ATIENZA - BAUTISTA - BISNAR - BOMBALES - FERNANDEZ - FORTES - KUNG - MAGSUMBOL - PAJA - PEREZ SASAKI - TABAG - VELASCO

3.18. JUDGMENTS
Requirements
written and signed by judge
must contain findings of facts and law applied
must contain a dispositive portion
filed with the clerk of court
rendition reckoned from filing with clerk
must be served on parties
may be amended before finality upon motion or motu proprio
entry upon finality
entry determines prescriptive periods
final judgment not subject to amendment
separability of judgments

(1) Velarde v SJS GR 159357 April 28, 2004 - VELASCO

FACTS
Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a petition for Declatory Relief before RTC Manila against Bro. Mike Velarde. SJS
sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions specifically on the separation of church and
state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified
candidate.
The RTC in its Decision failed to include a dispositive portion. Velarde filed an MR which was denied by the
lower court.
The case was then elevated to the SC via a Petition for Review.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC Decision was proper and valid
HELD
No
RATIO
The Constitution commands that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure states: A judgment or final order determining the merits of
the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court.
Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court issued Administrative Circular No. 1, prompting all judges to make
complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of
the evidence presented.
It has also been held in a lot of cases that magistrates should heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution, as it is a paramount component of due process and fair play. The parties to a litigation
should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court.
Here, the assailed Decision contains no statement of facts -- much less an assessment or analysis thereof -- or
of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of
the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional
provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents
before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent
of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or
specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED.

The RTCs Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was
based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive.
The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How will the ruling be
applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison? The assailed Decision in the present case
leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of the Petition.
Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent
nullity and must be struck down as void.
(2) Miranda v CA 71 S 295 - ATIENZA
FACTS:
Petitioner Miranda Administrator of estate of Dydongco
Judge Mendoza Original Judge
Judge Tantuico Second Judge (respondent judge)
Respondents Dy Chun, et al Converted Estate of Dydongco as their own.
Petitioner Miranda filed a civil case for the properties of the estate of Dydongco against the respondents who
he alleged to have been fraudulently and in bad faith and in breach of their fiduciary trust, concealed,
appropriated and converted as their own, the properties of the deceased. These properties were sold by the
respondents and the proceeds were used to buy lands and properties that they leased, earning rent income
for the respondents. Petitioner Miranda wants the lower court to declare that respondents holds these
properties in trust for the estate of the deceased that should now be turnover to petitioner and that proper
accounting of these properties and income be made.
Judge Mendoza ruled in favor of Petitioners. Respondents moved for appeal within the 30 day reglementary
period. After submitting their record on appeal, however, they filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial
which was heard and denied per Judge Mendoza's order of October 18, 1965. Respondents thereafter sought
to revive their record on appeal and submit additional pages thereof but Judge Mendoza held that their filing
of their motion for reconsideration was an abandonment of their proposed earlier appeal and that his decision
had become final and executory.
Having denied by the lower Court, respondents appealed to SC through certiorari under the case Dy Chun vs.
Mendoza. The SC did not rule on the timeliness of the appeal, but instead ruled that appeal should be
taken after the rendition of the accounting of all fruits and proceeds of the properties adjudged
in Judge Mendoza's decision of July 26, 1965 to belong to the decedent's estate.
The case was remanded to the court of origin, but this time, Judge Mendoza was already promoted to the CA
and Judge Tantuico now presides as judge to the court of origin. This is, in the exact words of the SC in Dy
Chun vs. Mendoza, for the rendition of "a full, accurate and complete of all the fruits and proceeds" of the
properties declared in Judge Mendoza's July 26, 1965 decision to belong to the decedent's estate, i.e. for "the
adjudications necessary for the completion of said relief (as granted in the decision)"
However, Judge Tantuico revisited the case and altered the decision to a great extent and under these
circumstances:
1. Denied petitioners partial execution of the 1965 order of Judge Mendoza saying that such decision was
interlocutory in character.
2. Denied new Trial of for the respondents
3. granted a major part of the motion for reconsideration filed by respondents East Mindanao Lumber Co., Inc.
and without new trial or reception of new or additional evidence reviewed, reversed and set aside his
predecessor's appreciation of the evidence and pronouncements on the credibility of the witnesses (who were
not heard at all by him) and substituted his own appreciation of the evidence and impression of the
witnesses' credibility or lack thereof and therefore reversed Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26, 1965
on threemajor points involving very valuable properties with an alleged estimated value of P5 million at the
filing of the petition in January, 1971 14 on the premise that "interlocutory orders are subject to
change in the discretion of the court" and "it is only fit and proper that this court believe in
every part of the judgement he is to execute."

Petitioner then filed for certiorari to the CA claiming that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when he substantially amended the ruling of Judge Mendoza.
The CA ruled in favor of respondents basing their ruling on the Dy Chun vs. Mendoza case where the CA ruled
that Judge Mendoza's original decision of July 26, 1965 was "still interlocutory," respondent Judge Tantuico
had authority to change, alter or amend the decision of July 26, 1965 was "still interlocutory," respondent
Judge Tantuico had authority to change, alter or amend the decision even after four years from the decision of
Judge Mendoza.
The CA used the doctrine of Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso which held that, unless accounting is done, the case is
not appealable.
ISSUE: Is the judgment of the lower Court (Judge Mendoza) final even pending the accounting of the
properties?
HELD: YES
SHORT version:
The SC holds that respondent appellate court misread and misapplied the SCs 1968 judgement in Dy Chun
vs. Mendoza and erred in holding that respondent Judge Tantuico could change, alter and amend his
predecessor's decision on the merits for recovery of properties with accounting as if it were a mere
interlocutory order or process, when all this Court held (applying Fuentebella, supra) was that
the decision was "not appealable" until after the accounting also ordered was rendered and
approved so as to complete the relief granted after which, respondents' "premature appeal" could then
be given due course from both aspects of the decision for recovery of properties and accounting of the fruits.
Hence, the only remaining authority of Judge Tantuico was to enforce, receive and act on the accounting as
ordered in the decision for the completion of the relief therein granted.
Longer Version:
The SC explained that remanding the case back to the Court of origin was meant to execute the accounting of
the properties. It explained that in the Fuentabella case (which is now to be abandoned), the SC ruled that a
proper accounting should be made before an appeal to complete the relief sought. This does not mean
however, that the order, prior to accounting, would become interlocutory. Even in the Fuentabella case, the
SC explained that remanding the case for accounting does not mean that the judgment can be amended.
Also, the SC ruled that for public policy and orderly administration of justice, it is unacceptable that a judges
judgment can be altered by his successor.
The SC also noted that Rule 39 allows appeal on judgments for accounting of properties whether it is the
direct relief to be sought or just incident to the case.
When the case was remanded to the respondent judge, the definitive judgment of Mendoza cannot be altered
and Judge Tantuicos responsibility is to implement accounting based on Judge Mendozas decision.
In explaining an interlocutory order, the SC quoted The late Chief Justice Moran, who penned the decision in
Fuentebella, who stated that "(T)he test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgement is interlocutory
or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final.
In the end, the SC abandoned the Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso and reinstated the H.E. Heacock Co. vs.
American Trading Co. 51, to wit, that where the primary purpose of a case is to ascertain and determine who
between plaintiff and defendant is the true owner and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed property,
"the judgement ... rendered by the lower court [is] a judgement on the merits as to those questions, and
(that) the order of the court for an accounting was based upon, and is incidental to the judgement on the
merits. That is to say, that the judgement ... (is) a final judgement ...; that in this kind of a case an accounting
is a mere incident to the judgement; that an appeal lies from the rendition of the judgement as rendered
The rule in Heacock means that appeal can now be made even if accounting is yet to be done, provided that
the judgement is on the merits and accounting is simply incidental to the judgment on the merits.
In view of the of the doctrine of Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso and the length of time that this dispute between
the parties has been pending final determination, the SC ruled that private respondents are given the option

within thirty (30) days from finality of this judgement to take an immediate appeal from the said July 26, 1965
judgement without waiting for the trial court's adjudication on the accounting therein ordered
(3) Republic v Nolasco 457 S 400 - BAUTISTA
Facts:
The funding for the Agno Rover Flood Control Project, a public works project, was to be derived primarily
through a loan from the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). DPWH constituted a Bid and Awards
Committee (BAC) for the purpose of conducting international competitive bidding for the procurement of the
contract. Among the 6 pre-qualified bidders are present intervenors Daewoo and China International. Nolasco,
invoking his right as a taxpayer, prayed that the DPWH and BAC be restrained from awarding the contract to
Daewoo and have Daewoo disqualified as a bidder. He alleged having obtained copies of "Confidential Reports
from an Unnamed DPWH Consultant." He said that based on the reports, Daewoo's bid was unacceptable and
the putative award to Daewoo illegal, immoral, and prejudicial to the government and the Filipino taxpayers.
March 27, 2002: the RTC of Manila dismissed Nolasco's petition. According to the RTC, it was a suit against the
State, which had been sued without its consent. Meanwhile, BAC resolved to recommend the award of the
contract to Daewoo as it has the lowers bid; DPWH Secretary Datumanong approved (i.e signed) the
recommendation. Nolascos prayer is that the trial court award the bid to China International utilized as legal
basis the power of the trial courts to issue partial or separate judgments.
Issue:
Is the prayer to issue separate judgments valid?
Held:
By any objective standard, there is no merit in allowing for such a relief in this case. Section 5, Rule 36 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs separate judgments, states:
Sec. 5. Separate judgments.When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any
stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all coun-terclaims arising out of
the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment
disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and
the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. . . .
On paper, Nolascos petition prays for two reliefs, that the petitioner be restrained from awarding the Project
to Daewoo, and that Daewoo be disqualified as a bidder and its bid be rejected. Yet these reliefs are obviously
intertwined for the allowance of one would necessarily lead to the grant of the other. The multiple reliefs
referred to in the provision refer to those sufficiently segregate from each other that the allowance of one at a
preliminary stage will not preclude litigation on the merits of the others.
More importantly, the rule is explicit that partial judgment with regards one of the reliefs is warranted only
after a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim. Herein, the partial judgment was sought
even before the respondents had the chance to file their answer to the petition. Moreover, it was prayed for
at a point when, at even such a preliminary stage, the claimant was actually somehow able to already present
evidence in support of his claim, but before the respondents had the chance to rebut this claim or support
countervailing evidence.
At bare minimum, the allowance of a partial judgment at this stage would constitute a denial of constitutional
due process. It would condemn before hearing, and render judgment before trial. Had indeed partial judgment
been granted in the assailed Order, it would have been rendered before the Petitioner were afforded the
opportunity to rebut the evidence of Nolasco, or to present their own countervailing evidence. While the
allowance of partial judgments may expedite the litigation of claims, it cannot be sanctioned at a stage when
the trial judge has not had the opportunity to hear all sides to the claim. In fact, it was highly imprudent for
the respondent judge to have concluded, as he did in his Order, that it was an admitted fact that the BAC had
strayed from fairly applying the Bidding Laws, Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations, and Bid Tender Documents,
considering that the Petitioner had not even filed an answer or been allowed the opportunity to present any
evidence on its behalf.

