Mo Ya Lim Yao vs.

Commissioner of Immigration GR L-21289, 4 October 1971

Fact of the case: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On
the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration.
After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of
First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if
the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to
be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person
is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao
al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
Facts: Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a
contract worker.

On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he
married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in
January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez,
arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was

just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability
extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. When petitioner and her two children
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez,
together with Marina Cabael, met them.As "guests," petitioner and her two children
lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the
Philippines as temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.

In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and
petitioner. On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed
from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the
same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration.

Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint
with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis
of the said letter, petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.

The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent resident given to
petitioner, the Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with
the laws of the Phils. There was thus no basis for giving her the status of permanent
residence, since she was an Indonesian citizen and her marriage with a Filipino
Citizen was not valid.

Thus this petition for certiorari

Issue: Whether or not the courts may review deportation proceedings

Held : Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable 2)
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.

We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law
the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her
marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport
aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country.

However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an "alien
who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated
port of entry" is subject to deportation.

The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive
period and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings
is made within five years after the cause for deportation arises". Tolling the
prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the
CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had
elapsed before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father,
was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has
resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an

application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court
the following documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified
accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was
scheduled on May 5, 1999.

Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take
oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's
petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so,
unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under
the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing
for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared
by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the
present jurisprudence.

Issue:

Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:

1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine

citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the
election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of
majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14
years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within
the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a
tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.
CO vs. HRETFacts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional
election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates
who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds

that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a resident of
the second district of Northern Samar.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in
1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court
an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the
private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984
and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted
there during those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino
fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal
footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides,
privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in thePhilippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required
that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It
is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of
afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence
requirements.
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of
Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA.
As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act
Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired
(1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other,

rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign

country.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service
in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA

2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who
Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the
Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over
petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he
is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still
be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return
to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
G.R. No. 161434

March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and
VICTORINO X. FORNIER,

G.R. No. 161634

March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ vs.FPJ

G. R. No. 161824

March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections
for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of
candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino
Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe
was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of
a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines
which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino
Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on

respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the

latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos
place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of

residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en
masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so,
Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an

American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced
by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not
make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation
of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the
assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the
established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Mercado v. Manzano G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
Facts:
Petitioners filed for respondents disqualification for election alleging that
respondent is a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual citizens
cannot run for public office.
Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows the
principle of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well.
COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born because
of the vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners assail this.
Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public office?
Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state that
follows jus saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to
a concurrent application of different two laws or more.
On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person simultaneously owes
loyalty to two or more states.
In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship meaning he forswears
allegiance to the other country and thereby terminating their status as dual.
The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express renunciation of
American citizenship.

Republic v Dela Rosa

G.R. No. 104654, 6 June 1994 [Citizenship; Naturalization; Naturalization
Proceedings; C.A. No. 473]

FACTS:
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the
Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.

October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992,
and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and
a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication of
which should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing.

January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and
move it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in the May
1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing was moved to February
21. No publication or copy was issued about the order.

February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.

February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is
readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.

Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to
annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance
taken by Frivaldo on same date.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.

RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the
Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same
to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final

and executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing,
without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition
itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the
judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
Frivaldo v Comelec
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed
office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for
the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against
President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must
be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an
indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid

repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of
America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the
US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in

accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine

citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC, [176 SCRA 1; GR 86564, August 1, 1989]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Qualification, 2nd Highest Number of Votes)

Facts: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of
Baguio City during Elections. Having garnered the highest number of votes,
Petitioner was elected and proclaimed winner while Respondent garnered the
second highest number of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition for quo
warranto contesting the election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is a
naturalized Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine citizenship having
sworn allegiance to the Queen of Australia. Petitioner opposes to the contrary.

Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an
elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines.

From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not
possessed by the petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from running as
mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

Issue: WON private respondent, having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes,
can replace the petitioner as mayor.

Held: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does
not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.
Note:

Dual citizenship is not a bar in running for elections, dual allegiance is.

Mere repatriation is not enough to run for elections.

A written certification of an oath of allegiance to the Philippines must be attached
together with the COC.

