Jamming Commercial Satellite Communications During Wartime:

An Empirical Study
Hank Rausch
CACI, Inc
hrausch@caci.com

Abstract
Satellite Communications parametersCarrier to Noise
Ratio, Bandwidth, Power, and Frequencywere
recorded for approximately 500 satellite communication
carriers continuously, over a period of 16 months.
These carriers support communications for military
operations in the current Iraq war. Communications
outages during this period were logged and the reason
for outage was determined. Some outages caused by
electromagnetic interference are shown to have
characteristics that would be expected if these carriers
were being subjected to a hostile denial of service
attack.
Keywords:
commercial
satellite
communications, jamming, denial of service attack,
hostile interference.

1. Overview
Commercial satellite communications play an
increasingly vital role in military operations. During
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-91),
military use of satellite communications was 1 Mbps per
5000 combatants. By Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003),
this ratio had increased to over 51 Mbps per 5000
soldiers [1]. Other sources put the figure at 3,200
Mbps for 132,000 combatants in Iraq today, for a ratio
of 121 Mbps per 5000 combatants [2]. Simply put, it
would be impossible to conduct modern warfare as it is
done
today
without
commercial
satellite
communications. This stems from two unrelated trends:
(1) The evolution of command and control mechanisms
to ever smaller units of action, creating exponential
growth in the numbers of communications links
required to sustain operations; and (2) inadequate
procurement of military satellite communications,

which failed to keep up with the burgeoning demand.

These two factors explain why today, 84% of satellite
communications supporting operations in Operation
Iraqi Freedom is provided by commercial satcomm [3].
This reliance on commercial satellitesleased
transponders from Intelsat and Eutelsat, for example
brings with it an attendant vulnerability. These satellites
are not hardened to protect against malicious
interference, or jamming. The potential exists that vital
military communications could be severed or reduced at
a critical time, due to unauthorized transmission to the
satellite by an adversary.
Recent authors have
highlighted this vulnerability, specifically as it relates to
the militarys use of commercial satellites [4]. The
Congressional Research Service makes this point
explicitly in a recent report to Congress:
a
growing
dependence
on
space
communications may also become a critical
vulnerability for Net-Centric Warfare [3].
The potential for this type of attack is known and
has been acknowledged [5], but up to now empirical
evidence for it has been lacking.
This paper presents empirical evidence of all types of
interference, including that by suspected hostile
adversaries, observed during ongoing operations in
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As a contractual clause
in the provision of leased satellite bandwidth to the U.S.
military, it was required to monitor and record the
spectral shape, power level, and carrier to noise ratio on
a continuous basis for all commercial transponders
leased to the military. This data was collected from
July, 2004 to November, 2005 and all instances of
degraded communications catalogued and analyzed.
The evidence suggests that unauthorized interference
is a small but significant subset of all types of satellite
communications problems experienced. Within this
subset, the cause of the majority of interference events

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was eventually found and determined to be non-hostile.

However, in a subset of these interference events the
cause could not be determined. Furthermore, these
events all had similar attack profiles, and in all cases
they disrupted military communications, forcing units to
relocate their communications to another satellite,
another transponder, or a different part of the same
transponder. It is reasonable to deduce that at least
some of these events were in fact hostile
communications denial of service attacks. This paper
presents an analysis of these attacks, and concludes with
a consideration of ways to mitigate this type of attack.

