The District Autonomy Pilot Program:

A new approach to decentralization in Indonesia

Christoph Beier and Gabriele Ferrazzi 1
( In Nord-Sd Aktuell 1997)
1.

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is considered as one of the most centralized countries in the

world, as evidenced by revenue assignments; in 1992/93 2 79.4% of the total
receipts of the government (including transfers from the center) were under the
discretion of the center, 9.9 % belonged to the first regional level, 9.0 % to the
second regional level and only 1.7 % to the villages. 3 Indonesian intergovernmental
financial relations are characterized by a heavy reliance on central grants.
The central level, and to some extent the first regional level, hold the most
important government functions, with the second regional level being largely limited
to implementation tasks, and even these are often largely prescribed by higher
levels. The development planning system conforms to the centralist bias. Although
conceptualized as the integration of bottom-up and top-down planning flows,
regional development planning serves central information needs and development
targets. Local potentials and circumstances have not been sufficiently considered in
the planning and implementation of development projects. Bottom up planning and
widespread participation continues to face many constraints (Ferrazzi et. al, 1993).
A centralist sectoral orientation has dominated the allocation of the
development budget, making comprehensive and integrating regional approaches
to development extremely difficult. The first regional level receives 55 % of its
budget in central grants, while the figure for the second level is 71 %. Most of the
villages only receive the INPRES Desa grants amounting to Rp. 6.5 million/year per
village4. Beginning in 1994 and ending in FY 1996/7 for most cases, villages
considered left behind receive poverty alleviation funds amounting to 20 million
Rp./year (IDT, INPRES Desa Tertinggal), paid to village groups.
The centralist orientation of the Indonesian government has deep historical
roots, harking back to early patrimonial Javanese kingdoms (see Anderson, 1972).
Nonetheless, early in the post-independence period, Indonesia showed some
experimentation with forms of government that were more democratic, plural and
decentralized. Despite (or because of) the centripetal tendencies of the late
Sukarno period and much of the New Order period, the regions have clung to their
desire for autonomy. The regions calls for greater autonomy have, for much of the
New Order period, gone unheeded due to central level perceptions of what was
needed for nation-building.
1

Dr. Christoph Beier backstopped the Support for Decentralization (SfDM) project in the Ministry of
Home Affairs during 1991-94 from the University of Bochum where he is a lecturer in the Department
of Economic and Social Geography. He has been acting as long term advisor (based in Jakarta, and
on leave from the University) since 1995.
Gabriele Ferrazzi has lectured in management and worked in management training, economic and
business development and rural development initiatives in Canada. In Indonesia he has worked as
institutional development advisor to regional planning boards and as the training and bottom-up
planning coordinator for the Sulawesi Regional Development Project. Since 1993, as an independent
consultant , he has taken part in the efforts of the GTZ to initiate a postgraduate level district planning
program at the Bandung Institute of Technology and GTZs efforts to support the decentralization
process in general through the SfDM.
2

This is the last year for which complete data on the budgets of all government levels are available.
Because in this section only average numbers are provided, one should be aware of vast
discrepancies between the budget numbers of government entities at the same government level.
4
The exchange rate as of April 1997 is about 1,430 Rupiah to the German Mark.
3

With the entrenchment of the New Order, and the task of nation building
showing at least partial success, the government has been giving more attention to
the issue of decentralization, under pressure from internal and external dynamics in
the social, political and economic spheres. However, unlike other east and
southeast asian countries facing similar pressures (e.g. Korea, Philippines, and
Nepal) Indonesia has yet to implement a major country wide decentralization
program. In this article we briefly review the Indonesian governments recent
preparation for implementing significant decentralization on this scale, i.e. the
District Autonomy Pilot Program (DAPP). In conveying the issues and tentative
findings we rely in large part on our close involvement in the Ministry of Home
Affairs Support for Decentralization Measures project, through the German
technical partner supporting the project 5. Additionally, information, reports and views
from Indonesian sources and other observers have been used to derive a more
complete picture.
We first outline the policy and legislative framework for decentralization in
the New Order, and we then describe the DAPP within that context. A preliminary
assessment of the DAPP to this point is then offered, and we end with a more
general assessment for the prospects for decentralization in Indonesia.
2.

