOLOGY

a,

itl objt.II In combination wi th the chim th:af only the ultim:atdy re:a.I is
cau.saIJy efficient. the ca.us:aI n:aturt of ptlccption underlies:an important
theorem in IU, system: only p:articul:an :arc perceptible. :and only the per
cqKible is ultimatdy real, AJrhough Dha.nnaldrti is typically d liptial in this
rtprd. he implies the following argument: first, a petaption i5 the effect
ofitl object, Scoond, only ullimatdy real mcicics produce dfccu, lbctdO~.
nnly ulrim:uely ~l enriries-p:micuhn__c::m ~ (hit: nbj<=:s nf p<"-n:q'>cion, for only uirim:atdy ral. entitics--p:an:iculan-producc dfecu, ~
~I

Set-. for c:umpk, PV).lJ.4;

&ape lOr ~ a ClUK, thrft it nodUnt: me thaI lhal could contriNl( &II mul)",
ban& the apprdIaIdtd oe;ea, Atncq 1M alllG of a~ dw aW( in ~
Umop: awvax.&rioa ilalkU <he "!'P'd ..udaI objo:a oI<ha. a~ , .... t" 'i
",,.., . . ~ ""_ .......,.., 1 "'IN h,JiI.T J " " ' .1IIIJb ~'" ..,...<rf.
I have foIJo-d M&IIo ... th&nillldiu'. pos. fur wr. (PVV;I96' "P''''''''); Dnm,
dnbo.ddhi (l"VP: I~ prorida IMgIou. rpt .".,.iMr_J.o. wNth.oowd per'

haf- rail ... M louI.

Drryfua h99T-,j6) appon 10 up tNl when Dtumuldrti dUm from Emma! R.aliun 10
EpiRnnK 1daIw... M abandon. W a ..... model of pcruption. Bul in f.a. Dbannakirti
w..pIy <kooieo m.. dw _ _ cf pt''''',......., ........... _'"""": h.r dos _..:oually d-r .....
_
cautf: mUll be: ~Itd. 00 tht. q,ia(ftlic Icblill ~. thai aUk iI tht. imprinl
("uJin IwamIGI (lee, for aampk, PV'.UrJ,I6).
~2 PcriupI

I>N.nnU.irti'. IIlOM ~ IUlenxnl of mil poinl is; -UiA:ma: is just pattp'

lion- IPVSV .. PVI." C '+IO: _ ' "
rf. SlhUkdln.rr 1~Jl.t I. nil
daim. ..i.kb mipl nom bo: JV>dc:mi "To mn it 10 t.. puetiwui, - indiala 1M doR rtblion be.... etU ptiIXpbon IlId the IIhilNfcly raJ ill Dtwm.akini', philotophy. To this_
add parpr dul specifytNC (II only patticubn produ dkcu; (II dw; oe;ea of a paap:
luai , _ ii, puticubr; 1)1 puapcwl a...vr:_ is rdalcd by pgaiUvc and ncptive

.,.IHJJJir,.,.;

objca in lhal il iI caUKd by lao objt: and (4J I I14jyoma/ if wvtal in

dial iI it incapable of
&II df'C(I. PV}.I _, it dw t.nG rlGiou for hI and bl. Paaup
rdcnnl w
and 14J induck;

conmmjWKC 10 ju

ul

cau.sinc

PV),S9: Thtrc if indtptndml .pprdlcnsion (i-.... paapcion IInmcdiucd by conapes) of mal objora wilh which, d"", 10 d.( ~ Clplcil)' of mal ob;ca. th.u aware_
ill rd.ucd Ihroup. P"'IM IlId nepi'lC"U ,ccnilllla. A. dUll! dial if oma INn
dw IlL, OM mal is 401 concomiwlI with 'W'ltmcsl in dw I'adUonI it lqoond Ihr
--- ,......wn.- J-"'" !
".,.."...rdiktJ I -.,.. , - , . r~'"

""-":rio' __

.~ .",..-.,;~ .

PViu .Ju (1flb?-IS)l1j: Then _ rwo kind. of ob;ecu (tmJ.). dx dircaly perpIlbk ~ and dw; mnott ~, or !hex two. dw ditealy ptrcqxibk it
dw 10 -..bich dw, form (u.,,,,oJ- .w,.JnI dx imag: in _ _ onnf'orrns Ihr-r;h
pnoilift and no:pOve eoow:onUlaIKI'. "if. wUqll(, real mintolW!ldy, me puricular.
TIx cxhn doc. 401 Nve d.( capoc:icy 10 direcd)' pIaa: ill own form in ........- .0 iI

...,1,.., ,.

bo: (dim:dyl puuMd (,.,.,.,. .. {yJ.MJ. (... ,.; - , . p]iJ ",oJ""P" ,.'"
D"" ,. # tit " P"I zIIrt ,. i ".."," ..... ~ ..,. '1"
,. iN" tIiutf JJ.r,. i rjn III . .0.",., ~,. _ .i "'''P'' III", . . I,u ,.; ." -...
C&nnoc

86

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTl 'S PH ILOSOPHY

In relation to this issue. Dharmakini makes some additional commcnu

thai , on Sakyabuddhi's interpretation, amount to a striking asscnion: every
ultimately real entity is perceived by some perceiver somewhere. Although
Sikyabuddhi's interpretacion may not be beyond doubt. another important
but 'oYCaker claim is explicit in the pas:sagc--namdy. that the capacity to
create a pcrccptKm of itsdfis the minimal telic function of which any ultimately real thing mWI be c:apable. H

_ ]i" ,. j . , . , , . i roflll Wi" ",....," ...." .,rJ M I pi- iii . . " ' . '" ,....,

"lIP" .;.,,.' _,." -.,,.1 pc:.tfo.-:n

~r,.",.,..u

'dwI,.",u ""1,

PV).JO: A unien;aI (:&/\IV)[ nom

tIM, tdic fwv:rion of Amply prodOOnc i
ImIOf)' lIWUCIIeIIofiadf. ADd p.eciody (tIW) IxaUK i. it irK'lpobkof.tw. illw no
narure (...v,.J [i. .... i. iI untmL d . PVP:l.4J1.sJ. lOt ohit incapecioy lOt rdic fUnction ill
dK dcfjnition of unrc:aI dUnp. (ju.........mJ.d.r.!'" ."~,,, .u nM 141 I tM

..I.

~ ,,.. -,.,.""',u.,-..~

S3 Noc~ dul pan of wiuo, it II JOb " - it tIK ~ iNuc: of ""'- it IIKaIIt by p".Q<pti.
bk" (~), fOr which Itt Kellner (1m). Tbt noOOA dw the poa:pobilily it tIM, millimal
relic cffiacy requiml of. FWtiwbr QHrIG frwn DbumakJn;', oom~tI ill PVSV .J
PVI.zll (G : 14,.U-lJO.~, w!I<'tt hc.aIJIIC' that an ~I thins'.
lion it "'" aUlCd, but
ill ;~I 10 dul W", iud( The I
sr mds:

We Qy the foIIowir,c: FOC' tho.e eLitrml Ihinp that. Iu.YinI beat knowrI (i.e. . per'
ca-I] II _linK by IOI'iXOIK, arc IlOl !lOW known. their OISAtion ill invariably COIl'
oomiwlI with their existtnce. They, 00"1 produoed, art aabli&bI UI be
impermanmt. The teaIOI\ fOr lhif it dw !he foIJowi"l is "'" poAibk: hi !hal tho.
thinp ~ dK ~ of produeinc an nnsmc::. of thenuod.a ya: bter (,.~), IIOC
Ita...;"' ......oed no 10"1" ptodooe such an - . OC' (1) that dwy -..Id dqKnd
upon ~ eke ill ordo:r UI produa: dw ....aIffM:II. NadKr of thac it poMibic
becauK dwy an: embIithed to 1u.V't the ~ of procfucins thai i W U - " And inon,,", at ....... thi"", ..., ........... ckpet>cko>.. 0<> od.c... to produce ...d:o. an _
no ~ of them wou.Id ~ ........ Apel dlClr is II!! 'I'cb real 'binl baz'lK cyqy
rqI rbinl is known h:r mint knam u IOlQC riQK and pin If dK thi", irl quarion
~ IlOl "'polk of ~ <he: .c& funaioa of pcoducin,an _
!ben il wouJd
IMX bn ral thlllI (-'"tl For. all I will czpIain ri.ll dK ~';"rf itt. real chinp
lint dul (.hiliry 1(1 prodooe an iwatnKII) all their Odini", clwxtcristic. \)or It.t/kil
......, ~ jMI4 _
... pu,-II ~ ..rth....,JM ..M.;'; ~ I .. ,..
~fJI!I~ / ... ",~ .......... itiJtU/It~~,_

....,.14 ... ~ ~ "',.nf1ff ( ~...~.,.". ~ I ,.. ... rqtt

/uMIkU It;I!'rij jUUI!' ,,;""rwg I ... ujN"."""'!' It;~ tin I
,.,...,.~"..n, ~ jUu ' jU-..k#"J.d"h'" ~ ~ _
...... Nt
.~ ~

~"I4liM" ~

_in Nkgi"';.1 .

Sikyabuddhi (PVT, ..,..:sa&If .. K:J)4.19ffl imu p'cLi dK undo:rIincd ph..... III mpotue UI
<he: ob;eruon, ~1IKfI would QOC be the: a.ae.".;m produd u OIi ty mal it IMX an objta of
kllo...tcd&c- ( ... "~,. ... .,..
Dw Ill! K: ". ,."" ~ .,.,.",
.'r ' ". OIJ_ .......". ~.l . H. do ... ",""......0. "oJ... io 1>O...d:o. ...... thin.s" to
mean "there iI GO such I Wr., due it IlOl all ob;ra ofk"o..
[PVf (..,..:Ja6):
/u

-JUt" * ... ",;

k.,"

DHARMAKI RTI'S M ETH OD AND ONTOLOCY

"
causal-

Now, thoe cb.ims about the relationships among ultimate reality,

ity and perception suggest another implicit d2i m: anything that is perceived is ultimatdy real. That is, if a perception occurs, some object has
acted as a cawe. Only ultim:udy real entities can act as a cawe. Hence, if
a perception occun, it necessarily has some ultimately real entity as its
object. This Sttf1U to make good KnK on Dharmakini's view. Nevenheleu. as it sands this d2im is pmhlematic, for it cnrrvs inrn cnnflicr with hi~
scantily <kvdopcd theory of illusion.
~ noted above, Dharmakini mainains that there a~ both conceptual
and nonconccpru.al fomu of illusion.)I In conceptual iUusion, the probkm
lies not with the: mechanism of perception, but with the sulmqlU'nt interpl'mltion-the: perceptual judgment-of the pre-interpretive image: in the
IOr.n50ry c.t>gni tio n . Th .. r is, on Dh .. rm.kin:i ' J ",i~ p""tcq>rion il :JW2Y'

devoid of conceptuality; in~rpmatioru or judgments such as -this is water"

JJn.,.

&4tr.,. .. _

ml1"'''
-;Ji",,(PVT:
fot,.. PVrp ("'"'6a.t): .Nt.,. -;Ji"
,.. but J({sJ4.)O): ... ui.....J~ ~_~ li".oJ ..,,)). Hena, m.e reuon. "be:awe rwry
lUI Will it known by IOmC known at _
Dint and place illdiellCl buic mjllimnmt
of raJ thinp; in dTa:t.. raJ thin .... be: puwu Ho ..e.u, thac twO doucd pb.-can
bt: read lhit ""y OlIly if me objtion Riled by $1kyabuddhi it wppOcd. 0tbm01sc. tht
ph.
'""' _
....J man: n~nlf7Jlr wi.h <he~ .. pNu.:. and o:bcy - ' d thcrd"ort
man: -lhac it ooJUCh [. raJ rhine. iL, one: ofwhid! the paapcion IIC\'Ct aual becaUlr:
~ry raJ mina ia " ' - " by _
tpific penon II acme specific time and pboe. " no., ..MatetnUII.....uw a rat thins mllR It kasc be: npol"" of ann. . . pe!ccption- wouJd then
mc:lfI WnpIy mat one: cannot apbift 1M OISA.tion 01 <he puapcio.. by fCaNQ( fO ill tr&ll
titiorl from I lIW\iku fO an urunanifm {bul .un mmnq lOt,.
Note: alto that ~i (PVP:1.4~ .JI'V).IO) rcpnu the: Ultl oo., thai the: abil
itylO ~J pac:tptio;l ofitadfia <he minimaltdicdtacr ~ re.I thinp ~vc: "Thinp
~11eMc .... 0'( me!dit: dfiacyof producinliUl3Willcne.u of~- I..."ti"" ill
JtytJ,.r~
'J ."; ..,, ~,. , _ _
JUt ........ PVV .J ciI. : ...ryJ

