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SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP FORM MANUFACTURING UNITED WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (SMTFM-UWP), its

officers and members, petitioners,


vs.
NLRC, HON. JOSE G. DE VERA and TOP FORM MANUFACTURING PHIL., INC.

Facts:
Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing United Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM) was the certified
collective bargaining representative of all regular rank and file employees of private respondent Top Form Manufacturing Philippines,
Inc. At the collective bargaining negotiation on February 27, 1990, the parties agreed to discuss unresolved economic issues.
According to the minutes of the meeting, Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement was discussed. The following appear in
said Minutes:
Art. VII, Wages
Sect. 1. Defer
Sect. 2. Status quo
Sec. 3. Union proposed that any future wage increase given by the government should be implemented by the
company across-the-board or non-conditional.
Management requested the union to retain this provision since their sincerity was already proven when the P25.00
wage increase was granted across-the-board. The union acknowledges management's sincerity but they are worried
that in case there is a new set of management, they can just show their CBA. The union decided to DEFER this
provision.
The union insisted on the incorporation in the CBA of the union proposal on "automatic across-the-board wage increase."
On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order No. 01 granting an increase of P17.00 per day in the salary of workers.
This was followed by Wage Order No. 02 dated December 20, 1990 providing for a P12.00 daily increase in salary.
As expected, the union requested the implementation of said wage orders. However, they demanded that the increase be on an acrossthe-board basis. The company refused to accede to that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme of increases purportedly to avoid
wage distortion. Thus, the company granted:
1.

the P17.00 increase under Wage Order No. 01 to workers/employees receiving salary of P125.00 per day and below.

2.

The P12.00 increase mandated by Wage Order No. 02 was granted to those receiving the salary of P140.00 per day and below.

3.

For employees receiving salary higher than P125.00 or P140.00 per day, private respondent granted an escalated increase ranging
from P6.99 to P14.30 and from P6.00 to P10.00, respectively.

Later, the union wrote demanded the company that it should "fulfill its pledge of sincerity to the union by granting an across-the-board
wage increases to all employees under the wage orders." The union reiterated that it had agreed to "retain the old provision of CBA"
on the strength of private respondent's "promise and assurance" of an across-the-board salary increase should the government mandate
salary increases.
The company, on the other hand, contended that in implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, it had avoided "the existence of a wage
distortion" that would arise from such implementation. It emphasized that only "after a reasonable length of time from the
implementation" of the wage orders "that the union surprisingly raised the question that the company should have implemented said
wage orders on an across-the-board basis." It asserted that there was no agreement to the effect that future wage increases mandated by
the government should be implemented on an across-the-board basis. Otherwise, that agreement would have been incorporated and
expressly stipulated in the CBA.
Issue:
Whether or not the company committed an unfair labor practice in its refusal to grant across-the-board wage increases in
implementing Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02. Stated differently, did the company violate the CBA?
Ruling: NO.
The union anchors its arguments on the alleged commitment of the company to grant an automatic across-the-board wage increase in
the event that a statutory or legislated wage increase is promulgated. It cites as basis therefor, the portion of the Minutes of the

collective bargaining negotiation on February 27, 1990 regarding wages, arguing additionally that said Minutes forms part of the
entire agreement between the parties.
The basic premise of this argument is definitely untenable. To start with, if there was indeed a promise or undertaking on the part
of private respondent to obligate itself to grant an automatic across-the-board wage increase, petitioner union should have requested
or demanded that such "promise or undertaking" be incorporated in the CBA. After all, petitioner union has the means under the
law to compel private respondent to incorporate this specific economic proposal in the CBA. It could have invoked Article 252 of the
Labor Code defining "duty to bargain," thus, the duty includes "executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by
either party." Petitioner union's assertion that it had insisted on the incorporation of the same proposal may have a factual basis
considering the allegations in the aforementioned joint affidavit of its members. However, Article 252 also states that the duty to
bargain "does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or make any concession." Thus, petitioner union may not validly claim that
the proposal embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation forms part of the CBA that it finally entered into with private respondent.
The CBA is the law between the contracting parties. In the same vein, CBA provisions should be "construed liberally. However, it
goes without saying, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal
raised by a contracting party does not find print in the CBA, it is not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim
whatsoever to its implementation.
Hence, petitioner union's contention that the Minutes of the collective bargaining negotiation meeting forms part of the entire
agreement is pointless. The Minutes reflects the proceedings and discussions undertaken in the process of bargaining for worker
benefits in the same way that the minutes of court proceedings show what transpired therein. At the negotiations, it is but natural for
both management and labor to adopt positions or make demands and offer proposals and counter-proposals. However, nothing is
considered final until the parties have reached an agreement. In fact, one of management's usual negotiation strategies is to ". . . agree
tentatively as you go along with the understanding that nothing is binding until the entire agreement is reached." If indeed private
respondent promised to continue with the practice of granting across-the-board salary increases ordered by the government,
such promise could only be demandable in law if incorporated in the CBA.
Respondent Company NOT in Bad Faith
Moreover, by making such promise, private respondent may not be considered in bad faith or at the very least, resorting to the scheme
of feigning to undertake the negotiation proceedings through empty promises. As earlier stated, petitioner union had, under the law,
the right and the opportunity to insist on the foreseeable fulfillment of the private respondent's promise by demanding its incorporation
in the CBA. Because the proposal was never embodied in the CBA, the promise has remained just that, a promise, the
implementation of which cannot be validly demanded under the law.
The Unions Reliance in Kiok Loy v. NLRC is misplaced
Petitioner's reliance on this Court's pronouncements in Kiok Loy v. NLRC 18 is, therefore, misplaced. In that case, the employer refused
to bargain with the collective bargaining representative, ignoring all notices for negotiations and requests for counter proposals that the
union had to resort to conciliation proceedings. In that case, the Court opined that "(a) Company's refusal to make counter-proposal, if
considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is specially true where the Union's request for a
counter-proposal is left unanswered." Considering the facts of that case, the Court concluded that the company was "unwilling to
negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union." 19
In the instant case, however, petitioner union does not deny that discussion on its proposal that all government-mandated salary
increases should be on an across-the-board basis was "DEFERRED," purportedly because it relied upon the "undertaking" of the
negotiating panel of private respondent. 20 Neither does petitioner union deny the fact that "there is no provision of the 1990 CBA
containing a stipulation that the company will grant across-the-board to its employees the mandated wage increase." They simply
assert that private respondent committed "acts of unfair labor practices by virtue of its contractual commitment made during the
collective bargaining process." 21 The mere fact, however, that the proposal in question was not included in the CBA indicates that
no contractual commitment thereon was ever made by private respondent as no agreement had been arrived at by the parties.
With the execution of the CBA, bad faith bargaining can no longer be imputed upon any of the parties thereto. All provisions in the
CBA are supposed to have been jointly and voluntarily incorporated therein by the parties. This is not a case where private respondent
exhibited an indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of petitioner
union. The CBA is proof enough that private respondent exerted "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining."
On account of the importance of the economic issue proposed by petitioner union, it could have refused to bargain and to enter into a
CBA with private respondent. On the other hand, private respondent's firm stand against the proposal did not mean that it was
bargaining in bad faith. It had the right "to insist on (its) position to the point of stalemate." On the part of petitioner union, the
importance of its proposal dawned on it only after the wage orders were issued after the CBA had been entered into. Indeed, from the
facts of this case, the charge of bad faith bargaining on the part of private respondent was nothing but a belated reaction to the
implementation of the wage orders that private respondent made in accordance with law. In other words, petitioner union
harbored the notion that its members and the other employees could have had a better deal in terms of wage increases had it

relentlessly pursued the incorporation in the CBA of its proposal. The inevitable conclusion is that private respondent did not commit
the unfair labor practices of bargaining in bad faith and discriminating against its employees for implementing the wage orders
pursuant to law.

G.R. No. 76989

September 29, 1987

MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioners,


vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and MELBA C. BELONCIO, respondents.

FACTS: Herein Private respondent Beloncio, employee and assistant head waitress at Manila
Mandarin Hotel was expelled from the petitioner Manila Mandarin Employees Union for acts
allegedly inimical to the interests of the union on the basis of the union security clause of their
collective bargaining agreement and the Hotel acceded by placing Beloncio on forced leave.
Two days before the effective date of her forced leave, Beloncio filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice and illegal dismissal against the union and Hotel before the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter held that the union was guilty of unfair labor practice when it demanded the
separation of Beloncio. The union was then ordered to pay all the wages and fringe benefits due
to Beloncio from the time she was on forced leave until actual reinstatement, and to pay
exemplary damages and attorney's fee which was affirmed with modifications by the NLRC.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE PRESENT
CONTROVERSY INVOLVED INTRA-UNION CONFLICTS AND THEREFOR IT HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER THEREOF
HELD: No, the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
Under the Labor Code, Art. 250. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall be unfair
labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives:
(b)
To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including
discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has
been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and
conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other
members.
Moreover, Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission (a) The Labor Arbiters
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide ... the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural;
(1)

Unfair labor practice cases;

In the instant case, the dispute is not purely intra-union but involves an interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provisions and whether or not there was an illegal

dismissal. Under the CBA, membership in the union may be lost through expulsion only if there is
non-payment of dues or a member organizes, joins, or forms another labor organization. The
charge of disloyalty against Beloncio arose from her emotional remark to a waitress who
happened to be a union steward, "Wala akong tiwala sa Union ninyo." The remark was made in
the course of a heated discussion regarding Beloncio's efforts to make a lazy and recalcitrant
waiter adopt a better attitude towards his work.
If the only question is the legality of the expulsion of Beloncio from the Union undoubtedly, the
question is one cognizable by the BLR. But, the question extended to the dismissal of Beloncio or
steps leading thereto. Necessarily, when the hotel decides the recommended dismissal, its acts
would be subject to scrutiny. Particularly, it will be asked whether it violates or not the existing
CBA. Certainly, violations of the CBA would be unfair labor practice.
Anent the question on the award of damages and attorney's fees, the collective bargaining
agreement between the petitioner-the Union and the Manila Mandarin Hotel provides "the Union
shall hold the Company free and blameless from any and all liabilities that may arise" should the
employee question the dismissal.

