Sanyo Phil Workers Union-PSSLU vs Canizares, GR 101619, Jul 8, 1992

Facts: PSSLU had an existing CBA with Sanyo Philippines Inc. (Sanyo, for short) effective July 1, 1989
to June 30, 1994. The same CBA contained a union security clause. PSSLU, through its national
president, informed the management of Sanyo that there are employees that were notified that their
membership with PSSLU were cancelled for anti-union, activities, economic sabotage, threats, coercion
and intimidation, disloyalty and for joining another union.
On February 14, 1990, Some employers executed a pledged of cooperation with PSSLU promising
cooperation with the latter union and among others, respecting, accepting and honoring the CBA
between Sanyo and specifically:
1. That we shall remain officers and members of KAMAO until we finally decide to rejoin
Sanyo Phil. Workers Union-PSSLU;
2. That henceforth, we support and cooperate with the duly elected union officers of
Sanyo Phil. Workers Union-PSSLU in any and all its activities and programs to insure
industrial peace and harmony;
3. That we collectively accept, honor, and respect the Collective Bargaining Agreement
entered into between Sanyo Phil. Inc. and Sanyo Phil. Workers Union-PSSLU dated
February 7, 1990;
4 That we collectively promise not to engage in any activities inside company premises
contrary to law, the CBA and existing policies;
5 That we are willing to pay our individual agency fee in accordance with the provision
of the Labor Code, as amended;
6 That we collectively promise not to violate this pledge of cooperation.
On March 4, 1991, PSSLU through its national and local presidents, wrote another letter to Sanyo
recommending the dismissal of some union workers because they were engaged and were still
engaging in anti-union activities; 2) they willfully violated the pledge of cooperation with PSSLU which
they signed and executed on February 14, 1990; and 3) they threatened and were still threatening with
bodily harm and even death the officers of the union.
Pursuant to a letter of the union that recommended their dismissal, the company sent a memorandum
to the same workers advising them that:
As per the attached letter from the local union President SPWU and the federation
President, PSSLU, requesting management to put the herein mentioned employees on
preventive suspension, effective immediately, preliminary to their subsequent
dismissal, please be informed that the following employees are under preventive
suspension effective March 13, 1991 to wit: Some employees.
On May 20, 1991, the dismissed employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal.
Named respondent were PSSLU and Sanyo.
On June 20, 1991, PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter was
without jurisdiction over the case, relying on Article 217 (c) of P.D. 442, as amended by Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6715 which provides that cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of

the collective bargaining agreements shall be disposed of by the labor arbiter by referring the same to
the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.
The complainants opposed the motion to dismiss complaint on these grounds: 1) the series of
conferences before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board had been terminated; 2) the NLRC
Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case which was a termination dispute pursuant to Article 217 (2)
of the Labor Code; and 3) there was nothing in the CBA which needs interpretation or implementation
(pp. 44-46, Rollo).
On August 7, 1991, the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the first questioned order. LA
stated that there are contradictory provisions in the afore cited Labor codehe better
interpretation will be to give effect to both, and termination dispute being clearly
spelled as falling under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, the same shall be
respected. The jurisdiction of the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration shall
cover other controversies.
Labor Arbiter suspended the case.
On August 27, 1991, PSSLU filed another motion to resolve motion to dismiss complaint with a prayer
that the Labor Arbiter resolve the issue of jurisdiction.
On September 4, 1991, the respondent Labor Arbiter issued the second questioned order which held
that it was assuming jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondents, in effect, holding that it
had jurisdiction over the case.
The private respondents also claimed that insofar as Salvo, Baybon, Ricohermoso, Solibel, Valencia,
Misterio and Lasala were concerned, they joined another union, KAMAO during the freedom period
which commenced on May 1, 1989 up to June 30, 1989 or before the effectivity of the July 1, 1989 CBA.
Hence, they are not covered by the provisions of the CBA between Sanyo and PSSLU. Private
respondents Tangkay, Atanacio and Dionisio admit that in September 1989, they resigned from KAMAO
and rejoined PSSLU
Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
Held: The court cited Article 217 of the Labor Code on jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission.
It is clear from the above article that termination cases fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It
should be noted however that said article at the outset excepted from the said provision cases
otherwise provided for in other provisions of the same Code, thus the phrase "Except as otherwise
provided under this Code . . . ." Under paragraph (c) of the same article, it is expressly provided that
"cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those
arising from the interpretation and enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by
the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may
be provided in said agreements.
It was provided in the CBA executed between PSSLU and Sanyo that a member's voluntary resignation
from membership, willful refusal to pay union dues and his/her forming, organizing, joining, supporting,
affiliating or aiding directly or indirectly another labor union shall be a cause for it to demand his/her
dismissal from the company. The demand for the dismissal and the actual dismissal by the company
on any of these grounds is an enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. This act is
authorized by law provided that enforcement should not be characterized by arbitrariness (Manila