(4) Briones-Vasquez v CA GR 144882 february 4, 2005 - BISNAR

 In an agreement denominated as a pacto de retro sale, Maria Mendoza Vda. de Ocampo acquired a parcel of
land from Luisa Briones.
Mendoza then died.
When Briones failed to buy the property back, the Heirs of Mendoza then filed a petition to consolidate their
ownership.
RTC ruled that the sale was a true pacto de retro sale but gave Briones 30 days to redeem the property.
The Heirs of Mendoza was appealed to the CA.
CA declared the the agreement to be an equitable mortgage.
This order became final and executory.
After attempts to execute the judgment, Briones filed an omnibus motion praying that order declaring the
equitable mortgage be discharged and that a Writ of Possession be issued against the Heirs of Mendoza.
RTC Denied.
Briones then filed a motion for clarificatory judgment, which was also denied by the CA.
It ruled that the agreement had already been declared an equitable mortgage and that with regard to the
issue of whether Briones should be entitled to a right to repossess, the remedy is with the lower court.
Briones filed an MR claiming that her motion for clarificatory judgment is for the purpose of obtaining a nunc
pro tunc amendment of final and executory judgment where the agreement was declared an equitable
mortgage.
Issue: Whether CA erred in denying the clarificatory judgment?

1.
2.
3.

Ruling: No.
GR: Final and executory judgments are immutable and unalterable.
Exceptions:
clerical errors;
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; and
void judgments.
The office of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done at a former time which was not
then carried into the record, and the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing upon the
record evidence of judicial action which has been actually taken.
It may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought
to have spoken. If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it has
rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering
the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment.
Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc pro tunc has no power to construe what the judgment means, but
only to enter of record such judgment as had been formerly rendered, but which had not been entered of
record as rendered.
The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the ascertainment and
determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, the judgment that had been
previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not
to correct judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the
one it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may
have been.
A nunc pro tunc entry in practice is an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to
have effect as of the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to supply an
omission in the record of action really had, but omitted through inadvertence or mistake.
It is competent for the court to make an entry nunc pro tunc after the term at which the transaction occurred,
even though the rights of third persons may be affected. But entriesnunc pro tunc will not be ordered except
where this can be done without injustice to either party, and as a nunc pro tunc order is to supply on the
record something which has actually occurred, it cannot supply omitted action by the court .
In this case, the judgment Briones sought through the motion for clarificatory judgment is outside the scope
of nunc pro tunc.
Briones did not allege that the CA actually took judicial action and that such action was not included in the
Court of Appeals Decision by inadvertence.
A nunc pro tunc judgment cannot correct judicial error nor supply non-action by the court.

(5) Navarro v Metropolitan Bank GR 165697/166484 August 4, 2009 - BOMBALES

Petitioners Antonio Navarro and Clarita Navarro were married, they acquired 3 parcels of land
o These land were covered by TCT however, are registered in the name of "Antonio N. Navarro
married to Belen B. Navarro

1998: respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (MBTC) had caused the judicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage which Antonio had earlier constituted on the subject
properties as security for a loan he allegedly obtained from MBTC.
o In December of that year, the properties were sold at public auction where MBTC, as the lone
bidder, was issued a certificate of sale.

Clarita filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the real estate mortgage and the foreclosure
sale.
o Clarita alleged that the properties involved belonged to her and Antonios conjugal partnership
property as the same were acquired during their marriage and that Antonio, with the
connivance of a certain Belen G. Belen, had secured the registration thereof in their names
without her knowledge.
o
She pointed out that Antonio and Belen then mortgaged the properties to MBTC in 1993
likewise without her knowledge.

MBTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, of laches. pointing out that it had taken
Clarita 11 long years since the issuance of the TCT before she actually sought to annul the mortgage
contract.

Subsequently, Clarita instituted another action this time for the declaration of nullity of the TCTs
covering the same properties and for reconveyance and damages.

MBTC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was already barred by the prior
judgment, and that Claritas claim had already been waived, abandoned and extinguished.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for it did not constitute res judicata because a dismissal
on laches and failure to implead an indispensable party could never be a dismissal on the merits.MBTC
appealed

In the meantime, a compromise agreement was executed by Antonio and Clarita in which the latter
waived and condoned her claims against the former, who in turn acknowledged his wifes share in the
properties subject of the case

CA found merit on MBTCs petition. It held that the dismissal of previous civil case on ground of
laches should preclude the filing the second case because the former had the effect of an adjudication
on the merits.

Both Antonio and Clarita advance that it was error for the Court of Appeals to direct the dismissal of
the complaint in the present cases despite the fact that the prior dismissal of the complaint for
declaration of nullity of mortgage and foreclosure was predicated on Claritas failure to implead Belen
as an indispensable party therein which, in effect, amounted to the courts lack or jurisdiction to act on
the parties present and absent.
Issue: W/N Antonio and Clarita are correct?
Ruling: NO
A perusal of the order tells that the complaint therein was dismissed not on the ground of non-joinder of Belen
as an indispensable party, but rather on the ground of laches. Indeed, what is clear from the said decision is
that the dismissal of the case was due to Claritas unjustifiable neglect to timely initiate the prosecution of
her claim in court -- a conduct that warranted the presumption that she, although entitled to assert a right,
had resolved to abandon or declined to assert the same.
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of contracts is not barred by the statute of
limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such action at the first instance has
already been settled by the Court of Appeals .

At this point in the proceedings, the Court can no longer rule on the applicability of the principle of
laches vis--vis the imprescriptibility of Claritas cause of action because the said decision is not the
one on appeal before us. But more importantly, the Court takes notice that the decision rendered in
that case had already become final without any motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal
being taken therefrom.

Thus, we are left with no other recourse than to uphold the immutability of the said decision.
Moreover, laches, or what is known as the doctrine of stale claim or demand, is the neglect or omission to
assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right which works
disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition of the property
involved or in the relations of the parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains
that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.
As a ground for the dismissal of a complaint, the doctrine of laches is embraced in the broad provision in
Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the various grounds on which a motion to
dismiss may be based. Paragraph (h) thereof states that the fact that the claim or demand set forth in the
plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, may be raised in a motion
to dismiss. The language of the rule, particularly on the relation of the words "abandoned" and "otherwise
extinguished" to the phrase "claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading" is broad enough to include
within its ambit the defense of bar by laches.

Moreover, what is striking is that a reading of the two complaints filed by Clarita one after the dismissal of the
other discloses that apart from the nature of the actions, the allegations in support of the claims and the
reliefs prayed for in both complaints were but the same

3.19. REMEDIES FROM JUDGMENTS (same court, same case)

New Trial or Reconsideration
FAMEN
Fraud as a ground must be extrinsic, not intrinsic. It is intrinsic when done by a party during trial (use of
forged documents etc), extrinsic when employed outside the court (concealing a witness or colluding with a
party)
accident and mistake as ground must be based on well-engendered belief ordinary prudence could not guard
against
excusable negligence as ground will depend on circumstances
Newly discovered evidence
must be material and not discoverable during trial

(6) Banco Filipino v Campos 63 S 180 - FERNANDEZ

Spouses Cleofas filed a suit against banco Filipino et al, they prayed that they be declared the rightful owners
of Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate, that the Torrens Title to said lot be reconstituted, the title thereto of their
deceased predecessor, Antonio Cleofas, having been burned in a fire in 1933;
RTC; Spouses Cleofas won.
Banco Filipino et al filed joint motion for reconsideration. Later, Banco Filipino et al filed joint motion for new
trial.
RTC denied motion for new trial. Banco Filipino et al filed petition for certiorari with the SC.
WON judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying motion for new trial? Yes
Under paragraph (b), Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, the requisites for the grant of new trial based
on:t.hqw
Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered,
and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result,
This rule for the granting of a motion for new trial, as all other rules of procedure, should be liberally
construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. Court litigations
are primarily for the search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given
the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to find out such truth. The dispensation of justice and
vindication of legitimate grievances should not be barred by technicalities
Gauged by these standards, we find the evidence proposed to be presented by petitioner in a new trial are
newly discovered evidence within the contemplation of the Rules of Court. The said evidence could not have
been produced during the trial because the subject-matter of the trial was Lot No. 719. Petitioner correctly
searched, discovered and presented during that trial, all documents pertaining to Lot No. 719 only. The
evidence sought to be presented in a new trial by petitioner became pertinent and important only after trial,
when judgment was rendered by respondent Judge that private respondents have a valid and subsisting title
to Lot No. 719 on the basis of sheet 15 of OCT No. 614 (Exh. "A") which on its fact does not mention Lot No.
719. Based on the incomplete data appearing on Exh. "A", petitioner conducted a new search and discovered
the evidence it now seeks to present in a new trial, indubitably showing that sheet 15 of OCT No. 614 refers
to a title to Lot No. 640, and not to Lot No. 719 in the name of petitioner. If admitted in a new trial, these
newly discovered evidence will probably alter the judgment of the trial court.
We hold that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial,
having disregarded in a capricious and arbitrary manner, the newly discovered evidence
We rule, therefore, in favor of new trial. The grant of new trial necessarily vacates the judgment

Motion for reconsideration

NT distinguished from reconsideration
grounds
results when granted
remedy when denied (appeal from the judgment)

Relief from judgment

not available for lost remedy
(7) Tuason v CA, 256 S 158 - FORTES-LEUNG
Emilio Tuason v. CA, Victoria Tuason (1996)
Doctrine: Failure of counsel to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal
as well as to inform the trial court of his clients confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his nonappearance at the scheduled hearings are not excusable negligence that would warrant relief from judgment.