LIBERTY FLOUR MILLS EMPLOYEES VS. LIBERTY FLOUR MILLS


On February 6, 1974, respondent Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) and respondent Liberty Flour
Mills, Inc. entered into a three-year collective bargaining agreement.
In the CBA, parties agreed to establish a union shop by imposing membership in good standing for the
duration of the CBA as a condition for continued employment of workers.
On Oct. 1974, PLAC filed a complaint against company for the nonpayment of emergency cost of living
allowance.
1975, petitioners Biascan and Evaristo filed similar complaint as regards ECOLA. At this pont petitioners
are veering away from PLAC.
On the same year, petitioners organized new union for rank and file employees of Liberty. They filed PCE as
the union among the rank and file. PLAC then expelled petitioners due to disloyalty.
The matter of dismissal was submitted to compulsory arbitration as well as the demand for ECOLA.
Meanwhile, the claims for emergency allowance were referred for voluntary arbitration to Edmundo Cabal,
who eventually dismissed the same on the ground that the allowances were already absorbed by the wage
increases. This latter case was ultimately also certified for compulsory arbitration and consolidated with
the termination case being heard by Lomabao. His decision was, on appeal, dealt with by the NLRC as
above stated, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on August 26, 1981.
At the outset, we note that the petitioners are taking an ambivalent position concerning the CBA concluded
in 1974. While claiming that this was entered into in bad faith and to forestall the payment of the
emergency allowances expected to be decreed, they nonetheless invoke the same agreement to support
their contention that their complaint for emergency allowances was invalidly referred to voluntary
arbitrator Cabal rather than Froilan M. Bacungan.
The position of the company is that the emergency allowance required by P.D. No. 525 is already covered
by the wage increases prescribed in the said CBA. Furthermore, pursuant to its Article VIII, such allowances
also include all other statutory minimum wage increases that might be decreed during the lifetime of the
said agreement.
That agreement provided in Section 2 thereof as follows:
Section 2. The wage increase in the amounts and during the period above set forth shall, in
the event of any statutory increase of the minimum wage, either as allowance or as basic
wage, during the life of this Agreement, be considered compliance and payment of such
required statutory increase as far as it will go and under no circumstances will it be

cumulative nor duplication to the differential amount involved consequent to such statutory
wage increase.
The petitioners maintains that the above-quoted Section 2 of CBA is invalid because it constitutes a waiver
by the laborers of future benefits that may be granted them by law. They contend this cannot be done
because it is contrary to public policy.
ISSUE: WON the CBA is invalid because it contrary to public policy?
RULING: NO.
While the principle is correct, the application is not, for there are no benefits being waived under the
provision. The benefits are already included in the wage increases. It is the law itself that considers these
increases, under the conditions prescribed in LOI No. 174, as equivalent to, or in lieu of, the emergency
allowance granted by P.D. No. 525.
In fact, the company agreed to grant the emergency allowance even before the obligation was imposed by
the government. What the petitioners claim they are being made to waive is the additional P50.00
allowance but the truth is that they are not entitled to this because they are already enjoying the
stipulated increases. There is no waiver of these increases.
Moreover, Section 2 provides that the wage increase shall be considered payment of any statutory
increase of the minimum wage "as far as it will go," which means that any amount not covered by such
wage increase will have to be made good by the company. In short, the difference between the stipulated
wage increase and the statutory minimum wage will have to be paid by the company notwithstanding and,
indeed, pursuant to the said article. There is no waiver as to this.
Curiously, Article 2 was produced verbatim in the collective bargaining agreement concluded by the
petitioners with the company in 1977 after PLAC had been replaced by the new labor union formed by
petitioners Evaristo and Biascan. 11 It is difficult to understand the petitioners' position when they blow hot
and cold like this.

(PCE CASE)
ME-SHURN
CORPORATION
AND
vs.
ME-SHURN WORKERS UNION-FSM AND ROSALINA* CRUZ, respondents.

SAMMY

CHOU, petitioners,

FACTS:
The R&F employees of Me-Shurn Corporation organized Me-Shurn Workers Union-FSM (Union 1), an affiliate of the February Six Movement
(FSM). Union 1 had a pending application for registration with the BLR.
Petitioner corporation started placing on forced leave all the R&F employees who were members of the unions bargaining unit.
Union 1 filed a PCE with the Med-Arbitration.The corporation a comment stating that it would temporarily lay off employees and cease operations,
on account of its alleged inability to meet the export quota required by the Board of Investment.
While the Petition was pending, 184 union members allegedly submitted a withdrawal. As a consequence, the the petition was dismissed. DOLE
Undersecretary granted the unions appeal and ordered the holding of a certification election.
Union 1 filed a Notice of Strike against petitioner corporation on the ground of unfair labor practice (illegal lockout and union busting).
Sammy Chou (the other petitioner herein) allegedly required the remaining union officers to sign an Agreement containing a guarantee that upon their
return to work, no union or labor organization would be organized. Instead, the union officers were to serve as mediators between labor and
management. After it, the operations of the corporation resumed.
The union reorganized and elected a new set of officers. Respondent Rosalina Cruz was elected president. (Thereafter, it filed two Complaints
charging petitioner corporation with unfair labor practice.)
Petitioner corporation questioned the legality of the representation of respondent union. Allegedly, it was not the latter, but the Me-Shurn Independent
Employees Union (Union 2)-with Christopher Malit as president (different president) -- that was recognized as the existing exclusive bargaining
agent of the R&F employees and as the one that had concluded a CBA with the corporation. Hence, the corporation asserted that the Decision
ordering the holding of a certification election had become moot and academic.

Union 1 contested the legality of the formation of the Union 2 and petitioners recognition of it as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees.
Respondents argued that the pendency of the representation issue before the DOLE had barred the alleged recognition of the aforementioned union.
ISSUE: W/N Union 1 has legal personality to maintain a suit against petitioner Corporation.
HELD: YES.
Legal Personality of Respondent Union
Neither are we prepared to believe petitioners argument that respondent union was not legitimate. It should be pointed out that on June 29, 1998, it
filed a Petition for Certification Election. While this Petition was initially dismissed by the med-arbiter on the basis of a supposed withdrawal, note
that the appeal was granted and that the Undersecretary ordered the holding of a certification election.
The DOLE would not have entertained the Petition if the union were not a legitimate labor organization within the meaning of the Labor Code. Under
this Code, in an unorganized establishment, only a legitimate union may file a petition for certification election. Hence, while it is not clear from the
record whether respondent union is a legitimate organization, we are not readily inclined to believe otherwise, especially in the light of the pro-labor
policies enshrined in the Constitution and the Labor Code.
Verily, the union has the requisite personality to sue in its own name in order to challenge the unfair labor practice committed by petitioners against it
and its members. "It would be an unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization through formation of labor associations if thereafter such
collective entities would be barred from instituting action in their representative capacity."

Finally, in view of the discriminatory acts committed by petitioners against respondent union prior to the holding of the certification election on
September 27, 2000 -- acts that included their immediate grant of exclusive recognition to another union as a bargaining agent despite the pending
Petition for certification election -- the results of that election cannot be said to constitute a repudiation by the affected employees of the unions right
to represent them in the present case.
(NotwithstandingthePetitionforCertificationElectionfiledbyrespondentsanddespiteknowledgeofthependencythereof,petitionersrecognizeda
newlyformedunionandhastilysignedwithitanallegedCollectiveBargainingAgreement.Theirpreferenceforthenewunionwasattheexpenseof
respondentunion.MoncadaBijonFactoryv.CIRheldthatanemployercouldbeheldguiltyofdiscrimination,evenifthepreferredunionwasnot
companydominated.)

PROGRESSIVEDEVELOPMENTCORPORATIONPIZZAHUT,petitioner,
vs.
HON.BIENVENIDOLAGUESMA,inhiscapacityasUndersecretaryofLabor,andNAGKAKAISANGLAKASNGMANGGAGAWA
(NLM)KATIPUNAN,respondents.
FACTS:
RespondentUnionfiledaPECinbehalfoftheR&FemployeesofthepetitionerCorporation.
PetitioneraMotiontoDismissthepetitionallegingfraud,falsificationandmisrepresentationintherespondent.Union'sregistrationmakingitvoid
andinvalid.Itallegedthat:a)respondentUnion'sregistrationwastaintedwithfalse,forged,doubleormultiplesignaturesofthosewhoallegedly
tookpartintheratificationoftherespondentUnion'sconstitutionandbylawsandintheelectionofitsofficersthatthereweretwosetsofsupposed
attendeestotheallegedorganizationalmeeting;thattheallegedchapterisclaimedtohavebeensupportedby318memberswheninfact lesspersons
whoactuallysigned;andb)whiletheapplicationforregistrationofthecharterwassupposedtohavebeenapprovedintheorganizationalmeeting
heldonJune27,1993,thechartercertificationissuedbythefederationKATIPUNANwasdatedJune26,1993orone(1)daypriortotheformation
ofthechapter,thus,therewereseriousfalsitiesinthedatesoftheissuanceofthechartercertificationandtheorganizationmeetingofthealleged
chapter.

PetitionerfiledaPetition for cancellationoftheUnion'sregistrationonthegroundsoffraudandfalsification and likewisefiled (withthe Med


Arbiter)amotionforsuspensionofproceedingsinthecertificationelectioncaseuntilaftertheprejudicialquestionoftheUnion'slegalpersonalityis
determinedintheproceedingsforcancellationofregistration.
TheMedArbiterdirectedtheholdingofacertificationelectionandexplainedthattheSumasaklawsaManggagawangPizzaHut(localaffiliateof
respondentUnion)isaLLOincontemplationoflawandshallremainassuchuntilitsverychartercertificateiscanceledorotherwiserevokedby
competentauthority.Theallegedmisrepresentation,fraudandfalsestatementinconnectionwiththeissuanceofthechartercertificatearecollateral
issueswhichcouldbeproperlyventilatedinthecancellationproceedings.TheSec.Alsoaffirmedthesame.
ISSUE:W/Ntheordertoconductacertificationelectionisproper(despitethepetitionforcancellationoftheUnion'sregistrationonthe
groundsoffraudandfalsification).
HELD:NO.
TheLaborCoderequiresthatinorganizedandunorganizedestablishments,aPCEmustbefiledbyaLLO.Theacquisitionofrightsbyanyunionor
labororganization,particularlytherighttofileaPCEdependsonW/NthelabororganizationhasattainedthestatusofaLLO.
Inthiscase,theMedArbiterdisregardedthepetitioner'sprayerthattheformerlookintothelegitimacyoftherespondentUnionbyasweeping
declarationthattheunionwasinthepossessionofachartercertificatesothat"forallintentsandpurposes,SumasaklawsaManggagawasaPizzaHut
(was)alegitimatelabororganizationandthattheallegedmisrepresentation,fraudandfalsestatementinconnectionwiththeissuanceofthecharter
certificatearecollateralissueswhichcouldbeventilatedinthecancellationproceedings.
However,itcannotbedeniedthatthegroundsinvokedbypetitionerforthecancellationofrespondentUnion'sregistrationfallunderparagraph(a)
and(c)ofArticle239oftheLaborCode,towit:
(a)Misrepresentation,falsestatementorfraudinconnectionwiththeadoptionorratificationoftheconstitutionandbylawsor
amendmentsthereto,theminutesofratification,thelistofmemberswhotookpartintheratificationoftheconstitutionandby
lawsoramendmentsthereto,theminutesofratification,thelistofmemberswhotookpartintheratification;
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(c)Misrepresentation,falsestatementsorfraudinconnectionwiththeelectionofofficers,minutesoftheelectionofofficers,the
listofvoters,orfailuretosubmitthesedocumentstogetherwiththelistofthenewlyelectedappointedofficersandtheirpostal
addresseswithinthirty(30)daysfromelection.
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Thegrounds in Article239oftheLaborCodeconstituteagravechallengetotherightofrespondentUniontoaskforcertificationelection.
Registrationbasedonfalseandfraudulentstatementsanddocumentsconfernolegitimacyuponalabororganizationirregularlyrecognized,which,at
best,holdsontoamerescrapofpaper.Undersuchcircumstances,thelabororganization,notbeingalegitimatelabororganization,acquiresno
rights,particularlytherighttoaskforcertificationelectioninabargainingunit.
AswelaidemphasisinProgressiveDevelopmentCorporationLabor,"theemployerneedstheassurancethattheunionitisdealingwithisabona
fide organization, one which has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau." Clearly, fraud, falsification and
misrepresentationinobtainingrecognitionasalegitimatelabororganizationarecontrarytotheMedArbiter'sconclusionnotmerelycollateralissues.
TheinvalidityofrespondentUnion'sregistrationwouldnegateitslegalpersonalitytoparticipateincertificationelection.
Oncealabororganizationattainsthestatusofalegitimatelabororganizationitbeginstopossessalloftherightsandprivilegesgrantedbylawto
such organizations. As such rights and privileges ultimately affect areas which are constitutionally protected, the activities in which labor
organizations,associationsandunionsareengageddirectlyaffectthepublicinterestandshouldbezealouslyprotected.Astrictenforcementofthe
LaborCode'srequirementsfortheacquisitionofthestatusofalegitimatelabororganizationisinorder.
InasmuchasthelegalpersonalityofrespondentUnionhadbeenseriouslychallenged,itwouldhavebeenmoreprudenttohavegrantedpetitioner's
requestforthesuspensionofproceedingsinthecertificationelectioncase,untiltheissueofthelegalityoftheUnion'sregistrationshallhavebeen
resolved.

