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1. G.R. No. 168464

January 23, 2006
ZENAIDA RAMOS-BALALIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROLANDO RAMOS, EUSEBIO I. RAMOS EVANGELISTO GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58644
reversing the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July 17, 1996, in
Civil Case No. Br. 23-357 which ruled that herein petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio had a superior right to
possess Lot No. 204, Pls-15, situated at Muoz, Roxas, Isabela, as well as its Resolution3 dated June 14, 2005
denying the motion for reconsideration.
As culled from the records, petitioner Zenaida and her brother Alexander (now deceased) are the children of
spouses Susana Bueno and Abundio Ramos. The spouses started occupying Lot No. 204 in 1938. Abundio died
in 1944. Susana met her second husband, respondent Eusebio Ramos in 1946, with whom she had five children,
one of whom is respondent Rolando.
In the interim, prior to 1958, Susana discovered that Felimon Domingo applied for a sales patent over the
subject parcel of land which she opposed. The Bureau of Lands resolved the dispute, thus:
In the light of the foregoing facts, it is clear that Felimon B. Domingo has not entered, possessed or cultivated
the land in question and therefore he has not acquired any preference right thereto. Upon the other hand
contestant Susana Bueno Vda. de Ramos and her children have sufficiently established their right of preference
over the land except the one hectare Cemetery site, on the basis of their continuous occupation and cultivation
and their valuable improvements introduced thereon.
Wherefore, it is ordered that the Sales Application No. 21992 of Felimon B. Domingo be as hereby it is rejected,
forfeiting in favor of the Government whatever amount have been paid on account thereof. The land in question
shall be subdivided so as to exclude therefrom the one hectare portion in the northwestern part of the land,
which shall be reserved as barrio cemetery site, while the remaining area is hereby allocated to SUSANA
BUENO VDA DE RAMOS who shall file an appropriate application therefore within sixty (60) days after the
survey thereof at her own expense, it not appearing that this Office has received the homestead (new)
application allegedly filed by her for the same land.
SO ORDERED.4
It was alleged that as Susana accompanied her husband Eusebio, a soldier, wherever he was assigned, Susanas
father, George Bueno, and daughter, petitioner Zenaida continued the cultivation and possession of the subject
land. Sometime later, Susana sold the land to petitioner who, in turn, partitioned it among herself, her brother,
Alexander, and respondent Rolando and his siblings. The partition was not registered but Deeds of Sale were
executed in favor of Rolando and Alexander.
Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share; however, it came to her knowledge that respondents Rolando and
Eusebio had usurped her share and deprived the mortgagees of possession over the land. After settling the
mortgage, petitioner filed a case for recovery of inheritance, possession and damages with a petition for
preliminary mandatory injunction.
The trial court had the land surveyed. Subdividing the land into Lots 204-A to 204-H5 based on the actual
possessor or occupant, the survey plan revealed the following:
1. Plaintiff Zenaida Ramos Balalio has no possession, occupation, and cultivation whatsoever of lot 204, Pls-15;
2. Rolando Ramos is in possession and cultivation of lot 204-F, lot 204-G and lot 204-C, with a total area of
43,957 sq. m., more or less;
3. Eusebio Ramos is occupying and cultivating lot 204-A with an area of 4,994 sq. m., more or less;
4. Lot 204-B consisting of 17,685 sq. m., more or less, is possessed and cultivated by Evangelisto Garcia,
another intervenor. His occupation is very much less than the two (2) hectares sold to him by Alexander Ramos.
It is short by 2,311 sq. m., more or less;
5. The total area of the land in question, after deducting one (1) hectare occupied by the cemetery is 73,150 sq.
m., more or less.6
On July 17, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision holding that petitioner was deprived of her right to

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cultivation and possession of her share of Lot No. 204 and thus ruled:
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, Zenaida
Ramos and against Rolando Ramos, defendant, and Eusebio Ramos, intervenor.
1. Ordering Eusebio Ramos to vacate lot 204-A and surrender it to Evangelisto Garcia because he is not entitled
to any portion of the lot in question, it being the conjugal property of the first marriage of Susana Bueno to
Abundio Ramos;
2. Evangelisto Garcia is adjudicated the first two (2) hectares from the North and East of the cemetery, as he
validly bought the area from Alexander Ramos. He is presently occupying only 17,689 sq. m., more or less. His
possession now is increased to two (2) hectares which includes the area being possessed by Eusebio Ramos;
3. The remaining portion of the share of Alexander Ramos is 4,410 sq. m., more or less. This is adjudicated in
favor of his heirs. This portion now corresponds to the area immediately South of the area of Evangelisto
Garcia, the partition being from East to West;
4. The middle portion consisting of 24,410 sq. m., more or less, and immediately South of the cemetery, and also
South of the portion adjudicated to the heirs of Alexander is now given to Zenaida Ramos Balalio as her valid
share of lot 204, the partition being also East to West;
5. South of the share of Zenaida consisting also of 24,410 sq. m., more or less, is the valid share of Rolando
Ramos and his full blooded brother and sisters namely Robin, Corazon, Myrna and Mila, all surnamed Ramos;
6. Rolando Ramos and Eusebio Ramos are ordered jointly and severally to pay Zenaida Ramos:
a. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as attorneys fees;
b. One thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos as appearance fees of her lawyer;
c. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as incidental expenses relative to the case;
d. One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred (P100,800.00) Pesos as the reasonable owners share of the produce
of the land of Zenaida Ramos from 1975 to the present, with an interest of 6% per annum until fully paid;
7. The Clerk of Court and the Sheriff are ordered to repair to the land in question and partition said land in
accordance with the tenor of this decision;
8. And to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that neither Zenaida nor Alexander complied with the homestead
application requirements in order to acquire superior vested right. As a consequence, it reversed the decision of
the trial court, to wit:
As a consequence of the foregoing, the Court rules in favor of appellants as to the fourth error and finds that the
contract supposedly dividing that property among Zenaida, Rolando Ramos and Alexander Ramos cannot be
enforced because neither of the parties therein can claim any vested right over the subject parcel land which is
still part of the public domain.
Also, prescinding from the above ruling, the intervention of Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto Garcia should
likewise be dismissed. As to Eusebio, since Susana never filed an application for homestead, her right never
ripened to ownership which she could have transmitted to her heirs. As to Evangelisto Garcia who supposedly
purchased that share of Alexander (an heir of Susana), since the vendor never inherited anything from Susana
there was nothing which he (Evangelisto) could have bought. In fine, neither of the intervenors could claim any
right which they can enforce in court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. Br. 23357 is REVERSED and the "Complaint" filed by plaintiff-appellee as well as the respective "Answer in
Intervention" of Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto Garcia are all hereby ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
7.1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION AND DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS COMPLAINT.

