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International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation

Author(s): Oran R. Young
Source: World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Apr., 1980), pp. 331-356
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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INTERNATIONAL REGIMES:
Problemsof Concept Formation
By ORAN R. YOUNG*

E live in a worldof international

regimes.Some of themdeal
with monetaryissues (for example,the BrettonWoods systradein commodities(forexample,
tem); othersgoverninternational
thecoffeeagreement).Some regimesserveto managethe use of naturalresourcesat theinternational
level (forexample,theinternational
forwhaling)or to advancethecauseofconservation
arrangements
(for
example,the agreementon polar bears). Still otherregimesaddress
problemspertainingto the controlof armamentsat the international
level (forexample,thepartialtest-bansystem)or to themanagement
of powerwithinthe international
community(for example,the neutralizationagreementforSwitzerland).And thereare some internationalregimesthatencompassseveralissueswithinwell-defined
geographicalareas (for example,the Spitzbergenagreementand the
forAntarctica).
arrangement
International
regimesvarygreatlyin termsof functional
scope,areal
from
the
narrow
domain,and membership.
Functionally,
theyrange
purviewof the polar bear agreementto the broad concernsof the
treatieson Antarcticaand outerspace. The area coveredmay be as
domainof theregimeforfursealsin the
smallas thehighlyrestricted
as thatof the global regimesforinterNorthPacificor as far-flung
nationalair transport
(the ICAO/IATA system)or forthecontrolof
occurswithrespectto membership:
nucleartesting.A similardiversity
therangerunsfromtwoor threemembers(as in theregimeforhighseasfishingestablished
undertheInternational
NorthPacificFisheries
Convention)to well overa hundredmembers(as in thepartialnuclear
test-bansystem).What is moststriking,
however,is the sheernumber
of international
regimes.Far frombeing unusual,theyare common
theinternational
throughout
system.
thatscholarshave not focusedmoreintenIt is therefore
surprising
sivelyon international
regimes,and thatmuchof theexistingliterature
in analyticterms.During the last
on the subjectis weak,particularly
severalyears,therehas been a noticeableupsurgeof interestin the
*

This paperwas preparedfortheannualmeetingof theInternational

StudiesAsso-

MarchI979.
ciation,
Toronto,
?

i980

ofPrinceton
byTheTrustees
University

WorldPolitics0043-887I/8o/03033I-26$oI.30/I

seecontributor
Forcopying
information,
page.

332

WORLD POLITICS

extensive
studyofinternational
regimes.'
We nowhavefairly
descriptiveaccountsof somespecific
regimes2
and somespeculative
ideas
aboutphenomena
suchas regimechange.3
Butthefundamental
characterof international
regimesremainselusive.Considering
the pervasiveness
and importance
of regimesat theinternational
level,the
a
stateof theexisting
literature
on themconstitutes
underdeveloped
seriousdeficiency.
In thisessay,then,I proposeto takesomepreliminarystepstowardfilling
thisgapbydrawing
on thestudies
ofresource
I havebeenconducting
regimes
overa numberofyears,and making
useofsomeformulations
I am currently
developing
at greater
length
elsewhere.4
THE CORE CONCEPT

theactionsof thoseinterRegimesaresocialinstitutions
governing
estedin specifiable
activities
(ormeaningful
setsofactivities).
As such,
theyarerecognized
patterns
ofpractice
aroundwhichexpectations
conIt is important
aresocialstructures.
verge.It followsthatregimes
not
of regimesfrethemforfunctions,
to mistake
thoughtheoperation
contributes
to thefulfillment
of certain
Like other
quently
functions.
or
less
be
more
and they
structures,
regimes
may
formally
articulated,
1 See, amongothers,RichardN. Cooper,"Prolegomenato the Choice of an InternationalMonetarySystem,"International Organization, xxix, No. I (I975),
63-97;
Regimes,"WorldPolitics,xxvii (January
ErnstB. Haas, "On Systems
and International
I975);
I47-74; JohnGerardRuggieand ErnstB. Haas, eds., InternationalResponses to
Robert0.
Technology,specialissueof InternationalOrganization, xxix, No. 3 (1975);
Keohaneand JosephS. Nye,Power and Interdependence(Boston:Little,Brown,I977);
Oran R. Young, Resource Management at the International Level: The Case of the
NorthPacific(London and New York: Pinterand Nichols,I977); SeyomBrownand
others,Regimes for the Ocean, Outer Space, and Weather (Washington: The Brookings
Commonsin
Institution,
I977); and EdwardL. Morse,"Globaland OtherInternational

the i980S" (mimeo.,Council on ForeignRelations,i976). In addition,international

regimesforsome time.To illustrate,
see L.F.E.
lawyershave talkedaboutinternational
the Maritime
of Ocean Resources:RegimesforStructuring
Goldie,"The Management
in CyrilE. Blackand RichardA. Falk, eds.,The Futureof theInternaEnvironment,"
tional Legal Order, IV: The Structure of the InternationalEnvironment (Princeton:

Princeton
University
Press,I972), I55-247.
2 For a rangeof examples,
see WilliamM. Ross, Oil Pollution as an International

Problem: A Study of Puget Sound and the Strait of Georgia (Seattle: Universityof
ed., The North Sea: Challenge and OpporWashington
Press,I973); M. M. Sibthorp,
of
tunity(London: Europa,I975); KennethDam, Oil Resources(Chicago: University

Fisheries
Chicago Press,I976); and Arild Underdal,"The Politicsof International
Management:The Case of the NortheastAtlantic"(unpub.,i978).
3 For example,Keohaneand Nye (fn. i), Part II.
4 See Young,"International
ResourceRegimes,"in Clifford
S. Russell,ed., Collective

Decision Making: ApplicationsfromPublic Choice Theory (Baltimore: The JohnsHop-

kinsUniversity
Press,I979), 24I-82, and Young,"ResourceRegimes:NaturalResources
and Institutional
Design,"in progress.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

333

mayor maynotbe accompanied

by explicitorganizational
arrangements.
International
regimes
pertain
to activities
of interest
to members
of
theinternational
system.
Typically,
theseactivities
takeplaceentirely
outsidethejurisdictional
boundaries
of sovereign
states(forexample,
deepseabedmining),or cutacrossinternational
jurisdictional
boundaries (forexample,high-seas
fishing),
or involveactionshavinga
directimpacton theinterests
oftwoor moremembers
oftheinternationalcommunity
(forexample,
majoradjustments
in exchange
rates).
In formal
themembers
terms,
ofinternational
regimes
arealwayssovereignstates,
thoughthepartiescarrying
outtheactionsgoverned
by
international
regimesare oftenprivateentities
(forexample,fishing
companies,
banks,orprivate
airlines).
theterms
Implementing
ofintera two-step
national
regimes
therefore
involves
procedure,
a feature
that
is notcharacteristic
ofregimes
at thedomestic
level.5
The mereexistence
ofa regimewilllendan element
oforderliness
totheactivity
itgoverns.
Butthereis no reasontoassumethatregimes
willguidehumanactionstowardwell-defined
substantive
goalssuch
as enduring
or maximum
peace,economic
sustained
efficiency,
yields
The concept"regime"
fromrenewable
resources.
no intrinsic
contains
in the
or teleological
metaphysical
orientation,
thoughactorsinvolved
ofanygivenregimewilloftenattempt
to shapeits
creation
orreform
withclearcut
contents
goalsin mind.6It is,however,
possibleto enumerate
several
thatevery
international
willpossess.
components
regime
The coreof everyinternational
i. The substantive
recomponent.
of rightsand rules.Theymaybe moreor less
gimeis a collection
extensive
or formally
butsomesuchinstitutional
articulated,
arrangetheopportunities
oftheactors
willstructure
ina given
ments
interested
willbe a matter
andtheirexactcontent
ofintense
interest
to
activity,
theseactors.
to whichan actor(individual
or otherwise)
is
A rightis anything
a recognized
role.The roleofhuman
entitled
byvirtueofoccupying
is oftensaidto carrywithit a righttolife.In the
being,forexample,
theroleofcitizencarries
withit theright
oftheUnitedStates,
system
5Among otherthings,it will oftenprovenecessaryto relyon domesticcourtsto
regimes.See RichardA. Falk,
in international
enforcetherightsand rulesincorporated
N.Y.: Syracuse
The Role of Domestic Courtsin the InternationalLegal Order (Syracuse,
Press,i964).
University
6 Actorswill virtually
neveroperatebehinda Rawlsian"veil of ignorance"in realSee JohnRawls,A Theory of Justice(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
worldsituations.
Press,I971), chap.III.