Additional:
ISSUE: W/N, afterthe necessarypapers anddocuments havebeen filedby alabor organization, recognitionby the BLR merelybecomes a
ministerialfunction.
HELD:NO.
Article234oftheLaborCodeclearlyindicatesthattherequirementsembodiedthereinareintendedaspreventivemeasuresagainstthecommission
offraud.Afteralabororganizationhasfiledthenecessarypapersanddocumentsforregistration,itbecomesmandatoryfortheBLRtocheckifthe
requirements under Article 234 have been sedulously complied with. If its application for registration is vitiated by falsification and serious
irregularities,alabororganizationshouldbedeniedrecognitionasalegitimatelabororganization.Andifacertificateofrecognitionhasbeenissued,
theproprietyofthelabororganization'sregistrationcouldbeassaileddirectlythroughcancellationofregistrationproceedingsinaccordancewith
Articles238and239oftheLC,orindirectly,bychallengingitspetitionfortheissuanceofanorderforcertificationelection.

ThesemeasuresarenecessaryandmaybeundertakensimultaneouslyifthespiritbehindtheLaborCode'srequirementsforregistrationareto
begivenfleshandblood.Registrationrequirementsspecificallyaffordameasureofprotectiontounsuspectingemployeeswhomaybeluredinto
joiningunscrupulousorflybynightunionswhosesolepurposeistocontrolunionfundsorusethelabororganizationforillegitimateends.Such
requirementsareavalidexerciseofthepolicepower,becausetheactivitiesinwhichlabororganizations,associationsandunionsofworkersare
engageddirectlyaffectthepublicinterestandshouldbeprotected.
Thus,inProgressiveDevelopmentCorporationvs.SecretaryofLaborandEmployment,weheld:
Thecontroversyinthiscasecentersontherequirementsbeforealocalorchapterofafederationmayfileapetitionforcertificationelection
andbecertifiedasthesoleandexclusivebargainingagentofthepetitioner'semployees.
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But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized
establishment,italsorequiresthatthepetitionforcertificationelectionmustbefiledbyalegitimatelabororganization...
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...Theemployernaturallyneedsassurancethattheunionitisdealingwithisabonafideorganization,onewhichhasnotsubmittedfalse
statementsormisrepresentationstotheBureau.Theinclusionofthecertificationandattestationrequirementswillinamarkeddegreeallay
theseapprehensionsofmanagement.Notonlyistheissuanceofanyfalsestatementandmisrepresentationorgroundforcancellationof
registration(seeArticle239(a),(c)and(d));itisalsoagroundforacriminalchargeofperjury.
Thecertificationandattestationrequirementsarepreventivemeasuresagainstthecommissionoffraud.Theylikewiseaffordameasureof
protectiontounsuspectingemployeeswhomaybeluredintojoiningunscrupulousorflybynightunionswhosesolepurposeistocontrol
unionfundsortousetheunionfordubiousends.
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...ItisnotthisCourt'sfunctiontoaugmenttherequirementsprescribedbylawinordertomakethemwiserortoallowgreaterprotection
totheworkersandeventheiremployer.Ouronlyrecourseis,xxx,toexactstrictcompliancewithwhatthelawprovidesasrequisitesfor
localorchapterformation.
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TheCourt'sconclusionshouldnotbemisconstruedasimpairingthelocalunion'srighttobecertifiedastheemployees'bargainingagentin
thepetitioner'sestablishment.Wearemerelysayingthatthelocalunionmustfirstcomplywiththestatutoryrequirementsinorderto
exercisethisright.Bigfederationsandnationalunionsofworkersshouldtaketheleadinrequiringtheirlocalsandchapterstofaithfully
complywiththelawandtherulesinsteadofmerelysnappingunionafterunionintotheirfoldsinafuriousbidwithrivalfederationstoget
themostnumberofmembers
Furthermore,theLaborCodeitselfgrantstheBLRaperiodofthirty(30)dayswithinwhichtoreviewallapplicationsforregistration(Article235).
The thirty-day period ensures that any action taken by the BLR is made in consonance with the mandate of the Labor Code, which specifically
requires that the basis for the issuance of a certificate of registration should be compliance with the requirements for recognition under Article 234.
Since, obviously, recognition of a labor union or labor organization is not merely a ministerial function.

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) vs. HON. FERRER-CALLEJA (1989) FACTS:


GAW Trading, Inc. recognized ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for the majority of its
employees. A CBA was executed.
In the meantime, Southern Philippines Federation of
Labor (SPFL) together with Nagkaisang Mamumuo sa GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a Strike after it
failed to get GAW Trading Inc. to sit for a conference respecting its demands in an effort to pressure
GAW Trading Inc. to make a turnabout of its standing recognition of ALU as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees
GAW Trading Inc. filed a TRO

Labor Arbiter: held the strike as illegal


GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU-PSSLU) Federation ... filed a Certification Election petition
Med-Arbiter: ruled for the holding of a certification election in all branches of GAW Trading Inc. BLR:
granted ALUs appeal (MR) and reversed the Med-Arbiter on the ground that the CBA has been
effective and valid and the contract bar rule applicable
SPFL filed a MR to the BR

BLR: reversed its previous decision and ordered the holding of a certification election among the
rank-and-file workers of GAW Trading, Inc. and ruled that the contract-bar rule does not apply in
this case because the CBA involved is defective as it was not duly submitted in accordance with the
Implementing Rules. xxx There is no proof tending to show that the CBA has been posted in at
least 2 conspicuous places in the establishment at least 5 days before its ratification and that it has
been ratified by the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.
Issue: Whether the contract-bar rule is applicable in this case?
HELD: NO Wind no reversible error in the challenged decision of respondent director. A careful
consideration of the facts culled from the records of this case, yields the conclusion that the collective
bargaining agreement in question is indeed defective hence unproductive of the legal effects
attributed to it by the former director in his decision which was subsequently and properly reversed.

To be a bar to a certification election, the CBA must be adequate in that it comprise substantial terms
and conditions of employment
LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY vs. DIRECTOR OF THE BLR (1983) FACTS:
The La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory Provincial and Metro Manila Sales Force Association
applied for and was granted chapter status by the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)
Sometime later, 31 local union members signed a joint letter withdrawing their membership in
NATU.
The local union and NATU filed a petition for certification election.
The company opposed on the ground that it was not supported by at least 30% (now 25%) of the
proposed bargaining unit because (a) of the alleged 48 members of the local union, 31 had withdrawn
prior to the filing of the petition, and (b) 14 of the alleged members of the union were not employees
of the company but were independent contractors. The BLR director denied the companys objection

Issue: Whether the withdrawal of 31 unions from NATU affected the petition for certification election
insofar as the 30% requirement is concerned
HELD: YES The SC reversed the BLR, it appearing that the 31 union members has withdrawn their
support to the petition BEFORE the filing of said petition. It would be otherwise if the withdrawal was
made AFTER the filing of the petition for it would then be presumed that the withdrawal was not free
and voluntary. The presumption would arise that the withdrawal was procured through duress,
coercion or for valuable consideration. In other words, the distinction must be that withdrawals made
before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the
contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary. The reason
for such distinction is that if the withdrawal or retraction is made before the filing of the petition, the
names of employees supporting the petition are supposed to be held secret to the opposite party.
Logically, any such withdrawal or retraction shows voluntariness in the absence of proof to the
contrary. Moreover, it becomes apparent that such employees had not given consent to the filing of
the petition, hence the subscription requirement has not been met. We hold and rule that the 14
members of respondent local union are dealers or independent contractors. They are not employees
of petitioner company. With the withdrawal by 31 members of their support to the petition prior to or
before the filing thereof, making a total of 45, the remainder of 3 out of the 48 alleged to have
supported the petition can hardly be said to represent the union.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT UNION
G.R. No. 146206

August 1, 2011

FACTS:

In G.R. No. 110399, entitled San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Union v. Laguesma, the Court held
that even if they handle confidential data regarding technical and internal business operations, supervisory
employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of petitioner San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI) are not to be considered
confidential employees, because the same do not pertain to labor relations, particularly, negotiation and settlement
of grievances. Consequently, they were allowed to form an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. The Court also declared that the employees belonging to the three different plants of San Miguel
Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, having "community or mutuality
of interests," constitute a single bargaining unit. They perform work of the same nature, receive the same wages
and compensation, and most importantly, share a common stake in concerted activities. It was immaterial that the
three plants have different locations as they did not impede the operations of a single bargaining representative.

Pursuant to the Court's decision in G.R. No. 110399, the DOLE-NCR conducted pre-election conferences. However,
it was found out that there was a discrepancy in the list of eligible voters.

The Med-Arbiter issued an Order directing Election Officer to proceed with the conduct of certification election.