"""'fUt"

~~~,.,autwjU~ .

JJn,.

D"'''

H Cono:ponul and I\OClClOtoa:pcual puu:pc:.w iDlUion arc indudcd IInde. tht rPJU&I ate<
pyof-5pUriow paa:pOot,. r,..~1.r/Ms..). dacribcd by Dhannaldni M PV).1U: "'Thuc
ate lOut kiDdI of ~ pclapcioo: three kinds ofllClOOtJKual awuenca and one thaI is.
norw::oncq>n.W I~ thaI an- I'rotn cfurutbanca in rk physial bua. ,i.c., tht: &c
..Icy]."

I """~

...".....,jU_... .u~~

If ! _'"

I . ...-'. "......

~~

~.

~ (_,.uu...- /4.

no., mree rom. of ~ 5pUriow pc:la:ption Il'lUlDoncd in tM _

arr. "uroncow
awumCII" (Mri"tijUu). "ronvcnoon.alllincW-ie 1W:lm1CA- (~vrujU-). and " in~
entiallW3lmCU and .., on- (.,,-U;). "l"bc. (l.tCJOOa m: bMcd llpon DiI"iP" brief
IfGunmt of UfO. (PSI.I.~). We m: Q)named MfC only wid! "fflOlICOW ~

whido if IImIIiIr. form of pc:ra:pnW iUwion. All

Q;XS of nonconcrprual spuriow

all paa:pcual iUw.iona. For mo.e on Dbarnu.
klrti. docoryof urar, lD rdlrioo to o;pup., theory.:lIld iU~1Im1 IfIftrpfCQUOf\. I
Funayuna (1m).

DQl,"

pc:"'''pc;u.n c:anespond to what

_.....,..jd

88

FOUNDATIONS O F D HARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

or Mthis is a mirage- must occur after the perception. In the most rypical
form of a conceprual illusion. me image in perception arisa in such a way
that an unschooled person is confused by the similariry bctwcrn the perceived ob}t and some olher object. He thus superimposes (I<Imi-4nth)
some aspca of the similar object onto the perceived object. Hence. when
a penon unfamiliar with mirages sees a mirage. the similarity between the
mirage and water confuses the perceiver, and he superimposes the fact of
being "wan!r~ onto the mirage. lbc resulting judgmcnl. "this is water," is
a case of ronccprual iUusion. For our purposes. Ihe key issue bere is that the
nonconceprual content (i.e., the imagt') of that perception is not itself
Rawed. II is the fX:Icci\'tt's inability to correctly interprtt the image. and noc
the irmge itself, that is cawing the enor. On the basis of the same kind of
perccprual contan. a ~n with the correct mental conditioning--f.unilwiry with mirages-would not make that error. In other words, it is po$"
sible to distinguish a mirage and wata mcrdy by sight.II
In contrast, in a nonconttptual error the mechanism of the pen::eption
itself is fbwed in such a way that it becomes impossible to intcrprtt the
image corrtttly through a pcrcq>rual judgment about the issue in qu~
rion . Ooc cnrn~e cired by Dharmakini i5 the ap~(r ofhain in the
visual petctpOoru ofa person with cataracts; his basic point is that. in regard
10 me question of whether one is smng hairs, a judgment twed on percqxua1 conlenl cannol be corrcct.!O A correct interpretation through perceptual judgmenl is impossible because, with regard 10 the issue in question
{"Art. these hain~', a judgment that is COl1.linent with the image will not
cnablt' tht' peroen.-tt to act upon an objco that can function in a manna
consislent wilh that judgment. That is. in relation 10 whC'ther me perceiver
is scc.ing ha.in, a judgment based on the image itsdf will lead the pcrcciva
10 condudt: thai she is indeed smng ha.irs. Even if the pm:eiver determines
through other mam Ihat me is not sing ru,in. the pen:qnual image will
still Rp~IIT UllHhain; hentt, a judgment 1wI JUSt on the image will inter
pm it as an image ofha.in. Nevenhdcss, while the content of the perception always scc.ms to be hairs. if the percei\'tt cries (0 act on the judgmem
s s Dtw-makini dclcriba concqxual mor in PVSV .J PVI.,. H,b (G:4HI). For the
ncxion NI habitlWion condirions !he dctt:rmiNotiont m.: follow upon pcttt'ption.. tee, 100cumpk:. PV .fI; and PVSV M m. (G :)LI R) , u'&nA:aud in die _ d!apler (n.,,).

fmjumdy cUtd. 001 other aiCII include: the pcrccpOon ofalip.cirdc made by a quicklywhiricd Iotdt. me paapilon ofllftl as morin& &on. the pasp56 Thil caw it dx mot<

,;"'" of. pc_

'"""'ins _ . "-" and ........... ~ drccco....-l br dw: ;",L.'. _

of!he body'l hwnon. Sec NS ., .

8,

DHAJl.MAKI RTI'S MET HOD AND ONTOlOCY

that rhcy 2rc indeed h.airs. mc perceiver will not be 2blc to act on an object

th.at has ~ causa.l durwcristia apC'Cud of hairs: any attcmp[ to brwh

those "haiB~ 2way will &.il. It is in this seruc th.at 2 judgment consistcnt with
the imillt will nO( enablc thc perceiver to 2ct upon an J,jtct m,at can fune-rion in a manncr consisrcnt with m.at judgmcnt.
In citing a case such.as thc appearance of hairs to 2 person with cataracts,
Dh2rmwtri retnforttl tho!- ;n(~biliry of nonoonttpuul crro.., th~ du..
toned inugc (which lculs to misleading intcrprct2rions) comes from a p:u.
ticu1:u flaw, and .as long .as thc flaw remains inlact, it will always produce a
distorted im.agc.'7 Without removing the Raw. no othcr factor- increased
acuity. h.abiruation. graduatc studies in optometry- will prcvCnl thc dis
tonion. To PUt it anomcr way. evcn if an optometrist with catar.aCU gives
an honest rq><)rt of w6.1 ,h~ sees, th~ optOmetrUl will ':ly that .h~

tees

hairs. Thus, an a.pen in dcsctt travel can distinguish a mi~ from water
JUSt by looking ae thc spot in question; but a cat:u'aCtOus optometrist can
nOt distinguish bctwcc:n hain and certain cfkcu of cawacu jllS( by looking at thc hairUkc images appearing in his visual perception.
To rerum. thcn. to thc notion of thc pc:rccptiblc and thc uhim.atdy real,
D6.rmaIdrU', theory of nonconcqmW error rugsau ~I. despite the pl:au.

57 Thil point is made in PVJ.JS9-)61, whm:- Dharm&Itlrti diJaweJ the IUION fix daimin, dw the oubjcctIob;.a duality in our P",cw:pcio;u: .. ..:nWIy un-.l. Noc~ hen:: chat tM
kind of topition
aNa: from inmnal dlstonioCl" (.~ is comJNn::d 10 _
t'amiliar ilIl11iona (i.~, the QW'XI-hain iIIwioa), ud mal distortion ml$ tbcOlCf(M~ amounl
coa dcft in the mind or mental f.cuky ir.df, norher th3n a II>M: miKorumw ol'iu ob;ca.
The _
in qlKlCion tad II follows:

mat

Thinp do . - lllrinu.tdy luve W MNn [fIlCh all bans an ~ objt

~tMIiI~ dw they an ptiai....d to Iu-.c ....... mc they hive neithct a go.cuW'a m..Jriplicil_ ~ [PV},)S,].
- SuI ~ 10 -wJy COO'tUIUon (WI), dlK 10 upaicncilll_ Jimibmy,
an illusion an.. becaUK one demmiMs tNt ...tUch does noc hat such-and.....dt a
nawn all luvilll that iWW'C.. Bw in tho. aoc, that if noc poMibic becaUK on )'OIl!
..ww noc Cm 0fK mti.,. in the -'d iI ot..a-i 10 hive llul illtim' [or ba"l an
...... cl... ..Jo:,J "" .........

..a..;.:........t ...d.J. (rv,.~,.t.J.

11lft'e iI challtind illusion. bul theI-e iI alto the: one dw br its 1lI~ an..ibwo:d
ill dw it onpnalo::a; ffom an inu:ma/ d41onion (_~ ~ if W c:uc wilh the
pou:ption of luin by a P"1OII wilh CIW'IICU and 10 on, it conwru a hlK ~
appcanna withouf ckpcndinl upoa W ~Uon of Iimibri.,. and wc:h.
[PV).j6tcd-P'V).j61] IM.IN'"... ..mifJtt". ~,!",..". ~ I J-lrttU,.v.
~ w ~'!' tqJJ!f _ ~ U 14 1M) { "",Vi ~ IJn.Jllti, ~ 1
~"i WU""""",.OIlJ#j<_ ..",. ,., III ...n.1f4j j4p1J _i"" d.".,i
filMr-"'; I .fiJUf .",. ,. .",."..,.,w_IlilillM.. If 41,
,~,.
,,;,.~tiMbi..J I ~~ un.irUiw, /-1.
I .........

90

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKlRTl 'S PHILO SOPHY

sibility of consistcnt arguments to the contrary, IOmc pcrccprual imagea'

luve not hem produced by ultimately real objccu. But what then is the statUS of objem such as the - hain $C'Cfl by a person with cawaca? If they arc
not ultimately real. they arc nOl particulan, And since for Dharmakini.
thc only other type of object is univerWs, we should SUpJ'O'C that the
- hairs- arc univeruls. But in the c:au under consideration, the hair-like
image in cognition U: vivid, and Dharmakirti maintains that this U: true
only of perttprion of particu1an: the pei ccption of the color blue is vivid,
but the com eO[ of the conccptwl thought, "blue," is not." Docs this then
mean that we must invent lOme mird type of object, the object of flawed
pcrttptions?
To IOlve this problem Dharmakirti employs a philosophicaJ technique
that, as with the sliding K:a..le of analysis, U: crucial to his ontology. That is,
from one pcrtpective, ccnain entities arc not uhimatdy real, but from
another pcr1pcctivc. the $afJle entities ." ultimately real. In the cue of the
- hair seen with the cararacrow eye. Dharmakirri notc:l tlut it appears
vividly precisely bca.ust. even though wrongly interpmcd as "hair. tIN
imlltt itselfis stili _ mnllIli ntmt, and as such. tIN im4tt (not its cause) is a
mental particular. But when construed as the perception of an c:xtcrnal
objter that has the causal rnanaeristia cxpcacd of hair. the image is nor
a particular. What is important about this technique is that Dlurmakirri
allO applies it to conccptual.l.y collStruacd univcrsab. Construed :II entities
that arc instantiated in multiple particu1an, they arc not ultimately real.
But construed as mental events, they ." ul timately real."
Although much mo~ could be said on the notion of the pc:tttptible :II
ulrimatdy real, Ie!: us restrict owsdvcs 10 this final observation: ~n if (as
Sakyabuddhi maintains) the nature of the rdatioruhip bcr.. ccu pc:rttptibility and ultimate reality is sud! thai all ultimately real entities a~ neswily pcrceiv~, this dots not aBow us 10 condtuk thaI objcca thai arc not

vivid ~ it ~
wMdItt Ie be 0CQl/'rl1ll1n 1M mlnd 01_ who it &Ikep or ~wakc.. And an ~ !hat "'
ocherwiK [namdy. 110{ vivid,Jio nonc:onccpc.w. ~dxr rhc mpDer ~ incithathcliupi",or wWnlru~ -I,.."."..w- .,.".,.w.~~itti l ~ ,.;mj" , JhqlN!1

SI.5. (or cumpk. PV}.I99: "M

IWlnftC:II

wid!

..,.,...._.

S9 Fw all ofrhc ~atpnn>" _ PV}.]-Io, u-ansIa,eci in appmdiI; U9rm). This qummt appeuIlO rae on ~', IQ;mnml, ~i ~"nh YfJ ,""",,, ..~
(PSI.I.7'lb). Noe aIJo tho! sli~ ben; iM:('fOun object md imaF- u-1Iy, in tpQkins of
.... ucf'ion _wo nd ....... oa.;.a IObo.~~ ., -'N;' ....... _01 ............ H _ ,
ho u , we ~ tpe"kina of tIM ~ iMlt and 110{ ia C&.w, _ a pvticubr.

,.

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD AN D O NTOLOGY

pe,aptible to .wi are neuSSlrily nonaistent. That is. although the object
itself mwt act' as a cause, a perceiver's perc:eprua12CUity is also a causal fac..
tor in perception. Hence, since that aC\Jity v:uia, an individual perceiver
cannot definitively condude whether an entity that is bt:yond his pc:rccpruaI abaitics docs or docs no. w.u."
T'IN U/ri"..uIy /Utd III ltu%J'rnsibJe lind MtJmnJlM]

We have Sttn dut the rdationship bttwctn causal efficiency and ultimate
rc:ality is imponant to Dharmakirti', notion of perception: since perception
is a causal process, only a causally efficient entity can be perceived. And in
order to be ultimately real, an entity mwt be perceptible; hence. only
e>I,lJ::l.Il y efficir.nr enriri~p~nicul~T1! Illtim~tdy mi.
The relationship berwttn causal efficiency and ultima.e reality also
underlics ('NO other, interrdated dainu made by Dharmakitti: lil'Sl, dut
particula.rs are not the objectS of concepruaJ thought or language. and second that particulan cannot endure for more than one ins.ant. Particulars,
in other words, must be ino:prusible and momentai)'. These (WO dainu
.tand in ~ nnightfcnwa.rd rdationship: on the one hand., an endty directly
apresed by thought and language cannot dunge; on me omer hand, a
causallyeffic::ient entity mwt change. Hence, since partic::ulars are pc:rceptible, mey mwt be causally efficiem; and since causally efficient entities
mwt change, partic::ulars cannot be what is directly apresed by concrprua1
thought and language. We mwt add here the further spccific::ation dut if a
partic::ular changes. it mwt change at f::fery innam and thus be mommt::uy. We will disc:ua m il poim monly, bur first 1ft w coru.i<ier how iI u
that, for Pramilp. Theorists, c::hange is incompatible with c::onc::eptua.l
thought and language.
For South Asian philolOphen of Dharmakirti's era, the referential
funalon (prllurm) of the c::oncept or word "c::ow," for aample, would fail
if an individu.a! (lIJ4kti) that we all a "cow" lacked an unc::hanging aspect
t h:u is the ume in :ill in$t:lncn. Without thai unch:lnging umeneu, the
60 O . TtIInnana (I~. And _ PVSV ,",?Va.!,-, when: O+oamWrirti

noteS:

In acruaIil)' (- . J . ~. a dUng that .. l'1(li bftna PC:":"; ~ is ~ a isrml

not nonaiattnt bta" 'C 011 the ont band, I:ftII eJIWI( tbinp m;y.t QOI b., pcrori-'
" cmain timc:s dw to ba:ing q>istmUc&lly I'UIlCn in fttmJ of rha:ir narun: and 10 0<1,
and beoux Oft ~ orha hand. rtw IIOftpaa pcion is tqU&lIy I(l in dw: ax oJ nona;.
iRan lhlnp aIio. IG:lol.llff. _ _ ". ",",?k""Jll_ .."",,,
1 _ _ qi
_f& ' Ji..,.,rd,,'1iI ~ "",."u-t&" UlJhAlDqi n.9wtlthl.

_II

91

FOUNDATI ON S O F DHAlMAKIRTl 'S PH ILOSOPHY

individual or entity that we aU a cow" would be one thing now, and after
2 change in which no sameness continues, Wt "ww" wouJd no longer be
2 cow, In short. mere mwt be some continuity rllnvlIJ4) th2t accounts for
twO f:acts: since we can corrccdy call that individual a cow" over the entire
dun.tion of ia existence, something about the individual must remain the
same over time such that it can always be: called a "cow," And sincc ~ can
also corrc:cdy rc:oogniu other individuals as being a "cow," then: must be
something the same about all those individuals, despite their m:any differences, Wt allows w to corttCtly call c:ach of them a
The alleged
entity that ac:c:ounu in both ways for this samencss is a universal" (s.lm4nJil. Urn', erc.), and it is the fact thar c:ach cow-individual somehow insrantiates the universal cowness" th.u allows us :always to call such an individual
2 "cow," If ~ consider a universal such as "cowncss" to sommow exiu in
distinction from the individuals themselves, we can easily allow for the
many differences among individual cows, md we can allow for the m:any
changes that:an individual cow undergoes over time, Despite such ch:anges
:and variations. the univusal "cownes.s" that each row inswulares remains
the same. and inasmuch as each oow-individual alwaY' instantiates the universal "cownen," each one can always be coruoc::dy callffi a "cow," As long
as we can assert univcrs:a1s in this fashion, the cb:angcs:and variations among
individuals will not vitiate the sameness uquired by thought:and lan~
Suppose. bowcvcr, that me universal cowncss" iuelf were to change in
such 2 m:annet that what was once cowncss" now became something omer
than "covmess," In that case, an individual which a momcot ago inst1nuated the universal "cowness" would suddenly instantiate some univtnal
that wed to be cowncss," bur now has become 2 non-cowncss universal,
such as "honencss," Hence, what was a moment ago ealJed a cow" should
now be called a "horse," Neither Dh:mnal6ni nor :any of his opponents
wouJd maintain Wt what was oncc corrccdy calJed a "cow" could in the
vel}' next moment be suddcoly and correcdy called 2 "horse," For mese
and other such m.sons, a univusal cannot change precisdy because it is
mrough direct reftttnoe to a univtrul that mought 2nd language can indirectly rekr to me individuals that irutantiate it,"

"ww:

61 SIx. for eumpk. PVSV .JPVI ,I~

(C:~. lll1):

II is cbimcd dw a univasai ill pnnw.al[ ~ux if;1 ~ impamanmt, it -.1d

noc be !he: Arnt (-*".J in aU insanas btaux one mill! [i.e.. the Wli~l -.1d
...... [in d.. fU.
and..-he. [.... , _lUna diKw.n. tN.n d.. ....; __11
...ouJd.n..e [in !he tIGI mamall], ThaC:Ult, thec:opkion olia inmncau the an>(

_.J

DH .... RM .... KI RTI S MET HOD ....ND ONT OLOGY

9J

Implicit he", is the auumption tim any changt: in me univetUl mWt be:
a change in its idenu[}'; that is, if the univl:'rsal oowness" changes in any
way at all, men il has changro into something other than the universal
oowness.- We do nOt have Ihe luxury here of claiming that me universal
can change in some of irs accidenral propenies and remain unchangro in
ia essential properties. We cannOt Opl for such a solution b:ause: univefull on he:ir nn pm~rTi~ ar all , wherh~ we cmuider them in ternu nf thl:'
l ul>stantialisl ontologies of mosl non-Buddhist Soulh Asian systems or in
temu of Dharmwni's nominalist theory of universals.O: Hence, since it
cannot manifest change through some alteration in accidenw properties,
if a uni~ changes, it essentially changes, which is to say thai it becomes
50mething dse, In shon , if "cowness- changes, it becomes a univerul that
~hou ld ~ insr.> nfi ~ ~

in

indi"id,,~ll .har

weff' nncl' .. nWl'. hll' nnw aff' nn

longer cows.
Thus, in order for the mcrcntw function of language and thought to
suc:eced, univcrsals cannOt change. On Dharmakini's view, hov-ner, if universals do nOt change, then they cannot have any causal efficiency bc:cause
in order 10 function cau.sally, an enrity mU$( change. That is, if an entity
cannot change, then ifit i$ not currently producing an efha. it will n"",~
produce an e/Tect. It could not produce an effect becaw:e an unchanging
enu')' that is nOt currt'ntiy in the stllte of producing an dfea cannOt change
from the state of nOt acting as a cause into the na~ of acti ng as a cause:.
Alternatively, if an unchanging entity were to produce effects, it would

i".,,_

......,Id """ boo 1""",;bIo!. i"" .......

(IJ,.,U) ""n....,. ................. induu""'" *
copition. r,,~ iii ~'" igtftr I tI"u,.tfIt ~"."" INul/Jil ~

tUf'tlfJtIJ>IJ"th II.
l'he ~ dw a uniwn:aI ""'" in _ _ bo:CO<L$~' or undw.P"t: nw duor'gMo' ( tht
diffMnl rtnndo ofSouch Alian philo.ophy. It appean 00 lqin wid. m. gnmmarianl:. as in
K.il)'lyalu" wdIknown phruc ITom !he fiflt v",,,,;u, "If tht rdarion bmoccn aptaAon
andob;m (tInhtI)is ....w.!;lhed (...:.tJhrt ItIWrn.I....,"''''''''M ... (d. 8Wdcau 1~'S), In dx
variotu inlcrpmacioru: eo<Uidcro:d by Pau.tlj,Ji in hisfUbKqr.lm( commentary.
common
!heme: is !hal 'ia eaobIisbcd" (~ m LUI <nean 'is permanenl' ("i".). In tcnns of
ob;.a (nrJ.), Paafljali ra:.onh two aide. u. 1hr drilatc: Vippi)'VLA. for whom a c:bu propmy (~) is m. ob;ca. and Vyi4i. for whom dx object is a .oo.12IlU (.,.,."..) (Sdwf
' 996:4111). h depicted I I Inc Oillln of tht M"""'~
m. uanslat ion in Biardt.iu
I ?"n~ffl. each A.x suppoIU iu cbim by noanS dw the cntiry!My iddur;e as
object "
pcrmanml, while- me her cn ary is Unpcrrn2llUlt, It" thus cka. ,hal. ir PaWljali', drilala
rdka early pwnnucial conmru. IIx ~ 01 dw ob;ea u permanenl _ oenmil<) me carliat layc:rof phibophy of~;n South Alia.

m.

(_

62 Sec below, 116.

m.

m.

FO UNDATI O NS OF DHAIlMAK i RTI' S PHI LOSOP HY

have to produce all of itli effectli simultaneously in every momem , since it

could never leave [he causal state. He.nce, if an unchanging entity wcrt: to
produce a pc:lCC:prwd image as iu effc.ct in o ne's mind, then one would nec
essarily ~rttivt' that entity continuously for eternity. These absu rdities
indicate that unchanging entities, such :1.5 universals, canno t produce any
effects. including pc:rccprwd images."
We have seen th us far [hat, fo r Dharmakini, universals cannot be
causally dficient because causa.l efficiency uquires dunge, but universals
cannot chan~. And since: universals have no causal efficiency, they canna!
be ~rccivtd, since: the ~n::cprua1 image (or sense datum) is an effect of the
e ntity that is considem:l the object of ~rceprion . But unlike univerub,
paniculars Cliff be perceived bttaU$f: they can participate in Ihe causal
process that is pcrttption; and since they art thus causally dficient, they
must change." In this fashion . Dharmakini argues [hat particulars must
change. but he wishes 10 do more Ihan that: he also argues that the dunge
in qucstion is a complete change that OCCUlt instanr.an~usly. In other
words, not only do particulan change, but they change entirely at every
instant: they :ue momentary (~!,jk"),
To argue that change requires momentariness, Dharmakini rcsoru 10 a

63 Soc, 1Or~. tho. argumttIi apilVl the puapJon of pnmanml ~ in PVJ.llff.

The pivocal aX (PVJ.lI) in this ~l n:ads:: "'131 pnnunen. uni~ .~. is capo'
bkof producin&a cosnilMln ofiudr .. ooly li.~ . alw.t,..J eopabk.lf. 00 u.., IKhtt hmd. I. is
lOmnima in(:;lp.>bk of producin& Ibi ooptirioo hen i. iii a1wa,.. inc.pabk of doi"fi to."
linu.u jUMplUN1 ~'!' ~". ,... lilt / .,th4J.,!-t:II'!' !-~ mI,u"j.r.,'!' unuJ,U".

fII. /..,.

AtJultWnu obou. c~ and ...ual offi""'Y '"" ..t.o ....-.uneR. 'n O .....""""n... coitioq ....
ofl - pcmwICfIt" {1Ji".. ~~cmaI : ' unchangins1 God at worid-acaiOf (PV1J...9and 1)-)0).
lbc:to: arsulUna often re&C noc only on the IIOIlon eN. pnnw>ml thlnp ClnOOI be modi
6ed by elx addition ~ ~bo:ra(lioo of qualiciet.. bul abo thai produaion q Kq\la"i~ and dUI
teqUCflriallty prauppo6CI dunv. I han':wumtd thae la1m' cwo axioms for .he p~ta
lion~. Soc PV1..4Jab (a. Nopomi 1911): 'En.;la dw oiJ< in '''""porU ~do 001
Of'i&iIUICfrom the POIIXI{1OIcia). and ,hal which c:&nnOI: be modific.d ClI\noIlkpcnd upon.
JUPPl>t'iinr; oondi.iona" 11flkr....., ~".i~ No.iW"." ~!"4tl . Soc abo PVSV.,J
PV.l" (G:rn.l4ff) [.w". '''l'1li' ~t:II"",""Mh4101'" dfrdA""'!' *.,"-!-ri, ,obou,.,,'!'

,*~lJip'" ."u~~ "', Chhcr ~ induck PV . j S ""PVSV .,J

rit.. (G:u.wfl) and H B (c'I- , , ' .~ ' . J). Soc Scrinkdlnct (1961) and Octke (199) .

601 Bdow _ will_ thai. 00 Dlurmakini', n.w. a univcrAI is oonscNCiled by (ONtruin&a

casni1i..r: image in ccm\I oil rqillion. 11x ~ _nl$ fol the pnmommal conum in
conapruaI and linsui*tk qtIi.ions; the nqarion iICCOWIiI for u.., ditnibucion requim:l by
!housh' and Ian~. On duo theory. the uniwnal .... i..,. is indd QUlaIly df'.....cioou,
.nd .. oudo.. it ... p-"Oadar. Bo,.. w'-' ~ved in <hi. _ y. i ... no< di ....l!u ,ed.,...d i. i.
IhcrJot., no< aaU1lJy a u.uv......l ba:a ..... il bc:Iuo d;'uibu.ion. 5 bdow. ,,)fr.

.,

DHARM AKIRTI'S MET HOD AND ONTOLOGY

Uy

mcory. any properties (sva6h4_) predicable of a particular (or of an

entity ~ucible to paniculan) mw! actually be identical to the panicuIar(s) in question. That is, we may oorrtiy speak of a thing as iuving prop-ertics; we can corrccdy laY, ~Th is p;per is white:" As we shall l:n er sec, this
type of st2temcm is correct in that it conforms to the causal ciuracteristia
of the entity in question. Neverthd(SS, the statement is misleading in that
it sUg&eia a distinction between a propeny (white ~) and the thing that
possesses Ihe property r lhis paper-). In fact, that distinction is unrcal ;
instead. properties arc actually identical to the: property-possessor that they
qualify. Without going inlO detail. ~ can nore that Dharmakirti's justification fur this opinion rests on his critique of relations. inasmuch as one
cannot specify whether hyposrasiud propenies arc the same as or different
from rhe rn\re"y-~sor r.h~t rh~ :>1I~ly qU:llify.61
In rejecting any real distinction betwttn a thing's propenies and the
thing i~l f, Dharmakini holds [hat the apparent distinction betwccn a
thing and its pro perties is actually a result of the process of conceptual
abstraction that we employ in order to speak about a thing's causal characteristics. One conceptually abstracts and construcu the property ~ bl ue."
for e:umple. from a blue_arom in order (0 focu l on the bhlc-:>tom'. capacity to p:lrticip:lte in the production of a blue image in a pcrceprual cogni_
tion. In fact , however, there is no property "blue" that is distinct from tbe
atom iudf." In tenns of change, this theory of properties makes it impossible to claim that the atom could somehow remain the same alom and yet
undergo a
in one orits propenies: a bluc-atom cannOl: become white
and yet retain its identity as the same atom. The implicit argument here is
dut if:my property or the :Hom d'l:lngts, then the :>tOm iuelf mw t ch:mge,
because me property is actually identical to the atom. H ence, ir the atOm
changes in cauW ternt5--Cither because it starts to produce an effect or it
stops doingso--then tbe atom itsdf mWt "change" in that it cca.scs to be
the: same atom; in this sense. a ~change" in (he atom acru.aIly means the ces-lation or the atom.

crumgc

6) T1w: rcnnal uyLe of aitiquc tmployal by Dbarrnakini . 0 rdiI.., hypoil<aliwl t,"icia Iw

bem di ..... ,lvd~. ,.;ff. Dluffnakinf. ipCrific position on
non ..diltinction or prop-min and ",ot''''''''''' .... on iI fOund. for aampk, a. PVI.4J and PVSV .J til. (G:~. 1fI)
and .... pVl.p -n (G;19.IG-JI.4). Thil theory il a crucial ~I in his '"'!""lent for
l,1l>I'
of one ",opary ("",MiN)~ niden for anodw:. ",OP"'I1. Stt
nat chapm.

66 Some- dealll of thil ....-. of ~bttnetion OK cIiJcwxd in 1M nat chapttr; 1M moll rtlenol ~ in OhannaltIrti'. wurk II PV' .s!r60 and PVSV "rlr., l!1lNbted bdow (ch.4,
n.l.4).

96

FOU NDATI O N S O F DHAlMAKI RT I'S PH ILO SOPHY

Before we explore the issue of change and cessation further . we should

first noce mat when Dhannakini argues agaiNt any real dininction be[V;een
propenies and the mings mat possess them, he f'requendy mentioN a corollary. mat wruuever causes the ming must also be: me cause of all its propenies, since me propenies are nothing but the thing iuclf.17 This follows
simply from the notion that. ana the thing has ariKn. whatC'Ver comes
into existencc after that thing must be: something omer than mat thing.
And since it is other man the ming, on Dharmakini's view it annot corrt.ly Ix: count~ as a property of the thing. since the properties must Ix:
idcnrical (0 that thing.
With all this in mind, let us schematically restate the relevant aspects of
Dhannakini', th~f)' of properties: if we can correctly predicate property
)( of thing then )( mun be: idcntiallo B. Hence:. if any propcny )( were
10 come into exu-tena (be newly predicable of B). it is B iuclf thaI musl be:
coming into existence:; and if any propmy)(wcrc to cc:asc 10 exist (no longer
be: predicable of B). ,hen B iudf must cc:asc 10 exist_
By restating Dharmwni's th~f)' of properties in this fashion , we an
more ckarly Itt how it applies to the: issue of momentariness. Let us:wwoe
Dharmakini is correa when he PY' that propenies are not actually difl'etent from property-posscssors. In that case, an entity that we can correctly
say ~ perdures (i.e., remains the same over time) must be one tru.t initially
aro5C in that fashion . Since the abstracted property called Mperdurancc" is
actually nOt different from the thing itself, in order for the thing to no
longer be correctly called Mpcrdurant: the thing iudf must cc:a5C BUI since
me thing is perdurant, how could it ever cease? That is. to no longer be
called "pcrdurant" the thing must cca$C' , but since the thing has ari5Cn as
something that we can correaly w l - perdurant" (i.e., continuing without
change), it therefore cannot cc:asc. And sinct it cannol cc:ase, it cannot
change. We know, h~r, that some things do indeed change. since we

67 Dharmwrti mda mil point II I numba of pIxa. indudillB th( discussion of momm",,';MiI al PVI .)) and PVSV "" ti... ...t.m: he mn.arb.1Or aampk. 11 ill'IOI com'CI thai a
qw1iry wIUch ia I'lOl csublisMd whm tofM chi ns is nabliJhe:I if 1 ",oper!)' oi dlal thi~
nor can _ ay mal q...... ,ty ~ a ..- ~ dilrnml /tom 1M auaa of _
thi", is a
"'<>pUlf of dlll dUns.. (G W.l~U: ... hi _ ill.ug,.1fM Rig-... .,.,,~ "" Will>.Mb.~ .

1lw: faa mat aU 1M F"openia: pmliabk of. thin,OOfnC: into ~ with thai thinS
is tM on rolopal buillOr Dhmnol.k.im, daim tNt one: proP..,I, an t>:n'f M ,nVlliabk m..
den for anotha plOPC:II,. and ;1 if implicil in 1M oft tcpnted phflS( MtiNIlliITilo",.JJ,j1l
(i ...... .....

dw po P '"'1

.0

be p ... . ~ ..

io "l .. YUiably _

, mi ..... wid. dw...- pracncc" of

1M proputy addllad iN utOc:rcc). S 1M ~ di.tawion below in ch:.pI~ J.

DHARMAKI RTI 'S M ET HOD AND ONTOLOGY

97

have ~rttptions of mem only at spC'C ific times and places (and not at all
times and places). S in ~ thOSoC' thinS' change. mey mU$t cease; and Ji n~
those things ~, they must nOl iK: perduram. Moreover, if those things
arc not perdUl'anI, they must arise:u nOI perdun nl (i.e. , not unceasing).
And since: things arise as not ~rdur.tJn, they cannO[ exist over time, which
mC'aJU that me')' mwt immroiatdy ceue. Therefore, all petttptible thingswhich means all cau..tally efficient things-mwt Ix: momenury (/q4l1iltll):
they endure for only an instant (~!"l).M
If ~ construe these: arguments about momentariness with the require
ment for the constancy of an a prasion's object (lItbdliTtIut), we an Stt
that. if particulars mw t Ix: constantJy in flux Ix:c.awc they are causally effi
cient, men particulars cannot ~ the objecu of thought and language pre
civ:Jy keaLLY. they M nnTperdu","" Th L L~. ,.lrhnugh Oh,.rm,.kim 1'I'I:Iy Ix: l...u
than explicit on this point. the awal efficiency of particulars underlies the
claim that they are inexpressible.
68

a. PV5V a'PVl.1b

(G: .,.ufJ). ln thU Kaion

m.

1 1u~

presented 1M IrJUn'lmt for

m.

lIK>mCIlw1nao in a way maL ;, meant 10 bridsc

afJ"mml a)nenning
cawdco.nca
of caution (..m.u..)with d~ afJ"mcnl for momenw1nal from cximnoe (i.e.,
to-aIkd
" , _..---. _ ~.J1y ()"d,., '99) r- an .,...,."i- t~ .........) . ~n"01I ..... (,' ") ....
~ed mal the IfJtUnlm l from ainma: ill mort prominall in DlunmkIni', Iala faTS,
bul be dearly don rIO( mean to vitia(1: rh.c: strong roruinLLiry mal 1'UJlS 1:oo:1 .. u
rdi,.",.
rion of any QWC' for a:waUon, on 1M OM lund. and
arcuma ll from cxlRma:, on
other, l1w COfLrinWty oprillP from Dhannakirti'l rheory of ptoperrics U;I n:U.ICl IOawaI
iry and pm:cprion. 1I is ill
~ dw _ _ borh arsummtl in PV and PVSV, ~
Dhanna.kini fIOII only rdilla aLiX'd assaOOn , bul he also maka a.lcnsi~ UK of !he uxu
menl 110m aillmU (PVSV .II PVI.I,l.-I9'r. G:'7. t8- loo.Ui). Orhcr.1as a lmsr,." P''''V''
indude:

m.

m.

m.

m.

w.

/'VI.II(>: ~6ItttU". ... _~.tmrt. " "" 1 W'JI'~ riA7,wU'I]4nIM'!I df;t

~1WfI1Wl Hand PVSV .J til. {G:,,,,lt--I.J}. ..~ ~~n.. tw lOI_

n.n....~~.. JJ.r-~~~ ..1Ni..,,,..m!I. Stt We PVSV iii

PVI.I17 (G:".17): ,.Ji umw'lfl ""i"._ "":!If1Tll oJ /,nvf. ~I }, and PVSV '"
PVI.ISllb (G :U,.l)-lS): _".". ,.~u'!l P-"'I"1"'!' b "-!t _ w i ~
IrJ ""j".,.. ..".m_ I!tt.WtiJ M.nwi I ... . ", lbJ",iulW JlfmWIJII MWi..;,.__
"uj,, ~

'V.

Note ol.o ...... o.eyn.. ('lm',~

anne; KJ... .!p' ~ ",toI..ut. s.. oI<ro ~'.. ";"n ...
DhamuJdl'1i', UK of"rwo comradiaory meaning of cfuimqr.llion (.. ,,;~ 10 uidr.' ru.
onhodox advasaricr into waning 10 his 1tJUI'M"1. Theil: IWO !OWlinp an: "ton>ething
m ill in rh.c: proa:u of dippparing' and "the mon: LIRI-lI tonno!lliioo of d~ rona:pr,
it, mal ' ming has already teUcd 10 be." HO"!'CI, if the is such an ambiguiry, il appan
fO ~ mLKh cxac.abaled by rh.c: Tihtun lI't11sLu;O<U. ..mid. oftcn F.ail10 dilorinpisb ide
quueIy b" c:c:n diff'cn:nl Icmu and pamrnatiaI forms in SamJuit. Stt. for alUllpiC. 1M
Tibcan IJ'IlUblion ofPVI.I,J and PVSV ad ot. (G:,s.6-1: PVSV D:)I~) who:,,;NIIIf
ill ,rambled ... Jit,.. and "'-q."WJ. 1If-rw,,,;u>d /SIfhw", an: :aU IramUU'Ci as }it,.J
IIP"I tJnJ ~"I&.

mil

98

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

We have juS! Sttn that, , intt paniculars an: o,usally efficient, Ih~ mWI ~
inexpressible and momentary. Tbis ontological rtquin:mcnl emlxds particulan in Ihe KgUbriry of causa.lity, and it mw gu;tranlcu tnal pc:. ec;prions
arc: nOI just random. Paniculan, ho'NC'o'u , mUSI also conrorm to ,he: dictat~
of reductive reasoning, and they thus mwt ~ irrc:ducible. Moreover. on our
rtlding of the commennricr 10 Dharmakirri', work, thc itttducibiliry of
particulan requires mat they lack spatial exlension. In our di5CWSion or
Dharmakini's philoJophical method, \W: n(Ked thaI other interpreten do
nOI accq>t lhill view; Drcyfw., for aample. maintains ,hat what he calls the
"alternative vi~. " which :mribul~ sp,uial cxtcnsion to panKulars, is a
poIition ( 0 which Dharmakini mak~ an ontoloeical commitment in at
least lOme comexrs. We will now examine this issue in greater delail
To recap some points made: ClItliu, we should n(Xc that for Dreyfus, the
"sundard interpretation" is what he calls the "Saurrintib " position: rttI
external objt'CU (bihytinhas) exist, and thOK objt'CU have no spatial exten,ion; they are, in shon. infinit~ima.l particles (p4mm4!'I4). This is what we
haVl: called "Exlernal Rali.Jm. In OOOlr.uc. , Dreyfus::oho idcnuflC:f an "alternarM view." whtrmy external parriculan: may have sp.aci.al extension. Dreyfus arguts that, while the srandard interprtllllion may be primary for
Dharmakini, Ihe alternative interprtt:uion nC'Venheless forms pan of his
onmlogy.MA curiow aspect of Dreyfus' approach to the "alternative view"
ill the cla.im that he is "not arguing thai this is Dharmakini's vi~, but.
ramer. thai this vi~ is prescnt in his work." Dreyfus does not mean
Dharmakini ,imply memioll$ Ihis vi~. fo r DharmalUrti frequently cil~
views specific:ally for the purpose: of rejecting them. Instead, Dreyfus means
that tht" alternative view is acccptnt (at least implicitly) by Dh:llTl'lilini in
lOme case where Exlernal Realism (the ~'nndard view") is IOmehow inadequate, and thai in such cases, Dharmalcirti employs the alternative view
without dearly rejecting or embtacing it.
In the section on method. we noted thai Dreyfus across levels of analysis reminds w to resist any tempt:u ion to formulate a systematic uniry in
Dharmakirti's work. Dharmakini's method is such that he: is not only permined, but is indeed (lMp!o argue from positions that he wiU CVC!nrually
aNndon, if his 5CXeriological project is 10 succeed.. Neverthelc:ss. we also
argued thaI DharmalUrti'. thought cannot be: so disjointed that. wht"n argu-

mal

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD AND O NTO LO GY

ing from an ontological srance that he will abandon. that same ontological
SUJlce itself exhibiu .uch:oJ, drgrrr ofinCOMrencr thai il is no longer clear
what onr should critiqur when making thr transition to a higher Irvd of
analysis. In otmr words, even though Dharnukirti', Exlrrnal Realism dots
not providr a fully unifiro and systematic ontology. he nevmhdess is quite
dear on thr issues that COUnt when we mo~'r from External Realism to
Epinemir:

ldel1ri.~m.

And what issues do COUnt ? A full reckoning would require a close c:xamination of what Dharmaldrti and his commenr:uors mean by Eputemic
Idc:alism. and we will not attempt that prodigious task hert:. Ncvmhdcss.
we can fint naIr that , when Dharmaldni applies an Epistemic Idealist eridque to External Realism in his PrlfmA!'avdm;kll, he does so whrn pre~nrins the Exurnal Rral iu rellpon ~ 10 a problem in ,he theory or
prtuption. In brief, thr problrm is that thr objrcu of prrcrption srrm to
exhibit at least some spatial extension. but mrrrologically rrductivr rn,soning suggesu that only infinitesimal partides, which lack spacial extension, can be truly real. We will shortly Stt that in this context. Dharnukirti
as Extrmal Ralist has every opportunity to resort to the alternative interprer.llion to solve th:u problem. Nevenheless, he chooses 10 avoid the
alternative interpretation. What is mon important here is that the very
concerns mal lead him to avoid the easy solution posed by me a1trmative
interprer.uion arc prrcisrly thr conerrm that lead him to abandon External Realism ahognher. In other words, WI:' srr a Strong dtgrtt of consistency in the move from External RcaJism to Epistemic Idealism: nOI a
consistcncy of ontological commitmcnt , but rathcr a consistcncy in stylc
or 'CIl$Oning.
Oreyfw agrees mat thc alternacive view becomes rdevant in mc context
of peruption. That is, on the: one hand. External Realism (Dreyfus' " St:U'l dard view") oprtatCS on a principle of ontological parsimony thar rtduces
all u1tim:udy real physical cmilies to infinitesimal particles (pttntmA!'I4),
which have no spatial cxtension. But on thc other hand, DhannaJcjni', theory or ~ption mainrai.u that indivi.iu.al inlinitO!$ima.l ~ides are nOt
pm:cptiblc to ordin:lf}' persons; ilUtcad, only "aggieg:ucd" (l4'!'OI4) infinitesimal pan;des a~ prrttived, and the mntcnt or appearance in peittption
is therefore extended. According to Dreyfus, Dharmmni dcili wim the
problem by implicitly introducing the "alternative view," whttcby Dharmakini concludes mal spadally extl:n<kd, rc:aI physical cntities do exist. Drcyfw nOtCii that th is issue becomes most acute in an argument that appears at
PV}.194- 2.1.... although we will $CC mat mc Swvrtti on PVI .lj7<'42 is aho

100

FOUND.... T10NS OF DHAkM ....KIII.T! S PHILOSOP H Y

panicubrl.y rt'icvant." For Drq'fus, it is in tht formtt pungt that Dharmakini rnahs an ali~ conoeuion to c:um<ied tntities. Ironically, ~ wiU
argue that it is prtt:iscly this samt passage that demonSlra.tes Dtwmakirti's
rt'jection of tht altunativt vi~ . Let us turn now to this passage.
In considering PV).t94-1l..i. we should fiftt note due the basis of
Dharmaldni's diffiruhy is, as Dreyfus notes, an app;rrttlt I2ck of congrutnct lKr~ tXli tht pbmomenal contel'lt (i.t .. mt i~) in ptotctption and
Dharmakini', account of what ClU5CS that contt nl.n This s:ming
incongrnmoe--a bdt of isomorphic correspondenc.c--threatens to contradkt the daim that the pcrcq)lual images gcncr:atcd by material objtcu rdiably cortC$pOnd (0 the way mose m2ltrial objects aUt. lbc: crw: of me i.uuc
is nummcal correspondence in tht wt of pctuiving material tnlities, me
pcrc.cprual im~ is singular, but for an ordinalY person, thai linpktr image
mWI lK produced by ",uitipk infinitesimal partK:les, sina: individual infinitesimal particles art: not: pc:1t:cptibie 10 ordinary pcnoru. If we do oot allow
the realiry of any OItended entiry mack ofinllnilcsimal particles. men thOloC'
multiple infinitesimal partides mUSl thcnudva be the obtcas of that perccprion because those particles canOOt combillC' to form a single, real, spaILally OItended object mal ClUSCS the pet'Cq)lion. Hena:, we may point to a
seeming lack of con espondena: bctwtt:n the image and the objects that
cau.si tht: pcrcqnion: tht image is singular, but th.t objects ~ multiple.
How then could perception provide us with information about realiry by
way of the perceptual im.age's "sirn ilariry ~ {sMl.rJyttJ 10 its objece 'J
70 80rh 0( m- pam! a~ tnrubtcd in fuU in the, appnodi1.

71 Wee wuIJ .I... ,...., ....1.... ~11 p<eooi,'5 -...- 01,'-"'51, d...,. """",,, '" ho..., booeu to- ....
nifooom lOr Dhaom;aki"i and his Cltlia.c contn'ItIItll OQ. For (nftlpk. ""PfI'O'C thai ' ) a congIomo-raree is I parti.o:o.Lbr; 1) common..:llk~fUCh at afootlWl ue thc:.cfult puticulan;
and J) puUadl.rs. at DhumWni mainu.im. ""' panIca (_~. In tMQX. when we _
_ footbaJ1. we &houId _ dK ani", footbaJl, lina _football:ll _ pmiculu it purlaa. Thus.
no pan of the: iOorba1I it WlWCII when ...., 100II ac it. 1""Ns would aMurdIy rcqwn:; thai we _
thai we CIII _ all Ada of thc: ~ airnua.n-..sty. nom the: pm of the fooIba1I thai is
puued apinM t~ gound. 0., ...., m.101 wiJh fO a1Iow thai. min~1 aiud ro4of.pad. is
pomculu. and IlOl a comrnonKRtC enuty IUd! u a fOOdWI. !!.\II III dut: ase. _ would t.n.,
to XCOWII lOr t~ r.a that.
aunpk, when I pucon my tcadilll &!U6CI. _conpomenlt
of"otnI c~ Will a moment IIIf;O flOC panicWu hit now bomt- I panjo:ubr btauM: I CUI
now _ iI. ln dka, ...., would bo- nuItin& partio..bndcptndail IIpon the,...mow IIrnJC r.c..
ultia and mind. of diffcrmc pn-...:: thai which io. putiaaW
OM ptnoXI would IlOl b0a particular !"or anotha-. This r:ypt of oub;t- or mind~ <:ontndiru the: b.sie
moci'l<lrion of E""mw RcaliIm---flamdr. dw UKf1ion 0(. miDd.indcpee"on.. ob;caiviry.

ro.

ro.

12 I boo-_ (.-n . . .ac ........ C,,",,,,) ~ hclpfi.J . - of d..: cum .""'W""n.<><. in

rnt 0( 0I)f~ Ora"';,. on Kirkham h99sl . TiUtllWU diainphhel

QIft .

bcl,,~a

,.,

DHARMAKlilT['S MET HOD AND ONTOLOGY

A3 Dreyfus notes. PVJ.19,,-214 is the most impomnt passage for this

issue in the Pr."uitwwirttiwlI. The argument then concerns two closely

related questions: can perception be conoeptuaJ, and given the incongruence that ~rainJ bctwttn {he singularity of a ~rcep(Ual image and the
multiplicity of the infinitesimal particles cawing the imagt, must wt: admit
wholes (..""",v;m) or conglomerates (....muJayas) exist as the objects of
perception in order to prcsc:rve the correspondence between image and
object? According to most of Dlurmakirti's interlocutors-most nOOlbly
t~ who follow the Naiyiyika Uddyorahra and the Vaik!-ih Prafasa
pada--g pelCt!ption can be determinate; in other words, it can have a deter
minate comem such as this is blue.'" These philosophers also maintain
that a material object of perception is in most ClSd a whole IJttJl'vin) that
is a distinct.. singular. real cn~;'Y created by (bur nor ~lIivalent 10) in pam. n
If, for example, one 5ttS a blueberry on the table before one, the: berry as a
whole can be taken as the object of one's perception. Follow;ng Digniga's
lead, Dharm:ak.ini rejecu both of th~ positions: that is, he maintains dut
perception is always nonconceptuaJ, and wholes do not truly exist. Thc
rejection of these positions is consistcm with Dlurmaldni's anlirea.list cri
rique or d inribmM entiries. for borh or thC50C daims i nvol~ thl!' pre-nipflO'"
sition or such entities. This is obviously true of :lily :wenion that a whole
r"UflJIIvin) is rea.I, since such an entiry would be distributed over iu pms
("~WIS). In the: case of dainu for detcrminatc perception, the dimib.
uted entity in qucstion is a universal. since Prami.,a Theorists maintain
rhal the COntCnt of a dcterminadon such as Ihis is blu(- is either wholly
or panly on( or more univcrsal." Such cntities cannot be admitted as
objeca: or percqn10n by Dh:unukini. for he contcn& th:l.t thc objeo:u or
pc:ra:prion are ultimately rea.I; mus, if wholes or universals w(re admitted

mat

r..

"~as cotIJN"K'I'" and ~ ... con,",nion: H( noIn tN. 1Hxh

rypcs In: conupondcnot rhcoria in ma. a ccnain bet mIlA cxisI if 1M ~t ptOpClIition.
onumm.or bdid'iJ to I..t ...... ",.. fi ... !)'pC. conpucncc. in.u..a an.ddcd CO<K!i,ion. va..
01.... then: 1... oonacnonJ~, . trP<' o(...;....,..;"t!rd Oon ..... A<e.'.he ",..h "bc..cr
and faa . T'K KCond 'YJX. i.e. -m..Uon. it . wakn cypo: of cnrrapon<kna:. whue
then:: it no JUCh ...... ,ocwphUm. but wbot- it ~ tNt me rIC! ~ for tb.. Qtnnetll ...
u~ to 1..lf1K.'

7J.sc.: ....... J9.

74 Udd)'Olllk&n', di",'flior, of the

y~

(NV"s!r69 .. aJ NSt.t.t<r69 ) it UiCNl

..urtt for the I1n&" ofthc-ooiesCOf>((rflin&thc ~ rowt.ic:h a un~ ... d .. ~ (jbi)

io d>c objet;< of_ ......pu.t.aI and llnpdMkcopldo.... 'SO:': alto 8w.x.u (I~). Scharf{t~

and Muc.h h".).

un

FOUNDATION S O F O HAAM AKIRTI S PHILOSOPHY

as objecu of perception. Dharmakini would b.= oblig~ 10 :l.dmit th~ ultimate reality of :1.1 leas, som~ di stribut~ entities.
In the first verse of ,he pasgge mentioned by Dreyfus (i.e., PVj.T94),
Dharrn:l.k.ini begins th~ argum~m with the voic~ of an objmor who is
:l.u~rnpting to point OUt inconsisuncies in the Buddhist argum~nts against
both the nooconcqnuality of perception :l.nd ,h~ claim that wholes do not
exist. The yerse reads:
Someone objt$, lhat which is :tggrC:g:lted (sa'!'ritil) is a conglomcrue (SIlmwili1")' and in th:l.t senst it is a universal (kim4nya). [Accotding to Buddhists such as Vasub:l.ndhu], one has
perception of such things. Furthermore, any cognition of:l. universal is n.CSS:ltily associated with conttptuality.""
A& ~ h:l.vc: notl.. Dharmak.ini and his prcdttcs50rs maintain that infini-

tcsimal p:l.nides arc not on th~ir own perccptibl~ (for ordin:l.ry persons);
instead, they mu.u ~ -aggreg:lted- (J4,!,ril4) in orde:r 10 ~ ~rceived. And
since: the: term kim4ll1" runiymaJ") an ~ :l.pplied to :l.ggreg:lted p:l.rtid es, th~ objector points out that Dharmakirti Iw fk fonoadmitted thar perception an ~ conceptual, for Dharmakirti himself maint:lin$ dm
universals arc: nca:ssarily associ:l.ted with oonce:pts.
Dharmakini responds that "aggrtgation" hcr~ does not mean that the
particles arc: forming a singie: whole:: rather, "aggregation refers to a pardcular state of those panicles, namely, Thar their proximity ~nablc:s th~m 10
ausally suppon QCh other such lillit they can ause an image in th~ petttiv~r's mind. He: remarks:
Due to a rdation with othc:r things [ i.~., other particles], infinitesimal particles that arc different [then their own previous
moments] arise [from the:it own pre:vious mome:nu such that
they can produce: an awareness). In that scnst, they arc said to ~
"aggrcgatl.." and as such. they arc: said to ~ a condition for the
production of awarencss. Moreover, the distinctive: quality that
particles obtain does not occur without the other particles with
which thty arc: in proximity. Hence, since awarc:ness does not
have any nccc:ssary relation to a single particle, awarencss is said
75

I'V,.",: ..,.o~ M~ M""""-""'" ""'" ~""'; *0 I

v..".""",,, '#yN H.

",w...JJhil nl...IJ-'!'

.....

DH ARMAK I RTI 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'OJ

have :it universal [in rM sense of a group of :otgg.tg;ltcd pa.nidn) as iu object."

10

AJ (Xvendr.abuddhi makes clear, Dharmakin i's point is that when the

term -aggreg:otted- is :itpplied 10 infinitesimal panicles, it does nOt refer [0

their form:ittion ofsome single entity; instead, it is:it way of expressing a distinctive property thai ~tJCh infi nitesimal panicle has obtained by vinue of
iu production being conditioned by the proxim:itte presence of the omer,
surrounding infinitesimal p:itrcides. Th:itl distinctive property is the ability,
when causally wistcd by omer infinitesimal particles. [Q particip:itte in me
causal complo: (MtJlJlimJItriJ th:itt produces :it perceprual cognition. And
since omer infinitesimal particles art ~uired for a p:itn icle to arise wim
such :> propcot}'. :> singl(' [",, ' Otl'rmn ic "",":>lIy .....ing e ...~ hy mLilripk
infiniteSimal panicles mat :itTe simulW\cously apprehended. Hence. a single perception is not related to a single infinitesimal particle, but n ther to
many infi nitesimal particles.n
76 PVJ" 9J- '96: .nhlllUrrlbhiu",J,.,Nihi) " " " ~ ~ ,.N / ..1t14l "~'!'ri14l "hi

'"

.;.'iU'!" ju-j---!o /I "~".'!"

~ ,,, _'~,..r'" "!"''' I - ' r~.;"'''.Ij
jU-.. ~ "~_ Il a . the mnsbtion olin- tna by Drqfw ('m17-&1).

77 IXomdrabllddhi (PVP:II,b.). commmrins IlJlOIllhe wnICI rileV above. cbriIia how lhe
Illim ~ pin a ddtinaiw: !,>lOp" rtnwWMw by ";rt\K of the prmimity of II", prm.
ow partida: in.he same Q)<Irinl,l.1.. Hf mrwb (WOIdr from the w:rx:s v.: iQ!irited):

Dw .. " rrt..,... wi,..,Jw,. ""Ift1-i.f .. dIM: 10 II", procna: of COndiriOM which enIlf "'" p'opclry-_Iobrl"" dial iI d", apac;ty 10 produu Ill\ a~ j"fi"j
1rIi...J ~ INI ""..., the capocity 10 produ an IWII <not. .n. &om
m..; , hu.n,i.1 ""...,., n .....Iy. ~ .. inl; .. i.,.i......1 f"'rrit:1eo Ii" ,r... .. ...., """" in.
uumlmal do ...... ha..... mar apacity. n.., word agrrp.lnI ' ap~ m.:- putick.
that N..., their ..spo...,~ apxi.ia which an: lItaincd ....nm lher arc in proximity
wim dtia and mal od"'l" putidc. 1*" pMn """f ,.; '"lIt''' iIrtI phJi, I ""'''' ,., sbn
1'" ~ I"r ~ I" i ",., '" j ",.., khi" Ii,M'" 'j ,.,.,..." ,,~ "" i # I
,,~ ' - k>t", i T1" "'l*'" " .... ", __,.. ..., 1M "..,. ",.. u,."",
~1*; ,,'"
", I """,hru pM" Mt
Dw' "" 1M J..,pJ- J..., pM" """ "J'I k;-,- ~.,

"'
'
'
p
m.
,...
*",.,

. . . ,., OO" .. ~ _ _ .._", ...... . ....,."" IfNI IoJ-J HI.

Dr-mdrabuddhi (PVP:li9/4El) alJo

,961:16) ..nctdly the notion of an

the Buddhitu arc act\l2lly pG'itins I wholt N

... in pId 10

objcaion m.nI caru." by DipLIp (Halton

m.nI as md.:nu for the daim Ih.u
the ob;ca of pcrapcion:

lKlIet Ill\

lJtUII~ iI

mil objeaion. ooncnnint: ~~ the ~ quality of pro-

ducinl ~ thai an- in infiniraimal putida dUf 10 their rcQ.>on wilh odxt
__ aNa: &om ihc onrufonna.ion of doeir fOrmer ttopeai..: continua mal art" in
murual conjunaion (fl-1Ihw1l "J'I1r P J,.,). TIw dUrinc:tivt:qualirt will n()( an,.,
",;m.,.,. <t<hc:r p;uUda
v.: O<XWTinlwidlOU' inlnxkc Ixa..... dul kind ofpar
rick on ill own doet _ ha..., "'" ....IU"' of prodoo,,& ~WU(f"I(:M. HtoIff, ~Mt "lIMN

.ha.

104

FOUNDATIONS O F DHAllMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

This response dispels th~ obj('Ction that D~nnakini is in dfect admitting th~ cxi5{~nce of a distributed entity (such as II "unh'mlll" or II ~whoJe ") .
for he tus shown that lh~ I~rm "aggregat~" does not mean that a singl~.
physK::a.l enlity aisa; inst~ad. it expl'tS5e5 $Omclhing discinaiv~ about each
infinitesimal partide. And since no distributed ~ntity is involved in pCJCxplion, DharmaJdni is nOI obliged to admit that perttplion is amceptual.
Although Dharmakini may be able to deny that the Buddhist Es:lcmal
Realist throry involves the supposition of any distributed entity as the objca
of perccprion . th:1I denial does not deal with ,he futth~r daim that the
assumption of such a distributed enlity~pifica1ly, th~ assumption of II
whole in the case of a marcri~ . pcrccprual object-is required for the cohereno: of his throry of perception. Amplifying upon the comments of his
prroessot Viayiyana," the Naiyiyika Uddyoukara makes ,his very point
when he says:

Ii.

...... . " _ ".. ..., Mt'nIII? m.n- ,.. Ii",v ,.~r> awvn1CII d.ac. noc
IuY! the: po oputr _Mb.olbri"l....
rily rtbted to ~ cstabIiduncnt of. sub0laAI% wt.ich U
panick, ..... ~""' ~ apaci.;.. of mo. p&nidrs ~
prodLPI. linp, ~ as [heir dkcl. they an Aid to be die: 00II1_ objca of
an~. ~. univa-AI (If1i, .. ~ Ihcyarc all dw:objI: olthoe_
but thoe ..arrnao u noc n nriJy rd.aled ("1ft,. . ~IO anyo.insJe on. 01 thr:m..
In other word., 1M '"IIO'1Kf>Ca u !he C'OItImon dfm of all of them. I... iii Z. JII,.,,,w
,.,." .,......., Iryi VItf MIl pJM,. ...", )"I .. "" "..,.. " " 11M ,. ~ .... ~ ,. ;
~,., ~ Nr pr N ' ~J-M JUtft-' u
aItout"" Nr ""
.. Z. -t' ,. W"", ,. r Dl u., tt# ji lu .. /nhi,. ... roW"".,..,..." SO< Df" ,.
1M ~ ..,. Ow ..
J
dNJ,. ~,. Z.
Z. fNII ,..1"w,;-..
pIM,. Ii -.I,.r ,., I -J,., irw u I 1M 'tI,.. N ,., ~,., ~,. i "'11.( Wi" (W"
""" ,.. Ji" ,. i """ .. 1* M ,.. '"
f"hli, I 1M ,.
oi

,..,*J.t,..,.

* 1M,.,., *""
"'P"
n ..,., -'
*
,.;
,J,J,....,.
.Jus Iryi ...... 1M k,., T''';'''''' tsbi" (.",..,.",. ",;.t Iryi f"hlir"'" I *
"-Kli 0.,. tIf,., "..,. .,..."" ..''trit IlytJJ-1tytJ,.;,;.,or
"'",. . .""",. . ",-J""
I mi' * 4.t
M 11JMfd u"
,." Iryi I""" '" . . "' z.. _ ..,., ,.. " ';" ~ I* Mt "-ot (u ~ *
Ii ..... h,." .... .,.. .. , tin l1li.
600 ....,.,,., "",,.
urr Ii" MM
tIM.. rM ,.,

If; " - ....,

78 NBh (. " 100) uNS1.I .)I-,J6:

HO'OI' U on.

to

qucNion ~ penon who. dtnyin, thoe ra/ity of I whok and minkinc.

"pu~pt"".hou1d not bt: Io.t: clai .... m.t the objc.;t of PCI"j>6on (~
ill 3 hap (,.~ of infinilesimal putides? ~ should ask about the objKI of
.:opirioo of I pc"xi.~ ob;.a u~. as in dw: (OpIition, "'Thit
ill .....
pm.." ThaI is. on..noutd - . "Docs. toplition of sinpluity IY...: an undiffam
ti.ted roti.,. u iu ob;ca. or docI illY...:. di~I~lcd roricy u iu objca:?" Iril tw
an undiifmnlialcd uui.,. ill iu objm. dwn sir> on. is Iowina thai die: LIl!dilfera>.
tl.ucI ob;c>co;.. _ h i.. cIlfrc ...... [d..an the mul.ipIe ...linioaimal ~ tho. comp\* il ), onr hu wmillfd 10 proor thaI I whok aisu. And in the cu. mal.

.'' 'w.ec:

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHO D AND O NTO LOGY

O n~

asks a penon aboul

""

th~ objta of a perceptual COinition of

singul:aricy, as follows; Does a cognition in the form. "1his substance is si ngulu,~ ha~ a multipl~ objt or an undilf~rtmi.ltro
objta? If it has a mulrip l~ object. then since it is not observed
that on~ has a correa determin.;uion of linguJuity wim regard ( 0
multiple mtities, thaI cognition would nOI be: COtrt. ThaI is.
with regard ( 0 multipl~ entities. a cognition in the fOrm. "1his
is singulu" is incoITC'Ct. O n th~ othtt hand. if that cognition hu
:an undiffertnti.:atro entity as iu obja:t. th~n the objt of a cognilion of singularity is a who l~ (1lIlItJ'lu;n) ,"

Uddyotakan. hcrc nisei the probk m of nu merical correspondence. Thai is.

if me nbjrcu of ~l'cq)[ion:are:KfU:l! 1y

"'IIJrjp"infinir~iIl\2,J

parrid..s while
th~ im:ag~ crc:atro by rnose infinitesim:al panicles is sinpwr. th~n how can
one claim mal pcrcq)[ual images correspond 10 rn~ir objccu? If th~ perception is not ro be: C'rronrous. is it not nt'Cetsary to suppose mat rnose
multiple particles :are subsumed by a si n gl~ entiry-a wnolC----lhat is th~
objt of perception?
In PY).I97- W7. Dhumakirti responds 1'0 (hiJ problnn prim~rily by cri_
tiquing me :alfttn:ati~, namely. that:an objt can ~ singu1:ar and yt't contain or ~ncompw multiplicity. Choosing :an espcci:ally moong c:xampl~,
Oh:armakini focuses upon the percqnion of a huuttfJy's multiple colon.
For ft'WlY ofOh.:armakini's interlocuton , including Uddyo takan. this type
of perception is especially problem:uic. for they must maintain dut the
coment of such a perception is singular. even mough it contains multiple
colon. Thi, leW 10 the 2U<.': rUon of:l. biurre ""nliry: the color eall<!d &mul-

mu.hipk emilia :u IU obju. it is I'lO'l raIONbIc for one

10 ho"" I pClCqxio<\ ollinpdaril)' wid! reprd lociilfuf:O'II mt;ria; for;1 I'lO'l obtc:....m
dw in me C:I.IC of nonspwiow pt:.apUon _lou me Ch(h'l<OW coptilion i1w is
~nsu.W~ wKh rcpd roan objea tIui is mu.h;pk. 1.1hI....,.";1U1f',~,..,,
~~. iIJ.!'~". ~-~". ,.,.lijJlIi1Y9"'", .~..,. iti
l ,u.. iM".
;'1 tA>t'-'An .,y.,.'!' ,."."..~ - iii,. rlu6,JJJ,;,
....,,1fbfb..,m ihti"j, Mi,,~ I ...." ... ij6?ti lsocl t'rf
.nIM._.""jurtM/ ....y.~ I ......n~ t'rf w,;,,~ ~..." .
..,.,..m'~ ",w.".;." ... in ~ In.4J/hir ... irlJ-u in1,

cog1Iition of 5inpbril1lou

Jr...,...

n"...

7<J NY (soc) . ; NS1.I.JI-s6 (cilrd abo br Kcy!:I90): d.hIUM..,.,.". ""'If"~

",.". hI/Jhi, If.", w". tint.".", in iii". ;,.". ......~
"_,,y.,m' I JIIIIi
"""".,.,.",. HInq. tul.rillNI#I -:po* .... _ U/ NInq. rlut", iIIIm< in J"*u.!o ,,..~ I
"r!tIMi"MnIM~~ In m~ ~. '. .,.rtUi.

.,.M.

106

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMA KIRTI'S PHILO SOPHY

rimlor" or "vuieg;uion" (ritr.j, which is rnetnt to be: itself a ""p color.

even though it contains multiple colors. Using v:lriegation- to sWld for all
forms of multiplicity, Oharmakini argues that it makes no sense 10 claim
that an object can at oncc be: singular and vuiegated.
To avoid unnessa.ry prolaity, we will assume mat Ofurmaklrti', arguments against varieg.ned singularity are convincing."' The more prtSSing
issue- is that, even if Dharmakirti corrtttfy rejects the notion of a real. varieg:ued singularity, he has nOl meteby solved the problem of numerical
corrcspondmcc mentioned above. It is one- thing to say that the others'
nOlion of a singular yn variegated entity is incoherent; it is quite another
to explain how his own claim that a perception of singularity with regard
to multiple infinitesimal pmicles is not erroneous.
One of the confusing a.sprs of the passage mentioned by Dreyfus
(PV3.194- :n.4) is dut it does noraplicidy unpack Dhamukirti's response
to lhe problem of numerical correspondence. The etrly commencuors
Devendrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi do, however, o::p1ain the solmion, and
they do so by apparmdy refwing to anomer passage: Dh.armakirti', Sl.ltlvrm
on PVI.137-14l-" In that passage, Oh.arnukirti explains how an expression
mar appears 10 rdi-r to a s.ingle cl'lIiry i5 in fact a convenient way to indirealy
o::press multipk parricubn on the basis ofsome commonality in their causal
~ristia. An exprtSSion such as "warer-jug," for o:ample, is used to
o::ptt:55 the facr mat multiple inllnitesimal partides a.re individual.ly in a scne
that a n be: collectively referred to as a conglommttion" (UlmUiNz); as such,
mey can work togtther [0 perform common dferu by virtue of aus:illy supporting each omer. Hencc, talk about a 5ingle "watt'l'-jug" is actually talk
aoom rh~ fact Ihat th~ multiple paniculan work mgerher to produce
common dfecu; thett is mw no need to as5ume that there: is a ra.I, 5ingle
entity called a water-jug" or e\"CfI a conglomcr.ltion."OJ A 5ingle expression

80 PV).wo--107. A1dlOlls/l lhc la m r>rr.lileral!y mearu muhicoloc, [)/q1TNki"i and his

foIJow.m (mM I~ lam mcupnoricaDy 10 rdtt 10 any Iypt' of multiplicity thai is meaUl
10 be. onnb.ucd 10 lin"", eftnty. Su, foe example. dw u..e of dw lam by ~rabuddlu
(PYP",.r.bR) and ~ (PVT: "?, UlObffl.

81 R.cadm who wid! 10 (Qlni,.... ,hese ~Q can ronsuI, IIw appendil!. ~ tIwy ;>0:
u"ansl~lcd in full.
82 Ncilna Ocvendrabuddhi (1'VI':.s,b,ff. IransblcU aobovc, n) no. ~i (PVT.
"-""'I ~ff) apliciUy a lol' PVI.IJ7-'41, bur 111.11 pam&" appats fO M lIw .uuta of their
intnpmationa.

8J s... PVSV u'PV' .'j7-'41 (G,6B.7-U)'

''''

DHARMAKI IlTl'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

may also be used to exprt:SS UK fact that panicu1an that arc aaually multiple may, due to being in me lalllC state (4I11Uth4), produce common dtccu.
Dharmakirri remarks:

LikcYlisc, those [panicuian] which ate effective (tlP"Ju}y4tt) for

lOme single function either Kparlltdy or in combination arc
"rra.~ by "preL~ion1 ,hal indic:u~ a 'lpecific sral~: rhey lIll!
exprascd in that way 10 that one might make them known all at
once. Examples of such opressionsa.rc: "visible" or "obstructive."
Tbosc [particulars] can be exprc:sscd in mu way due to the same-nc:s.s of their difkrcnce (bINUs4mb1Ji1) from others that arc nOl
oc:rurring in mat kind of state'"
The anal)'Jis gh'en by ~buddh i makes il particularly cle:ar that, on his
interprttlltion at least, Dharmaltirti is referring to the issue ofinfinitesima.l
particles acting together to produce a single perception:
Concerning the usc of a single expression for a Stale, Dharmakini
uys. LiJuw;y. thM, .... ThDu mnnJ: infinilC!limal ~n: i<:I C!l
(fNlrIlMl1!'tI) such as blue particles. Stparllulyme:uu putides rueh

as blue and yellow ones that arc not mutually depending on each
other {pllrllpllrinAfWkf4 111 Cf" "bi1lll1;1I11 means th05C that arc
together, one with the other. For JDrtU rilllk fonnum-that is, for
me production of perceptwl awareness, or for the prevcmion of

For

in~.

u..:..: par1~ that in ~tion (,._~) paf'orm a ,,;npc

df.:u Iu." no diMincrion &om eadI othn in mac they pcrfocn. thai df'fCt. Th",,,,v.
il woWd bot: pointka 10 nPf"'l any sudI dilrincDon. For this uaJ(M'I. in Olein 10 rd'
( ....,.;-.,..)10 all oJ them al once. pcopk apply ( .,..IiAw) onr npro:pjon 10 them. sudI
II "wamiui- (:htt~). n.o.c panXuIan that bm I W'Arcrius 1 aU equally ("tNq.)
differml from tbri, ~ homoIof;ues and Mlftc:olop.el. bul ';ra mq. COIIn.lle
10 thor: fWfiUmeru of thai fU'P'* {ou.cb as conlaini,,! W'AltrJ. ,hq Iff dlstinsuisbed
from odIm IN. do noc IU!fiU IN. purpok. Ha'ICC. dlIC 10 tlAt nondiffCf'ICX. r:bcy Ire
qnixd (p.ti]"II~) withou. disrinction fronI each ocher. IJ<' ..~ 1ti".nJ .....'!"
Wrytr'!" h"","ri U14'!' InN ~MJ..u",."mu ~..m ,up ~ II;'"
j<lIItlnb.IIf
1IJ"l!' ~ t.~ tqtI II~ p.~ i,; f ~ ;i 1ifjI.g.U .1f7tUIII u
1WtU~ ;; "If..",;.urft"utyi """.~ ~II" ;'7 .~t....

..." .

""IIf

,.."fly<I1lr 1].

;i ,,v..1t ..1rUJU H

hwUI "I"'JtIiJ-IIU ttl

~II4riMl!l ~,.., ~ ,-,.~, d.w,!" "*",,,,,IIU ,.IIiMrliIlttI!I..".r:ip .m

84 PVSV "" PVI.I'7-14t (G:61.t l-l.d:"

t

.J..

'JfMr M. N..u""."..

108

FOUNDATIONS Of DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

another particle occurrinR in each individual particle's locus. So

thttt (Ir!' mi,ht nrAltt thmr known .0 .t onu mam: for the sake
of definitively determining many particulars from a single cxprasion. In this ~ , those that Irt' effective (lIjNIJU}y4nk) for the
production ofoculu awareness arc called "visible; mey arc thw
wn.;u is expressed by an apres:sion for mu particulu sute. And
those that prevmt the arisal of another particle in their locus arc
called obstructive."
"Bul particles of blue, ycUowand $0 on are complctdy discinct
(IltyllnUJ bhinn4!Jj, $0 how an they be expressed with a single
apression such as 'visible'~"
It is Jilt to tIN Slfmtr,m oftlxiT diJformtt (bhdtulimdn",) from
othm. 1beir sameness [or univmaJl (lIlm4nJfl) is their differenoe
from what is other than them--i.e., others that art not visible or
obstructive. Thu is their sameness h:a.lLK: they are all excluded
from those othen. It is for that reason thu they may all be called
"visible." dC."
From ~buddh i 'J commel1l cornes the ~ution that he and Dcvcndra.-

buddhi attribute to Dharmakirti in response: to me problem of numerical

cortespondence. To be specific, the singularity of the perceptual image is
not congruei1l to (i.e. has no oomorphic correspondena with) the singu85 $ikyaOOddhi (PVT:u>}.Isff. K:l7LJIfJ): 61/1tUJMr....u.. ~ I ~

;lfJtII/i I" ;;

" llliIli,.,."v,.1NI/J 117)1 , ..u.., in ";~i~ ,.,...,.,._~ ,._~ _ . ,...

,.r...m~ I i - v in' r~"';iU- ......bk ,._7M,.m),.Ii....4JN N ..!rJ n.
".~". I ......... dMliNUJ NHv., /lilt",.,""" I IIIlTII " ru,._ijUw ,.,..,.jytulu I u .~~ SIIttiMri.... is] WJrIIUr I ~ nwtId6 ,.,..,.,.,.m", ,...np.u"n
I u,.~ iii 1_ ... 'fit.,i"'" ..,.....,u,w".... u Iwb.". ~ ,."iI/.,fn,lilcf d_
g.",. iii .,. ~J.. I uJ. ..
M.t ':rf,d~ I uM1IJ4M.J. ~ruip. ,~ ,.
ilNrl.SII"'~~.; J ,?_~t l ..... hm."' l PVT:l6,.sIf.,-.u.

"u,.

P"'''''I_'''''

"'. p i tiN"Ib ~ _ ""I~'" Utn "" .. J..,.,. _ u I

iii
'''t''' 10 J. .,. ,.; rJ.J pi- ... .., p l _ " . .. IIi "'P'f ,. ""'" _ ,. III ... ,.
";.,, ....." t.. /oil .N/oil ~ ~ l "wI 1M u... r.- .. ,,;" III R 'J.u 1M . . ~ I ;. ' ahit'
m .,. .. "i IIlit Ii ru".
>ht. ,. ..... I ,.",Ii""'" pJM" "..., .. ; trfI i:JN,. III" I
tit ur >ht. ,. ,.,uI ?i ... tI" ,.;". .,. .. IIi P '"' P.
i#
"' I tit III ...itt" ......". ,.,,J,n /II J. ,.,.. Hr ~ .. P'" ""Ji" ,. tU "'" iii fUI hAr ~
,., t." oi !Shit tis ~" .",..,. din I?' III , .., ti"" ... p-" .",..", .. i W i:JN,.
P"f,no 116M,.* "",III
"""I .r.,.,.;". ,""" .- /,..",,,,. ill", _,. t.."
,. "'" "i ;J,i" hi II. "",,. _ ,n. _ I tU "'" . ." J.,..,. III.",.; p rriI tis ji Iur
f"j./rr ...
pM/I "'" I.u ,.. "",. i lIJI' ,.,uIJ. eM .,. .. J. .,. ,. _

'*'

-"I" "'" ",. . ,.,.,. ..

iii.,.,.

1*;"" "'"

" 1.... pI- ........ -',.~J..r,. -',.MtJ. ..... "'*',.P"C,.. ,..~

""'Ii",. Ji" u I rNlfII r..t J" "'" I.u u.,,. ,.,uI iJi """ .. I PI' ~ " .......

DHARMAKIIlT I'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'09

larity of its physical causes. Instead, the singularity of the image' ~"&"t1
with a singulariry of cauu! function : multiple external causes ue producing a single effect, the image. In other words, the singulariry of ,he image
coITCliponds to the f'act that multiple infinit(Simai particl(S af( working
togmer to produce a single dkct. Thus, the fact of some atoms being Min
aggrcg:arion ~ docs 001 signify any actual, physical unity; inncad. it signifies
only the singularity of their effect. And indeed. this is not a singularity of
all their drecti, since each individual atom n ill produces individual dfeco.
such as iu own suint:quefl[ moment. Thw, as is strongly implied by
Dharmakini and spttincally St:lti by Sikyabuddhi," the aauaI objccu of
a single pcn;:cption arc mulciple infinitesimal partK.lcs. Hmce, jfjt is a phys-ial obj(Cl, the panicular (1JJ/I14~!I") mwt be an infinit(Simal panicle
(pII1'IJlm,i'!'tJ). lind "n

"88" g:a'" <:::a nnor bf."

nNI"'~~"

In her excdknt dissm2tion on the panicular. ~ mnarb upon Dharmakini's sU'atCfJ' oflooking to the nature: of the correspondence bc~CUI image
and object in order to accoum for numerical corrcspondcnc:e.- But although
Kcyt a.ppe::us 10 have a fairly dear norion ofDharmakirti's solution, she~86 111ft bd'ort-

me ~ ciltd abow-. ~dIIi rtn'LaJb: "MortOYe1'. in !he third~

M . (i.~ . t PV).'94ff) M will ""pl.in how il iI WI. ~ mo..p ~;. no pan-po"! IItt
(or '-hok1, 1M objt of _
pc:I CXption;. julc lllfiniu:,;,nal puridc:l."ur 1ur!'6" """""

'rIMII,.,

-.I,., JIIItl ,aJ ,;- l'1li# klot .... "''''''" III'" oi,.J"" ,., M "i kit 1'''''' ,. "
Doo'" (r61:a~d; SkL presn-I in K b , 1):
N"S4~ -.,.n_'!' ,.,..~ ........
~ n,.,.s whi ",.",~radt: bidJo'l
".tip*' ";"'w. Not~
Mtt ~ typic:aI inwnion ol .... ~ and prtdkMc in thr Y.b$n tnn$Ulion ).

,.tIM

,....,"*

87 Mo;(]inlodt hoop6I-69. n.l sl notf$ dut Sinl:ar:aktill .00 K:am&llllu, foUowinS

uturmakIru, ..... tooMi ttuJ poIition. SIN: mnsb'a the rdcnnl VftX rrs Sl)): - n..- inllnilaO..w.,.mda: whid! uiK:II mutwJly ~ ~ not bc:yond 1M KNC:S, bc:nu.c: tbry
~ thr ob;ccu of 1M 1mIQ" 1 .",.~nII uittl'!''' jJt4 ,.,.....~ , ..illbi..m".tJ
.", ~ 1'"'"""14 '/1. And w &110 rnmIata KamaWila, mnarlton 1M Vtt1C"1I

it not aobI4hcd !hat inlinilcWnal panieb iln' bo:youd !be ~ bca\lte dK. pWda dw
ha~ auaintd. putituI:ar _, iU'c ~ by dw: wnta" [~~~ lltilfliriJ"""'!' nJij"~""r4""" ;~,.,.t\. 1M nocion thai infinilaimal panidcs ~
pe>cxpciblo: in thilwouc daoibcd hen- ;. oIIOlUpponcd by ~:. ruowucd by Col1m
(1,"'74, 1I.1J). From 1M pc:' Ui~ OIdot Abhitllwnu TypoIosy, dili intnpl'tolion byp:aucs ",._.. 1.7 ". a1~cl in fiver of .'.fI1I'S"""~ An impon:anr
desidentum Mtr is 1M quao:ion of tilt' hisroriaI .., teccdma ofDhumaldrti'. tt..ory of per_
uptio.ln. Whik dw alIUiOon 10 Sal'Yilti>'id.. Abhidh:arma is &.iny dar in thil K'CIion, ..... do
nee Imowwhrthcr Dharmakini .... any particular oro: ofSa.r.isti.io;b. otOWiQ in miM. Many
dunIu 10 Sh6ry(t Kauura for ~n& IlK 10
work-

eo.:

eo.:'.

88 Sincx Kc)'I 's di.crution (19101 his MW'Cf bun published. il lw pnNpi: bomc: Wouckd
In _ ecruln dqm: or obwIry. 81.11 II iI. In faa, one 0{ thf tnOflI' oufltl.ndln8 _ , Audia
of Dh:annakirti, :and I m:ommmd i. hipIy 10 my mockn.

110

FOUNDATIONS O F DHARMAKiRTrS PH ILOSOPHY

mdcss insiJU that me sensory ob;ea~ hmer. !he panicubr-is a real,

singk entiry. namely, the agg":gatc." An argument. ho ....'a"eI", that appc:a1s to
lingutari!)' of cfFc:a as me basis fur the image's singularity in no way requires
any such claim. In f.act, on Kcyt's interpretation. Dharrnalcitti', roundabout
means of accounting for numerical cotl"C'Spondence: would be pointlw
be:cll~ numerical correspondcnct would no longer b<: problematic;II single
particular (namdy. Ihe: agg~Ie:) would isomorphically correspond through
pr:isc- congruence to a single: i~. and the divc::~nce: bc:rwe:c:u the multipliciry of!he aggltg;<lte's infinitesimal parricles and !he singulari!), of the i.magt
would be moot. While such. a r..dr. would indeed enable Dharmaldrri 10 avoid
any problem of numc:rica.l correspondc::no!. Dharrnalcirri apparently belic:vcs
mat. since it involves mcasscrtioo of a distributed enri!)' (i.e., a particular that
is a spatially extended, singie: aegtqate). such an approach would destroy his
KfUpuious critique of dislributed entilies. In otha words, il seems due, for
Dhamukirri, once: C\'CO one: cxrcndcd entity has been admitted. one cannot
sua:cssfully deny the: ultimate: c:x6tence of some extended entities (such as
universals and wholes) while: affirming !he ultimate: cxistena of others (such
as particulan that ate aggregates). It is probably this OVUTiding concern with
a critique of any form of dislribution that underlies his rigorous denial of
v:uic:g;ued singularity.
It should already be dear thaI Kcyt's proposal- i.e. !lUt tht' ag&regatt'
is a particular- is inadequate, but we can confirm iu inadequxy by ronsidt'ring the: point in Dh:umakirti'$ argument against varit<pled singularity (PVp.oofl) wht'u ht' moves &om an External Realist 10 an Epistemie
Idealist perspc:ctive. We have already seen that this argument focwc:s: on
re:futing the: claim that the object of perception is a rc:al. ph)'Jical emit)'
which. although ultimatdy singular, somehow ~ncompOlSSC5 physical components lhat ate ultimatc:ly multiple.'" While it may make good 5Cnse: to
claim thai such a notion is incohnem, the problem for Dharmakirti's Extcr89 5. for eEUIIpk. Kq-t h911o:190). 0rryfUs (1,"-13) adopu Kryt'l lnalysiJ ofpWcuWs.
bul ncilhn ~ not Kq-t ~ addmICI adoeq_dy tho: conmrdloiorl in rnainfZinin&. 00 dw:
OM 1wKI. WI ~fed mlfnr do IlOl form a whole. and on ~ othn . Wt an agrtpl~
;. a fin"", uhimaldy real panicub r.
90 II an bo. arp..d dw in dw:1 .. undtrconoidtmion (PV).woiJ). Obarmakini dos 1\01
adoeqIWdy .ddmr dw: mil. ofUddyolahno', ~ of whoks. rwndy. dial a wbok docs 1\01
in fact ronuln Of erw;omput puu. bu, i, rI'h,n a dwint."l: n"ioy crea,ed by il:J pan.. For
UddyoIabta. il iI mIlS i11q.i. illli<C 10 poinc ro 101M incompatibility bo......... tht ~ilJ'
of the whok and the mWripliciryofiu p.ua. Sec. for 0tlmpIc. NY wn-,IJ) .JNS:u.p.. BUI
Dharmak.ini'. upo<nen' """"' ..... upon bit -t;.,.. m.o,- of ~MJw (PVSV ..J
PVI ....)CdfF. G:69 6ft). whlch undttmi .... Uddyoubn . dd'enw..

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METH OD AND ONTOLOCY

III

n:al RcUist argumem is ,hal, when leveled again$( the Exlern:al Re:aliJl's
nolion of a cognilive image. lhe critique of variegated singularity pointS to
the same problem in his own system. In mon, while me Nyiya.yaH~ib
theory of perception restS upon me supposition of a variegated singularity
[hat iJ material, the aternal R.ealist theory resa upon the notion of a var
iegated singularity that iJ mental,
Dh.:umaki"1 maireE this point at PV),108, where. ~pealr:ing in ,he voice
of an objccror, he says:
~ I f singul:trity

is not possible in the case of objects such as a bur

terfly's wing that have vari~a[ed appean.nces, ,hen how can
there be a single cognition whose cognitive appearan iJ vuitption?"'"
Sakyabuddhi, referring in pan to the commena of his pmkccssor Deven
dn.buddhi, amplifies on tht laner part of Dharmakini 's verse::

-'" thnr how clln thn-t IN II singh ctlf"ition ~COf"in'lIt IIp~II'"

...";1 ...ri,!I1,,"r~ objeC'lor thinks the fOllowing: "You who
espouse thiJ theory about perception :tho usen that cognitions
occur with cognitive images, Hence, a variegated image iJ essen
(ially the cognition iadf (hltt'i INiIII"JiIi till tJIIr ",): dtal being
,he ClS(', you accept th,u cognilion has a variegated cognitive
appearancc.-(And when Devcndrabuddhi'" commenu), .~
fort, it is ineonc/wivt; he mUttS that me objeaor thin\r:$ the fol
IQwing:

r=son 't:atea in the form, ' thu whieh i,

V:l.ri~ued

does nOI have a single nalur(" is inconclusivt because ('Vtn

though cognition is of a singular nature, it can have a variegated
cognitive appearance, "'J

91 pv,.aol,

"""'-~~ ~~ ~

J...'-t' IV,..g.- 1 ~_

thw, ~~ L..

/,4; ..4l

.."....,<: 'Hi ll
92 PVP:19JU.
93 PVT ("J"I':WIuR): rt J/;f HI MtriJ wp4Y 1ft /urJ...... .......,. .... o..r l ""'''' 4w N
iii ...,.... tI.. ........ r I ,....,. i ..uN ' _ .. ~ ..,.'" IJ. M6", , . tU", w. ,. ..,oJ 'MtI
tU l M /ur ...
.-.oJ,.,/, H. i
D'",.p" ,..,/, Iu ... M. _ tWtr
JNll fm.: Jj
& Uurtr,. p" _ I ,/,; 1r .... "P ,.p" _
,,;pttf

-lIiwrl,. ';
u.s """ ""
,,,,.,"0111
..., ._ ..hop ,.. Jill ,.. ,/, ,rrii tJ .....,.
Jill " u.n

Jill

kbill ....

J.n.,."

H f pll ~ .... "t:" , .

r 11M trit ti ",'" W,'II ,.,u]ill ... J'I'''' IOU ~ /NIT ....'" ... ,.,u Ityi #
,..
II;

111

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK1RTl'S PHIlOSO PII Y

A5 we havc seen, Oh2J1llooni's Extem21 RealiSt critique of 2 physical

v2rieg:ued singuluity ~uires rum 10 2CCOunt for thc incompuibility
~n thc multiplicity of infinitesimal partides :lIld thc singularity of
pcrccpnlal appearance. Spc.tlcing rrom :lIl External Reali$( penpeaive, he
de2ls with (hi. problem by admining rcaJ multiplicity at the physicall.:vd
while deferring real singularity to the menw level. AI the samc limc. hc can
still :argue for com::spondence by mainwning that 1M singul.trity of 2ppearancc 21 Ihc menta.llcvel corresponds to s.ingul.trity of effect.tt the physical
level. O n this Extcrru.! RnliSI posicion, onc is thus fiu to deny the ultimate
aistcncc of :lily physical cntity thu is 21 once varitg:lled and singuW withOUI harming onc's theory of prrccption.
When. howevtt. this same :uu.lysis is applied to the mental bd itself, the
External Realist cannot employ till! same motif. 2n im.tge m2y have multipic colon:. :lfld il is proenled with some degree of 2pparcnr Spalial extension (slhuLllil). which is 10 uy thai: it has regioru. such as righr, left, upper
:lfld lower. Thus. both in terms or phenomena.! coloration :lfld Otteruion,
a cognitive im.tge is "v:aricg:l.ted" (citra). But 2 cognitive image is a.!so meanl
to be nothing bUI thc mind it.sdf, which is singular. Hcnce. thc ExtcnW
Realist is obliged 10 admit that a cognitive i~ is both w.rieptcd and singular. And if a variq;ated singulariry an ~ admined at 2 menw Icvd. why
OOt 2dmit it .1.1 the physical kvci? The central problem hue for the Extcrna.! RoWin posidon is m21 variegated singularity of a cognitive i~ an001 ~ Otptained 2way by admining the acruaI mulriplicity or the image and
dckrting the singularity to somc other level, for t~ is no other lcvellO
which External Rca.!ism might turn. It is true th.tt the Extema.! Realist
mighl defer singul.triry to conceplua.!iry. but since 211 cognitive images
appc:u- to have spatial eneruion (nh;;/m4), thil would ~ in effea: an admission llul a.!1 perccptioru 21l! conceptua.l; such :lIl admilSion would Il!nder
Dlurnakini', system unworbble.M
In response to the imr:act;J,ble problem of the cognitive image's variegated singubrity. Oh2l'Tn2kini 2bwdons Extenul Realism in favor ofEp isternic ldealism.:lfld the fUming point from Extctna.! Realism to EpistcmK:
Idealism comes :at the vem cite-d above (PVJ.108). There is. of course,
much more that could be said here, but for our proem purposes, the
important iuuc is that, 2t least on I~ interprmuion found in Sikyabuddhi's
94 nUll il. I>IwnWdn; would no IonF haw _
10 panic:ulan. the ioIc ukimardy ruI
ml;tia in hi. Iy1I:nn. And wi~1 tudI aa:aI, that- wou1d be no maN to diJrincuisb (.(III.
rdc. (i...trccdy) 10 ~ ...d thooc tha. do .,.... foo. ..d. deoc" ..; .....ion io
u1.illUld,.. I:wM "poll the Idie ~/hcx-, thai dwxtrri_ puticubn aIoM..

<><pu tho.

DHARMAkIItTl'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

HJ

commrnt:lry. mis V'a'SI: specifically lhows us trun the External RaliS! argument against variegated singularity rests upon a rejection of any such entity
at w physial levd, for it is pKCiscly this rejection mat makes the argumerll
contradiaory {and, hentt. inferior (0 the EpiSiemic Idealist theory) al the
I~ of the cogniti~ image:. And sintt me External Realist critiques the
notion of a vui~ted singularity at me physica.llevd, he cannot defend the
8uddh;~r

view of pr.IO:l'rion by f'M iring ~m~ ~ingl~ ~nriry Ih::If is an ap;g~

gation of infinites imal panicles. Keyt is thus incorrect to claim that

DharmalUni's argument against variegated singularity requires him to
accept an aggregate as a single particular.
Iu we conclude ow discussion on parriculan, we should now confidmdy
be able to answer me quc:st:ion mat gives me section its tille. -00 pan icuhrt 6.w: ~f>'ln:ol <':l<tomJi.on? ~ If Wl." I'C'ttncr ourwlw:t ( 0 Ohum:Udni's own
texts and those of his earliest comment.aton;, our answer must ckarly be
-no. And sinO! only particulars ~ causally efficient, we an aI.so conclude
mat any entity mat arises from causes and produces effects mUSt not be spaci.aLly o:tendcd. This point. however, raises a qucstion mat we touched upon
earlier: how do we interpret th~ pa..uagc:s in which Dharmakini appears to
.pal< ... if <=<Iended e nlit>e. such ... . molt.! 2rf! produced by c:auus :&nd " lIVe
effects~ A complete aruwer to mis qU$ion would rcqui~ mo~ '~ th:rn
we have here. but in brief. we can mum to me passage from the Sliflupti
mentioned earlier (PVSV .ra'PVI.t}7-L41.). lbal is, we should simply under
stand these: as cases in which, for convenientt, Dhannakini speaks of, for
enmple. -me causes and dfecu of smoke- ntther than - the common ausal
origin :rnd potcrltial for dfccu rd~ t to multiple infinitaimal panicles
that, when consickred in ~nru: of those common co.usaI chuaaeristK:a, may
be called~. ~ Indeed. as we have noted Dhannakirti occasionally uses the
cerm Maw ("ming; as:rn expression for material things such as mlO~ lim.
although extended, an: actually reducible to unextended p.:tniculan;.9!

2. -I Un;WTSI:Ils
We have observed mar in addition 10 pc:rcepcion. which takes paniculan as
its objects, DharmalUrti aI.so admits infen:noe as an instrument of know!
95 Sonxol w manyaampkl indudt: !heweol M;w to d.xribewnok~ (PVSV MliPVI.Js:
G:1.J..l1lf): !he adduaion ol !he 0Ql\u fw:uIty .. an i...w>ec ofl MI.. (MV .II PVI.98:
(;:,.,.1,/: and IlK menllOn of I waCtt-I" "' an eomple of I

G:,I.!rIl.).

*"" U'VSV d

"VI.I,);

II"

fO UNOAnON S Of OHAMMAKI MTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

edge. As demon.nnred in the pmriow chaprtt, inferences rely upon a rda

rion of"puvasion" {vpipti} that pernios bctwten the evidence (linl", w )
and the predicate (0 be ptovrn (~rma). Smokr, for aample. is pttvadrd by fire such that in all cases whrre smokt is found, fire is prcxnt. This
relation is a general one: it pcrtailU in all cam where smoke is prescnt. In
pan as a result of the generality of this rebtion, the predicate Clnnot ladf
be a particular, for a particular cannot be distributed ovtf other inSQflce5.
I nst~ , the predicille must be an idea or concept (mch as "fire1. This idea
or concept is what Dharmakirti means by a univcnal, and he thus undersmuts inferences to take universals as their objects.
While Dharmakini maintains that universals arc the objectS of inference, we have secn that on his view, univenals are not ultimately real
because. unlike paniculars. they lack ,e1ic functi on. We can understand
this distinction bctwetn universak and paniculan in a commonsense f.uhion-an 1WOnmem of particulars that YIC label "fire" actua.Ily produce hot,
but that label or concept "fire" ClnnOt boil our tea. On this basil, Dharmakirti de:nics thr ultimate reality of universals, and that de:nial is coruiuem
with his :antirealin projKt. We should thus note: tbat Dharmakirti's notion
of.a universal diffen significantly from the mdiu throrieli of phi105ophers
such as the Naiyiyib UddyotWr.a. Specifically. for realists such as Uddyo!ann a univenal exists in distinction from the: conceptual cognition that
apprelKnds it. but for Dharmalcirti a universal docs not exist indcpe:nde:nt
of a conccprual cognition."
In rejecting the uhimale reality of univenaiJ, Dharmakirti is de:nying
that an aprcssion or concept refen "in an affirmati\'e manner" (vidhirVp"J
to its rcfercm by virtue of the presence of the universal(,) to which that
exprcsston or concept: is rdared. Nc:vcnhelcss, Dhannakini does not thc:rcby
fltt himse:lf from the obligation [0 :tCCOum fo r how conceptual cognitioru
can still guide: action in the world. This obligation sreml in pan: from
Dh.arm.akin:i's unde:tst2nding of why we usc conce:pts, whether the:y be
within inference: or simply within a linguistic comat . To be sprcific, he
96n.., infl tll(U w., IUI~ ill thtitobjau" rYidcnllTom PV).I-). II - 0 11 ~'I
'P.o:<nmt (ciu:d by I)I...nnaldni in PVSV .J PVI.I. G :1.11-Ld: _
.....,. .. .......,y1U<-,.",.11IIith. h ' fUJi'~ ~",."M.*- Noel du. hcK htUJ".
ro I
conapc.w cosni1ion. S abo 1M di'''''Miont al PV 4.80 ;&I'd PV4.176'.

rmn

'17 The.- conciIc lIilancnl of dw ~ indficicncy-q.nd hcna irroli~ lUIiYCr_ .. '-'dindws,.".pn(-'PVI_I66,G:l+IO): . . . . _'!I~_' 1.~
~ . _ 5 "00 PV"'- J .owI .... Im""n! met .ph<>.- of ,he: aonuch (PVSV . .
PVI ,2.lG- m . G ,loti.l7-IO?\I: Ir.. ...t1lN on chape .... 4. , 10).

DHARMAK!RTI'S MET HOD AND ONTOLOGY

us

m:a.inwns dut we USC concepa nm: limply out of some pernicious habit. bm
rather with a specific purpose or goal in mind.'" We might, for I:UlTlple,
seck [0 heat ourselves in front of a fire:. and ~ might then usc the conceptual knowledge: of fire acquired through an inference in order to obtain a
real, particular fire that has the capaciry 10 fulfill the tdos (art"") that we
seck. On this understanding of why we usc lingwn ic and conceptual cognitions. Dharmalcirti is obligM to , hOY! how univeruk, ~ though unl'Cl..!.
can nn'Crthdcss yidd information about particulars. That is, he must show
how our words and concepts make seosc, even without the prcsc.nce or
"affirmation" (vidhi) of any ulcimatdy real universal.
To gain at least some sense of how Dharm:akirti dcaI.s with the problem
of meaning in the absence of real universals, let us brieRy uamine his
JljW.:w-theory. which for him ('Xplairu how we arriVf':1.I meming through the
amstruaion of universals dut are rul only conventionally (not ultimately).
We will begin with a summary, and then we will also inquire into two
aspcctJ of his theory: the nmion of particulars having the same effect, and
the question of whether conventionally real universals arc permanent.
FinaJly, we will raise some problems that the 4PO~fheory must address,
and we will answer them by referri ng to three senses of the term JlptJIut.
,8 s PVSV "P'VI.,) (G'4j.}I-+6.,):
p..,.. liof........... MJ ..,.,. ,bw ,hi",,1iIhitIJ 11 n/, ,. ~pliJh mnT /i"InIMJJ1*"
i,. ...ur ,. ~".pIish n- ~. i, if for UN rr_ lb., .;pifon ~
HjmI..
[P'VI.,,] The tXt mat pcoplr _Id encounter considuabk difficulry if Inq._
not 10 form Iiplimlioru or we apmWu is not .i mply I mailer of IOITlIt pmIicioua

.,,1UtI ,.

...hi. (..,..",_)

R...n... ......."...;"1 ..... ~ an .,...,..;,.~ . ........ __ an ""ptftOion ....

IOIN'lhinc dac,;' an undmaki............ pnctiaI xOor.---ror tho- sili of_pl. This

n..-.erv,

is .. brc::au$o InUtb \lIIderu.kinp would be ipmi.

it m.akes KIm ~
I prnon who is applyins Clpre.siona 10 IOmahi", ihouJd ha"" dairrd dfca in
miDd. And all pb .,~ ddinod u nther tho- 'Iu.inm~rll of whal one daira or ~
.mi<bn of wha. O~ don IlOl daiK . Thotrd"on: .inoe AICh ;. 1M ddini.ion oi.
pl, I petJOn dnmnincs what ac:compl4hes and don not aoc:ompliih ~ desirrd and
undcsiral.. and h...inS done 10. du. peroon ...... Clipreooi<>nl or P;O)'l .un"ion .0 .he
<ucor cxp-e . ' .... -ith d.c ;n'cnrion, oho..IcI Kt .... , .....; 0 . "1 ohould ....;.I ...... ;
or 'j .t.ould ha"", ~ lei on .ha,; Of I.nou!d h,a"'" 5OInC'OI\t avoid mal-' omerwUc:. one would !MY no umuion to Iu~ I..,i prlllitlrJtlJl ,~""" ~
~*",N"; 141 wu",MJrty II~ ..~"". ~~~ fl,yl "., ~J",/......i
~ tWjw~,.. "'J" ... ~"".,,.,..,,~- "'J"iJi".~". ",i,.
I ii,!, urbi l _
~ vArr ....~~ I "~",fIhcyo,.~"",,tIIi,
I ... "J"'!' J"IN/i" .,i kNn1l ,.;p."p~ ~'" rN ~i~i4 un",,!, "u-r./I I /4t u
_'!" ~,..!U'" ;".,,~ 11AiJoI... .~,,~ ,.u;",__ ~".,'!' U
JUrH IJIIN "u!"i";",,,. ft'1"'!' u~ wri IIIUn " iJ"lIjiU ,,~~ I
""",u.~!,iJiUW' -1.

u6

fOUNDATIONS O F DHARMAKIRTn

PHILOSO PHY

Overall, our aim hen:: is 10 raise: Ihe central issues and problems in (he
apoha-thcory, and to avoid surpassing the scope of that goal, we must fo~
any detailed o:amin:nion of the other analyses by modern interpreters,
despite their importance to my undmt:lnd.ing of Dharmakini's philosophy
of language."
SlImnutry ofDhttmutlnrti i AfDIM- TINory'"

Dharmaltini maim:ai.ns thai thctt an: mree different types of univctsals: those
based upon the real (i.e., particulan), ~ based upon the unreal, and those
based upon both. To simplify our wk. let us coruider only the type of universals thai an:: based upon real thinp-i.e., univcna1s consuUcted on the
basis of pciu prual content caused by partlrulars. A straightforward case is
the universal that is the object of the concept ~ m:I~ that occurs when. seeing first one and then anomer objca, we recognize (pNty4bJ,;-vjiUl) fWO
objcas as "rtd. ~ we have nOled, perception is causal, and for Dharmakini
this mearu mat in the case o( our visual cognition of those objects, me infinitesimal particles that constitute each of them cooperate with other causal
filcrol':l so as to crr:::IlC inuscs dUll \W: coneqnu.:uiu as simibr in their respective pcrt:q'lrual cngnitioru. Sin cach inugc is an cffi:ct. il i~ as much a particular as those infinitesi.mal panides. AJ a particular, each image is utterly

unique, and it cannot be distribuled over other particulars. Hence, the

images themselves
af1,,'U (or the universal--the "sameness"
{s4millJll}-that enables us to call both objts "red.. -,.,
Nevcnhdc:ss, each image. precisely bcausc il is unique, can be the basis

(,.,,""t

fo r the conn ructio n of the appropriate universal. 1luo.r i,. a panicular il

defined as ,hal which is capable of ,die function (.nh.Itriy4). which means

mat i, muSl produce dfccu. 8m on Dharmakirri's view, any entity thai

produces cffccu has necessarily arisen from causes; indeed. as we shall see
99 n... work of Sidcriu (a~s. 19511 and 1995I) ... '-n Qf>KialIr hdpiUl. dopil~ my dis.
"V-n>Cft ..,.;.h _ _ Df ... - I ........... 'lVlU1e f'ocu.inll p,i_ily on !an...!.ti and
Kamablib. Sidniu iI MYCnhcIe. quil~ 'ist" 10 nOt~ that mud! of thn. approKh I<) W
...,.w.thtoory is 10 ~ IOund in DlwmUini. apcOally u rt:ad mroup. thr: ~nwy of
$~. 0tMr mockm 'II'Ofh of impooutlCC to my inlapm::lrion etperiaIly induck

1'- ofTIllnmnt Crml and Ka~ (1991).

100 PVSV .JPV,.6I-7f. n:and..la! in m. appc:ntia. NIWn. I numba ofw ~II
dl,cwwd in

dw remainder of !his chafm:r.

101 On Ihr Ihm: rypn of unlvrrul.s, ICC PYSV . . rvl.l!ll (G :91019ff).nd rV}.f ,l;d:

"1M",.".

"j;

'In,.

_UlIthhiWM,.,~ pJ/s-.rJl.

Conc:aninc I'CICIDp1ition ~u..).

DHARMAKIRTI' S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

"7

in the next chaprcr. the range of dTccts that the particular is capable of producing is determined by the cawes from which it has arisen. A particular's
uniqueness thus amounu to the faa that it has arisen from specific causes
and that it therefore is capable of producing a specific or restricted range of
cffcru. '11 If we COlUidcr an image that arises from what we would call "red,"
that i~ (a mental paniOJlar) is unique or "excluded" (1IJd1J!TUl) from :ill
other paniculars in that no omcr partiwlars :uUt from exactly the same
causes or produce aacdy the same effecu. The image, being the unique
dfca of the unique paniculan that produced it. thw setvts :u the b:uis for
acluding the: imagts produced by other paniculars.....
The: f..C(. however, thaI each image acludes:ill other imagCll by vi nue
ofiu uniqueness is not in itself adequate to account for our usc of concq>U
",n,! I",ngll"'se wr: require '" nOtion o f J:lmencu. ",.nd n O I jU!t d ifTe:lellOt!. We:
must have lOme notio n of lameness bc-causc we ntt<! [0 :account for
.nlNlJ4. the "repcarabiliry; "distribution" or "continuity" applicable to
any cognition that seems to rder to multiple iruranccs. The conceptual
cognition of "rcd," for example, appean to assume a "redness" that is present in multiple irutanccs. and in thil smx the concept of-red" has anwrya.
Dlu.rnu.ldni mainninr that in order to conrrruct the nmc:rleu required by
.rn""J4. we pia "Iim iu" (av.rJh.) on the c:aU5ef and efTceu upon which
we foo.u. In other words, we have apecudolU in mation 10 what we wish
to obtain or avoid, and our concepa-which arc indininguishable from
universals for Dharmakini-are constructed in relation to those aptalions.... In the case of the concept "reel; some set of interests or other
DhutnUlro', ""'* dIorou&h accounl "found In I'VSV " " Y' .9' 97Jb ,G~s"'6-1 .I!I.
notion tN. an imase iud(, brin& tu>d4triOO.rd. annor be, J ...nm....J it ~~ II .
for oampio:, PV,.16j-.67 and MY "'PVC.7.aI (G:40-)-.1) ruuIamI in the appmdi;L
TI.t notion that ~ Qltitia may be, conPdomd thc AmC in tNlChey JR all eqcully dif-

n.r

fm:nt f'roon oWr nltiria: oaun rhl'OU!houl PVSV. 5c'C apm11ly PVSV MlPVL7J (uans"ted in thc ;oppcnclm).
IOl5c'C, 1Ora:ampk. PVSV "'PVI.I6(; (G:l4. u.~j.l) and thc nGl chapen (I',), wht:.., ....
;.....io~ .

03 ".., norion tNl ...niq""...,. of J>Mticubn: it ... ltilllJldy the ~ 101 CONINainl uni
aaU rhlllUl!ih adusion is aprcsscd ill, for cx:a3pk: PVSV '" PV' .70 (G:}I.?if; _ thc
appendDJ; PV'.71Cld and PVSV "'til. (C~9.1 6ffi_~: PVSV "'PVc.&! (C 'JS.1-Jr.

and PV)..I69.
104

n.r ~ role of apettioru in cht ronwllCiion or univcnah it indiattd by tht

. . of thc ~ dbi_ r apeacd1 wid! rdaion 10 dlorClIIk'I and dkcuon thc

basis ofwbldl J unltTJ&lls CQf\IIl\Kttd. oS I'VSV . . 1'\'1.9' (d ied earlkt. n.98). $eo- alto
dw: ~rma 10 dbip~ in PVt.6I-70 and MY '" til. (G:" .'; _ thc appendO: fo. a

III

FO UNDATI O NS O F D HA1,o.tAKIRTI 'S PH ILOSOPHY

such dispotitions prompts us to conmue the image in question as distinct

from C'ntities that do not have the causal eharactC'ristics C'XpcclC'd of what
we call "red"; at thC' samC' time, we ignore other elitC'ria, such as having the
causal char.lctC'tiSlics cxpC"CtC'd of that which is "round" or "SWC'C1 , " W'hen
we look at rwo obja that we will 001 "red,~ the first objC"C1 produces an
imagC' that acludes all images that ....-c would "orcaJl "red," and thC' imagC'
from the second object also C'Xciuda thOst images. If we do not inquire
runhel into the differences bctwttn those twO images thC'm5Clvcs, we can
construC' both images as mutually qualified by a negation, namC'iy. thdr
difference: from non-red imagC'$. That mutual difference, which Oharmaldni calls an "C'Xdusion" (IIJiivrni), thus bccomC'5 their nondifference.
In shon. that C'Xclusion or nondiffcrC'nce pert:lins 10 all things ,hat arC' diftrent from thOst that do nOI havC' thC' apccted causal charactC'Jistia-in
this case the cawal charactmsrics cspected of that which we call "red." I~
In this way. C'XciusiolU, being formed on thC' basis of the images in conceptual cognitions, arc construed as negations that qualify those imagC'5.
Thus. whilC' mC' images themselves arC' completdy unique-they do not
have anWlJll and thus are not disnibutC'd over othC'f instances they can
be construed as qualified by a n~tion that t4ts have ""wrjIJ. inasmuch as
oornpIctc tnrubtion). Tlw: notion of dIC ncpiVl: - limit" (,lIwJllij in oppoaition lo wbid! ~
"elution il CI)I'lHruClrd appnn to OClaIr only ona in dv
(i.~, PVSV MiPVI.I' j)

s.-rm

...t.eR DlwmWni rmwb (G:tl.J.H}'):

it iI CSlWliahrd that aU apralioN and COIIttpU ~ a d wio.,. (~)
u mnr objtcu. bon lhou!h 1N:s.t CG-rJemui&l aprcssio.,. and ODnpu.:kpmd
upon lhe _
rnI,hi"" ,hey ~VI: di~n' obju; lhey haft diff'ercnl ob.iecu
~ apt->on..-:I conupto or~ ~ (wf" ' ,... ' 1, r",",-) in teO/'1IU of
acJwions
appnr in copilion all if they ~ o:llffi:rcnl; and
CIIdwlon,
appear diff'erml due 10 those: adusiont diff'~ tilal an:' eoNIn.octrd \hrougb die
dilkiCi'ICCI in thdr dditni,m ( ...Jhi). [uuM' siJJh.", twI urw yUJ viwbllilql
-i1u4JI ('ff 1 M m ~tiYnI~.,. ~_ .-'hijJ"J.~;"'i~ ~~
Mt;,,1tt1" ;"'P"';~"
.,;,orffpi,.t.y..... w.;",...~ .... ..,.
'J"hndor~

.ha,

.no..:

r,Yhs ..

~i (rvr:1,~PVT..,PaH _ K:}47. ~jO) drfina "ddimilcr~ (nMihi) u follows:

lui adU;SO(ln ', dduniln IS IIIaI from wluctl one emblu"," lhen: 10 br ~ adUSlon,
For aampic. die ddimi'cr of die acL.uion a1kd "pmdua" jo "I\On,produa. ~ Likt'III'ik, I'ot dv cxdwion drfinrd u " impcntWlCfl" .M delimite. is "pcrmaneD\".C." and
on on {i.e. the same .. appliabk 10 all odlcr COIIttpUI. IJoI PJbt"i. ,.. ".,....u!J".w
Ii ,.,., Wh# I Jf'lhi -'1vM' V-,. .,.~ I"v", .,.;".,..t,~

,?-,,,,,,,,,,,,u,.

I ~ TIlC ~

j~ .

tt... o:rWn !:.lIil;'" nuy bcc:ocuidercd nondilinull bccawI: dwy arc &II differ

6 ...... .oJI...u.:. cou...... crnphui-I .. lCV'Uoi pi-:... indudint; I"VSV .Jrv..;ryd {G ...... t;Il),
MV MiI"V,,9!Cd (G.......l and cspiaIIy in I'VSV MiJ'VI.IJ7-'41 It..e
appmdix).

CIl<

m.

OHARMAKI RTn

METHOD AND O NTO LOGY

".

rh:u n~rin n :appl i~ In :all I.he inst::llnces in quesrion: :all me instances in

question exclude wh~t is not red,
Through mis :approach, Dharmwni arrives at a theory of universals
(s4tn1lnytllalq.a!'4) that requires both the image :and me exclusion. That is,
$[rialy speaking, a universal is ~ combination of mar which is nor dismbUled (i.e., lacks Ilnvaya) :and mat whim is distributed. nil: image, as a menIal p:trricub. , is nor distribtlt~ . bu' ,hI! 6dLls;/:>n (IJ)I"JvrrtiJ. :1_
' a n~';n n

applicable 10 all the images in qucstion, is distributed, Lacking distribution,

the image alone cannot be the universal. But on Dharmakini's theory of
qualities, a negation cannot exist in distinaion from that which it qualifies;
mef(:fore, me negation alone also cannot be the universal. The universal
must merefo re be an image mat we construe in terms of a particular ~
of neg::ation. mundy, the exclusion of th:at which does nee: h:tve the expected
effects. As we have secn, for us to apply this negation to all the images in
question, we must admit that all the images in question have the same
dfttt. Let us c::umine this imponant issue in grearer derail.

Dharmakini claims that :a universal is oonslruaed on the basis of me exclusion of all the entities in question from thos.c that do not have me expected
causal char:l.creristia. Dharmwni rccognius, however, thaI if u m in
things-such as those called "waler-jugs--are excluded from olhers
because: those: others do nOt have the expected causal char:l.cteristics, one is
also assc:ning that all the things we call Kwater_jugs" have the Ill"" causal
chanctul$t;cs, they a.lI have the ca....w chanieterUt;cs cs:pcaed of. "wate, jug."* For Dharmak:ini, this amounu to the claim that, in the casc: of all
warcrjugs, we may identify at least some of their causes as [he ~same (tkll).
and most importandy, we may likewise identify at kast lOme of their dfCCb
as the "same:""
106 FoIIowin& OIwmakIlti, ~ will5ptU; of"'hinp" ( ~_) IUCb III . "w;ucr-jUJ" rp.,u j
in. ~ Iha sIoaa OYa"tM lOOK prcciK 1R:almcrn ..nutbt tIM: nucloc:opK - '""ius
iI in faa ncxhin, bul mimwnpic infini!t$inai panicIcJ. M ~ haw alrndy M"nI/.98I1l. !hit
ptooedun puu,. limpl:il1a DharmWrti '. aalt. in tha. M ~ no! m(. GOnJtandy 10 inhn
ilC:simal pmlcks.
107 ..... though DI>:armUl rti tpcQfia1Iy ditcWKS 1M C'ONuuaion olllnr.tnaJs in lmN of

mfiria linin, tIM: AmC (ypcIof

thai mmtion both

(G:A .I.4-69,l ):

wa)'l

"*,...

b.r: tmds to foo::w upon IaInm$ of dkct. PM '"

of wllJInKlm& u,mcneu Include !,\lS\I "" t'\lI "}7-141.

110

FOUNDATION S OF DHAItMAKIRTI 'S PH I LOSOPHY

D hmna.kin i's focw upon sameneu of d fm becomes panicularly wient

when he presenu his .cpon.thcory in terms of the :act of rcmgnition, as
when a perceived enti ty or individual (",ati), such as a lone water-jug, is
recognized to be the same as another individual. M noted ead ier, when an
individual is pe.ccil"cd. it produa:s a JCnsory cognilton containing an image
that corresponds corrdarivdy to the panicular(s) that productd il. That
image. which is in DC! idem ical to the cognilion in which il arises, is a
memal particular, and as such. it is no Ic:s.s unique than Ihe individual that
produced il. If Dhu mw n i were to claim that individuals :m the same
btcau~ thO$(' effects-the cognitivt" images they produ--are the ~Rme
(tit,,). then it ICCms that he must conU'adia his ontology of paniculars: if
he 1:1)'1 that two images. which :m mental particulars. :m the same. then
how can he 5;l.y that all pankulan are unique? Speakinl in the voice of an
objtor, and wing "cognition to rmr to he cognitive imagt. Dharma.kini
ptus the problem this way:
But tlllh l'Df"itiD" is II" tj{m f{thost intii"iJIUIU, ,,"" Cllf"itill"
is tiifftrmt (PVl.lo8cd) for each real rning (pwi 6h1lllilm). That
is. as with the indi vidual thar caused the awan'nm. the cognition in which it appcart is distinct: therefore. how can all those
speciftC individuals have the same dfcct? For the cognition is
thei r effm. and it is diffen: nt in each case. In oth('f words, the

purlculan haw tIw GIIV cffea. In order to aprai INI thry haw that dI"ea.
onr: ~ thnn.nth ~rCS$ionlwchu -.mct+ilIIi" pt u. id! thai tM Ii~
Somt;

"'.oed.

............ tiuI, tko, JV""'1l> ...... 0. . . . . . . . . . . . ' - " "......1 t",;c.

0- o:ut liodl...royi tIfAtA parricubn in <hal &Won beeN... dwy _ ~ t'rom purio.Ibn IN,

are Othtt than thnn. Liltn.iloe. in tennl of havins tnc AII10e cawc. one can aptcll
... tw ia naru.i~ ..ith a "n~ ap........ in onkr to fxili t.tc prxlial aaion.
F.Prnpks _ "H uo;f",d. " "Jcrxy c-," or ". ~ an.e. irnmuIiatdy after dIOn~ or

".ound ia cawaUy producul" tJoolJ\&i~..,. utU.,. bllliJoi.,. _,.,.Mc~

p.jMid.u.jfJ ~ f ~Itm~ ...,."thu~ttW f
,,"1M r'4"'':rt N~ ~""N1"Url]il~ M~ irua _ 1.

I.,. ,.

Other aampla include: PVSV .d 1'V1-40-4l (G:II.It-l) : .,. ~ IJMM ilili

dt~ ~ ,....,.,; ,-~. ,...., ,.. ~ ~ I w.s..w-;..
it]dm~ vii' .. ,,....,""""~It;o thtIIJtfII"-UJtI ~~
",.~ I ,.thJ
",u.~ Id...!y
.wbl,,"i"~ri
hi>1I~ PVSV ,",PVI.6. (G:JI. ~): ad ;1'" )i l ..rbhi,!, _'!"I'll,.'.
...,,~ ,,~,,~ MiI/ytt.... ~.....M..,., ihwtUlt ~
~-.,.".m,"A ! .y.,.r ~ and PVSV ,",1'V1.7sd (G:.p..H): ,.JwJ.,.,J,iqi mi.
,_UJ U,J" .,. ~"""-'J"''''jlU.w;u,.. .,J,..h,'jt1'1' 4-____ ~~ '\ 4'1
Uhi.d U, wy.,./II m.. _twit.;',.j. 'rIJinrM,.
&

,,.,.,,..,..,,IMi,.U;. .

j"

'hi

",!wi""'''''

DHARMAICIRTI'S M ETHOD AND O NTOLOGY

single dfcct of Woller-jugs and so on, such as bc:arina water, is different for c:ach 5ubst:lllcc because me substances arc d.iff'c.rent,
Hen, those individuals, being different, do not have the same
effect.'" '
To avoid. tbis problem, Dbarmakirti maimains that (he cognitlorui.e.. the cognitions with imagtS corresponding through awali[y to their
ob;ca.-:are not what account for the sameness of thow objectS' effectS.
Instead., those cognitions themselves aa as awes for anOther cognition, a
-judgment'" {prilfJillMmIlrl4jIWM} th:a.r is the -ume~ {~ltil} for all the individuals in question. He explains:
i~ nm :I

prohlem. hK:al.ue 1M Mf"iliD1I pmJlUNi by LiUh

inJividMil/ in quarion is nonJif!amt sinn flUh copilion is lIN
CilMJL ofII j wiprnl tlNll is lIN IIlmL for.U lIN indivitJlUls in quntiDII. And linu thry iI" lIN CIIUlt1 ofw SIImL CJIf1Iiti41U. tIN ituiiviJwJs "" llisD 1I(JnJijJrrtn/[PVI.I09]. '"

Thil

Dhllrmllkin; ::admillE rhllr

r~

o::ognirion--or

mo~

prP.ci!W!ly, r~ o:ngniri~

imagc--produd by >t2Ch individu:..! is indct!d unique. Hence, one cannot

Jirtalyuse those images as the wamnt for the claim that the individuals arc
the same bccause they havt the.same dfm. If those cognitive images arc to
be used ro demonstrate tMIIM individuals which produced Ibe imago; arc
the.same, Iben Dlurmmrti must first show how those imy the effects
of the individllal arc (hem5Clves the AmC. To do 50, he oncc agai n turns
to the principle th:lt entities ue the 1:lJl1C if they produce the nme dI't.
That is, he maintains t:h:a.t those cognitiYC inugo; arc all the same bccau.sc
thl:)' all produce ,he same efft, namdy, a judgrnmt (pnlfJillJamllrl4jIfllM)
that takes as iu object the aforc:mentiooed cognitivt image and construes
that image in the urne fashion in each case. For example. all the cognitive
images can be the same bccause thl:)' a1l ltad to the judgment. "This is rtd.
Dh:arm:>kirti then m:lint:tins th:l t. if those cognitive im:ages :Ire the ume

108 J>VSV MiPVI.lokd (G:j6.Io-I.j; _ .... ihiJ;~ ~ ~ r. "j~tL [PVI.lokd l

".raIti...". J w..., u",../ii4Jti_ ftju~,. ~, I ...... ~ I "'" .. ..w~

...,.." wr. ~tL J,.J W="'/IM . Miu .. ~~~,!, "'" .,;~.,.",

160 b.I ~ rwri ~u,!, j.ht,Uu,!, u.,-.. .,;,
101

I"VSV"" l'V'.1O'I (G :)6..' H7'7):

-q.~ /7"'_' /~

UhtJiIii I dMIti~.,um.n. W .....~ [PV1.lo,l.

........... tINr

11.1

fO UNDATIONS Of DHARMAKIRTl'S PHILOSOPHY

lxausc: thty allle.td to th~ sam~ judgm~nt . then one can also gy that th~
individuals that pnxluttd thov: cognitive images in the fim place arc all th~
gm~ because thty too produce th~ sam~ dfcct. Thm, th~ wam.1\I for th~
sanl~ness or the individuals is that thty produce the same cfkct: the cognitive images. And the wamuH rOt the gffiCncs.t or the cognitive images is
ag:lin that thq produCt' the 5:lme effect: a a nain ~ or judgment.
/u ~ hav~ dcscrilxd it so rar. this d)(ory leaves itsdr ~n to an obvious rebuttal: what warrants the sameness or the: j udgm~nts ~ That is,
Dharma.ltini', initia1 problem is that individuals arc unique, so the samenc:ss required by language: and concrpu must be accounted ror by samellCS$
or df t. Bur ir he tUfns to th~ cognirive im.ages produced by those individuals, he has the same problems because those cognitions, like the individuals them.sdvC$, arc unique. Ir he now turns to the claim that those
cognitive images arc th~ sam~ b.ausc: they produce the same judgment,
th~n h~ appean to havt fallen into an infinite regress. In other words, it
would appear that we nttd, once again. to warrant the g mencss or those
judgmenu by appealing to the sameness or Ihrirdfcca; and or course:, me
wnmcss or the judgmmu' dfcca will once again tC'quire the: same warnnt,
:;& nd JOon.'"
Dharmakini's response: to this problem is c:xprc:sscd. ir somewhat ellip-rically, in his commenral)' on rhe verse: cited above. Nore mon here he uses
the metaphor or an ~ overlap-or ~ mixing" (141!U'l'1.4) or individuals whereby
the nature or one is somdJow partially prcsc:nt in the nature or the other.
For Dharmakini, such an overlap is impermissible in the as<! or causally
effickm things. since causally cffidem entities are paniculars (or arc rcducibk to panicul.ars). and thl:)' must be unique. With this and other such
issues in mind. he co mm~ms on the aforementioned verse:
It Ius already been a pbincdll1 ma[the natures of things (bhJlIII)
do nO{ overlap. and that .t cognition of lhcm in which me cogni.
live: inugc presents a thing ill ir its nature overlapped with O{hu
things is an error. However. those: distinct minI' indirectly
(Jmz~ become the causa for conaptS; ill such, by their nature
they produce a conccprua1 cognition in which they seem 10 over
IIOThisobjtion is hUlk partirularly dear by SJnwaktita ITS:lou- Ion)
(l'SP lUi til.:o401r.4OI).
II I ~ Dkannal.ini .-.Jd be.di:m"5 ...........be. 01 f
PVI.6I-11 and PVSV "" trl. (rnrulaud in me appmdix).

* KatnaWib

6 ' alikdy .............. ~;.

DHAIlMAKIIlTI 'S METHOD AND O NTO LOGY

" J

lap. Moreover. this is called Ibdr - no ndiff'ertnt differtnct"namc:ly. tha r cxd usion (lIiwlA) from Other things m:n b}' namrt
do nOl cause thai elfa:l. they arc: understood to be adudcd in this
fashion bc:caU$t: they causc some same effect . such :u a cognition
/(Dntaining an ima~ that lcads 10 the same judgmentJ.
In lerms of Ihe cognition thai each individual produces. even
though it is dilfttcnt fo r every sumtanct, each cognition appears
nondifTcrtm fro m thc: omen in qucstion in that by iu namrt it
causes a jUdgmem that overlays the image in rhc: awarencu with
a nondilfttcnce. Moreover. Ihc: innanca in question cause that
thing (.rth.t~namdy. an awarenc:u and such mal appears nondiffertm and thai in turn causes mal kind of judgmem. Therefore,

Th ~ inu:l n ~

Th rough Thei r n:lTU". p rnduu

Ji ngill':

cognition wilh an image thai pnxnu them as overlapping whose

ultimate oh;ea is their difference in ruamrt (S'llflhIMVIlhhuJ4) from
aU orner things,lIl :u has been repeatedly Stated. Therd'ort. the
11 2 1 1u~ uanil,u ro /lJfl1ohJt,r,~ in aaotd wim dw COIIIaI Mft. np",;'11y as providro
by the IOIIowIII& vax. Al l llndcnund II. the ICfIIl
u ~ mantto c.on~ the
nocioa thaI IIhi ..... tdy. lhc ... "b"b. it a DOII-cnticy; i. it lhc mc:n: r>ep,ioa tha ."",..m...r
I difTfttn in ftllom (_;lMN~) mal dill.inKUitMI particubn whkh pnform the:
"arne:" fimaion from d>osc that do noc. This "diff'titiltt" is an adllJion ("Ji~.1Onn
at MPIion. and UIUCft i. annoc be. n:..I mory ci4<ina from iu iruc~ This;, the: IIIOM
"ncptr.-t" inlajMtu,ion..r the ~tlwofy ill chc xnK lIut link " Iempt' is......x hen: 10

,..,."fIInbtI

Ka'IWIt

for I~ poIili~ upU of~"'" eopillon.: namdy. I ) ~"'" ,"""irioru

do noc pram. thmud_ U IICplioru. bul an: illl'lad o:paicnad wim _

fixm at rom
oJ tOnlnll (dw -..ord o. ooncqM. "cow" OCCl.In ";Ib _
kind ofimag: in dw mind); and
1) 10 Ix weful. mnapu and ttpSIIOIIi mo.m bUll! OM ,nlO COlIna with (or .. mply tefft
10J puUc:ubn; mil "rcftn:nlw /Unai.on" iI ~tM:. in that OM u1tinurdy pi... knowkdv
of puticuWs. and noc rqarlons.
Mort "~ti>ot" inlUjMrn>fions. which lqin immtdindy after Dharrnaltini and sOOli'
&IIr bonM: ~ pronounced. affirm _
pOOli";ry in OM or both that wzp: 4) thry
KI'c:II the importaoor ..r i~ or appn.n.rKa i~ COI .... p' ..... iOOplilloru; and/or ~ rhty loy
auphuis 0 11 u,., abiliry of wordi 10 lead one 10 INniculan. Bocb and are pramt in

..r

iIIfft'J"'"U''''''''''''

DIumuklni. pbilooop/ly. to .hae

noc mtiody unru.w : thq- !limply.lel
a ckpN anplwillNI I IIndtnund 10 be un,rurouro.
In hisp.uoIthe:compound .....WMNMo 4,..._,....., find web .c:-oIthe "poa.
n..,," i"'~lion ill $1ky.&buddhi. In I baP: WOK, the imporu.nl qUc:ltion " - is: wIut
iI
dw ...fJ.btIW A ncpi~ in.aprnllion illo"y Uw dw Mum,.. if; ruUy nodtinS
If..u: ir iI. nqnioA, and .ocptiotOido noc m..:. ApoIia~ 'apA_ ilfOayrlw the ...v . .
is ruUy the ~iad.u. bul only indirtedy ..... " ;. mu Imtr imerpicuDon thai c:oIoft ~
buddhj '. mnuta whm he p..a _WV,,~~,!,(PVT:I 17U_l . K::uJ.J1-d):

..r

-u,

"""'NJN~

fh-,.']t!W

.",...",."..'!' ~'!',. t'N , .... _rUN ",,.,..riN ;ym ";,,.,It.; I

~~UftIU " ' . . . , . (~""Il' "p hi

1tItyMI,..,

111

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAlMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

nondiff~rena:

of things consulS of the fact th:u they have the

sam~ ~fkct .'1J

Dhumaltitti's solution to tM: problem ofinnnite regress is that sameness

of effect does nona as (he warrant for the claim (hat those det~nninations
of sam~ness ~ the same. Innead, h~ dC'Yerly shifts what ht: mons by !xing
Mthe same" (~It.). Th~ judgments in question ~ th~ sam~ nOl because: they
have th~ same dfea. but because: they ph~nomenally pr~nt the "same~
content: by ovtrlaying the images in th~ cognition that produce them with
a Mnondifference~ (lIb1mJ.), each judgment takes th~ same form, such as,
"This is rt'd This amounts to an appeal to some unspecified combination
of exptriencc and mental dispositions: when we look at ctn:ain iliinl?1' we
just interptd them all as "red." in the: COntext fOrmed by ccnain dispositions
and the way thai we we the term "'red: This appea1lo exptriencc and disposilions highlighu the importanCe of mind-dq>endency or ~$ubjectiW' fa.c..
tors- in the process of constructing exclusions. That is, Dharmaklrti
maintains that wh~n we constructel:dusions. we do not do so haphazardly
or OUt ofsome pernicious habit; rather, we have some purpose in mind. and
(hat purpose provides CXpect2tiOIU and interests mat form the coma! of
our concept formation. Ukewise, we learn how to usc: language and are
habituated to that usc:. An apple and a strawberry, fo r example. will be different if we are concerned with [h~ir distinctive effts, bUI if we ar~ only
pJM" 1M I.t,. i .,. .. '" rtyitI tItnt ..",,.,.,, oi "Y''''' ...... ,.i -p",.,.J,.

rAn 1Ihit ....... ,., """'~ / ...... ,., mlffil"; ~,.,. "1If1i..usJM" """ J.t,.i
.or - Mo,r,.. .. fI.fo ..).

AJ it dear hcre. nwMnIl'''''' is I2km to ~!ht: pmicu1u (_!.r""~ -HNM iI bctc wed
moch :II -~ jn Gjridlioill

JWticuIu

~ ",
kind oftfft," or~', par'
bctc rakm 10 ~ JynOIIym of ~ 11W iI the inltt-

such:ll

Dcular tree.." In short....1IhiH is

pm2oUon takm by Scftnkdlfter('97I:'90 and ,-;",j. Hownft. since the mon:alfItttI of the
diW' ..ion fOa.-on iIwIIIu diliadK%. andNnu the next 'I'ffK ItrtSICt ROC!ht: ~
bul.hI. unreal ad"......... ~., inleljri'ftalion doeI ROC Re'JI WUrlllled heu.
II)

rvsv a'rv','Q7 (G :16.1t-S7.7):

"iwtli_ NUI,.thl """ MiMI....,. "",WM_1fUII7P u;ri 1""'" Ill~ 1w.tIJj,i,

.......,;, .... 1 uI!' ", WWitu/! ~ ....~ I';u!;wNvw WM_~,;
_."""_ iii til / ill , . qb1I
iIwIII I't} ~~NII/.t!I AwJtri'd.cr)or
"1Il1.hi""'~"""II<t~ 1 /iJ .,; p",;J,,,,,,,I!' M+wWu", ",i ,,.q,,.;u,~'"1...."""'.w,.w,.,.JJd ..Ji1N hmo, M.NJ dJ,;"""I!' ft~ri / 1llm.~Ill"""'''_,J.d..., ,,~Mi.si,.. jU~,,~ hmotf1U ",.It,.,. ii lIl'fU!1f4U"'I!'
...H ...,,11. hI' __ I -,. 'M'~ '. ~ ,...,..,..,.~,.,,?....J.r.I ..J.u... ....,
l uu1JtMi ~w.. Mth..... ,,~

"Mi_

u,.qW

DHARMAKIRTr5 METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'"

COnttm~

with thtir coloration. wt igno~ that diff'tttnct in light of tht

samtness constructed in terms of color. And of courst, our ust of "applt"
and "Str.lwbcrry" is dtpendmt in pan on our habituation to certain lin..
.
gwsuc practl(:cs.
Whilt Dh.atmaldrri's appeal to o:pc:ntnct and dispositions rdltcU mt
mind-depc:ndent aspects of the o:dusion procas. it is coupled with somtrhing mnrr:: an lIp~llo Ih~ narure {prllftrti or WIlhhtivtt,J of thinV lh~m _
sdvcs. That is. when ~raI individuab produce cognitions that in turn
product the Amt judgment. "This iI red," it is not just my own apcaations. conditioning and other relevant dUpositions that go into the conmucrion of that exclusion. Ramer. beyond my own subjectivity, the: entities
in question., Ihrir ""tllrt (WIlbh.i1h%1/IfI. prllJrrry4. ttc.) product cognitions
wf,"'<e C(lnrenr i~ (:lIp" hI ~ (Of hr.ing mnsrn,,~d :15 " r~ ." More rh"n 5Om ..
appeal to c:xpuienct. it is this assertion of the nature of mings that putl an
end to any infinite regress. We can pose the question. "But wh] do tbose
individuals all produce cognitiolU that can lead to the same judgmcm?"
And Dh.atmaldni can answer, "Bca.usc it is their nature to do so."'"
Some interprcws ll1lIy fed rather dissatisfied with Dhannakini's appeal
to nlllUl(,. In cfk.ct, he i.s Qying um wh~n wt can all :ill red things "red;
for eumpl(', it is not that they :ill imtanti:lt~ th(' univerul "rcdneu"; nor
that they all possess some real. specifiable similarity; nor even that tbey all
have the "same" dfca in a way that 'Nt! can ultimately specify in objective
temu. Rather, all those things arc JUSt different from non-red things, and
tht reason for meir diftcrence is simply that ., thrir ""tJlrrmcy appear that
way to us when wt attend to what 'Nt! mean by "red." Even me seeming
objeeUvity of thu appeal to mature lll:IIy diQPpoint some, for:ll we will see
in the nat chapter, a [hing's Mnatunt (SVIIhhtillll) is also ronceprually conmuct~ through the RfHJI-dt4Jry. On this interpreflllion of what Dharmakini means by nature, Dhamukini's talk about the naturt: of things that we
call Mred" is besl understood as a way of saying that, in ultimate tcnns, there
is no mcuphysically defensiblt reason for the fact that we call them "red.
M

Thw, if one i, hoping fot an

ultimal~y

" 111;' lppn1 to the natliK of tninp boma

Dharmakirti rcmuica:

deferuible motaphysic:a.l r_ n
I~Cnt

wMn, in a rfl.alni (Ontc:..,

Indeed. it ia /lOC COIf'C'Ct f,.. ... IIrlMui) 10 qllCltion r,.."."""".; <he nan,uu of dUnp.
II in -.;cIhy doer fire bum? Why ia it hoot, and water ill DOl!" ~ should jllK ask dW
m..m, "From wn,.t cawc don 1 dUnt;...nn thia Rarurc comc?" IPVSV "PVI.I67ab
(G :....1,...u):
MIMtui ti", "PI'
~
1M 1 M'.", iii I nhtft twlJit ...... "..,. _~ iii 4.

",,,,,...-.v..r .. .,._.,. ,-,.....,.,.'"

*1M"

116

FOUNDATI O NS OF DHARMAK I RT I'S PHILOSO PH Y

Ihen Dharmakini's answer 10 Inc problem of samenas is diuatisfying. On

Ihe other lund, one might suppose thai we arc engaged in a fnunadng and
frujdess enr~rprisc when we yearn to specify in precise terms the metaphysical warrant for our we: of Ih~ tttm "ud." In that case, Dharmalcirri's
al\SW'er is quite satisfactory, or perhaps even liberating.

WhaCVCf migtll be the degree ofOlutmalcini's covert skepticism, il is dear

thai nis .~throry is fonnulatm largdyas a reaction to roIist theories of
univenals. and with that in mind, Ont mighl mainain dUI Ohannaldni has
not al all solved !he problems he sc:cs in those roIist theories. Many of mesc
probkms focus upon chc impossibility of a roI. permanent universal luving
any inuiruic relation to its impermanent instances:. We h2~ already seen
thar, in Oharmakini'l philosophical milieu, a univsal such as "water-jugncss" {P .WlNlj musr be pc:tdur.tnt, foe ifit were to change, entiric:s that wert
prc:viou.dy called a "water-jug" oould no longer be the rd'crents of Ihe term
"water-jug. " In BUI if the univcm.l ptrdures even when one of its il\St2OC'.CS
ceases. how can il be an es:scnrial propcny of mat irut2nCrllndetd. we h.aw:
already noted that. if the unMml perdUI'C!i when its instances cease. then that
universal is emnrially differcrn from its instanCcs. and on Dhannwnj's
view, if r is tI.5CJ1tially different from,. men r cannot be intrinsic or c:s5fe1ltial (0 J. Thus, if waICf-jug-nas rp/AtLw) is different from all individual
waler-jugs (:h4f4S), then water-jug-neu is not csse:ntial 10 any individual
water-jug. Hena. no individual water-jug would really be a "watcr-jug."I"
One mighl suppose flur rhi~ ome pmhlem applies In rJw., .rpJ-rhcory.
ThaI is. if Ihe universal qUit adusion-thc nondiffcrent difference pc:t"raining 10 all water-juS' accounts fO r the sameness of those waler-juS',
then mal exclwion must nOI change. But ifit docs nOI change, one mighl
;wume llul il pc:tdurcs. It would mill appear thaI Oharmaldrti has simply
arrived III disguiKd meory of re.al, pc:rduranl universah, and thai the ailiosllU he hH r.l.i~ ~vin~f ~Iism would :1pply rn hil own .~rem . Indet.
nuny subsequent Buddh.i.u philosophers, cspcci.a1ly those in Tibet .assumed
mal Dh.armakini did indttd mean for universals to be permanent, although
115 .sc... aboo<c..

,....,s.

~ (16) and

jl.' ISn:... "-''"''''Tn ........ .- ;_""and

116

PVI.I 6ib-c

PVSV M <it. (G:lpI-1J): A" ~ ,,.,-,.

rn _ .[w - r ;'
'1 ...... '1.[

~ i& f...Jif in

WI _ ",. -1Jw nr-m ~ I . " tbwJ ". 'ItIJt' 11JNM!r".

_;a

DHARMAKI RTr S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

"7

they did nOI clearly cxplain how DharmakIni would avoid his own criticisms.III Fortunately, an interprtt.ation lwt:-d on Dhannakini's tCXtS alone
relieves us of any tedious nd 10 confront Dharmaltini with his own
altaeks, for Dharmakini clt:arly rejeas the nOtion thai the core of his ver
sion of unNcrRls namely, cxclusions--are petmanenr:'"
A

",.,,,tim. IltH"n ""tillY: IImu. tint' CIZ""nt amui", nJ;t lIS ""u)trJuranCt' ~

~nDn-ptrJuranu."

[PVl.I69abj That is.

there is no such thing u all as an ~Olher-cxcl usio n ." And con
cepts of that eJ:c1usion's ~rduring or ceasing by its nature,
which would follow from it ha\'ing a nature, do not make $Cnst:
int

Dr

(nA ItlZlpllnu).

In shon_cxclusions are negations. and as negations, they cannot beu any

propcnics at all. Hence, how could one say that they are either permanent
or impermanent? This same notion relates 10 Dharmaltini's claim Ihal
abstract predicates (such as "waterjugncss~ or ~cowncss~) cannot bear
qualities. Dharmaltini nOles that it makes no sense to say, for example, Mits
cown~$

is while."'" Presumably, this:tlso me2ll$ dut o ne eannO( s-ensibly

assen, "cowneu is permanent." Thi5 principle parallels the opinion5 of

many of Dh.armmni's opponents, for whom universals cannot insrantiate
qualities or other univeruls.
By denying that exclusions can be considered either permanent or impermanent. Dharmwni avoids the problems Ih.U would arise: from the claim
that his constructed universal changes. for ifi! is nOI impemunem, i! docs
n Ot ch:u1ge. At (he lame time, he avoid. the problem of the univernl
remaining after its instances cc:ase, fe r the universal is also not pemunem,
and thus cannot pc.rdure. We have scc:n, however. thai Dharmakini admits
117 See Dtqfuo h99]:I06R) .
118 PVI.I69Ib and PVSV

.u rit.

d I .L,V- ,Ml I .... ? ..., "'Ior ....,~v

/uJptt1l".

"'"

"'bJ ...MJw,.".,. fill IIWd.

_Mol"."..,..,;",:,!"'!> ,-u.;_dti.._

(G:lpl-ll): ,.i.,rur
I:i~'

""'J'" ....

119 DlwmUirti (PVSV ...tPVI.61, G:JH- )J.ll) dnWll dWill((ion be:f'IOtCh pmUca,e"J"U'00na (,o",.....-u.u.; and wbjcct~ (.u...... i~). In thr counc of
doing to, he noIeilhac 1 predialr-apraPon. .....id! e.praw:s jusl thr mc~ adusion iudf,
eannor allow fo, thr appIiealion of OIher pmlieale1 10 lhal cxdus.ion. The pall. rcadI:::
"Bul ~.auld be: no difkr=a: in d.t~,ic con'lUlOoIII wed for m( Mlbj(Q
o.nd I"niica,( '-'au", wj,hou, !he ~ of rc:aJ , d.lulRQ lhl"", tlxR .. no pur
P'* for it. '

118

fOUNDATION S Of OHAJ.MAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

n.., <hen: is. purpu.c. To ~ opccifoc. "'" Mis (,.a.J I" t1N-ffi'"'.' i ll BIIPis.

M tn_n..u for ,,,- 1M ~.IIS (i.~. f1"Iiu" "'Ims;.ou fWiI /U "CftI1IItII.NI

,..11m ~III ".m ......... i ;, 1Iu,INf-wr
~ Jiffrmo,..ti"f r-/j.
rin (~. wink IN I."" J.n 11M. T'bU Jijformu i ll _"M r."_~,, (~
r.ttforwu u IN tqIIUHN.J 1M JInS'" ....". ;,,. ~ , ,.,; IUInIInII [PVI.'I].
Wbm. ~ [i.c.., aliicencrJ who Iw II() apccolioNconcaning the pICII of
OIhttcadusionswishs ro know.-hnhc Of noc 1M _adusion ol'horw' " .ppli
abk ro $pific sro- objt, 1M $JICUcr, in otdn 10 inform 1M listener m.1I thaI
It:ind of mft~ odUJion ill appIObk. rru.ka it known wid> an aprtaion fOr which
the- XIIWIlK: COIlYUlUon ha& bn consauc:rm in thai bshion.; that is, the ~ "")'$.
"N",,honeneu pcnairu 10 this" (.!WcwtlWllllU]MJli). On 1M..mer hand. when . . .
~Mf who is "", wilno..l apUlioN c:ooccrning acluaioru oth than non hone...,.. wi.1oa 10 know Wt Wicabi1ity of Ihe adwion of hone, then lM JpcUtt
emplorl an apresaion for thc adusion ofhone: COf\SII'\JCd in I manner dlat does noc
disalloorl)lhn caduaiom: in nnJer.o....uthar ob;m: koown in duol way. T1w is, lhc
apukcr iI)'S. 1'hlI is I noo-honc: Haw:c. sina in d~ fomxr C&K the \IX of lhe
apreNion diAllows other differmca. MKh an cxplwion can be wrd 10 apml Mi
tMr c:o-mel'ftllialil)', nOI lhe qualil)'/q......tifird relarion. For cumpk:, om ealtn(t{
pl'Of'C'lly "'y, "lu arwnen ill whi~: A prc<iicalc-ctpfUlion such II "CO'NIIOI" 01
"hono:na." ClllII(l( GJlft$I c:o-ttrmnti;&[jl)' becaIUC the imace in I~-' ..WIll
.. 1M qualiflCaOOn oilhe object lIT the nine aduoion, nonhotxDcta, does noc
appear 10 be the: locus of Other pra;iia,,.. by vimao: of being .be JIm<' . . the: $Uhjca
il qualifin. And pra;iiale cxprcuioru &Iso Clllnoc npr_ thc qualil)'/qualimd rei..

,rU.Jn

...... \

........ ;. .... _,.-...lon 01 ......... _d....t-. a... in ..... _

nd Iolnd 01

a~, rwndy, a wbjca-apreuion,

thcrt is the- poMibilil)' of C:O-"{UUltiaJicy

and the qualil)'/qualilied malion. A Nbjta-aprnt.ion may indicale c:o-~enrial
icy bcc::aux. in acrord with the ..:mantic COIIYUlrion JOmIi", thc aprusioo. it indi
ala thallhc q.....!ilia, whic:h a.re aduaioN, a.re conjoined 10 a qu.allI)"poAaIOf or
oubjccL Sin the .... bjca thus -=nt 10 boca W1iury dUng WI ~
nriouo puu.
it thetdQrc appean thaI way in >snition. A oubject-aprc:.ion QII abo aprra the
qualiry/qualified malion bcawt; OM apecu cxhcr adwioru.. IIrllJljtutillM ..., hi
..~_~ ... "., I,..." _"

l ,.tIM hi I

~1IlInJ'~.ri~""riJtn4 ..

UJ-~ / ~~iu.rwIV...,,-o.;-!t IPVI "Jr '"~"

,.IU ...J.",..?"_ ...J"ItM.....

,,'!ffU1Ii/qtt ....~"..,.,.". j iju..u

"'tlMMti"iu,.~,!, ~~ J.Unt."..,

iU"'-

""; .. -n.m..,.. ."..nri

1)IIfIitI "....~ ""_i,"J.ilUMl"i~~ ..".

ialNtri a,m,,",.~
,u""," r.ur.iMiN.,-.n1ltwk ~u,. ,,..,..A~u '-n. ~,.. iri f .", nc

,.,.". ",~~n,.U.il'ilJllj ... 1hthMhiJur.~,!, .uq.~.

11M" N I fMN'"
iri I "",,,Jtn~ iwIJhn
6"'1l]l rlt.
twd"..~lr 1 "inltlu,.tak tw 1 'ririyr". MIt ...ri I """"" ,.~,,~

""""If)

..,.1tJtI._

,.~'!.ttJ--i'" &1..,.,..;, .,;~ ...,. ~.t...::rnw

.,.._ ... ..",~,a,.tNc tw

01

,.....~ ".".".,...... 1

~i !7.f,J7fI) and ~;n (\.49.uH) confum that in the obow: ~, the

aample, lu COIlO...,.. is while: is mun! to iIIustnlt an absurd statement .sa, alto
M:onoradwwKlin (PVV .. rir.), who rcrnarkI thai in this CIfIe -In INoI cue [i.e" when I
prcdicale<ll~ is to be LUcCI], ON: ... ys, 'lIS CO"h'.,' bvlOM don IlOl fly. ' Iu wwu ... ,
is ...rule~ [""',.,...,...,.. if) WJtI,, 11ttI
Mt._ itr'j.

"',.,...,Itf.,.

n,

DHARMAKIil.T1S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

a cognitive inugt: or appearat\tt:as the positive content in conccprual cognitions. Can we not say that mu image u eimer pt:tnWlent or impermanent? Dharmaldni responds:"

ANi.Jso lIn

.,,,,""10/ JUtrj!n.,d j1NlV/ is tiN""" thaI. NIf-

niti4n inllOlvinf _ IInillt7'1ld !Ms.'" For tIM, rtllJDn as _Ii. 1M criticism ctmurnin! JurtJllr.nu the not qp/y to otlHr-Dct:lwillPl.

[PV.I69cdl lndoed, a conccprual cognition b:u no objt: it u

a false: awareness r",ithyoijNi1lll) in mat it prcscnlJ a single image
:as inst2nfiared in dilfcrcnt instances. Since its object does not
exist, it ndmer pc:roures nor does not pc:rdure.IU
An im:l8'" in " con ..:rpn.o:al cogn irio n, w h,.n co nJtruM

:;oJ

qu:al if11 by an

cr.dusion, seems to be an entil}' repeated in multiple insCll\Cel. Coruuucd

in thaI fashion , even the menw con.tent of a conccpt'ual cognition-thc

120 PVSV .... PVI. I~ (G~ll): ~" ,mb) *?-"..",eii!"{flll";,o';";'-

.... 1thJ.~~,H_ ...' ..Wh_ili ... w'~IjA ... IIItim.w.;n~ ....

121 Tht in~ olthe "nTOf (~u thc image iudfis prOidtd by~.
dhi (zoIU jf. PVT-s:Jb'):

ANI. thc cxhtr-adwion thai is dw.n~ U thc copIilM ~ in a CXII'IapnaJ ~ ;, tiN "lUi ;1 iI thc miMh 01. copIirion inOMnl a WI~
Wi is, of," co"..... pc:,w ODpIitioII.. Tbud""', char r.;.... of odwr-c:u:luaion abo cIoa; IlOl
aW [PVT..., ~y (WirA, i_ 1M"''' ; 61.;
UJI
pb.lIlMtfU Ow" p1If]lll,. iii "';i W. 1# . - . , .. ...., . C'4II W. ,..'" """"
n", lImJ"]l1I .. I Nt... ... """'"
_]III IN. PVT"

..,Nt ...

U',.~.,.,., ~

nwM,..,.....,u
* ,.,.,]N"
,.,i1ft

I /J M~ Ul ";..,."-.1 ..".,,...,.;

{!

';*''fiW]i h U'-~'';; Nhir"'9',.."j.

Karc;!abpnin (p.PJ) confirms the

1lw"
miFnk~

po. of nTOf U 1M imqe il)dl: A...t.J. ... """.

dK univtral-~ NI appem_ tho: ~ indifl'a.:nt dUllS';' dw <l iCH

011 c:opUrion inoolYil\l1 IlIliYmaI iy.y/nttl ttti I J"!I ~ '.....

JIb ..aam~,..niM ..."IhW") Jtf1oo~Umw 'h -1.

122 Not.. tbac ~ (PVT.....Jb.4.) .......kI .......... mod the -.of pan of tho: commm.

JliiShdydaTcrcndy:

Why iI it: I (abe ~ iDbannaldrti Af'1 ......... BeaUiot I ~ COl!

ni.ion', ob;M:, '" IInimal ,.J,jd,;, "" ;~
I~,._ .11 ,,1/ tiN ......,
;_ttaf 1-1 tiN "".. '"~ ;11
Mithrr "m.rn _ ., _"m.n. Why?
& r - rIw . . "',.", foist . _ .... _ t:DsI..

,rnntUJ.
..-w"

This would yjdd 1M tnNbcion:

Indcod, om. ~ cosnJUon Iw no iJb1ea; Ii. II a f:ab( awarenc:fI: in thai its objca,
an ~ tNl iI iruanriami in ~. imcanca.. ncit:hcr p!'rduro nor Goa i'IO( perd un: bla. . thai objea doa IlOl ai.t..

IJO

FOUNDATIONS O F DHAlMAKiRTn PH ILOSOPHY

image that appears in that awarenes:s--is unreal.. Hence, jt ( 00 cannot be

.said to be t;ither permanent or impermanent.
Should wt; tht;n concludt; tJut the mt;nal image itself is unruH No. wt;
should nOI. for when considered simply as menal content, that image is a
panicular. In mat case, however. it is no longer the combination of image
and exclusion that is tht; univusal, for it is not construed as rt;pt;ated in
multiplt; inst:anOeS. In mon, tht; image in a conaprual cognition is both real
(as a unique menal evem) and unreal (as an apparently distributed universal). We have sn thU motif before in the case of the "hairs- in the
vistW perception o( a person with c:atafaCu. It is al that same: point in the
Prllmil!'AVilmillll that Dlurmakini notes Ihat the image in conceptual cognition is both real. and unreal. He docs $0 by raising an objection and offering an answcr.'U
~ Jf a unive:rsaI

is also a thing (artha) in terms of having the narure

of awareneg, then you would have: to concludt; that il i5 a parricular.
Since"lo'o"e do indeed a5St;n that a univt;rsaI is a panicular, 'Jo
your nate-mem po.ses no problem for us. Bur in lemu of having
the nature of other objeas, it is a univc:rsa.I in that it has thc saInt;
form (or all tht; objectS mat it sms to qualify. It has that same
fo rm because it i5 based upon their exclusion fro m other objects.
BUI as a universal. (hat image in awareness is not a real thing
(vastu) because il is ,hal which is expressed by language ... .

[PVJ.9Cd-uaJ .'r)
123 PVJ.9Crl-ua: jUury.~ 'nh-Jw 1hW"~ rn ,f4JIjJ;lu 1/ Ufthq~ u.,.
....,;;,._ """uU l _nw "~'rM~~ 1I rM._~
~,... See aOO W appmdiz ~S).
124

~d,.,.b"Mh;

(PVP:I1]a6) mmrb:

Sin the vni~ a.ho is by rurure awarmess iue/f, _ acttpI rNl ;1 is a panicular.
H.....a. "'-' ; ..... .-. ......."..... ni-! hy .1v "f'f""'...., n.l-.;.ninn.j Jw.

,...j.......

tt]iJ"" ,. j ,;,,;, ' " , . ' " ""'f ti 1II,w" rr]iJ,.." "" Mt/,. M fur ... pi" - '
M I cf. pW .J nt. j~UfJ4 d~ ,..m.,.~~ ~twIJ~ .
1n Sumnurizing lhc potnl hn.:. Dreftndnb.Mh.j (PVP:u ;bl- a) r-mwU:

SiltCt it it leN..,... ,. ~ il ia: !he -----m..1 ia, ;1 is lhc alll( b:auK lhc COS
nilion appean in thai fashion by vinu( of depending upon !he adwion of other
obju. II doe. to 1in;1ia produud Ih~ one1 apmm.x (...."' ... tU.wtu)
0( oJ.., aduJN.~ "'i ... Appcarins ... ...d.. i.;. ,he: "n,""nol 0( th.o. objcco. In .....
""'Y ;1 is defined III (bod!j a panicu1ar and I uniwoul. [....
J. hrfnI pItyi, ~ I

u.,,.

DHARMAKIRTI'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

.,.

When we combine this explanation with the one pr~ntt:d above

(PVI .I69cd). we see that. when the image in a oonccprua.l cognition is considered simply as a menw t:Yem, it is real. The implication is mat, coruidered in mat way. the image is impermanent; as with all particulars. it is in
oonsttm il.UL But if (he image is construed as a universal-i.e. construed
to be: qualified by a distributed adwion--it is as unreal as mat o:cIwion
it..elf. and the IInre:a1 a nnn! he either permanent or impermanl!nt.

Thru W..".o!Gmstnti"IApoha
O ne can perhaps already set: mal Ihe interplay ~n image. adusion
and particular is crucial 10 me apo/Ja-theol)'. bUI despite ml! importance of
~ dU'~

:upecu of the I!XduJ;on proceu, Dh:rrm:lkirri himsdf did no,

offer perspicuous a plarullioru of Ihe precise roles thai they play. The task

of delineating the apoltheol)' in ternu of these th~ aspccu was left to

the early commenl2tor Sikyabuddhi, whose a planarion became a sandud for some later Buddhist scholars., A Sakyabuddhi remarks:
Cona m ing thi' theory. there are threoe kind, oP" other-adu, ion, Fim:. there u the t:l:duded (1IJIi,,!,11I) partiwlar. because it
is mat from which an: o:duded this and that other [pan:iculatl.""

"'~ ,. tf7iJ II. 1M" pM" 1M fM,,. ~ brU7I,. 'i 'l' __ 11M M IsM......, ... ; ,h,ir
" 11J4f,.;.,. ",n.-", ... J.s ~,.. ;~,,. I jn
M'i "",;" ... 1M

M fur ,.",u",Sf'1"j ",rsJ."

JIIUf'"

"pJ-,., t - ,.,;" .... ..,.

126 'IlUI i$ _
noubIy w ~ for SlnwUJiu :and lUmaWi.... Thftr a!XOW\l t/ W thr
lOnna of.".e. appean 10 be: t.ued upon SiJcyabuddhi'. inlt'p'tution (5 TS:1oo1o-1009
and TSP -' nt:)90-)91). a . Ortyfw (Im ::}SfI) and Sidcriu (1m),

127 pVfoS rads, "mm: obju thaI = .. :

128 'IlUI ....lmtt IX*' kw philolop::al problmu. The fine ptobkm ODCK'UN HI ..., ftJtJ,
which .....,..J,d "'118"'" :an ..m.....,..,.......mo. 0 .... u..-,
in .he orisinal SaIuIcm. ",..
-.I.d, h.o .. . ... __ , ..... odd, .,<>OC _ -w.I be ..... ul~ ' 0 _
. ro.-. Ur.:r'" .....,
cue. I ""'~ rhw cno.m 10 inc.nprc1 thiI u a puai.... co...uuaion. Thc probable Suukril ror
mil sJou of
would ~ oW:: ~ _",".","
(nQ(~ tN, thiI con
flNCtion docs no.: !'alliin: a plunl conjuptionl.
The IC'COnd pbilolof;ical p!obkm iI tht .bUm.: ,.. ( 'Ji J.s phtI" ""'" pJu ...J. Althoup.
Ihil
iI c.onfinntd by me Olber editions of tht Tibc:an ten. tht ..... ti~ ,.. iI fn:..
qumdy confWcd widllho: p.utic:k J., whid> would htre lUnd lOr a kK:am.: ~ mdill&Such. n:adinS would pdd tht Sanskrit sic.: lIS",;""",".""",
Thil sJou iI in
I()me _)'I ptcf~. abk 'i) me ""'" fil~ Ililo'o<:. for II roon: dc:arly UitIwI mar me p.utkIIW II
tht NsilIOr .be formu1acion of adwiont. ThiI bner sJou aIJo rdatel mort ca&ily 10 tht onE

,.-.,.,.4

."JI'-"

.,w.,."

radin,

_p,""'u.

I}l.

FOUNDATION S O F OHARMAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

It is in terms of this kind of adusion that Dharmwni said fat

PVI .",O): "lhings:lrC by nalu~ quali6ro by Iheir o:clusions from
all homogenous and hctcroglMcous things. ~ This kind of exclusion is established as th~ basis lOr pr.actical action through language or infcr~mial signs; bowev~r, it is not established as th~
object aprcssed by language.
The second kind of"othcr-adusion~ is m~re other-ocision
(,rnpJ?'I'v.urlNJanuilro1j bcca.usc in this case "othcr-o:clusion" is
consuued to mean the acluding of what is other. This il what
previous savants establishro as th~ nondiffcrtnu mat applies to
all cascs becaust a me~ negation is not distina in any instance
from any orner insClJlu.
ThO! r.hiro:! fOrm of "rnher-ocdusion ~ is rhe "I'f""lr.:lnoe in" con-

ceptual cognition because it o:dudc:s what is other. H~ncc, it is

what me autOO of the uotisc considers to be thc objca aprcssod
by lan~ It is not reasonabk to say m:u such is the case in
terms of the othcr-cxclusion that is the o:duded particular. This
would not be reasonable because, if me: conccpl1..L:l.! image had the
n"'''~

of.he (p" ....c... l".J. i....... ,Id ~ ' 0 .,in when rh.e 1"" _
ticu1ara:ascd 10 o.ist sina: they would be nondiffucllt; and what
is prescnt aftcr a particuJar ceases is another panicular that is
acoepted to be different from that previous panicuJar.'>t

QtC'd by Stkyabuddhi (PVI.40). Ho.cnr, RauuJUni ~..:.w,;."'I') and Jlllwrimiua

~'''''''''lU-'J01), who rckr to .5imiW (bue flO{ quie~ idmlical) thred'oId fofft'lI..1alion, boch auoc,alc dill po. wnh .,.~_.. and nor wid! mr adudtd panialbr.
Ftou.Lly. the third probkm cono:rnI the mcanin, due
dorive fn>m thit PThat ia, it is dar thaa Sikyabuddhi wist.a 10 ha~ ,his way of CONUV.iIlJ ..
rmr to
the: pMtKclIf as I un)q1lC' nll ify. This would fIIFl tJw, gIou iMwt
ec:oIded by RaaWdrti and abbc-Ma1Cd I'O ..
by JMnalrimim. Ramaldrti and
JlUndrimill'll ~ proI:W>Iy rJnrin& co _ l aIn P"f"uuotion of~i'l praa!gtion. and this is ON: tQIOIl for haiuti", in adopIins their rWi"" In addition, their Pou
Rquim us (0 cnw:Pd the obbliw: panidc "'" 10 I iii., and Iinoe thac It( no! ohm coofi.ucd,
ow ~Iion ....,..J.,I1u~ 10 be made: on Imumic: JIOIIndt aIonc. Thus, a1tbouF ;u".
..",....."u ..~" nuy well bc:!.1 coo~ !he lMIlIin, inemdcd by Sikyabuddhi. I Iu~
.-kc:ted (0 In~ the 11011 II ;1 sanda.

we.w. ...

,.,.-u.., .,..

...,IiI.""

...-u ..,..,..".

129 ~ WVT:1OOOJfF.PVT-r.Jb1fi):
'Jir ,.; P'- Jd .....; nu.. ""'".., Ji..
Nr~ "", i ,."r "''''t'...tJh,vo",..

" / ,, &hit tol"; 'Ji "",~" u", p" .,{

ft},. .... Ji"
At",,;.,...JuuJ

w.r,.

_11"''''''w..,.. . .

_ I .u.- .... p1w.gi .... .., "" 1u.,,... "",.; 6nnr~ r ..,, /
r'....
1 'Ji ~"C.,.,..w", 1fIfI' "" " " "'" i I/J.II ~ kyi nno ..,;J'" ...... 1-pJMf "'" Ji"
",' /,VoIr ~,., .,.. ... "]ill ... ,.; -Ji" ,... / pfo ,. ....r.zh- J:l*I,. i fh1ir,w"

DHARMAKIRTn METHOD AND ONTOLOC Y

' ll

H~~ we: find ~uddhi describing m~ panicular. th~ adusion and

the imagr in t~rms of thret: difk~nt ways of understanding th~ Sanskrit
compound 1Iny4p6ha. lbc panicu1ar is -mal from which Othe:r is o:dudcd"
(1IS11I4J IInytUi .po""'t~).' AJ such, it is th~ 1lJiff!114. the "isolatM.," the:
"o:ttaCted," or simply tht -acluded: In shan, it is an utterly uniq~ entity.
Th~ o:clwion itSelf (vy4urni) is the: m~re "excluding of o lh~r"
J'Dh4_m). And me: im.llgr u rh.lll rhmugh or nn rhe: huu of which one:
excludes other (Imy"" IlpohyilU "rlU) . This duc:d'old schema allows
Sakyabuddhi to clearly separate three aspects of the exclusion process. To
understand the full implications of this interpretation, let us sec how it
responds to four problenu that the IIPf4theory must addre:ss--namely.
problems of (I) the relation between a universal and panicubrs; (, ) the
dinrihurinn of.ll nnnttiuenr, (J) rhe men",.1 cnnrenr of cnnt:r:pnl.lll cogni _
cions; and (4) the discontinuity betwttn m~ntal content and rd'erentt. In
addirion to unpacking Sikyabuddhi's int~rprttation , our ~ to these
qucstiolU wiU also aUow us to restate the analysis of the I1poh4-r:heory that
we have given th us far.

(11",,-

me

(I)

UII;IJtI'UII_;'UtllllC't

" Lu;,,,,

This problem is the one m.u we: cited :lt the beginning of our discuuion
on universals. and we: can f(:iten.te it in the form of a qucscion: if there is
no u1rimatdy rc:aI universal instanciated in aU its instances, how can the

:dJj.., P"t nr,... oi "'" q." (P: "'" -J J.r P _1ItI -'
'" ft#fJ*' "" ~,."... "" pIMf,.yi""" __ rM"""'" _,. ~,..,
- ",. i ~, "" I" ,,,,,,.,,; 'Jis ph- .J.., ;,nI,.;,;,,;, "... ,.., ".,,.; "'" t.
nut",

1M pJ,. till'" JUt

'*",.

,_"," i~'lI fP"f""" kif --ft'S ... ih;.J,,"~" ttyiJ ...

tiM ~ .. iIi,.",.. 1M!.p1 u,..,.,ti",Dba "]iJl4r,..i.a-, ... .". _ "?*'
,. M",;"", II I M;..,....,.;4. Ow".,." ... M..w,,. PI" oM..., Dro,u l JIM
JM,. ,.,J ,.; ~, "" f ,..", ti IIUJh.,. ",..,.... , . P"I',." ,. J" """ M I.s pJ-

",... 'J.UlI l

.4."'"....,

_ I Jj ... .1UbJI ... """.+6.1-.

,..,dhhJ~""lIuW~;MoIt.i...-M ... ~tlIJdk!i;pi,~~.
~ ~ I ,.. '" "'...~ I .""..",.~,.,."""ft J.itW I
~", ~ in
I "" IIIrwWiJ..Jnv~" ~"'~II f
~."..". ....... '" ; .. . fh f ~ .. .RUbotl 1,ij.,.".uu..,.,uyiMi
.... ~ f Ir.! ... lJooI .. 1If'I6I!I f nwL,~.. MJ,.Aj'foJll# I rM .,.mw,!" f ~
""'_~JII1!' fIInrI;" "UfJrUJ
11M 1"11 n,p..n "'~!Jhwr.,!" Jilt

Ub..,I..".... ....,... b\... ",'

.,.~ /,..,

I:rM

u,"" -J*I it:!-

......

nWww.,

130 Thlti. a coojnlral ra:oruuuction tucd upon

dwn~

(f'VT:z00b4): if; loorp/ll

",,,,phII,,.J,,,,,,,,,,,,',w,,a.Sco: the: phiJol.osieaI mnuIu in dl ~ nou.

1).4

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAkMAKI RT I 'S PHILOSOPH Y

concept ~fire" have any rdarion to me pan icul:u s that we call " fire "~ O n
Sikyabuddhi's interpretation, the claim that the panicular is ~ th at from
which all others are excluded" jusrifies for Dhacmakirri the relation between
a cognition that involves a univcrsalluch as the concept "fire" and a specific instance of a fi re. Thai ii , the univma.l "fire" rcfen 10 all fi res because
all fi res are diff't.mn from aU otha entitia thai do nOI have the causal characteristia o:pc:ctcd of .something we call "fire : This differen tiation of all
fires from non-fires is not a mere whim, fo r it is basI!d upon the uniqueness
of each mlity that we call a "fire": each one is actually differcnl in all ways
fro m IlUother entities. Although we consuua a universal by focusing upon
only .some of thO$(! differences, Ihis docs not vitiate the IX! that Ihe differences we do focus upon arc basI!d upo n the uner difference of the entitia
in question. ThUl, since the univcrul- which amoun ts to a sd ccrive difference or acl usion-is based upon the utter difference of each entity. the
universal has an indirect relation to thO$(! entities.OJ'

(2) Distribution
This second problem concerns IlIfIltlJll. the disuibution or continuity
that is nC'C"Pry for a universal ro apply ( 0 muhip\e instances. Here the
quation is: if there is no real univerul instantiated in all instances of fi re.
what sameness could acco unt for the faa that we can refer ro all of them as
fi re? O n Sikyabuddhi's interpretation, Dharmakini accoun ts for disn ibu-

131 TM nocion of a "Jdc:ai,(" difktrocc orcxduaion can ~ K'CfI in, for exampk. tM foI
lowing pN " (PV5V ,.jPV' ,9' nJb: G,..9.1'--t9-1J). which rcfft1llOW di~anIOIl&
uhim.o,dy
minp ~ "p...al tn"D' ("'!".~ i .. UK .... u{ I ~.i.iu ..:

dis.,,,,,,

H.";"I stnf tNt miJ11' {arthu) /J~,u.tfornl. ~",p/iJI tIN 16"'~ IIIk fo"m."
(. " bWiyl) ,..d. ~ tIN
r.r.td..J"m,
rr"j.illJ 1M
IlIilh
t:tprmi.1fJ III ,n, 111 thri~ Htyrr tIw Ji/frrntn fiw", tbi"l' u..1 ." .tINr u.." 1"wINII ur,,,,p/iJllbt .Prmtnltilw ut.s. H..Ii1tf.", II, "., c." Ibnr M'llJ'liu III
""., """';, tIN 16"., ~ 1M .fo"",nrti.NIi mi"l'- ........ ovbt:oI.", INf .",,,,," ,mil'
.tuIJ ..~ t/ti1tf./tbt 16_ ,,~. [PVI.98 nib], II hat al~ been .aicl lu

,-'wri." .{

PV . 7S) duo ......

."t

,hi""

d-ash ........ ouch .. the ~ and 00 _. ""' dinjnct. they accom

plish lk.......: Idil: function. A prnon __ rNl amons things. tome aaompliah dv:
.......: Idil: function, JUCb . l k pi'odl.lClitn of an ~ U wth thaN: thinp arc
coocq1(u.al1y diHinguiWd &om 0100 things !hat do 001 do to. ThoJc, things thlll
produce by dxit vny ~t\Il( &L.r: a~ in thai ptnon.; thai tlO'UalClJ iI asIOIiIltd with apru&ionr W I l\aV( as Ibrit ob;ea 1M adusion of tho.c things from dial
which doa 001 pa rorm the afomncntionrd actMiy. 'J'b.iI &It( 11II2mI(SI iI tIIw 1M
rccocnition. I'ltUI iI m.1-' 'I'h4 rccocnitionaiawarcna:l arna beaUS( lbe: imprinl
pbad In UK mind by dull per""" pln10w apc, ichcc baa bca-o ...........ocU [loy wh...
1Ih... pruendylinlll . In Ib il aa of ~ilion lbe: differenc.. bctwct:n lhole

DHARMAK!RTt 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'l!

tion through the mere other.acluding" that is the exclusion (vydvrttj)

irxlf.1u a negation, Ihe cxdusion can be colUtrUCd as conrinuow across all
irs instances becaU$C, as Sakyabuddhi notes, a mere: neg:uion cannOt be distinct acros.s instances. A negalion is also not Juscqnible 10 the critiques mat
Dlwmakirti levels against the distribution of rtal universals. For example,
some of his arguments re:ly on the claim that, if a universal5ueh as "WoIterjug_~ {z1lll.t4I1JM)~rr a rr.aI cnnry. rhen it mulit ~ cither Ihe.u.mc as or
dilfewlI from the irutmce:s in which it is instantiated. If"WlItcr-jug-ncss"
wcre' idt"ntK:alto any specific Wolter-jug, then as with that watcr-jug iuclf,
it would not be distributed ovcr other instances. On thc other hand, if
"water-jug-ness" 'NttC something cssc:ntially othcr duln its instances. then
once again it cannot be distributed. Among ,he many rasons cited by
Dhunuki"i i., rhe cbim th:u a cngnition of rhinv :u rh e .a rne mu1t al.'iO

indude the cognition of those thin&, as differem, but if the content of a

conceptual cognition is JUSt a univma1 distinct from its instances, the difference among the instances would nor be included within mat cognition.,n
Implicit hert is the nmion that the final justification for the claim that an
entity is distributed is a cognition in which that emity appears to be distnhmf!d (i.e., an ...~prtl.tip.un) . In conrr.H:t, when mn.cid .. rf!d:l;~ a mere

negalion, :I; universal construC"led through Musion encounters no such

difficulties, because as a negation, it cannot be said to be dther ultimately
the same as or di/krent from its instances. In a sense, by relegating distri-

fhinp iI p.-d . - (..~~ (jU~~ ..", ..", JmW

IthNlt )i hmwub f flrN1f'J """"1IJfl~i~ JJw....iMib uN I u'f'riJIl fTUYIlj...
IlijU,..". h"M .." fl",.u,uN lPV'.tI-99JIbJ f to!_ $ ' Mt-M I" MINt
~ri!'l'i ~"w;...J iri I ,.", ....",. jUtU.iiU.. ~ ~to JNd1fl" ~1<IJIri~ 606,. ~tIfi1Il W"., .... ;Jv!";~ ',{, ....istr~".
lMi nwItt.. iri J",,"MttNMu,",~fl. ' *"'. "'!fS..,.,.MnU", ",itItyJ'.fll]qll",
.JouuJorllri ., .
uniq~

1)21"hocx and othrr UJ'lI'"I'MU an found at PVSV .JPV,.I)9C.d-'07Ul. 5 abo PVSV .J

PVI.1I0 {G:' 7.7--' Sj:

... d" nondiffttmc:t; of lhinp coruUu of dw IKt thai Wy ~ the: ~ dfton. A..J
tIMl ..- - . ,br...p tfforr is.oJy 1M nrbui.,11 .JriM, ....hk. ___ -.... ,;"" 4fm.
II is only dw land DOl _
.q>uafl: \UIImaI] krlltoSta ral thins wbicJI it.u,,,.,, ,IN ,1tj"1fm ",-, it .....ifil$ ...."..,J,ftI! it Ji'trihuJ ....... ""'''-' ,...../IUI is lUI
Hs, ,.",Ii,. ;, 1Nu.1u imI fll.ru.lJ rrfotnl. lPVI.I toa-<:]. Indttd. dwR is no IUd! 11moasal thai, aItt.ouP tK"xptibk,
Ippc::ar ro 1M: dift'em\, from iu insunca. I

-.!>Of

.he..!r 0UlCd 0.1 ... [No caou .yk t I'VSv "'1'"V"'JI'I'~.unolol . Or, i( tha~ wa~
MICb IInivnuJ , il would noc be Ioared in anr of iu i,..nn.cQ. How COIIld if be
Iw~

1}6

FOUNDATI ONS OF DHAItMAKIRTr5 PHILOSOPHY

burion [0 :I nq;ation, Dharnukini blocks any :lnf!mpf :I[ raising disnibution (or:l distributed entiry) to thf! levd of ultilrnlltf! realiry.on

1M ClUK of an awumcss1And we have alrady pramit'd I proof lOt ~ ~wion of

.ud> ullivcn1J. Th<,tfOi<. Jhc comInlCtion of Uu., type' or III\j ~ is WfOII&.
!"wi>Jwt.riaw iJM".,,..,. UIJc~ I JJ dwlk.".~ I tN ..I 'J"S]tl".NJ1iuft I
_~ ~
n4f

SIn

r",'i 00... go f _

hi """',. "~_1IRI7..n._
PI ftNriJ .Ulriu'!' brIM,. jUJUIJmi, in f "..~ .. .tJJM,..

u .........,...bm).
13) f. rdfvan. P"P3F. '" MY "'PV,.Q-;oo, rrarulalni in me ~ ~ also ~
IOUowiI1l (PVSV "'PVl.IlI; G:6J-16-6.t.I6). Nou mal in m~ fWAC", IIu.YC insmni!he
~pkof-Uft:" and "non-im:"lOasrod..iFy Jhc ~I:
TMdi~ Itha< is Jhcdinaob;c-n of ~1 ha. no _nlW .... IW'( (.~
Tbu -.: ~ i, .. ","-..ins an tskntiaJ n.aJUn (~~;" simply I eqe of oosniove
oonfiuioA.
iI;, _ ..iii_*,.
..i.ui,.,.dNnviu, tbnt_ ..._ .....it
rlMt. fflfI tho'lff
nWi.,. ouIndI ;, _ I /biltf
1#9'''~. 76it

n.""UII'_
. ....W

'f_

M._

h.J. tliJj"rrnIN... "-t. " (PVI.n .. ] An eucnlial OWun (riiJl4) it whal a thi", is in
~ of!he u1umaK. lr .diffc,uu [....,;h. medilti:JUIIO< from non",fttl ~ 10 haw:
11\ CllmIW n.run. d.m il would rithct 1M. tnmlially 1M iruu.noe Uu.1 il qual iroes
[i.~ . tpific Uft]. Of dK il would bo: aKntiaUy whal ill not mal ~ (i.e., it
~ not IM..ha. ,ftt1. ,(;.-.... in - . . u... u..w- ludf. ohm;u.. dw u.-na.
would IM.diffamtial<d &om thotc od!erenriria Ii..:., non-ma]; llOocha inmn [of
Iftt] ~ br diltft.mtialcd l&om DOIImal bra..... ...-hal Iw die nil"", ofbri".
thM ;NU-I>D: doa not ","ve dw: ....."'" ofbeing -Ihirts dk. Hmo:, me ...... tiaJ
owun of the diffucna.not to be-;we 11M. (5pCCific IIftl. and ill UKllIiaI .... run is
w bo: tornethint 0Ihcr Idw! tIw ,roe-Wunu]. Ru. in
caK hi:.tkct, dw: dung
[i.e., tht I~~] would btc::rd....t.d "'"" ma. ldiff...."'a: from non-ln!Oi:]. Hmcz,
ON' could not ay du. tht inSlana (i.e., 1M ipt'Cific .ra:1 has I diffdtno< from thOR
! i .~, non .m:t]. FOf dut whic:h is tUtudni fro... lIOmCthilll is p~ th:o. IaUft'
thin.- "ThaI'" diflUaoa: !No: is one thin c:annoo: pmain ro lOOK odItt
.hey would N." no Ieb,ion bt""ecn than. I( thtrt W(f( I rdation. i. woukI ha." 10
be- mu:awddfm rda.ion !bcaUK tht rwo ctllitia: ~ difftmoc]. III m..: QIt. 1M di(
f(lt,1IO< would be all -nI.i.&I ptDpUi)' tN ptoduad br w panicuIat. HmO<. slnot
lhing c:alkd "di/ferm(ft" and minp c:aIkd "effi.cu" woukI ..... br disrina. aU cffcca
woukI br adusioru thai pertain 10 dxir alUel.
Mooco.t if the diIk,.,oa: [from rIOn-lrCt] W(f( in UKnot ~ odItt Ilhan
!he lr=illSW"Oot it IttmIIIO quIIifyJ. ihtn the [differmc:c from non,fttl abo would
h__ ,Ii"'" . _.~ ft.or" , ..,.. [.-On........... ,,,-" i. 'l.... lir..,,). "",,,.. oinac (..... I;~
from non.fttl would have as iu ddimitins quali'1 (..;i*i) I diffi:>woe [from tIw
uce-iMWIOt]. it would not br a difkrma pcrWnir\110 WI iMUnot, jwt I f an
u llirdy diff""," .. ,btlanor doa noc poruin 10 lhal ilUlII'I. Bu. [the diffumoe
&om non-.fttl ...... ittd( ddimitcd by. diKC=>et" [from iQ in.rtancott). llUItad. one
qualify Itho:: Itcuayin&1, "'This is (mit .m' . ] diffuuoa: from tNl (nonUft]: Honco:.
irwm..m as ;1 Iw no ddimilinJqualil)'. tht diffumoe doa not cUe. Th.:n(o. tht
dilK,tuO<;" no! ditiinc [bum tht illlOl>tt mal i, ~ to qualify]. and ';noe. lhcK
it no third P' "il*;.,.I. caJ ohi.. looM.- <han bciAlI d-.c --= "" .... diKcrcn. r-..
_
mriryJ, doe diA'.,tl\Clt ...... wrimacdy ral. (_
IJW" ;y.; I ~

.ha,

mu. ........ ,
K

*"

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD ANI) ONTOLOGY

(J) Mmt4i l'IJntmt

1he problem of mental or phenomenal oonte.u arUes when a univenal

is construed simply as a mere negation, since Dbarmakirri and bis interlocutors all maintain that affirmative c:oncepru.aJ cognitions (j.e., those mat
ue not negations) prcsent some positive content as an objcct in cognition.
For Dbarmwrti, this positive content would be: an appearance or image:: in
me mind. If. hnwrver. (he univenall~ a meTe neg:r.rinn. men a cnnc.epmal
cognition-i.e., one mat has a universal as its object- would involve no
positive content at aU, fOr how can a negation be: pr~ted in a positive:
fonn? This is the airicism kvdcd by the Naiyiyika Uddyotakan against the
initial fOrmulation of the .:JpJ-thc:ory proposed by Digniga. Dbarmak:irti'l
predccmor. Uddyot2kara remulcs:
There is this notion that me object 6mlM} of me word "cow
is tbe otber-cxdwion, "is not a n on-cow.~ But is tbis otberadusion an existent (bJuiw) or a nonexistent (llbluillllJ. lf it is
an existent, is it a cow or a non-cow? Ifit is a cow, men we have
no disagrttment. But if me object oftbe word "cow is a nonrow, then , my goodness such sJdll in ~m:ultia! On the other
hand, it is not reasonable that the othef-exciwion be a nonexistent because a nonWsumt is not the objea of either the act
of conveying meaning nor the act of undemanding what is conveyed. That is, through me word "cow~ being hnrd, one neither
conveys nor undersClllds a nonc:rislent. In addition, me object of
an apression is cognized by cognition, and no one cognius a
nonexUlem:as a rauh ofhe:.rinS the W'Qrd "<;ow.-')<

.....hi"y_ """ f ~1'/UrtM .... II~tIM ... hi

Mn.li J,MJ" ~ i n",!fh I/"JII
hi ,.",.......
~ ! iIhnW fflI..w,-"" ~ I
N".. II~"'" N I ~ uJ ~
~JtytU __ jJ,*u I .... hi IM7" ..,.... UtJIMY"
I .... uJ """ ~ "" I
~ d1tJU nw IJIZ ! utili (II 1HJl_ t4mJU .,n-rtn4 ! ,.. 1..w"lJ" Md. iii
.... 1Jll 11'" ~ J '.IM, al WJha' u~ uJ ~ uJ lJJ",,,,,nli .. i}w I>btJ. iii (II "" fyi.
I .... '" II",.RJ"S1" ~"1JwNIi I u,.......JhJIHJl.t f ""Ii "" "" !lryIIUn!'4M4"" iii
~If' ujjllJUU1!f Md.. if] llviJqJt I -UrJi!'; ~".,!, ~ I'Jl4! I
tfI

~~ ~

_~

"?h! ili~""""

~"UrwlW (II

.IN.J.t;- tAU

r.Jrii,.""

..w,.""

.,.t

WwJ" i n ~pUJtilvit ""I1J<lllurllNII Nt

~
~. ! .... II.. MW~ ~ ...... J- "'" iii ~ f ulIII "';",1,....
MIw~.. !' ~"., / WJIIhI ... ~ ! uM"",p""."* u _ _

&,

." ~

""~~.1 .

1)4 NY:,,?I..,. ..JNSLLU! "'"I'l)oar "'?"Iv & 'fo ~1Ir ... M.n.titi t'(,w"ijfl>*!t. ,. ~""

1)8

FOUN DATIONS O F DHAlMAKlRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Uddyorabra's point is that, rtg2rdless of whnher Dignaga considers an

other-exclwion to be existent or nonexinent, he cannot mainwn his claim
that the object of an expression (JabJartha) is an other-aclwion. If an
othcr-cxclwion is an aistcnt thing, and if the object of the word "cow" is
an other-exdwion, then in order to avoid the absurdity of claiming mat the
object of the 'N'Ord "cow" is a non-cow, Digniga mwt admit that the otherexclwion is a real thing innantiated in all cows. But if Dignaga were ( 0
assent to such a position. he would simply be upholding Uddyorabra's
own theory. The other option is to claim th:at an othcr-cxclwion is a nonexistent (.bMIIIl), but Uddyorabl1I rejtttS such a claim 1xa~ expt:rience
tells us that when we ~ words sud! as "cow," the objects of those words
arc presented affirmatively as aistent, and not negadvely as nonexistent.
On ~buddhi 's interpmation, Dhannakirti accounts for the positive
content ofsuch cognitions by pointing out th:at the cognitive im:agc (lk4ra),
"that which acludcs other," is indeed pan of what constitutes a universal
fo rmed through adwion.'" But in the course of including the cognitive
im:age within the aclwion process, Dh:armwni goes bqond merely
accounting for mental content. In addition, Dharmwni also claims that
the cognitive image is that [ 0 which one applies the negation th:1.t is the
aclwion itself Indeed, this is precisely why Sikyabuddhi refers to it as
"that which acludes other." And since. as ~ have Sttn, the exclusion
(vylvrm) is what accounts for the sameness that allows for distribution,
that sameness applies actually ro the image itself. and not to the p:aniculars
that gcner.ncd that image. Nevertheless, on Dharmakitti's view, one can
soU claim that aclwions have an indirect relation to particul:an 1xa~ the
uniqueness of images corresponds causally to the uniqueness of Ihe particulars that produced them.'JoO
The construal of the cognitive image as the lwis for the selective negation thai is me exclu.Uon has an imporwlt implicarion WI we Mve touched
on earliet: when Dharmakini spt:aks of universals, he means a combination

IJJh. ~ iii III , - Mtl~ ~,. p"" tifft' in {II, - p~ rulsti 1Ii~ III . dMtm
.n. ~IJmW.t4tIt- I .MMIIIU ,., "" ,..!~
~ PI "" pIltltJAlr.""ruU MJ.iw ,m,. "" "" ,.".".ri,.m!l l ~ f . ,wi
f'U'1I ".,.,.~, "" u pMUM .Mh.I", A.Jrit ".n~". iii.
pU~

,,.,;,-t,,.,,.,ti,.,,,.,

'i

1),5, 1'01' o:nmrk, PVSV "/PVI."-1o. cmub,cd in me appcnd.U:.

1}6 ThO. I'orm..L.ti.on oppIia only

<0 ..... i,..,....J..,

!he only type of univcnalt lNI _

an'

fo, mod on .Iw: buio of rcal .ninp. ......id. art

comidmn& MR.

DHARMAKI RTI 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'J9

of image and the aclusion. The a:dwion on its own cannol be the universal because it lacks meneal. conlen!. But the inugc on itS own cannO! be
the: uni~rsal bta~, as a menial particular, an imagt: cannot be distributed.
(.,) DimUllil'lliity lutwtm am/ml.lIIa rtftmr

The role lhat the cognitive image plays in the construction of universals
1M! fO [hil fOu"h problem I.h:u rh~ "P"~['->ry must :>ddn51. Th~1 is,
Dharmwni druvdy maimains that the 5ubjective experience of a conctptual cognition-i.e., a cognition involving a univma1-is of a menw
im~ or appearance. Likewise, the sameness established by c:xclu.sions actually applies to the cognitive images; hentt. our conccprual cognitions are
actually presenting an image as me same as orner images. and not a particu lu as [he umll' U othll'r p~"icubn:. But if WI!' ::Ifll' "p"rill'ncing mll'n~1
images, and if the 5a11\eness inherent in concqxuali[), applies to images, why
would ~ act on p:uticulars? In other words, if I employ inftrtnces that
leads to the conceptual cognitions such as -there is fire over there" or ~sound
is impermanenl," men those: conceptual cogoilions arc actually directing
me just to images. And images do nor perform any of the Functions opcaed
of the enr.l._ment:al p~icuhr, we would c:tll - fire- or "sound-; ~nce. if my
purpou ~ 10 wum my hands or to nuke a sound, me conc:q)luai cognilion
has pre$CIIlcd me with $Omcthing that CIII'II'ID/ fulfill that purpose.
DharmalcIrri cannO! $Olve mil problem by mainaining that conceptual
cognitions-i.e., cognitions involving univnuls-cakc pMticulars as their
objects, becawc, as we have: already ~n, DharmalcIni denies any such possibili[),. One mighl appeal to the causal rdation between image and parlicular. but while this may be lTUe when such cognitions are analyzed. they

do not in fact present themselves in that fashion in practitt. Thai is, in

practice ~ do nOt think, M
There is fire- and then think. M
The fi~imagc
construed as universal in the conceptual cognition. 'mere is fire : has an
indirt causal relation with $Ome actua1 fire, $0 I should move toward. the
actual fire . ramu than warming my hands at me image.- Instead. we simply move toward the fi~ l .t1
In cffccr. ,his founh problem is p.sychologica1: mere is a di.scontinui[),
between the subjectiyt content of conceptual or linguistic cognitions and

137 In addilion TO PVSV UPV'.91 (cind atx-. n.,8) I a11O. for aampk. tIM: IrptncnU
iii
againsc an "ilimatdy c:Itina1, c:bu-Iiyt (}tin) u tIM: object of aprcJ-

in

PVSV PV,.,..

lions (ld MrdJ/I). 1M poin, oflheK ugwncnll il mal iflhe:acnuJ alntml 01_1 00f;'I,.
lion ;,.~ . mm or.e willaa upon !he univnW, .nd no!: upon tIM: parti(uIar.

.40

FO UNDATI ONS OF OHAItMAKIItTl'S PHilOSOP HY

th~ ~f~~ntt of m~ cognitions to ili~ tdically dliacious paniculars on

which ~ act. Adopring the voitt of an objeaor, Dharmakini puu the

problem miJ WIly:

WeU, through this universal which you ha~ dcfmed :IS dilttrenee, does one cognize me particular as me same as other paniculm, or does one: cognize something dse [-namdy, a cognirive
inugo-J as me same as other [imagcsP If me panicubr iJ whar
one: cognit.es as me same, then how can it be an object of conttprualiry? And how could thm be Idie function (~rth4Itri]i)
mrough ma, other objecr [i.e., the imageH And [if the inugc: were
the objt) men on~ would not cogniu: universals such as impermmcnce :a.nd 50 on in paniculm. Thus, the panicul:a.rs would
nor ha~ impertn:l.llencc:a.nd such as thor na.,u~, :a.nd impenn:a..
nenee and such would nor be the qualitlc:s of rtaI things."'"
Dharmakini's mponsc: is 10 mainl2in that all conceprual cognitions
involve a fundamental error (bJ,rintl): namdy, Wt due to a beginninglc:ss
imprint (.Ni4iwis4M) in the min<u of ordinary beings, ,hose ordin:a.ry
beings construe the images in concqnual cognilions 10 be the panicu1ars
that thOk" images, h:a.ving bttn construed as universals, I'q)resenr.,,. The

I.r"'!"""

1)8 I'VSV "/PV' .7sd (G;.p..J-..1): Iti,.,.. _ _ 'hi &t,+,o- ~...",......,..- ....

~ iri,~", nIv"",;",. , Iti,. tiu; I,,*,,' ..t..~,. ~ ~ ~

....._ "

1 .,._ H It.tJ,.,. ."IMItriJI I

-v~~ ti,.j".~,

139 On !M lIO[ion of 1M Iq,inninpCSf imprint,

..rirn .~,. . , . d _ _

Jet, (Of

cxampk, PVSV .,/ PVI.'-4

(G :}P)-17):

Soon- objtt.... "Bu. lina one cu:l.uded !lu ",;' OWN upcalM in other mingo .......
(an iu other-adusOon be ..... m,naI!.
II is a lItIivnAI bcalUC it appcaf1INI way in IM<:OpIition ofR. aI~ chen-;.
ac:ruaUr no .....ivena! JHr .... A Linp.owiaUy bued msnffion OCXUf1 in such a way ml[
i, ,.......;",..,. (~.lQrLmonDl ,hi .......'~.., .... , ..ruallyJ -.0..,..1.. and;, dn...
10 IUIda !he influnlOt of alq,inni..ge. propensiry 10 oombiroe <:OpIitiw inug:s in
dW F.ubion. Ihlm- ilUlfi", dw)w ~"Pj M ...,..-,hJj,jft...,.,...
, ..thUh" fiIIPM ,,.,;~, I ... ..i ii'!'rit ......,.". lObUs'; I ~ 1noJJJJi, .,.u;".~ -'!fI!Hbt .,; Aw"",.,. ~!;'lJti j?lu-1 .

S abo PVI.JO'j:
The objco;t of 311 aprcuion b .;ru..1eci in I c.onapnw cosnilion IN. hal :uiM:n due
.., bcpnni..g- c:opo"r..: ionprin..: it io one: 01 throe kind. 01 cntin.:. (""--J i......
mud> ... it;. "-d mhrr upon rnI thinp,lItIrnllhinp. or both.. t
* .........

",1w"",..u.WJn"; 1ul.i.Jz

...wi....

Iw rriItiJJM " - - " ""'''''d'~J.1 .

DHARMAKiRTI'S METH OD AND ONTOLOGY

'..

specific content of each conceptual cognition is iudf the result of anomer

imprint (viJANi): the imprint left upon the mind by the pera:ptual ape
rienee of the paniculan represented in that conceptual cognition.'
Dharmwni raises this theory al a number of points. but perhaps the
mO${ salient presen12tion occurs in his response to the obj.rion raised just
above. Since this pasnge combines all the dements thai W'C: have di.scw.sed.
i[ is woRh ciring in full :
This f.auh (i.e. Wt conceptual cognitions would not guide one
to particulan;) does not apply becaUK in rdation to the appearance in conccprual awareness. W'C: form conventiofl.l ("1"v.JHirIl)
for universals. co-.cfuemiality. and the subjca-prcdicalc rdation.
~J21 :IW:ln"n~:u1Y!S ;n ~ on ;mrnntt ~hu h:awbttn left by pe.a:ptual o:periena. which apprehends the IUtuteS
of real things. Even though it does nOI haw those reallhings as
iu objca. conceptual cognition ~ to haw those things as iu
objea-the nattm of conceptual cognition is to imagine that its
objca has the IUturt of being an extra-mental thing. Conceptual
cogni6on OttlIB in thar fiuhion b.ec,"~ it is by n:arurt produad
by the imprinu mal previow experiences of panicul:an have
pbctd in the mind. Sintt concqxual cognition is [indlttcdyJ pr0duced by objccu that have nondifJerern effectS. conceptual cognition ittrns to apprthend a nondiffertnt image of an object.
1bat image is ultimatdy tht WIl( in thai it is dilfen:nt from other
objem that do not accomplish the intended function.
The;""'8'" which. "P~ 10 !he oo~ ~il;"n seernIi TO

be o:temal. singular, and capable of tdie dficacy. t:ven though it

is not. It appears this way becaux pmons engaged in practK:al
action (J1]IlwJMrill) proceed by imagining that an aspect of their
concepl is that way [i.e. o:rernal. etc.l. Otherwise. they would
nOI engage in such activity. Because it appcan as something that
And PV,.1,:
1lIc appc:arana of &II Glcmw 1U[1ft with rrprcI [0 a dau-Iip 01' the: ~
of an ob;m .. if the: un~ ~ ia _tUI nat\m it a ropIi~ mot'. lluo, mot'
it caused br
menw condi[ionins thai coma &om .mns minp thai war ~nu
bqinninpc. lime:. ,....."". .........". 'ar)VJ u~ .. tr~ 1 ~1I,q,
WtMIiHli-u,u,yJItj ' w";"";J

me

I".

140 hl .ddition 10 the: P"OP cited juK bdow. _ alto MV .,{PVI.70 (G:)I.I]-U ). "{
PVI.71 (G,...,.1O-1I). and .JPVI.,I "ab (G:.,.u).

142

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKI RTI ' S PHILOSOPHY

i5 c:tpable of:ll tdie function.

m~ cognitive :IIpptanncc:.sflU 10

bt different from dut whieh does not luve th:llt tdie function ,
bUI it is not ultimately real btausc it i5 not :II f.acror in a praeti.
cal lest. as I will explain.
Those mentaJly experienced objects Ihat come about through
real mings Itt app rehended ( 0 be the same by virtue of that univusaJ because they appear in temu of an exclusion from some
other things. But a panicular if nO{ what i5 apprehended as me
same because it doa not appear 10 a conceptw.l awareness. Those
conceptual appearances, while appearing ( 0 be cs.dudro from
some other dUngs. also appear 10 possess adusions fro m those
other things; as such, they apjXaI to be nondilTerent. Although
those conCC'pruai objects are not real in and of themselves. concc:ptual cognition presems (lIpU4rUNlJ them as if they wtre.
H ence. one forms conventions for universals to group many
objectS and C()orcfercncialil)' to abstract muhiple qualities from a
single object-the apparently distributed object of these conventions is faI.sc. Every ro nvenoon, being CQnSICucted through
the imprinu len by aperien(cs of particula rs, i, erro n ~us
(viplAva). Ncvtnhdess, conceprual cognitions whose production
is connected to paniculars arc UUStwonhy with regard (0 mose
paniculan. even though those paniculars Itt not appearing in
lhose conceprual cognitions. An o:ample is the erroneous cognition of a jewel when one sees the glimmer of the jewd. Other
cognitions arc not trustwonhy because, ~en though they also
arise from a distinction of lhe thing. these other cognitions fail
10 dete rmine the: dutinaive qualities of the thing in acco rd with
the way in whieh it was experienced;'" having fail ed to make
thar determination, they ! uperim pose some other distinction
OntO the dUng by app rehc:nd.ing$Ome dighl similaril)'. An o:ampic i5 the cognition of a jewd whcn one sees lamplight. '"

,"I

Sik,-..buddhi (PVf:96->. 1<:,8)) po-s .,,_..!"' ... "ik~

1"2 PVSV .... PVI.1sd (G:"'I-IH1.11,

tWy.

I,..

~
~~

I jMu/wiM4si,., ",.,IN tJ ...."""."..tW/hiIt.r"~,.,.u;""".;.

n4j jUtW,!, _6IJh..rrlln!lil".. M.tNll<lhitJ'!' IIIW...,. iJrilJ'l
wn,.,..", ",i wi";""''' iow uJn ..lth..-J,i"' .......

";ut,-Iu,,, ."."."",

,nou.. 'l'~ oJ"..

h, . .

" j.. . ,4U~ ~",."+

oJ ,' ',..-;;_ ~" .
...~Jm.. tM.."",IJ>d"!".""...m.....u..nh,,,. IMN", 'niMlth-!> ,r",;MJ,;

DHARMAKIRTrs METHOD AND ONTOLOG Y

'"

To overcome [he discominuity bc:tween menral content and refttc:nce in

conceptual cognitions. Dharmakini here prc:se-nu what amounts to a - the
ory of unoonscious error, ~ as Tillemans has called it. In orner words. A type
of error (bhrtinli) is always presem in conceptual thought. Specifically, an
esst:ntial feature of such thought is that it involva; a f.Use determination
{lIIihyauaSliJA} of the apprdlended fICtion as bc:ing a tnl panicular, and
(htu. hy::ln IIncon~'L~ en or. thi1 thought a n m::lkl': us reach (priiJHlJt~::I
particular in the world. ~ , ...
Thus. for Dharmakini, conceptual cognitions lead us to real things only
because ~ make a fundamental error when we have such cognitions: we
mi.stake their content, the cognitive image, for the particular thai it represents. As Dharmakini puts it d~here, the conceptual construct is
M

~i gnonxt (DJNUi},i";u)

in th O'!

~n!\l!

rh," il i, m n" n,t:ti

::11

iF it

~re

iden ti.

cal 10 the particular.'" O ne of the more important outcomes of this theory

is that. strictly spalting, universals Jhould nOi be counted as the insnu
menral objecu (prtlmty4). The most straightforward reason for this claim is
simply that, as Dharmakini indiales in the above passage, if a conceplual
cognition were (0 lead one only to the combination ofinuge and adusion
that is ::I u niverw , then that cognition would not d irKt on.. tow:ard ::In
I':ntity capabll': of telic fUnaion (tmJultriyii). And :IS Wf: shall see in dupte!
four, a cognition that cannot direct one toward an emiry capable of the
desired Ielie fUnaion cannot be insrnunenw on Dharmakini's view.
We can thus think of univcmls as having a twofold character. When ana
lyud in terms of the Dhannakirri's aiterlon fo r u1timatt eristena:, unfvttsals
arc ultimatdy unreal, for they are incapable of (die funaion . With this in
m ind. Dhumakirti himselF m.:aint:airu: th:u , nrialy Jpe::alc.i ng. then is o nly

,,..,,,,uf1

IMhJ- hwiu

ill~ 9i wUriwllIJIlwhirit;ti". "'~""*

II",.uW '''WI lfJWj#gb ... ~,.", ,."ciMJ..,w 1MiUbi~ Mi"_111 w.
_
("6 U t ~,.ri~~ ici "..~".q l " 'nhI ~"jl!di_ /no.
..""'1M hi tJlt7-l1 """"n.I ~!'~ ,..nMb.tMr _ -u.~!W1fI ,.,trI,,.,,,.;M.l..1OJI
I ", __ <"If hMk>J .rl.!~,..---.,.".- 'Ii pYI~ _ _ """'",w; ... ,,,.tiUJ,,,;,; I
..,.,.". _14111 llpi utlw
..,.,..rt.MII lIIitbJlnlw ........""',.,.uNdo
~ """,,,.cr I ,.,tw/ (~ nwlc"*!M1ibf nw MrilMiJiUobttti!r-

h"""

1Ii,"_ iii "'ipllQb' U.-.v".

-'!Jrtho IIUlf"'ci~tw 'pi .....no.., II";"".'

-.u -t;U~,. iN ""(lj~IIuf1 M,,"'" udbtJ.'./lJ.b,.w u" lI,i ,.thi.

ti.rJ1<'OIiJq611I<W'It!"''!f ,.';".0- /rilf'rit """"Y"P"&'!VN6 nJq6"UnIUIN..p4J
tIi,.,,~ n.. _(lil ... ,I*rfJ.
10 T .tlcnuru 1I"'''!n).

144 Sec PVSV .... PVI.:uo-:1.I1 (C!l07 ....); lIusialfCi in chap.:" .. (j oo).

I<H

fOU NDATION S OF DHAIlMAKI RTI' S PH ILOSO PHY

on~

kind of instrum~ntal object: panicub.rs.'" BUI universals may n~r

theless be used to guidt one toward paniculan, and lhey aUo arc presc:nlw
in conctprual cognition as if tht)' wert raJ.. From thot rwo Iantt poinu of
v~-thc: Pr2Clica.I and the psychological-universals may be gtanlN a
type of provisional exiuencc:. And by assuming that type of provisional
aUtenC(', one an employ con"ptw.l cognitions--cspc:cially inftttno.~
to accomplish one's goals, mosl notably the spiritual goal of liber2tion
("'I)~. '.

Tht claim that infet-c:ncc can tnablc one to accomplish one's goaI-<ven
a mundane goal such as obwning fire: by inferring iu presttIC(' from the
presence of smokc:--raises other problems. In particular, one must be able
10 demonstrate ,hat an invariable relation plenains among the con"pu
employed in inferencr, specifically, the concept: adduced as evidence and
mat Pre$C"nted as [he predicate 10 be proven 6iJhycJ. To sec how Dharmakini attempts to provide such a guannt~, let Wi move on ro a considera
tion of on~ of his most signifiant innovationl, the notion of the

IVIlbhJwpr.tiiNINiha.

1455 PVJ.j:HS with ~'I commmtJ (1......0).

146 5 bdow. d.apl:er 4 (poft).

3 Svabhavapratibandha: The Basis of Inference

that both Digniga and

Dharmakirti admit only two forms ofin.m umenw obju (prllmtyta).
namdy, particulm (JU4uA;uI!UfS) and univcrsili (JIi"'inJ"'~!w) .
Both philosophers
th<: existence of only two instrumenw objeas as
WUTUlt for :admitting only (WO forms of awareness as instrumental: p:rcqx:ion (Prll~) and inference (."'111111,..). Their argu~1 resu in pan
on the claim thaI particulars are inexprestibk: and univcn:a1s:ll'e not: causally
efficient: ~ing in"rn!Uibi<!. I""rtiClll:l" eannor Iw: r:&1c",n :u the objKrs of
mought and l:lngua~ and .incc inference involves ctlnoepul2liry. p:articu_
lars cannot be the (direct) objeas ofinfttence. l..iktwise, since: univmals are
aprcuible. they cannot exhibit change. Hence. they cannot create dkas.
and as , uch, they cannot be the objectS of perttption. which is causal.'

N TH!! PU:VtOUS CHAPTE"

we have

K'CO

me

While this -disjunction" (vipl.rnvt) bmvttn perct:ption and inference distinguishes Digniga and Dharmakirti from 8rahmanical philosophers.
admining o nly two fornu of irutrumeno oflmowlf!dse ~ nor n~l2J'i1y:ll
significant departUre from non-Buddhist South Asian tradiriofl5. II is true,
of course. that many other traditioru do admit more than pcrcqxion and
inference as in5lrumenw. Naiyiyiitu such as Uddyotakara accept ('NO
additional irutrumena: analogy (f4JH1miNl) and lan~ (iAbJmlAbJA).
I

5 tho I"~. '

If chapc~r

(,,).

aI',

2 Set NSI.I.' : ",_,;,*,.,11. .,..,.

d u,.",..", . . , .. . .114... Analosr iJ 11)061 dotdy
a_a uN widl JeaminllinsuOOc con~rioN. III wbm OM is mid "dw mw-Iiu aaruu
ova' tbm: ill eaIIN a ,....,.. - S aI.o Uddyouhn 'l commnlD (NV:I6i-'71), ..ruct.
do.dy ~kI V~ (NBh:uS'): " .jU_ ,."..",.. ~tliJtIsJt' riU,.lf4 ..
..,........ and especilily (1"""']0): ~ MwJ..,.".,..., ..1Ifl~,!, ~"w,.k

i"..,..tr

1IIM~",,"""""'~qili,~~..,.~iIy
, ~thI h]Ol P"'''''''!'f ,...,.
~ pM ..- ' r ell. , , _ .m,..
1JtJ>i]4> lw. . tI~ -JH'd N _ lJor p~~ ..1f'itIni MIfIj/WM'!'ftIiM....

~i#.

'"

..u...

1,,6

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PIULO SOPH Y

Mirnif!ua\w who follow Kumaril:a acttpt:all of these. while also :admitting

presumption (IIrthil"'ttijJ :and an innrume:nt Wt mc:y call - nonexiue:ncc~
(I,bh4vaP But in dc:nying instrumenmity (prama!']II) to these :allc:gc:d
mans ofmowic:dge:. Dhannwrti :and Dignaga are ofte:n jusl rejecting Ihe
cJ:aim th:at these :addition:ai mc::aru 5houId be c:uc:goriud Kp2r.udy. In the
C25t of langu:agc. for erample:. both Dignaga.:and Dh:armmrti frttly admit
thall.an~ can be::a trustworthy source of ccmin types ofknowlc:dge. but
thcir dUm is that. in casc:5 whc:re: a linguisric cognition is funaioning as an
instrumenm aw:arencss, il is 2CtU:al!y a type of inferc:n .' Dignig:a :and
Dh:armwrti also admit um..in irutances of presumption (ImhdJHllti):as
wdl formc:d infc:rt:nccs. and one: might :argue ,h:at the: ~mc: would be true:
for some insWlCCS of rosoning by .m:alogy. The poin!. (hen. is ,h:at by
3 In "prctwnpUoa, om prauma dx cmuna: of III crltiry without..tUch ~ a1ludy
dnmnined mote of affain -.1d bo: impc*ibk. Saban. ("'Nr.r~)O ..JM;",j~
1-1.1), cirin&: dx opinion of dw: Vrnikr&, P- dlC c:umplc of ptaWnilll dut IAaduu
muaf bo: ~ ou~ b. ..." .... one knows tNt bo: iI a1i~. but _ doc. not .... !Urn llIY'
wJ.cn, in dlC houie 1l1C pocmrial problcmJ with mil rype of~ ~ iUunfllled by
Kumirib'1 e:wnpk of pmumption '-cd on inklua: by infttma one can obsenoe th.It dlC
OlIn t...........cd; hnoa, ..... pruwna d.... i. 1\as doe ~'" 10 move.
Saban'. citation of dlt; Vruikln'. ddinj ~ rc:acU: IInblpMnir "1i J.1'JU!I In._ 1IInJ..
'"",'N ....,.~tlJ MnIMk.u,.,u; ,.,IM j i _ .,....."..,. tffMMJa &-rftI_
hhi....

-~
Kurdrib (SV. ~tlil) pYU: ~";ju. ~""" IIhJtUlM w""wt f .fn1'D!'
..~...".".~ni'~ fl
4 For a ~nl trt.llrMnl. I

KdI"". (1997).

S Dignlga IIIIS mil dearly H rs,.1Ie. fUya I ~:lst) . Dh.um&k1ni'l opinion is found",
nllmcrow points, indlKlilll PVl.laI-t. TM IpC!cific ~ of;nkrmot intr:ndcd hm: iI an
infdUICte from dfr (ta: below), lilltt that iI. callAl tdation beta" .. dlC ilnlSt in. fit.
rmer'1 mind and dlC IInonnu of 1M spnkcr. Stc-. for c:nmple. PVSV fill PV I.117
(G:UJ.lI- 17):
A natcmcnl is prompted by dlC ~s inlmlion ("',"i~ to eonununicall: I 'fK'
cilic meaninJlob;m (lin!.), for. pnIO!I..no knows, ilIilsulUllCn t iscornilll from
WI immrion." th.Il II<lIcmcnl indica.a the mc:.\Jl;ns/ob;t (MnJ..) m.r it the men
raJ appanncc Inamdy, lhc intmtion,l..bich iI dlC su.nnmr 'l ClLIIC. 'Tb.tft il lhwl
rdluon of produotr and producrd pm:ainins bo: ca. I mental mtity [lWIldy, the
intmtion] and tbt ~.ICI (Npij~ri). (..m-~mihI,.m",,,,, M"" iM". iii
~ nwlUill."." hi...... linN,!, nit.,.';Ii htUhiy.vp;jlWplJe. jI~-"
~M,""..J.NM .

6 Di~ (PSV'4Q&1ff .. PS2....49) fPCCificaly diKw.a p'QUmption (tmItI,.m). and he

rhl! 101M fomll of praumption arc aau.ally inferm<:n. Dharmaklni (PVSV . .
PVu,&ab; G:II]'-1I1) mcnOoaa an ilIJW"Cf't for dw: ois<mo: of the ~ fKUlric:J (i,.;n,.J.
..... whac he doc. not opoocify i. ~ ....:h. ..... MJWDCD' .. dc.uty all ~.,( p,Q<U..........
(II"""niJ.

1f!\KS

SVAIJHAVAPItATlIJAND HA: TIlE BASIS O F INf ERENC E

147

acctpting only (wo forms of instruments. Dignap. and Dharmwrti arc

not ncceuarily rejecting ilf toto {he othe.r forms of knowledge admiued by
their Brahmanical counterparts, thq are simply subsuming some forms of
knowledge in inference. indd, Dignaga and Dhannakini share this opinion with one of tneit Brahmanical coumerp.arts, namely, Praiastapida.!
Of the two forms ofirutrumcnts o(knowted~ admitted by Dharmilini,
we havre al~y (Dverrci {he most salient wues in Dharmakirri's theory of
pucqKion in the coune of the prtViOU5 chaplet's discussion of particulars,
the objects o( pttCt'ption. In the prc:5(nt dupler, we shall focus upon DIur
makirti's theory of inference.
Dharmwrti follows the basic structure of inferencc discussed in chapter I.' He acupts two overall ClIu~gories that bear the name "infettncc":
rhl!}' lilY: ";n~~cr._fnf-on~lf" (nNirth4l1J1wui_) and "infficnu-for-oth
en" r,.rtirth4l1J1matul). Suict.ly speaking. "inkrencc-.for-otbcn" is not actually an inference at all; rather. it coruists of proof statemcnu adduced with
the intention of inducing another to infer what one. al~y knows. Ir is an
"inkrencc" inasmuch as its goal is an inferential cognition; so tOO, it
employs: the basic theory ofink:t-cnc:r: described in the COntCXl or"inferencefo r. oncsdf." As befort:. "in&~cc" h~rc will M used 10 rd'O!T to "inkrence_
for-onesclf: unleu olh~rwisc n(Ked.'
Iu OOIed abon. N~yiyilw.such.lJdctyoQbno di..:uM anaJop primarily in :o.linsWWc
conlat, ~ OM karns the~" of new WOh. wo:h:or "x ..",. O{a bovine opia:l. by
:onaIop to the rmm.uof already 1lnoot.1I wonk JUCh IS "row." H3non {19'6S:nl lw loami
thu ~ cumpk in Diplp', wodt:. whm: il U uaecI 10 mow thai tom<: IOrms of anaJosicaI reuon illfi acnWly. form ofinkn:1'n". It is podibk that DhmnUirti wocld 0QI'l .

loIda'iUdI an arzumml

<0 ""

baxd on I ....fHoIawhm.

(KIr

I"VSV MWI.)I:d; G :..P)-Lf).

7 S PDS:ai'-Uil. 1M hiKorial rda,ion ofPnbslapida:and Dipip if; diRk "h 10 at

liUI with any r<aIOII:I.blc acwtaC)'. to the quation of any inHuma 01 ~ ~I ..cm the
IWO cannor ~ ~" thu poW!..

8 Sec d\.iplfl" I (Uilf).

9 DisnIp OOICI lhll ,.,..;,.",~ _ _ u oclr ~Iy Q/kd ;lIk":" C" (I'SV,.ob'_1
.JPS,.),

JL1II ill lOr OftC$df thne ariIea. cosniUon of w inlttmdum from:o. cop!iUon of Cidma: n:pkte with the duu upms. 10 100, dairi"l fa ~c wgnirion of the
infcrcndwn in anocha-. one SUtCU cvidmcc replete with 1M th_ upuu: [thai f)'IX
of ""r~tl u called ini"cfcnat.IOr-ncn.u- _ mft:IphoncalIy applies 1M rw'M
of the dI"ect 10 the CIUJe. Vi Izv ...Ki IIInJ
i ""f1/c "." atll Di ,J,n,. sl]tJ
k},j" ... ~ 1M "." l'flrf Di Jtn ,. ~,., 'J.i _ aIt.J,...", ,.; "." Wj.J
, . ,.j~IIDi Mil oi.;.. III ~ " " 1# 'D'I' W ..... h ~ ,.'i~,..j .
FoIlowinl Oig>ip. DhtrWUrti alto malnWni cha, ,.mrJ.iIlIl__ U GIlly mraphor-

,. *

PI"'''

1,.8

FOU N D ATI O NS OF DHARMAdRTI 'S PHILO SOPHY

J . J RLlation lhrough Svabhava: &yond "o,. PraLna

In contemporary 1Ch0lanhip on the- topic, it is generally agrc:td that one- of
Dhumakini '$ major innovuions lies in his approach to the: relations among
the me-mbC"n of an inferenCe', and tha, ,his innovation 5te-nu from his
atfemplro solve a central problem in tht thtory of his Buddhist ptedtceSsor, Dignaga. In brief, me- prolNem is dl.tI, on Dignilg:a's ehrory, the prestnCC of tht evidtntt (Ixtu, liifta) does not nmllril] mtllu th,l.( the property
to bC" proven (~mIIl) is also prescnt.II Although one can point to
two Icchnical issues in me- way Digniga structured his thtory dut cre:ue this
lack of ccrt:linry," tht basic SOUI'CC' of this doubt is the qJistemic problem
of induction: how can we arrive at a general rult-foch as the fact ,hat
smokt always indicates fi~y e:nrapolating from a finitt numbC"r of
obscrvarions! Despitt all of our prC'Yious cxpC'rience:s and aU dut we can
now observe, is il nol possible that me case at hand (or SOO')(: fUlure case)
docs nol (or will noe) conform to those cxpC'rienccs and observations?'1
tritutp~-'!' ,...."""". ."....._
bo TdJcmaN (.yI1) and PrnJ (,"~.

jc,aIly aJkd "" infamce (NBp:

_ry.,...,...,.
s... ..
Cf. I'VI" ,.. ).

I ltir.~

...,.s).

IDA. Strinkdlnn Ilu poUlin! (lUI h"':JI..

I>twnukini', focuIon mil p.obitm may
-U be chK .0 hu auociation ...im IJtoUUHI .. an i".~n of Oipip ...no WJI proNbly

of l>tuormUlni',.~ IInnIcm iI ccmnIly cmii!ed wim deccaillJ mil probkm

in DiSfdp,lheo!y. a1mougn M proposa t lOIurioll w. Dbmnaldni docs 110( accqx.
~ (J"tl lw gvm .. plHllibk .xounl of the bIckground dUI lead. lip III Dlwmakini',
_

' u,....

(lO..

II 11K fine problem it .hal i( _ I5IUIM Dignip to be -aing " d>rory of in~ thai
Ic.b . 0 indiopuUlbk ~ in aU c:uca. <hm _ ..... ob!ipl'o inclu<k III ru. 'JS"fII
~furm of inducrlw OHWtIpcion. dUI if. lht: _pc;"" w ....t.;,1~ .datioN tw.id in lht:
induaM domaill aIin hold in lht: tub;t cia... of tho inft"...... (Ha)'Q .988:.60). ~ teeond poubLcm u thal Dip>.Ip does lIQ( proridt an Mkq\u'I' ma.ns of dcurmininJ tho nc:p1M rorK'OIniW>a: ("'JtUiI'rhl~,n) (S.ci nkdlnu
'I'M ~ of thcJe diffieulriet
if WI DiA"lP has acmwned fnt otLIr _
~ eondilioru, b..al not MIfIkicn. ooca.
/Or dnwiAS . tru#W<Xthy inr(l("..... Haya (,,sI:.slR) arpn tha. Dipip', tw I'IIIC ihnd.y
"failed ill lW thooryof infnmu:. bul racher mal the WKntain.,. implicit in Dipdpl!ftc.
IIrf is an ClJIftlUon of his "'rpcicilm. Keprda of whethn Ibis if 1M caK, Dhannaklni',
....... Ihrory is cbrIy ~med dimilQu"I
unuruilllis.

'".:)1,,),

a,

m...c

12 Sn: ~ (I".:........l.1, ). Sidtri.. objeaa to llling "induaion" II a phibophiallool.lO

praml thor: issueJ .ha. prompc thr: formub.ion of.M ,...~ti..,wIM. bul hill :upmenc it ~ on tho UlUlnpOOn thal "therc: uonly one ... uu~acl'Oi""..mOon in the
IopcaI
-rem of ""y inkrmc.." booJ:Jlo). 1would. inltmd up wr.h= i I _ dian
_ ony to pac e INlh bca"vlhctt ill _Ihan one: ony 10 I!ndcnand th. ~ ma,ion (N.- """,.. pk, .. " ... "'u, c '" , N""'Llc~). WI ... """,,"," ot....." ..doJ"j'. poubk .....,
inducti..., ""'" Ulha. Iw -U . rdalion
trUlh dc:pmds l1li th. IQlUtc:I or idalli!ioos of

....oo.c

SVA"HifVAPItATlBANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFERENCE

149

We can understand Dha.rmalcirti', response ro this problem as an attempt"

to move away from the grounding of rht pervaJiion rt:btion (vyipri) in any
appcal to "mert: obsnvation and nonobscrvation" as the bases for esrablishing me twO aspects of pervasion, namdy positive and negative con
comiWlce: (lIlt WlJIII and IIJIlti"lta),U That is, on Dharmakirti', view one
cannot establish the positive concomirance by mert:ly Stting that in every
(2.o;e whe~. for elCImple. smoke is observed. fi~ is also ob5crved: nor can
one establish me neg;.cive concomitance: merely by me fact that one has
nOt obKrved a case when: smoke is present even though fin: is absent.
Instead, in order to draw a wdl formed inference:. one must be able to speciry the manner in which the evidence (Imoke) is related to the predicate
(fire), such mat every instance of the former must be accompanied by me
I:.tter.l'

Although Dlurmakirri does not PUt it this way, me specification of this

relation involves two separate tasb, Firsl, one must show WI would con
stitute me type of relation sought here, rumdy, a pervasion relation (UJiipri)
mat t;lUrlllltm our ability to infer the predicate from the evidence. Sec
ond, one must have a procedure fo r determining C2SCS in whKti thar reLa
tion ir in place. Of these two tub. I will focuJ upon Dharmwni'f
lhc.dao thnnJeIoa. wtw. ..bt lhc R~ of u.. mation annot be di......:cd &om iu contall. CO'm if _ undom.nd tilt' omla to be ~ thAt do not rdn to rW thinp in lhc

_.....

IJ From Dlwmaldni'J Jl(npeai~. 1IvarucnI'I IItempc at IOIvinllhc 1'1'" in DipUp'1

philMoph)' rdieI hea..uy on mere omanrion and ~. aM DIwmailrti. a;.

'i<J-.. .,J .I.i ~ "'po,; ... . ~ ~y Ai __ ...I rn .......Iy lwo"........ i .. ""l"""'........ I .. . ""

~ lhcaitiquaouur II I'VI ,II-Jl (G:9.1- :IO.17) ....t.cft much of ~ ItJIIIIICllI JOaues

upon the impoaibilif)' of emoblish.iDS
nonobIet 000,. For tilt' pan1Id dQ..

.".n..m thJoush

ouAon rn HB. _ 5.cinkdUw:r (196"71.

14 Thil poUIl iuummuimi II

PVI ' JI-J~

The ba dill lbinp lUnd in the rdationUIip r1 a.1ISC IOd dft 01' that OM thing iI.
plopc:<l)._....... of IOIt\C odin thinl an: ,uc,iainl tdlliomhjp. (.. ~ theft,.

r....:, dfCICI' and ..

II ,",,~~"I...tifi.od Iorthc: rule (~ol ........... mpo..

niecl non-uiaing. Thai ruk i& MM cktmniDed from not &erina the evidence in
hetuOSU_ caxo and .mng i, in ~ QICI. Otbcrwisc, how could one
arrM " the Nk WI OM thinlo namdy CItIK. ,....-april, aim beau a ruin 01'11a'I, which aft lhc drecu. aiat1 Or how could _1ITi~ II dw principle if an Attriblite mal i& I _Mad of the eidena: 11M. CIIlIe that i& dil'farnl &om the CYKkna:',
aLQd Thia; would be lih inftrrinl mat IOIDCthrnS ;.. mel. bccalUt i, i& doih,
r~'" RW'''''''''''' ''~ I ".; r.-.ry.._ ","",Uri 1M 1M
tJ.n.1W H ...,.'!'~"iJw~ U;
,.,~ 1 .~ .. r.II/Mi,,, ..,
tIh.~ /IIls.ui~,,,,,

,.-,...,.*

ISO

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHI LOSOPHY

formulation of the ptrvasion rdadon bttwttn ~i dence and predicate.

Besides being an area thoU requires clarification, his "icws on ptrvasionor mo~ accuratdy, the mort fundamental ~Iatio ns on which pervasion is
bued-a.rc panicularly innovative.
On Dharnukirti's view, the relation (Ihe IlJilpti or Mpervasion") between
evidence and predicaee cannot be I maner of mere co-presence or cooccurrence (lfI1MblNll/';''' Inm~ad, mat ~Ia!ion mwe alwa)'l amoum to an
IIvitu1bMlItllliy4m4. a nomological "rule" (lI;JllmIl) or restriction whereby
the evidence (MN4, /i';t.) does not occur (nil bbttvati) without (vi1Ul) the
predicate (uJhp). " This type of rdation will nevtr be Mmisleading"
I~ [I may be hdpfiallO think of IIXft CO-p'eRnCe in term!' of the MKalkd parMkut of rtu.terW impl.".nnn . TIu. io.. wfw.n _ ...... ,~ " .... ., on . r, III
_~
~ I.. <oun.mnru_

.,J.

........

ilM reruI, ,ha[ ow c:ondilK>nal hokIa wbnt~ , iI fal~ H~n , "if all appiel a~
(CI:~ tbm all appieI ~ INitl" iI rnx: oondiliorW. bul il iI [I"W only bccaUJc _
ba~ red1Kal the rondirion.JllO a IXlII.junaion.. ThU rrukcs no _
foe- Dharmakim. ~na
M pbas I hipt 'IlIhw: on dw: intuition dA,. when _ UK oondirionaU in raKKlins. if-=
ploptlly understand dw rncaninl of dw condJtionaI'l aniKecknI. ,.., an compdkd to acapt
1M IOONftluall. if _ wish 10 I"ftnain "..ioaa!. Thw.. in raptltm 10 1M I~ cumpk.
otwmakirti ...",.w uk. "Why should I think WI Mins IrtnhcdlOn has an)"lbi"lto do
..iu. btlnfi frui. 1" "'" ~--.... ~ P''''''P'''' w ,""'""-'c <l14' the ~"O"'''''''' ,d.tlu., ""',rtOI be ~'M .... ''''"eftal condi,ional. and liu-;... Ihll Oh.armak.ini', .~ of
_MJ."..ti"''''''
~ I miner of cominc up.,.;th 1M q>i... nnic ptxtic:a dA.
allow W 10cktmniM..-hen. pervuion holds. For a OttnletUlory tra.unc:n, of !da,ed iaucs.
I Sideriu (WO}).

unot

161 n Pins thil compound. 101M phil. . .' i _ tw;.:omc apparm . The meaning dAr
I ~ .. 1t ed.......wd bo-~ primarily from an inletp!da!ion of thecompound _1-'-~ (.~,..{ w. .u,.-.~ althoush :an .mIpis ofi! u :an inllrummw .., "'nqJI...",.w aJ.o yjdd dw dairal maninll:. It u impon:anl '0 nett, ' - ' ". thaI in dw
000. .,., of the initial pracnllOOn of dw IJ"P'S of rt_ in HB r... ki..I ... IriJJJ,a. ~ J
mlfiMi...,,;,.wUJJJ.m 'H'
DIwmalcirri pnwides a sIou lhac IlDOUn tilO
limili~ .." .. ~ (ni"'MJ-,. ~). Mo~ IptcifiaJly. hu inl~'P"lItioo rudJ

b,... ,.,.,JI).

(HB:s' H):
ni~ meuu mal IN: predate pr:rvades lM anribu.~ of lM IUbjea adductd u
n'idmce.. lba, niuMJ. doc:. not Gilt in lM calC' of:any icIma other than the
!hm: typa of cooickna mallioned heK. Hmcc, if iI.aid 10 be restricted 10 JUSt thac
dim:.l1<It;, ik:; : ...
~rir ..k"'6*N.fo. " tritMIhU __

,.,.1iNIHi

...,-...uui n,

."..i.";"" ""J'd'I.

Thc compound 1.n1fiMh.";"-,hw mcaru tho: - mtric:Uon r,,;"""J of If.;,.n& ... 10

mo.e three Iixnu of...-idrnc.c. and _ - ' the saint s.I- provided by ~i (PVT:6li7
"'1.11-16') in his ("I)ttUQtnU on VI.!. ru UK of "\Ie compound as a pitlft .." .....
ho.,"'f. u pUlW 10 the specific cant.,., of~fyinl thc number of types of rdi&f"Yidm.cc. a.. ...... ~.
compound U bcs< undmwod a ....;
f' lJl' Olin ilutrummw

"w:
14.,.."'1& F.... """",pic. bu..

.*

radinp KUJI W poGdobic in <he aM: ofPV,." . Fino. a

n:adinl of 1;ri,..Mhtt..;,.-. ttni1r.c.
in PV t., ...-...ld rcquilt W 10 CIIT)'
fWU

""""'11

SYA8HAYAI'R,ilTlaANDHA : THE BASIS OF INFEREN CE

lSI

(lIJ4hhit4rtt): mar is. since our rule (niydma) leUs us mal the evidence (s uch

as ,make) cannot occur without me predicate (such as fire). the evidence

musl ~ an indicator flllmllltllJ of Ihe predicale (e.g., smoke will a1w.ays
indicate fi re). In short, Dharmaldrti ugucs for a ntUSSllry "um'In belWttn
evidence and predic lte. and he calls ,his rcl:ation a wabhllvapratibam/ha, a
term that I wililcavc untranslatcd. allhough il may be rendered as a "nal",.,.1 "1:II;on." 11
f"oro.o.-ud (through """vrm1t/w; md(t\Oe 100ft!y thrtt reliable forms of evidmot from pVl.I,
for m. di.... "ion wrrounding PVI.) I iud( docs not allow for even:&ll implicit mama: to
IDe rumaioA r";"_J of IllfiIlJMi"" to enly Ihlft (emu ef eYidma. Scwnd, while
Slky:abuddhi'l own comrmtlD art: ambiguous, lhey dcarfy do not fUppon a scnili~ ..t _
ptiJ'lllll radinll of mfflbhivtut;",_ II pVt.,.. His commenD (Pvr~sa6-4 sb,) raid: 1""1
ti ~,tk by hi,. .....,,,,....,. ,.,.".,. .,vir",. tki pbJo', / 'I7" J.r", ."... ft.i

,. Itf" pm ~ ,.; ~ "" "", 6. "'''IIf"''' ,. bt ."j lImJ,." Sf"''' pm ~

,. .."'...., kin"..,..,." ~,. ~'i 6J.& npJ It:fi "''''-'..,uJ1Iu
J.r"l '''''I J,J,;"
oi ""l'~.,.,.", 6. mnI v ",j ~"l...,..,..,.
We can rrooCf much of m.
Sorukril of thtaoe commenD by alraain! me appropriate phruc:s (rom K;afl)akaJOmin
(".,"-,) . fo!Iows;,,- tM'!' , ..ti6.",u",..!M p...a.rv.ft w ....t I u.,.u,..~.-.I'"
,,7ti-U, 'fA; " .4.~~~, _M.i.-.lwl ...u""Y"t.r~~" ~t
~ IIJII.~ (II 1i"'~IIi";""".q, ~r",} lliM Nl Ml~ r"tn ,., p N V },
Althoup me, aaa oquinlmlofthe TiMan ",..,. P" VarI""" be indubimbly de!crmincd
r.om lW"~in'l ~i,. i,;' " .... ~, ........ clca.r <ha, Sikym.MMt,i;' 00< hc.~allPIorinS'" urliu gloM or .,..tM kt..,. .",....~ ttiJII-!J. Ir he wert: ro&wins ,!QI poa,
and ifW(" P~ m. po.. of .IIiIlJIIhivII. d~ lfilllli~ Nl MJNlJ, Inc liucr POI!ion of~'sCOfYlmcnlf shoWd read .arnnhinsaionB <he.t: lineJ: ...., ... -'''1'''''''
kin" oi """ It. ""
6. "'ttl .... ".j '''''''t 6.r "tn,.]iN IN .. u,."
,..#1M". alilit' '''''' eMt"."'". ....... M.i~ I"l"'"" P" vi. Of 0lWlC, _ _ flill kfi
with the p,obkm ofinlnprW"I the r~ "l"" P" ..... but in doinll lll, we muse be QUriouI not 10 auu~ thai Ihis TIbetan phl"Ul< M""nruy fcprucnlf lOme form of "j-ylUl..
~mjn's own commenD roIp1o)' IOrms eM " i/<l {I T.', a .rI-lS, and apKWly a.l}),
and ifKaro;Wagomin is ~ing upon the final word!.] of Sikyabuddhi', commmu., t/w;
final "1ft ,. P" V """Y rq>rtICnl :&II orip~ orUri.". Althoup. Ka.r~i n'. hiAoric:al
poeilion (nol 10 men lion the qw.liry of hi. c:ommenwyl maltetl his own, indCf><"n.knl
ranarb 1m rdcvanl. he aplicidy adopts a umwlJM,~ ~ing. Stt, for eumpk:87.13~ .... hi.u,-.!l eM"""," vi,.;..., u.""tilJ~ and a .lo-ll-Nry.-1Ii t.IIII.f]mulJi"" (I) .. u ~""Y"woup.rtislJll.w,... j"., (I) w- rMI.i"""''''''"'JN'tti"ikttyII I'M
*",.NiJuyo /til P""" .rlII~" "iytuu>eik~ ~, II iI this UIagt" lUIpted by S1ky.buddhi and confirmed by Kanpbgomin, wIlereby muMlIJII.";"'_ is
WlCIusrood.a .,, 'U"'''J'IO chat is ..... reionnl to tho: di:scu.oion or lOItI~ti~

,"'1_

ms'"

tI.r.""'" "'"

17 This lrarulation is the chotu adopled by Ha,..,. and Gillon (1991). Al<hou&h StrinkdJllCf
preICIID IlJUmmD lOr a putiruW anaIyW {~of compound _~1IIi1wNlhta,
be hi.....H" ~ (19460): ' II it pouibk 10 dedlKll: Dfurmakini"s immlioru with thc tum
_~,."ti6...JiM. i.e.. the 'comet' in~ion ofm. compound, dim;dy from any of
his nattmc:n~ Iu fatal I an _ . Dhamu.kIrti a p _ himsdr nowhcrt: in. Wly tlu.i1lKh
a dtdualon 1& pouIbIt. - T e IIIla wry Iv::I.pfuI ot.c:t .... oon I would likt 10 add that me anaIy,,;, of the compound doc. """ j" iru/fclarify .he phik.ophW;:al istuetI in q\lalion.

m.

Ip .

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOP HY

On Dharmwn:i's view. a wabhdWlpratiha"""'" comes in rwo forms or

modes. II may be a cak of producrion-from-thar- (tIlktpllttij. which I
will call the a production- mod~. - or il may be relarion of id~ntiry (tJdti,"'l"J. which I will call lhe "idemiry-modc." These rwo rel:uioru provide me
basis for Dharmakini's rwo forms of affirmative ~idence (W/hi). Thqr are
respectively: 1t4'J1'MNl, "evidence consisting of an dkct- or simply -effectevidenc~"; and WtlbIuiIJaMtu.. evid~na: consisting of a Iwtbhiwt" or
.. I .... bluiv.n'id~nce . - Dharrnakini first delineates cfft-evidcnce and
JWlbh.i~<knce in mis concise explanation al me outset of the P,..m4!fA~'li1ttlkL

An effect is evidence for a cause in terms of that number of II1IIbIM~'iIS without which ir could nor occur (..u;dbhdvi). Also. a
(1IIII-lbIM"" is ~idence for a IVIIbhil"" mar is innriably consequem from ia mere: presence.I.
Dharmakini h~ SClrcs Ih2t one may use eimcr an effect (hirya) as evidence for its cause, or a IlJIlbhaUil as evidence for a IIIIIbh4wt. The rdiabil18 PVI.l:

*..,..~

,i

nw"'".i,,.

Mtl""INbnI".rwJhi,.., a:

JM;, ."d6l.hi Ur~ I ~ ,.....", M.l ...

<he tnrub<ion by Haya and Gillon (1?5I1:S). Whlk lnmrpondns

Oharmakirci', wrnmmu in MY (G:}.I~J) on this wux. 1""~ IrIIUblcd il . irit ~

~Kp>mdy &om <he prow 1011 in which ic is tmbcddod in MY. ~ me ptVOIC
may h:3vr bn inltgnUlo <he wux !"rom the:: Q\l1KI:. TM key difficuhy in rmcIoerillllhis wux
is the:: phrur nww..;, Jlr-lWr, whi<:h I>h..umWrri dearly cot\HJUeI with both the:: df'ea
(Ury.}aains as ,.idalCl: and m.. a .... ~inkrmllJom wr dfut. Dlwmaldni, _
mabieI; him 10 apply the: ph __ _ ~i, Jia 'J.l.jr fO both the:: cffca (U".".) and tho
aux (Ur"!W) beaux the irutnllnmw e- ol ...M.lNi,,.. "unr""y pbw.i1My ~ con_f\N:d with ~thcr. I "'vr allmlpted 10 con"o'!J' til;. ambipiil}'.;tII tIw: Engiiah ph.-- -in
rnnu oi"; the adnnnct' of this InRSlalion i. thaI. I f wilh 1M Suuluil iud{, illpplin /!'10ft
darIy fO tho: awe than tho: dIi!a.
Ir !rambled .. tlTobcddcd. the fint
and Jim word of tho: .hird,.w. dIould ~
rcnde,cd Ilipdy difkrmdy. H_ is Illy IranaIa.!ion of thar ponion of tho: wux induding m.,
im~ldy MlrfoundinS proM from PYSV. Worda of tho YftX an undntincd:

tw<:I,...

""""' 1{

M 4fon iI m.lnffOr dw
twlrtMi""...,u. (.... Wwj i" rk ,._.."n,.
_, whim ;, ~ _ 6'-;" beaUK <hi, emi.y io rauianl 10 brinS tho. dfca of du.i
awc. bur only in tcrmI of u- Plopc,[ia of duol cffca that woWd not OOX\Ir wid>QUI tho.c .... """,tia of the allX.. AM 6 '"JMTJ (....) iI m.lnwfor." tDnUiMJ
~""'t iI i"...n.l9lWWrfW'1lfi'- tiN -..~ I u".~
nwMi...,j, jiwJMir ."'dMi,,; Un.{tt I tqJIfI ~ I lliU".WIIlIry.Mit IIi, nw
tlMn-ir, u;r ,,;d _ M",."ti I ... ",.iJMl,., MIw 'Ii Mi1411tJnVlI .....JJH"i I hmu

",,,,,,. I{"""

;0' N".,..)! .
N,- ~ ..... I ....... foil , "I ~~'.

as a subsuanlloariY( (i.e.

tadint (PVJ':.....,) ol .... 1oc:ati.e in ~

pi tJ..,. " MhtJr-"...1(K:17.1.I)). ~n copin

SVA"H)'VAPRA T1&tNDHA: THE. BASIS Of INfERENC E

ity or accur.acy (,n~bhic;irR) of th~

If}

modes of n-idena art ~

mocks of SVIIiJh4l1t1pratibRNiha, production and
twO

raptivdy upon tht twO

idtntity. Thu is, an effect can SttVI! as evidence for its cause: bause. on the
rdacion by production. uru.in IWIbhi.,. of fhl! dfca (such as smokt) an
nOI occur without ttru.in IVIIblJli.,. in ml! cause (such as fire) . ukrwist, a
lIHlbhlvtl can serve as n-idenu btcaust, on the identity rdation, Ihe
Wl!l.hhiilNl ::Wfucrd :IS thr r:videl1Cr: (such as "bring a sugu maple"} ntcelSi
tato Ihe pmmce oftht IfNlbhivtlto bt proven (such as "bring a uccl. In
other words, it is nOI possible for the entity in qUl!Slion to "bt a sugar
maple"' ifit is nm also "a trtt. "

The

T.,...s:nun ofSvabhiva.

One can ptrhaps already sec thaI a proper undersranding of the twO forms
of cvidenc:z admintd by Dharmakini-namdy, dreer- and 1IItIbhd~i
denct--mun be derived from an understanding of Ihe twO forms of
S'IJtl~lNIp""rilNt,.JJ,a. A propc'f undersanding of tIJiIbhtilNfpTluilw,Liha I'CIits
in rum upon an understanding of [he term flNJbhilNl. Unfortunaldy,
IW/bh.l_ cannot be expl~led mll.':fdy by rOUI"Se to ~ t=u.iuion, for :as
Stll.':inkdlner has pointll.':d out, IWlbhdf.l<l U extremely diAkult to translalll.':
accuraldy, in pan btcausc it has al lost IWO senses. On one of its senses,
IIMbhllNl may aprcu the "narure of an encity, and on this meaning, the
term is applkd singularly [0 a subject (J}",mr;n). Ont may speak. for aanl-

pie, of tht SVIIbhAlHIof smokt in the sense of the "'nalure of smokt. On thl!
second sense, tINIbhllltl ctpreues an entity's charaaer1stia or pro~nies,
:lnd on mu ~, :10 subject u underscood to h2ve multiple ,."..bhll_. O ne
can say, for aample. that composed o( maner: substantial: and so on

PVT. INt first (ar.I9-W) offnJ an a1tnnati.., _1\131 of doe Ioeali ... III Un!"'....".

mabIins him 10 in~ me illMrwnmallll im""".Mwu~{fJ(P:L}.U). Thilllntt lUI'

.,,;,..6:w...

intricWn&. but il ;"'iOIn die mation ofdle iNlnunmallO

1 hi... abo
IlOl foIlowaI Karqakapnin', p
ton of 00ftItNi1ll thr: pbruc ,.t/t.I.rytuM";'-Mbwith
boch me awe and the dUa (K:17.1)-l.4 and l.I.1-S). all d'liI ~ unneonrWy ~....

~;"

19 Sued on

me ~ of lhI: tnnI 6JM... and IlOl _MiN in the wale Olt<! hac (FYI.I).

Harrs (1910) Iw arpIC'Ii mal dIeK all' sicnifica.nldi.fNmitOtt btlUtu. the pwilion found in
die PtJ"_!'."mi~and dw ofDhamualru',laler rexu. Steinlcdlnu (J"o). ho .. coer. haI
~":II~ aonYino:inslr dw dUt ClI)iOCUil ;. mioplaad.1u Srftnkdlner noc~ aonI within
pv and PVSV DlwmakIrri makes it dc:u thaI both,."". (Ihe -indicalCdo 01' plopeu, 10
~ plOoth) and r-k- {tho: -inl.tica1Ot"" or~) ~ _ t v - . Set l'V:!i V "" I'VI."
(Gc&+,.) and PV,.19l with PVSV "'" til. (G:,&.IJ-9].7).

IS4

FO UNDATION S OF DHARMA](IRTI'S PHILO SOPHY

are swbh.i1lll5 ofsmoke:, and in the previous chapter, much of our ralk about
"proj>(rties'" rdlect~ th~ term IINIbIMVII in our primaI)' sources. ""hal is
common m both of mese meanings of swbh.i1l4 is the notion that il is essentWto themtity in question: on DharmalUrri's way of putting it, flO funhcr
causes arc l1!quircd for th.al entity 10 possess a Wtlbh4"., I,
Since an understanding of IlIffbhilWlpratilJlmJhll requires an undl'rstanding of thl' term twthhdlNl in both of its senses, pan of our taSk in Ihe
fOllowing pages will ~ 10 unpack both mcaninp; of me lerm, AJ we do so,
however, (WO points must ~ kl'pl in mind, First, as Sieinkeliner notes,
Dharmakini hinudf doo nOI provide a compkte accounl of me distinction
and relationship bnwttn IlNlbhiv. as property (or "property-swrbh.it"'-)
and IWlbh.i1lll as natufC' (or "narurc-fwbh.iv.t). Indeed, he docs not even
provKt~ any dear demarcation for the usage of the term in one $Cost or thl'
olher. Henu, if we arc to anempl 50me explication of IWlbhdlltl. we will at
20 Slrinkdl~1 (19711 IOU m., lim 10 d,- a d4tincrion bet'Olccn o;wo di!fcrmr ~ of
.......".,., The fxt dulINM.lrwU naNn can only be appIiedJin&ularlyto any p-m. caUq
iI best iUURrartd by CMoS whca the ram oco:u" in i",uummrallinpdu (_MIWU) Of
wirh tbc ,.,; tufIU: (,...w.-I4J. For c:umpIa in Pvsv, _ "" PVI,nab (G:1.1.I6 ); ""
PV...-v. (e ,)., .... ), .. rvL 7); .... rv .,. " ,\1 (e. ,o.~). U-J in mi> ':11K. ...J ~ ' .. ;.
a oynonym of ,.../trri wbOdt it .........i ...... !uM ..... sit...- lOr N.H.""" .... "",....,. For ttIIm,
pia of mil rype of ...... of ,...Jrrri in PVSV. Itt: G'40.u "" PVI.n ; G:41'" "'" PVL7J;
G:$O.) ';PVI.,. ' 9.b: G:f7.). ';PVI.I09 (mmpan!his instanatof~wilh tbc ncatby
~ of rNM.i_l4a, G:S6.lOO; G:60.1J JPVI.IlI; G'1'O-16 .;PV,.,.... ).
Wbn! I.I$td in !be pllInI, _#b.hwdoes noc ownurily rand for !be '".",.
...II~y ,""'1JJb.
of a Jin&k mlitr; inMcad, dw plural ohm oa:un whca many mcitXi art beitls ~ as
when one sptoLIu of many rh.inp who.: nalwa _ di!fcrm, or noc difftrtm (in PVSV I:
Go,6.7 .... PVUI; 67.. ';PVI.IJ7-14l; G:'JuJ ""PVI.1,,). In conttm fO ,n- CUCI. pluof -'IM_ ... P'0f"'"T include .-MJ_;~).. U b;~in N . ).....J _ut~"..
in PVSV JI"VI" J?-141 (G:6I.u - I.J). Similar ~_
f'ound in HB (~s., 1..11:
~~ . In -'<filion 10 dtil ~
of plun.! ~, many if\IW>[Q of ....M.i... in dw Jinpllar _ alto in m., ICftIC ofp'~lry'

n.!

...-,.u.,.",,,; p.,....''''''oi/I

u.-,.nwu......".

p~

Sirinkdlnct. in

IIOmC

coneoru compoonda cadins in -jl",--MM... and ")6_ _ '

_M4w~p:od~

211u Scrinlcdlnn (1974'J1})."... -,...MiowfJiI INI P'~hl (til ...;. 6bi"';) of IOIl'ofUUfl& which ;. noc cuatd by M'>mnhinll doc. bw ;.
Jivtn wid. , .... 'hina iud(.- ,"'"
notion due a JNJJ.illftii inrrimic or ~IW 10 an nWry in dw dUI muty does ..... ~..,

mw

any fiuthcr ClUIa 10 be q.ulillrd by thai _1rIoi. iI made al ~ poi"" in PVSV. including .... PVI.7 (G='.l6); "" PVI.16 (G:l7. lo-u): .J PVI.zI (G:I,.ls- uuh ""!'VI.J'; 1
(G::ao.-'lI; 11.6-7); ""PVI.., (G:t.6 ..,...): PVI.I66 (G:a.,u); ""rvl.l" (G:99.lo-lI);
"'" PVI.161 {G : ~ . J.O-lIh "'" PVl.ln (G:14S....,): .JPVI.l7'6 (G:14S.lot-'S). AU of dwx
.QlmlCnU may be unden!ood ... grounded in at.. !wOe "OM of ntUIM.. ..
~tuMhi.. in PVI.1. and !he claim in tbt commcawy on tNl 'tttIC thai ... caliry
.......J.d no< ...h .....~ F " I I . 'l.....u<y ,...........i_ h..~ " _ for ita "';0.1 (e ....

*'

lhoi,..,... ~ iJI.hw";"'/IfJ~ I Ur.~ ""'~MimilJ.

,-1'

SVABHJVAPRA TI!ANDHA: TH E BASIS OF INFERENCE

ISS

timcs be obligttf to denvt ugumenu and positions !h2! alT only suggested
by Dharmalcini's though!. Second, wr mw! also K'CIll a crucial point raised
in the previow chapter. n2ffidy, thiU although Dh.trmakini speaks of spatially c:xttndc:d things such as a Wllterjugs :as being emidcs (bh4t'llS) th:1' 1
h2ve effc:cu, he doc:s not mean that they arc paniculan (sINIld!"!'flS).
Instead, as we have seen, Dharmakini specifics th2t, on the Exttrnal Realist view (bihyirthttl!4J4), spatially extended emitics such as Wllter-jug.s arc
actually .tggrcgations of multiple infinitesimal p.trticles wh~ proximity
en2bles them to produa: effectS that they would not produce othenvi.se.
Talk about extended entities such as Wllter.jugs and the effectS of those:
entities is simply a matter of convtnience wd conventionY In the COntext
of the term WIIbhil,,;z. this point is crucial, for sVIlbhiiva as n:ature :and
lVilhh4lN1:H prnpc:ny c m both be applied t:ither to sp,uially l'Xtendc:d entities, which :are only convcnriOn2l1y real, or to noncJ.tended p2rticul2l'S,
which art ultimatdy ml Thc potential confusion hefC is that. as YIC shall
5, both.senses of Wtlbhiiv4 rest upon notions of causal funaKmaiity, which
is restricted to particulars in Dh.trmaldrti's ontology. Hcncc, if one YlCfC not
to kp in mind that talk about the causal functionality of extended cnti(iel u simply:l. nuna or cnnvt:nil'ncr, one might believe th2( Dh.trm:l.Kirti's
use of ~hb.i1Nl .as propeny :l.nd IIIahh,;,," :u n:alllte in the contl'XI of
atended entities would imply that such emitics themselves have cau.uJ
functionality, and that Ihey are therefore particulars. We havt a1re:ady seen
mat this is not the case, and below we will .see that the causal functionality
implicit in both senses of Iwtbhilwt is 2C(ually reducible to the causal functionality of paniculars, To avoid complexity, however, we will follow Dhar
mrnni and foc:u l primmlyon th~ ~ of[~ IrrmJ :II 2ppl ir.d (0 l'X(~lkd
entities such U Wll(er-jugs.
Svabhiva lIS "ProJH1'fJ"
When Dharmooni u.ses the term nwbhliwt in the sense ofproperty," he
mnm for i, 10 ~" JhA""'lI (" proprny" o r prrdic.u (>") "ppliM tO:l. s~.

22 5 tIw prn;ow: chapett (,IfJ).It .. imponat\11O mltn.IC ~ lhal in nnployin& lemu

~Iion, Dharmdlni does DO( mnn 10 adopt: 1M JIO'Ii(ion 01 moIisu ~h 1.11
lJddrouIwa. who maimains lhal 'uMUnca Ihlt alc 1M JW>m (.MJIl""') of I _Itt
i ............oe .'1c.......... ("'n..... cm;<dy .."w .......... _ . doe ... hvk (.. -~.,;-v oJ_ ;.. .....
WlIlttj""

...dI ..

me

IS6

fOUNDATIONS Of DHARMIIKiRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

cHic Jhan"i" (a -property-posscssor" or "subim-).1J This should immediately prompt us fO tum to Dlurmakini's .poIm-mcory, for as we havt sn,
on Dharmakini's view any prope:ny or predic:ue is actually an exclusion
(lIJiivrttiJ; specifically, if is an exclusion that excludes mose entitio that do
not have the expected dfecu or aU5C:S. To speak of a rose, for a:unple, as
having the propmy of "being a flower: we construct an exclusion whereby
that entity is excluded from al1 entities that have not arisen from the aUSC5
mal produce flowers and fMt do not have the dfecu expected offlowen.J<
In shon, on Dharmakini's view 10 be a propmy is fO be an exclusion.
2J a. Sicinkd1ncr hY7~n_~). llx JUbjea-pm;Iian: Of' propc:rt)'.poucuor-propmy rdalion
(JMmrUJ.u..r-) ir; pAfticubrly impomnt for undcnwId.illKlM US9 of ~ II:mI S.... W....
Specir.c.uy. h~ me predicn~ iI indeed a prop<:rty-nod,W... c:onNr\K'd .. a pmlicalt.

,_ Ho _ . whlJc tlw ...bj< io ..........ur ,....,...nr_Mol... a~ fn.xn lhc entity 10 whidl it ill IIItimatdy idullial. it iI pcaelled in eos--

O'."'Oj.ooa .. .Jw a ..... , ..., .... u

nilion .. ir;1 wen: 1M poACAOI' of lilt pmlicara; iU auch. il 00.::. not ~ . . . propmy
5. i'oraampk. PVSV *,PVI.71 (G,...~u.):

""N.

In addirion to It.. (Onvenlion. of W-inStallIUlion and tilt likt, lhc diKinaion of..b}m and pmlicact pauining 10 d... cqpUtn-r appcannec ;n a ~ c:oplition iI
alto not contlldktory in the ...... y dut it ill oopiKd. It iI JM*ibk that a oopitM
~ be dOOnn from YaIicw obiot<u I."M). n..1 beina It.. cue . ....t.... .......,
qurstiontt 'IIfiWs 10 know whnhtt that eogniri..::appcarana: is aabIUhed Of lejected
u discina from ...... of thoM:..t.;ea. (.rnA.). the mpondml india,a thu rnenWly
oorurmll rn1 thinS h:.vi1lJ CJ.ptuwd it (...~ at if it wen. pmlian: H'JW'Itt
&om It.. subjt-AOO! il -wan thai -r in cosninor-br mc:aru of a pmlialCapmllon (tlb.rmul.riJ.r)tW pRduda oWr diAinaioN [i.~. cxIIt. pmliala); t..
doa .,!g";ngat:a!Misbed anOdltf ptopc:!f)' -......... 01 thai "'"'w mcityat tbcsubjt withoollM diRinaion of ptIudins <Khn- pmticates. To
arent . subject and
prnficatt: ~stiB:hdy (.r",n.)diffnmt; hm, aa:onuprual~ [it-. 001: in~
iliff a .ubjca/pmliau.: constructionl appcan;n auch. war ,!gt i I _ 10 bf differml iued. Cocnilion is not, lIo.. nd , di~liated dUC' 10 _
diffnmtialion in lbe
raJ thins ben'"., thil would mail tilt above di.cu.ed probkms. [ "~" f A ,,",._
~ .".,.,lJoo/$,i,,..,,;ti NI "'~uI f .""..... L~ h ... w,."., 'idhrh.r1HwJ.rviJj,i,.,..,rillvlh.riij~ tMi .... _III l ..tilJi,I.tI~"u"!", ,o,.,"",""Unut
,.,~ hJ,JJ", l.tI,wp.rriMtbortWi "1"riril".r'!f
~,..,,,,
_WW...'!' ,o,.,moJ" '" ".....uhi".
I Iihw.IJl d"unw ""'...Jh.r",.;~
w" N ,IN"-ti.... hJJhiI. """'''~ I .... _nWhnIb l,..m.k~" .
lbe -abot- diKwtcd peobknlf- :tff proWbIr lhoK pramtcd by Dbannakirti in PVSV
J>Vt.nfl". For other tcXtWJ nota on this P".... and an a1tnnatM mn.ialion , _ tt...appendiJo: t.H6).

"Us

,..,.,rly.r"

,0,.,,.,,,,,,,,, ;...

."..

*'

N Sa chaplet 1 (utiA') . For u.., sub}m-pm:!icaIC .dation apRSKd in tcmU of

~~"",..,m. _ PVSV *,PV1S9 (G'Jl-1Ul). It is impOfwlllo note due Dlwtnaldni
...... 1... ( ...u.,. a JPC'ci1lc: "'tanan 10 d... di"ea dul....t.... ....Mh. iI uxd in d... _
of
"ptoptrty," il rd"cn to an adl.l$ion. This is i. JW1 du,e 10 the faa due Obarrnakini himtdf"
cUd . - du.lr ...u_~ ,.... tw<> onua ol . ......_ ........ JU.;........., I..... (Le. . ,. '! h .....
P'optfty and "",M.i... iU Nllur.,). Nnutbc ..... _
pm Fin I'VSV do rugae suman

SVA8HifvAPRA TlBANDHA: T H E BASIS OF INFERENCE

157

Hen, when the term wabhdlHl is used in the sense of "property," if simply stands for an o::clw ion. h is aucial, however. fO nole that, since a property formulated as an exclusion is constructed in terms of only one aspect
of WI subject, the subject in question still has numerow other aspcas lOr
which o::cIwions arc possible. In other words, the subject in question may
be considered to have numerow property-wabh4"VdS."

of p.optH)'-nwilti... and IIJi."m. An aamplc of auch an eqlUlion iI found in

PVSV ..JPVu6J. J- bJon duo. f'UAF. Dhumakini donia dw an ape ...ion could
rem ro an u1rinuldy raI P10ptnrnvitiN disuilxuro 0'Cf aU tht iruanca 10 wtoidl!lul
ezptmion rdefS. An ~jcaor ~ ~r PV1.I6}. and MVapbi ... m., ob;..nor, qualm
!luI such a dilUilxllcd nw~ would be nas&fY 10 explain dw aU dlOK "raChIS ha~
the Amt dkct. Buc in nil apbnacion of 1M ~jeaor'l pDlilion . I>harmaJdni iI obiipllO
opaIt of no diwibuccd nwMiw' ochn dw! an adUlion ' (G:lLlI: "Jh! ..i" ",...,..,. Thil
"'fiV"1
a IIJi~ may aho be corWdomd ~
A
las aplicil eq!Alion or ~iI; wi.n SMiIti... alto OCCUR in MV ..J
PVI.I J7-I4J. (trINb.cd in tht apptndR). ThtK, Dtwmaklni ....,. ",..,111; (or dw .dated
I""' ,.nivrm) in vaOow compouMiJ (G:U ,' 7: flu,ltl"..,-vrt". G:U .U): flU'"""
!6Thft#. G:67. 'l: -1!~~",",) 10 dilcula rlIt l'IOIion I .... II~ ~ of. poup
of n .. rti.o-o .. """";tut..l. by th.ft .tfr~idO r.- .....H doo< ...,. Ito_ ..... ""'peo:tod ~.
Thd tnoOIiril w.td 10 explain how
muhiplc _irucnu of. WlIler-iuI!; can be aIJcd!he
same: ewm lnoup,hcy do I'lOl IKIwJly form KpU1l.t mlit}' duo. io
WI.er-jus- In
C'.OUlK of tNl expbruoon, M'fM2b 01 dw INIIft".nd -=II IN. att dw ~ of.
Wllcr.jul! (G:" ,,!, p.~M.i" riir'7"!r). Unb _ undamndp.~1Ibi
10 be
I w,,1Irihi('UI wbich CIIC
phraK would mQII O
w form and lOon w. hle 1M nalUft
01. Wlra-juI!1, dw IQlo:mM' nwu._ of I ....Iet_ju'" (sIMf4J"'~) Q qu.itt darly
mruu .0 be coruuucrion b-.I. upon 'IM exdusion of what dOQ !>Of h.,, .M dfc
(expcacd of] .....,. (flUlltil".")h.. " i). ThUl. thQ piIRC 100 would eqUllC Propat)'tqu;lrion

w.

_ewha.

.nc

me

.nc

_ -- _. """",._ ..,...!"LL .

. ,

"

' )

2S Ir!he equalion of propcny-_Mi_ wim cxdusions (.,.....,..niI) iI ioo-l ICCUnIC, m..n

nlUllbo:r of poNibk p.opu.,-_Ml_ ill I~K:a1I, !imidca. Thio Q the impl.ialion
of PVI.Ic>--iI , -...htK Dlurmaldni c:oruidtn w specific CIIC of propmico oonaruaai lOr all
mrit}' du-out;h I dcfinltm: dn.mniru.ion (-..,.JJUbtcquml ( 0 I pau:pcion. Dlwmaldni'l
AWn c.onoml htft illO.bow thai sudI determina.ioN do no! rd'er 10 tMit objKu .poet.
u..dy" (,,;JJ,;,;;~ but nu.c.- uk. MPriody: th:a, iJ. dwylili exdurioru .. tMi. objco
.......'_ exd......, amWIy mcana m., ~ orprnmtlon offaltc impuatiQno (~
01110 an ot.;ea. Bul whm [)twmKini IUIJInwUa !he argumenl in the: twO vena: bdow, M
also poIno OUt that mc.c impulII~ htnu. propatiel; c:orutNCIro Ihroug. exdusion---...-c .. numa'OUl .. Inc numba of &be imputations. which IURUU ...... !hey aft tho:-In.:

omically limidal:

.c,._

1M dtfinilM:dtram inariona and exprea.ions ....II_1O

1M imputation of
pudicucs wroogIyanribu.cd 10 a..m;ca att ... nurnrrow .. tbt impuPrionsofinoor1m prcdic:ucs. timor, " - a:pnaionI and dcfiniri-tt dacrmiNriom a111uv.: diaina
abju.. ~. If a lin"" expKllIOft or conctpnW oasn,uoo [dur '0 ~nl
affimuri.-dy] wac: 10 pe.o. llinr;k- n:aI,hi"" thac would be no objta other tIw.
~ mi", itxU'1O which il would rmr. n ... ttf",c, all expK$&ioru would be oynonymt

ISB

FOUNDATIONS O F O HAIM AKI RTI'S PH ILOSOP HY

A5 with wabhdva as - propc:rry . ~ 10 understand the usage of the term

Ivabbtlva in the KnK of - nature. ~ v,e an: best served by returning to the
Itpom..thtOry. Previously we have mn that one of the fundamental moti~
vations fo r the formulation of the apoitheory is to accou nt for the fact
that we have ~djsuibudve cognitions" (ItnJlJl!fliprllf]ily4): we an look at
sevetal entities and n:cogniu: them all as -the same" (rlr,,) in that they ilIt'
all water-jugs. for example. For other South Asian philosophers. this type
of cognition is easily accoUnted for by appealing to the presence of a single
universal. -waler-jug- nm~ (tM.uUlNJ). instantiated in all of thost: e:ntities.
Thus. one an cogniu them as the ~me and call them all water-jugs"
because one's various cognitions quite literally cont21in the ~me objKt.
namely. that universal.
For Dharmwni, however, this option is not available. for it is a form of
rt:a.Iism that he rej('Ct$. Instead, he must find some other aplanation for our
cognition of all thost: individuals as the same. DharmalOni does so by for~
mulating a -nondiffert.n ("bbrJ.) that pertains to all the entities in question. Specifically, he claims that although all the individuals in question
arc actually unique, they are all nondiffercnt in that they arc all different
from thost: entities that do not have the potentials to produce the expected
dfccts and that have thus not bttn produced by the apect~ auses."
In the previous chapter. we have secn that. when Dharmakini discusses
aclusions, he plac%S panicular emphasis upon the samenm of the effect
(and not the sameness of the auses) that is asscned of all the entities to
which the same exclusion is to apply. We have also seen that this appeal to
a sameness of dfcct can lead to a number of problems. the most obvious of
which is an infinite regress. To resolve these problems, Dharmakini appeals
to the notion of a judgment of sameness- (rlulpratyaw"uni4jli4ft4). On
this argument, the claim that all the e:mities in question hav~ th~ sam~ efttct

[and aU conapnw c.os;nilioru would Iu~ me ~ com a ll]. r.,ww,.,. '~1fIlro'"

Utttt;w, ,,;tt~ I
ftW J...uJ ... _
y J,i,;tt~ Hup_iltnw I.j..
~
ri.rJrw --n f Ind'h]/"......",~ iii ~,. M._ 'il.

VJtl,,.

"*_

Whik 1'- _I"I!B M. tlN.rnk.JlimidClinaJoi poai~ propmy"sv.dJ!,i_ dw.;>CI\W

nwnoo cons(n.arud ~ lipan tht (l)nlm formrd by ~ habilll>.lion and 10

_ . s.... PVSV .,JPVSV , fM (di"",,'-' ........... "

S!I')

26 5. for rnmpk. PVSV "PVI.n (,f3rub,od in m., a~J. 5 abo I"" di ....,"io n
of dka in ,he prMoui cMpm (1I!i1J).

of ......-

SVA'H1V,4PIlATIIJANDHA : THE BASIS OF INFER.ENCE

IS9

resrs ultimately on the &ct that they eventually produce a sccond-otder

cognilion-a judgmnu-in which (he individuals in question are idenci~
fied as the same type of entiry.17 A1llhe entities we call ~btue, " for cnmple.
product' peruprual images thai, when the proper conditions arc' in place,
willlcad to the judgment. Ihis is blllC." In speaking of Ihis "judgmenl of
sameness: Dharmakini appears 10 appeal in pan to mind-dcpcndem faccon, such as the interestS, expocr.ttioru and omer relevanl dispositioru of the
person in whose mind the dclerminarion OCCUI'1. But if subjeaive facron
werc' solely rcsporuiblc for the arisal (or absence) of the wne judgment in
various irutanccs, men Dharmakirri', philosophy would lack the ttrt2inry
for which he Strives: there would be IlOthing aboul things memsdves mat
warrantS our application of one or another lerm to them. Inncad of this
semantic anomie, Dharmakirri maimairu that. once we understand temu
IUch as ~ WIIler-j u g" and elephant," our corrC'CI application of those temu
is not JUSt a matter of whim: entities that have certain effcas are indirectly
called. "WIlIer-jugs," while those with certain other effects art called "elephanu." and without changing the meanings of these ternu, we cannot be
correct if we literally call some water-jugs "dephanrs" and some dephanu
"WIlIer-jugs,"
27

a. Sirinkdlnn (19]1:190).

28 n... notion I~I.(""":U-C fiud wi<hin COfIVl:nu.on. if apraKd al a nlUllbcr of pbca in

PV and Pvsv, lndOOi"l Obumaklni 'l iniWl lUlnrlml ofhil ...~throry al PVI-4o;1!

All cmilia (M.n.), 1xauic lhey arc elIuobliabai in lheir own nIolUltS (_Mohwj. by
nalUft (_~ ....) F .... (lJMti"JI nd ... ioru; (~") from all bo~ and
~mOSt'_lhinp ("",MI~~ n.u.ro.c, abjccu (...m.-) arc concrioal u h:.vins~' IUnds of qu.alilirs ~riIJWi...i> d.... arc indic:r.riVI: { .pItt.
of d>oK obju' discina~ propntia: too.e qlAlilirs au NICd on this and WI from
..tUch mm, is !he a ciusion of rhaK ob;.cu.d 1lwdOrc. W I discinc:t:i~ plOp"" .,

which is copim:l by mc:&III of IOIIlC pm!ica~ (~C&II/lOII

known by mans

of any ocher pmficale; lima, dw ptc:Kntl.ion ("7'" +ii) [of uh imaldy idmUal
~ abanctcd !Tom Ilk _
"'bt<al is diffcrm. [r... Heft pruiia ..~J. 1~ ..... ~ ........ tNlMMi .."".NSthi~ 1 '''~T.M.lIMM,i", ]IIM1dtI
?hi ..iMiti...... /1 UUMJJ ",Ill ",Ill 'nItIu", "J'lrrnis ulflfjl-JJw~ I jiti~

p,w,fnau ~~~ H --WJ#"""""~ ~ -".n,...u l ... III

~,.. '''J'"'l'' _
MiJtJtJ f'J"lWSIbo,./JJ.
a ~ {PVI',sQ,. )(;,01) p..e.1thJrj1f U ~.nd he pouc.!he
compound "J'l.,mM.ltiIf U 'pot.,...;", adusiom" (IM:,...;"'", /J...",... ..
"""!rri-"~ no! recordcci in 10. K (loI.wff) COfUlrun il U P"M,!
(P'J.L'-4' - I.4!), i.e.. as 'Jhr'titfl ~u.

b~i (pVf''i6bI.-J'' K:lIl.H) gIouajtlnMJ...", tlhtmMMJ.. and

he offtn !he awnplc of impcrmancna and JO on {rifr ~ u", ~ . . " j

160

FOUNDATI O N S O f DHARMAKlRTI 'S PH I LOSOPHY

Thus, Dhumakirti's Rpoh.:J..theory is based in pan on the way things are,

and this is expressm by his usage of me lerm fWlbhdllll (or a synonym such
as pr"rt') in the seRSC of " naturc .~ That is, it is Mby their natu re ~ (fWlbhduma, pr~) all the entities that we indircaly call a "water-jug" have
the same effccu. For the Rpoh..mCOry, perhaps me most important "same
cff'ect" mal each of the entities in question produces is the aforementioned
"judg.mcnt of sameness" (tIUlprRtyttllll1NlrWjfi4r1il). But Dlurmakini also
means for me norion of wabhJloW as nature to explain nOI just that judgment, bul IIU the efft:s or functions of which an entity is capable. This
dearly suggesu Ihal an cnlity's nature-lVllbh.i1lll is me warrant for all of the
adwions mat can be. constructed for mal entiry. If we can say that a waterjug is "bluc," what we mean is that it is excluded from aU that we would not
call "blue,~ The basis for formulating [hose adwions is that those orner
entities do not have me cau.sal characterislies apccted of entities that bear
me propcrt)' ofbcing "blue." And the grounds fo r the claim mat the entity
in qucstion JoN have the ClIpted causal chan.cteristic.s is that entity's
nature: by iu natUre, thaI entity has arisen from the rypes of causcs that
eruoble it to have, by iu nature, the potentials to produce all me cff'ecu
apccted of somcthing wc call "blue..... This means, of course, that an

dJ iii ~ ;,..,~ II<' ",i ""f ,. ~ lit UfJ ,.;,; ". JlNtmuMrJi "lIi".,.
lqukfi!J"!l .,,}.

' 'The

~ion "indicative:" for

.'Wfihi" it manl 10 ClpClUT rho: pc of rho:

sJou oAm.:! by Siky.abuddhi (1'VT:16b: ""fI 'grtr H) and Ka~n

{K.: II1: _IthNU/JII~tuIilL}.

dGt)II\maDa1Jy, rho: lint mnnbn ollll1l"iJwNlhll~ should Ix corutNC"d wilb

lhe "d,uM pronoun.! of, -,. ... ~ :and I haw: {rantbltd aaconIinpy. Sik:yabuddhi (PVT:s6\IJ.). ho...ettl:r. unckmands t1111"iHNiJM~:II
~1IiN~ "baicd on theadl<lion," and ~in (K:lIr.,IoA)
ofi'tn FJIl",nlNJlli.,..! uiNlwJlllh.*A "based on the adudtd. the limit and
the: adusion. "
291n addition 10 the: p.....V' <:iltd in the: prrnou. wpm. _ . (or aampk. PVSV ""
rvl .n (G:,fO.U--...6; mdlMkd abo in thc: ~pPtndisJ:
~ou maintain

lhal diffrmll dtinp haw: a nondifferml dTcct. whereby choN: Ihinp

an Aid {O ~ I nondifkmK:,r; in dlar dq an aU be dwaaQ'Ucd by I diff~
ffom dtlnp dial _ Other !han t ' - tIw ha..., rho: aI"oIcnlCilriontd dt"ea. Bul how can
tilit be II\( cud"
."" '1111'_" (, qn) rhi"t' iJ l..m tIM, .Idwwp """ .,., iijfrmtl, ., /hri....hO"
(,...hJN) _ .[IIK.t
rnlrifrn til IIw Mrf""IiJJWlnJ1 .f1M $11_ ut.. ("rth.)
..n, <II ;...t..n"t ....._ j~. (dut,"''Y-'' _ _'''-ju,..) #r ,...IIKi,,& ,." .. _ .....
IIt1S.["" Hfrtt; 1M snfU fotljlrin,,'" ~ . .. "" nu",,u.. [PVI.n] For cumplc,

-t
It"

SVA6HAVAPRATf6ANOHA: T HE IlASIS O f INFERENCE

161

enury's propcny-m,bMws. being I:quivalentlo an exdusion. arc subordinate 10 ill nalu~11I4bh.i~..... Below, ~ will explore: the implicatioN of this
rdatioruhip bctwttn propcny-nwblM"" and nalurc-w.fbh.lllfl.
For thc momcnt, ~ need only remark thaI an cntiry's narurc-,,,,,bh.it41
musl aCI as thc warranl for all terms applied 10 that enlity. And sina: the
appliotion of a tcrm 10 an objt is warranled both by iu causes and iu
....,t~nfi~1

O!ffl!cu .. ~n en tity'.c nJmrl':-<lMIhh.iu. mll.cr N: whu

WI!

mJy ea l1

-the lOality of its causal characteristics"; the ouscs and condidons from
which il must have arisen, and the corrc:sponding dlccu that it iJ capable
of producing."
NATUU-SVAaHAvA ANO THE C.W $.o\L CoMPLEX
V~loed

wihin DhlU'm~rti ', nOlion of I!Jlth&iu.:u n"u~ i. ~ IUOng ~j~_

tion of random (likiUmikJl) causality and thus a strong commitment (0 the

regularity of ousa.1iry. H e expresses Ihis regularity primarily through various forms of the verb ni-YAM , to ~restrict." ln terms of an entity's ability [0

,he.........,. f..:uhy, '*"" ubjccl. ''[!.In, and "lCIUliun (_-'-"'.............. (-.:cunIl"I'"

otha-pniloiophial. d~.dr, the &amy, mind, !he objea. and conlXt-produa aan

p: dfta, namdy, an l...-annQI uf a..uibk form. 1bcy produu thif OM, ~ dfea
~ ~ !My do /'W){ imwuiale I ",niftnl! mal ia IQtricud 1(1 h.avins thc nIDI~
of producins WI dim. I...ikcwiw. diMina iJ\KlRCa of liftS W ... Ii~ and .,
on by !Mit vef)' n,II"'~ prodooe thc _
dfea, namdy rec:optilionall .... ~
hM an ~ of e.eh i~ Q the _ ... (he othcn. i.e U I "tm:: AIIlrt'Oinsanas havot thoKsmledfa:o~n ~!My at!: no( dislriOOIN thconeowt thc
tKhtt. Or tMyxmmpUsh 1OnM:!)(her tdie: IUnaion rlu.r ill(I be don.. by.-i,...m
U wmbtuDon. ~ and., 01\. in .aord with ~ eondi,iont, Bu, nom donush
wafn and web arc Wo not diAina fTom f lftl in dm any mUf)';1 diffnml from all
othcn, ..-aln and 10 on IXCI1hdao do no( pc:rform ~ alOrcmmlioncd tdic fUnaiona,
jwI: as the Q l and to on QIlnoc plVdua an aonmw:Jf ol";'ibk form. [ ~'!" """"
M;"tfhobt 1f1JJi,,1IIII!' 1tbJ-'!' In'If _..,. u,. M. 4' 1fUwr4 i" """,'" I "Iflrrir ~
MiftlltfJ'!' ~ ""'If""IJIf-nlrrhlfjU..u,. Wrtl..."~ I ~ ) i ".~Ufllmil
.... ~MI (PV1.7)1 U ,nbnoJriytl~t.k1f_1WUrI ~ __
......W'lf>!'"iu'fl_1UlJ If'; ~..."q- ~ ripllijU_ rh,!, jlf1llfJlMD
IW,!, liN 'v,. )i fIIotrI4 J-.n-"NJ' )i 1..kr1Jt'iMu.,. ~ lN1J'1'"
Inj~ jIf""",lID If"",!, _ 7/fm.,rw'JlfJl'l!l MlMMf!Ir,iju!' u"Um'Py,.,
~", OM lit ~ )ijlf'M'CIt m~..J ~jU"'-1.

wt

30 I base thc ~ "roaIif)' of c:oU$al dlaranuUtia" on Strin.kdlnn'. flOIOon of the "I0I1liry of c:au.NI ~Ii(ies" U hit po..: fix ....MJw as nlIt\IIC, He mnarb (t944!9), 1'hoe
maNns oltheword _lJwr.win ~ compound -iNM...,-i'-rO.. ,tbm uotd II a (trm
10 ,ndlClU die , _ 1M Iopcal ncxw--can only be 'CSKII, ' Uhatmaklru'l dmoullOn

for the raJ IIdn, ... a roaIif)'

or aual pouibilitics.~

161

FOUNDATIONS OF DHA1MAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPH Y

product dftctS, ht affirms a - ro tricrion in causal potentials" (uxtiniJl'mA)," which is ro say simply thaI any givtn tluiIY by its nature is only
Clpablt of producing some dfects: an apple 5C:'C:d ClnnOI product an ti tphallI. And in ttnns of an cntiIY's ClUses, ht claims that an entity's causal
potentials art ro [riered prccisdy be:caust they have ariscn from cenain
causes: if is impossiblt for an apple seed fO product certain typo: of dTccts
because: il is impossible for it to arise: from certain kinds of causes.),I Wbilc
these notions of restriction art negative in character, they amount to pruitive claims: an entity has tht pottntiili to produa ctmin types of dfcas
beaUS( it has arisen from ctrtain rypc:s of causes. There is thw a beginninglCSli chain of ClUSCS and effects: me range of an entity's causal potentials arc defermined by its causes and conditions, and Ihosc caustS and
conditions are thenudvcs effects whose: rangt of possible causal potentials
is likewise dere:rmined by their causes and conditions." It is precisely fo r this
31 n.c, COInpound t.hi~ 01' an equiyaklll consuuaion is used 11 RYUaI poina in PV
wd I'VSV. indudin&: I'VSV "" PVI . ~ (G:11..lS): PVSV "" PVI.I9S (G:".II): PVSV
PVI.1!! (G :I)1.17): PVI.lS7: PVSV "" PVI.lSl (G :149.n - 1J): PV 1.191 and PVSV ,J riI.

*'

(G:l S7.6-I).

321M moll IOCCina Halm"lall of !his poinl is found in PV1.1.8 ub: "From dw: rewiaiDl'l.
in dw: nawlT'"n>u~ ... of dw:CIolIKcomet dw: ICSttiaiof! in the nalurc-~of thedka.-

(nwMthw,.;,.,tMtI ~ "",MI~~ .
33 See. for a:am.pk. PVSV "" PV1.l671-C (G:.... I.-Ip: cired by Sl~nkdlna h971:1U.
n.n and }4): ..:0: aIso~, wpm- 1, n.II.,. Heft, Dlwmakim mpondJ 10 I Siqlkhya
objKtion mal, wMoul tome rqxaablc aa..n:o: Of propoty. ;1 wouJd no! be: pol'iblc 10 ar
.hitt many individu;ot" which 1r1' all-.:oriaJly di~nl , aUK 1M ~ dka:
This if "., Ik (MI. Ii...., . .bho"p.U ""inn .... Jiffr,.,."fiw ... U ..be.. nltili~ ,.~
tIw t/ftrl i,. I/_ri. ... wlJif, . d.m .. ...~ ,Itis ,IN ...", ... .[ ,Ite nI,iri"
c."" 11M, 4fin. (PVI.I67a-cJ Ifm.- erllities corui<krcd ClUIQ' ofdw: rIfm: in qUQ'
.ion W'm' not fO ha"" Illy disUnctk>n ,....., OI'Mr n .. il;a., .hen aU m,ilia would d rhcr
be- produan of anythi", ~ or none would be: a producer of anythins al aU
in malW:y ~ all eq.wJy dilfcfnll &om anyone m.ily'. haI~''''''Mhoo ofbeinc the
producer of !he dt"ta in qUlSlion. Bul ~n thoush all odin mUlia ~ not dislina.
in .hc;. J ,ffi;",,,,,,,, rrom <hAI_ cmity' . ....UK",...",,_ ......... _
h.o~c_ope
rial pwpa t) (~ _
of them Iff proUlICaI of mal riIm, wbik oWn ~
001. For INI JptCW ))lopmy is !he na.un of (juA:1
cmilia, and nothinc else.
1ndftd,;1 is no! COh eel (oY .. . ..&.Ii) 10 q~ r"."",.~the halum of minI',
as in ~y doa fi~ burn! Why. i. hoi, and _" is OOI! One can JUS! ad< this much.
"From wIw aUK doos this "",Mhoo ~- For ir me ....INM"" WffC 10 M I non
dcpa,dcm mUff mar had no a!UCl, Ihm one would incuI an ~letUion ~
Ihm: IIODUId be- ncxhins 10 fCSIOO c.main QUIQ'IO c.main df\ocu, Hrna, _ ay mal
tIw nawn-nwtl:lohool tIw prrwru 10 an m nl)' INI II co~ !he CIWC ilNCI from
dw:CIllKI.] ofdw mcity. And 1M nMtlfOon.,J,l,ft,.ofthal mtity'.a..c ...... ich produca
ma. mliry lin IUd. fashion Ihal il h.u 1M r\altm-"",MM"" of p.ooucinS 1M
tUM

mo..r:

,b.,

SVABH1VAP.tATI&ANDHA: THE BASI S O F INFERENCE

16}

reason thaL even if Dharmakirti 5UCSSCS the sameness of efreer as the warnm for the application of Ihe same lerm to multiple entities, he is in the
end also appealing to a sameness of cause. In other words, if we can call cerain entities "water-jugs" bccawc Ihey have the Arne type of dfccu, we art
al the same time s.aying that those entities have come from the same type
of causes. In short, we arc appealing to those entities' naturt-lV4bh4lN15: the
toalil)' of thor causal charxtcr1srics.
This emphasis upon cau.s:aliry leads one naturally to su p~ a clost relationship bctwccn the notion of IV4bhallltas naturt and Dharmakirti's theory of causality. $ro nkdlner poinu p.1nicu1arly to the rd.ationship between
Dharmakirti's notion of narurt-lV4bhdV4and his theory of the "causal compla" (hmmlmagri), the new of causes and conditioru mal arc required for
t he production of an cfJ'ect. Indcl. lOme PllQgel in Dh:umooni', W()rk
IUgesl a rt:bdoruhip bcrwccn an enlity's naturc-lV4hhdlW and ill particip.1tion in a prc:scm causal compla)< or iu uisal from a past causal complc:L

dfca in queKion l iadr aIIl'It:I f'rom lOIN' ocher aUk. Th.... lilt; JrqualCr or aWCI io
~ For. by dw:: ~ nmu>: orwa..,... and wdko;Q, ~I dUnp ~
IIIInC thinp Wt an: their ausa, .... hik other mi"8' an: IlOI. their aUla. There II no
i ..............uJ ....,u,.......1",,,,,-,",<. ma, euo ......u.:.. ohi.. 1",""'__ /,i Wtn/, 'Ii-u.!o
bin" u ~ I ~ }of... I rUsy. jDuUJ 6muU ~....tM/.I--".
~".u u Ml ~.JtV iii ",u ~ ,.., '11". ... IIiJq.&fI_Mrlwt I "'..
h.1IIIriJ 1m.l~1 ~Mkij ~ ...,.r'[' 1 111 IJi W}'I ,..MI".

.5.,..

."'"Ii "".

Mt.tU..." )i

u,-,.. I ... J.;

-pir U'-J ~ .. ,..J.U", i ii I

iii I "'... tW.rw ....,rlqi"" ,,;,,_J,hj~
I WlUI _M.#w .,. noM... ilJ WJfU' I WJip llljjltu1fl.novwl IiIM",..,..u .trUir
-"'f'D-'!"fU# .m"d...". It; JWrJ &n.r ""~ ,.M6..u U, .~ _ 1ri1!friil
~'Ow"", "'
Altt..:.up the (:I cndinp of lukWandtoon arr~ . pluni KIIIf.wn~ by In impliri. - Ui It" Stkpboaddhi PVT:l,abJ (dickel in PVT-

...".""" ....,..". "?,,"",-p'"

" . . , Itt

IJit hi. }of'!'

i"

t: lbJI- KJ14,.lj).

J.4 PnfupI W

molt tcpI'DCntalM: such p"PV is I~ ont mentioned ~nd Il1.Iulucd by