Mandarin Employee Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76989, 29 Sept. 1987, 154 SCRA 368) and always with due
process (Tropical Hut Employees Union v. Tropical Food Market, Inc., L-43495-99, Jan. 20, 1990).
he failure of the parties to the CBA to establish the grievance machinery and its unavailability is not an
excuse for the Labor Arbiter to assume jurisdiction over disputes arising from the implementation and
enforcement of a provision in the CBA. In the existing CBA between PSSLU and Sanyo, the procedure
and mechanics of its establishment had been clearly laid out as follows:
ARTICLE XV GRIEVANCE MACHINERY
the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding
the dismissal of private respondents. No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a
grievance machinery. The problem or dispute in the present case is between the union and the
company on the one hand and some union and non-union members who were dismissed, on the other
hand. The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance machinery with members
designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed
employees. Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an
impartial body. Since there has already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

Tunay na Pagkakaisa VS. Asia Brewery

Facts: Asia Brewery entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with BLMA, the exclusive
bargaining representative of Asia Brewery rank-and-file employees. Those employees explicitly
excluded in the CBA are, among others, confidential and executive secretaries and purchasing and
quality control staff.
A dispute arose when Asia Brewery management stopped deducting union dues from 81 employees,
believing that their membership in the union violated the CBA. These employees were Sampling
Inspectors, Machine Gauge Technician, both part of the Quality Control Staff, checkers assigned to
different departments, and secretaries and clerks directly under the respective division managers.
During the pendency of the case, Tunay na Pagkakaisa won in a certification election.
Issue: Whether or not the 81 employees may be validly excluded from the bargaining unit.
Held: No. Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity,
(2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor
relations. The two (2) criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered
a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his
supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor
relations.The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of their duties,
become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be
accomplished by the "confidential employee rule."
There is no showing in this case that the secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted or acted in a
confidential capacity to managerial employees and obtained confidential information relating to labor
relations policies.And even assuming that they had exposure to internal business operations of the
company, respondent claimed, this is not per se ground for their exclusion in the bargaining unit of the
daily-paid rank-and-file employees.

Silva, et all v NLRC and Philtread

Facts: Sometime in 1985, petitioners, then rank-and-file employees and members of Philtread
Workers Union (PWU), volunteered for, and availed of, the retrenchment program instituted by
Philtread with the understanding that they would have priority in re-employment in the event that the
company recovers from its financial crisis, in accordance with Section 4, Article III of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement concluded on July 5, 1983.[2]
In November 1986, Philtread, apparently having recovered from its financial reverses, expanded
its operations and hired new personnel. Upon discovery of this development, petitioners filed their
respective applications for employment with Philtread, which however, merely agreed to consider them
for future vacancies. Subsequent demands for re-employment made by petitioners were ignored. Even
the request of the incumbent union for Philtread to stop hiring new personnel until petitioners were
first hired failed to elicit any favorable response.
In November 1986, Philtread, apparently having recovered from its financial reverses, expanded
its operations and hired new personnel. Upon discovery of this development, petitioners filed their
respective applications for employment with Philtread, which however, merely agreed to consider them
for future vacancies. Subsequent demands for re-employment made by petitioners were ignored. Even
the request of the incumbent union for Philtread to stop hiring new personnel until petitioners were
first hired failed to elicit any favorable response.
Thus, on December 5, 1988, petitioners lodged a complaint [3] with the National Capital Region
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for unfair labor practice (ULP), damages and attorneys fees against
Philtread.
Both parties submitted their respective position papers. On its part, Philtread moved for the
dismissal of the complaint based on two grounds, namely: (1) that the NLRC lacked jurisdiction, there
being no employer-employee relationship between it and petitioners and that the basic issue involved