Yu vs Defensor-Santiago
Doctrine: Reacquisition of citizenship
FACTS:
Petitioner Yu, originally a Portuguese national, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen
on 10February 1978. However, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was
issued a renewed PortuguesePassport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.The CID detained the petitioner
pending his deportation case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a petition forhabeas
corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en
banc.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
petitioners acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship

HELD:
Yes. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be
displayed whenrequired and suppressed when convenient. Petitioner, while still a
citizen of the Philippines who hadrenounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreignprince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to theRepublic of
the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents
hesigned, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in
Hongkong sometime inApril 1980. Express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly andexplicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity,after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen
resumed orreacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal
of his Portuguese passport andrepresented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippinecitizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with hismaintenance
of Philippine citizenship.WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for
release from detention is DENIED.Respondent's motion to lift the temporary
restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediatelyexecutory.While still a
citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely
andforever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or

sovereignty" and pledged to"maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines," he declared his nationality asPortuguese in commercial documents
he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd. filed in
Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
EN BANC[G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001]AKBAYAN Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O. PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z.
TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE JOHN TALAUE,
RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M.
VALENCIA, EDBENTABUCOL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.[G.R. No. 147179. March 26, 2001]MICHELLE D. BETITO,
petitioner, vs. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONERS MEHOL SADAIN,
RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTION, FLORENTINO
TUASONand RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the Commission on Election (COMELEC),
respondents.FACTS: Petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the
May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December
27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No.
8189.On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying the
petition.Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II(YOUTH) et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus.ISSUE: Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the
COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general
elections.HELD: The petitions are bereft of merit.As to the procedural limitation, the
act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in
the election process. Thus, contraryto petitioners argument, registration cannot
and should not be denigrated to thelowly stature of a mere statutory requirement.
Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the
right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power,
may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the
ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the
incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be
performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one
which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times.Considering the circumstances where the
writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm
belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they
are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel
respondent COMELEC toconduct a special registration of voters. For the
determination of whether or notthe conduct of a special registration of voters is
feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of
election, involves theexercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by
mandamus.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari
and mandamus are hereby DENIED.

Makalintal v comelec
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the
said act on the following grounds, among others:

That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating
his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement
that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the
election;
That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim
winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it
violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further,
as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used.
Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The
domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant
who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered
a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee
voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not
qualified as an absentee voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress
to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential
and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed
COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential
and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way
transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad
G.R. No. 9959
35 PH 728, 751-753
December 13, 1916

Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive Treasurer

Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The
Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as
relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such but
$80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which
was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount.

In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the
$80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this
order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the
Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the
Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions of
the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a
recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and
their heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a

reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank.

HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a
complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of
Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people
thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public
interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro
people. The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no
other person is entrusted with it.

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court
ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in
gold or coin in Philippine peso.
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary.
He likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds

shall be administered by his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was
only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of Florentinos benefits for the child.
Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabaas filed a complaint seeking the
delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the childs trustee.
Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a
private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of parens patriae to the
terms of the insurance policy?

YES.

The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social
unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be
prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed
should resolve according to the best interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more
care towards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of

the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of
litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may
happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in
consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country
for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between
father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority.
Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens
patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
- See more at: http://lawsandfound.blogspot.com/2012/11/cabanas-v-pilapildigest.html#sthash.xL3uWJLG.dpuf

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22,
1986)FACTS:1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.2. On March
25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was

installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by
units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.
"ISSUE:Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.HELD:Yes.The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:1. The people have accepted the Aquino government
which is in effective control of the entire country;2. It is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government; and 3. The community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government
People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses
in an investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day
following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion edited by herein
respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence,
the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force
and can be applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of
the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King.
However, the Court explains that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor
its representatives for the provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty
over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it means that the invoked provision
of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court determined Article 256 of
the SPC to be political in nature for it is about the relation of the State to its
inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that it is a general principle of the public
law that on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer
in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore, respondent was
acquitted.
DIGEST: Macariola v.s. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 (1982)

June 14, 2014Author: No comment yet

DOCKET NO. / CASE NO.: A.M. No. 133-J
DATE: May 31, 1982
COMPLAINANT: Bernardita R.. Macariola
RESPONDENT: Hon. Elias B. Asuncion, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte

FACTS: When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge
Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8, 1863 for
lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he later
approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto was
complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot
according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to the
plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots denominated as
Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion
of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion.

Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares
and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.
wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil Case
No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with acts unbecoming a judge
alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E
violated Article 1491 pr. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code
of Commerce Sec 3 par H of RA 3019 Sec 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and
Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered a

decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion,

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice Cecilia

Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her decision dated
March 29,1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

ISSUE: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any
law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decide in a
Civil Case Nio. 3010 and his engage ment in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an act
unbecoming of a judge?

HELD: No. The respondent Judge Asuncions actuation does not constitute of an act
unbecoming of a judge. But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private and
business activities.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par 5 of the New Civil Code applies only
to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property. Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par
H sec 3 of RA 3019 because the business of the corporation in which the respondent
participated had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. SC
stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve to the commendation for their
immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing that
their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
BAYAN v. ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a
series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13,
1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively
signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the
senate approved it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:

Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so
that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in
by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain
extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will
find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining
the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We

find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding
as a treaty.