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7.2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS
NOT IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE SAID LAND, AND DECLARING THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT
WHATSOEVER TO THE DISPUTED LAND.
7.3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE ISSUE OF ACCION
PUBLICIANA IN THE CASE AT BAR AND CONFINED ITSELF TO THE CLAIM OF RECOVERY OF
INHERITANCE.9
The petition is partly meritorious.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and those lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.10 Lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.11
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936), or the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073
(1977), remains to be the general law governing the classification and disposition of alienable lands of the
public domain. It enumerates the different modes of acquisition of these lands and prescribes the terms and
conditions to enable private persons to perfect their title to them. It is, therefore, the applicable law to the case
before us.
A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land Act, a homestead patent is one issued to any citizen of
this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the owner of more than 2412
hectares of land in the country.13 To be qualified, the applicant must show that he has resided continuously for
at least one year in the municipality where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the
land applied for.14
In the case at bar, petitioner Zenaida asserts her right to a parcel of agricultural land that her parents Susana and
Abundio had possessed since 1938. She claims that, for some time, the cultivation of this land was left to her
and her grandfather and that, following the death of her father Abundio, the land was allegedly sold to her by her
mother Susana.
Zenaidas argument is flawed because it assumes that her parents had perfected their title over the land and that
they could validly convey the same to third persons, whether by sale or by inheritance. However, a careful
examination of the records shows that petitioner has not satisfactorily established that a valid application for
homestead patent was filed by her parents. The decision of the Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed
Zenaidas familys right of preference over the land, in view of their possession and cultivation of the land.
Nonetheless, the Bureau of Lands ordered the filing of an appropriate application for its registration which
indicates that as of that time, there was as yet no valid application filed.15
The purported sale, therefore, between petitioner and her mother cannot be given effect, nor can it be a source of
right for Zenaida, because Susana did not have the authority to sell what did not belong to her. The invalidation
of the sale consequently nullifies the partition of the property among Zenaida, Alexander, and Rolando and his
siblings because Zenaida could not have disposed of the land which she did not own.
For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor Rolando can claim any right whatsoever as heirs of Susana. Their
claim evidently relies on the provision of the Public Land Act which states:
Section 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of the patent or the final grant of
the land, or during the life of the lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the
Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations with respect to the
land applied for or granted or leased under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to
them the patent or final concession if they show that they have complied with the requirements therefor, and
who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the purposes of this Act. (Emphasis added)
The reliance is misplaced because the cited provision speaks of an applicant, grantee, or lessee. Susana was not
one of these. In her lifetime, despite her possession and cultivation of the land, she failed to apply for a
homestead patent and to acquire any vested right that Eusebio or Rolando can inherit. As such, the land remains
part of the public domain. Furthermore, Eusebio and Rolando cannot invoke their prior possession and
occupation of the land because the same cannot be considered as adverse, open, public, peaceful and to the
exclusion of all.
Hence, the subject land remains to be part of the public domain and rightfully belongs to the State. As held by
the Court of Appeals, none of the parties obtained a defensible title to the property which can be upheld by the
Court. Nonetheless, the possession of the land is different from the issue of its ownership. Petitioner argues that
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An accion publiciana is an action for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.16 In this case, the
issue is whether Zenaida, as an applicant for public land, may be considered as having any right to the land
occupied, which may entitle her to sue in courts for the return of the possession thereof.
We find that Zenaida has proven prior possession of the portion of land she claims as her share, which
possession antedates the filing of the homestead application. She produced evidence showing that she has filed a
verified application for the registration of the land with the Bureau of Lands on August 10, 1971,17 which is still
pending. The documents remain uncontested and the application has not been assailed by any of the parties to
the case. She alleged that during the lifetime of her mother, she and her maternal grandfather cultivated and
occupied the land.
Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that of her predecessor-in-interest (mother
Susana Bueno) covering the property. Time and again, we have held that although tax declarations or realty tax
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or at least constructive possession.18 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only
ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.19
All told, petitioner Zenaidas uncontested and verified application for a homestead patent coupled with her open
and notorious occupation of the land convinces us of her preferential right to possess the land claimed, which
entitles her to be protected by the law in such possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
16, 2005 is MODIFIED, insofar as to grant petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio preferential possession of the
portion of Lot 204, Pls-15, situated in Muoz, Roxas, Isabela, as delineated in the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July 17, 1996.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
No digest
Note: The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that they are not conclusive evidence of ownership. Nevertheless
the Supreme Court has also consistently held that they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner. [Ramos-Balallo vs. Ramos, 470 SCRA 533 (January 23, 2006)]
2. G.R. No. 73002
December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC.,
respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by
it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
(The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:
1.
That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly
organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2.
That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties
pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes
(paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');

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3.
That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat
tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4.
That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on
October 29, 1962;
5.
That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed
and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel
and Acer Infiel;
6.
That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and
public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the
applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial.
7.
That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8.
That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular
investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9.
That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the
donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the
Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the
Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which
donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special
session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the
correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations
from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition
not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from
the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48.
The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
(c)
Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30
years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were
cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that
Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members
of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and
occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason
thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially
confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to

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acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11
of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to
Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding
lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration
proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on
the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a
similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of
the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing
spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia
Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that
the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not
qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens
or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a
majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of
title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a
juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be
given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand)
alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand)
alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The
proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535,
July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2
thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the
better and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings
cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for
adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for the
necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It
may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but
certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions
were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since
July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act.
So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation

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of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient,
under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no
longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs.
Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable
to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by
himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent. ....
xxx

xxx

xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with,
the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack
of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is
of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and
length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient
and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in
force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from
acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the
Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the
Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or
acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete"
or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the
public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions
then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution
cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of
Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time
the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII
of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one

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thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in
the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx

xxx

xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the
corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt
or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of
segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded
as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise
affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there
being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts,
the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and
registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful
successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases
already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as
a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6.
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land
Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would
be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and
neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the
original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling
of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended
to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly
Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves
applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands
back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more
efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on
amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks
no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the
test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority
opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco

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rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for
confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the
1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main
opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My
dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line
of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public
Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to
'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual
personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to
be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for
brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained
to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful
possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that
said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral family
lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the registration court
(as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June
25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken
to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from
all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if
not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which
failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to
June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such
acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the
necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as
respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such

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conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or
defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the
public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the
aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands (except
a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the
erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners
from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million
investments redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality
of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could
not be impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels
had been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by
the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of title
proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly transferred
to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that
it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the
possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application
which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31,
1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976
and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a
technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly
applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting
the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and
held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the
applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular
circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the
legal question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal
fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the
matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no
such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise,
in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the
lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were
acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the
constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove their
undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year
period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural persons have
fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title,
although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not
defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by
them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to
the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its
rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and
Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural
persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.