was the interpretation of a contract, the CBA, which was cognizable by the regular courts; and (2) that
petitioners had no locus standi, not being privy to the CBA executed between the union and Philtread.
Petitioners, however, challenging Philtreads motion to dismiss, stressed that the complaint was
one for unfair labor practice precipitated by the unjust and unreasonable refusal of Philtread to reemploy them, as mandated by the provisions of Section 4, Article III of the 1986 and 1983 CBAs. Being
one for unfair labor practice, petitioners concluded that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case,
pursuant to Article 217 (a) (1) of the Labor Code.
Being of the impression that the April 15, 1992 resolution of the NLRC had been properly served at
the address of the law firm of Atty. Gutierrez and that no seasonable motion for reconsideration was
ever filed by Philtread, petitioners moved for its execution.
On November 18, 1992, the NLRC, acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Atty.
Gutierrez, promulgated one of its challenged resolutions dismissing the complaint of petitioners. It
ruled that while petitioners had standing to sue, the complaint should have been filed with the
voluntary arbitrator, pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code, since the primary issue was the
implementation and interpretation of the CBA.
Issue: The implementation and interpretation of the CBA
Held: The petition is impressed with merit.
Time and again, this Court has been emphatic in ruling that the seasonable filing of a motion for
reconsideration within the 10-day reglementary period following the receipt by a party of any order,
resolution or decision of the NLRC, is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such order,
resolution or decision.[5] The statutory bases for this is found in Article 223 of the Labor Code [6] and
Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission. [7]
In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that Philtreads counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of
the April 15, 1992 resolution only on June 5, 1992, [8] or 31 days after receipt of said resolution. [9] It was
thus incumbent upon the NLRC to have dismissed outright Philtreads late motion for
reconsideration. By doing exactly the opposite, its actuation was not only whimsical and capricious but
also a demonstration of its utter disregard for its very own rules. Certiorari, therefore, lies.
To be sure, it is settled doctrine that the NLRC, as an administrative and quasi-judicial body, is not
bound by the rigid application of technical rules of procedure in the conduct of its proceedings.
[10]
However, the filing of a motion for reconsideration and filing it ON TIME are not mere technicalities
of procedure. These are jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied
with. Although there are exceptions to said rule, the case at bar presents no peculiar circumstances
warranting a departure therefrom.
The Court is aware of Philtreads obvious attempt to skirt the requirement for seasonable filing of a
motion for reconsideration by persuading us that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no
jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. Jurisdiction, Philtread claims, lies instead with the
voluntary arbitrator so that when the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC took cognizance of the case, their
decisions thereon were null and void and, therefore, incapable of attaining finality. In short, Philtread
maintains that the ten-day reglementary period could not have started running and, therefore, its
motion could not be considered late.
The argument is not tenable. While we agree with the dictum that a void judgment cannot attain
finality, said rule, however, is only relevant if the tribunal or body which takes cognizance of a

particular subject matter indeed lacks jurisdiction over the same. In this case, the rule adverted to is
misapplied for it is actually the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which possess jurisdiction over petitioners
complaint and NOT the voluntary arbitrator, as erroneously contended by Philtread.
Finally, the contention that it was Atty. Gutierrez who exclusively represented Philtread and that the
law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo had been dissolved, are lame excuses to cast doubt on the
propriety of service to Atty. Borreta. It must be noted that the complaint of petitioners was filed on
December 5, 1988. Presumably, the preliminary conferences adverted to by Atty. Borreta, where Atty.
Gutierrez supposedly declared that he was exclusively representing Philtread, transpired at around that
date. The Court, however, is surprised to discover that the record bears a Notice of Change of Address
dated March 12, 1990, filed by Atty. Gutierrez, indicating therein that the counsel for respondent
(Philtread) was Borreta, Gutierrez and Leogardo whose address could be found at the 3rd Floor,
Commodore Condominium Arquiza corner M. Guerrero Streets, Ermita, Manila. If, indeed, Atty.
Gutierrez declared during the Labor Arbiters proceedings that he was exclusively representing
Philtread, why then did he use the firms name, and its new address at that, in the aforementioned
notice to the NLRC? Moreover, why did Atty. Borreta take fifteen days to file his Manifestation and
inform the NLRC of the improper service of the resolution to him? Why did he not object immediately to
the service by the bailiff? Considering that Atty. Gutierrez and Atty. Borreta were once partners in their
law firm, it behooves Atty. Borreta to have at least advised his former partner of the receipt of the
resolution. As a lawyer, his receipt of the adverse resolution should have alerted him of the adverse
consequences which might follow if the same were not acted upon promptly, as what in fact happened
here. As for Atty. Gutierrez, if the law firm of Borreta, Gutierrez, and Leogardo were really dissolved, it
was incumbent upon him not to have used the firms name in the first place, or he should have
withdrawn the appearance of the firm and entered his own appearance, in case the dissolution took
place midstream. By failing to exercise either option, Atty. Gutierrez cannot now blame the NLRC for
serving its resolution at the address of the firm still on record. [18] To our mind, these excuses cannot
camouflage the clever ploy of Philtreads counsel to earn a last chance to move for
reconsideration. This Court, it bears emphasizing, is not impressed, but looks incredulously at such
superficial moves.