S,nftkdl.... (1\11"111-116). M y ""n.!a.ion (PVSV .JPV'.:r. G " ........,) rnds:

TIN . n,.J . /... 4Jo "- u i..Jmw' it -.1 ./. (4-J " -,Iex it d.~ "" 4
_Mho. I{"- ......J ..",,ta .............. {r.,..m, forI "" 1foc1 i ,~" ' - _
.",un", tW. (PVI.71 ThaI (capil)' IOrl the production of an dI'ea doco
IlOl dtpmd on an,.minll otMr man ruch I roUooliion of w cn,i,ift in the aual
mmpla. lMrd'ort;, !Nt [apacil)'l. ...t.icb if 'nnrUbly mOJrq1lC01 from W!llm: or

MtH""'."

dw :0":>1''''''' or c:awct.;". ~... or dw Ulil)'. [namely, tN' causal compIexl. Bu,

in thiI a..e. _ """ infw only W pouibWl)' of the ariA! or W dJea from the aUA!
complo bcawe _ [only] int'cn Inc: apaciIJ ~U) or dw: ausal (Ompla to p~
duac the cfka. TIw aW LI)'. dnot tt IIlnvvbbly consoequcn' wim the mm: praer..:c
or Inc: complete (OmpM:o: or a..-. io jwt. _M.l"., and""'" is ....Iu. is infaTC'd,

16..

fO UNDATION S Of DHAlMAlClRTI'S PHILOSO PHY

Ncvenhdess. al thOUgh such a relationship does exiSl. an entity's nature-Ivabh4va should nol be equaled with a causal compleJ:, whether it be a
prcscm causal complex in which it pmicipates or the past causal complex
&om which it arose."
Concerning the interprttation of an enti ty's narurc-nwbhaw in terms
of iu participation in some prescm causal compla, we should rtmuk twO
rdevanl pointS about Dharmakirti's notion of a causal oomplex. Fim:, when
Dharmakirti uses the term, he mons for it to refer ( 0 "Uthe causes and condidons that contribute to the production of a particular effect. This notion
itself restS on pre--Dharmakirtian anaI)'5CS of causality according ( 0 which
the entities that oonuibuu! to the production of an effect are classified in
(urns of the role they play in the causa.! process." WilhoUi going into deta.iI.
we can nOle Ihe general distinction be(Wccn a primary cause (htlM,
Ibn-iii

~ -.("'!U ~ ....".;J"'u

I .nhJ""'._~lWt ,.

,.,.MJ".
'IfM"""!'ita!t IPVt.7] tUb.,i J"'dMs.".1Iihfth ,..",.", ~ in ,.,.....tnhf."'-'IJi

lHltIMw MJ-,. I u,... INN!.". ~t ~t ~rru.~ io_ lJoru

SiUllllf"iIjlli". ~1V7'D"""M""Mt I ~u u ullUfrl....ni"....Mhi" in

nvjIM.,.IJhwun.."?-" 1].
N.in
p....".. I 1M"" c:t-n.o ",nckr nvMJ- wi<hou. opa:ifyin, .............. i,
is a 1U1~ or a p.opmy_ ~ Inrkrd. ..n ile Sttinkdlnrr (1,,1) al .. this P"' S :as:on
iruanaof 1Urure-"..MJ.... lhrcapacil)' ~ ttf(t ied 10 hen: mi&h l as eaRly bto underaood as I propmy of tbr CluW rumple:>:. as Slonkd.llVr ..... a in I I.a[~ worlr. (1!l91b:717).
This ambiB"io:y.hould ranine! W WI Dtwmaldni do.. noo: himldf make a fomW diaioclion between W I'W'O meaninp of_w.n.
I ha~ adopted from Sltinkdlnu, IUId dw
Wk of ...uaI dncia"" nuy :as eaJily be aMOci.aled with an mtio:y', propc h ) ' ''''Mb. u

u... uu.

mil

with illlU~JMM.I ...

35 It is rIOI ftlludy dear whctha- Suinkdlner hinudr I\lQ/U 10 cqU.lII~ 1U(UKo1""Mb. with
... uW compla. or IllmtaliYdy to OONU'\IC Q.l.lu~"..MI... onIY;1I t=nt of ... wa1 poo:o:n~. and rIOI in IUUU or:on o:nury', dfccu. Althoush Sicinkdlncr probably did not inlrnd
tither of d~K intnpmalioru of lUiU~""M.hoor. boo:h misnl be dmved from his~.
as iI dnnoruulum by tbr IOUowillg pamp
I17t:1l,.

-n.c [IUN~I """""'of a thingil d~ pown' (/Uti) 10 brinS about an dIt

(~I,.uuT

I"Snbhln tina Din~ ill d~ Knh (J",!ri/lJ. tiM Wirkung llerYOnlibringm"]. 197':1." In lDhunu.kirti',] onlOklsr, [nao=-l_Miow"",ir.e,; tbr
f'OW'" of "\1,,1' 10 1, " " :l>on as pnno:.ple of Inn. 1:1lIIrnot .... [In ckr Onl~
bronun _/JINhw!Idic Knfi dcr DiIlfF. zuwirkro. &It PrinUp ihra Sri...... I. rI1J:
In OfIdngictI COfIirKU _6& h4(! mc:uu the po-. of thinp u tllf: principlt of their
bri"" in IopctI gonieKU tho: word tnWlI dot c.onccpt. dw is tbr dd'irUtc naOoruI conarua (.......I,w)WI is rdaredlO raJ things. lIN. 11,14: [For IUN~_~ ] ... thr:
1...,,,Luion 'CMcna:, WI:Kft" would be quitr ~r in Ontolopcal rontaU, u il
would aand b thr: rt1 indiaincc lOI2Iiry ef the: nriow po$&ibililia., pown1 of a thins
10 be or bonx pm of dHumn CluW complaa..

J6 S. for CA/llplo:. AKl..49ff;and AKBh um. (I.79ft) .

S VAJ!HAVAI'RATlJ!ANDHA: T H E BASIS OF INFE RENC E

16S

1IJNl44111lN hI. etc.) and its supporting conditions (lIlh4kliripralJ4}tIJ. In (h~

case of tht prodUCtion of:lo sprout, for example, the seed will be consKiered
th~ primary QI.IS(:, while soil. water, and such will be supporting cond jtions.J1 In this case, if tht t~rm "causal complo~ is to apply to tht totality
of causes and conditions nccamy for the production of:lo sproUt. then it
must apply not JUSt to the seed (primary CII USC), but also to all of those suprorting rondinnn~ (,he JOil, w:lter. :lo ne! JO nn). O ne o n ~~k ~ I ~ nf j l R I
a seed nor even of jusl :lo seed and soil as being th~ C:loW:loI complex for the
production of a sprout."
)7 Vuubuldhu (AKL61 and AKBh ..J til. ; IW - )1t1) ,efers 1O.1Msic: diRinaion br~ CCIi
primary OIlK (,.~) and rupponifll coocIilkIN (,.J.Uri,,). DN:rrmki"i', mat
oonunmtllOl'J .lIude 10 mit lwic diRinction II nrious poinu. indtldin&- lOt namp&c, in
IXvo:ndn.buddhi'. wmmcnll on I'VJ.U H ,... (PVP::a67a) : ...... , . R,. lti t. &-,.
J..itI,.; "'P ..,. "" ~ w,.r", PlUM , . , k". Jiyd "" ~". M e}lf", """",., JIwJ
,. "" .., In! ,. i "D"';II WIIf ",it '" t' ,. IIJ' u",11 rit ~ ,. 'i """"';11 ... .... FOI'
arMKbtra:amp&c,1fe ~i'lcommmuOll PVSV ..JPVI.I7OW (PVT:l.OlI )ffi PVT..:1a6ff)
38 DNrmakirti'l \lit of ~ tmn ou..W t'Ompla: " (4muJIIUIJri) is ~ ",doer (Oftfusi"" Jina il inOlvu
diffnml liruarioru: ;1.11 "incompltfc ou..W compla:" M".II
1Ht-.l,....). "complete 0 .-1 com pln." (uJtJ.l I"t>ubuf:rI). ....<I. "o...al eornplc. "
~ 1k Itml - inmmplac" (1Ii.U1J} wulty sc:and.1Or. oUAI complex
bdu
_
ofia QUICI 01' supponi"" conditions. A teed and JOiI, for c::ampk, ..ouId be ;1.11 inoomp&cte causal mmp&a for !Ix produaion of I 'PfOUl- This UAt would lead OM 10 IUIfl' tIw
"mmplctcOUAI oompG" &houId ~ 10 WCMr.mm, no .'pportin&tondirioruan: bdrin" BUI dcspilC Ihis 1UICIIi.-e condalion br, "ecn "incomplat" (,,;It#U) II "bckinc 10m(
OUKI and conditions.- and "completc" (uUlJ)lI "nor bcki"l;l.lly cawa and condi,iona."
a QI~ o;ompIcI wi,h aU OUKI and condi,iQru in pba: it aill nor "complnt:.- T., bot Q)mplett, . c:wPl compla: mill! not only h.lvc a11lhe requimi CWJCS and mndlIiona: in addin-. ~.......d pooentialo ( J,..lft.) do.. " ' - .......... ~ ..... condiriotu p n do-.h ......
proximiry mUM alto ~vc undnplc dc'>dopmm, {Jtui~-.) in I tonunuwn (1II1114Mjtudl
W I lhey are __ fully c:apabk of producin& ;1.11 cffL ThUl, in the case of the prod..aion
of I sproul, the X'td and all ia MLppOI'tinc condilioru an: nor complat wbo:n W teed is fin!
pbntrd. and they do nor become complat umil
causal compla dcuiops to rhc pornl
of aaually prodlCins iu dfc,;t. In tbon, W complat oUAI oompla is the orw
0W1
in the moonml prior to thccfka. 11 ia wonh nori", WI dUs IMKion of -complac- accoonu
for DIwmaklni'scWm!ha1 one can_ inftr
uiaI of an tffet:t: 110m a ClIlK, o:wn if WI
__ io ...;.>I>ffip-ic.I by 011 <he.--y ... ppo<u"I ".,...Jicioou.
T., mtrr:alt, ;1.11 "inc:omplcu cauW compIa: ia one WI Ixb _
OUKI 01' ClIfWfilions.
and a complac" c:auAI mmpla is one in ..nich all requim! cawt:lIOO condilioru an: pretml
dc.doped, Whal lbcn do _ all. caw.al compla wilh al l call1tl:and condilioN preenl W l lIO! fully J",dop.:d, .. ..tom one lin! plana I X'td1 Dharmakirti '*' w
Ilf\II.brwd renn, "causal compk:>.."
In this rtprd. DharmakJn i', WIt of lbe ItTm "calUal tompla" (~) is wdI iU....
U"lred by rhc IOtIowins PIS", (PVSV _PVI_I ~5; G:~I. I6-99.I). H ~, DtwmaIdni ~
t.ht iaut oIt.ht ousa! tompla in t.ht tonlal oIatab1ishinllNl an ml il)' cs.- nor requi",
any fimh.cr OUKI eM' tondilioru in order lOt il 10 cnsc:

mlft

mal

mal

.""N1Iy

mal

166

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Th~ second

rdev:tnt point concerning th~ notion of a causal complex is

mat an ~ntity may panicipar~ in several causal complaes, and that tb~
causa.! complexes arc nOI id~ntic:al . In som~ cases, :ttl t:ntiry may simult:ll~
ncou.sly participatt: in mon: than 0I1t: causal complex: a seed, being mommwy. can panicipatt: in tht: causal complex for tht: production of tht: na t
momml in the continuum of i" muena, but al thr: s:amt: nmt:, il may particip;lte in the causal complex for [he production of a SproUl. acarly, Ihe
causal complcxes in th~ !wo cascs arc nOI tbt: same: the seed in question
may be the primary cause in both ClSCS. but the supponing conditions will
dearly differ. Soil, for instanu, may be nfSSary fo r the Sd in question
to produce a sproUt, but it is irn:laranl to tilt: production of w su~uem
moment of the Sttd's continuum. In addition to the simult;mcoU! participation in multiple causal complexes. it sms likely thaI an entity may h.a~
the porendal to parricip;lle in contradictory causal complexes, ahhough it
is noc llCIWiIy ,Ix CUt ,....", C&IUCII havot drew Ioinu i, if pouibk dUll Ihrit
eond.itioru: be incomplrtc or thai tbero be a hirI<fnna, 110 m., dew:Iopmenl of their
r--cWoJ. .,4,../ ,.
-r-_'''-.fo/J-,f''$;.lUu.I H "'- ................... do..
~ it r.--'.. ....-9, dvt.u _ Jk,rJ ~wn.r
",Ii,, ; ~ or"u,
'-Ii,., ., ~ .["- Jnm.nN.. ~... dvt tffin 1i.1., tbr non" i .m..J Jmrw..
a.../ it _~ (. ~0InW"",""'" ;lJcmunnt""""" IPVI.I91). ThU
is.n in.mnnli<uy "'""".
ThUl, an entity It.. is nor ~ 00 oomethins dtr in ordtt ICI ~ ilia. ""Iun:
[i.L. ofhti"l perishabLe) is '"'"~ (,,;,,.~ ICI han"" Ihar natUft. at is rho: CUt with
a romp/ctt QlUAI compla in rduion 10 the produaion ofita dfcod irwmucb aI ;1 cannor be obStrUCIeci.
~ 8 ... _ _ .,.unl.,.,....pku,o . ......", d.ouy. ...." ~ __ ~. ~ ' ~pno _
ma:: of any od>c:r Q\Ua or MlpponIns conditions. do nor .~
"'ily Iwoo: th.M ""t1.Ul:
rl.f of produO,,&
di:aJ in _ CISr:t brooo.- fVft1 when ~ iI the QluaI compia of ca.nh, 1C'fd and Wilm, ~ lOIna"imcs it no production of a Iprout:
Thil u nor an arpmnll apiMl our pCIIitjon, becawoe in "'" cue II -JI. rho: cawaI
rocnpkJ: ~ upon ~ do:.dopmcnl ofthar COOlpiel of QlUiet and eoodiliont in
a continuum. Bul in Of00 ICI petish.. thins doa /101 do:pelld upon i&lIy rul1.Ul: cXvdopmmL MOfCO'IeI", in tha,1 connnuum of QII.LIoaI ODmplaa. .Ix final ON" ..ru.:t. iI /101
For

il

r ......

...

">ti,

;, ..<.....,....,.j by

fwuoa inM..." in do< "",,,,,,,urn "" ,he

,...oJ",,""" of ,ho< cfk.ct,

definiuly Iw tha.! dfc.n. Within WI COtI.inu),llll of (:II.IQI wmpbcs, only dull final
(:IuW oompIa iI rho: sptoUISClIW. ~ pm'iow momml ofrbc-oontinuu.m'.doevdI>pmftII is CKbn lhan m., fin.aI causal compkr. tach such momml is jwt lOt Ihc purl"*' of thai hnal rnornftl. in the coo linuum. And nochinS can 11',","",,1 W
oonlinUUI!>'. final moment from poooIuci.nS ill dkct.. [.Ii 1 _ ", .~ bN/1
~"'"" lNlii"t".,~.riH~",U."'" /
.!wl!f ~.try.hJ<f
...wnU; 1~ .'"~I!f 4mI1U11UUnJi,..", [pVI.I,sl ;"."III..n.+-& 11IIII
.".'!' MJ.. ._~ ,.{tbtl..,!, "..n uullt/NI""..".,,. "ut",MttINl",..nHMhtw

t""" r,rrMi""'"",,,

U ... ~",.".. 1II~.u ~""""'IfI I _

~

_ ~ .,; ~jt " ' - ' . 1OJ""1!f

6hi;",iiij. WhM~ .pi kMkiJ IlihtilrlllJllt~ I ,... utripi J.rIlWM

SVA6HAVAPIlATlBANDHA: TH E BASIS OF INFEREN CE

167

wiU actually Jnnicipllce o nly in a C20UW co mplex for which ,he nrhe!' suI'""

porting conditions arc prescnl. For example, some seeds, in addition 10

h.aving [he capaciry- to produce sprouts. may also be crushed to produce
oil. AJ with me case of.a SproUl and a subsequent moment of me seed. me
effeas-a sprout .and oil- rtquire different causes and conditions. but
unlike m.at previous case. me causal complexes in question are incompatible. This incomplltibilily doer not . however. mitigate the potential for [he

seed 10 participate in eimer complex."

Wim mese poinu about the notion of causal complex in mind. it should
be evident mal one should not equate an emiry's nalU~-IVilbhdva with iu
participation any specific. prescnt causal complex. The primary re.ason for
avoiding Ihis tqU2rion is dUll. while an entiry-'s nature-svabh.iV4 stands:as a
marker fo r the rOt:Llily of thar entity'6C:lwai c:har:taeriniC$, the c:auui co m-

plex in which mat enri[)' is acrually situated will nOi necessarily include all
those possibilicies. A sesame seed has the polentiallo produce .a SproUl or
oil, so if our interprtt.nion of IWlbhiva as nature is correa, the nOlion of
thai seed's n.ature-svabhdva must subsume both of these: pmenci.als. We
h.avt: a1re.ady Sttn, however, mat both of these polenlials cannot be .actualized in a ,insle Clausal co mplex, si na [hose co mplc:xa a~ ine;ompatible.
A , imilar argument can be made without appea1ing to the case of con-

uadictory causal complexes. We can note Ih.at a water-jug, for ex.ample,

has the potenri.a1 10 be Sttn (i.e., i[ can produce an image in visu.al awareness), and it also hu the potential for carrying waler. These: (W() polenti.als
musl be subsumed by its nature, and if nature is equivalem ( 0 causal compia, (hen those two polentials should necessarily occur in the same causal
compla . This <orould mean then when one clfect

oc;o;un,

the; othe r should

nccesnrily occur, but Ihis is clearly not the CISI!. When watt.r is presem in

,.ri!UmJ~"'" I ,.,uNI!" ~ ItkU .~.,. f ""...In .,,~ Ur.~_tri

"",...,J,iu
sJ ';""'NIJ ",. {
~ "lmiJ"".J.m.fJ f ....,.., iii ~
~ ' f i ,liM ..... f Nt t. tAI!""'" bini ,f.';""",",'!' "._~ ".

UrJ-".rr41

sm..

39 To my knowInIF. Dharmaki"i doc. IK)I o::xplicidy dil<;uu 1M notion of C.O I'''ndicroty

c:wuJ complcxa:. but it scmu implicit in his!hcory. Hf doa dikuw tIx notion of an mory
panicipaling in mulripk. diAcmu alWl comploes. 5. fOr enmpk. PV).UH }4:
Ewm lhoush illw ncither-onc,oo"nwIr (.epualf] awal POlCllliah. . Ihill! is Mill
~ 10 produa: multipk dkcu by io -.ery nacun:.
""T"his is 00l 1O, for mul tiple, dfmJ.nowd nO( arise fmm a linsk Ihi,,&-'
II iI nor the cue WI a siDgk effect ariJa; from singk aUllt. 1Whcr. all 1M variow dtccu of a thing ariJe from a Qual compla. And one: thing may b( in twO 101
mon:Ja..w oomplaa. Hcna:.lt is Aid thaI that Ihins produca mwupk dfuu.

168

FOUNDATION S OF DHAI.MAKIRTI 'S PHI LOSOPHY

il$ hollow imerior, a water-jug fulfilb il$ potential to contain waler, bUI if
it hap~s to be in the dark, it wiU not fulfill its polenrial for producing an
image in visual awucness, Ukt:wise, if light and the other requim:l supporting conditions are presem, the water-jug fulfdls the potentia.! for producing an image in awareness, but if Ihe~ is no water in its interior, il wiu
not fulfill its pon:ncialto contain waler.
Thus. if an entity's nantr(' were oquivakm 10 the causal complex in which
il iJ presently participating. then a Wllerjug in the d2rk is not a waler-jug.
or dse a waler-jug is not by nalure mible. Likewise, a water-jug without
water would nOI be a water-jug. or me a waler-jug does not by its natu~
have the capacity ro contlin water. So 100, a sesame s.eed being crush~ in
an oil prcu would not be a sesame Sttd, sintt it is nO! pan of the causal
complex for the production of a sproUl; or else a sesame seed planted in fer
tile and watered ground would nOI be a sesame seed, since il is nOI siruared
in the causal complex for the produaion of oil.
II should thus be dear thai the lotality of the causal char.actttistia that
constitutes the nalU~-I"..bh.i".. of an entity such as a seed or a water-jug is
rIot oquivalenllo that entity's paniqn.rion in one or more presenl causal
complexes, primarily because the number of causal complexes in which an
emiry actually panicipalC'S could nC'VC'1 oqual the number in which it could
potentially panicipale. In other words, its actual functions will never
o:ru.wt its potC'Otial functions, bUI the norion of a Wilbhdva as nature must
accoum for all those potemia.! functions. 00
In addition to the: problematic equation of an emity's natufe-tv.bhQ"..
with its participation in some present causal complex, we should also note
the temptltion to oqu:ate an entity's natu~ with the causal compla thai
produced thaI entity. AI first gIanct, this would make some sense, sintt we

[ .ww"tIc""'~

uJ WMwr II _
~.

i"

.,i

Ii ~ "'vj~ 1,~i..rntdi",!" ......iMm04,,_

tUi""", M~ "rIIfUlf",WMIM!J I m,!, "u

*i'!"riJ ....".

M.b.'!I ' " .tvU~ 1.-1.

NOIe INI tJw; cblm dw an mllty p""........ ndlhcr I single: auAJ pcxmli2l nor mu.l lipk
pcxmtiak is meanllO tdVlC: dw: rftfio:acioa of IcauAi pocmWl u an uldmacdy c:aistcnl eIllity.

"0 Yn anoI~r . ..mIni ~I apinst lhe ~uival= of ,.,.MMNII IU.luJ"e with the
l"IOIion of I atiAI compla is dw, in the cu< of an end!)' such as I WlIltfjU&> (nrilia lhal
_ would no! inruil:ivdy tOftWUI: as upeas 011 Wlla-juc'l lUlUft' would Ix "fir- included
in dUI IUlurr. For nampk, the causal compla lOr the prodlKlion 01 dw: i~ oil ""'""ius in risuaI ....... _ includes demma -.h u lill\! and.sornsory conlXC (",.,;.J. If the
na,,,,,,-nwMw_ of .....c ....i... c<[Ui..kn. to ..... co.....J <>om ....... u..c.. cn';.>eo ....a. ..
llshl and ICIIIOty cntllXC alC pm oil WilICf. ju.gIIUIUfIt.

SVA6H,tVAPRA TI&4NDHA, T ilt BASI S OF I NFEREN CE

16,

haw: sn WI an rnri[), has a amin n~ plttisdy:lS a result of the ClUSCS

and condition! Ihal produced il. Ncvmhdcss, despite a close relationship
betwn an entity's naturc:-n.whh.iva and the Cluul complex ,hat produced
it, Dharmakini's system docs not allow us to equate the twO. For c::umple,
sina Dharmakini maintains dut cawcs arc momemary entities distina
from their efreclS, me equation of an emity's nature wilh the cauul complo (bar produced i( would oblige w; 10 admi( that: ,) a w:uer-jug's natull!
is wmC1hing different from the water-jug; 1) a WOlter-jug's nature: mslS
before the WOlter-jug aislS; and}) a water.jug's nature no longer existS whrn
the W2tc1'-jUg exists. None of these conclusions arc compatible wi,h Dharmilini's philosophy.
THE SU BJECT ( DHARMIN ) AND SVABHAvA AS " NATU IlE~

Up to tbis point, our interpretation of IINIbh4Ui1:lS "nature" may be summarized as follows: an entity's natu~.rvablM'w is the totality of an entity's
causal characteristics, and this amountS to a restriction upon the kinds of
df'cas that it h:lS Ihe potential to produce and the kind of causal complex
from which it has arUcn. If this interpretation is correct, one :lSpect of this
mNning of IlNlblMua should be immM.iudy obvious: :I. suhject (dAo""j ..)
em have only one nature"Jf1blNIVtl. and the narurc-n.wbhdwtof ,hal subject
cannot apply to subjccu of another kind: the nature of smoke is not the
nature of a water-jug. This :lSpect of tIItlbh4&N11:lS nature stands in conlrut
to wabh411J1 as propc:ny. for as ~ havc 5c:Cn, an entity such as a watCf.jug
may be conceived as having multiple propcny-JWlbhdws."
But in specifying thai a subject may have multiple propcny-svabh.:iv.a
but only one n;uure-".,..bhdv.r, fWO k~ Usuu must be kept in m ind. FiRI,
we haw: already sec:n dut Dharmakini critiques the ultimate rcality of dis-

ttibuted encities such as water-jugs. In other words, on Dharmakini's view

a water-jug is rU)l ultimately real. and there is no 'ingle particular
{svalRlqRJ;UI} thar is in and ofiuclf a waler-jug. Ruher, in the comot of Out
intCfC:SU conttming the mevant causal characteristics, a "wa(C'r.jug~ is iudf
c:onc:eptu,.jly eonnruC;le<i o n Ihe !xu;, of p:l.nic;ulan that, due to :&riling
from ttmin causes and conditions, have gained cenain distinctive causal
potentials. in this case due to the mutual proximity of their previous
momenu. There is likewisc no collective "causal potential" (Wltti) Wt existS
separate from those paniculan themselves. Rather, each partKular interactS
with the other particulars in irs proximity in such a way that they Nnaion
41 ct. Sirinkd/nn (1fT., n..Lf}.

170

FOU N D ATIONS OF DHARMAK I RTI ' S PHILO SOPHY

together to produce certain effects, Thus. Dharmakini mainrains that

"w:ater-jug~ is merdy a convenient fiction that is imagined to be: dUtributcd
ovt:r all the paniculars in quc:srion, This suggestS that the "n,:uurt of:l. waterjug" must also be: conceived as distributed over those particulars. Every
infinitesimal particle: of the: -waItT-jug" is equally a locus of Ihe "narurt of
a W2ler-jug" in that thq all arise: from the: causal compla that produces
what we: identify as a ~ wate:r-j ug: and they likewise: all participate in the:
productKm of the: effccu of that water-jug. Hence, Ihe: nature-n.wbhdllR of
a wate:r-jug, like: me: water-jug itself, obviously QnnO( refer to some: ulrimatdy rc:al, single emity that is distributed over all the infiniteSimal pani
cles mal form WMI we: call a "waler-j ug."~
The second issue: concerrn: the particulars themselves. 11121 is. when cerrain particulars. due to the: conditiorn: of their arisal, nave acquired ccn:ain
distinctive: causal pote:ntials, we: are able to call those: particulars a "waterjug" by otcluding other particulars !hat do not havt: tno.sc distinctive porentials, since lhose: Otner particulars have not arisen wiln tne aforementioned
conditions such as proximity. In this sense, those: particulars may be: conttprualiud (by way of their otclwion fro m other particulars) as propc:nyslJIIblNilhlS of a warc:r_j ug."l But we: may also trear each particular-in !his
casc:, c:ach infinitesimal paniclc:-on iu own as a subjcct (tONt rmin). In

"2 S a~. ~ 1 (9IJ1f) and J>VSV ..JPVC.IJi'-141 (IraruJ..lIIrd in

dot o.ppnocfiJ.). Com-

1MII1illl on pan of Ihe bner~. Kn~abgumjn noca I~' tbcK iI no 'in9c a.ual
po<","i..a1 (/lUtijtha. caW in me d",irw;t nllilia thac , due <0 _lUnll~bn 10 produce
~;" ~ . *... n tLod . _ ......;..'S (_ 'h]"1.: ..... ,..._ "'1*',u idH. ~uj. Ju St,.;"Ia,tt.
ncr (1' 71;116') has lICKed, Dtwmakim (1"\',.16.4 and J>VSV Mrit.~ G:I).7-u ) aplOcitly rcjrocu
die nocion of I .inp a usal po<cndal OC" 1IlI11IK-1lWMI* !.hal. bcins dismooced 0Ya" omain
cntilia, - . . u fOr mnr apariry to produce me, sam.: dft(o) .

.4) In addilion 10 me pr"""-ly cited prcocntlllion in F'VSV .... PVI. I)7-141 (_

'M appen.

dix fOr I complnc lra.nWtion). 1M notion of I paniruI.u IM:rurd q ,. f'1"Clly....uMW

an I:IC' fOund in me, twO IDIIowinl!. rda~ I"m".... 11 is impomnt 10 1ICU!.ha1 me IX)fIIClI
ofboth pmlV" ia 1M dnnuNoCDIKm WI, while dot urUvmaU (()1U(n>(lrd /III meobju of
conapa mow M rorui<.kmI dot dim:c objco:u of tho.r c:ortupu. ~ uniVft"Al. midi WI;'
mardy I:IC' constructed on dot hIuU of a wally effkicnl panicubn. The firM ~C pauagt'
ir. PVSV MPV 171C-171 (G :14i.1i-f7.7). wIUc:h n:adr.

'f'bcm'orr II",. uniqlK individual

(~aJc.M iI fI". Hjm [.[~.,,]. ..J NINr

.IN"" {i., ..
..".,.jk ,.wpM] .1r.n...u, nl"tUuNIOI; ,,~ i.JillUl
...J if
i, ulkJ." -~fftt1 ".r. c...~. " .M _ d.i". lIN, ir " . ""nin<u,r"
(1Wd.~~J. AU lINN,., .j"fnM,.,.tt WNlnt.Imf ..
rtn<lt ill liN M"~..u;n.. .r
.N,uIlU .fthmt fPV1.171c,,- '711. It II already been .uccd .hal only llul which is
""p*bic of !die funttion ia a roI 1hins- It i,I"""'" 'M Sirpkhyu aUl a . . . . a UN'
wmI it iuM the ~of the.w,.1fom tall) Other thinp. For iftM univm:al wen:

.,,.rnu/y
.>btI,

/u"

SVA8H1VAPR,ATIBANDHA: THE BASIS O F INFEREN CE

171

shon. ~ can. at the same time:. speak of the - naru~" of an infinitesi mal
partide. Now. on the Extanal Realist view, an infinitesimal panide is iuelf
a paniculu, so one might swPt that the distinet nature-sWlbhdva of tach
infinitesimal panicle could iuclfbe a Jnicuiar. This would be ,upponed
by the: plausible: notion that the: subject to which the nature:-slIIIbhlillll
applies involves no distriburion in this case: it is the: infinitl'$imal panicle:
itself. But rven if this is [rue:, a panicular's narure-JINlbJuitw is srill not ifself
a particular. The: most straightforward reason for this is simply that a
nature-lIKIbhillll is nc:cessa.rily treated :as a dhttmw-a qualifier or aurit>ute dinina from the: infinitl'$imal panicle: which is in dhtt""in, the: e:ntity
that pos:sc:s:sc::s or is qualified by that dhttmt4. This is best iIlwtr.ued by a gmitive conS1n1Clion such as, -The: naru~ of the: infinitesimal particle:,"
Dhnm,.ki"; m,. i nt::l ;n~ ,h,., in such ~pra.ions the: tOm....,., iJ :actto.:L!ly ideocical to the: tiharmin iuclf. The: appare:nt sc:p:ar.ation of the: dhtt""", from the:

real thin" rhm il -..Id IlOl ~ ~ fur ;110 ~ Unpnoep!:ibic, beaUie tM cosnition of diffumr thinp aI nondiffnmr.t.ouJd Ix a _ by tM p.,,ption ofil aI
;" .. ~" ...,...t i" .'-n. , .... ~ ..... 1 ... ...... ,"- '-J'" ~ ,..., H .... ~!'
I

H"'" ~Hri W ,... _no i" . h.r", / .

~ ~ lift _"''?!wM ;g"u l lAltJtltipti~..moib,~~

...-

flU

.w,. ,...1,.,,...., ,.., ,..",..,.

~~ ~ / ...... fMJirrlMt_-'!ry..JI' ~..,..,u~o.-!",w.

"''' f ""..,..w,.,~fJ'iJ ~.jJ,;"""N~ .

Dtwmakirti it ha.. addraai", Sirpkhya pbilooop~ and Moe: lhosc: arnor phiboplxn do
KCqK
If YD:rss. rsft), hit cqtl.1rion of ~ ";th nwJ.~!U;1 bat wwkr_
Awd u ~ poIemical~, r,tha 1!wI a prrcisc dchnilion of~!",- Thit tqtl.1lion of
1M1.~f""";rb ri/qJl doG. '-'"n, If'PM"'r1y bd 10 an tqlUtion of nwJ.~/.U wirh propnty.~"" rn lhe foilowrn& r-gt" {I'VSV "1'V1.I79-11o; (,;:n.l6-ii!-tJ, wheft w
I~rm ~_" it ~ aI an tquinklH of prOPCi" ' _~
IlOl:

,.,..,..!'_

n.t "'ffi hM ..J ,..",.u"jforrwn tlwt.rr i,ultmpw PI " ' - rhtt,.rr HsN ..,." rIMt

nwrtW,.,.1ftTJ (u-) tlwnthfonW", ",." ~. !-Mil - . tJ,.t!"NII MII(.......iJJn,. .....i" ..;J ... rfforr..J.id, u,." , ..,.,.." ~
it ., in __ Mnorr iiJfrrnot
rw11'hi", . ,,4 in 11_ _ {t<Jirh ,.".,.; ,. thi"l'
"'''- _ "-1 it tIw ,. ." _{",;., ... A ".I iJn", U _ tJistrihW "'" ."Y.thrr ruJ

r-

1hi",~_.tl.tn..iN,

n.",,.,.,.,..,,

..... -..ut,........ u ..J.Jt J.", ..... .....JJ . . /..,..,;,., ..4N:J.

"- _ _ _,IiJJII. apW tffrrt/.[ PVr.l19-rlol To accomptith _

p;o.iJ ill~_ i~inlO mediffermca and nondifft.tencu ba"hC( obju......:t. ... by inqui,
ins aboul thr WII" thu I row it dilknnl from I hone and tM ways thar il it no!"
diIkR"," Inquiri"'l in rbis 1\uhJon, all pt'1O)o1l tMn ..:r:..;m ~ 10 just me . . .
which wt" call thr '"_66 'wf of. IN... r"."'broIlMI!"'~""'" )orr'!'".."""
_ f unU'J1wJ.NkM"''' ~M<tJ... " 'ff...,.M H ti,,~ .lIimwd ~
"Jh!fIJi til Iil1ffiMd f - ' ' ' ' _no Nltt..nj'N~,rau,.,.1lI!t H IPVI,r77-1101
u ... ,.. V'" ~

M;"...

MI"... wri Mnt.....~'!' 1M

IN~ ""H r.:dIiJ'll".Jhi1trrJ- p._11 f l.

,.rrd1mo ....... ,.,.

171

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTJ ' S PH ILOSOPHY

dharmin is simply pan of the adusion process. and is hentt conccpnal."'

How then should WI! Imlt natufl!.-lIIflbh4wi It Sttnl5 best to consider it
a special c:asc of swbhilllll in the sense of a propeny. That is, when we: speak
of some of me properties of a ~ warer*jug. ~ such a5 ib "impermaMnu~ or
irs matcrial iry,~ we: 46nJtnKI those properties. which do not ttist rvcn concq)[uaIly before their construction , by abstracting just a b of me causal
ch:mcteristia from within the fotality of possibilitiCl that is the water-jug's
"natufl!.." This suggests, of course, that the water-jug's " nalU~" is a com*
posite cntiry consisting of pos!ibilitics. Indeed. we have mus far spoken of
it in this fashioo for usc of aplanadon. But if we wish to be mo~ precise,
WI! must not consider the water-jug's naturt a5 itsdf a dusln'of possibilities.
bur rather as a scamlcu uniry from which. through the a:clusion process.

For the wh;cct-prtdicatt ,mUon JeC PVSV "" PVI.n (uarubttd in n. 1, and in the
appmdill). ~ also the f'oIIowin, pMnp- (PVI_S9-60 and PVSV "" til.; G:)LI)-}).J}:
I .. _
-tdN "-'1.f~'" thm .",41' ....... ..oJ tJmn,.;...~ "'P;~
-t u" fo ...., tIw c/tuiMo ;, .", /hi", .". lIN arl..MtI n.riIJ ;, .u-... 11", ,.....
41rruiMa ..J Jnn.i ...~ "'Pi,.,,",,..r-- jout III _teN rMl'nuN.... IPV. !,)
On lilt theory 01 ot:htr~lwkln. il;' not W CUI:' that the adwion;' om thllOK and
thc adOOed mi"l lrhal the adution qlUliha) is anothu, This~ ~ 110 btao.ue
one would lor fDn:rd. 10 rorw::l~ thai dw: adutkd thin, lauch U I cowl ill alJo
adudcd from iu adution li~, il WOlIId he adudtd!Tom thc adusion from __
COWl. In Wi cut, Illtexdudtd mi"l IAOdo .. lcaw) WOlIId br rhal llTom....t.ich il _
adudcd, sud! as. honotl. I(dw wm' til( c:uc, men thcR wou.Id be: no adusion lof
ccw" &om -honc:"]. ~, thc adusion is just thc adudtd milll iadf. The di(krmc:r in the apraaioN lOr and linguistic: ~Iioru: of the eulusion and euludtd
COOK from the diiklttlOt bawUIl tho: onnanlK: oonWtuioru: applied 10 them. 1bm:
ia no aawI diff'cmICIt in mcrnKt (~
~Sina: IW iJ no diik.cna: in ,dUuk<,. diff'dU>Ol in the ..... anric ronw'lfions
make. no Ioe1Ue brcawc the cxprcuiom fo, IUbjc.oa and prtdk:m would drnotc
(.~) thc I&InC tftin&. likcwioc. a gramlNltical QJf>ordarion (ruch II thc p iI;W of 'thc cownatof I cow'} thai inwotw.. distinction ben. CUI the me"u reWed
aUo makcf no IoI1lK btawc it dtpmdI OIl. diff'a'ttla t.n.UIl the ma\lI. ~
Au'-tII "'" ~ W 11_ ,bi,." l'W",_tK.J
met tIini"l' ;,1m ill
rtr-.n i..JiuuP dK,rwIicut,;,., is u" ~ (.nJ",) ifit fIInY Jilform, "".. tIw
,~~_" " ,..J""J~; ..J... f ... "''''1'''''' {(~ [PVI _""! It;' "",,n.,
cut thai any UK olbn~ is mtrintd til thecsaa>tColan ob;ta brawt ont wouJd
be fOrud 10condudr thal ... himsOal (.aN""'; UAft would not OCC\Ir.
typaol
"AlP an uxntd 10 mu 10 fW'I) ditUna thinp whether thc thin" art aaw1Iy di..
lina or noc. 8ci1ll anployal in INI WJ.y. U>cy naiJy poinl ow thc .dcl(ilI .. if ;1
wen: IWOdiffft(Dt thing. ThctJon:, em lhou&h both ' (II(TW' and w .. , =IT~ rtkr 10
the I&InC ob;m (urh.c). diffrrml orrnatIOc oonwnlioru: an conHruatd JO tNt one:
mishl kMw lbar 10ft!(: auribult is prtdicaml of _
oub;ta- \Vhcn ...m JCnWuic
"""'............ ...., ~ a ~ w+- "",,..bo. arc dUotinco "f'f>aIn in """"
nition in tuch a (uJ,ion rhal il indici.,u thc pmiic::aoc: .. if'il wen: diHcrct\1 from

m.n...

n-

SVAlIHJVAI'RA TIIlANDHA: T HE BASIS OF INFEREN CE

17 )

we abstract th~ various possibilitits th:u un<krH~ or ~n contspond to its

propeny-slNlbh4vas. The point here is m:u (he cawal char.aaeristia of an

emiry do not actually exist as real, dinina entidts whose aggrcg:alion constitutc:s iu nature-n.4bh4"", but rathu th:u th('f tOO must be abstraaed
from me uniry that is the nature-_bh4V4. We can thus consid~r the
nature-mlbhilNl to be the seamless totaliry of causal characteristics that is
me subject iuclf, ~n if mal subject iudf is one constructed through the
process of exclusion.') We will rerum (0 ibis issue below, but fim let us
aamine me twO moots in greater dmil.

me ~. nom though it u [in ba) noc diffulI from iL T1W ocrun hm"'" _ u
habinlamd by fq)Orcdly obcrn". that the r""""tic:aI rd.atioll iI ...ro in dw way.
Thlt ~ of. gnrnnurical rtblion doc:. not iudf CONtinlle ill ~ QK VI actual
di..incrior! bra. . mere i, noohi", '0 ~I dw IUC of...dI <dation in tQIYK CQCI
j\aR in ar:c:ooi with. ~'Ilksira and irllmlioN r,..~..J6t). For inIuntt. in
rUin coma.. a Jingle thi"ll is ap<cacd in dw li~. whik. in orda 10 ........
rapm.. thaI AIM mins mip u ~ apUMed in the plunJ, evm!hough il UI\OI dilfum, in that it io.uU. linPc dUng. [...
alny.~' .~1IJhfrY il}.,. 1ulMW
t. "iiaJM t. i.,. ~". ... _...u".u frV,_,,) un-Jn ~ ... JW"!fM .",.,.".,
..... ~ '4,n!7In' "i~ U*1tbq .. Ifb l whtl,. "'''!fU'1'.~
I""""'",.,iN -';wrui/> ,. ..... ..".., rw/I Iuu. ,nri,.niMeJ.. til "'!"Itn.MttU, / ...
-,dh. izjl _ ... *?t~,.".wMN. .".,.....u.,mtlt~
1 uN ttl .".,litdi~ ";w,,,w
~tNJ l .n.,.r ~~ 'pi
vi!N.ftli, '7.6lirrfti,,; 1 MI"_,,, .~". i ....vni NtJt w.~u[1 trV,.60) ... IV;

-nI'"

IIM"'"""

vrffl, iLthJl4 ",,'Jt'MJHI',.,.lit,b 1 u ,.Ih.i

IlJUiriftu -"mriku iii ".,..,..", itJtmu Ulthi ,,~ "", .rrhmr .,,.,...tVhnu
,,.,ft.U6Jrntri / '1111 P "' P""'''' ;1} ~"""IIInJJM1U
ft~ ~
u#NUu,!,

ftkjJ ..,.,......~tW

,i

~u.m.,!, ftrw s.~ .".,liriktbthi .;/t4dti, .nJ,J",.,."" n..u.,;",.,v;

".,IiMJ" ....nhi1llltrr "pi whi p1TJtIfMnltmi~t I ... ul-Wll,.,...trw w.. ,,~ /
"'Y"n-Jpi '"~ ~ ,,.,,.,,,Jt#IhJ#JhJllit I ,.,u,.jJ.,.,!" ftw,riJ tlt.t1llN......... ~u uM~
,Uiltl,yJ,.1Iirthtt'!' 1whII__

,i,.II,

The Ira...t..;.,., of this

._1.

pnraK {"the .wwion is o n, thinS and

the QCIu.W

~...i'r .. ... outI"",-" ."?-'7".""j, .~"!',., i'JI ;........ I"""~Ic:> .I"" llll~rp<n>'rion of the 0'CnC pm by DharmaIdni in pvsv, ....t.cn ~ is &k-d
aj; I1Jhrttir -,Jand -,.1IJhrrU:. .61IJIII nw ",""UlJ. H<l'"I'm'U, if ,his pnraK
is Irw>dalcd narunJIy xcordin& 10 !he Saruluil.;1 wouJd read. "otbn.adulion and CMhcr.adudcd. "

bIn Dbarmakirti"1 """,n commm,ary b.1ow. "wti is appanndy po..cd as

~"ti /ruiMlti. Thil is confumcd by ~buddhi {rvT:nb .. K: I~
whop...... i. &I~

45 The faa mal a IUb;.a (Jhn".i,,) iI. corut~ prope"Y. _M.hwconm"cd

ita has b.tn diIcwscd abo...: (n. ll).

aj;

a sub-

17<4

FOUNDATION S OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

3.2 TIN ProduC/;on-mtuU oftIN SV2bh:iV2pratibandha

The (W() basic nOlions of swbhtiva thai we have summarized above enable
us to describe the produaion-mock ci the Ivabhdwpr'luibflNihll-i.e., what
it is about cause and. effttt that enables w to inkr infoUibly rbc: former from
the laner. In brief, one can simply say that the effi:ct's narure-swbh4tIA and
the cause', rururc-SlNlbhtitIA mutually "rcsuia each other: for the clfca to
have: the naturc-swbluiVfl thac ic has. ic must come from thar specific kind
of cause, and for the cause (0 have the naturc-sV4bh.iva thai it has, it must
have the capaciry [0 produa that specific kind of effect. Although Dharmm"i clearly understands this restricrion that constitutes the productionmode of the SlIilbhllNfprlltiiNlntiJM to be one that pertains mutually bctwccn
cause and effecl, he expresses his theory by explanations thar emphasize
either the cause or the dfca. In both cases, his theory is expressed quite
d liptically, but when ptuC:nted prinurily in terms of the effect, his Statemenu :unount to the following:

PrwiltilJn-moM txprtJMd prim.ri/y in ItTmI lJflM rJfrrt: if some

entiry J can be called " s." then it has the nature or an S. which
means that it ha.s arisen rrom the cause that produtt5 an S such
thaI it ha.s the potentials to produa all the effects cxpected or an
.s: In shon, ;1 bears all me propeny-lINlbhti~ or an .s: It is known
that being a product or Fis a property-slf4bhdVII or an S. Hence.
ir some individual is an S. it mwt have: arisen from another individual tlut is an F. To use the aample or smoke, ir some individual can be called "smoke. ~ [hen it has me narure-sV4bhaV4or
smoke: it has alltru: property- JlIoIfbh4~ or smoke. The i3ct or
being a product or fire is a propcny-SvabhalW of smoke. Hena,
ir SOffit' individual can be called "smoke, it must have been produced by a fire."
Dharmakini employs mllti~ lUi IIbJurJllm to express these arguments for
me production-mode in terms or the cause. In the SVllvrtti ht' notes that.
if smokt by its nature arises fTom fire. men it annot arise ('\."Cn ona from
something otht'r than nre. If it were to arise from something other than nre.
then smoke would be causeless, since it can occur even when its cause (fire)
is absent. To avoid this unacceptable conclusion. one cannol claim thai

SVA!HAVAJIRATI!ANDHA: THE BA SIS O F INFERENCE

17S

.lOme orher. non-fire entity causes smou. brause die gme unacceptable
oonclusion would apply: smoke can occur cvm when dlat other, non-fire
enrity is absellI. In response, one might attempt to hroge one's argument
by allowing for some type: of"fuzzyM production, whereby something similar to smokc comes from something other than fi ~. But, assuming that
"similar" means "having the 5aJT\e effccu," Dharmakini responds that one
amid nor aanunr fOr the .unoke's differc:rxr from orher entities because differmces in causes account for difkrcnces in effecu. His point is that it is
precisely by appealing to dilTc:renu or nondifTucnu in their dTa.-u that we
say that some enciries are similar or dissimilar. Having abandoned any such
notion of"fuuy production, if one limply insists that smoke is causcless,
then one could not acco Unt for the observed fact that, rather than occurrin g hllphu-'lnlly. ~ mokc OCCUI"l' in ~pccir.<: rime< lI n ri pb<:t!ll." Th<':$C rhrox

unacuptable conclusions from the SW"!'tti-i.e., that smoke would be

causcless. that the dilfncncc in causes accounu fo r the dif'krcnu in df'ccu.
and that spatiotemporally rC'S tncted occurrence does not apply to causeless
entities---also appear in the HrtllbilUk There, hown'tt the argument oonurning dilTc:rencc is replaced by a more specific argument: namdy, that if
lmok~

can N- producM bolh by lh:u wnich by it!: " :lnl", producrs tmoJu.
and that which by in narure does not produce smoke, then smoke itself

would be by iu nature both smoke and nonsmoke."

47 In addition 10 ~ P' P nrul.ued in ~"PP'nda (PVSV ",",PVI.J4--J7). _abo PVSV
..,{PVI.I91 (tnrulucd.t-.:, n.}J).

4B In HB (10' -4-17), DlwlrWani oIrcn dIC foUowin" mot'r concitoe argummc

EIrect uwi auor an: m"nWIy ddinl'II hr.-ins 1M 1""I""I)f-_IJt.l_ 01 hftnt IN

prodllt'l'd uwi ~ prodlKU. In thil rtprd. if ~ ..-rft aho 10 COOlC from ron-.ahinJ
odICr dun tho: allAl compla 01 firr and 1UCh, thm i, would IlOl h.a.-c dw: pl'OpC'lt)'_6IJj ... ofbrinS prodlK.ed by fire. Hma. il would IlOl arix ewm ana: from fire. just
all is does IlOl arilc from lOtIlC'dr.ins rUe [1IICh ... Wllerl. Nor would dlC c;a1lAl com-pk:< of'fin. nc. prodllCC ~ IfCn (lRQ1 braWl: it would IlOI h.a.-c 1M ptopen,
_MtJ.. of prodllcins 1oInOI<r. 'II iI ~ c:ax with othn aWolI complaa. And tina:
....du: tw bu, one 1UINn:. I. docs IlOI makr ICI\IC for iliO N .-c 1M propmy . ...dhba
oI ......B ...... is procluced br ....... lire and ......-n.e. In ..u- _..J... .......;..........
f...,.... du. .....rum ..... dlC narurr 01 prodlKins In'I<lkt uwi d'OII ..mien does IlOI h.aC 1M
IUIlom" of producing omok.:, Im<>It would h.a.-c ~ 1lIIU", ofbolh.,...,u and non
~, bra""" an dI'a:t'l prop<:"'-.... Mr.h. _ cauKd by ~ propmy.~ of
U$(:3UIr. And if ~dfca:., .. ..,..."' .,..jI.
wm: IlOIlkpmdm, upon dw
_Mh. ofiu (::I""':, Ibm OM wou.kI be farad ,0 admil dw dlC dfm:'1 pt. ll)',.,.MtJ_ Irr aweku. Tllo:rdOre, dw ",ilich prodllU:l lrnoU: iI. particubr ~ of
caw:aI compla of firr uwi ouch. And du.1which is prod~ from w" pm.icubr ~
uJ ......... "",u.,.,.. '" ru~ ,.nJ ....... is ..."*"- Si",,", .I", .,....., iIlId elTa,;< ...... in ""to f.hion racrintd in dICit narure .... M.i', u...., if no production. of dlC dfft:t from that
1

po..,...""

176

FOUNDATI ONS OF DHAIlMAdRTI'S PHILOSOP HY

As with .he presemation that is stated primarily in terms of the effect,

Dharmakini's explanation of Ihe production-mode of the w.bhilNlprllti1n4iHt in terms primarily of the cause is a40 elliptical. One can. however,
derive the rollowing presentation from his arguments:
ProJuctitm-",otkapmml i" lnms oft~GlI. if some individual
can be: caIkd .. p''' mcn it Ius me IUture of an F. it hu arisen 110m
me causal complex m.u produces an Fsuch that it has the potentials to produce all the dfa ofan F. In shon, il has all the propcny-lVtlbhi~'iZS of an F. It is known thai the potential to produce
S is a propmy-wahhiva of an F. Henct, if some individual is an
F. then it must Iuve the potentia.! 10 product S To USt me crampic offite. if some individual can be: called a-fire," then il has me
IUture of a frrc: it must come 110m me ca~ thai produce fire and
thw il mWI have the causal potmcia1s offire. h is known tlul fire
Ius !he POICIUial to produce make. Hena:, if some individual can
be called "fire: it mWI Iuvc me poccntial to produce smou.ft

In the SWlI.rtti. (he argumems used to defend these claims thaI focus upon
Ihe cawe arc summarized in the rollowing brief pa.ssage

mal

... a panicular property-svahhiwt of smoke is

it is prod uced
by 1h1( {Le. fi re]. Likewise. the cause, fire also has the propertyswbhiVll of producing thaI kind of effect. If smoke wtte 10 come
from something else, then the capacil)' 10 product smou would
nor be a propctty-nrabh.iVII of fire. Hence. fire would nOI pro-

...-hich iI of a dlifCf'm1 kind dun rlw CI..,. of tIw kind of drea. Hena. an dIln iI
IV)I mi.,bdinS aboul iu ClUK.. llIcrd"o~ if the: rdarion of ClUK and df=; II maOlishcd. rlw ~n of rlw dfca by tM ClUK if aUo aabliWd. IJ.t-,.,J~
j.",...u-."....w,..~ ~.~. ""']'di JIti_ :eM) ali"",
.ueJ-- "pi
tIM""' IiUJII

4'' '

"'ii-1fJtf!I _~ ... """rilJ ~ .,. ,.,. ... tIM. . ntIM-..twl,

u,; shufri"", j#1WJn ..-~,.., M. i ......,.,.....'

.... u IJN-,.

r.J.~,.~tl..Mitw. . ~~~_1Kwh ';M......

Jhi~~bI ;lJh. ~MJ...U'f'~ ....~

,.~ ~-Iftlt- wtNIJ,,~"'-!I-" 'p~~,. -".,.0.

sJ-F~";r.!>".ow-. ili~".,., tN'f' ~.a,.,u, ~

lI",.mr ... M....n. ,., fUry.",

1M

.,.Mu6rtlti ""'" "*"- ....,

.u.,.a.,.. ,y"!WM ~ ,;JJ)M M.r""tiI.

49 S FVSV ,",PVI.}4-J7 (u)lli\uni in Iht:appmdix).

u-r.,..lcw.

SVA 6HAV,VRATI6A NDHA: TH E BASIS Of INFERENCE

duu smoiuo: even ona!. Nor an th.u which cornel from

In
lOme

other caU1C' be: smoiuo:. for it has come from an entity that docs
not have the propc:rty-lVItbh4lA1tof producing smoke:. And if that
other entity actually does have the propc:rty-/VoI'bh4va of producing smoke. then that other thing must be: fi~. Hence:. the:
re:lation be:lWttn an c:ffc:ct and a caU1C' is not misle:ading."
Combining the: pc:rspcctivc:s of both ClU1C' and dTect, Dharmakini concludes his argument with these: verses:
A termite: towe:r is fire: if il has the: nature: of fire:. If it does not
have: (he: rnlltu~ of fire: (which includes the propc:rty-lvabh4v4 of
prOOudng sm(l~J. how could smokr:uise in m(' p~ttofjun
a Ic:rmite: towcr~ Smoke: could not arise in thai case bc:cause: fift
has the propc:rty-SV4bhd'va of being the: caU1C' of smoke:; itS distinguishing charaCteristic (bhJ4) is to have: the causal potentia!
(0 produce: smoke:. If smoke were: to come from that which is
not the cause: of smoke. it would be causc:las."
In shon _by vinue ofiu narure:-slIAbh.lV4, smoke: has the: propc:ny-lNbhdv.or
of being an effect of fire:, and by its narurc-svabhdv., fire has the: propc:rty-

nwbbivtlofbc:ing capable: of producing smoke:. In this sense. smoke: and firc:

arc: rc:luc:d u\rough their respective: natures. At this point, howeve:r. it is
important [ 0 rc:call that the tdation bc:twttn an effect (such as smoke:) and
iu caU1C' (such as fire:) musl act as a warrant Ihat guannu:es the: tNStwOrthinc:u r.orvis.or".lAIlk) ofinfe::nca based upon

dfO:<:I~idcncc:

(as whe:n

infer fire: from smoke). When examined in Ihis lig}u, Dharmakini's theoty
evinces 5Ome: problems and lacunae. lc:t us now eumine: a few.
&tIM In>>n i" tIH App/irJltu,." D/ tIN ~" -,,,otk
To He how the: theone.: _ ....vc: d~ so far are applicable: ( 0 infere:nce.
~

,i

PVSV iii PVI.n ;:1).,....)): ujj."i. In J ... I>hJ*~ tf),M.... iti f ...rhIltm.r.,;
IiUlMMiu.orItby.j4_~N/I f 1MJi"J"AI
M.hot ,... $II IiUJII ,...M,m, in f utkrrI4,i ,...
j.,..." J ,... N $II
~
bJtJ..u Mmlt I uI:JWlNHlItZ_ C4 $II
it]

-,.""*"";'

""*_

__

....,.,i,

5 1 PVI.J6-)7: .",inwtM.h.w{l t.1muy4".~ M."..''''' ~ f .t.IM,...",inMMb. ,...

~_
....diwl!< ~ H tIhtt~ 1II...m,. JNt6Un~" f~"',!to ..;
6hJw $II ~ ~ H.

""*IIUSJ'"

178

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKI RTI' S PHILOSOPHY

should ptorbllps begin by rttalling (hat the produCtion-mode of tb-:

SWlbh.ilNlpriltilxI1,,{ha is m<:ant to ac.c:ounl for the ~ion rd':lIion (lI]t1ptiJ
in an inf~ncc from dT<:a 10 ClUK. ~ not<:d eariiu. that rdation consists
of a pnv:ackr (",.",kil), which is here th-: cause, and th-: p<:rvaded (vyd".,J,
which is here the eff<:a. As h:as been explain<:d, this means that any locus
of the eff<:a must also be: (within cemin spatiolemporal limiu) II locus of
rhe ClUSt'. BUI ir doo; not mean (har any locus of the aUSt' must be: also II
locus of thc eff<:a. Indeed, DharnuJdrri specifically r-:jccu tit<: notion that
effects an be: reliably infured from causes, and in the specific ColSC' of the
fi re-smoke inference, South Asian philosophe:rs generally cbim that some
fires do not produce smoke_~ The reilltionship between p<:rvadcr and pervaded is rhus :asymmetrical: wher~r the ptrvaded (smoke) is prtSeOl, me
ptorvader (fire) must be p~OI, but it is not the: ColSC' that wherevet' dle p<:rm-:r (fire) is present, the: pervaded (smoke) must also be present_ Dhumakirti's objective in the formuluion of Ih-: production-mode of the
tlNilbhdvapfll'ilNtlUiha is 10 ground me p<:rvasion rebtion in a type of ncccs~ i ty: smoke is nt:ec:SSarily rhe product of fire , and fire is nccesurily what
can produce smokt-.
With the pervasion relation in mind, let us now aaminc four lwic issues
that, in one way or IInother, could indicatc problems in Dharmakirri's argumentS for the production-modc of the II1IlbhdvapralibaNih4. My intention
in n.ising these issues is to demonSln.tc the problems that Dharmakirti
must c:xplicidy or impllcidy resolve ifhis arguments ue to be: actually IIpplicable to inferences from df<:a to ClUSt'. The four issues are
w-:

(. Smok-: is not thc only product of fire.

1. Only some fi res produce smoke.
}. Only fire is apable of producing smoke.
... Fir-: is not th-: only entity that may be called

~$ moke-producing

(JhiiltUljaMM).

I. Smolu is nor 1M only proallrl olfirt.

In his arguments presentr:d in terms of dle dfea:, Dharmakini claims
(hili smoke ncccssarily Iw the propeny-m,bh4tw, ~ product of fire. BUI
while Ihis proptony-Wilbhd"", may be necessary to smoke, it is not neccsnry
to only smok-:. If this w<:re not tht. ColSC', then :ashes. which arc an tffect of
fire, would also be smoke. HCIlCC, as with the pervasion of smoke by fire ,
M

52 W~ mUSl IMK(. ~. tN, uOOctamiin. h.ishJ'Il'tS(rimd condilioru, on.: nI.I'I il'>dem

infer In cffI &om a cawc, acro.dinllO Dharmakini Stt SlcinkcUna (1m).

SI'A8HAVAI'RATlaANDHA: T H E BASIS OF INFERENCE

179

the relation of "smoke" to "product of fire" is also asymmetrical: "product

offire~ pervades "smokt, ~ but the opp<i[e is !'lOt true. This amounu to me
claim thaI the correct dmrmination of some eIllity as being "smoke" is a
sufficient condition for one ro correctly apply the property-wahhdvll "product of fire ~ 10 mat entity. but me correct cUterminuion of some enrity as
possessing the property-.rvahh4V1l"product of fire~ is not a sufficient condition for one m pmpe-rly identify mit entity as "smoke." This is the moST
typical ~y that Dharmaltirti formulates a property-.rtNlhlHi"", and we will
el:plore it further under the rubric of Ivdhhav~idena. At this poiIll. we
can briefly characterize it as follows: if P is a property-Wdhhdv.r of S. chen
me rot:al au.sal characteristics [hac mu.u be in plact: if an entity i5 to be correctly called .. S"will necessarily include the a usal characteristics required
rn ctilihar enrity " p. " It is rhis norinn nf pmperty_.rvahh4W11 that underlies
Dharmakini's argumenu for the production-mode in terms of me effect.
That is. if the fact of being produced by fire is a properry-/WllhhdWII of
smoke, then me lOtal causal charaa:cristics rt12t mUSt be in place if an eml)'
is [ 0 be called smoke" will nessarily include the causal characteristics
required to call that entity "product:cl from fire."))

ffttly lIJ"" jim proJuu smolu.

The asymmcuicaI nature of the pervasion rdation requirc:s that only some
~.

fires product smoke, but in me SVII~ Oharmakini's arguments for the

production-mode of the uVJhhivap,-.tihllntIJM speak of fire as nC'CCSSarily
Mving me propmy-wahhdll4 of producing smoke. This is, in faCt. a missatement that Sakyabuddhi and other commentators correct on the basis
of a p~1d punge in the H""bi"J... The problem here iii ,ha,. if fire were
necessttily to bave me propmy-JVilbhdll4o( producing smoke. Ihen any fire
tha.t did not product: smoke would not be a fire. This diJcJq)ancy is corrected by noting tMt, although only some fires product smoke. IIOfires are
,",.hk of producing smoke. In effect. Dbarmakini appeals to an implicit
distinction betwttn necan.ry. nondi5positional propenies and necessary.
di.cJlOSirinnal properties. Thai i.c. rh~ propo!rty-n.w"hhorof " ~n8 3 producr
of fire" is a neoeuary. nonJirpotitioIW/propmy of smoke in thai all instanCeS
of smoke are 1ldU4U, product:d by firr. But ~ apable of producing smoke"
is a necessary, JispmtionAlpropcrty offire in that all fires are (I1""Duof producing smo~. but do not necessarily do so. The fact thai some fires iIC~
aU,product: smoke is then accoUnted for by the f.act thai the insrance ofhre
S3.s... bdow, 19+

ISo

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PH!LOSOPHY

in quesrion is pan:iciparing in:l complete ClIusai complex for the production

of smoke. Indeed, Dharmakini explicidy maintains m:u in an inference
from effect 10 caUK, one is :lctually inferring me causal compla.
J. Only fir(
~n

is ~ilp"bk o/protilUint Im06t.

Dhannakirti defends me productionmode of me tvilbhdwpratibiZNIha wilh :lrgumentf in tenns of the ClIUSC, he adduces :I spific. dispositional propcny-nlilbhdN. such as "capable of producing smol," as a
property of the cause, such as fire. In adducing this property, he does not
assume an asymmetrical rdarionship betwttn mat property-mrbhdlliland the
ClIuse. Thai is, until me relationship between "smolce~ and me propertyWilbh411r1 "prodUCI of fire," me implicit relationship betwttn "fire" and the
propmy-Wilbhdllil"ClIp;lble of producing smoke" is symmetrical: the correa
dC"l:ermirultion of some emil}' as being "fire" is a sufficient condition for one
to contttly apply the properry-WilbhdVd "ClIpable of producing smoke" to
mat entil}'. likewise. the correct determination of some entity as possessing
the propmy-Wilbhdw "ClIpab!e of producing smoke" is a sufficient condition
for one 10 correcdy iMmify mat emil}' as "fire. ~ Thw, it is n"1isariiy the
case thaI if an entity is a fire, it is capable of producing smoke, and if an
entity is capable of producing smoke, it is a fire. This suggt:S1$ that, if property-Wilbhillil Pis me type of propcrty-svabhallil :adduced here and Fis the
ClIU5e qualified by that propcrty-Wilbhav.r, then eimer: t) me tOIa! ClIusai
characterinia that mWI be in plac:c if an entity is to be contttly called .. r
wit! necessarily be Wnricill to the causal ch:mcttrisria requirro to corrtttly
call thai entity" P"; or 1) an entil)' has the ClIusai characteristics required to
correcr.ly 0111 thai enliry .. P" if and only if that entiry possesses the lotal
causal characteristics that must be in pbcr if an entiry is (0 be correctlycalled
"F~ This way of understanding the presence of propeny-llIilbhoiVd P as a
sufficient condition for idencifying the subject that il qualifies as being F
stands in contrasl (0 the more f2miliar inlCrpret2rion applied to ~ prodUCI of
fire ~ as a propcrry-SVIIbhdllil thai is necessarily applicabk (Q smoke, btu not
a sufficient condition for the determination of its subjecl as being smoke.
The reason 10 interpret a prope:rty.sva6hdllrl such as "ClIpable of producing fire- in this fashton should be fairly obviow: to take the example of
smoke and fire . if the argument fOr the produa ion-mode of the svabhdVilpraribiZtrtiha in temu of the ClIWC amounts tO:ln argument from the propeny-SVIIbhdw"capable of producing smoke" to fire as the subj.l (Jharmin)
quaJified by that property. and if something other than fire (such as a termile rower) can also poUGS that property, then an endry [hat produces

SVA6HAVAPMTJaANOHA: TH E BASIS OF INFEREN C E

181

Imou iJ not n~rily a fire. AJ we have ~n , Dlurmalcirti got;!:as f:a.r:as

[0 say thar. if a termitt tower is aaually producing smoi:, thtn it must bt
a locus of fire.
4. Fin iJ nOI 1M Imly mliry thAt m4J bt (JlU,d "smoltt-producinl(dhumajanana).
If the propeny-.roabhA"" -C2p:;1ble of producing Jmoke~ i~ nOI only n~.
essarily applicable 10 aU fires, but is abo a sufficienl condition for me entity
to which it applies lO be: a fire, and if the wood and such in a causal cornplcx that produces smokt ~ also ~smokt-producing: then one would be:
forttd to conclude that wood and such are fire. Ahernatively, to use the
example of a seed and a sprout, if the propc:rty-Ilwbhd". ~capable of producing a rprout is a sufficient condition for th:u entity to which il applif'!l
10 be: a seed , and if lOiI and such also panicipatc in the production of a
SproUl, then lOiI and such ~ a seed .1O
Dharmakini himsdf does not address this problem dirrctiy in the
S"'vrni, but he does appear 10 recogni:r.e il 10 lOme cxtenl. His recognition
of the problem is suggested by w claim that tht causal complex is what one
:iCtually infen through :.n inference," bUI if Ih .. c1:t.im were inlerpreted
nrictly, hi. ugumentll for the produccion-mode of the fWlbhJ""p,."tilNttJdh4
in terms of the cause would f2iJ: that is, tht dnermination of an enlity as
having me capacity to produtt smokt' would not be a necessary and sufficient condition for applying the concept fire~ to th:.t entity, since rnt
entity in question could:as easily be wood. II mw sa:rTlS likdy mat in claiming llut the causal compla: is inferred in an inference, he also means to preM

KrYe lO me distinction between the primary cause

r..phUtwlutu) and Ihe

supponing condilions ("","4ri,.). In shon , mt properry-twohiva "capable of producing smoke" mWI IOmehow apply to the primary Gillie in a
way lhat differentiates it from the sondary cause. DharmalOni's StVlvrt,i
contains some argumtnu tMt might supply this testriction, but ovenJl his
pre:senr.ltion there: iI incomplete in this regard." His Ht'tubi"J.. ofus mon::

po.,,.... U.......

,So4 The probkm men Ooncd hen:: i.~., m., '1xWon of u.. ooopo: of the
~ of produci",...>Okc--it ~mibr 10 0flC' notid by On.kt 1199').

5' PVSV ...tPVI.J7 (G:IJ.lO).

56 The diiawion of priCTW)'QIUC andwpponinfi c:oodJtion in PVSV MpV,.19S mar provick rhc: crpt of rtltriction thac it MCCUlIy!wK, lOt DlwnuJdrti thcr~ sugpu dw m., pri.
mary awe it..hac deI:=ninccl eM type of dJ"ta Ih.:al it produud by I QUAI compko:. In
Ibon, lui VJWl'Il'nI .. A '(J thai ~ m..:...;. lOll, """IU iUld IUd! nu;r occur In IxKh eM
alUll complel. dw produc:es I batky iplOll' and eM causal compk:c; thac produces I ria

181

FOUNOATIONS OF OHAlMAKllTl' S PHILOSOPHY

a tensivc comments on the distinction bctwt-cn primary cause and suppon ing conditions, but he cf()(S not appear to addrtSS dil't'ctly the problem
of restricting the properry.svA'bhliva "capable of producing $moke~ in a
manner lim would suppo" his arguments for the production-mode of the
SWlbhli""pralibllNiIM. >1
CONC ERN INC NECESS ITY

In our examination of the four issues addressed above, we have .sn th:u
Dharmakini implicitly relies upon some notion of necessiry. Although it u
incomplet:e, Dharrnakin i's inchoate theory of neassiry is probably what
prompts many contempol'al)' interpreters to rranslate property-SWlbhalid as
"esscntw property." Thu tntnslation may be suggestive. but it mWI be
employed with caution. Specifically, the notion of an "essentia.l property~
Iptolli.

!her ~ do not M"': lhe _b4J"" or Prodoon8 a ria ' ptOLIl whcta in I

QutaI compla duol i"d"des I. barley Ked (and 1\01 I. ria Id). The reuon for !his is tNl
~ .,il. ~~ and od>t. condilioN in ~ c:ompla pin the
of prodoon8 I. ritt
~I from the p~na: or !he rice seed. Tht moll tdtYanl put or ,he pA8C. whim
raponds '0 ,ul"rnenu '"Pinot IN: nOI;on ,hal an tnli!),', dDUVClion (,,;dJ;,) I . t't!)'
!IN)lntn1 is not inm.wc (W ~nriallO WI tI1riry. reads II follows (G:'J9"'-' 4):

,,,,,MiN

"Bm . in wow w ........ ricttprotJI" 10 be pmtIl.ICIed. a hatlry - ' and wch nuy .....
be in nd of :anythift8 .ddiDonal beaUK ,tl 1M aupponin8 oondioons
ooil
for tbt- production the riu 'PfO"1
JOmtIimtI be in !he proximity or ~n !he
harky -=I and ..m."
How is il l\Ol i" need of -miftl? Tho, is, in.umuch .. they (i.e.. the IN.rky K'nI
and aucbl do /IOl ha." tht wUhi"" of produc:in8 the.itt JPIO'" thai a rice rd two
they an: in ncni WI ,,,,Hh,iN.
"In ,hal caK. IOtM fibricaral or QUlC..II I:fllilies nur;abo 001 haw thll J''''iJhh"
,I.., .....a.c.
.k.:.r."
A ria: oud and ouch ha~ eha,_~of produc:i"81 riu~e due CO thcir own
QUK{,J. Heoot, W I which doe.: /IOl haw thoK cawa doe.: 1\01 ha...: .hal _Mbra.
And i, is pc:rcciwd mac I CIUK [or I ri Cd 01 a hariq...-dl ... I rauiacd autal
poccnUal. Nor is il rt:IIOI1Ibk- 10 claim dw d>t rsriaion in J""bh.iw WI pm:ai1U 10
dUnp (.nI!.a) is random (~iU) beaClK WI which dna DO{ rcqui .... awes and
conditioN for io MlI:nI:t antI(K be rcsoicted in span. ,irr>t and ",bllIf1. [ ....,,"
~
jII"" ......~ I ~ai, ~1Ii'!' Witi, w",fpi
"',!"r<UilJJhJt I ".,..,. ... ~ l ,....tA III ntIijI'!"
dIn,. ,u"tfJMu!I
U!iJ,ijtuJt:tJ ,.~~ I "",!, ,.,It; ~M'"
..,.~., "'Ii,!, N III nw

or

""'r

or

rom ..

or

".eo..

,......

..

;; uq..m"

Msri,.

,.,.*"

.,i

_1>Ith.
";-,,,-,.1t6I1fIlI "mw~,.,.u. ... .,;~ I Iili~rtbrt
qi III "",MJJW!J JI"i 1M
'S'*""';,. '",,,,,,,MiN!! ~ 1";",.;.Jn;J,. III
IomtfJ ""'rii~ , ..filii " " I ... r. "",~"""iy.r_ "niMu""
~fJ I

iii,. ...

."iWffiM

....~ ~",...~.ttt.

57 In noUn8 we the ~O;n H B do not "apJlQl"" 10 addre. thicl probkm.1 mnn 10

uI" 1-10- ...........t,...;.. ......... bc)"'l<'lo<l chc

Ic:awopen ohc: pooo-iobilKr ...... ~ u-uuW'

Kopt of ~ pnxnl woriI--mi&hlllncowu

-.I,....
lJOiUUon.

SVA"HAVAPRATI&A.NDHA.: THE IASIS OF INFEREN CE

183

must nOI be allowed to introduce an unw:arrantM. form of essemi.al.ismand its aftendanl problt:m5--i nto Dharmaldrri's system.
In this COnlal, if we are to think in IUms of necessity, it may be hdpful to draw from the: Euroamerican philosophical u:w.itio ns and introduce:
the distinction bctwccn the pro:ticuion of a property as being neceuary U
ft and the predication of a property as being n.......sury tk didf}. If a property iJ prM.iared tb ft. then the suhjfit' in que...ion nea:ssarily h:a.s me identity in qUClition tU llrubjm. If we claim, for example, that "being smokt~
is predicated tk n of some individual, then the identity of that individual
is "rcnurily smoke. In other words, it is not poS5ible for u.s not to treat
that individual as -smoke." The necessity here concerns the relation
between the individual and a particular property, and nOl (he rdation
~n prorerries l.hem.<l!Ives, In ront l"2~l , wht:n Wt: <:bim Ihn "h.,ing
dicto of an individual, we mean
ifwe predismoke" is predicated
cate "is smoke" of some individual, tl1I1y thtorrwiJl we assert (hat orner properties (concomitant wilh smoke) are nect:Swily predicable of [hat
individual. For oample, on Dharmakirti ', view, if one predicates "is
smoke" of an individual, "producal from fire~ musl also be predicable of
(har individual: it is n~ril y (~ OS!' that :a.nything wh ich " is l moke" is
:also "produced from lire," In this case, the necessity is tb r/i!'U1 in that it concerns the relation among properties, and not the relation of properties to
an individual. II
Now, my contention is that, at last in the contot of the lVIIbhiVtlp,If,ibttnJh.J, Dharmakirti'J sy'$~m does nOf allow for tk rt neccsJity, and if the
m.rularion ~essential propetty ~ for properry-lvttbhdVtl implie$ (hat type of
neat:.ity, then th::u tr.:tnsl:a.lio n l hould be :a.voided, We Cln mou e:uily J
that tk ft necessity does not work for Db.armakini by ra.Iling mat, before

~ 1M p'ellmllilion hm:of ill.&. and tk~lOOCbIjlicJ" modified

mal,

IOXOOW'lI for !he manin...tUcb DlwnW:ini ~ W nlnion bURuil. JiM,."j" (~ Mibfca") and a
" ' - - (. ' prcdiaIC"), T cdtnic:ally, in ill Jk. modaIiry ncUiry appIicllO I whok propo"lion (i.e.. ";1 iii fW"C*4Irily IN< mol dvub;.aof. ddiniti", daaminllion of blue is blue;
.. OFF" .! <0 J;~fIJ ,M;ry, in....t.;d, ~'YappI'" <0 the indjYi.du.oi {i.e., "i , iii ...... u.,..
the objt of . ddiniu~ dnmninarion ofblUo! is DeCaAriJy bI""~J (0. Pbtuinp 1974't-I}),
~ 1_ iI, that- notioru ~ conYUtibk 10 DbrmoJdrri'. way of conoo:i"u,S"poopaoitioru
(.u..""i"''''-- Uructurftj by daimins rha!, in ill kM mod:aIiry, dK' ncuaity penai'"
bt""",, twO JiM,.. ril is nco;.a.sarily UUoe!ha, the ~'" nun u ,be objca by W
ddinili~ danmination of'bluc' pcKKSM:Ilt\( """,-- 'bluc", wbik in tk rt modality, !he
nc'Ctaity penal'" be",n thc ,u""""i1l snd ib '" "we.) r'l ir. UUoe ~ W Jhn".;" nIu:n
as !he objca by w dcfinitM dctnminarion of'blue' .... nrily ~ the ..""",.. 'bIue- ).
F.... u .... ~ un ,-.aei'T' _ till: uf.~<.a! (if _oai"lD """uu.cnW) P"':'''''~' to I'bn".
np (1974), S ~Iso me bnefbutlUCid ditawion of c.ma: by Sou (I 99SJ,
IICf

184

FOUNDATION S OF D HAItMAKI II.TI s PHILOSOPH Y

an individual can lx: ron,n rucd :as a subject (Jhitrminj flU ~s moke: the
propmy-1V4bh4V4 ofbcing smoke" musllx: prcdicucd of that individual,
With this in mind. we can then nOle dur, ifbring smoke" wtte prcd.iatcd
' " rt of thar individual. it would not lx: possible foe dUll individual 10 not
bear thar propcny. In simple terms. one can say that that individual would
lx: in nsmusmokc, But Dhannakini's theory of nUu]tl C"dellnitiw determination" or "correa judgment") belies any such tk rt CSSlentiaiism.
Dh:umaltini claims that. in a COITCCt judgment immediardy subsequent
to a pcrupnon, the pmUcations one makes of an individual arc marWy
conditiont'd by mind-depcndcnt Faaon such as expectation. need. context,
perceptual acuity. habituation and so on, Thus. when a child who stUdies
under hil b.ther SttS him coming from afar, he will Ilnt conceive of that
person as father" r.nhcr
"tcacher," O r. in a morC: gruesome example.
whcn a dog. a libcnine, and a Jlltin gaze upon a dead womm's body. the
dog SI it as food , the man sen it as a woman, and the Jlltin seer it as a
corpse," Dharmakini's point in adducing these examples is that the individual may lx: construed in multiple Wll)'S with tilde owrIap: the minddependent facton
underlie the manner that a dog interpreu his
perception of a woman's body will have little to do with the facton that
unckrtic a libertinc's intClprC:t:ltion ofsuch :l. perception. In orncr word.t, the:

man

m:u

59 Tht paUlV i" qUCltion is PVSV .... PVI,sf (G:JI,I6-JLU). I" addition 10 IOcwincpnJlly upon ddin iti.., dnamin.ation (~ Obumaklrci ho:n: c.ondudcs his ~l
tnat, Cm thoogh any ptia:pUon OW""HNy conWIIJ &II the dllla that the ob;ut can prO'l'ide
to the prrtl:i.."., the Ikwmi"uiont that the ~ mOW ITom thallblll:an: dq>ctldml
upon 1M patti",,', dUpoJirions. In rlw eumpk of tho: woman ', body. ~i

dad_',

(rVt':7'Qblif .. K:I#o l~ p'tnicb lIWIyc(lhrdoeWls, Lt.., INI w~".

body. and tnallht pnmven:an:. ~11, a
IIMi .libntilK. The pM "rads:

doc

"But why .. il that, Cm though one .... hid. p"ICCpl.w ""p"Iicnoa: of"'" n.a1;UlC of
re:aI di'''fi (_"'I'M"') thai is diRina from :aU od>cr thinp. _ c&oa ISO'! ha..,
mnemon ic: dnerminalion ofil ar wchl"
BtcauJe 1M 1t1ppIlfti", condirioou:an: IIdtins. And IhtlJo.~ . wnt tIN.p HV IMI
."",," .J,J (>~""fI1 ~M tIM"" ".ti" (.rJq.) ,.., it {rJti_iJJJ MMJ '"
,...... _ ""P;.,. ....., JiJ,;.-;.., ...,..... ("w,.);" ~ In..,.,..i_';''' --r'''- '".....do
thnr ;, n"
tpJin- IPVqlJ Altbou&b _hal apc' icl'lCltd Vi rlllit,. thai
11M no pMU and wboK ~1\IfC'o_w... it dinincl from :aI othrr tbinp. _ doa 1>01
thnmr dnermine all iu dirunciM qu:alilios (MtJ,,) beawo: JUCh I CIIlp'ition dq>cndt
Oft otbn CliUKf. ~I is. pnupt.w upcl klllX prod\ICQ ~IWI" ~tioN (.,;s.
aIJ'Y.~ in aaord with _ 'I nwnl>ll conditioni,.. for 6oOri"B dw: fomIu1ation
of oeruin _\XL Foreompk, Cm iboufih!hen: is no diKnmu in thaI lhty an:
alltttin& m.... n , Iwhm. ~,.....,. the bodyof I drad W'DfnUIJ. "'" c:onaiyu illo "'"
a wopoo:; 1. 1.....fUj '-"I W<><1:l_ i. w be 1......-n; ..,.J ( I I,unpy tluJ) o:uou:i_ it
10 be food, In fUCh aKa, 1M KUil)' of ,he inul.lca, doe concqH.w imprinu

-,,.m.,

SVAIlHA VAPRA TIJANDHA: TH E BAS IS OF INFERENC E

18S

alImpk suggests that the dog will nevrr COnMVl': of the bodY:lS hi.5 lovn.
:&J1d the libmine will never conc:tive of it :1.1 food.
Now, if these propeny-lV4bh4uas--"bdng a love,- and "being food-wm: tk rt n:essary of mt: individual in question, mrn that individu.aJ "'lUI
bear thost- predicatcs, regardless of any Otht:, predications mat may have
bttn mack. In Euroamerican philosophy, ont: ()'pical Wlly of dtmOlUmlting th:u a prMial {~ P iJ not'" rt' n~ry of cktermin~t~ individual x is
to <it:monstf:lte that in at lcut ont: pcwible casc:, xis not-P, which is under$tood to be equival~nt to <it:moll5tf:lring that it is not rru~ rhat in all cases
it is nor possible for xro be not-P." For cwnpk:, if one wished to show that
mt: coia, of my coat is not tk rt rut, one demonstrates that in at lC2St one
possible world I could own the very same coat, but the COat would not be
red. !king ud .. thU$ no t th ,,_nrialto Wt thins', identiry ~ my <:02t.
This prottdure. hoWNer, may not be feasible: in Dharmwni's philosophy for variOUl rcaJOns. Some of these reasons have to do with the fact that
the aforementioned Euroame.rican :&J1aJysis resu upon some notion of a
trans-a.sc or transworld identity in which a change of prcdicates is possible. In the c.umple of my coar, me :&J1aJysis assumes :&J1 abiliry to posit :&J1
individual that .. my coat in rwo difTuent cues, which are molt onen
understood to be twO possible worlds, and then to apply the predicate -is
red- in one ca.sc and " is not rcd~ in anomer ~. But for Dharmwni, a
prcdiart: is constructed on .he. ~is of an (:fltiry's naru~, and an t:ntiry's
narurc is the IDl4li" of its causal charxtcrinia. A change in prcdica.Cf10 whim one is ICCtIIIfIWd. thecontal. md cxhcr IUCh faaon _ the 'f'P"WtilllCOrldiriona t~r acmum for Ux ariu.t of diffcrml darrmirwns from I pa-a:pC\w eIIperimce. And beaUIC of their -nryilll ckpftI of 1!IO('i,ion ~tti) and prioriry
(~_dctmninalionsOCC\lf ~rxhm. For cwnpk. nen.hough theft
is no diffio.olCC bc:... a:n the faco ....1 the pt~ one is.mlll is ....., pun>' and !he
faco WI he if one', leoc:ha. upon .mn' .....' F.IlM meni"" one rhinb. "my rarher
if comire"; OM doa IIOl think. "my lneher is meninJ. " I .n~,......; It~ _ _
Mi"M -.w,w '"..M.~.,.' ",1iM;"" ... "..". "w.,. M.iIffti J ,.J..,Urioi.

M;._...

~ J w.lu J~u6iu )i ~ ;,.J-i-;;u J:Jt~ iti~~

,. INn,.- H1*9", ~t.; _ _

1tIJh. ""'...

"''''''''UII IIIIiMfi _

,.,.,.MnIq" tlPm ~ M.iIffti I ftm(lh~lIIiI J.".JH.". t,; ,.tlJ.ir,iit.J,J-

..,.,.". ~n".,.,,,~'; l,.tIJl riJMMn.~ fi h't",.u,.;,,;~

,,;~ 1_
,!, ,... . . .u, h~ Ir.n't"- ;" u.,. "'odJ.HJ
M. __ .~. '+rJ.H/MlI ' IqtIM 1M rtf ,...".nhlntUMJlliiWNrlll ,..., ; 'JO'li'i
,,.tIJl~~ fi"f6n"~"-""n!Nfid_""d.'; ...'"

NUIn,.,...

""*"mann,
i,; 01.

60 I am
he.... 10 arp.ommu by -r of uusworid idnlliry. S Pbnlinp (In ...,lR).
Vap""'"' (I",) oIttn a ckar md ckWIcd accIOIlnr of IUCh uswnmu.

186

FOUNDATIONS O F DHARMAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

whereby a form~rly applicable predicate is no longer applicable-thus

r~uitu a c h:l.ng~ in causal characteristics. Hence, if ptMicatts eh:l.ngc,
causal charactt:nstics change. and if caus:a.l charact~ristics change. identity
changes. h is thus not dear wbethu Dharmakini would ~ willing to ~nter
rain ew:n hypochctically the notion of a transcase individual that bnrs different prMicatei. This is in pan dcmonstraled by the fact thai, in the
examples cited above, Dhannwni p~bly does not mean for all the ptedicues to ~ contradictory: the endry in question has the ~nature" - the
causal dunctcrisria: 'Euited for the respective pcrc.civns to identify it as,
for example, "food, ~ :I. "Iowr or a "corpse. ~.,
The resistance to a tram--casc individual bearing differt:m ptedicales in
Dh.armakini'J philosophy oould even suggest mat he espouses a de "essen
rialism. That is, if we cannot alk about some individual that occurs with
diITcrem pmlic:ltel in multiple ClS(S or worlds. it Sttms tha t W(: will be
un:l.ble to deny Ih:l.t, if x is P. then il is not possible that in any case )( does
not bc:ar [he predicate P, even if the case: where )( docs bc:ar P is restricted
to a single possible wocld. But W(: would be incorrect to ascribe: tk rt essentialism to Otw-malcirri, for ew:n if we cannot show that in one case}( is P
and in another case is not-P, his system readily allows us to demonnr:ltc
that even if in some: case )( has the propc:ny-svllbhoit'll P, it is possible that
in some other ca.sc xdoes not bear the propcny-IV4bh4"", P. Th~ kqr point
here is th:l.t, N"1ns som~ N1f1'iur t'D7lJrrwn l/,oy proJ'f"l'TrSlNlbhoil'llS on 1M

lNuis oflIN tUlturt-lllllbhiva ofthaI i"'/iviJuJ. Ihlll inJi"MU/ ellnnOI ~ UliJ

to br brarin, .nJ prnUCilltJ .1 II//. Thw, in the example mentioned above,

in the ca.sc where a dog is prcscm but the li~rtinc i$ nO[. the body burs the
to this point I!u.w wntd tho: qu=ioJn of ",hrdwr aU thl'tll: of tbnt <kcnminatio<u
r lovn," "food," rod "cotpKj mwt MconWemi COftl (","')'!d). ln I private communi
arion , Strinkdlntt Iwtugosc:cd that no ~ than twOcould be-. For r:umpk, if tI'M:' body
in quation iI tn. of a dad WOInUl. tho: Jlltilf and the doc would be comet. Burinl an
improlbk rd".,.ma [0 nrophil.ia. the libminr'l pctapnuI judpnmt would havr [0 beIf~ i.~., bucd on bvth ...... t is raJ (!~ WQIILUI'. body) .oo th~ no km",r rnI (h"

61 Up

...urinnoftir ,..;,." io.n). I ... ny .,..... _ """ J>>h.hIy'V"" ,h.o, nn ~"y ..... fi&",.:,,;"n~'
Ir:u. rwo olthac judp>mu m.... be- dem>cd .. IJJJ~ (basal on rnI thinp), and hma,
[UU

the: mulripliciry of correa but II Ir:u. aathcUWIy inc:om~tibk judpnrnt still appIia. Probably put of DIwmaldni', point ~ is that ~ th_ intnpmrn----thr 00s. tho: libmilW
and tlw Mi........u ICtUI!Iy livins in differ"1 brmic workU (1M';' and IS mult, dwir
intnpfft:ltio<u differ ~I,. Iftdftd, tho: nolion of tho: ~iona of prla ; OWl Ioattd in
diff"amr bnnic worids (II in tho: OK -...lIne water can M corrcaly prroei-J as I home by
1Uh, I Waki"'tl drink by hUmaN. or noxiow ..,.... una by /'"'A) m.lIr haw IUnctionC'd u
touI am "" P-ib&.: ......1J. in the Ewo;omc,;u"
below in tht- Coodwion.
~

t~,iono.

I alI...Jc: '0 mil ~

S VA6H)VAPRATIMNDHA: T H E SASIS O F INFEREN C E

187

propeny-svahh.iva "being food ... but it doc=s not bear the proptny-ltwbhdVd
"il a lover: And when me libertine is praent but the dog is not, Ihe: body
bean [he propeny-lIIfI'bhdt.., "is a lover" but does not bear the propertysvabhtillll .. is food ...
Now, mis may seem 10 be an inadc:quate: way to show that individual )C
does not tk rt bear P, which is me same as saying that the identiry of)C is
1'\1)1 ~urily (or ~ on l nt"('.l5.urily ind utk) P. Ooe: mighl m.:linrain. for
c:umple, mat even if me property Pis not constructed. xstill has the causal
characteristics mat make it capable of bearing P, hence. since the causal
characteristics can themsdvo be construed as amounting to a prt'dicate,
Dharmwni's position still rests upon tb rt essentialism. But such a
response:: would be ignoring the:: fact that me "causal characteristics" me::m~Ives

do f\O'I

~Iy

exist: for e:x:tm ple:. in terms of the: individU.:!l' , cap::!t;.

iry to produce entain dtects. the~ u e no separate causal potentials (11&,;)

distinct from the indiv\dual iudf, nor is ~ even one sing.le::, UlllVrutrJU'Ud
nature or undifferentiated causal potential from which w Other potentials
might be constructed.t.I Instead, a1llhcsc entioQ arc consuuaed, and in the
case of spatially extended or distributed entities such as a water-jug. the
individoal iudfisQaIUUUCted.. Of eou~, 0<1 Dlumulurti'J vi _ _ can s:ay
mat. in the ~ where an individu:al xu Jl-whl"n, for ex:ll1lple. me nu<knt
sea a pC'.non and identifies him as his f.uher- it is not possible that x does
not bear P in that case. But this docs not commit DharmaK1rti to tk u
C$SCntialism, fo r it is the same as saying that, in the possible case or wond

where my coat is blue, it is not possible mat my coat is not blue.

Since DharmakIni's system docs not allow tk rt predication, and since
$Orne notion of n~i ty is al leasl implicil in the: StMbh.i_p,..,iln"JJ,., we:
might as.sume that Dharmaldrti's syste::m involves an inchoate norion of tk
Jictll na:es.sity pertaining among propmy. sWlbhtiwa. But while:: we may
usefully make:: this dai.m for hronnie purposes. we must do so with exurme
caution. lbc first reason 10 exerclsc caution hal already been pointed OUt:
an entity docs nO( aau:ally bear a propeny s""bh.i1-1t1 umil mat property
nMbIM~... hall b.ec:n c:oruuvacO in n:lalioo 10 a mind, aod if minodde:JKndent factors such as imerest arc not in place, then me propcny-slIlI'bhtivas in
question will nOt be construCted, eYen if they tk dUro stand in a n...-ncary
mation to w me other property-lIIfI'bh.i1lRS that have been constructed. In
Dharmakini's discussions of inference. this iuue is transparent, for it is
naturally assumed that one:: is indeed interested in knowing, for example,
62 See abcwe, ft . L

188

FOUNDATIONS OF D HARMAKlRT I'S PHILOSOP HY

whether or not there is:l /itt in OIlC!'S room." H~, upon .sttingsomcthing
identified as smoke, the propeny-I",,6h4VA ~produced from fire," which is
tk Jicto nnary [0 smoke. will be readily contnucred. But tht:~ arc orhcr
tk Jicto nC'5sary properties, such as being momentary (~!,jk(l), that may
not Ix constructed. since they arc irrelevant (or cvm anrithrucaJ) to the
conurns of ,he pttson drawing the infe~nu. In soon. if wt wish ro claim
that DharnulUni's system involves an implicit norion of tk tikto ncussiry.
wt must remper that daim with lhe considerable emphasis on the relationship between psychologism and onrology in his system.
An additional reason to be cautious concerning any claims for an implicit
tk JinD nC'CCSSiry in Dharmakini's system conccnu his failure to fo rmulate
and provide adequate terminology for a dislinaion bctwn nea:s.sary and
accidenw propcrtic:s, even though ~ such dislinction is dearly required
by his thcory of infcre:n. If wt conUder, for c:umple, die case of .stting
something thai I identify as smoke billowing &om my room, my abiliry to
infer the pronmate prcscncc offire from mat perception relies upon die faa:
that produc.cd from fire" is tk Jirt# nC'CCSSaty to smoke. But any givc:n
instance of smokc, such as thc onc I sec billowing from my room. has
numttOw propcny-lWfbhd_ that, although not nMc!pry to smoke, can
Ix and may acrually be constructed of that particular instance of,moh. I
may notice that the smoke is reflecting a blue light, or I may see that il is
swirling quiddy, or the shape of its doud may resemble a rhiflOCCTOS. BUI
these propcnic:s are nor tk Jim ncccssary 10 smoke: I cannot say mat, if
something is smoke. then it necessarily rcscmblc:s a rhinoceros.
Indeed, on a &w occasions Dharmakirti himself docs recognize a need
fo r such a disrincrion. For c:umple. in the basic formulation of inference
cited earlier .... Dharmilklni spccific:s that for elkct--cvKkn, 0 1\(: is oon
cerned with that number or propcrty-n.wbh.i1l45 in the cawe withOl.lI which
a some other number of propcrty-wabhall45 in the effect oouId IlOt occur. In
giving a quantilative speciflCation (with the tcrm yawul) of property1VIIbh.i-., Dhannakini answm the objcction dial. sin all the propcnies
off'ire . for c:umple. panicipalC in the production of an df"ect.such as smoke.

63,., with moll ~ 11woriots. OhamuI<ini ''''''C''ivd dw doubI: {.."u.,.Jacdcsiro.

(0 know (jijUM) ~ a 1""aX''1 prtmIliisitt lOr the fonnlibtion of an inli.(.w:a::. Sro:. lOr
aampIc. PVSV _PVI."" (G:17.u-1l.a: "'tk~,, ..~p,,1iII rtf
_1Utp..............., and. in a ,daled conlon. PV .19 with the disauaion in Tolkma/U
(191701.41-14' ). Sro: allO ch.apm I. rI.460t Ser.oo..c, II' and n..11.

,.",,,.ti,.rra

SVAIHAVAP,t..tTlBANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFEkENCE

189

:lnd liner:lll rlv. rmprnleE nf Imnlrr: arr: rqu:;al1y r:Fra.-u. onr: might IU~
mat any propeny*sr.wbh.ill# of me effect can be wed as evidence for any
property*W4bhdV4' of the caUSl!!~ As Sakyabuddhi suggests. this objection
points to the problemacic cue in which. by focusing upon me subscmcial*
ity of lmolre and the brightncu of some individual fire, one rttiuccs me
inference offirr: from smolre to an infe:rr:ncc of brightness from substantial*
ity. Glossing the beginning of Dharmwni's rr:spon~, ~kpbuddhi noles
mat such an infert:nce would dearly not Ix rdiable bcaUSl! the properties in
quesrion-substanci.ality and brighmess---<io not provide me kind of resuic*
cion no dJ uy to form a trustworthy in&rroce. That is, since substantiality
an be a propeny*SVllblmva of entities orner man smoke, it an occur even
when fire is absent. And sina not all fires are bright. a fire an Ix p~nt
even ifbrighme$f;' ahunr." 11..a, 2$ Silcy:.buddhi de$.c:ribc& m;.. MgUrncnr,
the basic point hac is that somt propnty*svabh4v.ars art not rdeY2nt to tht
infttma of fire from smolre: in the case of smoke. tht irrelevant properties
are those that, even ifcommon to aU cases of smoke, are also present in non*
smoke enlilies. And in tht c:ue of fire, the irrdC'V2nt propmies are those
mal, CVUI if applicable to $Omt fires. are not applicable to aU fires.v
On ~ik~buddh i " intetpreauon, m;.. argument :already refers 10 acme
inchoate nouon of aociden.ta1 and e:ssenti.a.l property*swbhJ_: specifically.
if one daims thai certain proIX'rties of individual fires must be ignored
baust: they are not present in all fires, one has tk ftUtD identified those
propertics as accidcntal-and nOI essential-to firr: . As for smoke, Sikya*
buddhi's intetpmation is problematic. sioce our analysis of the produc.
boMI'l(Xie of me 1INIhh.ilNlprtllibttnt/h. has already shown thai: Dhatmakirri's
formuladon of ,he au.tal rciuion il ba.scd upon a property-i.e .. the prop-

erry*WIlhh4r.w of being Mproduced from mal (caUSl!r (t.JffllnJd}-which is

common to other, nonsmou encities, such as ashes. Instead, as Dhannakirri

65 Thil iI 1M P of,he objection (PYSV ..JPVI.I.; G:}.'1-" ): "Since if w dft iI indica

Ii..., ofdx,......, beGu'1e i, ariacJ from dx a ...... dxn una: CIWe and o:ff=;arc in mIN of
aU !heir upU (--nh4) .he produar and wtw iI produad. they ""'IJIdd be Ihc indicrolfd
and rhc indialOf in rams of all Wit upecu.' (,M'i ..JII~ ~ v-M'" _thJ
p"".-.u~-m..j.ttW""'WW~ .

66 SH PVT:l1bt-7.
67

a . ~n (K."17.6ff). who build. on SlJry..buddhi', infapt"=tlon by lIOIing !lu,

!he irTCknnl propcnia arc the "common araibu,lQ"

individ~

anribum-

and Gillon ('99':SI-1I).

(~,..;

(~,..)

01 tmokc and !he

of individ~ firea. Set Wo the d"mum in Hayes

190

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTI'S PHILO SOPH V

indicatcs," his poinl is 10 eliminate properties thar are nor construed in

terms of the effea. Thw, unqualified "substantiality- cannol act as evidence for fire, bUI when construed as a propeny-lWbhillQ of smoke, it can
act as evidence. If wt: assume Ihal ar leasl pan of Dharmwni's intention
is to rekr to propeny-rntbh4wa that are necessarily concomitant with the
mere presence of smoke. then this again poinu (0 an inchoatC' distinction
bt:twn es.sential and accidental propenies.
Although lhe interpretation wt: have jWI SUggesied indicates an inchoale
accidC'ntallc:ssenriai distinction in Dharmwni's philosophy, that dininc
tion remains vague and undeveloped. lbat Dharmakini did nOt fully recognize an accidental/es.senrial distincrion is best iUWInted by what appear
to be IWO ovt:n.lJ comolS fot the US( of the rum IWbh4Wl in the sense: of
propeny. In one rype of context, the tC'rm tINIbh.ilNlopresses a propeny of
a determinate subject~ne construed as a subject 'lUll one ofilS property
IlIQbhti". such lhal the propeny in question is J, tiiao necessary to rhe
property in lenns of which Ihe individual is construed as a subject. This is
the familiar case of where an individual construed as a subject 'lUll smoke
necessarily has tM: property of being produttd fTom fire. In the second type
of conlO I. 1V1lbh4~.. opresses a propeny of an indelerminate individualtnal is, an individual that is a subjea 'fJUI individual. and nOI qua one Onts
property-lWtbh.rl~... In both cases, the (erm IVIlblNiua conveys some notion
of necessity: for a determinate subject /fUll smoke, its suablNi_ are those
properties thai all instances of smoke mw t have. BUI for an indeterminate
individual , its IlHlbhilJllS are simply all its propenies. In the former case, an
:accidentallessential distinction is clearly (C'lev-mt, bUi in [hC' latter, no such
diuinaion is possible."
Regardlm of how we construe a propeny-swblNiva in relation to an
indC'tCrmina[C' subject. our problem as imerpreters of Dharmwni's phi.
losophy is that M: often does not dearly distinguish between thai comot
68 I am rdmins 10

mnark& tNl

m.: ronrinllOllion of DlurnWdrti'. COIl\llKfl':If)' Oll dai. m<' wbn< he

m.: S"DnllI clw-aamwa or m. dI1.a may alto act ;u eicknce provided tNl

quabfoed ;u propomots of IhI: d'feCI IG:, .17-11: kI./J'I1.,-OJJ/q#fr

1i",.viItj'j i*;~ r- tbUlI]hJ1fI).

IMy

an'

m.:

..., 'Mo_utl1fl/

69 OMan paim ro ~ c:ampb in PVSV. buc an o/mour; c:qe is

RfK mal ~ Iu~
ben. diKwoins (PVI.1.: ibJln!o ...w..n..ir;fi JM.;r .""/fIu,.m
- l ' I nwM.iw
MiN )j ~MhriJ",rMbi,u ,,,. Hm:,
nwM4w in
~ ntUlNlWir ~~
IlllUl rdn- (0 ptOpfttic:I; aiindMduak, AAa !he ipi';'::nion JlvrdJHti/l would odIuwilC Ix
supnfluoua. BIll in the btfCf ~ of dw: VCIIe (IWMiw Miw -,; Miw...trhllrMbi,u).
.. I."" 01_"....... rd"..... ",wI!! . . ~ he propc .,.......",...in '1_..... Qnoo< be
COIUln.oed in ,mnt of an individual, AI _ shalI_ in QUI" w.cu..ion of nw....,~

m.:

m.:

It.,....,

SVA6HAV.VLl TI MNDHA : THE BASIS Of INfERENC E

19 1

and the mntat of a dttermiruore rubjecr. This raiSlS a difficult quenion: it

this simply a failure of clatil)' on Dharmaluni's pan (who seems to lave
only lad an inchoate notion of:an :accidema1Jcssenrial distinction). or is
mis a consciously employed rheroric:a.l technique intend~ to undermine w
notion that mere are real properties (mch as dhii11fiJtrI4, "smokencss") mat
constitute the essences of things? I find no easy answer to mis question.
Of rhi.!; much. ho~r. WI! can be JUre: for the purpo5CS of the JINIbhalJlljmllilunJh... the predicuion of "smoke" is 1181 C$$Cntiai to any individual.
but if an individual is connrued in temu of one of ia proj>(:rty-svabh41145
as a determinate subject "smoke," then it must be: possible to reliably conUNCI other property-swbhll145 :15 wdJ. including "product of fire ." The
same restriction applies muutU muunJis 10 an individu.al construed as a
5L1hj<:Ct

QW1l "fi~. "

In sum. men. me production-mode of the svabhdlldpratibalflihR :amounu

to a necessary rdation bc:twoc:n the swblNil!45 that are necessary for the cortect application of the concqn (such u "smoke1 adduced:15 the effect and
the IINIbhll!45 that are necessary for the correct application of the concept
(such as "fire") adduced as the cause. This relation is neceuary simply
~UJol' (~concq>( of the ~ ("~moke") ;c corrr:ctly ~rr1iM only if the
entity in question is produced. ttom rhu ause--in Other words. the bet of
being produad from that ca~ is implicit in the concept of me effect.

TIN Dnn-mi_tiD,. of,IN Prodwtio1lmtuU

Dtspite the problenu:and lacunae that remain in Dharmmrti's formula tion of the production-mode of the ,""bhli....p,,,,;L ..tlbA. it iJ nol ~bsurd
to claim Ihat he has made a good Stan toward clarifying the type of relation
thai must be in placr if we are 10 solve the problem of induction in :an
inferenoe from effect to cause. It should be: oIMow;, hOW'eVer. that despite
the potential usdUInc:s.s of his analysis. Dharmmrti has dearly not solved
the problem of induction in iu cntimy. For he is niU Ie.ft with the second
Wlk th.:u is involwd in fpecifying th~ 1 re:l:ation.: h" mun "'" ~bI" to formu _
late a reliable procedure for determining whether that relation is indeed in
pl:ace. The. procedure proposed by Dlurmmni relics upon a combination
of peraption and nonpcruption. and it is unde.rstood to involve either
three or five. steps." Focusing on the: five-step method, Brendan Gillon
gives a synopsis thar poinu to the buie problem in Dharmalcini's method:

191

fOUNDATIONS OP

D IIA~MAK I RTI ' S

PH ILOSO PHY

.. . Dh.1.rmakini seems to bdieYC m;iIt a 5nluence of five simple

non-rd.ationa.l observations resula in relational knowledge:. For
example, one observes (I) first mat a place has ncither smob: nor
fi fe; (1) then, whrn fire is brought, thai Ihe pl:ace has fire yet no
smo~; CJ) nat. that the: pia has both smou:and fire: (4) then,
whrn (he fire is n:moved. that the pl2CC has smoke yet no fire;
and (~) finally. mal the place has neither smob: nor fire. The
problem is m.1.( this sequence cannot dUcrimina.te betwCC'n genuine causes and spurious correbtions. Suppose one obsttves rh2t
a place Iw nather.1. donkey nor smoke. then when 2 donkey is
brought, one observes th2t me pl2CC has the donkey but still no
smob:, bUi a moment tater, onC' observes the place ( 0 have bach
the donkty:and smoke. Later. whrn mC' donkey is removed. one
observes tlur the place has no donkey hut still has smoke. And
finally, when the smoke dissipoltcs. the place has neither a donkey nor smoke. But the donkey, even though it satisfies me condirions for being the cause of smoke. is not iu cause. MOf'COVCf.
funher observations will never dimina.te the possibility of spurious correlation. But this is JUSt the induction problem .1.gain!'
Were we to supplement Gillon's evaluation with 2 more dcuiled
account, we would examine the relevance of Dharmakini's theory of pttccptual. judgment (prlltyMltplp.?!'lklbJJMnik4]ll) in this contat. Nn<enheless, even wilhout such details, Gillon leads us to the crux of the problem,
namely, that this pro<rdure docs not in itsclfindubit2bly establish the production-mode of the llJitbhdlNlprllribtt1llihL11 More precisely. the procedure
docs not give us reliable grounds for limiting which aclwions, such as
"produced-from-fire," are ncccnary to the format ion of the concept
"smob:." A p:ara.lld (:and more acute) problem will become evident :as we
consider the other mode of {he UHl6billNlpf'llti611Nihtt; identity (tiJ4tmp).
71 Gillon

(,""st).

I..aak (1m) ups m,,1 GiIJon'. a ;liWm "miucs ill oO;ea" brnUK;1 doeo noc
:KCUrlldy IkpKI Dlwmakini', IQrIhod for Ikcumini,. aUlOllity. I am indinod 10 ~
m"t Gillon', tIUUl"lMI, especiaU y his RrJI ~ rrquira Unp!o"'''I(ftt; Lasic'. own accounc
(' m :an);'. much ..... p c:Ooe: radi ... N~ Cillon'luW,... is...dW in ill IUrlt
pracnmion of lhe: buM: pobkm. one dUI' rmWlIf ~ on 1Mic:'.~: namdy, !hal
.....- of pt. p!ions .nd nonpCl ccp1ioru cannoc ptoo'idc- ~n of I causal td.Ilion
without !he Q>UI~I UIIUIIp1ion Ihai the pctptual judpnulu in question ar~ aJrady
~

"",",a:...buo.. .be.......J ch..-...:ou;.u.:.,,( .... cno.;, iu in <[_;."".. Wi .............. aMUrnfKion.

Gillon'. donkq will mntinuc 10 be a 1lIOII

WI ... dcomc

au.

SVA!H.iVAPRATJ6ANOHA , THE BASIS OF INFERENCE

19}

3.3 On,1N /&l.atioluhip bdwun Propvt] alui Nature

have focused on dkct-cvidcna. which is based on the
production-mode of the tINlbhliVllpratibandha. As. we rum to tINlbhtiva-cvidena. which is based on the identity (lIlJatm)4) mode. we will sec that
most of the poino we have made are still relevant. Before. hoWCVtt. applym! dK:K puinu IU swbhoiiIR"'CYiucna:, we nccJ fint tv D<UllillC lUurc ~Iy
the relationship between naturc-svabhliVlf and property-swbhdVL To do
50, let: us begin by reviewing an impornuH contemporary interpretation of
thoe two sef1SCS of wabhava.
The interpretation I have in mind is the one proposed by Ernst Steinkdlncr, and if is an interpretation that I have followed in large pan. Steinkcllncr h;u u!ucd th;;1II the lWU ~n)Q uf w"bhlilJ~ MmatureM;;lIId ~
"propertyM--correspond to an omologica1M usage and a "logical- usage in
Dharmakirti's works. For Steinkcllncr. the "ontological" usage of wabhtilJ(l
(what I call the "nature-rlJ(lbh4114") is connected to the causal compltt
(Mtuumatri), or marc particularly, "the power of thin&, ro function as a
principle of their existence. "71 When he first di$CU$$C$ the ontological sense
of sIMbhdll4, he begins by citing Dharmaklrri's cla.im mat the uhimarcly
rca.I iJ that which is capable of telic function ." He then notcs:
Up to this point

W(

... rhis suitability of the thing [to fuUiU a function \ is based on

the Sl.!abhavtL Whether a thing fulfi lls a functi on IZunodo)"
depends on whether it has the corresponding SVilbh4l1tL" That

71 SlrinkdIne:r (1971:1.09): "In ok. OntOlosie bakultl wUbi...fJ die KnIt lin
,".v.., :Us Prinzip ihra Sri.... ... "

Din~,

:w

7. P'VI.I~ and PVSV.Jril. (G:.... r6) : "'lbM which it~of I~ funaion uan wo
mudy raJ t:hin& ror dail aIont ill the chuaaeriaOc WI disUngu4hes dw: raJ and dw: unraJ,
namely, WI the: former hal dw apacify for tdic: function,...t.ik the: lmer doer noc t...-..: thaI
~Iy. [lol

,.,."..nhi"-

W .. ,. ~fl l iM1ff tN hi IItfItJWHltllur

t.~.".,....m,.I ..).,.'ll M ~r.j a .the: uuWuion by Suinkdlra (1",:1'), n..10).

n; Strinlcdlra inlendi mal z-d be ukm ill both dw JeNcI he allribulCl 10

both -pi" and "fUnaion..- 5 1911:11""11), n..,.

.,,;,..

i.t"., at

76 StrinIcdlner MlppotDIlhiI daim wida the ~ tnsubcion /iQm PVSV (1911, n.Il):
"Abo thar alone brinp abouc Iht" fiiliiUmcm of iI function/pi only beaWC;1 poueff:ts
the corTaPOOdilllt 1NMiN. [Auch du eint: YOIIbrin".fit" ErfbJIq de5 Z..-kes nUl. wei!
er den m~endm SnbhlVll baim; G:.,.I,ff. .... )i u".~". ,.nNM.h.,."u

"'" "',.,,1

194

fO U/'liOATlO/'li S O f O HARMAKIRTI' S PHILOSOPUY

which has no IVtlbhilllll cannol fulfi ll a goal and il is therefore

not real,"
Stcinkdlner's poinl here iJ that SlNIbhtilltl in the ontological SC'nSC' refers to
the causal capacity of the: entity in question, As he pUC!: it, "Ihe IVtlbh41N1
[i,e" Ihe narurt-IVtlbiMtltlj of a thing is its powa (14kti) 10 bring about an
dna (luiryotpWlIJI),'" And since a thing u ultimatdy mal only if il produces effects, dw SC'nSC' of IVtlbhtiva (i,e., as nature) can be called "ontological," inasmuch as an entity devoid of causal capacity, being incapable of
effects, would be: unral. It is imponant 10 nore thai SreinkeLIner's "ontological" interpl'tt.ltion stl'CSSC'S the notion of narure-SJI4bhil14 as an entity's
causal potentials. h might mnd'orc appear that he tw not taken account
of the fact that an entiry's narurt-n.vbh.illll must be: the warrant fo r propmy-SVtlbh.iwa such as "produced from that [causer (ujjll"J4) which ate
based upon an enrity's causes, rama than its dftas. N~lw, although
Sldnkdlner does indttd stress Ihe nOlion of causal potential, he clearly
means that an mrity's narurt-nwbhtiAf also mcompasses an enticy's causes."
In addition to nOling that an entity's naturt-SJI4bh4"" mUS! :lCCOunl fo r
propmy-SVtlbhtiwa rclattd to iu causes as well as iu potential effccu, we
have also seen that an entity's rutture--lWIbhi"" should not' be: construed as
an ultimately real entity: there is no fUrure of things distina /Tom the things
themsdves. InStead, a nature-lWIbhmr U simply a special ca.se of an adusion (IIJilvrtri). At first gJance, Stdnkdlna's use of the word "ontologica.l"
mighl suggest rnat he would nOI agKC with this formulation. BUI in facl.
Sldnkdlner maintain5 that cvc.n in its "onlologica.l" SC'IlX, wtlbbdfI(J does
"otrrf~ to Mlme ulrim:udy R21 carnal power, and he aIel argu~t1 from
Dharmwrti's work that demonSlflue that poinr,- SrdnkeUna goa on 10
Ay that, rather than corres:pooding to lOme ultimatdy mal mtity in .he
world. the ~ onlological" IVllbhl,... ~ ... can ooly hi: mnnl in a figuralive
SC'1lX in order to aprcss the state of affain Ihat many causes, which are
Stcinkdlntt (1'71!1h- IIJ):' ... m- ~I ckI Dinp hmLhl auf dmI SvabhI....
Ob rin
'riMll Zwa:Ic niWll,' tww; auuehlicllidr. datIOn 3b, ob os den ~
S3bbM hat..

Din,

78 Scrinltdlntt (lJlI:IIJ): S..,bhba rinG DiIlJ'G itc die Knfi

'to<'J.Ubri"F"

(~). aM

Wirkuns Mr

79 5 Sc.rillkdlntt', diJcuaion of PVSV .J PVI.I67a-< (Inl: IU , n .)} and )4). Set: aUo
~, n.}).

80 Son: Strinl"d.",. ('71.,,16) .aud .... u...u... uf OI .... "..Io.i,,;

G:',,7- II) ,

(rv...6.... ..t I"VSV "" ,';.q

SVA8HAI'APRATIMNDHA: THE BA SIS OF IN FERENCE

19'

amditioncd mrough their own ~pKtivt: causes. produce on~ and me: sam~
effect. ... , In the case of an ~ntity such as a water-j ug, a nature-w.ofMdw is
mus -a mere, conv~ni~nt sign {Siv1lfor (h~ f..ct that th~ appa~nt 'working together' of the causes for the production of a single effect is 10 be
grounded exclusively on the bcginningkss prOnditioning (of those causes)
by {theirl respti~ determinate causc:s.~"
Since Sicinkcltncr mainf:lin.'l thai thc~ il no ult.imateiy rc::al naturesvahhirNlof things, he would presumably:agree Wt this ItNlbhiflll must also
be conltructed in some fashion . And in Dharm:akirti's philosophy construction always involves the process of exclusion described in his a~ha
theory. Of course, this does not mean that, in constructing a thing's
narure-ltNlbhoiw, the mind of the perceiver alone simply creates the ca.wa.I
characteriniCl th:u correspond ro the th ing'." n:Ul1rc. Thin~ :lri.~ from
renncted auses and produce resuicted effects ~Icss of whether their
capacity" to do so has been conttptualiud."
We have undcrsrood 5reinkdlner [Q mean that a n.:nure-lvabhoit'll i5 itSelf
an ultimatdy unrc:a.l entity conStructed through exclusions, and on this
basis I am largely in ~t with him on tht: discinClion bmvttn the twO
~nses of nMbhJv... One :l.$pecl . however, of SIe;nkellnc,'r prescnf:ltion
need.r funhcr expbn:uion. That U, in dc5cnbing nature:l.$ the ontologia.!"
mCllling of IVtlbh.i1llJ, Steinkellner could be misinterpreted as suggesting
that an entity's ontological" svabbiva (itt narurc-svabh.iva) is somcnow
"mote real" than its "1ogic:al" wabh411i1S (iu propcny-svabhillilS).
Now, as Steinkdlner has shown (and :as we M.~ also noted), many passages in Dharmaldni's worXs do indeed indiate that an entity's propcrtyrwlhiM- are ontologically . ubordin,ue to iu IUture-.m<IMo.i..... The d(;lUlt

of these are passages in which Dharm:ak.ini justifies the conJtruaion of

exdwioru :as the warrantt {p,a,,!"inimitlA} for words. Th:1;[ is, even without a tc:al univ~rW-such as "bl uencss" (,oriuuv.r}-iost2nriated in all the
entities in question. one can correctly and wcfulJy apply a word such ali
81 S.. inkdlrou (1'71:,16); ... I..."n d iu n... in iibtn _

Si,,_ .,mc.in...in. urn J;c

T.u.adlC III bn.richnen, daB mchrac UrAdoea, die: aUf ih,en cpn UlAChc:n hcnlll
Cfluprhn>d bcd.inll lind, rin wod d~ Wi"'",,! bmoorbri~.

82 S,nnkdlncr ('nr:117): "(So ~ "'=II ckt 'Svabhlva des Unxhcn.kompkus .. .abJ

bIoBa, ~ue ...... Si&d fur die T auachr:, doll ..... ochrinban: 'Zusammcn""irun' OIl
Uruchm lUI" Enaog\Ing riner ~ Wirku"8 auadtlidUich _ lin anfant;lo-n Von.\UJCrnI"I _ Cf1tspitd"nd bacimmendcn UrsadIcn tu Iqri1ndcn itt.'
IIJ It II impoItant to r:a1l that

dUo cirdc.

-cao.uc-- and - dfca- an :aln:ldylXM'lCC'pU- We ann.oI; ~

196

FOU NDATI ONS OF DHAkMAKl k T I 'S PH ILOSOPH Y

blue to all those unique particulan because the oclusion in question is

formed on rhe basis of the faCt that each entity has "by its nature" the
same {tkA} caw:a.l fullCtion."
In this way. the reality of the prope:rry-swbh.iv.. -blueness," for CX2fTlpic, is subordinate to the disrinccivt naturt-n.wbhdwr of each entity dut
produces an effect that can be conceptualized as -blue." But we have Ittn
that neither a propmy-swbhdVA nor :ll narurc--svabhdwr can be an ultimately
rcaI particular 'IlIA It'llbh.iva.ft and it is thus 00( at all clear that ~ terms
should be rmlred with different dcgrccs of ontoklgical commitment. If we
do so, we effectively posit a third ~ of reality: first, the ultimate reality
of paniculars; second. the convcmional reality of ProiXrry-/lAIIbhiVAS (such
as -blucncu') constructed through exclusions; and .hird, some quasi-ultimatc reality of an entity's narurc--IJl4bh.iva. which is nO( a particular but is
somehow "morc real" than an cnory's propcrry-/wrbhdV4S." There is no
evidence for such a thrcd"old schema in Dhannakini's work, but it would
surely be incvitabk if we difft:rentiate the ontological commitments appliable to propcny-swbhdNS and nature-/V4bhitlOlS.
But if neither a naturc--wabhRwr nor a propcrry-swbh.iv. is ultimately
real, how are we ( 0 explain what seems ( 0 be the ontological grounding of
an entity's propcnia in its naturd To attempt such an explanation, let us
begin with a few heuristic terms.

&1M HnirUtU- TtrmI

Earlier, I remarked that:ll clear oplanation of the distinction and relationship belWttn propcny-/wrbhd"" and nature-swblM~... cannot be derived
directly from Dharmakini's own works. We could. of course. stop our
inquiry al this point and simply nott the incomplctcnc:s.s of Dharmakini's
&4 a . SlrinkdJlICI' (J~"71--47J) . .Xc abo 1M di .... 1SIion of ~ of cfka in LM ~
..x:..... ~tr (119ft).
85 TIw; qualiliation flUllMiIbtI ... is man! {O ac:coum for cues whtr-e 1M infinilaimal..,lidcJ of a WlIltr ju&. b aampk. misht br: ~ propmy.n .. fw- of I WlIfa---jlll- &11
wIIik mis is indetd a caw....tltre -ptVf>t' I,._MINI ~ indirKd, 10 a panicW.v, 10 mn."'" 1M inlinill:oirnal partidc::o in mil fashion, OM mlUl ODhClCPlua/iK lhmI as piOptnin by
."..,.of an cu:I..... (i.~ , LM ~ of tba.e inlinilQimal puticIc. !hat do IlOl have LM
QUA] dwamrisla of 1M infinitclinul panidc:r that afT dle pmptny-, ...M.h. of a WlIleI'juJ) . .Xc~. n-4J.
86 CIc:uIy. ohc ,h,,.., rUfIDI ulao;l ..w..r-~ ~! ' AI .,... and ~~! "t4rI-J
afT IlOl cand>obIa lOr 1M threJoid rality requited hen, .ina: both P'optIlrnwt~ 'w and
~
nature-nwMIN

SVAIIHAvA'RATI6AftlDHA , T HE BASIS OF I NFEREN CE

197

philosophy. But I beliNt that we can profiably eomine these ideas further
by formulating an explanation that. while based on his philosophy, highlightS ideas or th~ries that att only implicit in his work.
II ICCffiS that me best way to attempt an explanation is to coin a handful ofheurmic temu. Although they have no dear Sanslui6c equivalents,
these temu wiU prove useful for seeing how cm::a.in aspetts of Dharmak.im'5
"P"I-thmry:art: rt:lev2nt to interpreting the senses of IIJiIbJuJlNI in his phi-

Jo.ophy.
The first tttm is ..bstr4dioll, which we can define as concept-formation
through the exclusion process. The procc:u of :abstraction is based upon an
enol)' conmued as:a subject. Ttut is, whcn we ab5tr:act Mhaving branches"
from ,he concept "nee: we are "selecting" or :abstr:acting amLin causal
ct..:.r:ocrr.ri~io fmm wi rh in rhe ror.:aliry nf fM CloDl du~l!f'driol ",!lr d: rho-:
narure-twbh.twt of a "uee," and we construct the predicate "having
branchcs" on me lwis of those abltracted causal characteristics.
Abstraction, however, can also rest upon anomer process that Dharmakim dearly discusses, although he provides no single term for it. To dcscribt
this process, I will introduce a KCOnd heuristic rerm, /nuptJuJ ctM!ncttlrt.
Through W pl"OCrU of concqnu:a.l ~~. individuals rh:u :iN' ..ceu _
ally distinct art: construed :is if they wert: aU COlUtitutive of :a single indi_
vidual. Hencc, in the case of "having branches; the formation of rh:l[
predicate is implicidy pru:eded by the conceptual coaIc:scc:na of the infinitesimal paniclc:s in a manner mat colUlrua; Ihem in tenns of the loality
of causal cluraattistia that is the n:arurt--JVIlbh4J11fof wn:l[ we call a "tree."
This "coaIescencc" must be conceptual, because although me physical char:>C'tenst>c. of rhof.e inlinitesim:&l panidet tilow us to co ruickr them,... arUing from ceruin auses and conditions SO:is to have ccm.in common efli:cu.
we are not oblixnJ to consider those infinitesimal panicles in that fashion;
we can, if we choose. consickr each infinitesimal particle individually.
Hen, when we abstract properties such as "having branches" from a
" tll'(:,~ we art: not $latting with a "tree" as a given. Instead. th~ M
tree- must
:&1.0 be concepru:tlly constructed. This means that the form :u;o n of the
predicate Mhaving branches" as :applied to a "tree- acrually has rwo aspcc;u:

fim. one c:onceprually coaIcscc:s those infinitesimal panicles by considering

them in temu of ccmLin causal characteristics (i.e. those resuicted [0 wh:ar
we call a "tree"), and second, one abstraas the predic ue "having branches"
from that [o[:a.iity of causal charaaeristia iuelf.
It is impomun to distinguilh co nc.epru:al coale&eenc:e from :mother fun -

damental concqxual process in the "pN;w-theory. I will call mis process

t98

fOUNOATI O NS O F OHAlMAKlllT" s PHILOSOP HY

iJmtificilric", the a mnrual of discrete instances of, for cnmple, a ~ trcc" as

the "same (,kA). In concq>ruaI coalescence, the discrete entities in qucstion
arc construed as forming a single individual or inn-ancc. they are all the
Msame" in thar they all constitute a single (tIt4) thing. In "identification" the
discrete entities are themselves instltnoes, and their.sameness consists macly
of the predionion of the same univcnalto them without their necessarily
participating in any single entity: all tree~irutanccS are the "s:lIT1e" in rnat
one: pre:dicues "crecness" of them. This me:ans, of course:, that concc:pmai
coaIe:sce:nce can justify identification: if individual infinitcsimal particles
an: undustood as constitutive of a ~ tlcc '" the: infinitesimal particles may be
treated individually as the "same" in lh:u each is an "infinitesimal panicle
of a u'tt." It is important to nott th~t ide:ntificatK>n plays.a ccmnl role in
Dharmakirri', ilpo/M-thCOry. for any concqlt that is construed as rtte:rring
to more: dun one irucmcc mwt involve: ide:ntifio tion.
TIN SlihorJiNftilJ"

ofPropmy U1 N.tIIIY

If we rurn now to the: application of the: .aforementioncd he:uristic te:rms to

the twO meanings of swbht111t1, we find that the:y (:Dable: w to explain how
an entity's prope:ny~n...bhivas are: suoordin2le: to iu narure-slltlbhiw with~
OUt having 10 suppose: some greate:r ontologica1 commiUTIe:D[ 10 natureWilbh4114. The: ke:y poim here: is 10 me account of the rdationships among
concq>a, causal cru.nctttlstics, panicul.atS and onlologica1 d.aims.
We: have: alrc.ady noted mat for Dharmaldtti, a prope:tty~svabhill4, such
as "being composed of manu," is a concept based upon re:althings. Thus,
he: is effeclivdy malOng a claim for some: type of omologjca1 reality under~
lying the eorttCt application of that concept. He: supportS thar claim by
appealing 10 the notion of a narure-JVilbMva. which we can understand .as
a predicate: that refers to the lotality of me: causal characterislics of the
subject to which that pred ica [~ is .applied. But that subject's nalureJI/Ilbhiivil is nor in iudf a rnI entity; inste:ad, it is a concept based upon
inriividu.al [Unicu\ars "working logtthe.r- to havr the effectS in question.
Hence, if an appca1lo.an entity's narure-tIJIlbh.iva is succc:ssfui in (:Xplain~
ing the: ontologica:l ba!u tor formulating iu prope:ny-JIJIlbhdvm:. we must
be able to demonsrnue: how a narure-svabhdl/ll is itself reducible in all cases
10 parricul.al1.
We an do so by applying the: [(:tAtS discussed above. Conside:r, for exampk. (h~ pro~ "h:lving b .... nch~- U :;IppliM to:l ~ u~. " The. ontological
basis for the predication of that property is that a ~ Utt by its nature

SVAIHAVAI'RATIJANDHA: THE BA SIS O F IN FEREN CE

199

(lVIlhhillmA) is capable: of producing [he: dfc:cts that att the: basis for [he:
abstraction of th:u predicne. By conceptually reverting this proccu of
abstraction, we can sec th:u the proptrty-Jlldbh4v.r ~having branches is
~uciblc to the: narure-lVII'hh41f4 of the subject that it qualifies. Thus, we
can undertcand that propc-rty-lvabb.iva as subordinate to that naturc-

swbM/HI..
Tlut na~swbh.iva itself. however, is nothing but the totality of causal
characterinia tNt is the ntt itsdf. Thus, for an ap~ to the "Utt's narurcIVIlbhliva ~ to scrve as the ontological ground for applying the predicate
"having branches," we must dcmonnrate (he ontological grounds for me
"uC'C itself. We do so by noting that the concept of a "tree" is formed by
conceptually coalescing individual infinitesimal panicles that have gained
cemUn causal porentials due ro me mannc:r in which they have been produced. In this way, by ~ucing the concept "uC'C iudf ro the causal potenliab of panicularJ mal have been produced in a certain fashion , we can
ground our ontological cla.ims in paniculars-thc only u1timatdy raI entities in Dharmwnj'J system-withom hyposwiring some real naturctlNZbh41Jt1 of the ~ trte."
In me end, what we have formubtcd is a principle of ontolofi~4' miwtum that appears 10 underlie Dharmakini'J system." Proptnies can be
reduced to the narure-swbh.iv.r of the Jubjea (dIM,.",in) that they qualify.
This amounts to a reduction of the proptnics ro (he subjea iudf, since its
rnllru~swbh.i1l4 is a marker for the totality of the cau.sal c.haracteristia mal
is tNt subject. And if Dharma1drri's ontology does noc allow mat subjt
iuelf 10 be a particular, a consinent onrotogy would require that it be
reduccd to the particulars mat, by arising from a certain type of cau.sal compia, account fo r the cau.sal potentials of that subject.
One of the advan~ of this way of interpreting Dharma1drri's we of
tIIIIbh.i1Jll is mat it also cn:abks us to actlOunt for an implicit notion of "levels" or "ordcrJ" of concepts in Dharmakirri's work. A concept at me loweSt kw:1. which Yo'(: might call a "first-ordcr" concept, is one that invol\U
only one of the conceptual procesSC$ mentioned above. One can argue mat
"infinitesimal particle." for example, is a firJt-Qrdcr concept. On the External Rnlist view, an infinitesimll panicle is itself a particular, so cooccptual
37 Hcrc w.:.bouId rcalI Fnncolob.ctvalioN on Dtwmaklni'. ml..aift mru...d (Franco
UX>l).

88 K.tIl.If1II (1'79 and 1991) aIJlIC' thai. hicnrchy of uni-w. is c:kariy mjuiml at leal! by
Oip>1p', vm.ion of tbe ..,..thco.y.

FO UNDATION S O F OHAIlMAKIR.T[ 'S PHILOSO PHY

coalescence is not pan of the formation of dllll concept: unlike tm- colleq)!
" tltt,- th~ conttpt "infinitesimal partid~- does not rtqui~ us to conJtru~
multipl~ parric.uJ.an as constituting a singl~ ~ntity. And if we treat an "infinitesimal particle" as a subject. this conupc is of course consuuaed. but nol
through absmcrion, Indeed. tilt on1ycoocqxual plOCt$S applicabI~ to "infinitesimal particl~ - would be )d~Juificuion , for m:u concept does present each
infinitesimal p.1rtide as the same: (rIfA) as all other infinitesimal particla.
If Dhannakirri's philosophy is 10 remain coh~rent. this norion of "levels"
or "onkn" of concepts sms ineviable, for it appears (0 be th~ only solution to the problem of tht subjca-shifi. d.i.scusscd earli('l". This shin is the one
thaI occun between the natut'e--nwbh.tllll' of, for a2mpl~. a "water-jug" and
th~ natut'e--sPllbhiv.r of an individual that ell" be construed as a particular
instance of a "Woller-jug." This problem becomes most obvious when we
choose to translate this usage of nwbhilNlu "e:ssencc." To be specific, we will
find it difficuh to account for why an individual identified as a "Woller-jug"
appears to have rwo naruru or "C5S('nces": on th~ on~ hand, as an instl.nCt
of a "Woller-jug." mat individual has the "essencc of a warer-jug. which
accountS for the faa dlln we can colTlXtly abstraa propenks such as "impttmanence" from it. But on the other hand, that individual bnn; other properties. such as "bdng mad~ in KiSi," thaI are acddemal to a "w:l.ter-jug. If
~ other prediCltCS art: comctlyapplkd to thal individual, then
must
be warnmed by itS essence: by iu csstntt (swbh4l1t1J11) that individual must
have the df"tas that enable us 10 abslf2Ct the property "made in KiSi.Now, sincc "made in KiSi" is accidental to being a "water-jug." we cannOI say thaI il is th~ naturc-JWbhilloll' or "cs.scncc" of thaI individual qUll
w:l.t"-jug to be made in KiSi, for water-jugs arc not neccuarily made in
KiSi. But it is the nature-lVtIbhtilNl or "essence" of that individual 'lUll individual to be made in KifI. This ~double-essencc~ would lead us to conclude Ihat mat individual is "essentially" or "by its nature" (swblMlIt"NI)
both "made in Kali" and nOI "made in KiIi"!
By appealing to som~ implicit notion of orders or 1~1s of concepu in
Dturmakirci', thought, we can avoid this contradictory imposition of (W()
narure-swblMV4S or -es.smces- in fWD ways. First, by understanding ~n

mer

89"ftw, p'obkm of ~ rubjt.dtift IUId dM: ~ problem of dx COlUmKoon of a wbjt as an aduded allity (II]l"fU4J susgau t~t MltiW ~tni dM: nuua whal he:
claimed that 1M - conup!' of 'o"',..;... .. was ~. lIalUal ro
onloklpcal bdidi of
,t.., [!'nurh AWnllncidan'- ('9RS: 1.1~: ~i,rd r.,.1~ ' II9TfDO. 1\.19).

me

90 Noc( thaI, aina both w ~ ~ anributtd in ~ of tho: totality of w o:ntity'.

aUAI dunctcriHia.. thil contJadierion annoc ~ raoI:I by appcaJil'lllO a elqoI'Y..u.ifi.

SVA6HAVAI'RA TlIMNDHA; THE BASIS O F INFEREN CE

101

na[~swbh.iVllor

-C5Se"ncc as an adwion. we can sec trutt both of thoc

natu~"",bh4&!115 or "C5Se"nces," although not identK:al, rould apply to the
same individual without contradiction. We can claim that we are aaualIy
dealing with twO different subjectS involving diffaem roncqxual procCSKS
in their formation. Seoond, by employing the notion of "orden" of ronapa, we can sec trutt a w,uer-jug's naturc-swbh6V11 (the total causal ehar:aoeriniec a"f1'!OM nf a "warer_jug'") H:II a higher nrdn rhan an indivillual',

nature-swbhiw (the (Ow causal duracteriJlics of [rutl individual). The

w:lter-jug- na tu~ is abstr:aaro from the individual-natUre, and by nO(
c:hoOIiing to concqnualitt w individual as a subjttt IJUil w.lICf-jUg. one
effectively reduces me warer-jug-nuurc (the tow causal charxteristics of
any water-jug) 10 me individual-nature (me toral causal characteristics of
that individual) .

Finally, the intaptn2tion of IIMbhiw as "nature- p~med here prevents unain problenu in the interpretacion of WtlbM"" in the compound
nNlbhdlNlprtltilHl1Ulh4. $reinkeUner has noted that, although we can point to
no dear gloss for the rompound in Dharmakirri's own works, 1IMbh.i1Nl in
this conlcxt mould mean what he calli cssmcc and [ prefer to call natureWllMA __ - The buic poim here is lhat if IWIbhli,wp",Ii&.,ulh., is me:llU 10
provide a buH "in re:dity" for the indubitability of weU-formed inferences,
then we should expect the term to refer in some way to the causal functionality on me basis of which the temu of an infetcnce are construCted. We
can supplement this cxplanation by noting that the "essencc of a distribUted entity such as a "twt is reducible to the paniculars th,u participate in
that causal complex, We arc thw not kft with the postulation of some
th.ird level o r .-.Iiry bcn.een panicvJan IlIld universals.
This intcrpreution allows US to take account ofShoryii. }(atsun', initial
response to Sto nkcllner's presentation of IINlbhlwpratibaNihA. In 1986,
Kauura remarked:
Although Sreinkdlner explicidy Statts that fINIbhilNl in this compound li.e., SINIM.i_,,..,tiIM-'M can only h.ave the onrologic:al
meaning. viz. C5Se"ncc, I wouJd ramer take it to mean "concept,"
the second meaning of 1INl6hiva used in logical COntOU as
pointed out by Stc:inkdlner him5Cif. According to DhannalUni's
ontological conviction mat everything is momentaI)', a relation
IUd! aJ tM Madhyatmb lC'dIniquc of applyinll:WO -aamca- to lhinp ttom
U'ta 01 m.. .-- moIilia..

pcnp-

101

FOU NDATI O NS O F D HAlMAK l llT I'S PH ILOSO PH Y

or connection is possible nO( in reality but only in the conceptual uni~rse because only conapa, being understood as -adu
lion of others~ (an]iipom.). an howe the nature of the
"universals" (silmJillJll) of other systems of Indian philosophy.
Thus Wlfbhtiva in nwbhilltlpratibanJha primarily denotes ~ uni
versa]- as exemplified by smokc-.nCS5 or fire-ness conuprually
constructed by Ittrylpolur. in other words, the concept of smoke
or fire."
tn a subsequent article, Kao:ura recounts a discussion that he held with
S[einkdlner on this issue;
During the second IntcrnarKmai Dhannakini Conference held
in Vienna, June [989, we [i.e., S [dnkcll ~t and Karswa\ h2d a
deb;..[e on this topic and came 10 rca.liu: that thecc were at least
twO oppming pmi[ions; namdy, one held th.at SVIIbhtivapratibaNihll represented the nate of affitirs in reality (how thinp .arc
and how they.arc connmed with e.ach other) and the other held
that the term meant .a logical concqn. i.e., the necessary connection be~n the prob.ans and me probandum (thus, somewhat
synonymous with av;tulbhtiwJvyipri). Steinkellner playfully
named the former sambandhtlv4lill and the Laner vyiptivitlA..,
Katsura goes on fO (XInfess trult his research on PV4 h2d convened" him
to the so.alled JII",lNzrulhttlNi4a. This conversion m.akes good sense, for Ka[sun's earlier position did not take adequate .aCCOUnt of the ontological
appeal implicit in the norion of nNlbhilltlpwibltnJh.. Ncvmheless, some of
his earlier suspicions wecc indeed well founded , for as we h.ave sn,
tINIbhlllltl ("natucc) in SVIIbhivapraribandhtt cannot iudf be .a panicular,
hence, it must be an exclusion, as Ka[liun argued in his earlier artide. With
the presmtation I haW' given here, we can follow Kauura's initial inruirion
white noting tlur. li~ properry-n!ltbhtiVdli arc nru:curiiy higher order (XIncepts than the narure-tINIbhiva on which they are based. SVIIbhtivtl as naturC'
can still amount to an appeal fO some underlying ontological reality.

9 L Kaaura (1916:17).

92 Kaaun. (1"l:)6-J]).

SVABHAVAPRA TJ.fANDHA: T H E IlASIS Of INFE REN CE

103

3.4 SV2bhava-t'Vidtnc( QnJ th( Idmtiry.-motk

In me interprwilion of trHIbhtilHl that I have just presented, one notion
appc:an to be commonly assumed by interpmen ofDharnulci rri-namcly,
m.e principle of ontological mluction. But while some such norion is clearly
implicit in Dharmwrti's wone, me aaa role it plays an be panlcularly difficult in one comext; namely, the identity relation that underlies trHIbha,.
evidence. Ln us begin by s12ting the basic form of such an inkn!nce based
on Dharmwrri', usual srock example:
This is a ttee because it is a sugar maple,"
O r, to use another rypical example:

A w.uer-jug il impermanent because it is produced.

As we have nored, Dharmwni's formulation of the svabhtivapratibtlnJha
aims to provide an invariable rule (niyJlm4) for the pav:nion relatinn that
evidence in any well formed
must penain ~ (he prrdic:ne and
inference. If in me first example such a relation il in plac:r, we mould always
be able to say mat if a ming "is a sugar maple," it also nasa rily "is a ttee,"
And likewise in the second example. such a rC'lation gua~tces mat if a
thing " il produced," it nessarily "is impermanent..... For Dharmakirti.
our ability to invariably infer me pmlicue from the evidence in such c:asa
iJ w:lrnnrl by thil kind o f ~I :u ; on: n:omely, a l1 ...bht1W1I'~l2ti""..Jh., in the
mode of "identi ty" (t.itJ4tmJll), But what is meant by "identity" here~

tnc

931 haw ct.o.m ben: to ~ Dlwmaklm ', UIU.i cwnplr of ~ to"wp nupk:
whidt ihouJd be ~ funilia! It lease to rndm in Nonh AmcriQ.

u.c. prcdicariorlJ (i.e., -il . uu" ramn than iI a "lfft") "",.,..,.

twO functions, I'lfR. I mean CO !how mal "lrft:
if "p.,.,...cd by a ....ooallli", in

94 ~ indwion of -is" in

nnI

nomina,;", QIC (~). iI ~ KUIIf;:1I a prtdicatc or property (JNmu) .ppI>cd

10 JUbjea (IN,,,,;,,) in JU;lrmml "a~ of dw wb;ect" (IN_ ivtlritt; _ chapocr 1,
n. 11,). Second, 1M inclusion of -is" _
to mark. IUC of an abAlXI ~ (Mbty ...'1'9-J.
We o;an mw.void awkward nroIopsma. aJCh ill "produan_" (ip.unw). 1i~1IOI
(Ii~"""'). and 10 00. A1thoup mil ~ doe. diminalc 1M diKinaion betw rrn sm emmu "r:lpreWw of IM .w,;.a" and
"a~ of dw pdiaIC" (IN- .M6_). dw
1mW\00: dilkom berw.cn t'-IU'~U is lOt in 00 directly rdcvant co the 1:>Iw.......
kim ', inr~lial theo.y, This iI :lmply dcrnotmn ml by.he faa thll DNnrWdn i In::IIQ the
~ _~u u !op;ally imm:hanpble itllirp!. "'~ and "'~1Iu,._,!, (_
PVSV .JPVI,1S: G"4J.II: .l'llISbml in 1M appendu),

me..

W4

FOUNDA TI ONS OF DHHMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPH Y

~r the ~rs, Steinkdlner has uimirably culled from Dharmakini's

texts all of the passages relevam ro interpreting Dharmwrri's use of the

term ~ identity" Given Dharmwni's reliance upon causality as a means to
ground his onrology, it is not surprising ro find that in many of these passaga, the notion of ~ idcmity~ is also based at least partially on causality. In
the case of "is impermanem and ~is produced, for example, Dharmakirri
claims that the causes that give rise to 2n entity that "is produced" art
euctly the causes Wt give risc to tnat entity's Mimpermanence." In other
words, if an entity ~is produced, ~ no further causes are needed for irs
"impermanence" because the causes that mm it "produced" also rmkc it
"imperm2Mnt." lndeed, ifboth "is produced" and "is impermanent" are to
be: propeny-mlohdvas of the entity in question. they mwt be: there from
th2t entiry's inception, for otherwise 2 thing would have to ch2nge iI'S
nature-sVll'bh.i!.l<:l, which is by definition unch:tngeable. In orner words, if me
tow ity of the causal chU2Cteristia (i.e., the n2rure-mlohdva) of mat entity
cannot provide the warnnt for the ctmstruaion of me propenies "is impermanent" and "is produced." then those propenies will never be: 2pplicable
to that individual.
How is this an argument for the "identity" of "is impermanent" and "is
produced" ~ It would.sm mat, thw far. Dharmakini appeals to something
qui te similar ro the principle of ontological reduction that I luve coined
above.. llut is. the aUSC'S that give rise to an instance of a "water-jug." for
example. can be: used as the basis for correctly abstracting the COnttpl'S of
both "is impermanent" and "is produced" from that "water-jug." Thw,
rhr:se: abnrxted propttties can be reduced to the subject or propcny-bc:an:r
(JharminJ from which they have been abstnaed. The twO propcnies ~
th us "identical- in that they ~ in fact nothing but that a;,.rmin itself.
The same analysis an be applied to thl." case of " is a tree" and -is a sugar
maple." If \rt can eorrecdy say of an individual th2t it -is 2 sugar maple"
and also th2t il "is a tra:: then what \rt mean is that no funher causes are
n~ry for us to apply one of thest> predicates [ 0 it. In shon. both of
these: p~icates are ontologically reducible to the subject that they qualify.91
Now, if this ontological reduction were all th2t Dharmakin i meant by
"identity,- then we could raise numerow criticisms against this notion.
O ne obviow critici5m is that, on thi5 theory, me inferentt could be: interpreted as a tautology.'" If the predicate to be pro~n (uldhyttJ 2nd the eviR

9S Xc !w:.flI hoo) ror a diocwaion of IOITK rdn3nt pm IF

96 This p'obkm is ""'p'_d throu&b

rhelmn".nj~(PVSV .JPYI.)9).

$ VAAHAVAPRA TI.!ANOHA; THE BASIS O F INFEREN C E

dena' iH~ in f..a nnrologK::ally id~nrica.l . 2nd if we mue no specification

beyond this slatement of ontologic:al idc:nrity, then we 2fe in dfect saying
"This is 2 cree bec:ause it is a tree." Dlwmakirri takes this criticism sc:riousiy,
and his entire elcunus on the llpoh..theory in the SVllvrffl can be understood as a response to this issue. Hi.! argument comcs down to the claim
that. in an inference by way of JV4bhoiVII-eVidence, me t'Yidence 2nd predial", "rr indeed onrolngia lly identic!' bur they do not hav~ the same
mc::aning (,mha) bec:ausr. they art fonned on the basis of o:cluding different "deIimiten" (IIwuJhj).n Although we do not have the spaer to ev:alwte
Dharmakini's :argument fully. the basic treatmr.nt of the 4'poh.,..du:oty that
I have presented earlier should SUggesl that chis aspect of his philosophy is
not implausible.
T "urology iJ i n~ " problem rh:u Dh"rm~kirTi m"~1 "void. hur if i ~
probably nO{ the most serious criticism that ensues when me identity-mode
is undcntood to consist merely of onmlogic:al reduction. To be spific, if
all we mean by the identity-mode is mat me evidence and the predicate are
ontologic:ally reducible to the subject (dhllrmill) that they qualify, Ihen this
would justify a bevy of flawed inferences. For example, mere reduction
would '"-TUbl... w: co ny. "This i." U t t becau~ ic is exii(~nl. " After :011, the
propel't)'-lV4bh.rlV4 "o:iJtence" (IIInJ) and ~ treeness" (vrit!IIItW) "re both
reducible to the subject (tiharmill) that they qualify.
An obvious response to this point is to say that such an infettnce would
nor pass the (cst for negative concomitance (lIJ1l1i"ltllU]4pri). That is, one
would observe (hat "coSten" am be present where there is no "tlttness,"
But the problem here is th2( this is falli ng back on "mere observation , ~
which on Dhannakini', view canool provide:l ~u fo r ,he rype o f n e<:a:sary relation berwecn subjecr and predicte Ihat he seeks. Dharmakirti
rejectS such cases by noring thaI one rim fonnulate spurious inferences that
"" pass the tCSt for nep(ive concomitance and yet "" 1I0t gWtantec the
presence of the predicate with the evidence.'Y1 Sec d ......c, .. u ],-u ',

98 1M ~ in qU$ion is PVSV MPVl.Jbb (G:U.......1S):

lhr: adusion of !he evidmoe in ~ casa is aublished bcaUK il is DOC

pClCched whm.he prcdic:m in qllCStion it: DOC ptQml."
If tiN II"-t;.,, .{,IN nrIkttcr i" ~,..., UUI ;, nl4&IiJiNJ thN ..p '"'It.JnnwttH". tbn. wit] _..JJ rrJrUIi"""-iJt-.w (J,qn.u) ., ""iskUi"f! (PVI,.bIll
f aampk. 1OITOtOI'M: mi&h' infer. lba.t pia: offrui, au ripe bccawc they au DOC
dilfffm. in color [from 1Iw; ,1Sted OMr Of -rMx au JWft1 beaUR.hey COITW from
1Iw; AIM btandI [u the temd _I"; IIw wpporung aamplc is tha.1hcy au ripe or

fO UNDATION S Of DHARMAdRT I'S PHILOSOPHY

To sec bow one can formu late a spurious infcren of this kind. we
must fint rtca.Il that the subject (Jh4,..".in) of the proposition to be inferred
(prtuij U) cannot iudfbe the basis for formulating tbe twO forms of concomir2nc:c: we must appeal to CUC$ other than those included in the
proposition to be proven." With this in mind. Dbarmakini asks us to
consider a case where we have some nuits of a min kind before us. and
we arc seeking those: mat bave a puticular taSte. Let us assume. as Dharma
kini implies. that (he tasre we scdc is a p,;micularly delicious taSte that this

m.iu

_
jllH liu the ~ I ha~ jw:! Q!tfI: III mis illkrena, aU doe: _
III' ripe
of ... hich one ...ut.e. 1'0 speak han lIftn ir>dudcd ill lhe ,ubjc-n under diKuaion

~ TN. brinr; rhc cate, ~ the pm;Iicuc in quation (~;. IMX p<aml,
m.. ..,.;.0....,. .. __ .-ceiw.cl. H_ ...... could m.. inklColloCC .... mi I di-w

Some IpbiloooJli...-nauch II '~I claim, In mil f)'pC of litw.rion. doe: _""

in hcm"c(IUI1:a$CII of !he p!opt'nJ adcIooed II C"id.mcc iI incondwM blol.lK
onot IWpC'CII ~I i. mipi be coon.umandni by. puupilon of one of dot ITWu in
q.....ion.
&u .hil QlIIIIOI be .he (:tK blo_ therr iI no
counrnmandinr; pe.-upnW
~III of III object thai baa hem akt;n II the wbtea of III inu.ua.
Bu ..,..,., lain rime one ..upl .... ot:. po:rupcU&l ~ 01 the t::Iltt .ha ..uJ
coon,cmund
a d lUion ofthc ide .... in hctn"8"na>UI o:ua. .
If one ~ ...... such tn. . . . . . . ohe caw. then one .. commirou.s ohe fi...h 01
Oot:iUtmSion bloUK thm:........ud be no ncu:uuy ratriaion (,,~ WI guan&I~ the abKnu 01. oowumnandilll perorption in oche. lituatiool II wdl,IWithour
admitting ....U"....,..ti~I_(:I.1I, ..;Imit only tiw. a o.IttmUy acrivt: insllu,
mental ...-armatl C'Otu"mmrw;Is ,hil faulty aduaion of dot nidma. If_not 1ft
ac:tit.wu-maI ~ 10 oountermand the~, tbm inrcm- would be unreli
able: in aU I:a$CII (bcco'I" IllY "iduo mip' ~IIWIy be ooun,crmandoed).
Insuad of relying on simple nonob.crvalMwl. ,~aclusloa of cbt ~ from
<hr ....~.""' ....,... o:aoca requires the kind oicaWn.y (-.,.J~ in. thc~ .
mioution .~ is the c:sublisIunml of rht cvidma only when the probandum is
aablUhftI. OM nd! .hit kind 01 anainty blowe. although ~ _y atabIw.
mrouch ooo .......... . Mion (.-"""'".JJ",)I~' I~ r.-idcna- i. abtml in IOInC M(.......
- . . CMU. i. q DOl the~ poon" thaI m., mdma, ..t.ich iI not (d-oown 10 be)
ItbmIIO the probmdum (by ..... y of _i\ ...,..,;.....Jborj, it ab.ml in all ....,......
- . . cuu. Hena. due ,odoubt. mm, iI no codwion of r=Wnokr~ in ....
~ caws, al>d mil on&kes io: midading. ("'''01 wH6.Jw "..,.,t.",'\>lr ~

....m

,ha.

.,.-., ..;; IMMrHJI '""rffl!I f7krlNfMtwI.,..u;.i>; .,,,, I,,.,,,Ji'UhI rW:r rdtu

,-ullJ '''''If'l'I1Jhj "" ~i1UqM/ d,u''''',,..w-.tr1tIJ H ~ i,; I ."qi

"~1MqII,.1q1U",!" ~

..ftIltJiiblw ;.01,-,..... I' ;'; ...,..".

",.MHd,~

...

,..."..,.Lf'hiM.a..,.~"'iIJ""I /~~'lrlliair / ~U.wJ ..ti

err l MN ~ .1i,~ 1 ~rnn~MJIIIh 1.,-" "..~",

4jj6d'_ 1 4"r'!4IMJJMM _".~ 1 "",tirJur ,., sWUM nw WiiM ...", iii

whiMh-..,.. ~ 1."y.J.",6hb ,., ilwriJ .iU., .j#y~ 4f7 .".ti""".
,Q,.q. uJ..... ~ ~ ..".ti~ ~~"IM}"' .

"a: Tillcmaru: (I"a:Si and n.61.

S VAIHAVAPRATIIANDHA : T HE BA SI S O F I NFEREN CE

10']

kind offruit can have whe:n ripe. Dhaflnakjrti th~n asks us to consider twO
different contats. The first contot il; me practical simation of deciding
which fruia on a particular trrc will have thai special tll5fe. We are uncon
cemed wilh other fruia, and thus the fru its on this tree form the ~ntirety
of our induction domain. With this in mind, we taste a few fruiu from all
the branches of the nrc, and we find that the fruits we sdected from a
particular branch all have Ihal delicious tasle, while allihe others we have
lUted do not. Pointing to that one branch, we then infer, "all thc:sc fruits
ha~ that delicious tute beaUS( they come from mat same branch, like the
ones we ha~ lUted, and unlike all me others.- Now, it just 50 happens
that only that branch does have delicious tasting fruits (perhaps only mat
bra.nch received enough light), Hence, when we make our test for ncg:acive
conoomiWlCC. we will tk flU"tD f:a..i11O find any instance m.u contradiCts our
inference: any fruit that f:a..ils 10 be on that branch will aho fail to have
thaI lUte. But docs mil; mean that all the fruiu on that branch do have ,hat
WIt:?

[n the IeCOnd comar, we are anending to the color of the fruiu in front
of us. I..e!: us suppose mal they are blueberries. and that we sce:k sweet ones.
We tlSte a few of various hues, and OUt observations suggest that all blueberria with a panicular bluebladc hue are SWtt( , while mhers do not.
Selecting the remaining benies of tlUt color, we claim, -all these blueberries are SWttC beaUS( they have mat same blue-black shade.- Now, only
blueberries of that shade (I'" be sweet, 50 we have selected all of me possible candtdatc:s as pan of our proposition 10 be proven . For this reason, tk
flUt4 the inference passes the test for negative concomitance: in me sample
available for obstrvacion, all non-blue-black blueberries are not S'A"Oet , Thus,
in both thil; contat and me one above, we might assume our inf'c.rences (0
be wdl formed.
Any bluebeny-gourmand, however, knows that even a blue-black blueberry can be brusquely bitter. But if we posit an idemi), relation on the
baJi.s of ontologic:aJ reduaion, we would have: no way of avoiding this type
off.illacious inference. The color and lUte may be "identical" in clm they
are both reducible to the subject that they qualify. But if we happen to inirialIy formulate the positive: concomitance of the pervasion relation bctwccn
color and taste on the basil; or blueberri~ that are both bluc--black and
sweet, we would ha~ no reason," UtOrtjcct that formulation. One might
claim mal the sample should be broadened beforr we draw our inference,
but broa<kning the sample docs not in itself guaramcc me reliabili), of (he
pervasion relation. We could be' unlucky (or luckf.) and encounter only

108

fO UNDATION S Of DIIAIM AKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

delicious. blue-black blueberries.,01 h is for this reason that Dharmmni

goes as far as (0 say that fW" II li"IU obtmJlltio" can be sufficient (0 establish a pervasion rt:lalion betwttn Ihe evidence and prrdic ue. For Dharmakini, the vicWitudes of the sampl( arc irrelevant if one knows that a
slIIIbh4l!11prlllibllndhll is in place. and without a svll6h4Vi1prlltl'lMndhil,
broadening the sample would be usdcss....
Thus, Dharmakini's explicit ~jection of the type ofimproperly formed
in~nce we have JUSt discussed suongly suggtsU that ontological reduction
cannol in itselfbe whal he means by the identiry-mode of the swbhilNJprlltI'IJIINlhII. With this in mind, we can murn to Dharmmrti's definition of
100 1 h.ovc . 'mpLined .he dioaouion h"u. If ............ 0

mo<e ..,.,......e, .... m .... ..,..

n(l(e duol . fOl' Dbannalrlni (PVI.9-IO and PVSV .J tTl. : G '7.1H.1j). Ihis type of infet
ma acllwly employJ dl"CCI...,.,idmc.c, It.~ta. Dh'llmU;ni is obIi&cd 10 inletpr~ this
type of inJ"nm aJ hued..pt'ln It.",.;,.m. because. according 10 the Abhidharma typal.
OIY tlAl nc adopu and Miapu 10 Erlemal Rnlism, infinilesimal panicles of color au
di"intl tTom ;nfinilctimal panicla of wle. B UI as Haya and Gillon have Ihown
(lnl :6,), Ihis I)'IK of inf"raKe (whi.eh ""1.9-10 is an infercDU fTom lute 10 color)
implicitly rd~ on the U$I: of nw.... ~. w-hcrcby one infen lhocapacity (J'I';O '1)
oflhe roIot-alomllO act aJ IlIpportlnl con4illoru for 11K IUIC... IO ....., 'T'he dJffi:...,nce In
11K prae... ~_I"" in(vcnec (rom color 10 lU!e--i. mal we ue no< oaly infernn,.
capacilY, INI abo the fact thai lhal Clpa(i'Y is fUUy aclival~. Thus, 10 Hilt !he praenl
aamplc mort prcciKly. _Ihoold nolt tim 11K IWO proptr'Y.,. Mi... in qualion lit
no< ptM";n;nl '0 the blueberry, INI r:nhrr 10 11K colot-atonu of 1M blueberry. Spif'i.
cally. Ihe ptrccption of color allows one It> dettnnine thaI thOM: coloralOIN an: actUally
1\>CIled in a aU$:ll compla whereby Ih.1 potmtial ;1 activated. HenO', the property.
,.,.Mi"., actinl &I rvidenu in our IirJbciow infcuna: of lurt from color illnc proptrty
of "ha.,inl,n activated potcrtliallo produo;c I d'llk-bJuc color." Ulinr; Ihil Pf0pt.'Y
,.bbtI"", II cvkIma:, another propmynwMl"", is fallariouJ,ly infarm, namc:ly. <he: property 'tV~N. "having an xliv,ued potenlw 10 aa II the: lupporting condil;"n for the
produaion of a ddicious Wft. " 1M complai!)' of thit: infem>(:l' .t.ouId mili il c:ka, why
Dharmakirti rudy chootct: 10 ~nl his anaIysil'l an 1I0mk Irvd. It ;1 woMh nocifl&
that . unlike the ;nfercnu from color 10 WI(, 1M in~na (rom color [0 ".ipt" is more
dim;tly an in(crena by .....iN..,..rvidelKc. inee "nptons" refen 10 Itlrufotmltion
applicable 10 all thc .IOms corulrued as the blueberl')'.
tOJ",.. .. ,I.e

p. ofdai.... ...ch_

... nodUn,othet [than an ~I or a propmy._MoIJW\ an lCfVC II cvi.oknu bcc:ow,c

!he I'CllricUon of unx.:ompanim non-ariA"I docs not pcmoin 10 IIAI w'-c: naNre iI
not rcbled 10 11K probandum. IPVSV .J""1.I0l G:I.I1-IJ.: /inUI"~ Iwt..rp....8
iti l .".ti4-Jl'wwWM_Jt;";NlW.""",ry.1IIibh4N~ .

....,

... one who acuptt thai, by muon of Ihe ntpln of one: crtti!}' bud! II fire}.
another [1UCb 1I1fnOI<e] 11 otp.rd. mUll ..... MUpI ma. ohcn: is 0IHnc: ._~;.

tntitiea. [PYSV PVI.14: G:IO.l)-14: .. , .......

";~IIJ'6""rffl" w,.,. ,.,. Ukit lAd ~ 'rvJrAtiINihII ." q~ .
HNiIM peruininl M""ccn lhote

JWO

SVAlIHA"VAPRATIlIANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFEREN CE

w.bJMw-cvidence and sec dut. in :I. lubder form. the s:ame concern is evident. Thu is, the ddinition itsdfis cr:afted in a manner dut aims to move
beyond the simple onrologial identity ofevkIc:nce to predicate. Let us recall
me definicion as found in PrllmrIt;Jllvirttiltll:

ALso, a WIIbhlVll is evidence for a WIIbhlllll mat is invariably consequent from its mere (wui",1I) p~ncc [PVI.t.cd).la
For the purposes of moving beyond the omologial identity of predicu e and evidence, the key term in this definition is milrll ("mere" or
"jUSt"). In employing this term, Dharmakini pointS nOt only to me on[C)logical unity of prtdica[e and cvidelXX, but also the way in which the evidenoe is "n ;nVll r;"ble "indiator" (samAlta) of rhe predic:ue. 1W2r.l, in
COntra5110 my inlerprttalion, has argued mu the term mlilrll (" mere" or
"just") should be understood such
it reftts jWltO the ontological idenlity of predicate (wIhya) and evidence (uitJJumll):

m:u

From this [definicion] il is eviden, that [he uitih}1lS occurrrncc

in aocord:anoe with the mere amena of the ,.dha"a does nor
mail the logical proposition th:at the SiUJhyII is alW2Y' restricted
by [he JIitJhJl1lll and hence pervaded by the laner, but it refers to
the factw.l relation in which the sdtihyIl arises always from the

s::ame cause as thu of the s4JhJl1lll.'OJ

I inuead argue WI the lerm "mete" does indeed have:l. "logical" functh"l it restricu the evidence ro the pn:dieate by p~en t
ing both overextension (IltiprllSllntll) and under-ntension (nft1lll14).
Consider the case of a thing that we identify as :I. "sugar maple." O n
Dharrnakini'l formulation of lVIlbh.iua-cvidencc. if we wish [0 s:ay that this
thing "is a uec" because i, "is:l. sup maple." we mwt maintain mat the
-mere" (wui".,,) pracntt of the propcny-sw-bh.iJloll' adduced as evidence ("is
"IU(Pl' maple) is sufficient to demolUtf2te me pre:senc.e of the propcrtyWIlbhtWtt to be proven (-is a tree1. The qualifier -mere" has rwo functions.
cion, in the

K'nR'

102 PVI.ud.; /om4I~6b.M)i WM"""",,,..,,,.,..Jhi"; Ii In my I~tion I ~ suppIiN d., _ for I>h.iw )i. whidI h;u; limply been dickd for ronric:al fQSOfIl. S SrcinkdIner
(.996>. who poinu otn that d.,
=cu."". "*,..., ddinicioN round in Dharmaldrti'.
tal ~ aU xmantiall, rquivalmt.

nnou.

10) I....... (100)'64).

1.10

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAIMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

First, it tdls us that omcr propc-ny-SWbh.oiV45 atC irrdC'V1Ult to our inference.

Thc sugar maplc we adduce as an aamplc may be' tcn mC'tcrs tall, or irs
leaves may be' red; but thc:sc propc-rty-wabhdVQS arc irrcJcnnt to our concern. We nttd only abS[r.lct from the thing in question the propertywabhAm, " is a sugar maple.~ This prcvenrs an under-cxtcnsion: if we believe:
th21 along with "is a sugar maplc~ \OI'C must supply "is (en metcrs tall" in
order to cotablish that a sugar maple is a tret , then shon sugar maplt$ will
no longer be in the domain of similar c::asa. Thus, if thc individual that is
the subject of the inference happens CO be shan. we will not be able to infer
that it "is a tree." For this reason. allowing (he propc:ny-wabhd'w "is ten
meters taW ro be a parr of or a supplement to the evidence "is a sugar
maple" incurs an under-atension beause it impropc-rly acludt$ some
"sugar maples" from consideration as "trees."
Second, mere~ tells us rhar if we mwt supply other prope:rty-wabh4V45
before we can affirm the presence of the predicate. then OUf cvidence is not
in itself sufficient to demonsuate the prc:scnce of the predicate. For example, if in lieu of "is a sugar maple" we use the prope:rty-wabh4va "is leafy."
we migtu attempt to infer: !"his is a tree bttause it is leafy: We would
find . howC'VC't, counterexamples, such as ivy. which are leafy, but not a tree.
Thus. "is leafy" would require supple~ntation with other properties before
it could serve:as cvidcnce for "is a tree." In other words, "is leafy" includes
roo many cues, and if we use it as evidence, we incur an overextension.
If my interpretation of "mere- in me definition of svablmlW-CVidence is
correct, then we have already moved a consider.lble way toward an understanding of the identity-mode that does not test on simple ontological
reduction of evidence to pmiicue (or both to the subject). Dh.arm.akirti's
:answer, in shon, is [0 place a restriction (through the qualifier "mere") on
the type of properry-wablNifltf that we can adduce as cvidC'ntt. Even though
the various sugar m:aples that we sec may h:ave m:any divergent qualitiC$height, le:af color. sweetness of s:ap-thc:sc qualities will be excluded by
-mcre bec::awe they:arc irrdC'V1Ult to inferring -is:a Utt," either bcc:a"SC' they
improperly adude some individu:als from the dom:ain of "is :a (fCC," or
bec::ause they impropc-rly include some individuals in that domain.
A.J we shall sec, this dose reading of Dharm:akini's definition of
IWI'blNiva-cvidentt suggesu me way mu we must understand the identitymode, if we:arc to :avoid accusing Dharm:akini of an egregious logical error.
But even if our te:ading of "mere'" is helpful, we must f:att the problem of
ft

lInd~n:f:lndin8

Dh:lrm:lkini's (lwn st::l remenu in r... brinn

to

,h... idcntiry.

mode. Panicularly important-and p:anicularly tfoublesome-are the

SVA8HAVA,..rATllIANDHA : THE BASIS Of INfEREN CE

1.11

many passago: whert DharmalUni describes the rdation of - identi(),"

(t4J4rm".J by employing ,he compound lA'tJV4bh4v_lilera.lly, "thallVabJuV4"--or some equivalent compound (/iUlbJuva, twrman, elc.).
Most commonly, he spifies mal tht property adduced as evidence r is:ll
supr maple; can be qualified:lS "dUI-SVilbhdVII" in rd.ation to me property [0 be provc:n ("is.a uee) .... The t\N'Ofold question th:lt arises !let(' is:
how do ~ conslrue the relationship bnwttn the compound's t\N'O members (i.e., "thai" and "'SVilbh411tl1 in mtx cases. and what is the rdevant
meaning of SVilbh4wi
Without going into great philological detail, ~ can note th:lll there are
only (WO vi.able alternatives for the interpretation of"thu-swbhdV4." The
compound either means - Ihe tvabhiva of that" (tllSyilllHlbh.tiva!JJ. or it
means - having that:lS ia SVilbhtiva" {)iUJII tilt Wilbh.tiIlilINl!JJ. Thus, if we are
speaking of the evidence, and ~ 52y that it is "tMt-n.'J1bh.iva" in rtl:lltion
to me predioll:. then ~ mean either that the evidence is the predicate's
IIHIbh.iw., or th:lllthe evidence has the predicate :lS ils wabhdva. With thtx
possibilities in mind. ~ can tben inlcrpt('t Ihe meaning of IIIflbhiWl :IS
either narure-.wabhit'il or propertY-.nwbh.tiV4. Combining these beton, we
arrive at four possibilities for the intC!prct2tion of:ll statement in the form
"the evidence is Ul1wIbhiWl in relation to the predicate."'"
Option I.
Option :z..

The evidence is the predicate's n:lture-lVilbh.tiVil.

The evidence is the predicale's property-SVilbh4V4.

,.._M.l...

1004 On me ...., of
and if:!: cqlli...mn1S (apialty wilhb.), Itt smnkdlna
Cl9I41 md IWllIa (UIClJ). Cua when dICK mmpoondJ afr applied as doacriprioru of the
n'idmor; Ilte 1M II"1(II( .devanl 10 (M,lf ddaulion, bul dICK (Ompollnds may alto Km' ;U
doacriprioru of dw: pmIigIR 10 "" provm (~ 1M larm ~ is puticubriy
common wirh EN: compound .. 4b1v... For. paDdip.u.:~. Itt PVSV -J1'\'1.I 7-J.8:

G:I'.''''):
WIwn

tnc pmiic.&tc 10 "" p~ is in thai w;lYacabIishcd 10 ""either the I,..]Ml..

of dw: CYidmor Of EN: ClUK of the Mdmcr, rhm IlI"Ir an IftIOfI as f'oIIo-: ifimP'"IIWICrIOr itat..ml in attrtain thl"" then tlw thin(l. no! conwuaaf; iffin: .a!.rnl.
~. oolmOltr. Ono: can raJ(\II in this WIIylxo;.o...., (Iti) dw: pmlic:au: in qtlaOOn
is m.. evidence', ....IIIM.. or (:I""" A.nd ~ c:ouId tho: ~ IICXlIr wirtlClUl ill
ClWD p'.,t, -nwMiw Of CKIfC HCIIOe. tm withoola Ioxw (~). tlw Mp!;~
COftCOmitana (:In Rill br ckmorulnlrci in me contrary ewnpk . [,..IIM' ,~.n~
vAt,.... 1tm......H wllti:y.nWMl.r Itp+ ~ _ M-Iti UJ".,..Mht ell ~-; 1
ttUiJI ftj ,. "'JIII_.w.. ..",., wl l Mm.,!, ,....,. _ .........IJIO blJlO ...'""""'"' ~
it] lirwJ- IllllMt"/fllfi ~"u ,_;.o".,ti ..,.,ti'"4 iI.
1050_SlCinkdhxr (I~n).

111

FOU N DATIO NS OF DHAI.MAKIRTI S PHILOSO PHY

Option j . 'Ille evidena hilS the pm:licau~:as its narurt-w.rtbhoiWl.

Option 4. Th~ evidena has Ihe pralicace:as its property-w.rtbh.iv#.
In his comments on the compound t4lJlJIlbh.iva, Stonkdlner has argued
that (he (erm w.rtbJuilHl shouLd ~ner.ally ~ im~rpmed:as M~na. M i.e.
nuure-w.rtbhilHl, and this leaves us with JUSt option J and option 3. Applying this 10 our c:xample and using the term M~ naM for nature-w.rtbhdva,
we would say for option 1: M
being a sugar maple Mis tIN amlct of "being a
t~. MOr, if we restate mis in morc: ordinary language, " 10 be a sugar maple
is the c:uenc:c of being a tree. MIn contrast. if we favo r option j , we would
say that "being a sugar maple has "being a (fCC" tIS ;lJ amlct. Again. in
ordinary language: "to be a sugar maple is in CS5Cf1a to be a t~. M
In much of his work on me topic Steink.c:llnc:r appc:ar$ to favor oplion I ,
and on this reading, Dharmakirti would claim that Mto be a sugar maple is
th~ wc:na ofbt:ing a t~. " I. While such a rc::lding U philologically possible fOf 201 lcasl some cues of the compound t4tsVt1bJuiva, from a logical
poinl of view, this interprcution is potenlially disastrous.
To sec:: what is disaSlfous here, it is important 10 recall a foew points. On
Dharmakirti's view. a predicate (such :as Mis a sugar maple") is consuUctc:d
on the basis of the causal ehaDcteristics of things. And if a predicate is
properly applied to its subjc:ct (dJMmrirl) . Ihen thai subject must luw: the
causal characteristics required for the cons[tuaion of that prcdicale. In
ilion, if we call something a "sugar maple," rlut entity must luvc all the
causal chancterUtics opc:ctc:d of a "sugar maple." And when we speak of a
narurc-JV4bhivli' or M~na" (w.rtbhivll) of a trC(', we are rcfc:rring m the
totality of the causal characrerisrics that an individual qUil lrcc-insttIla
must have. By dr.twing together these notions, we an derive the following
equivalencies:
M

"is a sugar mapkM the causal characteristics required

for the conmucrion of me
predicate. "is a sugar maple."

106 5rcinkdlncr (l97,.:u6):

And ~ [DhamWdnil .ddt in apWnins thisdcfin.ition: "A1tboush 1M IWO propcnies

'"'" difkrnM by rirtur 01 mal djtT.:rma: whKh c:onaiIu in me dilkrml~ (",.urtti
.. ~ {""" tho: ............'" uti"" I",Ut"'''11 ILl", i.Jn,;,'6 ......... '11 io {....By (_
"''''J nothillJ bul tM hCO: (_INN~) of 1M indKalecl [propcuil (/itfti)."
lHB:p'fF. .,m,-""'JJ(#i~ ~bMk )i _
~..."., .

S VA6HAVAI'MTI&A ND HA: TH! BASIS OF I NFERENCE

"the essence of a

Irct~

1.1}

me IOui caus:al ch:anacristics that

:any utt-inst:ance must have.

"being:ll. sugar maple" me cauul chancteristia required

is "the rsscnce of a trtt" for the conmuaion of lhe
prrdiCltr "iJ: a.lug:u maplr" iJ: rM
totaliry of caus:al char:acteriJ:ria
that :any ttrc insrance must have.

Thus, if the evidence (" is a sugar maple1 is the osence of the prcdicate to
M prov~n ("is :I I~"), we :In' actually claiming WI all treef are Jugar
maples. which leaves us with a numbcr of Stidty problenu. For cx:ampk.
rithrr maple syrup can br mw from the 53p of:an oak trtt; or oaks arc not
acrually mcs; or if oW arc trees but do not produce maple ~p, lhen the
ability to produce the sap ror maple syrup is not one of the caus:al charactcristia required for an individual to bc call~ a "sugar maple." The probI('m h('r(' i. :on inversion of thc relation between pe!'V2ded (vy4P7"') 2o.l'id
pervader (.".JMlt~). ,''' To usc the 11fl~ o f cxlclUionl, we cxpect the evidence to bc of smaller or equal extension wim me pred.icue. such that all
insranca of the evidence arc included in the CJ:tension of the predicate: as
in the claim, "all sugar maples are trees." But in ba. by ~ying that the evidence is the rsscnce of the pr~ica le, we have inven~ this relationship,
which amounu 10 me claim, "alltree5 are sugar maples."
A pocsible f'QIp<)rue to thil: criticil:m is

(0

m:um:un WI it improperly

COnslNeS :an abstract predicate (such as ~tl!4, "is a ncc" or "uttnessi

as having an essr:ncc. Since such predicateS arc in faa aclusions, they cannot be said to have an essence al all.' Although J agree with this criticism,
one must bc careful about interpreting iq implkations. OcarIy. U " Irter\CS5"
cannot ilJdfbcaran esKna. then we mwt modify our inlcrprcution orthc
cbim Wt the evidence is chana('ri~ :;II wlSWI,/M",. relali~ 10 rhe predicale. Instead, we should undcrsttnd the compound tllulMbhd". not in
terms of the evidence and predicate thcmsdves, but r.Hher in lerms of
instances that instantiate the evidence and prcdicate. Thus, in lieu of say
1fJ7 Hays fim Iflade. point of dW ...., h 9l7;,11- JU). and lwua (&00,", has cbrifoal
numbn of iu nmifoadono..

114

FOUNDATION S OF DHAIlMAKiIlTr5 PHILOSOPH Y

ing, as in option I above, ~T0 be a sugar maple is me astntt of being a

tr. ~ ~ could mo~ accuratdy say. "an instancc of a sugar maple is the
essence of an inSlancc of a tree.~ But even though this way of opressing
option I guards againSt me reification of predicates or (S$(nc:cs, it does not
solve the basic problem al hand: ~ Still arc saying ,hat if some individual
is a nee, then it is in (S$(nce a sugar maple. Hence, oaks produce me sap
for maple syrup, or oaks art not trees, or sugar maples do not produtt the
up for maple syrup.
Thus. it should by now be dear lhat in Sl2.temenu about me identirymode of Ihe IWIhhill!ltpralibtlnJJu., ,he compound ulIJvahhil"" and its
cquivalrn u cannal mean ,hal ,he propcny adduced as evidence is the
"(S$(nce~ (i.e. the naru~-lWhhaWl) of me property to be proven. If al all
possible. we should intcrprn the oompound as oplion-l. according 10 which
the: evidencc has the (S$(ncc of mal predicate. Or. to be mo~ precise. Wf:
should say. -rhat which iT15tanti:u:es me evidentt-propcrty has the essence
or narure-J1.ItIhhoiw of that which instantiates me predicare."
Slated in this &.shion. it may appear (har we arc talking aboul (W() diffetell( iT15Clllciates here: thai which iT15tantiates the cvidentt. and that.....ruch
inscamiates the predicare. This is where "ontological reduction" becomes
rdevam. That U. although an ontological identiry does not exhaust ,he
meaning of all sraremcnu involving tlflSVAhhallll, it is dearly pan of what
th~ Slatcmenu mean . The property serving as evidenc.c and ,he propcrry
to be inferred are reducible to the very same entity: "being a tree" and
"being a sugar maple" arc ontologicaUy idenrica.l, for they arc nOI actually
diStinct from the individual in question. Thus. an individual that instantiares the evickncc ("being a supr maple") iI itself an individual that insl2.lltiales the predicate ("being a tree"). but in me specific sense ,hal, by vinue
of instllntiaring the evidence nICing a maple~) , it has the (S$(ncc of the
predicate-insOInce (i.e. it has the (S$(nC( of a ~ (reel .
With the equivalencies sketched above. and whh the proviso that we arc
speaking here of instances and not JUSt abstract predicates, ~ can modify
our I':Ihl~

al;

follows:

the subject of "is a sugar maple". an individual that has me causal

chancterisdcs required for the
oonnruction of the predicate,
"is a sugac maple."

SVA6HAVAPRATI&A.NDHA: TH BASIS OF INFERENCE

~nct of a

l iS

trot " me toflli causa.! du.racte:rutia mat

any uinstance mwt have.

me subject of Mis a supr maple:" .. an individual that has the: causal

has the: "essence of a tree" characteristics required for the
consrrucrion of the: predicate
"is a sugar maple" has the total
causal characteristics mal any
Utt instal1ce mWI have:.
Thus. to $[ate mis point slighdy diffcre:ndy, on ow example: the ide:ntitymode of the svabhavapratiba"am, meanl mat, if we an correctly apply the
prcdK:atc Mis a sugar maple" to some individual, then mat individual nce-

cswiIy has me causal characteristia required for the construction of the

predK:ate "is a tree,"
If this is indeed what Dharmakini means by the identity-mode of
svabhavapratibandhiz, it seems to make good sense, Since conceptS arc constructed on t~ bam of an entity's caual chaT2Cl'erisria , if we in~ from the
COTnO' predication of one concept thar anocher concept is also correctly
predicable of the same entity. then presumably ~ arc saying mat the causal
characteristics necessary fo r the predication of me former concept include
all the causal charaaeristia necessary for the predication of the larter concept. We could mus argue mat. in this rcprd. Dharmaltirri is employing a
different kind of reduction, namdy. a ronptual ffductWn whereby more
complex concepti that are b:ueci upon a wider ~8e of C2un.l chancteri,",
cia arc reducible (0 simpler conceptS mat are bued upon a narro~r nngc.
Thus, since "is a sugar maple" can be reduced in this way to "is a tree." we
can infer that any given individual is a 1rt:C if it is a sugar maple.
Fonunatdy, this analysis of me compound tAtsViIbhliva (i.e., oprion): the
evidence has the predicate as itS narure-sWlbhava) accounts for me vast
m.. jority of C':Ise: in which Dharmakirri employs: i( 10 describe the identity_

mode. and it conforms 10 a careful reading of me tenn - mere" in his definicion of the svabhilJllt-a'idence, Option ) also avoid,., llnributing to
Dharmwni a position that is complndy untenable from a logical point of
view. whereby the desired logical relation berwn evidence 2nd prtdicale
is inventd. Nevertheless, option-) cannot llCCOunl for every usc of me compound t4trV1thlullJJl. TW2r:1 pointl 10 a number o f inSr:ln~ that some of
Dharmakini's later commentators interpret as option I (the evidence is the
CS$(:ncc of Ihe predicate), but most or these instances can as easily be taken

116

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILO SOPHY

as option ).'" Iwata cites one case. ho~r. that it unambiguously t/41
amenable to option }. h is a vmc from the third dupter of the Praml~
INirttilil:

At cemain times (i.e. when wing an inference] Ont ha5 an tsCI~

lishtd cognition of one thing through some other thing which
saves as evidence. ThaI evidence through which one has that
cognition is necessarily rilvaiyam) either produced &om that
thing or the SWfbhilitl of that thing. 1I1V).']OIf''''
What W( havt tT2lUlatro hert as "the Iwbhillllof that thing" is aaually the
compound Iillsllilbbiva in the original Sanskrit_The grunmar hert it such
that W( cannot possibly interpm I4Jmlbhtiw to mean -has that thing as its
Wflbhi"tf (option }). And if we inttrprtt IfJiIbhilitl as narurt-lViIbh.i"" or
essence. then W( have dearly arrived at option I , "the evidence is the essence:
of the predicate. ~ But perhaps we should first considtr the verst thaI coma
ne n in the Prtl1M!'4Nmilil.

It is not possible fo r a thing to occur withom its own Oust or

WQbhilitl. And thal character rripa) that is observed in these two
cases is prtciSC'ly the definition that applies to omtr reliable evitknce.IIPV).7111'"
For Dharmaldni the main point of thit verst is the assertion that the -characrer- of dfcct-cvidtnce and IVilbhiJNl.n'idtnce must apply to all cases of
rtliable evidence; in other words. all forms of rdiabk evidence must oonfo rm to these two in some fashion. For our purposes. however what is most
inlertSting ~ it that he again usc:s me term IViIbh4va, but now fIIiIbhiw
rerm 710110 I}" nnJnrrt. bl4t to 1M prrJicillt. Thus, in PV}.70. he laYJ that
me evidma: is the: n..bhi/lll of the prediOK, but in PV}.71. he laYJ that the
1091W::1I.1~ -osniu:l duol in mol! CUD op!ion I (I.e. "'lI~ is no!: ~Iy
RqIIimI by m., ~ of m., J>UAF in '1uaOOn. Commomuillo to. exunpk. on an OClaIr-

H 8 (,.'-4), IWilla IIOlCS, -of"""""" i! .. abo 1*Jibk: > inu:.pfCf

till_INN U IIrr.r.Ino-mhicompound [i.e, option }I."

rcnot of ",""",Miw in

I ] 0 PV)'1'" ,.uJ.> u.u.;, tiMIIM .". f'Wtitir ->M!t bwit f "'" II.c,.'!' III,. jlJ4 _
w.. fi .....WI If. Colt<! br I""a (100):1), ft.}j). I ba"", lnIUbud this and dw followi", ...... in ra:otd..;do ..... ;..~ oflev.endrabooddtoi (,f<)blffl .

M.a.

] I I PVJ.71' ~"'i_,!, -MJ_'!' _ ,,;U ~ _Mttow.!o f"... ~ ~ 1117" tInI"'!'

tU
1c"'!"'M II.

SVA 'HA'VA PRATJ.tANDHA.: THE BASIS OF INF ERENCE

117

cviMna' ClIlnnr o:ur without iu 1VtIbIMwz. namdy, tilt: pudicu~ This

usage lrnIIy JUrp..w us, but it should not. Instead, ~ should recall that in
the definition of swbh.iv.-evidence, the term swbh.iw is used to dcsaibe
both the evidence and the predicare. That is, on Dharmaldni's formulation one 1VIlbhtiV4tstands as evidence for another 1VIlbhaw in the case of the
identil)'-modc.
Now, eM ~ning of WIIIhh.i.,. in me Jr.Olnd ~rv: WI'; have drM (PV).,,)
should be &.irly obvious: when we say that the evidence ("is a sugar maple")
cannot occur without its swbMIIII ("is a fI'CC"), if $CCffi5 d ear thar IV4bh4w
must mean nafUrc-swbh4""" Thus, something cannot be a sugar maple if
if is nOl in CS5CnGC a tI'CC.III But wbat then do ~ do wilh the compound
tAllwlbhalJll in the previous verse (PV}.70)? Do ~ say that the evidena' is
the essence of the predicale, even though we will {hen immffli:ucly uy (i n

PV}.7d that the predicate is me essence of lbe evidence? TIlls interpmacion introduces a stunning dcgrcc of conceprual incoherence into Dharmakini's thought, and we would be forced to conclude either thaI he was
t:ru.ly ignonnt of how to work with qualities and essences, or else that be was
extraordinarily inq)[ al doing so.
Cluricably. we do luve vw)[her op'io n: we can decide th:>t in PV).70, the
leno SWlblNiWl mlUt be! tre:itM as "propcl'f)'-lWblNi",,-" In other worW, in
thaI verse Dharmaldrti is simply saying that the evidence is a propertyJVIIfbh.i.... of me predicate (this formulation is option 1 in our lin) . In relation to our example, Dharmaldni wo uld be saying mal "is a maple" is a
propcrty-lWbhiw of " is a trtt," or in ordinary language, "being a IrnIIple is
a property of being a trtt." At first glance this may appear equally incoberan, but if woe unckntand both of thete properties 10 be >denrical lO:;l single individual, Dharmaldrti would in effect be reminding us that the
property -is a sugar IrnIIple" is idenliaJlo the individual mat "is a Utt." In
ordinary rcrms, he would be saying. "being a maple is a property of this
individual thaI is a trtt." In short, he would be reinforcing the importrnce
of me principle of ontological rMuction. We have already seen thai OntOlogical reduction is nOI in itself sufficient to justifY the type of relation
required between evidence and predicate for a succesdi.1l inference of this
kind, but in reminding us of thai reduaion Dharmakirti is not committing
any great error.
AJ intcrprctm of Dlwrnaldrti's thought, the lesson we can learn here is
11211111 atlUmcm II made dKwbm:

In

I'V and I'VSV. Xc, for aatnpk, I'VSV U

PVI.I7-lI; G:lI.f..., (tnIutucd abo-oc, n.I04/.

118

fOU NDATIONS O f DH"aMAdRT I 'S PH I LOS OPH Y

that, while wt ha~ numerous textual rtaSOns to Stt rwo difftttnt mn-nings
in (he term svabhiiwt, wt should not forget mat Dharmilini never clearly
stares that he is using the term in two distinct ways. Often the context of a
usage forcefully indicates me preferred meaning of swbhllllll (as propnty"
or -nature' . but in many crucial cases, including rhe verses that we ha~
just considered, Dharmakini's words offtt no unequivocal choice. We nced
to kp this ambiguity in mind. fur it may suggest thar Dhanna1cini has
deliberatdy hidden some specific pu~ in this equivocation-a purpose
that modem inrerprttm ofDharmaldni have yet 10 detecr. BUI it nuy also
indicate that Dharmakini's theory of inference through nwbh4~dencc:
s..imply was not very well worked out, With this in mind, kr: us examine
$Orne potential problems.

Along the lines of our discussion above. we may be able to come to an

interprttation of swbhd'va--cvidencc and the identity relation that wt would
find easily defensible. bUl cvt"n so. a number of problems remain. lnc: mO$t
striking difficulty is simply that. although Oharmakini does appear to
recognize the insufficiency of mere ontologica1 reduction as a basis ofinfet
enct, he never explicidy explains how the identity-mode of the twbhi~
prlltibandha does not amounl to a reduction of me propcnies in question
to the individual they qualify. In other words. while the additional stipulation of a "conceptual reduction is probably the mon consistent possible
way of interpreting me WtlblNiV4pnl.libandh4 k identity-mode. the V1.gucness and incompleteness of Dharmaldni's diSCU5Sion of this topic makes il
impossible to definitivdy defend the inrerprtra.tion I have proposed. And
although some later commentators may ha~ suggested a similar imerprcDtion, al this point I cannot say whether such is the cue.II)
My inability to definitively establish how Dharmak.ini moves beyond
mere omologica1 reduction is in part a tcSul( of (he ambiguity of his State-ments. bUI it abo $Cems to rdlea ctrtain lacunae in Dharmak.ini', thought.
Perhaps the most Rlicnt or Ihest is the distinction between ao::idenw and
cucntial proptnies, for although such a distinction is implied by both
modes of the twbhliWlPrtlli611nJha, to my knowI.cdge Dlu.rmakini never
dirccdy propoaes a mcam for formulaling such a distinction.
III F.... . P'-"'''''''' ol ... he< , ...._1"01.1 ..... in i,,~ byway ol_UJ-.....idcnc:e.
(I!nl). Foe 1 vny wd'uI Rudy dw a;>miroa
Iwata (100)).

I Onb
I

w poairionl ofbr comm~m~ron.

$ VA6HJVAPRATJIANDHA, THE BAS IS OF INFERENCE

119

The a~na of a clear theory conctming euencial and accicknt:a.l propertte5 is particularly problematK: in the case of the: identity-mode. nut is.
it sms that the COI1ttt predication of Mis a sugar maple~ invu1ably allows
the correct predication of "is a trtt- 10 the WIle individual because the
causal cbaracterutia r{uircd for me: fonnt:r pm:licate include all the causal
ch:mcmisrics f'!'Quired
[he lalter. Now, ralk aboul "causal cbaracteristia" is always convertible 10 talk aboUt proprrty-wablMwa. Ixcause Ihe latter are: constructed on the basu of tht former. Hence, undtrsnnding
proprrty-wabh.iwa to bt "essmWl propmies.- 'Nt: should bt able to say that
an individual that is a sugar maple is necessarily a frC:C: because the: essential
properties of a sugar maplt include all the essential propenies of a tttt. But
this presumes that thoK propc'rties of the individual in question that art
necessary fo r it to btar ,ht predicates "is a 5Ugar maple" and "is a tttC" art
distinguish! !'rom those tNt art not nrcrss:uy for thost prtd.ications. If tht
particular tntiry in question has a certain height. we must ~ ablt to specify whether that height is ascntial to either a "sugar maple:." a "trtt," or
both. Dharmwrti. however. does not ~en use consistent terminology for
speaking in this fashion .
we have already secn that svahh4V4. which
probably should not' be rendered as "C$.SCntial propeny." is not wed in a way
that clearly distinguishes the accidetllal from the c:ssc:ntial.
Even if we assume that Oharmakirti does present a clear accidcmallessmrial distinction (along with consistent use of some (<<{uilitt: terminology),
this YIOuid not solve another problem: we: still nerd a way to MttrmiM what
is essential and what is not. Since the pervasion rrlanon in an infrrr:ncc by
lWhlMlNJ-eYidcna: u based upon identity (t44.lmty.). we can think of this
problem in ternu of verifying the pervasion relation when we employ an
ink:rence using sv.:rhhdl'lI-C'Videna:. Although he: ofTc:n no clear proctdure
in the PrIlINi!'4lNirttiltll or Swt"!ffi. in laler tOts Dharmakirti proposes a
procc:dure whc:rdty that rc:lation is affirmed by "an instrumtnw cognition
that demonstrates the incompatibility of the presence of the evidrnce in the:
contr.TIdictory of the predicate to be proven - {~vi,.ryII~ hdiJJutlt,,pf'll1lUi!'4).I1'
In the: description of this procedure, a key term is -the contradictory(";"''14yll). Sleinkc:Jlner has convincingly argued that in wing Ihis lerm,
Dharmakirti is nOI merc:ly referring to the absence of the predicate
(lIlJhyllJh.iv.:r). but rather to a "comradictory, i.e., an entity that

ror

ror

11411 is worth llOOIi"l dw,. ~ thoup DlwmUiru doe. IlOOI ap/icitly lOrmulate thU produn: in rvsv,:an inchoale f'onn ofil is IUund al PVI.191:and PVSV M rit.

no

FOU NDATION S O F D HAlMAKlRTI 'S PH ILOSO PHY

conlfadicts the: prc:dicatt; in such a way thai any third pouibility is

excludro. Thus, in our example:, this cognition would nc:ro [0 show that
the: prc:dicare:is a supt maple" is nm merdy absent where!feo:ltt abse:nt.
but rathe:r that the: prroica[C COIIIJ fUlt N correctly applied to an individual that bcm the predicate - is a non-ttcc." Srcinkdlner has funha shown,
especially on me b..sis of a discussion in Dharmalcini's Vauny4}a. mat this
tc:5t is accomplishc:d by appealing IO a particular kind of nonperttption
(ilnupalabJhi). Spifically, when we examine:an individual th:at inn:anti:ales the: conlfllldiaoty of the propeny to be prove:n, we do not perceive a
property that petv2des (",apax.Jht,mu:) the c:vidence:.u , In a convincing
extrapolation from Dharmakini's chosm a:ample (i.e., inferring momenranness from cxisre:nu), Ste:inkcllner IU~esU that in out type of example,
the: pc:rvading property fo r which we would test would be -having branches
and such."'"
Now, the: norion of a -pervading property" (vytlpoJuuiharmll) can be con5inently used in the: sense of an -cs.smtial property" of that which it perma, for as we have secn in chapte:r I, a pervada is prc:srnt in:all cases of
the penrackd (uyiifryll). Indeed. IIJiIpJadhamut is one [Crm in Dhannakini',
philosophy that could be tquated in all iu conrats with the notion of an
M
c:sscnti:al propaty." But.:ven if we have mus found a consiste:nt way ro
speak of essential properties, the nonperccption of a sugar maple's pervading property in an individual that is a non-trtc is not in itself sufficie:nt ro
.show that an individual mat -is a sugar maple" is nco:s.wily an individual
that is a tr:
Consickr. for example. an inferential cognition in the form , "This is:a cal
because it is a sugar maple." LLI us assume: that we can somehow daermine that :a pervading property of a sugar maple is "having branches and
I U Strinkdlnn- (I"I) polnlJOIII UDI. propnIy spnIcinKo- 1M lest by WlIy of sltihJ-.,;~
/'"lw"pll1fli!U is ckIcribecI by Dtwmakini in VN only in Imni ofthc inlmna: (by .... y
of ..... MJ_"idcna) ofrnomcnwi_ fmm cWlOIot. H( plopoKl Ull) , ~ , o.n
-apcrimml in inlerprnation" ~I(by 1M pro<:cduu used in llul cue is applied to 1M
inklCillX of"bcin&~ ueo:"rrom "bril18 a Ii~ (or, to...., Oo,1l'eamplc:. "beinsa tIft'"rrom
"brin! a MIP maplc:"). I ~ SII:;nkdJnn'l apnimml 10 Ix fully MKYXAfuJ in IIx
_
dw M bas c:orrrcdy ckpiaed dw I)'p( of promIun: duol ;, meanl 10 apply univuAlly
10 all in~ by ~. In o.ny caK. " " ' if ~ 'IO'CfT not: 10 ..:>cqK Sto:iohllncr', curriR, !he llJUmml ptnIltd loCI far_ L.. td upon 1M p'hy-_MJ_ "twi118'
ueo:" and -bri. a alp' ~"-wouId apply JUS/: as wdJlO -mommwillCll" and -aif~."

_',fti, .."","",i<

L16 SmnkdlMf (1"1) dni_ u,i.o proprny from briJ commtnll in I'VSV d PVI,'}
(G:16.~17 1).

SVA6HAVAI'RA TlBAN DHA: TH E BA SIS O F INFE R. ENCE

HI

_u.di" (f.ikh.uJinulttvtlj. On thi ~ In~it. 'Nt would verify the pervasion rd.uion
in O Uf inlf:rt:ncc by me nonpelccpnon of Khaving branches and such as a
correct predicate of non-caa. We know that the range and vicissimdcs of
our obscrv:l.tioru should have no impact On the outcome of this tCSt. so we
JUSt c:u.mine thl'tt non-caa that happen to be at hand: a dog. a car, and a
hooligan. We find that the causal characteristics necessary for predicating
Kb""n".hes "nd such" " .... nOf perivt:d in "ny nf fh~ CL~ . _'" _ Ih L L~
conclude that the sugar maple in front of us is a cat. Obviously, something
is flOt quite right here.
The problem, of course, is that we have failed to cstablish that "having
branchcs and such- is an -wenda!" or ptl'Vllding proptny (VJlipaltaJhamus), flOt only of a sugar maple (the evidence) , but also of a cat (the
predicate). In other word.. before resling for the nonpcrception of th:tt per_
vading propt'ftY, ~ first need to know whether "having branches and such"
is a pervading property of cats such that its prcdicability is relevant to deciding whether the items we tCSt are indeed contradictorics of a cat.
But if Steinkdlner's account is COITt (and I think it is), then the procedure offered by Dh:umakini docs not give us any means of determining
how to sdeo;t tho: pcJv.lding property for whkh 10 test. This is not terribly
surprising. for the only way we could determine whether, for example,
Khaving branchcs" is a pervading property of a cat is by using svabh4va<videncc, as in: "This hasJdocs not have branches and such because il is a cat."
In shon, we would faU into an infinite regress. Perhaps it is for this reason
that Dh:umwni docs not include I way to determine which ptl'Vllding
property is rclCVl1nt to our tCSt, but in not doing so, the tCSt obviously
rt:rnains incondwiyo:.
Thus, it appors that Dhannakini has once again f.a.iled in the second pan
of hiJ ask. That is, although his formulation of the identity relation that
underlies the usc of IViIbh.iv4-cvidencc may provide a theoretical guanmC'C
for the accuracy of such inferences, he has not provided us with a rt:liable
procedure for determining when thlt relation is in placc. This failure is
nOt, howcvc:r, panicularly damning. fo r it rc::so on an intracu.ble problem:
namdy, the distinction between the a.scntial and the accidental.m
One possible response to this probkm is to fall bade upon an appca1 to
worldly convt:ntion (IIJIIvahtlra, IoItaprasUJdha, etc.) as the basis for the identity rdation. In cfft, an inference by Iwbh.iva-evidencc becomcs an exercise in ltarning the proper definition of the terms involved. While this

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

prolnbly is /HIr1 of the identity relation. 1II it does nOi entirely solve our
problem. Fint, we must determiot: which properties of any given individ
uaI arc: germane 10 the predicale in question; is hdght, for o:ample, relevant
to being a me, and if so, how shon mighl a [rc:c be? This ilITlounl'S to the;
rhorny problem of describing oactly what constitutes a worldly convenrion. &cond, if we N.sc: idrnlity wholJy on ronvefuion, we lose the OntOlogK:al appc:a1 implicit in Dharmaldni's nOlion of wabhivapr.lilNtIUiha. ln
shon. the oerci5e of reasoning ITom the filet of "existence" to "momenG1rindS" would be reduced to a mere word-game ofleaming the accepted
rules for applying these terms. and it would ignore the question of whether
,hose con~ntions are based upon the causal charaaerlsda of u1timardy rcaJ
paniculars. On Dharmwni's view, to ignore (hat que:uion would be disastrous, for if WIlbhJllflpr.,ilNurtlJM is. as we shall $. to act u the: warrant
for the trustworthiness of inference. it must enable inference to lead us to
things that we can use to accomplish our goals. It must, in other words, lead
us to particuWs th:n arc capable of the telie functions that we seck. Thil
brings us to the question of the instrumentality (prifPllilJJtl) of inference
and ('\'en of JXrcqxion; why should we believe that either is a ltwrwonhy
means of knowled;e? In the nexl chapler we will examine lU(;h quenio(U.

118 Ser:, !'or t:nmpk, IN: p"FIfII' fTom D1unnocora'l ~..pUcif.td by Sctinkdlntt
!l991;n,sI), H~. DtwmotI2l1 dearly ~ IIw: ~ UAF of ganVlml>oN 10 be:
'v;,~ by .......~iookoo;c. n..: I". 5'" (NI)T:"" r~) mob (d. ..... ,nu...
lMion by S.rinlrdlntr, ' ; N .);

,.ur;i.aI

1iItU,..

,Iu"

In ,hil rtprel, mppow

in a pba abwIdanl in
1OfMOI'Iot..now. a nil
1i".u,.10 I dimwit who is I.Inhmilia "';,h m., lam (.,."whmt) "Ii'!fltl"t" and ma.
Idh him, ",his ill trtt." When lIu, happmI. ,be- dim"';l, bccalJlC of hil aupidil)',
bd~!Iu, me: IiIflUll'I tallnaa iuboa ICnWllie ICWK (" i",itUjb lhoe fUm "11ft."
Thil dull iI ma. ;rllrod1.iUd by ,1w: 0!h0 fdLow 10 tIw: &a dut!hac o1I li~i ~
10',

'r - ....... oerruon.tcc:o..... 1Or ~ ............ "1.-" .0 il . ~...t.e. kl.1ow

"1"htn- ~ no od\tf ~R\aIllic 12:aeJ, IUCh II mc: indica,oed f,''!fItI'" 011_ and
ouch, for 1M appIic:arion ofllw: tam ' \Ift' 10 d'" indiridlUll""cad" iu mctt /" w~
nell u,be- .muncie CIUK. ' In ocher oronia. eM ImWldc CMIK ulhoe faa of pcMWM"

.u.yt::

incbrancNs and IUch wNo:h;' irw:luded in WOOiMXpI ."..,.." [",,,..,, ,Ji~

tJm iNiiM1i'!fltl~~'*'ltnwriiwnl",Ii~"..,M dJW)

'"

..,.,. iii uuU ....~m.;~ __"'''; ~ ";".itvJlf.MIJ"l;

f iii ..~ ~ttw"'''''.i i", .,q..,.,lkIhIrr ,_~", ~ ,.;",itth

..

.., ..... oJ.

~~ ...._,.

I ..". ,. "~_".'!'

tIi_", if;"";",.", if]~ .

..."'"......

11i':'4, .,.., ' I" ,

4 Instrumentality: Justifying

the Sources of Knowledge

O FA. WI! HAVE EXAM INED some

issues in Dhannakini's ontology by

way of his views on instru~nw objttts (pr(l"'~); ~ have also discussed flNfbhlvaprmibantihll as the basis for his theory of infttena:. In
this chaplet, we will inquire imo the fou.mbrioru o f Dh:umaldni', epistemology. More specifically, w.! shall examine what it is mat justifies the claim
that perception and inference arc each 2n instrurncm of knowtrogc
(p1'ltmJity). In the language of PrlIImlQa Theory, this is Ibe question of
~i nstrumcntalii}' {pr4m4!fJ4}, an issue that Pr.tmil).a Theorists generally
tmu as a tOp ic: of discw.sion in and ofirsclf. It a mc:crru flOl the workings of
an a1legN instrument of knowll~ it a pt."lCq)tion. an in~nce. the
smsc faculties, a sacred tal, or ~me other candidate-Oul r.athcr what it is
mal ;wrifies the d.ai.m WI one or another of th~ is ind~ an itutrurncnt
of knowledge. To introduce ,he ccmnl iSliues al st3kc in discourse on

irut.nunmtaliry {pri'm4tryrt}. YooT will first discuss some critical problems of

rransl.:uion. I.n doing 50, we will darify thc manner in which Dharmakini's
theory of innrumcnrality is tied to his conception of the uhinutc goa.! of
Buddhist pracrio:. 1bc remncc ofDharnu.lcirti'l ulrimatc pi wililcad Ul
to thc problem of a tttming circularity in Dhannakirtj'l theory of imlNmen tality, which in tum will prompr Ul IO consider thc implicitly axiological contat o rOharmakini'1 thought. With aU thac ill$ua; in h;md, we will
then assay a dOSt: analysis ofDharnu.lcirti's theory of ilUtrumcnraiit)' it5c1f.

4. J PrirniU)ya

aJ

*'mrrummtll/i'Y "

AJ mentioned previously. l u:uulalc prilm4!,1'l as "ilUtru mcntality" 50 as fa

indiatc that al1 discussions of prilm4'.'~ mUll take account of Ihc SaNkrit
U)

11.4

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

grammatical concerns that frame thili discourse across all South Asian tra
didons. Specifically. Pramil)a Theorists across all mditions recognize thai
the gnmmatK:al fo rm of the word prllmi!", rinstrumcnl of knowledWt)
ili indicati~ of an inslrument (lAr.!U) in a verbal action. For aample. in
the sentence. '" cut Ihe tree with an axe," the rerm "axe" would be in the
instrumental case in Sanskrit. Liktwisc. Prami!:,a TheoriSts universally
unlkrst:lnd the issue of prtlm4!'y. as mated to the claim that the thing in
question- the sense faculties. scriprurc, an act of inferell. or some other
candidate-is the instrument (prtlm41J11) in an act of knowing (,rlltd or
pl'ltmili). Thus. when arguing for tht prtlfNi!'J4 of one or another candKbte,
these philosophers ineviably rum to the quesbon of whether thai candidate
manifests the propenies of a grammatK:al instrument. In extended discw:
sions on prtlm4!fYt1. (hili concern Ic:a<b inevitably to the ubiquirotu citation
of s.iJJHUfllllmtlh114 the widdy accepted defining characteristic of a gram
nutical instrument as the "most prominent causal factor" in an action!
While the starus of a P'flnu/!'" (an "instrument ofk.now\edgej as a gram.
nutical ilUtrument dearly frames all ate:nded discussions of what coruu
tUtes a pl'ltmJi!fll, a Pr.uni !:,a Theorist is not thereby (lIIlit,. to argue that
grammatial irutrumcnlality-i.e. the fact of bcing the "most prominent
ausal factor" (wJh.1t414m.) in an action-is our best or only way to cs~
luh thai the candidate in question is a prtlm41J11. As we will K'C, Dharmaldni
is a thinker who l'CIiisu thili standHd approadl . and he proposes the qual.
ity of "immediacy- (.1I1inlflhil4tv4) as an alternative: mark ofinsuumcntal
iry. Ncverthdess. the manner in which Dharmakini makes this argument
presumes that the grammatical issue of being the "most prominent causal
factor- cannot simply be ignored: in olhu words, the innovative move
toward immediacy is only made: possible by the need to COntest what is
meant by the grammatial inStrumentaliry of a prllmA~ Our interpretive
lesson here is thus that, if ~ arc to appreciate fully what it means For
Dhumakirti to claim thai cem.in kinds of cognitions arc instruments of
knowledge, we musl keep track of Ihe grammatical concenu that frame
that dixussion.
I On ~_ _ chapter I bsft) and Wo bMw (160ft). It is worth

noUn&!hat CC:n

lhe M J~

for wbom the yunmaial instrummwity of a /N~ ia I tbwmc.l

inconvmimce. wiU KiIIdi"" .'I'W,*/Uin 1nc.ICfIN. Stc, lOt cwnpk, Sv (-"*ta!I):
,,;,.utlll_tnlf' ....".., "'-/UIf' MM /,.,.~ Plnhuitathimikl (....,."..,..-iUr...-,6)
0(M"Q1MnU< . ;",i rwlf' !",,.jW; Ur.~,*".". ".",.,~ wuJ~ ......!U',. iii I
'"' .._
~

....

... ,IL... _ M .J.., ..L.iJw.

0; '
,

~.IL;

. .... iii,;

~ ...

, _T_
_
-

~.

IN ST RUMENTALITY: J UST IFYIN G THE SOU RC ES O f KNOWLEDGE

11.5

Scholarly communiria tend to dtvdop terminol~ habits, and the

nev.- tr2nsl:.u ion of p,im.i!fYll as - instrumentality" may not be well received
by some specialisu. One objection might simply be that the term is unfamiliar, but on my viev.-, the term', unf:uniliarity speaks strongly in its favor.
My poim is mal the gr:ammatica1 fnme in which we encoumer discussions
of primli!'JIl is unique to South Asian thinkers working in Sanskrit. Hentt,
in W2)1S mat we may nor immediardy recognize. PnmiQa Theorists deploy
arguments about familiar issua such as justification, truth, and knowledge
in a manner that, from the perspective of Euroarnerican traditions, creates
nev.- possibiliria for working through old problems-at the very least we
will find opportUniries to become more acutely aware of our own peculiarities in framing such issues. If instead we choose a more fam iliar term
5u ch :as ~tnlth " or V2l i di ry~ to tr:anslut.: priimti!,J4. rh~ ~~ihilirirs 2nd
opponunilies. which arise fro m the very unfamiliarity of me context. will
p rove~. tndttd. we may instead decide that Saum Asian thinkers were
simply nther confused about -truth" or validity" and dismiss their efforts
as unwonhy of serious consideration.
The twO terms I have JUSt mendoned-"(ruth" and validity"- have
been propoed and frequentl y used :u tr:lnJi,u .ioru of !mim.~J"'. ~ their
particubr inadequacit.:5:Kid 5ignific:anuy to me need for an :dtemacive Ir:InS_

bcion. One obvious problem wim the translation " tru(h~ is that. as Tillemans has noted. Dharmakini himself does not offer any clar theory of
truth; Dharma1Un i's disclWion of !,4m4?1J" is more closely :dlied with
questions of jusrificadon. and such may well be the C2$C: for most Pf'2II1i1)a
lne:oriSts.1 But me lack of a cleu-cut meory of [ruth is a relatively minor
w ue comp:iud [0 o lher problem, Ihllt we confrO nt w hen ~ tr:an,la lc
p,imd'!Jl' as "truth." For e::umple. according to:ill Buddhist Pnmil)a The:orists, we can identify many cognitions mat we would consider "true." and
ytt those same cognitions would nor be considCTC:d insrrumcnu of knowIedge V"llmR{IIlS) . For e::umple. a correct pcrttptu:U judgment is "truc" in
that its contents correspond [ 0 some actual stue of affairs in the world.
Nevenhel~.

we will ue II\;tI , uch

:I.

cogni tio n i, ~':l.n instrument of

knowledge: fO r Dharmakini; hentt, iI manifests "truth":1.$ correspondentt,

but not "truth" as p,imd!')d.l Moreover, on Dharmakini's peculiar view of
2 rtlkmans (1199:0-' 1).

) I am rderrins 10 the: notion of a -ddinitM dnmninalion following upon a punjilion"

r,"""I!J!b-"''''''''''mktlJtl}. _tllm I wtU!De1lSl

In JOInt.:

detail below (1.I7fl).

II U worm

noOng dUI, wben DlwmaIrJni"1 lhnMy of jilfttplion il CDI\SfNtd in ImtU of Epmnnic

l..tli

fO U NDATION S Of DHAL'.IAKJRTrS PH ILOSOP H Y

yogic percq nion (yofiprlltytl*",), the content of some yogic cognitions aTC'
false in that their contents aTC' no mort Mtrue" th:tn a hallucination. NeveTIheles.s, such cognido ns ti4 havC' prlimli1JJIl bec:all5C' they pl"C'dictably lead to
desirC'd outcomes.' In anorhC'Tcoma l, Dharmakirti discusses IhC' well
known position mal, in IhC' case of SC'Ilsory percrption, Ihe sensory organ
is the instrument of knowlC"d~ {prmnfi'JA}, and as such, it has prlimll,!J4.
Dharmoorti rC'jecu this pmilion. but hC' is obligC"d to takC' it seriously
bec2use it is a plausible approach 10 the issue of prlimll'.'JIl. Can We". however, plausibly maimain that a sensory organ has Mtruth -? How can a ph)'$leal object rhat does nOI haVe" anything like a propositional or senll:nrial
u ructUTC' be" considcrC"d eitheT"true" or "faIse-? Clearly. then. We" run the
risk of considerable confusion when We" translatC' pnl1nl1'!J1l as "(fUm.'"
When v.'C' tum to "validity: anomer common translation for pramli!lJll.
we encounter many of the same problems. On this translation. a pramR'JA
is a "valid cognition" or "means of valid cognition," and although the C'X:llct
meaning of "vaHd" here is nol of'ttn cl.ariflC"d. in most cases "validity" in pan
means "vcridic:aJity." Again. in the case of a percq>lual judgment. we 'WOuld
think thai "validity" should apply: if I sec Ihe color blue, and on the basis
of that pcTCq)tu:li CO ntCn! I form the judgment. "that is blue: should we
not consider this judgment "valid"? Even though it SC'tms ve:ridical in itself,
fo r Dharmaldrti that judgment is nelt "valid " bec2use il is n OI a prllm4'JA'
O n the other hand. an adept fJotin) can induce a mental perception in
which he dirKtly intuits Ihe conc~pl of impermanence. bur since the

Idnlitrn. M I>(Ja pl:K.n is "mJe: in dw Ihty arc all aff~ by the "internal distortion"
(."ury.,tn.). ~ the coriti.-.: ~ in puapl:ual """ilion appall moneousIy 10
~ Q tcmal h~ PVJ,lS~>,11. For a lre~unen l of ,uc.h iuua in rd~>on etpially 10
Kamalatila', appropNtion ofDturmUini', Ihc-o:wy, _ Funayun.-a (Im1 .

.( This upI oiDtwnWdni'J Ihrofy of yosk perpl'ion (ill found al PVJ.lII-lI6) Iw ra'
10 be adeqlUld y diKwKd. TIw: Uy _
ilNJ.l1S: -rhnd'orr. mUlo whid!. On( rnrdia.
ti..-dy conditioN onacIf, wbnhc. i, be real or ",nreal. will ~I in a c:ku. I'IOn<oouI"'u.al
"""ilion whO! that nwdiali.-.: oondilionins rncha iu allmination" (,-.wI M.iu",
.Wtiu'!''''~~ft"'Mi""'J 'I f iN.."..nllif/WIWMflU ,phMfJiev-8iJIMI.,w1). One
misfn asily miKolUI,," the tenn Un;,.1-Io.n to lMatI thaI 11M: ,..,,1i1ll of 11M: CIOJf'ifion, is
bul Dhannakirti rn.aka;1 quilC dear d\;.t in ~>on to d.t:i. phenomnW col'llmu
alone. yocic pcrorpcionI <lrc indiSlinsuiJhabk 110m dlol: ha.lI ",cinalioru of a lovesick peqon.
IrtJlead. Obannaki rti $pfcifict (PVJ.1.U) thai roPe paal"'iom;uc ,,.,...... breal.lle d.cy
:He "1I'\UlWOnhy (,.".Mi.',,), and _will_ that ,his Itrm rd"m to the resuiuobtained (01
obWnable1 lhrousf! tIM: oosnil>on.. M(>IC _ dy. Woo {zooJ1 loucha on thc:K i _

",rue::

,Acrordlns 10~. the nodon lhal lhe

ImJ(

facultkI:on: th=ueivu ,.._~

is raiJed by Dhannakirti II PV:t..J (PVP:Jb7ff, I bdow. n.7s).

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUST l fY1NC THE SOU ftCES O F KNO WLEDGE

117

concept Mimpcrmanencc" docs nOltruly ain, the phenomenal content of

his vision is no more "valid" than an obsessro lover's lullucinalion of his
belovtd. Yet a JOti" 5.sttmingly hallucinatory experience ofim(,(rmanence
is indeed a p r.m4'!4. and if ~ use the (erm "valid" to refer to such cogni.
tions, then it will be valid. And finally, in the CUI! of a sense organ, what
could il possibly mean 10 say that, ror example, one', ocular faculty is
"valid" ~

11ua, the traruiation of primli!'JIf:lS "validity" r.liscs many of the wne

problems :lS "mlm," in m :1I it tOO eqwtcs veridicality with prim4~' A far

greater problem, however, confronu the ~ or "validity" in this context: it

is a term already in US(: among Eutoamcrican philosophers, and irs techni
cal meaning is such thai we create tremendous confusion when we employ
il :IS a mrulation of priM4!l)'4. In irs philosophical usage. "validity" refm
almost exclusively to the structUre or an argument whereby trum is always,
p~rved. Most commonly, philosophm speak of deducrivt arguments:lS
Mvalid" in thai, if the premises arc trut , the conclusion must be true. In the
conrt:J:t of Euroamcrican philosophy, validity is thus wholly divorced from
contenl, and an argument can therefore be l/fI/Ulin terms ofiu muaurc but
"1UD,,nJin (erms of its content. This distinction clearly will I10t do for any
thMty of inference (1l""nuiNl}. how could one have an unsound but v:alid
.""nuitui The matter is even worse in the CUI! or perception. Given the
aforementioned and widespread wage of "valid" among contemporary
philosophers in me academy, the notion of "va.!id perception" is literally
norucnse:. Indeed, talk about "valid pcteqKion" is probably sufficient in
iadf to end any comparative philosophical endeavors, in that the: phrase
6 Of (:ou.w. tht ~ ' vaIid- doa oftU KlInt tmlpQ", (and vny b.>d) puN when _ con
Jidc:r dx nocioo mat t~ ICNC orpna Ihctmd_ can pbu.ibly ~ CDNItufti as In,u>:W' if
I haft ClwactI and .... um., hai.., u",~, my cyc:s ...., invalid bn:::t.u. I am an innlid..
If I COfpIC IMdICfUC orpm dx)' ~ would no!: be: valid. Whr. lkaUK they would
Ju,I: paMCd theil expiration date.
7 Sec Porttr

(,,--.,,.6). wIxte 1x .........1u:

".,u /i.e:., an insuncr oi, copUOOn for wt.ich I ~ ill tht inlllUnx'lI) may
noo: c:ormpoad...;m tIw llatlln of thinp {it ill -CIDftIp"ubk.n1h nn:w," as MolwlI),
~ il). "WIxdw:r or noc ,,.,u!'J'6 is c:onfincd in ics appIiallion 10 l~fOQKI
wt.ich mribuu: 10 theil colllmt propmia which an ob;t COI lcspolldin& 10 mat con
mil amWIy Iw II noo: I mat'CI"ofthtddinition of ~ {u il ;,Wcm 10 bc: I mal
ler of !he dcliniUon of ,.... th in WQlmI eo<Itmlponl}' d>(I\~II}. bul corutirulft
ram.:r fiuthn dxoty aboul .,J,fd, rwarmesK:I Alisf'y 1M putpolCl motiYlri"l'Ixm.
I

N~

<hi........... [d>cJ lim,," lhcoty .....kh r<q .. itu __ oupondcncc ;" .... UK
~ OM: othn 1)'Nmu.1UCh u BuddhiJm and Advaiu, do not.

118

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAItM .... "'IRTI'S PHILOSO PHY

presents such a terminological mismuch that one might wrongly believe it

impossible to find common ground on fUndamental issues of epislemology.
If ~ think il valuable to make the works of Pl'lU1lina Theorists available
within an expanded notion of whal one mighl profitably study in a department of philosophy, then dearly "validity" is nOI a useful translation of
prlmi!'JIIL And for the wm reason, "valid cognition," "means of valid cognition," and other such chom are also unhelpful n~nslati ons of prilmi!'JL
The problems cited above may in Ihemsclvcs be sufficienl to warnnt the
translation of prlm4!,J'I as "instrumentality," for in doing so one at least
avoids the most obvious difficulties associated with "validity" or "truth,"
especially the mistaken equation of primi!'J4 with veridia.lity. But following Karl Potler, l would funher suggest that "instrumentality" captures
an important component of the priimA!']II debate mat ohen escapes attention. In a bid to ":accommodate wh~1 all Indian systems ... can agr on as
a meaning for prinui?tJ4." Potier has argued mar a central element must be
the notion of purpose. On Potter's analysis. a chMaCter1stic of any cognition thai has prtlnui!']ll is that it apprehends an object in accordance with
the purpose that motivatC'$ me cognition.' With this analysis in hand, POllet proposes thar in every context. Buddhist or nOl, ~ translate priim4!'ftl
as "workability," a lerm inspirM by the pragmatism of William James. In
choosing this translation, Poner may ~Il be dcliber.udy overstating the
case in a rhetorical attempl to counter the frequent usc of "lTUlh" for
prtlm4!,ya. [n a less polemical conto::t. we might judge thaI the blatanl pragmatism implied by workability" stac.ks the deck against those theorists,
such as the Mimiquakas, who tis maintain that p,Im4!'J1' musl enrail
veridia.liry. Likewise, "workability" does not elicit the peculiarities of Ihe

of....nnw

8 Ponei' ill ~ primarily with the question

u\lm ill. r.. ' pry <ndirion
for a copi.ion [() I,c, ,,..,,,., i.~.. the reruh of the application of I , ......'!"'- H~ noIQ
(' ~)1I1.

To di.c:k ..Mthn uum ill

condirion lOr an a.....-.rmeM [() I,c, a, ...... OM

m.... ardUIIy IWHI the rdation whid! a fN"" mwr beu 10 iu OXItcn . W~.nnt a
.cU.ioo. R.. whid! holds bd"cu. any ,rlI1Nland iu CDntcnl,' rdcion which can Iw
admiutd by C'<'n'f Indian phi~ to Idd bduuo, a".,uand iu >nlfti. ~
kfII of the pouDc:ubr theory M 01" any od>cr Indian philotopher prop<iKI aboul the
na.u~ of 01" propaof R.

anal,.,..

nealAl)'

or

UU","C 10 repracnr >nl<:flt and

10 "'PI_III the cosniOOn {i.~.. j /U"'"
"'mcm!hal Rbe Khmwized UUII (I~}n):
R iff J apprehe...... (Ii " _ ..to. 0... 1 C in o.cc<>rdaac.

J
mor;"ltd J.

-i.n

iudi. POIIH

,h. P"o-poH 'M'

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

229

;j;UIlmatical is~ue~ that are the typical poi~t of ~epar:ure for extended dislttssions on prama1}ya. Nevertheless, Potter s baslc pomt should not be lost:
i~1fpose does indeed playa significant role in all theories of priimii1}ya.
ence , with both the notion of purpose and the importance of grammat~ concerns in mind, we will translate priimii1}ya as "instrumentality"m~t which warrants the claim that perception, inference, or some other
~didate is an instrument of knowledge or pramii1}a.

c:;purpose and Instrumentality

~When

we focus on the role that purpose plays in discourse on instrumen;taIity, we are in effect asserting that any instrument of knowledge must be
~good for something"-it must contribute to the attainment of the goal
;iUat one seeks. As such, an instrument of knowledge occurs in the context
~fa cognizer's desire to accomplish the human purposes of obtaining the
~esirable and avoiding the undesirable. 9 In speaking of instrumentality,
lframana Theorists often frame their discussion in terms of a general notion
~f mu~dane purposes. For example, in discussions of inference, one ubiq~aitous example is the inferential knowledge of fire gained when the per~eption of that fire's smoke is adduced as evidence. And when discussing
ire distinction between perception and perceptual illusion, Pramal).a The~rists frequently cite the mistaken belief that one is seeing water when one
~~in fact seeing a mirage. The purposes suggested by these and other such
~'xamples are clearly mundane: to obtain warmth, to slake thirst, and so
:~n. Buddhist thinkers in particular present their arguments for what con~titutes instrumentality almost uniquely in relation to these and other such
Jnundane goals.
~, Nevertheless, for Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, discussions of pur~bse in general presuppose an overriding concern with a specific type of
purpose: namely, the ultimate purpose or goal whose obtainment is meant
~o result from the proper practice of a tradition's "path" (marga).!O If part
ijf what one means by instrumentality is that an instrument of knowledge
i!-<;,>

;9 In Dharmakirti's work, rhis notion is best illustrated by rhe metaphor of rhe eunuch (see
:!lVI.2IO-2II and PVSV ad cit.; translated below, 3IO). See also the discussion of purpose in
,fhapter I (45ff).
;to The highest goal attained through such spiritual practices is variously described by terms
uch as mok!a ("liberation"), naifreyasa ("rhe highest good"), svarga ("heaven") and so on. See
the fine study by Chaltravarrhi Ram-Prasad (200I) for details.

l}O

FOU NDATIONS OF D HARMAKUtTn PHILOSOPHY

must be -good for something,~ one pre$umably will show a spial concern
for verifying the instrumenta.l ity of an alleged instrument of knowledge
that is meant to be good fOr the obt:linmcnt of ooc's highest purp<l6C. The
coma! of a highe$t purp<l6C, however, confron ts Pmn~a Theorists with
a basic problem: each rndition conaiVC$ its ultimate purpose-and me
path mat leads to it-in sum a fashion ma, to some significant extent some
clements of that pUrpoK and its palh ~ nOI amenable to cmpirica.l examination." Oharmakini , fo r example. posits buddhahood u his ultimate
goal . and whik he argues tenaciously !lUt the possibility and genera.! characteristics ofbuddhahood can be inferred prior to ia att2inment. he admia
that there are aspects of ,hat mile which we Qnnot know or understand
prior to obtaining it." Likewise, in terrru of the path thai is meant to lead
to mal ~ . our spiritual exercises may rest in some cases on belicfi; about
the lr.ulSempirica.l. O ne ROClbie example is the doctrine ofbrma, accord
ing 10 which the activilies of this life willlC3d to specific resulu in the nen
life. Again. Dharmakini wiU nu.imain that much that is at stake in me doctrine of karma-including the cxUtence of former and future lives-is
indc:N. amenable to aamination mrough an ordinary person's senses or
inferences based 0 0 what is available to the~. N~nhdeu, the tk,"ib
of karm.as workings arc tntirdy beyond such empirical aamination,"
In this way, Buddhists such as Dharmakini-and indd all PmnlJ)a
Theorists-are confronted with the nc:N. to suppon dainu about transII 'IIW dw mm -anpiriaJ - as. COIlYmimI mnns 10 rdtt 10 Dhannaldrti'. notion of the
lilt types of knowabk
a~ thoK thai IIc pcrapcibk (r'"1"Jq4 ~ thaI arc
- 1'tmOIC" ~ 01' .,;,~ and IhoM: thai ~ a lmndy mnoI'~' (/U)Jll",.".rM,.J.

oo;cas

With the IrmI " mnOi'C- DlwmakJoi is: rmn-iII(I: to m-, obju lhat, .kilo: nO!' paQ:pt;.
bIc. arcamtNblc to bcin&known mlOlJ!;h ir.f~ldia. ~ob;ecuuc known ' empiricaly"
in that ouch infttmce. my diRCUy 01' inditlly on the n'idma: of lhe ICNCS; hma:. such
infnrncft 0oprr.ilt; by the 10m. of ~ rhinp' (~~ In (Qfllrwl:. &II "atmndy
rnnotr" ~ U 0 - 1....1 is -tnnwmpiric:aJ. - in d,," it ~nOI' be known throosh either
pth:tpc:ion 01' infermce. S o..ryfuI (Im:l9S) and liIlemans (Im:1I--}1) fOr rurthtt diIaas&ions. Wr will w.., up lhe;- of lCrip"raJ inltlma: in the

nest...rnon.

12 OM obviow aampk of Dlutll1lllorti, ~ roncaninl cauin aJpU of bud

dhabood u found in his S4""1l4~ whtt~ his atzumml fWftwally oompdt him to
claim thai the ~'.knowIcdgc: iI'i~' "'SIa).
13 Sec. fOr aampk, Tl1kmant (I99P9). Conca-nins the norion thai the dnailed wotltinp
of karma U1: nanaanpirical, ~n (JOOI:J70) RIrdo mil ...,I known ftIlC !'mm dw
~,,;.w.-.,. of VNUbandhU: "The toUlity o( 1M Q~ &alII"" of;ll _ . pcacodt
fathn 'l qc U nOI' knowIbk cxcqM by &II omnilc:icnt onc. IOc- lhe knowIcdfr of dw ill tJw,

,......... ..t .......~. {AK8h

un, _ , , - , . . ........!'>""" .....,..

~rJ'?'~~~ 1ti~_" I"

~,. I

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTI FYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLE DGE

131

empirical entities. whether those t'fuities be in the form of an ultimate PUIpose or some: other enci()' whose existence' is requimd by tht: procedures or
practices one is to follow in orot:r to obwn ritat u1tim,ue goal. At the same
tirnc:. Pr:unil:'a 1beorisa dearly fed that they must dt:monstrate how it is
that Wt: an know thai such tranKmpiriaJ entities aist; in other words, the
traditions engaged in this style of di.scoulK argue for some instrument of
Icnowit:dge (pranUtwJthat will mabie ordinary pmons to confirm (or deny)
that such trarucmpirical entities exist. The paradigmatic form of such an
instrument is lruti or .ita""" both of which Wt: may refer to as "scripture."

At the risk of tl'ivializing the notion o( scripture. let w alee a mundane

oample in order to underst:md the special relevance of argumenu about
insuumentaii(), in the: COntOt of claims that scripture an ~ as an instrument of knowledge (or tl1uuempirical objcca. For the purpoKS of our
aamplt:, let us suppo~ that we art: standing in a v:tlley, and that I have a
spttial instrument ofknowledgc-4 pOlirof digitally enhanced videogr'aphic
binoculars. We arc interested 10 know ..... hat might be on the dinant top of
the motlnrain abovr. and poinling Ih", binoculars upw:ard, I rcpon tbat I
clearly sec an enormous purple house. You art doubtful, since the mounWntOp secms too remote for any houses, and in any case, purple seems an
unlikely color. Spurred on by doubt. you ask for mort derail. I then describe
circular windows, triangular doors, a roof made of crysal, and other such
oddities, aU of which I can clearly sec in the video image pracnred to me
by w binoculan. You :lR nill lk~cical , bul as long as I d~riM ~tures
that arc al kasl pouibk (even if improbable), you cannot definitively reject
what I claim 10 sec and know. Suppose funher that you gain access to my
instrument of knowlcdge-I give you the binoculars-and then you also
dearly Itt Ihest: slnnge sigha on the mountaintop. Wilhout the binoculan, tht: peak is tOO f.u- away to make any definitive judgmenl. u cept for
.. he binoculars th~mSl!Iw:s. you h~ ~ no way to vrrify whal t~ binocubn
show you, and the rugg~ [t:rrain prevents any attempt al climbing doser.
If you wish to doubt: Ihe dear video image presented by the binoculars,
your only recourse is to ask: are these: digial binoculars rdiable? Migln they
have been tampered with in some fashion ? Has me software been manipulated to crcue strange dist~ t sighl$? The point, in any case, is ,hal if the
dan (ha( __ p in from (hiJ i nnrum~( ofknowlM~ ato" to ~ qu~rionM .
our sole rccourv is to aamiM the rdiabili(), of that instrument itself.

232

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Our example illustrates an important shift that occurs when Pramana

Theorists take scripture as a means to gain knowledge about transempiri~al
entities. In the (;ase of empirical entities, one can always resort to other perceptions and inferences to confirm (or reject) the alleged knowledge gained
from some supposed perception or inference. One can always resort to other
perceptions and inferences because Prama.r:a Theorists clearly expect that
any empirically knowable object should be amenable to many different acts
of perception or inference: for them, it would be anomalous indeed to claim
that, for example, an object is generally perceptible (d.rfya) and yet known
through only one act of perception, or only in the perceptions of one person. But an appeal to scripture as an instrument of knowledge amounts to
the claim that there is but one instrument of knowledge-the scripture in
question-that will give one access to the transempirical entities in question.
And since we can neither confirm nor deny the scripture's claims about the
transempirical, our only way to contest those claims is to contest the reliability of the scripture. To return to our example, if we are joined by fifty
other observers in the valley, and if I claim to see with my own eyes some
house in the distance, each of those fifty persons can test my claim through
an act of perception unique to each person. But if I claim to see the house
only through our one set of special binoculars, my claim can be tested only
by passing the binoculars around, which may not be much of a test at all.
And of course, PramaIJ-a Theorists were not contending with just one scripture-each tradition had its own scripture (or body of scriptures) that presented its own version of the transempirical. Adding these competing
scriptures to the mix is akin to finding other binoculars that we might use.
In lieu of just one pair of binoculars, we would now have five or six, but each
set of binoculars presents a different (or even incommensurate) picture of
the scene on the mountaintop.
Although our example may be crude, it has the advantage of presenting
in rather stark terms the issues that Pramal).a Theorists face in sorting out
the competing claims about the transempirical that they encounter in the
various scriptures or scriptural traditions of South Asia. Since each tradition's ultimate purposes focus on transempirical goals, the Prama.r:a Theorists in each tradition cannot simply ignore scriptural disparity because
scripture alone gives ordinary persons access to the trans empirical. To
ignore the competing claims of scripture would be to ignore one's highest
purpose or goal. And since the scriptures provide the sole access to the
transempirical, when thinkers from different traditions debate the transempirical, they cannot overtly begin with the assumption that any given scrip-

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

233

"e is true. Otherwise, debate would be reduced to tautological assertion. 14

ce, although Pramal}a Theorists argue directly about the claims made
ripture, they focus most of the debate about scripture on the question
." strumentality: what is it that makes any scripture an instrument of
",ledge? And the style of argument employed across traditions tends to
ssuch debates on one critical criterion of instrumentality: the origin of
ipture. In brief, one aims to show that the content of one's scripture is
ble because its source is flawless.
examining this issue, Pramal}a Theorists prior to DharmakIrti employ
general strategies that are well known in this style of discourse. First,
may argue that a scripture is the "speech of a credible person"
viida), and as such, its instrumentality is derived from the extraordiqualities that make that person credible (apta), Second, one may argue
a scripture is eternal and not of human origin (apauru!eya); its instrutality is somehow innate to it. Of these two options, most Pramal}a
rists, including Buddhists, follow the former option, and this in turn
s two questions: is it possible for a person to be or become "credible"?
second, can we determine that a specific person is indeed credible?
makIrti's own answers to these questions are important because they
his apparent attempt to ground instrumentality in a seemingly cirappeal to the Buddha's credibility.

academic study of Buddhist Pramal}a Theory, some scholars have

that DharmakIrti's notion of instrumentality rests ultimately on
of circularity. Specifically, in arguing for the instrumentality of perand inference, DharmakIrti appears to make an appeal to the
of the knowledge derived from reading or listening to the
a "credible person," namely, the Buddha. It is this appeal that leads
which in its most general and trenchant form, is as follows: 15

attitude toward scripture in debate is a recurring theme in PV4 (see TilleOf particular interest are two passages: PV4. 48 (Tillemans 200078-79; see
comments thereon) and the related discussion of iiptatava (Tillemans
~U~U"Llily

sketched here is the most defensible version of a set of positions initially

by Nagatomi (1959) and Vetter (1964); for a clear summary of their actual positions,
(1999). Hayes' version of circularity (1984), while loosely resembling that of

1}4

FOUNDATION S O F OHARMAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

As innrumenlS afknawledgc, pc:rcq}[ian and infe~nce allow us

to demanstrate that the Buddha has certain CJ:uaordinary qualiries. Since he has those qualities. he is c~ible (,IPll1). Since he
is credible, his teachings can tx used as a source of instrumental
knowledge. Since his teachings arc a source of instrumental
knowledge. we can usc Ihem 10 demonsuale thaI perception and
inference a.rc instrumenu of knowledg.:.
This cird.: moves from th.: instrumentality of perception and inft:rtnc.: as
im:futable evidence (E) for the credibility (0 of the Buddha., and thar credibility then justifies th.: iluuumentality of his teachings
l..ik1N'~, the
teachings themselves justify the instru!mntality of perception and inference, but these arc already adduced. as evidence (E) far the Buddha's credibility. As a matt.:r of convenience, let us ~fer to mil argumeDl as the
-ECTE- circle.
It should tx dear thar. in terms of th.: ('YI() questions about credibility
!mntioned a~, the ECTE circle ~uires an affirmariv.: a.JUWeJ to bom.
That is, on.: must affirm that it is indd passibl.: to obtain th.: extraordinary qualities fhat make a penon crc<iible, and one must likewise maintain
that it is possible to know through pc:rption and inference that a spific
penon (in this cast, the Buddha) hal th.: qualities that mak.: him credibk
In ord.:r 10 a.$$CI$ how Dhannakini does answer these quesrioru--and
h.:nce whtthtr h.: asserts an EerE argum':D1~ne must examin.: his com
ments on twO concise statements mad.: by his prcdcctSSOt Digniga. The
fin:! of these is Ih.: famed Nlmab//okll (vcrse of homage") that begins
Digniga', PrttIfU1!J1lSilmurrllJil;

m.

He has becom.: an instrument of knowlcdgc. and inl':Ol on th.:

weal af the world. he is the tcacher. the SlIltllll. the protcctor.
Bowing to him. I will collect h~ in this text my theories scattered in various works 50 as (0 establish the instruments of
know\~. "

Naplomi and Vmrr. it koo rdcnnllOr our purpoMS. Smnkdl"" (I~l) laler mlen~ and
arJII"d for Veun's petition. bul lit: Iw N.naoplcd (Slonkdlner 100) for a IUbdcr vnsion
01 circularilY I~I we wiD dilaua bdow.
16 I'S ( OJ d . H.....n a,), , _ ~' Ao';"".1'-~.~':W ,-':W~ u.- nop"".1'- ~.., I

, ..,,"~.,',/,J j ~dt ~.~ luNtJt-

",,..,uJ ooluw/! /.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING n-tE SOURCES O F KN OWLEDG E

1}S

Variow interprctert ancienl and modem have shown mal Dharmakini

devotes the enlirc PrIlINi~i dupter of his PralNi!",wimika to the
unpaclcing of Ihis verse. Specifically. the chapter is structured so as to
dcmonstratcmat me Buddha is wonhyofthc primV)' epithet in Digniga's
praise-that is, Ihe Buddha can be correctly praised as Mone who has
become an innrumenl of knowlcdge (praml'Jllbhiiu). Dharmakini
ckmonnrates lhal the 8uddtu is wormy of this prinury epithet by arguing
that he is also correctly described through the four subsidiary epithets in lhe
vcm: "he who is iment on the weal of the worid (ja:adJhiui,in), Mlhe
tcachcr- (ldsrr), "the one who has weU underttood" (suKau), and "the protector" (tAyin). 11 We need. not address thr details of dUs inuicate argumrm,
but we should note that after he has argued that the Buddha is indeed. WOf*
thy of the subordinate epithetS. Dhannakirti concludes with a set of state*
menu that might easily suggest ECTE circularity:
M

of compassion (da,.) he scues whal is best (for his lislenert),

and through his knowledge (jMnll) he SlII)'S what is lrue. And
since he is imrm (llbhiyDxalldnl) upon staring th,u which is bcsl
and true :along with Ihr m~5 10 realitc it. he is an innrumrnt
of knowledge. Hr is praised as an instrument of knowledge in
thaI his tcaching is of thaI kind, and thr purpose of praising him
in that ruhion is 10 establish the nature of the instrumenu of
knowledge through mat tcaching."
OUI

I.n relation 10 Ihe notion mat me Buddha is Monr who has become instrument of knowIMW"" tpram4!",hhii14). rhl': comml':nr.ubl rl":ldirion u:nl':f:ally interprets these lines as simply rescuing Ihe long argument Ihrough
the four epithcu thai precedes this VCt5C. That is, (I) our of his compassion
(44,.), rhr Buddha "sedcs the wc:aI of the world,- and (1) because ofhu
knowledge {jfi4IUl)conccrning what i.s lrue, he is "One who has wdl under*
srood," Since (J) he rcaches nOI only that truth, but also a means (wihalUl)
10 realiu il. he is the -reacher. and sinu (4) hr i~ rffortfuJ (ahhiyofIlIN!lITt)
in that taSk, he is me MProtector" (Iayin;' And thw, as one who has these
M

17 Set- T.tlenw1s and Irwni (1916) and FmICO (1m) lOr diKl qioos of 1M IClUCTUre or ,he
Pr.tfIJ/WI;,uJ,i duPlu.
18 PV"L"'a-"')C

~my.""""'rw- ~'!'

M . M _ ... u _~~ .... -t"":,,

..

JIfUII4IlIItI,,"'~" / M~"~.muis ";,,,' ,(*"" f~

236

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

four qualities-compassionate, knowledgeable, informative and effortful_

the Buddha is. therefore one who has become an instrument of knowledge

(pramatzabhuta).
How might these statements lead us to ECTE circularity? First, following Franco, we interpret the term pramatzabhuta ("one who has hecome
an instrument of knowledge") as a synonym of apta ("credible person"). We
would certainly be within our rights to make this interpretation; indeed, it
is difficult to imagine why DharmakIrti's contemporaries would not themselves immediately see his use of pramatzabhuta as a reference to credibility.19 Thus, the argument by way of the four epithets becomes an argument
about the qualities tha~ make the Buddha credible. And once we are in the
context of credibility, we are de facto concerned with the instrumentality of
the Buddha's teaching. What role does the teaching play here? The verse
maintains that through the teaching (upadefatap), we establish that perception and inference are instrumental. And what is the relevance of perception and inference? The verse is not explicit in this point, but it is clear
that, on DharmakIrti's view, an acceptable and convincing argument must
employ instruments of knowledge as its warrants. Hence, presumably we
accept the long argument concerning the four epithets because it proceeds
through a rigorous application of perception and inference.
In short, the statements that we have just cited seems to invoke an ECTE
circle: 20
Using perception and inference, the long preceding argument
has demonstrated that the Buddha has four extraordinary qualities, and since he has those qualities, he is an instrument of
knowledge-that is, he is credible (apta). Moreover, we praise
him as an instrument of knowledge precisely so as to demon-

19 Franco (1997:29) offers a convincing comparison on Dharmakirri's approach to

pramiirtabhuta and Vatsyayana's discussion of iiptatva. Certainly, it seems that the characteristics evoked by the four subsidiary epithets resemble in significant ways the extraordinary
qualities that, for Vatsyayana, constitute credibility. See also Silk (2002).
20 We should note here that the question of whether the Buddha is an instrument of know1edge literally or only metaphorically actually makes litde difference to the issue of circularity. I have earlier suggested (1999) that the literal interpretation of the epithet pramiirtabhuta
is highly problematic, at least on the interpretation of the earliest commentators, and
Krasser's work (2001) strongly supports this conclusion. Nevertheless, the key issue here is
whether the term pramiiflabhuta should be taken as essentially synonymous with iipta. I
think that it must be.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIfYING THE SOUII. CES Of KNOWLEDGE

1}7

ur.ne that his teachings a~ also inSifumenw, and we usc the

teachings ro establish th:u pc:lctption and infercnct ;lie insrrumen" ofknowledge. And of c.ounc, it is pnupcion and inkrroc:c
dut have allowed us to demonsu':lte in the previous argument
tb,l[ the Buddha h:u the extraordinary qualities in question.
If we acupt this tCStalcmcnt of the Yenc:s that conclude Dharmakini's argument for the Buddha as prllmd!fAbhiitA, we obviously mwt accept dut his
argument evinces EcrE circulariry. And on my view, any straightforw:ud
rnding of the statements in question willicad 10 some venion of an ECfE
argument!' Henct, if we:uf: 10 avoid this circulariry, we musl suggCSt how
we an read those ltaternenu in a manner that is not nraightforw:ud. and
we must likewise provide sufficient grounds for doing so. We an accomplish both of these taSks by anending 10 [he wider conlC'Xt that informs
these vcnc:s and the long argument mat they conclude.
To suggest bowwc might read the verses in a manner that is not circular, we an rely on Franco's interpfC1ation:
21 Fnnm (Im:6sj arpa; apinst the ima ptt......... of the aX roottd in drwbr ~
As a lnllU't offXt, the immed.i.alt mmco!! of Iht vnx does ncx Mlppon Vmer', and

N.-ni', inwpetcac>oo [~. Iha, doc~. 1>0:,., it; rimJ1uJ ......,,'C OharmaI<irti
arpa htK and in doc foUowirc twO mQ mal doc Buddha U"Cd ptlUpc;o.l and ink.-
~.

ncx tha ....,.. an.-ilid bea..... ofhim. Nor doa thecommmwOf$' in.~
cion Juppor1 Vetter', or Nap-Iomi', h)'JlOthcxs, (Of none: of OIwnulr..ini',
commml1lon dnccu hat I~ ciK,,]..uil)' ptrccivN by Vmcr or !he: rmproO,y
daiJMd by Nap.omi.
Whik K mly be lfIK dIa,.he vnx (which it; aawIJy a ftX and a IWf) is not twapribk w
doc vrniono of rin:uWi1)' "'M MN by Nac;o.omi and Vmcr. it iI diffi..."".o ckfmd >ipinn
doc rircului<y _ baY.: akctdw:d~, if _lppcak ooly 10 !his vax and iu i~ c:onIUL 'iUhotn. in the _
tN. foUo,.-, DtwrrWUni ma!he 8<iddha', Wot of ~,a:pJon and
omainly"Cml juaUfwd in cb.imiilfi tNt we "-'Id acupI doc irumunmt:lll'1
of pmxpJoo and in(",u... bcuusc:!he 8tiddJg comidrmI thmo iiUlNmCntal. ~, it, lhe
I"act!hal ~ and inr.--1U"l" iftMl'tIft\CiIlJI", dCfIW:>nsm,eed by ~ flC! that.he: Bud
diu. who if; Cftdible ",",.non.,. 0 . . . uch .......- . .....d ........ (cf. Fnnco '?99:U). And of
couno:, we t.."" alrady UIIed paupeion.nd infcmKo"'o dcmonan.~ that.he: Buddha iI .
CRdibk ",,!hori'1 on web m.lRcrL
FitWly, while Iht tonuncntaton do not mention any such rircubril)', docU "lena on the
maLler rnit;:hl Jimply Ix an 1.1Cftlp! 10 avoid an intnaabk dauc. Hmot, 1douIx Wolwe CIIl
diam;' d..- amninsIY circu1u Irpmcn. Jtl!F'Ie.t by the _
illS! on the '-is of iu QOr\.
ICIII alone. InckaL if anyt/llilfi. iNsmum IS ....,.. oocur " the end of an argLimml for o:ht Bod
dha', e'Nibilil)' at "._~u.,., the ftX'. immcdi.atr to,lIa' lUpp<'lru
cirrulu
..p ........ loMcMl, .. f.1Ul<.U..Lou ..tru ...... it io u",b.... I;'.'"~", uf .... iptlAni io,{CfnlU: u...
allow. UI 1O.qca mon: ddinimdy lhe: ..:cua.1oo of ci1rulari1)'. .. we will...., below.

wac.." . _

.ha.

z}i

f OU NDAT IONS O f DlIARMAKIRTI"S PH Il.OSO PHY

Th~ fram~rIc

in which theK SDtmlenU are ma({(: is clearly

apologetic, as Dharmakirti aims at anchoring his own epistemology in {h~ original message of the Buddha.. Thus, according
[Q DharnWdni. Digniga praises the Buddha for be:ing a teacher
not only in rdigious maRm, but also in maRers of tpistemology.
TheK apologetics, however, an: to be: distingui5hcd from the
actual procedure by which Dharmakirti reach~ the conclusion
that th~ Buddha is a mons of knowledge. Ev~n if th~ uggc: of
perce:ption and infef'1!nce has bttn obsc:.rvcd in the: Buddha's
tc:achingot and servcs as a modd for cst:ablishing their (Jue: charKtffi.stia, one can tCSt and independently use: them to csl2b1ish,
among other things, the validiry of Ihe Buddha', teachings, and
from it the authority of the Buddha himself. Pe:rce:ption and
inference: within this ~omot ate certainly nOI established from
the OUt5c:l just because: of the Buddha's authority. Nc:vcrthdc:u,
one: is jUJliflcd [Q claim later on, in an apologetic comal, tha.t
Ihe means which iuve provro so succc:ssfuJ wcre a1re.ady discovered by the: Buddha and taught in his leiChings,u
In dfc:ct. Franco 5UggC:515 that the: steming circularity of th~ st:uementS
is a produa of their rhetorical oonlal. Dharmilirti strikes a ddibc:ratdy
apologetic stance: dUI allows him to make Ihe type: of claims about the
Buddha lhatthinkcrs in othe:r traditKJn5 routindy assen in rc:ialion to their
own founde:rs. This inte:rpretation resu on Franco's larger argument that
Dharmakini's discussion of thc: Buddha as pranui!"lbbwt4 is ,u.scc:ptibl~ 10
a "double re.ading" wh~rc:bywc on rad the tOt as a proof lhal the Buddha is pr.mtl~lIbhiit4 in the Buddhill or more: spc:cifica.lly in Digniga's
sense, but also as a proof that he is an tlpla (i.e. , credible: pcr50nJ in the:
Nyiya Vai~ ik:a or SiJpkhya-Yoga sense."u R.eca.lling (he "sliding scale: of
analysis" discussc:d pm'K>usly, we might rtadily accc:pt that Dhannaldrti
adopts here: a sliding scak in rc:iation to the question of cmLibility, such thaI
he is willing 10 argue: provisionally in a manne:r that leads to ECfE circulariry, only 10 abandon that argument 301 a higher Ic:vcl of his scale. Nevertheless. 10 claim that Dhannakini escapes ECrE circularity in thil fashion,
we must have good reason 10 do so: we mUSI mow that a Straightforward

22

F~

(1999'66),

2.J franc.o (1997'19). ~ at... McOinrodt ( IOO~J~I.

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYIN G TH[ SO URCES O F KNOWLEDGE

1} 9

tnding of the S(2temenu ciled above (with their anendam ECfE circularity) art superseded by a clearly amcuLned position in Dharmakirti's work
that sea the fauh in an appc:tl (0 credibility! '
~ it rums out, we can point to a dearly articulated position of thu
kind, :tnd to do so, we mwt turn to Dhannaltirti's comments on another
of Digniga's S(2lemena , mu time concerning credibility and the innrumentality of scripture,

Scriptllrllll,,/trt1t 11M Dhamut.iirtii /Ujtis" o/CnJibi/ity

At the beginning of his U'e:ttment of scriprural inference, Dtwmakirti cilC$
a short but crucial sruement from his prMcc.cssor Digniga: ~S inc.c the satemenu of a crtdible person a~ generally trust'NOnhy. a cognition arising
from them is :tn instrumental infcrcnu ,"" Dignliga's scucmem ccrtainly
appears to evoke the typial argument for scriprural instru menl2lity that on
our malysis would lad Dharmakirti to ECTE circularity, Thus, when

~ i......, II Iw.d inOkt:s ow Iwrrntnnnko of duncy.

whKh ill thil CIIC rem on. hypolhnKal anicwuion ofDtwmWlti', impticit method to.orden"' .............
oIid.in, oalc
If _ _ P" 1'5 0< pot;.;.,.. .....
don not ~ wi,h l1li' ~ vitwofDhmnKirtf l chougIl, _ rmrsmrnlly ~ our
vitw aIons eithuof (WO!ina: by inansing ow ""picion dw Dlwmaldrti'l ~k io in.:o-

2<t III dTo:n, I am OUSS'""'i,,! oha.

.Ion,_

of.....,-.

bmnt. or by NWminS_ cunmdrobKuft' ~ in OW' ~ 1, booo"tr,. wdI

micubud pa'nS" 01' poWon deuty con.radicu _
(Xbn, eoq..wlr wdI aniculatfti p4lngt
or ~,ion, tMn lhc ~ principk 01 hc:"hCIIC'''Q cIwity 1M _ ~ adopccd will
prompt: us to rank u- paMtioru aIonf; I hicTatdlial Jak: the: Iowtt position, while con.atuaIIy apcdienc, it ...pcnednI by tho: hipr poUlion
br vim. of pl.MillS a r:I.ionaI
lor m. tho: "-'" pOOlion &.ilo. confonN: /nOll: dotdy 10 Dlwmumi". '<'mioo of lilIima.c
truth. To employ this hcrmcnaIlQ.hniqllC, _ mUit Ix abk 10 opecif'y boIh tho: 0I)n1ClnW CIIpcd~1IC)' in q-..ion and I.... opecillc buh in tho- Iowrr po$irion oha. Otw-mUrni
camca if! dw hishn" JlCl'ition. I wgs dIM _ an II'IOtI boIh of u- condllioN: the: apedicnq wilma of lhc rhctorial mllmpNJiun dac:ribcd by Franco (an CIIpcdXncy ml!
in>'Ol_ a w* ""ntr of Wuos, indudinS imli1l11iona! identify and w.rvinO, and the f.wJ,
dw ~ hi(!;bcr fJO'ilion dclibcntdy <:riri.q.... and abandon. io ..... Iowtt potirion'l :appeal to
crrdibiJicy, .. 1 apt.in;u.. below,

mx.

15 PSLsab: ~~_",.. .",,1fWJw:.l, NOIt. lint. Wot altbour;h the pbmc -.

DD(!;JliDon ....... &om them" ..... Ix .... ppIiod br QOn~. ~ cbrIy IIndmand thio
.wantnl in tN.t Whion (ttt PVI.1.I6, u'amla!cdaJon& with thot tell of~ JcCtion on acrip11m in lhc appcndix). Nexc abo thai I prd'cr to .-.ok! !ht in~ 01 1bV""" aI "lhc
_ ." or "WnJb, to." Akhour;h my in.c'l"tUOOn it not diro:nly "'pponcd by ~ Tibetan
mmolarion
mmpound of dw form "1iI""" an arulnly have IN II"Ie:lnins of "".in smrnI" or "a smrnI ~ 01. (c-l- ' PVw .d,.w., ,...,.." whcK i. 1WIdi

r""*/IfI,..J..

in ....." . - ... ...-..uq., Si ....., 0.1", ...."""uf ;..

1I""1<'1"r ,,,,Kkn, doc QJlmncnu. by J~

dhi, Kan;tWpnill, and ~i ~ inldlJsibk. I loa." d>o..cn dut ~

240

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Dharmakirti unpacks Dignaga's statement, we should expect him to focus

his argument on the credibility of the Buddha, since credibility is the decisive issue in this approach to the instrumentality of scripture.
Surprisingly, however, Dharmakirti does not argue for the instrumental_
ity of scriptural knowledge by arguing for the credibility of the Buddha'
moreover, we can readily justifY the stronger claim that he explicitly rejec~
any appeal to credibility as an acceptable means of grounding the instru_
mentality of scripture. To demonstrate how this is the case, we need nOt
present a detailed analysis ofDharmakirti's approach to scripture, since both
Tillemans and Franco have already provided such studies. 26 Instead, let us
offer a brief summary and then cite his explicit rejection of credibility.
In sum, Dharmakirti's discussion of scripture falls into eight significant
parts: 27
1. An initial reference to Dignilga'swords that emphasizes the context in
which an appeal to scripture is permissible [Preamble to PV1.214]. One
can only make such an appeal if (a) the issue at hand is wholly
transempirical (atyantaparok!a) in that it cannot be adjudicated on
the basis of empirical instruments of knowledge; and (b) it must be
settled in order for one to advance in one's spiritual exercises.
2.

The general characteristics that a scripture must have ifit is to be a candidate for use in a scriptural inference [PV1.214 and PVSV ad cit.].
The scripture must address the concern mentioned in (I) above in
an intelligible and practicable fashion.

3. The "threefold analysis" that a candidate scripture must pass ifone is to

use it as the basis for a scriptural inference [PV1.215 and PVSV ad cit.].
To be used for a scriptural inference, the passage must pass three
tests: (a) it cannot be contradicted by empirical knowledge acquired
through perception; (b) it cannot be contradicted by empirical
knowledge acquired through inference; and (c) it must not contradict itself concerning transempirical matters.
4- A restatement ofDignilga's words [PV1.2I6 and PVSV ad cit.]. This

almost literal restatement's rhetorical location suggests that 1-3 can

be considered a complete account.

26 Tillemans (1993) and Franco (1997 and 1999).

27 See the translation in the appendix (J61ff). See also Tillemans (1999).

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

241

5. An alternative test that obliquely refers to the extraordinary qualities of

the scripture's author (i.e., the Buddha) [PVI.2I7 and PVSV ad cit.].
This test either supplements or perhaps replaces (3) the threefold
analysis. According to this test, one may employ a scriptural inference with regard to transempirical matters because the "important
topics" (pradhanartha) of the Buddha's teachings, i.e., the Nobles'
Four Truths, can be confirmed on the basis of an ordinary person's
empirical instruments of knowledge alone. Hence, since his teachings are known to be trustworthy in this regard, one trusts them
with regard to other, empirically inaccessible matters. To trust the
teachings in this manner, one must also maintain that the scripture's author (namely, the Buddha) had knowledge of matters that
are transempirical to us, and that he had no reason to deceive us.

6. A denial that scriptural inference is actually an inference [end of PVSV

on PVI.2I7]. Dharmakirti says that it is "not without problems,"
and his commentator Sakyabuddhi describes such an inference as
"not actually instrumental."28

7. An explicit rejection of the appeal to credibility [PVI.218-219 and

PVSV ad cit.], which we will cite below.
8. And finally, a reaffirmation of the possibility ofattaining the kind of

qualities that, ifit were possible for others to know them, would make
one credible [PVI.220-223 and PVSV ad cit.]. Here Dharmakirti
cites many of the issues that he will take up in greater detail in the
aforementioned discussion of the Buddha as "one who has become
an instrument of knowledge" (prama~abhiita).
_ A significant feature of this argument is the tension that it evinces
~~tween an appeal to one's own empirical knowledge as opposed to trusti-ig in another's (i.e., the Buddha's) trans empirical knowledge. Dharmakirti
~~~gins in an empiricist vein by avoiding any reference to credibility (1-4),
i~d the rhetorical structure of this portion of the argument suggests that we
,iiay consider it a complete account of scriptural inference, if we were so

