Casablanca Conference January 1943 Papers and Minutes of Meetings

MINUTES OF THE WORLD WAR" INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCES
THE WORLD WAR II INTER-AWED CONFERENCES

Declassified by JCS Regrading Memo 52- 73 on October 3, 1973
During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill
formulated allied grand strategy at a series of high-level conferences held in Washington. DC,
Casablanca, Quebec, Cairo. Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. At the Tehran, Yalta. and Potsdam conferences,
the Russian leader. Joseph Stalin, also played a major role. Under policy guidance from their national
leaders, the newly formed US Joint Chiefs of Stall' and their British counterparts, known collectively as
the Combined Chiefs of StafT, hammered out tbe military detlils of allied strategy.
The minutes of the Combined Chiefs'meeting at the major conferences touch on virtually every policy
and strategy issue of World War II, from initial troop deployments to counter Axis aggression, tbrough the
debates about the location aDd timing of the principal Anglo-American ofTensives, to tbe settlement of
post-war occupation boundaries. Besides being an invaluable primary source on the early years of the Joint
Chiefs of Stair and on the planning and conduct of World War II, these documents also ofTer insights for
today on the problems of managing a global coalition war. Originally highlyclassified documents, the min
utes were declassified by JCS Regrading Memo 52-73 on October 3, 1973. The Joint History Office is pub
lishing these minutes on CD-Rom to make them readily available to present-day militlry planners, faculty
and students at the joint and service scbools, historians, and the generdl pUblic.
Historians hal'e served on the Joint StafT and its predecessors since 1945. Created by General Colin
L. Powell in 1993, the Joint History Office provides historical support to the Chairman and,Vice
Chairman of the Joint Cbiefs of StlfT, the Joint Chiefs of StafT, and the Joint StafT. Joint History pub
lications are available in federal depository libraries and can be accessed under History Publications in
tbe Joint Electronic Library on the World Wide Web at http://www.dtic.milldoctrine. Inquiries should
be directed to the Director of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaIr,
Wasbington, DC, 20318- 9999.
~Q.~a=;
DAVIDA. ARMSTRONG
Brigadier General, USA (Ret)
Director for Joint History
ARCADIA (Washington. DC, 24 December 1941-14 January 1942). Roosevelt. Churchill, and
the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staft conducted their first post-Pearl Harbor strategy confer
ence. The political leaders drafted and signed the Declaration of the United Nations. The
military chiefs discussed an invasion of North Africa, completed arrangements for Ameri
can forces to rel ieve British troops in Iceland and Northern Ireland. made plans for Ameri
can reinforcement of the South Pacific, and set up a combined allied command for South
east Asia.
POST-ARCADIA (Washington, DC, and london, 23 January 1941-19 May 1942). At twenty
meetings. the Combined Chiefs of Staff worked out the details of implementing the ARCA
DIA decisions. They dealt with force deployments to the Pacific and Great Britain, com
mand arrangements, and the allocation of shipping and supplies. The Combined Chiefs dis
cussed the U.S. relief of British forces in Iceland and Northern Ireland. arrangements for
the American buildup in the British Isles. and the availability of landing craft for possible
invasions of the European continent in 1942 and 1943.
CASABLANCA CONFERENCE (Casablanca, Morocco, 14-23 January 1943). This was the
first of the great Allied mid-war conferences, with Roosevelt. Churchill, their military
chiefs of staff, and the French leaders Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle in attendance.
In the major U.S .-British debate, the British prevailed. The Allies postponed the cross
Channel invasion until 1944, but organized a combined staff to plan for it. For the immedi
ate future. they would continue the Mediterranean campaign with an invasion of Sicily.
They also decided to launch a combined strategic air offensive against Germany, and the
Americans were to mount a Pacific offensive against Japan. Roosevelt and Churchill
issued the Unconditional Surrender doctrine.
TRIDENT (Washin.gton, DC, 15-25 May 1943). Principal participants were Roosevelt, Churchill,
their military chiefs of staff, and Generals Wavell, Chennault. and Stilwell from the China
Burma-India (CBI) theater. The Americans secured British agreement to a cross-Channel
invasion with a target date of 1 May 1944. The allies reaffirmed their commitment to the
strategic air offensive as preparation for the invasion. They agreed to continue the Mediter
ranean offensive with the aim of knocking Italy out of the war. The Americans won support for
a stepped-up offensive in the Pacific, and the allies discussed operations to assist Chi.na.
future United Nations organization and post-war Polish boundaries. In the Cairo Declaration,
the United States, Britain, and China stated their intention to strip Japan of all her pre-war
and wartime conquests.
OCTAGON (Quebec, 12-16 September 1944). Roosevelt. Churchill, and their military chiefs
QUADRANT (Quebec, 14-24 August 1943). Roosevelt, Churchill, and their military chiefs of
of staff convened in the last of their mid-war conferences . They agreed on British and
American occupation zones in Germany. Roosevelt and Churchill initialed the Morgenthau
Plan for post-war German de-industrialization. Decisions on the Pacific war included
approval of the U.S. invasion of Leyte and plans for British fleet participation in the final
campaigns against Japan.
staff decided that the cross-Channel attack, codename OVERLORD, was to be the main
Anglo-American effort in Europe for 1944, with a target date of 1 May. They approved the
outline plan developed by the combined Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander
(COSSAC) staff and authorized preparations. The combined bomber offensive was to con
tinue with the "highest strategic priority." At the same time, the offensive against Italy was
to continue. Planning was authorized for an invasion of southern France as a companion to
OVERLORD. The allies approved the U.S. schedule of operations in the Central and South
Pacific and established the Southeast Asia Command in the CBI. The leaders discussed the
shift of forces to the Pacific after Germany's defeat and established a twelve-month target
for finishing off Japan after Germany surrendered.
and their military leaders reached agreements on the occupation of Germany and Austria,
including the creation of a French zone in Germany. Roosevelt and Stalin made a secret
agreement on Soviet territorial gains in the Far East in return for Soviet participation in the
war against Japan. The Big Three settled the issues of United Nations voting rights and
Poland's government and frontiers. The three leaders issued a Declaration on Liberated Eu
rope in which they committed themselves to free elections and democratic governments in
the countries freed from the Nazis.
SEXTANT/EUREKA (Cairo and Tehran, 22 November-7 December 1943). Principal partici
TERMINAL (Potsdam, 17 July-2 August 1945). This conference saw a changing of the guard
pants were Roosevelt, Churchill, the U.S. and British chiefs of staff, Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek (Cairo), and Josef Stalin (Tehran). The Americans, British, and Chinese discussed
plans for the CBI. The Big Three (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) stated that OVERLORD and
the invasion of southern France would be the "supreme operations" in the west in 1944.
Stalin promised to attack in the east simultaneously with the cross-Channel invasion. The
Americans and British agreed that General Eisenhower would command the invasion. Stalin
stated that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific war after Germany was defeated . The
allies agreed that the United States would continue its Central and South Pacific drives, in
cluding seizure of the Marianas as a base for B-29 raids on Japan. The allies discussed the
among American and British leaders. Harry S. Truman replaced President Roosevelt, who
had died on 12 April. In mid-conference, Clement Atlee replaced Churchill, whose party had
lost Britain's first post-war election. The conferees discussed surrender terms for Japan,
boundaries and peace terms for Europe, and Poland's frontiers and government. The
Potsdam Declaration reaffirmed the Allies' demand for Japan's unconditional surrender
and divestiture of its empire but promised to respect the human rights of the Japanese
people. Privately, Truman informed Stalin that the United States had successfully tested a
super-bomb.
ARGONAUT (Malta and Yalta, 20 January-ll February 1945). Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin,
39
COPY NO.
3 October 1973
Note by the Secretaries
pursuant
t o the authority contained is JC3 927jb95-3, thc following
bound volumes contatsing the papers and minutes of Meetings of t h e I n t a r natSob&i Conferences hald during World War IT are dowungradcd to
UNCLA56IFIED:
- December 24, 1941 to January 14, 1942

FOST-J\RCADIA - J m U w 23 l9h2 to
19, 3942
ARCADU
CASABLANCA
CONFERENCE
- January 1943 (2
TRID?WT CONFEReNCE
- May lgb3
QUADRANT CONFERENCE
- Auast
V o l ~ c S )
1943
SEXTANT. CONFENCWE
- fovcmber-December
OCTAWN CONFERENCE
1943
September 1944
ARGONAUT CONFERENCE
- Jahuary-Februuy 1945
TWMINAL CONFERENCE
- July 19b5
E. A , WILCOX
D. L . JONES
Jo i n t Secretariat
C A S A B L A N C A
C O N F E R E N C E
J A N U A R Y 1943
PAPERS
AND
MlNUTES
OF
MEETINGS
Edited and firintea i n the
Office, U. S. Secretary,
Office of the Combined ChCefs of Staff
1943
Tbis voluqe Mas prepared under the auspices of

the United S t a t e s Ghiefs of Staff who d e d i c a t e i t t o
the qenory of the l a t e Brigadier Vivian Dykes, GBE,
who served i q Washington as the British S e c r e t a r y
of the Goqbiqed G h i e f s of S t a f f f r o q the t i q e of
o r g a n i z a t i o n , Jaquary, 1942, through tha Gasablanca
Gonfereqce , Jaquary, 1948
U. S. SECRET
BRITISK MOST SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAPERS
C.C.S.
PAGE
75/3
System of Command f o r Combined U . $ . - B r i t i s h
153
Situation? To Be Created I n The Eastern Theater

( T a c i f i c And Burma) I n 1343 (Revised)
153/1
Operations
154
Operations I n Burma, 1943
155
Conduct Of The War I n 1943
155/1
Conduct O f The War In 1343
156
Suggested Procedure For Dealing W i t h The Agenda

Of The Conference
11
.
.
15
P
157
A l l i e d P l a n s Xelating To Turkey
158
Axis O i l P o s i t i o n
159
The Bomber Offensive From North A f r i c a (See Note 159/1)
159/1
Th
f f e n s i v e From Norlth A f r i c a
161
161/1.
Operation HUSKY
162
162/1
U . S. Aid To Russia
lb0
SKY
3.
S i t u a t i o n To Be Created I n The E a s t e r n Theater