Employees Union of Bayer v. Bayer Philippines

FACTS: Petitioner Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (EUBP) is the exclusive bargaining agent of all
rank-and-file employees of Bayer Philippines. During the negotiations, EUBP rejected Bayers proposal
resulting in a bargaining deadlock. Subsequently, EUBP staged a strike, prompting the Secretary of the
DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. Pending the resolution of the dispute, respondent
Avelina Remigio and 27 other union members, without any authority from their union leaders,
accepted Bayers wage-increase proposal. The DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral award ordering EUBP
and Bayer to execute a CBA.
Meanwhile, the rift between Facundos leadership and Remigios group broadened.Six months from the
signing of the new CBA, Remigio solicited signatures from union members in support of a resolution
containing the decision of the signatories to: (1) disaffiliate from FFW, (2) rename the union as
Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP), (3) adopt a new constitution and by-laws for
the union, (4) abolish all existing officer positions in the union and elect a new set of interim officers,
and (5) authorize REUBP to administer the CBA between EUBP and Bayer. The said resolution was
signed by 147 of the 257 local union members. Both groups sought recognition from Bayer and
demanded remittance of the union dues collected from its rank-and-file members. Bayer responded by
deciding not to deal with either of the two groups, and by placing the union dues collected in a trust
account until the conflict between the two groups is resolved. EUBP filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice (first ULP complaint) against Bayer for non-remittance of union dues.While the ULP case was
still pending and despite EUBPs repeated request for a grievance conference, Bayer decided to turn
over the collected union dues to REUBP.
Aggrieved by the said development, EUBP lodged a complaint against Remigios group before the
Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE praying for their expulsion from EUBP for commission of "acts
that threaten the life of the union."Labor Arbiter dismissed thefirstULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed asecondULP complaint against herein respondents. Petitioners complained that Bayer
refused to remit the collected union dues to EUBP despite several demands sent to the management
and that the latter opted to negotiate instead with Remigios group.
REUBP and Bayer agreed to sign a new CBA. In response, petitioners immediately filed an urgent
motion for the issuance of a restraining order/injunction before the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter against
respondents. Labor Arbiter dismissed EUBPs second ULP complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved by
the Labor Arbiters decision to dismiss the second ULP complaint, petitioners appealed the said
decision, but the NLRC denied the appeal. The CA sustained both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRCs
rulings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the management of Bayer in dealing and negotiating with Remigios
splinter group despite its validly existing CBA with EUBP can be considered unfair labor practice.
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
LABOR LAW; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
It must be remembered that a CBA is entered into in order to foster stability and mutual cooperation
between labor and capital. An employer should not be allowed to rescind unilaterally its CBA with the
duly certified bargaining agent it had previously contracted with, and decide to bargain anew with a
different group if there is no legitimate reason for doing so and without first following the proper
procedure. If such behavior would be tolerated, bargaining and negotiations between the employer
and the union will never be truthful and meaningful, and no CBA forged after arduous negotiations will
ever be honored or be relied upon.
This is the reason why it is axiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor
organization that has been duly certified as the exclusive bargaining representative and the employer
becomes the law between them. Additionally, in the Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE, it is
specified that the registered CBA serves as the covenant between the parties and has the force and
effect of law between them during the period of its duration. Compliance with the terms and conditions
of the CBA is mandated by express policy of the law primarily to afford protection to labor and to