'}n other words, the Acarya [Dignagal did not say that knowledge from scripture is a
type of instrumental inference by claiming that it is actually or truly (bhiivika) instru~mental. Rather, it is instrumental with regard to the way in which a person should
proceed.

242

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

inclined. Perhaps, however, Dharmakirti recognizes that in the context of

Dignaga's notion of scriptural inference, one cannot fail to speak of the
Buddha as credible-i.e., a person with the extraordinary qualities required
for direct epistemic access to the transempirical. Dharmakirti therefore supplements the initial account (1-4) by referring somewhat obliquely to the
Buddha's extraordinary qualities and transempirical knowledge (5). Even
here, however, he manages to cast the issue in an empiricist light: he affirms
unequivocally that one can determine the "important topics" of the Buddha's teaching just on the basis of one's own, ordinary perceptions and
inferences. Nevertheless, despite this claim's empiricist tones, Dharmakirti
is apparently troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha's transempirical
knowledge and concomitant extraordinary qualities. How else can we
explain the fact that he immediately backpedals by denying that scriptural
inference is really an inference at all (6)? Moreover, he then proceeds to
reject explicitly any appeal to credibility (7). Nevertheless, he apparently has
qualms about implying that, by rejecting credibility, he means to reject the
notion that it is possible to obtain the kind of extraordinary qualities attributed to the Buddha. He therefore reaffirms (8) that if one follows the Buddhist path to its completion, one can attain the kind of extraordinary
qualities that would make one credible, even if ordinary persons cannot
definitely know whether any specific person has done so.
Overall, the argument thus exhibits an ambivalence that oscillates almost
wildly between an appeal to the trans empirical knowledge of an extraordinary person (i.e., the Buddha) and a staunch affirmation that even as ordinary persons, we can confirm and know the important part of the Buddha's
teaching just on the basis of our own empirical perceptions and inferences.
I would argue that this ambivalence is certainly part of what contributes to
the appearance of EeTE circularity in the PramiiIJ-asiddhi chapter. Below we
will also see that this ambivalence is an important thematic issue that must
inform our examination of the Buddhist approach to instrumentality.
Let us first settle, however, the question of whether Dharmaldrti is
indeed caught in EeTE circularity. We have noted that we seek a clearly
articulated position in which Dharmakirti rejects the appeal to credibiliry
that would be required for him to be committed to an EeTE position. We
find a clearly articulated rejection at PVI.218-219, which on our account is
the seventh section of the argument on scriptural inference. To be clear
that Dharmakirti is indeed rejecting any appeal to credibility, it is worth citing this passage in full:

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

243

Others [such as the NaiyayikasJ think that a statement dependentfor

its origin on a superior person is in accord with reality (yathartha).
[PVI.2I8ab) According to others,29 a credible speaker (apta) is a
person with good qualities such as experience of things as they
truly are (yatharthadarfana); that person's teachings are trustworthy. This point is admitted ifone is able to know that that person has that superior quality. 3D [PVI.218ed] Every judicious person
who wishes to act analyzes statements to determine what is and
what is not scripture (agama); he does so as one who wishes to
act [effectively], and not because of some pernicious habit.
Learning what should be put into practice from the scripture,
he thinks, "Having acted accordingly, I might realize my goal."
On the basis of the trustworthiness of that scripture with regard
to things that can be experienced [through perception or empirical inference], that person acts with regard to other things [i.e.,
the supersensible objects described in that scripture] because such
is the case for most practical action in the world.
But if one is to act on the basis of examining the person, one
would not act at all because one cannot know whether or not that
person has those kind of extraordinary qualities. It is not the case
that persons such as us would not act because of not accepting
that there are some persons with those qualities, since that kind
of person does indeed make true statements.31 In other words,

1:.

SakrabUddhl (247a) does not identify who these others might be; K(96) glosses apareas

;~ainafJ, while Manorathanandin provides

naiyiiyikiiilayafJ.

i.Sakrabuddhi (247b3) comments:

~.We accept the point that has just been stated-we do not reject that kind ofidea. But
e.it is accepted only if one is able to know that superiority, defined as the experience of
~.things as they truly are, etc., as being a defmite aspect of that person. But one is not
!~able to know that. [bshail ma thagpa'i don gangyin pa de nyiil ni kho bo cag 'aodpa kho

~.na yin

te / kho bo cag ni de Ita bur gyur pa spong bar byed pa ni mi byed do / 'on kyang
Ita ba bzhin du mthong ba fa sogs pa'i mtshan nyiil can gyi phul du byung ba
.de skyes bu'i [D.: busJ nges par shes pa nus na de yang shes par mi nus so 1].

~gal te don)i

6) preserves this statement almost entirely:

'yam anantarokto 'rtha sa it!O Smiikam / ki1J'l tu fakyeta )fziitu1J'l pU7Ufanaiyamyena yo

.ayo yathiiilarfaniidifak!atJo na tu fakyafJ [S~ayana reads: yathii ilarfanafak!atzasYa
fakyafJ; this has been emended ex con). to accord with PVT: fak!atJo na tu '" in
ord with SakyabuddhiJ .
. he portion corresponding to Sakyabuddhi (2483.2) ... de Ita bur gyur pa'i don)i Ita ba

FOUNDATION S OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

Othtn !_mtl]. _ Buddhists.} hrow t}JIlt it u txtrtmt" diffi"

C'Uit 10 /mow (d~riHNIh4) whit,," Olbm haw: fo.Jts or IIrr foultlm.
lIS whtn ont rnpon4s t(1 tIN fJtti(1", -Ir thu P"W" liltt ,hu or
not!-/t uc;t"mt" diffiCNit u/mow IHatMSt tht instrumtnllli rot"
nilioN for ullrminin, l~ch W Utl illY lIim(1U unobt.i_bk
(durlAbhll).Jl(PVI.1J91
The: truthful {SIIMJIW and deceitful actions of persons arc: due:
[0 [heir good me:ntal qualitics and the:ir me:ntal naws, Th05C
mc:nw attributcs arc: supcrsc:nsible:. and mey would have: to ~
inkrrcd from the: physical and vocal ~havior that arises from
[hem, And mon bdlavior can also be performed ddibcr.ndy
(bwl4hipiil'llllm) in a way omc:r man me mc:nw state mey ser:m
to reflect because ch05C behaviors occur as one desires and
because: mose bdlavion may be imended for various aims.II
Thus. mere is an overlap of me alleged evidcn~ for f.aults and
faultles.sncss. Therefore. not having made a definitive demmi"
nation, how is one 10 otablish thai me author of me scrip(Ure is
flawtCSl?~

/dilll "III

..w-, .. IiI,.",. i JM ,.,. ""I """ ,. j MJn .. '" Jw. 1M ,.i "'" ". ..,u It,;

#.hould (l((IIt afio:r iiI!' ~I!' ~ WJ- ,.~ in KC,j)6.J)-u;).

.)2 The pm...... if onm nnWtcd simply as "difficWt,' ~ this Enpoo word if roo wak
fOr .ht-lmKtN. dx prda mI"c)l.ln ncarty~c:&tC, ~cxprencI ~ins_than
Eitpish "difficult" but nof ~ qw~,.. RTidmI" 'im~ibk:

Noc( mac, aocotdI"Ito ~i (Z4ia)"K(m), tlJ,rIwIhJ(lIJ if l'anini.w nornina.iw

sinsubr wbm ~ with "w.,ui but muculinc nominative plural wbm ~
with

.T,

u,Yt...

JJ Iu UI Cl<2IIIpk, ~i (J..48b).K(J97)) _
-nut it, penoN who have dctirc
may makr .bo:rmdvct appa.i' .. ir they ~ dcsirdca. and dairdas ~ rn.y rnab
Uwmwm. appear .. if they had dnOra.. IMIN iii ~ . . .,,~ mu-,. ~",;
I "Illrip/ {.

Ml7'ip_".

34 PVSV "" rVI.u8-'J"

(G :H)9.1)-UO.I.4): ""~I!' ,.,hJn/M",

,.,~uJip~,.,.

.,.,., ~ I

qus w,u~'" niIIIIfI..w. i1'7.~ f w.

",,~ ~ jUn.IfI '~J*Ij lIulll ,.,..,."

.,.,.
nofp_,. ...,,,""',,, H"'~

',,~ ~,...,.-.nu f .';*-I"H!!''''''' _ ~ ".~". mr"H" IJ'#'"

iti f_~~...,.",.~IdJ'i,_ f ~lH1~ 'Lb~,.

f,.~ ftllN"fTIh .,,.~'.,... f ~ ",thi~j~",...,.1Hl ~
f~
:1\ ' ''IIM f uthi It; f .,.. ,...", ... ...". .TJ .1'1' ,unlq,.,. M f "'rlIlMtt,

me.

",., prnU!li1fti'Jf ,

iIH".,.,.,
"

~ (PVu191

(G...,.Mr J.i l"'?'"{ J UJ4 ~

_,,.Iolw
..
rA.,..>1.,.,, ... hri,,.....,,.,b
...,..J,J,.. "'""!" '1.:1-" ,..,...""w'l"i_

u"",",,,.,.,.,.,,.~
r.'i~
.,.... t.M N,.J) { .. U_~

~"" f "'" .,.",IiIfpu~,."

u.'" ."ikiIf".,. ".tI~

~ f

<VI

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

245

The above passage leaves little doubt that, for Dharmaklrti, one cannot
demonstrate that scriptural statements are a reliable source of knowledge on
the basis of the claim that their author has the kind of extraordinary qualities that constitute a credible person. For Dharmaklrti, one cannot use this
procedure for the simple reason that one cannot reliably determine whether
the person in question has the requisite qualities or not.
On my view, the above passage constitutes the kind of clearly articulated rejection of an appeal to credibility that allows us to discount any
apparent ECTE circularity in Dharmaklrti's thought. On this interpretation, the seeming ECTE circularity of the statements' that end Dharmaklrti's discussion of the Buddha's extraordinary qualities (i.e., the
qualities that make him pramii1}abhiita) must reflect a calculated excess of
apologetic rhetoric along the lines suggested by Franco. Whatever else
Dharmaklrti may be up to, his affirmation of the metaphorical instrumentality of the Buddha as "become an instrument of knowledge" (pramii1}abhiita) is not meant to suggest that the Buddha's words are what literally
prove the instrumentality of perception and inference.
We might think that the passage cited above, which has also been discussed most notably by Tillemans, would put an end to all talk of circularity, but it has not. Instead, it has prompted Steinkellner to reassess the
issue of circularity in terms of a far subtler issue, namely, the relation
between Dharmaklrti's conception of ultimate goal and the need to define
the instrumentality of perception and inference in a manner that suits that
ultimate goal. This subtler approach creates an important interpretive context for our study of instrumentality, and it especially helps to clarifY the
curious ambivalence-the oscillation between the empirical and the
transempirical-in Dharmaklrti's discussion of scripture.

Axiological Concerns: Mutual Restraint ofPath and Goal

At the humble and amusing outset of his recent article, "Once More on Circles," Ernst Steinkellner remarks, "At a certain stage of life one's research
work seems to oscillate between three options: correcting old mistakes,
repeating old mistakes, and making new mistakes."35 This self-effacing quip
introduces Steinkellner's abandonment of the notion that Dharmakirti
espouses a form of ECTE circularity, and Steinkellner emphasizes that
change by citing and agreeing with the interpretations offered by Franco and
35 Steinkellner (200J:323).

46

FOUNDATIONS OF QHAI.MAKIRTI S PHILOSOPHY

TilklNlU. Steinkdl~r, howevn, does not mcrdy sum:nder his earlier posi.
tion; inst(ad, be aho sks to explain t~ un<krlying qualm dut prompted
him to interpret Dhannakini's argument abour inStrumenulity as circular,
and ,his rd'ormuiated circularity is of great hermeneutical interest. Indd.
for our purposes Stcinkdlntt certainly is not - making n~ mistakes."
Describing this underlying circularity as "conctpfual," Steinkdlner sum
marizes it schematically:)i
Our ordinary valid cognitioru (prllmA'."') Clablish the aumority of
the" Buddha's t(aching (bsuJdhtt-lNN:lll14),
1.. the" validity of our cognitions (prJm4!']il) is undentood as the"ir rdi
ability (Iluiu",VIlIiilWl).
J. tC'liability dqlC'nds on succmful activity (pNnr1Jw,iJJhi).
-<t. ..JI hwrum guoili alc dcu:rmillCl.l by lilC ullin ... u: gv;d (,.inJrl!"l),
S. the" - ultimate: goal" is indicatC'd by the" Buddha's [(aching (bwJJhIl
I.

INIClltul).

As we shall 1, Dharmakini's notion of a cognition's insuume"ntality

(which Steinkdlne"r calls "validity") resu on me cognition 's tfUSrwonhi
net$ or reliability, lind Ihal IfUStwOrmine.s is largely connilun~d by one',
accomplishment of a goal through me knowledge supplied by that cogni
tion. Stdnkdlne"r'. point hel'(' is mat, if we do not have a notion of what
constitutes our goal. how CUl we appeal to the accomplishment of a goal as
a cental criterion of a cognition's instrumentality? And if. as a good Bud
dhist, one UrivCl toward the ultimate goal of "imi!'ll. will not all omC'f
goals be defined in terms of it? Likewise. if all OUf goals at(' defined in terms
of that ultimate goal. then since only the Buddha (or some other IIrhllnt)
has Icnowlcdgcof mat goal. we must IPpeal 10 his words (i.e., the Buddhist
scriptures) in oukr to posit it as the u1timatC' tournuonC' for a cognition's
innrumentality.R Finally. Steinkellner draws a hetmeneuticalleuon hefC"onC' th;lt is dearest whC'n he refers 10 the parallel Ca.5C' of Varpg:lI~ya 's
s",!iulntrll, an early S2'!lkhya ([earise that discu.uc:s the instruments of
J6 Sicinkdlntt (1OO):J~).
J7 See Strinkdlncr'1 filnhn dOOcbtion (UIO}:U9):

bf a pp of IW;\m>C$l on !be: part of Dlwmaldrti,.."...I] .. the whole

tr.odilion Iv: rrprelftlU c:onarning 1M analysil of,~ il doa; 001 Kml to Iu""
'-n Clptc:Md in any oontC:1I that I''""'' (UJJhi) in auaini", (..,uJuJ or aYOidi",
(w-). ""' ........ Oti.....,. p
(-m.J i. dact-rNnai in .eo, if only indirudy, in ...,.
opinion by the ckIlnition of the "wtimate pi: for atWnmml of..-hid. all ~

'J'hcft _

10

INST.UMENT ALlTY: JUS TIF YI NG THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

1..47

knowled~.

Spoking of rh.e sn't:n forms of "connection (SilmbanJht.) 0 0:eswy for V~y.a'$ mtOry of inlml\. Sreinkdln.ef notes:
All thcK ~n kinds of conneclion arc dnrly conceived in I Uch
a way thaI me logical theory which u.sa lhem for explaining me
necessiry of me logical conncaions only allows for such inferences mal arc able 10 accomplish what il exptfed of them. And
tku is a d.erivation of the Silplthya system with its principia
and all io corollary dements.In other words, V~ya Sttks to Pre5(:nt an rpistemology that all othen will aeapt as a n.euera1 account of knowing, but he has unwittingly
5tacked me philosophical deck: if we accept his account ofinfereoce. wc will
Ix Jt /tKt(J obliged 10 .1.oc:.ept th.e ~ khya system and the ultim.1.te goal
toward which it is directed. In other words, "the syst.em is eJt2blishfed with
m.e help of such means of (instrumental] cognition whose presuppositions
art taltt:n from the system iuclf."" This amounu to wh2t Stcinkellnu calls
2 "true circle," and he suggats that Dharrmkini's notion of instrumenwiry is caught up in [h.e same problem. This is 2 rcm.arbbly valuable insight
whose full force will rae some rime to ho:ome tvident. W.e will artempt' 10
make some contribution in that direction by unpacking and modifying
Stcinkdlner'J .argument.
As I see it, at m.e core of Steinkdlner'J argument lies a recursive definition of instrumenraliry. Simplifying Srd nkellner', approach, we will
rcphr2SC m.1.t recursive definition as follows:

anainmcnfl Of lvoidmaa an: eoruidcral eilhcr u """""''1 Rep Of as impedimcnlL

BIll only if we kno.. !hedinaion to SO. do_aho kncrw!he di/fu",o: bd " t(ii ri&hl
ltId WfOrI&. plOd and " il. or bdm, wholesome (JnJ.J.)and WlwhoiaoI,iC (~).
Evi<kntly dUi pp hu IlOl been dowd by DNnnaldni. On 1M eo,nrary: una he
~n 10 propok, I think, an rpW~moIoo which a n be KUpCrd by non-Buddhisn
....,II . .... ..,..Jd ~'" nl., .don-.! ~ &.ti""';"" bet.oee, """ ' ....... incor_
~ aIIIIi1ioru 110m diC aulbority of !he Bc..ddha', ladIi"" Yn diu ua:acdy wiu.
we ha..r: t.m.: _ cin:k in !he _
of . Ii~ ~bk cirrular ~Ulion whicb
-..Id br ~ Sud! circk h. obady bem ri&bdy rdUtcd br TiDmwu
and
Fra,noo (1m). R.adw:r;1 if a cin:k .hall WllITle 10 am u diC otIlt'f tnme 01. omain
way 01 tcci"" U 1M '-iron 01 a way of dlftltilll< ....:h .. mal of Dhannakiro , ...tud.,
howatt, docI tIOI iDdf ~ pan and objM of sudt rhoupu.

""_

{I""

3S Sttinkdlnn (l 00J:))O).
)9 Sfeinkdinn

(~J:JlI).

f OUNDATIONS O f D HA1MAKIRT I 'S PHILOSOPHY

RI: Any cognition that leads to the obrainment of me ultimate goal is

instrumental (i.e. is a pram4!'4).

R1: Any cognition that leaw [0 the obtainment of a goal that leads to the
obtainment of the ultimate goaJ is instrumental.
R}:

No other cognition is instrumental.

Wortcing with this recursive definition, we would condudc. for aample,

thar any cognition that appeared to directly apprehend an absolute self
(4I7Mn) would not be instrumental, sintt one obtains the ultimau: goal
("jmi~) by diminacing the bd~ in me self. Lilttwisc, we' 'NOuld claim that
any cognition-such as the belief in ultimately real univcrsaJ.-that led to
the belief in the self would alto not be instrumental, In effect. ,his recursive ddinirion 'NOuld adudc the instrumentality of any cognition whose
content directly or indirectly aplCSkd any philosophical position that contradicted Dharmakini's notion of "irWIJIL Thus, all cognitions toen the::
most ordinary ones would haw: to contribule either directly or indirectly
to my progress IOward "irlNl!IL
1'h: problem, hoWC'Vtr, is that as it stands, this uipanile recursive ddlnition also exdudts a good many cognitions that Dharmakini dea:rlywoukl.
taltc to be instrumental. For example. if I en joy smoking cigarettes, men in
order ro Atisfy
desi~, I must be able to COCfC'Ctiy identify something
,hat' can US(' .0 ligh. my cigarette, Presumably, 'would do so by rdying
on one or more acu of pcraption and inferentt such thai, for example, I
identify the Rarne of a candle burning on the table in front of me. Surely,
Dharmakini would agrcc that at tc:a.st some of ,he cognitions involved in
my finding the candle's Harne arc instrumental, but he surely ......ould also
a5Sl"rt ,hat the goal accomplished by .hose cognitions-i.e., smoking a cigalene cannot in itsdflcad me either directly or indirtttly to "jmilJlL
Thus, the rtCWSivc ddlnition ~ abow: it OVttIy rt$Ulct~ 1Kc&usc= R}
incorrccdy diminates many irutanttS of irulrumcntal cognition. Ncvcnhcless. in its auemlX to apply to alJotdirwy instrUmental cognitioru. the def
inirion sugesu a crucial insight that is well worth preserving: for
Dharmakini, at bst JIJ",t of an ordinary penon's instrumental cognitioll5
can indeed lead eimu direcdy or indirectly to "imiJ;f4 This is the gist of
daiming that an ordilW)' person can determine the truth of the "important
pan" of me Buddha's teaching just on the basis ofher own puccptioru and
empirical inkrmccs. That is. those mgnitions that c:ktermine the [rum of W
impoitlnl pan of thc Buddha's teaching in thansdvcs c:onscirult the first step

mat

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

~toward

249

nirvtirta: once one has established the real possibility of nirvtirta, one

!has already set out on the path. At the same time, Dharmakirti clearly means
~'that except for their objects and results, there is nothing distinctive about the

~Qrdinary perceptions and empirical inferences that lead us, however increfihentally, toward nirvtirta. In other words, in their nature they are the same
,lis every other perception and empirical inference. Hence, when he presents
ffhe instrumentality of ordinary perception and inference, his discuSsion must
!~pply to all such cognitions, not just those that lead directly or indirectly to
l:nirviirta. Dharmakirti thus has two concerns: that some instrumental cogni~ons of ordinary persons be capable of knowing the truth of nirviirta, and
~at his account of instrumentality construes these cognitions to be the same
in their basic nature as every other ordinary instrumental cognition.
When these two concerns are combined, we arrive at a clear constraint
~!bh the way that Dharmakirti must approach instrumentality. That is, since
isome ordinary instrumental cognitions move one toward nirviirta (by givliing one access to the important part of the Buddha's teaching), those coglhitions cannot be inimical or contradictory to the obtainment of nirvtirta;
l!"ltherwise, they would be moving one away from it, not toward it. At the
~~ame time, his general account of instrumentality must apply not only to
~fhose cognitions, but to all ordinary perceptions and inferences; otherwise,
ll)rdinary
instrumental cognitions could not do the work that he claims they
t;
~$ll do. In other words, if the ordinary instrumental cognitions that lead us
~toward nirvtirta are not identical in nature to all other ordinary instrument~al cognitions, then Dharmakirti would in effect be asserting that those
~erceptions and inferences are not ordinary. Hence, since the account of
!tnstrumentality must apply to all ordinary cognitions, and since that genaccount must also apply to the specific cognitions that lead to nirvtirta,
!l)harmakirti's general account of the instrumentality of perception and
:tnference must avoid any features that would be inimical to the obtainiment of nirvtirta. In short, the nature of all ordinary instrumental cognitions
~ust be compatible with nirviirta, but those cognitions must also be capapie of establishing the important part of the Buddha's teaching without
reference to scripture or transempirical knowledge.

!eraI

:I..: ;.

From an interpretive standpoint, this "compatibility-capability" con-

~traint may help to identifY and explain a number of features of Dhar-

_,~1nakirti's thought. He must give an account of inference, for example, that

l~nables inference to be a powerful analytic tool extending far beyond the

I.'f.ange of our perceptions, since inference is our .primary means of estabIlishing the truth of the teaching's "important part." Dharmakirti must,
~f

lSO

FO UNDATIONS O f DUAII.MAKJRTI 'S PH JLOSOP HY

however, thoroughly critique not only inferences that a11~y apprehend

an absolute sdf (4mum), but he must also refute any :wcrtioru mat would
indirectly lead. to the affirmation of luch an entity, Hence, his account of
infelenCt' must deny the rwity of all universals, of which the self may be
coruidercd a special cue. TIna, intm:ncc must at once be fu -rcaching in
iu 5COpC and utterly shorn of any Ontological commitment ro entities whos.:
existence would directly or indirecdy contradict Dharmakin i's conception
of ninW!UL
Employed in this fashio n, the compatibitiry-capabiliry constraint suggcsu a hermeneutic of suspicion, such that we will tend to suspect mat,
despite Dharmalcirti's empiricist rhetoric. his approach to insrrumenraliry
is in f.act guided by the nem to ddend his ultimate, transcmpirical goal.O r to PUI it another way, we may suspect that in me background ofDharmakini'l theory ofinstrumenraliry operates an unadmowtcdgcd axiom: if
by accepting a particular position, one would be led (0 conclude [hat
"irvtl'.fll is indefensible or unobainable, men that position cannot be correct: In broad terms, I would char.tctcrilC such an axiom as axiologictl:
in that it ainu (0 preserve primarily mat which Buddhisu value in their
final goal (be it the rcmov:tl of sufi'erin", tilt attainment of happiness, the
survival of BuddhiSt inStitutions, or some other such conettn)." The probable role of this rype of implicit axiology is surely not to be dismissed at
least some of Dharmakini's philosophical choices arc likdy guided by the
need to dd'cnd the values embodied by " in'ti'.fll. even if at this point we cannot sptcify which chokes those might be. Ncvenhdess. we should make an
additional specification: th.atthe goal neW not be the only sour: of value,
since the mnns nuy also be.
To explain fully what I mean by this last rcm:uit would dnw us tOO f.u
away from our already <klaycd wk, namely. a discussion of Dharmakini's
theory of irutrumcntaliry. Let us. therefore. consider JUSt one example. It
is well known that Dharmaldrti and his fellow Mah:iyinists concave buddhahood in l uch a way that while a buddha may still have perceptions. he
no longer employs conttpu,u Indeed. Dharmakirti himsdfi<kmiflCS conttptualiry with ignoranu . Moreover. since conceptual thought is na040 Villi H uvry (1m) Fa a liM sumnwy 1M "hcrmmnllia iWpicion" in the ImIC
a1lwkd 10 hcn:.