( P a c i f i c And Burma) I n 1943
23
%&
58
63
72
U. S. Aid To Russia
75
163
System O f A i r Command I n The Mediterranean
'7 8
154
164/1
Operation ANAKIhG-Provision O f Forces
80
82
165
Draft Telegram To Premier, Stalian (See Note 165/2)
165/1
Draft Telegram To Premier S t a l i n (See Note 165/2)
165/2
Draft Telegram From The P r e s i d e n t O f The United
Operation ANAKII&I--Provision O f Forces
.
.
84
84
S t a t e s And The Prime Minister O f Great B r i t a i n

To Premier S t a l i n
166
The Bomber Offensive From The United Kingdom
166/1/D
167
The Bomber Offensive From Tne United Kingdom

Continental Operations I n 1943
168
Conduct Of The War I n The P a c i f i c Theater I n 1943
169
Proposed Organization O f Command, C o n t r o l , Planning
And Training For Operations For A Reentry To The

Continent Across The Channel, Beginning I n 1943
V
99
U. S o SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAPERS
C.C.S.
170
PAGE
Report To The P r e s i d e n t And Prime M i n i s t e r
Draft Report On T h e Work O f The Conference
170/1
Report To The P r e s i d e n t And Prime M i n i s t e r
170/2
Symbol--Final
102
109
R e p o r t , T o The P r e s i d e n t And
Prime l l i n i s t e r Summarizing D e c i s i o n s By
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
17I
Directive--Operation
171/1/D
D i r e c t i v e To Commander-In-Chief, A l l i e d
E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force I n North Africa--
HUSKY
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY (See Note 171/2/D)

171/2/D
D i r e c t i v e To Commander-In-Chief,
125
127
127
Allied
E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force I n North Africa-Operation HUSKY
172
117
S h i p p i n g C a p a b i l i t i e s For BOLERO Build-up
129
MINUTES
ANFA 1st Meeting
S i t u a t i o n i n North A f r i c a
ANFA 2nd Meeting
The General S t r a t e g i c P o l i c y f o r 1943

ANFA 3 r d Meeting
.
.
.
134
142
154
S e c u r i t y o f Sea Communications
Assistance t o Russia
Operations i n t h e Mediterranean
O p e r a t i o n s i n and from t h e United Kingdom
P a c i f i c and Far East Theater
C.C.S.
5 5 t h Ateeting
169
183
General D i s c u s s i o n o f A l l o c a t i o n o f Resources Based

on Enemy S i t u a t i o n
CoCoS. 5 6 t h Meeting
Combined S t r a t e g y P e r t a i n i n g t o t h e P a c i f i c S i t u a t i o n
vi
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MINUTES
PAGE
C.C.S.
57th Meeting
Ant isubmarine Warfare
S i t u a t i o n i n North A f r i c a
S t r a t e g y i n t h e European Theater
C.C.S. 38th hleeting
. .
195
207
The North African S i t u a t i o n
The S t r a t e g i c Concept f o r 1943 i n t h e European
Theater
S u p p l i e s t o Russia
Employment o f French Forces i n North A f r i c a
C.C.S.
59th Meeting
The E a s t e r n Theater
Iceland
Russian A i r Assistance f o r P.Q. Convoys
C.C.S. 6 0 t h Meeting
225
232
C.C.S.
Operations i n Burma
The S i t u a t i o n t o be Created i n t h e E a s t e r n Theater
( t h e P a c i f i c and Burma) i n 1943
E s c o r t Vessel s
P o t e n t i a l i t i e s o f P o l i s h Forces
Raids on B e r l i n
Naval S i t u a t i o n i n t h e Western Mediterranean
6 1 s t Meeting
248
C.C.S.
Conduct o f t h e War i n 1943

Suggested Procedure f o r Dealing w i t h t h e Agenda o f
t h e Conference
S t r a t e g i c R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and Coinmand Set-up f o r
Dakar -Fr ench West A f r i c a
P u b l i c a t i o n o f R e s u l t s of t h e Conference
52nd Meeting
254
Axis O i l P o s i t i o n
Allied P l a n s R e l a t i n g t o Turkey
Meeting w i t h General Giraud
vii
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S R lrlOST SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
C.CoS. 63rd J f e e t i n g
U.
s.
263
A i d t o Russia
B r i t i s h Z e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Turkey
The Bomber O f f e n s i v e from North A f r i c a
Command i n the Mediterranean

C.C.S.
6 4 t h Meeting
272
HUSKY
C.C,S.
Future Business
6 5 t h Xeeting
The U-Boat War
276
The Bomber O f f e n s i v e from t h e United Kingdom

Draft Telegram t o X - S t a l i n
ANAKJM
BOLERO Suild-up
Report t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r

C.C.S- 66th Meeting
D r a f t Telegram t o M. S t a l i n
292
HUSKY
c c o s ,5 7 t h
hfeeting
Conduct of t h e !Yar i n t h e P a c i f i c Theater i n 1343
300
P r e s s Communique
C o n t i n e n t a l O p e r a t i o n s i n 1943
O r g a n i z a t i o n o f Command, C o n t r o l , P l a n n i n g and
T r a i n i n g f o r Cross-Channel O p e r a t i o n s
Landing Craft
System o f Command f o r Combined U, S . and B r i t i s h

Ope r a t i ons
C.C*S. 5 8 t h Xeeting
3 10
EOLEXO Suild-up
Xeport t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and Prime M i n i s t e r
Operation HUSKY--Directive
C.C.S.
INDEX
t o General Eisenhower
Landing Craft
5 9 t h Meeting
Xeport t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and Prime M i n i s t e r
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY--Directive t o General Eisenhower
A s s a u l t Shipping
Conclusion o f t h e Conference
viii
3 14
3 19
IT. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
75/3
October 24, 1942
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SYSTEM OF COMMAND FOR COMBINED U. S,-BRITISH OPERATIONS
(Previous reference:
(a) C.C.S.
3 8 t h Meeting, I t e m 3)
Report by Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s
1.
The e n c l o s u r e , p r e p a r e d b y t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s i n accord
ance w i t h r e f e r e n c e ( a ) , is p r e s e n t e d f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e Combined
Chiefs o f S t a f f . Annex "A", a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o , p r e s e n t s g r a p h i c a l l y t h e
p r i n c i p l e s of u n i f i e d command as c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r e p o r t .
2.
The U. S o Navy members of t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s state t h a t
while t h i s paper does n o t i n i t s e n t i r e t y accord w i t h t h e i r v i e w s , i t i s

believed t h a t i t p r e s e n t s t h e b e s t agreement which can be r e a c h e d a t t h i s
time. The U. S. Navy members b e l i e v e t h a t t h e s t a t u s o f t h e a s s i s t a n t s t o

Supreme Commander, because of t h e p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e i r func
t i o n s , may r e s u l t i n a c t u a l l y i n t e r p o s i n g an a d d i t i o n a l element i n t h e
chainofcommand which would l i m i t t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e Supreme Comnander.
ENCLOSURE
SYSTEM OF UNIFIED COMMAND FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

DEFINITIONS :
1.
U n i f i e d command i s t h e c o n t r o l , e x e r c i s e d by a d e s i g n a t e d com
mander, over a f o r c e i n t e g r a t e d from combined and j o i n t f o r c e s a l l o c a t e d
to him f o r t h e accomplishment o f a m i s s i o n o r t a s k . T h i s f o r c e w i l l
include a l l t h e means c o n s i d e r e d n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e m i s s i o n ' s s u c c e s s f u l
e x e c u t i o n . U n i f i e d command v e s t s i n t h e d e s i g n a t e d commander, t h e re
s p o n s i b i l i t y and a u t h o r i t y t o c o n t r o l t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f a l l a r m s a n d
s e r v i c e s composing h i s f o r c e , by t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t a s k f o r c e s , as
signment o f m i s s i o n s , d e s i g n a t i o n of o b j e c t i v e s , and t h e e x e r c i s e of
such c o n t r o l a s he deems necessary t o i n s u r e t h e s u c c e s s of h i s mission.
U n i f i e d command d o e s n o t a u t h o r i z e t h e commander e x e r c i s i n g i t , t o
c o n t r o l t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and d i s c i p l i n e o f any f o r c e s o f t h e United
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
N a t i o n s composing h i s command, beyond t h o s e n e c e s s a r y f o r e f f e c t i v e
control.
2.
The t e r m " j o i n t " r e f e r s t o p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f f o r c e s from two o r
more of t h e a r m s
3.
(U.
S.) o r s e r v r c e s
( B r i t i s h ) o f one n a t i o n .
The t e r m ncombinedn r e f e r s t o t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of f o r c e s of two
or more of t h e United Nations.

SUPREME COMMANDER:
1.
I n c a s e s where t h e governments c o n c e r n e d s o d e c i d e , a Supreme
Commander w i l l b e a p p o i n t e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s when f o r c e s of more t h a n one
of t h e United N a t i o n s a r e t o b e employed on a s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n o r t a s k .
5.
H e w i l l b e a p p o i n t e d b y agreement between t h e governments con
c e r n e d a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e moment a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n t o u n d e r t a k e
an o p e r a t i o n h a s been made.
6.
Be w i l l e x e r c i s e u n i f i e d command o v e r a l l f o r c e s of t h e U n i t e d
Nations a l l o c a t e d t o h i s o p e r a t i o n .
7.
He w i l l b e t h e r e c i p i e n t of a l l major d i r e c t i v e s p e r t a i n i n g t o
t h e arms and s e r v i c e s of h i s f o r c e .
8.
Out of t h e means a l l o c a t e d t o him, he w i l l o r g a n i z e t a s k f o r c e s
as n e c e s s a r y , d e s i g n a t e t h e i r commanders, and a s s i g n t h e major t a s k s t o

be performed by e a c h
9.
He w i l l be a s s i s t e d by a s m a l l composite s t a f f which w i l l i n c l u d e
i n p r i n c i p l e a Chief of S t a f f , a P l a n n i n g D i v i s i o n , an O p e r a t i o n s Divi
s i o n , a n I n t e l l i g e n c e D i v i s i o n , a L o g i s t i c a l D i v i s i o n , and a Communica
t i o n s C e n t e r , E a c h n a t i o n i n v o l v e d and e a c h of t h e s e v e r a l component
arms o r s e r v i c e s of t h e f o r c e w i l l b e r e p r e s e n t e d on t h e s t a f f i n o r d e r
t o i n s u r e a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s , r e q u i r e m e n t s , and l i m i
t a t i o n s o f e a c h component.
LAND, NAVAL AND A I R COMMANDERS:

