PFR CASES

Domicile of Wives

Domicile of Minors
The domicile of a minor shall follow the domicile of the parents of the minor
unless the parents establish separate domiciles. If the parents establish
separate domiciles, the minors domicile shall be that of the parent with
whom the minor resides. However, if there has been a legal separation,
annulment or dissolution, the minors domicile shall be that of the parent to
whom custody of the minor has been legally given.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

248 SCRA 300
Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.
March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos
did not meet the residency requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the
COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was
the result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a
Resolution that found Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious,
Marcoscorrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.
May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied MarcosMotion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution drafted on April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcosproclamation to
the office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number
of votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would
be suspended even if she did win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner
of the said Congressional election.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1)
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus
candidate, of the first district of Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to
be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions

residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers of the constitution)2.

The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy
can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the
entry for the number of years and months in the residence where the candidate seeks
to hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when
Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC
to disqualify Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as
such, she was required to change residences and apply for voters registration in these
cited locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she
lost her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and
further contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to
transfer residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation
does not mean or intend to lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her
husband, her choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the
PCGG chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban
and their farm in Olot, Leyte.
(2)
WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the
House of Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of
having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event,
Sections 6
2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr.
Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification
case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

(3)
WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over
the question of the petitioners qualifications after the elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 119976
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte, providing information that she is a resident of
seven months in the constituency where she seeks to be elected immediately preceding the
election. Subsequently, private respondent Montejo filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification, alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency (must have been a resident for not less than one year). Petitioner thus amended
her COC, changing seven months to since childhood. This amendment was refused
admittance for reason that it was filed out of time, so Petitioner filed her amended COC with
COMELEC in division.
The COMELEC in division found the petition for disqualification meritorious and struck off the
amended as well as original COCs. In ruling thus, COMELEC in division found that when
petitioner chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay
there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that
place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and
school days, as her place of domicile. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte
for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections
HELD:
Meaning of Residence

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return,
and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in
a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One
may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be
to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

G.R. No.119976
September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a
candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI,
Sec. 6 of the Constitution
Decision:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte,

the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995
are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte.
Ratio Decided:
Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld
the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that
she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows
the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is
actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the
absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands
domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political
Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she
gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only
after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she
chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

ARTICLE III FORMAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE

EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, petitioner, vs. EDDIE P. ARQUERO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By letter-complaint dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process
Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality.
[1]

Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC
Brookes Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at
Bancudo Pulot, Brookes Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was
born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint was the girls Baptismal
Certificate reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached to the
letter-complainant was a copy of a marriage contract showing that complainant and Dedje Irader
contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.
[2]

[3]

By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the
complaint.
[4]

By his Answer of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied the charge of immorality,
claiming that it is just a (sic) mere harassment and a product of complainants hatred and extreme
jealousy to (sic) his wife. Attached to the answer were the September 27, 1987 affidavit of
desistance executed by complainant in favor of his wife with respect to an administrative complaint
he had much earlier filed against her, and complainants sworn statement dated September 13, 1994
acknowledging paternity of a child born out of wedlock, which documents, respondent claims, support
his contention that the complaint filed against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by
complainant to harass him.
[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise instituted a criminal
complaint against him for adultery which was, however, dismissed after preliminary investigation.
Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting with another woman.
By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to then Executive Judge Filomeno
A. Vergara of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan for investigation, report and
recommendation. Judge Vergara having retired during the pendency of the investigation, the case
was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y. Fernandez who was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000,
directed by this Court to (1) verify the authenticity of the marriage certificate and baptismal certificate
submitted by complainant; (2) conduct an investigation as to the information contained in the said
baptismal certificate and the circumstances under which it was issued, and such other verifiable
matters relevant to the charge; and (3) submit her report and recommendation thereon.
[9]

[10]

In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez recommends that the
complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that respondent is guilty of
the charge. The report focuses on the non-appearance of complainant and Dedje Irader Acebedo,
thusly:
[11]

xxx
Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and Dedjie Irader who per reliable
information cannot be notified for reason that subject persons are no longer residing in
their given address and their whereabouts is unknown as shown by the return of the
subpoena dated November 7, 2000, and the inadmissibility of the baptismal certificate
alleging therein that the father of Desiree Arquero is the respondent herein, and for the
reason that the same had not been testified to by Dedje Irader who is the informant of the
entries contained therein, this Court had not received adequate proof or relevant evidence
to support a conclusion that respondent herein could be held liable of the charge imputed
against him, hence, he should be absolved from any liability.
xxx

[12]

(Quoted verbatim).

By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the recommendation of the
Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that respondent be held guilty of
immorality and that he be suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without pay. Thus the
OCA ratiocinates:
[13]

. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9) months, he a single
man maintained relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant,
attended with sexual union (TSN dated 23 November 2000, pp. 14-15). Based on his
testimony, we observed that respondent justified his having a relationship with Dedje
I. Acebedo solely on the written document purportedly a Kasunduan or
agreement entered into by complainant and his wife, consenting to and giving
freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to live with him or her. Being a
court employee respondent should have known that said agreement was void despite it
having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo was separated from her
husband during their short lived relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and
enter an immoral relationship with a very much married woman and a co-court-employee
at that is highly improper. It is contrary to the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of
Public Officials and Employees which provides that public employees of which respondent
is one, xxx shall at times (sic) respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest. Moreover, respondent cannot seek refuge and sling mud at
complainant for having executed an Affidavit dated September 13, 1994, acknowledging
that he bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It would seem that respondent would
want to apply the principle of in pari delicto in the instant case. Respondent would have it
appear that a married man with an extra-marital relation and an illegitimate child is
precluded from complaining if his wife enters into a relationship with another man.
Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by herein
complainant. However, a cursory reading of said document reveals that it favors only
Dedje Irader Acebedo and not herein respondent. Interestingly, the date of said affidavit is
2 September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as evidence in his favor when
the instant complaint was only filed sometime in 1994.
Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if he attended the baptism of
the daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo, his former co-employee and ex-intimate friend, he
answered, I did not. Im not sure the child is mine. From his answer, we could infer that
respondent did not categorically rule out the possibility that said child might be her (sic)
daughter, only that he is doubtful of her paternity.

xxx

[14]

(Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original).