334

WORLD POLITICS

to votein elections,the rightto speak freely,and the rightto move

about at will. We are now witnessingvigorouscampaignsto clarify
and,in somecases,to redefinetherightsof women,children,hospital
patients,
inmatesin prisons,and animals.Many rolescarrywiththem
bundlesofrightsthatmaybe moreor less extensiveand whoseprecise
contentis subjectto changeovertime.7Of course,the possessionof a
rightin no way guaranteesthat an actorwill actuallyreceivethose
thingsto whichhe is entitledunderthe termsof the right.Although
evenacknowledgedrightsare violatedwith
rightsare oftenrespected,
socialcontexts.
considerable
in real-world
frequency
Severaldifferentiable
categoriesof rightsare prominentin internarightsmaytake the formof privateproperty
tionalregimes.Property
or
rights(for example,rightsto commoditiestradedinternationally)
to
or
high-seas
rights
airspace
rights(for example,
commonproperty
fisheries).8Because of the prevalenceof common propertyarrangementsat theinternational
regimesoftenemphasize
level,international
rights.These maybe exclusive
thedevelopment
of use-and-enjoyment
in nature(forexample,therightto exploita giventracton the deep
in non-exclusive
terms
seabed), or theymay be explicitlyformulated
straits).9But all
(for example,the rightto use certaininternational
suchrightsare designedto ensurethe availabilityof key resourcesto
actorsunderconditionsin whichprivateownershipis infeasible.Interof othertypesof
nationalregimesmay also encompassan assortment
againstcertainformsof aggresrights,
includingtherightto protection
transacsion,therightto receivespecifiedbenefitsfrominternational
tionsor productiveoperations,the rightto tradeon favorableterms
and therightto
withothermembersof theinternational
community,
participatein makingcollectivedecisionsunderthe termsof a given
regime.

In contrast
to rights,
rulesare well-defined
guidesto actionor standards settingforthactions that membersof some specifiedsubject
under
groupare expectedto perform(or to refrainfromperforming)
circumstances.'0
Any givenrulewill exhibitthefollowing
appropriate
7On the notionof bundlesof rights,see CharlesA. Reich,"The New Property,"
Yale Law Journal,Vol. 73 (April i964), 733-87.

8 Consult,
EirikFurubotnand SvetozarPejovich,"Property
amongothers,
Rightsand
EconomicTheory:A Surveyof RecentLiterature,"
journal of EconomicLiterature,
x, No. 4 (1972), I137-62.
9 The resultmightbe describedas a systemof "restricted"
commonproperty:see
and Prices (Toronto: University
J. H. Dales, Pollution,Property,
of TorontoPress,

I968), 6i-65.

10My use of the concept"rules" differssomewhatfromthat prevalentin recent

to jurisprudence.
contributions
CompareH.L.A. Hart, The Conceptof Law (Oxford:

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

335

features:
(a) an indication
of therelevant
subjectgroup,(b) a behavioralprescription,
and (c) a specification
ofthecircumstances
underwhichtheruleis operative.
In somesocieties,
forinstance,
there
arenear-universal
rulesenjoining
individuals
to tellthetruthand to
in theirdealingswithothermembers
keeppromises
of the society.

A rule may be directedtowardsome clearlydesignatedgroup,as in

the case of ethicalprescriptions
relatingto the behaviorof teachers,
doctors,or lawyers.Or a rule may focuson some specificactivity,
as
in the case of prescriptions
pertainingto civil aviationor maritime
commerce.Of course,the existenceof an acknowledgedrule does not
guaranteethatthe membersof the subjectgroupwill alwayscomply
withits requirements.
Even in well-ordered
societies,non-compliance
withrulesis a commonoccurrence.
Among the numerousrules associatedwith international
regimes,
threegeneralcategoriesare particularly
prominent.First,thereare
use rules.For example,membersof the ICAO/IATA systemare required to followcertainsafetyrules in using international
airspace;
thoseengagedin high seas fishingshouldabide by rulespertaining
to
theconservation
of fishstocks;and thoseusinginternational
sea lanes
are subjectto rules designedto maximize safetyand to minimize
marinepollution.Frequently,such use rulestake the formof limitationson the exerciseof rights.Justas rightscommonlysafeguardthe
freedomof actorsto behavein certainways,rulesoftenspell out restrictions
on thefreedomof actorsto do as theywish.1"Liabilityrules
constitute
a secondcategory.They spell out the locus and extentof
liabilityin casesof (usuallyunintended)injuryto othersarisingfrom
the actionsof individualpartiesunderthe termsof a regime.They
rangefromrulesconcerning
compensation
forexpropriation
offoreign
investments
undervariouscircumstances
to rulespertaining
to responin the wake of accisibilityforcleaningup maritimeenvironments
dents.12
Finally,international
regimesoftenspecifya varietyof proceduralrules,whichdeal withthehandlingof disputesor theoperation
of explicitorganizationsassociatedwith the regimes.
At the domesticlevel,collectionsof rightsand rulesare commonly
supplemented
by extensivesetsof regulationsand incentivesystems.
Oxford UniversityPress, i96i),

and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cam-

bridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,I977), esp. chaps.2 and 3.
1 See G. H. von Wright,Norm and Actions(New York: HumanitiesPress,i963).
12 On liability
rulesand theirsignificance,
compareR. H. Coase, "The Problemof
Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, iii (October i960), I-44, and Guido
Calabresiand A. Douglas Melamed,"Property
Rules,LiabilityRules,and Inalienability:One View of theCathedral,"
HarvardLaw Review,Vol. 85 (April I972), I089-II28.

336

WORLD POLITICS

areadministrative
Regulations
directives
frompublicagenemanating
ciesandspecifying
conditions
underwhichcertain
actorsaretooperate
on a day-to-day
basis.Theyare widelyused to translate
rightsand
rulesformulated
in generaltermsintoworking
managerial
arrangementsapplicableto real-world
situations.13
Incentive
on the
systems,
otherhand,are penaltiesand rewardsemployed
by publicagencies
forthepurpose
ofaltering
thebehavior
ofidentifiable
actorsin desired
directions.14
Perhapstheclassiccasesofincentive
aretaxesand
systems
subsidies.
Obviously,
regulations
andincentive
systems
willbe usedlessextensivelyin conjunction
withinternational
regimesthanwithregimes
at thenationalor subnational
operating
level.Theyrequiretheexistenceof somepublicagencypossessing
a measureof authority
and
power;suchagencies
arefarlesscharacteristic
ofhighlydecentralized
socialsystems
liketheinternational
thanof themorecentralsystem
izedsystems
interthatarecommon
atthenational
level.Nevertheless,
nationalregimesaccompaniedby explicitorganizations
can and
sometimes
do employthesedevices.For example,the International
Fund has promulgated
extensive
to
Monetary
regulations
pertaining
thedrawing
rights
ofindividual
members,
and theproposed
InternationalSeabedAuthority
ofmanwouldbe abletoregulate
production
ganesenodulesto implement
such
moregeneralrulesconcerning
matters
as the impactof deep seabedminingon the worldnickel
market."5

2. The procedural
component.
Althoughcollections
of rightsand
rulesformthesubstantive
coreof international
regimes,
theyarenot
theonlycomponents
ofsuchregimes.
A procedural
component
encompassesrecognized
arrangements
forresolving
situations
requiring
social
or collective
choices.Situations
ofthistypearisewhenever
it is necesto aggregate
the (non-identical)
saryor desirable
preferences
of two
more
or
individual
actorsintoa groupchoice.'6
Suchproblems
occur
in mostsocialsystems;
theyrangefromtheselection
ofindividuals
to
13 J
use the concept"regulation"
in a somewhatdifferent
sense than it is used in
discussions
concerning
publicregulationof privateindustries.
For a clear exampleof
thisalternative
usage,see GeorgeStigler,The Citizenand theState:Essayson Regulation (Chicago:University
ofChicagoPress,I975).
14Incentivesystems
can also be used to raiseor disburserevenue.Ordinarily,
however,theirprimary
purposeis to structure
thebehaviorof certaingroupsof actors.
15 See, forexample,RobertZ. Aliber,The International
MoneyGame (New York:
BasicBooks,I976).
16 For a generalanalysis
of socialchoice,see A. K. Sen, CollectiveChoiceand Social
Welfare(San Francisco:Freeman,ig7o).