2. Background
Commercial
geosynchronous
communication
satellites are susceptible to a denial of service attack by
hostile electromagnetic interference. This interference
can be present at the local receiver (downlink jamming),
or directed at the satellite and mixed with or overriding
the valid carrier (uplink jamming). Downlink jamming
is relatively easily detected and dealt with, using
traditional direction finding and triangulation
techniques. Uplink jamming, on the other hand, is both
easy to conduct and harder to prosecute.
The vulnerability of commercial satellites to uplink
jamming lies in the nature of their construction and
operation: A transponder on the satellite accepts
microwave energy within a specified range and
retransmits it at the downlink frequency. No special
processing or filtering is done; the transponder acts as a
simple repeater. Consequently, if a foreign signal of the
appropriate carrier frequency is introduced, it is
retransmitted along with any legitimate signals that are
present on the transponder. If the foreign signal is of
sufficient carrier to noise ratio, a receiver attempting to
detect and demodulate the legitimate carrier will be
unable to do so, as the two signals are mixed. The
foreign signal also raises the noise floor of that
transponder, which in turn reduces the carrier to noise
ratio of all legitimate carriers. Since most small aperture
satellite receive sites are (in general) receive power
limited, this foreign signal may degrade or sever all
communications on the transponder, even in cases
where it does not directly mask the legitimate carrier.
This effect is intensified by the tremendous encoding
gain employed in current commercial satellite
communication modulation protocols. The effect of
current encoding techniques is that a small decrease in
carrier to noise ratioin some cases only 1-2 dB,
results
in
complete
cessation
of
effective
communications, from what was once an essentially
error-free channel. Finally, an additional artifact of

commercial satellite communications is that since they

are geostationary, they are easily targeted with
rudimentary equipment. No tracking equipment is
needed; it is only necessary to transmit on the
designated carrier frequency with a continuous wave
(unmodulated) signal at the elevation and azimuth for
the target satellite.
The power required to degrade or sever
communications depends on the carrier to noise ratio of
the signal being targeted. Broadcast communications
carrier signals generally have carrier to noise ratios of
20 dB or more. Consequently, degradation of these
carriers would require transmit equipment of a like
natureantennas of large aperture9m or moreand
power amplifiers rated in the thousands of watts.
Indeed, all documented cases of interference with a
commercial broadcast have involved another
commercial broadcast site. In a series of attacks
between 23 and 30 June, 2002 the outlawed cult Falun
Gong successfully broadcast over 10 channels being
aired by Chinese TV on Sinsoat-1. They did this from
Taiwan, using a commercial broadcast site [6].
In 1986 a disgruntled satellite dish vendor and parttime teleport operator, John MacDougal, broadcast over
HBOs satellite service on Galaxy 1 for about 4
minutes, dubbing himself Captain Midnight. He used
the 30 foot dish at Floridas Central Teleport, where he
worked part-time, to do this [7].
During the period July 6 to July 14, 2003, Voice of
America broadcasts to Iran were suspected of being
jammed by Cuban authorities [8].
So in general, disruption of a high power broadcast
service requires like equipment. This is not the case for
full duplex point to point communications using socalled Very Small Aperture Satellite Terminals
(VSATs). These terminals typically use antennas
varying in size from about 1 meter to several, usually a
maximum of 4 meters. Because they are easy to set up
and tear down, they are used for the majority of ad-hoc,
semi-permanent communications needed by U.S. Forces
in land operations. These terminals are almost always
receive-power limited. Typical carrier to noise ratios are
in the range of 6 to 10 dB above the noise floor,
depending on weather conditions. Typical transmit
power is a few watts. Depending on the bandwidth of
the targeted signal, an interfering signal only needs to be
(approximately) one-half powerful as the target signal to
completely disrupt communications. Recall that due to
advanced coding techniques, the effect of decreasing
signal to noise ratio beyond a certain threshold is
effectively complete cutoff. This can be done with a
comparable VSAT with comparable power supply as
the victim terminal.

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The extent to which VSAT terminals are vulnerable