Facts:
1972, Maria Victoria Lopez married petitioner Emilio Tuason. They had 2 kids.
1989: Victoria filed petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity and prayed to be
appointed administratrix of their conjugal property to prevent futher dissipation
o Emilio was violent, jailed for use of illegal drugs and a womanizer. Emilio, a famous radio and
TV network owner, left the conjugal home to live with 3 different women successively during
their marriage. All these were reported in the newspapers.
o
Emilio also allegedly incurred several loans and sold conjugal properties including golf club
shares
After Victoria has rested her case, Emilio failed to present his defense and controverting evidence due to
several postponements as his counsel was out of the country.
Victoria moved to declare Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence which was granted by the
Court.
RTC granted the petition for annulment, granted custody of 2 kids to Victoria who was also appointed
administratrix of the conjugal properties.
Emilio filed petition for relief from judgment which was denied by the RTC
Emilio appealed before CA but latter affirmed RTC ruling
o Emilios defense: lack of due process as he was in drug rehab when he was scheduled to
present his evidence and his lawyer was abroad
ISSUE: WON Emilios petition for relief from judgment should be granted? NO

HELD:
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the RTC may be set aside on the ground of FAME.
The petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of
action
Decision annulling petitioners marriage to private respondent had already become final and executory when
petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period
He is not entitled to relief from judgment as there was no FAME. (please see doctrine)
petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right to present
evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the records show, petitioner, through counsel, actively
participated in the proceedings below
Roselles useless trivia: Emilio Tuason is first cousin of FG Mike Arroyo. Emilio used to own Trans-Radio
Broadcasting Corp operating DZTR AM (now Radyo Inquirer 990AM, where I used to work) and DWTR FM (now
99.5 Play FM). Both are in the middle of the old radio. So when youre listening to FM and decide to switch to
AM without moving the dial, youll just listen to another station of his. (Labo ng last sentence ko)

(8) Sps Que v CA GR 1507397 August 18, 2005 - KUNG

Facts:
Respondent Arrieta filed a complaint against the spouses Que and Adela Urian for the annulment of a quit
claim over a lot she inherited from her grandfather. After petitioners received the complaint together with the
summonses, they hired the services of Atty. Ranot. However, Atty. Ranot failed to file petitioners Answer.
Therefore, respondent moved to declare petitioners in default. Only Urian appeared during the hearing of
respondents motion and he also manifested that Atty. Ranot was still preparing the Answer. Respondent
presented her evidence ex parte, and the case was submitted for judgment. The quit claim was declared null
and void. The petitioners moved for reconsideration or a new trial on the ground that there was mistake and

fraud as they were allegedly under the impression that their lawyer had prepared and filed the necessary
pleading. The trial court dismissed their motion and so did the Court of Appeals when they appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners petition.
Ruling: The petition has no merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only when a
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Because they were allegedly under the impression that
Atty. Ranot had prepared and filed the necessary pleading, petitioners, in their petition for relief from
judgment in the trial court, alleged that judgment was entered against them through mistake or fraud.
However, that is not the fraud or mistake contemplated under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
Mistake, under Section 1 of Rule 38, refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. Fraud,
on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having
a trial or presenting his case to the court. Obviously, petitioners mistaken assumption that Atty. Ranot had
attended to his professional duties is neither mistake nor fraud.
Moreover, under Section 1, negligence must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if
it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown
his counsels conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere
subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions
against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the courts ruling.
In this case, the Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsels negligence and allowed a
litigant another chance to present his case based on the following instances: (1) where the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when the application of the rule will result
in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require.
However, none of these exceptions are present in the case at bar.
Therefore, petition must be dismissed for lack of merit.
(9) Monzon v Sps Relova GR 171827 September 17, 2008 - MAGSUMBOL
F:In this case,RTC, citing the absence of petitioner and her counsel on hearing despite due notice, granted an
oral motion by the respondents by issuing an order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by
respondents. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents.
Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal, which was approved by the trial court. Monzon claims that the RTC gravely
erred in rendering its Decision immediately after respondents presented their evidence ex parte without
giving her a chance to present her evidence, thereby violating her right to due process of law. Addio
Properties intervened
CA dismissed the appeal. According to CA, Monzon showed tepid interest in having the case resolved with
dispatch. She, thus, cannot now complain that she was denied due process when she was given ample
opportunity to defend and assert her interests in the case. The Court of Appeals reminded Monzon that the
essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of ones
defense. What the law proscribes is lack of opportunity to be heard.
I: W/N rendering of judgment was proper because of petitioners failure to attend hearings despite notice?
H: NO.It can be seen that despite the fact that Monzon was not declared in default by the RTC, the RTC
nevertheless applied the effects of a default order upon petitioner under Section 3, Rule 9.
According to Justice Regalado, the effects of default are followed only in three instances: (1) when there is an
actual default for failure to file a responsive pleading; (2) failure to appear in the pre-trial conference; and (3)
refusal to comply with modes of discovery under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.
It is even worse when the court issues an order not denominated as an order of default, but provides for the
application of effects of default. Such amounts to the circumvention of the rigid requirements of a default
order, to wit: (1) the court must have validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by
service of summons or voluntary appearance; (2) the defendant failed to file his answer within the time
allowed therefor; and (3) there must be a motion to declare the defendant in default with notice to the latter.
In the case at bar, petitioner had not failed to file her answer. Neither was notice sent to petitioner that she
would be defaulted, or that the effects of default shall be imposed upon her. Mere non-appearance of
defendants at an ordinary hearing and to adduce evidence does not constitute default, when they have
already filed their answer to the complaint within the reglementary period. It is error to default a defendant
after the answer had already been filed. It should be borne in mind that the policy of the law is to have every

litigants case tried on the merits as much as possible; it is for this reason that judgments by default are
frowned upon
We agree with petitioner that such failure to attend, when committed during hearing dates for the
presentation of the complainants evidence, would amount to the waiver of such defendants right to object to
the evidence presented during such hearing, and to cross-examine the witnesses presented therein. However,
it would not amount to a waiver of the defendants right to present evidence during the trial dates scheduled
for the reception of evidence for the defense. It would be an entirely different issue if the failure to attend of
the defendant was on a hearing date set for the presentation of the evidence of the defense, but such did not
occur in the case at bar.
In view of the foregoing, we are, therefore, inclined to remand the case to the trial court for reception of
evidence for the defense. Before we do so, however, we need to point out that the trial court had committed
another error which we should address to put the remand in its proper perspective. We refer to Monzons
argument as early as the Answer stage that respondents Petition for Injunction had failed to state a cause of
action.

available only versus final judgment

distinguished from NT or reconsideration
grounds
when/how invoked
result when granted
remedy when denied (no more appeal)
Annulment of Judgment (not same court, not same case)

(10)

Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v Court of Appeals 681 S 580 - PAJA

F: Dare (petitioner) bought a parcel of land from the Go-congs (several parties). Later, Dare discovered that
the Go-congs had mortgaged the property to Felix Ng. The Go-congs had failed to pay their loan to Felix Ng,
who thereafter filed a complaint for sum of money or foreclosure of mortgage with the RTC. The Go-congs
were declared in default by the RTC, and a decision was rendered in favor of Felix Ng, ordering the Go-congs
to pay Felix Ng certain sums of money. Dare filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the Court of
Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the petition for annulment of judgment was not the proper
remedy for the petitioner. Instead, the CA held that petitioner should have filed an action for quieting of title
or an action for Reconveyance, because the petitioner was not a party to the judgment it prayed to be
annulled.
I: Whether or not annulment of judgment was the proper remedy?
H: No
R: A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not bind or prejudice a person not
impleaded therein, for no person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in
which he is not a party. Hence, such person cannot bring an action for the annulment of the judgment under
Rule 47 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, except if he has been a successor in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action, or the action or proceeding is in rem the judgment in which is binding
against him.
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity that is exceptional in nature. The remedy of
annulment only to a party in whose favor the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, and petition for
relief from judgment are no longer available through no fault of said party. As such, the petitioner, being a
non-party in Civil Case No. MAN-2838, could not bring the action for annulment of judgment due to
unavailability to it of the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, or setting the judgment aside through
a petition for relief.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final order or final resolution is
understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of
final judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability
and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.

(11)

Sps Arenas v Quezon City Development Bank GR 166819 June 16, 2010 - PEREZ

Doctrines:
1) Rule 47 does not allow a recourse to annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are available, such
as petition for new trial, appeal or petition for relief.
2) Extrinsic fraud not a valid ground for annulment of an order if it was availed of, or could have been availed of,
by a question for new trial or petition for relief.
FACTS
On January 23, 2002, the spouses Dolores and Oscar Arcenas filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas
City, an Action for Declaratory Relief against respondent Queen City Development Bank.
They prayed for the declaration of their rights as lessors under the contract of lease.
On November 11, 2003the date set for the continuation of the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. V-07207-2002only respondent banks counsel was present. On November 10, 2003, the counsel for the Spouses
Arcenas filed a Motion for Postponement of the pre-trial conference because of conflict of schedule.
Respondent banks counsel objected to such postponement, as he was not furnished a copy of the motion and
the filing of such motion violated the three-day notice rule on motions; thus, he moved that the Spouses
Arcenas be declared non-suited. On the same day, November 11, 2003, the RTC issued an Order 11declaring
the Spouses Arcenas non-suited and set the presentation of respondent banks evidence on its counterclaim
on January 8, 2004. The Order was received by the secretary of the Spouses counsel on November 17, 2003.
On the January 8, 2004 scheduled hearing, despite due notice, the Spouses Arcenas and their counsel failed
to appear; thus, respondent bank presented evidence on its counterclaim, rested its case and submitted the
same for decision. On the same day, the RTC issued an Order 12submitting the case for decision. The Order
was received by the Spouses Arcenas on January 14, 2004.
On January 14, 2004, the Spouses Arcenas filed a Manifestation with Motion 13alleging that their failure to file a
motion to reconsider the Order dated November 11, 2003, declaring them non-suited, and their failure to
attend the January 8, 2004 hearing on respondent banks counterclaim was due to their mistaken belief that
respondent bank was earnestly seeking a settlement on both civil cases; that honest mistake and excusable
negligence were grounds for lifting an order of non-suit; thus, they prayed that the Orders dated November
11, 2003 and January 8, 2004 be reconsidered and Civil Case No. V- 072-07-2002 be reset for further pre-trial
conference. Respondent bank filed an Opposition to such Manifestation and Motion.
The RTC and CA denied the Manifestation and the Motion and ruled in favor of the Respondent.
Petitioners filed a motion to annul the order of the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
ISSUE: May the order be annulled?
HELD: No.
Section2.Grounds for annulment.The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief.
Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment
if other appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new trial, appeal or a petition for relief. 17 If
petitioner fails to avail of these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot resort to the action for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47, for otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.
Since petitioner claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by respondent banks counsel, she
could have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 within the period provided for by the Rules of Court, but she
did not. Section 2, Rule 47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground for annulment of
order if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Thus,
extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could have been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.
Petitioner tries to justify her failure to avail of the appropriate remedies on a promise of settlement. However,
such promise was not an excuse for petitioners counsel not to lift the order of non-suit and to file a petition
for relief.
3.20. EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS
Only a final judgment that disposes of the action is subject to execution
Final judgment versus final and executory judgment