<I I My lhinki"l aboul d>r nioiopol

Ilrin (WOI),
<12

nalu~ JUdI_raiI!u Iw bn lnAumud

s... Ed<d (1991) and Dunne (1996>.

by KIp-

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFY ING THE SOU RC ES OF KNOWLEDGE

lSi

sary to Dharmakini's thcory of inferential reasoning, this means that,

stricdy ~ng. a buddlu docs not employ reasoning (PIttl}. If his notion
of innrumem:ality were designed sim ply [ 0 lead us to that cond usion, we
.,,'QuId apcct him to emphuiu: perception or experience over reason. But
in fact. OUt best way to read Dharmwni is the i n~nc: fo r him. apcriencc
is clearly subordinate to reason, as is illUllloued. for cwnplc. by the argument- made aplicit by the earliest commentators-that only inferencc is
intrinsically instrumental. while perception on many occasions is only
extrinskally so.-IJ The prick of place that inference rakes in Dlutmwni's
theory of irutrumcntality indicates the crucial role that reason plays not
only on the Buddhist path. hut also as me mark of the prt~Wlnt, the
"rational" or -judicious person ..... For Dhannakirti and his fellow Buddhist thinkers. reason is crucial to obtaining nirvi(UL and that goal is thUi
obtained by judicious. rational persons. In shon , nirwi~ is nOt beyond
reason- it is ,.'.fi.tly in amJrJ with rtastJn.'\
By raising this example I do not mean to indicate only th:.at Ihe ultimate
goal, nirwl!"'. must be defined in a way thaI is plausibly compatible with
the empirical. Mere comp:.tibility with me empirical would sull be I2tisficd
by an emphuis on an irr.nional or ttans-rational vcru through faith . for
t:nmple. I mean 10 suggest fUrther thOlt Dh:.arm:.akini's conception of
"irvl!W is also constrained by the importance that he places on reasoning
and debate as practices in and of [herruelves. On this interpretlnion.
Dharmakirti sought to define and oplain his ultimate goal in terms that
prt:SotrvN the centrality of those pfXtKu. Hence. in thil regard. it il not just
the values inherent in the goal that constrain the means, oot also the valU~ onf' ~ in th~ m~n~ th:u cOnJtnin thf' pI.
h is the importance of such 2 reciprocal marion-of mutual colUlr:Um
and comparibility-pcrtaining Ixtwecn "irvi~and iu means thaI I derive
u th~ central lesson of Steinkellner's -!rue eirde. ~ O n my view, this reciprocal tcltraint likC\Visc underlies the ambivalcnce in Oharmakini'. 2CCOum
of scriptural inference. In short. he must nrike a delicate balanc~ bcN.un
. h",

~I'in<:um

.h... h,. "",1" eI n n rh., r 3rh .. nd .h.,

".~td j n'..'Y

,)":oli,;",,,

of buddhahood, his ultimate goal. In his aucmpt to strike th2t balancc.

Dharmakirt i mw oscillatcs berween 1 denial of the relevance of the
<13 Xc below, 117.
Xc McOi,"odt (z.ood.
-4 5 I ....,

dd.il:~n<clr ~

. ~t).

Xc ~ Edd

,be "Pi";"", vi' JIUI~t.I ... (S.~....

(t~.

.oMoo"'. 4; r...1d

l Sl

FOU NDATION S O F DHA.MAKIRT I' S PHILOS OPHY

Buddha's Cltraordinary qua1iti~n: an appeal to their rdevance would

endanger his emphasis on empiricism-and an affirmation of thc* qualities, since they arc precisely what make that goal valuable.
At (his point in (he nudy of Dhannakirti'l thought, ho~r, I do not
know how to make good hermeneutical usc of the implicit uiological concerns raised by Strinkdlner's analysis. Certainly fOr me, and perhaPJ fOr
the fidd at large, Dharmakirti's highly complc:a: theory of insuumentality
often does nor lend itself easily to what we might aU an ~ uiologica1 anaIysis~ through which we may uncover the values in path or goal thou may
sway Dharmakirti in lOme of his philosophical choices. The difficulty is not
only knowing when a consideration of axiological issues may give w our
best aplanation of the topic at hand, but also determining which pole in
any given case is regnant: path or goal? Probably conceiving the question
in this fashion is already far tOO simple. For these reasons my analysis of
iruuumentality below will only make a passing attempt at such an analysis. We mW( instead be sarisfied with the lmowkdgc. first, m.u Oharmwrti
does not facik:ly jwtify the instrumentality of perccption and ink-n:nee by
rooting (hem in the Buddha's mrucmpiricallmowlcdge, which we would
then access through scriprurc; SoCCOnd, that axiological considerations likely
play an as yet unclear role in his notion ofinstrument:l.lity; and firully, trult
we may hcutistK:a.J.ly bracket axiological considerations fOt the moment,
sina' tbe values of path or goaIlikdy mnd in a relation of murual constraint, such that an account that ignores axiological concerns, while incomplete, will ncvcnhdcu not be grossly misleading.

4.2 Ohat7lUlltirti on Instrummt4lity:

tIN &,lint ummmtlZriAl Account
The preliminary condwions on the general issue ofin.urumentality that we
have jwt sketched leave w free to artcmpt a dose reading of Oharmwni's
argumems, Ncverthdess. even with this freedom, we immediately &cc an
intractable problem: Oharrnaltini's own account of instrumentality is so
dliptical and brief mat an interpretation based upon his works alone would
be eimer trivial or excessively speculative. Hence, to seck a more substantial reading we have no choke but to focus on comment:lries. Each gener
ation of commemary, however, introduces an ever-thicker layer of
philosophical accretions deposited by each commcnt:ltor's attempts to plug
pcrcrived holes in Oharrnwni's theories or to respond to new issucs with

INSTII.UMENTA LlTY: JUST I FYI NG TH E SOURCES O F KNOW LEDGE

1S}

which OharmaJdrti could OOt MW contended. GiYal our inlertSt in a his

torica1 reading. the besl compromise is 10 col\$ult the earliest layer of com
mentary: namely, the work of Devendrabuddhi, along with occasional
references 10 Ihe sub-commentary of Sikyabuddhi."' Of CO UI'S(:, while
Ikvcndrabuddhi's comments will give us a richer sen5C of what Oharmakirti migtll mean by iNtrumentality, he tOO adds his own byer ofidca5.
Indeed, the philosophical cre:niviry required to fill out Dharmakirti's
aooount rcndm Dcvtndtabuddhi's inlerprcution nearly as much an i n~
pendent work of philOJOphy as a way of accessing DharmaJdrti's viev.rs.
This is nOI, howa'Cf, entirely problematic, for pan of our aim here is also
to present Devcndrabuddhi'. views in their own right,.incc many of them
reappear in the works of later Buddhist philO5Ophm. The same qualificatiON must also be applied to Sakyabuddhi'. rcmaoo. to the CXlenl that we
will rely upon them_

s-u &uk oqn.ititl1U

For Ikvendrabuddhi and Sikyabudct.i, Dharmakini's definition ofinstrumentality is found primarily in me fitst sa vcnc:s of the PrllmAflIZwlrtti/Ul S
JKDnd chapter, the PrIl~iJJhi. Subsequent Buddhist commentators
(as wdl as more rco:nl interpretcn) tend to sec this section as the iJu d4sIUw for Dharmaldni's viev.rs on instrumentality. 80th Devcndrabuddhi
and ~buddhi comment cxtemively on mi. series of verses (i.e.,
PV1.J--6), and a full accOUnt of their rich and intricate analysis would
require more space than is ava.ilable here. I will therefore rcstria mys<:lf 10
the more n1icnl points of Iheir interpretation.

To lay the groundwork for our discussion, in this first lCCtion we will
focw upon some basic definittoN . An oaminauon of the deails and conttoYefSies alluded to here will be deferred to me following scaions of this
presentation.
In Dharmakini's analysis ofinstrurnents ofknowkdgc in PVLl-', one
of .hoe rn,o,r. N Jioe .. M fuM"m",nnJ ~him l iJ fOUM in the n ...~ h..o.
opens (he discussion:

1(; In lhc dim..;"" thI.. tollowl, only anain ~ will be chosen OUr of. IMp diJcwoiuu. Tu o-l. II,", C Il Un: ................ (PV .... -<I ..i ... "'" <;:uIQIn<:n .. vi ~ and

~. tc'C lhc tnnloIM~ in lhc oppcndilI (n4ffl,

254

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

[Defl..l:] An instrument of knowledge is a trustworthy awareness [PV2.Ia-bl ] Y

Devendrabuddhi understands this statement to constitute the initial and
most salient part of the definition of an instrument of knowlerlge. On
Devendrabuddhi's view, this initial statement must be supplemented with
a remark that DharmakIrti makes near the end of this section on instrumentality (i.e., at PV2.5c). This latter statement concerns the "novelty" of
the cognition, and according to Devendrabuddhi, it must be added to
Defl..l in order to form a complete definition of an instrument of know1edge that covers all possible cases. The statement reads:
[Def1..2:] Moreover, an instrument of knowledge is that which
illuminates an unknown object (artha) [PV2.5c).48
Thus, on Devendrabuddhi's view, the full definition of an instrument of
knowledge is an awareness that is both trustworthy (Defl.l) and also "novel"
(Defl.2) in that it "illuminates" or makes known an unknown object. 49
If we combine our bipartite definition, we can restate the definition of
an instrument of knowledge more concisely. In doing so, let us also take
advantage of the fact that, for DharmakIrti, an instrument of knowledge is
always a cognition (jfiiina). Hence, by way of a terminological shorthand,
47 PV2.Ia-b l : pramii1Jam avisa7]'lviidi jfiiinam. Note here that jfiiina has been translated as
"awareness." The general question of translating the term jfiiina is of greater importance than
it might first appear. Potter has remarked on this issue in a somewhat different context.
Questioning whether "knowledge" as "justified true belief" is applicable to Pramar,a Theory,
Porter has noted:
A jfiiina is ... an act of awareness. It does not name a disposition (say, to respond in a
certain way when meeting a certain sort of thing). A jfiiina is ... an occurrent. If it
involves belief, it does so only in the sense of a believing as a fleeting act of awareness.
A jfiiina is not a belief in a dispositional sense .... Any act of awareness which has
intentionality constitutes ajfiiina. (1984:309-310)
This aspect of Potter's argument supports the point I am making here: namely, that a
jfiiina need not involve the determinacy implicit in the term "knowledge." This is especially

the case ifwe understand the "beliefs" that constitute dispositions to be necessarily determinate, or even propositional, in nature.

48 PV2.5c: ajfiiitiirthaprakiifo vii.

49 Both Dreyfus (1997:291) and Franco (1997:47) maintain that Devendrabuddhi understands these two statements to be taken separately, but Devendrabuddhi explicidy construes
them together at the end of this discussion when he remarks: "[A cognition] which by nature

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

255

our discussion will often translate prama1Ja as "instrumental cognition."

With this in mind, we can restate the definition as follows:

Def1.I & 1.2: An instrumental cognition (prama1Ja) is a trustworthy awareness that illuminates an unknown object.
This way of defining an instrumental cognition dearly gains favor among
Dharmakirti's commentators beginning with Devendrabuddhi. The exact
place of novelty in this definition is a matter of some contention, but let us
[eave that discussion for a later point. Instead, let us continue with these
basic definitions by citing Dharmakirti's explanation of trustworthiness.
On Devendrabuddhi's interpretation, the explanation reads:

[Defl:] Trustworthiness is a cognition of telic function (arthakriya) [PV2.Ib-c].50

leOn the most straightforward reading, Defl means that, if perception and
[ir:nference are instrumental, then they must be cognitions of that which
~accomp1ishes the desired goal. Devendrabuddhi notes that as such, percepi'tion and inference are trustworthy, for they are what "cause one to obtain
lI(prapaka) the desired object (artha). "51 As we shall see, on Devendrabuddhi's
tview, the obtainment of the desired object consists in the activation of a
%ognition in which there appears the accomplishment (kriya) of one's aim
1~r tdos (artha). Within the context of this interpretation, Devendrabuddhi
irefers to a statement from Prama1Javinifcaya, where Dharmakirti remarks:

i~ntains the aforementioned two kinds of characteristics is an instrument of knowledge; the

mlessed One is an instrument of knowledge like that [cognition]." [PVP (6b4): ji skad du
l~shad pa'i mtshan nyid rnam pa gnyis brten pa 'i ngo bo can gang yin pa de ni tshad rna yin no /
bzhin bcom /dan tshad ma nyid. Cf. PVV where -yukta (ms.: ukta) is read for brten pa
r~apekta): yathoktadvividhafak!a[layukta1J'l yat pramii[lam [I] tadvad bhagaviin pramii[lam .... ]
for more on the dispute concerning this bipartite definition, see n.qo and also Krasser (2001).

te

(J PV2.Ib 2-c: arthakriyiisthitifJ / avisa1J'lviidana1J'l. Note that the interpretation of

't:thakriyiisthiti as "cognition (rtogs pa .. J;ratipatti) of arthakriyii" is provided by Deven~buddhi (PVP:2a2-3) and explained by Sakyabuddhi (nye:73~:
~/ '

Dt

1;,

Ii,

'1
I*"
I'
~~'
1;:'

tt

An artha is burning and so on. The "accomplishment" of that means the arisal of it.
The sthiti of it means the cognition of it because the verbal root [i.e., sthii] has various
meanings. [don ni sregpa fa sogs pao / de'i byedpa ni skyedpao / de'i gnas pa ni rtogs pa
ste khams kyi don ma tshogs pa nyid kyi phyir ro].
PVP:2aI-2, translated below, 280.

lS6

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAII.MAK IRT I' S PH ILOSOP HY

Thue are two menu of conect knowledge (I4'!1J'1DIi4N1;' perception and inf~mCC'. They are corrta because, one who determines {he object (.nN) by means of one of those two and then
acts on tbat knowledge is not deceived ("If ... viu",lIIiI1pu)
:about dlllt object', telK: function (lIrth4kri]l),1J
In this pawgt:. whctt COrrttl knowledge" (SIf'!'Y"IJ;ulN1) is synonymous
with "instrumC'nta! cognition" (prIlN'.I4), DharmaIOrti C'mploys a ~rbaJ
mrm (i.e., IIA . JlWt1!UJMlyatrl of lluiJA'!Iv.iU.. the rum so fu trambted as
"trustwOrthiness." 'n the pus::a&,! JUSt citC'd. thC' VC'fbaI form has bun U':lIUiarC'd as "is 1\0( ckcdved." This translation, wbich rdlecu the Tibetan interp~[ion (m; 11M bal. in part merely nems from the alncncc: of an
appropriate VetbaI form of"lTl1StwOrthy." But it :also serves to c:mphasiu the
fact that. in Ibe above p:wage. the notion of llviSlf1!'VtlU is placed unambiguously within thC' con tat of action . In short. an aware:nm is
.JIiur""ddifJ-trustworthy Of" non-dc.uptive-in that if onC' aea, mC' object
obtainC'd through ooc's action will be inF.illibly capable of the desired or
apectC'd rdie function (a,.,~}.1J This raises the queStion of what we
mean by "!die function ." a nOlion clul we shall now examine.

Any anempc to understand Dharmaldrti's nodon of rdie function is complicated by the ambiguiry of the Sanskrit term. 1Irth.. Dharmakirti usa.rtha
in four serue:s thaI onen overlap: "aim" (i.e. pr.JiljllNt or "purpose"),
"objea" (or "tbingj. "meaning.... :and "refC'rtnL"14 Whtn using .,.,"" in the
sense of "aim; Dharnukirri admia twO basic '}'pes of aim: :acquisition and
avoKlanoe. One can speak of obtaining W2rmm, for c:umpk, or :avoiding the
cold. ThC' senSe" of
as aim. OOwn't't, may:also <m:rIap wirh in sense as
object (.,.,""). The objc:cu of pcruption and inkcC'ncc arC' onen called
.rth4s, but an -ob,ic:ct- here may iudfbc: an -aim" because of in rdeva.nce

.,.,hIl

'2 PVin,., , .......'!" ,.'!'J'#tiU-' ~'" .,.........'!" Ii "" ., ..,... .n6.'!",..,..

~" ..., ...1JIh# ,*If~ ~M.

5J Thil foIJowa dw ilMnpml Uon of~i, c:spiaIIy in Innu of1"'".,mIM. s..e

bdow, (161).
}t: EnmpIosof a111O.u marunpabow1d.. bw in DhannaIc1ni'l mmmmwyon!he fine YaK
cI ,., .... Nt............. Alone. one can find . . . _d ck&rl, in thlU mean. aim (Col" ' C"-,,
etb4V,.u".,;__-,.,._. .
1Id~_~. . . ... ), meaninl

umy-,., rM,i,,.,,,,-,.rm

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

257

to some further aim: the distant fire that is the object (artha) of one's perception may also be one's aim or purpose (artha) in that one wishes to obtain
the warmth that is one of its property-svabhavas. This overlap between "aim"
and "object" appears to be based upon the degree to which causal efficiency
is linked to purpose: considered just in terms of the causal efficiency of producing perceptions and (indirectly) inferences, an artha is an object. And
considered primarily in terms of purpose, an artha is an aim. 55
Although artha as "aim" and "object" may thus be distinguished, even
'when the term artha is best rendered as "object" it retains some connection
to the notion of a purpose or goal. Such is the opinion of Devendrabuddhi,
:is is apparent when he comments upon Dharmakirti's statement at the
Outset ofPV3 that the illusory "hairs" or "flies" perceived by a person with
ataracts cannot be considered "objects" (arthas).56 As noted earlier,57 the
of the problem here is that Dharmakirti might be obliged to posit not
~nly particulars and universals as objects of knowledge (jneya), but also a
third type, namely, illusory objects. Commenting on this problem, Devendtabuddhi raises an objection and offers his reply:

trux

"Well, in the awareness of a person with defective vision there are

false appearances such as hairs, flies, two moons and so on. Those

;~~g., G:2.6: siimarthyiid arthagatau pratipattigauravaparihiiriirtha1J1 ... ); and object (e.g.,

~~2..19-20: svabhiivapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rtham na vyabhicaratt). In the context oflan-

g~age, the verb pra4vrt regularly appears with artha (in locative), where the latter has the
~~nse of referent. For one of many examples without pra4 vrt, see PVSV adPVI.62 (G:34.1-2:

'lsmiin na sarvatra dharmadharmiviicinor fabdayor viicye 'rthe nifcayapratyayavi!ayatvena kafi{fjvife!ab) .

~;This way of understanding artha is closely related to

Nagatomi's analysis of the com~{9:ynd arthakriyii. See below (259). While unambiguous examples of artha as object or aim
~~Stlot difficult to find, some of the more interesting cases are those where artha is used as
~and object within the same statement. See, for example, PVI.93 (cited by Nagatomi
~;2~7-68:56): api pravarteta pumiin vijfiiiyiirthakriyiik!amiin I tatsiidhaniiyety arthe!u
;!?iftiyojyante 'bhidhiiyakiibll. More interesting yet again are the numerous cases where the
between "aim" and "object" is not at all clear. Consider, for example, PVI.III-II2:
. titatkiiritulyariipiivabhiisinim I dhiya1J1 vastuPrthagbhiivamiitrabijiim anarthikiim II
nty apy atatkiiriparihiiriingabhiivatab I vastubhediifrayiic ciirthe na visa1J1viidikii matii II.
harmaltirti's statement (PVpd) reads:
~111usions such as the hairs that appear in the visual perceptions of a person with

gataracts are not objects (arthas) because there is no consideration of them as objects
:C~efiidir niirtho 'narthiidhimok!atabl.

l~~ee chapter 2, 87-88.

l Si

fO UNDATION S OF DHA ..... IAKIRTIS PHILOSOP UV

faIK

a~

do nOI accomplish any purpose (IilniM) al all:

henet'. they are not COUnted as particulars. But even though they
are devoid of tdic efficacy. thq;m not included among universals because they appe21 dC2ny and because they are nOI distribUted ovt:r anything. Thus, since they are nOt subsumm under
the Clltegorits of paniculars and universals, they;m another kind
of object. Hena, il is nOI correa m:u m('re are JUSt rwo kinds of
objtttS. ~

No, il is nOI me c::a.K that ow view is not com:ct. To bt' spt'cific. hairs and so on are nor objectS (IIInhAs). Why? &cIllMJt tINy
art not MnsUinnJ,. bt objND [PV}.ld j. That ii, persons engaged
in practical action (lIJ4/1t1hanr" do not consid('r th('m to bt'
objectS. The intmtion of this statement is as follows. If the flies
and so on that are perceived by a person with cataractS and so on
wen: to be objects, then one: would invcstig:ne the situation. asking. ~Is it a particular, or is it me other li.e.. a univt:rsa1W But
they are nOI objectS in thaI &shion because, with regard to an
awareness in which there is me appearance of Aies and so on.
persons engaged in practical aaion do not have the intention.
"This is the objta of dut awarmm ."~

sa In Dtw-nWdn.i". pbilooupb,. the:...., of thr SMWit Inm .,....IM... iI ~I a.mpia. In the: d"';""1 SMWiI of DharmDirti'. ti_. thc: lerm _ wed oulJidc, of ptta.:.ph, in thc: _of. ~1'"0(1K,' tnIUKIion.- litiption.-Irp ",oc.dinp- and
oW.- Mlcd tmKS (Itt 86bdinsk- . . til.l . s.cn maninp VI: alJo found in BuddIUst lila'
anm. One eumpk is thc: lerm ~..Jtm. one of thc: thirty "~ ttplatcd by 1OrfeilUIT' (...,~ ~ iI clear &om the: M~ivida Vi...,,";~ (t S)a--IJ4b; cf.
Homer. ~Iit.. II:J06R), the: '~nn ."....J.b. in thil ~ ~ a "bu.ifICN as;rcrmm'" or mnsxdon. apiaI!r_..twr~ .1S""1 ia inwol~ 1l\,e meaJ\''''of.,.iAtlbbwu
m . . " .... ,' IaHAICI with wIw mq ~ thc: bcsc known Im5t" of""...w....in Buddhist phi.
bophy--nundy .,....hb. in ~ KfLK of I ~convmUoo. In Dharrnakini', eaK. "conVtiI.ion iJ unainly one of ~ mnninp of .,....JJln. bu. Iw; mot~ ohm uses ~ .am in
:anQlha, .mIN _
prKtial aaion." which iDduda all of tht; acU";Uc.. such u communialion. dw au orimled roward _
pl. All of thctc mcaninp of 1IJIII"",J,h" can ~
d.rrivftI Ioimply (rom dIC ..mou. conmo:tI in which thr unn iI usal. bul one can abo find
p..a in the QOr'ilJt>maty of~. such u "....,,;,."'" "action" or "impkmmtalion {PVT:uJ'7. K:J70.1-4-11}.

INSTRUMENTAUTY, J USTI FYIN G THE SO URCES OF KNOWLEDGE

lfj

r:>cvendrabuddhi', comments make it dear Uul, on his view, Ihe term

ttrth.t. ~ when uxd in W$MIC: of"objca: has a rdation to lOme goal or
M
purpose thaI beings pursue through their Mpr2Ctia.l aaions {IIJilIlllhiN}.
When 6nh. is construed wiiliin a linguiscic or conceptual context (i.e., as refemu Of mClllins), the plxe of purpose is even more prominent, for we have
already SC'etL that a pc:iuivu's apectacions play:l. role in the determill2tions
that she draws in rdation 10 an ob;cct. In other words, an entity's causal characo:riscia. while independent ofa penxiver's experu.tions, are conccpru:alized
by me pc:,ui.'a" wiiliin die context of expc:ct:uions concaning some goal."
The :ambiguiry in Dharmaldrti's we of the term IInha becomes panicuIarly salient in the compound lerm IIrtIMhiy4. As we have secn, in the contelt of innrumcnralilY IInh.kriy4 is applied to the objects of a trusrworthy
:l.wareness: that :l.warenw is trustwOnhy because it is a cognition of
IInhilltriyl. This m:l.y seem :I. straightforward char.teteriution of lru5rworrhinCSl, but when we uy to spify exxrly wh:at IInhll!triy4 means here, we
encounter the :l.foremenlioned :ambiguity. In:l. semin:a! anic!e on the IOpic,
N:agatomi describes our dilemma as a a.oicc between IWO interprct.:ltions
of the compound IIrthll!triy4:

m,a

M wc 10 analyze Ithe compound IInhamy.tJ as padanmu,a

'Ule :action of:l. thing, its caw:a.l cfficiency,M or as IIrtNtllofri .
prllJOillMlth'l4 1triy4 Maction that scrves a purpose, purposive or
useful :K:tion -?'"

7"JoJ.. .... 'J.. M; "hPT tk pJ rJ-" 1M' p"", - I pJ . -.. IMl'7'> ",. 1M - Ji,. _
.... I ",j rip,. _ ",. ~ I iii Ju, shU J.IIIf1 Mit ",ilf /W I rii ""', Jw NI l Mit J.._

-',.i,., ..

,. - " # ,.1. " ""' ..",. ,..t",tk I. ... J.. _,.

I...".
,.,,; iii
I pi ~ ..j rij WI I. ,." ,.. tb.itr ,. j __. , _ I. ,." ,. J,..J
.. #II;
I ri #II ..'" ti ",,... ..,.." ......", tP""*,,., ~ ..." .. NI l iii IsIlT
.I... ,.; ....
1","1 ti ,.,., .."" ito tIM ~ ""',.,. tk .., Ii J.n ,. P"I I. .......,.
.... J.,.",. ..../If ... i ,;".,. tk; pJ
J,n tk Ut J. - , . .... ]1,. _ a: P'VV-n

"It ",

'*,.If ""

"If

. 1.

'Ji,.,. ""

(m. n. I ), ._, ' I,,} r~ _ J . . Hr~ ~".,,.,.....,....,,trII~'!''''

iti

".,.,.,_,.l/JtmI

3 PVP: plM.. -Jilt. bul PVVn (III , ft.

"If,... :ow

"""""''''''''

*- ~'"""""'" ~

60 Schapur I (U.4-1,) &nd Dhumaluni'. commmo ift PVSV u'PVI.IJ7- 14J. tn~
in dw appmdix tlWfJ. II it worth nocinc tN.! dw indcpt-1IIknor of an ob;M:'. (:IUJaI fUn,;tioNJilJ' from dw;!dic ~ ofdw; !'CIeri", rnaka il d.i.ffic~h 10 aIIflItdy ~rxKritc:
DIwmaIdni', phiIotopby ... anyl'orm of pncr!YliJm. dopil( nain 'pragmatic OOtllOl'G'
ift hU philotophy. a: ~ (1m).
61 Napromi (' 967-61:H-~4).

260

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

In other words, if we say that an awareness is trustworthy because it is a cognition of arthakriya, does this mean that that object of that cognition functions so as to fulfill a specific purpose, or does it mean that the object is
simply causally efficient, i.e., that it produces effects simpliciter?
To demonstrate that both the telic meaning (i.e., "purposeful action")
and the causal meaning (" causal efficiency") can apply to the term
arthakriya, Nagatomi cites various passages that illustrate each meaning.
Although some of the passages chosen by Nagatomi may not fully suppOrt
his readings, there seems little doubt that the term arthakriya does range
over a scale of meanings bracketed by these two extremes (i.e., the telic and
the causal). 62
It is important to note, however, that Dharmakirti's philosophy probably would not support an interpretation of arthakriya solely in terms of
either extreme. This is certainly the case with the interpretation of
arthakriya in terms of purpose or aim, for to fulfill an aim, an object must
be causally efficient. & for the interpretation in terms of causal efficiency,
we have seen that for Devendrabuddhi and most subsequent Buddhist commentators, the content of awareness is an "object" (artha) only if it is interpreted within the context of persons engaged in practical action
(vyavahara). However, as a speculative interpretation, we should note that
in at least one context-that of reflexive awareness {svasarrzvedana}-the
notion of arthakriya may be applicable only in terms of sheer causal efficiency, since it is difficult to see how practical action (vyavahara) makes
sense within this context. Whether this latter interpretation be plausible
(or implausible), it is nevertheless the case that all passages where a telic
meaning is stressed still contain some appeal to causality, and the vast
majority (if not all) passages that stress the notion of causal efficiency still
rest on some notion of a telos within the context of practical action

(vyavahara). 63
Instrumentality (pramat}.ya) in Terms of Two Effects
Nagatomi's identification of the two different emphases-i.e., the telic and
the causal-that may be applied to the term arthakriya is highly signifi62 See Nagatomi (1967-68:55-57). Among the passages cited by Nagatomi, it is not at all clear
that in PVp-3 arthakriyii is used primatily in the sense of causal efficiency.

63 Among the passages cited by Nagatomi (1967-68:56), one is PVI.98-99ab {}fiiiniidyarthakriyii1[l tii1[l tii1[l dntvii bhede 'pi kurvatap / arthii1[ls tadanyavifle!avi!ayair dhvanibhip saha II

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

161

ant, ror rhcsc two differmt emphases mrrcspond to two different ways of
undc:rsWlding Dhannwn:i', norion ofinmumentaliry, csp:cially as int~r
pm~ by lkvendrabuddhi. To Itt how this is dK ase, ~ need to tim
rcca.Il me definition of an insuumcnl ofknowledgc within tbe /d'4kA I)'S'"
tem as the:: -most prominent ooor'" (s41ih4Jr4l11lff4) in me production of
me resulting activiry (ItriJl}. specifically, thai rcsulwlI :teriviry is the insnu
menml dkc:r r,m"u!'Ap".IA), which most Pf':lmiJ;l~ Th~rimI oekfi~:u thoe
resultant act of knowing (pn.",;ti) .... On ~endrabuddhi 's vi~, Dhu
makini proposes two al{~rnaliv~ inlerprc:tations of wbat constitutes the
instrumental dfc:ct. H~ claiffil dllll -... there :ll'C two kinds of inslrumc:n
tal effccu: one call~ a -human aim (pJl11if4nha), - which is a medialed
(dNJJ,. II]IllNlhilll) ~ffcct, and a distinctive on~ (lthytuJ,.r w, - viI;'.III)
that is not mediated. ~
When Ocvendn.buddhi speW of a human aim as the mediated
(.".Vllhilll) instrumental cffw: resulting from d~ application of an inslru
menl of knowiedgc. he docs nOt explicitly define what is meant by "medi
ated- (1I]Il/)"";III). Neverthdess, his point is dear: me effect is medialed
(IIJIIVllhilll) in mal there is an -intem.r (.".wu/h.iM; betwn the func.tioning of thoe iNiu'Um~m (the: ItIflTIfl!fA. i.e.. the P"IflMli':'lfl) and the dfc:ct. In
o th~r Vo'Ords, th~ ~ff:t is separated (vpllllhil4) from the: insuum~m by
vinuc of other intervening causes and conditions that mwt be in place for
the: cffw: to occur. The: cffw: is tbw -remo(~" (."..,.u,illl) rdativ~ to the
instrument. and since: some obstruction can therefore occur bctwttn tbe
functioning of me instrument and th~ production of the effect, me dfca
may not neceuari1y occur. even if the innrummt functions corru:dy. Thw.
although the Engluh term - meciiued" bat conveys th~ notion that the
prodUClon of me cffw: rcqu.irc:s other causes and conditions subsequent to
me functioning of the instrument, ~ could as easily refer to thit dfttt as
-remote," "separated" and so on.
In contrast [0 the mtdiated dfca, the unmedialed effect is "distinctive" in

.... 1J'fiJ- ""'jU,..'!I ..".. ." "",..,rUM). Evm in Ihia cue .-hm: ""_ h I}oI is
axucnaed mady with rhr pn.xiu<:Don all ftauI awarmat, rhr dUau.ion of iUwion bin
inthr:po B ....... (d,citindim:dyj doat_norianolplorpwpooe " ... iric""
limply duifyins rhr KaNl or 00(' . ~ia.iU

mevanl.

64 oS chapm I, 1.1.
6) Onn.dnbuddhi (t'YP:Jb4ff): .. Iur~_'i ..... '"' IN

din .". .. dI.J,. -.." ~,., (". d.t/,. ~,. ..

mao,.,.,..

ti l .."..,",;"

161

FOUNDATI ON S O F DHARMAKI RT r S PHILOSO PHY

mat, as ~i not"ca:, it "nca:u:arily OCCUR..... This is so because the

dfca is not separated (tI"FvU;u) from the inruument; it is, in faa , i<kntical to the insuume'll itsdf. ~ such, it is not JmIO(e (tI~;u), instead., the
effi:ct is aaually simuh::lflcous with dx in.n rumcnt. In other words, the insrrumenw eognicion (prllmd!"') is iadf the insuumtnoo dka (pram4t;14phal4).01
IN STRUMENTA LITY IN TERMS OP THE MEDIATED EFFECT

Dcvendrabuddhi develops this thea!)' of mediated and unmediated instrumental effea in order to ducidare Dharmwni's theory ofinstrumentality
as found in PVl..l-6. Staning at PV1.}b, Dharmalcini focuses upon the
claim that an awareness is the innnunent of knowing. Dharmalcini offers
rwo rea50ru for this claim, and according to Devendrabuddhi, the notion
of human aim (pllnq.irrhaJ as mediated dfc.cr is the focus ofDharmwrti's
first reason for the instrumentality cL awareness:
(PVl..Jb-d:1 Awareness is iruuumental because it is the primary
ooor in one', action toward an entity that one wishca: to obClin
or avoid."
Pan of Dharmakirti's motivation here is to defend Dignaga's claim that
awareness aJon~nd nOI the Knsc faculties o r any other faCtor in the
proec:u of knowing- is instrumental." But in comparison 10 his Brah66 ~i (f"VT, IIJf=nb1-J) sJo-t tlUtittmw .. rManins thai il wiU Wonitdr
occur" flJM"';,.. NT Pjw). H~ mnarb:
NY'.tA, ic is '~"1M ,Ji.unruo.. io ....., i, ..iD <kfmildy
ooa.or. Sinu thai W;lyofocaminc iI tUtfilltd
t"';uJ by that kind of dfta,
il ~ callN "dittinctiYe. In otM 'I'iOrcU. if thftc ;, an jtlW\lnwllIai c.opilion, an
iDKrumftlWob;.cr ",..-,.),.;U,.. "'1 be. c.opiud
;"") bccawc thai
ob;ta: il nQII diff~. (..,... rho: insu"mmw awan:nc.. Th~ ;' no< lbe. CQ! with a
mt'dUlro dfta bccaUK il it pcll ibk for IO!IlCIhi"l dw 10 obmuc1: aO\lff'mtt. [ik
(~I

rtnM,. ..

r",.,.,.r

~,., ~"" n". JNt Itrj.J M ,., ".; u Nr Ow" ,.i 1tJt:,tuI ""yO" t. "" '""'
,.; ,.,., ~ ,.r r." ... 1rJW _ )'.J ... ,..,. ".; .coo NT phM ,.,. rMfJ,., Door
~,. --',.,

"'" "'"
,.1IIMtI_
mi,..,;,,;,
,.JJ.
If'

fIJ1ir" I ~,., ..,." h".... JI" If' t-r' ~

67 1u ~ nons (PVT, IIJIr.nbd: ""l"M ',"unocmled' iI an ~ thai ;,doepmdml

on rrwrdy rho: innnurwnal eornion, and no< an)' other ~. An campk b a cosnition
of an il\SU\lnlCnlal ob;ca.' 1m..',. __ ,., JNt.". .. ,,;
t. 'IIJ'
yO.,,; T!"pIM.oU "i m.J,. -JUt If'J,n upJ.J""...",., Iu "' fIj .See bc:Iow, 161ft'.

PAt'" __

68 PVL}b-d: tiIJi"....!U.. 1"''7'UI'S W,nJbilfll""w ....,,, i/ .,.._,,;.

69 See 1'S1.I.Jm..IO and ..,.)C-d with PSV J til.

t...,.

INSTP.UMENTALlTY, JUSTIFVI N C T HE SOURCES OF KNO WLEDGE

16}

manical countcrpam. Dharmakini', dd'efU(: involves a significant shift in

me way instrumentaliry is being defined. SpecifK:ally, r.uher than consider
an instrument or knowledge to be instrumental rebtive primarily ro the
resulwlt act or knowing, Dharnukini construes an instrument or knowl
edge in temu or another resulting action. namdy. the ~rttiv's activiry
(prllll{tti) in rdalion to whal is to be attained or avoided. This is the dkct
thai ~ndl":lbllddh i conJidll!n: ro be a human ::lim (p """.r4'1'fM). a d aim
wamnttd by W fact that. dstwhere. Dharrnakini ~ uates a human aim
with thai which is to be either attai ned or avoided."
In speaking or activiry (prllurtti) as the mediated dfea: thaI is a human
aim , Devend rabuddhi proposa a specifi c inlerpret:ation or "activiry."
Describing the manner in which the instru mentali ry or cognition applies to
~ contell of a

hum:a.n :aim , h~ s:ays:

H aving known through awareness an ai m (IInJu) Ihat should be

done, a person implemenls i[5 mearu and thereby atai ns the

70 Ie iI-.onh notinsdw Uddyou.Ic:an (NY f1.ill) mW:s I JirniJ.u ~ whm dc:a.li", with
a probkm in Vliuylyana'l ~wion 01' i~. To Ix prKiK. 1M problem here 1I1h.11
... inf...",,,,,, i> m.an. <0 11a~ Ju..:",...Ic..~. men .in"" i"fr"""." ;. ;todf a ~e"" of &II
ob;ea. i, c:ouId Iu~ not Iu..,. "",,;,..,., r,r.",i ti) .. iu rQU/t fI,..~bta,*;1I
obit Iw alrady brcn """iud. After lim propoti", apmlNlkalIlMUI""'. Udd)'OQhn
t\lI'flt to. pIUIotoophiaI......, WI haI_ reonanc.c,.;m DharmaJdrti'. approKh:
.~

... MlppG'<' chae the IUlcmHll in dw tat tw t1w 1OIIowi", man.ing: inf...mu is
ropIirion thaI involva thaI wlUch is marka! by an infnmliallicn (J.itipi). Bul in
chal QK, dIuc would Ix eM huh olh.1vi1l& no IUIIllanc aa olJcno.,..inS-"
W~..,.dw ~"I'

1'1ti. io.-~ ~ ~~ ...... oftlwoh;eco .. w+u..

_ .bouId J'/'Oid, employ, or ig>or~ ;oK tho: 'T"Uh. MO'O\'TI'. in ITpfd 10 iu own
object. any iruu ummtal """ilion runaioru II dw wabaJ aaMty, JUCh due "inscru-

mn\1 ol~ mnru ,ftUlti. . . .tion fln ...,'ti)." With ~ 10 aMdIn

ob;ea, all ,..._~ fVnaioo II t1w inmumcm, luch thaI ""..'!"i' lnQRI "thal by
rMIIII of which eM objt ("..~ iI known r,r.",/ytI,,)." If dw; won! ',~.~ funnioftl II eM ..mw xtivity. chen wNol would M eM
mulcanl ..:tmcr.1'hm: could be no ..-Ir bta....., the: ob;ea it; alrndy "'I7'i....t.Viuyiyana] huoUd ...... dw: C05"i....... of dwoOjcct ....... whOch one
ohouId .Oid, employ or isnorr lIT
raull boaill<' ....ben eM ob;oa it;1mown. onr

[In

rcopona<'

m.

tw me- copUDona. nut is. ....ben t1w oO;ca is known ......, hal. duu IcindJ of meN lioll' 0"" copiza dw: ob;.ct II mae which .. 10 tw 1MIidod, ""'piorrd "';~

....".._

[Mw.nt NJ- __ t...+J.ti ,,.n,.m~

iii f ...... (}I ~6htIw..,. ~
!f ...... " ' ' ' #.4~".", ~mh f ~ u
,...Ii~"., " ...iti!l , ...w-,. iii I ~.,.",.. ".,. ....~_ I

'''''';,.'' '' ' ' ; ,r

,,..,u!f6'!l_"'''

,-1.",.

!",,,, I ,.A Mbw'USw..~ "."..~u"" J.i".

",""F) *"I-Y rtNU ! Iiku,!, ,,., ~'!' 1M......
iti I pt." .,<Mw..., 1frw"
1tJN,J",.,. triJJ,i.wUhir M.nwti ~ ",,! i t.,. ~/I'" _ 1,

,ur.n,.

264

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

activity defined as the direct apprehension of it. Likewise, knowing that some thing is to be avoided, a person does not implement its means and thereby obtains the activity of not directly
apprehending it. Thus, awareness is instrumental because it is the
primary factor in one activity with regard to a real thing that one
should obtain or avoid [PV2.3b-d]. That is, it is the primary factor-awareness is the primary factor-in the activity whose object
is a real thing which one should obtain or avoid and which is
thus called a "human aim." Therefore, since awareness is the primary factor, awareness is instrumentaL71

Devendrabuddhi's interpretation suggests three phases in the process of

employing an instrumental cognition to obtain a human aim. First, one has
a cognition that apprehends some entity as what one needs to obtain or
avoid, i.e., as that which fulfills one's aim. Second, one implements the
means for obtaining or avoiding that entity. And third, one obtains the
"activity" or "activation" (pravrtti) of another cognition, namely a perception in which that entity is experienced as fulfilling one's goal. Thus, on
Devendrabuddhi's view, at PV2.3b-d, Dharmaklrti uses the term "activity"
to refer to the activation of a perception of that entity. To be specific, it is
a perception that Devendrabuddhi elsewhere describes as one "in which
the accomplishing of one's goal appears" (arthakriyanirbhasa)'72
From a lexical standpoint, the interpretation of "activity" (prav.rtti) in
this fashion is certainly legitimate, since Dharmaklrti often uses this term
to speak of the "activation" or occurrence of an instrumental cognition,l3

71 PVP (3b5ft): shes pa blang bar bya [bal 'i don shes nas de sgrub par byed pa nan tan du byed
pas mngon sum du byed pa 'i mtshan nyid can gyi Jug pa skyes bus thob par gyur ro / de bzhin
du dor bar bya ba shes nas de sgrub par byed pa nan tan du mi byed pas / de mngon sum du mi
byed pa 'i mtshan nyid can gyi Jug pa thob par gyur te / blo ni tshad ma nyid / bfang dang dor
bya'i dngos po yi / Jug fa de gtso nyid phyir dang / bfang bar bya ba dang dor bar bya ba'i dngos
po 'i yul can dang / skyes bu'i don zhes bya ba can gyi Jug pa de fa / de gtso bo nyid kyi phyir te
shes pa gtso bo nyid yin pa 'i rgyu 'i phyir / blo ni tshad ma nyid yin no.

n Devendrabuddhi first uses the term arthakriyiinirbhiisa explicitly at PVP:2b7 (ji ltar 'dod
pa'i don byed par snang ba can = yathiibhimatiirthakriyiinirbhiisa), but this notion is dearly
what he has in mind when he refers repeatedly (starting at 2a3) to cognitions such as "a perception whose object is the sensation of warmth of a fire" (de'i dro ba'i regpa fa sogs pa'i yul
can gyi mngon sum), "a subsequent cognition whose object is burning, cooking, etc." (4<13: sreg
pa dang 'tshed pa fa sogs pa'i yul can gyi phyis kyi shes pal, and so on.
73 Perhaps the best known example is the negative statement in the context of nonperception (PVI.3a apravrttib pramiiIJiiniim apravrttiphaliisatz).

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLE DGE

16S

And from a commonKnsc sandpoint, Dcvendnbuddhi's description

makes good ~nsc. In 1M contat of wishing to obtain heat, first one app~
hmds SOnK heat-souIU: one sees, for aample, that a fi re is burning in the
fireptace across the room. Second, one implemenb the means to obtain
that entity: one walks across the room. And third, one apprehends the fulfillment of one', goal; one experiences warmth.
On rhie modd. whal then does it II"IaJl for an iruuument:a.l rognition
such as a perttpt;cm to be the ~primary factor in one's activity with regard
to a rea.I thing that one showd obtain or avoid?" In brid', it means that the
pcrc:ept'ion is an instrument (ItllrIl'!Jl) in that it enables one to act in a manner mat ruulb in the accomplishmcm of one's goal; in orner 'NOrds, it is
what -makes one: obtain" (pni,.J...) an object thaI accomplishes that goal.
obviouJ: rroblem~ r.h ~1 rhi~ r.a.i~ $lJch th~
fact that ont"" activity might be hampe.red---60me intervc:ning turn of
~nb might pteYml one from reaching the fire. For the momCf'll let us simply acknowledge dUI this 'NOuld be a plausible way 10 ddint" an instruBdow _ will

eJrrlo~ Klm~

mental cognition in tmru of a human aim (p~f'U!4r1h';'

Although this intaprmtion nuy be plausibk, it does not strike me: as the
man straightforwud re:>ding ofPVl.}b-<t. Instead. on :t rno~ n.:I.fUr.l.I ~
ing. 10 uy d",( an irutrumenw cognition iJ the prim:lf}' facto r in one',
activity with regard to somt" human aim is simply 10 say d Ull an iOllrumt"ow cognition motivates or prompts thai :activity. Indeed. t"VCO for
Dcvmdrabuddhi this interpretation must also be pan of what PYl.Jb-d
mUllS, although for him this ~ ap~ 10 be secondary.:oo Speaking of
why the cognidon iuclf-and not orner factors in Ihe mowing procas
cud!. M the ~ns.e i2euJria----iJ (he ilUuumenr, Devendl'2buddhi etpl..uru:
It is daimc-d (al PYl.Jb-<lj that awarrneu is ilUtrumcnw so as

to (dutt" the notion that rht" ~nse faculties and such are also
causes for activity. That is.:a penon who has facultia and so On
does not thtttby ncssarily cn~ in aaMty toward somt" smsc
objca:; orherwi.tc, one WOI.IJd have ro o;ond ... dc dl:tt o ne enRcs

in activity mt"reiy by virtue of their existencc. Instead. it i5 as

dvol prompc me to ..wn~ that dU. _

is~. Fim ,
Drvcndr-MNddhi'. din.-a po.. of ,._ptA; in tho: yux rd'-.n only ro
in tIN: _
of
the "aaMtion" of:an in&uwDM1II copiOon (J'VP:)bs-4). Sond, in btc:qolt:l'll poillll in
1m oommmu on I'VLI-ti, h .. dw nrlkr InUO: mar .. apln mlCl'llttd, and n(IC thc ~
of ".",m ... penon'. aaion IOW:tfd :an ob;ca.
74 ~ an::

twO /'CQOnS

p..,m

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKUlTrS PH ILO SOPHY

follows: having known what should be obtainro md avoided, a

penon who is that knower applies himsdf accordingly. That in
temu of which a judicious ~non (prrk,JpiirwUri,,) is initially
promptro to act is the cause of action toward the intended objta
(IIrt"'). Since Other awarmesscs arise by dim of that inicial awarent'$S or have thai in itial awal'Ul(SS as their objca, only that initial awarrot'$S is imtrumental!'l
These commenu immediately follow Devendrllbuddhi's interpretation of
-activity- r,,-.vrni) as the activation of a pc:tc.eption in whKh one a.:~ri
ences the accomplishment of OM " goal. But here. a difJ"C1ent interpl'tt.ltion
of activity is suggested: it is the pttttiver's initial aaivity toward the go.!.
In tM aampk cited a~, activity would be the first moma u of sening
out acros.t the room to reach the: fire, or mort spifacally, the tirst moment
of the intention to do so. Thw. on this interpretation a cognitton is an
iru:trumem of knowledge whose application resultl not in a pcKeption of
the accomplishment of one's aim. but rather in one's aaivity toward an
entiry tbat is capable of accomplishing that aim. In shon, such a cognition
is an instrument (Jt.,-.tI/I) because: it is "that which causes one to act"
(p'-lIlMuUItIl) toward the fulfiUment of one's aim.
That Ocvendntbuddhi is here speaking of an insuumental cognition as
that which initwly motivates action wiUbt-come panicub.rly dear when we
rerum to a discussion ofinstrumennlity in terms of human aims. In brief,
Devcndrabuddhi is oblip to see an instrumental cognition as a "motivator of aaion" (Prllll4rt11ltlf) in order fO avoid the conclwion that certain
forml of dtltrminate Itnowltdge rh:u are nor inferences would :llso be
instrumenul, as we will see. The kq- ovetall issue is tlut, in the conta t of
the mcdiatcd innrumtntal effect that is a human aim, Dcvcndrabuddhi
conSfruts an insuumenul cognition as an iru:trument (1t6'-6!U') in (trnu of
(W() rdared but undtniably different "actions-: (I) in the primary ItOSC, the
action is the cognitive aa of having a perception in which appears the

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLEDGE

267

:aocnmplimm.-:nr nf nn.-:'s aim: :md (2) in a .K!COndary se:ns.-:, th.-: action is rh.-:
initial action of Sttting out to accomplish thai aim.
Before moving on ro the notion of an unmroiated effect, we nttd to
make one final obscrv:arion: namely, that on DcvendlOlbuddhi's imerprel1ltion, Dharmwni accrpu the notion that, from at least the perspective of
attaining a human aim, an iruuument ofknowlcdgc and its effect may be
conuru~ H diuinct. ThiJ i~ indiotM morl 5f::"kly hy ~ndr.abudclh; 'J
claim that contrD)' Mon may imef'YC:ne bctwttn the instrumental cognition and the effect, such that the efft is not necesArily attained. in each
case. At first glance, this separation of instrument and instrumenra! effect
(pmM'.I4ph414) might not sm problematic, inasmuch as both Dignaga
and Dharmwni t'ltplicidy note that such a distinction may be made in
conventional ~rms .'" But Digniga =d Dlunn21cini', ~plicil n:uemcnu
about such an imputed orconvenrional sepat:l.lion rest upon the claim that
the inruumcnt and its cffi:ct arc u1rimatdy a single cntiry-: the cognition that
is the "instrument is iuclf the "effCCt," It is difficult to s how this
approach [() the singularity of instrument and effect can apply to Devt-ndnbuddhi's notion of a mediated instrumental effect, since the sensation
of warmlh , for example, that is obtained wr approa.ching a h~ dearly
cannot be considered identieal in:my f.u.hion with the initial perception of
that hre from a distance.
It would thus appear that Dcvendrabuddhi's notion of the mediated.
effect, if it is not to contradict Digniga and Dharmwrri's claims about
the ultimate identity of instrument and effect, must be construed as conventional in a difWenr f.ashion . Specifically, rather than :a conceptual diffe n :nti:l.lion of the l ingul:l.J" "nliry thaI is awaren,," inlO a cliitinci
instrumenl and effect, for Devt-ndral>uddhi an emirely differem comext
must be aslumed whereby entities dlllt arc u1tim:ncly distinct arc related
through ausaliry-: the dfect (whctheraction as initial motivation or action
as subsequent perception) is auscd, even ifindircctly, by till: instrurnenw
W

c.ogrmlon.

How useful i. this :aspect of Dcv.-:ndr.abucldhi'. interprct:&tion of

Dlwmakirti's theory ofinstrumcnraliry? For many sub5cqUCnt comment:UOB, the answc:r might wdI be "nOi at all, inasmuch as the subsequent
tradition of Buddhist PramiJ)lI Thcorisu, which often relies quile squarely
upon Dcvendrabuddhi's commentary, has largely abandoned this portion

FOUNDATIONS O F DHARMAK IRTI 'S PH ILOSO PHY

of his interprrtation,l'I' But dcspiu: this later R:j.tion, Devendrabuddhi's

approach does provide a pia wible and attractive interpretation of Dhar~
malcin i's explicit construal of irutrumenmliry in turns of an awarencss as
'" the primary !?clor in action toward a human aim: And even though
Dcvendrabuddhi'$ intcrpret:ltion may appcu to comradia some aspccu
of Dharmakini'$ philosophy, the commenmrial gymnastics thaI an abandoomem of Devendrabuddhi', view prompu in bter commcnt:ltors
suggests that the flaw may lie in Dhumwni'$ theory, rather than Dcvcndrabuddhi's intcrprrtation.1I
I NSTaUMENTALITY IN TERMS OF TIlE UN MED IATl.D EFFECT

Dcv... ndrabuddhi notcs that Dharmakirti does not argo... for the instrum..-nwity of aWllR:ncss $Oldy on the basis of its primacy in aa;on, in wbich
COntext 1M norion of a mediated instrumental df.t is panicularly relevant, Instead. imm<diatdy following PV1.jb-d, Dharmaldrti prtsents an
entirely different argumenl for tll<: instrurnentalil)' of aw.nencss:
[PV1..p.-c:] Also, aw.neness it instrumental bl."CuISI! a cognirion
is differmtiated du..- to the differmtiation of the awarencss' objec.

tive im",e; this is the case beause that cognition only oa:urs
when that obj.tive i ma~ is pn:st:nt.1f
For Dcvc.ndrabuddhi, this scrond argument CimblishCi tbe instrumentality of aWllrenw not in temu of a mediated dTect, but rather in temu of an

n Dha,mOll3n, fur a:ampk, rmka ~I,>C;III'" oll>o:wndrabudcihi'l rommcnla, bul M

appnr 10 rntn.ion ~ ~ 1M _ion of a medialed iMllummw d'fKt, He

inslad _b (with klmc: dilf..:ulry) 10 esplain iMlNmcnW cosn ilion in IC'I'TTII ofbuman
.i.......itt-.I Ulumin ,emote dira, Thil rn.oka: i. difl"c"h ..... him 10 rcconcik the unlion Mf'At<" the blln alwnmcnl of a ~ich iI dnrIy the pIll'pOfe of employins
an iNirumenw wsni1ion in tho: eotIlat of human ailN---4nd .M rcNaJ 10 sdmil dull the
tfrt could bt 1Cp&nIO: &om Iho: illllNmemrJ cosnidon. 5, fut n:ampk, 1M JOmtWha.
IOfIUfed in le'p~a ' iolU of
nd , ....
in LPI' (e'I-, "W.) ; lrand... ed in

doa

no'!

,,,,,.*

...... -

_*.

' 9\1 ' )

78 The f.,ult in OIurmaklrri 'l rheoty is specil1cally dull, in PV}. he oonsO!krs.., inItrummW wsnilion only in fa" .... of an u.. mediaRd irutrummw dim: with link rden,," 10
human ~ms ~ bon his preICfIwioa in PVl..-6, wt.id! dearlyeon.rrucl an iJuuu...
menial WJPition in _
ofhuman ai..... 3ppcars.o rntui~ ~'I notion of a
medialM illlmUl1tllai dI"ect. In "-t, DlwmM!rti'l atmsm unrmml ofirumunmw
dfm (,'.",.!W~ in pvJ doIS IMII cormpond wdl 10 hil accou.nc of inwummeaI
nilion in PVl.l-6.

cos-

19 PVl.4a-<: ~Itm~ u ~ ~_MrJ.t4J I i++W',..,. wi" .....

I NSTRUM ENTALITY: JUS TIFYI NG T HE SOU RCES OF KNOWLEDGE

169

unmcdiarcd (tlvyavahitlJ) one. Interpreting PV1.41-C. Devendnbuddhi

Il!marlu:
The [mere] cognition of an object (Jon rIOfS jHI- IJrthi.tJhit4m4)
is an unmcdiatcd inStrumental effect.- That is, dut through
which, when aU other causes are in place, the convention of
"Imowing"' (rt"Sl /UZ fJl"llhp.tti) il utidiffl wirhOLlt funher
mediation iJ an irutrumem ofknOYllcd~. And nothing but the
simulxnam li.e. image] of the object has that lack of media
don, for it iJ through that image that irutancc$ of knowing are
distinguished from each other, even though th(}' are indistin
guishable in terRU of their naNre of being experiences. Hence,
JIlL In tiN Ji./.forr ..tU.hn.. nfth, "I,,..nw i .....g.o-i ..... due ( 0 m:u
quality of the cognition-dle awareness, i.e., the kntlwint. is tlif
ftrmtiAtd And tina this effect c:mu wlNn tlutt is p1'Nn~i . e..
when the object. image is presem-awareneu is therefon: ilUuu,
mental If when "," iJ present, ..xcomes into aistencc, it makes
seosc that ",-is the most efficient ClUSC of "x, .., But if at some
point there were no ruch dfect {i.e. . "xj when .y - W'U pracnt.

then one would rdiu that " x" depend& upon JOme other mediating causal OOOr. That being the cue, since that former cause
y. is mediated by something else on which it depenm 10 produce.lf, ]would not be the most prominem caus:al factor. There
fore. it would not be the instrumental ca~. Even when the seruc
faculties and so on arc present, they do not [n.cssarilyJ have the
causal f'unaion of producing an ~ bca..s.e rhey au mediated by the object-sjmulacrum. But if the simulacrum is present, it is ncceuarily known because it is not medialed by
anything dsc for that knowing to occur. Sintt it is of the nalure
of awarencss, it is the basiJ for positing an effect that does not
depend on anything funhcr for ju presena: ....u
BOThe Tibaan (I'VP--4Ul n:ao:b a!,.J _i ..... h _rlW,.,-",M.......",. Ji" _ H_
ew!. Ihit_.pill fO bc_ of!he lIWIy cuaof IUbjea/prrdiar., in'mSion in a TIbnan
tnnsbtion fix. Suukri, KI1(metll!N1 -..u probably: . 7 di...,.......,!"9L,..~.
~ Noce rNI hne I ~ .... to
_rdy marki"l lhor pmiial(.

31 Thit Q)ftIpIa rebriw COIUtnICUon I\u bern rtp<amlfd wi", lhor ViIbIa "x and ;"
lOt Iht; sW: of darity in iu EnIish ",ndm""

11 PVP {4Uffl: a!,.J_ i ""'h _ ....,.,..,M.. """'''';'' M f M,-",'D'" thI-

170

FOUNDATIONS OF OHAkMAkIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

From the viewpoinc of Dharmakini's BrahmaniaJ counterparts, the

above argument for me instrumenrality of awareness (as opposed to the
sense filcuhies, ere.) follows an analysis more typica.l to this style of discourse, for the instrumenra.l effect (;rllmdlJ4phllta) in question is not the
attainment of some human goal, but rather the mere act of knowing
(prllmiti) itself. But even here Dharmakini adds a significant twist [0 his
argument, for his analysis does not roUow the typica.l kJrllkD-theory discw.sed earlier." On (hat meory, an instrument of knowledge would be me
instrument (k41'1l!fll) for the production of a resulting aerion (Ini]tl) that is
an instrumental effect (prllml1~ph4illJ consisting of the act of knowing
(pr4m;ti) . There is thus a cause-cffea relationship between an instrument
ofknowl~ and the instrumental eEtta that arises from it, and as such ,
the: instrument ofknowledgc and the innrumenCli dfca arc disrinct. Likewise, on lXvcndrabuddhi's inre:rpration, an inStrument of knowledge
construed in terms of a mediated efftct is also bued on a cause-cffect relationship; an insuume:mal cognition is the cause, and the resultant activity
(prllvrm) is the effect.
In con{fa5[ to the klirak,o..theory and the context of a human aim 'fUll
medi.ted effect. Dharmakini', analysis of an innrumem ofknowled ~ in
[emu of what Devcndrabuddhi calls an unmediated effect does not employ
a causa.l modd, in part because Dharmakini follows Digniga in rejecting
the distinction between ill5lrument (kllrll{IAJ and effect (1my4. p'"'ta) as
found in the klr41.theory." Dharnukini thw rqc.ru the notion of understanding instrumentality in terms of a causal relationship betwu:n two dis-

,.r

tM II? N .... ~ p", I.u m.J,. __

1'I#fI ,. j tIM """" thH ,. .... tU ~ .... Jill ...
I .... m.J,. tU ,.", Jfd ~ 'Jn .. t.s ,wll IA JWI ,. _ "II "" I In ...... IIi ...,.,.., III
~ N 'i u., ",.. J1. .....~ - ' J1. .;. ..,.", tU ;.,. ,. ,. IA tit. . . PM ~,.""
... 1tU Iur ... Jfd.-... [PVP_D: .-.ul uII ..
r4M Jilt,.i';";, 1
M. ~,.. ... J.,/,. " .. ,.." 'f!tI tU; JI7i''' / tU JWI .... ur pJ fPVP-D: IA",]"'. .......",
"Ully.J ... inI h it; y.J""". IM. iii tsIMJ".,. tt]U
/p",JWI,..IIJi4Ji"'" P"K
Dw N tU ..i tU, P,;1t ,., P ,., ~,. Jill'" "" _ I tU ,-J .... ,.,., p'un, ti Mt '"""
h - " ~~.. _ iii I lui pM ..,. N pbttlt iii "')1M t41hn ~ ~ Dow,.. / tU j ' Mt vrr
.... tU .pJ
1M r'- J" tNtI ,.. i ""', ,;,.J tU. .".",N UII oi "".,. .pJ tI..
",i D-,. I tU ...... ""..,. tt]U J. -:1" ..... 1
~
y.tI ,. ,. "'''K .,. N
__,.". " 1",,",,,
~ 'i phJir,. / 'Jn N .pJJWI- ..
&f N, '"
,."" l tU;tU iii ;""'P.i;lor",tMJ,. ...." ..... 1
#r'IA lui,. -",. UII of h h "."Iff ~, "...., ,.. i ..... "" .... Rad Jba ,.'; tNt for r.htJ

i'" """""',,, 1M,.,

"It ...

/1M,.,.,.

m ... ,..

~ 'i tb..

"btl.., ,. ,." ,..

JwJ,.,i..,. .. ..,..".,.i

Ct-9'

83 S 1hIM:. 1.1.
M For DisnJp'. pl'ClCnucion., I ~ PSI.).)O-<f and PSV . . til.

i,... "';

INST RUMENTALI T Y: JUSTIFYIN G 111 SOURC ES O F KNOWLEDGE

2.71

tinct entities---the instrument and its dfcct. He instead maintains that

instrument and action are idc:mial.; spccifial.ly. they arc: the awarc:nml'
objective aspect (.fT4hy4)and subjective aspect Wtih4kwm), respectively."
Dharmakini's ultimate rejc:aion or the .tamA-theory's differentiation or
innrwnent and action becomes clear when he mums to mis issue later in
me Pra1Ni!f4Vtimil4. Responding (0 me claim that instrument and instrumenw dfca arc: actually identical. his objector rc:marb. - It is contndictory fOe aaion and instrument to be: identical.- And Dharmakini ~rs:
This is not true bcca~ WI!' admit th:at there is a {concc:ptu:ally
constructed] dilfcrc:nce berYluu these qualities lof awareness, i.e.
the objccth-e and subjective aspects] . But ~ maintain that the: real
thing [i.e.. :aw:arenc:ss itself] is undilfcrenriatcd.1l' Such is the a.se
fo r :any establishment of action :and causa! factors bc:ca~ even
when dw: real things construed as the instrument :and such arc:
considered to be dilfcrent, the establishment of them as instrument and such ocrurs through imputation (tinlpa).8S T aIU"fj ..... pooi ................. "..,., . ..... wlt.id. io ... I.e -.bIioheci (~by ..... i .......mmt (Iu,.!y a Wihtuu), Dlwm:alcJni intnpml lht tyiJMltlu", u m( niyi beaUK il is
~isbcd in IftmI: of the ~ whid. is thus the ;rutrumml. 'fhQ, is d", basil lOr the
claim !luI ~ :and ~ a:and in the ..dation of ""'~"7"_t/:.qd"M.hwo.
Set. lOt aunpk. PV'.JI4- )l S:

W( do IlOI acap! Ow thnc ill diR'uma benocu. Uw objea of the acnon and Uw
objm ofUw iNmIment. Iftlx:y hac: dx:$UlCoO;m (nrJ,.). dono !hi: notion !luI thty
an: aaually rwo ditkmll cnliries is mo:aninpe... M..,w.(t. if lhey 1u.'C
~
ob;ca. chq Jhould IlOI ocau ~lially. l( tMy OCCUr III~ Aim lime, !hen IlItre
is no rdatiorl oftlx:", u tbc cttabIilhinl mnN (uJtD.NI) and the cstatMiIhcd (nliry
(~ rSur on our new]. tho: .... bjutm:: and vbjtin: ~ of tho:.OOo ~
ddined u tIx: em.biishinl mearu and ew.b1Wx:d mriry braUM:
establishment
(~ IIW) of
subjcaM Mpea iI bued upon tIx: objti.., upt. r ~.;,."..
MnU .,.~.~ Jdbrb.M....,.". ."."..". ow ,.. f1ir !r._1Ihhi1J
II 'w, 'd1H... rM.w.~ ~ Jh?- ~ J WIIJi'_IMir.,..- ~

me:

me:

MAl
___

me:

_L ,-,L N,
I. .
"'Im"!'

Nocc "- aI"-'&/I ~.b."Uhi here (rYl':l1i1b~) ....d cb>ewtx:n:..den "" tho: __ "PMU
(.".u)of awata'IftI (Jbi.ftC.) u tIx: -objea..imubcrwn" (~)and tho: "copilion
of tIx: objca" (~). I u.ndcnu.nd tbcK (WI) 10 ~ Iynonyma for ,..~ and

,......- ......."".
86 PV)lbb l ,

a.

.m,.u-~ .ilJ..,;,..,u,.;1i uJ.

tAn"'''i

87
~ (1I,.,)' 'Ji'~"lpJ..J"'; """ .. tt?JU"lM.. ,...",.
tW u. UJ"l>'''lfot ,. tk HMt 1m,. ..,.. ~i u.,,. 'i u. UJ,., "".., - " , . Ji- ON.
88 PV).JIIb,."" C- tIx: critialllOla in Touki. ,J rir. ), _ tI Jh,.",..H<lMIJIj 'P'P.ui

171

FOU NDATI O NS OF DHAlMAKIRTI'S PH ILOSOPH Y

To suppon the claim mat innrument and instrumental dfect are actually
identica.l, Dhartllak.ini effectively proposes an enrirdy n~ way of un~r
sl1Inding what constitutes an instrument: rather than being the aUK of
some t('$uitant activity (1m,.,). it il instead that which is unmediated
(IIvyaWlhitJl) with regard to me activity. Al Devendrabuddhi explains in
the comments cited a~. when the activity (kriy4) in question is an indubit.lble cognition (prllmiti), the instrument is thus -that mrough which,
when all other causes are in place. the convention of 'knowing' is Atisfied
without runher mediation. ~ In shon, it is that which requir('$ nothing furmer in order for one to be cunently having a cognition of the objta.
In emblishing the innrumc:ntality of an in.mumenw cognition in these:
temu , Dharmalcini (as interpreted by Dcvendnlbuddhi) rccogni-z.es that
one must be able to distinguish between cogrurioru. That is, if an irutrument of knowledge is mat which enabl('$ one: to claim that a cognition of
an objta is occurring, one must be able to distinguish the case: where a
cognition of that objta is occurring from a CIS(' where such a cognition is
not occurring. With this in mind. Dharmalcini also claims that the irutrurnefl[ of knowledge is the "final diffe:l'C'ntiator~ (a"tyabhui4It1t) of cognidoru. Thus. nex only ~ it provide [he basil fo r claiming that a cognition
is occurring. bUi it also accounts for the differences between the contents
of cognitions."' As Devmdrabuddhi points our, on Dharmakini's vi~ the
only Dcer of knowing that can meet thc:sc: critena of an instrument of
knowledge is the "objtaive image- WJ/ry.HJ'II) or "object-5i mulacrum ~
("~nya~i . e . the appearance: (pratibh4.sa, pnnibimbll) in a cognition. Funhermore, since the image is actually an aspect of me mind arising
in the form of an image:. and since the mind is ultimately undifferentiated.
the instrument is uhim:uely nothing but the mind (i.e., the cognition)
iudE. Thus. for an entirdy different reason than the one proposed in the
COntext of a human aim. an instrument of knowledge is once again shown
to be nothing but the awareness itself, i.e. the instrumental cognidon.

Two SENSES OF ARTHAK~YA

At the beginning of our discussion on insrrutnentaliry in terms of mediated
and unmediated eff<:as, I mentioned that Nagatomi's division between twO
THE Two EFFECTS AND THE

Ubi",..", ;ng- II tN~

......
_

"Ii.,.~ ~ /I.

89 a. KaISUta (I~).

u""'_ ~'!fJtl,iti!1 1 MMwr. Mf",uMn-

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

~eflses

273

of arthakriyii is relevant here, for it parallels the distinction between

:pevendrabuddhi's two types of instrumental effects. More specifically, it
~eems likely that something akin to Nagatomi's two senses of arthakriyiiare
~resupposed by Devendrabuddhi in the formulation of his theory: the
lhotion of a mediated instrumental effect presupposes the sense of arthakriyii
~"telic function" (Nagatomi's "purposive action"), while the notion of an
~l1mediated instrumental effect presupposes the sense of arthakriyii as
liriausal efficiency." In this section we will explore how this might be the
~e, with the important proviso that, since Nagatomi's categories are not
?ecognized per se by Dharmaki:rti and Devendrabuddhi, we are necessarily
~p'gaged in a somewhat speculative enterprise.
;t;To understand the relevance ofNagatomi's two senses of arthakriyii, we
Aeed first to recall that when a cognition's instrumentality is defined in
~~rms of a mediated effect, it is an instrument (kararza) because it is the
~ost important factor in the production of a subsequent effect, namely, the
\l:ftainment of a human aim (puruJiirtha). As we have noted, the instru~ent's effect is "mediated" (vyavahita) because even though the cognition
~sjnstrumental, its function must be supplemented by later conditions and
aevelopments, if the desired effect is to be obtained.
:~ The fact of being mediated indicates that this way of defining instrubentality emphasizes the first of Nagatomi's interpretations of the comlound arthakriyii, i.e., arthakriyii as "telic function" or, to use Nagatomi's
~term, "purposive action." As noted above, arthakriyiiis relevant to an instru~ental cognition's trustworthiness. Specifically, an instrumental cognition
t(pramiirza) is always trustworthy, and that trustworthiness is described as
),rthakriyiisthiti, which Devendrabuddhi interprets as a cognition of arthao/etiyii. Now, if arthakriyii is understood as telic function, this means that an
;:i~strumental cognition is trustworthy in that it results in a cognition of
~dic function. Or, to put it another way, the instrumental cognition is
~rustworthy because it results in the activation of a cognition in which the
~ccomplishment of one's goal appears. This is, as we have seen, Deven~rabuddhi's way of construing an instrument of knowledge in terms of a
;mediated instrumental effect. Thus, by interpreting arthakriyii as "telic
function," we arrive at Devendrabuddhi's notion of an instrumental cog~ition in terms of a mediated instrumental effect: the cognition is instru:!pental in that it is a cause for the resulting "activity" that is a cognition of
!the accomplishment of one's aim.
. In contrast, when understood in terms of an unmediated instrumental
~ffect (avyavahitapramiirzaphala), the instrumentality of a cognition involves

274

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

no appeal to a causal relation between instrument and effect. On this

approach, a cognition is instrumental not because it is the most important
factor in the production of some goal, but rather because it is that which is
the primary factor in establishing that an "effect"-i.e., the pramiti itself_
is already in place. Since the instrumental cognition is thus occurring at
the same time as the instrumental effect (pramartaphala), there can be no
question of mediation, whether causal or otherwise. But although neither
Dharmakirti nor Devendrabuddhi is specific on this point, it appears that
when an instrumental cognition is defined in this fashion, one likewise cannot construe its trustworthiness in terms of a cognition of arthakriya as
"accomplishment of a goal" (i.e., "telic function"). The reason for abandoning this model of trustworthiness is that it would lead to an infinite
regress. That is, consider the trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition
that "results" in an unmediated effect-i.e., that cognition itself is the manifestation of the desired effect that is one's goal. If the trustworthiness of
such a cognition were to consist of it leading to some subsequent cognition
in which appears the accomplishment of one's goal, then no such cognition
would ever be trustworthy, for no cognition would be trustworthy in and
of itself without appealing to a later result. 90
It can be argued, however, that the trustworthiness of at least one type of
awareness whose effect is unmediated can (or perhaps must) be interpreted in
this fashion, i.e., in such a way that its trustworthiness consists of its resulting
in a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's aim
(arthakriyanirbhiisa). To be specific, such a cognition would be one that is the
latter cognition itself, i.e., one in which the accomplishment of one's aim
already appears. An example would be the sensation of heat when, after seeing. a fire from a distance, one finally reaches it and feels its warmth. Here the
perception-the sensation of warmth-is itself the fulfillment of one's aim;
hence, no further mediation is required in order for one's aim to be accomplished. The instrumental cognition, in short, would be its own effect, which
is exactly what is meant by an unmediated instrumental effect. If this interpretation is correct, such an instrumental cognition may be counted as having an unmediated instrumental effect at the same time as involving the notion
of resulting in the accomplishment (kriya) of one's aim or telos (artha}.91
90 Although Devendrabuddhi does not discuss it specifically, Sakyabuddhi notices that the
problem of infinite regress must be addressed (PVT, nye74a5-6 and 74bz).
91 This certainly becomes the opinion oflate commentators. See, for example, Dharmottara's
comments to that effect (Steinkellner and Krasser 1989:13.3ff).

INSTRUMENTALI TY, JUST ifYIN G TI-I SOU RCES Of KN OWLEDGE

17S

h would thU1 appear that 50me notion of aim or td05 is applicable to the
interprcution of IInhttlrriyJ as the crilerion for trwtworthincu even in this
particular type of cognition with unmcd.iated effect, namely, a cognition in
which the accomplishment of one's aim already appcan. But even if this is
the case, ~buddhi's discussion of unmcdiated inmumenw dfCCland Dharmakirti's initial devdopmenl of the idea-is probably also
intended to account for in.strumenralilY in another fa.shion. Specifically,
the norion of an unmediared effect also enables one 10 understand a cognition's insuumentality without any concern for human aims at all. O n
this a1tcrnalivc inttrprctation, one can claim that III/cognitions arc instrumental in a minimal sense. Although neither Dharmaldni nor Dcvcndrabuddhi is explicit on this i.uuc, il would appear that an allemarive
interpretation of IIrtlMltriy4 must also be applied on this imerprct:u ion,
since the entil>t poim here is to cvalWlC a cognition without reference to
goals. Following Nagaromi, the a1ternalivc interprcation suggcsted-bUt
nCVff ckarly statcd-by Dharmooni or dlC: earliest commentators is that
of IInhUriy4 as mere causal functional icy: an emiry has IIrthttlrriy4 in the
simple sefUC that il has effect!. On this interpretation of IInhllkriyJ. an
""'~1!1$ would ~ tnllrwnnhy in th~ minim,.1 v:n~ th.:u it i~ ,. rr:al m~ _
tal ~nt: it has ~iti in thot ~ seruc thu it is ~r.tbliJhed (,u,jlll)
as a causally dFiciem moment of coruciousncu. This minimal trustworthincu amounu to the claim that, reg.ardkss of the determinate interpretation of a cognition', contem, one can always reliably know that one is
cognizing. Since mis minimal truStworthiness is applicable to III/ awarencues, all awarcncs.scs can be coruidcrcd trUStworthy.
Although ;1 m:ay U\"m odd to m,unmin t"'", ~'Y ;nst:llla of ,.W:lten~n
is trwtwonhy in the minimallCl1SC discussed abovr, this interpretation
helps 10 aplain WO other nOlions proposed by Dharrnak.ini. The first is
one we have discussed previously, namriy. mat illusory objras such as the
hairs ICCn by a person with cataracts are not "objecu (IInhlls) bccaU5C they
arc not considered such by persoru engaged in practical action (lIJIIwthtJrll);
in other WONk from the ~pcct:ivc of ~lc.in8" hum,.n ,um flU.,},.,) . th,.,
visual cognition of "hairs" in the mind of a person with cataractS is not
inslrumental. BUI for thai penon, those "hairs" IIl'tobjcct!l when consKictcd
simply as mental cvenu.'1 If we undel'5tand Dcvendrabuddhi', twOfold
explanation of instrumentality in terms of thr twO afon!mentioned sensc5
of IIrthllltriJ4. the perception of those hl.irs is not instrumental on the dcf-

276

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

inition in terms of a mediated effect (i.e., puruflirtha) because they do not

lead to or are not themselves the accomplishment of one's aim (arthakriyii).
But that cognition is instrumental in terms of an unmediated effect (i.e., the
mere fact of having an awareness) because that moment of consciousness is
real, i.e., it is causally efficient (arthakriya) in that it is a mental product and
will itself lead to other mental effects.
This way of defining the unmediated instrumental effect in terms of
causal efficiency helps to explain a second, related notion: namely, reflexive awareness {svasa'flZvedana}, the "self-cognizing" or "self-presencing" of
every cognition. Reflexive awareness itself is an exception to the rule that
the object of a perception (pratyakfa) is the cause of the image in the perceptual cognition. 93 Hence, if it is to be considered instrumental, it clearly
cannot be considered in terms of a mediated instrumental effect, since this
would require an appeal to causality that is not possible in the case of reflexive awareness. And it likewise difficult to imagine how reflexive awareness
can fit into a scheme of human goals; hence, unlike a cognition in which
appears the accomplishment of one's aim, one cannot appeal to some
unmediated experience of telos, except the restricted telos of knowing that
one knows. It seems likely, then, that the instrumentality of reflexive awareness cannot be established in terms of a mediated effect, and even as an
unmediated effect the issue of arthakriya as telic function is nonsensical in
this case. Thus, if we are to accept reflexive awareness as a trustworthy cognition, and ifwe are to maintain that trustworthiness means arthakriyiisthiti,
we must again turn to an alternative interpretation of arthakriya, namely,
that reflexive awareness is reliable in that it reveals the mere fact of experience, which is the same as saying that it reveals the mere causal efficiency
(arthakriya) of awareness.
If we close this section by returning to the notion of a cognition in which
appears the accomplishment of one's aim, we can now add an important
93 That reflexive awareness is noncausal follows from its simultaneity with its object, namely,
the awareness that is reflexively perceived itself. Indeed, what can be most confusing about
reflexive awareness is the notion that it is a cognition distinct from its object. This distinction is clearly the case for all forms of perception, including mental perception (manasapratyak!a), for in all cases the object (grahya) of perception is its cause (see, for example,
PV3.224). The same is true of inference, since it too arises indirectly from its object (see the
succinct statement in PVSV adPVI.I; G:3.8: avyabhicaraf canyasya ko 'nyas tadutpattep, where
tadutpatti is meant to apply to both effect- and svabhava-evidence). In contrast, what Dignaga
first identifies as the three aspects of an awareness-namely, reflexive awareness, the objective aspect (grahyakara), and the subjective aspect (grahakakara)-are all ultimately identical and hence simultaneous. The notion that reflexive awareness is cognizing the subjective-

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

277

;4ualification to the way we have characterized it so far. That is, even if such
:"icognition combines a telic meaning of arthakriya with the notion of an
!~nmediated instrumental effect, it also places greater emphasis upon
;;rihakriya as ca~sal efficiency, in comparison to instrumental cognitions
:that are considered trustworthy in terms of mediated effects. In the case of
~ese latter cognitions, trustworthiness means that they lead to some sub-

~:ind objective-aspects is merely a way of conceptualizing the process of knowing (see the locus
;classicus in PSI.I.IO: yadabhiisa1J1 prameya1J1 tatpramti/}aphalate punap I griihakiikiirasa1J1vitti
;triiya1J1 niitap p.rthak k.rtam). Although Dignaga maintains that External Realism can propose
:i:similar way of analyzing cognitions (PSI.I.9), this way of explaining cognitions assumes the
Epistemic Idealist position. Dharmakirti accepts and elaborates upon Dignaga's opinion in
Hie following verses [PV3-333-339]:

"If we maintain that an external object is experienced, what would be wrong with that
claim?"
There is nothing wrong with it, but what is the point of saying this: "An external
object is experienced"? [PV3.333] If awareness has the image of the object, then it must
have something that distinguishes [each] image [for each awareness]. [PV3.334] It
would be wise to look into whether that differentiation must come from something
external, or whether it might just as easily come from something else.
[I] There is no apprehension of an object devoid of qualification by the experience
of it; and [2] when that experience itself is apprehended, the object is apprehended.
Therefore for these two reasons, the cognitive appearance of blue is the experience
(darfana) of blue. There is no independent (kevalap; cf. PVP:223a7) external object.
Instead, something activates the internal imprint for some experience. It is due to that
awakening of an imprint that there is the restriction [of a particular image] to a [particular] cognition; that restriction is not dependent on an external object
[PV3-335-336].
Therefore that one awareness which is experienced and remembered in that fashion
has two aspects (dviriipa); the instrumental result is the reflexive awareness of both
aspects [PV3-337].
When the object is considered to be other than the mind and established with a
nature that is desired or not desired, then the object is the cause of the representation
and the effect is the experience of that representation in that way, i.e., as desired or not
desired [PV3-338].
If awareness includes the object (yadii savifaya1J1 jftiina1J1) due to the positing
(vyavasthiti) of the object as an aspect (a1J1fa) of awareness [and not as actuallyexternal], then the determination (vinifcaya) of the object is just the awareness' experience
ofitself. [PV3.339] [yadi biihyo 'nubhiiyeta ko dOfO naiva kafcana I idam eva kim ukta1J1

syiit sa biihyo 'rtho 'nubhiiyate II yadi buddhis tadakiirii siisty iikiiravifefi1}i I sii biihyiid
anyato veti viciiram idam arhati II darfanopiidhirahitasyiigrahiit tadgrahe grahiit I
darfana1J1 nilanirbhiisa1J1 niirtho biihyo 'sti kevalap II kasyacit ki1J1cid eViintarviisaniiyiip
prabodhakam I tato dhiyii1J1 viniyamo na biihyiirthavyapekfayii II tasmad dviriipam asty
eka1J1 yad evam anubhiiyate I smaryate cobhayiikiirasyiisya sa1J1vedana1J1 phalam II yada
nifpannatadbhiiva iHo 'niHo 'pi vii parap I vijftaptihetur vifayas tasyiif ciinubhavas tathii
II yadii savifaya1J1 jftiina1J1 jftiinii1J1fe 'rthavyavasthitep I tada ya iitmiinubhavap sa
eViirthavinifcayap II].

2.78

FOUNOATI ONS OF DHARMAKIRT I'S PHILOSOP HY

~~n(

cognition in which the- accomplishment of one', aim appears. Thus

it is not their caUAI funCtional ity as mere cognidolU that makes them trust
worthy, but rather meir causal functionality in rdation to some subsequent
effect. But in the ~ of a cognition in which appears me accomplishment
of one's aim, it is the causal functionality of that cognition it5df-t~ vtty
fact of its appearance-that makes it lrunwonhy. In other words, the- trustwonhinm of the visual ~rttption of fire is that it leads one: to ha~, for
example, a subsequent sensation of warmth. But the truStwOnhiness of mat
Kruaoon of warmth is nothing but the fact of mat Knsation itself. In this
Knse, the tlllStWOnhiness of a cognilion in which appears the accomplish.
ment of one's aim (Ilrthatmy4"irbhJu) is, much like rdlaive awareness
and me perception of illusory hairs, based primarily upon its IlTth4ltriyfh,s
the mere: causal efficiency of the cognition itself.
THI! PRIMACY

or

PURU$ARTHA

There is much more to explore in Dcvendrabuddhi', notion or twO types

of instrumc:nral effect, including the way mat his interpmation has been
partially adopted (and hma paniaUy abandoned) by me commenwial ua.dition.'" But one more limited question that com~ to mind is the role
pla~ in Oha.rmwrti'. philosophy by tbest: twO ways of defining instrumentality. More spillcaUy, should one way of connruing inStrumentality be consideud primary and the otha KCOnda.rr.
If Devendrabuddhi', presentation of irutrumentality in terms of {W()
types of instrumemal effeet (eRects some distinction betwttn instrumentality in terms of sheer Clusal efficiency and instrumentality in terms or
tdie function . it nevertheless mnains the ~ mat Ohllmakini hinudf
docs nOt expliciuy tell us whether we dJouid favor one approach or another,
such a distinaion is only inchoate in Dha.rmakirti's work.
primarily
In more n:a:nt tim~, h~, Nagaromi and Srdnlcdlner ha~ noted that
Dharmakirti tends to employ the term tlr1httltriJii primarily with the
emphasis on its meaning as Mtdic function, and not primllily with me

wusc

!U Lint;erin& quc:Riont indtwk how ~ '. inlft'J'ftUUon tdalD 10 what ~ and

lun commmlllon all 1M dun "'fWIioru" (~of iN!:.wnnu.u dfca (ore, C'I- '
PVJ':u}bdr and PVT. OI)II':u~. How, lOr ~arnpk, doD thilll\llpU ttblC 10 Dfwma.killi'. acnW ptaalraOoo in I'V) and I);gnJp'J initial My (PSI.I.kdR)! Conc::unincDewmdrabuddhi'. impaa upon laIn com.rnmcatOfl, his wonh ohm appear "'I:matim in their
oornmcnwia., bu. 11\,"'1: rn 10 find Illy ~ClhX bier chan ~ who aoppc:wu
,he .-ion of. medWtI inouwncn .... drccc. A ....dy oft- and..t.y ..... -'on _ ccj w!
...-.uk! ...my hdp '" 10 wwktsIand dw WOfb of otwa-wa. ~~ and cxhns.

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYING T HE SOU RCES O F KN O WLEDGE

179

meaning of cauul efficiency," If we arc correct in maintaining th:1.I these

two dilttrent scrues of the term ""Jultriya correspond lO lhe twO different
ways of construing the insuumcntality of a cognition, then the emphasis on
the relic sell5C of
suggests thaI the definition of an instrumental
cognition in temu of a mediated effect- i,e" in terms of a human aimwill abo be the principal one in Dharmakirti's work. Although neither
Devcndrabuddhi nor Sikyabuddhi offers any explicit answcr to this qua.
rion. they roo appear to consider the establishment of instrumentality in
tcrms of a human aim to be of primary importance, for when presenting
Dhannalcirti's theory of insrrumemality, they spmd far more time on this
way of defining an instrument of knowledge.
At the pricc of moving beyond Ihc usual hislorical limiu or our interpret::Hion. we can al~ rum 10 the opinion of a b,er commentllrnr, Dhn.
motW'::l. In a &shion that is closely rdated (bur nor identical)" to
IJcvtndrabuddhi's imerprecuion, Dharmott:lr.l draws a distinction betv.un
an instrumental cognition as ~ the appearance of the accomplishment or
onc's a.im~ 6lrthaltriy4nirblNIsa) and an inmumen(2l cognition as what
motivates aaion toward an object capable of the accomplishment of one's
:ai m- (4nJ...~ ..." n;" 1".'MrtAlt;t...). He rhen not" th,.t the type or
instrumental cognition '1nalyud by Dh,.nn:alc:ini i$ the I,.(fcr, ror it i, thi.
type of instrumental cognition mat a judiciow person (p"/qAwnt) seeks in
order to anai n his goal, In shon , for Dharmottara as well, Dharmakirti's
primary concern is with establishing the innrumentality or a cognition as
a mcaru to obtain a human aim.'II
Assuming mar such is the case, let w now examine a few issua that
becomc evident when onc dehn~ the insuumen r::a.li ty o r cognition in lerms
of human ai ms, especially as presented in Devendrabuddhi's interpretation
of PVl.l-6.

",,""ltriJt1

95 5 N;If;lIlomi (1 ~7-68:!9) ~ Slrinkdlnn (' 971:.81, n.9).

96 O/wmom.ra!loa; lICK appear 10 xupc DrwndDbuddhi',

IICKion of J mediufll dim: in

anrofhi. manr wrilinp on inanuncnuJify (~e.. NBT, LPP, ~and PVinn.
Ho:tI(e, dlot COIIIIWI he drloWi ~I"'n
rduiw 10 ,"rMiJn1u and mere
~,.;~ a1thou&h panIId 10 D.veDw:abuddhi', approh, is ck:uly lICK lMl:lItle.

'''''"1'''

,., N&T I, .,ft". FOf a nady Idmllalarpimnu In rVinT, _

(1989:16-1.9)

SlrinkdLna and JCn.ua

280

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Instrumentality in Terms ofHuman Aims:

Some Problems and Solutions

As noted above, if an awareness is instrumental in terms of the mediated

effect that is a human aim (puru!iirtha), then it is the primary factor in
activity (pravrtti) toward an entity that is to be attained or avoided. For
Devendrabuddhi, the resulting activity in question is secondarily one's initial activity toward the object; primarily, activity means the "activation"
(pravrtti) of a cognition to which appears the accomplishment of one's aim
(arthakriyiinirbhasa). When an instrumental cognition is construed in terms
of this latter activity, its trustworthiness consists of the fact that it results in
such a cognition. We can refer to this as the "confirmation-model" of
trustworthiness. Devendrabuddhi explains:
A cognition is deemed trustworthy because it does not deceive
people; this includes 98 perception and inference, which have the
characteristic of causing one to obtain ("" priipaka) the intended
object. 99 To comment on that, [Dharmaki:rti] says: "trustworthiness is a cognition of telic function. '100 This means that one has a
cognition of the accomplishing of the aim (artha) that is to be
accomplished by the object (artha) that is determined through
the instrumental cognition. 101

As Devendrabuddhi goes on to explain, the context here is one of action:

one acts on the basis of an initial cognition, i.e., the instrumental cognition,
and one obtains the desired result: a cognition of the accomplishment of the
desired goal by the object of that instrumental cognition. As we shall see in
greater detail below, Devendrabuddhi is at points obliged to abandon this
model. Nevertheless, in many instances, the fact that an initial cognition
results in a cognition of the accomplishment of one's goal by that object is

98 PV-D: khyad par byed pa-> khyab par byed pa (ex.conj.).

99 See parallel Skt. passages in Steinkellner and Krasser (1989:3I).
100 PV2.1bff: arthakriyiisthitip / avisa?pviidanam.

101 PVP(2aI): skyes bu ma bslus pas na mi slu ba ni mngon par 'dod pa'i don dangphrad par

byedpa'i mtshan nyid can gyi mngon sum dang / rjes su dpag pa 'i khyab par byed pa yin no / de
nyid rnam par 'grel pa 'i phyir don byed nus par gnas pa ni / mi slu yin te zhes bya ba smos te /
tshad mas yongs su nges pa 'i don gyis bsgrub par bya ba'i don byed par rtogs pa '0.

INST RUMENTALITY: JUS TIFYI NG THl SOU RCS OF KN O WLEDGE

181

prccisdy what makes that initial cognition instrumental. In other words. the
subsequent cognition in which appears me desired tel k function (i.e., me
accomplishment of one's goal) confirms the trunwonhincss of the initial
awarencu. A3 such, it confirms the fact Ula[ me instrumenal cognition is
-Wt cawes one to obtain" (;r4jH1J:IIJ an object that acco mplishes one's

goal.'"
Thc oonfirmnion_modcl and !'ducd claim) :loom trus(WOrthineu

l~

Devendrabuddhi inw a .series of problems and attempted solutions. We

will now consider a Few of these, first bycxamining [W() general WUC5, and
then by turning to problems that arise in the specific COntcm of ~rc:cprion
and inference. Although many of these problcnu and solutions resurface in
the works of subsequent Buddhist commentators, I wiU restrict m~f to
occuion:.i Icft"mcc o nly to the lub.<omment:u y of~iky:abuddhi.
Dcvt:ndrabuddhi poina to [W() issues that cause trouble fo r the defini
tion of instrumentality in relation to the attainment of a human aim. The
first of these is a disparity in time, that is. a problematic lag in time; the $Ceo
ond concerns the possibility that activity initiated by an insTrumental cognition might be obstructed.
A

DI SPARJTV I PoI

Tu.n.

In our discllSsion of ontology we remarked upon the connection between

momcnwincu and cawal efficiency in Dhannak:ini'. theory of the panicular. To rt:iterate, Dharmaldni maintairu mat paniculars are momentary
because: t) panicu.lars necessarily have the minimal effect of producing a
cognition of themselves; 1) only emicies mat change: may produce effttts;
and ,) by its narur.::, an entity that changes must alwaYl be chanpnS; oth
erwise, mat entity would never change. To this we should add the observation mat, when one is in purs uit of a human aim , one is interested
specifically in puticulan, for only panirulars are cawally efficient; bence,
only mcyan be employed to accompluh one's aim . '~
Thus, in conteXt ofinsttUmcntality in ttm1S ofa human aim, one scda
10 ;a.<;t ;n rcsud 10 momcnuzy puticuLu-s. and the nu.s~rth;ncu of an
instrumental cognition is that it makes one obtain the (die function of the
expected or required paniculars. The problem, ho~, is that in the case of
pclttplion, sina:
objca (r;rihJtl) of pcla:pcion is me panicuJ.u{s) that

me

me

101 See Pvp( ...pJ) tnnob.ecI in elM "!'podi. uwI. hotIow......

10) Set; PVI.1.ID-1II,..;m PVSY .J <it.; uanW.tcd bdow. ) 10.

111

FOUNDATIONS OF D HA.MAKII.TI 'S PHI LOSOP HY

caused it, the object of peiCxpcion has a:ascd at the time mat the perception
occurs, The same applies ro inference, inasmuch as me indirect objccu of
inkrencc:s art: abo partku!us,IM Thus, the crux of the problem is th2t th~
instrumental cognition.t----pt:rc.eption and inference---aIf: meant to be instrumental for 2 hunun :aim beausc: they take:as their direct or indirect objeru
panieulars that art: capable of the n!'!Cnnry tdie functions, But precisdy
bJ,ug th~ p:articulus CUI function in 2 causally efficient ITl2Ilner, they
haY!! ncccsnrily cc:ascd to aist: by the time one has acted upon them.
For Devcndrabuddhi, this problem of.1. rime-I:ag is most acute in the contat of the confirm.1.tion-modd: when one acts upon some initial cognition,
the instrumentality of mat oognition consists of its raulting in 2 cognition
in whkh appears the required tdie function (,1rthtthiyt1"irbh4Sllj, i,e., one in
which appears the accomplishment of one's :aim. As noted prevWusly, the
subsequent, confirming cognition would be the sensation of warmth, for
a:ample, that one has when, having Ittn 2 fitt from 2 dinana, one draws
near to il. On Devendrabuddhi's view, this !)'pC of subsoequent cognilion is
panicularly important, for he d:aims that it establishes [he trunwonhincss
of the firsl, Although we wiU rttWtl [0 this notion of oonfinruuion below,
the foUowing poISS2gt' offers a dear summary ofDevendrabuddhi's position:
For one who acts through being prompted to act by a f.lulry cognition that apprehends something that is not fitt as fitt, a subsequent awareness that has as its object burning and cooking
does not arise. That awareness docs not arise beausc: an aware-ocss in which the expected tdie function .1.ppears is b:ased on a
real thing. If Uur subsequent awvencss docs arise, Ihen the former can only be Itwrwonhy because: I) one obtains a tdie function in accord with one's OIpcaatioN and because 1.) the cause
of just th.1.1 kind of .1.wareness of tdie function is a rea.I thing.
Therefore, if the latter has a re:aI thing as iu object, rnen the former is ttwtwonhy with rtgard to it, '"'

104 Thu. u. Iht 1On:c of Dhannaldrti'l dain Ihal Ihcr-c il only OM iruuumcnw object
(J>V",~-d):

..,.",,.,q'!' 1. .w.,.!fM'L

_ iW"1" UPIqi 1..,1"'''''1'' w / k1"imt1",ullf

'nMr/". J. -rr 1" i yoJ .,." ai ~ ItJiIiwf ~ ~ ... ,.J1" - Ji" '" / ... III ;",.. ,.; ""'
.,." """:fl" ,. j #,. /"" .... JDff"'; liM .. iJ. .... Ji" r / ji Iu, "'''P'' 1'" 'MIl,. kJ,;"
lOS PVPbb)R): _ -'1"~

." ." .".,. . .,.,JI1JIr " " ' . " III tk ...'" oi 'JJ'" ",up" ,. i fhIi, ,. / tk lui,
". JIhp' _ ;",.. ,. i pJ .,." ",oJ:fl" ". / sttp _ '" u ,..; "" ... r.",." _

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIF YING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

18,

Thi_~

:lppm=h rn rmuwon:hinf!U involves rwo cognitions: :In initi:al instrumental c;ognicion , and a subsequent cognition, which is:also instrumental.
In mar latter cognition appem: me tdie function (such as producing heat)
o f me object (such as a fire) :apprehended by m e initi:al instrumental cognition. ~ IUch the latter cognitio n confirms--or even constirutcs--the
trustWOrthiness of me initi:al instrumental cognition.
With mil CIOn t~ in m ind. t::HvO!f\dnbuddhi d~bes the rime-hg ['..mlem as follows:
Someone objccu: - The latter in.s trumental cognition in which
appears the telic funaion of object apprehended by me former
awareness docs nOI cognize me objcci (IlnlNl) t hat was apprehended by the fo rmer. If ch:u if the cue. how can it luve:lS its
object me celie function of an object apprehended. by
former
awareness such that the former awareness is an instrumental cogni tion because it docs nex deceive: one about that tdie funaion?"'"

mat

Dcvendrabuddhi answers:

This is not a problem. lkings engaged in practic:al :action ("1"""-

INrnr)

act on those

objccu without diffe rentiating them.

Henu. in acmrd with such practical action (lIJIlwWarll), we say
beings act o n objccu mat occur in temporal sequence as if
those objccu were a singk thing.'" In re:ality (J1Jf!J1n4 ~),
the former and latter objectS arc distinct. Ho~r , the re:al thing
that ~ the objca: of th e latter instrumental cosni tion would no t
aist if the object of the former instrument:al cognition had not
been existent. H enc.e. we metaphorically say that the latter cognirion has as iu object juSt due object o f me former cognition.
['NO

mat

106 PVP11h4If}: pi ~ InF" mil!' ...j .... ' " ' " 9i "'-' _ ""I:J'" ..... yi.. _ , u ji ltv_ tin 1"'l' 1M wu1" i J,n, ~ , . i 7fd UJf P"I:U IV f u j _ ~1" u ,.. ".; ,u, ... i
fbfo '" '" nNJ _ Ji" YiN ....
1f11 Slkyabuddhi (PVT. "J'"'71b1H) comtnmU that tht formtr and bner ~ an: ddindfterm~
(~ti~

itivdy

..

umc IxaIlK "lhq- ClIIK a OJSIIilion with a

lillJk

imagt;"

em the buR of tbiJ deunnination tht""'lltkl posiu- thtm .. the tanV

ob;ca (ttrrIM). and thil happetu Ixa..uc tht po.itin@:ofan iruuumenw rosnition iI con_Donal [.-...1",n, ""'1"; 'U" W#Ji"1'" pJtJi, p, .......
I"""1a' n"fuj 1Jftnl ~ _u (1m....",,., 111"]1" ~ / 1IhU _ 'i mPlI"" y.,1"

..,-,.,.Jllt7itrit ttl..,..,

,,; ,;", I1t)'t'i (111 W# )'i.. ,. i ,;,,;, .. tlNJ bJu.. 1"" Dw,,.j

284

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was established prior to the cognition in which its telic function appeared,
that initial cognition is instrumental because through it the latter
cognition engages with the telic function (arthakriya}.108
Devendrabuddhi's answer to the time-lag problem does not deny that
such a lag exists: in reality, the object of the instrumental cognition on the
basis of which one initially acts is not the object whose telic function one
experiences as the fruition of one's action. Nevertheless, when beings act to
obtain some human aim, they believe that the former and latter objects are
the same, and beings thus behave accordingly. The crucial outcome of this
answer is that, if the trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition is in at
least some cases constituted by this model involving confirmation by a subsequent cognition, then the determination of an instrumental cognition's
trustworthiness is in fact based upon an error, namely, the false belief that
the object of the instrumental cognition and the object of its confirming
108 Sakyabuddhi (PVT, nyq5b6fl) comments on the last sentence:
Thus, in saying therefore he means: "since the latter instrumental cognition is impossible without the object of the former instrumental cognition." Therefore, since the
real thing toward which one acted was etablished prior-i.e., prior to the latter cognition whose object is the telic function-that initial cognition is instrumental. That is,
since it is the cause of the latter cognition whose object is the telic function, the initial cognition is instrumental, and it is such because it too has a real thing as its object.
Otherwise, if it were to have an unreal thing as its object, it would not be the cause
for that kind of subsequent cognition; he says: because through it that very cognition
engages with the telicfimction. Here, through itmeans "through the initial cognition."
In other words, the initial cognition is instrumental because the initial cognition is
itself the cause of the latter cognition whose object is the telic function. [de'i phyir de

bas na zhes bya ba 'di smos te gang gi phyir tshad ma snga ma 'i yul medpar tshad ma phyi
ma 'i yul mi srid pa de bas na sngar dngos po grub pa 'i phyir te don byed pa 'i yul can gyi
shes pa las sngar yang ngo I dang po nyid tshad ma yin te don byed pa 'i yul can gyi shes
pa phyi ma'i rgyur gyur pa dang po 'i shes pa yang tshad ma yin te de yang dngos po 'i yul
can nyid yin pa 'i phyir ro I de Ita ma yin na ni de dngos po medpa 'i yul can yin na de Ita
bur gyur pa 'i shes pa phyi ma'i rgyu nyid du mi 'gyur ro I de nyid ni de las don byed pa
la Jugpa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba smos tede las zhes bya ba dangpo'i shes pa nyid las tedang
po'i shes pa ni don byed pa 'i yul can gyi shes pa phyi ma'i rgyu nyid yin pa 'i phyir ro zhes
bya ba'i don to Il.
The Tibetan of the passage from Devendtabuddhi (PVP:zb5fl) reads: ma yin te tha snyad 'dogs
pa po dag tha dad pa med par Jug pa 'i phyir tha snyad kyi rjes su 'brangs nas I dus snga phyir
'byung ba can la gcig tu Jug par brjod do I dngos su ni tha dad pa nyid yin no I de ltar na phyis
kyi tshad ma'i yul gyi dngos po ni I tshad ma snga ma'i yut med na med pa'i phyir de yangde'i
yul can nyid yin no zhes nye bar brtags pa yin no I de bas na sngar dngos po grub pa 'i phyir dang
po nyid tshad ma yin de I de las don byed pa la Jug pa 'i phyir roo

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

285

;~ognition are identical. That Devendrabuddhi is willing to accept this

';rtotion suggests that, at least in the context of a human aim, trustworthi~ness concerns the results of actions initiated by instrumental cognitions,
~1Irtd not the exact, isomorphic correspondence of a cognition to reality. We
;shall see that this way of understanding trustworthiness in terms of its
~esults-rather than correspondence-is also applicable to inference.

~hBSTRUCTED ACTION
~ addition to the aforementioned difficulty involving time, a second gen~ra1

problem persists with the notion of instrumentality in terms of a

human aim, and it concerns the identification of an instrumental cognition
"that which makes one obtain" that aim {artha} by virtue of obtaining an
gbject {artha} that accomplishes it. This issue is broached when Devendrabuddhi notes, "Since an instrumental cognition is this or that cognition
~hose trustworthiness has been ascertained, doubtful cognitions and such
~e not instrumental."109 In response, one may ask:
"But since a person may be obstructed in his activity, even an
instrumental cognition may not be trustworthy, and it therefore
would not be instrumental."l1o

d'he objector here believes that, on Dharmakirti's view, what distinguishes

in instrumental cognition from a doubtful cognition is that the former nec~ssarily leads one to an object that can accomplish one's goal; in contrast,
instance of doubt might lead one to that object, but it will not necessarily
~~ so. Devendrabuddhi responds:

in

That trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition does not consist of the fact that one definitely obtains the desired object
{artha} through that instrumental cognition. Instead, it consists
of the fact that one obtains only the desired object through that
instrumental cognition. When one acts,111 the instrumental cog-

;;i.p9 PVP (3aIff):

~tshom za

mi sLu ba de dang de nges pa gang yin pa de ni tshad ma yin pa 'i phyir / the
bat shes pa La sogs pa ni tshad ma ma yin no. Note the typical subject/predicate inver-

:sion in the Tibetan translation.

~UO PVP (Ja2): gaL te skyes bu'i jugpa La yanggagsyodpas / tshad ma yang sLu basridpa'i phyir
tshad ma ma yin no zhe na.
~lll Sakyabuddhi notes (PVT, nyq6bI-2), "By implication one supplies (adhyiihiira): 'In all

1B6

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTr5 PH ILOSOPH Y

nilion is whal makes one obtain the objcci. Thus, an inurumcnal rognilion's insuumcnaliry consins ofia caJNUity to make
one: ob(;lin the: desired objccl, and nOI thai it docs make: one
obtain it. Since JUSt mal capxity is said to be Ihe truslWonhinm
of the: inmumental cognition. there is no problem concerning
obsuucted :taion.'11
As the TIbeta.n translation ofSikyabuddhi's commenwy suggeslS, this
argument amounts to a placemcot of the Sanskrit restrictive particle nNl in
the phruc Ilhhim4tiirtharya pri/Hl!"lM. obtainment of Ihe intcoded aim."
The opponent would have us understand this phmc as Ilhhimatiinhasya
prtipa!fllm n i l, "only the obtainment land not the non-obrainmentl of (he
inlcndcd IInIM. -where anita may be construed as either "aim" or "object:. "'I)
In sho" , if an innrumenr.al cognition's truslWO"hinm consisa of the bet
thai it leads us to the obtainment of the intended objttt or aim. and if that
means that an instrumental cognilion leads only (nIfI) to the obtainment,
then in cases where one's actions are obstructed, the instrumental rognition
in qumion would no longtt be insuumenr.al. In Ihe comat of seeking to
slake my mint, if I have correctly idcolified fresh waltr from a distance
and yet my attempt to tc2Ch it fails, mat petuption would nor be imlrumental because I have fai led to obtain my aim.
Devendrabuddhi's above-citcd aruwtt is 10 place the restriction noc upon
the obtainment, bul upon me objc:ct. From an insuumcntal rognition there
is thus IIhhi""'14n~ pripa!lJlltI, - the obIllinmem of only the intmdcd
IInha land not something dsc}." Iff act on the basis of an instrumental cognition. and if my actions art not OOslructed. I will obtain only the result that
I apcct; if my perctprion of fresh walU was an instrumental cognition,
then the objc:ct I obtain will slake my thirst. The poinl here is to dislinguish
the: imtrume:nDl cognition from a doubtful cognition, for even if such a
cognition may lead me: to what I apcct in $Orne: ClSC5, in othe:r casc:s it will
not do so: in some: ~ a doubtful perception might lead me: 10 wate:r, but

aKI

when Of>( is I><K obMruacd.. [..... r.J tI. PI' I>]tJ ". 'j '17"' - " ...

rhn.,.

..... - a,."" .....

"t" f'D MJ,. j " If ""I pImuI,. If; _ Jilf IW 1 ; ... n
p" ,;" ... 1M U "'''P'' 1M 'J.JJI4 wpJ4."lfhuJ,. Ji,. ... I M,.,.J ... ohM - fh-I
I'D I>]tJ JI4 ..,;JJilf ,. M Wr ... ~ I'D - JI4 ohM - ..,uIJi. 0' fhuJ ,. tt]iJ ,.i yilf ... I ."',. M",.. iii;"'; do. Np,.,.. lwjM,.i pJtyi, sJr,.,. ~,. _ yi,. _
112 PVP {)a.I.fO: M If; nlNJ _

II J 5

PVf, "J""7'a7ft

INSTRUM ENTALITY: JUSTIFYING T H E SOURCES OF KN OWLEDGE

1.117

in orner ca.so: I will find only th~ hO( sand of a mirage. In short. what distinguishes an instrummtal cognilion is not that it n('('N S1 ri1y leads one to
me result, but ramer trun it has me ~"parilJ to lad one to mat rault if all
omer conditions are: in platt.
An. important outcome of the definition of insftum~n taliry in terms of
capacity is dlllt it amounts to a rejection of Devendrabuddhi's earlier confirmalion-model- of trusrworthiness in mt'! m nrar nf a human aim. Tn
reiterate, me confirmation-model is: with some goal in mind, one h:as an
instrumental cognition of an object thai has the capacity to fulfill mal goal;
one implements the means ro obtain that object, and one Ihm has a cognition of the fulfillment of one's goal. On this mood, the trustwOrthiness
of that initial inn rumenw cognition consists of Ihe fact thaI it leads to
anothr:r innrum~t:al cognitinn whmr m ntetlf i. rht'! ~i roi fdie runction.
i.e. the ach i~menl of one's goal BUI if trustwOrthiness is redefined in
terms of capacity, then the production of thal rubsequt:nt, confirming cognition is irrdevanl to nustworthiness.
Why does Devendrabuddhi find himself in such a muddle? Cenainly,
part of wh.at aplains this tension is limply mal Dcvendrabuddhi h:as
b:adct'!tl hinudfinm rhecoOW'!". ~dr:1lbuddhi 's ~nition of an instrumenw cognition in lerms JUSt of the ~1l"'L.'ilJ to result in the aehievC'm~",
of one's goal comes after his initial presenation of the confirmation-modd,
and it IIrikcs me :as an attempt to avoid a claim made in Ihat conlat:
namdy, thai a trustworthy cognition acru.aJJy thn lead one 10 accomplish
one's aim.'" BUI although the move to mctt capacity is a aaKal rettcat in
hiJ argumenl, for our purposes it serves 10 highlight another, implicil :aspect
ofDev.endnbuddhi'. accou nr. n2lTlCi y the bipanit" norio n of extrilUic and
intrinsic instrumentality. To see how mis is the case. let w now rum 10
Devcndrabuddhi's discussion of me confirmation of the inslrum~tality
of perception.
Pt:rUpWJ" "lUi u".firmtltN"

In his commentary on Dharmaltini', presemation of insrrumenality in

PVl.I-6, Devendrabuddhi devotes considerable effOrt to the analysis of
perception, probably because the issUC$ surrounding perception prove the
most probknllltic. One major difficulty is accounting for the: observed dubiety of perception-the faa that we cannot always determine what it iJ thai
114 5 his inilial aQ:OUnl of confirmation 0 1", abo~. :tJo.

188

FOUNDATI ONS OF DHAkM AKIRTI'S PH I LOSOPH Y

we are lensing-and the consequent nero for confirmation. This mue

begins with a passage that we have already cited:

Something is trusrworthy if it does not dC'CC'ive people. This

includes'" both pcrception and infcrmce. both of which arc what
CiUJC one to obtain CtmipU6) the desired objt. (."';"'). To a>mment on that. IDh.armalclniJ says: -tnutworthiltaJ is. t:tIK1'iliolt
of "fir fonrtiolt. ~This means that one has a cognition of the
accomplishing of one's aim by the object (art;") that one has
definitively determined through the insuumenral cognidon.1Mo
~

we have nored. Dcvcndrabuddhi here presenu a notion of trwrworthiness (and hence. of an insttumcnral cognition) that f.t[ls within the context
of a human aim. This becomes clear when. immediately after the above
Sllltemcm, Devendrabuddhi clarifies his point in a pas5:lgc that concerns
anions that arc inirially motivated by perceptions:
For example, for the person who. having cognized a fire through
PClUprion, then actS (j~r ptt) on fire',1II capaciry to bum. rook
and 50 on. there is the activation of a pclccprion whose ob;ca is
the sensation of w:ltmth and such. Or, for aampk. on ccnain
oc:x:asions there might be a cognitive error due 10 something which
has a form similar.o fire and so on; at that rime, there is for tha.
person the aaivarion of an inference through smoke which definitively determines the firc..(Dcpmding on the motal, one of thcst:
twO-{hc engagement of a subsc'Quent pcn:cprion or infttenoeconfirmsl the tn&$lWOnhincss of a pciOepcton.n. lkawe various
causes of error ate possible in the case only of pcrcc:ptton, it is
known to be instrumenral through the activation of a 5UbscqUCOI
if\$trulllCnral cognition thai h.a.s as iu objca that thing's (.rtIM)
1: __
'It
IeIIC runctlon ....
li S PV-D: ~,.,."..,. ->

116 Fat
117

fthJ-,,.r~,.

(4tMj.).

Tibru.n , Itt .bof, n.IOI.

_ - >_

I' (atfIfjJ.

118 Sikyabuddhi (PVT, .,.-:]1b1) mUa it dear dut

talifJ of ptJupcion.
119 PVP (u.pJ):ji fur ",,,,"IIl,,, oiI,J,n

tho. P'lUS" OOhCOh, the iruuumcn-

__ i trrt" *.., 1 'nINJ,. J. ,.",.1 ..1U,.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KN OWLEDGE

119

In thiJ puugt!. n.:v.. ndr::ahuddhi .q-.r:alu nf rwn C25l'!l involving :action thu
is motiv:atcd by an initW petceptton tim requires confirm:ation. In the fin;(
c:ase, :an initial perttption of an object capable of the desired tdie functi on
motiv:ates one to :act tow:ard th:at object. For enmple, one perceives wh:at
one believes to be:a fire , :and intent upon obtaining he:u , one walks toward
th:at fire. In this first c:ase, th:at :action results in the :acrir.ltion (prlllJ!fti) of
:I poerC\'f'tion wh~ conr<ml ;1 t~ de<i~ l..Ji.: h,nt:fion, ont' l':Wf'Hi/':n~
heat. In me second c:ase, one is also prompted to act by a pera ption, but
one's action results in:a perception ch:at is not definitive: per~ps one only
draws close enough 10 perceive a color th:at might be II fi re, but might also
be a brilliant dump of flowers. On the view of DharmaIoni :and Devendrabuddhi, in this second case the perception following upon the :action is
urable to produce:an immediately subsequent definitiw determin:ltion or
correct perceptual judgment (prllty4/q11P."l.thlllAbJhanikllJll) of the object as
havi ng the desired telie function. UI In this latter case, the initial perception
mWl be confirmed. by m inferellCC.
The key here is that, regardless of whether the initial, motiv:ning peroeprion is confirmed. by a subsequent perception or:a subsequent inferena ,
that initial pc:rcoeprion cannot in and ofiuelf guar::amee th,u one will att:l;n
one's goal. In shon , that initw pe:rctption does not enable one to determine whether the content of that perceplion is something (such as fi re)
capable of the: desired tdic function (such as heat). Ncvenhdess, it is crucial to note that Dcvendrabuddhi does not wish (0 claim m:at such a perception cannOt be instrumental. Instead, accord ing (0 Dcvendrabuddhi
and the sub-commenra[or Sikyabuddhi, when one acts on the basis of
,ue:h a pe:rce:ption and one: then auai n$ an o bject with the de$ired or
expcctro [die function , m..t initial perception was insuumental; one was
simply unable [0 determine the instrumentality of dut perception :at (he
time of the perception. III
To llCCOUnt for these cases and preserve Ihe inslrumentality of such pe:r-

J",u.",,,,,,,,
t. ,..';pJ r"" or "'''P'''''''' """I fllji
_ W]iJ t. ........ ,.. "'.......,. ,. t. ..,.,.. i. 'r.m, r;U
i .. .. 1M

t. k,..

f'

fur

p 'rhit ti aM

iImJ,.
-1tflS ,., "'" ,.;
'in ,.. ..,,. j i"l'" "'; J.. '" Ji" ... / ","P' ' '"'" ..y;4 t.
j YD" ,,,,, nMrr ,. ..yUI
*fo J.. '" .nJ ,. i !hJirJ, i .... 0' u .. b]t.J,. j pJ Col" gj I1h.J "'" !hJi "'" PI'" aJ..J
"",,,,oJ tI.. ,.,.."" "" .... See also PVT ( ..,...7 )b.if) uanamd ;n W: approdix.

7thnJ,..

120 For

me rd..liowh;p ~ ,, n ,roll]oliqq!y",WJhttNk.,. i&IId ;nstrumulI:lli()', I PVP

u.~FJ) . d~-d

beIo-. ' 91

12 1 Sft PVP (s.aVf) and PVT (")".7 6n- )).

190

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRT I'S PHI LO SO PH Y

cq>tions. ~end rabuddhi proposes that instrumentality in this conteJ:t be

confi r m~ by a subsequent instrumental cosn ition ~ pccificall y. an
instrumental cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's goal.
or more simply mnsl at~. one in which the des.ir~ relic funaion appears.
A1 not~ JUSt above, that su~uent instrumental cognition will be either
another perception (such as rhe KfIurion of the fire's warmth) or an infer
ence (such as the: inferential cognition of the firc from its smoke). If one actS
and one Ius an innrum... ntal cognition in which th ... desired rdic function
appears. then the initial p..-~ptjon th:lt prompt~ action W25 instrum ... ntal. On the other hand. if one experi... nces no such confirm ing cognitionwhether perceptual or inf... rential-then one cannO( cb.im mat the initial
p..-~ption was innrumental.III
On... key point h... rc is that. if the instrumentality of that initial poception i.s (0 be co nfirm~ by a subsequ...nr p..-tcq)tion. th:u subsequent perception must itself not require further confitmation; otherwisc:. one would
f.all into an infinir... regJcss.'1:I One cannot wonder. fur cumple, whether one
i.s fedi ng warmth from he fire or ' imply experiencing hI)( Rashes. ThiJ distinction berwttn a perception that r..-quires confirmation and on ... mat
doc.s not require confirmation is fcwgni7:ed by Devcndrabuddhi. but
Silcy.abuddhi fenders it more explicit. Sikrabuddhi fim focuses upon this
distinction by noting that lXv..-ndnbuddhi's argument concerning confir
mation implies that, in it l..-ast some cues, activity is ptompted not by an
unconfirmed percepcion, but by o~ that is sclf-confirming. Sikyabuddhi
remarks:

Activity tlUt is Ixu..-d on pe:rttption is 1W0fuld: initial and habitual. One has dear and habitual perception of those things to
which one is habituated. When that pnception arises, it arises
dctamining its image in accord with O~'J habitU2tion in a manner that avoids all causes for error. And that awareness producu
a subs..-quent verifying aw.ueness of that kind: hence, the person
am on that objm. Therefore, in that c:ase the awareness itself
determines its own instrumentali),. Since it does not depend on
In Noce llul I un noc deaJin& hen: wilb dw:qlUllion <lit- ~n inflrmnoflm frum......,
could be. qnilion "in which a.p~m Ihe accomplUhtlM'nt of OM', aim" (",.,;,.m~.
IIirMJ.).
1 23~; ............. 0-..0 ~ p<>in.. ;n ....,d~ _ ....Ii............ (_, ....

PVr. II;"'.7)~ff).

'

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYING HIE SO URCES OF KNOWLEDGE

19 1

the activity of lOme su~uent inmumenw cognition, it is not

inappropriate to say. Mdet:ermines the object .. .. "'m h is nOi me
case m at all perceptions are determi ned to be insttumenw
mrough something e1.se, In the CI5C of acting due to an initial
perttption (Le. one which does not involve IubiruationJ, if one
has not definitively apprehended the objeds identity ('1J'I
mtlhtt" .. nimina), '~ one actS OUt of doubt,'

12-4 ~i Me rekn ro PVin 1.1, ciled~. l S6,

125 The "definirivf; ~nsion or lilt object'. idallhy" ('lI'"' ",. ." "'",.., p"f iw)
appan '0 ~ ~ Ilr.Uguforward ,d;",,, .0 !he Abhi<.llufm.ic definilion of ..'!"iU ill
*.JJ.!fII. T'hc lerm ";,,,jrw in Inis ClOmCllI U .:mICtima {f'llJu.!atcd ill "cfutinl"ishin,
.....n..."bu. 'j,dc..n.y- ......;c. _ <k-.....r ohc .-.... of ohc ....."""'-1 ~";..d ....re. 1\ oypic:aI,telunm, appan in AK 14C;r,-d and AKBt. d n., (" ,sR):

If."';'"

Rn.pjrWr! ill, 1IlIlIi" dN -p~. #{thu/Jjf"i iMroti'J (,u".;rw). 1lu.1 is, KWfi'
nilion ia the appnbcnaion of an ob;.a ,.. blue or Jdlow, Ion&: or.bon, WOITWl or
man , friend or tnany, pkasanl or u.npkaanl (~and.o on.. [..",U ";"",,...
r.JM~iH [, ..., -d[ ,.."" u.,iuuli~""""",;"",,,.~~~

t/i,,;"'iItMItr_!W"' ..... "",!,j~~ .

"'''''''''''l''!"

1261'V1' t"Y7:ta6ft), 1trJM,.. "',.,.""'111", nm U tI tI' y..,,..

wilt"",.
.,oJ-J.,...._ ,. r... _ I J" J...- ,. -J.", IJ.. ,. ~~",.. J. .hi" ......_ ,. pJ k
,.." oi "'''r'' no". ~ ,.. _ ji /u k 1Izhi" J" p..u ,., _ ~ lJJnJ,.; """' ",tJWr.
~"I''' Of , -Dis1''''' '" kM/ _ sk]r k..", 1J" /u "" 0"'''';# "",,,, .. j rttn
, . .,., .".,. 'i ~, J" ,.
h j ",,., llyN M I J" j ~, J" ,. Of"l "JiJ t;,f ,.J",J
-1tftl,.,i'}J" J #~1tJi

nJ-I ...

niWt IIfj

k,,.,.
u.,.
P" ... / ..",.. '''..

,.w14~."~,,,. i ~, _

rhuu - ' " j pIM" 1M

,.IMJ
Ji .... 1,ultf,..,;J 11ft ;..,,. PltfJi" " IM"}II", 'lI'"'
"'..,..,. .,...14' P"f k """,. tsIH .. IfJiJ .,. -'P _ y",,., .". M 1
CD.rlln.:nli", on the DOUO" dul. penon who aas on an i",uummw mgmuon .. ,II4i'
ciovs, and thar am", OUI of daub! would noc br judicious., S1kyabuOdhi alto IIOICI (PVT.
".. It. j '

'# MJ,. ...

-.,...,.,:zIwc,. - *

, . . " 1M juJ _

"J'I"71bUf):

"If one ia aaillJ 001 of doubi, how is;1 COl,eo 10

Ay

,Iw plpk who do .o are 'judi-

(ious' ~!*,.,.um"J.'

A penon who inYCSIiptCI dw AlUIrioft bdOn aain, is noc. prnon ....... am JUS! DUr of. dcfini~ Mtminarion [.... cmainry: .,...
,. rUI,.,..!. n .... tt-.. _ r-o c.o_....t.ic:h ODfftpd one to o.n, doubt ohou....
object (.m..)and the dd.... i';~ ck"" "'i .....ion of an object (.,.,;,.). I ~I)' alto has
!'NO aUKS: daub! due t:hcK is no ttnIM (_ ,.w,.J and definirive dccmnination tNl
~ is no objea (.......). A penon who XII .... I of the 6.. !'NO QUM:I and. penon
who doa nor.a oul of tIK KCOnd!'NO is ..""1 the world mcaJU: by ~ i,,,Jiriou, per_
JOn. Ir actin, wilboul defini,;~ cktennirwion is JO unWU&i, then il would ~ CDRrradia....,. for fatmen to work in !be (.doh and JO on, for they havoe no ilUlrwDmw
oosnition whid! tu. ddinimdy cktennincd dw:ir IUR.ln:: ...ne.1 and -..en will srow. fr/
Whal is dlt ClORlradiaion

~ ......... ' " If" - J-t.,. fl" - ft lui, ""f" "'P" "" ...., H ~." Utn ",. 'Ji ,. 'pi'" ri ,-J 1pltf ih. - "f"I ,. i 'P . . ;..,,., 0-'" .,u ..,,. "'l""

191

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKI RTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

Siky2buddhi's point here is rhar not all actions butd upon perttprions are
tentative, for in some cases one's action is ~habitual ~ ("bhjNis4lN1ti), in me
sense thar the one has undergone Mhabituation M or conditioning M
(.bhytIu). In such cases, one's perctption is able to Mdet'ermine its image,M
which means that the perctption itself is capable of directly producing a
subsequent correct judgment that can guide one's actionY1 Somrone
might, for ewnple, become sufficiently familiar with the fire-like flower
that she can easily distinguish fires from a d ump of such flowers, and she
is thus able to determine without hC$itation that the enti ty on the far side
of the field is indd a fi re.
Sakyabuddhi later goes on to specify that this distinction amounts to one
between petuptions that have intrinsic instrumentality (lWub pr4m1i!'JAm)
and amnsic instrumentality (pttrtlltll; prlmJ!'J'Zm), He comments;
Hena:, a percq>tion whose object is ca.pable of accomplishing
an aim (1011M), sina: it is devoid of any causes of error, is ascertained r,-"fI III bcJUi 14" pllriahi"lIA) by reflexive awareness as
being by nature insuumenta.!. It produces a correct judgment of
that objea: in aa:o rd with the way that it was aKertained. H ence,

fu,,..,

i .. ...'" N ..... ".., ]i..... 1tk

k ~ iJtJ,. '" ... '" ~ ..... N .."' ....
"'",...,., '17" ".."',. p]iI Ji- ... J1Mr,. JUt """ twJ ,. '" u" nh.", U N
J "-..N ~ 1tft1,.pyis ...... ]i.. ,.. , .
1t]i 'l)W pyU ftrU k,."

"1tf

",..,.,,..,uJ
9U 1Mf,., ;po,

Dw' N p1JfJi.. ,.....,,.,., MM,. pfo

N p1Jf';' J '" ,.; ".,
, . utpII i .. -r N .... Ji.. 1M' j~ ".." ... "'iM M Jpi ... "'" ,. ,.,w 1t]i 'P - k
,., iJtJ,., Dw' N "t' ..oJNo]i" 1U J;, .....i zhi1tfJ "',.,.,,. zhi", "'''''''' '"
kIM iJtJ,. p1Nr p, .... ..,"'".., ."",.;)'" '" ""',. p,. '"
~,.;

"tn'"

nNJ ".., ~,. ".., ]i.. ,.,.j,

127 ~ (PVT, 9"-7-tbUfl nocct:

I .. ,M.-..-.-tn [och) cua of pcrccpion--ladU", habilUJ.OOn, w capmmu
(",dJ.,., N J.rlMw) U noc cku. 10 IIx panicIIIu idenutY (~,., .w,.) of me
objl is IlOI dcfinilivtly cklmniMd; Ibil apWru the aK wncn one: il initially
prompied loaa [uoppoKd 10 habit\latnl aaion.o IoI:c ~J, AI tNlUmc, OM aIao
.:u OUI of doub!. By implicaDon mis IWCI W.I if, d~ 10 iI.:IbilUOllion, OM ckhnitiwly
appehmdJ (.,,.,,P"f ~!he panicuIu identity. e-om paotption docs nor Ikpcnd
I,lpoD !he n\~1 of a sub.cq\ln\1 awumca, 1pooJ,. - ',.,
N pi N

-'-t

,.;0

j..,,.,

JlbJir ItI.,.J,., "l'" ,. twJ,.".. ... 1 'Jis ..i ..,.,,. ..,..1t]i

iJtJ
pM _ " MIIII M I J, 'i nJ...
oil A::-t kIM'''''' M JP"'I" Ie A::-t

, . __, . j'

* ....

~ "'"~,....,~ .. ~ .... ,.,... J,yJ ..J-I_ i

,. "..,]i.. ,. ziN1 .....
~,.,
~,

oU

Dw'"

M'" J.. ""'r" _,..., J_

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

293

it is intrinsically instrumental, and therefore, there is no infinite

regress. 128
Sakyabuddhi'sargument stems from a particular concern: namely, that
no infinite regress ensue in Devendrabuddhi's notion of confirmation.
'Clearly, part of his concern focuses upon confirmation through percep'non, since if a subsequent perception is to confirm an initial perception,
:that subsequent perception obviously must be self-confirming.
, But Sakyabuddhi is also concerned with inference, such as the cogni:cion of fire from smoke, where the cognition of the evidence (smoke) is a
?perception whose certainty could be called into question. While Dharma'/drti himself maintains that the evidence may be ascertained through infer:~nce, 129 if no form of perception were self-confirming (i.e., intrinsically
(instrumental), then in no case could one ever establish one's evidence
ithrough perception. That is, one could not appeal to one's indubitable per~eption of smoke when inferring fire from smoke, for one could always ask,
~.How do you know that you are seeing smoke?" Sakyabuddhi apparently
~els that this would lead to an insurmountable infinite regress in Dharma~:rri' s system, and his discussion of intrinsically instrumental perception is
~Rpart meant to prevent any such problem. 130
Having presented this notion of an intrinsically instrumental percepP

~B PVT (nye:y5a6ff): de 'i phyir don byedpar nus pa 'i yul can gyi mngon sum ni 'khrul pa'i rgyu
'fitshan medpa'i phyir tshad ma nyid kyi bdag nyid du gyur pas rang rigpas yongs su beadpa yin
,'ii}lji Itar yongs su bead pa bzhin du de la nges par skyed par byed pa de Itar na rang nyid kyis
~d ma yin pa de 'i phyir thug pa med pa ma yin no.
:~~,

;U9 See HB (2*.13-14): tatra pak!adharmasya sadhyadharmiIJi pratyak!ato 'numanato va prasid'i!r~r nifcayab, yatha pradefe dhumasya ....

~~~ Sakyabuddhi addresses this problem earlier in the argument (PVT, nye:y3b6ff) by rais~ti1m objection in the context of inferring fire from smoke:
'~s

it not the case that, if smoke is apprehended through perception, then since there
are causes for error, the evidence will not be definitively determined? That is, there are
:#Ie causes for error that prompt one to wonder, "Is this a thing that has the appearance of smoke but is actually magically created by a yogin? Or is it coming from a ter:mite tower?" [du ba mngon sumgyis gzung ba na de la yang 'khrul pa'i rgyu yodpa'i phyir

!tags nges pa nyid medpa ma yin nam I de Itar na ci 'di ni rnal 'byor pas sprulpa'i du ba'i
t;tam pa 'i dngos po 'am lei brgya byin gyi spyi bo las byung ba yin zhes 'khrul pa 'i rgyu yod
710 zhe na IJ.
buddhi goes on (nyt,:? 4aIff) to argue that this is not a problem since the evidence can
lImed by a perception that is "fully habituated" (shin tu goms pa), i.e., one that is
... sicaIly instrumental.

19-i

fOUNDATIO NS OF D HARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

tion, Sakyabuddhi goes on to conrl'Ul it wiln one tnal is extrinsically

instrumental. Gting whal appears to be the asc of confusi ng the shimmer
of a dimm fire for a pool of warer, he conrinUCI me passage jusr cited.:
One might nor, hov.-cvcr, be habimarcd to an initial awareness
with d'IC appear-.1nce of Arc or w:uer: in that asc, tMt awucness
docs nOI have Ihe capacity 10 produce a definitive determination
bcc:ausc, even Ihough that fire or W:ller has been apprehended by
an indepcndem (roll'll rouJ- lWltllnlr4) instrumental cognition,
there arc causes that inducc errors [which pm-em such a ddinitivc determination] . In that case, that initial awareness is established to be ;ns(Tumental by Ihe engagement of a sulcquent
iiUtrumental cognition. Hena . il is extrinsically insrtumenw .
Howcycr, if onc has an awareness that involvCl Mbituation and
darity, then iu insuumcnality if determined from iuclf ('4"l1m
Jl'Ittaj1), as was aplaincd abovc:.'" In Ihis w:ay, it remains Ihe
casc Ihal perception is instrumental in some cases intrinsically
and in somc cases a triiUica.lly.... ').I
Whal is il Ihal distinguishes an intrinsica.lly instrumental perception
from one that is arrinsica.lly instrumenal ~ II is me capacity [0 prod~
without any addiliorW condilions--a definitive dnermination of the object
in question. Sikyahuddhi docs not go beyond ~ndr.lbuddhi 'l specifie
statement:

fA perceptionl ... is a5$CT1ed to be instrumental conccrning that

objective aspect (bunl N '; nil'" p4 a r;rihyiU'4) with regard
to which it produces a definitive determination bc:causc it causes
action toward that aspc:ct. II is nor insuu mema.l with rcg:a.rd 10
any orher aspect. Even Ihough there is no difference in lemu of
being experienced, there is the ddl nitivc determination of thaI

131 Namdy. PVr, "JI"1sa6K. ci ted;we~.

131 PVT (""'-:1S-7ffi:

iJi

Jmrr,.'
_""ltfm.t /.Mill N i ';"" "JI'''fP'''",..vi,. "",...,
9U
.i:J.nt WnJ,. ;
,-J,. i ,.,.,. ...., ,.

~
rJ.J - .,.. Pili "" ~"
~,. ; "'" ,. ".,J, . '" ... ",, / '" t.

'rf'I . . . .

,;,,;s iJi tslMtI_ k,., tJI.i _

,.,
~ ,..1
tk bn "" pIMa ltu tslMtI_ "" ,. / tk JI''''
,..- .... ""'Y..p.I .
'-P"F J...J ,..-Iu ... ..
yi.. .,

"""f F-" I.f "'-' - '"' ..

/.J,;"J

",wI tI_ ....,'"

pr!U , . ,-J ri"f pi ...

I ....... ';I.' " - .......... _

t." "w.

,.; .......

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

295

aspect for which there are the causes of definitive determination,

such as interest, habituation, context and so on. What requires
the mediation of other conditions is not determined. 133
Although Devendrabuddhi is here discussing the more particular case
of determining the instrumentality of an awareness from reflexive awareness, Sakyabuddhi understands this observation to be more generally applicable: a perception is instrumental specifically with regard to that aspect of
its object for which it can produce a specific kind of correct perceptual
judgment, namely, an immediately subsequent definitive determination

(pratyakJaPrfthalabdhanifcaya).
We have already discussed the notion of definitive determination (nifcaya); in the context of perception, it is the conceptual cognition following
upon a perception that interprets the content of that perception, which is
necessarily nonconceptual and thus indeterminate. According to Dharmaldrti, a perception may be capable of generating a subsequent definitive
determination of some aspects of its object, but not of all aspects. One
might, for example, be able to determinate that one is seeing a water-jug,
but one may not be able to determine, on the basis of that perception alone,
that the water-jug is momentary (kJa1Jika). As noted earlier and as Devendrabuddhi remarks here, whether one determines one or another aspect of
an object depends upon numerous factors, including the perceptual acuity
of the perceiver. 134
Drawing out the implications of Dharmakirti's theory of definitive determination, Devendrabuddhi applies it to the instrumentality of perception
in the aforementioned fashion. And expanding on Devendrabuddhi's analysis, Sakyabuddhi applies the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction: for a person who
is seeking warmth, for example, a perception of fire that is intrinsically
instrumental is one that can produce an immediately subsequent definitive
determination of its object as "fire" or as a "heat source," and so on. A perception that is extrinsically instrumental cannot do so, and if its instrumentality is to be determined, one must depend upon confirmation by
some later instrumental cognition.

133 PVP (5a5): ... bzung ba'i rnam pa gangyin pa dag fa yang nges pa skyed par byed pa de fa
/ Jugpar byedpa 'i phyir tshad ma nyid du 'dod kyi / gzhan du ni ma yin no / mthong ba las khyad
par med na yang / rnam pa gang don du gnyer ba dang / goms pa dang skabs fa sogs pa nges pa 'i
rgyu yod na de nges pa yin gyi / gzhan chod pa ni ma yin no.
134 See chapter 3 (n. 59).

296

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

And what of inference? Is it too sometimes instrumental intrinsically,

and sometimes extrinsically? Continuing a passage that we cited earlier,135
Devendrabuddhi notes:
Because various causes of error in the case only of perception are
possible, it is [sometimes] known to be instrumental through
the activation of a subsequent instrumental cognition that has as
its object that thing's (artha) telic function; this is not the case
with inference. That is, a property-svabhava used as an inferential sign and an effect used as an inferential sign are restricted to
being the property-svabhava of the real thing in question and
the effect of the real thing in question, respectively, and only
they [i.e., a property-svabhava and an effect] are the causes for the
respective sign-awareness. Hence, if that kind of thing [i.e., a
property-svabhava or effect] is absent, there is no inference.
Therefore, inference does not rely on the engagement of a subsequent instrumental cognition. 136
Unlike perception, inference is always intrinsically instrumental, and
its instrumentality stems directly from the svabhavapratibandha, the invariable relation between the evidence and the predicate to be proven (sadhya).
The svabhavapratibandha guarantees the presence of a predicate with a
specific kind of nature, precisely because, if the predicate (or the subject
that possesses that predicate) did not have that nature, the evidence could
not have the nature that it is determined to have. Smoke, for example,
can have the nature of smoke only if it has been produced by fire; a maple
can be a maple only if it is a tree. 137 Thus, the dubiety that is possible in
perception can never apply to inference, for if an inference is well-formed,
it is indubitable.
To dose this section, let us now see how this bipartite approach to instru-

135 I.e., PVP (2aIfi). See above, 280.

l36 PVP (2a{fi): mngon sum nyid fa 'khrulpa'i rgyu sna tshogs pa nyid kyis slu basridpa'iphyir
de'i don gyi don byed pa'i yul can gyi tshad ma phyi ma Jugpas tshad ma nyid du rtogs par byat
I rjes su dpagpa la ni ma yin no I de Itar de'i rang bzhin can nam I 'bms bu'i rtags dngos po'i
rang bzhin nyid dang I dngos po 'i 'bras bu nyid du nges pa ni rtags can gyi shes pa 'i rgyu yin pas
na I de Ita bur gyur ba'i dngos po medpar rjes su dpag pa yod pa ma yin pa 'i phyir Iphyis kyi tshad
ma'i Jugpa fa Itos pa ma yin no.
137 See above, chapter 3.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTI FYIN G THE SOURCES OF KNOW LEDGE

297

memaiity-as intrinsic and (Xtri nsK:- rclates to the "muddle- th.:1.( closed
the previous section. There, we noted that rHvendrabuddhi begins by
claiming mat, in the como:t of a mediated instrumental efft. an instrumental cognition is "what makes one obtain" (prlipUllJ an object with th~
desired tdie function, and that the fact of obtaining such an object connirutes the instrumental cognition 's tNSt"N'Orthiness. But toward the ~nd of
his arpment he must account for the possibility of obsnuat'd :action. and
he is thus obligM to reddlne instrumentality simply in tttnu of an inurum~ntal cognition's ClfJ'iUi1J to make one obtain one's goal (i.e., an object
with th~ desired tdic function).
We can ICC this tension Ixrween actual and potencial obtainment of one's
aim as paralld to the division ~n extrinsic and imnnsic instrum~n
tality. Specifically. for an extrinsially instrumental perception (0 be known
as insuumental, it musl 3Ctually lead to the accomplishment of one's aim ,
whe:rc this is defint'd as a cognition in which appears the desired telie function. This is 50 txau.sc: when a cognition's instrumentality is exninsic, it
rc:quires confirmuion by a subsequent instrumental cognition whose con
tent is the desired (elK: function , which is the same as saying thai the confirmation requires mat one actually obllli n one', aim.
In contrasl to the CISe of cxtriruic illSTnimenuliry, a cognit}on who$("
instrumentality is intrinsic requires no substquent confirmation, and mis
amouna to the claim that the cognition is inmumcm:a1 even if one's aim is
not: aaually obnincd. This notion oorresponds to the charact:eriz.u ion of
instrumentality as the cognition's capacity 00 make one: obain one's aim
(i.e., ia capacity to lead one to a cognition of an object with the desired ~Iie
limo;","). If Om' urv:ierl'l':IodJ lM rerm C1 pacity~ (/A},';) to include cua
where the goa1 is actually raliz.ed, one can inttfpm such a cognition as me
trivial case of a cognition that contains the appearance of the desired telic
function (IlrtJmhi]dllirbh4sJlJ, since th:tt ap pearance is c:quinlent to the
obtainment of one's aim. But mo~ inte:restingly. such a cognition can also
be understood as one that, even though it does not dirt:ly contain an
"Pf>e1r:m~ of the deircd tdie fi.mCtion. noevcnhelen is indubiubk :about ito:
object', capacity for that [elic function. Although ~buddhi poina O UI
that 5Om(: ascs of ~tion fall into mu category, [)(:vendrabuddhi places
particular SU'CS$ upon inference as intrinsically instrumental. For as we have
ICCn, a we'll-formed inference must be bucd upon a JlIIlbh4~'ilpr4tibandJu,
pmaining bctwttn cvU:knce and prtd.icate. Sincc mat relation guarantees
rru.t me encity inft'llcd h.n:a CftUin type of IU.ture, it Iilcewise guv:mcc ch:i.r
that entity is capable: of sptt:ific telic funaioru; this 50 because tdie funct}on

298

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

rests upon an entity's causal characteristics, and "nature" (svabhava) is a way

of referring to the totality of those characteristics.
There are, however, certain problems with the instrumentality of inference, but before we consider them, let us examine one more topic under the
rubric of perception: namely, the notion of perception as motivating action.
PERCEPTION AS MOTIVATOR (PRAVARTAKA):
THE QUESTION OF NOVELTY

We have already mentioned the notion of the correct perceptual judgment

that Dharmakirti calls a "subsequent definitive determination immediately
following upon a perception" (pratyak!aPr!.thalabdhanifcaya). A key question, however, has yet to be raised: why is this theory introduced? The
answer lies in a tension within Dharmakirti's philosophy: on the one hand,
perception is necessarily nonconceptual, which is to say that it is indeterminate: it cannot determine its object as being "fire" or "water" or any
other entity. Dharmakirti shows no willingness to relinquish this point,
and on my view, he is in part motivated by a concern that I have cast as "axiological." Although Dharmakirti does not put the problem in this fashion,
if perception were determinate, then universals would be ultimately real
because universals would be the content of determinate perception, and
perception apprehends what is ultimately existent. And if universals were
real, then the arguments employed to refute them would be incorrect.
These same arguments are employed against the self (atman), a distributed
entity that can be considered a special case of a universal. 138 Hence, if the
arguments against universals are incorrect, the arguments against the self are
incorrect. Thus, since Dharmakirti's soteriology rests finally upon the negation of the self, his soteriology would be contradicted by the introduction
of determinate perception. 139
On the other hand, if perception is to initiate one's actions toward the
accomplishment of a human aim, then it should be determinate: if one has
not identified some object as "fire," why would one seek its warmth? At
138 There is no doubt that on Dharmakirti's view, what he sometimes refers to as selfless
(e.g., at PV2.135-13G) and sometimes as emptiness (e.g., at PV2.214d-215ab) is to serve as the
"antidote" (vipak!a) to satkiiyadnti, and hence to all suffering. Dharmakirti does not, however, provide any extended refutation of the self in either PV or PVSV. But as with the
Abhidharmic analysis of sa1f1vrti- and paramiirtha-satya (see chapter I, 41), it appears that his
refutations of distributed entities-especially universals-are meant to serve as the arguments to be employed for refuting the self.

139 For more on Dharmakirti's soteriology, see chapter 2 (Goff).

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

299

issue here is the notion that part of what constitutes the instrumentality of
a cognition in the context of human aims is that it is a "motivator" (pravartaka) of action. As noted earlier, the notion of "action" (pravrtti) here is the
secondary sense applied to that term by Devendrabuddhi when he addresses
Dharmaklrti's claim that "awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one's action toward an entity that one wishes to obtain or
avoid" (= PV2.3b-d). It is clear that Dharmaklrti himself is concerned with
the argument that perception, as indeterminate, could not be instrumental because it could not motivate action. In his Pramii1}avinifcaya, he raises
the problem with an objector's voice:
"Well, now how can there be practical action (vyavahiira) from
direct awareness, whose nature is not that of a definitive determination? One could not engage in practical action because one
acts in order to obtain things that cause happiness and avoid
things that cause suffering only when one has made the definitive
determination 'This is [a thing that causes happiness, etc.] ."'140
To resolve this problem, Dharmaklrti must find a way to introduce a
kind of determinacy into perception without actually claiming that perception is determinate. He does so with the following response:
This poses no problem, since just when one sees the object, there
occurs a mnemonic awareness that arises due to that perceptual
awareness. Due to that mnemonic awareness, practical action occurs
because ofone's desire [to avoid or obtain some aim]. 141 [PVin:I.I8]
Although direct awareness is the bare perception (Ita ba tsam =
drHimiitra) of an object, just when one sees the object, there occurs
a mnemonic awarenesJ'-i.e., one that is immediately following
that experience-and due to that awareness, purposeful action
occurs with regard to what one has seen as being what is desired
or what is not desired. 142
140 PVin ad 1.18 (58.I2ff): '0 na da ni mngon sum ma nges pa'i bdag nyid las ji ltar tha snyad
du gyur I 'di'o zhes bya bar nges na ni bde ba dang ,-dug bsngal gyi sgrub par byed pa dag thob
pa dang spong ba'i don du Jug pa 'i phyir ro zhe na.
141 PVinr.I8: taddnfiiv eva dmefU sa1?Zvitsiimarthyabhiivina~ I smara?Jiid abhiliifepa
vyavahiira~ pravartate / /.
142 PVin adLI8 (58.I5ft): I skyon 'di med de I ganggi phyirl don mthongba nyid mthongrnam

300

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

The introduction of the theory of definitive determination allows

Dharmaldrti to attribute what might be called a clandestine determinacy to
perception without actually claiming that perception is itself determinate.
In doing so, he can salvage the claim that, in terms of obtaining a human
aim, perception is instrumental because it is a motivator of actions oriented
toward such aims. 143
Nevertheless, while introducing the notion of a subsequent definitive
determination may solve some problems, it creates others. Consider specifically what we know from our previous discussion about an instrumental
cognition (pramarza): in brief, it is a trustworthy awareness, where trustworthiness in the context of a human aim means that it enables one to
obtain an object that accomplishes one's aim. This way of characterizing an
instrumental cognition can be reduced to one claim, namely, that it is "what
makes one obtain one's aim" (prapaka). And to do so, it must also be "what
motivates action" (pravartaka); otherwise, the question of obtaining an aim
would be moot.
.
Since Dharmakirti maintains that only perception and inference are
instrumental, he would have the description we have just given apply to
those two types of cognitions, and only those two. We might grant that the
description does indeed apply to perception and inference, but if no further
specifications are made, a third type of cognition will also satisfy this
description. Devendrabuddhi describes the problem in an objection:
"You say that an instrumental cognition is that which is trustworthy with regard to the telic function when one acts having
become aware of the instrumental object through that instrument. If that is so, then consider the case where one acts upon a
water-jug through the conceptual awareness of a water-jug; when
one does so that conceptual awareness is also trustworthy with
regard to the telic function of acting in that fashion. Hence, that

la / myong ba'i mthu las byung ba yi / dran las mngon par 'dod pa yis / tha snyad rab tu Jugpa
yin / mngon sum don la Ita ba tsam yin yang nyams su myong ba'i mthu las byung ba myong ba
mtshams sbyor ba'i dran pa las / de mthong ba nyid na mthong ba rnams la mngon par 'dod pa
dang cig shos dag gis tha snyad du 'gyur ba yin no.
143 See Dreyfus (I996) for an account of these issues; for the title, Dreyfus draws on Tibetan
authors, one of whom compares the problem to "the fool leading the blind." The question
here is how the "fool" (perception, which cannot think thoughts) can lead the "blind" (conceptual thought, which cannot directly see any objects).

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

301

conceptual awareness would also be instrumental, but you do

not accept that it is. Therefore, the definition of instrumentality
is faulty."I44
This objection is clearly tied to one raised by Dharmaklrti himself:
[PV2.5d-6a:] "The knowledge of a universal that follows the
[perceptual] cognition of an object in itself (svarupa) would be
instrumental." 145
The major problem here is definitive determination itself. That is, following upon a habituated perception of a water-jug, in the proper context
one will have the definitive determination, "This is a water-jug." Since that
perception leads to such a determination, it is considered instrumental.
That is, in the case where one seeks the function(s) that a water-jug per'forms, that perception can (indirectly) prompt one to act in such a fashion
that one will definitely obtain what one seeks, provided that nothing hinders one's actions. But clearly, the same is true of that definitive determihation itself: it can effectively prompt a person who seeks a water-jug to act
in such a fashion that, provided there are no obstructions, she will definitely obtain the water-jug. 146 In short, it is both "what makes one obtain
one's aim" (prapaka) and "what prompts (or guides) action" (pravartaka).
We have already seen that Dharmakirti is unwilling to admit such cognitions as instrumental, in part because that admission would lead him
down a slippery slope to determinate perception and, hence, the ultimate
Jeality of universals. Thus, he must add some further specification that will
disallow the instrumentality of definitive determinations. In a reference to
Dignaga's work,147 he does so by maintaining that such cognitions are "con'144 PVP (3a7ff): gal te gang gis shes nas Jug par 'gyur ba'i don byed par mi slu ba de ni de fa
:tshad ma nyid yin pa de'i tshe I bum pa 'i mam par rtog pa 'i shes pa las I bum pa fa Jug pa de'i
:.aon byed par mi slu bar 'gyur ba de ltar na I de yang tshad mar gyur na mi 'dod pa de bas na
mtshan nyid khrugs [ex con). for PVP-D: zhugsl pa yin no I zhe na.
,145 PVZ.5d-6a: svariipiidhigate{l para1'(l II priipta1'(l siimiinyavijfiiinam.
146 It is worth noting that, in terms ofDharmaldrti's apoha-theory, a definitive determination must therefore be a concept based on real things (bhiiviifraya), at least in relation to the
:!Spects (iikiira) of the object relevant to the desired telic function. For the notion of expressions and concepts based on real things, see PVL205-206 with PVSV ad cit. (G:I05.24ff).
147 I understand Dharmaldrti's use of sii1'(lv.rtaat PVZ.3a-br (grhitagraha1}iin neffa1'(l sii1'(lv.rta1'(l)
(0 be an allusion to Dignaga's use of sa1'(lvrtisatin the context of perception (PSLI.6cd-7ab:

JOl

FOUNDATIONS Of DHAlMAtr;;IRT I'S PHILO SO PHY

ventionar in that they art' -apprdlending whar has already been apprehended ~ (lfhi14trW!'ll); as such, they art' not instrumenru. ,.. Devendrabuddhi, citing Dharmakini's response, offers these commenrs:
(The afo rementioned objtionJ ... is not a problem. Sinc~ amwnh'OrUll ct1f'Iirjon Ilpprrhmds tbllt which hiU Illt'ttuiy hn apprthmMd. JIH Jo nDt clAim that ;1 is ;nstrJ4mmlaL (PV1..ja-b,] '"
That is, conventional awaren= that have objects such as a
watcr-jug. c:Wtemhood, number and upward movement are not
claimed to be instrumental. Why? For mc reason that they apprehend what has already been apprehcnded. Here (Dharmalcini
has aid mar) JUSt thc initial opcricnce of an object is instrnmtnta.l--it is what makes one act.'" The subsequent conceprual
aware ness that comes from it arises rtalling mal object as it was
apprehended. Hen, it is not at all an awareness of a real thing
that can aa:omplish a goal (arrha). So how can it be whal makes
one act after Oot has known its object?'"

As is sugated by Dcvendrabuddhi's comment, pan of the concern here is

mat these cognitions' content, being universals such as -watcr-jug-nw(ghafllll.'Il) or othcr hyposwil.ed entities such as number (ul1"khya) or
movc:mefil (k",."utn). would be tk /MtD ultimately real by vinue of their
appearance in a pc.rceptual judgment, if mat judgment were construed as
pan of me pc.rceplion iucl'SJ In ptoposing that mese cognitions are -apple~

_ _ ..... _.......,.

-.H.".,.,~

- ' ~'!' ' - -...0'

N'" Ill. 1(, .. ~hi ', c:ommma imply. 1M COIUClI 11m- mnarru conoepllw 0DtInilioN ocrum", afU:r ~ Wn dw: oIl...oon
~ IC'IIIC.

..w.a

148 Set I'VLp-Oj"

149 PVL)a-OI: p,."u.,." ~'!" sJ,!,~,!,-

I SOTh"" Ildelllla:" 10 HB:l ,J..I, (Ill"."'" u,.". ~!W~I!'

".."u,....J. SH the pun". in lhe 2ppmdix (..,un.

'*'" M,..,. _ "1...."' ..

"",.,,..,.1fyN/

""""_I!'

Wt'W

151 I'VP{)blft):
fot
iW" pbJi, .....",...,.; / ".; 'J.JlfJ 'Ji
IsM h",,.
""", I ,...."lf ""'" iitrr,. '" /J#ff,.i,.J r.oJlrti ...... "'"'?i
Jhn,. If; rm.J _1fYN/ J.. "'; 'J.J M J til #.M _ I P"",,,
'V"'"' pbJi, ... 1
M '" """, ~ "'tA...t N ff]iJ r:JhtJ ...... """ '" i"'l,.,."..,.]i" IW 1M i ",tho. t., ",",,,,
... roo_ rti ""'''' ,., ....,,. i ,..., ,. ""...... ji Iu NI>Jn" J.. ~"fI ,.. ko..t ... j Mil oi ~
r.o" IJu" IdUt ,u, ~ ... M Ju, /U in ... jyd. .,.,."..1M i J,.,.. ,.
uJ .i;Jw"l
sMI ,. -",. M ...... P"I ~ sMlNU k,., .",.,., ;0..'"

Ui",..

(II,.,

152 This iI. in shan. an upuntnlapiM admining~ (..riufpt~pauption. See,

INSTR UMENTALITY, J UST IFYING T HE SO URCES O F KN O WLEDGE

303

hending what has betn apprehended," Dharmakini means--at least in

pan-chat these cognitions have undergone a conccptuali:r.:uion process
whereby the initial, indeterminate comem of perceprion is filidy interpreted. Even in the absence of any aplicit statement to mis effect, we can
thw hear an implicit claim in this argumen t: narndy. mat since conceptualization always involves error or ruslOrtion (bhrtlnti). a conceprual cognition cannol be considered instrumcnral if one does not demonstrate how
that error tus been overcome.1II
Devcndrabuddhi. however. largdyavoids this tack and inslC:ad rums the
argument to a more specific description of what it means for an instrumental cognition to be ~ what prompts action ~ (prtJlHlrt.Wz). Al noted above,
within the COntext of a human aim, a cognition's insuumentality is in part
cnn.uimrcd by the faa that. by virtue of prompting one's acrion toward
some aim, it is an instrument fo r the acco mplishment of th:u aim. Alluding
to Dharrnakirti's HaubjruiM, Devcndrabuddhi he~:u1ds the spmfication
that only the initial ntpnimct (4t/ytJJtJritJntJ) can be what prompu: action.
Thus, since: a ddini tive detcnnination is foUowing upon such an initial experience. it cannot be insmunem:al in the context of obtaining a human aim
ho!eall~ ;1 ... ~ not i 1liri41ly prompt one's action rOw:lM (h.:lt :r.im.
With this :r.rgument, Dh:r.rmwrti (u intcrpmed by ~dr:l.buddhi )
may employ me theory of definitive determination to accoum for the determination necessary for perception to be instrumental while denying that a
definitive determination is instrumental. But although these twO problems
may thw be solved, me solutions have created a third problem. Specifically, by requiring that an instrumental cognition mwt p:w me test of not
being wh.:lt :>pprehends the :r.lr~dy :tpprehendcd. Dharm:r.lUrti h:u: :r.ppu_
endy d iminated a whole cl:w of inferences from consideration as instrumental, even though he clearly mwt admit thaI those inferences "rt
instrumental
To under$land me cl:w of inferences in qucstion, we mwt recall mat,
according to Dhumakirti's meory rX definitive determination, one has a
det~min"rion immO!di.:l(cly fol lowing " pc~lion only o f th"t propcny_
sIIfIbhlfllfl of the perceived object for which the proper conditions arc in
place. Since neither Dharmaltirti nor his commentaton offer w systematic
for cumpk, pvJ.l}J ( _ _ ",,,,,,,,",,,,,uiJ ..vJt.Jpiviu~ I ,,;... ~."fN"
~~~ti ll).