On the date of the election, petitioner filed the Omnibus Objections and Challenge to Voters, questioning the
eligibility to vote by some of its employees on the grounds that some employees do not belong to the bargaining unit
which respondent seeks to represent or that there is no existence of employer-employee relationship with petitioner.
Specifically, it argued that certain employees should not be allowed to vote as they are: (1) confidential employees;
(2) employees assigned to the live chicken operations, which are not covered by the bargaining unit; (3) employees
whose job grade is level 4, but are performing managerial work and scheduled to be promoted; (4) employees who
belong to the Barrio Ugong plant; (5) non-SMFI employees; and (6) employees who are members of other unions.

The Med-Arbiter issued an Order directing respondent to submit proof showing that the employees in the submitted
list are covered by the original petition for certification election and belong to the bargaining unit it seeks to
represent.

In compliance thereto, respondent averred that (1) the bargaining unit contemplated in the original petition is the
Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation, now known as San Miguel Foods, Inc.; (2) it covered the operations in
Calamba, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas and its home base is either in Cabuyao, Laguna or San Fernando,
Pampanga; and (3) it submitted individual and separate declarations of the employees whose votes were
challenged in the election.

The Med-Arbiter validly identified the respondent as the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt
employees of petitioner's Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis.

On appeal, the then Acting DOLE Undersecretary affirmed the order except for the four employees that should be
excluded from joining as because Matias and Lozano are members of Magnolia Poultry Processing Plants Monthly
Employees Union, while Delos Reyes and Pajaron are employees of San Miguel Corporation, which is a separate
and distinct entity from petitioner.

Petitioners motions were denied by DOLE and CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not these employees who worked in a different and separate entity should be excluded.

2. Whether or not the payroll master, human resource and personnel assistant are considered as confidential
employees.

RULING:

1. No, they should not be excluded. There should be only one bargaining unit for the employees in Cabuyao, San
Fernando and Otis of Magnolia Poultry Products Plant involved in dressed chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry
Farms engaged in live chicken operations. Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working conditions, location
of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their communality of interest.

Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of each division are actually
interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit.

The test of grouping is community of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining units
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

2. Payroll Master does not involve in dealing with confidential labor relations information in the course of the
performance of his functions. Since the nature of his work does not pertain to company rules and regulations and
confidential labor relations, it follows that he cannot be excluded from the subject bargaining unit.

Human Resource Assistant, the scope of ones work necessarily involves labor relations, recruitment and selection
of employees, access to employees personal files and compensation package, and human resource management.

Personnel Assistant, ones work includes the recording of minutes for management during collective bargaining
negotiations, assistance to management during grievance meetings and administrative investigations, and securing
legal advice for labor issues from the petitioners team of lawyers, and implementation of company programs.
Therefore, in the discharge of their functions, both gain access to vital labor relations information which is outrightly
disqualifies them from union membership.

G.R. No. 149552

March 10, 2010

GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, Petitioner,


vs.
ERNESTO CASIO, ROLANDO IGOT, MARIO FAMADOR, NELSON LIM, FELICISIMO BOOC, PROCOPIO
OBREGON, JR., and ANTONIO ANINIPOK, Respondents,
and VIRGILIO PINO, PAULINO CABREROS, MA. LUNA P. JUMAOAS, DOMINADOR BOOC, FIDEL VALLE,
BARTOLOME AUMAN, REMEGIO CABANTAN, LORETO GONZAGA, EDILBERTO MENDOZA and ANTONIO
PANILAG, Respondents.
FACTS:
The labor union Ilaw at BuklodngMangagawa (IBM)-Local 31 Chapter (Local 31) was the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank and file employees of GMC in Lapu-Lapu City. IBM-Local 31, through its officers and board members
headed by PINO entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with GMC with stipulations as follows:
Section 3. MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP All employees/workers employed by the Company with the exception of those who are
specifically excluded by law and by the terms of this Agreement must be members in good standing of the Union within thirty (30)
days upon the signing of this agreement and shall maintain such membership in good standing thereof as a condition of their
employment or continued employment.

Rodolfo Gabiana (Gabiana), the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao, furnished Casio, et al. with copies of
the Affidavits of GMC employees charging Casio, et al. with "acts inimical to the interest of the union." Subsequently,
Pino, et al., as officers and members of the IBM-Local 31, issued a Resolution expelling Casio, et al. from the union.
Gabana said that Casio, et al. must be immediately dismissed from service by GMC pursuant to the closed shop
provision in the existing CBA and warned that failure of GMC to do so would constitute gross violation of the existing
CBA and constrain the union to file a case for unfair labor practice against GMC. So, GMC terminated Casio, et al. and
placed them under preventive suspension.
Casio's efforts to oppose reached the following:
a. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch VII > NO CONCILIATION
b. LABOR ARBITER >>> dismissed
c. Grievance Machinery >>> still no avail
d. Voluntary Arbitration >>> termination is in valid compliance with closed shop provision in CBA.
e. CA >>> set aside the contention of Voluntary Arbitration and ruled that while the dismissal of Casio, et al., was
made by GMC pursuant to a valid closed shop provision under the CBA, the company, however, failed to observe the
elementary rules of due process in implementing the said dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Casio and other employees can be terminated by reason of the closed shop provision of the
CBA?
RULE: NO.
Even though the dismissal of Casio, et al. was made by GMC pursuant to a valid closed shop provision in the CBA, the
company still failed to observe the elementary rules of due process.
Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on the following grounds: (1) just causes under Art.
282; (2) authorized causes under Art.283; (3) termination due to disease under Art.284, and (4) termination by the
employee or resignation under Art. 285. Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to
the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. x xx.

"Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of
membership," or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain
union membership as a condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are
required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance
of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who
thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they
are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop, on the other
hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their
representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she
is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely
comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.
Union security clauses are recognized and explicitly allowed under Article 248(e) of the Labor Code, which provides
that:
Art. 248. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers. x xx
x xxx
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring
membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already
members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is State policy to promote unionism to enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and
with more persuasiveness than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer. For this reason,
the law has allowed stipulations for "union shop" and "closed shop" as means of encouraging workers to join and
support the union of their choice in the protection of their rights and interest vis--vis the employer.
Moreover, a stipulation in the CBA authorizing the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory
provisions on dismissal under the Labor Code, since "a CBA is the law between the company and the union and
compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor."
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs only to
determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement
of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to
expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the
union security provision of the CBA.
There is no question that in the present case, the CBA between GMC and IBM-Local 31 included a maintenance of
membership and closed shop clause as can be gleaned from Sections 3 and 6 of Article II. IBM-Local 31, by written
request, can ask GMC to terminate the employment of the employee/worker who failed to maintain its good standing
as a union member.
It is similarly undisputed that IBM-Local 31, through Gabiana, the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao,
twice requested GMC, in the letters dated March 10 and 19, 1992, to terminate the employment of Casio, et al. as a
necessary consequence of their expulsion from the union.
It is the third requisite that there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al.
which appears to be lacking in this case.
It is apparent from the aforequoted letter that GMC terminated the employment of Casio, et al. relying upon the
Resolution dated February 29, 1992 of Pino, et al. expelling Casio, et al. from IBM-Local 31; Gabianas Letters dated
March 10 and 19, 1992 demanding that GMC terminate the employment of Casio, et al. on the basis of the closed
shop clause in the CBA; and the threat of being sued by IBM-Local 31 for unfair labor practice. The letter made no
mention at all of the evidence supporting the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al. from the union. GMC
never alleged nor attempted to prove that the company actually looked into the evidence of IBM-Local 31 for expelling
Casio, et al. and made a determination on the sufficiency thereof. Without such a determination, GMC cannot claim
that it had terminated the employment of Casio, et al. for just cause.

G.R. No. 106830 November 16, 1993


R. TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVIENIDO E. LAGUESMA. in his capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, CHRISTIAN LABOR ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CLOP), NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU-TUCP), respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines (CLOP) filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE a
petition for certification election among the rank and file employees of the R. Transport Corporation.
Med-Arbiter A. Dizon dismissed the petition on the ground that the bargaining unit sought to be represented by
respondent did not include all the eligible employees of petitioner but only the drivers, conductors and conductresses
to the exclusion of the inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics and washerboys.
CLOP rectified its mistake and filed a second petition for certification election, which included all the rank and file
employees of the company, who hold non-managerial. and non-supervisorial positions.
Contention of the R. TRANSPORT CORPORATION in opposition are as follows:

dismissal of the first petition constituted res judicata and that CLOP should have interposed an
appeal to the dismissal of the first petition and its failure to do so barred it from filing another
petition for certification election.
second petition for certification election should have been filed after one year from the dismissal of the first
petition certification election.
employment status of the members of respondent CLOP who joined the strike must first be resolved before a
certification election can be conducted

ISSUE: WON R. Transport Corporation can intervene in the conduct of the certification election?
RULE: NO. It should be noted that it is the petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most tenacious resistance
to the holding of a certification election. This must not be so for the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole
concern of the employees. The employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely regarded as a
bystander.
As to the argument of res judicata by the petitioner, before the principle of res judicata can be operative, the
following requisites must be present: a) the former judgment or order must be final; b) it must be a judgment ororder
on the merits; c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties;
and d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA
732 [1991]).
In the case at bench, it cannot be said that the parties in the first and second actions were identical. The first action
was dismissed by the Med-Arbiter because it excluded parties essential to the bargaining unit such as inspectors,
inspectresses, dispatchers and washer boys. The second petition included all the employees who were excluded in the
first petition. Therefore, the Med-Arbiter was correct when he gave due course to the second petition for certification
election after respondent CLOP corrected its mistake.
As to petitioner's contention that the second petition for certification election should have been filed after
one year from the dismissal of the first petition certification election, in this case, there was no certification
election conducted precisely because the first petition was dismissed, on the ground of a defective petition which did
not include all the employees who should be properly included in the collective bargaining unit.
As to petitioner's contention that the employment status of the members of respondent CLOP who joined the strike
must first be resolved before a certification election can be conducted, Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries,
Inc. v. Torres, 211 SCRA 95 (1992) has well-settled that employees who have been improperly laid-off but who have
a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification elections
(Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 548). Thus, and to repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the case now at
bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal and/or unfair labor practices was filed, the employees concerned could still
qualify to vote in the elections.
Therefore, the employees of petitioner who participated in the strike, legally remain as such, until either the motion to
declare their employment status legally terminated or their complaint for illegal dismissal is resolved by the NLRC.

[G.R.

No.

98363.

June

15,

1992.]

