Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA 162

Facts:
From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and theAssociation of Luzon
Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration caseto resolve the following issue
Issue:
WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provisionand the
Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.
Held:
It is to be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator ora panel of such
arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of thelabor arbiter and the
appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC) for that matter. The
state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitrationprovides that "(t)he award or decision of
the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final andexecutory after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of the copy of the award or decisionby the parties," while the "(d)ecision, awards, or
orders of the Labor Arbiter are finaland executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both parties within ten (10)calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders."
Hence, while there isan express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act
No. 6715 issilent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator

Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 538
FACTS:
Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron
and steel industry.
PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISAs
original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No.
555 dated August 31, 1979.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National
Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government,
embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an
integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such steel mill was considered a priority
and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC,
Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982
withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and
reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC.
Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical
fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No.
1277, also dated November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the
owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFCs present
occupancy rights on the subject land.
Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.
ISSUE: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of
ISAs term.
RULING: Yes
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical
personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general
or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The
ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP, or
more precisely of the Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that
is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the
personality of the Republic.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic
itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and
attributes which are compendiously described as legal personality.
When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as
well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in
the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g.,
devolution or transmission of such powers, duties and functions, etc. to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must be
looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the provisions of
the Corporation Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are
properly regarded as folded back into the Government and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto
by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or
delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD
272.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC,
even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little
differently, the expiration of ISAs statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal
of the eminent domain proceedings.
Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79 (1989)
FACTS:
Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is suing Solid Homes for failure to deliver the
certificate of title. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes contended that jurisdiction
is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD 1344
granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA.
On August 31, 1982 Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes Inc., before the
Regional Trial Court alleging that they contracted to sell her subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9,
1975. Subsequently Solid Homes Inc. executed a deed of sale but failed to deliver the
corresponding certificate title despite of repeated demands by Payawal because defendant had
mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. Thereafter, Solid Homes Inc moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction this being rested in the
National Housing Authority under PD no. 597. The motion was denied, hence, the petition to
reverse said decision of the Court of Appeals in sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court was submitted by Solid Homes Inc. to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award damages
HELD:
SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction.
In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of
the dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP 129 and PD
1344 the special law.
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive
power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create
more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities.
Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof
with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers
in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.
Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable
them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose.
Sources of Administrative Law
Constitution
Statute
Jurisprudence

Rules and regulations by the administrative agencies (quasi-legislative)

Orders and decisions by the administrative agencies (quasi-judicial)

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC. v. IGNACIO G.R. No. 164789 | August 27, 2009
FACTS
CGA entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision lot4 (subject property) with the respondents,
the registered owners and developers of a housing subdivision known as Villa Priscilla Subdivision
located in Bulacan. Under the Contract to Sell, CGA would pay P2,373,000.00 for the subject
property on installment basis; they were to pay a down payment of P1,186,500, with the balance
payable within three years. Subsequently, the parties mutually agreed to amend the Contract to
Sell to extend the payment period from three to five years. According to CGA, it religiously paid
the monthly installments until its administrative pastor discovered that the title covering the
subject property was actually part of two consolidated lots (Lots 2-F and 2-G Bsd-04-000829
[OLT]) that the respondents had acquired from Nicanor Adriano (Adriano) and Ceferino Sison
(Sison), respectively. Adriano and Sison were former tenant-beneficiaries of Purificacion S.
Imperial (Imperial) whose subject property had been placed under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
27s Operation Land Transfer. According to CGA, Imperial applied for the retention of five
hectares of her land under Republic Act No. 6657, which the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) granted. The DAR Order authorized Imperial to retain the farm lots previously awarded to
the tenant-beneficiaries, including Lot 2-F previously awarded to Adriano, and Lot 2-G Bsd-04000829 awarded to Sison. Understandably aggrieved after discovering these circumstances, CGA
filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC. CGA claimed that the respondents
fraudulently concealed the fact that the subject property was part of a property under litigation;
thus, the Contract to Sell was a rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. CGA
asked the trial court to rescind the contract; order the respondents to return the amounts already
paid; and award actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the case. The respondents claimed that the case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. CGA opposed the motion
to dismiss, claiming that the action is for rescission of contract, not specific performance, and is
not among the actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
ISSUE
Which of the two the court or the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over CGAs action for
rescission and damages.
HELD
HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over CGAs action for rescission and damages.
The extent to which an administrative entity may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers
depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such
agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and
apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of
the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable
only by our regular courts

Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission

Lianga Bay Logging vs. Enage

Larin vs. Executive Secretary280 SCRA 713; GR. No. L- 112745; October 16, 1997
Ponente: Torres, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The President issued E.O. No. 132 which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of
InternalRevenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed,
decentralized ortransferred to other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax
Service, of which thepetitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that
was abolished. Petitioner assailedthe legality of EO No. 132 claiming that he was removed as a
result of the reorganization made in the BIRpursuant to E.O. No. 132. He claimed that there is yet
no law enacted by Congress which authorizes thereorganization by the Executive Department of
executive agencies, particularly the BIR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned EO
No.132.
HELD:
YES. Section 48 of R.A. 7645 clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and
abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions.
Nevertheless, the act of creatingand decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of
Section 62 which shows that the President isauthorized to effect organizational charges including
the creation of offices in the department or agencyconcerned.Presidential Decree No. 1772
which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416 expressly grants the President of the Philippines
the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power
togroup, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and
classifyfunctions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.