10.
The o f f i c e r a p p o i n t e d b y t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f as t h e
S e n i o r O f f i c e r o f e a c h combined a r m o r s e r v i c e n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l o c a t e d
t o t a s k f o r c e s b y t h e Supreme Commander, w i l l a d v i s e t h e Supreme Com

mander on t h e b e s t u s e o f h i s own combined a r m o r s e r v i c e .
11.
These Commanders w i l l c a r r y o u t t h e i r d u t i e s a t t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s
of t h e Supreme Commander u n l e s s s p e c i f i c a l l y o r d e r e d o t h e r w i s e b y him,

TASK FORCE COMMANDERS :
12.
T a s k F o r c e Commanders w i l l o r g a n i z e t h e i r commands as may b e
n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e t a s k s a s s i g n e d - Sub-Task F o r c e
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH ,YOST S E C R E T
Commanders w i l l be d e s i g n a t e d asmay b e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e
subordinate t a s k s a s s i g n e d . The p r i n c i p l e o f u n i f i e d command w i l l a p p l y
throughout
13.
The o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t a s k f o r c e s w i l l b e governed by t h e n a t u r e
of the o p e r a t i o n s t o b e performed. The t a s k f o r c e s w i l l i n c l u d e a l l t h e

elements--land,
a i r and n a v a l - - n e c e s s a r y
f o r t h e accomplishment of t h e
task. The appointment of t h e Task F o r c e Commanders, s u b o r d i n a t e a s w e l l

as major, w i l l b e governed by t h e n a t u r e of t h e t a s k a s s i g n e d ,
major arm o r s e r v i c e i n v o l v e d i n i t s performance, i . e . ,
and t h e
whether prepon
derantly land, a i r o r naval.
INTEGRITY OF NATIONAL UNITS:

14.
I n s o f a r as c o n d i t i o n s w i l l p e r m i t , t a s k f o r c e s w i l l be composed
of units o f t h e same n a t i o n a l i t y . When o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f one n a t i o n s e r v e

under t h e command o f an o f f i c e r of a n o t h e r , t h e p r i n c i p l e w i l l b e main
t a i n e d t h a t s u c h o r g a n i z a t i o n s s h a l l b e k e p t i n t a c t and n o t s c a t t e r e d
among o t h e r u n i t s .
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
ANNEX " A "
I
NOTE.'
INDICATES
0
INDICATES
U.S.
BRIT.
SUB TASK FORCE COMDR.

I
L
U. S - SECRET
C.C.S. 153 (Revised)
J a n u a r y 17, 1943
SITUATION TO BE CREATED I N THE EASTERN THEATER

(PACIFIC AND BURMA) I N 1943
Note by t h e S e c r e t a r i e s
A t t h e i r 5 6 t h meeting, t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f d i r e c t e d t h e
Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s " t o r e p o r t , on t h e b a s i s t h a t Germany i s t h e
p r i m a r y enemy, what s i t u a t i o n do we wish t o e s t a b l i s h i n t h e E a s t e r n
Theater (i.e
t h e P a c i f i c and Burma) i n 1943 and what f o r c e s w i l l b e
necessary t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t s i t u a t i o n , "
E n c l o s u r e "A" is a p a r t i a l r e p o r t on t h e above d i r e c t i v e p r e p a r e d
by t h e J o i n t U, S . S t a f f P l a n n e r s which h a s been d i s c u s s e d a t a meeting
of t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s
E n c l o s u r e "B" i s a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e p a r t i a l r e p o r t g i v e n i n
Enclosure "A" p r e p a r e d by t h e J o i n t U
S . S t a f f Planners
V
DYKES,
DEANE,
Combined S e c r e t a r i a t
ENCLOSURE "A"
(NAMELY PACIFIC AND BURMA)
I N 1943
ASSUMPTIONS:
1.
The Combined P l a n n e r s assume

t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e of t h e b a s i c g l o b a l s t r a t e g y is
t o b r i n g t h e war t o a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n a t t h e e a r l i e s t
practicable date;
t h a t i n g a i n i n g t h i s o b j e c t i v e e f f o r t s m u s t be made toward
t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e economic and m i l i t a r y power of a l l our
a d v e r s a r i e s a t a r a t e exceeding t h e i r power of replacement;
t h a t Germany i s recognized as t h e primary or most p o w e r f u l
4
U.
S. SECRET
and p r e s s i n g enemy;
and t h a t t h e m a j o r p o r t i o n o f t h e f o r c e s o f the U n i t e d
Nations a r e t o be d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Germany i n s o f a r a s i t i s con
s i s t e n t w i t h the over-all
o b j e c t i v e of b r i n g i n g t h e war t o a n
e a r l y conclusion a t the e a r l i e s t possible d a t e .
2.
T e n t a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n s a r e made
t h a t t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n as between R u s s i a and J a p a n w i l l
continue,
and t h a t t h e Chinese w i l l c o n t i n u e i n t h e war i f s u f f i c i e n t
s u p p o r t i s f u r n i s h e d by G r e a t B r i t a i n and t h e t l n i t e d S t a t e s i n
t h e way of s u p p l i e s and equipment.
SITUATION T O BE CREATED:
3.
he c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e accomplishment of t h e o v e r - a l l
objective,
as well a s t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s e c u r i t y of our p o s i t i o n i n t h e Pa
c i f i c , r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e b e k e p t under c o n t i n u a l p r e s s u r e s u f
f i c i e n t i n power and e x t e n t t o a b s o r b t h e d i s p o s a b l e J a p a n e s e m i l i t a r y
effort
4.
The United N a t i o n s ' p o s i t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c a r e extended o v e r a
l i n e roughly 12,000 m i l e s l o n g - - f r o m t h e B e r i n g
Sea, t h r o u g h t h e Hawaiian
I s l a n d s , Samoa, F i j i , New Guinea and Korthwest A u s t r a l i a , t o S i n g a p o r e .

The J a p a n e s e , s t r o n g l y e s t a b l i s h e d , occupy i n t e r i o r l i n e s which p e r m i t
o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n by t h e i r mobile f o r c e s a g a i n s t any of t h e A l l i e d p o s i
t i o n s - - u n l e s s t h e s e mobile f o r c e s a r e d e n i e d freedom of a c t i o n
The l ' n i t e d Nat,ions' p o s i t i o n s have d e p t h a t c e r t a i n p o i n t s , a s
i n Alaska, Hawaii, and N e w C a l e d o n i a , New Guinea. The p o s i t i o n s between

Hawaii and New C a l e d o n i a have l i t t l e d e p t h and a r e s u s c e p t i b l e t o suc
c e s s f u l enemy a t t a c k , i f t h e s e a t t a c k i n g f o r c e s a r e f r e e t o move, Some
of the United K a t i o n s ' p o s i t i o n s
( i o e , yon t h e l a r g e r i s l a n d s ) a r e
capable of s t r o n g d e f e n s i v e e s t a b l i s h m e n t s
Other p o s i t i o n s s u c h as t h e
smaller i s l a n d s , l i k e Canton, c a n n o t b e s t r o n g l y d e f e n d e d
Economy i n
d e f e n s i v e s t r e n g t h of t h e l a r g e r i s l a n d s , and s e c u r i t y o f t h e s m a l l e r
i s l a n d s ? r e q u i r e t h a t we m a i n t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e b y o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n ,
This o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n m u s t be d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Japanese o b j e c t i v e s of
s u f f i c i e n t importance t o t h e Japanese a s t o cause J a p a n e s e c o u n t e r a c t i o n ;

they must b e s u f f i c i e n t i n power t o combat s u c c e s s f u l l y t h i s J a p a n e s e
counterac t i on
By t h i s p r o c e s s w e i n t e n d t o p r e v e n t t h e J a p a n e s e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y
U. S. SECRET
f o r c o n s o l i d a t i n g (digging i n ) , t h u s s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , t O a n
e x t e n t t h a t would p e r m i t them t o i n i t i a t e o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n a t t i m e s and
p l a c e s of t h e i r choosing
We c o n s i d e r t h a t J a p a n e s e power I n r e s p e c t t o s h i p p i n g and a i r
c r a f t has been g e t t i n g p r o g r e s s i v e l y weaker; t h a t our a t t a c k s a g a i n s t
7.
s h i p p i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y by s u b m a r i n e s , s h o u l d be pushed t o t h e maximum
e x t e n t p o s s i b l e ; and t h a t our o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s h o u l d be d e s i g n e d t o
e f f e c t a c o n t i n u i n g d e c r e a s e i n Japanese n a v a l and a i r power
To m a i n t a i n the s e c u r i t y of our p o s s e s s i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c and
t o c o n t a i n i n t h e P a c i f i c a r e a t h e J a p a n e s e F l e e t , i t is n e c e s s a r y t o
c o n t i n u e i n t h a t a r e a t h e major p o r t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s F l e e t
TO
g i v e f u l l implementation t o t h i s n a v a l f o r c e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t s u f
f i c i e n t mobile ground f o r c e s , a i r f o r c e s , and s h i p p i n g be a v a i l a b l e i n
t h a t area t o undertake continuing limited offensives against Japanese
p o s s e s s i o n s - The c h a r a c t e r of t h e s e o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s envisaged f o r 1943
are s e t f o r t h i n subsequent paragraphs

9
I n p l a n n i n g t h e s e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c , we t a k e
n o t e t h a t t h e a b i l i t y of t h e United Nations t o p r o j e c t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s
a g a i n s t t h e enemy i n a l l a r e a s i s l i m i t e d by s h i p p i n g
I n the Atlantic
t h e r e is a f u r t h e r s e r i o u s l i m i t a t i o n c a u s e d by t h e l a c k o f a d e q u a t e
numbers of e s c o r t s
U n t i l t h e e s c o r t problem i s improved, t h e amount of
s h i p p i n g which can be moved i n t h e A t l a n t i c i s d e f i n i t e l y l i m i t e d
This
same c o n s i d e r a t i o n of l i m i t a t i o n of e s c o r t c a p a c i t y does n o t a t p r e s e n t
a p p l y t o t h e P a c i f i c , because of comparative absence of submarine menace
i n t h a t area a t t h i s t i m e
10
The a d v e r s e s i t u a t i o n i n r e g a r d t o t h e number of e s c o r t s a v a i l
a b l e i n c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e number of s u b m a r i n e p a c k s o p e r a t i n g i n t h e
A t l a n t i c , a n d t o t h e convoy n e e d s i n t h e A t l a n t i c , w i l l n o t b e g i n t o
show r e l a t i v e improvement b e f o r e October
OPEFlAT IONS :
11-
The p r o s p e c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s t o c r e a t e and m a i n t a i n t h e s i t u a t i o n
i n 1943 s e t f o r t h above a r e :
(a) S e i z u r e and c o n s o l i d a t i o n of U n i t e d N a t i o n s f o r c e s i n t h e
Solomon I s l a n d s , E a s t e r n New Guinea up t o Lae Salamaua pen
i n s u l a , N e w B r i t a i n New I r e l a n d (Rabaul) a r e a .
(b) S e i z u r e and o c c u p a t i o n of Kiska-Agattu
(Western A l e u t i a n s )
(c) S e i z u r e and occupation of G i l b e r t I s l a n d s , Marshall I s l a n d s ,