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUAN B. SANTOS, ROBERT GRITCHTING, EMETERIO L. ASINAS, JR., JACK CHIOVINI,
HONORATO T. SABLON, FRANCISCO G. SANTOS, RANULFO M. RELLITA, MARIO D. FONACIER, Petitioners, v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE-DFA), Et Al., Respondents.
FACTS: Prior to 30 June 1987, private respondent Union of Filipro Employees (UFE-DFA) had four (4) Collective Bargaining
Agreements (CBAs) with petitioner Nestl Philippines, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Nestl) covering four (4) bargaining units
of the latter, namely: (1) Makati, (2) Alabang/Cabuyao, (3) Cebu/Davao and (4) Cagayan de Oro. These CBAs were to expire
on 30 June 1987. Prior to such expiration, both UFE-DFA and Nestl negotiating panels met to draft the ground rules for the
negotiation

of

new

CBAs,

the

agreement

on

the

said

rules

was

eventually

signed

on

27

July

1987.

After negotiation meetings, the UFE-DFA panel declared a deadlock and later declared and staged a strike at the Makati,
Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan de Oro work locations of Nestl. Nestl deemed the strike illegal and terminated from
employment all the union officers for allegedly instigating the same and knowingly participating in it.
UFE-DFA filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Yet, even before the case was decided, the striking officers and members of
UFE-DFA voluntarily and unconditionally offered to return to work. Nestl admitted all except eighty-three (83) officers and
thirty-three (33) members, included in this number are the twenty-eight (28) individual private respondents. The said
employees
were
issued
separate
letters
of
termination
by
Nestl
dated
5
or
11
February
1988
These 28 individual private respondents filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, National Capital
Region, at Manila, a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, reinstatement to former or substantially equivalent
positions and damages against the herein petitioners. Of the 28 individual complainants, six (6) have their workplaces in the
National
Capital
Region;
thirteen
(13)
at
Cagayan
de
Oro;
and
nine
(9)
at
Cabuyao,
Laguna.
NESTLE filed a petition to dismiss on the ground that venue is improperly laid saying that under Section 1, Rule V of the new
Rules of the NLRC, all cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional
Arbitration Branch (RAB) having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant. Since 13 of the 20 individual
complainants were employed in the Cagayan de Oro plant and 9 were employed in the Cabuyao plant of Nestl, venue then
was improperly laid insofar as they are concerned. The complaints should have been filed in the RAB in Cagayan de Oro City
and
in
the
RAB
in
Region
IV
(either
in
Quezon
City
or
San
Pablo
City,
respectively).
This was denied by Executive Labor Arbiter reasoning that all the complainants have identical causes of action against the
respondents brought about by their alleged illegal dismissal from work on December 17, 1987.
ISSUE: Whether or not complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal filed by Union of Filipro Employees
should be denied on the ground of improper venue?
RULE: NO.
"There is no doubt that insofar as the twenty-two (22) complainants who had their workplace in Laguna and Cagayan de Oro
are concerned, their complaint filed with the National Capital Region (NCR) suffers from the legal infirmity of improperly laid
venue. Yet, the participation by the respondents in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter has effectively cured the legal
infirmity
of
the
complainants
complaint
vis-a-vis,
the
issue
on
wrong
venue.
Moreover, it must be noted that one of the principal complainants herein is the Union of Filipro Employees (UFE-DFA)
which has its principal office in the National Capital Region and that it is representing all the complainants
herein
with
a
common
cause
of
action
against
the
same
NESTLE.
It is settled that objections to the venue are deemed waived if a defendant, inter alia, submits through conduct
manifesting satisfaction with the same until after the trial or abides by it until the matter has proceeded to a
hearing.
The rule on the construction of labor laws abhors it. Article 4 of the Labor Code 23 provides that "All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor." Our reading of the Revised Rules of the NLRC further reveals that no motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue may be allowed to interrupt or delay the proceedings.
The reliance of petitioners in paragraph (a), Section 1, Rule V of the NLRC Rules "All cases which Labor Arbiters have
authority to hear and decide may be filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the
complainant/petitioner"
is
untenable
and
unpersuasive.

We agree with private respondents 24 that since paragraph (a) of the abovequoted Section speaks of the
complainant/petitioners workplace, it is evident that the rule is intended for the exclusive benefit of the worker. The reason
for this is not only convenience, it is economic as well. The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as
complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case may be, the nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute must
be placed at his immediate disposal, and his adverse party must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent
agency sitting in another place to overburden the former. This being the case, the worker may waive the benefit. It
must be stressed, however, that this section does not constitute a complete rule on venue in cases cognizable
by Labor Arbiters. For one, it cannot apply to instances where the complainants are labor unions or where a
single act of an employer gives rise to a common cause of action to many of its employees working in different
branches
or
workplaces
of
the
former.
It is not denied that Nestl has its principal office in the National Capital Region. It is likewise admitted that the UFE-DFA and
six (6) of the individual complainants are residents in areas within the National Capital Region. All of the individual private
respondents are members of the UFE-DFA. All are aggrieved by the decision of Nestl to dismiss them. Under the aforequoted
rule, the case may be filed with the RAB, NCR, or with the RAB of either Cagayan de Oro City (Region X) or the
RAB of Region IV.

G.R. No. 85085 November 6, 1989


ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS
(NAFLU), respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Associated Labor Union (ALU) had a CBA with Philippine Associated Smelting and
Refining Corporation (PASAR) which expired on April 1, 1987. Several days before the expiration of
the said CBA or on March 23, 1987, private respondent National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
filed a petition for certification election with the BLR, alleging, among others, that no CE had been
held in PASAR within 12 months immediately preceding the filing of the said petition.
Petitioner moved to intervene and sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that NAFLU
failed to present the necessary signatures in support of its petition. In an order, Med-Arbiter dismissed
the petition. However, the order of dismissal was set aside and the said order likewise enjoined
PASAR from entering into a CBA with any union until after the issue of representation is finally
resolved. Finally, in the order dated June 1, 1987, the petition for certification was dismissed for
failure of NAFLU to solicit the majority of the rank and file employees while ALU submitted 33 pages
containing the signatures of 88.5% of the rank and file employees at PASAR.
BLR: Private respondent appealed the order of dismissal to the BLR. While the appeal was pending,
petitioner ALU concluded negotiations with PASAR on the proposed CBA. Publication was made then
followed the ratification of the CBA. Thereafter, petitioner ALU moved for the dismissal of the appeal
alleging that it had just concluded a CBA with PASAR and that the said CBA had been ratified by 98%
of the regular rank-and-file employees and that at least 75 of NAFLU's members renounced their
membership thereat and affirmed membership with PEA-ALU in separate affidavits.
In a resolution, the public respondent Director of BLR gave due course to the appeal by ordering the
conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of PASAR with ALU, NAFLU
and no union as choices, and denied petitioner 's motion to dismiss. Both parties moved for
reconsideration of the said resolution. However, both motions were denied by public respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract bar rule is applicable where a CBA was hastily concluded in defiance of the order of
the med-arbiter enjoining the parties from entering into a CBA until the issue on representation is finally resolved?

RULING: The record speaks for itself. The previous CBA entered into by petitioner ALU was due to expire on April 1,
1987. The petition for certification was filed by NAFLU on March 23, 1987, well within the freedom period.

The contract bar rule is applicable only where the petition for certification election was filed either before or after the
freedom period.

However, the parties were in bad faith when they concluded the CBA. Their act was clearly intended to bar the petition for
certification election filed by NAFLU. A CBA which was prematurely renewed is not a bar to the holding of a certification
election. Such indecent haste in renewing the CBA despite an order enjoining them from doing so is designed to frustrate
the constitutional right of the employees to self-organization. Moreover, We cannot countenance the actuation of the
petitioner and the management in this case which is not conducive to industrial peace.

The renewed CBA cannot constitute a bar to the instant petition for certification election for the very reason that the same
was not yet in existence when the said petition was filed. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that
should not be circumvented.

G.R. No. 118915 February 4, 1997


CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER OF CONCERNED EMPLOYEES-UNIFIED FILIPINO
SERVICE WORKERS, (CMC-ACE-UFSW), petitioners,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment; CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS AND CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
INCORPORATED AND DRA. THELMA CLEMENTE, President, respondents.
Facts: On February 17, 1992, respondent union's petition for certification election
among the rank-and-file employees of the Capitol Medical Center was granted.
Respondent CMC appealed the Order to the Office of the Secretary by questioning the
legal status of respondent union's affiliation with the Alliance of Filipino Workers (AFW).
To correct any supposed infirmity in its legal status, respondent union registered itself
independently and withdrew the petition which had earlier been granted. Thereafter, it
filed another petition for certification election.
The subsequent petition for election was granted. Thus, on December 9, 1992,
elections were finally held with respondent union garnering 204 out of 380 votes cast.
Respondent union was then certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
of the rank and file employees of CMC.
Unsatisfied with the outcome of the elections, respondent CMC appealed to the
Office of the Secretary of Labor. Respondent CMC's basic contention was the supposed
pendency of its petition for cancellation of respondent union's certificate of registration.
In the said case, Med-Arbiter Adap issued an Order dated February 4, 1993 which
declared respondent union's certificate of registration as null and void. However, this
order was reversed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations. The said
Order dismissed the motion for cancellation of the certificate of registration of
respondent union and declared that it was not only a bona fide affiliate or local of a
federation (AFW), but a duly registered union as well.

Respondent union, after being declared as the certified bargaining agent presented
economic proposals for the negotiation of a CBA. However, respondent CMC contended
that CBA negotiations should be suspended in view of the Order issued on February 4,
1993 declaring the registration of respondent union as null and void. In spite of the
refusal of respondent CMC, respondent union still persisted in its demand for CBA
negotiations.
Due to respondent CMC's refusal to bargain collectively, respondent union staged a
strike on April 15, 1993. Subsequently, the case was certified to compulsory arbitration
before the NLRC.
It is at this juncture that petitioner union, on March 24, 1994, filed a petition for
certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of the CMC. Petitioner
insists that the circumstances prescribed in Section 3, Rule V, Book V Of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code where a certification election should be conducted, viz: (1)
that one year had lapsed since the issuance of a final certification result; and (2) that
there is no bargaining deadlock to which the incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a
party has been submitted to conciliation or arbitration, or had become the subject of a
valid notice of strike or lockout, are present in this case. Petitioner union claims that
since there is no evidence on record that there exists a CBA deadlock, the law allowing
the conduct of a certification election after twelve months must be given effect in the
interest of the right of the workers to freely choose their sole and exclusive bargaining
agent.
Issue: WON there was a bargaining deadlock between CMC and respondent union,
before the filing of petitioner of a petition for certification election.
Ruling: Yes.
Although there is no "deadlock" in its strict sense as there is no "counteraction" of
forces present in this case nor "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining," such can be
attributed to CMC's fault as the bargaining proposals of respondent union were never
answered by CMC. It employed all legal means to block the certification of respondent
union as the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file; and use it as its leverage for its failure
to bargain with respondent union. CMC was unwilling to negotiate and reach an
agreement with respondent union. CMC has not at any instance shown willingness to
discuss the economic proposals given by respondent union.
As ratiocinated by public respondent, for petitioner to capitalize on the ensuing
delay which was caused by the hospital and which resulted in the non-conclusion of a
CBA within the certification year, would be to negate and render a mockery of the
proceedings undertaken before the Department and to put an unjustified premium on
the failure of the respondent hospital to perform its duty to bargain collectively.
It is only just and equitable that the circumstances in this case should be
considered as similar in nature to a "bargaining deadlock" when no certification election
could be held. This is also to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for the
circumvention of the law by unscrupulous employers to prevent any certified bargaining
agent from negotiating a CBA. Thus, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implement Rules
should be interpreted liberally so as to include a circumstance, e.g. where a CBA could
not be concluded due to the failure of one party to willingly perform its duty to bargain
collectively.

NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU-MIF) vs. ATTY. ERUDITO E. LUNA
Petitioner labor union, in this certiorari proceeding assailed an order of respondent Med-Arbiter Luna dated July 29, 1977, which surprisingly denied
the petition for certification election of such union on the ground that there was lacking the 30% requirement provided for by the Labor Code because
while the evidence for petitioner union showed that the 30% requirement had been complied with as indicated by the signatures of the employees in
the collective bargaining unit, thereafter, at least 212 had changed their minds, as shown by affidavits submitted by respondents union the reducing to
less than the required percentage the number of employees petitioning for certification election. ,
Director Carmelo C. Noriel, the superior of the med arbiter, rendered a decision which is stated as follows: Since there has been no certification
election for the past (12) months and no certified collective bargaining agreement, the present petition for certification election could naturally
prosper. This was also the decision the SC.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but which was denied in a resolution dated June 28, 1976. Hence this present petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
(1) WON there was a valid retraction by the 212 employees.
(2) WON a certification election should be conducted
RULING:

1ST issue: NO
In Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel , this Court had occasion to state the rule that should be
followed in case of such withdrawal or retraction of signatures. Thus: "There is persuasiveness, likewise, to the submission of Solicitor General
Mendoza in the comment filed, that the thirteen employees who allegedly retracted were not even presented before the Med-arbiter and that the
alleged additional forty-five employees who supposedly likewise changed their minds, were also not called to testify to that effect, petitioner
satisfying itself with their being named in an affidavit executed by its president. That would make, so it is plausibly contended, such alleged
retraction to be highly dubious in character There is this reinforcement to the contention of respondent public official in this closing paragraph of
such comment: 'Besides, the best forum for determining whether there were indeed retractions from some of the laborers is in the certification
election itself wherein the workers can freely express their choice in a secret ballot. If, therefore, petitioner herein is confident that it commands the
majority of the workers in the collective bargaining unit, why then does it vigorously oppose a certification election?' " 18 Had the respondent MedArbiter been aware of the above, then perhaps he would not have been led to pursue a course of action clearly at war with the doctrine in
interruptedly adhered to by this Court favoring the holding of certification elections.
2ND Issue: yes
The tenor of the ruling of this Court in Benguet Exploration Miners' Union v. Noriel, involving the same two labor unions, parties to this case, with
principal respondent Med-Arbiter Erudito E. Luna in this certiorari petition likewise included therein as one of the public respondents, not lend itself
to misinterpretation. It reflected the constant and unwavering policy of this Court requiring a certification election as the best means of ascertaining
which labor organization should be the collective bargaining representative. So it has been since United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries
Philippines v. Noriel, 3 promulgated the first year of the effectivity of the present Labor Code, to Monark International, Inc. v. Noriel, 4 decided in the
early part of this month. The attempt on the part of such labor organization, now respondent, then petitioner, Benguet Exploration Miners' Union, to
prevent a certification election by the far-fetched and implausible plea that before it could be ordered by respondents Noriel and Luna, they should
first decide a motion to dismiss based on a provisional guideline which had become obsolete, was thus rendered futile.
The present state of the law on certification elections was succinctly set forth in the latest case, Monark International, Inc. v. Noriel, referred to at the
outset of this opinion: "United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries Philippines v. Noriel has left no doubt that both under the Industrial Peace Act
and the present Labor Code, this Court is committed to the view that a certification election is "crucial" to the institution of collective bargaining for
it gives "substance to the principle of majority rule, one of the basic concepts of a democratic polity." In a subsequent case, Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, it was held that even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% of the labor force asking for a
certification election had not been strictly complied with, respondent Director is still empowered to order that it be held "precisely for the purpose of
ascertaining which [of the contending labor organizations] shall be the exclusive collective bargaining representative." Such requirement then, to
quote from Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, 'is relevant only when it becomes mandatory for respondent Noriel to conduct a certification
election. 19 In all other instances, the discretion, according to the rulings of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition for
certification. It would follow then that had respondent Med-Arbiter taken due note of the authoritative and controlling precedents, he would not have
ruled the was he did, unless he was so-minded Once again, it is quite apparent that independently of the doctrine of the law of the case, deference to
such applicable pronouncements from this Tribunal ought to have dictated a result different than that arrived at in the assailed order.

LAGUNA AUTOPARTS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Respondent union filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE Regional Office/ In its petition, the respondent union alleged that
Obrero Pilipino was a legitimate labor organization under Registration Certificate No. NCR-LF-11-04-92 issued by DOLE and that its chapter
affiliate, LAMCOR Chapter, had been assigned Control No. RO400-9807-CC-030. The petition further alleged that the bargaining unit sought
to be represented was composed of all the rank-and-file employees in the petitioner company, more or less, 160 employees. It averred that the
said bargaining unit is unorganized and that there has been no certification election conducted for the past 12 months prior to the filing of the
petition.

The petitioner company moved to dismiss the petition. It claimed that the respondent union was not a legitimate labor organization for failure to
show that it had complied with the registration requirements. Petitioner company further asserted that even if the respondent union was issued a
certificate of registration, it could not file a petition for certification election since its legal personality was at question.

Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election for the respondent unions lack of legal personality because it failed to indicate its
principal office on the documents it submitted to the Regional Office which was a fatal defect tantamount to failure to submit the complete
requirements, which warranted the dismissal of the petition for certification election. The Secretary of Labor and Employment who reversed the
decision of the med arbiter and ordered the remand of the case to the regional office for the immediate conduct of a certification election among
the rank-and-file employees of LAMCOR. The CA affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Labor. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUES:
(a) whether or not the respondent union is a legitimate labor organization.
(b) whether or not a chapters legal personality may be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election
(c) Whether or not the petitioner, as the employer, has the legal standing to oppose the petition for certification election.
RULING:

1ST ISSUE: YES


Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. In this case, the CA affirmed the finding of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment that the respondent union is a legitimate labor organization. Indeed, a local or chapter need not be independently registered to acquire
legal personality. Section 3, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V, as amended by D.O. No. 9 clearly states
SEC. 3. Acquisition of legal personality by local/chapter. A local/chapter constituted in accordance with Section 1 of this Rule shall acquire
legal personality from the date of filing of the complete documents enumerated therein. Upon compliance with all documentary requirements, the
Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the local/chapter a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations.
As gleaned from the said provision, the task of determining whether the local or chapter has submitted the complete documentary requirements is
lodged with the Regional Office or the BLR, as the case may be. The records of the case show that the respondent union submitted the said
documents to Regional Office No. IV and was subsequently issued a certificate. The Regional Office, through the Labor Relations Division Chief,
has determined that the respondent union complied with the requirements under the law. It, therefore, declared that the respondent union has acquired
legal personality as a labor organization. Absent any pronouncement to the contrary, such determination of the Labor Relations Division Chief will
stand, on the presumption that the duty of determining whether the respondent union submitted the complete documentary requirements has been
regularly performed.
2nd ISSUE: NO
Such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral attack but only through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it.
This is categorically prescribed by Section 5, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, which states as follows:
SEC. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality
on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack but may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.
The Secretary of Labor discussed that what applies in this case is the principle that once a union acquires legitimate status as a labor organization, it
continues as such until its certificate of registration is cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation. Equally important is Section 11,
Paragraph II, Rule IX of D.O. 9, which provides for the dismissal of a petition for certification election based on the lack of legal personality of a
labor organization only in the following instances: (1) appellant is not listed by the Regional Office or the BLR in its registry of legitimate labor
organizations; or (2) appellants legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality. Since appellant is listed in the registry of legitimate
labor organizations, and its legitimacy has not been revoked or cancelled with finality, the granting of its petition for certification election is proper.
3rd ISSUE: NO
The ruling in San Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Laguesma is still sound, thus:
In any case, this Court notes that it is petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most tenacious resistance to the holding of a certification
election among its monthly-paid rank-and-file employees. This must not be so, for the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of
the employees. The only exception to this rule is where the employer has to file the petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the
Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively, which exception finds no application in the case before us. Its role in a certification
election has aptly been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, as that of a mere bystander. It has no
legal standing in a certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiters orders related thereto.

G.R. No. 75810 September 9, 1991


KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN), petitioner,
vs.
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, and VIRON
GARMENTS MFG., CO., INC., respondents.
FACTS:
(NAFLU) was declared the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Viron
More than four years thereafter, another union, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino filed a petition for
certification election among the employees of VIRON.
The petition allegedly counted with the support of more than (30%) of the workers at VIRON.
NAFLU opposed the petition.
Med-Arbiter ordered a certification election ascertaining that since the certification of NAFLU as sole bargaining
representative in 1981, no collective bargaining agreement had been executed between it and VIRON.
NAFLU contended that it was in the process of collective bargaining with VIRON; there was in fact a deadlock in the
negotiations which had prompted it to file a notice of strike;
These circumstances constituted a bar to the petition for election
The one-year period-known as the "certification year" during which the certified union is required to negotiate with
the employer, and certification election is prohibited has long since expired.
ISSUE: Whether or not KAMPIL's petition for certification election is barred NO.
Prior to the filing of the petition for election there was no such "bargaining deadlock (which) had been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout."
Its attempts to bring VIRON to the negotiation table had been unsuccessful because of the latter's recalcitrance and
unfulfilled promises to bargain collectively; but there is no proof that it had taken any action to legally coerce VIRON to
comply with its statutory duty to bargain collectively.
NAFLU could have charged VIRON with unfair labor practice; but it did not, could have gone on a legitimate strike in
protest but it did not.
Its attempts to bargain collectively had been delayed by continuing challenges to the resolution pronouncing it the
sole bargaining representative in VIRON; but there is no adequate substantiation thereof, or of how it did in fact
prevent initiation of the bargaining process between it and VIRON.
From February 27, 1981 when NAFLU was proclaimed the exclusive bargaining representative of all VIRON
employees to April 11, 1985 when KAMPIL filed its petition for certification election or a period of more than four
(4) years, no collective bargaining agreement was ever executed, and no deadlock ever arose from negotiations
between NAFLU and VIRON resulting in conciliation proceedings or the filing of a valid strike notice.
The respondents advert to a strike declared by NAFLU however these activities took place after the initiation of the
certification election case by KAMPIL.