While complainant appears to have lost interest in the prosecution of the present case, the same
does not ipso facto warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges have been filed, this Court may
not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth thereof. For it has an interest
in the conduct of those in the service of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the
people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainants desistance from
prosecuting the case he initiated.
[15]

[16]

On the merits of the case, the entry of respondents name as father in the baptismal certificate of
Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove her filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of to
imply that respondent maintained illicit relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical certificate is
conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church
by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the person baptized. It merely
attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the
administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the statements therein as to
the parentage of the child baptized.
[17]

[18]

By respondents own admission, however, he had an illicit relationship with complainants

wife:

Q: During the formal offer of the possible nature of your testimony before the
Court by your counsel, did the Court get it correct that there has been a short
lived relation between you and Dedgie Irader, am I correct in my impression?
A:

During that time that I have heard she and her husband have parted ways
already, I jokingly informed her that she is now being separated, she is now
single and is free to have some commitment. So, I courted her and she
accepted me, so we have a short lived relation and after that we parted ways.

Q: For how long was this short lived relation you made mention a while ago?
A:

May be (sic) about eight (8) to nine (9) months.

Q: When you said you have (sic) a short lived relationship from 8 to 9
months, you mean to tell the Court that you have (sic) a sexual union with
this woman?
A:

Yes maam.

[19]

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainants wife with the spouses having
priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was embodied in a Kasunduan,
the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:

Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO, may sapat na

taong gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino, at kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Brokes (sic)
Point, Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at magiging miserable
lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama
bilang mag-asawa, kami ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang magasawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na ng kaniyang
makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa
mang hukuman;
xxx

[20]

(Italics supplied).

Respondents justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have
known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between
complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rules established by law which
cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.
[21]

Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service.
[22]

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary. That is why
this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of morality and decency expected of those in the
service of the judiciary. Their conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility, characterized by, among other things, propriety and decorum so as to earn
and keep the publics respect and confidence in the judicial service. It must be free from any whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside
the court as private individuals. There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged
by their private morals.
[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]

[28]

Respondents act of having illicit relations with complainants wife is, within the purview of Section
46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal is
imposed for the second offense.
Since the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes his first offense, his
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal
Trial Court of Brookes Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he is hereby SUSPENDED
for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that commission of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with severely.
Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

RULE 131 - Burden of Proof and Presumptions

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is
the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the
delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in
the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;

(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed
upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for
arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was
overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still
lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing,
who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been
missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose
existence has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present
may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the
circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient
for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before
marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as provided
in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to
the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature
habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartneship;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other
and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry
each other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits
of money and evidences of credit are equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three
hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the
absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even
though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former
marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority,
was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals
of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular
person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title
of such person or his successor in interest;

(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no
particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following
rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have
survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to
have survived, if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is
deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall
prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same
time. (5a)

PEOPLE VS. BORROMEO 133 SCRA 106

Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias
Borromeo told Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming
because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo
Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to Susanas
hut. There they found Susanas lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias
mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant,
Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be
liable for homicide and not parricide. He thinks such because there was no
marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his
testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in
a chapel by a priest.

Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being
married, are presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the
common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the
fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity
and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the
same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant
violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does
not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites
for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to
the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The
appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to
30,000

HOW TO PROVE MARRIAGE

CASE DIGEST
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence
and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls
threatening him and that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member
of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that
she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated
Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys allegations and she
said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters
that shows Orlys affection and care towards her.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its
face, it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have
the pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the
merits of the case, Orlys allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was not
able to prove that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to be
created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her
party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat
he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely
marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never
had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also,
there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the marriage. It took him 4
and a half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilias contention that Orly freely
cohabited with her after the marriage.

CASE FULL
G.R. No. 132955
ORLANDOVILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26,
1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with
modification the Decision dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing
petitioners petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b)
ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs. Also
assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
1

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got

married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992,
Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that
threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already
pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never
cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondents child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.
4

In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the
petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed
with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters
to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him
personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended
in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs.
5

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorneys fees in
the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and the award of
attorneys fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to
P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following
assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE
CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS
THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN

AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEYS
FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.
7

The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the
ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the
trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the
findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private
respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do
so, thus
8

To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged
coerced consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13,
1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years
and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage
annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilias allegation
that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable
judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal
in the criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him.
Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided
ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of
the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the
bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope
that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an
acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is,
therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he
did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that
created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and
strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University
of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka

Celso, a supposed member of the New Peoples Army whom appellant claimed to have
been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of
Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage.
It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as
a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to
assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the
proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats
were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the
assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities
of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by
appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellants
excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is
bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also
conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the
appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the
appellee went to a hotel where the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant
on top x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant
resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child
was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of
fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential,
as there is no controversy regarding the date of death of appellees fetus.
Nevertheless, during the continuation of the cross-examination of the appellee, she
declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in
the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the
appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion
as to the exact date of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had
presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.

Appellants propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellees evidence

continues in his argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was
impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she could not have a premature
delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-week
period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellees impression that
she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had
delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellants admission that he had a
sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latters
pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the
appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower courts appreciation of the letters allegedly
written by him to the appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with
thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the
appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the appellant
contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a
man under duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly
changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was
forced to admit them because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was
laboring under duress when he made the admission, where did he find the temerity to
deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be
motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those
letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should
be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of
cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a
marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union
by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack
of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the
appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
9

We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Article 2208 (11) of
the Civil Code provides that attorneys may be awarded where the court deems it just
and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual
and legal basis. There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would

support an award of moral damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals
merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of
her by the appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate.
xxx
10

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any

testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., we held that:
11

In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of
moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his
complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have
taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly
suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they
must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have
proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal
to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to
exemplary damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the
plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no
proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in
addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated
damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no
exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear
right to moral damages. In the instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily
12

establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January
12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172
in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioners petition for the annulment of his
marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and
exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.