"

fUl DI.... ".aJui. ;..fan"", '""" i .....Ioa ...... IU"... uf,,..... . IN. tiM: e....... ...-c...""''' t.y
mo:aru: of tho: _~-'ku;",. Sec: chapter J.
I ~)

FOU NDATION S OF D HA'-MA KIIlTl 'S PH ILOSO PHY

terminology ro rekr to this ryJX of p~rty-Wltbh.iWl, let w min our own

term and call it a -perceptually determinable propeny-nwbh4"",, In short.
a pej(:rprually determinable propeny-svabJuiv.r is one for which ,he perception in question is capable of producing an immediatciy subsequent
definitive determinadon in the mind of thr perceiver bcca~ aU the conditiofU for producing such a detcrmin:llK>n 2fe present.
In COntrast to such cases whttt thr pt:rttption is capable of inducing
such a definitive determination. in some ca.ses the propr.r condiciolU arc
not in placc. and therefore the perceiver will not have an immcd.iatdy subsequent definitive: dctrnnination of the property-nwbh4v.r in question. We
will o..Il this ryJX of propcny-lVAbhd"" a "perccprually indctcnninabk property-WIIblui""" " This is a prope:ny-lWI'bhJ;v.r fo r which the perception in
question is MtClpable of producing an immcdiatdy subsequent definitive
detennination in the mind of the perceiver because: one or morc of the conditions for producing such a determination arc absent.
Let w now rtl:lU wme further specifications conettning the types of
coBditions that are required for the production of a definitive determination immediatciy following a perception. !u noted earlier, some of the
r~uircd conditions can be considered conlarual. The perceiver mWI. for
aample. find hinuelfin the appropriate COntc::n (prullrll!'4}--one formed
by interests and opecu.tioru-in order to have a determinacion of the
aspect in question. ')< Thus. in some contots--as when the pe:rcciver is
thinty-the perceiver may have the detenninalion. -This is a water-jug."
while the s:amc perceiver may not have Iha[ determination in some other
COntQtl, as when he is nol thirsty. But other conditions arc embedded. in
a wider. morc stable contOl. in that they depend primarily upon ,he perceptual capabilities of the perceivel'. mind. For aample, Dharmwni
nu.inctins that if a -dim -wincd~ (1NlwbwJJhi) pcrson ~ an objtaisting in a homologow conrinuum (i.e. nO( acrually disintegrating at a gross
level). then mat percepdon annot directl y induce the determination that
that objt is impermanent. Thw. when such a person perceives an in[2C(
water-jug, that pc,ception cannot ncinduce an immcd.ialdy subsequent
definitive determination of that waUf-jUg'S momentllriness AS 1D"t AS tht.l
pnkJ" is ~dim-wilUJ. -With Ihis in mind. we can make the speciflCllion

INSTIlUMENTAlITY, JUSTI FYINC TH E SOURCES OF KNOWLEOC E

lOS

that this typt of propt:rty-lWIbh4W1 i5 perceptually indcterminable in prinripk for sudJ a pnwn. ,..

Mthough he is not explicit on this point, Dharmaldrti's reference to

dimwined persons" appears to be an allusion to a typical division between
ordinary persons" (p.nlMgjal'l4). whose pcn:quions an: rdatively limited
by their weak mental capabilitits. in conU'a.u [ 0 -adepts" ~ns), whose
pt:rccptiolU enable them to directly perceive objectS that an: inaccessible to
ordinary persons. This allusion becomes especially dear when, in one of the
passages where this issue is discussed, Dharmaldn:i COntrasts the dim-witted with ~ those of great intelJt:Ct ~ (~i}, ' Sikyabuddhi idemifics these
latter as those ~ who Set what is bqond the senses- (IltiruliryaJari;" j, a rypical epithet for JOtim and especially buddhas.'" More specifically, in this
contet they are those whose perceptions are capable of inducing a definitive dcrermination of lin) aspect of an object that they perceive. 'II
Assuming that the distinction between ordinary persons and JOtins is
indeed operative here, we can apply the nouon of a propeny-WIlbh4V4 that
is perceptually indeterminable in principle 10 a soteriological COntext. That
is, on Dharmaldrti's view, what makes the extreme perceptual acuity of
)l'Dgim vallllllhl!! is not their ahiliry to 5 loog dinaoas. hut rather their
ahiliry ro hav!! a oert::lin rype- of in~'mm!!nt:ll oognition: namely. a direc;r,
nonconceptual experience of the si:l Ittn aspecu of the Nobles' Four
Troths. '" These aspects include propeny-svabh.i1JllS such as emptiness and
moment:lriness that ordinary persons arc unable to determine without
recourse to inttrcnce.,II 1.5 we have JUSt Setn, Dharmakirti maintains that
JOtim have perceptions that are capable of immediately producing definitive df'{!!rminuionJ of th~ and a~ orh!!! propl!ny_"""bM.,m of:l p"'rceived subject (dharmin) without recourse to inference, and this is prob2bly
I SS 5ft pvsv tUiPVI.})ab (G:1I.6/l) and the doIcIy ,cblrd dixlWion I I PV). IOI-I 01.
156 PV). Ia,d.
I S7 S PVr h7Sa6): .1.".,

cbm,.. chn",.. .. ";......,,.

IS8 PVJ. IQ7Cd: "",~"d"'~""

...,,.;~,,

",,;,.,,, .. it.

,.,..,w,.." rNtbtUh~.

l S95ft D1wmWm'l loooum of"';~ {PV}. 181 47)' npi.lly.,jlh dw; oontmc'nu

ofOcvaw:lr:lbuddhi (PVP:l lobJffl.

160 NOIC

mal alihou&h 1M oonlCl.l IJ,en, iI the appIicIIion of the propcny. ,..}JM.. JdfIe:M.

new to iIO enti!y on the b.is of 1M ~ of tNl mliJ)'. Ihil doa; noc rman dw KIf
anaa ' " '" iI pthxplible. ~ibtr. the di$rinaion hen, iI bth"UO the lbili!y 10 h~ I
<kf'in','..,dacrminl'ion ofodllcaonal dircctlr from the jX,aption and 1M fIftd 10 raon to
CYickncx to apply thai p.open,........""..,.

)06

FOU NDATI O NS O F OHAilM .... ICIIlTI'S PHI LOSO PHY

pan of what Oharmakim mons in his discussion of tht "yogic perception"

(yofiprllt}ll~).

The way a JOtin attains that c:xahed state, h~r, is prteisd y thaI, as an ordinary penon, she focused in meditation upon a con"'p,- i.e., one of {he siJrt~ n upccu-until she attained a direct,
nonconcq)(ua.l cxperientt of th.at content.'" The !cry, bOW'eVn', is that in
order for that mediative experience: to be insuumenr.&!, it musl be trust'wonhy. which Inf::Im that the original conct:plUaI cognition from which it
is derived muSt ilsdf be indubitable. 'oW Sina Ihe only ooncqxual cognition
Ih.at is guaranteed to be induhiable is an inkrt:ncc, this means th.at Oharma.ldni's sottriology u1timattiy rests upon the lISt of certain types of infereRca lhat enable ordinary JX'SOns 10 devdop truuwonhy m napa that.
when meditated upon. willicad to the direct expcrlMces that arc sought on
the Buddhist path. That is. beginning from a State in which one has no
perceptions of tht entities in quc:nion. one uses such inferences to develop
an initiaJ, unhabitwued perception. Finally, through repc2ted practice:. one
develops a fu lly habituated pcrccption. whereupon the inferences arc no
longtt needed. In Ihis way. ccm.in ink rcnca arc crucial 10 die Buddhist
soleriological project, but many such inf~ are cndangcm:l by the principle of "apprehending what has bn apprehended" (ghiUltrom.1J4J.
With this in mind. Itt' US flOte four characterutia of these endangered
ink rencc:s. First, the sub}ca (tlhttrmin) it pcrccivcd by the perceiver. Second. both the predia tt to be prOllC:n (~mu) and the eviden: art
proJ)(:tty-/wbh4v4S abstracted from that subjcci. Third. the propertyslMbluw adduced as tvidence is perttptually determinable for that perttiver. And founh. the propctty-slIllbh.ivoII' to be prov~n is in prineipk
perceptually indcterminablt for that person. ~ all apply. For cumplt.
to the C':llK where an ordinary JKf'SOn infers that a water-jug is momentary'
bccaUR' it is produced: (t) she perceives the water-jug: (1) both momentariness and produahood (/trWttlIVoll'J art: prope:tty-slMbluv. of the waterjug; (j) she determines directly from perception that Ihe water-jug is
Ibl !io dw hoplyconcuUUOfnnmt offhu point II I'Vp.,: 'M'cfoir, ~ It ~ INC'
or unn~, wh.al~ ;. "",.dit:llled upon will mull in dar, no<..:tII,"pluai qnltion what

......,..,.,..nn un

IIw meditation is

~rfm:nL'

[tc""" MitlfM ...-",,,, .. ,.. ,.J tfIfIi/,iMtlo,." I

",",.tU..t,.JM"",u". /~.

162 PVj.l.S6:"Amons thew ~ ... _ . mcdl~fidy indllClrd pcrupcion lhal i1 lnw:

wonhy ;' inwvmmw. ali is d"" caK with an ~ oflany of IIw ".Ieml reaJirln "W
wm: ptc>lowIy cnmincd [in""" p,.,""(WitltlMchapcnl. TIw mnaindc:r, such u """ hII
~ ola "' a ....! _ . U'C mOou.Iorn. -1 _
,,-_!""!' ...",W.i1""'r"" " ; ' l " _
,...., J f*IJJ~ "."...". ~'" /qI ..,.~ I~.

INSTRUM ENT ALITY, JUSTIFYINC THE SOURCES O F KNOWLEDC E

}07

productd: and (4) as an ordinary person, she can nC'Vtt detennine jWt from
~rcrption that me water-jug is momentary.
The impornm point to recall here is that, on Dharmakirti's view, a perccptton app~hends (lDthe a5ptS of its object, which is simply to say mat
iU\ objt contributes in its emimy to the produaion of a pctcqnion."
This means mat alllhc: propcny-Jl4i'bhd_ of an object have been apprehended (ghiu), ("Ven if one has no determinate cognition of memo Hence.
it iJ clear that if a definitive determination immediately following a perccptton is not iU\ insuumental cognition bausc ilapprdlends the already
apprehended, men the instrumentalil)' of mis type ofinferencc should also
be rejected. The reason for mis is mat me water-jug has already been ~r
oreiVC'd: henore, c:vt:n if the ordinal}' penon did not d("(ermine from that inicial pertq)lion that the water-jug is momentaI}'. that propeny-1WIbhdV4
has tk fortD been app~hendcd by thal initial percqnion. Thus, as wim a
defini(i~ d("(ermination immediatdy following a pelception, this type of
i nfe~nce should not be instrumental because it apprehends what has
already been apprmcnded.
We have 5CCfl. however, tha, on our interpretation ofDhannakirti's soteriology. he is obliged to preserve: the instrumemaliry of such inferences.
Hence. ht must ~pccify some additional mlerion ,har will ~how how
inferences do nOI involve tht app~hcnsion of what has already been apprehended (KfhirRf/'Ilh/lJ;Ul). Dcvendrabuddhi maintains that Dharmwni
establishes this additional criterion by claiming that. since the propertyIINIbhdva about which one is concerned is perceptually indeterminable in
that case. irutrumentaliry an still apply to thai inference. N Oharmakirti
put!; it. such inftrtn~ "illumin:!lt whn hu nnr yt'l ~n Icn(lw(l
flfjfiillil,.u",prRktJJ.) (. Defl .2r in a case "when me particular has not been
disc::trned" (tllljjfiilu '''''~!'t) wim respect to a propcrty-IfIftbh.i"" that is
M'" "'ry for the fulfiUmem of one's aim.'" In shon. it is what has been
called in recent rimes me ~novt:lty" of me knowledge offered by such an
inference that prest:tVes its inscrumentaliry.
Alluding to the casc where one infers the impcrmanencr of sound. from
me fact of being produced, Dcvendnbuddhi offers us the above interprtation with an objection and response:

maw:

163 PVI ,,~ ""I'hc:rdotr ..ncn a thins (lrbMJ iu:xpniroud th<OtJ&h 1"'.Ct:prion. all oliQ
qualilia an: apniMad ....IWJJW/~ ~-,. ~ ~J.,..!fI'!t. Thill UK MiInII"IaIira the UJUIMII I olPV.....r44;md PVS\' .J riI. (G:-l.6. I-17.l)I.

16<4 Sec PV Lsc--'. mulJ.fti in the appmdiL

JoB

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAl.\tAlrWlTl 'S PHILOSO PHY

Somrone objectS, -lnfertnce would not ~ instrumental because

it is an awareness of what has already 1>n observed, as when
one infers that impermaocnce u a propeny-Jl.IQbhiw of sound."
This is not so. Even tbough sound's unique nature, which is
excluded from all other thinp. has already been apprehended,
the object of practical action (1IJd1l4hJ1lI) can only ~ that aspttt
with regard to which that perctption has produa:d a defini(i~
dC'tC'1lJlination and so on as iu dfect. 1berefore. sino: it applies
(0 that which has not been apprehended, inference is instrumental.'"
For Ocvcndrabuddhi, Dharmakini's argument amounts to the claim
that, if a pc:rcq)(ion cannot induce a ddlnitivc determination of a propc:nyIWbb4W1 with which one is cof'lCC'rnn:i, then the object of that pc:rtrption
has /for been " !mown" (jlf4u) or "discerned" (vijfi4l4J. II is still true that the
property-n.wbhoiw in question has already been IIpprthmtUtl WhiU) in that
it, being identical with the object iudf, has contributed to the produaion
of pClttption. N~Iw. to bolTOl\l' ~i 'l phrase from a related
context, it is i/U iftllllt propcny-nwblui.... had nOt been apprehended at all ,
since one can h:lve no indubitable determinate knowledge of that propeny-sWlblMw without tdying upon infertncc.".
Thus, if we can combine Dcvcndrabuddhi's inrerprtr.uion with what
we know of Dharmakini's sorerioiogy, nove1()' plays a crucial role in
Dharmakini's thco(), of instrumentality, for it preKrvtS the instrumentality of a class ofinkrmccs that arc ccnrrailo his soteriology. This is cerainly
Ocvcndrabuddhl', opinion, and for him the overall definition of an insrruITlC'ntai cognition thertfort has two aspccu: first , an irutrumental cognition is a trustworthy awareness; this ....'aIT:lfltl the daim that an instrumental
cognition is -what makes one obtain" (priJNIJu.)one's aim. And SCCOfld. an
insoumental cognition mUst "revcal Mut has nor been known" (Iljurirth.-

ria"""''''' oiMJ
"'M l p''''1ff hhillloi ",i
""''''' ",w ...", .. *' "" i J#7i,,. ........ ,." "tIM .. r.s IMf ""; .,..; ""'r",w
""',. ..", _ Ji,. "" k.u.t ... ..;" ~ 1- "", 1"'" " ..,.,.,. ... tin TfS "" " . " ""
165 PVP (6aS): pi /Jt

.. ,..

_""'<111""

ali

"'IIfli Jr.. ... ,.,. ~ t,tJ "" *,., tIM.,,-J J.. "'", .. blff" F"f1i ttM" .... ,.,.
"" M Iur ....... h..y" wyiJ"
Ij4 "'.,,"",.; IIIMJ .... Ji" IW
166 For $iJry.buddhi'. pooibon, Xl' PVT, "Jf'!]6u-J. For an aampk 011 l.ua oommm
1.OIOI...no doa.- cIi.c- ---uty in d;';ncUon fn>m .nwo o
Kn..et (,", .....
'''JJ on DharmcloU:aB'. thmcy ofi...uwnmulity.

i-t""i"

h.i...,.,....,

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

309

prakiifa); this warrants the claim that an instrumental cognition is what

"motivates action" (pravartaka).
This way of defining an instrumental cognition later comes under attack,
;for subsequent commentators, probably including Sakyabuddhi, maintain
~\hat, since only novel cognitions are trustworthy, an explicit statement of
inovelty is not necessary. Without going into the details of such arguments,
~",e need only note that such interpretations do not abandon the criterion
~pf novelty; they simply subsume it under trustworthiness. The main moti~vation here is probably in response to Devendrabuddhi's somewhat vague
~pproach to trustworthiness: he is apparently willing to apply the term
~.'trustworthy" (avisa'f!lviida) to a definitive determination following on a
~erception, but he never explicitly states whether or not such ~ application
~ould be legitimate. By eliminating any such application, Sakyabuddhi
~(who himself is somewhat vague on this point) and certainly later com~entators forego the need to adjust the overextension of the term "trust~orthy" as a description of any pramii'(la; instead, they simply maintain
~~at what is trustworthy is necessarily novel in that it is a "motivator of
f~ction" (pravartaka). 167 However, in contrast to Devendrabuddhi, these
~later interpretations obscure the likely motivations behind the various
l~aims that Dharmaldrti makes. And since Devendrabuddhi's argument
[firaws upon other portions ofDharmaldrti's work, his interpretation like~Wise suggests how Dharmaldrti's presentation of instrumentality accords
fiwith other elements of his philosophy, most notably his theory of definiftive determination (nifcaya) as a means of re-introducing conceptuality into
~erception. For these reasons, and in view of its subsequent impact upon
fthe commentarial tradition, Devendrabuddhi's interpretation strikes me as
ithe most useful starting point for an interpretation OfPV2.1-6. In any case,
Devendrabuddhi's work certainly helps to clarifY the reasons for citing both
trustworthiness and novelty as essential characteristics of any pramii'(la. 168

li167 See, for example, PVT, nye:79a5ff, where Sakyabuddhi, by reducing the discussion of a

l~econd characteristic to a matter of worldly convention, seems to suggest that an explicit

[~tement of novelty is not essential to the definition of an insrtumental cognition.

t1t68 Franco (1991 and 1997) has argued that Dharmakirti does not give a genetal definition
Ipf an instrument of knowledge (pramii7Jll) anywhere in his works. This interpretation is
~argely based upon the argument that the particle vii in PV2.5 can only properly be con~i~l:rued as a disjunction. Franco's work, which seeks a historical reading that at points must
!:resist the commentaries, has elicited considerable comment (see for example, the exchange
~~etween Franco and Oetke in Katsura 1999). Beyond Franco's insightful suggestions conferning the relation ofDharmakirti's work to the wider philosophical context of his time, one
k

310,

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Inference, Error, and Trustworthiness

While the ,qualification of novelty preserves the instrumentality of certain

forms of inference, other problems arise. These specifically focus on the
fact that the objects of inference are unreal universals. As such, the objects
of inference are incapable of any telic function, for since only ultimately real
particulars can be causes or effects, only ultimately real particulars have
telic function. 169
In their discussion ofPV2.I-6, neither Devendrabuddhi nor Sakyabuddhi consider this issue at any length. Their comparative silence is probably
due to the way they understand the overall argument of the Pramtitzavtirttika-namely, that the entire preceding chapter (PVI) had already
addressed these aspects of inference. Indeed, in the course of that chapter,
Dharmaki:rti returns repeatedly to a crucial question: if conceptual cognitions-including inferences-take unreal universals as their objects, why
would anyone bother with them? After all, reasonable or "judicious"
(prek!tivant) persons seek to accomplish their goals, and to do so, they seek
to obtain that which is capable of the desired telic functions. Why, therefore,
would they concern themselves with cognitions whose actual content is incapable of any such functionality? Alluding to an answer, Dharmaki:rti employs
a provocative metaphor to formulate the problem in the following verses:
Through distinguishing the propositions that the thing in question is "real" and that it is "unreal," those who do not deny the
utility of an expression's meaning analyze the real thing itself,
for the production of an effect depends upon that real thing.
Why would those who seek the goal in question bother to analyze something that is incapable of accomplishing that goal? Why
salient outcome of this" vii controversy" may be the finding that, if we do not resort to commentarial interpretations, our conclusions on the matter are necessarily underdetermined by
the available evidence, namely, DharmakIrti's laconic statements. This is not a problem in
itself, but it is one that must be tolerated when we assay the difficult exploration of Dharmaklrti's immediate historical context in isolation from the commentarial tradition. When,
however, we seek to situate DharmakIrti within the commentarial tradition that follows him,
our task is less difficult. Indeed, we find unanimity on the notion that DharmakIrti does provide a general definition ofpramii1Jd- and also that both trustworthiness and novelty are components of that definition (the only question being the issue of whether both must be
explicitly stated). Since I am thankfully concerned with this latter, less assiduous task, I have
forgone any extensive discussion of the "vii controversy."
169 See chapter 2 (84ffl.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTifYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLEDGE

, II

would a Iwrful woman bolht:r 10 Stt whttht:r a (:\lnuch is lxautiful or noe"'

DtuImaldrti ad<h his own comments:
Whtthu an aprasion's object (Ilnh.t) is real or unreal. it can
neither pr(:Vtnt nor accomplish a human aim (p N~nh.tJ
because that object docs not x rw.lly cist in me way thai il is
imaginatively d(:tt:rmint:<i mrough me expression, and because
the opression'l objt is not intended in the way that it actually
exisrs. '" Thcrd"ore, a pt:rson. when inquiring inlO the reality or
unreality (U MYI) of the thing in question. always ignores the
conceptual appearance and nkes u rhe focm n;l of his inquiry
just that real thing. such u fire, on which dt:p(:nds the accomplishment of the (desired) human aim. such as counteracting the
cold. He does so because me apression't objm is nOI capable of
funCtion, since even when Ont apt:rieoces the: object of the
oprcssion, ruch u the concept - fire, there is no apericnce of

mat

rhe 2Calm plW"n~r of rhar aim. ~lIch:L~ cnunrtnllCTing enid. And

it does n(lt make ~nse for a ~l1On who ~b 10 accom plish
some aim to C:Xen himst:lf toward something that is not capabk

of accomplishing il. Indeed, why would a sexually aroused

woman strive to 5tt whtthcr a eunuch is lxaulifuJ or nOI?'1)
170 PVI.I lo-IU: ~ uWIoLJiJJMf"MlifltilJ , _ .... tiN]tI'" II, 1UN".mb i l L " ..
H .~_nb.sy. ....",ijo iii". UiUnJn ... ' ,.~ ,.,._

..

'_1..1...,...

",;~ 1Ii~,.,.~ H.

17 1 ~ (14a,)oIfm:,Jlishdydifkmll imttpfnllion:

Ir iIJ _

-t? ..w-i, doo ~ aiH-

..;~ha,

i>o Iiw ...., Ih.u;. it

;-pun"", ""'"-

.... a ~ imapnalivdy drcmtlincl the npc -ion, .... 10 be ~

bk of ao:omplWU"l dor [<birrd[ Mfa And dorapreasion',"';"is POe aublishc>d

fI- - mnM) i .. tiN II"'J u,., illImMIIy m., u .. in dor OQy Ihli dor partia.lu it
...bIiWd

tl- - n40'...v.

K{JII) tQ(IowI ~yabuddhl

firM p/u"aIf. bul 00 ttlt: I'O!Id phruc he rmurb:

8_ it it _ ilflnfMt/ i.. ,., _ ......,.1iNu It.,...u, nri,UI bec:wx dor ".,,;,. U noc
akm u VI ob;cct by dor c:ap<asOon in dor IYWIMf thaI oM .nA.panirubr or _
tal ~io.tbr ;, a ub&hcd 10 alsc. lJouloI~ ......;h;IiIIIIIll' ,.M>4s-t.~!W".
~!M'" fill ubiu"
M~ktutfllltl .
172 ~u..n. wbieh ~ ((l.4u}.KClU)) c\oua <&II ~k.tM.
00 lhe

u'"

17) PVSV .J PVI.llo--lIl (C:I07. I....,l: ... hi

t.UJ.

i:.",." fIII"".m ,.~.

312

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Although Dharmakirti offers the above comments in relation to linguistic

(fiibda) cognitions, his observation is equally applicable to all conceptual
cognitions, including inference and definitive determination: one may infer,
be told, Of determine subsequent to a perception that a fire is present before
one, but the universal "fire" that is the actual content of all such cognitions cannot accomplish one's aims. In this passage, DharmakIrti responds
to the problem by only briefly noting that the conceptual appearance is
"ignored" (avadhirita). But this brevity is warranted, for he is simply alluding to his previous, lengthy presentation of the apoha-theory.
In our own treatment of apoha, we have seen that this act of "ignoring"
the conceptual appearance qua construction is a cognitive error or distortion (bhriinti, viplava, etc.). In part, this involves what Tillemans has called
an "unconscious error," whereby the image is erroneously construed to be
identical or "mixed" (sartZsr!ta) with the individual (vyakti, vastu) in which
it is alleged to be instantiated. This identification (eki-Y kr) of image and
individual is in part an epistemological error, in that it concerns the manner in which the universal is apprehended. But the error in question also
involves an ontological imputation: namely, that the universal is construed
as distributed in space and time. The universal "cowness" (gotva), for example, is understood to somehow qualifY all cows in all places at all times. 174
For Dharmakirti, the ontological and epistemological error in conceptual
cognitions does not render inferences incapable of guiding one to entities
that have the desired telic functionality. In the previous chapter, we have
already examined at length how this is possible: the svabhiivapratibandha
between evidence and predicate guarantees that the former is invariably
indicative (gamaka) of the latter. But it is likewise essential to note that,
from the standpoint of actually employing inferences in practical contexts,
the aforementioned error is indispensable. 175 When one infers that that there

uparw}addhi samiidadhiiti vii / yathiibhinivefam atattviit / yathiitattvarp ciisamihitatviit / tad

ayarp pravartamiinalp sarvadii sadasaccintiiyiim avadhiritavikalpapratibhiiso vastv eviidhi!!hiinikaroti yatriiyarp puru!iirthalp pratibaddho yathiignau fitapratikiiriidilp / na hy atra fabdiirthal;
samarthas tadanubhaviiptiiv api tadabhiiviit / tad ayam arthakriyiirthi tadasamartharp prati
dattiinuyogo bhaviturp na yuktalp / na hi v!,!asyanti !al}tjhasya riipavairiipyaparik!iiyiim avadhatte.
174 See the account of the apoha-theory in chapter 2 (II3fI).
175 The most concise statement of this notion is: "Even though they [i.e., the particulars]
do not appear [in an awareness of a universal], the world engages in practical action through
the error of imagining [that the conceptual image is the particular)" [PVSVadPVI.Io6;
G:5P-3: atatpratibhiisinyapy adhyavasiiyavibhramiid vyavahiirayati lokam].

INSTR UMENTALITY, JU STIFYING THE SOU RCES O F KNOWLEDGE

) I}

is fire in me hearth by obsetving smoke pouring from me chimney, if one

does nOt h.a~ the belief that thc concqn ~ fire" that is the object of this
inferen somehow participatC$ in the raJ (i.e., tdially efficient) fire in
me hc:anh, one obviously will not go insilk to warm oncsdf. In other words,
without connruing the concept "fire" as "mixed" (sa~!#)with the :actual
fire. one will never be prompted to :act upon the raI fire . Likewise, even if
one construes "fire" as participati ng in that individual fire . if one does nor
also believe that that fire is thereby the same (t,hr) by nature as all fires (i.e.
that it bums, cooks and so on), OI\C will on again have no reason to act
on that individual fire. It is thus clear that both the epistemological :and
ontologic:al aspccu of error (bhrJ"ri) are psychologic:ally indispensable for
one to employ inference effectively in pursuit of a human aim.
For Dharmaldni. this problem expresses irsclfin me tcnsion within the
claim that at least one form of instrument.tl cognition- namely, infer
entt--is :at on erroneous :and uwrwonhy. In fact, Dharmakini explicitly
5l2tC!l that even though me utility of such cognitions makes them instru
mental, they an neverthdess be chmcterittd by "f.Usity" (mirhy4rva). He
commenu:
Although all conC(pnl,-1 cogni rionJ such :IS inferen ,-re con
fused, wt still define some as instrumental and some as spurious.
We do so because we '-gree on the ifllended capacity or lack
thereof for tdic function . We do so until wt arc fou ndationally
transformed. fThc cognitions of sclAessness and such] arc: f.Use
(bcausc they proceed from the imput2tion of unral universals].
N~rthM,. (My lI' inffrum~r:oI <gnirionJ bot!.ea~ they ue
conducive to the pacification (of ncgarive ment2i StatC!l] .'1II An
176 rvr (usa1ffl'
Sintc 11_ upon an imputtd univusaI, dwoognitions of ~ and...m ID'rfoJs...
N~
liN] ~ ,.,.J.ri.... ,. ,...-ifit.,..". (hey an: ilUfNmmal. "p.ar..
""....... .. .he ............ioo> of d..lnt ("'r') ...d oud.. H."""s app"I_ ~cod ....... thinr;
u ~ imasc IMI il a univnsallUdl u Id~ one ~1.ltQ. Whm liM: media
Uon olmo.. who m..dicau:: in thai &ahion ir pnfm.ed, mq no Iongcr ~ tiM: par.
lio:ular aha, iI tiM: ob;ca of dcsin; and sum. and dory mlli eiimUu.lc ~ and 5Uda.
iii #'i .-...,.,." ,.i';";'
wW 9i /
til dti ....
j#
tJIw/""]i" ... / "'" til JIi I... ,,; iIMI m."
ill ..,. ,. '14"" ,. f/!r / J"P' ,. ..., _ , . ill .,. ,.1f1i '; .....'" , . pM'" _sp'"
,..,.,.,. i 'P'" ,.".... NI / MJ tI..to J. ,,%",.; ...., Ii ",tJht,,, ",oJ "'''P'' til'" J..
,...' ~,... ... ..." ito -"1''' ,,.,,,, Iw f pJtyir ,. / _ K:~" .JO' "'i.~ , srJ! I

He._

[u..rr _,. J..,.,.i Ihn,.

.... 9ut,.,

"'".n-,.

ytUttyJU,.,.,,., ...~ .dllflMlijtJ,..,. ,.im,.tNlfI /

_1...,;"

""~ ~"".,.H.

314

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

example is the practice of having the attitude that a being that is

not one's mother is one's mother [in order to eliminate desire].In
Despite the fundamental error in conceptuality, one can still speak of some
conceptual cognitions-specifically, inferences-as instrumental because
they are trustworthy in that they reliably enable us to achieve our goals,
such as the goal of pacifying one's mind and attaining spiritual liberation.
But one admits their instrumentality until one attains "foundational transformation," which refers to the elimination of the form of ignorance
(avidya) that underlies the errors in conceptual cognitions. 178 This implies
that after foundational transformation, inferences are no longer instrumental for that person. In short, Dharmaki:rti appears to maintain that, from at
least some rarefied perspective, inferences are not ultimately instrumental,
for once a person has obtained the human aims for which such cognitions
are useful, why would one continue to admit the instrumentality of such
cognitions? Why would one continue to carry one's raft on one's back?

Ultimate and Conventional Pram3.I).a

The metaphor of the raft, to which we have just alluded, is a well-known
trope found in the Alagaddupamasutta. The Buddha instructs his followers
that "the Dhamma is similar to a raft, being for the purpose of crossing
over, not for the purpose of grasping."179 That is, just as it would be pointless to carry a raft on one's back after one has reached the far bank, so
too it would be pointless to hold on to the Buddha's teachings after one
has reached the ultimate goal. Taken to its furthest point, this metaphor

latviit priimiif/ya1[l praiamo riigiidiprahiif/a1[l / aniitmiidisiimiinyiikiirCfla vastu grhitvii

bhiivayatii1[l bhiivaniini!pattiiv aniitmiidisvalak!af/apratyakfikiiref/a riigiidiprahiif/ii!l.
Note the crucial difference between the ways Sakyabuddhi and Karl).akagomin interpret the results of the meditation.
177 PVSV ad PV I.98-99ab (G:5I.3-7): sarve!ii1[l viplave 'pi pramiif/atadiibhiisavyavasthii ii
iifrayapariiv.rtter arthakriyiiyogyiibhimatasa1[lviidaniit / mithyiitve 'pi praiamiinukiilatviin
miitrsa1[ljfiiidivat. Note that it is Sakyabuddbi II5bo2)=K(2II.35 who maintains that the
meditation upon beings as one's mother is for the purpose of eliminating desire.
178 See Sakyabuddbi's gloss (PVT:II5arff): gnas pa ni kun gzhi rnam par shes paz 'khrul pa1
sa bon can no / gnas gyur pa ni sgrib pa dang bral ba'o [= K:2lI.8ff: iifrayo bhriintibijam iilayavijfiiinan tasya pariiv.rttir iivaraf/avigamarl.

179 Majjhimanikiiya 22. See the fine translation in NiiJ?amoli and Bodbi.

IN STilUMENTALlTY: JUSTifYIN G TH E SO UilC ES O f KNOWLEDGE

J IS

sUg&csts that. while the Buddha's leachings arc true to his followers, they
:are not true to him. In this way, the met:l.phor appart:ndy pointS to the
pragmatism of the Buddha', teachings: they are only to be :KUpted in rcb~
tion to a goal, :and oncc thaI go:aI has reached, the pragmatic truth of the
teachings mould be abandoned, since they wac only (0 be considered true
for the purposes of reaching that go:aI. This appeal 10 pr2gl'1t:l.tism, h~r,
is in some Wll)'S mi5lc:1ding, especially when we consider Dharmaldni',
notion ofconventional- (Ul",lIJilvahirilu.} :and ultimale" {pirllmtinhiluj
instruments ofknowtcdge,
Dharmwrti', notion of convenlional and uhimale inllrumena of
knowledge: falls within dtc EpiStemic Idc:alisl CriliqUC of pel<xption. AI mal
level of analysis, not only inferencc, but also percqnion is distorted. or en oncous (bhr4Ifu) bcoUK perception involves an internal distortion"
(IInlllfllJHIpiaWl), This distortion. a form of ignorance. ntakes the cognitive
image: in perception seem as if the objects of pcrcepcion :are external, evc:n
though, according (Q Epistcmic Idealism, no such objccts exiSt ouuide Ihe
mind. On :an tvcn stronger rtlding. the distortion :abo causes the varie~
ga.tKm'" (citrlltJi} of the object, such that it appears 10 have various attributes
(Iuch H colnrs) :and dimen.!:inn~ (~ uda :Ill heighT :a nd widrh). Whether
u nd.erllrnod in io Sirong or weal.: form , rhe error is nonconccpn.:al: rhe cognitive: im. iudf is distorted.'- If, hOWC'V(:t, evc:n perception is somc:how
distorted, what distinguishes a rdiable or trustwOrthy cognition from one
thai is nol? If all our ordinary cognitions are distonoed such that none actually !dim or rt:presttlt things the Wlly!hey uoly:uc, then would not all cognitions become equally unreliable~ In his PWM!"'w"ikitp, Dnarmakirti
OOlUidel'f. (hi.!: U:IUe-: (OI
- [Sinct they do nOI exist cxterna.llyJ all cognitioru' objeru are
refuted. If thai is Ihe case. Ihen since there is no difference
between cognitions in that all their (seeming) objeru are dis
toned.. how do you say that one cognition is confused while
:ano.her ic oth e,....;~ (i.e .. i. is inJfMJmenr:aJp-

Sinct some cognition! have the fault of lacking a consisteD(

imprinl for distortion (vipialJll), even the unskiUed say that some

180 5

me, diJcv.ssion of ~uaI fttOf i~ dupen 1 (a

181 Mr .nd1n5 ullhlo ~ it inflllaKCd

1u..1~.

br

).

O harm<tlUl1l. g muncnaJY {I'VlnT

316

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

cognitions are not reliable for practical action (vyavahara); thus,

it is said that a cognition of that type is not instrumental. The
other kind of cognition has a stable imprint; hence, for as long
as saYj1sara endures, it has an unbroken continuity. Having such
an imprint, the cognition is in this context an instrumental cognition in terms of being trustworthy for practical action, and the
nature of these conventional (saYj1vyavaharika) instruments of
knowledge has been stated. Others are confused-and cause confusion-even in regard to these conventional cognitions. Hence,
it is only those who cultivate the wisdom born of contemplation
that thereby orient themselves toward the ultimate instrumental
cognition that is devoid of error and immaculate. 182
Although all perceptions are distorted by the internal distortion, one can
still distinguish between perceptions that are instrumental and those that
are not. In effect, one can do so because the internal distortion is always
present in an ordinary being's mind: for as long as a being is in saYj1sara, the
defect that causes the distortion remains. Since all beings in saYj1sara have
the imprint, they are all equally confused in this regard, and they thus can
interact consistently within that mutual confusion. In a similar context, a
later Buddhist thinker speaks of two persons who, because they have the
same ocular defect, can hold an intelligent conversation about the two
moons that they see. 183 Other, additional, errors are not "stable" (drdha) and
all pervasive, and they therefore can be contravened by other perceptions
182 PVin adI.59 (roO.12ft): de yang shes pa thams cad kyi yul bzlogpa na bsfadpa dangcigshos
su ji ltar smra ste / khyad par med pa'i phyir ro zhe na / nye bar bsfad pa'i bag chags mtshams
sbyor ba medpa'i skyon gyis mi mkhas pas kyang tha snyad fa yid brtan du med par mthong bas
gcig ni tshad ma ma yin par brjod fa / gzhan ni bag chags brtan pa 'i phyir 'khor ba ji srid bar mi
'bral bar rjes su 'breI pa ni tha snyad fa mi slu ba fa ltos nas 'dir tshad ma yin no /'di ni kun tu
tha snyad pa 'i tshad ma'i rang bzhin brjod pa yin te / 'di fa yang pha rol rmongs pas Jig rten slu
bar byedpa'i phyir ro / bsam pa las byung ba nyid kyi shes rab goms par byas pas rnam par 'khrul
pas dben zhing dri ma med fa log pa medpa don dam pa 'i tshad ma mngon sum du byed do. Cf.
PVin as collated against the fragments collected by Birgit Kellner: upapfavavasaniiniibhisandhido!iid aprabuddhasyiipy aniifvasikaY(l vyavahiiram utpafyann ekam apramiiIJam iicak!ita,
aparam ii sa?psiiram avifli!fiinubandhad.rhavasaniitviid iha vyavahiiriivisaY(lviiditpek!ayii pramiiIJam, sa1pvyavahiirikasya caitat pramiiIJasya riipam uktam atriipi pare vimiihii visaY(lviidayanti lokam iti cintiimayim eva prajfiiim anufifayanto vibhramavivekanirmafam anapiiyi
piiramiirthikaY(l pramiiIJam abhimukhikurvanti.
183 Such is my liberal interpretation ofrhe metaphor as used by KamalaiJla (TSP adTS 908).
The actual context here is rhe "unconscious error" required by rhe apoha-rheory. In order for
us to apprehend language as related to rhe external world, we must misconstrue rhe mental

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUST I fYING THE SOURCES OF KN O WLEDGE

JI7

which lack those t.rrors. No pt.ra:ption of an ordinary being, howevt.r,

cowd evt.r conmvt:ne mt. internal distomon, bt:caUSt. an ordinary ht:ing's
~fcq)tion is always distoned by it.
Nevcrthdcss. beings :lilt. not (.tt.maIly doomed to distorted ~ra:ption .
Thq mOlY "culcivatt. mt. wisdom bom of contt'mpI2tion: and ht'u, "con
templottion" dearly mearu tht' rigorous 2nalytic:al 2nd meditative protcticc:
that I~ to "seeing things 25 they~" (yilthibh,;taMrWtulJ. To c:n~ in
such 2 pn.cticc, one must h2ve 2 pro~r unckrstanding of how conven
tional ~fCCprion md inference o~rate. H2ving learned the correct (i.e.,
Buddhist) theories concerning the instruments of knowledge. md h2ving
:applied one', instrumental cognitions to tht. malysis of reality itSelf, one
then develops the contcmpbcion du.t leads ro the realiu.tion of the Wtim2tt.
instrument oflmowledge. If we trUSt Siky.abuddhi's opinion. the ultim2te
pr.m4!'4 would be the pure, nondual, rdl.exive awauness of the mind
itself.'" But while this ultimue instrumentotl cognition is the mans to
Dhannaldni's finot! sotmological goal, it is nOt useful for prxtical 2C(ion
in tht' world (i.e., SIIf!Wlrll). If the ultimate instrument of knowledge is
indeed some pure fo rm of rcfIexive 2Wlrencss, then there ace no longer
aternOl1 nhjK'L~r even m~nt21 mnr~nr---<>n whir.h '" act. Hence, it
would seem rhn oonvcntiOn21 ~rctptioOJ 2nd inkrences ~ eventu2lly
\t.ft behind, but in terms of cognitions for pn.aical 2Ction in tht. world,
thtsc conventional cognicions are 25 IfWCWOnhy and irtcproachablt. as any
such cognition could evt.r be.
I have discussed Dha.nnakini's norion of ultimate and conventional cog.
nition in order to bring us back to the iuues that o~ned the chapter,
n:undy. the notion that the instrumentality orinference ill :accepted in rei:!..

rion to a final goal. Borrowing from Karl Potta's work, we made the over
all point that the ~nt'r.d notion of instrumenrality is tied to purpose, 2I\d
thu South Asian minkc:n; ofDhamukini's time were especially concerned
with some highest purpose. Drawing on Stt'inkc:llnt.r', work, I pointed to
Dh:umalcirri', nttd to defend the value ofhis highest goal, but I also tug
gc:srl!d ch.:al his conception of what is dU2ble in the ,.,,,"Vto Uut goal like.
wise provides an axiological contat fo r his thought. We find he~ a
conltnQ of couap!uaI and IinsuOOc CGpIino... .....:h ~ ..-.:: e&kc dMlIC mmmtllO aomebow
~ idmOOd 10 dw; real, t:m::rnaI thinp chat they rcpiuu.t. lr anyone ~ DOl fa make dw error,
!ben _ would ~ wubIc: IOspcak in~ with wr penon, but Una: all I&KQ ol~
do maU dw~, ..-.:: an 5PCaIr intdJiajblywidl achodlcr.bow rbc...,.id, Stt:abowor: (rl,).
1M Stt PVT .sJPV).U l.-u

J,

uarubtcd in the appendix.

}III

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAIMAKIRTI"S PH ILOSOPH Y

rKiprocal rdalion of munW constraint and compalibiliry that pertains

bctwn pam and goal.
To dOK this final chapter. I would funher suggest mar Dharmakini's
nocion of ultimalc and convcnlional irutruments of knowledge may well
embody !llllt relacion bctwccn pam and goal. If we well' good BuddhiSi
sludt:ntJ of Dharmaldrti. we would .seck to be: as fully correct as we could
possibly be: in our convcnuonaJ knowicdgc within S111fJSlr.. most par1KU.
larIy when mar knowledge pem.ins to the Buddhisl pach. Ac the same lime.
we would wish that scrupulous adhcrmct co COIttCt ways ofknowing-YCf.
i6able through Ihe efficacy of our inter.Ktioru within S111JUIirlf-tO lead us
(0 some higher way of knowing in an immaculate selle frtt of ignorance:.
Our ordinary instruments of knowledge are conraminalcd by Ihe incemal
dislOnion that is ignorance:, ytt they muse be: compatible with mat amor
dinary state of pUll' cognition in which ordinary objeru fall away. And tillIt
same aahcd Slate, while uCterly free of Sil1!JSIin,'s impurities, mwt iut:!f
remain accessible 10 those correct (but worldly) ways of knowing.

Conclusion

I tuve aim~ IOdcvdop a hislorial. reading of the g:n u;u i.uo in Dhilrlllakini'l philwophy KI lUi tu pn..vide an imerprtution of his work as it is prestnl~ by tht: earlieJI
known commenalors. In doing 50, 1 hope [0 have contributed 10 the history ofidc::as embodi~ by a line ofimagincd Dharmakirtis found in the var
ious commenW'ies to Dharmakini's worb. BUII:also hope: thai an acc:oum
of Dhannwni's thouglu from the perspective of a single commennri.al
SlralQm will prompl questions that arc otherwl.K more difficuh to ask. For
example. in.lOffiC comaa one nuy find it bcsl to examine a specific issue-such as the notion of insuumenlality--al various commentarial stnf:l. To
do so, one would uace the imerprmcion of that issue through many centuries of commc.narics, perhaps including nOl only commentaton writing
in Sanskrit, bUI a150 Ihose who compo5C their works in Tibetan. To be
worthwhilt:, such a srudy would have ( 0 provide a history of the interprctalion ofinslrumentality, and one wculd therefo re hi! obIign!:also (0 notice
and interpret the distinctions among various commcntarial interpretations.
As a result, we will ccnainly learn a grt:al deal about the issue under examinarion, but we will also find it difficult to gain an undmtanding of the way
in which that issue relata to other alpttlS of DhannakJrti's thought. Our
difficulty in gaining such an undentanding siems largcly from the enonnity
of the task in question: on the one hand, we wish to discuss the way in
which various aspccu ofDharmakini's thought are intcnwin~ , but on the
other, we have committ~ ountlvCli to aamining several centuries of com
mentary. To accomplish both mks, we would bt: compelled to give an
accounllhat:addresses ICYerai aspccu ofDhannakini's thought in terms of
ICYerai distina commentarial strata. The sheer quantity of m:ucrial and the
diw~nt tendencies of the difft:rcnt commenr.uial sinra involYfti render
that app~ impossible. both for iU2udicncc and iu 2uthor(S), AJ a rc:suit,

HROUCHOUT THIS BOOK

'"

FOU N DAT IO N S O F D HARMAKIRT I 'S PHILOSO PHY

JI0

tilt: prxtic:al

and intt:rprer:ive lirnit'2t1olU of a nudy mat ranges widdy across

commenwia.llaycn will (end to avoid cenain queSliolU,
The qUCllions I have in mind arc those Ihat involve an interprttltion
focused on thc systcmaricity of Oharmakirti's work as it is pl'tsenled in
caeh commcnrarial SU'2rum. In attending especially to systemaricity, ~
echo certain concerlU of the commcntarial uadidon, in mal itS method
presumes such systematiciry: each po.1ition mUSI be fully compalible with,
or ideally, implynoU)' other position.' Our appropriation of the commentatOI1' ancmion 10 S)'Stematiciry allows us to mort ~rly understand cerain choices that they have made, and by asking questions Ihal Ihe
commenaron have IlOt asked, we abo highlight thc concerns that we bring
10 the tcn- whtthcr OUT conttrm be historical, philosophical, ethical, or
of sorm other vanny, Certainly, it is not the case mat a J)'Stcmabc reading
of this kind will respond 10 all of our interests: the IlOtion mat Dharmakini's views changed over the: coune of his life is one wue mat attention
to SYSlcmaticity might obscure. Nnomhdess, il may give us a grtater appreciaciOllnot only for certain dcmems ofDhannakini's worX, but also for the
tr.Wition of inlerprcution thai dc:sccnd5 from it.
In discussing Dharrmkini'J "lOne through iu foundational poinu, I hope
nOI only to have cncouraged questions that attend to systemaricity, but
aho to haw raised some of themobliqudy. One aamp1c is my allusion to
the place ofaxiological cona:ms in Oharmakirti', theory of instrumentality. This is a qucstion thai can only be asked in a way thai emphasizes the
syuematicity in Dharmakini's thought. Along similar lines. I will conclude
wilh the overall contOurs of an interprer::a.tion thaI springs from a simiw
qucstion, namely. the rclationmip among three. issues in Dharmakirti'.
thoughr: nature {lIJIIbhawt}, intrinsically ilUuumemal percqxion, and petson:a.l transformacion or rdinemcol. My argument on this point will rcmain
only suggestive, but it will serve to C:lC'mplifY me: type of srudy that might
e:mcrge from the: ime:rprc:t:uion I ha\'C ptc$Cllted.

Naturt, Pn'ttpt;on and Rtjinnnmt

As mentioned above, Devcndrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi maint'2in that, on
Dharmakirtj'J view, a pe.ceprion is in.Slrumenw in mal it leads to a cornet
I I II

<><hn-.. ~'. """''-'''_ .-.110 ;..~ ~'. ......... .;.,

sko nor>>n....d>aoty whok...toow para mwualy rrinfon:ceado..don.

*"

dot III..."duaion.

CONCLUSION

J"

judgment about that a5pt of the object in question which has the expcaed
tdic efficacy rabhimilurth.Itri]t1). In the cut of SOtnt ~r~tions . instrumentality may depend on a subsequent irutrumental cognition. For eumpic, when I see a bright color on the othtt sidt of the fidd, 1 may think that
1am seeing a fire, but that ~rcrpt:ion's lack of acuity will r~uirt that I 1M
some other instrumental cognition to come to a dtfinirivc determil12Uon
(nika;lll) conoernina this isslK': in such a cut, I will only know mat I am
mng fire when, for example, I inkr its presence from mng the smoke ruing above that spot. The instrutntntality of this type of ~iCt:ption is considered lO be -o:mnsic- rpaTllt4f1). Undu other conditions, a ~rception
produces such a determination direaly in the form of a correa ~lUprual
judgment. A perception of this latter kind is considered to have -intrinsic
insuumenrality" (SVtIIil/1 pribMlfYII). Sum pt:.ceptioru are instnuncntaJ only
in that they direaly produce a definitive determination of (rhe capacity
for) the expected tdic efficacy; hence, even though any such pe:rcrpt:ion is
nCCt1suily MMDnaphull its iruuumentaJity rests on a correct amaphull
cognition, namdy, the correct judgmenr (a definitive dtlerminalion or nilclIJ4) mal it immediatdy produces. Thai judgment, moreover, is correa in
rMr if JlIIIY'.,..crully ~ rn lm Im!iry fMr ruu the 6pc:crM. rdic dJic:aq. II
;1 in rd:nion especially 10 these bntt lCl ccl"ions ,nd rhe judgmenrs [hey
mUll produce mat Dharmakini's notion of I12turt (Wilbhlllll.) plays an a~
cialIy aucw role.
The nOlion of nature ClplUre5 our attention when we note how the
apoN-rheory accounts for a correa judgment'SsUCCC'Ssful reference 10 such
an entity. Let us suppose lhal we h2ve a perception lha, immediately
inGlIcu the judgment. -nil i. :I. w::I.tCf'_jllg. R.eetlling our dU.curllon of me
apoh.theory, we know that this determination cannot refer by way of its
rdation to some real universals because Dlwmaldrti denies the ultimate
eristencc of universab. Instead. Dtwmakini musl aca)unt for reference
simply on the basis of particulars alone. He does so by appealing to the
norian that each entity that ~ call a &water-jug" is the same as every other
emiry wr -e call :I. w:ltcr_j ug in wr all those enrities I"ve the J:lI1l.e eff'ea.

One may thus differentiare them from other entilies thar do not have the
dfttr in qucstion. Hence, even though every Imtity is entirely unique, one
effectively ignores the uniqueness of "water-jugs" in reluKm ( 0 each orner
and focuses on their distinction from tho entities that do nOt have the
effect in qucstion. One thus construcu a universal that, in the final analy.~. eGmin. o f th~ cxdwion of ~ entities that do not lu._ the (:;1.1.1.01
chatacteristia expected of what we aU II &water-jug."

FOU NDATIO NS O F OHAIMAKJRTrs PHI LOSOPHY

}1l.

Discussing the llpoh11-rheory, we nored me difficulty Dhannaldni faces

in justifying tht: daim m:1II all the entities in question have mc same effect.
ParadigmaticaUy. he appeals [0 the ~enes.s of the pclCCptw.1 image cawed
by each particular -..tcr-jug. Thus, all "Woltcr-jugs" are: the: samc in that
the:y a1l have: the same effect: mey produce the same image. Peruprual
images. however. arc meow particulan. and Dharmwrti snictly mainrains that all panicu1an arc unique. How, then. can he claim that all those
mental inugcs arc the same? It would Sttm that, JUSt as all the paniculars
that we call "-..ter-jup" arc in fact diffen!m from each other, all me images
produced by those entities should 1iJcrwis,c be unique. Dharmakini responds
once again by appcaling to sameness of cf&ct. That is. ~n though all the
emitia that we call "water-jugs" arc actually diff'en!nt from each other. we
call them the same in that, with other conditions in place, they produce the
same effect, which is a pcrctptual im . Likewise, ~n though the pficcptual images produced by those cnciries arc acrually diffcrcm from each
other. we may consider those images to be the same because. with other
conditions in placc, they tOO produce the same effect. But what is this same
effect
all the images produce? It is a $eCOnd-ordC"r determination mat
coruuues the entiry thar produced me imagt to be the samc as the other
entities in question. Thus. all "'waterjugs: although actually unique. may
be considered the same in that they have the same effect: a certain kind of
perceptual im.; and all those imago:. alrhough acrually unique. rm.y be
considered the same in that they all have the same effect: a certain kind of
sccond-order determination.
In our ~ier discussion of this appcal to a sccond-order dcrermination,
I nOted that Dhannakjni's initial problem was an infinite regress: at each
level, the: conceptually connructcd RmeOC$ll or a set or entities is warranted
by the acrw.1 sameness or their effect. but those first-order elftct:s arc the
same only inasmuch as wir effectS are also the same. Hence. in order 10
avoid this infinite rcgrca. Dharmwrri docs not argue that the aforemen.
ttoned SttOnd-ordcr determinations arc the same because they all have the
same effect. Instead. he :asserts that those determinations simply prescnt
themselves in such a -..y due they sc:cm to be the same. But why do those:
dC1:erminaoons.seem [Q be the same? The answer is suaiglufu rward: because:
it is the natun! of their causes the perccptual irnap-to produce dcrermina,ions that seem the same. And why do me pero:prual images have that
natun!? Because it is the nature of their causes-the perceptual objects in
'1..~r;.,n--(I) rroduCJe ;m2~.,f rhar kind. F..-plainM in rhil way. Ohar_
malcini's theory roou ,he conccprually construaed sameness ,hat accounu

,ha,

CONCLUSION

for a correct judgment's reference in the nomological natures of causally

efficient things.
Returning now to the intrinsic instrumentality of habituated perceptions, we see that the notion of nature plays a critical role in Dharmakirti's
theory. Such a perception is considered to be instrumental because it immediately produces a correct judgment concerning the relevant causal capacities of the object in question. And the correctness of that judgment is
warranted by the very nature of the object itself. Read in this fashion, Dharmakirti's thought appears to be a fairly straightforward brand of realism, in
combination with a nominalist stance toward universals. In the context of
instrumentality, his thought appears to rest on a kind of internalist foundationalism, where knowledge is ultimately rooted in the indubitability of
habituated perceptions.
We come to such a conclusion, however, only if we ignore other contexts
in which the notion of nature appears. In our analysis of svabhavapratibandha, for example, we saw that, for Dharmakirti, an entity's "nature"
must be a conceptual construction that represents the totality of that entity's
causal characteristics. While that construction is restricted by the causal
functionality of the particulars involved, it is nevertheless mind-dependent,
in that factors such as interest, acuity and habituation always playa role in
the formation of concepts according to Dharmakirti's apoha-theory.2
Another way to express this point is to note that, if two persons are
observing the same perceptual object, the images produced in the minds of
those persons are unique particulars. As particulars, those images differ,
and whatever might be the causal variations in the non-mental factors, the
differences in the minds involved will make those images different. Hence,
the "nature" of the object in question is in significant ways reflective of the
mind in which that object is being perceived. 3 This dependence on the particular state of a being's mind might lead us to think even more strongly

2 See the discussion in chapter 3 (I84).

3 Note that, on DharmakIrti's view, the particular conditions in the production of an effect
will slightly alter that effect such that it may have a distinctive quality; hence, even if it may
be counted as the same as other effects in a general sense, its particularity will distinguish it
even from those other effects. This basic point is made in PVI.2I: "It is seen that substances
have different kinds of capacities due to the differences in conditions, such as location.
Because one has observed such a special capacity in a thing in one place, it is not correct that
one is certain of the existence of that special quality in the same kind of thing in another
place" [defadibhedad drfyante bhinna dravye!u faktayap I tatraikadntya nanyatra yuktas
tadbhavanifcayap}.

}l.4

FOU NDAT IO NS O F DHAlMAK IATI 'S PHILOSO PHY

Ihal Dharmaldni is rc:soning 10 an inlernalisr found.arionalism rooted in

irrerngable and prival~ se:nse: ciao, blU in fia, Dh:annakini clearly rejects
the ultimai(' rdiabiliry of such data,
The previow chapter ended with a reference ro Dharmaldni's norion of
an "inranal diston ion," which applies only at the level ofEpine:mie Idealism, Through that diHonion, all the pe:rce:ptions of ordinary persons are
conraminaled by ignorance. That distortion, moreover, operates in a manner analogous [0 orner casc:s of nonronttptual error, as in the tnmpl~ of
the bent nick: when one visually examines a Slick that is panially submerged in water, one will ha~ Ihe visual impreuion thai the nick is bent,
and any straightforward phenomenal accounl of one', peiCeption would
have to include a tqX>n such as, -rru.t nide is bem." Thil tnmple demonStratcs thar, given the eircunutanccs (angle of vision, a panieular kind of
visual faculty, and 50 on), the error will remain irremediable:; the cognitive
image in the peiccption is one in which the nick will always: look bent,
and an image produced unde:t thOiC circunutanCCS can ncver be phenomenally "straightened OUt" as il wcre. Along these: same lines, Dharmaldni's
Episternie Idealism maintains that the "internal distonion" applics to aU
perceptions of all ordinary persons: all cognitive images involving me fiye
sc:nse: faculties will always include an irremediable diS(onion whettby the
perceprual object would appear to aisl ouuide: of mind. And JUSt as the
nick is nOI actually bem, 50 [00 the object is nOI acrually extra-mental.
Thus, in a significanl way. the sense data of aU ordinary persons arc fimdamenally flawed, and with rqard to at least 50me ontological issues, sense
data therefore cannot be the foundation for one', knowledge.
Our discussion of ulrimatc and conventional knowlccigc, howa>e(, indicated that Dhannaklrri docs not just dismiss Ihe peiCeptions of ordinary
persons. despite me dislonion inhcmlt in them. Instead, he considm them
to be ~convemional innrumenu ofknowiedgc" that we may we for vari ous purposes, including our progres5 IOward spiritual emancipatio n.
Hence, even rnough the mind-dC?=ndency of a perceprual object's nalUfe
in part means that an ordinary person's pcrttption of it will be: distoned,
that dinonion docs nOI entirely vitiate the perception. We can understand
this poim by rc:calling dlllt the imrinsie instrumentality of a percq)[ion
depends on that perception's abiliry ro immediately produce a correct judg.
m~nt of wm~ asP' of the perceptual object that is relevant to the purpose

CONCLUSION

J"

hand. BUI 10 be insnumenw in mis fashion, the perttpdon need nOI

produa ;I correct judgmenl aboul twry asp!: of:lll objro:. Hena. my
paotprion of a patch ofbluc: may lad directly ro lhe determirnuion, lnat
is blue. - And if that judgment is rebant ro my purpose, then that peraption is intrinsically irutrumenw, Suppose, however, that I am concerned with me question of whether ,hal pen::cplual objro: endures for
more than one iruwu. In my current scue. my perceptual d:atll. alone will
not enable me (0 directly determine. -'T'hal is momentary-; hence, dUI
perception is ".1 instrumental in rq:ud ro mome:ntarine:u. Likewise, if my
purpose: rtquircs that I know whether that perctptual object is in faa extramental. then my perception wiU again not be instrumental, sina it is con
taminated by the: internal distortion that makes all of my sensory obje:cu
srem extemal.
Despite such dinon;olU and inadequacies. :lIl ordinary penon 's pttce:ptwIU have whal we mighl call a -quotidian instrumentality-; that is, they
;Itt insuummtal about numerous ordinary iuue:s. Indeed, most of our quotMiian conarns (Is mil teacup hOf: ~ Is this w:&ter cold?) are matters aboul
which OUI pen:qKioru::lIe irutrument.al, despite:lllY internal distortion:llld
",her $1Id.. probll!mc. 111;$ 'l'U)fidi:ln in$f",menl'2liry i$ OO!rT:I. inly (':I" of
wM.t Dhumakirti moIU when he tpeW of such perceptions :u rtJnvnlhOM/ in5trumenu of knowledge. Moreover, Ihe Sanskrit term 1I11!'1IJll1l4hlrill., the conventional, suggesu that a perception iJ conventionally
ac::c.epa.ble in thai it somehow cohercs with the distoned li~rld of ordinary beinp.' One pbyfu1 metaphor that applies in this amtext is the coherenl (if limited) conversation that two drunbrds may have about the (W()
moon. dUl both 1ft. Both beine; eqiWly soused. dtey both see [WI) moon .
and they can each remm to the omer about mis remarkable even[. O r perhaps even more i propos is the example of the -pus-rive:rs" seen by IfthlS
r hungry ghosuj . ThaI is, when humans and 1ft" gue at the ume Aowing substaoa:. humans see :II river of w:&ler, but 1ft" see a river of pw.
The f.&a mal their perc:eptiOIlS cohe~ diffcrencly-humans aglU that it is
w.uer, hungry ghom:agree th:u i, is pUlo--is a ray.h of the karma ,hal h:u
shaped the likworld that they inhabit. From the perspective ofhumaru. the
hungry ghostS' perttptwllS att dUlorted. :lIld from me point of view of :II
hungry ghOSt. the humans see it wrong, Nevenhdess, the humans aglU
;II

I :un thinkinB "f'";,uy 01 thr.."y in wt.ido U{N'pd,,"u.. impl>er, U\lIUKIionaJ or

ItllUlah", ou!l'1tNc furmt dv conl",,1 01000:" pr.ctial aaionIloward. pi. 5C't lbr p~
riow chapin. Il. st.

326

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

among themselves that what they are seeing is water, just as the hungry
ghosts agree that they are seeing pus. 6 This cosmological example is useful
for understanding Dharmakirti's notion of conventional perception. That
is, even though the lifeworld experienced by ordinary persons is contaminated by the internal distortion and other such problems, they can usually
agree on what they are seeing. In other words, their perceptions cohere in
regard to most daily issues.?
We might think, then, that we have returned to some admixture of
internalist foundationalism, confirmed by an appeal to coherence. The
ultimate arbiter of a habituated perception's intrinsic instrumentality
amounts to the fact that our perceptual content appears a certain way to
us, and in this sense the theory resembles an internalist foundationalism.
But when we examine our perceptual process rationally, we uncover certain contradictions that point to fundamental distortions (such as the internal error) in that process. Concerned that our sense data may therefore be
somehow compromised, we confirm our interpretations of our perceptions
by appealing to what others report, and we find that everyone from whom
we can receive a verifiable report is in agreement, at least to a degree that

6 Along the lines of Asa.ti.ga' s Mahiiyiinasal?lgraha (I5b-I6b), this case is raised by Vasubandhu
in his Virrtfatikii, a text that Dharmakirti probably considered important. Sakyabuddhi and
Devendrabuddhi refer quite clearly to the Vil?lsatikii (see the translation in Appendix 7, especially notes 14 and 18). The point of the example is that the same locus is seen by different
communities of beings in divergent ways. Vinltadeva (I77a) limits his interpretation to different communities of hungry ghosts; this is less striking (and less well known) than the
notion that beings in entirely different karmic states are having radically different experiences of the same spatiotemporallocus. In Dharmakirti's time, Candrakirti refers to such a
case (Madhyamakiivatiira 6.71), but a particularly clear account is offered much later by Asvabhava in his commentary (82b-83a) on a verse from Kampala's Alokamiilii:
Due to the variety in their karma, when pretas look at one river, it is filled with pus,
and it likewise has the scum of urine and excrement; that is, it has a scum that is a mixture of feces and urine. But when humans look at that same river, they see it as clean;
and they drink it. ['las sna tsogs pas chu bo gcig fa yang rnag tu 'brub cing de bzhin du

bshang gcin rnyog pa dang /dan na / phyis dang gcin 'dres pa'i rnyog pa dang !dan par yi
dags kyis mthong ngo / de bzhin du chu bo de nyid fa mi yis chu bo dri ma medpar mthong
ba dang ni 'thung ba yang yin no I]
7 I will not discuss here the mechanisms of that coherence, but in addition to an obvious
appeal to karma, Dharmakirti's theory also likely rests on some notion of intersubjectivity as
briefly described by Vasubandhu (Vil?lsatikii I8ab and Vrtti): "Cognitive representations are
mutually restricted due to mutual influence. That is, due to the mutual influence of their cognitive representations, all beings' cognitive representations mutually restrict each other, as is
appropriate" [anyonyiidhipatitvena vijfiaptiniyamo mitha~ /r8ab/ sarve!iil?l hi sattviiniim any-

onyavijfiaptyiidhipatyena mitho vijfiiipter niyamo bhavati yathayogam}

CONCLUSION

~enables us to engage in practical actions about subjectively obvious sense

t~bjects, such as a glass of water. It would seem this confirmation need be

terformed only b~ those who h~ve uncovered the rational inconsis~encies
~n our understandmg of perceptIOn, and once we know that those mconlistencies are irrelevant to our quotidian concerns, we can bracket out the
Ja,istortion revealed by our rational analysis and rely on our habituated sense
l~pressions-the ones that do not involve any doubt-to pursue our quolidian goals. Metaphorically, we might say that we are all wearing defective
.lasses of a certain type. We find that the defects are irrelevant for quotidmatters, and since everyone is wearing the glasses, no one offers a diverlent report on obvious perceptual objects. Thus, even though we know
~at the glasses are somehow distorting our perceptions, we need not be
~ncerned with those distortions because they affect neither our daily goals
lbr our known communications to other perceivers. We can thus rely on
Ihose habituated perceptions at face value, at least for the purpose of daily

!lin

~~>
~atters.

Dharmakirti's notion of conventional instruments of knowledge sugIgests an account along these lines, but we need to add an important stipu0~tion: namely, that on Dharmakirti's view, we are all deeply dissatisfied
:th those daily lives. Thus, even though our perceptions are adequate to
.jmd consistent with) the way we lead our lives, we would prefer that our
:. ::~es were otherwise. In short, Dharmakirti's theory assumes that we seek
:~ escape the lifeworld in which our perceptions are embedded. The possi~~Wity of escape is indicated by the very conventionality of perception itself:
':,though our perceptions are coherent in relation to that lifeworld, they
I. in fact erroneous from an ontological perspective. It is thus not contra.tctory for hungry ghosts to see pus in one locus, while humans see water
.' ~,. the very same locus. A contradiction is avoided because these perceptions
;o. not fully correspond to ontological realities, and to the extent that they
" er, they are located within different conventions which are sustained by
l~e beings within each world. Hence, inasmuch as some aspects of our pertption~ are err~neous, the ~y we perceive the :world does not r~flect an
pntologlCal realIty. In part thIS means that, even If we feel and belIeve that
~'~r perceptions correspond to the way things really are, the lifeworld with
.l.hi
.... ch those perceptions cohere is not ontologically given. Leaving that life'prld behind therefore does not require some kind of radical ontological
Jrakeover-a task that would seem impossible, given Dharmakirti's notion
';,causality. Instead, escaping that world is a matter of eliminating the per~,~Ptual errors that sustain it.

i
ifI"

r
~!',

j,

328

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

For Dharmakirti, it would seem that this elimination of error proceeds

through a gradual process of refinement. Speculatively, we might say that
the goal is to alter the dispositions that, from the perceiver's side, contribute
to the construction of a perceptual object's nature. In other words, the transition from one lifeworld to a more refined one is facilitated by coming to
see the world in a certain way, which in effect means learning to construct
natures in a particular fashion. The construction of nature; however, is not
a matter of manipulating sense data after they are in place; rather, it is creating a mental context in which sense data will appear a certain way, within
the constraints posed by the causal characteristics of the objects in question.
For Dharmakirti's purposes, perhaps the most effective way of shaping the
mind in this fashion is reasoning.
Consider, for example, the reasoning that leads one to understand that
a seemingly perdurant entity-such as a water-jug-is in a constant state
of instantaneous flux. Through the careful application of that reasoning
and subsequent contemplation of the conclusions that one reaches, one
eventually begins to see such entities as momentary. In other words, one
starts with an unhabituated perception: the water-jug just looks utterly perdurant, and this perception is therefore not instrumental in regard to the
water-jug's momentariness; indeed, the notion that it is momentary may
seem so counterintuitive that it is at the very edge of what we can plausibly entertain. Applying, however, the appropriate inferential reasoning to
that perception, one realizes that the water-jug is indeed momentary. Eventually, by using reasoning and contemplation to habituate the mind to the
momentariness of such objects, one no longer needs to rely on an inference:
the object now appears momentary when one gazes upon it; that is, one may
immediately determine that it is momentary without appealing to any intervening inference. Gaining this insight, one has effectively left behind one
faulty lifeworld-in which beings see and react to such objects as if they
were perdurant-and moved on to a more refined one, in which at least
that one error has been eliminated. 8

8 I am alluding again to the verse cited earlier from Santideva (BCA 9:3-4ab): "In this regard,
it is observed that there are two kinds of persons, the spiritual adept (yogin) and the ordinary
person. Among these, the ordinary person is refuted by the adept. And adepts are refuted by
successively more advanced yogins through a distinctive quality of their understanding" [tatra

loko dvidha dmo yogi prak.rtakas tatha I tatra prakrtako loko yogilokena badhyate II badhyante
dhivife!era yogino 'py uttarottarai{ll}. Prajiiakaramati provides the gloss of loka as "person(s)"
(jana), but it is tempting here to translate it as a "lifeworld."

CONCLUSION

'"

If lOme such modd underlies Dharmakini', notion of rdinement. then

reasoning p\;ays a crucial rok in the trmsition from an etTOntow lifcworld
10 a more rdined one. NcvcnhelCQ, tcaIOning is dearly not sufficient in
irsdf: it mUSt be guided by certain interesu and questions, without which
one could not conslrue an object's nature in the required fashion.' That is,
10 begin an inquiry into the ICCming pcrd urance of entities, one must be
motiv:ued by some desire ro know (jij/ils;J) directed toward some p~
{JmtJojIlNlJ. Here, one central purpose is to eliminate the suffering associated with loss: when my favorite water-jug brcab, I am disturbed: as my
body deays and dies, I fttl unhappy. But to:addm.s the problem oHm, I
must ac:ccp1lhat I am suffering in that way. Liitcwise, I must believe thaI
it is possible to eliminate thaI sufferi ng, and I musl agree that rational
inquiry into my belief in pcrdurancc is It least pan: of the mcaru to do so.
Numetow other Buddhist claims soon become crucial : contemplation
enables reasoning to refine me mind: mora.! rectitude is a prerequisite for
effective contemplation; a morality rooted in compassio n is the most efftive COnla 1 for such praaices. Dharmakini would surel y maintain that ,
without these and numerous other conditions, refi nement through rcaIOning cannot ~ begin. In shon. the procr:u of rdiOC'ml':flf reql1i r~ nor
jwr Buddhist rc2JOning. hur a Buddhist w.ay of lik
Oharmmrri's recommendarion that we refine: O UrsdVCli through rcaIOning and conte:mplation can thus be read as an indirect argument for the
importance of Buddhist institutions. To PUt it baJdly, in order to become
more refined one must learn to seC' me: world like a Buddhist. And $ing
the world in mat fashion requires me pcrvuive conta l provided by the
Buddhi.u community. In other words, 10 see the wo rld :as a Budd.hUr, one
must aJlow Buddhist irutitutiollJ [ 0 mold one accordingly. And we can
thus swpcct that, wnatCVCf cbc they may do, Dharmakini's atgUmenlS arise
from-and scrve to defend-thosc institutions, NcvenhelCQ, s.ctting aside
our suspicion, we can draw orner lcuollJ from Dharmmn:i'l notion of
refinement: to be rdined, one mUSt acknowledge the contingency of one's
lifeworld. including iu institution. Rcfinemenl also requires mat one
accepl me possibiliry mal orner equally contingent lifcworids and inn.itu-

<-

9 To pul 11 anochn way, r:hc pi'obkm of aJUbjea-Wli in DhamWWti', norion of Nrul'C'

1OOffl, aIonl";d! hit nocion of r:hc conditioninc of pcrorpruaI judgnent (_ II4ffl .tquiru
dul, ~ any rcuonin&an M:applied. one must fi,.. ~ r:hc ~b;m of one', inkrcna in
1M approptble fashion. If, for exampIt;. one annor I that 01' .rtf II JU.tbinl penon..
inlttenca concHn;ng r:hc QUIlt of dut $Wkring ~ M applied.

330

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

tions, whose otherness places them at the edge of our ken, may have
resolved some of what we find unsatisfactory in our own. On this charitable reading, Dharmaklrti counsels us to seek out those institutions that
accept contingency and the possibiliry of refinement, and he urges us to
inquire into those other lifeworlds that, while not yet understood, may one
day aid us in the goals that we seek.

App~ndix

of Translations

A Nou on tht Tramilltions

provide me larger comot of the

poRioN cited in me body of this vrork. Where possible, me trotHSlations have been prepared from critical aiitions (I the bibliography). In me case of some Tibetan tou-most noably the commentaries
of Devcndrabuddhi and Sakyabuddhi-<ritic:al editiolU are not anilable.
for these texts, I employro me Sde-dge edition of m e Tibttan canon. On
some ocx:asioN, a passage in one of these tOU would prt:Knl, a.! il sQnds,
a meaning that seemed either grammalic:ally incoherenl or irreconcilable
wim me contOI of the argumenl. Only such passages were chod,ed for
variations in the Peking edition of the T ibetan canon ,
Some of the p~CI u;uularcd heft have been previously tnnslatcd,
and the chan below lists those previous versions. In my a~ricna, the best
translations build on the innluable work of their predecessors, and I am
dearly indebted 10 all who have worked on this material. I generally
avoided, hO'NCVCf. any consultation of previous translations umil the point
of preparing final drafts of the: pasnges presented below. It is hoped that this
proadun: preserved a certain nohnw ofinterprtt.uion.
Trarulalionl inlO German :and J:ap:anese wete consulud only on qUeflionable readings. TranslatioN iOlo English or French were checked mort
thoroughly, In some: cases, an inirial Muadon of a translation prompted
me to avoid coruulting it further, One or mort of mree basic reasons underlie such decisions: (I) the translarion follows primarily an indigenous
Tibetan imerpret3tion of an Indian tat whert Ihe afortmentioncd inlerprecuion cannot be reconciled with Dharmakirti's earliest commenQlon;
(1) the translation is unintdligible; andlor
the translation consistently
interprcu passages in a manner that is 50 grammatically or semantically
HE FOLLOWING TRAN SLATI ONS

u)

'"

}31

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTl'S PHILOSOPHY

implausible that no informed reader could accept its interpretation. It is

particularly impon:lnt to note that the first criterion- i.e., a translation by
way of a uniqudy Tibetan inrcrprctadon-bas no bearing whauocvcr on
the quality of the rr.mslation. It u inuead the historical constraints that I
have placed upon this work that limit the relevancc of such t~lations.
In general, I have avoided specific reference to previous trarulatioru in the
notes bdow, in part because ~ted mention of diugtttments would be
both tedious and poindcu. I thus leave the t:adc of detailed comparison to
me readt'f. II is, of course, my contention that where previous vcnions arc
available, I have nwk: at least some incn:::mcntal improvement. in the hope
truu this work tOO will be supcrscdcd before long.

APP ENDIX O F T IlANSLATI ON $

,.
0

1 '3
:J

1
:J

1 1Ji

'3

:J

!13 ....:;j

]
E

=I

:J

Ji

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j ....:; 1
j

:J

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~
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"
"'"

""

g ~
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J
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S i,

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,
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if.
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"

I A lnIUbclOn of "1dea1OOl" mdlkkl up 10 _ dmi aIm. pam" A I'ftIdmn& of "_

"
Uoduda ~ lhan _1hW, buc lipific:anl ponjoru luoo: '-n dJded. A InnSblion of"alI" iI
of dw;mti~pr . .

2 A "NIl'

COI' ...

harioo

IDanI

that I ....00: read alI"!he lnNbUon and CIOIllfM"'d. ~ili-

PVSV .... PVI.lI ..... llj

.Ht.!
.a: f 1.
"

d.

.. qt
, ~l~

K MlPVSV ..... PVI.U4-UJ

N_

PVw",

J~(99)l
Vaa Bijkn
Kauun (1910)
NlpComi (1911)

i
rll!
~a.

ti~

PVP ..... PV1.1-6

PVT .... rvr .... f'V'.I-6

PV,.I- IO

JY!
~~,

.. E- ..
.H~
~ ~:'

i.ii
,HI

.-

~~l
I &: i.,
!H

Eo"""
En,,""

......

,..u

'w'

,..u

'i'

PVT .... NSV ../)7VI.lI4-11) Non;e

brl:
r

lillnmn. (199) and 19t5I) AU

Yalta (1917 and. 1911)
All
Sdutioou
Franco (1"7)

Vmnh944l

.......

Van 8ijlcn

M~

.......
'w'

c..~

Limited

Enslish

,..u

Enslisb

...

,..u
,..u

AlI

J."...,.

SiT

M~

English

M~

o
z

o
~

"j

Umiled

Englilh

c._

'w'

c.~"

Limited

Umilcd

Limiled

'"'

PVf u'PVP .... PV,.".- ll.4

l'lQta 11991)

H8: t o,IH' "

Sttinkcllntr (1967)

AI,

All

NOI: Coruuhad

J."..-

IW1II31199I)

Iw.u h99l )

"""""

... """
Umiatd

Sdtcioru

pvp uPV,.I'4- 114

Vnltr (196,d

T_
T"""
..,..

"~
c

.......
Mm,
.......
.......

PV,.I'4--214

......
"""
......

N_

v.,., c.s.

pvp .... PV'.I- IO

All
All
All
All

Umilcd

z
<

1. PVSVad PVI.34-37

;"\Vell, then, if observation and nonobservation are not the basis for knowIng the positive and negative concomitance, then how does one know that
smoke is invariable as an indicator of fire?"
One knows it since
smoke is fire's effect because the characteristic of being its effect
is distributed over all instances of smoke. [PVI.34ab]
If a previously unperceived thing defined as perceptible is later perceived
:when other things are perceived, and if that thing is not perceived when one
among those other things is absent, then it is the effect of that thing. That
kind of definition of an effect applies to smoke.
If it exists even when the fire does not, then it is no longer
causally arisen. [PVI.34cd]
2Smoke is established to be the effect of fire from being seen to be so just
yonce because, were it not its effect, it would not occur even once from that
which is not its cause. And if an effect were to exist without its cause, then
it would be causeless. For that which exists without something else does not
have that other thing as its cause. If smoke were to exist without fire, then
fire would not be the cause of smoke.
Someone objects, "It would not be causeless because something else
could be its cause."
Such is not the case because the same problem applies, since smoke
occurs when fire is present, even if that other, alleged cause is absent. How,
moreover, could smoke occur from that which does not have the property-

1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from PVSV are based upon the interpretation of
;Siikyabuddhi.
32 Siikyabuddhi (PVT:50b) supplies:
One might wonder, "One has seen that one instance of smoke came from a particular causal complex of fire and so on. But if that which one sees later is something different, how can one establish that it is the effect of fire by observing that smoke came
from fire just once?"

335

J)6

FOUN DATIO NS O F D HA I.MAKIRTI 'S PH i l OSO PHY

IVilbh411t1 of producing smoke, whether it be fire or something else! If you

do not admit mal the cause must have: the property-wabh4~ of producing
smoke. then since an entity that does not have that propcrty-IWlbluiWl of
producing smoke docs nO( produce Imoke, smoke would be causeless.
We are not saying thaI the smoke iudf occurs from something other
than fire because we mean that something similar to smoke occurs from that
orner ming.
How can an entity that is similar to smoke come from a cause that is dissimilar 10 fire:? This is not possible because an entity similar to smoke comes
from an mtity similar to fire. If an dfta ,that is similar to some: Other dfta
:r: were: to come from a cause thaI wu dissimilar to causc of x, then the
causal capacities of thOle: dissimilar causes would nOI be restricted [0 producing dissimilar effttu. Hence, a difference in cause would not be detetminative of things as different.J Therefore. the diversity of the univeC1e
would be causcless, or ~ anything ....,ould come from anything. 1be:rd"ore,
since thOle: condusioru are unaccrpa.ble, it must be the case that the difference or nondiffe:rencc of efkcts is due: to the difference or nondiffe:rence
of causcs. Hena:, smoke docs not come from an object (tmha) that is dissimib.r to iu observed source because one would be: forced to c;ondude that
smoke is causeless. And thus,
since that which is causeless does nOI depend on anything else.
il would be either permanently existent or pe:rmanmtly nOnexistent. Things occur intermittently because: [h~ are: dependent.
[PVI.3d

If smoke were causdess, then, since it would not depend on anything for
its existence, it would never be nonexistent because there would be no
incompleteness in the conditiON for its existence, JUSt as there is no incompleteness in the c;onditions (or its aiuence at the time that it is accepted to
have been produced. O r dse it would not even occur at the time when one
accepts that it has been produced because that time would not be distinct
from the time when it is not aistmt. For it is by virtUe of their dependence
Ion a completc causal complex at a specific time and placeJ that thingt are
intermittcnt (ItllJiritlu.).

3 I.. ock. _..is. Oft< could ..... ..abIiah d.a. " ..... Y "'" d'n:..-. by ....,....t,,,& .0
w. x and , haft dilfncclI a .......

u.. r..c.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

337

Entities must be dependent in this fashion because the time [and place]
en and where an entity does occur have the capacity required for that
".;. tity to occur, but the time [and place] when and where an entity does not
!~cur do not have the capacity required for that entity to occur. This must
\: the case because otherwise the time [and place] that are a locus of that
~1tity's occurrence and the time [and place] that are not such a loc~ would
\t~ equal in terms of whether or not they had that capacity. As such, the fact
being ~ locus for the occurrence of that e~tity would not be restricte~ [to
"!pst the time and place that had that capacIty] and the fact of not be10g a
OC~cus for the occurrence of that entity would not be restricted [to just the
Itme and place that do not have that capacity]. And what else but the presi.!1ce of the cause could constitute that capacity?
Therefore, a thing that is occurring in one time and place in distinction
another time and place where it is not occurring is dependent upon the
~bnditions in the aforementioned time and place. In other words, its occur'ence in that fashion [i ..e:, in .a speci~c time and place] consti~utes its
Jependence on the conditions 10 that tIme and place because a th10g that
~d not depend on the causal support provided by those conditions in that
Ime and place could not be restricted in its occurrence to that time and
Ilace. Hence, since smok~ is restricted to a s~ecific tim~ and place, ~e
f,),ature-svabhiiva of smoke IS the product of that 10 whose tIme and location
Loke is observed [at least] once and in whose absence it is then not
1&1;,:
~bserved. This must be the case because otherwise, smoke would not occur
J.en once. And being restricted to that time and place where its cause is
~resent, how could smoke occur elsewhere [i.e., where its cause is absent]?
mf it were to occur elsewhere, it would not be smoke because a particular
~roperty-svabhiiva of smoke is that it is produced by that cause .
1:, Likewise, the cause, namely fire, also has the property-svabhiiva of prot4ucing that kind of effect. If smoke were to come from something else,
~en the capacity to produce smoke would not be a property-svabhiiva of
[lfe. Hence, fire would not produce smoke even once. Nor can that which
lomes from that other thing be smoke, for it has come from an entity that
~oes not have the property- svabhiiva of producing smoke. And if that other
(rung actually does have that property-svabhiiva of producing smoke, then
~at other thing must be fire. Hence, the relation between an effect and a
fuse is invariable.

:.;.if.
...

Ip

~\,,!

A termite tower is fire if it has the nature of fire. If it does not

have the nature of fire [which is unique in including the prop-

3)8

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAR.MAKI RTI S PHILOSOPHY

erry-swblMva of producing smokel. how could smoke arise in

me prcscncx of just a termite tOMr~ Smoke could not arise in
that casc bccau.sc fire has the propcrry-slJllbhi,," of being the
aUK: of smoke; its distinguishing characteristic (bhtJII) is to have
the ausal potential [0 producx smoke. If smoke Mtc [0 come
from that which is not the oUSt' ofsmoke. if would be ausdess.
[PVI36-37]

" A urmhc: wwu (Ukr...,;nJM..j .....y ..mctima em;' omoIu: due ,u ,he ........yinS nu.Lle'
wed 1<'1 wum !he "1!1 du.mbas.

2. PVSV,d PVl.6IJ-75
Real mings are themselves diErertnt,' but in concq>wa1 cognition
they appear as if nondifl'(~nt in that they appeu in SOIn( single
form . Th((: dtingJ Olppe;u m:,u Wily in (h;;J' mldr diflerc:nti.nion

is obscurtd by VI obscur.ui~ cognition which obscures' the form

of something else [-i.e., those distinct real things-J with its
own form [i.c . the fo rm o f a lingle image!. Th.:1.1 obscurative

cognition, although based on tho~ diff"crent mal things, has the

cognitive appearance of a single objt. WVI.68-691
Due to the intention of that cognition, a universal is commonly
said [0 aUt. BUI it docs nOI ultim:ndy exist in the way that it is
conccptualit.ed by thai cognition. [PVl.]o]
A conccptw.l awafcnm ari~ in dependence on things which arc
aduded from what is other than those [that have the samcca~o r dttctl.
In conformiry with the nature (prtUrrriJof its imprints, that awareness conaals the distinct fOrm of each of most things. and ascribes (0 them its own
nondiffi::rent appearance. Doing so, thaI conceptual awareness conRares
those things and presents them as nondiff"crent. Those things conceptual.
Iud as nondiff'emlt arc adudcd frem othen in that thq< have the same
effc.ca and causes; there is abo a cognitive imprint (1!dJ4/J1l) that induces one
to conccptualiu those things in that fashion. The nature (prak[ti) of those
distinct things themselves and the nature of that imprint are such that the
cognition that arises from those things and that imprint appcan in this way
li.e. such that those things seem nondifferem J. That awareness is obscurative (u'!'''!ri),.J that is, it obscures the form of something d se (i.e., those
distinct thinp ] with irs own form. In other words, th:tt cognition obscures

I Ncxt!hat ~ Sushil J)'fltaaical muaurc 01' theM:

approximated in ~.

n1CI (PVt.~)

cannot

be

2 p~ 'lOa Iw bc-cn chanpllO active ~ fo. $yntlCtic .implicit)'.

3'l'De lam ,.".",ri UlcnlIr conveys dw IoetU< o( "w ub.o:uri"," or "me, action 01' obKu,
in,, Hmec. the cosnirion is Utcnlly"an acrion oI'obKurin,,' Thil Iw bttn rmdcm:l with
"obicunti",, to.void unN ...,. qntaicromplait)'.

JJ9

HO

FOUNDATIONS OF O HAIMAKIRTI 'S PH ILOS O PHY

the difference among those: things; even though they arc themselves differem , they appc=ar nondiffemlt in that they appear with some single form, In
conformi ty with those things. appeanncc. we c:a.IJ Idle mentally con.structed
image) the ~ univas:al~ of those mentally occurrent real things, which appear
[Q be atcmal' due [Q being apprehended in ,he form of a specific kind of

.. .

cogn U iVC 1m

- But how is it that a universal is an other-uclwio n?~

That lconcqxually oonsuuCled i~1 is itsdf an other..er;dwion.1 ConcrptuaI awareness apprehends that. and since conttpu are by nature erroneow, the aw.neness appart as ifi, ~re apprehending a raJ thing. That
conceptual cognition occun only with regard [Q things that are excluded
from othen Imat do not have the same ClUSC5 or effects) ; as such, that
awareness is undernood to have an adusion as iu obiea.'
"But the distinct things in quc:stion are a ternal. and concepu do not

.. Sikpbuddhi (PVf:I,.t.1lf. K:1".6A):

MnoWiy __" " " " . j r1N"" mea", dK ioIlowin& H.";ns fl<.apc..ally apmmad
..... iaIlan. i.n ...........
!ha. czpcria>ct dw:n:: arixs in one', car_ p<...l ~

wm.

unclnr ~ ol_ thinp ....:h .......IH. ;.... and _ thinb.. 1'hd iI I ......_;..,.
and that ilalto I ..... In-jus. 01"lw univwAI PftWllfdirecdy (.111) 10 dIOK imIfCI.
IN. i. Goa !>Of pauin IdiRCdyl to partitulan ba:al*' mq. do !>Of apfIQl in an
lIeU wboK ob;m iI uniYaul.

,-=

S ~i (PVT:I/'b" K:169-170) p~ Ihil KCUon wi.h.n oo;caion:

"If.he uni~ich pma;", only 10 mmtaUy OCCVITmI muria Il.~. irnacalil , form (~pramtrd bycvnJXt.W coplion, tMn how an wun~ ~an
Ot~""""~ Yo.. have.u dw: D.d ....... 01 putiaalan "-a dw:U ~ ia
.... u~ dw io of .... lWUre of
panX:wus. ThaI ~ i~ of ~nc of
_
menIal form,)'OO p'(.iowIy aid dUI tIIc.oamcncu ('Jr.,., tt]iI- llwoI..rl)of
indiidualo I~". thoK ailed 'bI1H'1 !hal ha~ Ixm adu&d from thoeK {i.It..
tho noc aIkd 'bllH'l iI rMt IIOII-rd.nion with thoeK CKher _
(i.It., lhe non bI~
indiid.....Js):

me...:

me...:

6 PVT (17b6 - K:' 70.6)

The author ...y.. T1Nu . Thai ~na INI Iw been pbud In concqxw.I ~

_ iI iMif the other-eul1Uion ~ it Iw come aboul throup. tbcapttima: of

a n::aI thine (...,.,.. K: ,_.JtolMJth. ioaparaf( from odw:r minp. T1u1 io the d.ift'tt
(J,.".III) objc of apt ;fK\l."T"Iw; non-c.onn:tion lof any pva! PI"iculu with aU
odIm] iI the Nmibrity (arnonsputiculan] in the "'''"''' mac il il lthcob;a:t ofClptoJions only) mruophorically, [When OIw-JnUi"i JaY' thil.J be: iI ~U",!hal
individ.w. ftul"
IR; similar for jUl{ Ihillta50ll only,

.,..wJ

$+', dwdclhl, in .,...... ;.,." ;. cleu f"o.....,.,.... ro d..o ......,..;. of ,,~oll'e...! by

~~ ITS'")O..... OOS) and ICamaIaliI.a rrs p.J ri~).

APPEND IX OF TRANSLATIONS

,..

refer [dirttdy[ to aternal things. So howcan one luve a conceptual awarenw with ~ to them?"
Those who att analyzing universals distinguish [the concqxuaUy consuuettG im~ from the objectl. but people enrged in practical action
("",v.hanr}do not. Thinking mat their percqn is capable of ,die function.
those engaged in practical action unilY the visible object with the concepruaI
objt. and havine doM so. they act. It u in terms of the intention of perlOllS c:npged in practical action mat the rdatioruhip between univasals and
paniculan is explained in this way-i.e. such th.u particulars: which. by
vinuc of producing the (desiredl dftct. arc different from those: that do not
produce mat dfea. are made known as such by an expression [whose direct
object is necessarily a univmalJ. But those who ponder rd.ity do not consider the univcnal and the panicular to be nondifkrent because parDcu1ars
luve distinct cognitive images lin perceptual awarcnwl and so on.'
MBut if your Slllrement that m napa occur with regard to particulan
conforms to the intention of the person knowing them, then the universal
should flO( be an other-oclusion becawc it is not known in dut way by
th05C persons."
Not only is it nOI \mown in th,:1.1 w.Jy. hur it i~ :ilL., nm known :H l'ithl'f
rhl' urne u or different !Tom iu insflInoes, Of u pnnu.nO\{. all pervuive.
and SO on. Rather. awareness arises with JUSt a nondifTerent image. What
is the basis for mat awarcncu~ We u.y dul ia basis iJ oml'f-oclusion, and
we uy this because: (I] dult ocher-oc1wion does exist in rd. things: [11
thcrt it no contrad~ion lin claiming dut other-o.clusion is the basi.s for
such cognitions] : and 131 practical action that is based on language is
~ (0 proo::ud in ,hu tn2n~_
Moreover, mere is no rd. univcn:al wha~cr that exisa in the way
thai a conceptual or linguistic cognition appean, since
the individuals (lIJiIktil thl'nuclves do not occur in many things;
and nothing l'!5e thaI occurs in many things appcan. [PVI .71ab]
7 The objeaor'. paim ~ is !hal. on Dtwnukin i'IIhwr. (OI>Olptl dilUdy rmr only 10
c:onaptuaIIy CUI'UtJUCIcd ~ Hcnu. bowc:anOM aaouI\l eo. rdltl'Ula 10Klual. atft'naI thinp!
8 A.ording 10 ~ (PVT:aIl1 - K:171.19ff). and to on" indicaus

lWeI oeM rnIxaIU( _pea do 1\0( _10 aiIl.mm WKm: noobto..bk [pm'iaIbn)
and bea..... lpanic:ulanl 11m: ,riM;: funaion. but loou"pul do noc:

JOnI:

9 ~hi (PVT:I~ 1<.:1]).1)

&Ioua

"individual."

r..,u,.,.;) ... "putinllan

}41

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK IRTI'S PH ILOSOP HY

Individuals arc not distributed over each other. They annot be distrio.
utcd because if they ~ there would be no distina individuals; henc:e, o~
would be forced to condude th:1l there would aho be no universal." Moreover, it is not the caK that something that is other- i.e., dininct from those
individuals-----appears that way in awar~ness. And how c:an that which has
no cognitive ap~ct: induce one to apprehend or designate somtthing
dse as itsdP." Nor is it the caK that something is universal just because it
is a ungle thing whim is connected to those [pmkulanl because one would
incur an overextension. I have already explained this.It
"A single univrnal is the wan-am for expressions and cognitions that construe many individuals as nondiffacnt. It is not the caK that aU [entitW::s
that inhere in things, such as numbus, SJm'~ as wamnrs in that fashion! .But how c:an one have: a cognition of one thing from anoth~r thing~
"Because the on~ thing has a rdation to the other.~
Then one would be forced to conclude that number. effect-substance.
and so on arc also univcn:al5.u
"They arc not universals beause they do not have the nature of universah."
Well, we should investigare what ,he nature of a universal might be. In
this regard. SOnlC philosophen say that when a a:ruin kind of singular. real
thing has a rdation fO multiple individuals, one has a cognition of those
individuals as the same; thus, they c:a11 that rca.I thing a univrnal. But here,
we say the: following. One could have a cognition of some individuals u the:
same from effect-substance and so on. which arc also conncctcd to many
Dtw-maldrti'. UK 01 rM ICrm iIXliYiduali probably tdkcu III mnnpt 10
adopt, for the. sake of NJ!.In>enI, the. rerminoIov ofNaiyiyib and VIi ' Iu authon.
(_t.~rJ!,i).

10 NOIc ltoe M.tU ;. uxd as a CGUlunoun r doonalhill,") ramn dw! an ab.:raa noun
r diffttcntt"). 1M pain! here ;. mal I hypoatasiud uniCfAI ;. only poaibk if lheft arc
inJu_ in ..... ich il is ilUruuiau~d. No~ lhal in Ibis Imfma:, !he pmn ,.,.
(~lW) only adds nnphuU. and it Iw IlOI bftn diRCtly lrarubrtd.
II '" Sakyabuddhi mUa deu (pVf:19b4If- 1(;17).ull). the noOon Iwrc;. dw in I In
.,...,.ual ... li......iuic cop;lion. indmduaklNI pnMrM'" il'UWltial~ a ccruin uniwrul an:
contmICd in ro:rmf 01 mal uniwnal For ~, aD indiYiduaiJ dw in.tanlia~ "wall:r-jUl_" an:appt~!daI:u wam.jup" by~irt\IC of~ POQ(DCIC of"mal UlIia$l.l in cad! indi.......w. 1M upunml ~ ;. lhal 10 do 10, W univuul mUlt aaually Ippear in _1

....'-

12 Stt PVSV tlliPVI--40'-41 (G:l1..ffl.

I) An drax..JUbKana:"

(i~",c)

.11IIb.cana Wtl'Clll!tI from

om.c. ...' - - .. ~1'01 )db IM",.-CO (,0., -

me Injunction of

1<;'1+'1) oM Ietm often -..do ............nok.

(-:1"ltitt). Sft, for aunpk, iu IWIE II PDS (I l l).

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

343

individuals; one could have such a cognition because effect-substance and

so on can serve as the warrant for such a cognition. Therefore, effect.substances and such should also have the nature of universals. Otherwise,
the other case-the case of what you call universals-should also not be the
warrant for a cognition of many things as the same because there is no distinction in this regard between what you call universals and what you call
effect-substance, number, and so on. Thus, on these philosophers' definition the natures of substances, qualities and universals are all muddled.
"Well, then, the universal is the appearance in a cognition; and since it
is of the nature of awareness, it exists."
That is not so, because of the following question:
And how can that which is not different from awareness occur
in another object? [pVI.7Icd]
How can a universal allegedly instantiated in some objects have the
nature of awareness? It cannot because that which has the nature of awareness does not exist in those objects.
"The universal has the nature of awareness because one imagines that the
mental universal has the nature of those external objects whereby one commits a cognitive error; it is through this error that one engages in practical
action."
What then causes awareness to arise in that fashion with regard to those
particulars? If it arises without any basis, one would have such awarenesses
with regard to everything. Alternatively, [if one ignores the problem of the
cause, one can still ask:] how can a form which is not different from one
awareness be the form of another awareness that comes from another thing?
Therefore, how could that which does not pervade other awarenesses or
other things be a universal?
Therefore, the apprehension of a single essence (atman) in many
things is a false cognition. [PVL72ab]
Objects are not the same in terms of any essence present in all of them,
whether it be distinct or not distinct from each thing that instantiates it.
Therefore the apprehension of those things in that way is just a false conceptual cognition.
The seed of this conceptual cognition is each object's difference

}....

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAkIRTI 'S PHILOSO PHY

from (his and that oth~r object; one ~ngagcs in the formatwn of
linguisric conventions (SIIf!tjfil1)" for th~ purpoK of knowing that
difference, (PVl.]lCC1J
On~

forms linguistic convenlwns in order 10 have a cognition of a cer

tain type of difference such that, having known Ihal things which have
nondifTtldlr efrccts are different from thost- which do not have m~ dkcu,
pSOns who undmtand th~ convenlions act by avoiding Ihose thingt
that do nOI have th~ aforementwned effI. This difference from this and
that is the seed for th~ false conceptual cognition in which those Ihings
appear 10 have a 'ingl~ ~nce. Having appreh~nded that difference thai
those things seem to share. the conceptual cognition appears in that way
due to me nature of th~ imprint for it.
"You maintain mal different things have a nondifferent effea, whereby
those thingt are said fO share a nondifferenct: in that thq" can all be characteriud by a diA'ercncc from things du,t are other than those that have me
aforemenrionc:d effm:. BUI how can this be the casc?~
The nature (prat,ti) of things is such that
although Ihq are diA'erc.n[, by their nature (svabhdfltl) some of
th~m ate rc:5tricted 10 the accomplishment of the same tdos
(a"ha) such :as inducing Ihe same judgment Mrapratyallil'
I'MrlAjfil1naj or producing an awareness of an object; the sense
filculties and so on are an cxarnples. [PVt.])]
For cxampk, the sensory faculty. the ob;cct. ligl'\l, and mentation (I'M"llIilc4ra}-or [according to orner philosophiesl. the self, the mulry. mind,
the object, and contact-produce a lingle effect. namdy, an awareness of
a visible form . Thq produce this one, same effect even though thq do not
instantiate a univerWthal is restricted to ha:ving Ih~ nature: of producing
(hat effect. Likewise. distinct instances of tKCS such as iif!I/Rp4s and so on
by their very naNre produce the same cffi:ct. namdy, a rccognitional awareness that has an image of each instance as the same aJ the others, i.e., as a
~ Utt." All tree-instances have thosc same effects even though they are not
distributed the one over the other. Or thq accomplish some other [die
function Ihat is [0 be done by wood, such as combustion. housing, and so
I"

~lIr.r"'..Idh;

(PVT:9.b. _ 1(,.",_...,)
lion" (aw ~ ,. ~ ,.".m.~.

p.._

~,.. "fon.",.;",.,

,,(1;"8";..... """'_

APPEN D IX O F TRANSLATION S

'"

on. in accord wiili me oonditions. But even iliouth Wo:uer and such au abo
not distinct from tl't'CS in that any entity is difftrent from all omen. water
and so on nevcnhdCSli do not perfonn the afo~mencioned tdic funaions,
JUSt as the ear and so on cannot produtt an awarenCSli of visible form.
A further examples au cmain medicines which, aliliough they

au dilkrcnt from each other. art Sttn to eliminate bcr, eimer in

oombination Of iodividually. Other things do not do so. (PVI.74J
The Gu4uci herb, purgation and so on, either together or se:paralely.
perform a single function such as me elimination of fever. Even though
thCK things arc difftrenl , a univerul is not required fo r such to be the
ea~ _e.. for ,hl':m m h:lW': ,hi': urnI': dkcr_ Meawe'. their narucc is such
iliat iliey relieve fever. Even though they arc not different from iliose medicines in ,hal they are also unique (i.e. dift"erenl from all other thingsJ,
curds, lead,1) and such do not do so.
But someone migiH say. "Some univeBal exists in those kinds of things;
and it is due to that univeBal that they perform one funruon .~
Thit is not COrTl!Ct. The uniVf!rul it witMllt JiltiPlrhDPI. "T"hnrfo", t~
llnilnllJ is not (PVJ.7SaJ that which performs that funaion

because one would be forced to conclude that those: medicincs'

performance of tha( function would not be distinct. even when
there are differences among those medicines, such as being pfOo
duced in different fidds . (PVI.7Sb-<j
If the dfcct of alleviating fever and so on were performed through a uni
versaI. then sintt the univcBal is not distinct in any of its instances," the
individuals, dcspite the difference in the fidds where they arc planted and
such. wouJd also have no distinctions. such as bringing slow or quick relief.
So tOO, the qualities of some plann would not be better dun omen. Alter
~tivdy. if th~ uni_r.::tI h.:td SOJn~ dininetion in thi.c or th.u in(ttnu, th~n
it would by its narurc-SJ.Whh4W1' be different in its V2J'ious instances; hentt.
it would lose: [he nature orbeing a univcm..l (which is necessarily the same
in all its instancesj.
15 Shah b96T-91) plU

tI ~

tnrubtion.

161n odICf words, thoe univerA! always mnaina lhe amc:. rq;trdkA ofthoe individo,gld\at

;lUWItiaU:S ;1.

346

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Also, the universal is not what pafOmu functions i1lIug, since the universal iJ trlNtAnJ, it (linn!), (1l1lSll/Jy Jupport IllfJthilfl. (PYI.7Sdl
[Sioclt it is unmanging,] a unMrsal a nno t bit augmltntw, so if it .....-c~
to provide causa! suppon , it would produtt all Onts dru at once. Otherwise, it would no t have the n~ lUre-llIIlbh4l11l of producing that effect.
But individuals occur in diJ[incrivc waY' due to the time, place. and modifying conditions of their occurrentt. The~ is no contradiction if one
says that those individuals produce distinctive effcas. likewise, even
though they are by natu~ different, ttrtain things accomplish the g me
telic function. sum as producing the same recognirional awareness
(prillJllbhijfi4lfll). As such, they arc diltt~nt from other things that do
not IX'rform that function. and they are therefore said to be nondifferenl.
O r [hose variow things that arc produced by a single cause arc said to be
nondiffe~nt beca~ they are different flom [hose Ihings that arc nOI
produced by that cause.
"Well, through the universal---which you have dcfinw as diffen:nce
(from that which does not have the intended. telic function}-does one
cognize the particular as the same as other particulars, or does one cognize
something other than a paniculu in that falhion ? What problem comes
from th is~ Well, if the particular is what one cognizes as the same, then
how can it be an object of co ncq)(uality~ And if one cognizes something
cIsc. then how could there be cdic fun ction fro m something other than a
particu1ar~ And sino: one would not cognize impermanence and such in a
particular, the particular would not have the nature of being impermanent
and so on. Funhermo~, sintt they arc not cognized in paItKulan, those
univenab such as impermanence would nOl be qualitic:s of real thinp;."
This Dult does nOt apply lxau$C it is in reLuion to the :lppear.mcc in
conceptual cognition that wt form conventions for univerWs, oo-refermti;&iity, and the subject-predicate mation. This type of aw:lf'enc:u arises in
dependence on imprinu tru.t have been left by pclCCprual experience, which
apprehends the natufCS of real things. The awareneu thar arisc:s in this fashion is conceprual; as sum. even though it docs not have those real, extr:amenw particulU$ U its objca, ronttptual cognition sms to have them
u iu object. In other words, being conceprual, that cognition bas a nature
such that iu objt is imagini (1lIiJryilINllil4) 10 have tru.t natun: [i.e., the
nature ofbcing an extra-menw puticularl. Conoeprual cognition operateS
in that fuhion bccau.sc it is by nature produced by imprints thar have been
placed in the mind by e:lpcriences of those particulars [i.e.. the onc:s that
prompt the concept in qucstiOrll. And sintt conceptual cognition is lindi-

APPEN DIX OF TRAN SLAT IONS

reedy] produttd by objccu (pllddnhta) that havc nondifferent t"ifecu, it

has an aspect mat is ultimately the ume for aU ~ objecu--namcly. the
difft'nnce from objecu or cognitions that are othC! Ihan those [mat havc
the expectcd effccl] . H aving thai aspect, tach such cognition sccms (0
apprehend an [exlcmal] object that is nol different [man othcr objtttS of
the samc dassl.
Thc imqt which appem to (hc conceptual cognition Ims to be extcr
nal, singular, and capable of tdic function. cvt:n though it is nOI capabk of
il. It appcars this way beauS(' persons cngagcd in practical activiry
("",vaharin) proceed by imagining that an aspect of a conceplual cogni
tion 17 is mat way [i.c. extcrnal, clc.j. Othcrwise. it would nOI be possiblc
for them to cnvge in practical activity.
8ecawc: il appcars as somcthing mat is capablc of a relic function. thc
cognitivc appearance seems to be different from that which does not have:
mat tdic function , but il is not ulrimattly real becawc: it is nOI a &eror in
a practical tCSt. as I will explain.
Those mentally apericnctd objtttS [i.c. thc imagcs that comc about
through me particularsl " are apprehended as "the same~ by vinue of that
uni venal because they appear in terms of an exclusion from some othcr
Ihinp. Bur a particular is nor what is apprehended as ,he same because it
does nor appcar to a c;onceptual awarenm. Th05C conceptual appeannccs
appcar as nondiffcrcnr in that mey arc oduded from some min~, but they
may also appear to Ix nondifferem in that they possess adusions from
othcr things. Thcrcfore, although those appearances are nOI rcal in and of
themselves. conc:qtual cognition prc:scnu thcrn as jf they ~re; and onc
Ihu~ fOrms Mnvl!nrionJ fOr univn5:>l~ ~nd cn--l"I'!r~n ri~ l ;ry ~n rhough th~
objt of mesc c;onve:ntions is faiS('.
Funhermore, all of these and other such convenlions are erfOncoUl
(IIipIA",,) in thaI mey are con.ruucred through the imprinu kft by aperi.
cnCCl of particubrs. Thus, conc:qlual oognitiolU whose production is c;on
ncacd to those real things by way ofimprinu arc u usrwonhy with rcgard
ro ~ real'h ing. ~ ,hough rht: re:al'hing in quarinn d~ nor "p('\"'Ir in
those conceptual cognitiolU. An c:x:ample is mc erroneous cognition of a
17 ~ikyllNddhi (PVT:,..h " Kall) "'gpo mat DtwmUirti is apc:akins of an "upt of
oosnirion"
rtiu~.

(_,.,,,.,,.im. _

18 S~buddhj bsa,Jif - K:th.IJ)

(",.;,..ur~)

slOMa hJJhi"i.m~ as "Those ~&a of objeas

u.... ......... 0>0'" obuu. d .......,. P""io:uI.o.<~ (_&l'r'~_.;,If4!I) ...><I '"f'P"'<U '"

conoep<ua1 oosni.iotl,

J,48

FOUNDATI ONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

tewcl when ont" ss the glimmer of the jewel. Other cognitioN are not
trwrwonhy beca~, ~ though thq also arise from a disrinct;on of the
real thing. these other cognitions Fail to determine" me distinctive qualities
of me thing in accord with the way in which it waJ aperienccd through me
serues; having Faikd to nuke that duminat;on. they impute some other
distinaion onto the thing by apprehmding some slight (Iti~f) similarity,An example is the cognition of a jcwcl when one S('CS lamplight.
The above response 10 me objectioN raised above shows that Ime capK
it)' forI performing (die functions docs nOI apply to things that are con
ttptual objKU. II also shows that it is nollhe ca.sc Ihat impermanence and
so on do nOI pcnain 10 particulars. This is 50 because there is no imper
manCntt othtt than me' Ruauating lhing (II"J'U ~1t/4J INIIhl1UIf,) irself. Thai
is, one apprehends a minI which is of mat kind Ii.e., impermanent] 10 ~
something that perdurcs for only an wan .. henet'. one has cognitions such
as: ..,-nis is impcrmanem" or - Lmpttmanentt pertains 10 this," Focusing on
the nalure (tihllmwt4) of the particubn in quotion, such conttpu prcscm
various qualitio [conceptualized as aruibules of a single ming], single qualities iconcq)(ualiud as common to a group of thingsl . and qualities which
are eonceptualiud as distinct [ho m what they qualify). ThOS( conceptual
cognitions art nOt ground.l~ beca~ they are based on the experience of
an asptcr (bhd4) of the rca.! thing.lI Nor are conttptualiud qualities such
as impetmane'ntt nOI qualities of real things bttause: that which has thaI
nature (uUVllbhilltl} appan in that way.
However, it is still errontous to apprehend a real thing as having various
distinct anribules, or as the same as Olhn' reallhings, or as distinct from me
qualities abstracted from iL It is erroneous because: an indivKiual that performS:l function that is the $:ImC U lhe function perfonned by omer individuals or th;u pC'rforms many functions is defined in that way jwt for me
purpose of making thOS( who wish 10 know aboUI such things aware that
it has such a nature. One does nOI define it in that way bttause of me' real
19 !.ltpbouddhi (PVT''9NJ- IC .I) -....) po-. ...........!""':t< .'4-"J"'.

20 Noco:" tNt dw: term ~.....,. ia: not UKd 11m: in the _
of"uni'm1oll: at iI e'tidmt from
~i{pvr:?NJ).whomsJ*"",.rtnelcmibrdw:Ttbn:an iIn"andP rd 'Ju
H p/M"
j ",tJIw .. ,.,;J 9i p. ....
21 ~j (PVT:96b .. 1(:1&4' P- '1; ' \oM at "an ~ of tJw, rW thins. ~{
aopca: bo:ins ddinnl. imp=nanrncc and iO on" (Jnp.,.. i w.,.J,.,,.; ".,.,.. ,.,;J t. """
,.. 'i ",,,.,. ..,;J. ... a. Kaf~min. who modifia ~ 'Ilrnemcnl by rypia1Iy

"""/If'"

lnj:....., pure.
-L.~JUI1If... l.

ck5K~

of mliam in,o ,I><: <I>........oon: __ ~,..~ ....~

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

349

nce of distinct aspects of real things because: [I] a single thing cannot
anifold; [2] many things cannot be singular; and [3] we have already
fed the distinction of an abstracted predicate from the subject from
iJch it is abstracted. Since property-svabhavas are conceptualized as being
~}fpature di~erent from each other and from t~e subject of which the~ are
p'i~icated, If one wer~ to acc:pt tha: t~e objects (art~as) of expreSSIOns
'~1"esponded to real thmgs, co-mstantlatIOn (samanyadhtkara!lya) would be
~possible.

"'''~omeone objects, "Expressions for both quality-universals and dass-uni~~fsals

denote the one substance that possesses those qualities and univer-

~~sas its delimiting qualities. Hence, there is no such problem."

i""%~If the substance does not causally support a universal or any other alleged
aelimiting quality, then that universal or other such entity is not that sub~;i;ihce's delimiting quality because that universal or other entity cannot
~i~end on that substance. If that universal or other such entity were
~4:jj>endent on that substance, then substance and universal, etc. would
~d in the relation of producer and produced. Hence, those two could not
,l!Jt'cur together [i.e., simultaneously], so one could not express both of them
;~~e;, whereby the substance is expressed as qualified by the qualifier that is
~X~'delimiting quality]. And if one [i.e., the substance] must be expressed
~~ough semantic implication (adhyahara) [by way of an expression that
if~fers to a delimiting quality], then expressions do not have real things as
~lli~ir objects. 22 And if the expression for the substance has as its object a cog~itive appearance, then such should be the case for every expression. This
;iust be the case because, if the singular possessor of various delimiting
~::~
i!.talities is apprehended in that fashion [i.e., through conceptual imp uta':ign], then the delimiting qualities [which should be apprehended non;~~nceptually] would not appear in that cognition. 23
. The objector responds, "The delimiting quality and the substance that
",<~

:/15akyabuddhi (PVT:98a = K:r86) now inserts the following objection:

Someone might think, "The [substance] that is qualified [by those delimiting qualities] has ceased to exist [because it has served as a causal support for the delimiting qualities; hence,] the expression whose object is that qualified [substance] has a cognitive
appearance as its object. But the expression whose object is the delimiting quality,
which exists, has as its object a real thing."
~~
r have followed 5akyabuddhi (PVT:98b) who says:
,"\

One must admit the following: the cognition that imputes the already ceased substance qualified by the delimiting quality in question is conceptual; the cognition that

3S0

FO UNDATION S O F D HARMAKIRTI' S PHILOSO PHY

possesses it are the causally suppon C'd and the causal suppo" ; :IS such. they
occur together. TherefOre". me fiult you have raised does not hold true."
No. mis response is not correct. Something which is already created is
not de~ndc: nt on anything, so it could not be a delimiting quali[),. And
something mat is not yet created cannot be a delimiting qualiry because its
narure (IVIIriipa) is not esf1lblished (such that it could, by that nature", be a
delimiting quali[),J. Thus. whC't her the delimiting quali[), be already aeated
or not yet created, mere" is no d~ndena: whatsOC'Ver. H en ~, the convention fo r me qualiry/qualified m ation must be Qablished after one has conceptually imputed the existcna: of these emities. If (hat is me ClSC, why
should conceptual and linguistic cognitions not occur in conformi[), to
conventions mat have been consrructcd through conceptual imputn ion in
all cases~)oI
It has been prC'V iousiy stated that if a single expression or instrumental
cognition rakes some quali[), of a thing as an object by the force of rnI
things memsC'l vcs. men other expressions or instrumental cognitions would
be useless because all omer qualities of the object would already be implied.
But if such cognit)ons confo rm to convt:ntions in the aforementioned manner, this would not be the ClSC. Thai is, since the appearance in cognition
is unreal. the problems that arisC' due 10 {the claim that me objects of such
cognitions] are real do nOI follow.
Therefore (uuJ),n a universal is not contradictory in accord with the way
it is cogniud because me cognitive image appears in cognition to be nondifferent from some orner images. The relationship of qualifier and qualified (as in the expression -blue lotus"] is also not contradictory in Ihe way
that it is cogniud for the following reason: even mough one aspect (1Iuir.)
{such as ~ bl ue"J has bn taken as an object, the other (such as ~ Iolus"l has
not been determined; th:1f other aspect is what is apprehended by a cognition wh ich involveli lOme doubt or apcctation about mat Other aspect. [as
puaiva w q.wiry. wbich iJ an [a1~1J ~a1thinK> if ocllnwiK--il iJ PC' "p'.w.
11 Q no< poooihlr fur ~iin5kCUKJlj.ion 10 pmxi.~ b:xh a raJ '1ualhy wd an unraI..,....
a:p<U1Ily im pllKd Stlbsun.
2-4 ~i (pvr:9II~ _ Kab):
If rnUa KnK 1Ot....m oopi.ioru 10 oa\lf in f;i)nformiry with ronvoenlions b:aUK
iI iJ no< po.aibk 10 mpgt' in praaical:action witMu. &pmdins on l mmtally p~
amtcd ~ of an ob;cc..

or

l S Th. COMpI;.,. ..! oynUJI

. h. follo-in, s ....J.ri u . ...... en .. h... bo:.... ....... ""'sed
a...od unncccaary complaily in English.

",

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

351

~n

the doubt, "there is a blue what?"]. Co-instantiation is also not contrain the way it is cognized because even though two exclusions are
~dicated (upasa'f!lhiiraJ6 to be objects of different expressions, they appear
~li1 cognition to be nondifferent [in that they seem to be instantiated in a sintile locus or subject].
.
"'~. In addition to the conventions of co-instantiation and the like, the disiliinction of subject and predicate pertaining to the cognitive appearance in
:}conceptual cognition is also not contradictory in the way that it is cogitiized. It is possible that a cognitive appearance be distinct from various
~bjects. That being the case, when some questioner wishes to know whether
ifhat cognitive appearance is established or rejected as distinct from one of
~ose objects (arthas), the respondent indicates that mentally occurrent27
~eal thing having expressed it (sa'f!lcodya) as if it were a predicate separate
itom the subject-since it appears that way in cognition-by means of a
~redicate-expression (dharmafabda) that precludes other distinctions [i.e.,
~ther predicates]; he does so having established another property-svabhiiva
s~f that mental entity as the subject without the distinction of precluding
;:6:ther predicates. 2s To this extent, subject and predicate are slightly (a'f!lsena)
2~:ifferent; hence, a conceptual cognition involving a subject/predicate con~truction appears in such a way that it seems to be differentiated. Cognition
~snot, however, differentiated due to some differentiation in the real thing
~ecause this would entail the problems discussed above. 29
Moreover, since persons express many differences of that kind such as
~~ictory

~"

~~(;

..

Glossed by Sakyabuddhi (PVT:99a = K:r87) as pratipiidana.

~7

Sakyabuddhi (PVT:99b = K:r88) suggests: tad eva buddhipratibhiisabhiita1J! vastu.

~I]akagomin offers a second interpretation in which the vastu is understood to be biihya.
,-hat is, instead of saying "The distinction of subject and predicate pertaining to a cognitive
~ppearance is also not contradictory in the way that it is cognized," he says "The distinction
~~ubject and predicate pertaining to a real thing is also not contradictory in the way that it
]i.cognized." He then makes the apptopriate changes in his commentary:

yad vii dharmadharmibhedo 'py asya vastuno na virudhyata iti sambandhab / kuta ityiiha
I anekasmiid arthiid biihyasya bhedasambhave sati tasyaikasmiid yo bhedas tasya vidhiprati!edhajijfiiisiiyii1J! kim anityab fabdo bhavati ciik!u!o na bhavatiti tad eva biihyam
vastu pradarfyata iti sambandhab.

~'rhe complicated statement from dharmadharmibhedo to pradarfyate is difficult to render

iD~intelligible

English, and I have therefore chosen to break the statement into more man-

[~~ble sentences.

~Sakyabuddhi (PVT:99b6ff = K:r89.II) claims that this complex passage treats two sepa~e cases of the subject/predicate relation: a predicate-expression (dharmafabda), such as
"'IJp.bdasyiinityatvam, "and a subject-expression, such as "anityab fabdab." This interpretation

35 2

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

qualifier/qualified and subject/predicate, there is therefore a difference in an

expression that indicates quality and qualified; there is also a difference
between a predicate to be inferred and the evidence that indicates it, even
when they are actually identical to the same undifferentiated real thing.
These differences in the context of language and inference are drawn by
means of conceptual differences that appear in cognition as predicates that
are based on the property-svabhavas of the real thing. Such distinctions are
drawn so that one might know that real thing's nature.

is weakened by the absence of a conjunction, and I have thus not followed it. One might suggest, however, that the current translation problematically suggests that a single statement can
be both predicate- and subject-expressive. Since this objection is plausible, I will note here a
translation based upon Sakyabuddhi's interpretation:
The distinction of subject and predicate pertaining to a cognitive appearance is also not
contradictory in the way that it is cognized. A cognitive appearance can be distinct
from various objects (arthtts). That being the case, when someone wishes to know
whether that cognitive appearance is established or rejected as distinct from one of
those objects (arthtts), the respondent presents that mentally occurrent real thing having expressed it by means of a predicate-expression that precludes other distinctions
that could be predicates. Thus expressed, it seems as if a separate predicate is expressed
because it appears that way ro cognition. But he may also present it having established
another properry-svabhava of that mental entiry as the subject without the distinction
of precluding other predicates. To this extent, subject and predicate are slightly different; hence, a conceptual cognition of this rype appears in such away that it seems
to be differentiated. Such a cognition is not, however, differentiated due to some differentiation in the real thing because this would entail the above discussed problems.

3. PVSV,d PV1.137-142
In order to point out that the things in question ptcrform me

(desired] cfkct. the ancient oncs assignrd dK W1'It aprtSS.ion to

those dUngs which, allhough difkmu. perfonned lhe same Nnction: the semantic ause (nj",iftll}ci thaI expression u the ad usion from that which does nor have that cfft. They did not
assign an expression for each thing because an expression for each
distiner thing would be impossible duc ro the difficulry of doing
so and because it would be poimlcss. The ancient ones did not
assign me same c:xpression (0:1 real un ivrnal bec::lluc:l.1I [hings:afr:
siruated in their own propmy-wahh4v.a. [PVI.ll7-1)8]
]be euence of a Had"ord

u not a Jmcy's' euence, but mcadu-

sion from du( which docs not have the dkct of a cow exists in
both of them. (PVI.1391
Withalll the nondifferr:ntt of

w objts. a nondiffnencc of the

expression used fOr those things doa not make any KfUe. Therefore. we accept thu the capacity to ~rform the same effect is
the difference from thal which docs not have that .:freet.
IPVI.I40)
For eumple. when

::1.( :I

rt::lin time it i. poaible to

~ P"- that

the things such as the eye and so on, whose effect is an awareness
of form, have that dkct as their nondiifucncc, somtonc forms
a signifying cxprcuion so as 10 Ienow all of those things as caU$C!l
of ocular awarcocss al once; that sign is fonned without a JCPilatc universal which would be theil essence:. {PVI.I-4I- I-41]
Somtonc thinks the following. "Without a nondiffcrcnl cntity instanti
ated in each instancc, how could a single exprcuion [such as 'cow'] apply
to many [individual cowsP A single o::pression could not refer to them all
I "Hutkwd"1w beat wed (0 mnsiale "'..w,.....nilt "Jnwy" ~a ~ Tht_
otnioouI diff~ bot:fIOIccn 1 1tl~ and NInI~ Ui tbn, ....ptd;ot colon. and II III for
thl. reuoa!hac I N" ct-en ro .... lM _
familiar mlN "Hufford- and "Jnwy."

jj4

FOUNDATIONS O F O HAIMAK IRTI 'S PH ILOSOPHY

Ixcause: III rhey would have no similariry; 11J since they have no similariry, thar expression would refer to only one individual; therefore, that
expression would not produce the cognition of anomer individual of that
type: IjJ if:u1 awattness of one thing as the same: as another were to ariK
without any semantic proximiry (praty4JAlti), then an overextension would
occur; 14J the application of a single expression to them would be useless
because one would not be applying me expression to a singlt thing (artha)
(since they do not share a universal]: :and 1,1 if one were ro apply one apro-sion separately [0 each individual for the sake of cognizing' those individ
uah whose essential natures are diffirem from each other, one's listener
would not know that those distinct things that have been expressed in that
fashion (i.e., as distinct instances of the samt type of emiry1 are diff'trent: J
(In this regard, there are two possibilitiC'Sj . Thinlcing, "that individual
also has that single universal," peoplt apply an apression to it. Or a single
univusal manifesu the expression just by iu capacity as a real thing (i.e.,
without any human agency] . But ntither of th~ possibilities is the case.
Instead, a pt:t50n applies expressioN to something with some pu~ in
mind. That is, if differenr things are usdUI for one telic function, persons
concerned with that funetion ddinitdy (llwUyam) should express that efficacy of those: things with regard to that function. If one were to express that
efficacy individually (i .e., with an expression for ach panicuJar] , it would
be extremely difficult to communicatt. And in :u1y case, it is not possible
[0 express the unique essence of a panicular; mt antmpt TO do so would also
be useless. Instead, that pt:rson using language or conctpu should JUSt
express those objecu that are capable of that fun ction. The s~er has
autonomy in this regard: he can choose [ 0 express those things that are
capable of that effect with one expression or with m:u1y. Therefore, it is
simply by vinue of tht speaker's intenrion (abhipr4ya) that one expression
could refer [0 many things, and that being so, it is nO! correct to object to
the use of a single expression for many things. Moreover, it is not impoJ
sible fo r that one apression 10 bc wed for all those thiny because the
capaciry to t"ekr to thinp depends on the speaker's wishes (icch4) [or needsl .
If mc:ming is not mro by the wishC'S (icthl1) of the person using the apre:ssions. then how could :u1 expression refer [0 even one thing? And if inten2 Ao;onfinS

fO

$ikpbuddhi (PVT:lslb.t ~ K:1}4.11- 1J). putil"U]t";' 10 Ix: lUpplied by

COfIIClI (~.;

.1 Utc,aUy, ".,..., would ...... KCOV'W: ,he di.un'ty (~) of ,he .h in", ...... had h-ecn

a pre.ccl .. NCb. "

APPE N D IX O F TRAN SLAT ION S

lSI

tion docs fix meaning. then who could pre...ent this a p~ion from referring to many things?
-But there wo uld be no purpose to wing aprmio ns lif there is nothing
to which they rc2lly rckrl; therefore. one would nO[ usc expressions.I have al ready Aid th:u the purpose: is to know from one exprmion that
diuinct pan Ktilars arc different from that wh ich docs not fu lfill the
[expccrcdJ purpose. It is not the c:a.se d\a t one applics expressions because
a p ro~ny-SW'bh4U4 of the things in qucstion is the A rne. And I have
already asUd. '1ne propeny-W4bhi_ of rc2l things :ue SituatM rupeetivdy in their rupttt i~ real things, and as such. they are not disn ibutcd
~r each other; hentt. how could an expression for those distinct things
have as iu sc:mamic ClU$C (" imift4) a single propeny-svabhdv.r occurring in
all those th i n gs ~ But evrn though things arr different. it is nO[ contr:adictory' for them to have an aelusion from thar which docs nO[ fulfill the
[expected) purpose. Hence. let US consider this no ndiR'erencc of the things
(,m h.t) to be the cause for the nondiR'Cf'COCe of the cxprcssions applied to
them. Therefore. in saying, "'These arc whar fulfill that purpose. - those
things arc Stated to be distinct from others that do nO[ ful611 thOlt purpose:.
RU! rlv.: F....::r o ( tuvi ng 1M! t:ffin i~ nor U)m O!: qll!lliry !hu ;$ n rh e r rh:an rhO!:
p:lnicul:ars them$d v~ : otherwise. they would nor be different fro m the
other things which do not have that dfect.'

.. $ikpbuddhi (PVf:t6oa - K:169) r~ ... f(I !'VI~L

tM.,

tM , .........

ttJY ","", ... ,.'11 ~ Itti- z..

tb. . .,.. ,... ,.,.. ,. ; ",," ... This 5hooId ptoI.bly Ix: ammdcd 10 tM..., p.... which

, PYSV-O(1f9a} r-u:

IIi pJvtt J ..

..w..........a. ............... in I.... d

r.II

tIw: rmdinc.wr.--l byC ..... i and K. Snndlr. ...... .t-.Id

raJix thai du. almoK cnWnIy r~prCKntJ a nNnl radins dial could Ix tOftMruae4 all
follows: "",._ qht IUIJlU'" ....,.,..",.,. 'Mo ' ,..nIh,.M ... II is F
tkol ,..,.
1-Iruilh _ adokd by rht: TIbn.an Il"UIIobrors ro. dMilJ. In 'lIIr cue. Gnoli ia dearly
izK:orKa when M rmwb dw such radi", in lhiI aIfIlCD is wholly mnninpc.. for a
rq;HM bn., ...ue.!nOR _ than Gooli'. rcadin&. Indmi. rho: abJmc,r oi. lIC:piM in
Gooli'. readins rendcn it: hishlr problunaiK.
Alrhou&to tht: roc oiK ..ppNtI Gnoli', rcadin& K rmwIu (169-170). "In othn.......w.

i*

,.r-....

....... P. ' f
~LI; ..... ;. -d.....lcdhm..v... ...;... ;. ....... ~(-:I-o;J ' ...
.... n,uw-~. " 1 ili,....,J. Thilocar.nncnl rd'rn obliqudy f(I PVI:J9. ~ I)hu.
maklrti poinu oul dw an QCluoioo (. qualify or pmfio;arc) and tho: adudcd dUns (~ qual.
if)'1lOlK_ OJ subi=.l Qt\Me Ix actually diflmnl; rMy ~ only ~ diRmnL
AppIyi", Iht: same an.aI)'$is hue, one Qt\ rnnark tlu.I rht: "f:.ct oi Iu.";,,& duo, cffr(t"
(~) OJ "thal~ (if 000: c:an ,okr;.u abr ~ ~) ClIUICM Ix
tornnhinc diocina !Tom lhc pWcWus dw iW qtA!i6ed by W I-df'eanaa. If !how panieubn wm: distinct from rheir "dw~ thor would bt, aduckd &om " dw~";
ad! doq wuukI &.II inco dw cWo of thins> which do CMM have w , dJoa., which mano dxy

would no Ionsn Ix: undmtood .. ddtina !Tom

mo..r rhi"51 ...m.:h dr> Me bicw dlat dIta.

f OU NDATION S OF DHAlMAK IRTl 'S PH ILO SOPH V

,,6

For aamplt. [accordi ng to Buddhists} tht qt, color, light and mentation all ha~ [undc:r cma.in conditionsl tht wnc tffm: ocular consciousnw. (According to others] the ~lf. tht f.aculty, tht objter and rhtir
conjunaion have that ont dft. WhatleVu theory ont proposc:s, it il possibtt 10 o:prc:u their sameness (s4~) in ttmU of having that dfca. as
when someone asks., "From what docs coruciousnw of visible color arise"
Thil ~ing the case.' in order to facilitale practical aaion (lIJilvttM,..uf./M~'finIMm). somtont applies a con~ncion-esttbli.shing (SiI~;) statement:
"1l1e causes a~ such-and-such and $O-and-so." One uses these exprcssions
such that the listener somehow knows all of the causes of ocular cognition
and $0 on u once. HenCC', the~ il 00 essetlU that is distributtd over all of
them. Rather, their nondiff'trenCC' iJ this diff'tmlce--namdy. that since
they accomplish that leiOS (IInIM),
things are differenl from [hose
that do nOI accomplish that telos.
To be specific, they, being all of such-and-such a kind. are expressed by
expressions lhat inmate :I amin conglomu.uion (IIlmw), continuum
(wnrlina), or State (1lIlIISthij . Those particulan thai whttl conglome:rated

m06e

This inmprmllion ma.krs lTIOft JnIit; dw! GnoIi's radin&. lOr illmtll 00r WI Dtwmaklni is rdan"110 1M iuua rWed II FYI:l', "ThII M is raisi"l It- iuua is Iimhu Npportal t". hiJdccWon IOdiKwa 1M pcoblun of dw: pm..: rd.llion, kw Ii...". !.alto. lOr W.
is dw: AIm iswt- tha ht- rakes up II FYI:60. To Rippon IlKh an inmprewm. the aWII
SansIuU. in bodI K and Cnoli can be limply amr:nded by dw: addirion of In
In
Oftbosn.phlc dmce W1 is ohm didcd in INIllllO'ipa, The m.anwaipi ofK. ro.- campk.
is pcppcn:d wid! nUmmKII JUCh disions. 'The amended Sansluil would mIlS read ... ,..-r

-W-

qbI ~~ u~ / .~"~",._ . ~.
Unfonunarcly. ~:obddhl (PVT:ot:c) "'- ..... pt""'ick .... y additional darlncooion,
a1thour;h he aL.o oIJm the IlfualislxtOfJ n:adins ~ u..Jb
J.
J.
liM,.i 1't1i~ r ) wKhoullM ....,._ Reader'I of dw:
~ have 1M additiofqJ and quile .. ~ p.obIem of :0. lup: portion of 1= WI it _I of onkr. 1"hiJ irnsului.,. ;. ' - d ... lD:o. buh ill tnnWtion.l"or ....tom eN _ "..." order ia Itst(ItN. Iht u:o.noIao:ion
I"oIIows rucdy W Satukrii of K. Hcnoe, il tmnI
in the KnII cmturia ber.tt .. lhe
u:o.nWOon of riM: leO and !hot Cll'Yin& of dw: ScIe-df;e ....""..,"10011 ~ TdJewa .robe iNd
maid)' copi.d I folio QUI of order. The order is. follow.:
from
afu:r
tJ,. ... -tkip forwIrdlO llilb. and tqin at. -M ~
tlwtIM,.
Rae! 10 16li1l. F/Om [6li1l mer
J. '
,. _ ... "Wp b.dt.o .6,bl and tq;.n at. "ritr"'u-.,.." Rad 10 16,b,. From 16.b. mer
oft tu.- ....P:ip 10 16uII and tq;.n at.
J.." From thia poinl eN fCXI is 110

SdMsr

r,.;.." P- m.

w.

.!iob.

-II'-.t.r,.,.,,.

--',..u.. ......

0......,,...,

M..,..,.., .,. ...

Ionca

of order,
In ocher wonh.lM scaion of tal from [6tbl
UN tIM,. -',."up to [6li1,'M
J. ',..- ... needs 10 be iMmN I' 16Gb1 after "phtm "" 1M Ut

0111

OM"'"

""'..,..., J.n.,.
...
.

,."."
6 -n.is bci"l,ht C:tJoI:"

~u dw Ioc:atM

of 1iU~1IIi~w.

