In: Kokinov, B., Karmiloff-Smith, A., Nersessian, N. J. (eds.) European Perspectives on Cognitive Science.

New Bulgarian University Press, 2011

ISBN 978-954-535-660-5

Discourse processing and spatial navigation

Francesco Ferretti (fferretti@uniroma3.it)
Department of Philosophy, University of Roma Tre, Via Ostiense, 234
00144, Rome, ITALY

Ines Adornetti (inesado@yahoo.it)

Department of Philosophical Researches, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via Columbia, 1
00133 Rome, ITALY

Abstract
This paper analyses the cognitive systems that underlie the
pragmatics of discourse. We examine the ability to speak
appropriately, that is, in a manner coherent and consonant
to the situation. Specifically, we focus on a particular aspect
of this ability: the capacity to build a coherent discourse. We
show that coherence is a property that concerns the level of
discourse and that the processing systems of the internal
constituents of the sentence are not able to explain the
connections between sentences in the flow of speech. Our
hypothesis is that discourse processing relies on some
cognitive systems involved in spatial navigation. In particular,
in our opinion, the processes of action planning and
monitoringthat characterize strictly the executive
functionsare at the basis both of keeping the route to
achieve a destination and of building discourse coherence in
the flow of speech. We discuss empirical data that support
this idea.
Keywords: pragmatics - discourse coherence - navigation
Williams syndrome - executive functions - traumatic brain
injury (TBI)

Introduction1
This paper takes into account cognitive systems that
underlie the pragmatics of discourse. It examines a specific
pragmatic skill: the ability to speak appropriately in the
context, namely, the ability to speak coherently and
consonantly to the situation. The aim of the study is
twofold: First, we intend to show that appropriateness is a
property that concerns the level of discourse rather than that
of the sentence; second, we aim to demonstrate that the kind
of processing implicated in the analysis of internal
constituents of the sentence is not suitable for explaining the
connections between sentences in the flow of speech. Our
hypothesis is that discourse processing relies on some
cognitive systems involved in spatial navigation. In
particular, the processes of action planning and
monitoringwhich
are
fundamental
executive
functionsare at the basis both of keeping the route to
achieve a destination and of building coherence in the flow
of speech. To illustrate this, we discuss empirical analyses
of the discourse skills of impaired subjects that attest a
1

This paper has been thought and discussed together by the

authors. However, for the final version Francesco Ferretti has
written the sections titled Introduction, Inadequacy of
microanalysis, Communication as navigation; Ines Adornetti is
the author of the remaining three sections.

relationship between disorders of spatial navigation and

deficits in the building of coherent discourse.

Inadequacy of microanalysis
At a general level, language processing consists of two
dimensions: a microlinguistic analysis level (withinsentence analyses) and a macrolinguistic analysis level
(between-sentence analyses) (Davis et al., 1997; Davis &
Coelho, 2004; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; Marini et al.,
2005). The microlinguistic dimension refers to lexical and
syntactic processing; the macrolinguistic dimension
concerns pragmatics and discourse processing. The
prevalent approach in cognitive science is concerned with
the priority of the structural analysis of the internal
constituents of the sentence. There are important theoretical
considerations in support of such an approach. From a
philosophical point of view, the main topic today is the idea
of the propositional nature of thought. According to Fodor
(1987), for example, the propositional structure of language
depends on the propositional structure of thought: Given
that language has the function to express thought, it must
share the same type of structure as thought in order to
perform that function. From this point of view, the general
processes of verbal production and comprehension are
conceived only in terms of the microlinguistic dimension:
All that is requested of a cognitive device to explain the
linguistic information processes is, in fact, the computing of
the constituent structure of the sentence.
The idea that the sentence is the essence of language is
supported not only by philosophers, but also by some
neuroscientists. For example, Pickering et al. (2001, p. 1)
note that linguistic processing devices have an important
role within human cognitive architecture and argue that the
investigations that have focused on what architectures and
mechanisms underlie sentence comprehension are justified
because their contributions illuminate the general nature of
human language processing in the context of cognition as a
whole. In their opinion, the analysis of sentence
comprehension, indeed, is a way to understand the overall
nature of language processing. The idea that the sentence is
the essence of language leads to the consideration of
language processing exclusively in terms of microanalysis:
What matters in the explanation of language processing is
what happens within the sentence. From this point of view,
the discourse level (i.e. the flow of speech) should be