PUGEDA VS TRAIS (4 SCRA 849)

ELISEO DELA TORRE, EMILIO DELA TORRE, PATRICIO DELA TORRE and MARTIN D.
PANTALEON,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ISABELO DELA TORRE, LIBRADA ILAGAN DELA TORRE, SPS. EMILIO
ANDRES and LYDIA CLARK, SPS. ARSENIO AURELIO and FELICIDAD ANDRES, SPS. GONZALO
MAALAC and MARINA ANDRES, and SPS. NORBERTO ANDRES and ERLINDA DE
GUZMAN, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This a petition for review of the December 27, 1991 Decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27891,1 which affirmed the April 27, 1990 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 978. 2
The case involves a twenty thousand five hundred thirty-nine (20,539) square meter
parcel of land located in Angat, Bulacan, identified as Land Lot 5483. The said land
formed part of a tract of friar land titled in the name of the government under Original
Certificate of Title No. 798. By virtue of Sales Contract No. 6081, dated June 13, 1938,
Mamerto dela Torre bought the subject land from the Bureau of Lands for the sum of
One Hundred Ten Pesos (P110.00) payable in ten (10) annual installments. 3 The first
installment of Eleven Pesos (P11.00) was paid on the same date under O.R. No.
744721, leaving a balance of Ninety Nine Pesos (P99.00) payable in nine (9)
installments every May 1 of each year. Mamerto then occupied the subject land until

his death on November 15, 1946. His wife, Maxima, died, the following year, on August
19, 1947.
Mamerto left behind three children, petitioners Emilio, Eliseo and Patricio. The latter
were asked by their uncle, respondent Isabelo dela Torre, sometime in February 1972,
to sign a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale in his favor. The three,
however, did not sign the deed and instead, on October 27, 1975, sold the same to
petitioner Martin Pantaleon,4 the owner of a piggery farm in the adjoining land.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1978, respondent Isabelo Dela Torre obtained from the Director
of Lands a Deed of Conveyance executed in his favor covering the subject property, on
the strength of a Joint Affidavit, dated October 13, 1948, executed by his father,
Feliciano, and then minor nephew, petitioner Emilio dela Torre, certifying that he bought
the subject parcel of land from Mamerto for Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00). 5 According
to respondent Isabelo dela Torre, Mamerto approached him offered him half of the land
if he could pay the annual amortization thereof starting 1942. When Mamerto died, he
shouldered the latter's burial and funeral expenses in exchange for which the
remaining half portion of the subject land was ceded to him. He paid the tax payments
of the said land for 1972 and 1978. On November 8, 1978, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-250534, covering the subject property, was issued in the name of respondent
Isabelo dela Torre and his spouse, Librada, by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
After discovering the existence of said title, petitioner Martin Pantaleon filed an adverse
claim for annotation on the title on March 26, 1979. 6 Thereafter, he filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages with the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan7 on April 4, 1979, as a result of which a Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated
by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on TCT No. T-250534 on April 6, 1979. 8
Despite the existence of said Notice of Lis Pendens, respondent Isabelo dela Torre
was able to sell the subject land for Fifty Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) to
respondents Emilio Andres and spouse Lydia Clark, Arsenio Aurelio and spouse
Felicidad Andres, Gonzalo Maalac and spouse Marina Andres and Norberto Andres
and spouse Erlinda de Guzman, on May 25, 1979; 9 leading to the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-257086 in the name of respondent Emilio Andres and
company.10
On April 27, 1990, the lower court rendered its Decision dismissing the Complaint of
petitioners and confirming the validity of the grant by the government to respondent
Isabelo dela Torre. On appeal to respondent Court of Appeals, the said Decision was
affirmed.

With the denial of petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the instant Petition was filed,
raising the following Assignment of Errors
I.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MAMERTO DELA
TORRE'S BENEFICIAL AND EQUITABLE TITLE HAD NOT RIPENED INTO
FULL AND VALID TITLE OVER THE PARCEL OF FRIAR LAND HE BOUGHT
FROM THE GOVERNMENT EVEN IF THE WHOLE PURCHASE PRICE
THEREOF HAD BEEN FULLY PAID, SIMPLY BECAUSE NO FINAL DEED OF
CONVEYANCE WAS YET EFFECTED IN HIS FAVOR BEFORE HIS DEATH,
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 1120, AS AMENDED, AND
THE RULING IN PUGEDA VS. TRIAS AND OTHER CASES.
II.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ALLEGED
ORAL SALE OF THE SUBJECT LAND TO ISABELO DELA TORRE BASED
ONLY ON HIS NAKED CLAIM AND JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF DECEASED
AFFIANTS, IN VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUD AND BELIED BY
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE.
III.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FRIAR
LAND IN QUESTION ALREADY SOLD TO MAMERTO DELA TORRE WAS
VALIDLY APPLIED FOR AND AWARDED TO ISABELO DELA TORRE, AND
THAT IT WAS SUBJECT TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS AND
DETERMINATION.11
Re: The First Assigned Error
While respondent Court noted that full payment on the sales contract was made in
1944, it held that Mamerto took possession of the subject land only until 1943, when he
fell ill; such that when full payment was made in 1944, Mamerto was no longer a
"settler and occupant" thereof as required for purposes of conveyance under Section
12 of Act No. 1120.
Petitioners argue that there is nothing in Act No. 1120 which requires that the
purchaser be an actual occupant of the subject land at the time of full payment.