promote industrial peace. Thus, when a valid and binding CBA had been entered into by the workers
and the employer, the latter is behooved to observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union
dues and representation. If the employer grossly violates its CBA with the duly recognized union, the
former may be held administratively and criminally liable for unfair labor practice.
However, as to respondents Remigio and Villareal, the court finds that petitioners complaint was
validly dismissed. The ULP complaint cannot prosper as against them because the issue, essentially
involves an intra-union dispute.
Apalisok v Radio Phil Network
Facts: Marilou Gaunzon Apalisok the petitioner, received a Memorandum from branches operations
manager Gilito Datoc asking her to submit a written explanation why no disciplinary action should be
taken against her for performance of acts hostile to RPN, and arrogant, disrespectful and defiant
behavior towards her superior station manager George Suazo.
16 days later, petitioner received an other memo from the administrative manager of RPN, informing
her of the termination of her services effective the close of regular office hours of June 15, 1995.
On one 5, 12995, petitioner informed RPN, by letter, of her decision to waiver her right to resolve her
case through the grievance machinery of RPN as provided for in the CBA and to lodge her case before
the proper government forum. She then filed a complaint against RPN DYKC and Suazo for illegal
dismissal before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration branch of Region 7 which referred it to the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board.
Petitioner and respondents agreed to submit for voluntary arbitration the issue of whether petitioners
dismissal was valid and to abide by the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. Then the VA awarded in
favor of the petitioner.
The Coaurt of Appeals stated that the option of petition not to subject the dispute to the grievance
machinery provided for the in the CBA was tantamount to relinquishing her right to avail of the aid of a
voluntary arbitrator in settli8ng the dispute which likewise converted an unresolved grievance into a
resolved one, it further held that the voluntary arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over petitioners
complaint and accordingly nullified and set aside the voluntary arbitration award.
Issues: Whether or not the Voluntary Arbitrator had jurisdiction over petitioners Complaint.
Held: Yes. Art. 262 of the Labor code of the Philippines stats that Jurisdiction over other labor disputes.
The Voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall hear
and decide all other labor disputes, including ULP and bargaining deadlocks.
The above-quoted Article of the labor code provides that upon agreement of the parties, the voluntary
arbitrator can hear and decide all other labor disputes.

Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Knitting v. CA

Facts: In 2001, the rank-and-file employees at the Clothman Knitting Corp. formed the petitioner
union, which was registered with the DOLE. A petition for certification election was later filed by the
petitioner union with the BLR.
Pending the resolution of the petition for certification election, the CKC issued a Memorandum,
informing the employees of the change in the schedule brought about by the decrease in the orders
from the customers.
Subsequently, another Memorandum was issued by the respondent informing its employees at the
Dyeing and Finishing Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations therein would be effected
for one week. The employees were advised to go on vacation leave.
Unable to solve its financial problems, the respondent decided to temporarily shutdown its operations
at the Dyeing and Finishing Division effective the next day, scheduled to resume until further notice. It
notified the DOLE of the said shutdown. The operations of the other divisions of the CKC remained
normal.
On June 11, 2001, while the respondents service truck was to deliver fabrics in Bulacan, the group of
petitioners approached the truck and blocked its way. Later that day, petitioners with 16 members of
the petitioner union, staged a picket in front of the respondents compound, carrying placards with
slogans.
Issue: Whether or not the strike was valid.
Held: SC held that it was not valid.
It is apparent that the concerted effort of the members of the petitioner union and its supporters
caused a temporary work stoppage. It is worthy to note that the whole company did not cease to
operate and that it was only the workers in the Dyeing and Finishing Division who were affected by the
temporary lay-off. Thus, when the respondents conducted a picket in front of the companys premises,
the whole business operations of the respondent was affected.
As can be clearly inferred from the spot reports, employees from the knitting department also joined in
picket. The blockade of the delivery of trucks and the attendance of employees from the other
departments of the respondent meant work stoppage. The placards that the picketers caused to be
displayed arose from matters concerning terms or conditions of employment as well as the association
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment.
Clearly, the petitioner union, its officers, members and supporters staged a strike. It bears stressing
that the requirements for a valid strike are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith makes the
strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to
reasonably regulate the right to strike.
Since the strike was illegal, the officers of the union who participated therein are deemed to have lost
their employment status.