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

337

the termsof tradeforexchangerelafilltop positionsto establishing

ofvaluedgoodsand services.
tionshipsand decidingon thedistribution
Severaltypesof problemsrequiringsocialchoicescan be expectedto
arise withinthe frameworkof an operativeinternationalregime.17
Some of thesewill involvethe allocationof factorsof production(for
example,deep seabedminingtracts,totalallowablecatchesin thefisheries,and segmentsof theglobal radiospectrum).Such problemswill
leveldue to theprevato solveat theinternational
be especiallydifficult
lence of commonratherthan privateproperty.Other social choice
problemswill relateto issueswithexplicitdistributive
implications(for
in exchangeratesor royalexample,decisionsrelatingto adjustments
ties in connectionwith deep seabed mining). Collectivechoiceswill
also be requiredin settlingdisputes.Typically,thesewill arisefrom
efforts
to apply generalrightsand rules to the complexitiesof realworldsituations.
Nor does thisexhausttherangeof problemsof social
choicethatcan be expectedto emergecontinuallyunderthe termsof
international
regimes.Thus, therewill be cases in whichgroupdecithesortsofresearchactivities
sionsarenecessary
to determine
to permit
in an area like Antarctica,
to resolveconflicts
betweendifferent
usesof
thesameresource,
and to organizecollectivesanctionsaimedat obtaining compliancewith the rightsand rulesof an international
regime.
Social choicemechanismsare institutional
arrangements
specialized
to theresolution
of problemsof socialchoicearisingwithintheframework of particularregimes.Like othercomponentsof regimes,these
mechanismsmay be more or less formalized,and it is typicalfor a
regimeto make use of severalat the same time.The range of these
mechanismsis wide, encompassingsuch devicesas the "law of capture,"markets,voting systems,bargaining,administrative
decision
making,adjudication,unilateralactionbackedby coercion,and organized violence.18
Certainconditionsare requiredforthe effective
operation of each of these mechanisms;we may thereforeassume that
individualmechanismswill be associatedprimarilywith particular
typesof socialsystems.
The moststrikingfeaturesof theinternational
systemin this connectionare its relativelysmall numberof formal
membersand its high level of decentralization
with respectto the
Social choicemechanismscharacdistribution
of powerand authority.
teristicof systemsof thistypeare the "law of capture,"bargaining,
17 Problems
of social choicepertainingto the selectionand reformof international
regimesperse are discussedin a latersectionof thisessay.
18 The classicstudy(focusingon votingsystems)
is KennethArrow,Social Choice
and IndividualValues(2d ed.; New York: Wiley,I963).

338

WORLD POLITICS

variousformsof coercion,and, to a lesserdegree,markets.We should

therefore
expectimportantproblemsof social choice arisingin internationalregimesto be handledthroughtheseprocedures.19
Still,proceduresinvolvingvotingand administrative
decisionmakingwill not
be altogetherabsentin international
regimes.Voting,forexample,is
of some significance
in cases like the InternationalMonetaryFund
and theICAO/IATA system.But therecan be no doubtthatunilateral
claims,bargaining,and coercionare centralto the processesof reaching socialchoiceswithinmostinternational
regimes.
It is also worthnotingthatsomeregimesdo notpossesssocialchoice
mechanismsof theirown. They may relyupon the institutional
arrangementsof largersocial structures
in dealing with problemsof
socialchoice,or theymaysharemechanismswithotherregimes.Such
situationsare commonin cases where adjudicationor votingis employedin reachingcollectivechoices.For example,the same courts
may resolveconflicts
of interestpertainingto civil liberties,business
Courtof Justice
activities,
and land use. In principle,theInternational
or the GeneralAssemblyof the United Nations could be employed
to deal withmanysocialchoiceproblemsarisingunderspecificinternationalregimes.In practice,however,variouscombinationsof bargainingand coerciongearedto theproblemsof specificregimesconstitutethenormat theinternational
level.
3. Implementation.
Smoothlyfunctioning
international
regimesare
difficult
to achieve.20
and evenwidely
Rightsare not alwaysrespected,
acknowledgedrulesare violatedwithsomefrequency.
Nor is it reasonable to assumethattherelevantactorswill simplyaccepttheoutcomes
generatedby social choicemechanismsas authoritative,
and abide by
them.Accordingly,
it is importantto thinkabout the effectiveness
of
international
ofcompliance
regimes,21
and thissuggestsan examination
mechanisms
as a thirdmajorcomponentof theseregimes.
Anydiscussionof compliancemustdeal withtheissueof incentives.
and costsof complyingwithrightsand rules,in
What are thebenefits
contrastto violatingthem?How do individualactorsdecide whether
to complywith the substantive
provisionsof international
regimes?
There is a tendencyto assumethatthe typicalactorwill violatesuch
19Young, "Anarchyand Social Choice: Reflections
on the International
Polity,"

World Politics, xxx (January

I978), 24I-63.

20 That is, realityseldom approximates

the conditionof "perfectcompliance"discussedin Rawls (fn. 6), 35L.
21
aboutdomesticproblems,
For a similarobservation
see A. MyrickFreeman,"Environmental
Managementas a Regulatory
Process,"DiscussionPaper D-4, Resources
for the Future, January
I977.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

339

of being caughtin specificinprovisionsso long as the probability

stancesis low-a line of reasoningwhichimpliesthatthe availability
of
enforcement
proceduresis essentialto the achievement
of effective
mark
of
the
wide
be
quite
appears
to
compliance.But thisargument
to identifycircumin many real-worldsituations.It is not difficult
will lead to compliance,
of self-interest
stancesin whichconsiderations
on iterativebeespeciallyin conjunctionwith long-runperspectives
havior.Further,thereis no reasonto assume that individualactors
calculationsrelatingto
make large numbersof discretebenefit/cost
regimes.Actorswill
compliancewith the provisionsof international
in
or
this
and it seemsrearealm,
rules
policies
oftendevelopgeneral
sonable to expectthat long-termsocializationas well as feelingsof
obligationwill play an importantrole in the articulationof these
rules.22

pubor setof institutions

A compliancemechanismis anyinstitution
provisions
liclyauthorizedto pursuecompliancewiththe substantive
of a regime,or withtheoutcomesgeneratedby itssocialchoicemechanisms.The image thatcomesto mind hereis one of formalgovernmentalagencies,and suchagenciesare no doubttheclassicinstitutions
specializingin the achievementof compliance.But less formalcompliancemechanismsare common,and highlydecentralizedsocial syssystem,typicallyrely upon them.23
tems,such as the international
calculations
The resultis apt to be a heavyemphasison self-interest
forself-help
in theredress
coupledwithpubliclyrecognizedprocedures
the outcomemay involverelianceon arof wrongs.24
Alternatively,
in whichexplicitagenciesareemployedto gatherinformarangements
tion and to inspectthe actionsof individualactors,but decentralized
proceduresare retainedforthe applicationof sanctions(for example,
regimes).25
theICAO/IATA systemand manyof theregionalfisheries
Fromthepointofviewofthemembersofa regime,thedevelopment
problem.Anyexpendiofcompliancemechanisms
posesan investment
costs,
tureof resourceson suchmechanismswill generateopportunity
will virtually
and decliningmarginalreturnsfromsuch investments
alwaysbecomepronouncedbeforeperfectcomplianceis reached.Ac22 For an intriguing
empiricalexample,see AbramChayes,"An Enquiryinto the
Harvard LIw Review, Vol. 85, No. 5
Workingsof Arms ControlAgreements,"

(975),

905-69.

ApplicaA TheorywithInternational
Young, Complianceand Public Authority,
Press,I979), esp. chaps.4 and 5.
tions(Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUniversity
Ind.:
Government
(Bloomington,
24 For empirical
see LucyMair,Primitive
examples,
Press,I977), esp. chap. i.
IndianaUniversity
Harvard Internaof IATA Agreements,"
25 Ronald S. Tauber, "The Enforcement
tionalLaw journal,x, No. I (i969), I-33.
23

340

WORLD POLITICS

itis safetoassumethatthemembers
ofa regimewillrarely
cordingly,
todevelopcompliance
mechanisms
attempt
viocapableofeliminating
whereequilibrium
willoccurwithrespect
to
lationsaltogether.
Exactly
theseinvestment
decisions
madeaboutthe
dependson theassumptions
members
of international
In viewof thedecentralization
regimes.
of
thatgoeswiththedecentralization
ofpowerandauthorresponsibility
ityin theinternational
system,
however,
it seemssafetoconcludethat
underinvestment
in compliance
mechanisms
of
will be characteristic
international
regimes.26
Still,varioustypesofcompliance
mechanisms
do occurat theinternational
level,27
and suchmechanisms
mustbe
accepted
as a thirdmajorcomponent
ofinternational
regimes.
Severalclarifying
observations
are in orderin closingthissection.
It is possibleto arguethatsomeregimemustalwaysbe present
with
respect
to anygivenactivity:
regimes
in extent,
can varygreatly
and
extreme
casescansimply
be treated
as nullregimes.
Thus,thearrangementforhigh-seas
fishing
priorto WorldWar II mightbe described
as a regime
basedon unrestricted
common
andtheprocedure
property
knownas the"law ofcapture,"
rather
thanas a situation
lackingany
Butthislineofreasoning
leadstoserious
operative
regime.28
problems.
Sometimes
de novoin theabsenceofpriorexpeactivities
areinitiated
rience(forexample,
ordeepseabed
international
satellite
broadcasting
mining).In suchcases,we wouldhaveto developsomefictions
about
latentor tacitregimes
to avoidtheconclusion
thattherearesituations
in whichno regimeis present.
Further,
existing
regimessometimes
breakdown,leavinga confused
andinchoate
situation
withrespect
to
someactivity
thecurrent
(forexample,
situation
regarding
theterritorialsea).29Heretoo,theconceptwouldhaveto be stretched
excesthecontinued
sively
toassert
existence
ofa regime.
Additionally,
avoidtoassumethepresence
ingthetemptation
ofsomeregimein conjunctionwithevery
specifiable
activity
willfacilitate
laterdiscussions
ofthe
ofregimes
origins
andofregimetransformation.
26 International
regimes,like othersocial institutions,
will ordinarilyexhibitthe
attributes
of collectivegoods (that is, non-excludability
and jointnessof supply) to a
highdegree.For further
discussionof theproblemsof supplyingcollectivegoods,see
MancurOlson,Jr.,The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity

Press, i965).