6
IT. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H XOST S E C R E T
C a r o l i n e I s l a n d s , up t o and i n c l u d i n g T r u k . I t i s p l a n n e d
that t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s w i l l be undertaken subsequent t o

Rahaul.
(d) E x t e n s i o n of o c c u p a t i o n o f Kew Guinea up t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y
t h e Dutch b o r d e r . T h i s w i l l b e a n e x t e n s i o n of t h e T r u k
campaign f o r t h e second p a r t .
ENCLOSURE "B"
(3) Burma

campaign. L i m i t e d o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g p r e s e n t f a v o r a b l e
weather c o n d i t i o n s s u c h as t o p e r m i t improvement of communi
c a t i o n s from I n d i a t o China, t o h e f o l l o w e d by more e x t e n d e d
o p e r a t i o n s towards t h e end o f t h e y e a r w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e of
r e e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e communications a l o n g t h e lower Burma Road.
The o b j e c t i v e of t h i s campaign i s t o s t r e n g t h e n f o r c e s i n
C h i n a w i t h t h e v i e w t o k e e p i n g C h i n a i n t h e war, k e e p i n g
p r e s s u r e on t h e J a p a n e s e i n t h i s a r e a , and t o t h e e s t a b l i s h
ment and o p e r a t i o n o f a i r s t r e n g t h
OIL
Japanese shipping i n
C h i n e s e and I n d o - C h i n a p o r t s a6 w e l l a s o n t h e f l a n k o f
J a p a n e s e s e a communications a l o n g t h e C h i n a c o a s t .
12.
The i n c r e a s e o f f o r c e s i n t h e Pacific-Burma a r e a i n 1913 f o r t h e
o p e r a t i o n s l i s t e d above w i l l depend l a r g e l y on t h e s t r e n g t h of J a p a n e s e
d i s p o s i t i o n s . They w i l l be o f t h i s g e n e r a l o r d e r :
Ground F o r c e s , i n c l u d i n g a i r p e r s o n n e l
T.J.
250,000 t r o o p s
S. and U. K. - 500 a i r p l a n e s
Ravy - The major p o r t i o n o f a d d i t i o n s (by new c o n s t r u c t i o n ) t o
t h e U. S. F l e e t , w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g i n t h e A t l a n t i c p r e s e n t
l a r g e s h i p s t r e n g t h a n d i n c r e a s i n g d e s t r o y e r and a n t i
submarine e s c o r t i n t h e A t l a n t i c .
Increase i n s t r e n g t h of the B r i t i s h Eastern f l e e t s u f f i c e n t t o
s u p p o r t o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t Burma.
Shipping
1,250,000 t o n s
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 17, 1943
153/1

( P A C I F I C AND BURMA) I N 1943
Memorandum by t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f
1.
M
e have been i n s t r u c t e d by t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f t o com
ment on t h e p a p e r by t h e J o i n t U . S . S t a f f P l a n n e r s on t h e s i t u a t i o n t o
b e c r e a t e d i n t h e E a s t e r n T h e a t e r ( P a c i f i c and Burma) i n 1543 (C.C.S.
153).
2.
Our comments are as f o l l o w s :
ASSUMPTIONS:
( a ) f a r a g r a p h 1:
k e f e e l t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be reworded a s f o l l o w s :
"The Combined P l a n n e r s assume t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e
o f t h e b a s i c g l o b a l s t r a t e g y i s t o b r i n g t h e war t o a suc
c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n a t the e a r l i e s t p r a c t i c a b l e d a t e . T h e
q u i c k e s t way o f a c h i e v i n g t h i s w i l l be t o c o n c e n t r a t e on
d e f e a t i n g Germany f i r s t and t h e n t o c o n c e n t r a t e our combined
r e s o u r c e s a g a i n s t J a p a n . h!eanwhile
s u c h p r e s s u r e must be
m a i n t a i n e d i n J a p a n as w i l l p r e v e n t h e r from damaging i n t e r
e s t s v i t a l t o t h e A l l i e s , and w i l l h i n d e r h e r from c o n s o l i
d a t i n g her conquests."
(b) P a r a g r a p h 2:
We concur.
SITUATION To BE CREATED:
( c ) P a r a g r a p h s 3-10:
We a g r e e i n p r i n c i p l e w i t h t h i s e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e s t r a t e g y
r e q u i r e d , p r o v i d e d a l w a y s t h a t i t s a p p l i c a t i o n d o e s not
p r e j u d i c e t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d e f e a t o f Germany.
OPERATIONS :
(d) P a r a g r a p h s 11-12:
Re suggest the following a l t e r n a t i v e :

The o p e r a t i o n s which a r e c e r t a i n l y r e q u i r e d i n 1943 t o cre
a t e and m a i n t a i n t h e s i t u a t i o n s e t f o r t h above are:
[I.
S. SECRET
BRITISH XOST SECRET

( a ) F e i z u r e o f ,
and c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f u n i t e d Nations f o r c e s i n
t h e Solomons, E a s t e r n N e w Guinea up t o t h e Lae-Salamaua
p e n i n s u l a , New Britain-New I r e l a n d (Rabaul) area.
(b) Burma--Limited
operations during the present favorable
we a t h e r p e r i o d :
(1) T o r e c a p t u r e a n d e s t a b l i s h a i r f o r c e s a t Akyab
(Cannibal).
(2) T o e s t a b 1 . i s h a b r i d g e h e a d i n t h e Chindwin V a l l e y so
t h a t , when a n a t t a c k on Rangoon i s m a d e , s i m u l t a n e o u s
p r e s s u r e c a n be e x e r t e d on Mandalay (Ravenous).
(3) T o c o n s t r u c t t h e Hukawng V a l l e y r o a d from Led0 t o
M i j i t k y i n a and L u n g l i n g .
The a d d i t i o n s t o p r e s e n t f o r c e s i n t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r r e q u i r e d
for t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s must depend upon t h e s t r e n g t h of J a p a n e s e d i s p o s i
t i o n s b u t w i l l be of t h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l o r d e r :
.. :........
A i r c r a f t . ...............
Navy ....................
Amphibious f o r c e s .......
Shipping ................
Ground f o r c e s
No f o r c e s a d d i t i o n a l t o t h o s e now p r e s e n t w i l l b e r e q u i r e d i n
Burma.
12.
With t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o m p l e t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i o n s o u t l i n e d i n t h e
preceding p a r a g r a p h , a new o f f e n s i v e w i l l be n e c e s s a r y i f w e are t o re

t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e and t h e r e b y c o n t a i n d i s p o s a b l e J a p a n e s e s t r e n g t h .
Detailed p l a n s f o r undertaking t h e following f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s ,
though n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n t h e o r d e r g i v e n , s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e mad.e;
b u t , s i n c e t h e t i m i n g must depend upon t h e s p e e d w i t h which t h e e a r l i e r
o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Rabaul-New Guinea a r e a a r e concluded, a d e c i s i o n wheth
e r o r n o t t o l a u n c h t h e s e f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d b e t a k e n by t h e Com
bined C h i e f s of S t a f f l a t e r i n t h e y e a r .
(a) The s e i z u r e and o c c n p a t i o n of Kiska-Agattu
(b) The s e i z u r e and o c c u p a t i o n of
(Western A l e u t i a n s ) .
t h e G i l b e r t I s l a n d s , b!arshall
I s l a n d s , C a r o l i n e I s l a n d s up t o and i n c l u d i n g Truk.
( c ) E x t e n s i o n of o c c u p a t i o n o f N e w G u i n e a up t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y
t h e Dutch b o r d e r .
campaign.
T h i s w i l l be a n e x t e n s i o n o f t h e T r u k
U.
S. SECRET
For t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s t h e a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s r e q u i r e d w i l l be of
t h e order of:
Ground f o r c e s . .
.....
............
Navy ................
Aircraft
Amphibious f o r c e s . .
Shipping
............
13.
D e t a i l e d p l a n s for o p e r a t i o n s t o reopen t h e Burma Road (ANAKIkl)
d u r i n g t h e winter o f 1913-44 w i l l a l s o b e made. I t i s n o t p o s s i b l e a t

t h i s stage t o s a y by when t h e f o r c e s r e q u i r e d for t h i s o p e r a t i o n could be
p r o v i d e d without d e t r a c t i n g s e r i o u s l y from t h e d e f e a t of Germany. Orders
f o r t h e c o m p l e t i o n of f u l l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r e p a r a t i o n s by O c t o b e r 1,
1943, have, however, a l r e a d y been g i v e n and p l a n n i n g i s p r o c e e d i n g i n
India.
The f o r c e s a d d i t i o n a l t o t h o s e now i n t h e t h e a t e r r e q u i r e d f o r
t h i s o p e r a t i o n must depend upon enemy s t r e n g t h and d i s p o s i t i o n s a t t h e
time h u t w i l l be of t h e f o l l o w i n g order:
Ground f o r c e s . . . . . . .
Nil
Aircraft............
Rival forces..
18 squadrons
.... Covering
f o r c e s a s may be found neces
s a r y i n t h e l i g h t of t h e n a v a l s i t u a
t i o n a t t h e t i m e . As much as p r a c t i c
a b l e would b e found from B r i t i s h re
sources.
6-8 E s c o r t C a r r i e r s
40 D e s t r o y e r s or E s c o r t V e s s e l s
Amphibious f o r c e s . . . A s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and l a n d i n g c r a f t suf
f i c i e n t t o l i f t 4 I n f . B r i g a d e Groups
and 1 Armored B r i g a d e .
Shipping
............ 6
0 MT
ships
20 P e r s o n n e l s h i p s
14.
I t i s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t h e n a v a l and amphibious
f o r c e s r e q u i r e d for s i m u l t a n e o u s Truk and Anakim o p e r a t i o n s c a n n o t b u t

r e a c t a d v e r s e l y on t h e e a r l y d e f e a t of Germany. I t may be p o s s i b l e t o
c a r r y out one of t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s w i t h o u t such a v i o l a t i o n of our agreed
s t r a t e g y . The d e c i s i o n as t o t h e r i g h t c o u r s e of a c t i o n should be t a k e n
l a t e r i n t h e l i g h t of t h e development of t h e war.
10
S. S E C R E T
BRITISH MOST S E C R E T
0.
C.C.S. 1.54
J a n u a r y 17, 1913

OPERATIONS I N BURMA, 1943
R e p o r t by B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f
THE BURMA ROAD:

1.
The r e c o n q u e s t o f Burma s h o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n a s s o o n a s r e
sources w i t h i n t h e e x i s t i n g s t r a t e g i c p r i o r i t i e s p e r m i t .
2.
The o u t s t a n d i n g t o p o g r a p h i c a l f e a t u r e g o v e r n i n g o p e r a t i o n s i n
Burma i s t h a t a l l main communications r u n n o r t h from Rangoon.