In order for a strike to be valid, the following requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article
263 of the Labor Code must be complied with: (a) a notice of strike must be filed; (b) a strike-vote must
be taken; and (c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported to the DOLE.

Capitol Medical Center v. NLRC

Facts: UNION filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB, serving a copy to CAPITOL. UNION alleged as
grounds for the projected strike the following acts of the CAPITOL: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion
on employees; and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization.
A series of conferences was conducted before the NCMB, but no agreement was reached.
CAPITAL filed a Letter with the NCMB requesting that the notice of strike be dismissed, the Union had
apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting
where the strike vote was conducted.
UNION submitted to the NCMB the minutesof the alleged strike vote purportedly held at the parking lot
in front of the CAPITOLs premises, at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay Avenue, Quezon
City.
Issue: Was the strike legal?
Held: NO. UNION failed to comply with the second paragraph of Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus
Rules of the NLRC.
A UNION intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of
strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the
date, place and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB
would be unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides toexercise its power of
supervision. In National Federation of Labor v. NLRC, the Court enumerated the notices required by
Article 263 of the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to
the NCMB:
1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the
Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;
2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution of the
strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair labor
practice. However, in the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened, the
cooling-off period need not be observed.
3) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a
24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of
majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
4) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.
In this case, UNION failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the NCMB before it
conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a result, CAPITOL complained

that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that the strike staged by the respondent union
was illegal

Interphil Laboratories Employees Union FFW v. Interphil Laboratories

Facts:
Interphil Laboratories Employees Union-FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and
file employees of Interphil Laboratories, Inc., a company engaged in the business of manufacturing and
packaging pharmaceutical products.
They had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from August 1, 1990 to July 31, 1993.
Prior to the expiration of the CBA, Allesandro Salazar, the vice-president of the HR Department and
Nestor Ocampo, the union president and Hernando Clemente, a union director had a meeting. The
representatives of the union were asking to make the new CBA effective for 2 yeas. Salazar informed
them that it was still premature to discuss the new CBA.
The following day, all the rank-and-file employees refused to follow their regular twoshift work
schedule 6:00am to 6:00pm and from 6:00pm to 6:00am.
At 2:00 pm and 2:00 am respectively, the employees stopped working without sealing the containers
and securing the raw materials they were working on.
Enrico Gonzales, a union director, told Salazar that the employees would only return to their normal
work schedule if the company would agree to their demands as to the effectivity and duration of the
new CBA.
In addition, the employees started to engage in a work slowdown campaign during the time they were
working thus substantially delaying the production of the company.
Respondent company filed with the NLRC to declare illegal the petitioner unions overtime boycott and
work slowdown which amounted to illegal strike.
The respondent company filed with the NCMB an urgent request for mediation. However the parties
failed to arrive at an agreement.
Petitioner union then filed with NCMB a notice of strike citing unfair labor practice allegedly committed
by respondent company.

\In the interim, the case before NLRC continued. The labor arbiter then found that the overtime boycott
and the work slowdown as illegal strike. Petitioner union contended that according to the provisions of
their CBA on working hours clearly state that the normal working hours were from 7:30 am to 4:30pm.
The labor arbiter should not have admitted other evidence than that stated in the CBA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the working hours of the petitioner is only from 7:30 am to 4:30 pm.
HELD NO. The parties in the CBA stipulated that: the schedule of shift work shall be maintained;
however the company may change the prevailing work time at its discretion, should change be
necessary in the operations of the Company. All employees shall observe such rules as have been laid
down by the company for the purpose of effecting control over working hours. It is evident from the
foregoing provisions that the working hours may be changed, at the discretion of the company, should
such change be necessary for its operations and that the employees shall observe such rules as have
been laid down by the company. The company had to adopt a continuous 24-hour work daily schedule
by reason of the nature of its business and the demands of its clients. It was established that the
employees adhered to the said work schedule since 1988. The employees are deemed to have waived
the eight hour schedule since they followed, without any question or complain, the two shift schedule
while their CBA was still in force and even prior thereto. As the employees assented by practice to this
arrangement, they cannot now be heard to claim that the overtime boycott is justified because they
were not obliged to work beyond eight hours.