(12)
Investment v CA 147 S 334 - SASAKI
FACTS:
Petitioner Investments, Inc. (Investments) filed a civil case against respondent Tobacco Industries of the Phils.,
Inc. (TIP) for the annulment of a chattel mortgage executed by Investments in TIPs favor covering five
cigarette-making machines
Initially, a TRO was issued by the Court ex-parte enjoining the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of
the machines
Later, the Trial Court DENIED Investments application for a writ of injunction and DISSOLVED the TRO
Investments brought the matter to the CA on certiorari and prohibition
CA
Issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the threatened auction sale upon Investments posting a bond
(75k)
Later, the petition for certiorari was DISMISSED and the injunction was LIFTED (1st Resolution)
Investments filed an MR
CA
Suggested that the injunction bond be increased (650k)
Investments paid the increased amount
Reinstated the injunction
Later, it promulgated a Resolution declaring that without prejudice to the early conclusion of the case in the
Trial Court, it deemed the proceedings before it terminated because it had already stopped the sale . . . of
the machines . . . until final judgment shall have been rendered in the Civil Case (2nd Resolution)
Clerk of Court caused entry of judgment
But inadvertently entered the dispositive portion of the previous resolution (1 st Resolution)
DISMISSING the petition for certiorari
Trial in the Civil Case continued and judgement was rendered
Trial Court
DISMISSED Investments complaint for lack of merit
Investments appealed to the CA
TIP filed a
motion for execution pending appeal w/ the Trial Court AND
a motion to lift the writ of preliminary injunction w/ the CA
Investments opposed both motions on the ground that
the injunction issued by the Appellate Court against the holding of the auction sale was meant to subsist until
final judgment in the Civil Case, and
since the decision rendered in said case was not yet final and executory, said injunction was still in force
CA
Declared that it was no longer entertaining the pending incidents on the ground that the case before it had
long been terminated
It relied on the dispositive portion of the 1 st Resolution erroneously entered by the Clerk of Court and failed to
take account of the injunction it had issued thereafter (2 nd Resolution)
TIP then caused the mortgaged chattels to be sold by the Sheriff at a public auction
It was the highest bidder
Investments filed with the CA a motion for contempt and for annulment of the sale
CA
Issued a TRO stopping TIP from taking possession of the machines
Subsequently, Court DENIED Investments motion for contempt and annulment of sale
the restraining order enjoining the sale of the mortgaged chattels had lapsed upon the rendition of final
judgment
Declared the auction sale to be VALID
ISSUE:
W/N the writ of injunction of the CA was still in force
HELD:
NO! Effectivity of preliminary injunction ended upon rendition by trial court of its judgment on the merits
regardless of its appealability or actual taking of appeal from the judgment
The parties do not dispute the fact that the injunction was to subsist until final judgment shall have been
rendered in Civil Case.
Investments contends that the decision by the Trial Court was not a final judgment because it was an
appealable judgment and had, in fact, been appealed seasonably

TIP asserts that that judgment was in truth a final judgment as the term is used in procedural law, even
if appealable and hence, upon its rendition, the preliminary injunction of the Appellate Court expired, its life
having precisely been fixed to endure until such judgment shall have been rendered.
The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or executory as of
right [final and executory]), is definite and settled.
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the
Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at
the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the
right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining
the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to
await the parties next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment
once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory.''
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things, etc.
Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order
may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the
final judgment rendered in the case.
Now, a final judgment in the sense just described becomes final upon expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected" or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment of
the appellate tribunal in turn becomes final and the records of the case are returned to the Court of origin.
The final judgment is then correctly categorized as a final and executory judgment in respect to which, as
the law explicitly provides, execution shall issue as a matter of right." It bears stressing that only a final
judgment or order, i.e., a judgment or order that finally disposes of the action of proceeding" can become
final and executory.
There is no showing that the parties and their counsel intended to give the term final judgment a special
signification, a meaning other than that accorded to it by law and established usage. Their agreement must
therefore be construed to mean exactly what it says, that upon rendition by the Trial Court on December 9,
1981 of its judgment on the merits, i.e., its final judgment, the life and effectivity of the preliminary
injunction came to an end, regardless of the appealability of, or the actual taking of an appeal from, said
judgment.
The petitioners theory of the case, founded on its concept of a final judgment is erroneous and cannot be
sustained.

Test of a final judgment: Does it leave something for the court to do with respect to the merits of the
case?
Execution a matter of right when judgment final and executory, but only upon motion
judgment becomes final by operation of law, i.e., when no appeal has been taken within the period
provided by law
enforcement of judgment (execution) is ministerial and mandatory once it becomes final, subject to
certain exceptions
execution before finality of judgment, only upon good reasons
(13)

BF Corp v Edsa Shangrila, 294 S 109 - TABAG

FACTS:
-

Petitioner is BF Corp (a contractor). Petitioner is Edsa Shang (the hotel).

BF Corp brought a collection suit against Edsa Shang and others for a sum of 31M plus. (Side
kwento like Roselle and Nikki: Cynthia del Castillo one of the respondents - is my soro sis, former
dean of ALS. I think shes still in the board of Shang. Wife of Justice Del Castillo.) Amount
represented by cost incurred by petitioner for construction of the hotel.
RTC ruled in favor of BF Corp, but only ordered payment of 24M plus, and the return of 5M
retention sum, as well as legal interests and damages.
Edsa Shang naturally filed an MR. This was denied. Pending disposition of the appeal, petition
filed a motion for execution. RTC granted this.
Thus, Edsa Shang assailed the Order and filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. BF Corp
opposed through a comment. CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining RTC to carry out
order of execution and asked Edsa Shang to file a bond or 1M. MR was filed, then CA rendered a
decision setting aside the RTC order of execution pending appeal. CA also found that order of
execution pending appeal was not in the form of a special order required by Rule 39, 2. MR was
denied. Elevated to the SC on Pet for Rev on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N CA erred in setting aside the trial courts order granting execution pending appeal.
HELD:
NO! Execution pending appeal is not to be granted except for good reason to be stated in a
special order. For the general rule is that only judgments which have become final and executory
may be executed. In this case, the issuance of an order granting execution pending appeal is
sought to be justified on the plea that the [r]espondents dilatory appeal and refusal to pay
petitioner the amount justly due it had placed petitioner in actual and imminent danger of
insolvency. Contention has no merit:
PBCOM vs CA: Even assuming that it was indeed in financial distress and on the verge of facing
civil or even criminal suits, the immediate execution of a judgment in its favor pending appeal
cannot be justified as Falcons situation may not be likened to a case of a natural person who may
be ill or may be of advanced age. Even the danger of extinction of the corporation will not per se
justify a discretionary execution unless there are showings of other good reasons, such as for
instance, impending insolvency of the adverse party or the appeal being patently dilatory.
BF Corps bond payment of 35M also doesnt not justify the grant of execution pending appeal. We have held
in a number of cases that the posting of a bond to answer for damages is not alone a sufficient reason for
ordering execution pending appeal. Otherwise, execution pending appeal could be obtained through the mere
filing of such a bond.
On the issue of the issuance by the Court of Appeals of writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction against the trial court, the sheriff, and petitioner: Issue of lack of verification and the denial of the
right to due process are already moot and academic in view of the appellate courts decision rendered on
June 30, 1997, permanently enjoining the trial court from enforcing its order of execution pending appeal and
ordering petitioner to return the amounts paid to it by virtue of the garnishment of respondents bank
deposits.
Rule 39, 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure also provides that where the executed judgment is reversed totally
or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of
restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances. As
garnishment is a specie of attachment, the procedure provided in Rule 57, 20 of the Rules of Court for the
recovery of damages against a bond in case of irregular attachment should be applied. This means that
notice should be given to petitioners surety and that there should be a hearing before it is held liable on its
bond.
Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good
reasons. Appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedy that can relieve the losing party from the immediate
effects of an improvident execution pending appeal.

discretionary executions, when stayed

(14)
City of Manila v CA, 72 S 98 - VELASCO
FACTS
The City sold parcels of land to the Company. It was agreed that the Company was to construct a building
which would be used for theatrical performances. Upon completion, the building and the lot would then be
reconveyed to the City. After which, the City would execute a contract of lease of the same property in favor
of the Company. And upon termination of the lease contract, the property would be returned to the City.
The building was ravaged during the last World War, and could no longer be devoted to theatrical
performances. The City then notified the Company of the termination of the contract and demanded that the
latter vacate and turn over the premises to the former. The Company refused to do so; the City then filed an
ejectment suit.
During the pre-trial, the presiding judge suggested to the City the filing of another complaint to recover
possession of the land and building involved in the unlawful detainer case. The City filed a complaint for
rescission of contract with receivership, which it asked to be consolidated with the appealed case. The trial
court approved the consolidation.
After a joint trial, the lower court ruled that the City is entitled to recover from the Company the possession of
the property.
The City filed a motion for execution of the decision relative to judgment in illegal detainer and forcible entry.
The Company filed its opposition contending that the consolidated actions had become an accion publiciana
which could not be the subject of a motion for immediate execution.
The trial court directed the implementation of the execution order. When it was appealed, CA set aside the
special order of execution.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it set aside the special order of execution pending
appeal
HELD
Yes
RATIO
Section 2 of Rule 39 states the conditions in order that a judgment may be executed before the expiration of
the time to appeal:
On motion of the Prevailing party with notice to the adverse party the court may, in its division order
execution to issue before the expiration of the time to appeal upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter the motion and the special order shall be included therein.
There are three conditions required: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party; (b) there must be good reasons for issuing execution; and (e) the good reasons must be stated
in a special order), only the existence of good reasons is disputed.
Even though the element that gives validity to an execution Pending appeal is the existence of good reasons
in support thereof, the statute, nevertheless, does not determine, enumerate, or give examples of what may
be considered good reasons to justify execution. What these good reasons are must therefore, necessarily be
addressed to the discretion of the court. The discretion given by statute is sound discretion, for the court may
grant such execution only when there are good reasons therefore, and which are to be stated in a special
order.
The trial court retains its discretion to issue an order of immediate execution pending appeal even when the
losing party posts a supersedeas bond to stay execution. It is necessary, however, in order that the trial court
may disregard the supersedeas bond, that there be special and compelling reasons justifying immediate
execution.
Here, the Company offered to post a supersedeas bond to stay immediate execution, the basic issue raised
can be resolved by determining whether there are good, special and compelling reasons justifying the
questioned order of execution. In such determination, the facts and circumstances which impelled the court to

act as it did and its own assessment of the equities are entitled to considerable weight, for the issuance of the
order of immediate execution is within its sound discretion.
Another reason given to support the decision complained of is that execution pending appeal cannot be
justified because the supposed right of the City to immediate repossession of the property to prevent further
loss caused by dispossession is the core of the controversy and the merit of such claim is under appeal. Anent
this matter suffice it to say that in determining whether execution should be stayed or not, the merits of a
case, which should not be determined in advance of the appeal, are of no moment.
(15)

Valencia v CA, 184 S 561 - ATIENZA

FACTS:
Valencia filed a civil case for the rescission of the lease contract with respondents. Respondents filed for a
counterclaim.
During the pendency of the case, the lease contract has now expired and respondents returned the property
peacefully to Valencia. As such, the lower Court ruled that Valencias claim has now become moot and
academic. With regard to the counterclaim, the trial court awarded P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages to each defendant and further ordered plaintiff to pay P30,000.00 as
attorney's fees, aside from the costs of suit.
Petitioner claims that defendant Bagtas acknowledged in writing his receipt of a copy of said decision on
January 3, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner received a copy of the decision on January 10, 1989. On
January 17, 1989, private respondents filed a motion for execution pending appeal, alleging tha under Section
2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court a writ of execution may be issued to enforce a judgment before the
expiration of the period to appeal upon showing good reasons.
On March 6, 1989, respondent judge granted the motion for execution pending appeal, the defendants having
filed a bond in the amount of P330,000.00. "
ISSUE: WON the posting of a bond is enough as good reason for partial execution pending appeal
HELD: NO
According to the SC, in order that there may be a discretionary issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal
the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to
the adverse party; (b) There must be a good reason for issuing the writ of execution; and (c) The good reason
must be stated in a special order.
In the case at bar, the ground relied upon by the trial court in allowing the immediate execution, as stated in
its order of March 20, 1989, is the filing of a bond by private respondents. However, the rule is now settled
that the mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good reason for ordering execution pending
appeal, as clarified in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
The SC explained that the exercise of the power to grant or deny immediate or advance execution is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However, the existence of good reasons is principally what
confers such discretionary and that this should be RESTRICTIVELY. This is because, although full restitution
can be made on a partial execution of judgment when the order is eventually reversed, damages could arise
due to the partial execution which may not be fully compensated.
Also, the SC explained further that in Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) vs.Lantin, et al,
awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot be the subject of execution pending appeal, under the
following rationale:
. . . The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main
case. Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific
contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary
damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the
Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court