POLICY/LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR DECENTRALIZATION

Decentralization policy in the New Order regime is enshrined in law No. 5 of

1974 (L. 5/74) which sets the basic structure of the government and its
administration in the region. The status of the villages is regulated in a separate law,
No. 5 of 1979, although the nature of the original autonomy (otonomi asli)
recognized as inherent in the villages is not clear. In practice, throughout most of
the New Order period, the trend has been toward increasing control from higher
levels and uniformity in village governance structures.
According to L.5/74, there are two autonomous levels of government below
the central government, the regional level I (provinces) and regional level II (districts
and cities). The focus of local autonomy is set at the level II. However, very little
progress has been made in the intervening years to realize the intent of this law,
particularly with respect to the emphasis for autonomy on the second level . The
central government, and to some extent the first level regions, continue to be rich in
functions and revenues, and the second level struggles with limited functions and a
very constrained revenue base.
The Government Regulation No. 45/1992 (G.R. 45/92) was the first attempt
to operationalize the decentralization process as intented in L.5/74. In this
regulation, general criteria were set to decide which kind of functions should be
transferred, and time limits were set within which level I governments had to devolve
certain functions. However, this regulation failed to visibly spur decentralization
efforts. In part this was due to the need for additional legal instruments to make
even this regulation more operational. For example, in G.R. 45/92 it was stipulated
that the transfer of functions to the second level governments has to be conducted
in accordance with the respective capacity and the situation in the regions. The
Ministry of Home Affairs was made responsible to implement a study to assess the
capacity of the regions as a basis for decentralization. This was in fact a reflection
of the basic decentralization concept or principle found in L. 5/74, otonomi daerah
yang nyata dan bertanggung jawab, which means a real and responsible
5

The authors have been involved in the decentralization arena in Indonesia for several years, primarily
under the auspices of the Support for Decentralization Measures (SfDM) project, a Ministry of Home
Affairs (MoHA) initiative supported by the German Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ). While we deeply appreciate the opportunity provided by the project, and GTZs support for
our dissemination activities, we are fully responsible for the views put forward in this paper.
2

regional autonomy. This concept stands in contrast to the pre-1974 decentralization

policy of otonomi daerah seluas-luasnya, which called for regional autonomy as
broad as possible.
The Ministry of Home Affairs produced a ranking of the second level regions
in terms of their readiness to accept more regional autonomy, but this framework
had many conceptual weaknesses and in the end could not be used to guide
specific decisions relating to the transfer of functions on a sectoral basis. By 1994,
the President himself was said to be losing patience with the buraucracys slow
progress in finalizing a decentralization framework. The President asked the
Minister of State for Administrative Reform (MENPAN) to take the lead and, in
concert with the Ministry of Home Affairs, to generate a breakthrough in the
decentralization to the second level.
3.