G.R. No. 107610 November 25, 1994


CRUZVALE, INC., petitioner,
Vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
MED-ARBITER ANGELI M. TUYAY AND UNION OF FILIPINO WORKERS (UFW), respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent union [UFW] filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file workers of
petitioner.
Petitioner sought the denial of the petition on the following grounds:
1. No charter certificate was attached to the petition or submitted to the DOLE at the time the petition was
filed
2. Respondent Union has not presented any proof that it is a legitimate labor organization.
Respondent Med-Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondent.
Respondent is an unorganized establishment.
ISSUE 1: W/N Respondent Union is a LLO YES
The Med-Arbiter found that private respondent was issued:
1. Certificate of Registration No. 11106 and
2. Charter Certificate No. 82
Progressive Development is inappropriate to the case at bench.
ISSUE 2: W/N Certification Election should cover the EES in Cainta and those employed in the cinema
business - NO
The call for the conduct of election covers all the regular rank-and-file employees of Cruzvale, Inc. at its garment
manufacturing corporation.
The employees at the Cinema operation and those at the garment manufacturing operation do not share
commonality of interest as the former clearly perform work entirely different from that of the latter. Thus, their
separation into two (2) distinct bargaining units is proper.
ISSUE 3: W/N petition for certification election should have been filed with the regional office which has
jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer.
"Jurisdiction refers to venue where the petition for certification must be filed.
Venue merely refers to the place where the action shall be brought.
The said provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification election where
1. The place of work of the employees and the place of principal office of the employer are located within the
territorial jurisdictions of different regional offices.
Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing on the petition for certification election before the
Regional Office No. IV, which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the principal place of business of
petitioner is located
Petitioner is being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for certification election / be filed with the National
Capital Region Office, which holds offices in Manila.
Where the employer had appeared twice at the hearing of the petition for certification election without questioning
the venue, said employer was barred from raising the issue in the subsequent proceedings.

G.R. Nos. 178222-23 September 29, 2010


MANILA MINING CORP. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS CHAPTER, SAMUEL G.
ZUIGA vs. MANILA MINING CORP. and/or ARTEMIO F. DISINI, President
FACTS:
Respondent company [MMC] is engaged in large-scale mining for gold and copper ore.
The company is required by law to maintain a tailings containment facility to store the waste material generated by
its mining operations.
One of these dams was Tailings Pond No. 7 [TP No. 7] which operated under a permit issued by the DENR.
Eleven [11] rank and file employees of MMC [who later became complainants] attended the organizational meeting
of Petitioner union.
The union filed all the requirements for its registration and acquired its legitimate registration status.
It submitted letters to MMC relating its intention to bargain collectively and its CBA proposal.
Upon expiration of the tailings permit, DENR-EMB did not issue a permanent permit due to the inability of MMC to
secure an ECC [Environmental Compliance Certificate], which is the consent of the residents in the community to allow
TP No. 7 to operate, which MMC failed to obtain.
Thus, MMC was compelled to temporarily shut down its mining operations resulting in the temporary lay-off of more
than 400 employees in the mine site.
MMC called for the suspension of negotiations on the CBA with the union until resumption of mining operations.
The 11 rank and file EES together with the union, filed a complaint praying for:
1. Reinstatement
2. Recognition of the union as the sole and exclusive representative of its rank and file employees
Complainants alleged that:
1. MMC did not want to bargain collectively with the union so that instead of submitting their counterproposal
to the CBA, it decided to terminate all union officers and active members;
2. Individuals laid-off were those who signed the attendance sheet of the union organizational meeting
MMC justified the temporary lay-off as bona fide in character and a valid judgment prerogative pending the issuance
of the permit to continuously operate TP No. 7.
LABOR ARBITER: Ruled in favor of MMC temporary shutdown of the mining operation and temporary lay-off of the
EES is VALID.
NLRC: Modified ordered the payment of separation pay; temporary lay-off, which exceeded more than 6 months
had the effect of severance of the ER-EE relationship.
The union elevated the case and claimed that:
1. Temporary lay-off was effected without notice to the DOLE [Art. 283];
2. MMC is guilty of ULP when it unilaterally suspended the negotiation for a CBA;
3. Lay-off and subsequent termination of complainants were due to the formation of the union at MMC.
MMC defends that it merely deferred responding to the unions letter-proposal until the resumption of its mining
operations.
ISSUE:
W/N MMC COMMITTED ULP FOR REFUSING TO BARGAIN WITH THE UNION NO
HELD:
ULP cannot be imputed to MMC since the call of MMC for a suspension of the CBA negotiations cannot be equated to
refusal to bargain.
Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the phrase duty to bargain collectively, to wit:
ARTICLE 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with
respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances
or questions arising under such agreements [and executing a contract incorporating such agreements] if requested by either party
but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.

For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that the employer was motivated by:
1. ill-will,
2. bad faith or fraud, or was
3. oppressive to labor
The employer must have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy
causing social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety.
While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the employees to bargain collectively with
each other, such compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the
proposals of the other.
All it contemplates is that both parties should:
1. Approach the negotiation with an open mind and
2. Make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement
It cannot be said that MMC deliberately avoided the negotiation.
It merely sought a suspension and in fact, even expressed its willingness to negotiate once the mining
operations resume.
There was valid reliance on the suspension of mining operations for the suspension, in turn, of the CBA
negotiation.

The Union failed to prove bad faith in MMCs actuations.


Supporting Details:
Despite all efforts, MMC did not succeed in obtaining the consent of the residents of the community where the tailing
pond would operate.
It is MMCs faultless failure to secure a permit, which caused the temporary shutdown of its mining operations.
The suspension of MMCs mining operations was not due to its fault nor was it necessitated by financial reasons
because it was brought about by the non-issuance of a permit for the continued operation of TP No. 7, without which
MMC cannot resume its milling and mining operations.

GENERAL MILLING VS. CASIO


The labor union Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa (IBM)-Local 31 Chapter (Local 31) was the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of GMC in Lapu-Lapu City. On November 30, 1991, IBMLocal 31, through its officers and board members (Pino, et al.) entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) with GMC. The effectivity of the said CBA was retroactive to August 1, 1991.
The CBA contained the following union security provisions:
Section 3. MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP All employees/workers employed by the Company with the
exception of those who are specifically excluded by law and by the terms of this Agreement must be
members in good standing of the Union within thirty (30) days upon the signing of this agreement and
shall maintain such membership in good standing thereof as a condition of their employment or continued
employment.
Section 6. The Company, upon written request of the Union, shall terminate the services of any
employee/worker who fails to fulfill the conditions set forth in Sections 3 and 4 thereof, subject however, to
the provisions of the Labor Laws of the Philippines and their Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
Union shall absolve the Company from any and all liabilities, pecuniary or otherwise, and responsibilities to
any employee or worker who is dismissed or terminated in pursuant thereof. 6
Casio, et al. were regular employees of GMC. Casio was elected IBM-Local 31 President for a three-year
term in June 1991, while his co-respondents were union shop stewards.
In a letter, Gabiana (Gabiana), the IBM Regional Director for Visayas and Mindanao, furnished Casio, et al.
with copies of the Affidavits of GMC employees Basilio Inoc and Juan Potot, charging Casio, et al. with "acts
inimical to the interest of the union." Through the same letter, Gabiana gave Casio, et al. three days from
receipt thereof within which to file their answers or counter-affidavits. However, Casio, et al. refused to
acknowledge receipt of Gabianas letter.
Subsequently, Pino, et al., as officers and members of the IBM-Local 31, issued a Resolution expelling
Casio, et al. from the union.
Gabiana then wrote a letter addressed to Eduardo Cabahug (Cabahug), GMC Vice-President for Engineering
and Plant Administration, informing the company of the expulsion of Casio, et al. from the union pursuant
to the Resolution of IBM-Local 31 officers and board members. Gabiana likewise requested that Casio, et al.
"be immediately dismissed from their work for the interest of industrial peace in the plant."
Gabiana followed-up with another letter inquiring from Cabahug why Casio, et al. were still employed with
GMC despite the request of IBM-Local 31 that Casio, et al. be immediately dismissed from service pursuant
to the closed shop provision in the existing CBA.
Pressured by the threatened filing of a suit for unfair labor practice, GMC acceded to Gabianas request to
terminate the employment of Casio.
On March 27, 1992, Casio, et al., in the name of IBM-Local 31, filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMBRegional Office No. VII (NCMB-RO). Casio, et al. alleged as bases for the strike the illegal dismissal of union
officers and members, discrimination, coercion, and union busting.
Casio, et al. next sought recourse from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Regional
Arbitration Branch VII by filing on August 3, 1992 a Complaint against GMC and Pino, et al. for unfair labor
practice, particularly, the termination of legitimate union officers, illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, and
moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was accorded due process by GMC?
RULING: NO.
The power to dismiss is a normal prerogative of the employer. However, this is not without limitations. The
employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is
made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. x x x. Dismissals
must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee because it

affects not only his position but also his means of livelihood. Employers should therefore respect and
protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor. x x x.
The Court reiterated in Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield v. Ramos that:
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of procedural due process.
The law requires the employer to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices
before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a written notice apprising the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he desires, and (2) a subsequent notice
informing the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. This procedure is mandatory and its
absence taints the dismissal with illegality.
Irrefragably, GMC cannot dispense with the requirements of notice and hearing before dismissing Casio, et
al. even when said dismissal is pursuant to the closed shop provision in the CBA. The rights of an employee
to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a
controversy with either the company or his own union are not wiped away by a union security clause or a
union shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement. An employee is entitled to be protected not only
from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own union the leadership of which could yield
to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and hence dismissal from his job.
In the case at bar, Casio, et al. did not receive any other communication from GMC, except the written
notice of termination dated March 24, 1992. GMC, by its own admission, did not conduct a separate and
independent investigation to determine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the expulsion of Casio,
et al. by IBP-Local 31. It straight away acceded to the demand of IBP-Local 31 to dismiss Casio, et al.
In sum, the Court finds that GMC illegally dismissed Casio, et al. because not only did GMC fail to make a
determination of the sufficiency of evidence to support the decision of IBM-Local 31 to expel Casio, et al.,
but also to accord the expelled union members procedural due process, i.e., notice and hearing, prior to
the termination of their employment.