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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48.
The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a)

...

(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
(c)

...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease
not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five
hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly
applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion
that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a)
case.

The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the

(b)

After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c)
As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the
Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should
first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows
only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be
impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in
not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and
vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the
original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted,
because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their
names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons)
can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional
provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public
domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted
should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of

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Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed
457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.
Hence, it is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the
provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to
the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be
construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule
against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended
beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is
necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything
which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor
Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the
Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which
would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA
799 [1982] and related cases.
DIGEST:
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)
FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and
Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or
disposable public land or within the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government when the
Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient
and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded
that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in
excess of 1,024 hectares
Note: The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. [Director of Lands vs. Acme Plywood and Veneer Corp. & IAC, 146 SCRA 509.

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3. G.R. No. 163751

March 31, 2006
ANECITO CALIMPONG and wife [NARCISA YGUAS],* Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF FILOMENA GUMELA represented by FLAVIA MOLINA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
Complying with the order issued on December 10, 1927 by Auxiliary Judge Mariano Buyson Lampa of the then
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in Cadastral Case No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record No. 757 for the registration, in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, of Lot No. 3013 of the Cadastral Survey of
Dipolog (the lot) located in Anastacio, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte in the names of Filomena, Dionisio,
Eusebio, Victoria, Fortunata, Serapio, Hipolito, Victor, Romualdo and Miguel, all surnamed Gumela1 who were
therein decreed "the owners in fee simple" of the lot, Decree No. 342638 was issued on October 19, 1928, as
attested by Enrique Altavas, Chief of the General Land Registration Office. Despite the issuance of the decree, it
appears that no certificate of title was issued and registered in the names of the Gumelas.
By the claim of the Heirs of the Gumelas (the heirs), they hired an overseer in-charge of the cultivation of the
lot.
In 1992, the heirs agreed to partition the estate of their predecessors-in-interest which includes the lot. They
soon learned, however, that the lot was being occupied by Anecito Calimpong (Calimpong).
It turned out that Calimpong filed in 1976 an application for Free Patent over the lot, which application he
followed up with the Bureau of Lands when his possession was "disturbed" by the heirs.
The heirs thus filed on July 27, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City a complaint2 for quieting
of title, damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction against Calimpong and his wife.
In the meantime, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) Hilarion L. Ramos approved
Calimpongs Free Patent application, by Order3 of August 17, 1993, in light of the following findings:
1. That the applicant is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and is otherwise qualified to acquire public lands
through Free Patent;
2. That the land applied for has been classified as alienable and disposable and is subject to disposition under the
public land laws;
3. That upon investigation conducted by Deputy Public Land Inspector Marciano I. Carangan, whose report was
duly indorsed by LMO-III Designate, Ramon S. Pacatang, it was found out that the land applied for has been
occupied and cultivated by the applicant himself and/or through his predecessor-in-interest, since July 4, 1945 or
prior thereto;
4. That the Notice of the acquisition of the land by the Applicant under this application has been published in
accordance with Law and that no person has proven a better right to the land applied for;
5. That the claim of the applicant is in all other respects, complete and there is no records in this office or any
obstacle to the issuance of patent; and
6. That there is no adverse claim involving the land applied for still pending determination in this office;
(Underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the Order disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the occupation and cultivation of the land applied for as described in the caption hereof is
hereby confirmed and this application is then hereby entered in the records of this office as Free Patent Entry
No. 372.
As the applicant has already complied with all the requirements of the law for the issuance of the corresponding
patent to the land, it is also hereby ordered that the necessary patent be prepared for the issuance in favor of the
Applicant.4 (Underscoring supplied)
On August 17, 1993, Patent No. 09721093961 was issued to Calimpong which was forwarded to the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte for registration and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.5
On August 19, 1993, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-337806 was issued by and registered in the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Zamboanga del Norte in the name of Calimpong.

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To the complaint of the heirs, the spouses Calimpong alleged in their September 3, 1993 Answer with
Counterclaim7 that, inter alia, assuming that the lot was adjudicated to the Gumelas, "the same ha[d] been
considered long abandoned because neither the adjudicatee[s] nor any of the heirs have pursued the titling of the
land, cultivation, improvement and possession." In any event, the spouses Calimpong informed that a Free
Patent and an OCT over the lot had already been issued in the name of Calimpong by the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte.
The heirs thus filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint8 impleading as additional defendants PENRO and
the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, seeking as additional reliefs the nullification of OCT No. P33780 and Free Patent No. 09721093961.
The amended complaint9 was admitted by the Dipolog RTC, by Resolution10 of February 8, 1994.
After trial on the merits, the trial court, by Decision11 of February 28, 2001, rendered judgment in favor of the
heirs. It held that, among other things, the title of the heirs is based on a grant thereof to their predecessors-ininterest by the government in cadastral proceedings and by such grant, the lot ceased to be part of public domain
as it had become private property, hence, not subject to free patent application. It thus concluded that the free
patent and the title issued to Calimpong were null and void. The decretal portion of the trial courts decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court declares the herein plaintiffs being the hereditary successors of
the adjudicatees mentioned in the Decree (Exhibit "L"), are the rightful owners of Lot No. 3013, Cad. Survey of
Dipolog under Cad. Case No. 5, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. 757, situated at Anastacio, Polanco, Zamboanga del
Norte and, as prayed for in the complaint, in order to remove clouds cast on it by the claim of the defendants
Free Patent No. 09721093961 issued by the PENRO of Zamboanga del Norte, as well as the Original Certificate
of Title No. P-33780 issued by said office and the Office of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, are
hereby declared null and void; the defendants are hereby ordered to turn over the peaceful possession of the land
in question unto plaintiffs; the plaintiffs, upon proper petition filed in Court, may ask the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte to cause the issuance of a Certificate of Title under the same terms and conditions as
stated in the Decree issued to Lot No. 3013, with such decree as basis thereof.
No damages awarded, the same not being proved.12 (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal, the appellate court, by the challenged Decision13 of January 26, 2004, affirmed in toto that of the
trial court.
Hence, the present petition of the spouses Calimpong (hereafter petitioners) faulting the appellate court in:
1. . . . [not] holding that [they are the] true and real owners of the land in question[.]
2. . . . [not] declaring . . . Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 .. as valid and legally issued[.]
3. . . . giving weight to the alleged title in the name of respondents predecessors in interest which was not found
or existing in the records of the Register of Deeds neither presented or offered in evidence by them[.]
4. . . . appreciating in respondents favor their inability to show proof that they ever filed a petition for judicial
reconstitution of said title, if at all, it actually existed[.]
5. . . . failing to consider respondents alleged payment of taxes to the land started only in 1993 at the time that
this case had already been instituted in court[.]
6. . . . [not] holding that laches, more than prescription, applies in this case[.]
7. . . . resolving that the existing Original Certificate of Title issued in favor of petitioners coupled with the
latters actual possession, not the ghost, alleged title of the respondents predecessors[-]in[-]interest, should
entitle the indefeasibility of the torrens system[.]14
The petition fails.
It is undisputed that the lot was judicially adjudicated and an order for the registration of the lot in the name of
the predecessors-in-interest of the heirs (hereafter respondent) as "owners in fee simple" was issued on
December 10, 1927, and that a decree of registration was issued on October 19, 1928, to wit:
xxxx
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act in the name of said Filomena Gumela, Dionisio Gumela, . . . subject, however, to such of the
[e]ncumbrances mentioned in article 39 of said Law as may be subsisting, and to a first lien in favor of the