interpreted as a sequence of sentences: Speech

comprehension can be understood as the comprehension of
one sentence after another.
The priority of the microanalysis in contemporary
linguistic reflection is primarily due to the predominant role
of Chomskys Universal Grammar. It is beyond the scope of
this paper to examine whether the constituent analysis of the
sentence (carried out by the syntactic parser) is able to give
an account of the sentences comprehension (a critique of
this idea is offered nowadays, for example, by the
simulative hypothesis of language comprehension; for a
review, see Fisher & Zwaan, 2008). Leaving aside any
model of sentence comprehension, it is evident that the
analysis of the internal constituents of the sentence is unable
to explain the flow of discourse: The microanalysis, in fact,
cannot account for the relationship between the sentence
and the verbal context (the coherence with other sentences
within the discourse) or the sentences connection with the
extra-verbal context (the consonance to the situation).
The strongest evidence of this failure is represented by
Chomsky (1988). When Chomsky treats the question of
what makes humans human, he asserts that the difference
between humans and the other animals relies on the ability
to speak appropriately, that is, the ability to speak
coherently and consonantly to the situation. According to
Descartes (1637), this ability is closely related to the
question of linguistic creativity, which is the key element
that distinguishes human language from other forms of
animal communication. It is important to note that according
to Chomsky, the question of language appropriateness,
which he calls Descartes problem, is not resolvable in
principle because of the limits of the human mind. However,
we propose that Chomsky cannot resolve Descartes
problem owing to the inadequacies of Universal Grammar,
rather than the limits of the human mind. More specifically,
the problems with Universal Grammar concern two
correlated aspects: the endorsement of the idea that the
sentence is the essence of language and the autonomist
conception of language, that is, the idea of language as a
specific and independent processing system. As we have
already noted, language appropriateness is a pragmatic
property that primarily concerns the discourse level (the
macroanalysis dimension). Therefore, a linguistic model
focused on only the analysis of the internal constituents of
the sentence is unable to take into account the relationship
between sentences. Attempts to explain discourse coherence
by relying on the microanalysis level, in fact, have some
conceptual difficulties. Perhaps the most persuasive is the
idea that coherence cannot be interpreted in terms of
cohesion, that is to say, in terms of the grammatical devices
(syntactic, morphologic, and lexical) that allow a sentence
to be connected with the one that precedes it (e.g. by means
of the use of pronouns). Coherence, indeed, may be
considered as either global or local: Global coherence refers
to the relationship between the content of a verbalization
with that of the general topic of conversation; local
coherence concerns the conceptual links between individual

sentences or propositions which maintain meaning in a text

or discourse (Glosser & Deser, 1990). It is important to note
that cohesion explains only local coherence, not global
coherence. Such an argument leads Giora (1895, p. 699) to
affirm that cohesion understood as a linear relation that
obtains between pairs of sentences is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for text coherence.
These conceptual arguments are supported by empirical
considerations.
Increasing
evidence
shows
that
macroanalysis and microanalysis levels can be analysed
separately (Davis et al., 1997; Marini et al, 2005). For
example, analyses of the language of schizophrenics support
the existence of a dissociation between these levels: Such
analyses show that the language production of these subjects
is impaired mainly at the macrolinguistic level of processing
(Marini et al., 2008). A typical example in this regard is the
phenomenon of derailment, a pattern of speech in which
incomprehensible, disconnected, and unrelated ideas replace
logical and orderly thought (Andreasen, 1979). Another
example, more interesting for our purpose, is that of
Williams syndrome (WS): WS subjects show good
phonological, lexical, and syntactic skills, but a relative
weakness in the domain of discourse processing (Marini et
al., 2010).
Albeit in different ways, these cases have a specific
problem in common: The subjects are unable to keep the
route of their discourses. For this reason, they cannot
produce a global coherent discourse. The following sections
focus on the latter point, taking into account some
neuropsychological
populations
that
have
poor
macrolinguistic skills but are good at the microlinguistic
level. The analysis of these cases allows us to propose an
interpretative hypothesis on the nature of macroanalysis
functions.