P r i o r t o t h e J a p a n e s e o c c u p a t i o n , s u p p l i e s reached China by t h e
so-called "Burma Road" :
(a) ~ a n g o o n - ~ ~ a n d a l a y - L a s h i(or i v e r , r a i l and road)
(b) Lashio-Lungling-Yurinanyi-Iiunming-Chungking ( r o a d )
It i s t h e o n l y trans-Burma r o u t e by which China c a n r e c e i v e s u b s t a n t i a l

s u p p l i e s . The c a p t u r e of i:angoon and Mandalay must be e f f e c t e d b e f o r e i t
can be reopened.
JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS:
3.
The J a p a n e s e r e l y on s e a communications t o Rangoon t o m a i n t a i n
the 4 t o 5 d i v i s i o n s t h e y now have i n Burma. They a r e , however, develop

ing o v e r l a n d r o u t e s - - r a i l
and road--from
T h a i l a n d , and t h e s e a r e a l r e a d y
s u f f i c i e n t t o e n a b l e them t o m a i n t a i n 3 d i v i s i o n s o p e r a t i n g i n Burma.
Communications i n Burma a l l o w t h e J a p a n e s e t o m a i n t a i n l a r g e r
f o r c e s i n t h e Mandalay area t h a n t h e B r i t i s h c a n m a i n t a i n a c r o s s t h e
Assam f r o n t i e r .
OPERATIONS J A N U A R Y - A P R I L
4.
1943:
F i e l d ? ; a r s h a l N a v e l 1 i s now c a r r y i n g o u t c e r t a i n o p e r a t i o n s
which a r e n e c e s s a r y p r e l i m i n a r i e s t o t h e reconquest, of Burma. These a r e :

(a) O p e r a t i o n CANNIBAL f o r t h e r e c a p t u r e o f , and e s t a b l i s h m e n t
o f a i r f o r c e s a t , AKYAF- T h i s o p e r a t i o n h a s s t a r t e d .
(b) O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t b y I V Corps
(two
d i v i s i o n s ) of a b r i d g e h e a d i n t h e Chindwin v a l l e y s o t h a t
when a n a t t a c k on Rangoon i s made, s i m u l t a n e o u s p r e s s u r e can
b e e x e r t e d on hiandalay.
(The r o u t e s from A s s a m s o u t h t o t h e
Chindwin R i v e r w i l l n g t s u p p o r t more t h a n two d i v i s i o n s . )
11
U. S . SECRET
C e r t a i n Chinese f o r c e s were t o h a v e c o o p e r a t e d i n t h i s opera

t i o n , b u t t h e i r cooperationnow a p p e a r s u n c e r t a i n . The opera
t i o n b y I V Corps w i l l s t a r t i n F e b r u a r y 1943,
Both t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be completed b e f o r e t h e monsoon b r e a k s i n
May 1943. I t i s hoped t h a t RdVENOUS w i l l draw o f f some Japanese p r e s s u r e
from t h e Southwest P a c i f i c . .
OVERLAND COMMUNICATIONS W I T H C H I N A :
5.
N e i t h e r o f t h e s e p r e l i m i n a r y o p e r a t i o n s w i l l however r e e s t a b l i s h
l a n d communication w i t h China, whose r e t e n t i o n i n t h e war i s a g r e e d t o

be o f g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e .
A p a r t from t h e Burma Road p r o p e r ,
t h e o n l y m e t h o d s b y which
s u p p l i e s might r e a c h China appear t o b e :

(a) The Hukawng V a l l e y r o u t e from Led0 v i a S h i n g b w i y a n g and
Myitkina t o Lungling--thence
n o r t h e a s t w a r d s b y t h e "Burma
Road" p r o p e r .
An a l l - w e a t h e r ,
one-way
r o a d h a s b e e n s t a r t e d and t h e i n
t e n t i o n i s t o improve i t t o two-way as h e l p from U.S.A.
t e c h n i c i a n s and equipment become a v a i l a b l e -
Latest advices a r e t h a t the all-weather

way--will
route--one
o r two
n o t r e a c h Shingbwiyang u n t i l t h e w i n t e r of19.13-44;
a l t h o u g h i t may b e p o s s i b l e t o p u s h t h r o u g h a d r y - w e a t h e r
t r a c k a s f a r as M y i t k i n a a f t e r t h e monsoon of 1 9 4 3 ,
During c o n s t r u c t i o n i t w i l l n o t be p o s s i b l e t o m a i n t a i n more
t h a n one b r i g a d e g r o u p ( o r two C h i n e s e d i v i s i o n s ) on t h i s
road i n a d d i t i o n t o l a b o r " There w i l l t h e r e f o r e be great
d i f f i c u l t y i n arranging its protection, especially i n the
M y i t k i n a a r e a where J a p a n e s e f o r c e s c a n b e m a i n t a i n e d b y
r a i l and a l l - w e a t h e r r o a d ,
(b)
A i r transport:
I t i s recommended t h a t t h e a i r t r a n s p o r t r o u t e s h o u l d b e
m a i n t a i n e d s i n c e i t i s t h e most immediate means o f b r i n g i n g
a i d t o China.
RECONQUEST OF BURMA (Operation ANAKIM) :
6.
The r e c o n q u e s t of Burma w i l l n o t b e p o s s i b l e b e f o r e t h e w i n t e r
of 1943-44 a t t h e e a r l i e s t , I t i n v o l v e s :
(a) The r e c a p t u r e of Rangoon..
(b) The c a p t u r e of t h e Moulmein a r e a w i t h a view t o b l o c k i n g
12
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H IYOST S E C R E T
J a p a n e s e o v e r l a n d r e i n f o r c e m e n t s from T h a i l a n d .
( c ) C o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h ( a ) and ( b ) a b o v e , p r e s s u r e by B r i t i s h
f o r c e s from Chindwin R i v e r b r i d g e h e a d s , and i f p o s s i b l e b y
C h i n e s e f o r c e s from Ynnnan, a g a i n s t Mandalay.
(d) The d e f e a t o f t h e J a p a n e s e f o r c e s i n Lower Burma, i . e . ,
Rangoon-Mandalay
the
area.
Plans f o r t h i s r e c o n q u e s t a r e known as O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM.

f o r c e s r e q u i r e d f o r ANAKIM are approximately:
Naval
6-6 E s c o r t Carriers
40 D e s t r o y e r s and e s c o r t s
8 Submarines
6 F l e e t mine sweepers
i n a d d i t i o n t o s u c h c o v e r by heavy f o r c e s as i s r e q u i r e d by
t h e s i t u a t i o n a t t h e time.
Army
8 Infantry Divisions
1 Armored D i v i s i o n
Air
28 Bomber Squadrons
17 F i g h t e r Squadrons
4 C o a s t a l Squadrons
Assault Shipping )
(4 i n f . bde. groups)
and Landing Craft) to l i f t ( l armored b r i g a d e )
assault
loaded.
The a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g a n d l a n d i n g c r a f t f o r t h e s e a s s a u l t s
amount t o :
9 L.S.I. (L)
10 L.S.T.
4 L.S.D.
inn
or L.S.G.
L.C.A.
C.P.
1c, >:
120 L.C.E.
16 L.C.S.
NOTE:
( 1 ) I f L.C.T.
c a n b e made a v a i l a b l e t h e numbers of
L.S.T.
could be reduced i n t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f o n e
L.S.T.
f o r e v e r y f o u r L.C.T.
( 2 ) Landing c r a f t a d d i t i o n a l t o t h e above w i l l prob