27 For a variety
of examples,see WilliamT. Burke,RichardLegatski,and William
W. Woodhead,National and International Law Enforcementin the Ocean (Seattle:
University
of WashingtonPress,I975).
28Francis T. Christyand AnthonyScott,The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries
(Baltimore:The JohnsHopkinsUniversity
Press,i965).
29 For the background
of earlierefforts
to reach agreementon a regimefor the
territorial
sea, consultPhilipC. Jessup,"The UnitedNationsConference
on the Law
of the Sea," in Essays on InternationalLaw from the Columbia Law Review (New
York: ColumbiaUniversity
Press,i965), I -23I.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

341

In analyzing
international
regimes,
thereis a tendency
to focuson
highlycoherent
and internally
consistent
constructs.
Yet,real-world
regimes
aretypically
unsystematic
and ambiguous,
incorporating
elementsderivedfromseveralanalyticconstructs.
This divergence
betweentheidealtypesarticulated
bystudents
ofregimes
andthemore
inchoate
inoperation
in real-world
regimes
situations
is partly
attributabletomisunderstandings
bythosewhomakedecisions
aboutregimes.
Muchofit,however,
arisesfromtwootherfactors.
The development
of
an international
regimeusuallyinvolvesintensebargaining
and the
outof criticalcompromises
hammering
amongtheinterested
actors.
A dramatic
current
illustration
of thisphenomenon
is theongoing
bargaining
relatingto theproposedInternational
SeabedAuthority.
Furthermore,
international
regimes
evolveand changeover
generally
timein response
to variouseconomicand politicalpressures.
This is
trueevenofregimes
initially
formulated
in
comprehensively
somesort
of "constitutional"
contract.
Withthepassageof time,regimesgenerallyacquireadditional
features
andbecomelessconsistent
internally.
The pointoftheseremarks
is neither
to criticize
nor
existing
regimes
toarguethattheexamination
ofidealtypesis unimportant
in conjunctionwiththedevelopment
of international
regimes.
But a failureto
bearin mindthedistinction
between
idealtypesand reality
is bound
to leadtoconfusion.30
thereis a difference
between
theconditions
Finally,
forthe
required
of an international
effective
operation
regimeand the consequences
fromitsoperation.
resulting
To illustrate,
a regimegoverning
consider
international
tradeinsomecommodity
basedonprivate
property
rights
anda competitive
The conditions
market.
to ensureeffective
necessary
of sucha regimeincludethe availability
operation
of information
aboutpotential
a willingness
to acceptthetermsof tradedictrades,
tatedbythemarket,
andan absenceofnaturalmonopolies.31
The conof theregime,by contrast,
sequencesof theoperation
relateto the
extent
towhichityieldseconomically
efficient
thedegreeto
outcomes;
social
or
whichit produces
costs neighborhood
theattractiveeffects;
in distributive
nessoftheresults
Boththeconditerms;and so forth.
tionsforoperation
andtheconsequences
ofoperation
arecentral
issues
in theanalysis
of international
Butit is important
to differregimes.
entiate
between
clearly
them,as wellas tobearinmindthatboththese
to the
300n the relationship
betweenideal typesand reality,withspecialreference
theoryof games,see AnatolRapoport,Two-Person Game Theory (Ann Arbor:Universityof MichiganPress,i966), i86-2I4.
31 For a succinct
see RobertHaveand clearlywrittendiscussionof such conditions,
man,The Economics of the Public Sector (New York: Wiley,i976), 22-27.

342

WORLD

POLITICS

fromefforts
issuesareseparable
tocharacterize
theinstitutional
content
ofan international
regime.
REGIMES IN OPERATION

theanalytic
with
Havingexamined
content
oftheconcept
"regime,"
specialreference
totheinternational
system,
letmeturntosomeofthe
majorfeatures
ofregimes
as theyoccurin real-world
situations.
I. Varietiesof regimes.Variety
withrespect
to extent,
formality,
direction,
andcoherence
is a prominent
feature
ofinternational
regimes.
Sometimes
thesedifferences
areattributable
to underlying
philosophicalorientations.
Forexample,
regimes
resting
on socialist
premises
will
encompass
moreextensive
collections
ofrulesas wellas moreexplicit
efforts
todirect
behavior
towardtheachievement
ofgoalsthanlaissezfaireregimesthatemphasizedecentralized
decisionmakingand autonomy
forindividual
actors.In othercases,variations
arisefromthe
character
of specific
of settingup
bargainsstruckin the processes
or fromthe particular
regimes,
patterns
of institutional
evolution
overtime.
The extent
ofa regimeis a matter
ofthenumber
andrestrictiveness
ofitsrights
is thecaseofunlimited
laissezandrules.At oneextreme
faire,in whichtheactors
arecompletely
freetodo as theypleasewithAt the
outeventheconstraints
ofproperty
or userights.32
ofa system
otherextreme
arearrangements
central
anddeemphasizing
planning
tailedrulesgoverning
the actionsof individualmembers.
Between
in terms
theseextremes
lie variousmixedcasesthataredifferentiable
towhichtheyincluderights
theauoftheextent
andrulesrestricting
oftheactors.International
tendto be lessrestrictive
tonomy
regimes
thandomestic
theextreme
ones,buttheydo notgenerally
approximate
ofunlimitedlaissez-faire.

in theextentto whichtheyare
International
regimes
varygreatly
laid out in formalagreements,
or treaties.
For example,
conventions,
thecurrent
to a greaterdegree
is formalized
regimeforAntarctica
thantheneutralization
forSwitzerland.
As in domestic
arrangements
to arise
it is commonforinformal
settings,
moreover,
understandings
ofan interwithintheframework
established
bytheformalstructure
interSuchunderstandings
toprovide
national
regime.
mayserveeither
oftheformal
ofambiguous
pretations
aspects
arrangements
(forexam32
A regimeforsome naturalresourcewith no privateproperty
rights,no liability
rules,and allocationbased on the principleknown as the "law of capture"might
approximate
thisextremecase.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

343

ple,thenotionof maximum
sustained
withthe
yieldin conjunction
marinefisheries),
or to supplement
formalarrangements
by dealing
withissuesthattheyfailto cover(forexample,
thetreatment
of nuclear technology
underthe termsof the partialnucleartest-ban
regime).Thoughitmaybe helpful,
formalization
is clearly
nota necessarycondition
fortheeffective
operation
of international
regimes.
Thereare informal
regimesthathavebeengenerally
and
successful,
thereareformal
thathaveproduced
arrangements
results
unimpressive
(forexample,
severalofthecommodity
agreements)."
Regimesaredirected
to theextentthattheyexertpressure
on their
members
to actin conformity
withsomeclear-cut
socialgoal.Various
goalsare feasible-including
economicefficiency,
thepreservation
of
ecosystems,
distributive
justice,
andso forth.
Evenwherethereis agreementin principle
aboutthepursuitof somesocialgoal,however,
it
mayprovedifficult
tomeetunderreal-world
conditions.
For example,
thegoal of "optimum"
yieldwithrespectto themarinefisheries
is
notoriously
difficult
tofulfill
in reality.34
whena regime
Additionally,
is directed
towardtheachievement
ofseveral
goalsat once,closeattentionmustbe paid to the determination
of trade-offs
amongthese
goals.35
In theabsenceofsystematic
efforts
to construct
trade-off
functions,
anyapparent
directedness
ofa regime
twoormore
encompassing
distinct
goalswillbe an illusion.
Coherence
refers
to thedegreeto whichtheelements
of an internationalregimeare internally
consistent.
Severeinternalcontradictionsarecommoninreal-world
evenin caseswheretheyhave
regimes,
beenarticulated
in moreor lessexplicit
"constitutional"
contracts.
For
there
areoften
example,
contradictions
between
userights
formarine
resources
andrights
vestedin adjacentcoastalstatestoexcludeoutsiders.
conflicts
arisebetween
theallegedrequirements
Similarly,
commonly
of
indivisible
statesovereignty
and theobligations
imposedby therules
of international
It is nothardto accountfortheseelements
regimes.
ofincoherence
in terms
ofthecompromises
to achieveinitial
necessary
of a regime,or in termsof the piecemealevolutionof
acceptance
regimesovertimein responseto changingpolitical,
economic,
and
socialforces.
Butthewidespread
occurrence
ofincoherence
meansthat
33United Nations, InternationalCompensation for Fluctuations in Commodity Trade

(New York: UnitedNations,i96i).