Communication as navigation
A key concept of this paper is that the flow of discourse is
evaluated by speakers in terms of appropriateness
(coherence and consonance to the situation). More
specifically, the ability to speak appropriately relies on the
speakers ability to orient himself correctly (keep the route)
within the flow of speech: In this paper, it is argued that
language appropriateness is evaluated by speakers using
specific spatial navigation skills.
The fact that navigation is intuitively a good metaphor of
communication processes is represented by the analysis of
goal-oriented movements. Gallistel (1990, p. 35) defines
navigation as the process of determining and maintaining a
course or trajectory from one place to another.
The process of keeping the route is fundamental to reach
the final goal. This process is well known to anyone who
has experienced the difference between the individuation of
the azimuth on a topographic map (to go from point A to
destination B) and the necessity to overcome or avoid the
obstacles of the ground (cliffs, rivers, or forests to be
avoided) to reach the destination. Real navigation never
follows the straight path drawn on the map: The actual

movement in space requires a continuous realignment

between the final destination and the obstacles of the
external environment. As in spatial navigation, the flow of
communication appears tied to the problem of keeping the
route for reaching a goal (the communicative intention or
the content that the speaker intends to convey to the
listener). As in spatial navigation, in verbal communication,
the achievement of a communicative goal relies on
continuous realignments that the speaker must perform to
find the route (after, for example, a digression). Such an
ability, as described below, is strongly related to functions
such as planning and monitoring that govern the orientation
and navigation processes.
Empirical data support the relationship between spatial
discourse and spatial navigation (Denis et al., 1999;
Tenbrink & Wiener, 2007). The more documented case is
that of WS, a pathology characterized principally by visuospatial representation deficits (Atkinson et al., 2001; Farran
& Jarrold, 2003). The relationship between spatial
representation and spatial language is widely supported by
empirical data at the microanalysis level (KarmiloffSmith,
2007; Landau, 2002; Landau & Zukowsky, 2003). In spite
of this, the relationship between WS and language concerns
mainly the macroanalysis level. The narrative deficits of WS
subjects substantiate such a hypothesis. According to Marini
et al. (2010), WS affects the narrative aspects of language.
Although Marini et al. do not explicitly assert the idea, our
interpretation of the empirical data is that the difficulties of
WS subjects are due to their reorientation deficits (Lakusta
et al., 2010) rather than to their visuo-spatial representation
deficits. From our point of view, these subjects have an
impaired Mental Space Travel (Ciaramelli et al., 2010), a
network of processing systems that allow a person to orient
himself and to navigate the space correctly. As noted, the
process of keeping the route relies on continuous
realignments that the organisms must perform to reach the
destination. Because these realignments are made keeping
trace of the proper location on the ground, we now focus on
a specific cognitive system able to plan and monitor during
the tasks of spatial navigation.

Executive function and spatial navigation

Spatial navigation is a fundamental cognitive function
that permits the organism to adapt to the environment. It
relies on a distributed network of brain regions among
which are the hippocampus, parahippocampus, caudate
nucleus, and parietal and retrosplenial cortices (Aguirre et
al., 1996; Ekstrom et al., 2003; Gron et al., 2000; Shelton &
Gabrieli, 2002). Recent studies have demonstrated that a
key role in spatial navigation is also performed by some
regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (Ciaramelli, 2008;
Hartley et al., 2003; Maguire et al., 1998; Spiers & Maguire,
2006). As the PFC represents the principal neural substrate
of executive functions (Baddely, 1986; Fuster, 2008; Stuss
& Benson, 1986), the first implication that can be drawn
from these studies is that executive functions have a role in
spatial navigation processes. The second implication (and