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Insular Government to guarantee the payment of the special taxes assessed pursuant to the provisions of section
18 of Act 2259, as amended.
Witness the Honorable Mariano Buyson Lampa, Auxiliary Judge of said Court, the 10th day of December, A.
D., nineteen hundred and twenty-seven.
Issued at Manila, P.I, the 19th day of October A. D. 1928, at 10:03 a.m.
x x x x15
Nothing in the records shows that the order of adjudication was appealed, questioned or set aside.
In De la Merced v. Court of Appeals,16 this Court held:
. . . [T]he title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal
from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such appeal having been perfected. The
certificate of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the
land where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.1awphil.net
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the
certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had
already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of
ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for
all intents and purposes, had become from that time, registered property which could not be acquired by adverse
possession.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the immediately-quoted pronouncement in De la Merced, the title of ownership on the adjudicatees,
the Gumelas-predecessors-in-interest of respondent, was vested on December 10, 1927.
Whether a certificate of title was issued in the name of respondents predecessors-in-interest is immaterial. For,
following De la Merced, the title of ownership on respondents predecessors-in-interest was vested as of 1927.
The lot, for all intents and purposes, had become from said date registered property which could not be acquired
by adverse possession and was, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau of the
DENR (formerly the Bureau of Lands) to subject it to free patent.
Under the provision of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private respondents predecessor in interest
was issued, the President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a
free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued
is null and void. The nullity arises not, from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and
does not cover lands privately owned. The purpose of the legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act,
Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in private
ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold
or fee title, or of private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the
purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any
manner in the title of the Act and the same are excluded from the provisions of the text thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) 18
Since the DENR had no authority to grant a free patent over the lot, Free Patent No. 09721093961 issued on
August 17, 1993 by the PENRO of Zamboanga del Norte and Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 issued
on August 19, 1993 by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in favor of petitioner Calimpong are null
and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Digest:
ANECITO CALIMPONG et al. v. HEIRS OF FILOMENA GUMELA
486 SCRA 441 (2006)
The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately
owned.
The subject lot was acquired by the heirs through a cadastral proceeding. The heirs of Gumelas (heirs) decreed
the owners in fee simple of a lot located in Zamboanga Del Norte without certificate of title was issued and

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registered in their names. The respondent heirs of Gumelas learned that the lot was being occupied by petitioner
Calimpong.
It turned out that Calimpong filed in 1976 an application for Free Patent over the lot, which the application he
followed up with the Bureau of Lands when his possession was disturbed by the heirs. The heirs thereafter
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City a complaint for quieting of title, damages, with prayer for
preliminary injunction against Calimpong and his wife. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
was issued in the name of Calimpong.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs. It held that the title of the heirs is based on a grant thereof to
the predecessors-in-interest by the government in cadastral proceedings and by such grant, the lot ceased to be
part of the public domain as it become private property. It concluded that the free patent and the title issued to
Calimpong were null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bureau of Lands has the authority to grant a Free Patent for a land ceased to be a public land
HELD:
Under the provision of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of Heirs predecessor in interest was issued, the
President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent for
land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership, and a title so issued is null and
void. The nullity arises not, from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and does not
cover lands privately owned. The purpose of the legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act, Act No.
2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public domain, and lands held in private ownership are
not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee title, or
of private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of
said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the subject of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in
the title of the Act and the same are excluded from the provisions of the text thereof.
Since the DENR had no authority to grant a free patent over the lot, Free Patent No. 09721093961 issued on
August 17, 1993 by the PENRO of Zamboanga del Norte and Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 issued
on August 19, 1993 by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in favor of petitioner Calimpong are null
and void.
Notes:
THE TITLE OF OWNERSHIP ON THE LAND IS VESTED UPON THE OWNER UPON EXPIRATION OF
THE PERIOD TO APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OR ADJUDICATION BY THE CADASTRAL COURT
The land had become a registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession and, therefore,
beyond the jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau, to subject it to a free patent. The free patent issued by
the DENR and the certificate of the title issued by the Register of Deeds are null and void. [Calimpong vs.
Heirs of Filomena Gumela, 468 SCRA 441 (March 31, 2006), citing De la Merced vs. CA, 5 SCRA 240]
The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free patent
for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to private ownership; and a title so issued is null
and void. The nullity arises not from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. [Calimpong vs. Heirs of Filomena Gumela, 468 SCRA 441 (March 31,
2006), citing De la Merced vs. CA, 5 SCRA 240]
4. G.R. No. 133168
March 28, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,1
vs.
BENJAMIN GUERRERO, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
decision2 dated February 12, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50298 affirming an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-3899, entitled "Petition for
Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin
Guerrero, Registry of Deeds of Quezon City."
The assailed decision of the CA recites the facts as follows:
Sometime in December 1964, respondent Benjamin Guerrero filed with the Bureau of Lands (now Lands
Management Bureau) a Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-83191 covering a parcel of land situated at