to this type of interference is shown by the large number
of instances of unintentional self jamming that occur in
military use of commercial satellite bandwidth.
Commercial satellites all use polarization separation to
maximize the use of available carrier bandwidth.
Typically,
communications
are
carried
out
simultaneously on identical carrier frequencies, on both
the horizontal and vertical polarizations. A vital step in
setting up a terminal for allowed transmission is to zero
out the cross polarization component of ones
terminal, by rotating the transmit feed horn. Failure to
do this properly results in excessive power on the other
pole, presumably being used by other customers.
Military satellites, in general, do not use polarization
separation, and consequently many military terminal
operators are unaware or unappreciative of the
significance of minimizing cross polarization. In
military use of commercial satellites, it is commonplace
to have to respond and attend to several cases a week
where a terminal is inadvertently cross-polarized. In
short, the user terminals act as jammers themselves,
operating at their normal transmit frequencies and
powers. This illustrates how easy it would be to do so
on purpose.
Uplink jamming is made an even more significant
threat by the fact that a threat jammer can be anywhere
in the uplink footprint of the transponder, potentially
thousands of square miles. This threat can be made even
more difficult to eliminate because the jammer can be
mobile, or operate only on a limited duty cycle, or both.
Geolocation of the threat jammer while he is on the air
is made difficult due to the directional nature of the
uplink transmissionit does not broadcast out in a wide
pattern, as would a downlink jammer. Rather, it
concentrates its energy in a focused beam, making it
very hard to triangulate.
Susceptibility to this sort of information warfare has
been understood in the abstract for some time.
However, to date there has been little documentation of
actual attacks using these techniques. It is proposed
here that one reason for this lack of documentation is
that it is difficult to isolate bona fide interference attacks
from other forms of communication degradation in
general, and specifically from other forms of
interference. Contributing to this difficulty is the fact
that commercial satellite providers do not monitor all
their transponders all the time, and that even when they
do they almost never record and archive transponder or
carrier characteristics. Consequently forensic analysis
of past suspected attacks has been impossible.
Fortunately, it is now possible to analyze at least a
subset of the commercial satellite bandwidth used for
military communications, and to make an assessment of
the relative threat of hostile interference, or uplink

jamming. This is so because for a significant portion of

commercial bandwidth provided during the current Iraq
War, a contractual clause stipulated that these
communications be monitored and the RF parameters
recorded continuously. This dataset provides us with an
opportunity to investigate and determine whether
instances of jamming occurred. The evidence is only
circumstantial, in that it is not possible, in the absence
of information about the transmitter in these instances,
to definitely say that jamming was occurring. However,
we can certainly determine that communications were
impacted, and that the nature of interference conformed
to how an attacker would be expected to behave.
What follows is an analysis of all instances of
communications degradation that occurred during the
period July 2004 to October, 2005. This set of events is
categorized according to source, leaving a subset caused
by interference. This subset of interference events is
further classified according to origin. A subset of
unknown interference events, all of which severely
degraded communications, is then analyzed for their
similarity to what would be expected to be a traditional
attack profile.

3. Data Gathering
Leased commercial satellite transponders were
monitored as part of a contractual requirement in the
provision of commercial satellite services to the U.S.
military. This was done by a worldwide network of
teleports with receive antennas located in the downlink
footprint of the leased transponder. A spectrum
analyzer was connected to the Low Noise Block
Downconverter (LNB) or Low Noise Amplifier (LNA)
of each antenna. The signal was digitized, and each
carrier attributepower level, carrier to noise ratio,
occupied bandwidth, and center frequencywas
recorded. These values were compared to expected
values, and an alarm created at a central monitoring site
when measured values differed significantly. In
addition, alarms were also generated if an unexpected
carrier appeared. In most cases these alarms were due
to an authorized site transmitting without prior
coordination with the satellite provider, but in a subset
of these cases the source of the unauthorized carrier was
unknown. In these instances, detailed spectral plots of
the interference were taken and all efforts were made to
determine the source, and to restore communications.
A screen capture of a monitored carrier, with parameters
monitored, is shown in Figure 1.

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few tens of kHz to 27 Mbps. Modulation also varies,

with the vast majority being Single Channel per Carrier
(SCPC) with QPSK modulation, but some broadcast
carriers are included and the data also contains a few
multiple access networks using Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA). A very few carriers also used spread
spectrum modulation techniques.
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Figure 1: Monitored carrier with parameters

shown

Figure 2: Average Number of Carriers

Monitored per Month (7/04-10/05)

The scale of these monitoring operations is quite

large, involving (to date): 16 worldwide teleport sites,
some 46 separate monitor antennas, over 100 discrete
transponders, and over 500 individual carriers. The
volume of data collected is therefore huge, consisting of
over 7M discrete parameters recorded since monitoring
operations began in April 2003. This information is
stored in a database, along with records of each alarm
and actions taken to correct the alarm. It is this body of
data that is the source for this study. The study focuses
on a subset of this data collected from July, 2004 to
November, 2005, when detailed records of
troubleshooting efforts were retained.