the most important for the purpose of this paper) is that if

spatial navigation is a good metaphor for discourse
production and comprehension processes, executive
functions may have a role in such processes by virtue of
their contribution to spatial navigation. Therefore, the
relationship between spatial navigation and executive
process must be examined more precisely.
First, what are executive functions? This is an umbrella
term that refers to a wide range of cognitive and behavioural
skills that allow the temporal organization of goal-oriented
behaviours, language, and reasoning (Fuster, 2008). A way
of characterizing executive processes is to distinguish
between routine (or automatic) and non-routine (or
controlled) processing. Routine processing refers to mental
operations that are well over-learned, whereas non-routine
processing refers to mental operations that are used in
situations when there is no well-established stimulusresponse association, or when a behavioural impasse has
occurred (e.g. one notices an error that implies a revision of
current behaviour). The expression executive functions has
become synonymous with the controlled processes, that is,
the processes used when we have to efficiently formulate
future plans and develop appropriate behavioural responses
(Gilbert & Burgess, 2008). Thus, executive functions are at
work in non-routine situations such as novel, conflicting, or
complex tasks (Godefroy, 2003).
Although there is not a precise taxonomy of executive
functions (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007), it is possible to
delineate some aspects of convergence among the
neuropsychological models. There is a general agreement
that executive functions are implied in processes such as
planning, working memory, inhibition, and mental
flexibility, as well as in the initiation and monitoring of
action (Chan et al., 2008). Therefore, executive processes
have a key role in regulating the equilibrium between the
organism and the environment: They allow formulating a
plan, starting its execution, and maintaining attention
(perseveration) on that plane until its realization. Moreover,
executive functions allow rapid shift of attention for the
adaptation to novel contexts and, at the same time, they
inhibit inappropriate behavioural responses to the current
situation.
Such properties are very interesting for the processes of
discourse production and comprehension. Language is
characterized by creativity and verbal communication
constitutes a constantly changing context in which new
elements are continually introduced. From this point of
view, production and comprehension of discourse require
the ability to adapt and respond flexibly to new conditions.
This is evident, for example, in cases of figurative language
when the subject must be able to shift rapidly from the
literal meaning of a word or expression (i.e. he must inhibit
the term because it is not pertinent) to the effective
(figurative) meaning it has assumed in the context.
Moreover, executive functions seem to be particularly
important for the production of flow of speech: uttering of
well-formed linguistic constructions that are internally

coherent and coherent in respect to the general topics of

communication. Such functions are at work also in
discourse comprehension: They allow listeners to keep in
mind the critical elements of the current discourse by
processing the gist of the speech and to prepare inferences
on the basis of information provided as well. Because our
idea is that such properties are tied to the theme of spatial
navigation, it is now important to investigate the
relationship between executive functions and spatial
navigation.
Several functional neuroimaging studies of navigation in
humans have showed a significant increase of prefrontal
activity during navigation tasks (Gron et al., 2000; Hartley
et. al, 2003; Maguire et al., 1998; Yoshida & Ishii, 2006).
For example, Ciaramelli (2008) describes a patient with
bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex who
had severe difficulty in navigating around his hometown,
even though he was able to remember the goal-destination,
landmarks, and routes. In particular, the patient was unable
to find his way to the final destination; instead, he often
headed to familiar locations that were irrelevant with respect
to the goal of the task. Observation and experimental
analysis revealed that the wayfinding deficit of this patient
arose from his inability to maintain the goal representation
actively in working memory and from his incapacity to
suppress the irrelevant information (familiar locations) with
respect to the current goal. It was hypothesized that both
these inabilities were caused by damage to the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, which appears to play a fundamental role
in spatial navigation tasks (see also Spiers, 2008).
Particularly relevant to our topic are studies that show the
involvement of prefrontal areas in navigation in referring to
capabilities such as planning and monitoring of the ongoing
task (Hartley et. al, 2003; Maguire et al., 1998; Spiers &
Maguire, 2006). Spiers and Maguire (2006) examine the
association between London taxi drivers brain activations
and their thoughts while they navigated in a virtual
simulation of London. Their goal is to pinpoint the
transient and highly specific engagement and
disengagement of particular brain regions (p. 1825) during
the different stages of the task. Indeed, spatial navigation (in
this case, traffic navigation) is a dynamic process. Initially,
we plan our route to a goal-destination, but en route, we
must often modify our plan (e.g. in response to an
unexpected obstacle). Sometimes, we plan the route up to a
given point, and when we reach this point, we must
complete the route planning; often, within a familiar
environment, it is as if we function on automatic pilot, going
along without thinking. Moreover, at every stage, we must
constantly monitor the environment to make sure we are on
the correct route (e.g. we must check for particular
landmarks along the way). Experimental results showed that
the initial seconds of route planning, the periods involving
traffic monitoring and responding to customers irrelevant
statements, were associated with increased activity in the
ventromedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (in addition
to the activation of areas classically involved in spatial

navigation). The authors argue that the increased activation

of the PFC during route planning is compatible with the
suggested functional role of this area: planning, decision
making, monitoring of responses in situations of
uncertainty, and altering behaviour to adapt to the
environment. Hartley et al. (2003) had previously obtained
similar results showing that activation of the medial PFC is
specific in wayfinding tasks that require planning new
routes. Because we hypothesize that these properties of the
executive functions involved in the navigation process also
have a role in processes of discourse production and
comprehension, in the following section we examine the
relationship between the processes of planning and
monitoring and discourse processing.