Instead, referring to Section 7 thereof, they insist that what is required is that the
purchaser be a bona fide settler or occupant at the time of the sale or lease.
We agree with petitioners.
A careful review of Act No. 1120 fails to yield any provision requiring the
applicant/purchaser to be an actual occupant of the subject land at the time of the
payment of the full purchase price thereon.
On the other hand, the non-payment of the full purchase price is the only recognized
resolutory condition in the case of sale of friar lands. Indeed, it has been held that the
conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called certificate of
sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory
condition that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid in full. 12
That actual occupancy of the subject land is not required in the case of friar lands is
further underscored inPugeda vs. Trias, supra, where a distinction was made between
the sale of friar lands and the sale of public lands under the Public Lands Act, to wit
We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different
from a sale of public lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act. In the
case of public lands, a person who desires to acquire must first apply for the
parcel of land desired. Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If the land is
awarded to an applicant or to a qualified bidder the successful bidder is given a
right of entry to occupy the land and cultivate and improve it (Secs. 22-29,
Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after satisfying the requirements of cultivation
and improvement of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is given a sales patent
(Sec. 30).
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the
certificate of sale in his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in case the
price agreed upon is not paid. . . . .
Thus, while in cases of sale under the Public Land Act, cultivation and improvement of
the land is a requirement before a sales patent may issue to the applicant, no such
similar requirement is found in the case of sale of friar lands. Again, it was reiterated
that such sale is "subject only to cancellation (thereof) in case the price agreed upon is
not paid."

Petitioners next question respondent Court's ruling that even if Mamerto was still a
bona fide settler and occupant thereof, no final conveyance had been effected in his
favor by the government and that without such, his equitable title could not have
ripened into a full and valid title over the lot.
Again, we agree with petitioners. On this point, Bacalzo vs. Pacada,13 is instructive
Petitioners' contention is that their deceased father Carmiano Bacalzo became
the actual owner of the lot in question upon full payment during his lifetime of the
purchase price thereof, and as his legal heirs, they succeeded him in the
ownership of said lot. We find merit in the contention. It is not disputed that the
original purchase price of P200.00 for the lot in question was fully paid on June
17, 1947, with a payment of shortage of interest on August 12, 1948, or before
the death of the purchaser Carmiano Bacalzo on November 5, 1948. All the
requirements of the law for the purchase of the lot having been complied with by
said Carmiano Bacalzo on August 12, 1948, the Government on that date was
legally bound to issue to him "the proper instrument of conveyance" by reason of
section 12 of the Friar Lands Act, providing that
* * * Upon the payment of the final installment together with all accrued
interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said
land so held by him the proper instrument of conveyance in the manner
provided in section 122 of the Land Registration Act. * * *.
The fact that the Government failed to do so cannot, in our opinion, preclude the
now deceased purchaser from acquiring during his lifetime ownership over the lot
in question. It is not the issuance of the deed of conveyance that vests ownership
in the purchaser under the Friar Lands Act. Thus, in the case of Director of
Lands, et al. vs. Rizal, et al., 87 Phil. 806, this Court speaking through Justice
Montemayor, said that "in the sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120, the
purchaser, even before the payment of the full payment price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by law as the actual
owner of the lot purchased under the obligation to pay in full the purchase price,
the role or position of the Government being that of a mere lien holder or
mortgagee."
This is well-supported in jurisprudence, which has consistently held that under Act No.
1120, the equitable and beneficial title to the land passes to the purchaser the moment
the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued. 14 Furthermore, when the
purchaser finally pays the final installment on the purchase price and is given a deed of

conveyance and a certificate of title, the title, at least in equity, retroacts to the time he
first occupied the land, paid the first installment and was issued the corresponding
certificate of sale.15
All told, notwithstanding the failure of the government to issue the proper instrument of
conveyance in favor of Mamerto or his heirs, the latter still acquired ownership over the
subject land.
We now come to the rights of Mamerto's children to the subject land. The pertinent
provision covering the status of the purchased friar land upon the death of the
applicant or purchaser is Section 16 of Act 1120, as amended by Act 2945, which took
effect on February 16, 1921. As amended, Section 16 provides as follows
In the event of death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is provided
for in section twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the Government
to any purchaser, the interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend and
deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands
would have taken had the title been perfected before the death of the holder of
the certificate, upon proof of compliance with all the requirements of the
certificate . . .
The said provision being applicable at the time of the death of Mamerto in 1946, his
interest descended to his heirs.16 And with the death of his wife Maxima in 1947, such
interest was left solely to his three sons.
Re: The Second Assigned Error
Notwithstanding our findings that Mamerto's heirs rightfully owned the subject land and
despite the government's failure to issue the corresponding instrument of conveyance
in their favor, we shall nevertheless discuss the validity of the alleged oral sale of the
subject property to respondent Isabelo dela Torre.
Respondent Isabelo dela Torre claims that he obtained the property from Mamerto by
(1) paying the amortizations thereon and by (2) purchase. However, there is absolutely
no written proof of said sale or assignment. In claiming title to the subject land,
respondent Isabelo dela Torre merely presented a Joint Affidavit allegedly executed by
his father and nephew. This runs counter to the basic rule of evidence that unless the
affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such
affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay.17 Stated differently, the declarants of
written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-