THE DISTRICT AUTONOMY PILOT PROGRAM DAPP

In April of 1995 Indonesia initiated a two year district autonomy pilot project
(Proyek Percontohan Otonomi Daerah; DAPP in its English acronym). Involving 26
districts initially, the stated aim of the government is to increase autonomy
throughout the nation based on the results of this preliminary phase (MENPAN,
1994). Even before this date, starting in late 1994, the Minister of State for
Administrative Reform, in conjunction with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA),
negotiated the conversion of the vast majority of deconcentrated units of the central
and provincial governments in the 26 districts to units responsible directly to the
district head. By the time of the formal announcement, made on April 25 (and
commemorated as Autonomy Day henceforth) a set of responsibilities were
formally devolved in a crash program of government and regional regulations.
Resources to discharge these responsibilities and personnel reassignments to the
regions were to complement this measure.
Most Ministries and provincial Governors were supportive and cooperative,
but some had deep reservations. Some government departments or agencies were
able to stay out of the initiative, arguing that they needed to maintain their presence
in the district. Others sought to reduce the scope of the transfer of functions that
were formerly undertaken in the departmental arms at the district level. Intense
discussions were required to reach MENPAN-Ministry understandings in these latter
cases (Jakarta Post, 1995; Kompas, 1995), and compromises were made.
DAPP was clearly explained as the first step in strengthening the autonomy
of all second level regions (districts and urban centers). The first two year pilot was
to be a learning exercise to determine the best way to shape district autonomy and
how to implement it properly. The monitoring and evaluation system was to play an
important role in this process. MENPAN and MoHA were jointly made responsible
for the monitoring and evaluation and were to report on the findings to the
President.
4.

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE DAPP

In assessing the DAPP it is important to be clear about the criteria used to

gauge success. Complicating the task for the DAPP is the fact that numerous goals
have been advanced by Indonesian officials, including improved local services,
increased public participation, more efficient government apparatus, increased local
revenues and economic growth. Evaluating DAPP against these general goals is a
formidable challenge, and one which will be difficult to meet with the government of
Indonesias monitoring and evaluation systems as it stands (for a more thorough

review of the development of this system see Ferrazzi and Beier, 1997,
forthcoming).
However valid some of the goals may be in theoretical terms, the
assessment of the DAPP against them is methodogically difficult but also to some
extent inappropriate in view of the actual scope of the initiative. It may be better to
employ a more modest framework for assessing the DAPP for the time being. Key
questions that may be answerable at this stage are as follows;
1. Does the DAPP represent a significant step in decentralization?
2. To what extent has the process of designing and implementing DAPP been
consistent with the goals of decentralization?
3. To what extent has regional autonomy been enhanced through DAPP?
4. How likely are the changes made in the framework of DAPP to be supportive of
the general goals attributed to it?
These questions will be addressed in turn in the following sections.
4.1

Significance of DAPP

In view of the glacial pace of decentralization (including occasional reversals)

since L. 5/74, it must be stated that DAPP is an important first step in promoting
decentralization and in creating some political momentum for all concerned parties
to become more active operationally. The blockage of the decentralization process
that the originators of G.R. 45/92 could not break through (or ended up
compounding) was bypassed through a crash program approach. Although the
program is marred by several weaknesses, it was successful in revitalizing the
decentralization discussion and it will certainly lead to some clarification of
conceptual and on the ground constraints to meaningful decentralization in
Indonesia.
In the field, the scope of DAPP is quite visible. Indeed, it quickly becomes
evident that the program reflects the lead conceptor organizational view (i.e. that of
the Ministry of State for Administrative Reform, MENPAN). Where districts
previously may have had less than ten sectoral departments of their own (Dinas),
most can now boast of more than 20. For the population at large, to the extent that
they are aware of a government presence, the large signs outside the transferred
offices provide proof of change. This visible feature unfortunately also obscures the
actual degree of change. Nevertheless, the visible change does have an effect at
least on the local administration, both in terms of the number of new employees
added to local rolls, and to regional officials sense that progress is finally being
made on the question of regional autonomy.
Although some departments and agencies escaped the first round of DAPP,
it is worth emphasising that nearly all sectoral departments have released certain
functions and some resources to the new district departments/agencies.
Discerning the longer term significance of the DAPP is more problematic.
DAPP was framed as special kind of pilot program. The choice of words was
deliberately made, in the Indonesian text the initiative is explained as a
percontohan, meaning example. The implication of the use of this term is that
there will be a follow up to the pilot stage. Indeed, there are already plans afoot to
expand the pilot to a combined 68 districts and, for the first time, cities. However,
the example approach does not carry the same sense of exploration as might be
implied in the term uji coba, that is experiment, which underpins most Englishs
speakers understanding of a pilot program. This shade of difference is in the end
quite important in more ways than one.
4