Executive functions and discourse processing

As noted above, the processes of planning and monitoring
play (even intuitively) an important role in building the flow
of discourse. As speech is composed of linear sequences of
words and expressions, the speaker must constantly form a
plan of verbal expressions in order to decide what to say and
how to organize what he says, if he wants to express himself
in a coherent manner. Moreover, during the execution of a
plan, that is, during the stage of discourse production, it is
necessary to continue estimation of the task in order to make
sure that the elements introduced accord with the general
topic of conversation. Beyond the intuitive power of this
idea, empirical evidence confirms the effective role of
executive processes in discourse processing.
The most interesting data in this regard come from studies
of patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI) with executive
dysfunctions. These subjects have deficits in action planning
and monitoring: They are unable to complete a goaloriented behaviour through a series of simple actions (Zalla
et al., 2001). Neurolinguistic experimental data show that
these patients cannot organize and maintain global discourse
coherence (macroanalysis dimension), while they have no
problems at the level of local coherence (microanalysis
dimension). TBI subjects connect sentences correctly by
using cohesion ties (grammatical devices), but they are
unable to construct and maintain the global coherence of
their verbal productions (they cannot relate the individual
sentences to a plan or to a more general purpose) and often
introduce material that is irrelevant to the current context in
their verbal productions (Biddle et al., 1996; Glosser &
Deser, 1990; Hough & Barrow, 2003; McDonald, 1993).
Because of their inability to formulate and to pursue a
communicative goal, their discourses appear pragmatically
inappropriate.
From the data discussed, it is possible to draw two
conclusions. First, the empirical studies reported support the
hypothesis that the functions of planning and monitoring are
involved in discourse processing, specifically in building
and maintenance coherence. Specifically, the planning
system permits speakers to structure verbal behaviour for a
final goal by means of identification of the sequence of
steps required to achieve that goal (i.e. planning and

organization of text units in a logical and sequential manner

in order to achieve a goal or a general theme). The
monitoring system permits a constant evaluation of
discourse (eventually, in order to correct errors) and is
essential to maintain thematic unity. The second conclusion
that can be drawn is related to the analogy between the
discourse competence of TBI and that of people with WS,
discussed earlier. In both cases, there is a dissociation
between the functions of microanalysis and those of
macroanalysis: The former are essentially intact in both
groups, while the latter appear to be compromised. As
noted, the discourse deficits of TBI are due to executive
dysfunctions, while the narrative deficits of WS are due to
deficits of reorientation that generally affect these
subjects. As executive functions have a role in the processes
of spatial navigation, is it possible that the deficits that
individuals with WS manifest in terms of macroanalysis are
(in part) also attributable to an executive dysfunction?
Few studies have examined the involvement of frontal
areas in WS. Most have focused primarily on the role of
inhibition (Figerio et al., 2006; Porter et al., 2007), attesting
the existence of a deficit in this domain. Marini et al. (2010,
p. 108) argue that the problems of narrative in WS subjects
may also be linked to a deficit in frontal functions and to an
inability to inhibit irrelevant elements during online
processing. Instead, we propose that the problems of
coherence and discourse processing of WS subjects may be
attributed to the aspects of executive functions involved in
spatial navigation; in particular, they may be attributed to a
deficit of planning. Data to support this hypothesis come
from a recent study by Rhodes et al. (2010), which
investigates executive processes of WS subjects. The study
reveals a deficit in prefrontal functions beyond mere
inhibition. In particular, the experiment results show that
some of the cognitive and behavioural characteristics that
are often associated with WS may be attributable to
executive function deficits in planning, working memory,
and attention set-shifting (Rhodes et al., 2010, p. 1222).
This supports our hypothesis that the processes involved in
spatial navigation are involved also in the building of flow
of discourse.

Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the cognitive systems
that underlie the building of discourse coherence. We have
proposed that in order to explain such a property, we must
focus on the dimension of macroanalysis, rather than that of
microanalysis. The microanalysis dimension focuses on
internal constituents of the sentence and is therefore unable
to explain coherence, because discourse cannot be
understood as merely a sequence of sentences. We have
proposed that discourse processing relies on spatial
navigation processes: In both cases, it is fundamentally
keeping the route to reach the final goal. Among these
processes, particularly relevant are some executive functions
involved in spatial navigation: action planning and
monitoring. These functions allow speakers to build and to

maintain the coherence of discourse. In support of this idea,

we have discussed the narrative ability of WS and TBI
subjects.

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