APPENDIX O F T RANSLAT ION S

J!7

perform a sing.l~ cAt ha~ no dinincrion from och other with regard to
that cAt_Th~reforc. it would be poindCS5 to express any such distinction.
For this reason, in order (0 mcr (niJDjtmlf) to all of them at once. peoplc
apply on~ expression to them. such as water-jug.
ThOK (i.e., th~ particulars that form a wat~r-j ugl arc all equally diffcr
Cnt from their respective homologues and hererologues. but since they contribute to th~ aa:ompl ishm~nt of that single purpoK !such as containing
wat~rl. they a r~ distinguished from othm that do not do 50. H~nce, they
arc cognized as non-distina due to that nondiffetence.
fin regard to th~ point just raised, thc ClIpression the color and SO on of
a wat~r-jug mcam that th~ color and such that arc the propt:rty-Iu.rbh.i~...
of th~ water-jug arc capablc of an effect such as a specific:" way of containing watcr.Y Through thc exprcuion color and so on- is indicated (,m'
7 ~ (PVf:.6ob. 1<:'71) rWa an oo;mion:

"Thut: ill j_ ookIr and 10 on; bul dIcft- is 110 wa~iuI W,I is ..... ~ ~
rfOll! dw:C'OIoo: and lOon. So __ can ~ bot attpanlion Ibn .. oxn dw wan-j""and
io proput1nwM.I_11I in the _cmcnl, "The ..,.'er-j",,. tdor and 10011 ... :r'
Thoil mmmm. and ..... :IftIWft' du. Dlwmakirti prolkn rdy quit~ ckarly on dw analysis of

dx subjen-pmfiQlt malion prae!lltd in PYl:S,,",. and PVSY M nt. 11W _ I I fi1nh

cvidMa tha,1he mdilllFvm byGnoIi (67) ")IWW~.".
IiJ""""'}\IS(
__ .
m
lin ...) til 'M
- . __
aL
.........
, IIS
II

mlISII

be~ 10..".

Sikpbuddhi (PVT:l60b6-7" 1<:171 .1) P<-=I specific (.u.,.) 11 tha, which caftOOl be

~ by non-w.un. jutp rg,."u .." t44yrw'!'J. II thUJ i!ppGtI

dili CORca. II synonym for rU]cu.

'0 be I.IKd in

!I ~i (PVT' I6cb7-.611l " 1<:17 .1,) rctnarlu.:

Thr::Ibovf: mans dw

fOIlowi"" 'Tbcaprmicnl "cokN '

and 10 on IndUtt lhc ..ndn-

fUndi,. dw color and 10 on an: nondiA'ea-., in dw they ate Cl!p'hk of ..... ~

dfm lhal ill '0 be aoc:om~ bycolor. But tMwonI"W::II..-iu! GJriUICS!hac 1M
coIor-pmida: in quarion an: specifiai (~by their dill'a-ma f'roI!Irhat color and
10 on dw an: P'OfKny .-M.I- of. doch; lbot watn-ius', color and 10 on an: Ifl''
i6ed in duol r..hion ~.....,. an: a.pahk d a IpOCiroc ~ (~). H rnu.
dw: ltatnnmt"the walcr-iu!', c.oIor and 10 on' pl'oduca thrOUJh the: optnrion of
..... twO words an lwatmeM w1lh. COIIIil;"" i..... of ... ni ......... ("'-'1f)'I(J (i.e .. dUll
of albl and I specif7inI diltinaion (1Ii/q4) (iA that of c:ontrib.tlins 10 ~ dfttu
6UCh u hoIdin,..atftl. 11x16oce. I
rdarion (",M.h;) in whid:J
dw: two manbcn an: diKinct ill appIiaIl0 aptta dw !d,tion of Wli~ [i.e., color
and...dl in ~ I and. spik (oub-'t' "'"" i.e.. rhc: mIoc and RICh of I wuCl'-j"ll

smirm rmmaDal

(tJtM~.

in..

Nott duo" for K(l7U4) .. shM";r-.ilq.MJ .. ",.~_liiu 1-Jt'iru

Sikyabbddhi (PVf,,611.l) reads ... ' " tW.,ithJM,-oi
J..,J.J,.i".." u"oi t/rwt,.
71'" - - -'''J-rilq.dlol ... ?-".rt.{l'Yfl~ P-J"U-' I b."" ful.Luwa.I

w,., ...

,,,,",.1.

H8

FOU NDATI O NS OF DHARMAI"'lTI 'S PHILOSOPIIY

tiJJJN,) their naNn: that is wdl known (prasiJJh4) to be the means for producing a
effect (uimi"J"kiry4 ,tThcy an: then specified (viIq!4) by
the specification (vilqa) (i.e., "water.jug"j that indicatcs that they also have
ttnain specific dfcct.s (vi1;"!Jlki1Jll) [such as conr.a.i.ning water]. Being so

gwm

specified. they an: called such [i.e., "the color and such of a water-jug"j. But
~r than dUll color:and such, there docs nOI o:ist here any subs-WItt thai
has charactcrUlics in tht manner dC5Cri~ by those o:prcssions. It docs
nOI exist bausc one docs not pcrctive Ihal kind of substance."
The expression "warer.jug" is used. in the singular 10 indicate that those
paniculars [i_c. me many pan iculars that compose it] have mc causal
potcntial to together produa- the wne cfft [cvcn though then: is no such
real causal potential aClually iosrantiated in all those particularsj." Or dsc,
the singular is dependent on linguistic convention (Ill",,",,,).
For irut:lOCC, ccnain kinds of causes and cffccts (i.e. , those that form a
continuum] either produtt some single effttr or art produced by a single
cawe. In order to cognize those causes and dfcct.s all at once, one expl'CS5CS
them with an expression such as "rice" for which the linguistic convention
has been formed . This should be explained as in the above expl:an.ation of
o.prcssionl fOr conglomeratCi such as watcr.jugs. lJkewise, those particu.
lars which arc dkctivc for somc single function cithcr separ.ucly or in combination an: expressed by expressions mat indicate a p;tnicular state; thcy
arc exprascd in that way so that one might make thcm known aJi at once.
Enmplcs ofsuch exprt:s.sioru art visible" or "obmuctivc." The paniculars
in question can be expressed in mat way due fO me QIDCflCS$ of their dif
fercnce (bhdMimi"J") from other particulaT$ that an: not occurring in
that kind of sau'.
10 ~ (PVT:,6'IJ _ K:'7l.1S) po.- "conunon dfm:" III "Ol>C'tha. ill ro btao:om=.7.~ICn: (lot" unq~wdJ color usd ,ud!- (. . .~".", "w,i.I"w..mt,."I).
i Wo 1'10(0 (,fI'l) K:171.z&) ."", dw: ;lUuumnuai .pc iJ*r.u aD lot concilhn iaJ....Ithfi,.Wq.!M 01'
In...., ~;,
iaJ..,.IJJii,...
Wq.~ Wi.h this ;NlNmnlW COlmrutd as. rt:UOfI "'" phraK would cad. "Sina: color
and ...do ....... naturt thac .. nublW>t.d ... "'" dw: ......... for produci", ...... in cnmmon
dffCtJ. thq an nude known by ""'" UpLwiON 'mIor' and iUCh:

RnoN

II

UI'-'-

""'n: ..

11 Aa:OfdinllO ~buddbi (PVTa6u .. K(171), ,hi, is a calC of dw ROnpCtUpCioCI of

IOoInfthias diu iI by ddmilioa pnuJMibk. Ht Lhm ~ u.. irnpo.wn ..,Inr>m', "In
tiM: thUd cNpu [DharmakJnil wiDapUln dw "I>Tf in which just infinilaimal panides;an:
dwobject of I't.cqxion wilMoIi thm: bcin& an)' pm-IX ,.......,. [,ordJ.I Mi"~",-".
";-"14"'~'" tIW pw~ ~

....N!.
12 K(17J.): ... ,"IW ",..

a. fMrj, 1Niytu.r.

r.1M IJ'riJw IK ",ad,: ft,j1i:M ~ ".~

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

359

In some cases, where some particulars have the same effect, in order to
indicate that they have that effect, they are expressed by expressions such
as "water-jug" through their difference from what is other than them; they
.are so expressed provided that a suitable convention has been formed
(krtasamaya). In the same way, in terms of having the same cause,one can
express what is non-singular with a single expression in order to facilitate
practical action. Examples are "Hereford," "Jersey cow," or "a sound arises
immediately after effort," or "sound is causally produced." One can also
express multiple things with a single expression as a negation of their ability to have the effect in question. Examples include: "sound is not visually
perceptible"; or "impermanent"; or "essenceless {aniitma)." One can also
use expressions in this fashion as negations of the notion that certain things
have the cause in question. Instances include the expressions "unowned"
(asviimikajI3 and "empty." One may also state other ways in which expressions are formed in accord with the theory presented above.
In the case of expressions such as "empty" and "impermanent," expressions
perform their semantic function (vyapadefa) by [first] inducing in cognition
an image that is intended in accord with the interlocutor's concepts and then
excluding that image. Expressions work this way because all the objects (artha)
gf expressions have a distinctive aspect that is projected by cognitive intent. 14
13 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:r64b2 ~ K:274.r3) remarks:
Others assert that that which is controlled (adhiJthita) by an autonomous self is
"owned," and such things are also asserted to be non-empty because they are controlled by that kind of controller (adhiJthiitr). The controller is what appropriates
(svikararza) that which is controlled (adhiJthiitavya); otherwise, it could not be the
controller. Therefore, others use words such as "owned" (sviimika) with respect to
some self being a cause for such a relation. But there is no controller with an established
essential nature who would control things that disintegrate instantaneously and exist
in dependence upon a mere collocation [of conditions or parts]. There is no such controller in connection with which the mental conditions (sa1pSkiira) would occur. Therefore, "unowned" and "emptiness" are posited by refuting the existence of the
aforementioned self acting as a warrant [for the designations "owner," etc.].
lor K(274.r4) iidhiJthiitii ciidhifphiitavyasvikiirarzam Sakyabuddhi (PVT:r64b3) reads bdag gi
'ryed pa nyid kyang bdag gir bya ba'i ryu yin gyi. The Tib. corresponds to iidhifphiitii
~dhiHhiitavyasya kararzam, but this reading seems problematic.

.4 Emend G(69.7) buddhisamihii sal!Jdarfita ... to: buddhisamihiisal!Jdarfitavibhiigatviit in

.ecord with PVSV-D (299b6): sgra'i don thams cad ni blo'i rtogs pas bstanpa rnampar dbye
'a can nyid yin lJa'i phvir ro.
Sakyabuddhi (Pvir65a ~ K:274) glosses buddhisamihii: buddhes samihii imam artham
'ropayiimiti sal!Jkalpab-"Cognitive intent is the intention, 'I will induce this object (artha)
i~ that person's mind].'"

360

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Poor thinkers'15 bombasts which raise problems such as the assertion that
there is no [real] contrary (pratipakfa) for expressions such as "essenceless"
should be ignored.

15 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:r65a

K:275) mentions Uddyotakara as the object of this critique.

4. PVSVad PVI.214-223
-[Dignlga} said, "lbc: testimony of a credible person is th~ 50w ce for an
inkrtflCe ba~ it is generally UUSlWOnhy.'0 In this way. he said mat scripture is a source of in fcrcn rial knowledge. But how can this be dlC asc?"j
JA penon cannot procd without rdying on tht inst~ntaliry of scripture because: [IJ he has ha rd mat, in the case of some activities whIlSt
dfecu arc nOI peiccpliblc. engaging o r not engaging in ,hose activities will
have some txU'C:mdy pr.U.s.:wonhy Of disastrous' resuhs; and I1J there is no
obsetwd contndiction in that being the case. He would thus act. thinking
"If this is to be done. it is best that it be done thus." It i5 through ana!~"
ing it in this manner mat (DignlgaJ sDud the irutrumentality of scripture.
In this regard.
A stHemen! liul is a wonhy subject of aaminauon is one [hal
is oohcrent (JilmbtuitihttJ, offen :ll suicablc rnrtbod, and eifel lOme
I 5 PS 1.p.
2 Sikpbuddhi (PVf:1,fw" 1(;,,0) ~II

ilII

ob.ifor'$ pG'irion;

.,..nm1

'Iran apt , ' m is noc inununmw for kllo.Ie" of

tal thmp. Wn wN.!
about [dw IUlemctll mMk by Diplp; namdy. lhad i1w IUlanalU of. cmIibk
~ an: dw buU for ordl-lOrmed in(crmtt: bcaUK me,. an: pually UW(WOrtby' I""~'!"~ ........~ 1 ThaI ...No:h ill a ,,1<:mCft1 <Jtf. (mi.
ibIe ~ ia inmnn..-niblr. an n2II'Ipk iI dot lUI.tmftV 'AlI .......nn...-:I min&<
aft mommwy. l1!m: aft abo ltaretnmll oi. cMibk penon COl ...... ..;'" a:.~mdy
rmMMC objent; th.crd"oR. they aft aho inc:ontrovutibk. In dUi; IIWIncr. Iuoowkdsc
dcriwoed from 1M .c:aimony oi. CftdibIc ~ ill form oi inm.tntt beaoUK JUCh
MI'~U aft ~u, ~. ThU$, .i.d.ry. Oi~ Wd th:u I~
dnnoed &om1~ ii, (1Orm of] inkmsa coaamin& atcm.1l ob;tc....To sate th:al mil conrndicu wha. hal ~ IIXI:pIcd {by DhamWdni. lbe ~
_,~..,." I -Btu ..... r.. tIJiI k ~-e_

""nose: ."......

Noec th:u the

c ..,... iI /'101 .0 M ClONtNC'd with the aantpk ,.tIM
... IN. radon II the HI.tmm. oi.be,.,., in mil inlttmu.

3 Sikyabuddhi (PVT:~1h5 K:J,o) offm the &in oiDhannaldn.iII~

In othn words. the Ad.ya [Diglipl did /'101 Q'f duo. ~ &om Kripnm: iI an
inlU ....... by daimi. duo. it iI ~y (oe Indy] (UhiUj inRl\lftWfti:al. R>.d.cr. i. iI
instlumerual with reprd 10 the ""'y in which I ptrIOIIlhouId pt'ClCX'ed.
.. for G(lof) .~,. fad ..,,,.,.
pt'c~,.bk

wim

~i (rVT:~)a) . whidl K'CIN . he much

readinl-

,6.

}61

FOUN DAT IOt<S O F DHAII.M AKllI.T r S PHILOSOPII Y

human aim. Other srarcmcnu are not wonhy subjccu of aamination. [rYI .u.tl
Coherena' means that the statemenu coaJes (upRSIl,!,hil'lI) on a single
topic. md by doing so they are helpful fo r understanding that topic.I This
is nOi the CU(' wilh sratemenu such as -ten ard.amom podt- md so on,
which arc incohcKnt. Otherwise. the ineptitude of the author would ensuc.
Abo, a person who seeks a rc:sull should not bother to aamine trtatises
Ihat propose the attainment of results through impossible means; nor
should he bother to a:unine trearisa thai discuss results that arc: not human
goals. Examples of the fOrmer include the iruuuction that one usc the jewel
raken from the cobr.a-hood of the Naga king T ~ as an ornamenl in
order to counler.w:t poilOn, and an example of the laner is the anaJ)'Iis of
Ihe number of teeth flut a crow tw.
In conlrut 10 that kind oftre:uisc, one may examine a treatise that hI is
coh~m , 11) proposes possible means, and
discu.sses a human goal. This
is Ihe kind of trtaciK llut is wonhy of cumination because it is unreasonable to concern onc:sclf with those other kinds of trtatUcs. If when invcstip ted the trc:l.tise in qucstion is nOi liable to being unuustwonhy
(rfisA",v.iJAbhdl). thcn it is good to PUt it into practice.
But what constiwu:s iu uUSIWOn:hineu?

u]

fa austwOnhincss coruisa of nol being contradiaed by pcn:eprual

awal"Ct1CU and two kinds of inferena' with regard to bOlh the

obsnvabk (dr!.u ) and unobscTv.ablc {tId.'!!"J Ihings (arthc)thal arc:
the objecu (6rr1M)of those in.srrumcnral cognitions.' [PYI .u sl
Not being contradicted by pcrctption means rhu Ihose things Ihat arc:
considered to be perceptible according to me UCl(isc acrual.Iy are perceptible:. Exampln include: the: color blue:, plc:asure and displeasure. the: recognition of a characte:ristic, mental St1ltCS such :l5 desire, and awareneu. Also,
things fhlu are nOl considered 10 hc perttptible should not be perceptible':.
Exarnplell include: th~ claim that on~ can ~rceivt: plc:asure: and so on as a

' Sikyabuddhi (PVT:14)a) IIiI1)'1 thai ",..mwu chat lht IU1I~mmu "poinl OWl" (-1M
~- ~.rir fL U )

that IOPic.. KOOI) oIrm no r;ka

6 ~i (PVT:14)b . K:",) pnMdcI tIw

po.- tOr 1M IWU leNS oi...-m..

APPENDIX OF TRAN SLATI O NS

j.j

oonjunClion ofform panicks such as sound:' and the nQlion Ih.:u ruhsr:mce.
morion, univers:W, CC)nmcl, and SO on ate real, perc;:qxible things.- Likev.rise,
tho.sc objectS mat au oonsidered to ~ infer.lble wilhout relying o n scripture mo uld be IO-lhe Nobles' Four Trudu are an example. And IhO$(:
things that are considered no t to ~ inferable mu.$( not be---aamples
include the self, This is :also the case for inftrentt based on scripture.' For
elCI.mple. hllving ~ccqnM mn rht: a"",nr;lIl nnll.t: (rii/"l) of nt:g:u;~ ml!'n _
tal states such as desire is dlihamut, and having accepted that the origin of
tho.sc negative memal H2les is tUihArmA [in the sense: of .h!'l'ma], the suggestion th:at o ne perform :ablutions and fire sacrifitt in o rder [Q d imin:a!e
IltiJu,I7ftIl is not sound advitt. The scripture's purity [i.e., in lack of contradictions] in regard to all those objecu which can be determined in the
lIbov.. mllnnt:r conu;rurl!':l its lruH'W'Ortltinl!':ll.
(Digniga] said m:at, since: the statements of a credible person :are
gcncuJly trustwOrthy,' a cognition from such statements o f

.,.._.

7 ~i (PVI':144h .

K:)9})

8 ~uddhi (rvr:~
-Vailqilw and.o on,"

_ K:J,,)

I>O'ICI du.llw: d\C'01)'aiticQ.cd httt i, from IMSirpkhya

" :"IaIL. ,I"" , ,I..: .icw 1~j'W h.;,C u .h., uf'M

9 ~i (PVT:l-fsal:

s,.

Ahu purifying ~ .,;riP'''''' by means of eM rwo kinds orinStnllnmtal lXW'ition dull

proceed on tho: IIMii of rallhinp (. , .
ftJis Un.zr,." _htIMI.J~. OIl(
.hal poUu mat .,;ripa= to ~ ubjcn of prcdialion (dw ( lUI" "'--i,,);u a ifni
ria mat hat bem oncpnd at instrUmmw, Thaa, due to infming CO!Iu.diaion
bwccn JOnlC carlH:r and lara- past'V', when one mpsa in an an.oIyoiII of lhc dif
fUel"'"' be:t.w,
p'mgo" Ihc.,;ripru!31 infcn:ncr-lhc inl1:rmabucd on Kriplun-t-hoWd I\0Il be: conuadicrW. 'l"hU Q!he conlQI of.....tu.l follows. [.;'''PI,. .....
Itfo Un.fI ,. 'i aJ",J _ pJilltfo I.mt """,. fNU """.; k # tsii _ & 1m ,.

m.o.c

...,..,,.i"""

..... gi "'_ b9i m./tlnMm fMb&i.t ....... 1...,.,;,,; pi 1M 'in 116

1PlOf fI' """ ~,., ..."....". uk,. tU 'i """ I.", u 11M,." 'in JM . . . , . , , . ~ 1
(II", Itt u. ,. i '" ... ...,..,,. M U l"p,j , . trW,. dJn .".., ... 'i .u", ,... 11#".
Kb,,) oII'ers _ ... ~. lcoo helpfUl commuoo:

0"4' migtu invaripte . Kripru..., d"" to a conlradiction between earlia and laler r-Ages conumi", tho: rwo kind. of obja mal U( pu"" (in th.t they '""' 1>0'1 comn
dieted by ~n:qxual aWU'UlClii or in~!ICU !wed 0)(1 raI thinp] and QUl!'md,.
rrmoIeobjecu. In Uw cut.;~ MsH.,. tni".." ';"""'."1>0'1 contradict dw
KripNrC" _upplkd by conU:::II. [fIi~ ~""7I ''''''''''I'''~ (.l.-~
~,,;~ JWrIi.. rill~ '-1IfI~'; _ ill dp~"'''' """"'n.".
qi 1.bUlv.w", itj ,P,.q,.", ".

10 1nc: compound

"11"" 'ua.".~1t]ii an be rad in one of rwo

w:t)'I.

1'he lmn

16.4

FOUNDATION S OF DHAlMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSO PHY

those St:uem~Q ' objca is a weUfonne:d inference of that obje:cr.

~en though the object is C:pistemic::ally remOle. The cognition is
said 10 be: an infe:rence: because !here: is no other Wily 10 know th.:II
objea. [PVl.1I6)
These: kinds of stalemenu of a ere:dible pe:rson-thosc: [described by
Dignigaj and thO$C [accordingly ddine:ate:d abovej-a.re: genera.lly
(1Ilm4"l") (tusrwonhy. Hence:. nO!: ()bse:rving those st:atenlenu to be: m~
leading. one infers [be: nUtwOnhinC:S1 of a cognition of those:. st:uements'
object, ~en though it is not knowable by pe:lceplion and empiric::al inference. One infers that IUch a cognition is rfUSt'NOnhy b:ause: it is based on

lhtbtJt' may to. inlcrprftCd in dw.a- 0I"..mmc:ss.."In thil caK. dw ~I would to.
WI dK INRWOnhinat f..r-,.fl44) of a Cft'diblc: pnlO'I'$ IUlcmcnll aboul ~bIc:
ohjecn is rIN 161M U W ~ncu of die. Jalnnenll with rq;ud to unob.nvabIc
objlJ. In otbn _1'Ch. me KJ~tJ I n tnlItWOrthy ptcc$::ly boaUK!hey _ me RlIIIeIMIItJ or. cmiiblc: penon. Thil 1ppc:al1 10 to. tho: imnprnllion Wen by Slkyabuddhi
(PVT. p:~"",.

K:m):

codibkpaMn..p...cl. io .... _
i.n l.. ~ (_ ...."" H .
Il~ Thai is.;ua u
cmiiblc pmon', IpCUh illrusrwonhy wilh rtprd 10
UI objm thai can to. dncnnincd [throuF f'C1"p'ion at>d ordinary ;nkrmoe}. Iike... BoM' .........

me

witoe il i! mlK'II'Oftby wilh lepro to an extmndy rtmOIt abita at- pR'riJdy bceo'llC
i l it: the ~ or I cmiibIc: penon. [.,..,,. UtI,.'i 1Ihit.,,; ...i lift..., ....""
,. i ~, _ I ri fur """".. ,.... J-r .;r, ...... ,.. .,; w.. Hi .." ~"f' III pJ"'"
"III ,.IA It]tf , . uti,. 'i d.r ".; w.. H tit fur ,J,i.. no '"' no 0'",.,.'",.... r I .,..,
,. - ',.; lib;' ..,u,... ,.; """ .. K: , . " ....' ~1fI~~
'rdJ.o .,111# ]hilozt!flMllM ~..~ ;;"".~ .... 4
fOSlrp~ ....... ~ ~~ __ ~~ 'T'kio" cJ-+y conup<
and Iw bn COIlecled ttwtj. ro conform to PVT].

w".,.,. ....,

I,.,...

1lUe- in~ ~ 1M IfIWI1MI upon. ~ rwndy. ~ whidI ..

tWn u."".".,01 ~""'"' PhiIoq>hiaIy.!his in~Don" poablcmaric. for Dtw
malUm lIinudE'dcnia !hal Oft( QIl dttmninc whaM Uly pWII indMduaI hu the qtWi
tics thai ww.Id ...- him credible.
On HCond inu;iPl CUDon, me f(fm
QIl b.K to. undtntood in Inc IeIIIt of"in
~." For I panIJd IIJa&II: in PV. I ( ( PVi.IM. ~ On lhi! in,erpmo.bon. the
argumml iI tNl. Ana 1M IUltmanl or. panicubr IUtJ- ~ been obocnN 10 to. 11Ua.
wonhy in lmol of ~ objo:cu. thlI ~ uuarwonhincu may to. exlended 10 W>OOItfYIbIc: ob;a.. 1M obviou:I poobkm with dtiI--.d inu.rprturion .. that;1 IIfU Ilypt
ofl'Clll)f1inS mal Dlwmaldrti aplicidy rtjeaa. namdy, iq.IJ~. wt.nmy the ~
co-omImna: ofIM m.knu in I probandum ttpboa I MO!SIIf)' marion to.",CUI the .....
dmoe and !Ix- probandwn. How"". Ana: DhannUirti i! noc cor'IttfIIed wim rmdcrins
Kriptunl inkrmcn NlIy inmumtnal. lhillml3l;VC ratonins may be adoquuc roc hi! pw

_1bY..,.

. . - II ., Icuo hao .he adftn. . ol no< ""flicioly con~ ............... d.ao he malteo

only fWO

VCQ(!f

bll:f.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

.,those statements, just like the other cognitions based on those statements
~that can be verified by perception and empirical inference.
Hence, even though that cognition comes from language, it does not
make known just the speaker's intention like a cognition coming from
~[ordinary] language because in this case the cognition is also an inference
'.of the statement's objects, since it is trustworthy with regard to those objects
~(artha). 11

Alternatively, we state in another fashion the fact that, due to its trust;Worthiness, the speech of a credible person is the basis for an instrumental
Inference:
Alternatively, since the true nature (tattva) of that which is to be
avoided and that which is to be done along with the methods for
doing so are well established, the statements of the credible person in question 12 are trustworthy with regard to the most important issues (pradhiintirtha). Hence, they are a source of inferential
knowledge with regard to other objects. [PVI.2I7]
That credible person taught what to avoid, what to do, and the methods
for each; what he taught in regard to these issues is not erroneous, and
;hence, those teachings are trustworthy. An example is the Nobles' Four
Truths, in the way that will be explained. 13 Since those statements are trustworthy, the assumption (upagama) that other statements-which are useful for accomplishing a human aim and suitable to be practiced-are also

11 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:246a '" K:394) remarks:

It does not indicate just the speaker's intention. [K The word just (eva) should be read
in a different order [than what is recorded]]. Instead, since it is trustworthy in the manner just described with regard to an object (artha) that cannot be known by either perceptual awareness or [non-scriptural] inference, it is also an inftrence from the
perspective of the intention of a person who wishes to engage in activity. [K: But it is
not actually (vastutas) an inference because there is no relation between expressions and
objects].

f'l2 We supply from context the phrase, "the statements of the credible person in question."
i,That we are dealing with the trustworthiness of a credible person's statements is evident
'.from the way that Dharmakirti introduces the verse (PVSV adPVI.217; G:I09.II-I2): "Alter"natively (atha vii), we state in another way the fact that, since the speech of a credible person
}s trustworthy, [knowledge derived from that speech] is inferential." [athaviinyathiiptaviidasyiij~iJisa7(lviidiid anumiinatvam uryate].
1;Y'

:13 Dharmakirti is referring to the discussion in PV2.

366

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

trustworthy with regard to other issues will not lead to one's deception
because [1] there is no instrumental knowledge that contradicts that
assumption, and [2] it is pointless for that speaker to make false statements
without a purpose.
!4Thus, in the two ways [described in these two verses]; it is said that a
cognition coming from scripture is an inference since there is no other way
for one to proceed, as is illustrated by the thought, "If one is to act in aCcordance with scripture, it is best to do it thus." However, this kind of inference is not without problems (anapaya), since expressions are not invariably
concomitant with objects, as has been already pointed out.
Others think that a statement dependent for its origin on a superior person is in accord with reality (yathartha). [PVI.218ab]
According to others,!5 a credible speaker (apta) is a person with good qualities such as experience of things as they truly are (yatharthadarfana); that
person's teachings (pra/:zayana) are trustworthy.

14 Introducing this next statement, Sakyabuddhi (PVT:247a2-4; absent in K) raises an objection:

"A person who is trustworthy and who acts so as to benefit others will necessarily not
deceive others about any object or issue if s/he perceives the supersensible (atindriyadarlin), but one cannot be certain that s/he can perceive the supersensible. Therefore,
his statements may be trustworthy with regard to a human aim that is knowable
(bgrod par bya ba ~ gamya) through reason, but due to a lack of knowledge, his statements may be deceptive about extremely remote human aims or objects." [gal te skyes
bu gtso bo'i don fa bslu bar [Po mtl byed pa yin fa / gzhan fa phan pas Jug pa dbang po

las 'elas pa 'i don mthong ba can yin na / gdon mi za bar 'ga' zhig fa gzhan mi slu bar gyur
ba yin pa de'i dbang po las 'das pa'i don mthong ba nyid ni nges par nus pa ma yin no /
de bas na rigs pas bgrod par bya ba'i skyes bu'i don fa mi bslu ba yin gyi mi shes pa nyid
kyis na shin tu skog tu gyur pa la bslu bar yang gyur ro zhe na I] .
The sense of this objection is clear: one cannot guarantee that the trustworthiness of such a
person necessarily extends to extremely remote objects. Sakyabuddhi continues:

It is true that this is an issue (don ~ artha) concerning which one cannot be certain.
But the Buddha is posited (bzhag pa) as such [i.e., as credible,] in terms of an individual's [soteriologicallyoriented] activity. In order to demonstrate this, [Dharmaklrti]
says .... [nges par mi nus pa can gyi don 'eli nyid ni bden te / 'on kyang skyes bu Jugpa La
ltos nas de ltar rnam par bzhag pa yin no / de nyid bstan pa'i phyir de dang zhes bya ba La
sogs pa smos ... ].
15 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:247a) does not identifY who these others might be; Karl!akagomin
(396) glosses apare as vadina/:!, while Manorathanandin (PVV ad cit.) provides naiyayi-

kadaya/:!.

APPEND IX O F TRAN SLATION S

Thit point (Ilnhll) is :wmiliM {i,!Jl} if anI'. is :l.bll'. to know mat

thu penon has that lupttior q~ity." [ PVI.1I8cd 1
Every judicious pSOn who wishes to :l.et an3.lyzes SIlII~mcna 10 det~rm in ~
what it 2nd what is nOI scripture {4g.MIl}. he does so with the desire to:l.Ct
cffi:ctivdy. 2nd not because of some pernicious habit. Learning what should
~ PUf imo pr:actioe from rhe ...::ripnJf"e. he rh in b . ~ H:lvi n g:acted :accordingly. I might raliz.e my 803.1." On me basis of me rrustwOrthiness of mat
ICripture with ttprd to things that can ~ expetienttd [through percqnion
or empirical inference] . mll! penon acu wim regard 10 other mings li.l'.., me
supcn;ens i~e objecu discussed in me scriprure] bcc:aUS(' such is me case for
most ptll.ctic:al action in me world.
BUI if one is 10 act on the lnJii, of ex:unininS t~ penon. one would not
:I.Ct :l.t all beaU51'. one cannot know- whtttKr or not Wt person has those
kind of exuaordin:l.ry qualides. It is not the case thu penons such :I.J us
would not :let bccaUS(' of nm :a.ccepring that th~re :a.rc som~ pef5(ms with
~ qualities. since that kind of ~rson docs make true (.."illlthtl) SllItements." In other words.
Othen Irwndy. we Buddhisu.1 know that it is eJ:tremeiy difficult to know (JurbotihlJ) whether others h:l.ve faults or:l.re faultless, as when on~ responds to me question. ~ Is this penon like
this or not ~ It is exuemcly difficult to know beawc th~ insuu-

16 ~buddhi (PV1':lo4"fo,) commmu:

Weacapt W poinl ~ Iw jwt bn 1U!td-_ do roof deny lhil kind oflpouibil.
ifyJ. Bul it iI: KCep(aI only if OIl('
10 know WllUptriorify. ddlnal. w ~
rima of thiflt;i !hey lruly an:. eu~.. bane' definile up! of ~ pnson. Bul OIl('
is not abk lO know that. [J"J",J_ th.t,.i -P"fJi-,. MttpJ 'II. ......
MI
,. ~ _ Ji" (If I ~ .. <Wf II; M Iu .., D'" ,./fftI. NT 6yd ,. iii ,.,i 6yd .. I ...
9r"!"x.J (If"" ji Iu .. ftbi" J. ,.,,;,.,. .. t. .... ,.7..uJ.""p4,.." rJt,mJ J.

u.bIe:

"""'. *.

r,..

"fI"I,.,.,,.

""I
1111/" M]tUtf Ibn,., ... ""''' fl.
Kart'ahpvnin U96J praoc. _ this IUInnml a1mou murdy:
~ i - _~ . ...... in- . .,., / ii". ,. ;u,rr.. j Mnl", ,""'!"ury.,,,,,-~
b1.Je ",~ ......t..". "" ,. ~ [For. ~ Jm.""I .,.~ ". ~ rod
_~

h 'i (D.:

_III ...

in xcon:!wid! ~I.

17 The: portion Wf.oponding to ~ (PVr:l4bJ,)...

* Iu w'D",,.. _ji Iu

g" '" ... ,.1,.,. 1ft IiMrf IMII ,. i' ~ tv tk ,., . , "IIS,.
1t]i ,.,., tbould O\U afta' iiI!' ~ and ,..,. , ..".,. in Ku,.s.J.I- 16).
'" khr" "" I

368

FOUN DATION S O F DHAIt.MAKIRTI 'S PH I LOSOPHY

mental cognitions fo r dctttmining such issues are almost unoo.

tainable (JII,wb&tj." [PV,.2.191
The tnlthfuJ (SIlmytltJ and dcttitful anions of pmons arc dut: to their good
mental qualities and their mental fla...,. Those mental attributes are super.sensible, and they would have to be infe' lcd from the physical and voc:aI
behavior (flJlllI4hl,.) that arises from them. And most behavior can also be
performed ddibcratdy (bwitihipiimz1lt) in a way other than the mental state
they iCem to reflect bec:au$(' those behaviors occur as one desires and
because those bduviors may be inrrnded for vWow aims." Thus. there is
an overlap of the: evidence: for f2ulu md f2uldcssnes.s. Thcrd'ore, not having made a ddiniti~ determination, now is one to c:mblish that the: author
of the scripture is flawle:u?
-men is there no such a person who is f2uldcu?"
l8The pma J.!t-. ohtn tnNbud ~ u "difficub," bu. rbit EnsIish word it 100 wak
for Ihe ImK IhM Ihe prUu mnooryL In ncarlyroar cut, .6.!J. apnae JOmCthi,. matt !han
Ens\ish "diffiaab' bu. fIOI ~=:t u ' imj)C*ibk:
Nocc mal. KICOfdilllco
. (PVr:14Io. K:ml, ",,~). fan,nine nominW"" IinFu when <:OnIlI1Kd wi<h

.. rued ....w. .>OJ .,.,

,.i. (i

.. buI muo:ullnc nonWJatj"" plwa when wn-

19 ~ an Q&lD.pk. ~j (PVT:l.4Ib - K:J97) ncxa: "Thu is, fIUIGN who ha~

d$n- ....y make thuNdW'Qi appear if !her wen: ~, and daiWcM penoN may
make tbantrIYa appc:u II if Ihq Iud daira:" IloIil4oI '" " '''- .yi
'!'

'"""is"""" .,.,.....

""""'",; l ..uNpI U Ui"PN'.1.

20 Slky.buddhi (PVT:1<I9U; ab6aI. in K) ammmu;;

.J- .,...u;rift. lill

<hil IOIlonall (otwm.Idni
ihowul
aaxpa ~ claim
~ an _
prnons who aft f.IIIUdaa. Hlvi,,! acupud dUo daim, olna: he dnira ID ... .t.I;q, il by dnnonstnO",!he inwummral evpIilion .tulihows aKh IIW( ID bt poIIibk, he pYu bwani all oppoai"l
opinion fJJt1trr..- - .. fIi,..,.q.Jbyarins. Ibm is iheft noJUCh ... '" (,.; iI..t
,.'i# .... _,.. tiM ..... .a';";.ri _
k i]or""
"" fMI "J'f , . _ Iw ,. 1M,., MJ,. WI i]or .. M U. u.,r _ 1M,. ; fIiMJ
_ " ' _,., ; .... __ J, ~,.... 'MJ,."IP.D: 'i] ~ ' -r _ .. _,,-. __ .,..
.. ,. "" ~ 'pJ!4T ir!,wIJ. /j.
I, it "., .. jw.._ " " . , MrrjIIi", " -

~ .,jill

rIJm
"-li""malt{"Ix). - Ma ..... "..,"*"""""'
.. Throuch
mal
cr _

.,,._,.i# .

Sikpbuddhi (PVI":L4,M) ahrr .... duou&fa IIx _

, alto n-marIu:

In !he IIC"ClOOd cbaptu [DharmWni l shOWI tha. !he knowkdp of ~ mil.

__ aU Ib_ Tk,,:....<. it is nQC mal _ do nQC attqK m. dw:n: iI any .....:h prrlOCI. W( aft jus( ....ri.. ~ it is c:urandrdifficWllO know...-htthcr or noc ~ ptnon
..t.a iI _ '1 ~ is dJ:, ot of&uJu.. [..,... 1M --. eM Itp' ,..-J,. UI/I.a J u.,

--',.. i"-,..,." _ .... kio,...,..,..

, . j . . . . .,.; [PVI"-D and -p: ...1

l.o._,. D-Jt,n.. 1*........_,.,...,,.

_*11.

MJ,. _';. ~ J

hru-r
1M

,..

APPEND IX O F TRAN SU,T IONS

All Raws. being susceptible to decrease and incra5C. have coun

tcragcnu (vi,.ltpt); hence. due to having inculcucd the coun
[Cfagcnts through habitw.cing onc:sdf to them. at some point the
ncgativities (IJrlIIltl) should be eliminated. (PVI .UO)
However. it is a.rremely difficull 10 know whethcr someone elK haJ
a"ailV(! rru.r .t:limil\lloon of ncg::nivitirs. IntW,d. in:nmuch as Raws h.:a\"r: rho.-:
qualiry of unde:rgoing decrease and inc.c:asc. they demonstrate: Ihe: corre
sponding abundance or pauciry (U,ItIlf!Dpall1'!") of the: eradicuive force
(lIbhiblNtJltl) of the coumcragc:nu. as is Ihe c:a.K with Gre. This is the case
becau.sc. being produced from concrpruaJity. through habituating oncsdf
to some positive mental quality. they wiD dccrcasc. even though their basic
C:lldIt ( ,.pMlillA) it mil present. And wn.t:n that habiru:r.rion of onedf (0 tM
countcragcnlJ becomes inte:rue. [bose fuws have the: quality of being dim
inaled without a mu. as is the: ~ with Are and such. Tlltrcfore:. someone: may indd be: flawless.
~Bul bow could someone: be Rawlc:u? No one could be for Ihe following
reason: c:vc:n when me fuws' coumeragcm (vip"Jt,.) is infused (t4tnuIN) in
a ~non's mind. awes wowd Ulu ag:a.in in aecord wim the eoncUtiolU wr
becom.t: availabl.t:. jtat u that counre:ragent arisa in a ~non whose mind

is infused with the: Raws." >I

This is not a problem. sillCe

The nature of the mind is such that it is frtt of ncptiviry and by

nature it has a real object (lJhiit4nIM);JJ as such, it cannot be

"*JUtl mn,.,A.Iw,i" "'.*_"'T_,/ Ncxr Ih"..", ...... MJ

MJ,.

,. .t.oWd bf f ....nckd 10 sIt]a ... ,.;

in aeoord with K()9I), us ...... _
ut 'Ii ~,.~ ,.,.". NfJt'N NMI .. M~ III ", 'P~ J..ryu.. ;';1.

21 In orhn wonk, whm dw mind u fiIkd with 8... . one ~ mab: is flawkA: by (:OUlIrcraainl cbo.e R:awt with their IXIWICn,.nL 1M "counCn'IIf'Ic" of
tUws iI J mmwlO.le
thai ~FF =~. ICis ch. taliucion of Jd~ Buc;..c .. the - 'iutica

m.e

01 odflnancsa can (:OUlIlff'aCI m.e tU. . _ mipr c:bim chal chi:: R:awt could aIsu oounluaa:
d.r -u...oion of1d.8_ m 1M poinl ~ is mal. on Ohamukini', W:-w. ch. realiuoion
of.tdll .... Q(I _
all , IXIWIlerJFQt 1<1 the flaws bct::au.K chal taliQlica .nd IhooK fla..,
. - I in cFFc.ioon 10 rachother.1'hoeobjlOi pcW!a OW en.. dwopflQlidon..,.,.boxh..,..,
~ .. dw cWizarion of .dfIoanew an tupplant ch. fla_ ch. 0.. ... can IikcwQc wppbnl
the realiution of.dlk:unca.

22 IIodI hI:W..-hen il ,, !'QUInt in f'YJ.. this _o;ou.!d be undmtood to be rdi:ni", 10

rIw mind of. pn10II who hal JI kaR undmcood ~ ruhn dwI dw mind in tmaaI.

370

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

counteracted (badha) by what is opposite to it because, even if

one were to attempt to do SQ, the mind is naturally inclined
toward its nature. 23 [PVI.221]

It is not possible to alter the nature of the mind without making an effort, JUSt
as a Brahman scholar (frotriya) who later becomes a kapalika cannot stop his
disgust (ghnza) without making an effort. 24 And it is by seeing the good qualities in the nature-svabhava of what one seeks to obtain and faults in the
nature of what aims to eliminate that one makes an effort to obtain or eliminate something. But it is not possible for one who has inculcated the counteragents of the flaws to see good qualities in the flaws because their opposites
[i.e., the states that counteract the flaws] are free of negativity. They are free
of negativity because [I] in them all flaws are eliminated; [2] they are devoid
of the suffering that comes from negative orientations (paryavasthana) and
birth; and [3] they never turn away from the taste of the bliss of peace. 25

Dharmakirti, as well as Sakyabuddhi and Devendrabuddhi, understands the realization of

selflessness to be a state that is natural to the mind. On this verse, Sakyabuddhi (PVT:250b)
comments:
It is free ofnegativity because it is devoid of all the negativities of sa1J2sara. A real object
(bhiitartha) means that its object (artha)-which is to say its object (vifaya) that are
particulars such as the impermanent and so on-are real in that they are not distorted
(aviparita). And precisely because it apprehends a real object, it is the path-state
(marga) that is the nature of the mind. That is, in mentioning the real object, he refers
to the mind's object (artha). In this regard, when the mind functions through superimposed images, it is confused; since that superimposed image is not the nature of the
mind, the faults are adventitious since they are occurring through superimposed
images. If even in the state where one has not yet cultivated the path it still makes sense
for the path-mind (lam gyi serns) to be the nature of the mind because it is confirmed
by an instrumental cognition, then why would it not be the nature of the mind when
one has cultivated the path? As it says in the second chapter (PV2.2IOcd-2uab):
The mind is by nature luminous cognizance (prabhiisvara). Defilements are
adventitious. The defilements do not have the capacity to arise in the mind
even [when one just intellectually understands selflessness] prior to [actually
meditating on it]. So they obviously cannot arise in the mind that has the nature
of that realization of selflessness after [one has perfected one's meditation on selflessness].

23 This verse is identical to PV2.212cd-213ab.

24 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:25Ia) reads 'dod pa for gh.r1Jii, but the sense of "disgust" seems more
appropriate here.

25 These three are the opposites of the three "negativities" (upadrava). Sakyabuddbi
(PVT:25Ia-25Ib) records them as follows:

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

'"

A mt:nral state that has an unrttl obt1 (abhiiJ4nhll) arises due to a primary aUK (ufUitUNI) (i.e. me: conceptual imprint for a fWe, conceprual
cognition] . AJ a result of appropriating (updJdut) what opposes the conrinuum of that mental nare. mat menu! srate should not continue to exist.
HO'NeV(f, a menwscue [such as an awareness of sdRcssncul trun has a
real object cannot bot halted by cultivating its opposite bau.sc: it arues due
[0 real things themse:lves. The Raws have: unreal objc:as. and as such. they
cannot oppose a mt:nw sate in which their counteragcnt has bC'cn infus!..
Therdo~, the Dults do not arise: apn. This is the case: bcc:au.sc: even if one
were to strive to re-create (he flaWl in ,he mind. ,inee (he mind tends
toward positi~ qualities (XW!l4). a judicious penon [who ,till has some
Raws] will make an dfon only for wlu.t counteracu dum DullS. How much
mo~ so i. hi. the case: for a penon who is unRawcd.
"But what i. the source of thoc naws such that by ioculcating that
source', countcragcnt th()' can bot diminatc:d?~
All rypes of R.aws are born from the belief that the evanescent
components of body and mind a~ the locus of an Clsc:ntial sdf
(utlilyiuUrt.1IJI). ' gnon.nce is thai belief. When ,hal hc:lief
ntturs. nne aperien~ clinging In that alleged ~Ir. and from
lhat clinging comes an~r and so on. IPVJ.lu]
A person who has neither the- nocion of "' - nor the- notton of "mine" is

without grasping. and as such, he- docs not ding to anybody or anything.
And a dispwiolUtc penon cannot haw hatred for anybody or anything.

Tlw:1l' I mm: rq.JtiYitic:t due 10 1M abtma of ....nich dw palh is comidered to ~

~ of r>qiumty. ThaI..tUcb bilWh tht mind is tIv ~tivKy of d", fIa_ and by
il !Ix mind it boo.u!d ....m that il QlInoI ~ in d.., Of"'ricnoe (tIItW,.,.j of rnl
nbjtns TIw:.wpm1}' of IIIfkrinl and mtaul . . - ;, wt..l Clu.a bodily and """,.
uI diocqlillibftun'l

(~And d..., 10 no!

'- ...... ro. -r "

~I

h..-i"lJNlcifiN COfIu.minMN F' . ,'Il' .....,

i.--tlUo ................,. oi .... " _ " 01 e>On""';_...l

-~.

26 ~ (PVT:Jflb-1J~ . ~I) iI ~ hdpNJ !'or this team. u u incI.i_ell by !Ix need 10 irucn ~ pamuheric:al ph..-s into IN: Inrublion. AI dw n>d of

hit COII\IMnl he mtWlu:

Ewm when !Ix flaws I.un infiMd (I A . in !Ix mind. insuummul copiliont thai
~ real im,..a....c:h as dlC' imparmnal1 and 10 on induce d", palh-l11l~
(~ohu UlUDocnLU ~

i~ ("~.w) Is.

u..- n...-huw m ...... ......., .... ,hen. when

t-a infwed in dw mind1

372

FOUND ATI O NS O F DHAI.MAICIRTI'S PH ILOSOP HY

This is SO because hnred cannot occur if (h~rc is no harm being dolK [0

on~'s self, nor to what pemins to it. Nor can on~ hav~ hatred for a person
or thing th:u opposes what harms one's allegro self. Th~rcfore. th~ bdief in
:an cucnlializ.cd self (4tmM1#rWlUI). which arises from being mem:ally condilioncd to prrnow momcnlS of that same type ofbdief, gives birth to th~
fiution on what pertains to that .sdf (ihlfi]lltr4lu). Th~ two-namdy.
the self-belief:and th~ woon on what pertains to it--givc:: binh to dinging ro th~ self, or self-I~ :and thn clinging or self-love gives rise ro anger
and so on.
In this way, all Raws arise from the bdief that th~ evanescent psych~
physical components arc the locus of an essential self (SAt~!i). And that
very belief is called ignorance.
Confusion (i.e., ignolllnce) is therefore said to be th~ fundamental cause (nwlUI) of the Raws. In other conrau, the causc
is said to be the belief that the evanescent componenu of body
:and mind :arc th~ locw of:an C$5Cntial self because when that
belief is eliminated. the flaws arc diminated. (PVI.n))
[The Buddha) said that confusion is the run<hmental cause of me Raws
because the flaws do not uUc in on~ who is not confused. In orn~r contats,
he said that the fundamental cawc of the A.aws is the bdief that th~ evanesemt aggJ~g:a[CS constiturc:an essential self. This point about the cause of the
A.aws is m:ad~ in terms of the priPPUl'1cause because it is comradictory for
the flaws. whim :arise due to variow causal conditions, to be: produced by
a single caW( [without orner causal conditionsl . Moreover, if both "ignarancc- and "the belief that the ~ncsttnt componenu are a locw of:an
cucnrial self" were each the primary caU$C, then staring on~ in on~ contal
:and th~ other in another conto:t would not show much skill in teaching.
But if both indiate the
Raw, then there is no contradiaion
in wing one term or another in .
. A primacy or emphasis
(pr4Jh41fJ4) is placed on me belief rut the evanescent componenu :arc a
locw of an essential self. This belief is considered primary because it serves
as the subsruuial awc (llpMUNI) fur the A.aws, since the flaws :arc climinatro when it is diminatro."
27 DhannUini', point M.: ill limply tel bria& losechu slisbtly difl'uml ways of ~n,
abou. d.o h'-.I _ ..... ca.- ( ;J,-.)olbulu. On u... one MM. __ ~.,..u ol
~O~., eM bdid" or "view" mal eM ~1IeICen1 oomponenll ofbody;l.tld mind aft

APPEND IX OF TRANS LATIONS

l7l

Thus, it is possible that one might eliminate the Raws, which arise from
the bdil!'f that the evanac.c:nt psychophysical componl!'nts atl!' thl!' locw of
an essential self. One can d iminate the Raws by eliminating that belid; and
onl!' eliminates mat belief by means of its COUntcragcnt , which is ml!' real
ization of I!'mprineu. But it is difficult to know (durllnll4J") whether thl!'
person in :aa:ord with whose teachings onl!' might practice lw indeed dim
irnllti!'d thl!' Raws.

Ioo:w of J.n cam.ia! KIf). This bdid". ho" hU. m.y 1M: alkd -iponna" (.m.Iyi), and
inorana may Ix alkd "coofUsion- (-'-1. ~. rvorn thouJh both -0. and
~ an: Wei !(11M: rhc aUK of the: fb_ no o;ontndKtion is involvni. sin dwy may
Ix Uft~ as synonymow: In dtlJ COOlo:D. DhlrmHirti d _ 10 anptwia: "'U,,J;lIi
bccaUIC it ~ readily KaMlnu for his way of tpakinl about ibws and their dimm.uion.

5. PV2. /-6 with &ltions from PVP lind PVT '

[b,troJuri"f tIN Vnn"Ill r~ ofrlN (hapUT, IRvnuIrabJUidhi rmuzrln:)
He. n:uTldy rhe Bles.ced One. is:ln instnuTlern of knowledge beouse he is
similar to an instrument of knowledge.I An objector asks. "But what is rhe

natllf't of an instrument ofknowkdgc such that you claim that he is similar

it ? ~

An instrument ofknowledgc is ~ trustwOrthyawarencss. (PV1.la]

[lHwNJrabwJJhi(lb4./JJ "our that thrn art two kinds ofrrustworthinns:)

As for rhou trustwOrthincss,

- h~ving

determined the objttt. when one then

acu upon il .") thai thins'. c:ou$al copaciry iI ftlabli.hcdi hen ce. [in one

$C:n$C:Jthe trusrwonhiness i.s that th:l' thins has the lUnd of nature which it
I S Knuotr (1001) ora numbottol usoeNI Sarukri, ~tJ, lTWIyofwbidl wnt' induded
in. prniow -uo.. of til;.. l.....ul>un (Dunne 1999:4)6A).
2 Commmtinl on ~i'J SUtcn>ent, ~j (PVf, 1IJ""7lb]ff), ~ the
following ~jtaionl and resporues:

"lnfm:nce and pacc:ption an! ilUuummw; thaI bring ,he cue, how an tbc BicsKd
One. ..t.o docs no( ha~ the IWUtt oflinfm:r.a: and pcrcc:jlOOnJ be: called such (Ihal
iJ., 'irmrummw' W
H~ iJ c:alkd an "","rumenl of~ beaUIt' he is $imihr 10 ~ ("'0 kinds
ofinJ"'In-cnc. ofk..IO~. In other 'A'Clnb. he (an be IU~ in 1M mcu.pbo.,
"iruc:nuntnw."
' Su, the B'-ni One Iw; the .... run: of the ~ nona>neq>rual, .mminl ..;..
dom thai atdots by fotu of kir medlUlicn. Hena. 'M BIeucd One ;.. actually by
naNn: I perception, 10 why doa one nttd In n:ly on. mcu.pho.~"

Sikyabuddhi (PVT:rutH") mpnndl:

rhiI ;.. no( I probkm beawc the qnthn ,"lIfh:MltlJifil is inrmded to
n:kr 10 ~ SUIt. But hcn:. the 0Dtta:I n:spotuc iI I i follows: Evm if the8ksKd OM Iw; tho: ....1Wl:' of lhe afomnmlioncd inlfrumml oIluoowkdst", he iI
~ DOl (Om..-dy kMwn II ouch. ~. he if metaphorically (Ompand

Some lily

[ hal

to ........., .. ,

a-a. ..... """...., ofknowl<.l!,,-

17.

APPENDIX O F TRANSLATIONS

is aumcd ( 0 luve. This kind of trusrworrhiness is a quality of the obica.

When one knows ir u such. the awareness is trustwOrrhy; this is a quality
of the subject.'

[lHvrnJTIZ/nuJJhi (~IZJffJ TIZUa tlw "bjtilln tiMt, sinn inftrrnu;s nnmtfJlI.1

(bhrinta), it wou/J nllt S4tUfj tlKtkfillinon of~rthi,,~t;i1X1l in PV~. I.
HI rnnarh :)

Sin infertna does nor dcrermi nc the objccr in iudf, the definition of
'trustwOrthiness' does not includt it; hence. your definition is incorrccr."
We respo nd that a cognition is trustwo rthy !>aU$(' it does not dtctivt

"~buddhi (I'VT, ""':7~R) makes IOInc illlpom.rt.l ~u on dW point;

- If pclC.'tp!:ion. lIon...conapClw, il anrIOIIdnmnillor wt.ahon- [Inc puapl[ wam- and

to OII:U~ tnlCOI' fabc. Hena. bow CUI Ont $aJ' W I one 'detmnilM:l dw l tf~'(iiI and

.,.

~ .

H_ _ ....y 1M IOIJowin&.. Ac:tMty thaI baKd on puapbon !wofoId: initial and

hahin llOl. 0"., ..... 0::1""" . nd Iuhi ..... I I'*"""'I"inn nl""- .hih!' .n ..t.im """' io Iuni....
1U1ed. Whm mal puaption an-.;I ariJeldeurm.inif\A ia irmsr in aoooni with onr',
habii\Ullion in I ........... dw .OidIaU (:I.1UCI1Qr a'roO'. And lbar .....uacu prodlKCi

I aWoeq"uu ..mfrins lW'UmeA of dial lind: hmu, me pmon aru on IMI oo;ca.
1'1w:n .......... in thac ~ dw . warmaa iudf dctmnilM:l iu own iNuumuualiry. Sina:
il doa IlOl ckpmd on dw: actmry of ......., MJl..q1lnl' irul:rumcrlal ~ion, it ill NIl
ilUflP'"",ialr 10 ay. "dnemilM:l W objm;.... " It is tI(M !he caK thai aU pnupcions
an: dnmninni 10 be ~o:al dvourJ> .omrthi.ng doc. In !he a i r of acting d""
10 III illilial pc,aplion [i.r.. one which does nOl in~ Nbituarion l. if OM baa not
~n;riYdy "i"I"'<'hoondr,d ..... objt ........ ,iry ('PI' -mIw... iii.,;,..). ..... ~ ...., nl

........
WdI, hoor is il apptopr ial( 10 .... y. ' HM", oo(fmincd 1M ob;ea (..-m.p."

TIK 111m: prodlKlioo of dw ,,",' ap'''''' with dw '!lUI" oilbar objra is <;OI\,",n'"
tionally dc:sis,nalcd in tN, fbion, as hal a1rudy bern apbincd [PVSV _

PVI.J7b-dl.
~If _

isaainaOUI of doubt, how is itQ)l'Tl fOfI.y dul pc<)pkwbo do to ~ 'j\>di.

cious' ~Hri~'
Wha . ...............-..di.:t..... he.ff A pn- ....... in_,;P''' ................ ~ ..,.
inS ;''Il0l ptnon who ~ i - 00' of. dtfi nitiw dnmnilWion. Th.., ,},.,'" :ur two

ClWCI thai compel OM 10 ICC daub!.bou! an objea (.nh.) 1UId'}'" dcfiroili,", drmminll1ion oian objea. lnac:tiYirya1to hallWOQWCI: doubc thal !fw.... ill noob;rn and
ddini~ drcermi.Aalion tha, ,her<: ...... ob;c<;t.. A pmon who xu 001 of,},., JifA rwo
QWG and a penon who docs 001 Xl 001oi lhc SOnd JWO is wtw the world maru
by. judiciouJ PC"""" If Klins withoul ddinil~ dacrminalion is to unwwl, Ibm
it would br contodictOly for &rmrn 10 work in ,},., Iiddo and ... on. for tlwylur,", no
iNm..""".... ""!V'i.ion which has drfini.;myoomnilKd lI"';r n..,,"' .........1and web

will pow.

} 76

FOUND .... TI O NS OF DH .... IlMAKI RTr5 PHILOSOPHY

people; this indudes' pcra:ption and inferucc, which have the cha~er
istic of causing one to obwn the intended obj('Ct! To comment on that,
(Dharmwni) says: fnUnvo"hi"m is II ctIf1'itiD" 6/ ulic fimctiD".7 T'hi$
means that one hu a cognition of the accomplishing of the aim that is to
be accomplished by the obj('Ct that one lw delermincd through the insuuois bwuh JNlT bJII btl I" Jo"
mental cognition (tsINuJ 1IW JD"fI1I4 "trf JNlI"
b]uJP'I' 1'UJt1,. ;).' For example, for the penon who, having oognizcd a flI'C
through perception, then acu (jMI/M) on fire's' capacity to bum, coole. and
so on, there is the activation of a perception whoK: obj('Ct i$ the sensation
of warmth and such. Or, for example, on certain ocasions there might be
a cognitive error due to something which lw a form similar to fire and so
on; at that time, there is for that person the activation of an inference
through smoke which dc6nitively determines the fire . (Depending on the
comat, one of these ~he engagement of a subsequent pcrccpc:ion or
infcrence-<on6mu) the tNS(W()rthiness of a perception.'"
fkc:ause various awes of error in the case only of perception arc possible, it is sometimes known (0 be: instrumental through the activation of a
subsequent instrumental cognition
has as its obj('Ct thai thing's tdic
function ; this is not the CiUC' with inference. That is, a propertY-s"""''''",,,
used as an inferential sign and a cause used as an inferential sign arc
restricted to being the property-Wflhhiwr of the rcaI thing in question and
the dfttt of the real thing in question, rcspectivdy. And only they (i.e., a
property-llIIrI'bh.iVtl and an effect) are the causes for me respective signaware ness. H ence, if mat kind of thing {-i.e., a property-J1Ibh.i1l1l or
efl"ea-l is absent, mere is no inference. Therefore, inference does not rdy
on the enp.gement of a subsequent instrumental cognition.ll

,'m

mal

,.->

5 pv. D: 1tb]M/,.,11:JtJ

~ ,.,~,.

{a tflljJ

6 See paWId Ski. p"'l &ts in Smnkdlnn and Krasacr (1989:)1).

7 PV.1.. IbfF, lI~tilJ l ..u.,.lIrIbu1ft.
/I ~~hi (PVr. ~JLtfJ)

p..... ,hi< IrnTU.:

An ttnIM is bwnillS and.., on. 1lw ac.c:ompliulln~m of dUI

-tI,..,
mII"""",;J

meaN

dw arWI of it.

1lw um,;of il ~ dw cosniUon ofit bra" .. the..mw fOOI l~ '. """ Iw nrioua
maninp. (MIf ";.,,,. t.
~'i t,tJ,."j .,..,..1. ; f'W,."j",.
114' iNwu 9i'"
9i fh1i',,).
9 _ -> _HatMj.).
10 Sikyabuddhi (PVT, ""..71h7) makai il dcardw!his puA&C cono;crm the inwvmcnta1ity
of ptllXp!ton.
11 AaoniinSIO~ CPVr!7-4htl. die poinl hen is thai inkrma involva no infO.

APPENDIX OF T RAN SLATIONS

In other cases," one: may nOI be: ttrtain of the: difrcrrnce between a perception and a spurious perception when they occur, in IUch c:a.ses the actual
perceptual aware:ness is known to be: trustwOrthy through the: e:ngagc:me:fl(
of a subsequent instrumental oognition.
"'Ine: latter and forme:r perceptions arc not distiner, so, since one might
doubt that one: is not acting on a real thing. one: could not be: cert:a.in that
it is not erroneous. -')
This is not the: CI.S( lxcaW( both would not occur (JUt /'4) in the ab5c:nC(
of a real thing. That is, for one: who actS through bring prompted. 10 act by
a f.&ulty or dubiow cognition thai apprehends JOmcthing that is not fi~ as
fi~, a subsequent awarmcss that has :IS its objc:ct burning and cooking docs
not ariK:. It docs not arise: beaUS( du[ [awareness in which the c:xpcaed. die
f"unaion appe2lSl is bras!. on a rea.I thing. If that substoquent awareness docs
ariK:, men the formercan only be: trwtworthy lxcawe: [I] one obtains a [die
function in accord with one:'$ expectations; and 1xcaW( III me: callS( ofjwl
nile ~ (by virtue of requirin, ya anotha-lUbKqllCftl.~ for the oocnninaciDn
of iQ ilUtnuncnuJity) '-''1M' inra-a- iI intriNiaJly inMnunmuJ (>jn 1M "I-l,. f!; ..",
",u ",.. tJ.M .... ~ "" ....... ,..., HIo.t,..)lif!,.. i ~, tht.t,.. .N,. .... )Ii.. ,.J.
12 ~ (PVT",otbiA) not""

If! ~ ~n oth

of FK~ki"B Iubi[\Q,Iion. <he npWcna

dear,., me puticWar idcnrlly (H1JM,., _riJq4)of the
objt i.o nO{ ckfinidvdy oon-mincd; dw aplli ... lbe 12M' w~ one iI initia1ly
prompted 10 I(t [ . . oppovd to ~ituJ;miKtioN--tft ~J. AI. tNt rlnw. one alto
aaa 0lIl of doubt. By implicllion thil laid dw if. due: 10 habiuwion. one <khnitM:Iy
:apprdlcnds ("fI!I'" n.."t H j thc panicWu idc:nlity, C"Vf:n pt"tuption doa no!
depend upon thc cnp&rma'II of .w-quml aWUft"ICIS.
(",*",Iw _

u"",..ji:s

<:ala

IlOl

13 ~ I"IOfCI that dw; former and lauer I'W&rUICSICI an IlOl diffrl1:nl in W.I the: lal'
IXIt"lI<ins mishl .., be dubioul, when one appem fO Itt hl1:
in a drHm and then IIJ>PC2" 10 Itt its he'llli~ and c:ooking. Thil dubiety or ~ dw; con
firmins iI'II'U"CTIrII wooId ~ il 10 be conhrrnoed by ya .....,u..". c:onflrrning - . and
ON: mlYllIiYCI.t an infinite ~ I( on th. odwr hand. ON: admiCi w.t dw; latter ~
ter nrvn>eIII ofbumi,. and

naI

iI ...tr-conJirmi"" thm why nol admit tim

mr hnt OM iI u

well1 Stiryabuddhi

(PVT",,.b7-1?ll thm q _ rwo _

he onrihuta 10 KI.lmlrila, and which may wdJ be
from dw; fJrIM.tfiH. Thry _ riled H 1'5 't. tJS~H:

JustIII'Ihc hfSl:.~ drpmdI upon that ~ [Rlppt;ecI by mr IIeCOftd

OMj, in tbr -r ~ W3y that UUICWOfIIti_ {Rlpplird by mr 1IeCOftd] wooId:oL.o
rcquil1: ya anomer uwtwOnhinc:u [wppIicd by JOfTlC thirdJ. lf, ho .. r..:r, onU'efr 10
.unil duo IOIfIC j.wuaxa in this ctwn] uillluumcnw inuUuiaUy [i.c.., on iu own].
tbm why _ you anpr abow tbr 1iI$I.~ bo:ins tbH W3y IUd! tIw )"011 will IlOl
let il be toI !Jor'b.ri....
jU_", III'U",*"",1fI ~ f "''''~;
"''''~

,-'--'to

, .. _, ...'fIG "'riM..... hi II

ar,.m

, .....- , . ..... U..... ,~ inu hn.IIol U.

nI ~ ,...,. n>tI , ... _..,..,.

}78

FOUNDAT ION S OF DHAlMAKlllTrS PHILOSOPHY

me

that kind of awarmcss of tdic function is a rc:a.I dUng. ThadOf'C'. if

latter
has a rc:a.I thing as its objm:. thrn th~ fonn~r is nusfworthy with regard to it. ,.
Someone objects: "The lauer i nsuum~nral cognition [in which appears
the tdic function of [h~ object determined by [he former aw.af'C':nessj doa
I" Sikyabuddhi Rm.uio:a on !he tcaion, lUlling with ~i 'l lalemenr: TIN;'
Nih K-lJ _ fItrIU (j"f JMJ i,. w .~ ". -'
Sikyabuddhi
eo~u (nalfl)!

_ UN

(_11._

a.u.

un,.,.

!he I'tO'O ~ 11K a.ppem.ntt of fiR in the fOrm aJ&IIiOOn md

appannce of bumin& and such in flK Ianet. Although a. tapUtivc appc:amICC of
fiR may apply 10 C"I'm unreal tbinp.
ofbwningand wch wi.lInor. nu.
il apresxd by !o.-ndnbuddhjI] lOtemrtlr: for ..... """" 11
ki",1""',w

IIIQnS

wappcarana

"'""tit
,. lin i-y. fo .. hJ J..~ "'Pi';',. u,., ."",JwVt -un,., thttt iJ _ fi" 10firr.

hils ill Hjm "'"'"","'"'

"riM. 't"-,..,
11._._mom
dJu.---.namdy. dK 1 _ tMI IlUeIw"h an ob,ea that Iw 1M
~

"'lwfW1lt

.IJN

.-.Mi", " - _

10

!die

funccion ofbumi"" cooking and to on-iJ""'",,, -' thi",. I/i, "- DiM. thnI
UN~ ...,. ... ~ WtnlJ~tN.1 is, if IlUbtequenl ____ oflMob;ea (...m.)
thaI accord. wilh OM', Clptatioru ....... in a paIOn who aeu through bcinS
pron1p!"ro by dw kind of former lwaleral, Inm tN.1 ii Of conmluler W formt!"
IwaKl'IQI' !nUlWOI"thi.....,.. ... TIWo is 10 M._ IN t.-.Jput tJ",t ~""
-/"lir fo1lttiH it . "'" thi,.,. Thai it. iioor: il acmmplisha: .. Irlo. (ttrth.) such as
""minI and ~ fiR is tM wtoidl aaompWher buminr.. cookinK and 10 on;

.r._NWfI

likewisr, ~Irr it tN.1 whidI it wrd

10

acoomplWl washing and drinking. This is so

baUK a rr.u dunS i. by ddinluon dllt willch II

~blt

of Irhe funel>on

(."b.~).

" Sui

done is WI kind ollruRWOnhinou with

~ 10

a lno. (ttrth.) ~n in a

d~ '

It is prd't1"IbIr mal theR be 1 reU thinS in tru.1 aoc; whm a-n. lhett is no other
INUs (rrttd for pocirinS" reU thins.
llIm dram lwata'ICIaICI woukI be irunumrnal."
Sin<:c _ admil
this ;, the aso., mil is nor a flzw in ow ~nli.
"How is ;llhal.".. art thaI an lwauneaa is nGI ;lUtlumcnlal?"
BroaUK OM tbinlu,
is trfOnc'OW.. Hma, a prrupr>on whoK objt ;, ~
bit- ofllCCOmpWhin& an aim (.nIM), Mn;1 is dt-Oid of any C;Il11e1 of error.;' UCft
lain! 0."1'''' ..... ,. 1tr rdiClivc aw::lR~ "" !xins by n.a'UR
irmtumnlal. ]1 produca I dcfin~ drrmnirulion of mat objKI in aocord wilh the
_ y ~t;' ...... ucmail\Cd. HPI(t:, il is intriruiaUy irmrummal. and thn-d"oR, IIKrr
;, no infinilr rqras.. O~ mishl nor . I........ cl. be habiru.nro 10 an iniriallw::llmCSll
...;.h ....... w-n ....... oJ r.~ '" _fff: in ..... " "'. ,h., ................. ~ .-- "-",,, .....
CII~ry 1(1 produu I dcfinitr.c dn .... mirwioon becawc, e-trn dw!u&h WI fin. or ""'t....
has bern appreMnded by an inckpmdm. (...,., 'fP'I/- _,..,,.,..; irurrumcnm cognilton, done I f ( a.IUCIIW. induce ~ !hat pmoenl MIC.h I ddinilm: dncrmirulion.
In Wt caK. WI iniliallwaKl\Cll is mablmed 10 be iruuumcnal bylhtmptr;anml
of 1 subtequem illlltUtnCf\m aJ&IIilion. Hena. il iI afriMia.lJy ;1lSII\UI\Cntal. Howtvrr. if OM Iw an Iw::IRnC:II WI involou llabitWlion and wriry. thm ill irmlUmmaliry is oktcrminc.t fiom irwlf (...,., W .. _~), "" _ apb.i1\Cd aboo.ot.. In!hil
....1, ; ~ .w.... oJ", ...... ,1_ JKlo.cptiu" is inK.W'OCI ..... ill .... 'IC c.oa ;'",i...oc.Jj1 ,""t!
in _
CUCI ClninsiallJ'. lnfddOCt ;, in.rumcnlal in lriruically.

wt

"'i,

,.rird,i,...)

APPEND IX OF TRANSLATIONS

'"

not cogniz.e me object. lIut w:lS apprehended by the former. If mat is the
ColiC, how can it Mve as iu objea the ,elie function of an object. determined
by mat former awareness sueh that Ihe former awareness is instrumental
because it docs not deceive one about that object's telie function ~
This is flOt a problem. Beings engaged in pr:roctic:al action (1IJII1IQ}",,,,j act
on those twO objeca: without differentiating them. Hence, in KO) rd with
such practic:al action, we S2y that, beings act on objectS that occur in tempotal stquencc as if those objccu wete a single thing. In reality, the former
and latter objectS arc distinct. However, the real thing that is the object of
the latter ios((umental cognition would not aist if the object of the former
instfUfflC:nw cognition had not been existent. Hence, we metaphorically say
that che latter awareness has as its object ju.u thai object of the former
awareness. Therefore. since the real thing toward which one aeted w:lS
established prior [to the cognition in which iu telie function appeared!.
that initial cognition is instrumental because through it the lalter awareness
engages with the ,elie functwn . '~

(umlin,,;nl on IlK U1JU oftrustworthinm." Drvtwll/JuJdhi (1.bl/J) turnI 10

lin inl"p"uuUJn ;nlrmu D/Episumi.. /Jllllism.:)
IS Sikyabuddhi (PVT'7'Ib6f1l mmmmu oa dw WI

ImIn'lCt.

Th<at. in ayin& til...!-.. M mam: "aina tM bn ;lUIrummW copUtion is impotaibIc withoul tho: ob;.ct 01 tho: bmrr iruuummt:oi COV'ition. "Thu"bc. SUO _ - '
dmrt -"' ...oINdI .ow .w I<0Il ntdHishtJ ,rHo i.e.. prior to d~ Iancr cq;nilion
.....tIoK objea is the Ielic IUnaion-u- ;,.;M/ npin... uUutr/t1WJU4l Thai is .iner:
il ill tM OIWC of tho: Lau cq;nition who.c objm: i, tM ,die function. 1M inilial
copo.i,ion if inll",IImnlrJ. ~ il II NC.h IocOIwc il 100 tw a rallhin! at ill obj!.
Otherwise. iri, ~ 10 1Ia." an un,callhin! u iu objr. il would flOC Iw 1M cawc
for thaI kind of IUbteqUOMI COV'ilion; .... uyt:
;1 duol ""Y COSftition
"".", __..tit rIw rdk fo..m.... H~ t~;, meam "throup I~ in;,W copilion.
In otM warda. !he inicial COV' ilion it; inu:runwntal bawc me, in;li... c:osni lion u
iuclfdw 01<* ol'M bn .... copition wbaK objr u 1M ldie function. !M'i ~'M
.., ... a.Wr ",., ...
P"fli# M.J _ J1Ifi' _ j]Wi -.J,.,r rJwJ _ JIr7i
_ i pJ ".; IriJ,. M .., ... mpr.,.,.. ,. &",6 ,. 'i fItyi, " .." .,...,.,; pi .... ".
tiM ,.
Itf' 1111ft! "1fJU M.J .,. rill" Mil 6yt-i,. rod r." gi sNr
,., 1hri -; 'fY"r pr ,., IV",,. JIM,. J'Mf niMJ _ 71'" "M" f t ! . " ,.;""

nrw m,-"l.""

'Ji.-"

l1li,,.,.,,.,,,

rl" "J*tip'",.'i';";r ..1M lu .... ri" ",,,, M,b,p1,."",.;,.,;,./<"lUI';" "" M lu

jo" D"" ,. i sNr ,. ""'. _ 'i 'fY" 1f7iJ" .. j Owr .. 1M "Jii II; M t.. ... .,.,.
III k,. i #
.. .,.", ... 1_ " M 1M r.hn ",.. .. J.",,. i k ,. "J*ti t.a U' "-t
,.; k,., It; .." 'rN,. i pJ (."01 k,. fhyi _ i 'X)W "pi,.;",.i /'o/ir .. u,n

",.. .. 'i"" ..,.

l(i Stu,u'''';'';''1 tiM; vbja;.iu".....J .~_ tI... I...." bun ......,

(PVT", Jb1):

ha". S1J,.~""~!hi .......

]80

f O UNDATI ON S O f DHARMAKIRT r s PHI LOSOPHY

According fO those for whom c:r.:rcmal ob}ects do not exisI:. W obit which
is dctamincd by the former iJl$[nunenral oognition is not iocontrovcrtibly
the cause or me laner ilUuumenw cognition: howcvc:r, it is the cause or an
aWllrcncss that has me appearance or the desired tdic function. Whatever
docs not have mat appearance is not inmumenral. hence. there is no contradiction. Even ir there ~ no external objcas. [he aWllrmc:s5 that arises
with mat kind or appearance is a human aim (JItyn 'j Jo" PllnqArtM).
Thus, with regard to meir theories of tfUSlWOrmincss, mere is u1timatdy no
difference between those who maintain the existence of external objcas
and mosc who do not.

"*

{lRvnuJrabwJJhi Mill txAminn tD ttlM Usun (fmcrmill: tnutwtmhillm: Joubt

111111 o/ntnU'tion. Ht rllUn 1111 objtjolf 11M III1J1r1 it:!

SonxoIM: obju.. "Bul . ina: 1M formtt insuummtal copilion is whal cauKI dIO'
actiYation (k,. """,. - ! '' ''taU) of dIO' uller inttrumcntal copiticon. tht: 1Orma illilrwnmtal mplilion is illltnllnmw only when dIO' urm inKnunmtal c:opidon "
p.~. ,. .... 1\01 QtutMfltN. But u..t bfter ,,,"nrmental

_,,,,,.td;

aJ&nition docs

IIOf

lui...: the apacif)' 10 lUke

mal

t"onner IWVmC'# whkh docs not

ha...: [dK naNrc ofbri", inouwncntal ] into an~..........ao thai doco ha...: dIO' rwurcof
bci,. ilUlrwnmw." AI Kumirit. hu aid: -Ln i. ~ known ~I all insuumm" of
kno~ aft intrinsically ilUl~na.1. 1Ot lhal which doa 001 hae the apacil)' W
~ al an ilUlf\/.ml:na.1 copliOOn OP i" own (anJ)O\; ~ made: Q pi' bk: 01 doinlllO by
.mochtr IRlb.tquc,"1qnilion " I ~ ~~ ~ iii p...,m-

I .... ""'_ Wi ~ ",-_.""... ~ f1 (~V:

c..u,.., 47)1.

for Ih.~. [ ~dd.hiJ AJ'E Tbw. m.n.... ln othe-wonk. withoul dIO'

obic'a of <he fOl"llM:r ilUlf\lllM:nw QOKIlilion. d>c ob;ctt of <he bner imlnuno:nw (0.
nilion would ~ impoaibk: htn. the b tta" _ ~tN;r. the ob;m ofdw: 1Orma;,.",J/
d.clcfun dlt: ftnt~ 0lIl: thar is ~ tht 2~
whidl hal as in 00;..;.: aa:omplishmml 011'" [ap'd] ,do. {~;, ;"IInI1IfnfuJ. In OIhtr words. 1M firM ~ OIIIISCI d>c Iura-.~ whoK obj1 is dw:
aa:omplisluMnl 01 1M [apeaed] Idol (.nJJ.). as MaCh tht f i n t . _ is iNtN'
mental bawe il also Iw. ~ thinllas iu object. 176a11rthal W01: 001 dw: ax, d.m
lM fine twaftm. would Iu...: an IIIlreal!hi", u ia ob;ca: as
would 001 bt:
..... au", oi ...... kiM '" ... ~..,.,., _ _ _ Ii ..... ...... wiv- ~ .. ,+... ___
plishrrooenl of d>c apIed .doi]. This;'10 si~ .....p;t. (,rqr._".. .,.,.,
wid, lIN ~t If'" {".,.-J}
TIImIp;, tnanI "ml1Mll!h me, fint
awarmc:n." In other words. this I!W:IlN' -since me, fUll ~ is the auK" of d>c
lifter ....... tcIICSf whoec ob;t is the aaomplidlllM:flI of tht [apmed] ldoc."
TIu.1ItpfIIftI1 dmiorutnles d>c ~ When it ariICI from in own ClUICS, d>c
I"ocmu twaft_ NiKI u lui""" only d>c IWUn: 01 an iruaumcow ODpIition bca......
raJ minI {. , .- -'"'- ~ is pmkM. Howco~ if tbrn aft =-lQrftTO<
.... rely me JdU, .;..., ck ..... ui ....ion of;. ao ;~ ...,.J io CZfH
rh.roug...-l-.cr

"'"'IF

-n. ;.

w...

[subKqumt ]

cosnilMxl.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

Since an instrumental cognition is this or that cognition whose trustworthiness has been ascertained, doubtful cognitions and such are not instrumental.
"But since a person may be obstructed in his activity, even an instrumental cognition may not be trustworthy, and it therefore would not be
instrumental. "
The trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition does not consist of the
fact that one definitely obtains the desired object through that instrumental cognition. Instead, it consists of the fact that one obtains only the desired
object through that instrumental cognition. When one acts,17 the instrumental cognition is what makes one obtain the object. Therefore, a cognition's instrumentality consists of its capacity to make one obtain the desired
object. Since just that capacity is said to be the trustworthiness of the instrumental cognition, there is no problem concerning obstructed action.

[Dharmakirti next raises the issue oflanguage:}

This instrumentality is also the case with linguistic awareness
because it makes one aware of the intention [in the speakers'
mind]. [PV2.Id]

[Neither Devendrabuddhi nor Siikyabuddhi offer particularly striking comments on this point. Van Bijlert, who understands this entire discussion to refer
to the instrumentality ofthe Buddha and his scriptures, interprets the verse as
referring to the Buddha as speaker. 18 A more likely interpretation would be to
construe the verse as a defense against objections based on Dharmakirti's antirealist semantics. In other words, if Dharmakirti denies that expressions refer
to real universals instantiated in substances, then language is ultimately meaningless. Why bother to use it? The response is simply that language does yield
trustworthy knowledge, but only with regard to the linguistic intentions ofthe
speaker:}

~l7 5akyabuddhi notes (PY[, nyq6b1-2), "By implication one supplies (adhyahara); 'In all
'cases when one is not obstructed' ... " [thams cad du gags byed pa 'i rKYu med na zhes bya ba

'khong nas dbyung ngoJ.

18 Cf. Van Bijlert (1989:130-131).

j81

fOUNDATIONS OF DHA1MAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

An a.:prcssion is insuumental in that it indicates the object that

appears in awareness as the object of the spewr's linguistic
inlention. BUI il is nOI caused by Ihe actua.Iiry of things. IPVl.l]

[TIN ot,," issw thar Ltnf'Ullt rllist:1 is ~nt thilt Ilpplits U1 CfJnptlUl/ ropiriorJI
in p"IlL lJnJmJr.lnulJhi aprmn rlN probkm in tht foJ/.owinl objrion

(,.,}oJ

An instrumental cognition is that which is uustwonhy wirh regard (0 the

tdic function when one actS having become awa~ of the instrumental
object through that insuumem. If mat is so, coruider the case whe~ one
acts upon a water-jug through the conceptual awareness of a water-jug;
when one does so that conceptual awarenm is also rrusrwonhy with regard
to the relic function of acting in that fashion. Hence, that conccprual awar~
nm would also be instrumental, but you do nO( acccpl thai it is.. Therefore.
the definition ofinsuumcntaliry is faulry.-

[Aort/inl

UJ

lKw1uIr.buJJhi, Dharmll!tirti 's nca statmlnft rtlponris UJ this

issw:)

Since conventional aw,Hmess apprehends that which has aI~dy

been app~hended , we do nOI cla.im thai it is instrumental.
[PV1.ja]

Thai is, conventional awarcncsses that have objects such as a walcr-jug,

cxiSlcnrhood. number and upward movement arc not cla.imed to be
instrumental. Why? For the reason that they apprehend what has already
been apprehended. Here IDharmakini has said thalj JUSt the initial experience of an object is me insuumcnral cognition," i.e.. il is what makes one
:>Ct. The JlI~ue", co nttptll<11 <1W:O'~ef$ ,10.", com es fTom ir <1n~ rf!elll ing trull object as it W25 apprehended. Hence, it is not at all an awarcnm
of a rcaI thing that can aa::omptish a tdos. So how can it be what nukes one
act ah:u one has known its object?

19 This iI ddCiICC 10 HB:l ' .,1-'9. Set btbw.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

[In PV2.3b-4c, Dharmakirti defends an important claim made in PV2.Inamely, that awareness itselfis instrumental. This conflicts with many ofDharmakirti's Brahmanical opponents, and to introduce Dharmakirti's verse,
Devendrabuddhi raises a typical objection (3b4).}
"But why is an awareness with the aforementioned kind of image instrumental and not the faculties and so on?"

[The answer is Dharmakirti's verse.}

Awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one's
action toward an entity that one wishes to obtain or avoid.
[PV23b-d]

[To clarifY the point being made here, Devendrabuddhi (3b4./JJ makes an
important innovation: he introduces the notion of "mediated" (vyavahita) and
"unmediated"(avyavahita) instrumental effects (pramar:taphala). He begins by
answering the question he posed just above-''Why cannot the sense faculties
themselves be considered instrumental?,]
Because it is not possible for the faculties to be instrumental. To be specific,
there are two kinds of instrumental effects: one called a "human aim" which
is a mediated effect and a distinctive one that is not mediated. 20
Having known through awareness an aim that should be done, a person
implements its means and thereby attains the activity defined as the direct
apprehension of it. Likewise, knowing that some thing is to be avoided, a
person does not implement its means and thereby obtains the activity of not
directly apprehending it. Thus, awareness is instrumental because it is the

primary factor in one's activity with regard to a real thing that one should
obtain or avoid. That is, it is the primary factor-awareness is the primary

20 Sakyabuddhi (PVT, nye:77h2-3) glosses distinctive as meaning that it "will definitely

occur" (gdon mi za bar 'gyur ba). He remarks:
[Devendrabuddhil says that it is "distinctive." The distinction is that it will definitely
occur. Since that way of occurring is fulfilled (spyod pa = carita) by that kind of effect,
it is called" distinctive." In other words, if there is an instrumental cognition, an instrumental object (j>ramrya) will necessarily be cognized (rtogs par 'gyur) because that object
is not different from the instrumental cognition. This is not the case with a mediated
effect because it is possible for something else to obstruct its occurrence.

)804

FOUN DAT IONS OF D HA1MAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

ncmr- i" tM tICIivitywhosc object is a re;d thing which o~ should obtlli"

or IlJIOUJ and which is thw ca.lled a -hullWl :tim. - Therefore, sina awarencs.s is ,he prim:a.y m(Ot, llWil""nj if in;trJlmrnUlL
It is d:timed (:at PV2.jb-d) that awareness is instrumental so:as (0 rdl.LIe
the notion that the sense faculties:and such:are abo cau.ses for :activiry, That
is, a person who has ncultio:and so on does flO( mereby engage in activity
I[ow:ard some sense objtJ: otherwise, one would haw: to conclude that o~
engages in activiry merely by virtue of their exlnence. Instead, it is :as fol lows: having known wh:at should ~ obaincd :and avoided, a ~n who
is th:at knower applies himsdf :accordingly. That in terms of which a judiciow person is initially prompted 10 act is me cause of action toward me
intended object. Sinct other awarenesses:arise by dint of that initw aw:areness or haw: that initial aW1lm)CSIi:as their object, only Uu!t initial awarrnCSli
is instrumc:nt:al.
{Dewn4f'1lbudtJhj thl4J "",jnuiN thaI, whrn DhaTntAltini JifmJs tM iNtrumnlulil] ofIlWilrtnm by &timi,,! that il is -1M pn'nnptllflUUJr in acrion, M
is rrftrrinx to II Milllttl instrummt4l1foa. Htrt II -mttli.tn/ tfficr- is 1]11onpllf)JI.S with II puruJ1rtha. /n tIN"at /H'rtilm ofW1W, DIM,."..ltin; prrsnrlS
two """imulAl rrasom for tIN ciAim thilt IlfLWfflJtU jtstlJ is i1lStrflmmtAJ:/

Also, aw:areness is instrumental because a cognition is differentiau:d due (0 the difTerenti:ation of the awareness' objective
imagt'; this is the case because mat cognition only occurs when
th:at objective image is present. [PV1...p-C]
/Hm, DtwndrtlbudJhj Undmtaruis DhlIrmalti,.,i tit IH riftrri,,! '0 ."
Jlnmtdullttl iNtrummUl/ t/ft. He rommmlJ {4b2J1):J
The [mere] cognition of an object is an unmediatcd instrumental effect.l '
'That is, that through which, when all [other] cau.ses:are in place, the convention of -knowing" is prisned without fimher mediation is :an imtrumenr:al cognition. And nothing but the simulacrum [i.e. the cognitive
image] of the object has that bclt of mediation, for it is through th:u sim-

21

Thc TIbmn(l"VP~re.b aIMJ_ i lrtih_dJ,.~_'-st,."" .....

How

this xcmI apin 10 be: 00( of 1M many (aCI of ""b;tIpralial~ in~ in ar.buan
tra ..... ~ fO... s..n.Iui. _ ....",,,. d-a. _
P' ''~ b', . ...,.. ...,.'~~I '......... o4w-

~,

JJnp~

Noce thaI 11m: I uncImwMI ,... III nwrdy be: m:arlU"lI W pm,Uc::uL

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

;ulacrum that instances of knowing are distinguished from each other, even
"though they are indistinguishable in terms of their nature of being experi'ences. Hence, due to the differentiation of the objective image-i.e., due to
rrhat quality ofthe cognition 22-the awareness, i.e., the instance ofknowing,
.is differentiated. And since this effect exists when that is present-i.e., when
irhe object-image is present-awareness is therefore instrumental. If when
:"y"is present, "x"comes into existence, it makes sense that "y"is the most
~fficient cause (shin tu sgrubs par byedpa = sadhakatama) of "X."23 But if at
some point there were no such effect [i.e., "x'1 when "y"was present, then
one would realize that "y" depends upon some other mediating causal facior. That being the case, since that former cause ''y''is mediated by something else on which it depends, it would not be the most prominent causal
factor. Therefore, it would not be the instrumental cause. Even when the
sense faculties and so on are present, they do not [necessarily] have the
causal function of producing an awareness because they are mediated by the
object-simulacrum. But if the simulacrum is present, it is necessarily known
.because it is not mediated by anything else for that knowing to occur. Since
it is of the nature of awareness, it is the basis for positing an effect that does
:not depend on anything further for its occurrence. As such, the object-simulacrum is the cause of both kinds of effects. And since it is of the nature
of awareness, awareness alone is instrumental .
.{This all raises the question of how instrumentality is to be determined.
. Devendrabuddhi briefly discusses and rejects the Mima1!lsaka solutionnamely, that all instruments ofknowledge are intrinsically instrumental (svataJ:t
.pramal).yam). To show that the awareness itse/fcannot present its own instrumentality, Devendrabuddhi (sa3) cites Dharmakirti's next verse.}

The awareness' essential reality (svarnpa) is known through the

awareness itself, [but not its instrumentality]. [PV2.4d]
{Devendrabuddhi (sa3ff) comments.}

That is, through reflexive awareness, an awareness that is called "instru-

22 PVP (4a3) ex.conj.: zhes pa'i chos-> shes pa'i chos.

23 This complex relative construction has been represented using the variables
for the sake of clarity in its English rendering.

'x" and

)"

386

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

mental" is established to be an extant awareness, but it is not thereby estab_

lished to be instrumental.
"But on your view its instrumentality is not distinct from the extant
awareness itself; therefore, that instrumentality is also apprehended when
one apprehends the awareness as extant."
This is true. Since a perception does not arise in a piecemeal fashion, that
instrumentality should also be apprehended. Nevertheless, that awareness is
asserted to be instrumental concerning that objective aspect (bzung ba'i rnam
pa = griihyiikiira) with regard to which it produces a definitive determination
(nifcaya) because it causes action toward that aspect. It is not instrumental
with regard to any other aspect. Even though there is no difference in terms
of being experienced, there is the definitive determination of that aspect for
which there are the causes of definitive determination, such as interest, habituation, context and so on. What requires the mediation of other conditions
is not determined. Therefore, although one has already apprehended the
instrumentality when one perceives an extant awareness, it is as if one had
not apprehended because there is no definitive determination of it.
"How then is one to determine instrumentality?"

[To answer this question, Devendrabuddhi cites the first portion of Dharmakirti snext verse.}
Instrumentality is known through practical action (vyavahiira).
[PV25 a]

[Devendrabuddhi remarks (Sb6-7).}

... through practical action. That is, instrumentality is known
through a subsequent awareness whose object is telically efficacious. 24
This leads to an obvious problem: if one can determine what is instrumental
simply by acting, why would anyone bother to write a treatise? Dharmakirti
anticipates this problem and responds.}

24 Sakyabuddhi (PVT, nye:79ar) notes: "Since it produces a definitive determination subsequent to itself, in that it is an instrumental cognition, perception is instrumental with regard
to the objective image." [tshad ma'i phyis 'byung ba cangyi nges pa skyed pa'i phyir mngon sum

ni gzung ba'i rnam pa dag fa tshad ma nyid yin no J].

'"

APPENDIX Of TRA NSLATIONS

In this regard. U'Clltises arc For

fusion . (PV1.sbJ

th~

purpose of dimin.aling oon-

Composing treatises is not wclw bcawc mlfrises tin for 1M pll~ of

~limj1Ulti"s m"jjnu,,.. ~n one iJ pmmptM to 2Ct. if Ont acu without
knowing the ddining char.t.ctcrutK:s of an irutrumenw cognition, o~ ouy
be deceivM. TherdOre. those who wish to act should know before they aa
thc defining characteristia of an instrumental cognition and of a spurious
onc. Those defining charaCrtr1s1ia thar one docs not know are lcarncd (ril
ptt "!lUI):u they arc taught in a treuilC', defined as that which tcaches the
Dh..mtA, which is hen! typifiM by innnictlons on Pmr'" lmowIf!dge. Hn_
ing learned those defining charactaistia. onc will thcn :act in some appropriatc manner. It is for this purpose that treatises art composed.. Thai is,
they diminate the audience'l confwion about whal il an innrumenw cognition and what is nor. In this SCIUt'. a ueatise is not poindw.
Thus. those: who maintain thai a lfCllrisc would accomplish nothing are
That if, the innrumenDi cognitiont 2rC n01 commonly en:ablished beawe. by w.ly of the mutuilly contndiaory ddlnitiont tiul :are
presented, it is obKrvcd that evtn thoughtful scholars misunderstand what
not

eor~.

constitutes an insuumcnlaJ cognition. How much more so is it the case

for w world in gcner~H Hcnce, if one's aaions arc not prcdcd by an
instrumental cognition, one will be dcccivcd. And it is abo nor al all accepcable that a cog.oilion be: considered nondcuptivc by virruc of (merel acci
dent:&l,u<Xfll.

{At this PO;III, INwrubabtlddhi (l4imJ tJutt Dh,mrukin; has finiJMJ his
tlntriptio" ofthe first J4i"j"ldMrlllVrism (I"a) of." ;nstnlmmJaI cornilion. Ht t laimJ thlll Dhttmutltirt; "OW prtSttrtt. -soN4 Mfininf m.~

mVti(-:r
25 PV1"(sbs--.6'): "' ... utklurtJ...I_ i .uJ..u."pJ.,i "" N"",",I.'-''' I ,.; k ....
oipi I,rJ AJ-:Iphtm ",oh- tt]iJ
Jill ". /. ~ (PVT, ~) ..qeca
dlC noOon tM INs acnAIIr rot'..aUlfei I tcaI!Id ddWrion: inRad lit- INinWIII tM ~.
dnbudcIU is mo:ntr ~ of du. MIIo!ICOI'.Od "p:meraI ctwaa.::riaic"rp-IfIIlN1I.,wPJiI
N"; Ii'I """oi .;.I,.,I,rJ,. iii,.; nY'1I1. 1 iii,.; tJ- __
Jill ". . . .", N __ ,. JUt . 1""" IV pb.1I -J,. . . .", N ... ~ ,. """ _ w1
phtur - .....
J'""'I;y..y..I,. - Ji ,,.., fA ..w _ ~ ,.
too ..,.,."
,.,uph- k,., Ow,. 1'Ji ,.,u ItJit tJ..J - pJill. ~ ,. ,.,u ?i,.,., ,...,.

I"J'I"

,. aha.,.

"Jill""",,,

,.pfo,.
7""

}Sa

FOUN DATION S OF D HARMAKIIlTl'S PHILOSOPHY

Moreover. an instrwnenal oognitton is th:u which illuminates an

unknown object (tzjiUtJnIM). [PV.2..scj

cognition is Wo a cognition that iIIuminares-i.e. makrs

known--the reality of an objt-i.e. a thing--<lf which the: oognittr is no(
yn awvc. In this coma t, since it also illuminates that a particular is absent.
by uring thing" (t1nlM). h~ acttpb that it giVCI knowlalgc of the mliry
that is defino:!. :IS the existence or nonexistence of a thing.

An

i nS(rum~ru21

/This j,1II1J I(). ftw problmu. StI"" htlw tD th wim ,IN possibk ;1Utnlmmtai
ity ojlNtUlKilUltWnJ. ilUlS",uch lIS thry Also "iUlimilUlu whttl hAS not bn Jis
mnd "DrwnJrilbudJhi (JM) t/4irm IIMlmis notWn is tlvmN", tlx ~ til
thr urm ../lniNt. .. Drwnt/rtllnuJ;/hi Ju d4irm tlNr: tht tmn "/lrth4 .. nulbln
tlnr I() rollnt ntlnprrrrptWn (/lnllp4l4bJhi) lIS inJtnlmtnlAl (Jb71U). BWI thr
mtlJI imfX1rt1lnl tlbjrditln raisrJ hrrr is Ihr Imt t1JnlAinu/ in DJutmulti""; i
nat SlAlmrmr:)
"The knowl~ of a uni~rsaI that follows the [perttprual j cog.
nition of an objKt in itself {w.rifMJl would be instrumental."
[PVzSd-6aj

fDtvnrJrabuJJhi apl4inJ this objtrtilm (6arff):)

"If an irutrumeru21 cognition is that whKh illuminates an unknown object.
mt.n me awareness involving a universal that coma after th~ cognition of
a thing', n:toture {lVIIri/"lJ would be instrumental. That is, me awareness
involving a llOiversal that follows upon the cognition of a patticul:ar would
also be instrumerual since it takes :IS iu object a univcrsa.l that was not
apprchendal by the preceding perception. But yo u do not accept m is:
hence. )'Our definition iJ erroncoWi."

U; Sec aOO h.ir; com~nts on PV). I (PVI':u)&4fl}.

m., IftrII I . , 'r hm.lUnnioN .. a synonym lOr n"L.q.!U- In Il1O preax 1unu,IO apprdlmd m., ~of an objm is toapplmc.Kl it in its KtWlity. ThUJ,orUy
poption "f'PrdKndo m., -.w,. of thinp. irwm..m c:onapnW msniUona apptebcnd
27 In a kIott- _

objo:cu i... ,.._iJ'/Uftion...........dy. ~ the mcdi.otion of. uni ........... Sec

and u.,,~ .. ol~ (..,.hl.

1'\')-,,..,,

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

'fpharmakirti answers:}
[Not all such subsequent conceptual cognitions are instrumental; only some are] because [the statement concerning the illumination of what is unknown] is intended to refer to an
awareness in the case where some aspect of the particular has not
been discerned. [PV2.6b-c]

rjpevendrabuddhi (6a2Jj) amplifies on Dharmakirtis response:}

~,

that criticism [raised in PV2.5d-6a] is not a problem. To be specific, when

~ perceptual awareness apprehends an object such as blue whose essential
~ature is excluded from this and that other thing, there may arise a
innemonic cognition whose object is a specific aspect in accord with the
~ay the particular was perceived. Therefore, it is not making one cognize
khat one has not yet cognized such that the definition would be erroneous
~ue to all subsequent conceptual cognitions being instrumental. And even
~we suppose that an awareness involving a universal cognizes what has not
!been known, nevertheless it is not erroneous because [that second character-

~tuticJ is intended to refer to the case where the particular has not been discerned.

~'fhat is, an instrumental cognition is that awareness that cognizes as its

!9bject a particular that one has not discerned. Since he states this definition
Wong with a qualification, awareness involving a universal is not instru'mental.
"Then inference would not be instrumental because it is an awareness of
what has already been observed, as when one infers that impermanence is
a property-svabhiiva of sound."
This is not so. Even though sound's unique nature, which is excluded
from all [other things], has already been apprehended, the object of practical action (vyavahiira) can only be that aspect with regard to which that
perception has produced a definitive determination and so on as its effect.
Therefore, since it applies to that which has not been apprehended, inference is instrumental. This has already been explained [in PVI].
"Why is it that only an awareness that cognizes a particular is asserted to
be instrumental, and not any other?"

[Devendrabuddhi uses this question to introduce Dharmakirtis last remark in

this section:}

390

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Because [judicious persons] analyze the particular. [PV2.6d]

[Devendrabuddhi (6a7jj) remarks.}

Only the particular accomplishes a telic function. Hence, for the sake of
that telos, a person seeks an instrumental cognition with regard to an object
that is a particular, which is asserted to be the basis for [the desired] telic
function. He does not seek an instrumental cognition with regard to
another object that does not accomplish that telic function, because by
accomplishing that kind of thing, the telic function is not accomplished.

6. PV3. / - /0 with 5<kctions from PVP and PIT

Innrumcm:a.l cogni[ions are of two kindJ because mere arc two kinds of
objtS. There are rwo kinds of objKU because some objccu :arc apablc of
[die funaion while: omen;u-c nOI.[ IIIIUiun l JUl;h a",llhc: ha.in [dlill "ppc:ou-

in ,he visual percqxions of a person with cu:uacuJ arc: nor objecu (IIn"-)
bttau.sc they ate! !lOr considal to be objccu,' [PVJ.II
I ~ndrabuddhi (PVP:u,P4ffi:

with ddi:aM Yiaion dxr,. ate &lK appc:annc:a

....J. iM 1....... 1\ia., , ...................J .... "'.. "..., r..t.c ~ ... _ ... .- _.pI ....
any P'WP'* (.,.",.) II all; bomo., tMy U't' no! induoXd in [die alqpy 01] panicubn.
Sui nm thou&h ,bey ate dc-toid of any fIlCh ,elie function. they all' noc inchKlcd
........ UD~ """UKthqappcu dearly and ba:awc thqan: noc diaribuu:d O'a'
anydtins. n. .... ~ntt tMyate ROC..bswnetI wwkr [dwalcpiel oE) parricubnand
u~ they anilllOlhcr kind of ot;m.. HclKlt, h is noc WI'' tNllMrT arc [juMJ
rwo kinds of ob;u.
No, it is no!. dK ""* tNl OW' vir- .. not <OIWO. To be ~ bain and > on ate
noc objeta (If" '). Whr.
t'PIWmI. H ~ 1I'V}.Idj. 1~1
;., pa...... aoppl in pncUcaI ;oc..... (.,....;.",) 00 1Io)C~,.hem 10 be objt..
1lw; inlenOon oidtit IUtMWllt is u IOlkrws. If tIw Aia and 10 on thai an ptla:i.ed
by ~ wid> QI~ and II> on
10 be objoas. dim one ......Jd invntipte 1M
Jirualion. ukin& -11;1 a puUcuLv. Of it it v.nivustlr Bu, Wy U't' not: ob;rcu in thai
Whim ben ...., wid> rcprd 10 an 2WU'CftCJI in whlch !haT is dlor appc:anna: offlics
and 10 01'\, pmoru cnpgd in prxticaI aaiGn do noc Iu"" dw inlmrion, Ibis is 1M

WdI. in IM......am1CII 0( a

pcrMNl

&WIM"."""

--=

ob;ea of mal lwaI'UKa.

ThUl, II in the cue oflhe IUbjeai~ pea oflW2l'mCll. cvm lhoop IMy an:
cktnminai. Ihq do nor hl~ II'Ic WIlli of bailS obJects 0( pncucal action. Hu t
ahhoup 1UIiva'AJ is nor IlIlirrwdy 1ft oijea. ~ mppl in pnaicaI action
imaplllri-tdy ~o:rmint il 10 be I rnI thiDIS> and they a(t aeoordinsir. hrnu. il ..
ptIIiK'd u 1ft ob;co. Thia will be t:lpbincd laIn.
"The prooilUlm1m1 is as fOllows. 1luo: wt.icb is DOC 0DIUickred by pmona 10 be dw;
ob;ea o f _ l-...an:nno docs ..... glisly ~ mn....,tion of brins dw; ob;ea of duol
~ An cumpk is the: .... bj:ri.c a5fKCt of INt lwan:nctI. ~ ~ in
pnaicalllCtion cIt> ..... cocu.lder the baln uwI oooa "";'00 hf PU_II wnh QtaraCU
and 10011 IObeOOjo " "TheC.idellla: here is the: ... ~pUon of. ptopc,tr_Miwl tlutl
oonlndicu a propel ry""'Mbw tNl ~ W Mpndwn.
"The Mlb;m~ aspcu ., d~ objM of ~ I~ dxrd"orc. lhc o:umpk it

..... eII.blishaL

This. ftOIlO, MaUlt 1M a.b;a:ti~ aspea: ismpliKd (rit,. . wt/iyJ ]n dw it iudl"

an- 21 mIaiw _

~ (PVT ..".IJWU):

This InQl\I me fOIIowins- r~l lwam-oc:M is ftOI JOmnhins odwr tN.n lhe Mibjcai~ IIJpta AJCh tNI ;a objta would be ~ ~~ upea. ~lher. I~ IUb;c:cli~

J9.

391

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTrs PHILOSOPH Y

The~ arc rwo obju txausc some uc similar across irutanccs and omers

are not similar;

bcca~ SO rm'

are the objttu of words and others are not mr

objccu of words; and beea.wr the cognition of some occurs when mcre: an:
causes othcr man Ihe object, and the: cognition of othcrs does nOl occur
when me~ are causes orner Ihan (he object. [PV}.l)
In this conlal, (hal which is capable of telie function is said 10 be: u1liImuely real. Thc other one is said to be: conventionally real. Th~ arc,
respectively, me particular and the univenal.' [PV}.})
"But nothing is capable of relic function."
Wc o~ truat rhinp such as seeds ha~ a capacity for relie function in tbe
~ of sprouts, and so on.
~S uch things a~ considcred to havt such a capacity conventionally. IlOI

ultimately:

Let it be so in the way as you have said

{1fJ~ l"thtl

tIlthtlj.' IPV) ...]

"That capacity for relie function is found in all obju."

;\IflC'Ct uoopimI ill WI ir uiJawim rhe 1U1U~ ~ .cfltxiw awarmea. I( rbeyarc IlOl
distina, how ~ lho:rc Ix rhe rdalioll oI .... bjca and obim sud! !hat the: eumpIc

wooId IlOl be atabIished?

2 ~i

(I"VP:I ~

,,"fa the ruuo..i"l &Jc-: "- iii lrar hyi." Mi 1f:1tr/,..i

"'ItJtrI,..(.nIM/I4i",. WIJtI A,?-t1

,&_). a . Napromi 11"7-61).

) Dcmd"b"ddhi (PVP:l14hl maka 1M foIlcrwi"C ",nwU:

An objector Aflo 'BIU __", U ~ " " IN jiufmM. 'This ..-na, 1hc capaciv
b- [die: hilKlion don not m. u1tirnatdy ...m1llX'm".' 'J1gt it. I rca!
IMI U
_ned w aile u1lil1Vtdydon not /u<w aJlrdwaam.cia (J.ip~wtu.IIiX .a . 'Thoe
oarpmm! j,; 'J1g, wtudo. don I'lOl e:aist in .omahin& dx Unotl dwaaeritUe of duo!
thine; ... cumpk is the: dwxtm.ic, homN" ..ben applied 10 I borx. 'Thoe apaei", for tdio; funaion doa IlOl
in dw whkh io _cd.o Ix rhe partioabr. This
is III qumm. by fQIOII of aM nonpaaption of dw pcrvadi", quali(),.
IDtwmaldni fCIJIOI'Wbl: W, fA m. rm"l' __ ... -Js '-r. rqM"iIJjiw uW
fo..m... iff tiN UN I{If'"UI. .,.. ,. "'" Wkn he: Ars ~ the apKi", is obto:rmI.. be
maN due ilII dr.xt iii ob.a ,ed. ThiI meanr aM f"oIIowi"" When one rNllI COITICI inco
.,.iKmc:o: whc:n dw: otha- ul'fUmt. tMllann thi", .... a .-:ap;oci()' 10 pcvdu the for
.................. 10 "" ....... bk of ..... ~ ............ ;u.. th... Ici....t of ",-..,..,,;.. 0.:.
That (lI~'" U wI\" -.:U and .0 011 lui....: in rda.ion IO...-.U and M) _ . ,.,...., rhe

mms

I.

en..:

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

19'

It is not found in univmais. which art not o~rvro to have othe:t positive:
concomitance (in which a universal necessarily aiJu when the:rc i.t a cognition of a univasal] or ne:garive concomiuncc [in which such a cognition
also in the: prcsmcc only and merely of a universal] with the cognidon of
a univc:rsa.l. An example in which these relations do occur is that of the qc:
faculty and the: form perceived in relation ( 0 the cognition of that form .
[PV.l.S]

tuIOII fOr tM objector'. argument is not esablW>ed. ~ ob~ III)": "The pfO>
duaion of. spro.!t and 10 0<1 when. xed and 10 on aisu is. QK of c.onvmOonal
produaion; ;t is DOl. ultinule prodllCtion. Tha&'",c. if tM ~'Y fOr Idie funcrion
is mted in lemu of uhi/I'UU prodocrion iU w ddinilion of. rcaI thing. thrn ;1 is not
iQ ddinition bcc::au il does not COYer all ilUWlCa of w ddinimdwn. And if il is
IClled in tnms: of c.onvmOonal production. uniCf'Ah would alto M~ it; tM ddlnition 1fII'OUld dllll be innlid by reuon of O'I:IUlms>on."
1Dharm,.klrti raponds:) Ut it bt ~,... ...... ",iJ. We Illy thallMClpacity for INc
Iimcrion ill not qualificcP- lu rimer ulaltUU: or c.onOftlcion.alJ. Bw: ~ kind of~.
iry lOr ....i.e IUnmnn ...... ;. "'"1...,.;, ....,1 (-Il-t ~ _ Jm...) [by t...;"..! ;, i...:!i.,.. ...hIo>.
and what cIwactaUa a particular is rhertfore thai kind of indisputable: ClpJdty for
cdic Nnaion. We do not haft tM ka$I objtion 10 you caIIill! iI whaleva' you mip

....

MOreDvu. what is ;1 mat you aIlnt te be c.onvcntiorqJly cxiJtmt such chat )'00
111m QX\\'auionai produaion IUSl'1bull101 production in me otbtt..,."y (i.e. ulaImfdy]! If tM c.onvul1iona1 is 111.11 which is utterly nonaiscmt in ;tiI ma<ny. thrn
whm ipCilinl of 1hc "c.onvultion.a!." _1'I'I)U\d mean that 1hc thill! hu no~
''Y' But in speak;nl of " pnlduc;tion~ .,..., would mean chal the dUnl hu [ldie1~
iry. And irwmum as dv: capaci.,. rro. rdil runcion] and .....1-..... "' .... , "'r-i.,.
~ mutually =w.ift f!--s,..,."mhtlrll1llnti). bow an a linBle chi", ha..., bod. dul
capacity and itl ab.mc.c?
Or ebe. if )'011 IJKIt that the tcml "OOIIvcntional" means -produr:cd" thr:n IJina:
-ulamaK" muru "oonproduction1)'OO Uft lhereby:wcru-d dI.11 ~ is noaproduaion in ultimate tcnnf, i.e.. by eM non;woduccd. (a . PVT. "J""ISSal] 11w bri",
tM cue. othcn (i.e dMIK who hold our oplniMl do not ~ 111.11 lhcrr is the produaion of 1M nonp<Odl.OC>l:d ....t ...ct.. Hence. In it waujMed ;,. tb.n II.Wy n....., ,.. you.
hs- ....", ;. ]. ,, ;. ...... .... "' . _

... _y

u...., "the p<"O<I.-d P"~1J ' <O the:

produr:cd" bca....., then:: iI [obvioualyl noodwr fOrm of production.

3pyp (r1.4b6)

y"..,..,J,._>~,.

.,.,.

Cf. PVT. ~.1s-.b6.

~'I objeaor mpondi dw m.lCllcmeru"1,..c( it be II you haft Aid," "IOUId

mean tN! ~ univuAk ha~ !die: f"unaiDn.1ouc ~i mpondi dw they do not
bra...., they ~ not invariably cor:w:omiQn! with thoe OCCUrTellOe of In lwarmcsa of thnn.

He ~ ~ AI. tM -r Ievr. the !ciK: IUnaion of rnI rhinp ;'10 pnldua: In awa.rmc. dw
thina ... i.. 00;....; unlvt:nm do rMX rvcn M..e tM ~ w produce awarmcw
[tNliuvc u tbcir ob;ecu dv: 11Ilivt:nili:1."

I.... U..-

39..

f O UNOATIO NS Of OHAItMAKIATrs PHILOSOPHY

The fact that a uni . . ersaJ is not invariably concomitaru with the cognition
of a univerul explains cognitions of supposlly exua-mental entities, such
as substaruial wholes-i.e., a watcr-jug-projcctions. universals. numbers.
etc. 1bey ate' also not invariably concomitant with their cognitions because:.
like univmals, the cognition of them follows from the PJ'CS(:fn of other &ctors, such as signs and mental effort. [PV3.6]
'fhinF;!' such as me hairs [that appear to a person with cataractS] are not
universals because they are not considered to be objects (by persons who act
upon mem]. This fauh does not ensue fo r absences because: they are apprehended as knowable.1 (PV].7]
The fault also does not ensue for thO$C hair-like appearances when they are
apprehended in mat fashion (i.e. as objects by some other awarmess]. This
is so bccawc there is no reason to deny that they are apprehended as knowable objects. The clarity of the appearance of hairs in cognition is due to the

" o...-..!...b 'dd'" (PVP,,"'b) In,,od ...... tN. -.... with .10.. obj.ectloo>,
"'You daim

!ho,. WI;ven.J .. ma, oiwhid. one: ...... ""'5"itiun ..ba. then: ale od>c.

faaon .ha. do no!: ckpend on an object (ndM). Bul ~ awamlCSi of mint;< wen ..
~ halrs lhal a penon with caWICII paw .,. OC\Irs without dx prClella of JWn and
such mal art apabW ofldic: funcrion; rau.u. JUCh awarmeacs 0fXIU ...t.m ~ are
odIC' causes....m .. eoptiti..e dfon r.M.p). "ThaI bci"l lhc cue. u.o.r halr-<i...,.,p!
mIlS( be univasals.
5 Onendrabuddhi (pvp:n6b):

Tbi"" JMdI. INti" p t _

"i_1I. Whf. &r..u, ~." _t i"";lIN. ,., HjNts.

p~.,,;m <:aUnCQ do noc ~ in practical acrion by i~ning du.1hc hair-dut..

len and such duo, appear ill ma r own awumeu are objects. Hena, one sbould noc
think of it as a WliO'el'Sl! or discina objeer. Ra,ha. OM.t>ould haw this notion with
~ [0 1M, which is inusinni 10 be: III object by personJ cnpp in pnaic:al
xtion. ...
"If hain and JUCh art' IlOI univus:ais because peoplt do ROC cn~ in praaic:al
"""ioN in .cpnl '0 d>nn by ""'"'"' in..p>nl ,),.,." ,u L.:..u;........ ,)""" ..!hr..... "' ~ ..J.ou
noc uniwnaIs. IUr lhtr are IlOI ima&incd 10 be: objts. "

J. ;. noc thec::&IC dw. Ana abIcnca do no! haw the nature of" univcrub. one would
be obIisaI.o admir dw thif Ibw abo appIIeIm ab.cnca. Whf. 8_ dtq .,.,.,p~ ............ 6/,. Ewn thou&h i, is noc till: cate duo. one cnl'V" in praaiaI acriona
in rcinm.o abtma:t throush n..Yi"l imapncd them [0 be: objcctJ. 0 114' ntCnhdcsl
nuy cnW in pnaiaI aaion throosh hmnB conwucd ablt,nas as know.obk. II ;,

duo only ad..... , thlne:o (_N}_I,no.,o..bI.. t.e.c." ...

an objca in 101M fashion .

. - . . . . a.IC

au.. III

i., ............. ....

)1 ....

'9S

APPENDIX OF TRAN SLATIO NS

fact dun they are objects [j.e., paniculanl' in that they are of the nature of
awarencu.

Hown'tt, thoughts such as "ibcsc art ha..in" have univmals as their objts;
but the appeannct ofha.irs does not have any object. (PY).8-9ab)

"If a univrnal is also a (reall object in terms of having the nature of awareneu, then you would have to conclude mat it is a particular:
Sintt we do indttd ~n that a universal is a panicular/ your statement
postS no problem for us. But in terrru of having the nat\lK of other objts.
it is a univcnaJ in that it has the same form for all (me objects that it secJlU
to qualify). It hu that same form bec:au.sc it is based upon their exclusion
[from orner objccu that do nOt have the expected cawal charactrnnia).
[PY).IO)'

6 Demdrabuddh i (PVP:U7a).
7 ~ (PVP:UN'

su- the ....i....w .J.o ... by AMUN ~ '<MIr. _....,.,. ....... to ;. .~.
Hence, dlCft iI 00 mntDdiction IrWrd by ow vppotlm. '. objtuio.. l. bh.. ,.j lIP N
If]it/" .. ,. 'i fb7ir ':Iiy..." ,..'" ti ...arJ." If]it/:fl""" ....,. Un IV i.J N ...,J J.I.

8 SumrnarUinl chc point~,

~buddhi

(PYP:l17b1-l)

SJrw it. "-, ..,,.,. _ .... ' . ... it is chc ..............d is, it ia u.., _ bco;:r.... u.., rocn;lion 'ppeall in thai Whion by rim.e of ~nl upon chc adwion of ochn
objecu.l. _OO.mc..;1 ia prod\KlC'd throtJ8:h OM'ltxptric,1U (......, ... .. ~
vi <.I.., c- d .. 1cd ,...a <.I............... ;''11_ MlCb, i. io rn..-....uYalid oflha. ubjca:. In mil
war il ia defined u bod! , paniaIbt and I uniYUGl.

7. PV3.194-224 with &irionsftom PVPand p'fi

' ''That which is aggregll.(ed (lIl1'!,du) is :II congfomcntc (#z'"~)' and in
that KIUC it is universal (d ....'"P). [According to Buddhis[S su ch as
VasubandhuJ. one has pcJ(cpcion of such mings. Furthermore, any cogni.
tion of a universal is necessarily associued with conceptuality. [Ht'flCC, it is

wrong to say thai ~ption i.s frtt of conceptuality]: rpV}.1941

D~ to :II

rdadon with other things ,i.e., ocher particles). infinitesimal par-

tida thot arc different

thAn

their own p~iou.. momcnu: arUo:: (from their

own previoU$ mommu luch thatthq can produtt an aw.uencuJ. In mal

sense, they are S1id to be aggregated: and as such, they art said to be :II condition for the production of awareness.) IPV). 19SI

Moreover, the distinctive quality thai particles obtain docs nOI OCOlr withQut the Q, hc r panicle. ""j,h _hid>

:lwarcnCSII docs not rn.vc any

.h~

n~

arc in proximity. H e nce. , ince

rduio n 10 a single panicle. aware-

(PVP:.I9a) prd'aas dlis me with lht- f,;,Ilowin ob~,

""TheKOA (.u~ofrbc h~Jwamw::Ml an; agepmiJUbewx:a. all isaptCMd

in 11K phiIoIophical poNI>on, The corpw of ~ _r~'I" ha.-e 4ilw1el (."",
,.-,.n~ thW _
. Haw iI il apptIlpI'Wc. lhcn. roCOlKlCi oftt.o. *tpcs
.. ~ """t!.k thinF F.,.- <he .... <><~.bk V.......t.....dh ........ Ie .. II I,d.n... okCO<J"'" of
fivoe a~ h:.n .. din. objecu _ -panicubn auc:h as ~, which iI apprehcn6rd by me ocular faculCY;'1 ia noo:;wmcd tim dq!aU ~partinobn u
.heir objKU.' So ho-w iI ;. duo. their ob;.cu arc paniaI1an [in !he _
mQII[ by
DipIf;l and DharmUirril ~
objtctl an:;we uN,...1, ' lei. PSI.I-4. quoc'ns
AKBh on AKI_loJ_

..

n..:u

2 ~ (1'VP:119b1I'l0l' dw dwr an: disrina from

prmow: panic:ko in dw dq

1.r in prm:im.iry ro tad. othn: U I rnuh. thq pin I pUIf'lC1f)'- _"'1N f_ , ...Jwhich is

their c:apacity 10 prodUCJr ....... rmc.. Pn:.umabIy. pro:ocimiry to a patti r'.

abo intmded heK_1M
portion froon ~rabuddhi rndJ:

,dtnn.

IItIIfC

~ry if;

Ow ,..,.... tWJ,.u-~ d... to dK 1',...,,4 ofcoadiliona which ac:u. W

poopm,........""." which is
ao.,..my TO prodUCJr an ~ ;"foUuJi- '
,hal haO't d... capacity 10 produa an ilWU'Cnca arUc from their out..Wllial
aol,U(l, namdr. pohiow inl'in,ltSimal panicles ('n die IO\II'IOe QlIlI;n\l\lllli m.. do 11<0(
ba.-e WI capaciry. 'The wonI "iIQ9cpted" ezpr_1hoM: panides dial bavoe dW
aopKitia Ina. arr .tt-inn! wbrn !My Ire in proximity with thil and """
od...r panidc.

,.mnn

me.

"'PI''''

,,.

APPENDIX OF TRA NSLATIONS

197

ness is said to luve a universal rin the sense of a group of aggregated partides)J as iu objt.'IPV3.1961
"Even though they occur in thc same perceptual field, if they do not form
a new, diu inct substance. then those various panicles arc not observed
simultancously.Then how does one apericnce the simulrancous apprehension of small
dUnp: ruch as sesame seeds
arc dUjunct [i.c_, thai arc not forming a separate cntiry
is a wholeW IPV3.197)

mal

mat

, The word lOt univual it uh!fI""" bul thlI word an also man I "wholc or I compotilc ctlQIY." lnaunuch II chc reWiorI of. L1llMnaI II) i~ panicuhn PI*' many of the J;Une
robk....... dw: rdul.on of. wt.o&c fO i.. pano. Dharnukinl coUap.co ~ of Of><' infO
diKu.ion of anodla. Hue. DharmalUni
rlw I ~lN ctluIY !NI
ai&o ICfIU1'te from ill COftS(irucnu wouJd mIOUlII 10 an admiWon of. kind of raJ unmr_
..I; Mnot. he UICS tfu, word "\IJ\iwm.a!" [i.e., "rompc:w.itectlo!)'"] 10 IWnC I ronporncmcof
paniaIIan withoul mala", any ontolopal c:onun;lmctll to lhc aiacnct of thai compc:w.itc
entity in diRincrion from the panicubn of...tUch ;1 iI rornpo;.cl ThU: point it clarified by
~i (PVP:II9b-I\lC).

me

RCOpIz

4 ~i (PVP: I8gbJ rnnarb:

"There .. no

~ (" ....;........J ") c:aJJed. "conp.meno .,o ..... io ei ...... dUcina Of

non-diKina from;1I pamlUCh
wt.en _ illy thaI me ptrccpl it I
l ie," me ~lIg~lion bas an opportuni!)' [10 mule w ]. ThaI is. [Dip\ip] aid.
"It it in ~d 10 xnsum-patticulat
tNIMJ It,; rDtf Ii IIIfm- ..pJJ rlw """.tory awucnesa: is aid 10 ha.,..,. particuhr II ill objca; ;1 it IlOl in rqud 10 ~

mil.

"CDnpom.:._

{sI:JtJ

particular" (a It,; "'ItfIi IIIftJM. ",;JJ. (S PSI.I.4 and PSV IIJ riLl. In !his repnI.
me opcciaI quality of producing rNU'CnCaCI !ha. ansa in infinita.i.!NJ panida; due 10
tbcir motion wid. odxr things ariJu from the lI'aIUionnarlon of tbcir former rupeertw: con.rinWl dul Ill' ill mlloW COfIjlll>Ction (phaI ohM" ",,'" ;r. Nj. TIw dif..
ri~ quali!)' wiU nor ariJc withoul cxMt panida that art occurring .. ithoul
intend IxaWII: tIw kind of pan:idc on ;11 -.. doa noc ha.,.., chc !WUJl: of prod"Ong
_ _ Hmcr, siNr ~ "- Of/It ..... ..., 1IImJII] ,.,t.r;... ,. II si"p ,.,mrf....-....iDtt a~ doa noc No.,.., the plopm)'-_MMwoi bcing MOeIAtiIy moted
10 me etUbliahmmt of a "'boana: which ill. lingle partkk, and lintt the CI~ria
of thoK panidc:s I~ pooduttt .inc1<=: .~ ... o:hcir dfttt. t:hcy all: aid 10
be the common ob;ea of an 1WIrrnt::$$.. A4 a IInivcnal (",".~). they Ill' all
the objea of the lwamKII, bul t:ht- orwataIeU is nor ncMariIy rdated (T''' "7.,.j 10 Inylingle OM of rhrm. In odxr.....,.w, that awam>al is II,., ODIIlmon dfca
of all of them. It is noc lhal t:hcy Ill' noc lhc common obF of 'WU'CIICIl b3wc
~ appn:hmdI.tm.un \lJ\Mnal (9-~(~,.IwtJ "" 1f'JV.119CI
Sintt the _ _ t"it it no! by virtUe of. ~~" Ittn
J!]fIJ
to dispd the "".....,y molion of .warenCl! to .lingle ,,'l)<llntt IcompodJ ofinfin
itcsimal putidcs, it is nor: conmdictory "' claim dw awaretlC# doa noc ha", as ill
obir a uh!fI~ (" un~' thai islUJIKIIlN by I capacity 10 produa:_

(1u".

5~; {PVP: I~.

398

FOUNDAT IONS O f DHAItMAKIRTI'S PHI LO SOPHY

The obteaion th:u awareness OCCUI'5 quickly and hence one mistakenly
apprehends them as one entity has already been refuted [at PVJ.IH]. And
why would sesam... Sds and so on that are falli ng down Kqu ... ntially not
b..- apprehended simuit2l1rousJy? Moreover. all cognirjolU art equal in duration. so why would some hav..- Kquential conceptual appeannca whik
others art simultal1<Ous? On... would b..- forced 10 conclud..- that th ... appreh... ruion of any obtea is non-sequential. rpV3.1')8-1991
And how could one 5cc: a variegated form such as a multicolor (ri".) butterfly?
"That multicolor is a single real color."
Then that multicolor is even more psychedelic than that muiticolom! butterfly!" (PVpoo]
Ther... is no singJ..- ... mity, ~mu lticolor, ~ just as a form composed of an
arrangement or jewds is IlOt a single entity. This cue is me same as the
concqnw.i app..-arana: of blue and so on in m... observation of multicolored
(riml) mings such as cloths [that art composed of mr..-a<is of diffm:nt colors]. IPV).101]
- In tho$c c:::a..scJ where one sea a single color and IlOt the multicolor. one is
jusl seeing the color that is a part lof me whole).
If aft~ eliminating thr conuirul'. nr colors such as blue. you ca.n Ifill set'
$OEm: multicolor that is other dun thoK constitueru colol1, thf."n what you
Sf."t is indd psychtddic! IPVpol ]
Two [cognitions, one of a manuDctum! butterfly made fro m different colom! thread or Jints and one of a natural butterfly.J1a..... both dnmnined
to have (he same cognitive :lIppearance or their object :lind to have t he sa me
duration. So why do you say Ihat one is a sequential cognition of various
6 ~ Dhumaklrti motb mit poRIa with pby on wonb. The word rrw- mcaru bod-.
"muhicoloted" and, by awuioft. wondrow Of amuinS- To all(mpc 10 c:on~ a link of tho:
lIavor oldU:s p.yGn -w, 1ha..... ~ tho: laner~ .. "pIJdv:ddie." in!h.. K!IaC
~w 10 Amman wltuK.

7 n-: cumpkl.~ prori<kd by ~ (PVP:19IabJ.

APPENDIX OF T RAN SLATi O NS

obju and the other is a non.sequential cognition of a s ingl ~ obj~ct?

(PV,p o}1
For w~ posir thar Ihings are variow because cognirions are various; [and
when one sees a variegated or multicolored (eiml) object, the vuiegation
remarked in cognition must reAect , wricry of things that produa: that
cognition]'
"The differena: remarked in cognitions does nor conuibutc [to establish
ing that things are different],"
What men would establish thai thi ngs are different? [PYp04]

Because heterogeneous substances do nOI combinc co form [a distinct substan. a whole], one would have no cognition of vuiegated color in me
casc: of paintings and such. And the conjunction relation (SII~M")
[whereby thc substances of the painri ng are hdd together] cannot iudfbe
multioolored because it has no visible form,' Nor can conjunction scrv~ a.s
:a 1ncm or a mttlphor bn::::nL~ (h~ is no v:ui~(io n in the individll2l [p:am
of a painring] , h an nol serve:as:a metaphor also because there is no v:aricgarion in the individual [colorsl .' IPYpos- l.06a]
8tu Onmdn.buddhi (PVP:19u) noIet, Nai)iyibs and V:O.ifqiW ..wnwn thaI ~~ it
qual.ity.particular tlo<!W'). Si na color (~ it abo a quaJ ityparticulu, ~~ cannot
haw any coIomion bec:awc a quality....,ua.Jar 12nnoc qual ify anCKhcr q.witypartiaoW.
~ IlGI

rec:otdI th.iI

mol'!

on the pu1 0( thr objIor:

-Althou&h the obja:l (",.,) 0( the word 'mlilrico!or' is 001 a mlliricolon:d conjulK'
lion, ~nhdc:u, dx contvnaion of the ckmcnu in ~ntin, it ..unibr in quality
to the mv.lricoloral fOnn 0( the whok thu is praml in mllll~ bvllcrilies and
toOQ, The E
.Me, the conjoit>cd colon in me painrin, ~ mcu.phoric::alIyalkd 'mullimIor' jwc &I OM ~ of the mLillicolorMnea of the bunttfly. [DlwnukIniJ
~ N-..ull. " ."
9 This inlapra:arion is buro on lJoevmdnbuddhi (PVP"9,b-19z.a). NOIe mIl on his
inlcrpt'ewion. the phrase
ninrnnU Jhould apparently .,., tq'Ialcd.. N~ilbcr
~i IlOl' Oc...ncirabuddhi offm putialbrIy dar commmu on Ihi. phruc, bvl
IOOr commcnu on me argumml ill whok uc: wotth norin"
Dnmdrabuddhi (PVP:19z.a) commenu:

,""IJdM'"

Conjvncrion OJI.IIOI""

me object of a mcapbor in me InUt ofbcin8 o;:aIkd mlllti.

color" Mini) bec:awc;1 is oimilar 10 (....... rw] mvlticolor, ""1 U. d>= is 00 mulUo:.uI.uoai (n'w.) wlouk ' " t....unOy, ;and ,.hac .. AU . .......... a.I ..u <U """""p.huri<:dJy
.nribv" mLll!iaItorcdnca (ri.w"") to m., pug ol lhc bulterfly,

FOUNDATI O NS O F OHAllMAKIRTI'S P HI LOSO PHY

And things that have bttn

gr.upcd sequentially cannOt Ix c:onflated by a

cognition that c:onsuues mem as a 5ingular multicolor bc:causc [on your

vi~l due which is non-singular cannot Ix grasped by a single cognition.
(pYp06l>-<d]
Therefore. a single cognition that has variow [simultaneous] objects should
be established to occur. Hmu, [pcrcqnion. even though caused by multiple panicles) is established to be non-conCt'pnW. sinu when conuplUaliring one object, wh~1 one scc:s is anomer. [PV1.a07]'

" In both CalIS. di$cina nnity is dor

ftUOfI

for dw rrwaphor."

~ (PVT ..,.._, ........

"/.. NIh usn tliJrmn mb" if tIN -for liN ~ I

I .

1luc ;" dw objector cbims Wt 1M ani!)' whic.h it tho: whok 01 tl-w bunm\y and dw
di$rinct entity thac it dw pvc lll 01. mulricolorocl {dw.} carper and such ~ dw muitic>oloml coLor 01 bor:h; u 1Udt. thq aft dw R:UOn f' tho: metaphor fha, lIor con
junaion is multicolored.

Onmdrabuddhi (PVP:I,u) continua:

Thil canOOl be dwcue bcawc thcR;. no muitirolomincM li.c., \'II'ilpriool in tl-w
color 011 multicolomi bunafly. and ixn'lM' thcR iI no multicolored endry in the
po.;nlinS and wch.
~i (M', "]W'wob) dari~

n,;, U1/Mlt N tIN ret _ _ rhrrr if .....~ j .. tIN rWw.j' ..JM.I.mI

~ Thai iI, thcR iI no mukic>olomlnal [ i~, .,.,q.tionl in the aonc.qMualIy
.........,'-"""011 ~~ en';.,. Ilwl .. the;..t.ok (~....,.. .....;. " . . i.ta. ............ ;, _ ,.,OJ.i...J.nJ
j .. lIN ,.n"'"'r "",, ___ Thai io, .u- dwtt iI Iir$c of all no wftok, dM:
oppoilCllf doc:. 001 .,,;q>C I~, mulciobecl enti", thai iI tIw wboIe. RatIwr, only
tho: ooIonoi dw puul~ . 1lwy individ&W1ydo noc ~any muldw1otM.! ...... and
...n.;.... diltina cokJn can/lOl. be dw bo.W ()ou .w, " .tip) lOr I meuphorical we 01
m~_ bra" ...
opponmt doa noc aox:qx that on< an.appn::hcnd

t1IIi"

many minp Rmul~y.

I""

c..m.....n,i", nn ,.,~...rNirr.Nill.. o...-t:ndrabuddhi {PVP:19W nat ...)'I:

MOI Khtr , _ _ mip;hl daim

mat pantinp and P.toeh...., mru.ph.oricilly calkd

"mukic:oloml" bcawc tht paru inbeu ill I si,.kconjunaioa, but dtil aJ"o doe. DOC
maltt' KIUt'. T'lu;1 is, t~ iI no conjunaion thai ia I multic:oloml mu", in th.e indio
.-idaW paru.1UCh as tIw coIorbllK, in ~of whidl rMn: itt said 10 be I conjuncDon.
lrucnd, thoK paru ha." thcir own e-ncc orlwina blue: and 10 on: u fIlCh, they....,
individually /101. multiooMN ed: !hc~~c, Met dwy aft DOC connccwd to lsinpoo;m:
(.,.,Jw). Ih<yc:an.nor be: dw objt {~of a metaphor.
10 Dn-cndrmuddhi (PVP: I,th):

.'"

APPENDIX O f TRAN SLATION S

"If sincularity is nor possibk in the case of objecu lsuch as a ooncrfly',

wing] mat have varitg:utd appeannct:S, thcn how ca.n ~ be a linglc cognition whose cognitive appean.na is variegation?"" WVpoSJ

''Ibost who analyze reality makc a statemcnt that is cnt.liltd by real things
tharudvcs-namdy, th.:at thc way in which mey think of objts is thc way

in which those objecu disappear.

"Might there be vutcg:ation in a singlc cog.nitiont

n.u iJ. jwc N mmc:ol ~ Itnds 10 apprcbMd many ...0;..:1:>. ~ wbaI con
uadicrion is that: if sauory awarmeA aIao appc:hcnda many ob;rcu [simulwocoudyll

Hma:. il is rIO( aI all ~ !OJ tmJOfy ~ 10 do to. T1UI is. ~ thouch

tbn.:- .. no Mnp: muiricoioled or nmpud ~ in dw ~ bluc and 1O DC! of ~
painti"" dw . - . . - char arita Mm a multieolooed or 'f"Irirped ~ u tinpar. '....fo... " Ii"p . , btu ""rir", dw iJ. sinp COSD;Uon chal has many
~~ t/ ' +Ii,.",lOoa:ur. Hma:.!hey aft' pn..d..,....I by maar nbjc:ca, on<'

ni, awlpwn.
rn.rel u an ob;ea. Htrta, tina !hey timulWloellUSly apprdlCnd various obju. (dIN
1I1Ii .... _f{~ .... ""u~""" ~ ~I ' ....."".,..
Fin! of ~I. if bar
~Icady bn apUined chal I concqxuaI copmion docs rIO( haw I dear CIDpIiri"l'
appearanco!, bu.r since mil apIarwioa Iw noc ~ bteded, be 51)'$. . ....
Iu- I un"","",] [in .....

c:on .." .... ......, onurwy ......... n

..

.J1Q", _

+r (.,,;.;.

\'CIbr.

_ 1m ., .""",", H ..... llimulWlCOlldy

'-ifl-'

Km

....nou.

objuo IUdI as ~ and 10 nn. when on<' K'CIN 10 M apprdxndinc jusc OIIC "bIuc
m..1 ia Cl)ImCCIC(i..nth io 1WnI:, II in the (poocaa of (O<MPC.wJy idmlifyins

u-

lIWly objeco _Ibh.c and "bIuc [(.1. tbealbc: IIICfl: ~ob;ea (MfhIIJchat
m.n oq>MaU! f'rom d..- /oohn . . . . ~ :III bI....] io ...... :u dw Ii"", mnjoiAM

with ia name bauJc I nilll'lC and I

ODIMp'

do nor &rUe llmuIaneousIy.

]] $iJcyabuddhi (PYT. "T-10 U) cbri/la;:

"... " - ' - MlII.w ~

"""..,..m-.. . . .

~ "'-"1tC~ it

_..,..,.,u"'Tbe

objeaor minla lbe rotIowins: You who "'P" .... mis dICory aboul per.....,.w.n aIio
UIm chal mpirionl occur wid! cop!iri"l' inuf;a. Henu, I ~ed irnast' iI OKII
lioIIy d>c c.opicion ifJd{ (M. i ~
l1"''';' m..1 bri.. lbe (SR, you IODeJ'I

"'*'

..... ""'1"1.......... I.....q,..ed .....: ...... ....,.........." [And

..nc.. ~

(,,)U) oommmaJ. "n..../ ..., it;, ~.~ M I1ICaIU dw d>c oo;.no.lhinla d>c
~ Ihr IftIDn .lIIed ito. the bm. 'dw whid. '" ....ncpnd don loot t.- tinrJc _rial nature' '" irKondwi~ bcuusc: ~n rhoush CIDpI;lkIn .. of I "nplu
Ral\lft. il can ha"l' I ..,..;q.aud copiIM: apptaraIIOe."

11 Dewodnbuddhi (PVP:.I ~}a) inuoduca u..,

nal

ftQC

Mm tt-

ThiI cririciam appIiG 10 OM who maintains mal d>c ~ (_

,.J" u1limau, bul

II doD nor apply 10 1M b:auK 1 do nor ICIOrpI thai 1M I. . . . aiIu in !hat faahion.

Tn okmoruuau IhiI poinl, [DtwmaldniJ AJ'I ...

FOUNDATIO NS OF DHAllMAKIRTI 'S PHILOS OPHV

There mould ~ no variegalion in the: cognilion as well, SUI if one is conI(:n! 10 havre this br: the: objects' euc:ncc:, who are we: to objttl to that?
[PVp.Q9-2.Ioj "
I] ~ndnbuddhi (PVP",)&} maka it dear lhal the ones !loins the aru.lyr.illl hm: afI: the
Buddh.. H~ abo rnnatb:

*'

... * . . .,

j ,. wIncI!
Ibi... f{Hjrr. dial ia, wbr;n on.: ntiolWly anaIflCI than as
cithn-lin&ular" multiple, thq tIisq~ Itt ckvoid of ainilll-in INI way,
i.e., in INI faahion lu either anpbr or multipkJ. In oWr wotdJ, thty annoc M
aabliohood in
of any CSKmw narw~ ~.

,....

~buddhj (PVT, ~.) makes lhac oommma:

... 1M ....., u. tuIHd. "-1 Ibid f{NjNrs tmn fO awnaJ bilK. rdlow and JO .... H~
(.m,.)to rdill~ the nocion!Nt ;1 ia disrlna fi-om ~ (lIijflhtt4)
iudf. M is noc rdilrinc the nocion rNl ~ ;. by !\aNU,.,..tnIr& This will
AYI "ob;ca~

abo Mcxplaincd w. T1w ....,i,...M "~1i"rmeans thq art noc osabIiohood

u rithtr .. ncuW" multiple. [Whm ~ndl'lobuddhi JaY'-1i,. _
f{.", mnoriM
_ " ....1JMr; M means tNl thc oO;rn ann(lf bot esablUhed as aluna!. nor a n
il bot _blUhed as !.m", thc ruNt<! of coruciousneM. In ochn- words. thq 3M noc
acablisMd as .pptarin, Iq)"Inldy (~. Mftp!). In the immfdi~I~ly fOllowin,
phrucl hr do:monHnla 1M <Q)' ill.....t.id. i. is noc rsnIJiha!..

Ikomwi.m..ddhi (PVP:I')I) oominua:

AcccpIilll mal dharmu haYf bn .no...n 10 be ~ il is from dIe~.,."

of oWn thai hr IWa the opi...... of an ob;mor, "I, ~ "..~ #r""';'"

,.n- (ri~ u.. -1I(k t9pitiMr

~ (PVT, 11)0:10" ) ~
AJ for the statarw:nl tha.lqina. .0-.... IM_ Nt. sJ.- ,. N mtrttWn.. (oW nona
iscma (.1IIIcM _ , .J is noc the: CSKO-:r'n,II."of dharnw ........ ,... ono: would bot
focud '11. c:ondu<k tha. theft" iI Mlm afIIinion nor purii'olio.. and bco:allK thc ton
...tw.l. in ....... an ...... apIai.-l culm. t....u. tM ... u.- ~i ... odf ....U
czpLain mil tdA-,
to the mnt rdI~ awan:naf mal is dnoid of COOl'
ccplually ~cd objea and IUbjea.

_.iona! ..

~i

..m..

(PYP:I,)I) ~"inuc

"If dw:tt tOmdtow ~ ullimal~ varicption or mu1UoolorcdncM in I

aw--.
then in ulrimarc ICfIN dIU nriep.tcd 01" II>ultkolortd 1-.,." .... would aublish thaI
the raJ mi", was Wo vvicplcd or mul.icoWnd. Likewix. il would be ""'.- This ill

"1" ~"..J.,.. -n..,.".-.' ..u_;,. .............. Si~:and YIritptiooImul~_

...1... oJ", '1uoUoo'" ;. ,;nu,. ~,. 1.. '<>f>U'-' oJ"' ....a~n-

oonmwiinOf}'. If ~ <:IOJI1ition it 1lnguIu. it ultimaldy doa noI ha.,." l.-ariq;;ucd 01"

mullicolomi ftalW C; inl ncwnhcIcM appean with r.uiepttd or mullicolomi cot"
nul...: ~. thm mal OOJIliu.,." ~ doca . - ultimaldy aiR in !hoM
c:opitioM. One mllll aa:qK this ptIIilMln bcaUIC otherwiJc" the .. ntuluitr of the
oosnition would bot CIOUnlnmandcd. Otbcr than a di~rmt or nor>dilfcnm oosniri...:
~. thm: it ulrimatdy roo od> - . foc the aabiiahtMrll of lOtI"Iftbins as or.e or
llWly. In Ihis Rpfd. if ono: ~ to mainwn thaI CD&"'UOII " wnma.dy both one: llId

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS
~;4-:------

variegated, then the whole variegated world'would be one single substance, and that
being the case, that position would incur flaws such as the fact that everything would
be produced simultaneously. Therefore, if it is singular, then it cannot have a plural
image.
tSakyabuddhi (PVT, nye:20Ia-b) comments:
[Devendrabuddhi says,] then in ultimate terms that variegated or multicolored awareness
would establish that the real thing was also variegated or multicolored. This means the following. {20Ib} An ultimately singular cognition arises with a variegated/multicolored
cognitive image due to that kind of object (artha). The external real thing that determines the cognition which apprehends that image is thereby established. Likewise-as is the case with the singular cognition that has a variegated/multicolored cognitive
image-it would be real.
!He (20rb) also comments on Devendrabuddhi's phrase, !f (the cognition) is singular, it ulti-

imately does not have a variegated nature:

That is, it does not have a variegated essential nature because if its essence were variegated, then it would be contradictory for it to be singular. Instead, the cognition
appears with a variegated cognitive image due to cognitive error.
On Devendrabuddhi's comment, therefore, ifit is singular, it cannot have a plural image, he
says (20Ib-202a):
If cognition is singular, then it cannot have a plural cognitive image; rather, cognition
{202a} just has the nature of mere reflexive awareness which is devoid of dualiry.
Devendrabuddhi (PVP:r93b) also comments on the last part of the verse:

!fone is content to have this be the objects' essence-that is, even though they do not have
that nature [of being external], they become apparent (gsal ba '" vyakta) in terms of that
nature; if ultimately abiding in that manner is their suchness, why should we bother
refuting it? The idea is that one should just let it be so.
Sakyabuddhi (PVT, nye:202a) comments:
"If there is no variegated external real thing, and if there is no singular cognition with
a variegated image, then how does cognition appear with the color of the external
object in a manner that is restricted to -a particular time and place?" In response to such
a qualm, [Deveridrabuddhi] says, !fone claims.... One speaks of an "object" due to the
imaginative apprehension of that which is by nature the cognizer's (sgrub pa po = pratipattr) cognitive error as being an object. Those appearances are not [actually] objects
because the constructed nature does not exist at all.
What is being asserted? [Devendrabuddhi] says, even though they do not have that
nature, they become apparent in terms of that nature. The phrase even though they do
not have that nature means "even though they do not have the nature of being external." They become apparent-they appear-in terms of that nature-in terms of
being external. The phrase, ifultimately abiding in that manner is their suchness, means
the following. Appearing as having a nature that they do not have is the way that they
ultimately-really-abide because there is an instrumental cognition that establishes
that appearance. Therefore, that appearance is not unmistaken suchness. The idea
here is that since the cognition of them as external objects is contradicted by an instrumental cognition, that appearance of them as external is not suchness.