- execution before or after death of judgment obligor will depend on the nature of the judgment, i.e. recovery
of property v money judgments
(16)

Session Delights Ice Cream v. CA (GR 172149; 2/8/10) - BAUTISTA

Facts:
A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed against petitioner Session Delights Ice Cream & Fast Foods by
private respondent Adonis Armenio M. Flora, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR 09-0507-00. The labor
arbiter decided against petitioner, finding that it had illegally dismissed the private respondent. Based on
such finding, it awarded private respondent backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, indemnity,
and attorneys fees.
The CA affirmed with modification the NLRC decision by deleting the awards for a proportionate 13th month
pay and for indemnity. The CA decision became final per Entry of Judgment dated July 29, 2003.
In January 2004, and in the course of the execution of the above final judgment, a pre-execution conference
was held, with the contending parties in attendance. In said conference an updated computation of the
monetary awards in the total amount of P235,986.00, which included additional backwages and separation
pay and a proportionate amount of the 13th month pay due to private respondent Flora, was made and was
approved by the Labor Arbiter about three (3) months after.
The petitioner objected to the re-computation and appealed the labor arbiters order to the NLRC but the
same was denied. The CA, however, partially granted the petition by deleting the awarded proportionate 13th
month pay.
Issue:
Whether a final and executory decision may be enforced beyond the terms decreed in its dispositive portion.
Held:
As a rule, the court frowns upon any delay in the execution of final and executory decisions, as the immediate
enforcement of the parties rights, confirmed by a final decision, is a major component of the ideal
administration of justice. However, circumstances may transpire rendering delay unavoidable. One such
occasion is when the execution of the final judgment is not in accord with what the final judgment decrees in
its dispositive portion. Just as the execution of a final judgment is a matter of right for the winning litigant who
should not be denied the fruits of his or her victory, the right of the losing party to give, perform, pay, and
deliver only what has been decreed in the final judgment should also be respected.
That a judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and wellestablished rule. Otherwise stated, it is the dispositive portion that categorically states the rights and
obligations of the parties to the dispute as against each other. Thus, it is the dispositive portion which the
entities charged with the execution of a final judgment that must be enforced to ensure the validity of the
execution.
A companion to the above rule on the execution of a final judgment is the principle of its immutability. Save
for recognized exceptions, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the
alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, renders it. Any attempt on the
part of the responsible entities charged with the execution of a final judgment to insert, change or add
matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on immutability of judgments.
(17)

Cayana v. CA (GR125607; 3/18/04) - BISNAR

 Raymundo and Eulalia were owners of 2 parcels of land.

Raymundo with the consent of Eulalia sold the 2 parcels (Parcel 1 and Parcel 2) of land to Pastor, executing 2
deeds of sale.
After Raymundo died, Eulalia executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on the 2 parcels of land, claiming that
the deeds of sale in favor of Pastor were forgeries.
This claim was later cancelled.
Civil Case 1: Eulalia, together with her other 5 children filed a complaint against Pastor for the annulment of
the deeds of sale.
Pastor and Rosita (his wife) entered into an agreement of counter guaranty with the Insurance Corporation of
the Philippines (ICP) with respect to Parcel 2.
Pastor also mortgaged Parcel 1 to the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo.
Pastor then sold Parcel 1 to Rosafina Reginaldo.
The mortgage over Parcel 1.
Rosafina then mortgaged Parcel 1 to secure a loan.
In Civil Case 1, the deeds of sale in favor of Pastor were declared null and void.
Mortgage over Parcel 1 was foreclosed and the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo was the highest bidder.
The Rural Bank then sold Parcel 1 to Marceliano and his wife, who in turn sold it to Rafaela nd Rosemarie
Ramos.
Civil Case 2: The other 4 children: Rufina, Josefina, Mercedes, and Susana (Petitioners), filed a complaint
against Pastor, Marceliano and their wives, praying for the annulment of the deeds of sale.
Recognizing the decision in Civil Case 1, the court ruled that the Petitioners were the true owners of the 2
parcels of land.
CA reversed, upheld the validity of the deeds of sale.
It ruled that the principle of res judicata does not apply as there was no identity of causes of action.
Issue: Whether or not Civil Case 1 barred the defenses and counterclaims in Civil Case 2?
Ruling: There was conclusiveness of judgment.
Section 47, Rule 39 thereof provides:Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or
status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the
probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in

(c)

interest by title subsequent to the commencement to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto.
The distinction between the doctrine of res judicata, or bar by prior judgment, under paragraph (b) above and
conclusiveness of judgment under paragraph (c) is well-laid.
There is bar by prior judgment when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the
second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action.
It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to
any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could
have been adjudged in that case.
But where between the first and second cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action,
the first judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein.
For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the court must
have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court, the third requisite for
the application of res judicata is not present in this case.
In order to determine the identity of the causes of action in Civil Case 1 and Civil Case 2, and consequently,
the application of the doctrine of res judicata, it is essential to consider the identity of facts essential to their
maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of action.
If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same and covered by
the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action.
If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of fact, or if different proofs would be required to
sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.
It was found that the evidence required to prove the allegations in Civil Case 2, which involves the annulment
of the subsequent transactions and the recovery of possession is necessarily more than that required in Civil
Case No. 1, which involves only the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor
Furthermore, the decision in Civil Case No. 1 necessarily turned only upon whether the Deeds of Absolute
Sale were fictitious or simulated, while that in Civil Case No. 2 will also have to include a determination of the
good or bad faith of the subsequent purchasers.
Res judicata, therefore, does not apply.
Nonetheless, even if the causes of action were different, considering the the 2 cases involved the same
parties and their privies, and there were identical issues the trial court and the Court of Appeals should have
applied the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment.

(18)
GR 177121 (3/16/09) - BOMBALES
JP LATEX TECHNOLOGY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
BALLONS GRANGER BALLOONS, INC. AND CHRISTOS SANTORINEOS, THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT AND EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF BIAN, LAGUNA, TATSUYA OGINO AND KATSUMI
WATANABE,Respondents.
Facts:
Respondent Ballons Granger Balloons, Inc. (Granger) is a foreign corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of Canada.
Anchoring on an isolated transaction, respondent Granger filed a complaint for rescission and
damages against petitioner JP Latex Technology, Inc., a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the
manufacture of latex and balloons.
The complaint, , alleged that Ogino, representing himself as the president of petitioner corporation,
and respondent Santorineos entered into a contract for the sale of respondent Grangers machinery
consisting of four dipping lines and all associated equipment for the amount of US$1,230,000.00 and
other non-cash considerations consisting of a 20% shareholding in petitioners distribution company
and the distributorship of its balloons in Canada and Greece. Although respondent Granger had
performed its end of the bargain by re-assembling the subject machinery in petitioners factory in
Bian and transferring its dipping formulations and technology to petitioner, the latter allegedly paid
only a partial sum of US$748,262.87 and reneged on its other non-cash commitments. According to
respondent Granger, it made several written and verbal demands for the full payment of the purchase
price to no avail. The complaint was accompanied by an application for the issuance of a writ of
replevin.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of respondent Granger. Petitioner filed an MR

While the case was pending, respondent Granger moved for the execution pending appeal and was
later on granted
Issue: W/N execution pending appeal may be issued and implement when the decision sought is
not yet final because of the pending and unresorved MR
Ruling: NO
Execution pending appeal or immediate execution, which is now called discretionary execution under
Rule 39, Section 2(a), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is allowed pending appeal of a
judgment or final order of the trial court, upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing. Section 2 (a) of Rule 39 expressly states:
o SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. (a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal.
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it
has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on
appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period
to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.
It is clear from the caption of the provision that discretionary execution is allowed only when the
period to appeal has commenced but before the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. The period
to appeal where a motion for reconsideration has been filed as in the instant case commences only
upon the receipt of a copy of the order disposing of the motion for reconsideration. The pendency of a
motion for reconsideration, therefore, prevents the running of the period to appeal.
In the instant case, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision. The records of the
case show that the motion had not been acted upon by the RTC before it ruled on the motion for
execution "pending appeal." That being the case, the pendency of the motion for reconsideration has
prevented the period to appeal from even commencing. The period within which a party may move for
an execution pending appeal of the trial courts decision has not yet also started.
Where there is a pending motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, an order execution pending
appeal is improper and premature. The pendency of the motion for reconsideration legally precludes
execution of the RTC decision because the motion serves as the movants vehicle to point out the
findings and conclusions of the decision which, in his view, are not supported by law or the evidence
and, therefore, gives the trial judge the occasion to reverse himself. In the event that the trial judge
finds the motion for reconsideration meritorious, he can of course reverse the decision.
In the absence of an appeal from the decision, as the motion for reconsideration is still unresolved, the
execution ordered by the RTC cannot be properly considered as execution pending appeal. All
references to the assailed order as an order of execution "pending appeal" are mislabeled.
The need to resolve first, or better still deny, petitioners motion for reconsideration before the RTC
could grant the discretionary execution becomes more imperative in the light of the rule that
executions pending appeal are frowned upon.
Lastly, the Court does not find any good reason to justify the execution of the RTC decision pending
finality. The RTCs finding that the machinery under litigation was deteriorating is not supported by the
evidence on record. Nor is the possibility that petitioner would not be able to pay the judgment award
a good reason to order discretionary execution. The good reasons allowing execution pending appeal
must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or damages
to the adverse party if the decision is reversed.
(19)

Stronghold v. Felix (GR 148090; 11/24/06 - FERNANDEZ

Emerita Garon (Garon) filed an action for sum of money against Project Movers Realty and Development
Corporation (Project Movers) and Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. (Stronghold Insurance). In an Order
dated 19 September 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 56 (trial court) granted Garons
motion for summary judgment. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Garon
Garon filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
In this case, Garon anchors the motion for execution pending appeal on the following grounds:
(a) any appeal which Project Movers and Stronghold Insurance may take from the summary judgment would
be patently dilatory;

(b) the ill health of Garons spouse and the spouses urgent need for the funds owed to them by Project Movers
and Stronghold Insurance constitute good reasons for execution pending appeal; and
(c) Garon is ready and willing to post a bond to answer for any damage Project Movers and Stronghold
Insurance may suffer should the trial courts decision be reversed on appeal.
WON

Garons motion for execution pending appeal should be granted? No

Execution pending appeal is an exception to the general rule. The Court explained the nature of execution
pending appeal as follows:
Execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, being more of the exception rather than
the rule.This rule is strictly construed against the movant because courts look with disfavor
upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired finality. Such execution affects
the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal. [13]
The requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal are the following:
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal;
(c) the good reasons must be stated in the special order.
As a discretionary execution, execution pending appeal is permissible only when good reasons exist for
immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the
period to appeal