Dario v. Mison

August 8, 1989 G.R. No. 81954

FACTS:
P. Cory Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 in 1986. It provided for priority for the reorganization of
the government, eradication of unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of
the previous regime.
3 days later, she issued EO 17, prescribing the rules and regulations for the implementation of
section 2, article III of the freedom constitution. This recognized the unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the deserving officials and employees and prescribed grounds for
separation/replacement of personnel.
EO 127: Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance.
Commissioner Mison issued Memorandum Guidelines
on the Implementation of Reorganization Orders.
Mison sent notices to several customs officials, stating that those incumbents whose positions
are not carried in the new reorganization pattern are deemed separated from service, and that
they have been terminated.
CSC ordered reinstatement.
In 1988, RA 6656 was enacted: an act to protect the security of tenure of civil service
employees in the implementation of government reorganization. It mandated the
reinstatement/reappointment of officers/employees whose separation violated its provisions.
Terminated employees filed this case.
There is no question that the admin may validly carry out a government reorganization. The
issue of the parties are as to the nature and extent.
Argument of Mison: Transitory Provision in Article XVIII, Section 16 explicitly authorizes the
removal of career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of reorganization pursuant
to Proclamation 3. Thus, the reorganization under EO 127 may continue even after the
ratification of the Constitution, and employees may be separated from service without cause as a
result of the reorganization.
ISSUE
WON transitory provision in 1987 Constitution allows the government to remove career public
officials it could have validly done under an automatic vacancy authority and without rhyme or
reason. (since 1935 transition periods have been characterized by provisions for automatic
vacancies)
HELD:
NO. RATIO:
The 1987 Constitution is silent on the matter. This is restraint upon the
govt to dismiss public servants at a moments notice. The other constitutions were express/clear
in the matter of
automatic vacancy, unlike the present constitution.
The authority to remove public officials under the provisional constitution ended on February 25,
1987 (Feb 2, 1987)
.........................

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora

During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order
deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the
service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana, which EIIB
employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod
ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning the said
orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to abolish a public office, as
that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional
right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.
HELD:
No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The
exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the executive
department, the president may deactivate them pursuant to control power over such offices,
unless such office is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the presidents power to
reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD
1772 and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has always
exceeded P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it needed to abolish it and
replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is
invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest.
Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad faith in
the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to exist, there is no separation or
dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.

Bagaoisan vs Nat'l Tobacco Administration. G.R. No. 152845 : August 5, 2003.

FACTS:
1. The petitioner was terminated from there position in the national tobacco administration as a
result of the executive order issued by president Estrada which mandates for the stream lining of
the national tobacco administration, a government agency under the department of agriculture.
2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the civil service commission to recall the ossp.
3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with prohibition an mandamus with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining order with the regional trial court
of Batak to prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice of termination and from ousting the
petitioners from their respective offices.
4. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the national tobacco administration to appoint
the petitioner to the position similar to the one that they hold before.
5. The national tobacco administration appealed to the court of appeals who reversed the
decision of the RTC.
6. Petitioner appealed to the supreme court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tobacco administration is valid true issuance of
executive order by the president.
According to the supreme court, the president has the power to reorganized an office to achieve
simplicity ,economy and efficiency as provided under executive order 292 sec. 31 and section 48
of RA 7645 which provides that activities of executive agencies may be scaled down if it is no
longer essential for the delivery of public service.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the Petition for an En Banc
Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of judgment
be made in due course. No costs.

Domingo v. Zamora
The Facts
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive Order No. 81[3] (EO 81
for brevity) entitled Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of DECS
in School-Based Sports.
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales (Secretary Gonzales for brevity)
issued Memorandum No. 01592 on January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily
reassigned, in the exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus
of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning the BPESS
staff named in the Memorandum to various offices within the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied
with their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition.
In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being an undue
legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain that the Presidents issuance of EO 81
violated the principle of separation of powers. Petitioners also challenge the DECS Memoranda
for violating their right to security of tenure.
Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. Petitioners pray that this Court
prohibit the PSC from performing functions related to school sports development. Petitioners
further pray that, upon filing of the petition, this Court issue a temporary restraining order
against respondents to desist from implementing EO 81.
During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 (RA 9155 for brevity), otherwise known
as the Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001, was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155
expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS
relating to sports competition to the PSC. The pertinent provision thereof reads:
SEC. 9. Abolition of BPESS. All functions, programs and activities of the Department of Education
related to sports competition shall be transferred to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC). The
Program for school sports and physical fitness shall remain part of the basic education
curriculum.
The Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS) is hereby abolished. The personnel
of the BPESS, presently detailed with the PSC, are hereby transferred to the PSC without loss of
rank, including the plantilla positions they occupy. All other BPESS personnel shall be retained by
the Department.
The Issue
The issue to resolve is whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are valid.
The Courts Ruling
We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic.
As manifested by both petitioners[4] and respondents,[5] the subsequent enactment of RA 9155
has rendered the issues in the present case moot and academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the
BPESS and transferred the DECS functions relating to sports competition to the PSC, petitioners
now admit that it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption by the PSC of the
functions of the BPESS.[6] Moreover, since RA 9155 provides that BPESS personnel not
transferred to the PSC shall be retained by the DECS, petitioners now accept that the law
explicitly protects and preserves[7] their right to security of tenure.

Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the Court to point out that
Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292 for brevity), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President. Section 31 of EO 292 provides:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to
the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one
unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as
well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies;
and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as
well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO
292,[8] EO 81 is a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize the Office of the
President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office
of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner
he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the
command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
Petitioners contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is immaterial. Under
EO 292, the DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not
part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the
President to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its
charter, the PSC is attached to the Office of the President.[9] Therefore, the President has the
authority to transfer the functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports
development[10] to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.
However, the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President
Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to reorganize
offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is
limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The abolition of an
office in good faith necessarily results in the employees cessation in office, but in such event
there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases to exist.[11] On the other
hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the employees cessation in office
because his office continues to exist although in another department, agency or office. In the
instant case, the BPESS employees who were not transferred to PSC were at first temporarily,

then later permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their continued
employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that these employees shall be retained by the
Department.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.