examination. Without the presentation of the affiants in court, whatever matter the Joint
Affidavit contained is hearsay and consequently, without probative value. 18
The Joint Affidavit, which was the sole basis for respondent Isabelo dela Torre's claim
over the subject land, cannot and should not have been given credence, being
hearsay.19 Therefore, as between the verbal claim of respondent Isabelo dela Torre and
the documented claim of petitioners, the latter should clearly prevail.
Isabelo's claim that he paid the annual amortizations to the Bureau of Land beginning
1942 and for six years thereafter, as Mamerto could no longer pay the same, is
doubtful. All receipts during that period were issued not in his name but in Mamerto's
name,20 raising the presumption that the payments were made by the latter. We agree
with petitioners that, otherwise, the receipts should have been issued in Isabelo's name
for the account of Mamerto. Moreover, Isabelo did not have any original copy of the
receipts, only photocopies of the same from the files of the Bureau of Lands. If indeed
he had made the payments he claims to have made, the receipts, at the very least,
should have been in his possession.
Re: The Third Assigned Error
Coming now to the last assigned error, we find that the grant made by the government
of the subject property in favor of respondent Isabelo dela Torre was invalid.
To begin with, granting that Mamerto did sell or transfer his interest in the subject land
to respondent Isabelo dela Torre, it would appear that the requirements under Act No.
1120 for a valid transfer of rights have not been complied with. Section 16 thereof
provides as follows
. . . . In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the land
before having complied with all the conditions thereof, the purchaser from the
holder of the certificate shall be entitled to all the rights of the holder of the
certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands for registration.
And in Arayata vs. Joya,21 this Court warned that "in order that a transfer of the rights of
a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary
that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands for his approval and registration; and that "the law authorizes
no other way of transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands."

In the case at bar, no such assignment or formal certificate of transfer was submitted to
the Bureau of Public Lands for its approval and registration.
In the light of our finding that the Joint Affidavit relied upon by respondent Isabelo dela
Torre in support of his claim is hearsay and has no probative value, the grant of title to
him by the government is void.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the Decisions of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27891 and the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 978 are SET ASIDE.
Let new judgment issue (1) declaring petitioner Martin Pantaleon as the true owner of
the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-257086; (2) canceling Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-257086 as well as the owners' duplicate certificate; (3)
directing the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue a new certificate of title covering
the subject land in the name of Martin Pantaleon; (4) ordering respondent Isabelo dela
Torre to return the amount of P55,000.00 paid by respondents Emilio Andres and
company as purchase price for the litigated property with 12% interest per annum from
May 25, 1979 until fully paid, together with costs of the action.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST

Trinidad v. CA 289 SCRA 189

Facts
Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes Trinidad, who together with Felix and
Lourdes, his siblings, are heirs to four parcels of land of their deceased father. He presented
the following evidence.
a. testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child
b. testimony of Meren that she was present in the marriage of Inocentes
c. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed)
d. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes, until he got married.
Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturios claims:
a. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married
b. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio was simply
a neighbor. She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown
holding the baby of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.

Issue
Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation are sufficient.
Held
Yes. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of
marriage: fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of the
child, and other documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth certificate
cant be produced, other evidence like the baptismal certificate, is admissible. Use of surname
without objection is also presumptive evidence of legitimacy.
CASE FULL: ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX

TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be
proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of
Appeals[1] Decision promulgated on December 1, 1994 [2] and Resolution promulgated on February 8,
1995[3] in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
petitioners action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint [4] for partition and damages
against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First
Instance of Aklan, Branch I. [5] On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not
substituted as a party.[6]
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision [7] in favor of the petitioner, in
which it ruled:[8]

Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate
son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by his
deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this
case. Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving [his] share from
said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as
to what year he stopped receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore
cannot rule on that.

In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and
that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed:[9]

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.

In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioners] complaint and the
counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads: [10]

The Court DENIES defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration, dated December

15, 1994, for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion
that merit the modification of the decision.
Hence, this petition.[11]
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows: [12]

On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance
of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described
therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3)
children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of
land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three
(3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the
defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the onethird (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was
the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was
single when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied that
plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the
complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and
that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the
above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon,
Kalibo Aklan.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three
(23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that the
above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that
he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but defendants
refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby
reproduces pertinent portions of the trial courts decision: [13]

EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she
testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since
1972. She testified that before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of
barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a member of the] board of director[s] of
the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff
because they are neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the
father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were
already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. Witness
recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the
time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters away from
plaintiffs parents[] house and she used to go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows
both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are
the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is
the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she also knows
that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio
Trinidad who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels
subject of this litigation. That she knows all these [parcels of] land because they are
located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness
answered and mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels
belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio
Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his death the land went to his 3
children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned
or divided among the 3 children of Patricio.

A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman
in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby was
identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was
pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio
Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the
same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case,
witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She
testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad
was holding a child which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by
the court when xxx the picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in
1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had
gone to the house of his parents. Witness then identified the certificate of baptism
marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name
of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively, were
marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked. The
signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as
she used to pass by it always. It was located just near her house but she cannot exactly
tell the area as she merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who
took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not know as
she was not present during the picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the
picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only
sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a
widow. She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad and
that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio
Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington,
Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows
Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also owns a
parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting
and harvesting season. That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of
them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited
from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in
possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of the

produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the
one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present. The witness
testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he
was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio
was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken
care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad
wanted to get his fathers share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that
defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and
sister of his father. That the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio
Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother,
Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944
and his mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a
certificate of baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth
certificate was burned during World War 2 but he has a certificate of loss issued by the
Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their
nephew as his mother was already dead. Plaintiffs mother died when he was 13 years
old. They treated him well and provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5
years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the defendants and lived on his own. He got
married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live
with them. So he and his wife and children lived with the defendants. As proof that he
and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to live with them, he
presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes
Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs daughter, his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture
according to him. Another family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle,
defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs son. According to him, these 2 pictures were
taken when he and his wife and children were living with the defendants. That a few years
after having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he
requested for partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked for [a]
lawyer to handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which
parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is
100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries
are : East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and
South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.

Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1
bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are : EastAmbrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio
Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the
deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two
times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones;
South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area
of 540 square meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310
with reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia
Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863
of the cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married to
Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2
is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax
Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is
covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were
getting the share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further
testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They
were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this
Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does
not know because he was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death
certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime. That after the death of
his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and
uncle, the defendants in this case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother
receiving the share of the produce of the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and
Felix Trinidad, are single and they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioners]
highest educational attainment is Grade 3.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed
and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the defendants,
Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being his first cousins because the mother of
Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister and
brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and
Lourdes and he is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad
[died] in 1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That
he knew this fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was
then residing with his aunt, Nanay Taya, referring to Anastacia Briones who is
mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes
Trinidad. That at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to this
witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his children before
1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with
anybody before his death, he answered, That I do not know, neither does he
kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he
can recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with
whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro
Briones, answered that he could not recall because he was then in Manila
working. That after the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia,
at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not
know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes
Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be
a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: I do not know
about that..
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan, he started to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of
their father was located there. When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land
which is the subject matter of this case before the court, witness answered that he
does not know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad,
Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940,
according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65
years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead
before the war. When asked on cross examination if he knew where Inocentes
Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in
their own land because the Japanese forces were roaming around the
place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of the
plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the picture,
which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing

a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when
asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES
TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75 years old, single and jobless. She testified
that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already dead and he died in 1941
in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in
1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died. While his brother was in Manila,
witness testified she was not aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when
he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When asked if she
knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her
because Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she
does not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato
as husband and wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she
said, Yes, but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had lived with them. According to
the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his
grandmother by the name of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato,
having died already. When asked by the court if there had been an instance when
the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered, he did not. When
further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house, witness also said, He
did not.
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that
her parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children, namely:
Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and
Inocentes are already dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the spouses
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that
her brother, Felix Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner
that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and children. She herself
testified that she does not have any family of her own for she has [no] husband or
children. According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried
him in their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was
wartime and the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese
forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that Inocentes
Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and
March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not answer the question. When
she was presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein she
was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she answered; Yes. and the

child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According to
her, she was only requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because
she will be baptized and that the baptism took place in the parish church of
Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she answered; Maybe there was. When
confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture carrying the child, witness
identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child to the
church and that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and
the latters child was taken during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not
have a case in court yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child
marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the child being carried
by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she
does not know because her eyes are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to
identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child held by her
brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his
wife, witness answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight
neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture
for the same reason. When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that the
one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito
Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified
that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the
same manner that she also knew the defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes
all surnamed Trinidad because they were her cousins. She testified that a few
months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lolas house whose
names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad
had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he went home only when his father
fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That according to her, about 1
months after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified
that she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married
to Inocentes Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad
died. According to her she was born in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old
when the war broke out. When asked if she can remember that it was only in the
early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she
[was] not sure. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their
private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody
would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years
old and a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that xxx she knew both the

[petitioner] and the [private respondents] in this case very well as her house is only
around 200 meters from them. When asked if it is true that according to Lourdes
Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15
days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in
the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in
a house which is only across the street from her house. According to the said
rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a
wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was personally present
when couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad
arrived from Manila he was in good physical condition. That she knew both
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that according to her,
their marriage was solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of the
sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato,
Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not
able to present a marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification dated
September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of
births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were
destroyed during the Japanese time.
Respondent Courts Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad,
Respondent Court ruled:[14]

We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient
evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action to
claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the
defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One
witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad

married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized

by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony
(t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the
marriage, nor of Inocentes acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born
on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil.
23). Where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the
property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936,
January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p.
497). Admittedly, the defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land
involved in the concept of owners since their father died in 1940. Even if
possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority, still,
defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring
ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: [15]

1.
Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant
evidence the marriage of his parents.
2.
Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence
to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private
respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3.
Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the
decision of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after
the Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.
4.
Whether or not petitioners status as a legitimate child can be attacked
collaterally by the private respondents.
5.
Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired
ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:

1.
Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents marriage and of his
filiation?
2.
Was petitioners status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the
action for partition?
3.

Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?

The Courts Ruling

The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires
preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedents estate. [16] His right as a
co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and
subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court
holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the
assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral
Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate courts assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in the
face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply
here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this case. [17]
Petitioners first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married,
and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This, according to Respondent Court,
he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias[18] ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has
been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove
the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to
the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention
of such nuptial in subsequent documents. [19]
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification [20] from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan
that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioners
case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union,
petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant
evidence may take its place.[21]
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who
testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New

Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as
husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and
former board member of the local parent-teachers association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidads
house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. [22]On July 21, 1943, Gerardo
dropped by Inocentes house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioners
baptismal party held at the same house. [23] Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation
respecting marriage.[24] It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
[25]
Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were
named as the childs father and mother.[26]
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266.
In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the
filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
ART. 267.
In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[27]
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification [28] that records relative to his birth were either
destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was razed to the ground on
June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal
certificate and Gerardos testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and
his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioners first
daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad
(Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioners first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case
was instituted. Although they do not directly prove petitioners filiation to Inocentes, they show that
petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes legitimate son ante litem motam.
Lourdes denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B
shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioners daughter, she demurred that she did so only
because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized. [29] When shown Exhibit A, she
recognized her late brother -- but not petitioner, his wife and the couples children -- slyly explaining
that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect. [30]
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other
means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled
in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:[31]

What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that
an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, according to the Civil Code, or by
evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father, according to the
Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either
consanguinity or affinity,[32] her testimony does not constitute family reputation regarding
pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioners legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioners positive evidence clearly preponderates over private
respondents self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents thesis is that Inocentes died unwed
and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents witness, Pedro Briones, testified that
Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to
carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese forces. His
testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months,
and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive: [33]

Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was
married or not?
A:

Not married.

Q:

In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?

A:

I was staying with them.

Q:

When you said them, to whom are you referring to [sic]?

A:

My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.

xxx

Q:

A:
Q:

xxx

xxx

Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia
Trinidad and his children before 1940?
For only three months.
Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you
know if he had cohabited with anybody before his death?

A:

[T]hat I do not know.

Q:

You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

A:
Q:

Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of
anybody with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt
Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?

A:

Yes, sir,

Q:

How often did you go to the house of your aunt?

A:

Every Sunday.
xxx

xxx

Q:

You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?