34 P. A. Larkin,"An EpitaphfortheConceptof MaximumSustainedYield," Transactions of the American Fisheries Society,Vol. io6 (January
1977), I-II.
35 On the economicapproachto such trade-offs,
see RichardZeckhauserand Elmer
Shaefer,"PublicPolicyand NormativeEconomicTheory,"in RaymondA. Bauer and
KennethJ.Gergen,eds.,The StudyofPolicyFormation(New York: Free Press,i968),

27-101.

344

WORLD POLITICS

in
constructs
tooheavilyon neatanalytic
we mustbewareof relying
andthatwe mustlearntocopewith
situations,
real-world
interpreting
ofcontradictions.
theexistence
prievenhighlydecentralized
All regimes,
organization.
2. Explicit
buttheyneednot
aresocialinstitutions,
arrangements,
vate-enterprise
withtheir
arrangements
by explicitorganizational
be accompanied
and so forth.Effective
budgets,physicalfacilities,
own personnel,
are commonto
arrangements
organizational
lackingexplicit
regimes
to societies
confined
no
means
are
by
butthey
societies,3"
"primitive"
makinguse of comsystems
free-enterprise
ofthistype.For example,
vital
performing
areclassiccasesofsocialinstitutions
markets
petitive
Many
organization."
explicit
of
the
absence
in
in
society
functions
dress,and
manners,
as thosegoverning
othersocialinstitutions-such
with
effectively
behavior
tostructure
relations-serve
intergenerational
true
Althoughit is undoubtedly
littleneedforexplicitorganization.
involvefewerexplicitorcharacteristically
regimes
thatinternational
not
it is important
regimes,
thandomestic
arrangements
ganizational
assotoo far.The explicitorganizations
to carrythisgeneralization
nottrivial,
regimearecertainly
monetary
ciatedwiththeinternational
in conjunction
contemplated
arrangements
and the organizational
arequitecomplex.
SeabedAuthority
withtheproposed
International
is apparent,
regimes
Evenwherea needforexplicitorganization
createdforotherpurposes,
structures
maymakeuseoforganizational
in preferwitha morecomprehensive
publicauthority,
or associated
of theirown.Suchsitarrangements
autonomous
enceto establishing
turnover
regularly
level:regimes
uationsarecommonat thedomestic
disputesettleinspection,
gathering,
tasksthatinvolveinformation
so that
in thesematters,
specializing
andenforcement
toagencies
ment,
oftheirown.At the
orpoliceforces
courtsystems
theywillnotrequire
appearsto be farlesscommon.Situainternational
level,thispractice
fromsucharrangetionsin whichsubstantive
regimescouldbenefit
regimes
enough.For example,arms-control
mentsoccurfrequently
and
the
ICAO/
procedures,
couldmakeuseofmoregeneralinspection
itsrules.38
toenforce
couldrelyon somelargerauthority
IATA system
are eitherlackingor
capabilities
But comprehensive
organizational
Thus,the
community.
in the international
underdeveloped
severely
carriedout
activities
UnitedNationsis hardlycapableof inspecting
Mair (fn. 24), PartI.
of marketsin preciselytheseterms.
See Haveman (fn. 31), 21, fora description
38 See RichardA. Falk and RichardBarnet,eds.,Security in Disarmament (PrinceUniversity
Press,I965), as well as Tauber (fn. 25).
ton:Princeton
36

37

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

345

or resolving
to
undertheregimeforAntarctica
disputespertaining
individual
deepseabedmining.In theinternational
system,
therefore,
arenottightly
regimes
linked,eventhoughtheyoftenlackextensive
in theirownright.
organizational
arrangements
reasonto endowregimes
Perhapsthemostobviousand compelling
ofinis toresolve
withexplicit
organizational
arrangements
problems
Butthereareseveralothertasks
terpretation
anddisputesettlement.39
For inthatare difficult
to accomplish
withoutsuchorganizations.
various
and to monitor
it maybe desirable
to conduct
research
stance,
in orderto determine
whether
activities
rightsand rulesneedto be
arecommon
adjusted
todealwithchanging
conditions.
Suchproblems
withrespect
thestabilization
ofcomto themanagement
of fisheries,
modity
trade,andthehandling
ofoil spills.Whenever
revenues
must
be collected
anddisposed
willbe
of,someorganizational
arrangements
required.
For example,
a regimefordeepseabedminingthatrequires
leaseholders
can hardlyfunction
to makeregularroyalty
payments
withoutsomeorganization
funds.Moreover,
to handletheresultant
in dealoftenbecomeimportant
explicit
organizational
arrangements
thatareoutsidethe
ofsocialchoiceandcompliance
ingwithproblems
realmofdisputesettlement.
of fishstockspurelyon
The exploitation
no explicit
but
thebasisofthe"lawofcapture"
requires
organization,
theneedfororganization
hararisesas soonas regulations
limiting
The sameholdstrueof
areintroduced.
schemes
vests,
quotas,or entry
Someregimes(forexample,
thepartialtest-ban
compliance.
regime)
without
areabletoresolve
theirbasicproblems
ofcompliance
creating
Butwiththeintroduction
ofsystematic
surveilexplicit
organizations.
lanceor formalsanctions,
theestablishment
of explicitorganizations
a necessity.
becomes
The emergence
of explicitorganizational
arrangements
raisesa
thatarejustas pressing
rangeofclassicquestions
attheinternational
as
at thedomestic
level.How muchautonomy,
othercenters
of
vis-a-vis
in thesocialsystem,
shouldtheorganizations
authority
possess?What
ofdecision
sorts
rulesandprocedures
shouldbe adoptedin conjunction
withtheseorganizations?
How muchdiscretion
shouldtheorganizationshaveto makechangesthataffect
thesubstantive
content
or the
character
of theregimeitself?How shouldtheorganizaprocedural
tionsbe financed:
whereshouldtheirrevenues
comefrom,and how
shouldtheyberaised?How shouldtheorganizations
be staffed?
What
39This is, forexample,the classicargumentdevelopedby Locke and similarcontractarians
concerning
theoriginsof government.
See JohnLocke,The Second Treatise
of Government,paragraphs123-131.

346

WORLD POLITICS

sortsof physicalfacilities
shouldtheorganizations
have,and where
shouldthesefacilities
be located?The answersto all thesequestions
can affect
theimpactthatanygivenregimehason itsmembers.
It is
therefore
tobe expected
thattheseissueswillbe fought
overvigorously
-not onlyat theoutset,
butalsoduringthewholeperiodoverwhich
theregimeis effective.
To theextentthatexplicitorganizational
arrangements
arelessimportant
in international
regimes
thanin domesticones,thissortof contention
will be lesspervasive
at theinternationallevel.Nevertheless,
it is impossible
to makesenseoutofrecent
negotiations
relatingto international
monetary
arrangements,
deep
seabedmining,
or theallocation
of thebroadcast
frequency
spectrum
without
payingcarefulattention
to thesequestions
of organizational
design."
3. Policyinstruments.
Policyinstruments
are elements
of regimes
thataresubjectto deliberate
or plannedmanipulation
in theinterests
ofachieving
socialgoals.Suchinstruments
atdifferent
canoperate
levelsofgenerality.
theinThus,changesin bundlesof property
rights,
troduction
ofrestrictive
anddecisions
individregulations,
concerning
ual applications
forloansor mininglicensesmay all be treatedas
matters
theuse of policyinstruments,
but theyobviously
involving
addressproblems
at different
levelsofgenerality.
occurring
Policyinstruments
are also apt to be articulated
in termsthatare specific
to
individual
of
regimesor typesof regimes.
Thus,the determination
allowablecatches,as well as decisionsconcerning
the openingand
of
harvest
closing
areas,are standardissuesinvolving
policyinstrumentsin fisheries
of exchangeratesor theisregimes.
Adjustments
suanceofbroadcast
in other
licensesarecommonpolicyinstruments
regimes.4"