For our purposes, the dominant Indonesian understanding of the pilot

program is reflected in the less than rigorous monitoring and evaluation system put
in place for DAPP. Focused mainly on the question in how far the transfers fixed in
the legal products of DAPP have been realized, the DAPP approach itself is not
made an object of a broader reflection about the best way to manage the
decentralization process in a more sustainable and effective way in future. Hence
the opportunities to learn from the pilot program have to some extent been limited
by the framing of the pilot program concept. Despite this general shortcoming, in
the following sections we put forward our initial and tentative assessment regarding
the process of the design of DAPP and the actual degree of autonomy afforded.
4.2

Process of Design and Implementation of DAPP

The political urgency for a breakthrough in decentralization emerged rather

suddenly in 1994. Speculations abound regarding the timing of this initiative. The
initiative does appear to coincide with considerable ferment in the regions over
government appointments (particularly at the first regional level) and increasing
impatience reflected in the mass media over the distribution of the fruits of
development. Officials will only concede that the President took a personal interest
in the issue of decentralization to the second regional level. Regardless, the design
of the initiative was a shrouded affair, with low key negotiations conducted
unilaterally by the joint MENPAN/MoHA team with the sectoral departements and the
first level regions.
The resistance met in some sectors may not only be based on the general
unwillingness of central level agencies to share power and funds; it reflects also the
crash nature of the program. It can be argued that these agencies had 20 years to
put their house in order after L. 5/74, but even so, the speed of negotiations did not
favour thoughful analisis and wide particiaption within the sector and with other
stakeholders. The most powerful or less committed sectoral departments and
agencies thus withdrew their participation, or limited their involvement to what
seems to be rather token transfers of functions (see next section). The first level
regions, unclear about the final form of autonomy to be retained at the provincial
level, also generally felt uneasy about the DAPP. Here, the direct control of the
Ministry of Home Affairs meant that these regions in the end had to accept the
initiative, and indeed many of the most significant transfers of functions in DAPP
were made from this level.
This top down and precipitous approach to decentralization resulted not only
in some unsatisfied givers but also in some unsatisfied recipients. As will be
discussed in a later section, the list of functions selected in the DAPP would be
quite different from that drawn up by the districts, based on their own assessment of
what was needed and their capabilities. The top down approach extended even to
the setting of the organizational structures for Dinas, supposedly autonomous
district agencies. Much disappointment in districts was generated by this detailed
imposition by the centre; some districts would not have established some Dinas,
prefering to combine certain functions under one roof or integrating them in other
existing Dinas. Given that routine budgets to support the Dinas come mainly from
the districts, this is no small objection.
Of even greater importance than the specific complaints with organizational
structures or functions received is the lost opportunity for widespread and
fundamental discussion including the question of proper institution building for
decentralization at central and local level that could have been engendered by
DAPP. Such a discussion was never realized as a result of the pace of negotiation
(and top down decision making). The focus of the discussion came to rest on the
features of the DAPP itself. Even so, the degree of autonomy actually provided in
5

DAPP remains to be fully assessed and is only now being discussed more widely.
Our initial thoughts are offered below.
4.3