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Pugad Lawin, Quezon City, consisting of 256 square meters. Upon favorable report and recommendation of the
District Land Officer, Guerreros application was approved per Order of Award (Exhibit "B"), with the
boundaries of the land awarded specified as follows: N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801; S-Culiat Creek; E-Road; and
W-Public Land. A sketch of the land awarded is contained at the back of the Order of Award.
Subsequently, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982 was issued in favor of respondent.
Pursuant thereto the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982.
On July 29, 1983, one Angelina Bustamante filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands claiming that respondent
obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or omission of material facts considering
that 174 square meters awarded to respondent covered the land where her house is situated and where she has
been residing since 1961.
A formal investigation was conducted by the Bureau of Lands, after which the Director of Lands issued an order
dismissing the protest of Angelina Z. Bustamante. The dismissal of the protest was affirmed by the then Minister
of Natural Resources and by the Office of the President in a Decision dated July 22, 1985.
Bustamante filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated July 22, 1985. Acting on the motion for
reconsideration, the President, , ordered that the case be remanded to the DENR [Department of Environment
and Natural Resources] for the latters office to conduct an ocular investigation and resurvey of the disputed
area. The said directive is contained in the Order dated October 30, 1987(Exhibit "J").
Pursuant to the order of the Office of the President, an ocular investigation and relocation survey was conducted
by the DENR. A report (Exhibit "K") was thereafter submitted with a finding that 83 square meters of the titled
property of Guerrero consisting of 174 square meters is under ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION of Marcelo
Bustamante (husband of Angelina Bustamante) with only 91 square meters under the physical possession of
Guerrero. It was also found out that OCT No. 0-28 is supposed to be traversed by a road 3 meters wide, as even
the Order of Award in favor of Guerrero, shows by the boundaries of the land indicated therein, viz: bounded on
the N-Lot No. 10-C, Psd-37801, S-Culiat Creek, E-Road and W-Public Land.
On January 10, 1989, the Office of the President, upon receipt of the [DENR] Ocular Investigation and
Relocation Survey Report (Exhibit "K") , issued an order directing the DENR to implement the Report for
the proper correction of the technical description of the land covered by OCT No. 0-28 issued to respondent.
Pursuant to the directive of the Office of the President, the Director of Lands [on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines] instituted the instant action [Petition for Amendment of Plan and Technical Description of OCT No.
0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero] on November 7, 1989.
On April 6, 1990, the [respondent] Benjamin Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss the petition , alleging among
other things, that the RTC of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the Director of Lands petition and that
the said petition was defective in form and substance, inasmuch as it failed to name [Guerrero] who holds a
certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) over the properties subject of the petition, as respondent in the action, and that
the title sought to be amended was irrevocable and can no longer be questioned.
In its order dated July 8, 1992, the lower court denied the said motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Trial of the
petition followed with the Director of Lands, on one hand, and [Guerrero], on the other, presenting their
respective evidence and witnesses.3 [Words in bracket added.]
On July 13, 1995, the RTC, on the postulate that petitioner Republic failed to prove its allegation that respondent
obtained the sales patent and the certificate of title through fraud and misrepresentation, rendered judgment
finding for the latter. The trial court likewise ruled that the original certificate of title (OCT No. 0-28) in the
name of respondent acquired the characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of one (1) year from the
entry of the decree of registration.
Consequently, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which, in a decision dated February 12, 1998, affirmed
that of the trial court, rationalizing as follows:
It is a settled rule that a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is as
conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued upon private lands in ordinary or cadastral
registration proceedings. The effect of registration of a homestead or any other similar patent and the issuance of
a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if
ownership had been determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and
indisputable.
In the same way, therefore, that a decree of registration may be reviewed or reopened within one year after the
entry thereof, upon a charge of actual fraud, a patent awarded in accordance with the Public Land Law may be
reviewed within one year from the date of the order for the issuance of the patent also on the ground of actual
fraud.

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xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx there is no showing that at the time the [respondent] applied for his miscellaneous sales patent, there
were third persons who had been in occupation of the land applied for. While subsequent survey documents,
prepared as a consequence of the protest filed by the Bustamentes, report the possession of the Bustamantes of a
portion of the land, and the erection of their house thereon, these reports do not indicate if such structures were
existing at the time the application of the [respondent] was filed in 1964.
There is no support, therefore, to the submission that the [respondent] was guilty of actual fraud in the
acquisition of his miscellaneous sales patent, and subsequently, OCT No. 0-28.4 (Words in bracket added)
Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied by the appellate court
in its resolution of March 23, 1998.5
Hence, this recourse, petitioner Republic contending that the appellate court erred in holding I. That a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public lands is conclusive and
indefeasible despite the fact that respondents title was procured through fraud and misrepresentation.
II. That there is no basis for the submission that respondent was guilty of actual fraud in the acquisition of his
miscellaneous sales patent despite the final ruling of the Office of the President from which ruling respondent
did not appeal.
III. That the Director of Lands cannot raise the issue of possession of a third person of the land, or a portion
thereof, after the award and issuance of the patent to the applicant despite the obvious fact that the protest was
filed within one year from the issuance of patent.6
Petitioner argues in esse that respondent procured his sales patent and certificate of title through fraud and
misrepresentation. To support its basic posture, petitioner points to the verification survey conducted by Engr.
Ernesto Erive of the DENR, which, to petitioner, argues for the proposition that respondents entitlement to a
public land award should have been limited to a 91-square meter area instead of the 174 square meters
eventually granted.
On the other hand, respondent contends that his OCT No. 0-28 which he secured pursuant to a sales patent is
conclusive and indefeasible under the Torrens system of registration. As such, his title can no longer be altered,
impugned or cancelled.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the essential issue raised in this Petition the presence of fraud is
factual. As a general rule, this Court does not review factual matters, as only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. And as the Court has consistently held, factual findings of
trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive on this Court,7 save when the
judgment of the appellate court is based on a misapprehension of facts or factual inferences manifestly incorrect
or when that court overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.8 Obviously, petitioner is invoking these exceptions toward having the Court review the factual
determinations of the CA.
The basic issue in this case turns on whether or not petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent procured Miscellaneous Sales Patent (MSP) No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 through fraud and
misrepresentation.
It bears to stress that the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and disposed of
via a miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were
brought under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under
the Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to
the fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.9 As it were, the Torrens system aims to
obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate
and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further; on the part of the registered owner, the system
gives him complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily
disposed of any right over the covered land.10
Section 122 of Act No. 496 provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands belonging to the Government of the [Republic of the Philippines] are
alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official
issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument
before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province where the land lies and to
be there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a certificate shall be entered as in other cases