At theinternational
theextentto
level,a keydistinction
concerns
whichtheuse ofpolicyinstruments
theexistence
of explicit
requires
the
organizational
Forexample,
itis possible
toredefine
arrangements.
of
contents rightsand rulesat occasionalassemblies
of themembers
of a regime;it mayevenbe possibleto do so bymeansof unilateral
actions
onthepartofsomemembers
subseofa regime
towhichothers
quently
conform
ona de factobasis.Policyinstruments
ofthissortwill
havean obviousappealin highlydecentralized
This
socialsystems.
40See, forexample,Brown(fn. i), and MichaelHardy,"The Implications
of AlternativeSolutionsfor Regulatingthe Exploitationof Seabed Minerals,"International
Organization,
xxxi, No. 2 (I977), 3I3-42.
41For further
discussion,
see GiandomenicoMajone,"Choice among PolicyInstrumentsforPollutionControl,"PolicyAnalysis,ii (Fall i976), 589-6I3.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

347

tendency
to respondto problems
appealmayaccountforthecurrent
byredrawing
jurisdictional
maritime
regimes
relating
to international
common
fromthedomainofinternational
boundaries
(thatis,shifting
rather
thanbyagreeing
property
to thedomainofnationalproperty)
resources
at theintertospecific
rulesfortheuseofcommonproperty
Jurisdictional
changescan be pursuedunilaterally;
nationallevel.42
organizations.
requirements
fornewinternational
theydo notgenerate
ofuserulesforcommonproperty
resources,
bycontrast,
The creation
is apttorequirethedevelopment
thoughthe
organizations,
ofexplicit
results
maybe moreequitablethanthosearisingfromshifts
produced
injurisdictional
boundaries.43
suitableforuse by explicitorganiNonetheless,
policyinstruments
withinternational
zationsare not altogether
lackingin connection
hastheauthority
to
The International
WhalingCommission
regimes.
quotasforindividualspeciesof greatwhales.
adjustannualharvest
in
conditions
The International
Monetary
Fundcanlaydownspecific
currency
problems.
The Interexperiencing
granting
loanstocountries
allowsfortheallocation
of exportshares
nationalCoffeeAgreement
SeabedAuthority
International
Andtheproposed
amongitsmembers.
of permits
wouldbe ableto makeuseof a relatively
complexsystem
of manganese
nodulesfrom
and licensesto regulatetheproduction
to reachautonothedeepseabed.The abilityof theseorganizations
mousdecisionsaboutthe use of suchinstruments
maybe severely
in theuse
canbecomea majorproblem
limited.
compliance
Moreover,
of suchinstruments
(forexample,exportquotasforcoffee).4"But
between
theuse of
distinction
a qualitative
thesefactsdo notsuggest
and theiruse in domestic
in international
regimes
policyinstruments
is limitedby
In short,
thoughtheuseof theseinstruments
regimes.45
associated
with
thecharacteristic
of explicit
organizations
weaknesses
at
irrelevant
are by no means
international
theinstruments
regimes,
theinternational
level.
42
arisingfromunilateralextensions
Recentchangesin regimesformarinefisheries
thisprospect.In the case of the
on the partof coastalstatesexemplify
of jurisdiction
was accomplishedthroughthe passage of the Fishery
United States,the transition
Act of 1976 (PL 94-265).
and Management
Conservation
43For a case in point,consultthe analysisof the proposedInternational
Seabed
ResourceRegimes"(fn.4).
in Young,"International
Authority,
HarvardInterAgreements,"
ExportQuota Commodity
4Bart S. Fisher,"Enforcing
nationalLaw journal,xii, No. 3 (1971), 401-35.
45 It is notnecessary
to Marxianpreceptsto realizethatdomesticas well
to subscribe
by actorswho are, in principle,
regimesmay be heavilyinfluenced
as international
underthetermsof theseregimes.In fact,thisis thecentralinsight
subjectto regulation
of the"capture"theoryof regulation.

348

WORLD

POLITICS

REGIME DYNAMICS

areproducts
international
of
Like othersocialinstitutions,
regimes
andtheconvergence
amonggroups
humaninteractions
ofexpectations
entities
waitingto be
of interested
actors.Theyare notautonomous
forinstitutional
togovern
discovered
arrangements
byactorssearching
natural
theiractivities.
are
some
Nor theylike
rights,
possessing normactors.
ativestatusindependent
oftheevaluations
oftheaffected
thatregimesarisefromthe actionsof groupsof
It is significant
Sometimes
actors.46
socialinstitutions
ofthistypeemergeandfunction
effort
on thepartof individual
pareffectively
without
anydeliberate
the"invisible
Thatis theideaunderlying
hand"conception
ticipants.
thatgroupsof individuals-each
in whichit is suggested
ofmarkets,
in sucha way
hisownself-interest-will
interact
vigorously
pursuing
effias to producesocially
desirable
outcomes
economic
(forexample,
mechanisms
be counted
cannotgenerally
ciency).Butinvisible-hand
The conditions
on toyieldeffective
international
to
necessary
regimes.
are highlyspecializedevenin the realmof
producesuchoutcomes
In the international
arena,
straightforward
economictransactions.47
self-interest
leadstooutcomes
that
thepursuit
ofindividual
commonly
the
sense
even
are sociallyundesirable
(in
of beingPareto-inferior);
the actionsof individualactorsfreconsciousefforts
to coordinate
runafoulofsevereconflicts
ofinterest.48
quently
therewillbe no physical
Sinceregimes
arehumanartifacts,
barriers
andreform.
Butchange-especially
guidedchangeto theircreation
is notnecessarily
freeasyto achievein thisrealm.Socialinstitutions
to change,evenwhentheygenerate
outcomes
quently
proveresistant
as undesirable.
are fathatare widelyregarded
Existinginstitutions
whilenew arrangements
miliarconstructs,
requireactorsto learn
unfamiliar
and to accept(initially)unknownoutcomes.
procedures
of existing
Further,
guidedchangerequiresnotonlythedestruction
aroundsomenew
butalsothecoordination
ofexpectations
institutions,
focalpoint.In viewoftheprevalence
ofconflicts
ofinterest
regarding
itis fairto assumethata conproblems
ofinternational
coordination,
aroundnew institutional
of expectations
will
arrangements
vergence
arecomplex
oftenbe slowin coming.
Whatis more,socialinstitutions
whichtypically
a numberof informal
as well as
entities,
encompass
46 Comparethisview withthe analysisof conventions
in David K. Lewis, Convention:A Philosophical
Study(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,i969).
47 For a moreoptimistic
of invisible-hand
assessment
mechanisms
see RobertNozick,
Anarchy,
State,and Utopia(New York: BasicBooks,1974), 18-25.
48Thomas C. Schelling,"On the Ecology of Micromotives,"
The Public Interest,
No. 25 (Fall i'7i ), 6i-98.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

349

to adjust a regime
formalelements.Consequently,deliberateefforts
runtheriskof doingmoreharmthangood; theymayproducedisruptive consequencesthat were neitherforeseennor intendedby those
advocatingthespecificchanges.Althoughnotall initiatives
alongthese
lines are doomed to failure,naive hopes concerningthe efficacy
of
in thisrealmaboundamongpolicymakersand stusocialengineering
dentsof international
relationsalike.49
threechannelsor
Originsof regimes.It is helpfulto differentiate
tracksin the emergenceof international
regimes.There is, to begin
in someactivity(or
track.The actorsinterested
with,thecontractarian
theirauthorizedrepresentatives)
maymeetforthe explicitpurposeof
negotiating
a "constitutional"
contractlayingout a regimeto govern
the activityin question.50
The regimeforAntarcticathatwas agreed
thistrack;the currenteffort
to work out a
upon in i959 exemplifies
a far
comprehensive
international
regimefor the oceans constitutes
on a conmore ambitiousattemptto engage in regimeconstruction
tractarian
basis.51
An alternative
track:
approachcan be describedas the evolutionary
ariseeitherfromwidespreadpracticeover
sometimes
socialinstitutions
timeor as a consequenceof dramaticunilateralactionsthatare subsequentlyacceptedbyotherson a de factobasis.In general,regimesgoverningtheuse of marineresourceshavetraditionally
originatedin this
the post-I945regimefor the continental
fashion.More specifically,
thispattern.52
shelvesexemplifies
whichmightbe
In an intermediate
processof regimeconstruction,
labeledthepiecemealtrack,actorssometimesreachagreementon one
or morecomponentsof a regimewithoutenteringinto a comprehensivesocialcontractregardingthe activity
in question.A commonjustification
forthisapproachrestson the (dubious) argumentthatthe
ofone or severalregimecomponents
will initiatea process
introduction
of taskexpansionor "spillover"thatwill lead overtimeto the emeri.