A:

I do not know him.

Q:

A:

xxx

After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has
stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
I do not know about that.

Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the Japanese
occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon because he was
sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without
issue in March 1941, one and a half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato,
who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes. [34]
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of
Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes died in March 1941.
[35]
The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942; [36] thus, it stands to reason that
Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury their
dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area.
[37]

Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without objection from
private respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes legitimate child. [38]
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs
that of the adverse party.[39] Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial
court, Respondent Courts holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is
unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all
the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature
of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their
personal credibility.[40]Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly held that the
weight of evidence was in petitioners favor. It declared:

xxx [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the
status of being their nephew xxx before plaintiff [had] gotten married and had a
family of his own where later on he started demanding for the partition of the share
of his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants xxx
is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were
taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his fathers
share. xxxx His demand for the partition of the share of his father provoked the ire
of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew. xxxx In this case, the
plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only
broken when plaintiff demanded for the partition xxx as he was already having a
family of his own. xxxx.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes
Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the
preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo,
who is the barrio captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the time she
testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA
officer and the court sized her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to
gain in this case as compared to the witness for the defendants who are either
cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant,
Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children.[41]
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. [42] Rather than rely on this axiom,
petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents marriage. Hence, there is no
more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioners cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription

Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested
parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership, and
because private respondents had been in possession -- in the concept of owners -- of the parcels of
land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in
question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the other coowners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. [43] Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a coowner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the
concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the land in
dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond
question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioners
father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in their fathers
name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not
shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested
no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held:[44]

x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect
to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit
prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco,
117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the
other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an
action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del
Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition
may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved
(Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that
petitioners claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No.187683,February 11, 2010

FACTS: That on or about the 18th day of August, 2002, in the
municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to kill his wife Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom
he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, use personal violence
and stab the said Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting the latter on
her trunk and on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting
upon her serious physical injuries which directly caused her death.
HELD: In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the
marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that
he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such
relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against
penal interest. Clearly, then, it was established that Victoriano and
Anna were husband and wife.

FULL CASE:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (APELLEE) VS.

VICTORIANO DE LA CRUZ (APPELANT)
GR NO. 187683

Before this Court is an Appeal,[1] seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision[2] dated October 31, 2008, which affirmed with
modification the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 11, dated August 15, 2005, convicting appellant Victoriano
dela Cruz y Lorenzo[4] (Victoriano) of the crime of Parricide.
The FactS: Victoriano was charged with the crime of Parricide in an
Information[5] dated January 2, 2003, which reads:
That on or about the 18th day of August, 2002, in the municipality of Malolos, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill his wife Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was united in
lawful wedlock, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, use
personal violence and stab the said Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting the latter on her trunk
and on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which
directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, Victoriano, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded

not guilty to the offense charged. [6] Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on August
18, 2002, he and two others, including the aunt of Victoriano, were playing
a card game known as tong-its just three to four arms length away from the
latters house.
While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking his
wife, herein victim Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz [7] (Anna), in front of
their house. Joel knew the wifes name as Joan. Victoriano then
dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's hair, then
slammed the door. Joel overheard the couple shouting while they
were already inside the house.[8]

Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together

with their young daughter. Victoriano was behind Anna, with his arms
wrapped around her. He asked for Joels help. Joel noticed blood spurting
out of Annas mouth. He took the couples daughter and gave her to
Victoriano's

aunt. He

then

went

with

them

to

the Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However,

Anna died.[9]

On the same day, at about 6:30 p.m., Senior Police Officers 1

Condrado Umali and Eligio Jose, responding to the call of duty, went to the
hospital for investigation. There, Victoriano was turned over to the police
officers by the hospital's security guard on duty. [10]

The Certificate of Death,[11] prepared by Police Senior Inspector and

Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray (Dr. Viray), showed that
Victorianos wife died of hemorrhagic shock as a result of a stab wound,
trunk. Moreover, in his Medico-Legal Report [12] dated August 21, 2002, Dr.
Viray had the following findings:

HEAD and NECK:

1) Hematoma, frontal region, measuring 3 x 3 cm, 3 cm right of the anterior
midline.
2) Hematoma, left orbital region,
the
anterior midline.

measuring

2 x 2 cm,

3 cm from

CHEST and ABDOMEN:

1) Stab wound, penetrating, right shoulder region, measuring 2 x .5 cm, 2 cm
right of the posterior midline, about 12 cm deep,
directed lateralwards and
slightly downwards, piercing the
underlying tissues and muscle,
lacerating the upper lobe of the
right lungs.
xxxx
> There are about 2000 cc of blood and blood clots at the thoracic cavity.

UPPER and LOWER EXTREMITIES:

1) Hematoma, distal 3rd of the left forearm, measuring 7 x 4 cm,
bisected by
its posterior midline, with superimposed abrasion, measuring 1.5 x 7 cm,
along its anterior midline.

Version of the Defense

Victoriano testified that, at around 6:30 p.m. on August 18, 2002, he

came home very drunk from a friend's house. Before he could enter their
house, his wife, Anna, started nagging him saying, Hindi ka naman pala
namamasada, nakipag-inuman ka pa. He asked her to go inside their
house but she refused. Thus, Victoriano slapped Anna and dragged her
inside their house.

Due to the continuous nagging of Anna, Victoriano pushed her aside

so he could go out of the house. However, she fell on a jalousie window,
breaking it in the process. When he helped her stand up, Victoriano noticed
that her back was punctured by a piece of shattered glass of the
jalousie. He brought her outside immediately and asked the help of his
neighbors who were playingtong-its nearby. Victoriano admitted that Joel
accompanied him and his wife to the hospital.

At the hospital, Victoriano was taken into custody by policemen for

questioning. It was only in the following morning that Victoriano learned of
his wifes passing.