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of registered land, and an owners duplicate certificate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of
conveyance from the Government shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only
as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of
deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in
all cases under this Act registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the
land lies. xxx. (Words in bracket added)
Upon its registration, the land falls under the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time and
again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the
person whose name appears thereon.11
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action to
reopen or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. Section 38 of Act No. 496 says so:
SEC. 38. xxx. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the
exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the
[Republic of the Philippines] and all the branches thereof, . Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, minority, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees, subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of the land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] a petition for review of the decree of registration within one year after entry of the
decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of
one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. xxx.
(Emphasis and words in bracket supplied)
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception
practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed
as a fraud because of its detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even though
the act is not done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.12
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to
an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated therein. The fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in court and thus prevent
them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the applicant.13
The distinctions assume significance because only actual and extrinsic fraud had been accepted and is
contemplated by the law as a ground to review or reopen a decree of registration. Thus, relief is granted to a
party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are
not contested when in fact they are; or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims; or in
deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice; or in inducing him not to oppose an application; or in
misrepresenting about the identity of the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw
his application. In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud,
therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.14
We have repeatedly held that relief on the ground of fraud will not be granted where the alleged fraud goes into
the merits of the case, is intrinsic and not collateral, and has been controverted and decided. Thus, we have
underscored the denial of relief where it appears that the fraud consisted in the presentation at the trial of a
supposed forged document, or a false and perjured testimony, or in basing the judgment on a fraudulent
compromise agreement, or in the alleged fraudulent acts or omissions of the counsel which prevented the
petitioner from properly presenting the case.15
Petitioner fails to convince the Court that the facts relied upon by it to justify a review of the decree constitute
actual and extrinsic fraud. It has not adduced adequate evidence that would show that respondent employed
actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably
failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its right over the lot in question and from properly presenting
its case by reason of such fraud. In fact, other than its peremptory statement in its petition filed before the trial
court that "the patentee, Benjamin Guerrero, obtained the above indicated sales patent through fraud, false
statement of facts and/or omission of material facts,"16 petitioner did not specifically allege how fraud was
perpetrated by respondent in procuring the sales patent and the certificate of title. Nor was any evidence
proffered to substantiate the allegation. Fraud cannot be presumed, and the failure of petitioner to prove it
defeats it own cause.
Well-settled is the rule that the party alleging fraud or mistake in a transaction bears the burden of proof.17 The
circumstances evidencing fraud are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. It may assume
different shapes and forms; it may be committed in as many different ways.18 Thus, the law requires that fraud
be established, not just by preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.19

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Petitioner relies heavily on the verification survey report20 which stated that respondent Guerrero was entitled
to only 91 square meters of the subject lot instead of 174 square meters which was awarded to him. There is,
however, no proof that the area eventually awarded to respondent was intentionally and fraudulently increased.
It was never proven that respondent was a party to any fraud that led to the award of a bigger area of 174 square
meters instead of 91 square meters. Petitioner even failed to give sufficient proof of any error which may have
been committed by its agents who had surveyed the subject property nor had petitioner offered a sensible
explanation as to the reason for such discrepancy. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions must be respected.
This Court agrees with the RTC that the issuance of the sales patent over the subject lot was made in accordance
with the procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act.21 Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the
veracity of the material facts set out in the application.22 The law also requires sufficient notice to the
municipality and barrio where the land is located in order to give adverse claimants the opportunity to present
their claims.23
In the instant case, records reveal that on December 22, 1964, a day after respondent filed his miscellaneous
sales application, an actual investigation and site verification of the parcel of land was conducted by Land
Investigator Alfonso Tumbocon who reported that the land was free from claims and conflicts.24 Likewise, the
notice of sale of the lot in question was posted at the District Land Office in San Miguel, Manila, at the Quezon
City Hall, and at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City for 30 consecutive days from February 17, 1965 to March 17, 1965
which was the date scheduled for the sale of the lot. The said notice was worded as follows:
If there is any adverse claim to the land, such claim must be filed at the Bureau of Lands, Manila on or before
the date of the sale; otherwise such claim shall forever be barred.25
Further, the "Order of Award" 26 dated May 20, 1971, as well as the "Issuance of Patent"27 dated June 28, 1982
were both duly signed by the Director of Lands. The "Order of Award" even declared that Guerrero has in good
faith established his residence on the land in question. On the other hand, the "Issuance of Patent" stated that the
land consisting of 174 square meters is free from any adverse claim and that Guerrero has fully paid the
purchase price of the lot. Having complied with all the requirements of the law preliminary to the issuance of
the patent, respondent was thus issued MSP No. 8991 dated August 16, 1982. Thereafter, the corresponding
OCT No. 0-28 was issued on August 27, 1982 in the name of respondent Guerrero.
At any rate, by legal presumption, public officers are deemed to have regularly performed their official duties.
Thus, the proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of MSP No. 8991 and OCT No. 0-28 in
respondents name are presumptively regular and proper. To overturn this legal presumption will not only
endanger judicial stability, but also violate the underlying principle of the Torrens system. Indeed, to do so
would reduce the vaunted legal indefeasibility of Torrens titles to meaningless verbiage.28 Besides, this
presumption of regularity has not been overcome by the evidence presented by petitioner. We, therefore, cannot
sustain petitioners contention that fraud tainted the sales patent granted to respondent Guerrero, as well as the
certificate of title issued in consequence thereof.
Granting that Guerrero committed extrinsic and actual fraud, petitioner failed to avail itself of the remedy within
the prescribed period. Under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration must be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree.
In the case of public land grants or patents, the one-year period commences from the issuance of the patent by
the government.29
In the instant case, the sales patent was issued to respondent on August 16, 1982, while petitioner instituted an
action to amend respondents certificate of title on November 7, 1989 or after the lapse of more than seven (7)
years from the issuance of the patent. Clearly, petitioner failed to timely avail of the remedy to contest
Guerreros title.
Petitioner argues that the right of the State for the reversion of unlawfully acquired property is not barred by
prescription. Thus, it can still recover the land granted to respondent.
True, prescription, basically, does not run against the State and the latter may still bring an action, even after the
lapse of one year, for the reversion to the public domain of lands which have been fraudulently granted to
private individuals.30 However, this remedy of reversion can only be availed of in cases of fraudulent or
unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title. In the present case, petitioner cannot successfully
invoke this defense for, as discussed earlier, it was never proven that respondents patent and title were obtained
through actual fraud or other illegal means.
Lest it be overlooked, a piece of land covered by a registered patent and the corresponding certificate of title
ceases to be part of the public domain. As such, it is considered a private property over which the Director of
Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.31