49This pointof viewmayseemconservative

(in the Burkeansense),but surelyit is
more than that. There are similarthemesin many of the anarchistcriticismsof
Marxianor authoritarian
socialism,as well as in many contemporary
expressions
of
libertarianism.
Skepticismabout the efficacy
of social engineering,
therefore,
is not a
good indicatorof ideologicalorientation.
50On theconceptof a "constitutional"
contract,
see JamesM. Buchanan,The Limits
of Liberty (Chicago: University
of ChicagoPress,1975), esp. chap.4.
51Howard Taubenfeld,"A Treatyfor Antarctica,"
International Conciliation, No.
531 (i96i),
and EdwardMiles,"The Structure
and Effectsof the DecisionProcessin
the Seabed Committeeand the Third UnitedNationsConference
on the Law of the
Sea," InternationalOrganization, xxxi, No. 2 (1977), 159-234.
52 Note thatit was formalized
or codifiedin the 1958 Geneva Conventionon the
OuterContinental
see Jessup(fn. 29).
Shelf.For relevantbackground,

350

WORLD POLITICS

genceof a morecomprehensive
and coherentregime.53
Prominentexamplesof thispiecemealtrackat the international
level includemany
of the regionalfisheries
regimes(for example,ICNAF or INPFC),
as well as the institutional
arrangements
relatingto marinepollution.
There can be no doubtthatthe evolutionary
trackwill be followed
moreoftenthanthecontractarian
trackin highlydecentralizedsocial
systems
like theinternational
system.These systems
lack authoritative
procedures
fordealingwithregimes;it is oftendifficult
evento determine the pertinentset of actorsto deal with the developmentof a
regime.At the same time,groupsize undoubtedly
makesa difference
It is possibleto idenwithintheclassof highlydecentralized
systems.
tifycases in which small groupsof actorshave been able to reach
contractarian
bargainseven in highlydecentralizedsystems,
but such
difficult
to reachin systems
thatare bothhighly
bargainsareextremely
and largewithrespectto numberof members.To illusdecentralized
trate,the I2 originalsignatories
to the AntarcticaTreatyof I959 were
able to reach agreementon a relativelycomprehensive
regimefor
Antarctica,
but in the UnitedNationsConferenceon the Law of the
and large numSea (UNCLOS) the combinationof decentralization
in workingout a meaningful
bershas led to fundamentaldifficulties
''constitutional"
contractcoveringtheoceans.
whetherthe institutional
Does it make a difference
arrangements
governinga given activityemerge along one or anotherof these
tracks?Contractarian
processesofferthedistinctadvantageof producthatare incorporated
into documents(such
ing explicitarrangements
as treatiesor conventions)which become part of the public record
availablefor consultation.
But the articulationon a "constitutional"
contractis not alwaysan unmixedblessing,evenwhen it is politically
feasibleto persuadetheactorsto acceptit.Agreements
ofthistypemay
be explicit,buttheyarefrequently
couchedin ambiguouslanguagedeof interest
signedto obscureirreconcilable
conflicts
amongtheactors.54
Moreover,actorsfrequentlyindicatesuperficialacquiescencein arto whichtheydo not intendto abide in practice.In such
rangements
contractpurportingto
cases,the promulgationof a "constitutional"
spellout a regimeforsome activity
will not onlygenerateconfusion;
it is also apt to breeddisillusionment
and cynicismamong the membersof the relevantsocial system.Despite theirobviousinitialdraw53 Leon

Lindbergand StuartScheingold,eds., Regional Integration:Theoryand

Practice (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
Press,I971).

54 On the resulting
problemsof treatyinterpretation
in international
law, see Myres
S. McDougal,Harold D. Lasswell,and JamesC. Miller,The Interpretation
of Agree-

ments and World Order (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, i967).

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

351

processes
fromevolutionary
regimesemerging
backs,international
to thosearisingfroma contracthatarepreferable
mayyieldresults
tarianapproach
gonesour.
thecritical
issueconcerns
thelikelihood
approach,
In thepiecemeal
will acof one or severalregimecomponents
thattheintroduction
Although
taskexpansionor "spillover."
tuallygeneratesubstantial
or planned
fordeliberate
theapproachseemsto offeropportunities
wherecontractarian
ofinternational
procedures
regimes
development
is notreassuring.
Withreactualexperience
infeasible,55
arepolitically
wherethenotion
andpolitical
integration,
specttoregionaleconomic
theavailableevidenceoffers
mostthoroughly,
has beeninvestigated
on toyield
canbe counted
thatthelogicoffunctionalism
no assurance
results.56
Whatis more,thepiecemealtrackmaylead to
significant
whenlittlespillover
occurs:it may
of incoherence
severeproblems
withlittleif anything
to recomleavea trailof half-formed
regimes
mendthem.
International
regimesdo not become
Regimetransformation.
Theyundergo
evenaftertheyare fullydeveloped.
staticconstructs
ecoin theirpolitical,
in response
to shifts
transformation
continuous
mayoccurwith
alterations
Significant
nomic,andsocialenvironments.
ofits
andrules,thecharacter
rights
ofa regime's
respect
tothecontent
mechanisms.
orthenatureofitscompliance
socialchoicemechanisms,
at
somecriticalpointof transition
to identify
It wouldbe arbitrary
changein thesenseof one
whichsuchalterations
yielda qualitative
myobonetakingitsplace.Rather,
and another
regimedisappearing
which
theprocesses
through
is to identify
jectivein thisdiscussion
on institutional
proceinternational
change,and to comment
regimes
duresforhandling
thesechanges.
fortransformaseveral
typesofpressure
It is possible
todifferentiate
regimes.In somecases,thereare fundamental
tionin international
shifts
from
Forexample,
activity.
in thenatureoftherelevant
changes
fortraditional
majorproblems
lightto heavyusagehavegenerated
and the adventof communications
regimesin themarinefisheries;
the pre-existing
problemsaffecting
has raisedsignificant
satellites
for
In
other
cases,
pressures
for
international
broadcasting.57
regime
of someactoror classof actors
changearisefromthedissatisfaction
2.

55The classicearlyexpression
A Workof thisreasoningappearsin David Mitrany,
ing Peace System(London: RoyalInstitute
of International
Affairs,
I943).
56 Leon Lindbergand StuartScheingold,Europe's Would-BePolity (Englewood
Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,
I970).
57 See Brown(fn. i).

352

WORLD POLITICS

The unilatof a prevailing

withthedistributive
regime.
consequences
on the
jurisdictions
in recentyearsof200-milefishery
eralimposition
of
a dramatic
illustration
coastalstatesconstitutes
partof numerous
formajoralterathistypeofregimechange.A thirdtypeofpressure
orcoherent
a systematic
regimetoreplace
tionsis a desiretointroduce
or
regime.The basicidea hereis to streamline
a chaoticor inchoate
in the
orcontradictory
rationalize
a regimethathasgrownambiguous
oneofthemotivatThisobjective
is undoubtedly
courseofevolution.58
new
efforts
to
work
out
a
"constitutional"
current
forces
behind
ing
fortheoceans.
contract
thearforchangethrough
anticipate
pressures
Regimesfrequently
arrangements
rules.Theseareinstitutional
oftransformation
ticulation
whatstepsmust
howpressures
forchangearetobe treated,
specifying
in a regime,
andwhatdecision
rule
be takentobringaboutalterations
when proposed
is to be employedas a standardfor determining
rulesmayvarygreatly
changesare to be accepted.Transformation
towhichtheymakeiteasy
withrespect
totheirstringency
(theextent
andthereis noreasontoassume
accepted),
ordifficult
togetalterations
thatthosewishingto changea regimewillalwaysabidebytheterms
theexistence
of a setof transformation
of suchrules.Nevertheless,
rules-evenif theyare notalwaysfollowedin practice-islikelyto
of
of theprecisecontent
efforts
Regardless
to alterregimes.
structure
ofthe
intheirimpacton theinterests
therules,theywillnotbe neutral
ruleswill determine
actorsaffected
Transformation
by a regime.59
coalitionbuilding,legal
whatskills(such as bargaining,
legislative
in efforts
to altera givenregime,and
reasoning)will be essential
of theseskills,or easeof
actorswillneverbe equalin thepossession
of transformation
accessto them.It followsthatthe promulgation
matas an important
regimewillbe treated
rulesforan international
of
of theregimewill promote
theacceptance
ter,and thatmembers
overtime.
rulestheyexpecttofavortheirowninterests
in all social
Guidedreform
ofsocialinstitutions
is a difficult
process
and
in thepresenceof rapidpolitical,
economic,
systems,
especially
that,
severein systems
socialchanges.
Butthedifficulties
areunusually
liketheinternational
arehighly
decentralized
in theirdistribusystem,
tionof authority
procedures
lackroutinized
and power.Suchsystems
The distinction
betweenthistypeof pressureand redistributive
pressurefrequently
becomesblurredin practicebecauseit is politically
moreacceptableto cloak redistributivedesiresin the guiseof promoting
good management
practices.Numerousillustrationsof this phenomenoncan be found in the debatesover the AmericanFishery
Conservation
and ManagementAct of I976.
58