a b l y be r e q u i r e d f o r maintenance of f o r c e s a s h o r e
u n t i l i t i s possible t o bring p o r t s i n t o use.
13
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H WOST S E C R E T
(e) Shipping
60 MT s h i p s
POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT " A N A X I M "
I N WINTER OF 1943-44:
heather:
8.
O p e r a t i o n s c a n n o t s t a r t b e f o r e a b o u t November 1, 1943, and must
be c o n c l u d e d b y A p r i l 3 0 , 1 9 1 1 , o n a c c o u n t o f t h e monsoon. To t a k e
Rangoon and hloulmein, c l e a r t h e whole o f S o u t h e r n Burma up t o Mandalay,
and reopen t h e Burma Road from klandalay t o L a s h i o , i t is e s t i m a t e d t h a t
t h e a s s a u l t must t a k e p l a c e a t t h e l a t e s t i n e a r l y December 1943.
To s e i z e and c o n s o l i d a t e t h e Rangoon-Moulmein
a r e a only, the
i n i t i a l a s s a u l t m i g h t b e p o s t p o n e d u n t i l t h e e n d o f J a n u a r y 1911.
A v a i l a b i l i t y of B r i t i s h I'orces:
9.
(a) Kaval
The B r i t i s h might be a b l e t o f i n d t h e c a p i t a l s h i p s and c a r
r i e r s r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s o p e r a t i o n , p r o v i d e d n o o t h e r am
p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n s were b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t c o n c u r r e n t l y i n
t h e European o r M e d i t e r r a n e a n t h e a t e r s ,
They would however r e q u i r e , u n d e r a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , con
s i d e r a b l e h e l p from American l i g h t n a v a l f o r c e s .
S u b s e q u e n t l y , i t w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o keep open t h e s e a com
m u n i c a t i o n s t o Rangoon~,
(b) Army
These w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e i n I n d i a by October 1 9 4 3 - - i n c l u d i n g
the brigades required t o b e t r a i n e d f o r the i n i t i a l a s s a u l t s .
(c) A i r
The a i r f o r c e s r e q u i r e d c o u l d b e made a v a i l a b l e i n t h e
I n d i a n t h e a t e r b y November 1913.
(d) A s s a u l t S h i p p i n g and L a n d i n g C r a f t
(1) If NO major amphibious o p e r a t i o n s are c a r r i e d o u t e l s e
where i n 1 9 4 3 , t h e a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and l a n d i n g c r a f t
c o u l d b e found b y t h e B r i t i s h by O c t o b e r 1, 1 9 1 3 ,
(2) If O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE is c a r r i e d o u t n o t l a t e r t h a n t h e
end of J u n e 1 9 1 3 3 and no o t h e r a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n
takes place,
t h e a s s a u l v s h i p p i n g and l a n d i n g c r a f t
c o u l d b e found b y t h e B r i t i s h b y December 1, 1 9 4 3 , i n
I n d i a n w a t e r s . T h i s would p e r m i t o f an a s s a u l t on Ran
goon a b o u t December 30, 1943.
U. S. YECRET
BRITIM .YOST S E L I ET
( 3 ) I f HUSKY i s c a r r i e d o u t a f t e r cJurre 1 9 ? 2 - - o r
any ot,her
o p e r a t i o n , such a s t h e Dodecanese, i n a d d i t i o n t,n HKI?>fSTONE--it

sklippirlg
w i l l riot tie p o s s i b l e t,o p r o v i d e t,he a s s a u l t

ail(?
l a n d i n g c r a f t f o r ANAKIM from l i r i t i s h
s o u r c e s u n t i l about r e b r u a r y 19M.
(?) I f O p e r a t i o n AKAKIbl i s c a r r i e d o u t w i t l i H r i t i s l i a s s a u l t
s h i p p i n g an6 l a n d i n g c r a f t a t any time d u r i n g t h e wint,er

1943-4!:,
i t would s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l t h e B r i t i s h s h a r e o f
any cross-charniel o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e e a r l p s p r i n g o f 194%.
( e ) Shipping

T i l e a v a i l a b i l i t y of' s h i p p i n g cannot be f o r e c a s t now, b u t the
U.S.A.
w i l l have t o p r o v i d e a p a r t .
15
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S.
155
J a n u a r y 18, 1913
CONDUCT OF THE WAR I N 1943
I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e Combined C h i e f s o f
S t a f f a t t h e i r 6 O t k l m e e t i n g , a d r a f t memorandum s e t t i n g o u t t h e t e n t a
t i v e a g r e e m e n t s a l r e a d y r e a c h e d h a s b e e n p r e p a r e d and i s c i r c u l a t e d
herewith for c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t t h e n e x t meeting.
DYKES,
J . R. DEANE,
ENCLOSURE
DRAFT MSMORANDUM
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f have a g r e e d t o submit t h e f o l l o w
i n g recommendations f o r t h e conduct o f t h e war i n 1943.
1.
SECURITY:
The d e f e a t o f t h e U-boat
must remain a f i r s t c h a r g e on t h e r e
s o u r c e s o f t h e United K a t i o n s .
2.
OPERATIONS I N THE EUROPEAN THEATER:

O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e European T h e a t e r w i l l b e c o n d u c t e d w i t h t h e
o b j e c t of d e f e a t i n g Germany i n 1943 w i t h t h e maximum f o r c e s t h a t can be

brought t o b e a r upon h e r by t h e United N a t i o n s .
3.
The f i v e main l i n e s of o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n w i l l be:

I n t h e Mediterranean:
( a ) The o c c u p a t i o n of S i c i l y w i t h t h e o b j e c t of:
(1) E a k i n g t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n l i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s more
secure.
(2) D i v e r t i n g German p r e s s u r e from t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t .
(3) I n t e n s i f y i n g t h e p r e s s u r e on I t a l y .
(b) To c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n i n which Turkey c a n b e e n l i s t e d a s

16
U. S. S E C R E T
BRITIS8 MOST
SECRE?
an a c t i v e a l l y .
In t h e 11. I<. :
( c ) '!tie
h e a v i e s t p o s s i b l e bomber o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t Germany.
(d) Such l i m i t e d o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a s may b e p r a c t i c a b l e
w i t h the forces available.
(e) The assembly of t h e s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e f o r c e ( s u b j e c t t o (a)

and ( b ) above and p a r a g r a p h 5 below) t o r e - e n t e r
the conti
n e n t as soon a s German r e s i s t a n c e isweakened t o t h e r e q u i r e d

extent.
4.
I n o r d e r t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s a r e
not p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e n e c e s s i t y t o d i v e r t f o r c e s t o r e t r i e v e a n a d v e r s e
s i t u a t i o n e l s e w h e r e , a d e q u a t e f o r c e s s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d t o t h e P a c i f i c
arid Far E a s t e r n T h e a t e r s .
5,
OPERATIONS I N THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST:

( a ) O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e s e t h e a t e r s s h a l l c o n t i n u e w i t h t h e f o r c e s
a l l o c a t e d , w i t h the o b j e c t of m a i n t a i n i n g p r e s s u r e on J a p a n ,
r e t a i n i n g t h e i n i t i a t i v e and a t t a i n i n g a p o s i t i o n of r e a d i
n e s s f o r t h e f u l l s c a l e o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t Japan by t h e United
r a t i o n s a s soon a s Germany i s d e f e a t e d . .
(b) T h e s e o p e r a t i o n s must be k e p t w i t h i n s u c h l i m i t s a s w i l l
n o t , i n t h e o p i n i o n of t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f , p r e j u
d i c e t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e Cnited Nations t o t a k e advantage of
any f a v o r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t may p r e s e n t i t s e l f f o r t h e
d e c i s i v e d e f e a t of Germany i n 1 9 4 3 .
(c) S u b j e c t t o t h e above r e s e r v a t i o n , p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s
s h a l l b e made f o r :
(1) The r e c a p t u r e o f Burma
(2) O p e r a t i o n s ,
( A N A X I M ) b e g i n n i n g i n 1943.
a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e of R a b a u l , a g a i n s t t h e
M a r s h a l l s and C a r o l i n e s i f t i m e and r e s o u r c e s a l l o w
without p r e j u d i c e t o ANAKIM
6.
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA:
The r e s i s t a n c e o f t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s must b e s u s t a i n e d by t h e
g r e a t e s t volume o f s u p p l i e s t h a t c a n b e t r a n s p o r t e d t o R u s s i a , w i t h o u t
prohibitive cost i n shipping.
17
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
155/1
J a n u a r y 19, 1943
CONDUCT OF THE WAR I N 1943

Memorandum by t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
The Combined Chiefs o f S t a f f have agreed t o submit t h e f c l l o w i n g
recommendations f o r t h e conduct of t h e war i n 1943.
1.
SECURITY:
The d e f e a t o f t h e U-boat
s o u r c e s of t h e United N a t i o n s .
2.
must remain a f i r s t c h a r g e on t h e re
The S o v i e t f o r c e s must b e s u s t a i n e d by t h e greatest volume of

s u p p l i e s t h a t can be t r a n s p o r t e d t o Russia without p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t i n
s hipping.
3.
OPERATIONS I N THE EUROPEAN THEATER:

O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e European T h e a t e r w i l l b e c o n d u c t e d w i t h t h e
o b j e c t of d e f e a t i n g Germany i n 1943 w i t h t h e maximum f o r c e s t h a t c a n b e

b r o u g h t t o b e a r upon h e r by t h e U n i t e d Nat'r o n s
4.
The main l i n e s o f o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n w i l l be:

I n t h e Mediterranean:
(a) The occupat.ion of S i c i l y w i t h t h e o b j e c t of:

(1) Making t , h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n l i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s more
secure.
( 2 ) D i v e r t i n g German p r e s s u r e from t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t .
(3) I n t e n s i f y i n g t h e p r e s s u r e on I t a l y .
(b) To c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n i n which Turkey c a n be e n l i s t e d as an
active ally.
I n t h e U.K.:
( c ) The h e a v i e s t p o s s i b l e bomber o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t t h e Germail
war effort.
(d) Such l i m i t e d o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s as may b e p r a c t i c a b l e w i t h
t h e amphibious f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e .
( e ) The assembly of t h e s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e f o r c e ( s u b j e c t t o (a)
and (b) above and p a r a g r a p h 6 below) i n c o n s t a n t r e a d i n e s s
t o r e e n t e r t h e C o n t i n e n t a s s o o n a s German r e s i s t a n c e i s
18
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH VOST SECRET

weakened t o t h e r e q u i r e d e x t e n t .
5.
I n o r d e r t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s a r e
not prejudiced by t h e n e c e s s i t y t o d i v e r t f o r c e s t o r e t r i e v e a n a d v e r s e
s i t u a t i o n e l s e w h e r e , a d e q u a t e f o r c e s s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d t o t h e P a c i f i c
and Far E a s t e r n T h e a t e r s .
6.
OPERATIONS I N THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST:
(a) O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e s e t h e a t e r s s h a l l c o n t i n u e w i t h t h e f o r c e s
a l l o c a t e d , w i t h t h e o b j e c t of m a i n t a i n i n g p r e s s u r e on Japan,
r e t a i n i n g t h e i n i t i a t i v e and a t t a i n i n g a p o s i t i o n of r e a d i
n e s s f o r t h e f u l l s c a l e o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t J a p a n b y t h e United
Nations a s soon as Germany i s d e f e a t e d .
(b) These o p e r a t i o n s m u s t b e kept w i t h i n s u c h l i m i t s as w i l l n o t ,
i n t h e o p i n i o n of t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f , j e o p a r d i z e
t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e United N a t i o n s t o t a k e advantage of any
f a v o r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t may p r e s e n t i t s e l f f o r t h e d e c i s
i v e d e f e a t of Germany i n 1043.
(c) S u b j e c t t o t h e above r e s e r v a t i o n , p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s
s h a l l be made f o r :
(1) The r e c a p t u r e of Burma (ANAKIM) b e g i n n i n g i n 1943.
(2) O p e r a t i o n s , a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e o f R a b a u l , a g a i n s t t h e
a r s h a l l s a n d C a r o l i n e s if t i m e and r e s o u r c e s a l l o w
without prejudice t o ANAKIM~
19
SECRET
U. S.
C.C.S.
156
J a n u a r y 18, 1943
SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE AGENDA
OF THE CONFERENCE
The Combined S t a f f s , a t an i n f o r m a l meeting on J a n u a r y 18, 1043,