Figure 3 shows the number of alarms created by the

monitoring system during this time period. In fact, the
number of actual alarms is much higher, this chart
represents the number of trouble tickets opened. To
reduce operator workload, trouble tickets are created
only when a carrier exceeded nominal parameters for a
set amount of queries (usually within a six minute
period). This chart shows that satellite communications
are subject to many types of problems, most of which
are transitory and correct themselves quickly.
3500
3000
2500

4. Results

2000

To understand the scope of the problem of

unauthorized communications interference, and
specifically potentially hostile attacks, it is useful to
categorize first all alarms, then the subset of these
alarms caused by unauthorized interference, and then
the subset of these events for which the source is
unknown and deemed potentially hostile.
Figure 2 shows the average number of carriers
monitored per month. It can be seen that the number of
carriers monitored increases each month, which itself is
further evidence of the increasing reliance of military
operations on commercial satellites. The vast majority
of these carriers provided communications in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom (>80%), but also included here
are communications supporting operation in other
theaters. These carriers were generally several Mbps in
bandwidth and constituted one-half of a full duplex
point to point communications link, but range from a

1500
1000
500
0
1

IEEE

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Figure 3: Alarms per month for monitored

carriers
Figure 4 shows the subset of the alarms indicated in
Figure 3 that were actual problems that were tracked
over a period of time to resolution, in the same time
period (7/04-10/05). It can be seen that the number of
problems tracked to resolution is much smalleron the
order of 50 times lessthan the number of alarms
generated by those carriers. The reason for this is that
many alarm conditions are transitory and correct
themselves before troubleshooting efforts are required.
It is possible that the alarms shown in figure 3 contain
some hostile interference events, but because the effects

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were so brief, further troubleshooting was not done. So

figure 4 provides the best picture of events that
terminate or degrade satellite communications long
enough to be a real problem.
70
60
50
40

15

13

11

30
20
10
0

Figure 4: Satellite communications problems

per Month
Not all of these events are unauthorized interference,
in fact, these events are a minority. This can be seen in
figure 5. Figure 5 is a breakdown of all problems
identified in figure 3 according to cause. Causes are
categorized as follows: End of Mission (EOM)*
(13.2%),
Hardware
Related
(HW)
(23.0%),
Maintenance (M) (15.7%)**, Power (P) (16.9%),
Weather (Wx) (14.5%), Interference (I) (9.8%) and
Unknown (U) (6.9%).
*End of Mission refers to the condition where a carrier
has gone off the air apparently for no cause, and it was
subsequently determined that the transmit station
intended to do so but did not notify the satellite provider
beforehand, and troubleshooting efforts were initiated.

In summary, only 9.8% of satellite communications

problems for the monitored carriers were due to
unauthorized interference. This represents a total of 50
separate cases over the monitoring period. In the
majority of these cases, it was possible to determine a
cause for the interference.
In the subset of 50 cases of interference where
communications is terminated or degraded, it was
possible to determine the cause for 29 cases. The
results of this classification are shown in Figure 6. In
12 cases the cause of the interference was a terminal
that was authorized to transmit to the satellite but had an
improper polarization setting and therefore was bleeding
energy into the opposite pole (Cross-polarization, or
Xpol.) Fortunately, it is easy to spot the offender since
a cross polarized terminal will have some (usually the
bulk) of its energy on the correct pole, so identification
of the interference source is not an issue. This is not the
case with the other sources of interference. In 3 of the
cases the source was adjacent satellite interference,
where carriers on the adjacent satellite bleed onto one
another. Terminal operators inadvertently transmitting
on the wrong frequency or pole caused 5 cases,
oftentimes because they did not receive the current
lineup (Lineup problems).
Some type of selfinterference caused 5 other cases, where a lineup or
equipment problem at the operators own terminal
generated RF energy that interfered with his receive
signal. 3 cases were caused by known events that are
not captured by the above classification.