59 See Young (fn. i9), 260-62.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

353

(forexample,legislativemechanisms)capableof accommodating
pressuresforinstitutional
change.Wherethenumberof membersis small
and thesystemhas beenin operationa long time,it maybe possibleto
solvesuchproblemsthroughregularizedbargainingprocesses.Where
the numberof actorsis large and theirinterestsare heterogeneous,
costsassociatedwithefforts
to transform
inhowever,the transaction
ternationalregimeswill be substantial;it may prove impossibleto
to highlycoercivepracarriveat clearcutoutcomeswithoutresorting
tices-eitherin theformof unilateralactionstakenin disregardof the
to imposechangeson others
ofothers,or in theformofefforts
interests
in the absenceof theirvoluntaryconsent.Currentefforts
to hammer
out a new international
regimefortheoceansoffera clearillustration
of theseproblemsof achievingguided institutional
change in large,
decentralized
systems.
3. Changeand socialchoice.Like all socialinstitutions,
international
of collectivegoods to a high degree.6"
regimesexhibitthe attributes
Therefore,no marketswill arise in internationalregimesper se,
thoughtheremay be marketsin entrypermitsfor fishing,pollution
rights,licensesfor deep seabed mining,and so forth.Since regimes
neveryieldneutralresults,it is safe to assumethatinterested
parties
with respectto both the initial
will expressnon-identical
preferences
developmentand the subsequentreformof these social institutions.
Moreover,the expectedimpactof international
regimesis generally
great enough to deterthe affectedactorsfrom consigningmatters
relatingto theirdevelopmentand alterationto administrative
experts.
Under the circumstances,
regimedynamicstypicallyrevolvearound
processesof socialchoiceor procedures
throughwhichconflicting
preferencesconcerninginstitutional
can be aggregatedinto
arrangements
collectivedecisions.Again,a particularly
clearillustration
of thisphenomenoncan be seen in the currentcomplexnegotiations
concerning
the institutional
featuresof the proposedInternationalSeabed Authority."6

environment
In thehighlydecentralized
of theinternational
system,
the prescribed
procedureforresolvingsuch problemsof social choice
is to resortto multilateralbargainingwithinthe frameworkof an
conference.
international
of interestamong major
However,conflicts
60 This argument
is set forthclearlyin Olson (fn. 26), forthe generalcase of social
institutions.
61 Comparetheviewsexpressed
in Young,"International
ResourceRegimes"(fn. 4),
of Deep Ocean Minerals:Regulawiththoseadvancedin RossD. Eckert,"Exploitation
toryMechanisms
and UnitedStatesPolicy,"journalofLaw and Economics,xviI (April

I974), I43-77.

354

WORLD POLITICS

actorsor groupsof actorsare typicallysevere.There is no effective

traditionthatputspressureon interested
partieswho findthemselves
to
the
of
in theminority accept preferences majoritycoalitions.62
Since
actorscommonlymistrustthe performance
of institutional
arrangeto resolveall potentialissuesduring
ments(to thepointof attempting
the phase of regimeformation),multilateralbargainingis oftena
costlymethodof resolvingproblemsof social choicerelatingto internationalregimes;sometimesit fails to yield any clearcutoutcomes
altogether.
Two alternative
methodsexistfordealingwiththedevelopment
and
alteration
of international
regimes.In somesituations,
smallgroupsof
actorspossessingstrongand generallycompatibleinterests
in a particular activityband togetherto work out an acceptableset of arrangementsto governthat activity.The existingregimesfor Antarctica,
whaling,and fishingin the northeastern
Atlanticare all productsof
this methodof handlingproblemsof social choice. There are also
indicationsthatseveralimportantactorsare preparingto followthe
same route in developinga regimefor the marine fisheriesof the
or SouthernOcean area.63
Antarctic
The othermethodinvolvesdramaticunilateralactionon thepartof
one or a few powerfulactors.Under suitableconditions,thisprocess
will lead to de factoconformity
on the part of othersin the same
way thatpriceleadershipoperatesto producecoordinatedbehaviorin
Both the existingregimeforthe outer
certainoligopolisticindustries.
continentalshelvesand the emergingregimeforthe marinefisheries
have arisenlargelyin thisfashion,and thepostwarinternational
monetaryregimemaybe considereda productof Americandominancein
the aftermath
of the war.64If the UnitedStatesgetsits way,developmentofa regimefordeep seabedminingmayfollowa similarcourse.65
Any givencase of regimedevelopmentor alterationat the international level will undoubtedlybe governedby the configuration
of
62 Some analysts
favorunanimity
as a decisionrule,especiallyat thelevelof "constitutional"contracts:see JamesM. Buchananand Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of
Consent (Ann Arbor:University
of MichiganPress,I962). Rawls (fn. 6) suggeststhat
individualscontemplating
principlesof justicein the "originalposition"would reach
unanimousagreement.
63 "Thaw in International
Law? Rightsin Antarcticaunder the Law of Common
Spaces,"Yale Law Journal,Vol. 87 (March I978), 804-59.
64 See, for example,RobertGilpin,"The Politicsof Transnational
EconomicRelations,"InternationalOrganization, xxv, No. 3 (i97i), 398-4I9.
65 A Deep Seabed Hard MineralsAct (H.R. 3350), settingfortha unilaterally
imposedregimefordeep seabedmining,narrowly
failedto pass in the 95thCongress.
Similarlegislation(S. 493) has been introducedin the 96th Congress,and standsa
relatively
good chanceof passing.

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: CONCEPT FORMATION

355

The resultant
aremuch
actors.66
poweramongtheinterested
dynamics
in oligopolistic
industries.
Whereone actoris
like thoseoccurring
unilateral
actionsare likelyto loom largein the
clearlydominant,
of regimeconstruction
processes
and reform.
Whereseveralactors
in the activity,
sharepoweras well as a stronginterest
by contrast,
regimesare likelyto emergefrombargainsstruckamongsmall
groupsofkeyplayers.67
CONCLUSION

Although
thereis greatvariation
amonginternational
regimes,
they
are all social institutions.
Amongotherthings,this suggeststhat
aredependent
regimes
of convergent
uponthemaintenance
expectationsamongactors;formalization
is nota necessary
condition
forthe
of regimes,
are alwayscreatedrather
effective
and regimes
operation
than discovered.
theseattributes
accountfor certain
Undoubtedly,
thatariseregularly
in efforts
to studyintermethodological
problems
national
regimes
Buttherecognition
oftheseattributes
systematically.
fortheachievement
of anyanalyticsuccessin this
is a prerequisite
realm.
I wouldliketolayoutan agendaofquestions
In closing,
thatshould
in theanalysis
ofanyinternational
be considered
regime:
I. Institutional
character.
Whatarethecentral
rights,
rules,and so-

oftheregime?How do theyinteract
cialchoiceprocedures
with
thebehavior
ofindividual
actors
toproducea stream
ofoutcomes?
2. Jurisdictional
boundaries.
What is the coverageof the regime
withrespect
tofunctional
scope,arealdomain,andmembership?
To whatextentis thiscoverageoptimalunderthe prevailing
conditions
?
3. Conditions
foroperation.
Whatconditions
are necessary
forthe
regimetoworkat all? Underwhatconditions
willtheoperation
of theregimeyieldparticularly
desirableresults(forexample,
economic
orequity)?
efficiency
Whatsortsofoutcomes
4. Consequences
ofoperation.
(eitherindi66 For a reviewof recentthinking
aboutpowerin international
see David
relations,
A. Baldwin,"PowerAnalysisand WorldPolitics:New TrendsversusOld Tendencies,"
World Politics, xxxi (JanuaryI979), i6I-94.
67 For a moreextensive
development
of the analogybetweenoligopolistic
industries
and international
relations,see Young, "The Perils of Odysseus:On Constructing
Theoriesof International
in RaymondTanterand RichardH. Ullman,eds.,
Relations,"

Theory and Practice in InternationalRelations (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress,

I972),

I90-95-

356

WORLD POLITICS

vidualor collective)can the regimebe expectedto produce?

Whatareappropriate
?
criteria
in thiscontext
ofevaluation
5. Regimedynamics.
How did theregimecomeintoexistence,
and
whatis thelikelihood
ofitsexperiencing
majoralterations
in the
foreseeable
future?
Does theregimeincludetransformation
rules
andaretheylikelyto be effective?
This agendais intended
to stimulate
thedevelopment
of a growing
substantive
materialon international
bodyof comparable
regimes.
In time,thismaterial
canbe expected
to improve
ourability
to arrive
at generalconclusions
aboutthisfundamental,
yetpoorlyunderstood,
international
phenomenon.