In this case, Garon failed to present good reasons to justify execution pending appeal. The situations in the
cases cited by the Garon are not similar to this case. In Ma-Ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Caete, Caete filed an
action for compensation for his illness. The Workmens Compensation Commission found the illness
compensable. Considering Caetes physical condition and the Courts finding that he was in constant danger of
death, the Court allowed execution pending appeal. In De Leon, et al. v. Soriano, et al., De Leon, et al.
defaulted on an agreement that was peculiarly personal to Asuncion. The agreement was valid only during
Asuncions lifetime. The Court considered that Sorianos health was delicate and she was 75 years old at that
time. Hence, execution pending appeal was justified. In this case, it was not Garon, but her husband,
who was ill.
The posting of a bond, standing alone and absent the good reasons required under Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Rules, is not enough to allow execution pending appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a successful party is not
a good reason to justify execution pending appeal as a combination of circumstances is the dominant
consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution. The bond is only an additional factor for the
protection of the defendants creditor.
The exercise of the power to grant or deny a motion for execution pending appeal is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. However, the existence of good reasons is indispensable to the grant of execution
pending appeal. Here, Garon failed to advance good reasons that would justify the execution pending appeal.
(20)

GR 17250 (1/12/11) - FORTES-LEUNG

Hrs. of Santiago Divinagracia v. Judge Ruiz, Bombo Radyo (2011)

Doctrine: award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees, awarded as an incident to an
intra-corporate case, are exempt from the rule on immediate execution

Facts:
IN 1999, Santiago Divinagracia as stockholder of filed a derivative suit on behalf of Peoples Broadcasting
Service Incorporated (PBS) assailing a management contract entered into by PBS and Bombo Radyo

Counterclaim: suit filed by Divinagracia was unfounded and intended only to harass and molest them,
claimed for moral, exemplary damages and attys fee.
RTC acting as Special Commercial Court dismissed the Divinagracias complaint and granted the
counterclaim of PBS and Bombo Radyo. The Court further ordered the Heirs of Divinagracia to pay PBS and
Bombo P850K
The Heirs filed a notice of appeal with the RTC while Bombo and PBS moved for immediate execution. The
latter was granted by the RTC
Heirs filed petition under Rule 65 with CA. They argued that the issuance of the writ of execution by the RTC
was improper, considering that they had already appealed the decision to the CA. The CA in dismissing the
petition reasoned that Section 4 of Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies
was very explicit in providing that all decisions rendered in intra-corporate controversies shall be immediately
executory
ISSUE: WON moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees, awarded as a result of a
counterclaim in an intra-corporate case, are immediately executory despite the pendency of the
appeal in the main case? NO

HELD:
In 19 September 2006, the Court en banc issued A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC titled "Re: Amendment of Section
4, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies by Clarifying
that Decisions Issued Pursuant to Said Rule are Immediately Executory Except the Awards for
Moral Damages, Exemplary Damages and Attorneys Fees, if any."
Hence, Sec. 4 now reads:
o SEC. 4. Executory nature of decisions and orders. All decisions and orders issued under these
Rules shall immediately be executory EXCEPT THE AWARDS FOR MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES, IF ANY. No appeal or petition taken therefrom shall stay the
enforcement or implementation of the decision or order, unless restrained by an appellate
court. Interlocutory orders shall not be subject to appeal
The issuance is retroactive as indisputably, the amendment of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules is
procedural in character.
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent

(21)

Yau v. Silverio (GR 158848/ 171994; 2/4/08) - KUNG

Yau bought a Promissory Note (PN) from Philfinance. The PN was issued by Philippine Shares Corporation
(PSC). Philfinance issued checks in favor of Yau. When the latter deposited the checks, it was dishonored. PSC
denied issuing the PN. Yau filed a complaint for recovery against Philfinance and the members of its board.
Only Pablo Carlos, Jr. filed Answer and the other members of BOD were declared in default. Silverio and the
other members of the BOD filed an MR to the order of default. When their MR was denied, they appealed the
order denying their MR to the appellate court. It was also dismissed and the decision attained finality.
In the meantime, the trial court decided in favor of Yau for the recovery of money he paid on the PN. This
decision was appealed by Carlos, Sr. to the appellate court which substantially upheld the decision of the trial
court only modifying the computation of interest. This decision attained finality.
The trial court issued a writ of execution against the members of the board (Macapagal and Silverio) who
were declared in default. Their bank deposits and shares of stock were garnished in favor of Yau.
Silverio and Macapagal, both members of the board, filed separate appeals. Macapagal filed a petition for
certiorari before the SC which was referred to CA and was subsequently dismissed by reason of res judicata.
Silverio filed a petition before the appellate court which was also dismissed. Both filed petition before the
Supreme Court assailing the dismissal of their respective petitions before the appellate court. The petitions in
the Supreme Court were consolidated because they arose from the same facts. The petition was however
dismissed.
The sheriff of the trial court resumed the enforcement of the writ. It sent notices to several bank to garnish
the bank deposits of Macapagal. A motion to quash the writ of execution was filed by Macapagal on the
ground that the decision of the trial court which is the basis of the writ of execution is more than five years.
Hence, it can only be enforced through an independent civil action. Macapagals motion was denied by the
trial court. According to the trial court there was an effective delay because of the various petitions filed by
Macapagal before the CA and SC. Macapagal appealed the decision to CA but it was also denied.
The sheriff also served notice of levy on a house and lot owned by Silverio in Forbes Park. It was sold in an
auction sale to Yau. Silverio then filed a petition before the trial court to declare the levy, auction sale, and
the certificate of sale void for the reason that the judgment sought to be executed was more than five years.

The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Yau appealed the
CAs decision to SC. Macapagal and Yaus petitions were consolidated in view of the identity of parties and
issues.
Whether the Decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 may no longer be enforced against
Silverio and Macapagal since more than five (5) years have already lapsed from its finality?
No.
It is clear from the above Rule that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of
its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, before barred by the statute of
limitations, by action. However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after
the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds.
In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court held that in computing the time limit for
enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is
stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ
of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Thus, the time during which
execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the
debtor. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is, the delay is caused or occasioned by
actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became final and executory on December 26,
1991. The writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. It could not be enforced for the full
satisfaction of the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal and Silverio filed with the Court of
Appeals and this Court petitions challenging the trial courts judgment and the writ of execution. Such
petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ.
Because of their maneuvers, there has been a delay of sixteen (16) years in the enforcement of such
judgment, reckoned from its finality on December 26, 1991 up to the present. Indeed, the enforcement of the
trial courts judgment by motion has been interrupted by the acts of Macapagal and Silverio the judgment
debtors.
(22)
Jerome Solco v. Provido (GR 176533; (2/11/08) - MAGSUMBOL (APOLOGIES FOR THE LONG DIGEST)
F: A Contract to Sell and MOA were entered into by Villaruels through Atty-in-fact respondent and petitioner.
The agreement provided for the payment of P1.6M upon the signing of the contract, and the balance of P1.4M
upon the dismantling of the structures thereon and the clearing of the premises of its occupants w/in 6mos.
Thereafter, Solco entered the premises and commenced w/ the construction of the improvements.
The Villaruels filed a complaint for rescission of contract w/ damages and application for a writ of preliminary
injunction w/ the RTC alleging that Solco violated the terms of their agreement when he entered the premises
w/out notice & started delivering rocks, sand and hollow blocks w/c destroyed the gate & barbed wire fence
that secured the premises, and uprooted the ipil-ipil tree. The construction materials allegedly blocked their
access to Lacson Street, rendering impossible the dismantling of the structure & removal of the materials
therein w/in the period set by the contract.
In his Answer, Solco alleged that the Villaruels had not substantially complied with their obligations under the
contract as the house and the billboard were not dismantled and the occupants had not vacated the premises
yet. He claimed that the contract allowed him to take full possession of, and to commence construction on,
the premises upon the execution thereof and the payment of P1.6M.
RTC ruled in favor of Solco. Villaruels appealed to the CA w/c affirmed the decision of the RTC. They filed an
MR but was denied with finality. Judgment was entered and became final and executory.
Solco then filed a Motion for Execution. It was granted and a writ of execution was issued.
Sheriff served the writ on Solcos consel who informed him that the balance of the purchase price will be paid
only if all the adverse occupants had vacated the premises. Upon ocular inspection, all adverse occupants
had vacated the premises, but the billboard was still there. So despite demand for payment of the balance,
Solco did not pay.
Villaruels sent a letter informing the latter of thier decision to cancel and terminate the sale transaction, and
the forfeiture of the 1.6m to answer for the damages caused to them. They also wrote a letter to the clerk of
court stating that Solco failed to pay the balance, and prayed for the full implementation of the writ of
execution.

Solco filed a manifestation w/ motion asking the court to accept MTBC cashiers check as full compliance of
his obligation. RTC accepted the payment as full compliance and ordered the Villaruels to execute the deed of
absolute sale.
Villaruels filed a complaint for Cancellation of Contract, Quieting of Title and Damages. They also filed a
Motion to Quash the writ of execution and to set aside the first Order claiming that the writ of execution was
void because it varied the terms of the judgment & RTC had no jurisdiction to alter/modify a final judgment.
RTC denied motion to quash
In the CA, CA granted the petition for certiorari saying that the orders of the RTC were issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
I:
1. W/N CA erred in reversing the order of the RTC accepting the MBTC check as full payment of the contract
price?
2. W/N the payment to the clerk of court was valid?
H:
1.YES. Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious
reasons demanded by justice and equity. In this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final
and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment, upon
motion within five years from the date of its entry, or after the lapse of such time and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, by an independent action. Either party can move for the execution of the decision
so long as the decision or any part of it is in favor of the moving party. The rule on execution of final
judgments does not make the filing of the motion for execution exclusive to the prevailing party.
In the instant case, the Villaruels moved to quash the writ of execution because it allegedly varied the terms
of the judgment. They claimed that the writ directed the sheriff to execute the decision only as against them,
contrary to the dispostive portion of the decision which likewise ordered Solco to pay the balance of the
purchase price. This contention is untenable. Although the portion of the decision ordering Solco to pay the
balance of the contract price was not categorically expressed in the dispositive portion of the writ of
execution, the same was explicitly reiterated in the body of the writ. Villaruels remedy was not to move for
the quashal of the writ of execution but to move for its modification to include the portion of the decision
which ordered Solco to pay the balance of the contract price.
2. YES. Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control over its process of execution. This power
carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution,
as well as the power to compel the Villaruels to accept the payment made pursuant to a validly issued writ of
execution. As the prevailing party, Solco should not be deprived of the fruits of his rightful victory in the longdrawn legal battle by any ploy of the respondents. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts frown upon any attempt to
prolong them.
Under the foregoing rules, a sheriff is under obligation to enforce the execution of a money judgment by
demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment directly to the judgment obligee or his
representative of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. However, if the judgment
obligee or his representative is not present to receive the payment, the rules require the sheriff to receive the
payment which he must turn over within the same day to the clerk of court. If it is not practicable to deliver
the amount to the clerk of court within the same day, the sheriff shall deposit the amount in a fiduciary
account with the nearest government depository bank. The clerk of court then delivers the amount to the
judgment obligee in satisfaction of the judgment. If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the
obligation, the sheriff shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor.
The Rules do not specify the period within which the sheriffs must implement the writ of execution. When
writs are placed in their hands, it is their mandated ministerial duty, in the absence of any instructions to the
contrary, to proceed with reasonable promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. If the
judgment cannot be satisfied in full within 30 days after receipt of the writ, they shall report to the court and
state the reason or reasons therefor. They are likewise tasked to make a report to the court every 30 days on
the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires.
Sheriff Garbanzos served the writ several times on Solco by demanding the immediate payment of the
balance of the purchase price and made the corresponding reports to the trial court of the proceedings taken