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Petitioner likewise insists that respondents title had yet to attain the status of indefeasibility. As argued,
Angelina Bustamante was able to timely file a protest on July 29, 1983, which was well within the one-year
prescriptive period.
We do not agree.
While Angelina Bustamante indeed protested the award of a sales patent in favor of respondent, the protest was,
however, filed with the Bureau of Lands instead of with the regional trial court as mandated by the aforequoted
provision of Section 38 of Act No. 496. Said provision expressly states that a petition for review of a decree of
registration shall be filed in the "proper Court of First Instance" (now Regional Trial Court). The law did not say
that such petition may be filed with an administrative agency like the Bureau of Lands. To be sure, what the law
contemplates in allowing a review of the decree of registration is a full-blown trial before a regular court where
each party could be afforded full opportunity to present his/its case and where each of them must establish his
case by preponderance of evidence and not by mere substantial evidence, the usual quantum of proof required in
administrative proceedings. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing, than that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of
truth.32 On the other hand, substantial evidence refers to such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.33
As the review of a decree of registration constitutes an attack on the very integrity of land titles and the Torrens
system, a full-blown trial on the merits before a regular court is necessary for the purpose of achieving a more
in-depth and thorough determination of all issues involved.
Hence, contrary to petitioners assertion, the protest filed by Bustamante with the Bureau of Lands cannot be
considered in the context of a petition to review the decree of registration issued to respondent. It was only on
November 7, 1989 that such petition was filed by the Director of Lands with the RTC and obviously, it was way
beyond the one-year period prescribed by law.
It is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers
title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the
system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be
even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens
system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the
law are satisfied.34
Instead of stabilizing the Torrens system, petitioner, in filing a suit for the amendment of OCT No. 0-28,
derogates the very integrity of the system as it gives the impression to Torrens title holders, like herein
respondent, that their titles can be questioned by the same authority who had approved their titles. In that case,
no Torrens title holder shall be at peace with the ownership and possession of his land, for land registration
officers can question his title any time they make a finding unfavorable to said title holder. This is all the more
frustrating for respondent Guerrero considering that he had bought the subject lot from the government itself,
the very same party who is now impugning his title.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of registration of titles to
lands,35 justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the
mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest
damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to
any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the
registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.36 Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever
be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have
regularly performed their duties.37
Respondents certificate of title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was thus vested with the
garment of indefeasibility.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

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Digest:
REPUBLIC VS BENJAMIN GUERRERO G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006
FACTS: December 1964: Benjamin Guerrerro filed with the Bureau of Lands a Miscellaneous Sales
Application covering a parcel of land situated at Pugad Lawin, Quezon City. This application was approved and
Miscellaneous Sales Patent was issued subsequent thereto. Angelina Bustamante later filed a protest with the
Bureau of Lands claiming that Guerrero obtained the sales patent through fraud, false statement of facts and/or
omission of material facts. This was however dismissed by the Director of lands and further affirmed by then
Minister of Natural Resources. Through a MFR, an ocular investigation and relocation survey found out that
83 sq. m. of the titled property of Guerrero is under actual physical possession of Marcelo Bustamante, husband
of Angeluna. Thus, upon the directive of the Office of The President, the Director of Lands instituted a petition
for the amendment of plan and technical description. Guerrero opposed said motion through a motion to
dismiss but however was dismissed thereafter. However, the RTC ruled in favor of Guerrero stating that the
Republic failed to prove its allegation that Guerrero obtained the sales patent and certificate of title through
fraud and misrepresentation. RTC also ruled that the original certificate of title in the name of Guerrero acquired
the characteristics of indefeasibility after the expiration of 1 year from the entry of the decree of registration. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES: 1. W/N the Republic has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Guerrero procured
Miscellaneous Sales Patent and OCT through fraud and misrepresentation.
2. W/N Guerreros title acquired the characteristic of indefeasibility.
HELD: 1. NO. the property in question, while once part of the lands of the public domain and disposed of via a
miscellaneous sales arrangement, is now covered by a Torrens certificate. Grants of public land were brought
under the operation of the Torrens system by Act No. 496, or the Land Registration Act of 1903. Under the
Torrens system of registration, the government is required to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the
fact that the person named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and
encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. Upon its registration, the land falls under
the operation of Act No. 496 and becomes registered land. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens
certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon.
However, Section 38 of Act No. 496 recognizes the right of a person deprived of land to institute an action to
reopen or revise a decree of registration obtained by actual fraud. However, the Republic in this case failed to
prove that there is actual and extrinsic fraud to justify a review of the decree. It has not adduced adequate
evidence that would show that respondent employed actual and extrinsic fraud in procuring the patent and the
corresponding certificate of title. Petitioner miserably failed to prove that it was prevented from asserting its
right over the lot in question and from properly presenting its case by reason of such fraud.
2. YES. Guerreros title, having been registered under the Torrens system, was vested with th garment of
indefeasibility. NB: The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the
sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual
after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in
the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be
even more abrasive, if not even violent. The government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens
system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the
law are satisfied. While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands but merely a system of
registration of titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the absence of proof of his
complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet
title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in
the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the
Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are
ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties.
Note:
Prescription does not run against the State and the latter may still bring an action, even after the lapse of one
year, for the reversion of the land to the public domain, of land which have been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. [Republic vs. Guerrero, 485 SCRA 424 (March 28, 2006)]
5. G.R. Nos. 170096-97
March 3, 2006
RICARDO SANTOS and PAULA SANTOS WONG, Petitioners,
vs.
ILUMINADA CRUZ, represented by Attorney-in-fact GLORIA ISRAEL, JUDGE FRANCISCO LINDO,
MeTC, Branch 55, Malabon City, Respondents.
DECISION

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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Joint Decision1 dated July 15,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, City of Malabon, which reversed the Joint Decision2 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, City of Malabon.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows.
Respondent Iluminada Cruz is the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-19968 and TCT No. 19973
of the Registry of Deeds of the City of Malabon, portions of which were occupied by petitioners Ricardo Santos
and Paula Wong, respectively.
Respondent Cruz filed two actions for ejectment docketed as Civil Case Nos. JL00-346 and JL00-347, against
petitioners alleging that the latter entered her lot without her consent and built thereon structures without her
permission; that petitioners, being her relatives, were allowed to stay free of charge on condition that they will
vacate the premises upon demand; despite repeated demands, petitioners refused to vacate the said lots, and in
view of the failure of the contending parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent was constrained to
file the instant suit.
In answer, petitioner Ricardo Santos and spouse admitted respondents ownership of the land covered by TCT
No. M-19968 but alleged that 177 sq. m. thereof was sold to them on August 28, 1978 as evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale3 in their favor.
Petitioner Paula Wong, while admitting respondents ownership of the lot covered by TCT No. 19973, averred
that a portion thereof, measuring 142 sq. m., was sold to her husband Marcos Santos by the respondent under a
Subdivision Agreement with Contract of Sale dated July 31, 1976.4
In a Joint Decision dated February 4, 2005, the Metropolitan Trial Court of the City of Malabon, Branch 55
rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the plaintiff to prove by preponderance of evidence her cause of actions alleged in
the complaint, the case is hereby dismissed with cost against the plaintiffs (sic) while the defendants[]
counterclaims in both cases for payment of attorneys fee[]s are likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied, respondent Cruz filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Malabon which
reversed and set aside the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the lower court having committed reversible error, the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and new one entered:
1. Appealed Case No. A5-014-MN (Civil Case No. JLOO-346)
a) Ordering the defendants Ricardo Santos and his spouse, and all persons claiming rights under them, to vacate
and demolish their structures/houses on the premises located at M. Sioson St., Dampalit, Malabon City, Metro
Manila and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff and/or any of her authorized representative;
b) Ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, a reasonable amount of Php20,000.00 monthly from
October 21, 2002, the date of the demand letter, for their continued use of the premises involved until they
finally vacate and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff without the structures/houses which they built
thereon;
c) Ordering defendants-appellees jointly and severally, to pay an amount of Php30,000.00 as and for attorneys
fees plus the costs of the suit.
2. Appealed Case No. A5-015-MN (Civil Case No. JLOO-347)
a) Ordering the defendant Paula Santos, and all persons claiming rights under her, to vacate and demolish her
structure/house on the premises involved located at M. Sioson St., Dampalit, Malabon City, Metro Manila and
surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff and/or any of her authorized representative;
b) Ordering the defendant-appellee to pay, a reasonable amount of Php20,000.00 monthly from October 21,
2002, the date of the demand letter, for her continued use of the premises involved until she finally vacates and
surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiff without the structure/house which she built thereon;
c) Ordering defendant-appellee to pay the amount of Php30,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus the costs of
the suit.