Degree of Enhanced Regional Autonomy

Beginning with the transfer of functions, the assessment of the degree of

autonomy provided through DAPP reveals a mixed picture. Although a large degree
of uniformity is found in the design of DAPP (sectoral transfers were uniform
nationally), due to the varying importance of sectors in the districts, and the
occasional variation found in the transfers made by the first regional level, the
impact is bound to differ among affected districts.
By and large it appears that the most important functions transferred have
come from the first regional level, perhaps reflecting the clout of the MENPAN/MoHA
team in negotiating with this level (see Table 1 for a list of sectors and origin of
functions involved in DAPP; those from the first regional level are drawn from the
province of Bali, other provinces may differ slightly). Some Dinas at district level
received some functions from both the centre and first regional level, but this is the
exception rather than the rule (ex. employment). A total of 165 functions and 353
tasks have been transferred to the Badung district in Bali, and some of the task
have been further detailed into activities. However, this general count can be
deceptive. It is difficult to compare sectors due to the terminology or categories
used in each sector. Some functions in some sectors would only be tasks or
activities in the categories or language employed in others sectors. There is no
hierarchy of functions agreed across sectors. Hence the number of functions, tasks
or activities transferred is not a good indicator of the weight or importance of the
transfers.

Tabel 1: Functions and tasks officially transferred to the District of Badung

(Bali) in the framework of the DAPP
GOVERNMENT LEVEL
RELEASING THE FUNCTIONS
IN DAPP

GENERAL SECTORS FROM WHICH MAIN

FUNCTIONS IN DAPP HAVE BEEN SELECTED
FOR TRANSFER TO THE DISTRICT

CENTRAL LEVEL

Agricultural subsectors:

CENTRAL LEVEL

FUNCTIONS
(tasks)

food crops

13 (55)

animal husbandry

13 (91)

cash crops

14 (74)

Fisheries

13 (36)
6

CENTRAL LEVEL

Transmigration

CENTRAL LEVEL

Village Development

CENTRAL LEVEL

Civil Records

CENTRAL LEVEL

Social Welfare

CENTRAL LEVEL

Coops and Small Business

CENTRAL LEVEL

Health

CENTRAL LEVEL

Education

6 (44)

CENTRAL LEVEL

Industry

CENTRAL LEVEL

Trade

CENTRAL LEVEL

Mining

CENTRAL LEVEL

Employment

10

FIRST REGIONAL LEVEL

Traffic and Mass Transportation

FIRST REGIONAL LEVEL

Public Works:

14
6 (36)
16

Irrigation

Roads

2 (7)

General Construction

FIRST REGIONAL LEVEL

Tourism

FIRST REGIONAL LEVEL

Mining

FIRST REGIONAL LEVEL

Employment

FIRST REGIONAL LEVEL

Forestry

Total Functions and tasks transferred.... 165 (353)

Source: Government Regulation No. 8/1995; Local Government Regulation of the Province
of Bali No. 2/1995

The public works sectors (roads and irrigation), tourism and to some extent
the education sectors have seen significant transfers of functions. For the roads
sector, the upkeep of national roads was turned over to the districts. For irrigation,
the district also became responsible for the upkeep of larger scale irrigation
systems. In the tourism sector, approval and supervision over a broader range of
tourism facilities was given to the district.
Others district Dinas, while accepting new transfers on paper in the
framework of DAPP, had actually already received these functions via other legal
instruments years before or had defacto been undertaking these functions (the
agricultural subsectors in particular). Other Dinas received but a token increase in
their functions (the Health Dinas for example only received medicine
storing/distribution).
If the central level departments were less than generous in the negotiation
stage, they were sometimes also less than gracious following their initial
agreements. Soon after the agreements, some departments took action to limit the
scope of transferred functions. For example soon after the inauguration of DAPP,
the district was suddenly limited in its authority over permits for mineral exploitation
7