Victoriano also testified that he does not usually drink; that he

consumed hard liquor at the time of the incident; that Anna was not
immediately treated in the hospital; that he loved his wife; and that he did
not intentionally hurt her.[13]

The Lower Courts Ruling

On August 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Victoriano L. dela Cruz Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
heirs of the late Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz the following sums of money, to wit:

1. P60,000.00 as civil liability

2. P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
3. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Aggrieved, Victoriano appealed to the CA. [15]

On October 31, 2008, the CA affirmed with modification the
findings of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15 August 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court,
Third
Judicial
Region,
Malolos,
Bulacan,
Branch
11,
is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The award of civil indemnity is reduced
to P50,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages is deleted.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Hence, this appeal

In its Manifestation[17] filed before this Court, appellee, People of
the Philippines, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
intimated that it was no longer filing any Supplemental Brief in support of its
position.

Meanwhile, in his Supplemental Brief,[18] Victoriano, as represented by

the Public Attorney's Office, claimed that the CA erred in appreciating Joel's
testimony, since the latter merely testified on the non-mortal wounds that
Anna suffered when the couple were outside the house. Insofar as the actual
killing was concerned, Joel's testimony was merely circumstantial. Moreover,
Victoriano averred that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong
against his wife, evident from the facts that he carried the injured body of
his wife; that he sought for help after the accident; and that he brought her

to the hospital for medical treatment. Furthermore, Victoriano asseverated

that he was very drunk at the time. Thus, he prayed that these mitigating
circumstances be appreciated in his favor.

Our Ruling

The instant appeal is bereft of merit.

The crime of Parricide is defined and punished under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:

Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his
spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.

It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed

by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in
Parricide other than the fact of killing is the relationship of the offender
to the victim. In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage
certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to
the victim, in itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can

be taken as an admission against penal interest. [19] Clearly, then, it was

established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.

Victoriano claims that Joel's testimony coincides with his own, which
refers to the slapping incident that occurred outside their house. It does not
at all point to him as the actual perpetrator of the crime. Thus, Victoriano
submits that Joels testimony is merely circumstantial.

But circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, as we ruled

in People v. Castillo:[20]

Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can
be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity
of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the
guilty person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof
excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind" is required.[21]

In this case, we note the presence of the requisites for circumstantial

evidence to sustain a conviction. First, immediately preceding the killing,
Victoriano physically maltreated his wife, not merely by slapping her as he
claimed, but by repeatedly punching and kicking her. Second, it was
Victoriano who violently dragged the victim inside their house, by pulling
her hair. Third, in Dr. Viray's Report, Anna sustained injuries in different

parts of her body due to Victoriano's acts of physical abuse. Fourth, the
location and extent of the wound indicated Victoriano's intent to kill the
victim. The Report revealed that the victim sustained a fatal stab wound,
lacerating the upper lobe of her right lung, a vital organ. The extent of the
physical injury inflicted on the deceased manifests Victoriano's intention to
extinguish life. Fifth, as found by both the RTC and the CA, only Victoriano
and Anna were inside the house, other than their young daughter. Thus, it
can be said with certitude that Victoriano was the lone assailant. Sixth, we
have held that the act of carrying the body of a wounded
victim and bringing her to the hospital as Victoriano did does noT
manifest innocence. It could merely be an indication of repentance or
contrition on his part.[22]

The foregoing circumstances are proven facts, and the Court finds no
reason to discredit Joels testimony and Dr. Viray's Report. Besides, wellentrenched is the rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal,
inasmuch as the court below was in a position to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying. The Court does not find any arbitrariness or
error on the part of the RTC as would warrant a deviation from this wellentrenched rule.[23]
Even if, for the sake of argument, we consider Victorianos claim that
the injury sustained by his wife was caused by an accident, without
fault or intention of causing it, it is clear that Victoriano was not
performing a lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an accused
may be exempted from criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12
(paragraph 4) of the RPC, the following elements must concur: (1) a
person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes
an injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or
intention of causing it. For an accident to become an exempting
circumstance, the act that causes the injury has to be lawful.
[24]
Victoriano's act of physically maltreating his spouse is definitely not

a lawful act. To say otherwise would be a travesty -- a gross affront to

our existing laws on violence against women. Thus, we fully agree with
the apt findings of the CA, to wit:

With the foregoing avowal, We find that the death of

appellants wife was not caused by mere accident. An accident is
an occurrence that happens outside the sway of our will, and
although it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond
the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. It connotes
the absence of criminal intent. Intent is a mental state, the
existence of which is shown by a persons overt acts.

In the case at bench, evidence disclosed that appellant

started beating his wife outside their house and was even the one
who dragged her inside. This, to Our mind, contradicts his theory
that he only pushed her so as to go out of the house to avoid any
further quarrel. Such incongruity whittles down appellants
defense that he did not deliberately kill his wife. [25]

Finally, a person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must

present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the
commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating
reason.[26] In short, the defense must show that the intoxication is not
habitual, and not subsequent to a plan to commit a felony, and that the
accused's drunkenness affected his mental faculties. In this case, the
absence of any independent proof that his alcohol intake affected his mental
faculties militate against Victorianos claim that he was so intoxicated at the
time he committed the crime to mitigate his liability. In sum, Victoriano
failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in its

assailed Decision. His guilt was sufficiently established by circumstantial

evidence. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed,
considering that there was neither any mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance. The heirs of the victim are entitled to a civil indemnity ex
delicto of P50,000.00, which is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of
the victim and the culpability of the accused for such death. Likewise, moral
damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, should be awarded even in the
absence of allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the victim's
heirs, because certainly the family suffered emotional pain brought about by
Anna's death.

However, the CA erred when it deleted the award of

exemplary damages. In line with current jurisprudence, it is but fitting that

exemplary damages, in the sum of P30,000.00, be awarded, considering
that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this being a case
of Parricide.[28]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC

No. 01575, finding appellant, Victoriano dela Cruzy Lorenzo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz,
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages,
ORDERED.

and P30,000.00

as

exemplary

damages.

No

costs.

SO