thereon. Considering that Solcos obligation to pay is conditioned upon the eviction of all adverse occupants
and removal of all structures found in the subject property, he was justified in not paying the balance
immediately after the May 18 and May 27, 2005 sheriffs demands because the billboard was not yet removed
from the premises. In reciprocal obligations, only when a party has performed his part of the contract can he
demand that the other party also fulfills his own obligation. Assuming all the obligations of the Villaruels were
complied with on June 7, 2005, but Solco still failed to pay his obligation, sheriff Garbanzos should have levied
the properties of the latter to satisfy the judgment as mandated by the Rules. He should not have waited until
August 18, 2005 to institute the garnishment proceedings or after the Villaruels requested for the full
implementation of the writ.
Nevertheless, this procedural lapse on the part of the sheriff should not affect the validity of the November
23, 2005 Order of the RTC accepting the MBTC check as full payment of the contract price which was based
on the August 8, 2005 letter of the Villaruels to the clerk of court requesting for the full implementation of the
writ.
Moreover, the fact that payment was made to the clerk of court is of no moment. Indeed, the Rules require
that in case the judgment obligee or his representative is not present to receive the payment, the judgment
obligor shall deliver the aforesaid payment to the executing sheriff, who shall turn over all the amounts
coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of court, who in turn shall deliver the amount to
the judgment obligee or his representative in satisfaction of the judgment. However, it would be defeating the
ends of justice to rigidly enforce the rules and to invalidate the acceptance of the payment made directly to
the clerk of court just because it was not initially paid to the sheriff, who is duty bound to turn over all the
amounts coming into his possession to the clerk of court. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided

(23)

Hi Yield Realty v. CA (GR 138978; 2/12/02) - PAJA

F: Private respondent Noli Francisco (mortgagor), as attorney-in-fact of spouses Carawatan and petitioner HiYield Realty (mortgagee) entered into a Real Estate Mortgage. The property was owned by Spouses
Carawatan. The mortgagor failed to pay. Hi Yield extra-judicially foreclosed the property. The mortgagor was
the highest bidder. The redemption period was set to expire on August 13, 1993. Mortgagee alleged that he
offered to redeem the property but that the mortgagor refused to accept the offer and wanted a higher
amount.
The trial court declared that the issue as manifested by the parties in the pre-trial conference was
merely to determine the amount of the capital gains tax and documentary stamps as computed by the
Marikina BIR office. Thus, it ordered private respondent to pay the corresponding amount of taxes within
thirty (30) days or on March 15, 1994. Private respondent failed to pay by that date and instead moved for an
extension of time (asking for 45 days) becaues he was waiting for the approval of a bank loan.
Initially the trial court denied the motion. After a month, the trial court did a 180. It issued orders
overturning its denial of the motion and allowed private respondent to pay petitioner the redemption price in
the amount of P548,872.93 plus 1% per month from April 8, 1994 to June 30, 1994 within five (5) days from
receipt of the (new) order. Not only that. Petitioner was also ordered to accept the payment offered by
respondent as the full redemption price. Petitioner refused. Private respondent filed a motion to consign the
amount. Petitioner filed an MR, it was denied. Petitioner argued that the trial court in effect extended the
twelve-month period of redemption of a duly foreclosed property by almost four years. The CA affirmed the
trial courts decision.
I: W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
issued the questioned orders?
H: YES
R: Permitting private respondent to file a suit for redemption, with either party unable to foresee when final
judgment will come, renders meaningless the period fixed by the statute for effecting the redemption. It
makes the redemptive period indefinite and cripples any effort of the landowner to realize the value of his
land. In the same way, the buyer cannot immediately recover his investment. Thus, unless and until the
redemption is resolved with finality, both the landowners and buyers needs cannot be met. Petitioner and
private respondent herein were thus basically posed on similar footing before redemption.

Private respondent may have elicited the sympathy of the trial court. We cannot, however, be blind to
the rights of petitioner. It was serious error to make the final redemption of the foreclosed property
dependent on the financial condition of private respondent. It may have been difficult for private respondent
to raise the money to redeem the property but financial hardship is not a ground to extend the period of
redemption.
As a result of the trial courts grant of a 45-day extended period to redeem, almost nine (9) years have
elapsed with both parties claims over the property dangling in limbo, to the serious impairment of
petitioners rights.

(24)

Honrado v. CA (GR 166333; 11/25/05) - PEREZ

Doctrine: The exemption against the levy of a family home must be claimed by the debtor himself at the
time of levy or within a reasonable period thereafter. Moreover, sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ issued
by a court is purely ministerial.
Facts
Petitioner owed Respondent, Premium Inc. a sum of money.
Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money
against Jose Honrado, who was doing business under the name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32965. Premium sought to collect the amount of P240,765.00 representing the total price of veterinary products purchased on credit by Honrado from November 18, 1996 until
June 30, 1997.
A writ of execution over the petitioners land was issued.
The Sheriff levied on the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-143175. The Notice of Levy was annotated at the
dorsal portion of the title on April 4, 2001.[7] The Sheriff set the sale of the property at public auction on April
4, 2001. Honrado was served with a copy of the notice of such sale but he opposed the same.

On May 17, 2001, the property was sold to Premium, the highest bidder, for the amount of P650,204.10.[8]
On May 23, 2001, the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued[9] and annotated at the dorsal portion of
the title.[10] Honrado failed to redeem the property .
In the meantime, the RTC of Calamba City rendered a Decision[11] in SP Case No. 489- 1998-C on April 29,
2002, declaring the property a family home.
On May 3, 2002, Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution under Article 155 of the
Family Code of the Philippines in Civil Case No. Q-97-32965. It was alleged therein that the property is exempt
from execution because it is a family home which had been constituted as such before he incurred his
indebtedness with Pre- mium. He also alleged that he and his family had no other real property except the
land which was levied upon and sold on execution.
Premium opposed the motion on the ground that Honrado was already estopped or barred by laches from
claiming the exemption, and that said claim has been mooted by the lapse of the redemption period for
Honrado to redeem the property. Premium averred that, after the sale at public auction, Honrado and his
family even vacated the property. Honrado re-occupied the property only in April or May 2002.[13] It further
averred that the law does not automatically exempt a family home from levy or execution and there was no
showing that its present value does not exceed the amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Family
Code.[
RTC ruled in favor of Premium.
Honrado filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the April 14, 2003 Resolution of the RTC. On June
30, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition.[19] The CA declared that there was no proof that the public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to assert his claim
for exemption at the time of the levy or within a reasonable time thereafter. It held that once a judgment
becomes fi- nal and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the
issuance of a writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
Issue: Is the execution judgment over Honrados land valid?
Held: Yes.
Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as the family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by Law. A
family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the
dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy

such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases. Such provision finds no application in this case.
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period within which to claim the exemption, the rule is,
nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption must be claimed by the debtor himself at the time of
levy or within a reasonable period thereafter. It is self-evident that petitioner did not assert their claim of
exemption within a reasonable time. Any claim for exemption from execution of properties under Section 12
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before its sale on execution by the sheriff. Petitioner and
his wife failed to disclose in their petition for the judicial constitution of a family home that Premium Agro-Vet
Products, Inc. is one of their creditors considering the fact that the collection case filed against Honrado was
filed in 1997 or prior to the institution of said petition in 1998. Petitioner never raised the argument of exemption of his family home before the trial court before and during the auction sale. We find that such actions
reveal a dilatory intent to render nugatory the sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of execution to
put an end to litigation. Petitioner previously failed to appear in the pre-trial conference, failed to submit his
appellants brief and now conveniently raised the issue of exemption almost a year from the auction sale.
We find no proof of grave abuse of discretion [on] the part of public respondents. Once a judgment becomes
final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ
of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. It is well-settled that the sheriffs duty in the execution of
a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial. The function of ordering the execution of a judgment, being
judicial, devolves upon the judge.
(25)
Cardinal v. Asset (GR 149696; 7/14/06) - SASAKI
FACTS:
PETITIONER, Cardinal Building Owners Association, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing under R.A.
4726 (The Condominium Act) located in Malate, Manila.
Benjamin Marual is a member of petitioner association being the owner of two condominium units
Due to Maruals failure to pay assessment dues, PETITIONER filed w/ the RTC a complaint for sum of money
During the course of the proceedings petitioner and Marual filed a compromise agreement
RTC
APPROVED the compromise agreement
Marual failed to comply with his obligation, prompting petitioner to file with the RTC a motion for the
execution of the compromise judgment.
RTC issued the writ of execution
court sheriff served a Notice of Levy/Attachment upon Realty on the Registry of Deeds
PETITIONER learned that there were prior annotations on the same titles:
That Marual mortgaged his two condominium units to Planters Development Bank. The mortgage was
foreclosed and the said units were sold to the bank at a public auction.
before the expiration of the period for redemption of the foreclosed realties, Marual sold the same units to
Asset Recovery and Management Corporation, RESPONDENT
RESPONDENT filed an action for mandamus against the bank. RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the bank from consolidating in its name the titles or taking possession of the units, or otherwise
disposing of them until further orders from the court.
PETITIONER filed with the RTC a case for sum of money and a Motion for Possession of the units
RTC
Issued a writ of possession
RESPONDENT filed a petition for certiorari w/ the CA for grave abuse of discretion
CA
GRANTED the petition; NULLIFIED the RTCs decision
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in nullifying the RTCs decision
HELD:
NO! RTC acted w/ grave abuse of discretion!
Section 20 of the Condominium Act, provides: that
Sec. 20. An assessment upon any condominium made in accordance with a duly registered declaration of
restrictions shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at the time the assessment is made. The amount of
any such assessment plus any other charges thereon, such as interest, costs (including attorney's fees) and

penalties, as such may be provided for in the declaration of restrictions, shall be and become a lien upon the
condominium assessed when the management body causes a notice of assessment to be registered with the
Register of Deeds of the city or province where such condominium project is located
Such lien shall be superior to all other liens registered subsequent to the registration of said notice of
assessment except real property tax liens and except that the declaration of restrictions may provide for the
subordination thereof to any other liens and encumbrances. Such liens may be enforced in the same manner
provided for by law for the judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage or real property. Unless otherwise
provided for in the declaration of restrictions, the management body shall have power to bid at foreclosure
sale. The condominium owner shall have the right of redemption as in cases of judicial or extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgages. (Underscoring supplied)