ASI

**Maintenance refers only to those cases where a

station went off the air for maintenance without
notifying the satellite provider. Scheduled maintenance
with prior notification did not trigger an alarm.

Lineup
Ot her
Self
Unk
Xpol

eom
hw
int
main

Figure 6: Classification of interference events

according to origin

pwr
unk
wx

Figure 5: Classification of satellite

communication problems according to cause

This leaves 21 cases during the monitoring period

where the interference degraded or terminated military
communications and for which the cause was unknown.
A breakdown of these events according to geographic
region is shown in figure 7. Certain common attributes
of these cases makes one infer that it is possible that a
hostile operator intentionally caused the interference.
For starters, 15 of the 21 documented cases interfered

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with reception by a terminal in Southwest Asia.

Secondly, in almost half (9 of 21), the cause was
documented as a continuous wave (CW) carrier, i.e. an
unmodulated one. This is significant as in general there
is little reason to ever intentionally transmit a CW
carrier, in fact satellite operators frown on allowing its
use. The reason is that a narrowband CW carrier can
have a much higher carrier/noise ratio than a modulated
one, and thus can easily raise the noise floor of an
authorized carrier to the point that authorized
communications are terminated. In effect, it is the
perfect jammer. During normal operation the only time
a satellite operator will allow a CW carrier to be
transmitted is during initial lineup of the terminal.

Figures 9a through 9c show the temporal behavior of

another sweeping carrier.

Figure 8: Example of a sweeping interfering

carrier

16
14
12
10

Total Unk Inter f er ence

Sweepi ng Car r i er s

CW car r i er s

6
4
2
0
SWA

Eur ope

CONUS

PAC

Figure 7: Classification of unknown origin

interference events according to geographic
region and characteristics
Furthermore and most damningly, in 5 of the 21
cases, the unauthorized carrier varied its center
frequency within a set banda sweeper.
Significantly, every single one of these events occurred
to carriers where the receive terminal was in Southwest
Asia. The behavior of a sweeping CW carrier can be
seen in figure 8. This is an actual screen capture of a
sweeper in action. The lighter trace is the maximum
hold trace of the spectrum analyzer, showing a
historical record of the highest amplitude recorded by
the spectrum analyzer in that frequency. The darker
trace shows the current (real time) trace. A narrowband,
high C/N CW carrier can be seen at approximately 11.1
kHz, and the max hold trace shows that in the past, it
has swept out approximately the upper 15 Megahertz of
the transponder. Users attempting to receive a signal on
this part of the transponder would experience
intermittent outages when the sweeper transmitted on
the same frequency. This is indicative of potential
jammer behavior. For a given amount of power
available at the transmit antenna, it is more effective to
concentrate that power in a high C/N unmodulated
carrier than spread it across a wider spectrum.

Figure 9a: Example sequence of a narrowband

sweeping carrier t=0

Figure 9b: Example Sequence of Narrowband

Sweeper, t= +25 minutes

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5.1 Monitoring
An active monitoring program for military
communications over commercial satellites is virtually a
necessity. The logged data available for this study was
only available due to a specific contractual requirement
to monitor and archive leased bandwidth. Commercial
satellite operators do not archive their transponder data
and in many cases do not monitor it continuously at all.
Without a monitoring program, the root cause of many
of the problems highlighted in this study would have
been unknown.
Given the difficulties in maintaining satellite
communications highlighted in this study, even without
the prospect of hostile interference, it should be clear
that continuous space segment monitoring of
commercial satellite communications is a necessity.
Figure 9c: Example Sequence of a Narrowband
Sweeper, t=+57 minutes