for tracts of land exceeded 5 hectares, even though no such limitation was agreed
within DAPP.
In general, there has been a tendency to only transfer functions which are
not linked to sizeable soures of revenues. Many of these dry functions, as they
are labelled in Indonesia, relate to the guidance and strict implementation tasks.
For those functions that have included opportunities for revenue generation, the
realization of the transfer of the functions has been plauged by reversals, limitations
and delays. The sign in front of the office may have changed but that has been no
clue as to whether the functions normally carried out in these deconcentrated arms
have been transferred as a whole, or whether some have been excluded from the
DAPP, or whether some have been included in the DAPP but as yet not
implemented in practice.
In principle, according to Indonesian regulations, all functions transferred to
lower levels must be accompanied by attendant resources; staff, assets and routine
and development funds. In DAPP, this principle has been grossly breached,
especially in relation to the development budget. This alone has meant that the
resources available to implement the functions in the 26 districts have been less
than when these functions were held in the deconcentrated arms of higher levels,
and less than most of their non-participating neighbouring districts continue to
receive from higher levels. For the clients and public touched by the affected
services, the DAPP has in many cases meant a reduction rather than improvement
in services. The inability (some would say unwillingness) to transfer the requisite
funding has been particularly deleterious for districts with a low level of own
revenues (ex. Aileu in East Timor). These districts now must support a greater
number of Dinas with their own routine funds, and they are often denied the
development budget that were once attached to these functions. Only for districts
with a substantial own revenue base (ex. Badung in Bali), has this problem been
attenuated by an infusion from the district budget.
The districts have voiced their concern over the lack of substantial functions
in DAPP, but some sectors and some districts have also voiced their satisfaction.
Some have indicated that the functions transferred have been or will be an added
burden, though this sentiment seems to be linked to the lack of transfer of requisite
resources. Overall, it would seem that the DAPP represents a modest step in
decentralization in terms of added functions, but the full impact of this modest
initiative is less than optimal due to the failure to pass on the required financial
resources passed.

4.4

Contribution of DAPP Toward Decentralization Goals

At this early stage of the DAPP, much of the attention is focused on ensuring
that the original intent is met in terms of the full and real transfer of functions and
the requisite financial resources. Nevertheless some officials are anxious for
confirmation that DAPP is indeed a success in tems of the stated broad goals of
decentralization and DAPP in particular (DAPP seems to have been atributed with
most goals associated with decentralization). It seems premature to make such
assessments in our view, and there is the real danger that if done too early, before
all of the functions and resources entailed in DAPP have been fully transferred, the
districts could be unfairly judged. Unfavourable impacts may to a large extent
reflect the problems of inadequate transfers, and the blame would be better placed
with higher levels controlling the transfers.

One important consideration in making a plausible link between the specific

measures of the DAPP and the broad goals of increased public participation,
improved services and increased government efficiency lies in the degree of effort
made by the district apparatus in implementing the functions in a better way.
Certainly the Dinas are exhorted by many district heads to do just that, and the
climate produced by the initiative is in general supportive, although the frustration
with the lack of follow through on resources is undermining the initial build up of
enthusiasm. In general, our field observations lead us to conclude that the district
level apparatus is not giving sufficient attention as to how the district can do better
with these functions than when they were held by higher levels. Specific arguments
or proposals indicating efficiencies and improvements in coverage, speed, quality
and other relevant indicators are few and far between in the districts we have
visited. Moreover, the subdistrict level staff of the district Dinas have by and large
not been fully apprised of the intent and mechanisms of DAPP or the subdistricts
possible role in improving the implementation of the transferred functions. It is
difficult to see how participation or service delivery will appreciably improve directly
as a result of the DAPP.
The fate of the new functions is not entirely in the hands of the district. If the
promise held in DAPP is to be realized, the central and first level sectoral
departments must continue to support the district Dinas beyond the initial transfer
(assuming that in itself is concluded properly). It is the higher level tehnical
departments that must provide technical specifications, training and other support to
make the implmentation of the functions at the district level a success. At this point,
some departments do not even have the necessary indicators ready to assess
whether indeed the functions are being properly implemented. Effort on this front is
essential and should follow the transfers in a timely manner (Beier, 1996)
The achievement of the broad goals pursued by the Indonesian government
calls for significant country wide initiaves in transfers of functions and requisite
resources. But this alone is not enough. As the GTZ team has argued in a recent
discussion paper currently being shared with Indonesian counterparts as a base for
cooperation in the decentralization effort, a range of critical issues must be
addressed to have an overall significant impact in terms of these broad societal
goals. The district apparatus must become more acountable toward the district
legislative branch, and the legislature itself must be more accountable to the district
constituency. In other words there is a clear need for a political decentralization as
a complement to the more administrative decentralization of the DAPP. Additionally,
strengthened subdistricts and a revitalized and autonomous village are essential in
assisting the districts to shoulder the burden of decentralization (GTZ, 1997).
5.

PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DECENTRALIZATION

Despite the problems with the DAPP monitoring and evaluation system,
Indonesian officials are reasonably aware of some of the bigger hurdles facing
DAPP. However, officialdom could greatly benefit from a lively dialogue, with many
and various stakeholders, on the issues surrounding DAPP and those issues
occasionally surfacing in the mass media or intellectual/international circles. The
lessons to be drawn from the DAPP are beginning to emerge, and they need a full
airing.
Some of the issues brought to the fore in DAPP relate to the resistance met
in the sectors and the first regional level. The approach to communication and
negotiation needs to be reformulated if further steps are to be more successfully
implemented in the field. It may also be necessary to address the issue of the
autonomous role of the provincial level to give some certainty or vision for what it
9

means to emphasize the second regional level. Of great importance, as already

alluded to earlier, will be the linking of administrative decentralization to political
decentralization.
Decentralization is usually initiated by the centre, and only when the centre
feels safe, or compelled, to allow for it.
The prospect for meaningful
decentralization in Indonesia is limited due to the resistance to be found in the
bureaucracy. Even when Presidential force is brought to bear (however inconstant)
the bureaucracy finds ways of delaying or diluting the initiative. Indeed, the
communication pattern of the bureaucracy in Indonesia works against meaningful
dialogue; the tendency of the bureaucracy is to become self-referential and isolated
from external claimants (Beier, 1995). As difficult as the task may be, it appears that
pressure on the bureaucracy must come principally from the bottom. In this respect,
forward looking Indonesian officials, and their supporters (in non- government
organizations and the donor community for instance) must seek to organize the
lower levels of government to more effectively and forcefully channel their
aspirations to the political/administrative apparatus.
6.

CONCLUSION

The District Autonomy Pilot Program marks a significant departure from the
pattern of delay and uncertain progress in realizing the objective of increasing
regional autonomy at the second regional level, in accordance with stated national
policies and general regulations. The initiative has been generally well received by
the districts, but less so by some cental sectoral departments and first regional
levels. However, even some districts are currently frustrated with the slow pace of
the transfers, and the lack of adequate financial resources to undertake the new
functions. The top down approach to the design of DAPP accounts for some of this
resistance and poor implementation, and points to a host of issues that have yet to
be adequately addressed in the limited decentralization dialogue in Indonesia.
As a beginning, the DAPP cannot be faulted; even if it is rather modest in its
scope and likely impact, it is after all fairly significant in symbolic terms and also
significant in practice for certain sectors.
A more thorough assessment needs to
be made to determine whether it has been successful in terms of various evaluation
categories and success indicators. If this assessment is indeed made with the
Indonesian governments broad goals in mind, then it is likely that the DAPP will fall
short of being a success. But if DAPP is viewed as one step toward meaningful
regional autonomy, if it leads to a richer and broader dialogue, and if it generates a
more pro-active stance from the regions themselves in voicing their views and
needs, then DAPP will augur well for the future.
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Press.
Beier, C. (1996). Perspektif untuk Peranan Departemen Teknis,
Desentralisasi, 10, 1996, pp. 3-10.

Buletin

Beier, C. (1995). Dezentralisierung und Entwicklungsmanagement in Indonesien.

Beobachtungen zur politisch-administrativen und zur wissenschaftlichen
Kommunikation: ein systemtheoretischer Versuch, Saarbruecken.

10

Ferrazzi, G. and C. Beier (1997). Technical Cooperation in M&E System

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