FOUNDATIONS OF DUAilMAKlIlTl 'S PHILO SOPHY

Therd'orc:, neither the objttU nor me awareness has a spatially extended

appeannct: bca~, sinct that kind of propcny-lVo1'bhiv.rr [-namdy, spatial
extension- l has already been disproved in the case of a singular emiry. it
is also not possible in the case of what is many. [PVp.u )"
It i. o:oma that

apel jellU of t:lUeiM objccu iI moncow; it if no! ..... Itd IG

claim tha, m,,1 apujeha: ill no! M'OMOl& Btl! what iI coma ("iP,. - ~ li.~,
thr: bet dut the atemal ~ iI an ~l is noc pn::ocnud in dIM [1CIIIOf)'1waJem~

MIl iaelfl; Mmhtbs. we rd'ul~ wtw is ~ted by f:.IK cona:pruaI COIftirion mal
is inMn.unmWly cootradicud. Hm, as in the- caR ~ nonaislttl' thinp ~ as
hairs and
~ to 1 penon whotc C)"$ ~ impalmi by CIWKU, an atcmal
ob;t. ~ rhousb nooc::tdttnt. appcan 10 t!loK w!loK qa all' ((I,,'ut by the
ClWXlII of iponna. Siner if is "PP'''P' inc 10 pretml this noOon in thU aIfltat, the
.... thor of tho: Ircati$e A)'I, "J_In;. H ...
I.notI.u ir.'UjlituDon (-,.tri- '" _.., ...volmil-oon is. foIIo.wI. ~
pl\nw if oJti-':! Ifbiii", i" "-r _Ii ...... ;s thm ...m- mans dw; bet dw thinp
whid! do no! ha~ chat IW.Uft appear 10 have Out naN" c:ome!I about throur;b an
inMrurnmw COI1Iil:ion. '" tum. iI is no! confuxd; inRe1d. it iI ..Jtitn.t~ ThaI is, the
bet tNotlhoK Ihings lICt~y aift at~ illhrir nonoolliOO_ MKhnaa. Hm,
what would Ill' IIll' point in my rd'utilll I ralionally rupponed obtea by thl. W1'U<'&
idc.a.> Hena:, hu Wk.o. is: how an one.n- m,,1 whal is rc:uoNbk iI f:.IK [i.~. non
..Jrim..JuJ?

rna

I. DcYmdrabuddhi [PVP:I , )b) c:ommmu on

111:

,hmt...,

BtIl .i1Klt thc ~ of the ob;t., r.ocnitivc inuF is noc ttllUdtnca,

...mbn tIN ,~"a .. -IUCh ar~ daimai 10 be the ob;m-_.....--which iI
daimod 10 Ill' the JUbjt---N~ any SfOdy atmdai ~ in other word.. tIw
which Ippatl ..-ith 1 'fWiaDy at~ ~itiw i""", does noc aUt either aterNIJy
or inlunllly. ThaI is, dlal which appnn 10 be "",tiaDyUl~ndc-d mlLll be ~ithtt linpar .... plwaI. A ...ltfJ<IMmtiry c:anooc i!ppQI' 10 be 'f'1Iially _ndc-d boalUC spatially almlkd Mngu1ariry ",.,.m-, ...... ~ lihar aIrady bem aplaincd that
u.. _.ity oN.. .........L:I Iuvoo .po.i.! _.......... nuneil'" _ .;nsul........ 1, ~"' .....
aill. n.., ~"" .f,.",..tr-U... ..... tially atftldcd imap-irtd. OOC aiaunl
;/1 tIN ~" ..."., ir -II}'-namcly. color, .-hid! C(IlUi.su of inlinilClUoal partida.
T1u1 ~ die: .ti~ imagt; that apport ill awamICII 10 be 'I*;'lIy afCI!dcd does OOC
aiM in the: indmdo.oal infinir.simal pmidel. And if an awcpiled enury mac if ~
an ob;ea doe. OOC M~ Iny Ii~~, with whit could awarrIMA Iw similar
[tueh ,hal it would alto han I linpalu ~l ~

.......

Sll:yalx.ddhi (PVT.
E~

,.:,ow), diKuainlit the

nln1f1'

of ~tni mliriel, malus theJe

ir ir.finil6i.maI purida: arc mixed with OOMr inlinitesimal panM:la, !My do ooc

10K that naum ofball! infmitaimal panidca. ECrt in ~tion, thty would by
iWUR bot infinitesimal panidtr. if auch if the caR. dw:n In ~ ..-hoK COSIIiUwor
inur;or it "P"tia1ly at~ caniKiI haw: iMnitailMl "","ides. its objt. 1lw bcift8
.he aaoe. il c:anooc be do:n:o-rninni by. noln--c",Meoua awatmeII bealUC. COIftiUon
(,..",...J IMI hal orw:oopU<iw: Unag::annol apprehaIdJOOWOOMr mine [with a diflaro. COSIIiliYi: ...... I. ~. one would 'neII' an ow:rn~

APPENDIX Of TRANSLATIONS

Some umkilkd pmom A,. tIx fOIlowins: IlxR ;. no ~Iwl,. almckd ilmF
~ ~~,. or ;n.~,., and it .. ....,. t1x..a;.a of ~ Ralhcr, lhe: objm:
of paa:plion it ilII infinitai.tNI puriek _toI.lIII.kd br other infinit$..w panidel
IUd! dIM !hey _ atm"lldy dole wi~ bans InlurupmI by an objm:.
infinjlcarnal ~ ho .. (>'tI. arc nO! mind tw."H' mirin& iI ....,. p""ible in tilhcr of
tIx [WO ........hk arfWlCUM'llS: if they...., cunjoi.ncd II j ..... _ poUtl , tIxn tIx: pam..
del would llaw JWU and hma: almlion; and if thcy an: conjoined in their mtimy,
dwn tIx: ..... prd dump would i_ be !he IDe 01 an inlinimirnal panicX. ~
~. [tix obju of ptia:pUon an: infinilesU!W ~ WI arc] am:md,. dow 10
each other RKh tIw they an: noc inlUnlplCd by an,. hner..- p;wticX6 but dg
haw &It intmla bavoun than. Moreowr, IIx apparar1O of. ~Iully a:tmdrd
oopUlM: Urusc
it I pndurilll conpommr.te .. o:nono'OUi tw..LIH' il ooWd nO!
" - nm I minute inlmUor [bc""cu,1hc aroma
cotIIpotrd il; il ..... bern "'-n

n-

w.

-'-------'- .
..
~ "'""" &It InIClJClltt .. "'"

n-

I"
'7 .

w.

who a:prs dIiI qumcn. an: lOoIisb: I!1CdiIll their own words with their
_ _ _ , th.y ... ......fU.od. [fic ic .................. ~.,( _ 'F ri_'Iy_ended
~ irnIF in an ewarmc:N..ned fO appdlClod infin~ putidelit all _
,
then how can me IwvmtII dw ..... W.I lind of ipltialIy extmded imat;c ukc inliniIUinu.l panicks m ob;ccu.' An ~ mal .,. one thin& .. ill oopitiw imasc
ClnnOI boa." _hi",d.o: .. its ob;ta bea... othnwiw ...... would inau ilII own::I!_
1mIion. 1'his Iw already bern explained. No
mropic (rJt- ... . , Iw) per'

aosnirid,.

_could ~a:osnlzc 6-r"""~f"Jan _ _ whoK~ imacI:an ~ ~ (~n.. Wt, infinitesimal ~an:nO!tlxub;lIof

paapUun. ...... _...,. .... ~ utiofaal<C. c::.u..-,........ ~......., ut """""",,inlWieoi..w jMItideo. __ ......" in~1C it loy...,.. of *" i~ .cigI. whid> io Ihc
abKnot of tIx,wumat!Nt is tIx dMlloflhc aDqrd obja:lI]. Otha pmom mainDin dwea\ dw; n::sultinsCOl N ..,.... iI wprodua o,.";oIan int.enW impriDl;
even ... the ~ would noc IU'f'C at: an inkrmtiaJ lip for tho.c imprinu
-n.. AJthout;h one an claim thai ; 1 docs occur. il K euy 10 I thai: the sparialJy
exwodrd oopUti." imat;c ...tudt ;.., i eN 10 be ...t..I one ClfA'iaoca doo:t ....,. ultinwdy CIlia Iwa"., when one anaI,.- ~ il iinuJar or pIunI. il doe ....,. wilhlUnd tuc:h an anaIyaiI.. 1lv cttmWI Ntuft: ("I"' . . . . .,. I Mh.) of infinitaimal
poonido ia

ClUJalod,

rnncJI.~

io

me ~iouat, dauibnl

DliUlllD" .

Bu. io

<alII .....

j,.,

dmXd .-:h, and thnc is no irwu1.uDcnQloopition thai ~it bcoo_....Lau,

I JfNIW/y extended inuF il ia linplar by virruc: ofbri"l panIca.
On !he other hand. one michl think. "Thm: it abo no inll.NmCnW c:opilion thai
pi"O"a it. 1lw;lCtO.C. it .. doubtful Thai brine the~. it hat not bro indubiably
dcmoowraK'd tha. doinp It(" in all _ xtResa.
To dIiI_ respond as rouo-. E.-m po-...be m..ab: tueh daimt mUll admil
thai infinilclimal po.rtida ..... matmal tN"" (J.u nlf ".;m.,) beaux if ;. ....,. poIIibk lOr an imtnamW tJuns 10 ~ an ,tthNiesurW parodc. ~. wh,......,.u.t one
noc o:opUu m10d and mental fi.u>nioott. rnueriillif
maco:rial thi...
il nftWiI,. Iw distina Ada; and KCton beaux thai which ia ~ 01 discina
Iidcs and ttaOn can....,. be nwo:rial ihi. . . . . tho: cut.;u, _
And ifiOIIKtN"I ..... diRina Iidcs and ttCtOn. thm il ..... par1$. n,UCfOi .. ill iI dw cut .nth spatial exwuion, ..t.m OM analyxt: wt.nhtr infipitaimal J*tida an:.inp1ar or plunI,
they dg 001 withRand audt an anaIysiJ. 'fhncforc, infiniluimal partida I f ( alto con
u.diatci by an irutrummaJ copiDoo. Thia Iw alto bem dart,. prewntrd by powcrfW thlnkcntuc:h at: Mallin Vlp ..... todhll; hmDt. CX'IcmaI . 1 1 do....,. aiR.

oornnhins".

,,06
This

fO UNDATION S Of O HA1MAKIRTI'S I'HILOSOPHY

P~"

of awue:neu-namdy. the: one: that is established such that it

SttOU oCle:mal-is diffCrmt from the inlanal dtte:rminarion [which is the:
part of ~warencss that sou to be the subjectivity that apprt:hends th~t
apparendyexternal panl. Awattfle5S is not differmri~ted, but itt appealWlce
iJ diffCrmti~ted into twO. Th~t being the caM, thu dualistic appearance
must be cognitive: confusion. [PV}.lU)'1

IS lXmdnbuddhi (1'VP:19)b):
E..... thoup lhut is nodlUM object. 1M awwmetlf dul haf mal duafutic appearana IIhinu.tdy pisu,
This abo doa: tKII maU IftlK for ~ fdlowilll raION. 1W ;.~ _ _/..uiM
ma.tIJ the dcfinitivdy dctmnil>C'd PpCrimce or the Mibfea-ifN&'t which is infm131
(......,,, u., ttJ .. ~and del:mnlnN (O Ill' a l l . rndt)'. This Is thr one
Iiom.....nich Ihr odIU upcct istlijJirnu; doac odoer upca is ~ oar di.Jt is_MiIJW
$WJ. Ib.I in ~ coruidrntiolu of childish bcinp i. _
mn-J. Whrther or noc
dlrlNi ob;u em.:, rfIIl'ilion haa I duallUlWr. but i. doa: noc IIItim.trly makr
ImK kw I ain&k copition to haw two oopitive i~ beclwr the copiOOn would
no Ioosel M Jinpbr.
On ~othu hand. ir~appann oliu objca:-imlFwen: noclcosnitiCappratana. !hen il ............ no 1onF" br dw eo&nitiw ilnafl' of tbr COJ"ition'l ob;ctt. thaI
being the c:aw. OIK:mWd tKII Sly. " . . is ~ ~ oithat' just by dw men: bet
of ~ Hmoe, OM mIlS! aro:pt mal lM
oimilar 10 tbr c:or;nirion'l
ob;t (.nh4j. MIJI'C'O"ft", Ihrre is no similu im.asc ocher than what is inl~ to cot!:nibon. to copition iud( ill wha, appcan {O copition.

i....., '"

Sikyabuddhi (PVT .-"r.v:>)a) <:Oo\mrIIU on thc pIuaIc 'childish bcinp':

He A.,.' d!iJ,IiJ, M.". bcut-Ithc duali", of ob;t and .ubjra) apvc:an in WI fuhion only {O IhoK who are conf'llstd. 1M bodhisattvN who haw tft!iud lnal " - uc rdfIeN only ~ (. . . . vj4#mcre tdlaiw 'wam>cU (NOIf rit,. u", ..
_~~.....nich is dn>oid of dll&!ity.

S1ky.buddbi (P'VI'. "1""V:>}I) amtinuu:

l:Nt- 10 thai: cosnili..., Ump tNl appru 10 bt external and internal. cosnirion iI
duaiisUc, rrprdIcu of wbctber or tKII mere uc ammJ ob;cat. Hena:. rvcn ir thm:
~ encmaI objt<Cu. one mIlK admil WI .--mw:Y induda oosni~ iImst becluor
without. cocnitiw inugr. ;apprchrnsion iI impo"l'bk. And CYCII if encmaI ob;ccts do
not aile. awatmCII nrvcnhcks:i an- with thai CJCIItI.itM iroagoE /i.e.. wim an Una,:c
thai appruilO ~ c:xttmaI). Thai bci"l
c::aK'. in fnml of jWl -+w appcan (pi ,..,
ItJ. __ ~nor), 'wamJeIII is d"a'iqjc Ho ooc.u . d,,:ali";"awarcncu is tKII rai.
rather.;t ill ftI<lbIiWd
~ .,l,iuJt!uouKhcopirMrnvr beta,.:
in conwnrionll trrms., rnl minp an: ~ in accord wirh the way d" they uc
;mapnatiwiydamnincd. If !hat wen: not Ihrc-. how could the duality ;o. sillP'Jar ........cocu ~ real!

m.:

(--,..,k/t,..

Sikyabuddh.i (PVT .-"r.zo)b)

notCi

mQ

~~~

.u-IM"'"

in the rcer>on WI lqin$ ... u,.,

Sikyabuddh, (l'VT. "J""1O}b-JO.4&) abo

Dn-cndnbuddhi iI adcimai"l thr .iniUr.lIMi..

AP PENDIX O F TR.AN SLATI ONS

.07

~IX objecu:

"If thcobjm: and IUbjea do IlOl aiK, then..nar would ~ left bur
rhe IUchI1C$l of lwarmat iudP. CopUliwdy rnyopi( bcinp do IlOl 0l"'. iutc:c anydoin8 bu! doc: objciw and subjti~ cosni Lin ilNgCl. If they ....:n: to apericntt
IOII>nhinS dR, doty would..., .uchne.. l104I l llv.1 bcinS doc: cue. beinp would ~
cfFonJe.Iy libmutd. llv.r aochMII QIIIlOf Ix ddinirivdy da"erminnl doroup. inference. Fim of all. an infnmcc by way of an GSCfIlW plopu f)' KlYinS u mdcncc is
IlOI pouiblc in thar cue beg ..... its _nnal property hao: ~ 10 ~ proven. An infermot abo could IlOI rome from an dI"oct teMnc Q cvMtrn(C bcao ..... thc pacxptions
WIlC)ft-pcrttpUons mal ..-ouId aablish thc norKiu:a1iry of IwumcA and doc c:aUAl
rebtion n my lOr an infduoa: from an dfu:I an: no< ....,.bI.iohed. Nor QII one han
the kind of proof of a c:aw.al relarion mal is ddinnl doroup. the .bscncx of doc dfcu
.....twn doc c:awe is ab.enr becl\~ rhe dfea is IlOl c:nablilobai {in 101M paralkl cue
tuch mal one could nexia iu abtmcx in thc cue in qualionl. Th.1 beill8 the c:aK,
if doc non-duaJ JUChnca of doc Yopcira ill an d'fKt. il c:annex ~ -..bHshed insllummWly. The dlUlinic appearance it no< an dfC'CC .1 all bec:> ..... il is Iikc the horru
of ........i .

To dW _ rapond Q foUows. n.- IWmlCIIlI b;a~ bn made by rno.c who.

d\IC 10 docir scupidif)". do no< undrntand dlUlif)".
with the word "oubjcct. we
do fOOl mean 10 cJIm' rdIa~ awaun~ imcmal cosnilion thai ariaa in '''It.
iow fOmu JUCh Q thc pkaAnl and the Wlplc:awu-RKh thai by apratins il with
Ibe term .tub;m:" we -..ld Ix ~yi", that il doa n(K cisI. btMr. we mean the /'01Iowin& Cosnirlv-r appeataIlCft JUCh Q bill( l1l'i10 ~ alllfn;oiw IWlLmIGf, bul when
one anaIyza whnhtt IhoK appc:aranca an: tingubt or plwaI. doty aft wubIe w wido$<3Dd du., anaI)"b; Iocna. <hey aft IlOI fUChn .... Tlo.crdQn,. thac iI uhima,dy no
obi< tha, is dictina from , , _ i~r, and ainot thai 00;- doa 100' ""iso, _ ..y
theaub;ca <loa IlOl cziA; in u yins this .... mean doc lUbjca mal occu... in 0.,..,..
sioouor concepu d\a( 1Uf~ (IV.... ~,. . p~ in dcpnlda>ccon
dw lappamHly t:lllemal ob;eaJ. II in "This is dw Ial enlif)" ("" N . ny.,hhu is the
1Ubjf which apprdlmds mal object. which is doc rnl ena ry dou if COVOiza. Since
an arml and ill pariml aft c::onmuctcd in dcpmdcna upon each other. mac IWO (i.r..
... b;ca Inc! objC'CC] aft poIi~cd in dependence on e.c:h orhcr. Thf apreaioo . ...b;ea. does IlOI apmlln<'tf ~ "warenas. which iI ,he _nlw narun: of qni-

Tha, "

...... iudt. n", .:.oKm;.) "".un:.,( "'5"-i, ;.,.. it ......

in mung] ~
on lI:IIIWthin8 dR bcao01K il aNa u su.c:h from ill own a wa. 1M CMUUW n.m'l"f
of COV'ilion is oab&haI in rncrc rdIczm: ,,-=>elL Since il iI devoid ofthc ~

dacribtd objr and subjra.;1 u Aid 10 be non-dw!.

AJ il Iw been Aid:
"Thr appcarana: of bI"", rdlow and JUdo .. if doty WftC c:ncnullO ~
ia no! rnI: 11041>1tMrd"orc,;, ia Wd tU. the"".emaI doa I0OI cziA ulli ......dy.
""J1... ..... if)' ...... i Iu- ' r ' i ..........! ... I-... ,,,-, "'S"'...... ;ft ...,! . ...... ..,. d....
[apparuody a!cnul bur aaw.lly unreal objr); ulUd!, if it Wo nex ultimatr.
Hmcx, il ia dd'inilM/y damTLined lIw. apc:lia~ is nono4..... (. U"f '"
MfI . -.. JJn t.J J#
..J hJr;" liM .,..", g.~ .. Jill iJ". _ ';" ill #
fhl.. Jill..,.. liM NJ'
Jill u./rytJ,. ,. 'i 1ft' N J rit f'U
P"I
,.'" ,. Jill 1""1 ill ",u ".;,. ill ""'~ f
PJU "."J "It' ;o..~ f J.

_at'" "'1"1"

""*'
,
.
at

Since me aKIltW naNn: of awurnaII iJ established by ~

il iI nDI
me cue tNt, OM U o;wnpdkd fa admil dw all beings would on: suchnao: lif me ob;ta
IWlLm'OCSl,

and ... b;ca irna&a -.-.: unn:olJ. Thar iI. Cf'tft thoujVl doc I:IImliai natuft of IWIIrtI$

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

The nonexistence of one of the two in awareness eliminates the existence

of both. Therefore, the emptiness of duality is the suchness (tattva) of the
awareness. [PV3.213]
The definition (sarrzsthiti) of things as different is based on the difference

is apprehended as part!ess (eha medpa nyid kyi phyir= ana1[lfatvena) by reflexive awareness, as a result of its connection with the seeds of error, that reflexive awareness does
not produce a subsequent definitive determination of the nature of cognition as nondual in the way that it has been perceived (rtogs pa ; pratipatti). Therefore, even though
reflexive awareness has already apprehended the non-dual nature of cognition, it is as
if it has not been apprehended.
But this in and of itself does not establish that the cognition is not a general [i.e.,
unqualified] subject of predication. That is, the qualities (khyad par; vise!a) that one
might wish to predicate of the subject "cognition" would be duality or non-duality.
Even though these might be in dispute, no reasonable person would be able to say that
since the reality of the distinct qualities (bye brag; bheda) under dispute are not yet
determined, the mere subject of predication itself is also not determined. That is, when
"sound" and such is established as a general subject of predication, one might argue
about whether or not it is momentary; in that case, one would then use an inference
to determine whether it is momentary.
"If one cannot say that the mere subject of predication is not established just because
the quality of being momentary and such is not established prior to the inference,
then how could any evidence be unteliable by way of not having an established locus
of predication? One would have to accept that a general subject is established in all
cases of inference."
If it were the case that one could say that, then when one had definitively determined the subject, one would also definitively determine the predicate that is under
dispute. That being the case, it would be pointless to seek out evidence that had the
three requisite characteristics. Therefore, in this context one has established through
perception that cognition (rtogs ; pratipatti) is a predicate that has the quality of
being pleasant and such. Nevertheless, due to one's cognitive error, one has not definitively determined its non-dual nature. Thus, in order to establish that, one employs
an inference.
The proof statement is as follows. That entity that is contradictory to some property-svabhiiva is devoid of that property-svabhiiva. For example, heat, which contradicts the property-svabhiiva of being cold, is devoid by nature of being cold. The
essential nature of cognition contradicts the properry-svabhiiva of being dualistic in
the manner discussed above. {205a} The evidence used here is the perception of a
contradictory antecedent. Therefore, it remains the case that mere reflexive awareness is what constitutes selfless things (dharma) that are devoid of the aforementioned dualiry; it is not, however, devoid in all respects. When the Prajiiiipiiramitii
and so on cites the refutation of things being essential singular or plural, and when
it refutes production and so on, it does so in terms of the constructed nature; it does
not do so in terms of the non-dual dependent nature. Hence, only awareness that
appears dualistically presents distinct qualities such as production; mere reflexive
awareness does not do so.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS
~n

mose (i.e., the object and me subject]." If the aw:ucoCSI is crfO.

ncous (lIjWpi4IN1), men meir dilfcno:nce is also erroneous. IPVp4]

There is no definition of mings outside: of the definition of mem as cime:r

objcca or subjccu, rThosc: definitions do not uJrimatdy make scnsc;) merefore, since mings are empty of any definition, it is aplained mat they aJ'e
cssencdc:ss. [PV},lJS]
AU dlsdnaive definitions of things such as me ~tCJ arc: delimited by
activity. nut activity is not ultimate; merd'orc, those mings arc: also devoid
ofluhimatel ddinition. IPVpl6) 1I
~

is me cue with persons who have cuaraco. m05e who art by narurc
confused by ignorance have cognitive presentations (IIijliAp,i) wim false
images that arise in dependence on their fcsptive conditions. fPV).l.17) '"
16 ~ (PVP:I',.a):

TIw Mjilfi';'" (1II'f'l.mti)

.["""I' III t/;/for'ml iJ

NwJ." d. Jifo'rttn ~ " -.

'TlIa1 is, it has. iu (2ute Iht ditfdalClt bUiiCQ. objca and AIbjca. The ditfatiltC and
noodifr",uo of me copoilr...: ~ io the Q .... lOr d" Wonilion oi dunp at
difftrml and nondilfmm" If theft Wtte nDthins II aU, Ibm on wIuol buU woWd ruI
!hinp 1M: dilfMnl and not diffi:rmtll..iUwi.o:, d>e ~ ~I appta to !hiIII"
&ris&l and 10 on. That it, mrWdtt d>e caKwMrt- 1 ptiupUon mac ..... pmwr IM)t
praml Wti OCQUI; thai puapcioon io ..... dw ;1 apprd><nd.o d>e ClC>!l"iu.,,;....., oi
III objea {"'*J. AI dw tUne, d>e dojcai." cosnilion of tNI objca arixI; wbcn ;1
bteoob"dnooid of d>e appeanntt oi d>e ptiupcion oithal c:opiriC ilNf1. il;' aid
to Iuo." "a::ucd: Bul if bod! that which pcraioea ancI tNI wIUch is pticalo'f(\ do IM)t
cUt, lbm theft is no IX,apcioft 11111 ba:awe dom: II no CIOpil;'" ~ of objt
ancI aab;ea. 1lw IM:ins d>e Ce. if ia mo.u detomincd tNl aNal docs not Iuon perorption ;rs - . .

17 Ikvmdtabuddhi (PVP:.94hl rrmaJb:

Ym ifor>< ~ ~mUI ob;ecu. aU thinp (tit. .. J1M1'JIW) HiDhI"" no ddiniti<wt.

For iNDntt. !be Jmi1lniwJqilfin-.[.,.,'l us;' rhac thq_ "hape:I up": "'1M,
"1I'CpIC " - d>e mranlns of ~ heaped up: Abo d>e Imll " CXlaWoo" {1it]tJ
IItdW _ ~Iw me_ ol"thu.hlch is cnmded": "fundammcal dancnl"
(-"-' _ JIMN) .... the ICfIK of"-.ra:- of prodlKlion. AU audI definitioN _ q.......
;fwd byaaMl)' {~ in m.lhtyare JIIi..mJ .,.mw'1- Aamry is abo. M1pU'
impoAUon; lintt III dUnp ~ devoid oflCli";ty. il doe. IM)t ulrimudy aiR.
18 Bach Dew:ndrabuddhi {PVP:I~ and M~tharw!din (PV: ,J ri,) /\Ott thai the
ipIontw:t- clled here it
IlnaJHiaai iplontu. Slkyabuddhi (PVT. "J"' wsb) dd'inc!: it u
the "the imaplAu." domrmwlion of objca: and p,bjcn" ("1-""" 1M -. - ]i" 1M j ,.;
. . 1M ,.; P""K .. """ iQ:j" JMU ""'P" JMU . . . 1M .),
lkvcndnbuddhi {PVP:I~ nioea I ~u.I probkm:

me

4JO

FOUNDATIONS OF OHARMAklllTI 'S PHILOSO PHY

11K: ultimate nature of the cognitive content (in perception) is not known
by any [ordinM)' beings) whose vision is not supreme; they do nO( know
that ultimate fiaNce b:ause it is impos.sible fo r them to experiencc that
content without the elror (WplrrllA) of subject and object. (PVJ.118)
Therefore, (the buddhas), ignoring the ultimate (~ptJt,il4l4lhNirt""). close
one eye like an r1ephant't and propagate theories that involve otema!
objectS mrrt:ly in accord with worldly conceptions, (PV).219)
A color such as blue in a variegated or multicolored awareness is a quality
conringent on awareness OU_pltihi,. and as such it does not panicipate
in any other awareness [ruch as the awareness of just blue), Hence, it can-

"If. o;osnitivc P"'*'nUlUon does ROC dcpmd on In amnal ob;ca:, then..-by doc. il
oaur wnh mpca fO. rw:d ~ioa...d 10 on ' "

11IiJ iJ .110 the problem raiK'd by vu ... bandh .... , the

u-r.}.8A). ~i o&n an anrwtt

~nnillJ

of IW

Vi~,;U (V.I;

Even ~ it doa noc drpo:nd on amnal obju. I mplirivf: pracntlrion doc:. not
oc.cur in<kpc<kndr 101' cauKO ...... CIOCIoditionoJ, Rother , the p>d...ctlvc _
oS. cos'
n;.iw: pnvnr.rinn it..",.,. ~ in dw, mmw conrin ... um. That IlnIlJ the aK. il
..... in..",.,. f>pil\cl form in 1ClCXWdwith
~ofrbe ....u.bkc:ond'rion& nw
is wtu. (DharmUJrti] india!CI lwith the phrut i. """"" "I.. 1M /Mit "".,mw_
JitNoul. h iI ROC the Oi( dw thi!: &h i.e.,~. pceKIllJltion Iw ftOlftd..
all; it iI jwt dw one canROC point it oo.n br SI)'i"" "11oit ill iu ..m' One cannot If'ify the Id in this fuhion Ma.\IJt
id Iw dw ~ <If the appa=Il .mibriry
(in
':'101 <If ""_",,nU oil m.. mind.nd nwnw Kala.

me

me ".,

S ~i wvr, ''.I'C106b) for the bl3Chud phrata ruppliocd ben. ~

(.,pJ o;onunua:

"Irthe na~ oft:hc...nI cannoc br pointed OOt, lhen how doa. it m.tr'
If it ~ nonaistcnt, then sinor then: lIT no diffio,u>cu amon, tbt nonc&iJum,
all tbt con ...... tioftJ of birth, darh Ind JO on tNl arc pcrecicd of f'U'OII' wbo _ perotivcd in drums would .o br ~ of!hoM: dream penonl when one _ - - . . .
jwr Ii thtr- pncrivcd ro apply ro doc pcrJOII..no .. pua:i+in, tboeedtntn brinp.
WIw difk,ulOX """,Id there br aIIlOrI8 thex nonaittmt pcr1'Onf! E+'UI utterly nonaisl:UII "Jllilkl oudIli burm woman 'l MIn wooId be born and dif, tuM: Ii.,..;m.
penon wbwc bini. and death an: .c:aprcd. Othnwisc, the penon ""'- birth and
death arc acupad would aI.o not cUe. Het>(C, if thm: ~ ftO...nI fOr m'Of, then
<lODtU..i copirivf: appc:aranca would ROC oa;lU.

S alto ~i'l atmaM commma on du. Kerion wvr, ..,.,106I-b).

19 N Manonthanandin explains (.J riI.). an elephant', ryes;oK on the sides <If ill head:
.... n.:c, il an m..o... not to look If wtu.r iI occu.rrin, on one fide by .....pIy ibullinl one rye.
20 o.e..mdnlMddhi (PVP:,')60.-M) p.....~11 ."..."._jJJ....~

..'

APPENDIX O F TRAN SLAT IO NS

not be K'Cn las distiOC1 from the varitgarionl bccawe when analyzing it las
disciOC1) . one is focusing on the object (lin},.) [that producai the awarenc:u,
not the awareness iudO. [PVpl0J"
An awarcncu is experienced in which(Ver way that awareness appc:m."
Therefore, indeed (Nimll), the variegated or multicolored image in awareness should be simple. rpVp2.t]
If the colors of a d oth and such also formed a simple or single enti[}" then
thq should not be analytically dininguishable from each other. And when
the analyzed parts arc diminattd, a remaining unanalyzabk whole is nO(
observed. (PVpnJI:!
And what is the contradiction if many [panicles) that have the special characteristic (of producing awareness) when aggregated are not the awe of
aw;irencss individually, as is the case with the senses and such ~ IPVj.11JJ
And except fo r something being a cause, there is nothing else that could
coru:lifUie ,hal thi ng's being Ihe apprehended objra. Thai is. the apprr_
h~nded objta of "n awa r... nen i5 u id 10 be um in the image of which

awarrocss arises. (pVPl.4J

21 Dnmdnbuddhi (PVP:I ~ noxcs:

In CKha- WOfda. whm

I ~

rtr--'r) throu&h

InoWr

copIition distinpWhc:l

WI inup ofbl~ and lOCh from otM", auc:h u ,..:IJo.-lhinkin(. ThiJ is bilK:
"This is rdIow'--.thor. aNIyzillfi il in this Yi"i)'. is IlOl roauillfi on thai mullicolorlvviorprcd lwanness beauw thai IqIIRlt aHor is 1>0( of lhe IIInm of thai mullicol_
omIInricpmI awarmca. INlcad. sIM it fotwsi", M UN Hjm. In otha words. thaI
[analyUalJ lwar"""" is mwillfi..ith jwI: the objt.

Manyofct- oonunPlQl aK~~ in ManontNnandin (PVV: .J ril.l. wt-1'mlIfkI

au ckattt in this insu.noe. Sonw olhis conunenll ~ parUcuWty inrmsrins:

-,..

~ ~"S ...... bI_ r..- ""',..u-.~' ''""",,"'''pe'

liaad thaI" csuobtilohina u.. the b/w: is diIkmIl fivm the: yd~ .. is IOOuiPf on
only theob;ea--i.lt.. bI-.. the- anaIyricaI objea. AI tNt UItW. the ob;ea (1IrfIM) is
I /'a1XKe r,.,.-,.J bI~. Bu. tN. wbich Iw 1M nanue 01 ~ is 1>0( mnoce.
n-,.&'... c ..tw is anaIp.cd is 1>0( aW'UUal. And what is ~ is 1>0( anaIyud.
n..,.~

(__ ,,*,~W~ /";~"'''''''~"~

22 Read _j~fJ " for p.d.iJ.""fo/lowinS ""Ml!,iI.~.. M. PVSV-D. and Dtvmdnbuddhi (PVP:.96bl.
U Rae! bJ -{Vwliwith all ammmwit:s and PV-D.

8. Instrummtality in lIN Httubi"du (HB: 2. 1~3. 16)

Nou: In tiN immttiiAuJJ p"utiin, ~'t oftiN Hetubioou. Dhamurltirti
lNu ;"t7MunJ tM tblW uptt (riipa) nl'ffSSll"Y fl, n>iJ"," 10 j., fnU~""
thy-NlmtiJ. tIN pDlitivt ctmcttmilIINY (anvaya). 1M n~ativt to1fctlmilllna
(vyarirdca) . anti tlK tvidmn-subjt rrlalion (pa~adhumati) . in ,hal disnmi,m. Dhamutkirti IHu bmJlJ mtnriDntJ tha, ~ relations mIlS' b.t J1initivtIJ tinnmiruti (nikita), anti tIN JNUI'IKt trrInsuuti !HJow "Tns wi';' a
dimmion of what th(lI means in tm case of tlK tIIidntu-tMbjt ,tLuwn
(p;.kpdhannad.). Tbis illUis Dhllnrwltim' hi _N tmmJ torvUkratUrv ~,.
,""in, tiN dHtraatrinia ofan instr'M ..tnllll t'Of?Iition.
Concerning what has jWt been said. me "definitive determination-I [of the
evidence-subj:t relation} is the common establishment (pNJitJdhi) through
either perception or inkrence of a qwliry of the subject serving as evidence

0'"'

in the ... bjea ro be p........,n. Exa.nple. include the ckt-nmination thaI .....
is prescnc in a loau: or thac coruuuctedncss applies to sound. That is,

a
person lim o:pc:rienccs through perception a smoke-pos5CSSing place whose:
nature-swbh.nw is distinct from everything else as be:ing unique.' In that
person who has perceived that place there $ubsequendy arisa a cognition
of the evidence (liti,a";jfl41J11.); that awareness is a mnemonic cognition
(smJIrtllm) whose: object is the difference [that distinguishes smotu: from
non-smoke) in KCOrd with wh.tr has bcc:n pc;rccivcd.

In this rqard. only the initial o:periencc, whose: object is a unique thing.
iJ an irulrumental cognition.J Wllen II thing of th2f kind has been aperiI Nap (HST::lO.,) dai..... ""'1 the Icnn

,,;x.,. is only bot:i", wed meapborically heK.

2 nor, pasl aai~ paf1icipk ~OIII/JrU!lIw bren inlnprttcd in an ~ _

to tXilialc
brnki"l IhllIonJ Sarukril JmIC1lDe InfO fWO .nona eng!WlImtaKa. Thb putidc: II wed
in ia pas! KIIK in the I"oUowins 1m(Q1(e

.) Arcafa mnarks (HBT:I J.17):

nac is. the dcfin ilion of an iruuummt:ilOO&Ricion is lb.' ....... objta was IlOl ~
viowIy known and WI ..hole objta ill mearu!Of u:lie: N.naion (....kri]J). This
pmairu only co paa..... ua1 upcncn(.r. In Ibis
the qualilicalion "the inilW"
Upl"","" lbot: fan mal thai apcrima: Iw an ob;t lbat baa not bcocn prcwiowJy
known. And "..-hoIor; objta it Wliq\IC" ~ the I'a.:I char dial experiotnce Iw an

,.ro.

objoct mal io meaN lOr relie IUncrion .~ only ~ an bot: mc&nI lOr relie:

."

..,

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

eneed, there occurs a mnemonic cognilion thai represt:nts that thing's

uniquefldl with regard [0 this and den other thing in terms of whkh il is
unique. 11u1 mnemonic cognition represent! thai uniqueneu as a difftr*
enee from those other things; as such, mat mnemonic cognition has as its
ObjltM thing's adusion from thaI which it is not. This mnemonic cog*
nilion arises by the force of that perception. Since it apprehends a cogni*
ti~ im:l&C of the observed thing in the manner in which it was observed.
that mnemonic cognition is niX ilUtrumenw. This is so because, one having first SCCJI a unique thing, the subsequent mnemonic awarencu repre5tnts the image gc~r.llled in poception :as Munique M ; I't:p~cing the object
in that fashion, dut mnemonic awareness has no cognition of an object that
was not prcviowly cognized. Also that mnemonic cognition is not inmu*
mental because. since the previous perception o~ the ~rity Ihn iJ
the means for {the ~peoedJ tdie funct ion, there is no cognition through
thai c:onceprual awarenas of II prcvlowJy unseen particular that is by nature
the means for m.u (die funaion.:as is the case with inference} u "1
The reason for this is:as foUows. Setking some relie funaion . a judicious
person invenigatcs what is :and is not :an instrumental cognition. And a
univ~1 iJ nm c:a[Uhloe nf 2oI'XI)mrliJhing :ony IdOl :01 :011. for it iJ wMr iJ
apprehendc.-d by a conceptual aw;uencsi thaI. after the pcruption of:a par_
ticular, arises by the force of that perttption. An cxatnple is the concept,
"blue," thaI appears in the conapcual cognition of a person immediately
after he h:as.sn blue. For il is only thai blue-particular thaI pcrfonns that
kind of tdic function. and it is seen with that very naruf( by perception.
However, the object of the conccprual c.opiition, ~ blue, ~ that:arises after the
apprehemOon or thae putic uhr docs noc poertonn the rd.k fWKtOon which
mould be accomplished by the color blue.' Ther~fore, ~n though it is

,,.._!""

tUt.aion. [whoi' I,; m'*~_ ~~",.", r.

~~,., I ..J "~;Nui Uff. MJ-o ;'7
,,;}'oA_tMl,., .~u,.,
.:w~ .. ;t> _4. ' ,) ! .4-_""o-t_", I
! ' 11)01 .

.,.$ "'" ....16.<:-:1",

....
...

.,*1,

...v...tMI~ .

(HBT"1.ll-d.l) points OUt. ink.u.c.c ( _..; q rnml~ u a counwnarnplc. In OIher words. inkna iJ ilUttUll'lC!'lQ/ bcawc it docs inYOM rM c:osnibon
of lOiIMthin& dw has noc ~ bun ~.

" N

S ~ P- ,,;t' t ' A;LJ....,;.r. ~ ~ fine inMaru of .... {i.r.. 1IiJ. _ _.)

is supplied from dw Tibnan tH.u}. Ho-r. HBT u p
. ) rada only .jle~m,.L
Thi. R:IIdina oecma ptch...blt:.
G~ .f. .t..IM

\(7' '.Ij'~

ro.

i. ~ CO similar conKt\IClIons In I'VSY (~" .

+i"!+c:M'r]sho II~").

...

FOUNDATION S OF DHARMAK\RTI 'S PHI LOSOPHY

said, ~ an instrumental cognition has as irs obj1 a thing that has not yet
been cognized: one should add the qualification, -in casc the particular has
not been cogniud, But if the pan icular has been cognized, the conccprual
cognition that arises by Force of that previous cognition in correspondence
to the image lof the obj1 in perception] is only a mnemonic cognition
because that [perceived thing) is irs object only in tenns of that conceptual
cognition's df1 [which is to induce action directed toward the particubr].
!u such, that mnemonic cognition is not instrumental because: [II there is
no cognition of a real thing that has nOI yet been cognized; and (1) the
determination of a cognition as being instrumental is based upon rcaI
things. This latter reason is the casc becawe the activity of persons who are
intent on the [desired] rd ic function has as irs object a thing that is capa
ble of that tdie function. and a real thing is dchned as that which is capa
ble of lelic function. A further reaJOn why this mnemonic, conceptual
cognition is not instrumental is aOO mat one acrs upon a real thing through
that conttprual cognition by imagining irs obj1 lo be the panicular, (The
conceprual cognition uill guides one to the particular) because when one
acu, Ithe obj1ion of the conceprua1 cognition] has a coherence and continuity that is not different from Iwt previous object of] perception!

6A1eap (HBT:w ) PIlI! r ~ ~RIIt ,.. ,.,.tdnJ..~ / u.,.. 11"11 ,...t.'r~

'1U'I/f'OJII " ..._".. ",J".J""~ til.
7 A1ea~ (HBT:" ..) oIfm tM following commmtl!

me

"Sw if d\rou," thai imapnaIDredeu:.milUlion (~. penon aca on jWl

mlthi"" dxn whT do you noIlikcwM odmil thai , tina: thai c:onapc..w coplilMKl
ill ~ 1(1 be: apprrhmdins ~ dw has noI ~ boom cogniud. il Wo has
iu own dislillCl inwwnmt:ality'"
[Dlwmakinil AJ'I. "&u_ """'" _ _ on fwI the ptlnicular, thai ........ tr..w
copIitioo . . II ,.tUi""iIJ ttNI .... " I.... ~ W I ;, iON 4iJfrrmI ft.", dw II""
",riM. namdr. the 'lisuailWalU'ial," H~
fJ-tcJiII obc:ainmmr (/qr it
ddined it !he adwion ~ ollll ob;ea thar has /101 betn obained br (/ql
p"rcqllion. C,1IIi" ..i l7 (~ mnru mainlmana. ddined II
tontinuana:
(,.".."..,..jof that tdie function. ~r of whieh!htrt' it nondilkmll conrin"uty and
cohcrma: is ailed such [lot .. !he compoIllKI is. kbooll'rihrl, In thit rtpd. tM con
eqxuaI toptirion has a oohc:l tllOt dw is /101 dilkm!r from !he nonconapruaI peraprion bca.1IK it imaJina il.J ob;m to be: tM partiaIlu. II Wo has nondiffutnl
continuil)' bca.1IK, II if ~ had acted du.e 10 the visual pnupcion. abo wbm ant IICU
dUl' 10 rbe cou/Xptw.i tGpIition, one..:u ....-. JUSt the partiaIlu. fJorJ u_ ~
~ - . . , ..... 1*rtIflU1tI
uthJ" 1-'*"pwJ1dIl,.,n
.,.
~ ,,.o..l prlwJo;o.,...,. Iti... ;,; -tJI'6'" j,; " ' I rib.. ,.....-,-.. .. ,/
~ ~".
,rtt".,~ tIiK.M~Mi"""'l'P""""~1 I ~ .,..".". ~

.....4"."'...

me:

me:

,'."!'fU

"I""

APPENDIX OF TRAN SLH IONS

..,

~"~J.OI "..,ti~ I ~ ~""!fIM~!'4'f' ,.np4t.-", I

.M;,,/MII ~ II1Jni III ,.~ 1_. MJr.1I-JII "im/w""wJ.~M;"1N
~ . -.t.. ..... !" , '1:Joo- !; '.~ I _M,'~ ~ """_"""'j'u,.u i_ ",Ir~.,i
1W~!'4 ,..,. ".~ I

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p~ of an edited or trmdated work.. )

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M(fa,..-.t4~Tlland M~IIIU4~

In MIlIihytl"ulll6lJittATIl JNlT C".J,"Itirri. "~" tihh4i". Ediled by

"7

418

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

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[Dharmakirti]. (1964) The Pramarzavarttika ofDharmakirti. Translated by
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FOU NDATIO NS Of DHA"MAKIRTJ 'S PH ILOSO PHY

IDlwmakirtil. (199la) Tshad mA nurm in1rJi 'trr/~ I- PVSV-DJ. TlUSIated by Subhumri and Dgc ba'i blo SJ'OI. 8mn Dur. Sde dgc: edition.
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Wwcruchaften.
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AjliJllllltllrtrlt.rt.IlIIh4rmlJttIlrll!iltil!i'/H'J:fiuln4thll",. Edited by Svimi
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[Dh;umakini]. (2000) Dhllmutltirrl 's PrIlMll!Uwlmilt.. A" A""IJUlr~"

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Ou,'"

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IDh.armoIt2l'll]. (19912) Rip pll'; Ih;p JUI'; "D" eMr fre/ pll f NJlJIIbitulM!iIt4j. Tr2IlsLated by Jftinagarbh2 and Dh.armilob.. Edited by
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in/

(DhumonanJ . ('99Ib) T,hAJ mil nllZm p.r n!n JUlI

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4n

FOUNDATIONS O F D HA IlMAKIRTI 'S PH ILOSOPHY

Dignag:a. h99lb) T1Juul nul JlIm 1m Imu pill' 'trtl pll l_ Prllmli~mut
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(GautamaJ . (1912.- 19) Tht NpJ" SUmu bfGIIUtAnuI ",ith 1M BIuJuII bf
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UMnagarbhaJ. (1987) SatytJdlNlJilvibIM,;:1I. Edited iU\d translated in Eckd
(1987).

Jliinu rimitra.

(1987) ApolulprllkllTII!/1l. In jiilinlliri",itrilnibllntihillil/i.

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s. Parna:

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V~a.d :

&yJdlllI Bhir,lIi.

(Karl}:lkagominl. (1943) PrllnuIt;lIIlNlnriltiUtNlvrfflpltli: Actl'J" Dhamtaltim&

PranuI':fllmrii4", (Sv4rth4mmwNljNlricrlN"4) SlItIjNljfUtvrttJillGtmlli4-

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Kumarilabhana. (1898) Mim4lf1SiJhltllvtIrriltlllfl N ilthiiAtllntrlipaflltllntraIrimlltpdnhas4rlllhimiJraprll!/ltII)I>1 NJ4JIITllmHllfdlthytty4 VydlthyllJ4nutlltll",. Edited by Rimuimi Tailanga. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Scries
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WJilJllralnAkllrll " of PilrthllUrlllhi Milrll. Translaled by Gaoganltha
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19081.

11l8L10C RAPHY

" l

Kumirilabhanll. 11990) Mimi'!lS4f/oiIlWrriJUl", SWllritll",i/rllprll(litAy4

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Kumirilabh.a~ (199) SbJltlllNirttilt"", Srimilquinhtu.irillhjmi/r""jrMilll]fi
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frau
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usro

Manoramanandin. (19)8-40)

p,."mA~lNirttiltllvrtti

In Dharmakirti (19)8).

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Index

Due to the fm:Jucncy of meir cil1lUon, me worla of Dharmaldn.i, Dcvendrabud

dhi. and Sikyabuddhi are nor lined in lAc indo:. For major thcmQ, iH the I1Ibk
ofcomenu,
A

.MlN.. ~ nonexmml referent

Abhidhmna typOlogy. V=Sl. ~

Abh~ (Vuul.ndhu).

z! 81. 109087

UIn,* 5 inll:ntion

s8nl1 tis n}7

"".t.o AMiJIM_hIMo<

II~,

Stt tu.biruuion
absux cion

AMiJh.mwko"'~
(V"n.~ndhv)

u applyinr; 10 both luh;ect :one!

precl ia~. Is6nl}, H9
and causal charactttisria.,

on a[>~heJuion of mliry,
19 10l1S

on bcginningkasncss. I n!
on congIomer.ued partida.
79 o }1
on lunna as uaruem pirical,

17!=7}

and COfI(leJM formation, 197--99

of propenies. 2i! ~ li l., 119018,
100-101, Hs-..9

and

l)OnI}

on momcnrarinuo., 80<0"

JI...bhi~ 110,

.11)=11 .

)06

abstract ptcdicah~1

on prim..,. cause' and supporting

condition, 16S0}7
Sauuintika theories in. ll1n.I2.,

as not baring qualities, z! !!Z

:u not diJtina. from particulan. !L
!Jb IS901l, 171-7J, ~

59"'}. 79n}!, 8onJ9

Sn .ts. abstraction

on 5eruC pclaoption, 14ftl}. 196nl

on ICnR Iphcn IMnicuJan. 79n}8
:as JOUf'Ce for AbhkUwma
fYPOloIy. ,8nll
1WU.t,.~ and MmA1f]"U",!", in,

accidcnta1/cucnfial diRinctxm ,
11111-91, 100, 1111-11

Sn MJs. nccasity
:Kcidcnal properties., il

"-

action (nTytl)

equated wilh wbjfive aspea or

awareness, 171
in U,."g 'fI'u:m. !Z=!!z lQ, 161,

on noo tttlitics. 40=41. IS!

ultimate raliry in, !l::::h
A~~phll.lilnhtt~hytl

.'"

(ydomitra). IZ!!!!
."

+40

FOUNDATI ONS OF D HARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

meaning in compound
1SC}-6o, 161. 17<4

tmhUriytI.

AlA:UJiiJM_n.. SSft.4. ) 14

~ (Kampab). )16D6
(II,.1ffII1II6,. aUo "analcJsical
induaion"). lJ11lO, !M. 146 .
' 47n6

ana1o&Y

!'dation 10 i rutfUll'"lml. JQ, 1In .16,

4t;O, 1!.t 170""11
Sir .Jw activity; practical action
action of knowing r,,.,,,iti: ,rIl1ffll) .
,8-19. l.Cl. 4HO, 1!

anal,."iJ. In.:b of. &t kvcU of

analysis

aaiv:nion (prtl..,rri)

analysis. f'ftIuctive. SN f'ftIunive

of a cognioon in which

me

accomplidunC1'11 of ooc', pi
appe1r1, 1'-4, 166, t.8o. 190.
)Ion"

of an ilUlrument2l oopUtion.
16sn140 181-89

activity fiN",",)
aW2l'C1lQS 11 primary baor in,
161. 16s-". 161, lAo. )lrI..
as d.irt~ to panicubn.I.tn4"
111 ~ "14"1

as dTta ofilUltummt2l cognition.

161, 116. 16;.-Q, 110. 119.
lB-IJ9, 19" , ~
as guided by dctaminate

cogniliol1l, 16ft1. ~ !!i. }16

as mocivated by inderaminatc:
ptrcqxlon. 191-JOlI. }86
ob5lrua~,

and ilUlruJnC1lwity,

1Is-17. 191.}81
as prompted by pis. 16n1, 4":19.
ll~n98,

IS'

aaivalion; prxtical

~m",

~""* Sir &Ix dctmnin..OOn

affirmation (rN/hi). lQ., !!!.!!1.

analysis

&t.dflc:unc:ss
.tuIuul. 5 mulliplicity
6JIw,jlkJttlJlfJ.. Str Epiltcmic
MJIIltJfl611.

ldealiun
tUtU"',.,J. ... Str intanal
dill'onion
antiralism. B ~ 101. ~ )l1
6JuuNl,..,

Str iNcrcn

...".&Whi. Strnonptt.... ption

Str diwibudon
tUt",.,.lf7l/1ri. Str concomitance.
611",.,..

P"'''~

1llIJ'I'"

Sec .,.".~

Ilf"h.. See .y.h.t-thcory>;

ad......

.,w-""'",

u bucd on the narurc: of things.

!!Ll6a.
and c:oruuuaion of lWMb.,
IS6=rz. 19S. 197:2t
ncptivc and J*itive
imuPfetlltioru of, 111ml. In-,s
role of erro r in, 14O:1J . }lt,
}16nlt}

1f1J11J
ip __ Sir lCrip<un

and s:amcnca of dfca, 119-16.

1f.m4k"Jlbrll--- Str ICriptuni

StalUS of universals in, 1181

iUbjeaiw faaon: in, 114- 11. J1)

inkrrno:

I SI-6o. )1J-11

agent (hmr). !Z=!!! " H I , 401nlS

agent of knowing (,r.1fI4t:J), !Z::!!t

JUmmary of, 116-19

iMl. 4.11n1l
agrcpllon (,.",wU}tI: ,.",~.
SN ;nhn; ....u..:o! ~
~ Str cognitive image

thrtt

andnwMl~. !Q!

wa,. of ODlllUUin" !l!:::ll

Udd~'. ~ti.qUC' of,

l v-lI

5N.b. COO"'"'I""O; .,.duo..... ;

uni~

INDEX
appearance {jmuiMiM, pr.rilti",b.).
StrcognirM: irmgc
appIicalion (II"~), .scvidcnccIubjm: !'da,ion
l,tIl. SN ctcdibiliry
l,tII'" SNcm:libiliry
Alcala, '1n4J... nnl. 411n}. 4l)~.

"''''''7

..,~,.
In,.. Str imputation

nh.. SN PUrpoK

mated '0 goals. -4!S6 60,

178--79. 111- 81
role in concqH formation. 111ft9...
l}4lU)l. 16oftl9. I]0n04S. ,J+4- 4S .

J.46. JS4. n6
td ie function . 1!: I". IS6-60.
164. 171-19.111. )7 6
rwo ~NeI of. 11'-'0. '71-71
uniYenals u \adO,,!- 81n.. 1. 86nSI

;u

91=94- !!1z

~ rcausal d'ficicncy-; - ,die

dIicacy-; - tdie function "}

wgnition in which the
accomplilhmcnI of ont"s goal
(~lIi~).

!il! l!!..t }<46

.rth4piuri. S p:SUmption
.rwlrJ.rIill. Sn onlinalJ' pcno!U
AJmga, )16n6
l/rqt.ptIrill'{1'ti Sn foundarional

ISS. IS9. 17J-76. 180. fl6-79.

transf'onm.don
Asvabhlva. }16n6
.6",,* Str supttK!Uibk ob;t
6ri'~I" Sn OVttCJ:tcruion
ImIiUL !in self
l~ Sn sdf-dinging

conpnw a~ as tomning

6tyiU1U,.rWq.... Sn tramoempirical
obj<a

appean

17,....... 117-190.197. }1I.

};o,. }80nI6
cognition of as mark of

)n.

uusrwon hincs:s (.nh41rriJlsmiri).

",

w poueu. ' ,I-o. }4I . }47-...s

AI criterion for knowkdgc. til.
Is6, )11- 11, )'6 . .. I)
as critmon for thc real, .Sft64,
-,-n. ' I ~I .

')-&6. 1]0n04} .

19Jft7 ... }]S. ~ .. 1.4

and Episcm-oic ldeilism. j80

apccted (,lIlhi_uin""!rriJl). !i..

~ U]--' 9 ,

!H, ~ 116, 1,]nl.4,

~ ~ ~ 101, 111, l S6.
2.\11..... 1, 116. 2.119, )11, J.47.
)n, }]Snl.... }Ion16. )9S . ..I)
f:W.c appcuanca as bcki.ng.

m.

2J1--1f. )91
and infcfen. !M. 196--98. )10-1)
;u mark- of particulars. 8)-4 iL
2L 116, Ill. 390. }91

as mere causal dftcicncy. 116=60,

of. 16.. f7nn. }9)n}

6111U/hi, Sddimittr
61VJ6vin. Sn whole.
6tN Sn ignot'ancc
6ttiNl!biIl/l,.iyfttu. Str ruk of unx
companied non-aming
6viu",1JtIJ... Sn tRlnwonhinC$l
6l1Jilbhidr&. Strcvidcncc. rdiabiliry

of
6~tII,r.ml"..phJ&

Sn irutru-

mental effect. unmcdiatro

;u caU5llly dlicicnl, In-?6

:u inlnltio...J,
!S4n~7

l!.

as primary l'xtor in action.

161-:6;. 163. 199. JlJ--8.4
:u undiffi::r~rllia(cd, Ii! 161ft66.
163--71.)St . ..06-11

&r.Ju cognili'lt image-; cor.ctpu;

27J, 17S- ]S

:u flO( WlilNotC. )9l--9J

pcn;cptibi1,ry AI m,niaW

authorial intent, :i=Z

rdlaM: awarencu
~iry

axio~ wna: ..... 141--1"" 19'8.

JI 7- 18

FOUNDATI ON S OF DHA1MAKIRTI 'S PHILO SOPHY

natufe-lfJIIbhilltf and, 167-Q, 170-

!li! !li

as nell separate from !hings

~...uI&

&>t E:J:[ttfU.] RnIiun

bepnningkss imprinl
(.1IMIiIlllud). S imprinl
beginningk:unc:u. !. 140--41. 161, 1 9~
Bhatt, Govudhan, l}n1O, 16n19.

"""

W .... S exUlenl !hing

Bhinvivtb, Inl
~WIIl",.. &>t wnmcss. of
diffaena

.s

Mml"ti
ermr
Biudeau, MadeI.n ...., .8n. o, 91n'.,
10ln74
&Jhk"ryi...lJln (Sintickva), i.,

,,,,

Bronir.hom. Johanna, }Snp.

."""'"

aUlhori!)' of, I}Ml

as ignoring the ultimare 10 Ic:ach
brillgJo 110 41U
as not employing reuonintl SO-SI
pragmalism of. }14-1 ~
as kring the: trarucmpirical, )OS
buddhahood. ~ 4S-1l
Butun~lgtl . KlaUl, 161\4, )6n47

C
Cabtt6n, JOK, ,)n4
Candralcini, rr. )61l.4i, S4n}. )16n6
capacil)' (,JIotIt4; /Ilk,;)
of aggug:alcd partKks 10 produce
a....artnall. 10M. .J96nl
of caUJal compln:. 16)n)4,
~n l OO

of iruuumallal cognition 10 make

one altain a goaI. l.86-I7, 111,
!!L }I}.}SI
of iruuumtnial tOp'Iilion to
pmdua. ddinitivc
dcielmin.:uioC'\. 194. )v. )7Ift!4

~Ives,

!!z

propmy-nwbh.b.r~.

176. lIL

H7. },tinl
ClUAI compln: (~1PIIIfri)
compkte (~~mqri). 180.

ll'

inoomplete (viJ:aJi MtNM1NItri).

16sn}8
narnre-nwbh.illtf and. 161~. 170.
17Sn.ti. !ilr 199. lQl
participation of aggrq;ucd aloau
in. 103-) . 10!. 108n. <>o
caUAI cfficirocy. 5 .nbdriJi
causal poc.trllial (1.Jrri)
capaci!)'
ccnainry (lIik9"), }n6. 16n4. !lit
lO6098, 191ft!16
S .Js.definilive detamination
caulion (";MIII). 86nn. i.L 97n68
S .~ momentariness
orr.. S nrkFlion
dass-sign (j4ri). St-t univeruJ
cognilive im38C (~T'" ,rni/,;mlN.;
,,..tiMb.; also appo:arancc;
conc:qxual image 0)

.s

as hom rnI and un real. 2Q, LI.6.

119=11
and conceptual ilhl.lion. ~
construed in Iemu; of I ncption,
94/'64. 116-+4. }40
correspondence: with pmkubn.
100-111.

u.a

ermneousl y coruuucd as ounmental objccu, M. 141 41.

116n}, 177n9}, l iS, ) 4. ).40,

,..6-47.)96. 401- 14
and wor in conceprua.l tOp'Iilion,

t!. 61l117.18)nl07. )11. HMl

"...,

ill

irurrnm(nt oflmowledge, 1710

.. m~nl.1 p&niculu. t!!t 116- 17.

!!2: UL

) 11

.,

INDEX

and pc.cePlu.aI illusion, .1~

as produccd Ihroogh panKulm..

........,. u. U:2:. 1611

5t't Jw awarcnc:u: conapu;
objcaivc image: subjrivc imag.:
~nl:aria

reuoru for rdiulce on, 1:1

ccr.ai:Jb~n8 or tno:!i.ion:al, 7 - 11 ,
lP:- ,:}, ) 19-10

$I)'k of rcuanill! in, 1::L )10

commonsense: objccu. 6t-79
companli~

philosophical

roda,VOi'$. 117- 18

mmpassion. S4n), 66.. lu- J6, }19

mmpktc cr.URImmpkl.: (JllUU
~-zri). S cr.wa1 (OII\pC:.
compklc

moapu
as Cfroncow, it 61n17. !..!2.
L+O-4 J,

1.1'.

119

as mcnw images, n 9=,I. 117--19

as nol taking me u1limalc as an
objca. l2.. i!.! )01, JS4
as 001
14n1S. iQ
as objl of infcrmce. ~!11!
lS(H:l . )06
rc:baion w the real, It 4Sn6+. Z!.

"vid.

'f. ' IrH. " 9=,.

l 57n1S. 1]'Oi\4J. )00=)01.

S pcrttption, col"lCq)-

nul
co ndWiion (IJipmA....... also
"5ummation1. )4tI.4S. )S0-4S
conconuuncc
infm::nccs involving only nepli.....
(1trWI~"",tirrh";. H0-4S. !:Q:i=:!
inr,,",_ involvi"s on.,. pot.ii;....
(1trWI14..,.vi"J. JSR.4S
need for cxampla 10 (SubIWt.
19=11. UYi 8

nqlli"" ("",nrrU). 11-19. )1OJ9.

'48nll. ~ 1u01 04
ontolopcr.l Nsis lOr, j6n67
poiilM: (.IJ"""~), 1I-1,}, B

,I.

l!

as uansblion c:hoicc, lBnJ6

S Jw rndcnce-plcWalC rdation
conditioning (-bh]i.uJ. S habiiw,
,~

JOj, jll=l-4

I'ormation of, 9va6+. u 6-16,

1u;6. 169-", 197=1OI, !Q:t.
p .l. )}Hl
illusion and. 1:z::::H
kvd.t: Of onkn of in Dtwmald"i's
thoughl. 199-101
as mcnJai COnleill. lon1O, 11jn1l1.

"11>9+ .......

p,.,,~).

)I~I"

j8,
Sec abo .""".".-chcory; cop!ilin
image: dcfinidw detcrm ination;
uni~

concqxual cxlcnoon. SH. 6.l

S.k. dU,";b."Oon
conccprua.l perception (lIluikJ,.u

confusion (~. W\1. dn.Il,

61016. )7)n17
conlal (!rWM1)II). 4$ ...... 9, ~ !l:.tr
Is.nlS. !!i. ,.snS9, 1S9-60. 19S.
j04. ,d.}86
conti ngent reality. 5convuuional
reality
conlinuity (_,,~. 5dililrlbulMm
convuuion (~rMhb..
~pI"/UUUIM),

19n51. liI=='!ll!

PI_u. 1s.nsl. ~n I 67. ,..6-47.

no. ) SI
!in.Is. conwmional cop!irion;
con""ntional rulicy; PfaCtic:al
action: scmanhc con~ntaon
con""'n.in""l cogni.inn
(U",.,rijMIf4" sl",.",.). 87nS4.
)01-1. H9, )81

&t _I. convcnlion: convcnlional

rali'1
con""nttolUl pr_""!"'- 5
iNtrumcnl orknowlcdgc. convencional
conventional reality (u"'~

444

fO UNDATIONS Of DHAlMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

prlljfiAptislll; abo - contin~n(

reality )
boddlw tcathing in aord with,
Hns
of di5tributtd cntitia; .ih 76-]9.

!..U. 16?-zo
kncrwtcdp: and pen:eprion within.
J4- 1I

levels of anaIpis and. 61=-64, 61-61

oIlNbhi.... 19)--96. 19' 99
tdie: function :u. J91
of UOMBaU. 811l.41. 114=11. )91,
191n}

Vuubandhu on. 40-=11, "...,so

s,.,. lib. C'Onv.rntioornJ.,.,..,ition;

realities; Kmanhc con~ntion
coprcsence (s.JJ.rMt.h.a: abo-cotwO

oa:um:nce-), 1InJ6. 19n}l. }In}8.

""

co-n::fuuuiality, u 8nl0+ 12.8mI9.

1+1=41. J.46--.t7

..... ,a:. lu"""lc. (-,ol"*&iIW_). .u..

116

Sn-Js. il\SQUlll(nl of~

correa perccprual j~1

!J"u,.I,."".JJ.;'..

,..
pelttp-

definitive &termination. as

luai judgmem
Conens, Andrew. S901)
coumeraampk
( ...UJJ.~II(j. ~ 1110104

Sn- Js. eumpIQ

as prompting action. 1910116 , }u..

"'".

as 'Ubtcquenl petccpnw judgment

r".".;,.,,,,.w.;;,.,,,,,"J"i. lL

IS7n1S. usn). 117-')09. )11

delimiter (.. ~.
-'imil,,). !.!L
118nl0,., ~ 160011
delimiting quality (1I~.Jhi). t)6nl)).

.uo

.....,0

desire ro know (ftjtwU). 161l.4.l.4Dl,.

188n6}. J19

.s .Js. doubi

dctam.im.te cognition
("iIc~rillJ<lJ")
C'Onfon..ins TO ....... ntic
conventions, 17J.n4.4
tkpendenl on mental conditioning.

,&,.oS9
nernn.y rault of an inArumcnt of
knowkdg<. <Z

SN ~ conccpu; ddinitive
dclcn ..i".. uu..

detenninatc oontent. 16nl, LO.I

ilh.mw. Sndcln('ntai qualiry; praii-

cue ro be: pl'Om; propcny

,u",,,,...uu,

Sn- predicalc-

apra:slOn
J),.rMIlukil.. 4 .

Sn pn::d.iatc-

apfUSlOn
~mli1l.

Sno Jubtt

or a plOpotJdon

Jh.nrcillkit.u" Sn lubjcaaPresllOn

Col:. Colk'll. l09n'7

cn::dibility (ipWlJJC). l}HS. )61-73
craiibility
crlibk: penoo (iI";'

.s

o
debale , L.!l! l}l-n. lSI
0.: Bitt(, Jan, SJD-4
ck6nitM dctamirulion ("nu,.J
as a;mditioned by minckiqxndcnt
(aaon, ~ 19.....-9S.)O<H. 40Irus
ilUUUmentaliry .nd. 117-309. )11.
)z8nl", }l6, }l9. +11

Dhannonua. !, 11101IS. 168nn.

11.fl191. 1711 n9", 179. )010167,
}ISnISI

diA\orcnce io nanm

(SNbhi"",~,

ill
Dignlp
on craiibiliey, Ub!, )61, )6J--64

ailial ofNyiya Kntoe

mcory.

l)nU
o n definitive determitutions. )01-1

on

etTQC.

'7nS.

on the inltnUMnU ofknowltdgc.

.,

INDEX

l.6l
on pankulan (nwlc"t*!MJ. II-fh.
11, '4S-4',

of the Jdf. .wn61. 191

lOI:ericMogy as progrcuiYC rcjecrion

or, 61-61

Y.1a ) 97"4

on ,,..,,u!'4bbiu. 1M 19
problem of induction and. !.i!
on rdlaive I~. 9OnS9.
1]6n9), l~J
o n ..... _ _

of innnomcn, .lind

dfca, Sf!. 167, 170

and .,.,n, 18nH
Uddyoaakara'. critique of. 19n)8.
1)7=}8

on lhc ultimate as inexpressible.

80
on unlversab (IAtdltJ""""~),
11-1). j6nl~ !!1. 199
on whoks. ,9nJ4. i!. lo}nn
Set' abo P,._!;'4U"'N~
PnuNl!flUilMwrltJilvrtti
dim-wined penon (_~).
l1lnlll . )04--S

dispoIition
;u

tattor in concept fonnllJon , III,

114=11. !1!. I~S9

~ u . 16 nl,

t!. 1J4n47

rttmcmcnt and. J18

.df-dincing as. 60
dUpoJitioNl PI'Op("y. 17'9-10
Stt tdu accidC"nWlcumtw
distinaion: IlCaity
diAribufion (. I f , ,' abo

;u

+l=1 h

z!::::::!!

Stt tdu unillCr1a.l: whok

doulx (M"u",.)
at

prompting ;oaion. ' ? ' . ' ? :!.n117.

as prompting iDquiry. 16n4,

Il8n6}. lSI
diminaled by ttrtai.nay. 1Jn1.4
miJ.lading cviden and. 106n9l.

Dravid. N.S., J6"41

hllJL Sn SUbsWKC

O..yfw.c-.,.
lIonl9
on caution. 971168
on commentary. ln l4
on the ddinilion of a , rlllNlf.U,

IS4"49
on the iruuumcnulity of

pcroepuon. )OON4}
on the plK1I: ofDburrWtini in
Dsc lup pa. education, 1n}
on Slkp Mchos kbn, 9n17. M..

,...,.

on the scak of anaiysia. nnl, ss.

~ 6ocz<J, IsnSI
on Tibcun Yinn of un~ u

-conti nuity-; -Q:t(fUion-)

permanmt, 117nll 7

abient in the u1limardy re:aI. ~

zl-II
as apparently required by
l.IInK''''''''' n.. 80. IO'_IOJ

;u

117=111, ~

on naNialing n"Ic"t*!'4 and

Mi"u"rL.~~

hll4s

t/milfl& Stte:amplC$

~ s,...1"'""'1"ii:>k 'hinS

dualiay. W'} . ti!. l9nsz. 401nJ}.

as c:onscruaed. !!z, lQl. }11

critique of. J7=.41, i!. ~ ?l-II}.
.!J!, I"rzo, H9-f1, m~

and isnonncc. 6c:::&

of rxptioru in conc;qmuJ
..... co ~" . t<tn6<t. 116-19.

spatial. lanponl or coooeprual.

406nJs. 407nJS. 401

Stt.u. cn.ra-mental objc:a
~h& Snsuffrnng
E

" 1-) 1.

IlY16. 1)1- 19, 1f7n1.4. !l!

Edod, M . D.vid. 71n)7,

l S'Il4S

IjO~

...6

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAIlMAK1RTI'S PHILOSOPHY

df"ttt-cvidcnu (Urytthnw),
~ 188-91. 108nloo, 116

I p.-j) ,

u lruubtion for wwMl""" ,610)0.

l6,.njS. 1~101 , lll-17

SntW.(Y~

IIlI4MtlIlil,'lflilMNDJ",

U lraruialion for."".,,,, J.4}

production-mode of
rIrt.,,,,IJtIJJff_rYjulfL Sn
judgmcm of 5:lmC:na.J
n..ul. s..,. .implicity: .in....larif)'
Strsimpliciry; linplariry

t'.w....

ekmcntal q.wity (Jh.~ alto -de.mmwl hing1, ~ rr, s8m1.

I1I\.4S. 14Onl '9

empiricism. 2..4J~ 150- "'.

EpiHe-mie I<kaIi.Jm
alw .bn .,.

(t,nj~pri..wr~

-..0, ,;pll

,.~ .",TO<

.....IIIMj~
criliqUC of pu u ptjon on. ,1S-17.

'"

definition of 1i. 6001...

ncithcr-one-nor-manyarr;urrw:nu

and, M,

nO=I)

rdkxivc- ilwatmat and. 1n

smK

fl9'

objtcu u rtd ooblt (0 mind

Realism 10 . ~
68::69, n., z!, ISnSI. i2.
lrunwonhineu and. In-80
oS Ills. bds of analysis; YogIcln
ExIC"tml

trror (Wml"ti; 1I,.,t.1JiI;

.,;,.riujIU1III; 1II)/4N)
oo~ . !rh. I.no!.!i..
140=;1. )Ol, JIl-I ... .uC>. 14r.8
inmuITIe-nw coptil ion u rompat
ibk with, 117n7.14 }11-1".

m-80
nona:tRlXpfl.lal.

'7=19. JIS-17. )14.

191, )96-411
progrm;iw: rdi.JllItion of through
the- K2k of analysis, n-;.
JI1-19
~

;DCl:pras.ibk. }S4
u undiuribulod, n6
Sec also IWIW,.., U 1Uo1llfeU

_W~

aKncdama&. JS9, }60

essenlwism. ,1J=14. 11~7. J71

essential n.1ll1rt (wtlM4IJ11;";;p.).
Sec wtllM4""" U natufe-SWMws.
essencial propeny. 2l! 116, In- ,.
.... OJ }9. !.Y.. 171D41. ,11='1. 100.
~ 1 !r.I . 4Q 7 "' ~

Str If.iIIJ accidcnWiessenlW

distinction; na::asity
mdmoe (hm,;lilfpl.: p~
WlMM)
uomainmmlof. 19}. 196
deKription of. 16-u. ~ !!1
incompalibilif)' wilh theoon tr.&dictoty of die prcdiale- 10

be prown (sMIhJR,,;~

in . ~

shifi from

~"U

notioN concaning. ;t, i!,

lli 16n7
SN.IM m...ion; inlernal
dinortion; spurious puuption

u t-uo
onTOlogical basis for, 96n67. lSI
rel iabiliry (.IIJ4~I1r';of.
of lhe IImJeI, ZL 1 )01\11
thrttfold (~,;p). JSI\.4S,
~,,,,_~.

'S0=5'

1"7" 9

forms of. 11ld]

Str .Js.Jdfca..mdcnce; 1IItIf1N....
IWO

"""'""

~-pn:dica~ rclalion

(I1Jtl!ti:

also -pnvuion-)
dc.cripcion of. '1i--I1. l!. !!1
atabIishcd through a single obscrv,J.lion, lOll
and identity.mode of mewwMtl".",.rilNtNilM, 101-11
U DOl established through mut"
obscmllUon and nonob.crviilion.
1t'l::U , !!!1. l}S-)a

and problem of indua ion, 1iII-:SJ

44'

IN DEX

and production-mode of the

1IIJI1JM.,.",.tiIMNIh.. 174=11
~ .ls# c;oncomit2JlCe; ruk of
unaccom~ied non-uisinl
cvicfence..subjca m alion
r.,.Ir[.Ivr",m~.: N""",,' abo

application"). H-H. J5~S, ,,11

_ _ ,_
r'""

( L..~,.u

-:1.-'

,,414. ...""' . sl.o

. '

"cumplificarion'1
JlCCCSIi[), of in inference-for""""
l!Cll
&,
.Js.lXIWlll:ra:ampk;
5upponing example
excluded mary (1IJbrtU), 80-81 .
l2I. ~ I)QflU.~, 11I-n, !.H!

171f1+4. )119
ezdusion (VJllIIJTfi:~)
at abttraaion. !..2Z
u bucd on unique: particulan. !!L
!.!it ~ ~ 170. 19s--96, J)9
:as both real and unreal, 1l'l=lO.
)9sn8
aJ ~ "'ppann(C, !!L
Ill-H. u!. ~. H7
as idcmieallo UUII which is

,,,...

adudcd {1IJl",""J. Ill-H.

:as mere ezduding of other

(.1fJtI/!dM-J, Hl-U, IU-J6

~ru~IWJ,lMIM u being. l.Il1:1
narutt-moIW""" U wamlnr for
construaing. IS9-61
as negation, & !.!i. !..!l. ~
1)1-". IU46

and 1Wbhiu. ~cc, 101"

Sec al50 ..~ .. hcorr. ezduckd
entity

or("mpliftCaoon (.uUh.r.!'4). SoT

examples
aistc:nl thing (M.il\ll; abo "erlliry";
"thingl
opable of ......, func.ion, '.n....
as causing unique rognilioru. lUI

:u

as cxpcricnml in its cnli my in

pcruption, }07m6.4
as h3ving 3 n.aru~ mal docs rIO(
overlap. III
;and me real in Nyiya.Vmqw.
1, n6 1

as referring 10 extended mtilia,

76-78.!L!!l! 119m06
ClIPCCUUOIU
;and

ph. 2.S9.

roIc in conccpr folTlUlion. U7=-19.

11:4-2.1. 158 n2.5. !l!
tolc in judgmc'l! subsequent to
pcro:;plion. ~ )01
and 5C1'JUntic convaloons.
IlBnll9. H I

Sec also Ilnh.kriJtl. apccttd

apec1td wic efficacy
(.bhiWW<irth.kriJtlJ. Sec
ttn~ apcctcd
ap<n<n
ugumcnlS

from , lL ~

;ppcal IO. lb 11:4-2.1

initi31 alone as inJlTUmcnw ,
}Ol-J. )12., Jil-IJ

as neither permanent nor

;and karma, )2.,-16

imprrmancnr. nlO-lO
:as ob;ca of apres&ions, 9-10,
118n101. !l2t!J!, 1]7=", }5)-60

ROnm~ual. )OS-1

proptny or ptcdiatc u cquivaknl

10. IS6-v

qualifying univmab..
"7=19.

I~J. ~

!.Ql.

JJ9'-Sl. J9S

role of .........c:Ul>ON in
COnsmKting. 118-19. ~ 156, Jll

of things as [hey truly lI.fC fJluhln.

~~~h2.1},}66. )67D16

as .ubordinalc to InJOn. 2.S1

a lcrnal obtecu. Srt ClIU1Immw
objccu
Extcrnal Rcaliun (~)
clacriplion 0(, 18--19. ft:::2
dM::rgenl intaprctaooru 0(, 6?-Z9

fOUN DATI ONS Of DHA1MAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

rOC" adoptin" ~
ontology in, 79-111, !.11! 171,
199-100, 108nl00
percqxion in, 14fI16, 99:101,
motiYllUons

Jhih to Epi,li,"fIlk Idealism &om,

~

8snSI, 98 99. no-I]

.w .J. kvds arWp,is
CXlnuion. .w diJuiburion
c:lIU'a-mentai objecu
acttptcd by boddhas to aid being,
6)n18,

or

or

as cause image in awacmos on

third Icvd anaJpU., u nll,
H.::1.. M. !2!0 )4O-4J
.. cnon-ty ooppc:ui,,! to be: the
object cognition, ~ 141....1,
u6n), lnn9), )IS-16. }14 lS.
)4J--47. 401-14
~ or oooc:xisteoo: as irrekYlItll to trwcwonhincss, }Io
as infinitesimal panidcs, 2!: !Q9.,

or

f"oundalionallraruf'onnacion
(Ur.,.,.rivrtri),

Franco. Eli
on IN: Clrvab tradition. unl9

or a

on the: ddlnition
pr.""'?f4,
1S4l149, }09nl68
on error, ,6n7
on Dhumilini'l critiq~ of'thr:
self, +4"61
on Dhumaldni'l reduaive:
method, 199n17
on the: Ny.lya mdition', usc

or

6~49nn

on the: Sttming circularity in

DhumalUni'llhcoryof
insuumcnwity. l))nl', 1)6-)9,

,.,

or

'"

as objt of ncption at f"ounh

kvd or anaIysi$, sk,. ~ ~

66. 1'9n)8, 8SnSI, UO-lL
as 5patially c:lItcndcd, 6orz9.
98=100
exttcmdy temO'(c object
("",~. s..

Inrucmpirical object
(:ZuUuic iruuumtnuJi'Y

r,.nub

prbNi'!Jl'm) . .w irunumenWiry,

=N<
F
f.ilic appannar;. 1S7-Si. J91
.w .Js. aTOr, illusion; Ipwlow
pcrtqXion
hlK dnnminarion r.Jhp~,
!!l. ) IU\J 7S. )46, 414"17
.w 11M impulalion
f"onnaliun. !1. l!! 1Z
formal
. 5 Fonn&lilm
foundalionalism . )n6. )1)-4. )16

)1)-14

Frauwallner, Erich, 1m
Funayama, Toru, 87ns+ u6n)
G

l"1NIU C indK:alor1 Strevidcna:

,6"'J1' n ndiaared j , Splediaatc 10
be proven
Gancri, Jonardon. ISnl
Gauwna, !L !.i" um8. 13n u.
~
Gillon. Brendan. ~ 1' lm7, ISu1I8.
189n67, 1, 1"""'91, 108nl00

gill (.rrIM), .w ptupoJC

God. ..
Go rams pa bSod IUmI ten8 ge.

''''''

trilNlUUrll. .w MJbjective image

Vllh]tUinl. Sobjecrive image
cnmmatica.l rdations.. 171,,",
17JA4.4, )S7n9
S .Is. pcedialc-aptalion;
Sa.nsk.rir gnmrnatK:aitradirioo;
MJbject-oprcssion
Griffiths. Paul, !..L )6~
G}'1Iuo. LobAng. ltl)

..,

INDEX

H
habituation (.~)
10 coum~nu of Raws,}6f
and inuinsk inwwncnta.liry of
pcrccpoon, 190-91, 1514""91.
J74l14> }n nn.. 378ft!4

HfflI.i"JM/iltJ(Arap),II1L4J.
411111, 411ft) . 40% 41-406, 4l-4J17
IN,..,.".""... SN causal compkx

hierarchy ol views. St'i kvds of

...Jym

role in conapl formalion. IslnlS.

highest bd. of ta..l ity. &r ultimate

raJif}'

mk in puapnW judgment .L
linn. ~ IlS. ,14. jl6

hornologoua i....aN'" (~, ~

j lnl!" ' 4\1014
Hoy. David, 7nl)

,.,

Hadcin&o lan, I nlO

Halbbs.. Wilhelm. tIn.f) . dn.n
Hallilq. Charles, 11110.11
happiDQI, 4h1. 1"
Harvey. Van, lJ0n40

HaltOn. MuaaJc.i, lJOll.

human aim "'M~' also

'h~go>I'
II focus of uealises wonhy of
invatigation. )61
insnumc:nwiry and , ~7' 1U,
) 11, )1', ) 14, )80
~olasmmof
credibility, "S. )66n4

~76.

101 n.71. l,on6, 1}4n16

Hayti. Richard
on ac:cidm.u.1 and (:$$Cntial ptopcr-

as maw.!Cd iR$tl'Ul'lW:nw dfca,

1&1, J6~ , In, 179, )i}-8.t

ties, 119n67

on Mi.-and /fMMi .... IUm9

on circularity ofDha.rmU.ini',
theory of iruuummWity. Inrus
on Dhumakini's prwc, j
on Dignip's UJC:$S1n(fl1 of

language. ~
on inductive UlWTIpc:aon in
DisniP" !houshl. ,,.ann
on inkreno: of "'pacity through

nwMiv.t-cvidena:, 108nl00
on inYUl'ion of puvada-pcrvadcd
rebdon , U}l\I07
on llansLuion of tih.,.",;" and
JJ,."".as qlolality-pc r.:.or and
qu.ality, U
on Ifsnwrw...

of

lW"'-wpnti.."JJ,. u ru.tunl
rebtion. ISlnl7

Htgd. G.W.F.. 1lt4

hcrmc::nrutia of charity. 1L 1)9014
bmne:nnuia of wspicion. lSO

as ~uirinl dctenninate COntent,

16nl, 191 )00, )0)
hungry gbo6t. See ,rru

1
idcntifiation. 191 , 100
identiry. modc of the
1H~"tuIh&.

swu.w,,.,ib.,,JJ,., identity.
mod< of
ignorance (Il~)

as aUK of subjtlobject dualiry,

1!l }IS. }4. :tn..,. 9
.. aute ol.wreri,... W'l, 6J.
.. concqxu.aliry, 61"-'7. ll2 4
equa~ with M~np. sI nn..
60-61. )71-7)
5ff.ls. internal cful:otrion

illusion. }6n,.1, 17'=90. Jill

SN .Is. error; illUlOfY ob;u,

ilIUJOry ob;ecu. U 90. lJ7-SI, ln:,

hect~ut inm.nI;o: (vi~

l!!J ) I f t " , ....
1.Ojn,l, ~ ..,8

,ft...

hm.. SN evidena;

Stt

'"""

450

FOUNDATiO NS OF DHARMAK IIUI 'S PHILOSOPHY

Sn momcntar1MN
imprint (v.rbItllll; aOO .. tendency"),
impama~.

8snSI, 61nl7, 140-41, 1nn9),

, 1}-16. H9.
J.46-.47. ,, 1,
,.osnl"
imput:llion (I"~ 1II11f4"JNr),
61 n17. 15]n1S, 111. lU- I), J.4HO
Inmli. M . USnJ ?
iDdividu.al (~,;), !. U. 8on41.

*'.

~9. , 1=9), 1 ~l i

dcmenu (....S") rhac m .... be

$lal<eG. )On}9 , 4snJ.4

cmpiricai
(_rIIb.J./N~"W1lf4_). ~

1.4), + 49
for-OncKlf (nWnlMlfwWfIi_J.
11=16, H:. ~

(or-omc,rs rp.nnb4I1I1 _ _) ,
11-16, ~1. h, ~

pounded in the

JIIfIM.ilJlllnr';b.1UIh., 1.......111
all having un~ all ilJ objcaJ.

!!..C!1
as including oc:hcr insnumcnu of

knowledge. li b ?
lfl,-jl4,

)17,

)7.....,o. 4 1:a.-IS
invomng only ncpl M!:

c:oncomitancJe (1m.J..IIJ<Uirtiilt).
HII.4S. ~

involving only positn-c

a;mcomit;ll}(r (i~"t.tqi,,),
3SII.4S

lanJ'AlC. prtlumption. and

analogy as fonnf of, 14 r 4 7
Wftd notioN; of, It=}t. 1!
!W.Is. iruuumcntality;
ilWrumenlJ of koowkdge;
nvJJw".",..riIMNiIM
infemJ-for-ooadf

I'or-o nadf
inkmK:e for-othen
r,.~JlWN_)

Sn inferen,

IO,-<nha.
infinitesimal panicles

agtegarion of.

69-79. 98-111.

)96-97. i04Jl14.
all

r,.,..tU(lv}

jJJ

basic buildine: blocks of mallcr.

"

infeR"" (.,,,I1ff4tM)

instrumen talj", of.

S inkrmcc.

Iinguittic reference and. ~ Z!a

71=77. u6.
reality of. i!! ~ 69-Z9. H
and md"."", 16t-n, .96n!S.

S .J. paniculu
i..Jri}tt. S seruc faculty
induaion, ."'&-'142, 19' =:'11

all

(~JlII1IfIl_).

'n=&oo

Sn ..u. paniculu
inmumcnl (Jut,..!"'). l7=u., 114!H. 170-'11
il'\Sinllncntal cognition (P,.1M!"').
5N i,uuumcrli of~
inruumcntal dfe.ct (pflJlU!",p/MiA)
mediated {.,......m~. 161-61,
17B-n, }Iris

as I'lOl distinct from ilUtJ'Wl\Cllt of

knowkdp:, 16,. l]O-'1l.
Wmi notioN conccming. . He,
i!! l ?O
unmediated (.",.utJnu), 16 1=61,

......,.,"...,

iNtn.llncnwity (pri~

definition of. 1f)-S6

cxuUuic (,.,.."'" lrimll!'1""')'
lSI, 191-97. )11 . )"snI4
immediacy 15 3 marlt of. 111
ofinfermcc, )10=14

intrinsic

(~ ,,411f1l?lJlfM), 151,

191=9']. j11- 16
and n(lYcity, l S4- SS, 1~
of pUCC}Hion. lI7-J09

and pwpcC, 1)9-)1

~m....:

ddlnition of, l1H

of Kripturc. 1)1- )), l)HS

xemins circubrlry of. l JJ-S1

in lemu of the mediated d&a,

INDEX

161-61.171-411.

Jh-ls

in W11U of the unmedi21ed dfc.ct.

'"
inl(flc:ztuaiiry, 1..16:. Sl
intrituic ilUtrummr;Uiry

161-61, 168-71. ",....as

at

'''~'''). Sit itulTUmCntalily.

intrinsic

tl'UUbtion for ,'I"u~

irreducibility

12)-19

Sit .u. tfW(WQrUti0C$5

inwumenw object
snd tM rnl. 79=-14 . '4)=+4 ,

r,,..-,.;

and COmffiOnKnK ob;ccu. 1 1-14

ofinfinitoimal p2rtidcs. !:i. 5b 51
of pan>culus. 2!
of the uhimatdy real. ]!, ib !Za

>8,
shared ooOonl mncrming. 18-11,.
lHS. ~

!, Z!! n.. !h if

Sit II/u reduction; miuctiY'( an.aIy.

1!

instrwncnt ofknowkdgc (prw~.

abo ~iNU\lmental cognition 1
convenrion.al. 18)nI01. )14-18.

fvuascna, .4Bmo. 149nl), 106n98

lwara. Tabhi, lO4l!fl. !!!:2...
UII\I04, U}I\I I77. llJ-16 . llln u j

J~- 1 7

ddinition of. 1S4--,:6

and insmlnwn w dfc.ct

(p,.."up*,n.J..). ~1
bngu2lgt. ptcsumption :and

anaIos7 as. 14HZ

U!nOSI p~t

f.ad:or in

produaion of aaivily. lOnl S.

1l..4.161. 169, JIIs
Q motivator of :IClion (pnNuU).
16t-66, 168n1. 19i-}09. }ion16
rdation to action. 49:10. 110-11

JartlC$, William. u.I

jlri (cbss-si&n). &runivttW

Jayatillch. J.N . 111'16
Jh.a, Ganganatha. l,nu
jijUL Sit <!din:: 10 know
}IWIIA.Su~

JliInalrim.im. 1J:llI.llI
j "", s.. '""'""'" obi<
joog.mcnl of IiU1KnCIS

PNI1Iitj~), 1I'e16.

:and ptUpOSC'. f H9
KriptUft: as. llbS.

)61-'7)

sharaI norions concnning, !1:::l1o

i!! !J:j, 110
ul!im2le. )'4- 18
u unmcdiated with rcgud 10
activiry. 111

as wh21 make. one obuin a pi

(p,Iptd4J. ~ l SS. 1li.4-65,

168nz. t!o-I7. t8S. 197.
Jz6-77. }81
Sit.u. inurumenwiry
intention (.wn,,~ umihl),
}OO ) 0 1 .

)6,.

'46n,. ,W. "4,

}81-11
inlcnw d m onion r.",.,.~pt.PC).
ssn,. I19nsz. u,6n). JIJ-, I , )14- 11.

".
Sit II/u error

(,....ub

(dApt1fIJilN~

uk!

judicious penon (p~1I#11It;

prJt,4",nwhlri,,)
at Kling for the sake of goW, 1751.

)'.

u aaing on pankulan. )90. 41)

at acting through doubc. JiSll4
Q acti ng through inwurncmal
rognitioru. 166. 191nu6. 38..

the mark cr. l SI

and .aiprun::, 14), )67
as 5king fOdiminate flaW$, 371
juscifJatian, 1:. us
!iN.u. inmumo:nr.aliry
raJOn as

K
Kajiya ..... Yu ichi. 1, lnZO
Kamabiila, lo nll. I09 nI7. 116n99.

-ip.

fO UNDATIONS Of DHAkMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

l.11nllO. 1}IOll6, 116n). }16nll}.

-'

Kampab. )z.6n6
Kapstc-in. Mallhew. 4OfISl. 41ns;
1}Of11). 1Son41

Urili I)'Ilcm. 16=10, 161. 170-71

u~ 5 inurumem
bnn., m
5 .1r4lwmic world
.brmu,,!u motionl. J01
unu" lu objea]. 5 patinH
Iwmic 'II'Orid (J.M). 186061. )1,--)0
Unr. 5 Igem
IUryorhmI. SNdiKl-cvidma:
K..uura. SMryil. s'n7 . l09ni7.

u6n99. l?9n8l1. 101-1. 171n19

IGty.iyalU,9}n61

KdIner. Birgjl. 86n5). 1.46"4,

316mb
krv,JJ"HJi'" 5 inFerence.
involving only pomive
colKOmit<tnO:
~"Y'ftirdin..

S inl'CKI>CC.
involving only Iq2live

1<eyI. C.M.. losnn, 109-10. ill

IGrkham. Richard, 100R71

on pr#lftli~1tIti,.. l}6n:tO. 2.SSfl.i9,

' 74l'I,

on rdauYe dadng of South Asian

pbiJo.ophen. Inl
Irri]i. 5 acrioa
~!,il.t1J4.

5 mommw1nc:A1

Kumirila
as Dhannaklni'. intmocutor, J1i
on dcmenl$ of:an in~. )Sf\-iS
on aampic:s, JOn)9. }In}9
)1.n-i1

on ilUtrumcmal knowledge ;II

dUtina from action. ~
on insrrumenta oflc.nowkdr;r, ~
on ;'\I,.;.nne ;n.. n..,n",n... liry.

)nm). }800l6
on pc:rttpllon, l.o4lI1S

on predia.l~ncc ..dation.
18nn . !!z }On}.
on purpose and inmwncnllll

kncwIoI&<,o!

. ...

un IoCIIX urpla. ,).IIU. ',Il', .

on simplicity and the real. }7n50

*
also Sln.lI4mik.
Kun dga' rgya1 muhan

dtya

~ta, 97n61

""""'bk obi< Q'?'J

illusion and, 1Jr1sS, 394-95
u imcrnal, i!l
all real and instnlmc:nm objea. ~
lli Unn
types of, !l2. n.u
5.lH iruuumcnllll objea

kncwIoI&< {fol-J
16n1
in Euroamerican qti,;rernolopcal
theory, 11-19

approprQlCnc:Al;ll lum.

;II

evuJl, 18-19

u jlUtifJed uuc belief. 1W\-47

5.lH ioslrumcnl oflmowkdgc;

iNtrumcmaJiry
Kru.on-. H~m'"
on Dlurmo(Jan, IInll. ,6Inn.
)081'1 16 7 ,

L
LaC-pia. Dominick, 1. 5"9. u.n2.)
J...".P1ri"y!'Jl'~

(DIurmottara). 2.6Inn. 1nn96

language (J.u.,;u/M.)

a:ntraliry to pursuil of spiritual

freedom . 2.5n18
all having a neption;ll ita ob;ca.
i::!Q, 116-2.5 . Il!> )S)-&I
IS an in.nrument ofknowlai&c.
11S-:46
and the real. lZ::l2
ttkrC:llIial fUnc:tion (pr.lI(1ti)of,
6a. Zh:zs. 91-91 . !.!.it 113nlll.

,,,..,.,

requiring I disttibtlled ob;m:.

8g. @h 904fl6.4, !!Z

all

INDEX

as rcquirin;t oorion of wnmru.

!!L tn. JlI

as m:juiring;tll unchmp"lobject.
91-9', u.6
Sit.ls. linguistic cnsnilMxl;

scnprurt; 5Cm;tfIIIC ronvmuon

Luic. Hom. 19ln71
Ieve1. of anaIyW. rt--79 . 91;-t9
Lindrntt, Qrinim, Inl
/iJip.. SIt evi&nce

linguistic: cognition
as crated through 5CnU.nlM:
c:on~ntion, ' 71lJ.41

as Ilavi", a uni~m.I;as ob)ect.

IOln7i> !!L )11- 11., W . MIDII
as !cadin8 to panicubts. " 9-=+9
phenomc:.w content as image
conjoined with ncption, ,~,

,,0

rtaliry of ob,i1 in Mn-Buddhist

Ihougln sO!S.t
as spurious pcraf"ion. l7nS4
IinauistK: ronvendon (~~). SIt
.
.
if:m;tIltl( c:onvenoon
logic. focm.rJ. Sttfomulism
W Sa Iwmic world
lH.tur';UN&. Sn Il'U1tIXndc:nt
.~

M
Madhyamaka. S9nl). 1Oln90

4S'
uJrul9. )66nl,. 409m8, 1'om2.
4Ilnu
muaial implication. lSOCUl
Mali1al, B.K.. tsm . ,6nl. t61\4,
17 n8, 18ruo, !..it ll. JSR4S. }7nSI.
l00n8,
manC!" (riJNl}. !L ~}i, ib. it ii..

zhl!
Sit Ills. sub&tantt
McO.intock. San. U! H:!!l! '09n'7.
l}1nlJ. J.S'"+4

mediated inwumcnal cfTca. Stt

iNtrumcnW dka. mediated
menu.! fac.ulry (- -J. !.1. .9nS7
mcnw irru.ac. Scognitive inggc
mc~ ana/yIU. .t2a 4!:'i), 1!t
61.-6J. H

Sit.JH reduaive anaIyW

Mimirpsi. L6. ~ 14l'1, ul. }Is
m ind-depenckncy, ~ loon71.
111=J.1, IJ<l-6o. 1"'-88, '9J, J01,
}1)-lS

MIdw
pub "'" ... Dpol """" 2!
__ Sconfiuion

Mohanry. J.N" 14nJ.S. IsnJ.7.

17RJ1, )1J\40. JSI\.4S. )8RSl. 117R7
-'r S spiriMJ fiudom.
momeRwlncss ~!ljJwv.J. i!.
IoR}9, 9t~7. lBl . J04-7, )IS. )lB,
}6lnl
~

promincnl auW

raao.-

MaAp: .t.PllnupJi,.

(~.

(Bhivaviveb.). Inl
M~lJIIdril (GancirUirti),
J6It41, }16n6

knowledge. as ~ promlncnt
faaox in .aion

u..",

...~

.u_~

(Candraldrri), )6'48
M.JM1JMu. (P;tmlijali). 17n7. 18nl0,
9)n61
M~MBuddhism. ~

MIIhl]tJ_",pbII (Asanp). )16n6

",.whl/Jhi oS dimwincG
pc.....,

Manor.ulwu.ndin, 8n1S. 8Snll .

S irUUUmcnl of

Much. Micbad Tomen, IOID71,

Mq,._d4p....LU~
(Nig.bjuna). 'RI. W)
MilI..uaJvlsIirida, J.S8RS8
mulcipliciry (II~~J
of the awes of II single perttpaual

,mage. 1 ~ 1I 1
of e:opUtiw imap:s. )96-111
and aimplicity. 11=<U

Sn 111m varicption

"14

FO UNDATIONS O F DHA1MAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPH Y

non~ion

N
Nigifjuna, 1m, +4n61., H
Nagalomi, MuatOlhi
OD

.rrhUriJtl. 8+n.49, l S7nSf,

1,!r60, 171-n. 17S, 171.

OD

circularity in Dharnukirti',

theory of instrumentality,

....,

l}}fUS, l}7nl.l

on imptrmanen and change,

~idmrJL

S tdfks.mea

n,u ullll marion. Set

1IIIIM.i"",nuiIMMhtt
nanlll: (,'Urri: ~,.. IfMWIItt),

See ,.."u...... ,..

-"".

(."lIp.1.6.hi),

91n60, llO-1.I, JsSnu, )88

fU .... rc-

"""'''Y
M ..... . nd * Jim. 181-9 1

pctVUion rdatklnr:ll grounded in,

novelty of insuuma'lfal cognition,

1H-SJ. 198-m

",.,... Sr.. ratOning

Nyiya, !L 17n)1

_w..u. (Vi..,."""

on analogy, 14~ n1
on desire to know and doubl
liin.., 1.4fl1S
on r;oaIs. ~
on gnmlTW' and ontology, }8nS1
on indisperuibility of c:ocrea
knowJcd&c for libcntion, 11n18
.u..... ,.,wyW "nd ,,._~
t6nl. ,8n9. 10ms
on peroepiKIn. 1}n11, 1.4fl16,
t04n78
o n p~ Theory, 11n17

NJII1tfbiNiIl.tiU (Dlwmouan).

19-jO. Id--JI, 1ZZ:91

S.us. acridmtalll!SlCnrial

11.1n1l8, 179n96, 179"97

diRinaion
ncprm: concom'QtK.C ("1",inu).

Nyaya mahoU, 16n..t

~,f>t..n. ($.upkansvimin),

SconcomilUCC. ncpt~
ncitw-onc-nor-many ugumcnt,
iQ, f i 6l.-6J
S .us. mercologK;al analysis
"i,ll_IlL Sffcondusion
lIif1.lli!W- Sff ultimate goal
Sftoecru.inry; dtfinilfvt

1)n11
NJ9tIiiitrw. (Gauwna), !L. !2I
11.n17. 11m8. 1Jnll, .u-..6, 14Sn1

"ik.,..

determination
"ikilJil1~

Sff dctermilUle

oognilion
lIiJt1-. Sff restriction

Nooks' Four Trutlu, 8l.

"4l}OS,

)6}. }6s
nominalism. '9 nl}. 6l. ilz }1}
nominal reality. Sn- convcmional

"'"~

nondisposilional proptny. 179-80

Sr.. "Js" XCidentallcssmliai
distinction; nca:ssity
~rtffI. ,efi"",nf (.IJv..).

IJ7=lfI

Nyiya-VaiXfika, J7nso. UL ;J!

N,.,.,,.11til. (Uddyoukan)
o n the agent of knowing. son71
on analogy. '4Snl
on me amnliry of purpose,
.'n67. 47n68. 16}n70

on conapondcncc of gramlTW' 10
ontology, )SnSl
critique of .pH.theoty, lon1O
emplwi. on impottanCC ofinsuu
mtfll of~. lOftiS ,

1.Inl6
on ~-predtcar'" marion,
18n)s,19n jl, )On)9
on importance of knowkdgt for
spirirual libcntion. 11m8
on in ~ u

grnund..:l i n

pctapuon. j1ll41

."

INDEX

on the object ofbnguagc, 101n74.

ofknowkdge (prllftl4twMwu),
J.Jf=IS. ~I . 14S

lJ7nlH

on marion between action and

inslfumem, 49n74. 49nnon ~ perception, 1Jnu, llIUl,
1.41114, LpllS, losn79
on Iharat philosophia.l principia:.
:u nl 7

Sn Ill. ctedibili),
ontological miuction. Sn n:auaion
orden of contq)lJ, ,~U)'
ordinary persons (p,rthtt:j.tw.
Iln.c,brli,,)
bdidi of as ob;t of rd'uu.OOn,

14- 17. fu. ~

on the whole (IIIIIIJ"'"" ), J9nS4.

I01n72.. IIOn90

as capable of derermining the ~

lrine of Iwm:i. 1}C)=\1
ill ca~ble of determining tbe
truth of 1Iirwl!Jl', ~ . }16-IS
oognitiolU of ill erJOnootU, )6"'48,

o
Obc:rlwnmer, Gcrhud. lBn}6
objca (uJ,.). 5 iruuumenul

obp;r, knowable objr, object or

""object (hrm.1I). SnPUlml

cognitions of as having quotidian

instrumentali)" )14-1.8
ill iIw::apabk of direa.ly pera:iving
rnotnenlanncss, )04-7
infinitesimal ~rrida: ali not
pc:~ived by, M... 99-100, lIll
ali requiring KripfUfe 10 aa::as ,be

objtive ima&e ~r.. .Ju

"objective aspect of 3wumcss";
"objcct-slmubcrwn"), 168. 169,
171-71, 176n9J. 194, )84, J8J-U
obtea known (pr.",~). Sn
in.nrwnental object
object ofbnguagc (I.btUrrh.: ~
object of an expression")
as arising through imprinlJ.
l4OnlJ9

as an a:dusion. t::!Q,. ltrl9,

,,>-<0
as including a univenal. 12. ~
as ncttSAriIy unchanging. 2Z
Paalljali on, 9)n61
poc.itive interpretation of, l2. ill
Uddyouhn. on. 101n74. ')7:j8
as u1rimardy rn!. 4Sn'-4
all

u1limaldy unrnl.. 11)"111.

)11- 11

object of negation. 66
object-simubcrum (Il~
~~. Sobfc<:tive image'
~. ClaUJ,80nJ9.9~6J.97n68 ,

,,,,mo, '48nl1. ,Sins... lISnll),

)01Inl68
am: who hu bt:come an innrumcnl

311-IS, )14. 410

IraJUmlpiric:al, 1}1. l.p.

Olher-a:dusion (.",.poh.). 5
Ilpo/M:-thcory; exdusion
oven:xteruion (IltiprlUlllit.). 109-tO,
)09, )41. JS4. J9)n). o404Il'4.
405"'4
p

PiUUrrhtuih.nIUSIl'!':nJM
(PnJuupada)
on d'fea' IuNlance, )41ll1)
on evideno.--ptcdicue ,dation,
19n Jl
on ;Mlnomental :aa;""n and iMino_
ment as dislina, 49n74
on instrumental ascnl u the Kif,
sonn
on inscrumtnu of knowI~,
147n7
on knowledge ill crucial for
opiriruallibcn..ion. :u.n.I , ,.&n:ro
on pwpote. 4Bn69

4 56

FOUNDATIONS OF D HARMAKIRTJ'S PHILOSOPHY

on ICnIC puccplion, 13n11. 14fu6,

1InJS
,..,.. Stnub;ea of a proposition;
d~is

",Iq,JI,."r7/ffiUL ~ tvWkncc-JUbtt
.,mllon
paradoJ: or malcrial impiicnion,

'son's

o<h<n
IM",t4,d"u!lJM"o Sn
inslrumcmaJity. Cltlrimic

Sn tmIOtC objca

t'~niculu

(, ...t.~!"')
basU for conccpruaI

1.$

confirmalion of, 117"-91

cpUlcmic Kblist a1tjquc of.
)~JI

inference &$ ~ in, 1!.t E:! II

inmumcmality of. 11]-)09,

inapres5ibility of, ~ 91=97. !is

I.$ llCking spatial extcnsion,

69=79. 81-i). t8=1I!

problem of dUparicy in ti me 0(,

1I1-flS

problem of oblUuctcd action in.

"""-'

dlarcd notioN concuning. 11- 1S.

lL~ SI. ~

menw. !Q;, u6-II,1.lQ., I ~JI

morncm:uy, 2.!::!Z
1.$ putksa. 1on}9
pCiCl!plibility
~
1.$ ukiouldy mal. 81R4J,
1.$ unlCluc, ill

and imunal dislortion, )6n.t8.

ssns. l9nJ7, ) 15-17. 111-17
&$ a II)OIMlor of .erion, 198-J09
as nonco~ , !z::!!!
1.$ not nndom. IL !l, t6-9z
and pcnonaIttanSfonnarion,
'~jO

construction, u6=.t1
1.$ auWIr efficacious, ~

as undUlOncd rdIcction of rc:allty,

Z<oZl

1.$

u vivid, ~ l!! ~

or.

Sn "- cognllM image;

~

pu1-pottaJOf (.~,,).

SNwhok
PJ.talijali, 17n7, I'mo, 9)n61
!Nolie-nl (l."'''), !L lL <f07n lS
Pcircc.
~
pClCl!plibk thing (JriJ.: II7IlJIIkW
1.$ ina:pcasibk and momcnwy,
i!=!Z
1.$ bcltin& spatial CJ[lcnsion. 9I-IIJ
as one of ihm: I)'pC5 of knowable
objcas Q"';, l)OnJl , 1)1
1.$ uhimatdy real puticubr, I.t-il,

c.s.,

'70""
Sn.1s. infinilClimal!Notticlc;
particular
p"'OOp'ion r,~)
1.$

.tOUIISl

' 7 4-90

/M"'-!lN. ~infini[csimal partidcs

~",,_NI. S infamcc, 1m

,.~

conceptual (III";k.tp.u p'""Jq.),

ClwaI. I;-is. i!.. 2i> 22

pcro:ptibk rhing
perttptual illusion. S el'1'Ol.
nonconcepnW; illusion; $pUriow
pciCxpuon
ptlUplual judpncnl r,~
",.w.u;,."ik~. SnddiniiM
determination, &$1Ub.cq1lCll1
puo:ptU1l judgmenl
pcrdunnt entity, !!. ~ ?6-9z.
I16-H. )11. P9
Stt "- momclltmncw

Penon f!1In4jfl),

1Q

personal uuuformacion. )1)-140)10

pervaded encity (~ lBn)s. ~
!!L '110

pavading propcny
(&rJit"Lsc'lwnru;

.,.,,..l.I; also

p"'rvsdet"). 1in)s. !Z!,

~"

:u,.

."

INDEX

pcrvuion (l!;1l,ti).

5cvidt:noe-

predic:lu: rdation
PhilliP'> Stephen. ~

koowIatg<
p,.Mi!"'bhiu. 5 one who has

Plancinga. Alvin, IIJnsJ. IISn60

plunlity (.,.Ju,d). 5 multipliciry;
varicption
.
p<M.nve concomllan"

(.,.~~ti).

5N oona;lIrumnce,

"""'~worlds, Ils-&6
poasibk
Poner, Karl
on usumpcions in p~
11Koly. 1On1 4
on inmummality. n7n7. u8-19.

"7

on M<T'pry rdaci0n5 in in/UeD(Z.

1,n}i
o n Nylya. 17n6. JS"4S

on the raI as neassarily

knowable. )6"4' , 4sn6.t

n,

'"

and inlcrnai dinomon. 1+1-,11.

) 11, )1S-17. )1S-16
and Iinguinic convention,
I:1ODl07. !!h J44. JS6, J"
and penx plUai illusion. lS'-19,
l n:, ),Inl. )94DS

prompted by pera:prioo, 199.

koowIatg<
pN1fI4~ 5 irutrummtai

,/tta
p,.".u!M"''''~ ( Di~

00 (X:mYaltionai ity of definitive

determinations. JOlnl47
on aalibi.lity. !l2. )61 01
o n crror.17nS4, 9OnS9,
o n ilUltumentai dfca . 167n76,

170nlt, 178 n94

o n language I.J Inference, l46ns
on nonduality of awanncg,
l n 09J
o n KIUC pcrccplion.

l)OU . 2.401).

venoe of~. !Y
Stt :Wo Pt.1fI4!MUmwrllJll",ni
PrmM')iUiUrfwtllJlf",ni (Oignlga)
0 0 ilwanncg alone as
ilUlrumentai, 16U169
on inaprcaibiJiry of panic;ulan,

10"",
on iofertoce.for-om.:n, 147n,
on illlluumcntai dfea, ,on76.
167n,6. 17Ofl8.4.
00 pruumption (.nhI1,.,m) as
in~.I.n 6

on IctlJC pe.ctpuon. )97Il4

on the refutation of a wbok
(."..,.,vi,.J. )905'1

Sec also Pn1fl4!WM'..roIJiI

)01. )79. )89

at . ... n ...... inn dw>~,

become an ilUlrurtKDt of

)9601,)970"

o n me [am knowkdge fo r jUu,

16nl, 1Jil1.47
pnctical action (IIJiIv.hlrtI: PrtnlfttlJ
and conceprual cognition, IIsn'}l,
!l!:. W. ~7. )son2.4, JS6.
and in.nnunmtality, 160, 1IJ-I4,

I.J

p.Mi1J6.. 5 ilUuumenl of

1slnsl

$.w aamry; convention;

$CIlUl\cic c;oovmtion

prasmatism. fi... uB, l S906o, ) IS

Pnljl\lbngupra. 9MS, 178
PnljlUbn.nuli, s6nl, )1Inl
pntjfMptisAL Sn-convcrnional rcal.ity
,~,.. 5conlc<t
priUNl. Stt action of knowi",

Pn.,u ....rJntil..Il..Jtb.
.

(Praj~pa), 90IS. "lion

fuN!",lItlrttiUurm
(ManoratMnandio), SOl" SsnSI.
I1ln ll9 . <f09 oll, 411 011

Prw""!fIVi"ifntJtt,tild
(Dhannoan), 9016, 179n96.

"'7,n'7. ",n.8.

, rlMi!'Jl'- $ irutrwncnWity

..S8

fOUNDATIONS OF OHAIlMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

,,.wullf. Sn-apl of knowing

,rll~ Sn- inmumnual object

,,.,,,iri. Sn-aaion ofknowi ng

,r4pU.. 5 iruuwncnt of
knowledge. IS wIlli makes 0flC'
obWn I goal
Pr_1IMptuU (CanciralUrti). S4lI)
Pt;l.&~""]"ida . r& u nlit. lRnJf. !.2.
,,]=:11. i2! !2!. !fZ

Sec aIJo P~mfIIIII"'phII

,rltfi bbtlJ.. 5cognilive image
"lItit;", ... 5c:opitive image
,,.tijtU. &r ches.iJ
"IIry.bhij fUIW. &r reoognilion
,~ 5 pc:rcc:ptibk <hins; pc:r-

-~"

,r.~1HMsL

&r Ipw-M,tus pcrttp-

".~.~IJ),."ikllJ&. Sn
ddinil~ dnerminalion. 1S.5U'*'quent ~ua1 judgmenl
Struuuumenl of
knowitdgt. IS motivalor of action

,,.l1li",,"

,n""';" &r activation; activity;

pracria.l Klion; refem'ltial
runaion
'~NL 5puIpOlC
predicale (tlh.nrt4). 5 propaty
predialt-aprtuioO (JlN,,,,",,,,~
r/M,.",.,vid/II/J,). 117n1l9.
l13nn9. Is6nl). 171n44. lO)nSl'"
lS I . jJ1tl19

&r .Is. proptny

predicate of a lubject (tiJMmg). .sn
evidcncc'Iubjta rduion
predicate 10 be- proven elk.,..'
'M." . ,o",nPI4; Jh.nrJII," VMJA).
16-zB, !.!i>. 148-11

&r III tvidenc:t-predicale malion

prrk,lpiinwUrill. &r judicious

"""'"

prr~IeL

.sn

judicious penon
presumption C....hJf'6Jti. abo ~pf\"
lumprive indIJQw)tl"), 1)n1O, ~

pm. (" hungry' ghosl"). J!16n61,

J1~-16

PrnJ, Ernst, l..anSl

prirnaty cawe: (,.,..uMhrr..),
164-66. 181-81. J69-71
production-mock of

SWMillllprtUiHNIiM. Sec
....JJ.b.".li~ prntluoinn_
mode of
proptfty (1ihIInru; alto predicate"),
!l. 9s=J6, IU-fl, IS9nll, 16ul)).
171n.... , 18~. 197-101, 1Ot-U,
l49 , )S1-51

-....

Set also 1IIff~ as proptny.

~
propaty-P0'YVN (tIM""i,,). $no
wbjea of I proposition
propaty-IllllbJM_ Sec IllllMiIlll, IS
proptfty, sIWMi...

Plopat)' WI puvadc:s

(lIJIIp"ulb."",,). .sn ~ing

propc:rty
propertY 10 be prtJ\'al
(t.#; 'VmI4). S prtdiate 10

"'P~

prop06ition 10 be- p~n r,rlUijiU;

,./qA}. $no tha.is
$no ordinary persons
psychologism , 14n1S, 17n)1, lli !L.

,.rrhtttJiI-

...

prychophyUcal awegalCS (IU"';"),

6!Q. 61n17, j~, 409
,wI~ rz!!!..!
hJpiII"i~ (Vuublondhu).
1}Oftl)

pwpotC ("";",,. ,~ .. abo

"aim"; "goal": "tdos")

centnliry 0(, 16n1. JI"11. "H9 ,
1!.. J11-JO
IXmccpu as requltlng. !.!1. ~ }44 ,
,...s, JS4-5S. Jf7
ilUltumenaliry and, llB-p. ~
lSS-6ll, 17)-17. 197. l~)OJ.

)08. )Itrl) , J14- 1S. }8,..&4

INDEX

tclic function and. ~J-94,

1S'-'o, 211-78. )]6. )91 nl
of a ueau.e or scriJlfUU". U::H!
)61~1. )17
w limalC:. lsn1l. ~ 11.9-)1. !II .
4M2. )14-18

Stt.w human aim

!"~s,.P_n

! 1I"'fIlrth.. Sn hunun aim

rye. Michad, 15"'4

'"
la:ocnition ("ny.Mijfi41111;
u'!'jlU), u..6.. UQ, lY!lJ}I, 161n19.
19 1n115. }44. }46

~ "" ,,/nil"''''''' ~ !Z1

reduction
coocqxual, 215. u8
of atrnded (tIlities 10 panicuWs.
~ 7!ci'i . !la 21.t!.!lt :ull
o nlologial, principk of, 199,
J:OH, 101--11, 114. !!L 118
of propettics 10 p.1Inic:ulan,
. 03-~

Q
quaii[f. 17'-=21, 11
s.w PrnUcatc of a proposilion:
II1/IJMIwI, as ptopt:iiy-lI1/IJWJ.fw

quaiiry-pouasor. 17=11, n nso

Stt ..huubjec1 of a proposition
quali[f/qualificd tdalion. !.!J., ~
I1SnIl9. HB-Sl.)H
Quine, W.V. 2uml7

Stt.J. irrrducibiliry: reducti~

analysis
m:1uaivc: ana.l)'$b ( III."."... 1IkbW,

.
..,....

aha ~reduaiYc rcuoningl

of diKributed (fuilia. til

and kvds of analysu. ~

6t:79,

a.

70=7 6

~, ~ .p=-;).1t 6z.-6).

R
Ram-I'ruad. OWuavanhi. ll9mo
Ra.tnaltini, l}uull

oflhc real. l!t 2io.1!.

i8=-99.

R..ml,.,w (N1prjuna), W')

Sa ttl. irreducibiliry:

real (S/l.I)
as dwxtcriud by Idie dfx:xy,
4sn6.t, ~

as COII t (tll oiindubitabk

knowing. JH6, t!.o Lt-lz,
91-1I}

as inapret.5ibk. 12. i!.::iZ

as momentary. i!:::!Z
as simpk, }Z- i S, 11 79-81. 98-11 )
s..Is. particular, IWO rcalilia:
rnliml.. )61l4i. S!. S9nIJ. 'ZL

u6-1z. !l!, }lJ

lUIOnins (1IJIIJIa.' ,un)
as Buddhul practice. 1SI. )18-1.9
corxfilionals in, 1 ~15
and ICYds of analysis. 61
pwpoM' as a ~ ooor in, fl
SN "'- inkn:ftCC1 redlK'ti"" an&iy-

w: 5I}'k o f rnsoning

anaI)"iI; reduaion
ItfdcntW fi..maion r,"'''!"i), ih
195, I11n1l8

Stt (1M semantic convention

rdino:mem. }10. )11-)0
rdkx.ive awarmcss (1lIIW'!'wtLut..)
as arising as the: subjtiYc asp!
of awum.el$. )9lnl
insuummr.ality of as sheer ausal
dJic:ic:ncy, 160. 176, 178
n"...dUl li.,. of, +07"IS
role in UlXnaining
in.n rumemaliry of pc.ception,
191, 195, )78",+ 3iS-36
sellks.snas as, 401n1 ) , .. 06nlS.
,.oSnl5
u uilimale p,,,1N1fU, ) 11
reI.lion., t!=1,.!1
rdiPOW subscratum, 10nl4

..60

FOUNOATIONS OF OHARMAKUtTrs PHILOSOPHY

><mO<' ""'"

(J'I'lNIhilll!"'m4!'A}IMJ.r). S
instrumental dfcct. mediated
ranocc object f/'i',."q.; ,,;,~,
I snp., 91n6o, 1)Onll. ~ 1D11
Srr Ifiso lnnscmpirial objca
rtpeatability (IIIIIItItJtIl. Srr
diuribulion
fUlriction ("9wIJU; abo - invuiabk
ruk")

in caUAI potentials (/Mti"iJtt-).

16oIU9. 161-6~. !M! 19S. )44
inlcQubjeiVC'. j16n7
of pervasion !'dation. :zBn}6. !2z
149='" ZO'I J.06n,8. 2.09=10

of the rea/lo a spuiotCtnponi

locus, 8L !!L m
Srr IIiu rule of unacoompanicd

condition

Ulti.Sapacity
IUM~. Srr ratric:rion. in
causal polC'nliW
S1Icya Mchos klan. 9n17. ~ 76-78
Mm4"rLr~!,& Srr univaul
S imputation

--

U"""''''

as conoqxuaI C'Xtcnlion. V;I, 6.a

of difrc:rcncc (U. 1,Hm.i,?,,).
IOz-!. }SI
of dttas, !.92. 1I9=16, IHn) l .
}1l-1}

as rtquired

non-aIUlDg;

IMbbi..,,.,,tiIM1f4IM
Rony, Richard. sn9
Ruegg. DavMi Scyfon, 10014
rule of unaccompanied non-arising
(1I";,uiHMJw"ry.-V, 14!Hj. 2.01,
100nl01

s
Saban.. 146n j
J.btUrth.. Srrobject oflanguasc

""""uu,. "" ""'"'"

!iMlJJMnNII"~ SSl1-4

~lJUtIJ&

the c:onuadictoty of the prcdicalC'

to be: provC'n
~ Srrlimibrity
";"Ml"", Sncopl'C'SC'nOr;
w..1tbip,..".".. S supporting

Srr instrumcnl of

k.nowIedge. as masl prominenl

aUAI factor in acrion
sMIh.-. Srrmdcntt
sM/h.,mj In,.",.. .wsupporting
~p"

-.Dryulh.mt& S praliate 10 be
p~

" Dr; dl",mrj,.. Srr Nbjca of.

' ''!'Y'I'';~ ~,..~

Srr nidenoe. incompuibility with

by language. 9 1-91.

116-17. !H
Srr IIIH diuribulion; judgmcnl of

~1II'!fJfU.. S recognition
1II~ S $Cn\anUc convmtion
5aqlkhya. ti.t 1Q, 7jfl}l. 16u\}}
1II"u.,.. Sn doub!
1II1!'''!fisirr. Sc:onVC'lltionai reality
lII1f'111tifUltll. S correct koowkdgC"
Sailgabbadra, I09nS7
1II""ihf".. S $CIUIOty oonraa
Sanskrit pmmacical tradition.
11010. }8nJ~ 9}n61

SturlllNl,,_iJJhiplei (Vjoliadna).
6ont4
Sinuralq:ira, il lln11. nnl, 109n87.
116n99. 111O U O. Ijlnl1.6. ).4on6
Sinrideva, ~ ~ }18nS
../"'~ Sa bomoJosow: insuna:
SarviSlivida. i!. 5901}, 109017
$tqIiIll1lml (Virpgal:Iya), 1.46-0
~"..mpiU, 1,nu

"" s..=l

-UJ*l.",. ("belief d>., Uw:

P'}'ChophyUeal aggrepa ill'C' the

..s,

INDEX

lotus of I xlf'}. U. ~I.

as object of spiri tual adqJu.

1,.nl)8. }71-7)
Sauuintib. 11 Sin.l " ~ Zh Ii!

.II

79n}l, Ion)9. 9!
IClk of analysis. 5 IcYds of

Vl~lpuuiy.a

..w,.;.

$dwf, Robert, 9)n61 , 10l n74

Schmid...-n , Lun!.en, l 'n7
saipNtal infcrmc.c
(tlp~1Il/.mI), " ,.... S, ISI; l,

universal dwxteristic of
elemental things.. 811\4S

poairion on, S7nll

ACmanUc (l)l!.Yefllton (~.
",.uJ,4,~ abo ~linguisric conYm-

lion'

analogy:u 1Uociucd with, 141nl.

as crucial to inference by
IJW~. 11lAI18

)61-7)

saipnm (tlplM: /rwti)

,,.,

Oharmaklni'.IJIIlrin! citation of,

Dhannkinr. aniNde loward in
&:bate. Innl4

eight demen~ of Dharmakini'.

dixwt.ion of, 40-41
instNtDenuliry of, lL 1)nlO, 11-4.
lll- n . l)HSt )61-7)
:If not

)05n16o. )69n11. 406nl'

of hl.UlWl origin

(""~. 1J)
thredOkt analysis of. 14~
5 .w. credibility; Kriptunl infer~

tetf (brrfIut)
:If agenl

ofiruuumental knowing
in Brahmankal thouJht. H!
beliefin as diminated in 1I;nliflll,

""""
,,.

.II distributed

entiry, +41161, 61n17.

as object oIbdicfin ~i.

iL~ )71- 11

Iin9c

:If a
eum. )4). mini}
... uninr.,...,.hk. j6)
tdf-dinging (h1tvIlSttthc). ~

J71-1l

sdJIesmeu (.I/IlhruI1I; ""i~)

:u antidote to Alffaing. 6onlS.
191n1)l. )6In1O, }69n1l. }71
all a dist:ribuled entiry, ~1
AI inHnunc:no:ai ob;ca, ",.
4C)lnl}, 4O'Snl4, 408m1

indirectly refcrins 10
infinitesimal pa.nic:Ia. l!!

all

IlOnl07
:If rooted in odwion, )+4.

)H~

for Alb;ca and predicate. 117n1l9.

l1.8n1l9. 17lIl44
ACNe cilium. ~
Sit .w. cognitive image
ICnK faculry (i~. abo -1CftJC
ocpn', 1'=14. 12.4. 116-17, 1.61,
US , 169-7'0. }I)-Is
sensible dement (l)Ioru..... abo
-JeNe sphere', ~ ZO=71, 79nJl.
10l nn. I09 n87. J97""
JCmOf)' oontaCt (s.1r1rj~ sp.rt.),
!J., 1!! 169",,0, )44. )6)
Shah. Nagin. }<tSnlf

Sidmu, Mart. 116n99. 1}1Jl116.

l..,nll, ls oru s
Silk. Jonathan, 1)6n19

similariry (~
:If basis for error. ,6n7. 11-8g. !:i!
of images to their obja. &.cls.
.;mplici.,. ( .....6<1; ...... - ;

dwcd notions cona:ming.

JZ=-J9 .

"

Buddhist Yin.,: on, iCt"i'. 1!:

79nJ!. &0
Sit.u. Nngulariry

linsuJariry ('''u.' ,fun",)

li"!,,ill;'; "k"1KC ....;thoul.
m-60

,.61

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHARMAKI II.TI' S PH I LOSOPHY

of pcn:qllual imap. 101 II},

)96-,.11
5 .h.limplicity

sk.J>UIJM. 5 psychophysical
ag:n:g1ilIcs
$IciU in mnm (~~), 11
Skinner, Quentin, sn9
didina K1iIlc of analysu, &r kvds of
analysis
SJH.umril1ll (Kum1rib)
on agem of knowing as the .td,

on circularity in Dharmaki"ni',

thcoty of instrumentality,
l~lS,

1.4S-"7, lSI;l, }17

on lhe compound stJiIMlwMrJ.,

I14fiHl
on the compound tIlOlitlbh,#ViI.
1JInl04, 111

on the conu1ildiaory of Ihe

prcdiale 10 be proven, 1 '9-11
on inferring an dttct from I ClUK,
l78nSl
problems io Oignip',

theory

~onn

DO

_.,

of inference. 1-+8010 , 1-+8011

on swJHMlIft., 1St=14, Is6nl),

on elcmCfltl of an jnfcrcnc:c. lS"'4S

on grammatical instrumentality.

,6,")0.

,...,.

on Knse organs. Ip'U, 1)0l.),

Sou. Ernest. 18}1lsl

IOtcriolozy, ..,.n61, i!:!.1t:::H!
60-61, 191. ~-8. )17
sfN'rlA. Sacnsory contxt
ipUia.I mension (~). 12.. ~
s6-1l, 6l. 6crz<J. ~J, 98-111,
.!1.L. ,.o,.. ,.osIU,.
S ~ dUtribution; whole

,pctdl of 1iI credible pcrIOn

(4pllJlld.). &racdibi.lity;
KriPlure
'pirilual adept ~1f). 1.4016, 1..
!!i. l86n61. 116-17. 19)01)0,

)01-6, )18n8
$pirinaal excrciJcs, !lQ. '40
Ipiriulil frttdom (~), 11. lsn18.

4 . ~ ~ ll9nlO,
)14 , )2.4
.
IPUnow pcroeptlOn
~,.~bhtls.).

}6n.d. tzus .

&rIlWcrror, illusion
tquan: bnckcu, 11-1,

S.etnkdlnC"f, Ems.
on the argumcnl for
momentariness from exUtena',
97 n68

on IInIMhi]tl. 178-79

16~

' 70n'tl-. l86n61,

191-96, 101-1. 1090101, Ulnll l

on 1'IIIIJM4U11pnriiMlfIiht" lS I nl7
Slhiramati, !1
,rbiit.tL Sspalial ClllcrWon
uyle of R'IJOnins. }, 1: u. !.L tl. H
!ubhagupta. "nl)
IUbJl-a:prcsuon

(tihtI""il/tJdiJJbttII). 117f11l9 ,
,18nIl9. 10)094, )S1019
lubjective image (,zrihtdliHrII; also
~wbjective aspca of awarencss~).
171, 176n9), J91, 407
aubjcalobjcct duality. Sduality
subject of a pr0p05ilion (J),.,mri1.;
idh],Jh.f1IIilt; , . . ). 1901 ).
lkll, ~ 16cJ-n, 199, lOOn&,.

'"'='

aubjcct-predic::ue reblion. !.o !..1..

171"'4-4, ).46-S1. 3S7f17
sutJ.;tanI;C ('/'IIIIJII). It-1+, J!. l2!
J.4!>-SO. 1Q-S9. }6}. 196-99

surcring (~. ..6-..7. ""

60-61. 110, 19801)8. 199, )19
supcrimpolilioo (SlUlWI'OpII). Sn
imput3tion
lupcncnsibk objcn (116,",*)
as amcnabk 10 perception of
pti... z..tn~6

as the domain of Kri~. 1.4). }67

,6,

INDEX

as

ntH

anvnablr: to

Dignlga'J rhmry . ........9

Str ,Js, tvidtnu-predicttC

inr~

366n.4- J68

}11\41. ~
DOl: charaa~rWng

as

infinitcsimal

panidcs. l09nl]
one who JCCI (.tiMriJiUMr/i,.).
)OS. )66n ll

SIr "'- rnnxmpirical object

IUpponing condition
(.."d4n"6lJ9tI). '<4n6). 16,-61.
11'='1. Il4n~" lOImoo

mpponi"& enm.pIc
(~"fi) "/."H4I1I11). lQ., WSn,s

mation: ncaviry
nwld!ll!lll- Str panicular
11JIInh4,.M""'IUI. Stt inr~rmtt.
ror oncselr
IWIU,!,uwWlUI.

1UIIt4 prhul!'Ji'm. Str

inlCrumC"nwiry, inrriruic:
ryllogUm. !l
I)'It~matKiry. klL ~ a z!.

-"",*

''''

as C'.OfI.Kructcd. US-:t6. u6-p.

136-117. )1). ))9-1:1

as nature-IUIIM.f,., ISJ- n . 1sS-7J.

19)=1.01
and nccasiry. Illdl
as propc:ny' IUIIMrI,., '1i=9'j.
11HZ. '70-7), 181.-91. 19t-101

two IICIUQ' of, ISH', 164nl4.

170-7). 1,)-U1
univaWs :and. ~

Sec abo IUIIMrllltlprlltiluMh.

IUIIbhl,,,,MrJ.. StrdiflUmcc in
nature
IUIIMl~oa' (1UIIbh4~).
'1n~, I 11:1l, f79 , 1O)-11

IUIIMJl1IIp,.tiIMtuih&, idmtiry.
modC'of

Sec IUIIhbl~ntt

wdlMwpr.tilMMh. r n.anual
rel.arion'
gcntnl ddinition.. r;&;1
i .... ntiry.......... (wt.".".) o(.
' SM), lO t-l l
and inUtMic: insuumentaliry or
infCfcntt, 1,6. 197-98
maning of IJlllMolu. in. IU-SS.
19)- 101

production mode

(~) or.

')~-SJ , I] M~

tMUlmJtL Stt IUllMiI14PrlltilMtUiJM.

idmtirymodt of
uJ."..,tti. Sec IlWhbllWprlltihMht&.
production. mode: of
rAnlWbiMV.

("tMr"",M.lJ).

111- 11

Tllm...sII,!,phiI (Stntanlqira).
,nliS. l09 nI7. l11nIlO. 1)lnu6,
}n6. mn l)

TlIItMU1!'rlliMpdj iU
(KamalaIala), I lllllIo. 1)lnn6,
}16 n.I) , ,Hon6
tdK;: c:lJic:::lq/funaion. Scc
IIrtJ,.~

Stt 11M ..-viden:

IUII~

Stt ~

response to problems in

trW. Stt purpose

(C'mporal alC'lUton. ih ~ il!
ski, 6l.1l2. '4JliS), 111). 379

Str.JJ. distribution:
~=-

theory of unconsciow: aror. ~

)n .

),'n,' }

Str ills. aror

theW (priltijU: ~ abo
"propos.irion to be provtn "), !L
~.H! 106-7

thrWold (VideOtt (",,j~nJitit-J.

Str (Vidmtt, thfC'C'foid
Tibnon W

"UlK"llIIQn, b

l! 1l!

69-79. Ibn<4J, )OOnl<4). JI,

.6.

fOUNDATIONS Of DHAII.MAKIlHlS PH ILOSOP HY

Tibttan translalions. !. 97n68.

l09n86. 116, 169n80

Tukmans. Tom
on.~

116n99
on Candraldni. )6"-41
on congruence, loon71
on the aaiibility of the Buddha,
11S. 117 ")1

on doubt as a na:x:sury dement of

rcuoning. l88n6)
on ckmcnu: of an inference. JS"45,

,06"..
on cumpks, j lnj9
o n die ncitncr-one-nor. many
;&r8,m>a>I, 40n n

on scripnuc, Inn I.., 140

o n the ruuaurc of the
PrtItd,!,,uj'dJ,j chapter, 115n17

on the theory of unconscious

CI1l)I", ~ )11
on the Ir:uuempiria.l. l)Onll,
1)Onl}
on lruth, US
totality of CltuaI chanctcrW:ics,
161=V, 18s, 197=100, 1J1-1}, 198.
l'l
""irii!JtW"'~. Scvidcncc,

""""'~

Innsccndcn, aw:umeu
fWolUlr.jfU""J. 4!n57
lranscmpiric:al objca
(.".IIU}M",q.; abo c:nremcly
rt'fllOlC objca~), lJO:Jl, 140-"1,

L45, L49-S1,}61-67. ~nl.

Sir.1. supcnomsihk objca

u~rulation .

11- 1], 1l}- z.8

transworld identity, 18t:"
tl\lMWOlthineN r."u.".....)
of conceptual togni liOlU, !.
ofirutrumcntal tognition, ~
1S<t-j6, 1S~, 17)-97, )00,
)08-18. )47=..8, )7....."
of "";pcu~, !l2., """ , 11), "1-13
of speech, .!

of yogic pcrorptioru, ul'i04, )06

inRrumcntality
(ru th, snlo, !l. (Oln7J., us-lS
s" als. conventional ruliry; IWO
rea1ilicr. ultimarc reality
twO rulilics, iO':+b ~ 10'"90
s".u.convenlional rc:aIiry;
u!timlle ruliry
IWO truths. Sn-twO rulilics

Sir.w

U
wUh.r~

Scamplcs
Ud<lyoubn
on agent and imuJ,., \9:
on qnualiry of ph for
re:uoning. .. hz. i!
cridquc of ,,~thcory, 111=18
as Dluirmakini's inlmoanOf, 16
on infcrcnc:e. lS n}S, 19n1l. }OrIn,
)'"J9. )1~ n. W'4S
on inmumcntal dJca, 16jnzo
on instrumcnu: of~, l2.
!it 14 r46
o n pam and wbolea. )8np, ~
u?4=1, 1I0n90
on pclccjAion, 13n'll. 1jnl).

14ll14< 14ll1S. 101

on 5hated principles of Prami.r:la
Theory. Unl 7, unl8
on univcnab, 101n74, ~

Sec also NJIlttviI'ttiU

uhimalc goal ( lIj""'~ also
uhimatc purpo5C"). 11). U9-JI,
14'=11, 314
ul lioulc pr.td!.fIL S innrumenl of
Itnowlcdac, ul limalc
ultimate rc:aIity rp.r.".,.nh.s.t)
as abtem in Wlivcnab.
81041.
8snS1, 9}-9i. !.!i! n H I, ~

zt

}4s-.6, )9:--'4

buddhas as igDOring when

luching bcinp. 11
ohjcna :and, 2....zq
incJ:preuibility of, i2.@l,i.!:::2Z

COaunolU<!ftlO!"

..,

INDEX

as Iacki"l diruibu laon, Il0-l1,

J6. !.ll.t 169-70.

bds of analysis and. 61-4,
"=11\. I U

6~,

)"U

70=79. 1)9n4

of mind as undiffemuimd. 171,

176"9). 401-14

mommwinal of. !!=!Z

.... object of """",p<;,;", , ....., I2l>

1,s. )01- 1
of panicubn. ~ Z!z '!, 81::14.

as combinarion ofinuge and

c:xdwion. !!it 11cru. HZ- 19.
J40- }4"-47
construction of, 94n64. It
11'=16. 1Jt-+i. IJOfl4J. ,,s.
H9-1"l

COIUlrutd

as 3 pmkular. ~ u.

')0=" . '"

u convenlionally real, IQ, 'ID4I,

!Q.,

~ ))9

Dharmalt:ini'l rcjtcrion of, S9m).

l 'O
~tyof, 1t
Jimplicity of. 4WS .".....ao. ~

61-6,
as not an iluuuJnmw object. Ml!

Idie fimaioa and. lt-k !.!i.

19, 4l }
as paradigmatic cue of conception

19J-"H, }IO. }9J

Vuubandhu on. 40-=<11, zt-8o

&t tJu conventional reality;
particular; two ralilics; univerul

unconscious (rror. theory of. &t

theory of unconsciow enor
untqucncu
as a1lmon for tht u1timaldy rn.I,
I<bh
of tht adudcd enliry. 1)11\111,
!llt!M! }l9
u ignored in proo;:d$ of aduJion.
Jll-11

of images. 116-18. 110=-11, !lQ,!l!.

""w

of momentary partida. ~ ~
of panicularJ. 81=&4. l , nSI.
IJO"-4J. }H

as a lheortticaI poUUon. 1. It
of unique individuals (~).
111141 , J4S. 411-1)
S-.J--d... M>n; .i ... pJkioy.

JillJUbrity
univenal (uMl'7"lc"1'?U: jhi)
as usoci31cd with conttpU. !02.
as cawally indflCiml and
u1timatdy unreal. ~ I lfl4I'
I sn f1, ,,....,., !.!i. 11HIt Ml!
j-4)-.

,.,!=I1

)0 1- ). JIG-I+ 318

C:Xleruion. 6J.
questioo of heinz an object of Ia.ngwge (",lNIlnJMj. @2.2.1, !.Q!,
~ II7=11J.l!!.t m -6 0, }l1

qlJCSlioo of pennaocQClt or
impermaneQClt of. z!, i!. 116-11
rcialion 10 individuals. 4.1, ti! IQ,
91-9), lIS 1.6. I1H) . W - 4)
~ Mdq: ldan on, 76-n

the ad( u a 1pW iNUrla of. 191

lWilhlaw and. 2Jll=2.
Ihrer rypc:s of. u.6
TIbetan undemandin! of as
penn:mml. 77==71, 116-17
Vasubandhu on, 81-11. !l! 12lo

,.....,

'" Wo _"""'r. "'.."''',,'''

awa.rmcu; adulion;

judvncnl

of_~

unmcdialal irullumen w dkct

(...,...";';14", .. , #t:U~). SN

irutrumena.! dkct. unmcdUlai

IlpiJl~ Stt primary caUK

,.,um,&tddimiling quality

IIlM1M1J4. &t amIogy

II,.,..,.. &t~jt
rdalion

.fNlJ-Iu.J.J,.. Scr oIWI in mean.

466

FO U N DATI O N S OF DHAI.MAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPH Y

V
Vicaspafimilra, lOnl,

~ ~ ' 4Snl, 1}6nI9, 16}n70

Stt .... """'...,.

IWi4Mlift).ir1!41ftA. Sn

Vrdu, "4n1" ~

countucnmpk
Viii,,*, slluu, 1.iM
Viliqika, & }8nn. iii ,6nlo.
ionJ9. l2L H1tl9, }ti}nl, J99n8

Verpu~n ,

Roger, 18sn60
vcridica1iry as truUbtion fo r
,riIUrrJ4. 16"'4, 116-11
Vetttr, Tilmann, Znnls, 1}]lI11

Sn.Js. Nyiya-V.ilqika
vali.dily aJ' tramlation foe

W/hi. Sn aff'u:malion

,,.,,u!'Jl'.

om

1.11--2.1, ~

Van Bij1en, Vittorio, }l1

vuicplion (dt1W; em.";

critique' o ( 5ingularity 0(, 101- 1h
J96-411
.. produced by in.una! dia.omon.

"J

as wnding for all form. of

multiplicity, tali

Sir.Js. mulripliciry
Vi~ya,

uij;;.primlltrm. !in Epi.P(mic ldalui!J4 hmsJ"",. Sn caUJal

compla:. inrompkt:e
Vi~ (Vuubandhu).

}16n6, }16n7, 410nll

Vi...t.tiJuI'rlti
.
. (Vuuban4J.,,)

,1"'4l, 79n}8, }16n7

uinJ.!.. Strctss:nion

Vi,..,,-Mbiwtip, lS8ns8
Viniradeva, 6on14' }16n6
vi~

14hz

vbllI4. Sn imprint
WPJ4H~"lJ!niIlllllff4q.

vipuiuj""q. Str error

1Ii,,,,_
Sff t rror

.,.w;. Str indiyidual

on inttnubjca:iviry, }l&n6, }z6n7

koowkdge of the dttaikd

workings oflwma. llOnl]

011

f1KrdogiaI analysis and, ~

IlJiipUMIhtt,.-"w. Sn puvading prop-my

IIJIipri. Sn CYick~prcdicatc
relation
~"..

o n momtntarinc:a. 1on)9
o n primaI)' caIUC and. lupporting
conditions. 16Snp
rqJramQ.ri~ or Abhidlwnu

typoIogy, ~

on ms aJ' the: ca~ or

cog:niliolU, 410ml

on _

~~ion ,

Sn httaosencow ilUUl'ICC

,,;,nJt,.,fL Sn tClTI(KC obj;1

inf"":<ncc. ,.mpiriool
Vasubandhu

as

,In..p.,

J.4fIl)

Sn pervaded mliry

-=

"J#Irim.. SNcxmcomitanct,

"",uJt.lr.. Snconvention; praaic:al

.
.
.
actIOn; kmanuc conventIOn

"",UilhitllpnuM!",p/NJM. Sn
inslJumcntal dl'ca. mediated
ryJl!ft"'. Strexdudcd mliry
~urni, Sno:dusion

on I''&"'~ and 1Il....~w,.!Y

I1::Il. !1. lQl, }96

on two Icveb of n:iliry. 40-41, Z!
Sec alsoAMiAI~
Abb~"""
Viuipuniy.u , 52!!!!
Viqyiyaruo. 17=-10. u. 2.4l11S. }8nsl,

Waher, Joscph, }4n)

whole- (.,...,.";11; also -part.
pm.....orJ

JJw,.,., .. u
J7nso

roughly ..qui...,.kn.

'0.

INDEX
dl'a;t-lUb$WK:r (~.",.) <u

sb.nding ror. J4UlI)

I.J ob;ecr of negation <II ~nd
kvd of UlalyJis. 66
and onloiogiaJ simplKity. ),......c.

...

as paradigm foe distributed

unities, 4a>-4), T1. ,,7ft)
re)ectjoft of, 40. S7. 61.-li}, 66.
101- 11 , 109n86. J96-411
Uddynnka~ on, 19. 10 1, I04-J

Sn .J. distribution; rrw:reologic::al

anaIyW: reductive anaIysu
WillWns. Paul. ISft.1
Woo. Jctem. 116tl.4

,..'htirthMWrt...... Snapericnoe. of
Ihinp as tbey Iruly an:
Yogkira. 79n)!

Sn .u. Epinemk Idealism

yogic perceptioft fMiprll~

14"1'. 1~17 ,~-6

Sn .J. spiritual adept

r-r;i'" s...- .piri ...... ...kpt

]#fi,rw~

Snyogic ....
pt . cx'OP'p';."
JllDllIIl. &r apviry
JNm.Sn~in,

Y~,iU. 11ft1). l.4I114. -49.

13ft} . , ITl ft4}

z
Zysk. Kcnne'l h, 10nl4

y
y.uomirta. S7ft ll

so.