NESTLE PHIL VS. NLRC


Private respondent Union of Filipro Employees (UFE-DFA) had four (4) Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) with
petitioner Nestle Philippines, Inc. covering four (4) bargaining units of the latter, namely: (1) Makati, (2)
Alabang/Cabuyao, (3) Cebu/Davao and (4) Cagayan de Oro. These CBAs were to expire on 30 June 1987. Prior to such
expiration, both UFE-DFA and Nestle negotiating panels met to draft the ground rules for the negotiation of new CBAs,
the agreement on the said rules was eventually signed.
On 2 September 1987, after sixteen (16) negotiation meetings, the UFE-DFA panel declared a deadlock.
On 8 September 1987, then Secretary of Labor and Employment issued an Order enjoining the UFE-DFA from resorting
to any strike and directing the parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that would aggravate the
situation. This notwithstanding, UFE-DFA declared and staged a strike at the Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and Cagayan
de Oro work locations of Nestle.
Nestle deemed the strike illegal and terminated from employment all the union officers for allegedly instigating the
same and knowingly participating in it.
On 21 September 1987. UFE-DFA filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. On 17 December 1987, even before the case
was decided, the striking officers and members of UFE-DFA voluntarily and unconditionally offered to return to work.
On 19 February 1990, the UFE-DFA and the herein 28 individual private respondents filed with the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC, National Capital Region, at Manila, a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
reinstatement to former or substantially equivalent positions and damages against the herein petitioners.
One of the issues raised by herein petitioners in their Position Paper is improper venue. They allege that under Section
1, Rule V of the new Rules of the NLRC, all cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed
in the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant. Since 13 of the 20
individual complainants were employed in the Cagayan de Oro plant and 9 were employed in the Cabuyao plant of
Nestle, venue then was improperly laid insofar as they are concerned. The complaints should have been filed in the
RAB in Cagayan de Oro City and in the RAB in Region IV (either in Quezon City or San Pablo City, respectively).
Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss the case on the ground that venue is improperly laid. Executive Labor Arbiter
Guanio handed down an Order denying the motion to dismiss.
Public respondent promulgated a resolution dismissing the appeal on the ground that petitioners has waived the
defense of improper venue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners appeal from an Order of the Labor Arbiter denying
a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.

RULING:
It must be noted that one of the principal complainants herein is the Union of Filipro Employees (UFE-DFA) which has
its principal office in the National Capital Region and that it is representing all the complainants herein with a common
cause of action against the same Respondent. So therefore, we reiterate the ruling of the Executive Labor Arbiter a
quo that in keeping with the orderly and expeditious administration of justice, this case should be tried and litigated in
the NCR arbitration branch rather than in three different arbitration branches."

We agree with the public respondent that petitioners waived the defense of improper venue. Although petitioners
invoked the said ground in their Position Paper which was filed on 18 April 1990, they did not pursue it with the
diligence of a party confidently if not absolutely, certain of the indubitability of his defense. In this case, it was only on
18 August 1990 four (4) months later and after they had participated, with neither qualification nor condition, in
the hearing on the merits of the case, and more specifically in the reception of the testimonies of three (3) witnesses
for the herein private respondents, that they belatedly filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. This
belated awakening from deep slumber and deafening silence deserves no sympathy but, rather, condemnation as it is
a crude legal maneuver, grounded on pure technicality and unfavorable to labor, designed to delay the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter.
Further, our reading of the Revised Rules of the NLRC further reveals that no motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue may be allowed to interrupt or delay the proceedings. Thus, Section 14, Rule VII of said Rules
expressly provides that:

"SECTION 14. Motion to dismiss. Any motion to dismiss a complaint or petition on the grounds that the Labor Arbiter
has no jurisdiction, or that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment or by prescription, shall be immediately
acted upon by the Labor Arbiter if the facts strongly indicate dismissal. Any motion to dismiss with no such indication
shall be disposed of only in the final determination of the case and shall not be allowed to interrupt or delay the
proceedings."
When juxtaposed with paragraph (c), Section 1, Rule V, hereinafter quoted and which speaks merely of improper
venue not objected to before or at the time of the filing of the position paper, the intention of the Rules to exclude
improper venue as a ground for a motion to dismiss and to consider it as a mere formal procedural defect appears
indubitable.
Furthermore, Section 1, Rule V of the NLRC Rules reads that:
"SECTION 1. Venue. (a) All cases which Labor Arbiters have authority to hear and decide may be filed in the
Regional Arbitration Branch having jurisdiction over the workplace of the complainant/petitioner.

This Section speaks of the complainant/petitioners workplace, it is evident that the rule is intended for the exclusive
benefit of the worker. The reason for this is not only convenience, it is economic as well. The worker, being the
economically-disadvantaged party whether as complainant/petitioner or as respondent, as the case may be, the
nearest governmental machinery to settle the dispute must be placed at his immediate disposal, and his adverse party
must in no case be allowed a choice in favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to overburden the
former. This being the case, the worker may waive the benefit. It must be stressed, however, that this section does not
constitute a complete rule on venue in cases cognizable by Labor Arbiters. For one, it cannot apply to instances where
the complainants are labor unions or where a single act of an employer gives rise to a common cause of action to
many of its employees working in different branches or workplaces of the former. In such instances, recourse should be
made to the Rules of Court which, pursuant to Section 3, Rule I of the Revised Rules of the NLRC, has suppletory
application.

KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)

Facts:
In a certification election held on October 3, 1978, the Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (Union for short), a legitimate late
labor federation, won and was subsequently certified in a resolution dated November 29, 1978 by the Bureau of Labor
Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant.
On December 7, 1978, the Union furnished 4 the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining
agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals. Eliciting no response to the aforesaid
request, the Union again wrote the Company reiterating its request for collective bargaining negotiations and for the
Company to furnish them with its counter proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained unacted upon by the
Company.
The Union, on February 14, 1979, filed a "Notice of Strike", with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of
unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.
Concilation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling off period. But all attempts towards an
amicable settlement failed, prompting the Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration. But the company has a lot of postponements.
When the case was called for hearing on June 4,1979 as scheduled, the Companys representative, Mr. Ching, who was
supposed to be examined, failed to appear. Atty. Panganiban then requested for another postponement which the LA
denied. He also ruled that the Company has waived its right to present further evidence and, therefore, considered the
case submitted for resolution.
NLRC: that the company is guilty of unjustified refusal to bargain. The draft proposal for CBA sent ny the Union is hereby
declared to be the CBA which should govern the parties.
Issue: WON the Company is guilty of ULP for refusal to bargain.
Ruling: YES.

Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations towards a collective agreement, 6 is one of the democratic
frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a
climate of sound and stable industrial peace.

It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a legal obligation.

Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse "to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of

work, and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question
arising under such an agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.

While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain, the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to initiate
contract negotiation. 7

The mechanics of collective bargaining is set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are present,
namely:
(1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of
the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code;
(2) proof of majority representation; and
(3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all of which preconditions are
undisputedly present in the instant case.

There can be no doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain against its (Company's) attitude, the totality of which
is indicative of the latter's disregard of, and failure to live up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code to bargain in good
faith.
It has been indubitably established that:
(1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent;
(2) it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining
Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and
(3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire
to negotiate. 8
A Company's refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad
faith and this is specially true where the Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered. 9
Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Company's approach and attitude-stalling
the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting
its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with
the Union.
Petitioner has not at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set
forth by the Union much less justify its opposition thereto.

In re: Lab Rel


(Last Case, Part IV-A. Sorry Hindi ko alam mag-attach ng file. Hehe. )
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS VS. SOLE
FACTS:
A certification election was conducted among the rank-and-file ees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel
(the Hotel) with the ff. results:
EMPLOYEES IN VOTERS LIST= 353
TOTAL VOTES CAST= 346
NUWHRAIN-MPHC= 151
HIMPHLU= 169
NO UNION= 1
SPOILED= 3
SEGREGATED= 22
Because of the significant number of segregated votes, contending unions, petitioner, NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and
respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter to
decide which among those votes would be opened and tallied. 11 votes were initially segregated because they were
cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending before the Court of Appeals. Six

other votes were segregated because the employees who cast them were already occupying supervisory positions
at the time of the election. Still five other votes were segregated on the ground that they were cast by probationary
employees and, pursuant to the existing CBA, such employees cannot vote. It bears noting early on, however, that
the vote of one Jose Gatbonton, a probationary employee, was counted.
Med-Arbiter ruled for the opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, especially those cast by the 11 dismissed
employees and those cast by the 6 supposedly supervisory ees of the Hotel.
Petitioner union which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the SOLE, arguing that the votes of the probationary ees
should have been opened considering that probationary employee Gatbontons vote was tallied. And petitioner
averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which garnered 169 votes, should not be immediately certified as the EBA, as
the opening of the 17 segregated ballots would push the number of valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17),
hence, the 169 votes which HIMPHLU garnered would be 1 vote short of the majority which would then become 169.
Secretary affirmed the decision of the med-arbiter. In fine, the SOLE concluded that the certification of HIMPHLU as
the exclusive bargaining agent was proper.
ISSUES:
(1) whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification elections should be allowed to vote.
YES
(2) whether HIMPHLU was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent.
NO
HELD:
1. The inclusion of Gatbontons vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary
employees have the right to vote in a certification election.
The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted.
As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja holds:
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or
permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the
labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall
be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Collective
bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union
binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their
employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to all the
employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the bargaining
unit.
For purposes of this section (Rule II, Sec. 2 of Department Order No. 40-03, series of 2003), any employee, whether
employed for a definite period or not, shall beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible for membership in
any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and other workers, the self-employed, rural workers and those
without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection and other legitimate
purposes except collective bargaining. (Emphasis supplied)
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees from voting cannot override the Constitutionallyprotected right of workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the Labor Code and its IRR. A law is read
into, and forms part of, a contract. Provisions in a contract are valid only if they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
2. It is well-settled that under the so-called double majority rule, for there to be a valid certification election, majority
of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.
Hence, all the probationary ees votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the supervisory ees should be
excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would increase from 321 to 337.

Under Art. 256 of the LC, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes cast by the eligible voters shall be
certified as the sole and EBA of all the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1. Hence,
50% of 337 is 168.5 + 1 or at least 170.
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU was not able to obtain a majority
vote. The position of both the SOLE and the appellate court that the opening of the 17 segregated ballots will not
materially affect the outcome of the certification election as for, so they contend, even if such member were all in
favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus untenable.
It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid votes cast is for it to serve as basis
for computing the required majority, and not just to determine which union won the elections. The opening of the
segregated but valid votes has thus become material.
To be sure, the conduct of a certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate bargaining
unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining representative, if the employees desire to be
represented at all by anyone. It is not simply the determination of who between two or more contending unions won,
but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the bargaining unit as to whether they want to be
represented and which union they want to represent them.
Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained the required majority, it follows that a
run-off election must be held to determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent the rank-andfile employees.

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