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SO ORDERED.6
Without moving for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before this Court decrying the
alleged violation by the Regional Trial Court of their right to procedural and substantive due process. However,
in view of the manifest violation of the procedural requirements, the Court issued a Resolution on October 3,
20057 ordering the petitioners to:
a) PAY the amount of P1,230.00 as balance for docket and other legal fees as required under Sec. 3, Rule 46 in
relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56; and
b) SUBMIT: (1) a certification against forum shopping, that is, a certification under oath by petitioners that they
have not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues thereof in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or in the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other
action or proceeding, they must state the status of the same; and if they should thereafter learn that a similar
action has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, they undertake to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom as required by Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46 in
relation to Sec. 2, Rule 56 and Sec. 5, Rule 7; (2) a statement of material date showing when notice of the
assailed RTC joint decision was received, to show that the petition was filed on time pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 65
in relation to the second paragraph of Sec. 3, Rule 46; (3) proof of service (e.g., a written admission of the party
served, an affidavit of the party serving/registry receipts) of the petition on the lower courts concerned and on
the adverse parties as required by Sec. 2(c), Rule 56, the third paragraph of Sec. 3, Rule 46 in relation to the first
paragraph of Sec. 2, Rule 56 and Sec. 13, Rule 13; and (4) proof of authority of Ricardo Santos to sign the
verification in behalf of the other petitioner. (Emphasis added)
After having paid the balance of the docket fees, petitioners submitted a two-page petition dated November 4,
2005,8 which purportedly was in compliance with the October 3, 2005 Resolution. A cursory perusal of the
petition however, showed that it had the same procedural infirmities as the original petition. The petition was
written in old and torn piece of scratch paper, which does not look like a formal pleading. The petition lacked
certification against forum shopping, a statement of the material date showing when notice of the assailed
decision was received, proof of service, and proof of authority of Ricardo Santos to sign the verification on
behalf of the other petitioner.
Even on the merits, petitioners case will not prosper. Petitioners anchor their claim of ownership on the
photocopies of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1978 executed in favor of Ricardo Santos
and his spouse and the Subdivision Agreement with Contract of Sale dated July 31, 1976 allegedly executed in
favor of Paula Wong and her deceased husband Marcos Santos. On the other hand, respondent Cruz relies for
her claim of ownership in the transfer certificates of title covering the assailed properties registered in her name.
These certificates of title, specifically TCT No. M- 19968 and TCT No. 19973, being genuine and valid on their
face, are incontrovertible, indefeasible, and conclusive against petitioners and the whole world. Thus, the
unregistered deed of sale and the subdivision contract upon which petitioners rely cannot prevail over the
certificate of title in the name of respondent Cruz. To hold otherwise is to defeat the primary object of the
Torrens System which is to make the Torrens Title indefeasible and valid against the whole world.
In filing the instant petition for certiorari, petitioners contend that their right to due process was violated by the
trial court. However, other than a general statement of such fact, the petition does not state what specific acts or
omissions were committed by the lower court that would constitute a violation of petitioners right to due
process to warrant the invocation of the equitable remedy of certiorari.
The petition must allege the facts showing that the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess, or
with grave abuse of discretion, with prayer that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board, or officer. It must likewise allege that the petitioners, through a motion for reconsideration,
has called the attention of the lower court upon such error or irregularity and asked for its correction, unless
such previous motion for reconsideration was unnecessary either because the proceeding in which the error
occurred is a patent nullity, or because the question of want or excess of jurisdiction had been squarely raised
and submitted in the lower court and the latter had squarely met and decided the same.9
As a general rule, the special civil action of certiorari may only be availed when the lower court or any of its
officers, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. When an appeal is in itself a sufficient and adequate
remedy that would promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the order or judgment
complained of, existence of that appeal would bar the institution of the remedy of certiorari.10
The case of Cervantes v. Court of Appeals,11 citing Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga,12
clarified that "plain" and "adequate remedy" referred to in the foregoing Rule is a motion for reconsideration of
the assailed Order or Resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari,13 subject to certain exceptions, to wit:

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(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
In Cervantes v. Court of Appeals,14 we further stressed that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a
writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law
and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration
is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must
show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so.
In the case at bar, petitioners did not file a prior motion for reconsideration from the decision of the trial court.
Even as they alleged in the petition that the lower court acted without jurisdiction when it rendered a decision
without due process in the proceedings, the averment of facts was incomplete.
Moreover, the instant petition for certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Disregard of this rule warrants the dismissal of the petition. While the Courts
original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not allow an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.15
Petitioners have not alleged sufficient ground why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. Thus, we
reaffirm the established rule that this Court will not entertain a direct appeal unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for insufficiency of form and substance. The assailed Joint Decision
dated July 15, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, City of Malabon, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
No digest
Note:
T.C.T. No. M-19968 and T.C.T. No. 19973, being genuine and valid, on their face, are incontrovertible,
indefeasible and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world. Thus, the unregistered deed of sale and
the subdivision contract upon which petitioners rely, cannot prevail over the certificate of title in the name of
Cruz. To hold otherwise is to defeat the primary object of the Torrens System which is to make the Torrens title
indefeasible and valid against the whole world. [Santos vs. Cruz, 484 SCRA 66 (March 3, 2006)]