5. 2 Operations Security

The ticketing system that recorded these events gives

a rough estimate of the duration of impact of these 21
unknown interference events. Duration of tickets ranges
from 0.1 hours to two extremely long tickets (2446 and
2043 hours). Throwing out these two instancesthe
tickets were probably kept open past the time the event
clearedreveals an average event duration of 85 hours.
In some cases, the sweeper or unauthorized carrier
would stop transmitting and then retransmit again. In
one case, a sweepers behavior was quite regular,
always starting at the same time each morning,
transmitting along a swept frequency for about an hour,
and then ceasing until the next day.
This behavior: Unmodulated, high C/N signal,
sweeping out a section of a transponder, and
intermittent operations, are all consistent with the
pattern that would be expected if an adversary were
attempting to disrupt communications. Combined with
the fact that the vast majority of these cases occurred to
communication supporting military operations in
Southwest Asia, it is reasonable to deduce that at least
some of them were due to hostile interference. This
supports the central thesis of this paper, that military
communications across commercial satellites are subject
to hostile interference that is relatively easy to execute
and difficult to troubleshoot. The next section will
address ways to defend against this type of attack.

The 500+ currently monitored carriers represent a

fraction of the total number of carriers on commercial
satellites. Even if the range of potential target carriers is
limited to those commercial satellites with the correct
longitude to support communications in a given theater,
the choice of potential satellites may be in the dozens
and the number of transponders up to the 100+ range.
The data from this study suggests that an adversary can
disrupt communications on only a portion of a
transponder at time. Given the range of potential
transponders to choose from, how does he/she know
which one to jam? This highlights the absolute
necessity of keeping the transmission plan that
documents communication parameters secure. By their
nature, it is impossible to keep some characteristics of
these carriers secretin fact the carriers themselves are
in the public domain, inasmuch as they are transmitted
in a common medium open to reception by anyone.
However, the communications that these carriers
support, and specifically the military units and locations
supported, must be kept secure. This necessitates a
decoupling or firewall between carrier characteristics
needed for the satellite operator and operational
information that would give an advantage to an
adversary.

5. Conclusions

It has been shown that the origin of the majority of

interference events
(approximately 60%) were
ultimately known, and attributed to inadvertent
jammersnon hostile players that, out of material
failure or operator error, accidentally interfered with
military communications. However, determining which

The following mitigations are recommended by this

study:

5.3 Demodulation

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interferers are benign and which are potentially hostile

is a time consuming process. The ability to determine
the modulation type and symbol rate of interfering
carriers would significantly aid this process. For
example, in some cases an operator becomes out of
sync with authorized communications plans and
transmits a
previously authorized carrier on an
unauthorized part of a transponder.
His carrier
characteristicsmodulation and encoding type, and
symbol rateare known. The ability to determine that
an interferer has, for example, an 8PSK modulation
type with a symbol rate of 1230 ksps, would greatly aid
the process of determining the source. TDMA carriers
can easily be mistaken for hostile interference, as on a
spectrum analyzer it appears that a narrowband carrier is
sweeping out a section of bandwidth. The ability to
demodulate this signal, at least to the point of
determining that it is a modulated carrier and not a CW
would allow a monitor to concentrate his/her efforts
on actual hostile interferers. Commercially available
monitoring equipment exists that can perform this type
of carrier characterization. Its use would greatly aid a
monitoring agent in sorting out unintentional
interference from potentially hostile actions.

[2] Satellite Industry Overview: Satellites are Critical Global

Infrastructure. 2005 GSA/FTS Network Services Conference,
15-18 August 2005. Chicago, IL
[3] Wilson, C., Network Centric Warfare: Background and
Oversight Issues for Congress,
(2004) Congressional Research Service, June 2
[4] Gansler, J, and Ninnendijk, H. Information Assurance;
trends in Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Technologies Working
Paper published on
http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/IaverMao03.pdf by the National
Defense University
[5] GAO-02-781:Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Commercial Satellite Security should be more fully
addressed.. GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on
Government Affairs, U.S. Senate August 2002
[6] Tanner, J. Behind Falun Gong's satellite hack, downloaded
from http://www.findarticles.com on 10/22/05
[7] The Story of Captain Midnight , downloaded from
http://www.signaltonoise.net/library/captmidn.htm
on
10/22/05
[8] Johnson, S. Cuban Jamming Demands A Firm Response
(2003) WebMemo #310
published July 22, 2003 at http://www.heritage.org

6. References
[1] Rayermann, P. Exploiting Commercial SATCOM: A better
way US Army War College 2003

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