Records do not show that petitioner had its notice of assessment registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Manila in order that the amount of such assessment could be considered a lien upon Maruals two
condominium units. Clearly, pursuant to the above provisions, petitioners claim can not be considered
superior to that of respondent. As mentioned earlier, the deed of sale wherein Marual conveyed to respondent
his two condominium units, was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
Moreover, the Decision rendered by the RTC based on the compromise agreement by the parties is a money
judgment, the enforcement of which is provided in Section 9, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended (see Rule 39, Sec. 9)
There is nothing in Rule 39, Section 9 which authorizes the RTC to issue a writ of possession over the two
condominium units in favor of petitioner.
In Abinujar v. CA:
An execution is fatally defective if the judgment was for sum of money and the writ of execution was for
the sale of the mortgaged property
As petitioners obligation under the compromise agreement as approved by the court was monetary in nature,
private respondents can avail only of the writ of execution provided in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court, and not that provided in Section 10.
(26)
Republic v. Antonio (GR 1668866; 3/27/08 - TABAG
NOTE: Guys, Im not sure about the relevance on the topic because its about a compromise agreement being
executed as basis of judgment. This is GR No. 166866 (1668866 is non-existent). Also this is Republic vs
ANTONIO FLORENDO. Date is correct though.
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is represented in this case by the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA), a government corporation created under RA 7916, as amended.
On April 14, 1991, the Export Processing Zone Authority, predecessor of PEZA, filed a complaint for the
expropriation of seven parcels of land located at Barrio Ibo, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, owned by respondents. The
purpose of the expropriation was to establish and develop an export processing zone or a part thereof on
those real properties. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the expropriation of the
seven parcels of land and payment of just compensation of P1,500 per sq. m. with 12% interest per annum
from the time petitioner took possession. During the pendency of petitioners appeal for the correctness of
valuation, both parties reached an amicable settlement and agreed for the payment as fixed by RTC; as well
as presentation by respondents of clean titles of all the subject properties before payment by petitioner.
Accordingly, the parties executed a deed of absolute sale dated June 25, 2001 which set out the terms
and conditions of their settlement, the transfer of ownership from respondents to petitioner and the execution
by the parties of the corresponding deed of absolute sale for the remaining six lots as soon as respondents
could settle or clear the encumbrances or other problems affecting them.
Petitioner prepared a joint motion to dismiss the expropriation case but respondent Antonio Florendo
refused to sign because there were still three lots which had not yet been paid. Respondents could not clear
these properties of their encumbrances and liens as there were pending cases filed by third party claimants
over them. Instead, they proposed that a partial compromise agreement be executed to cover the four lots
that had already been sold and transferred to PEZA. Petitioner, however, found the proposal unacceptable
and contrary to their compromise agreement.

Meanwhile, CA (unaware of the compromise agreement) affirmed the RTC decision. CA decision attained
finality. Antonio then filed a motion for execution of the final judgment of the CA with respect to the 3 parcels
of land stated above. RTC granted this motion and writ of execution was issued. Notices of garnishment were
served on Land Bank, depository bank for the 6M amount.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash a writ of execution and ex parte motion to lift the garnishment. Both
were denied. Deed of sale executed while appeal was pending was not approved by the CA and thus did not
bind parties and did not make decision moot. MR was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in CA. CA dismissed. Elevated to SC with prayer for TRO and W of PI.
ISSUE:
W/N compromise agreement contitues res judicata and therefore CA decision could not have superseded it.
W/N execution of the final judgment is inequitable.
HELD:
YES. Petition granted. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal
concessions in order to resolve their differences and thus avoid litigation or to put an end to one already
commenced.When it complies with the requisites and principles of contracts, it becomes a valid agreement
which has the force of law between the parties. It has the effect and authority of res judicata once entered
into, even without judicial approval.
When a compromise agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon the
parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is a determination of the controversy and has the force and
effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent, forgery,
fraud, misrepresentation and coercion. Thus, although a compromise agreement has the effect and authority
of res judicata upon the parties even without judicial approval, no execution may issue until it has received
the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is
thereupon decreed.
On whether this perfected compromise agreement is valid despite the finality of judgment of the CA, we hold
that the compromise agreement reached by the parties while the appeal was pending in the CA is valid. When
the CA rendered its June 25, 2002 decision, it unknowingly adjudicated a case which, for all intents and
purposes, had already been closed and terminated by the parties themselves when they agreed on a
settlement.It does not matter that the CA decision lapsed into finality when neither party questioned it. A
compromise agreement is still valid even if there is already a final and executory judgment.

(27)
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas and OSG (GR 186571; 8/11/10) - VELASCO
Facts:
Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. In April 2005, Gerbert returned to
the Philippines and found out that his wife was having an affair. He then returned to Canada and filed for
Divorce. The Superior Court of Canada granted Gerberts petition and the same took effect a month later.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert found new love. Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists
under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved with the RTC.
RTC denied Gerberts petition, as Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him
or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
Gerbert claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file
the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal
interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his

Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office.
Issue: WON Gerbert can claim right under Art. 26 of the FC
Ruling:
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse but the foreign divorce decree is presumptive
evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the
RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor
of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal
of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a)
In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b)
In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
(28)

Republic v. Gingoyon (GR 166429; 2/1/06) - ATIENZA

FACTS:
This is a resolution (Feb. 1. 2006) by the SC to settle the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by the
Philippine Government on the SCs Court decision in December 19, 2005. In the 2005, the SC ruled that
PIATCO has right for just compensation and that the Government cannot take possession of NAIA-3 without
paying PIATCO first with the amount awarded by the SC in 2005.
However, the Philippine Government argues in this motion that two entities, Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka)
and Asahikosan (Asahikosan) Corporation, who allegedly claim significant liens on the terminal, arising from
their alleged unpaid bills by virtue of an Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract they had with
PIATCO. On account of these adverse claims, the Government now claims as controvertible the question of
who is the builder of the NAIA 3.

The Government postulates that if any part of its Php3,002,125,000 deposit is released directly to PIATCO,
and PIATCO, as in the past, does not wish to settle its obligations directly to Takenaka, Asahikosan and
Fraport, the Republic may end up having expropriated a terminal with liens and claims far in excess of its
actual value, the liens remain unextinguished, and PIATCO on the other hand, ends up with the
Php3,0002,125,000 in its pockets gratuitously.
ISSUE: WON the Philippine Government can execute write of possession of NAIA 3 without paying PIATCO of
its just compensation as Builders of NAIA 3 as ruled by the SC in 2005
HELD: NO
The SC explained that it wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual premises that are not yet
conclusive or judicially established. Even if Takenaka and Asahikosan got a favorable ruling in London court
against PIATCO, the same was not presented in the Philippine Courts, and as such, it is not yet binding in the
Philippine courts.
The Philippine Government should then pay PIATCO the provisionally determined just compensation of 3.02
Million pesos before it may acquire physical possession over the facilities of NAIA 3. Since the issues raised
with regard to claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan are factual in nature, the SC held that there are other
judicial avenues appropriate for trier of facts.
(29)

Benjamin Sanga v. Florencio Alcantara (AM 0-09-2657; 1/25/10) - BAUTISTA

Facts:
Complainant Sanga is one of the legal heirs of plaintiffs, Spouses Josefina and Salvador Sanga Jr., in an
ejectment case. Later on, Sanga substituted for his parents in view of their death. A Decision, in favor of his
parents, was rendered by then Presiding Judge Leili Suarez-Acebo of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tanay,
Rizal, which ordered the defendants to vacate the premises of the subject property and to deliver the
possession thereof to the plaintiffs. Subsequently, on March 17, 2004, a Writ of Demolition was issued.
Sanga narrated that Alcantara estimated that the amount of P45,000.00 was needed to execute the Writ of
Demolition. He claimed that the demolition was scheduled on April 9, 2004, but the same did not push
through since he failed to raise the amount needed to implement the writ. Thus, on May 3, 2004, Sanga gave
Alcantara the amount of P5,000.00. Again, due to his eagerness to fully implement the Writ of Demolition,
Sanga obtained even a usurious loan to be able to raise the balance of P40,000.00, which he gave to
Alcantara on May 21, 2004. No official receipts were issued for the money received which, in totality,
amounted to P45,000.00. Instead, Alcantara issued a handwritten receipt for both P5,000.00 and P40,000.00
he received, respectively. However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, Alcantara failed to deliver to
Sanga the lawful possession of the subject property.
Disappointed with Alcantaras failure to implement the writ, Sanga sought the assistance of Bisnar. However,
Sanga claimed that Bisnar, likewise, demanded from him the amount of P100,000.00 for the implementation
of the writ, but eventually settled for P50,000.00 after he informed Bisnar that he would not be able to raise
such big amount. On September 10, 2004, Sanga gave Bisnar the amount of P20,000.00 as evidenced by a
handwritten acknowledgment receipt duly signed by the latter. On November 10, 2004, Sanga again gave
Bisnar the amount of P27,500.00 as partial payment for the demolition as evidenced by an acknowledgment
receipt duly signed by Bisnar. In both instances, no official receipts were issued for the amounts received by
Bisnar, allegedly to defray the initial expenses of the demolition. The demolition was scheduled several times;
however, as of the filing of the complaint, the writ remained unimplemented.
Both Alcantara and Bisnar demanded and collected money from the plaintiff allegedly to defray the expenses
for the implementation of the writ. The acquiescence or consent of the plaintiffs to such expenses does not
absolve the sheriff of his failure to secure the prior approval of the court concerning such expenses. There
was no evidence showing that respondents submitted to the court, for its approval, the estimated expenses
for the execution of the writ before they demanded monies from complainant. They did not deposit the sums
received from complainant with the Clerk of Court who, under Section 9, was then authorized to disburse the
same to respondent sheriff to effect the implementation of the writ. Neither was it shown that they rendered
an accounting and liquidated the said amount to the court. Alcantara and Bisnar made no mention in the
sheriffs return, which they submitted to court, of the amounts of money they had received from complainant.

Issue:
Should Alcantara and Bisnar be dismissed from the service for having been found guilty of grave misconduct?
Held:
Under Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to secure the courts prior approval of
the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court process.
A sheriff is guilty of violating the Rules if he fails to observe the following: (1) prepare an estimate of expenses
to be incurred in executing the writ, for which he must seek the courts approval; (2) render an accounting;
and (3) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment debtor.
Sheriffs are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of
their duties. To do so would be inimical to the best interests of the service, because even assuming arguendo
that the payments were indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the
suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Corollary to this point, a sheriff cannot
just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps;
otherwise, such act would amount to dishonesty or extortion.
A sheriff is an officer of the court. As such, he forms an integral part of the administration of justice, since he
is called upon to serve the orders and writs and execute all processes of the court. As such, he is required to
live up to the strict standards of honesty and integrity in public service. His conduct must at all times be
characterized by honesty and openness and must constantly be above suspicion.
On Misconduct
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is
an unlawful behavior by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. In the instant case, it
has been clearly proven that both Alcantara and Bisnar willfully violated established rules, and unilaterally
and repeatedly demanded money from the complainant. For these, the Court finds respondents guilty of
Grave Misconduct.
The court pointed out the heavy burden of responsibility which court personnel are saddled with, in view of
their exalted positions as keepers of the public faith. They should, therefore, be constantly reminded that any
impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided.
Those who work in the judiciary must adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the courts good name and
standing. They should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency, and they must discharge
their duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the court and agents of the law.
Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.