p r e p a r e d the a t t a c h e d note s u g g e s t i n g the procedure t o be followed f o r
d e a l i n g w i t h t h e major q u e s t i o n s on t h e a g r e e d Agenda of t h e Combined
C h i e f s of S t a f f
(C.C.S.
140).
They s u g g e s t t h a t it, s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e Combined Chiefs

of S t a f f a t t h e i r n e x t meeting.
V . DYKES,
J . R. DEANE,
Combined S e c r e t a r i a t .
ENCLOSURE
1.
The n e x t s t a g e of t h e d i s c u s s i o n s s h o u l d b e t o examine e a c h o f
t h e o p e r a t i o n s s e t o u t i n t h e (C.C.S. 155) d r a f t p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e con
d u c t of t h e war i n 1043, w i t h a view t o d e t e r m i n i n g :
( a ) The r e s o u r c e s of a l l k i n d s r e q u i r e d f o r each.
( b ) How t h e y a r e t o be made a v a i l a b l e .
(c) T a r g e t d a t e s , where p r a c t i c a b l e .
2.
&BOAT WARFARE:
The n a v a l and a i r f o r c e s r e q u i r e d t o d e f e a t t h e U-boat
are al
r e a d y u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n by t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s whose r e p o r t
s h o u l d form t h e agenda f o r an e a r l y meeting.
3.
MEDITERRANEAN:
(a) O r g a n i z a t i o n of Command, and e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s p h e r e s

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the Hediterranean.
of
(b) HUSKY:
(Reference: Paragraph 3 ( a ) , C.C.S.
155)
The r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e d f o r HUSKY have been a s s e s s e d b y t h e
20
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH YOST SECQET
B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f . A summary o f t h i s and of t h e
o u t l i n e p l a n w i l l b e c i r c u l a t e d f o r d i s c u s s i o n b y t h e Com
b i n e d C h i e f s of S t a f f . Agreement s h o u l d b e r e a c h e d as t o t h e
r e s o u r c e s t o b e p r o v i d e d by U. S. and 3 . K. r e s p e c t i v e l y and
on t h e arrangements f o r p l a n n i n g and command.
(c) A i r o f f e n s i v e from N o r t h A f r i c a a g a i n s t I t a l y , B a l k a n ob
j e c t i v e s , and Axis s h i p p i n g .
4.
TURKEY:
(Reference: Paragraph 3 ( b ) , C.C.S.
155)
A d r a f t p a p e r b y t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f on Allied
Plans relatingtoTURKEY which has n o t y e t been c o n s i d e r e d by t h e B r i t i s n
Chiefs of S t a f f w i l l b e c i r c u l a t e d a s a b a s i s f o r d i s c u s s i o n . B r i t i s h
Chiefs of S t a f f t o c i r c u l a t e a n o t e on t h e Axis o i l p o s i t i o n f o r d i s c u s
sion i n connection w i t h t h i s i t e m .
5.
THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINCDOB:

(Reference: P a r a g r a p h 3 ( c ) , C.C.S.
155)
B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f t o i n d i c a t e t h e p r e s e n t and p r o j e c t e d
build-up of t h e R.A.F. Bomber Comnand and t h e B r i t i s h c o n c e p t i o n of t h e
general p l a n f o r i t s employment i n 1923.. Agreement s h o u l d b e r e a c h e d on

the program f o r t h e b u i l d - u p of U
Bomber f o r c e s i n t h e U n i t e d K i n g
dom and on t h e g e n e r a l l i n e s of employment of A l l i e d Bomber f o r c e s f r o m

the U. K. a g a i n s t Germany.
6.
K. :
LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS FROM THE U.

(Reference: P a r a g r a p h 3 (d)
B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f
, C.C.S.
155)
t o c i r c u l a t e a paper o u t l i n i n g t h e i r
conception o f t h e l i m i t e d o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s p o s s i b l e i n 1913 under
the terms of C.C.S.
7.
155 and t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e .
BOLERO BUILD-UP:
(Reference: Paragraph 3 ( e ) , C.C.S.
155)
B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f t o c i r c u l a t e a p a p e r showing t h e f o r c e s
which i n t h e i r view c o u l d b e made a v a i l a b l e f o r a r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i
nent i n 1943 under t h e terms of C.C.S. 155. Agreement s h o u l d b e r e a c h e d

on the g e n e r a l c o n c e p t of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s which would make s u c h a n
operation f e a s i b l e .
8.
ANAKIM.
(Reference:
Paragraph 5 (c) (1)
, C.C.S.
155)
B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f t o c i r c u l a t e a p a p e r g i v i n g t h e b r o a d
21
U. S . SECRET
of t h e f o r c e s c o n s i d e r e d
n e c e s s a r y . Agreement should be reached a s t o t h e r e s o u r c e s t o be p r o v i d e d
by U. S. and U. K. r e s p e c t i v e l y .
c o n c e p t f o r o p e r a t i o n ANAKIM, with
9.
M indication
OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC:

(Reference: Paragraph 5 ( c ) (Z), C.C.S. 155)
U. S. C h i e f s of S t a f f t o c i r c u l a t e a paper g i v i n g t h e b r o a d con
c e p t f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c w i t h i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e
f o r c e s involved.
10.
(Reference: Paragraph 6, C . C . = .
155)
Agreement s h o u l d be reached on t h e p r o b a b l e e f f e c t of t h e opera

t i o n s agreed a t t h e conference upon s u p p l i e s t o R u s s i a i n 1913.
11.
T h e f o l l o w i n g i t e m s which a p p e a r i n t h e a g r e e d Agenda of t h e
conference have n o t been d e a l t w i t h above:

(a) S t r a t e g t c R e s p o n s z b t l z t y a n d Command S e t - u p
f o r Dakar-
F r e n c h W e s t P f r z c a n A r e a r e q u i r e d t o be s e t t l e d a s e a r l y a s
p o s s i b l e . A d m i r a l King t o be i n v i t e d t o make p r o p o s a l s .
(b) I n c r e a s e d e f f t c t e n c y i n t h e c a s e of S h z p b i n g .
Lord L e a t h e r s and General Somervell t o be i n v i t e d t o d i s c u s s
and make a p p r o p r i a t e recommendations t o t h e Combined C h i e f s
of S t a f f .
22
U. S. SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 18, 1943
157

ALLIED PLANS RELATING T O TURKEY
Ifemorandurn b y B r i t i s h , J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f
PART I
ENTRY OF TURKEY INTO THE W A R ON THE SIDE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1.
The f o l l o w i n g e x t r a c t from C.C.S.
135/2 h a s been t a k e n a s t h e
b a s i s f o r o u r f u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e problem of i n d u c i n g Turkey t o
j o i n the A l l i e s and of u s i n g t h a t c o u n t r y f o r t h e development of of'fen
sive o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e A x i s .
"Our motives i n i n d u c i n g Turkey t o j o i n u s i n t h e war would be:

(a) To u s e Turkey a s a b a s e f o r a i r a t t a c k s 011 i m p o r t a n t o b
jectives,
s u c h as t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s and B l a c k S e a
conimurric a t i o n s
(b) T o c l o s e t h e D a r d a n e l l e s t o t h e A x i s and open t h e m t o t,he
I!n i t ed F a t ions
(c) To f o r c e an i n c r e a s e d d i s p e r s a l of German f o r c e s b y u s i n g
Turkey a s a b a s e f o r p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s i n t h e B a l k a n s and
South R u s s i a
(d) To deny T u r k i s h chrome t o (lermany,."
INDUCEMENTS TO TORKEY:
2.
The two main f a c t o r s upon which T u r k e y ' s e n t r y i n t o t h e war de..
pend a r e :
(a) Her f e a r of tiermany now;
(b) Her f e a r of R u s s i a a f t e r t h e war..
In o r d e r t o make Turkey ent,er a c t i v e l y i n t o t h e war a t an e a r l y

d a t e , we must c o n v i n c e h e r t,iiat ( a ) i s unfounded, and a t t h e same time
e x p l o i t h e r f e a r of
(b)
FEAR OF GERMANY:
3.
T u r k e y ' s a n x i e t i e s under
( a ) w i l l o n l y b e a s s u a g e d when s h e i s
s a t i s f i e d e i t h e r t h a t t h e A l l i e s have so s t r e t c h e d t h e A x i s a s t o re.
s t r i c t the l a t t e r ' s a b i l i t y t o h u r t h e r , or t h a t m a t e r i a l p r o v i s i o n of
23
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H .YOST S E C R E T
t h e A l l i e s t o d e f e n d her a g a i n s t Axis a i r o r l a n d a t t a c k i s forthcoming

i n time. The former may r e s u l t from a development o f o u r e x i s t i n g strategy
i n the :Xediterranean and from c o n t i n u e d Russian s u c . c e s s e s . The l a t t e r i s
examined i n P a r t 11.
FEAR OF RUSSIA:
4.
With r e g a r d t o ( b ) , Turkey must now a p p r e c i a t e t h a t her hopes of
a weak R u s s i a a r e n o t l i k e l y t o b e r e a l i z e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , h e r b e s t
c h a n c e of post-war
s e c u r i t y l i e s i n o b t a i n i n g f o r h e r s e l f a p l a c e and
s u p p o r t a t t h e P e a c e Conference. She i s p a r t i c u l a r l y a f r a i d t h a t R u s s i a
may s p r e a d h e r i n f l u e n c e t h r o u g h Rumania aiid B u l g a r i a and c o n f r o n t h e r
w i t h t h e f a c t of b e i n g the power i n c o n t r o l a t T u r k e y ' s w e s t e r n door
i n t o Europe as w e l l as a t h e r back door i n t o Asia. She a l s o f e a r s t h a t
R u s s i a , h a v i n g s e c u r e d c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l o f t h e B l a c k S e a , w i l l demand
u n r e s t r i c t e d r i g h t s o f p a s s a g e through t h e D a r d a n e l l e s . She would l o o k
t o the A l l i e s ,
and e s p e c i a l l y t o t h e B r i t i s h F h p i r e , t o s u p p o r t h e r i n
r e s i s t i n g . e x a g g e r a t e d Russian c l a i m s i n r e g a r d t o .passage o f t h e S t r a i t s .
5.
\<'hether it would be wise f o r H i s N a j e s t y ' s Government t o oppose
R u s s i a n d e s i r e s r e g a r d i n g p a s s a g e o f t h e S t r a i t s seems a m a t t e r f o r
u r g e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n , f o r i f we thwarted R u s s i a i n t h a t r e s p e c t we should
p r o b a b l y b e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a c l a i m f o r r i g h t s of t r a n s i t through P e r s i a
t o a p o r t on t h e P e r s i a n G u l f .
T h i s , from o u r p o i n t o f v i e w ,
would be
most u n d e s i r a b l e .
6.
B r i t i s h and Ameri.cail d i p l o m a c y . s h o u l d be d i r e c t e d t o e x p l o i t
T u r k i s h f e a r s o f R u s s i a . I t s h o u l d be made c l e a r t h a t p u b l i c o p i n i o n
w i l l have l i t t l e sympathy, when p e a c e comes, f o r a c o u n t r y which r e
mained a l o o f when we needed h e r a i d .
ECONOMIC AND TERRITORIAL INDUCENENTS:

7.
G u a r a n t e e s o f c o n t i n u e d f i r i a r l c i a l and economic a s s i s t a n c e , of
whickl d e t a i l s a r e g i v e n in E n c l o s u r e " A " ,
might be a u s e f u l weapon, p a r
t i c u l a r l y i n view o f t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e T u r k i s h p o s i t i o n .
8.
There a r e c e r t a i n t , e r r i t o r i a l a d j u s t m e n t s by which Turkey s e t s
s t o r e . F i r s t l y , s h e i s d e t e r m i n e d t o kiave complete c o n t r o l of t h e r a i i
way which a t p r e s e n t runs o u t i n S y r i a n t e r r i t o r y a t Aleppo. S e c o n d l y ,
s h e r e q u i r e s some m a t e r i a l f a c i l i t i e s i n , arid some g u a r a n t e e s f o r , t h e
T u r k i s h p o p u l a t i o n of t h e Ilodecanesc I s l a n d s . T h i r d l y , she d e s i r e s a
r e c t i f i c a t i o n o f h e r f r o n t , i e r w i t h B u l g a r i a . \Ye can s e e no s t r a t e g i c a l
o b j e c t i o n t o t h e i r r e a l . i z a t i o n a f t e r t h e war p r o v i d e d we c a n r e t a i n
II. S . SECRET
BRITISH XOST SECRET
c e r t a i n r i g h t s t o u s e t h e Aleppo-Mosul r a i l w a y , b u t w e must n o t l o s e
sight o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s a s t r o n g French i n t e r e s t i n t h i s r a i l w a y .
We have also g u a r a n t e e d t h e f u t u r e i n t e g r i t y and independence o f S y r i a n
territory.
Creek i n t e r e s t would b e d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d by t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f
the second aim and i t would b e d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e A l l i e s t o encourage t h r

a p p e t i t e o f an a l l i e d b u t s t i l l n e u t r a l c o u n t r y a t t h e e x p e n s e u
'
fighting a l l y .
We d o u b t whether t h e s e t h r e e sops would m a t e r i a l l y a f f e c t Tur
key's d e c i s i o n on the main i s s u e .
SUMMARY O F DIPLOMATIC POLICY:
9.
We s h o u l d e x p l o i t T u r k i s h f e a r s t h a t s h e s t a r i d s t o l o s e i f she
remains out u n t i l t h e e l e v e n t h h o u r , making i t c l e a r t h r o u g h d i p l o m a t i c

channels t h a t t h e e x t e n t o f A l l i e d s u p p o r t f o r Turkey a t t h e P e a c e Con
ference w i l l be c o n d i t i o n e d by h e r e n t r y i n t o t h e war w i t h o u t d e l a y .
PART I1
INITIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKFl
10.
An u n d e r t a k i n g t o a s s i s t T u r k e y a g a i n s t A x i s a g g r e s s i o n has
already been g i v e n . T h i s i n c l u d e s a p l a n f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g c e r t a i n f o r c e s
i n Turkey (Sprawl P l a n ) arid t h e p r o v i s i o n of equipment and s u p p l i e s t o
augment T u r k i s h r e s o u r c e s . A summary o f t h e s e m e a s u r e s i s g i v c l r a.3
"C" and "D", from which i t w i l l b e s e e n t h a t a subst,ari

t i a l q u a n t i t y o f m a t e r i a l t o g e t h e r w i t h some a i r c r a f t h a v e a l r e a d y
Enclosures "B",
reached Turkey.
11.
The r o l e s of t h e f o r c e earmarked under t h e Sprawl P l a n were:
(a) To g a i n and m a i n t a i n a i r s u p e r i o r i t y .
(b) Assist T u r k i s h l a n d arid a i r f o r c e s i n t h e d e f e n s e o f Thrace
and Western A n a t o l i a ~ .
(c) P r o v i d e s u p p o r t f o r T u r k i s h f o r c e s a g a i n s t s e a b o r n e a t t a c k
i n t h e Izmir a r e a .
(d) Assist i n t h e d e f e n s e o f Ankara.
(e) A t t a c k s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e 3 i n S o u t h e a s t Europe.
(f) P r o t e c t b a s e p o r t s .
S. SECRET
BRITISH ,YOST SECRET
LJ.
CHANGED CONDITIONS:
12.
E x i s t i n g p l a n s assume t h a t Turkey had a l r e a d y b e e n a t t a c k e d .
The c o n d i t i o n s under r e v i e w a r e somewhat d i f f e r e n t . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e

t h e t h r e a t we a r e now c o n s i d e r i n g i s p o t e n t i a l r a t h e r t h a n a c t u a l , a l
though t h e r e i s s t i l l a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t If t h e Germans b e l i e v e d t h a t
Turkey was a b o u t t o e n t e r t h e war t h e y would t r y t o o v e r r u n Thrace and
a t t h e same time bomb v i t a l a r e a s . I n t h e s e c o n d p l a c e Turkey i s n o t

compelled t o f i g h t b u t must be i n d u c e d t o come i n of h e r own f r e e w i l l .
A s a l r e a d y s t a t e d , t h i s s h e i s u n l i k e l y t o do u n l e s s s h e i s s a t i s f i e d
t h a t t h e g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t s German o f f e n s i v e p o t e n t i
a l i t i e s i n t h e Balkans.
THE A I R THREAT:
13.
The a b i l i t y o f t h e Axis t o d e l i v e r a heavy a i r o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t
Turkish v i t a l a r e a s cannot be f o r e c a s t .
I t i s c e r t a i n , however, t h a t
Turkey w i l l r e q u i r e t h e p r o v i s i o n of a i r and g r o u n d d e f e n s e s . The ex

t e n t t o which s h e w i l l r e g a r d t h e s e a s an inducement t o f i g h t w i l l de
pend upon t h e r a p i d i t y w i t h which t h e y can be r e n d e r e d e f f e c t i v e . Should
Turkey b e p r e p a r e d t o t a k e t h e p l u n g e i t would b e t o h e r a d v a n t a g e t o
augment h e r d e f e n s e s with A l l i e d h e l p b e f o r e s h e a c t u a l l y d e c l a r e s war.
he c a n , however, u n d e r t a k e - - p r o v i d e d
ground equipment i s i n s t a l l e d and
p r e p a r a t i o n s made i n Turkey b e f o r e h a n d - - t o
have o p e r a t i o n a l about 6
F i g h t e r s q u a d r o n s w i t h l i m i t e d a n t i a i r c r a f t d e f e n s e s w i t h i n three days
o f the Turkish i n v i t a t i o n .
To a c h i e v e t h i s , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 100 t r a n s p o r t
a i r c r a f t would have t o b e made a v a i l a b l e .
THE THREAT THROUGH THRACE:

14.
T h e Turks a t p r e s e n t i n t e n d , i f a t t a c k e d i n T h r a c e , t o h o l d a
forward l i n e n e a r t h e f r o n t i e r u n t i l a " s c o r c h e d e a r t h " p o l i c y h a s b e e n
e f f e c t e d , and t h e n t o withdraw t o t h e C a t a l j a and B u l a i r l i n e s . These
a r e sound d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s ,
and we see no o b j e c t i n p e r s u a d i n g t h e
T u r k s t o e s t a b l i s h a main p o s i t i o n f o r w a r d , as t h i s would b e weak i n

d e f e n s e . If, on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e a t t a c k does n o t d e v e l o p , t h e forward
a r e a w i l l r e m a i n a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e s u b s e q u e n t c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f our
o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s . The T u r k s w i l l h a v e , i n any c a s e , t o r e l y i n i t i a l l y
on t h e i r own r e s o u r c e s , s i n c e communications p r e v e n t any s u b s t a n t i a l
A l l i e d m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e r e a c h i n g Thrace q u i c k l y .
ALLIED MILITARY WLICY:
15.
The f o r c e which w e s h o u l d e s t a b l i s h i n T u r k e y ,
26
i n the first
LI. S . S E C R E T
p l a c e , s h o u l d c o m p r i s e t h e minimum d e f e n s i v e e l e m e n t t o s a t i s f y t h e
Turks, and t h e maximum o f f e n s i v e e l e m e n t , w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s of communi
c a t i o n s , t o meet our own f u t u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s .
16.
We c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s t i t u t e a s u i t a b l e d e f e n s i v e
o f f e r t o t h e Turks:
AIR:
26 s q u a d r o n s . Of t h i s f o r c e , 6 F i g h t e r s q u a d r o n s would c o n s t i
t u t e t h e immediate a i r d e f e n s e c o n t i n g e n t r e f e r r e d t o i n p a r a g r a p h 13
above. The t y p e s o f t h e remaining s q u a d r o n s p r o p o s e d i n t h e Sprawl p l a n
may r e q u i r e a d j u s t m e n t i n t h e l i g h t of changed c o n d i t i o n s , b u t s i n c e a
t o t a l o f 25 s q u a d r o n s h a s been o f f e r e d t o Turkey and t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s
f o r t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h i s f o r c e a r e i n h a n d , w e c o n s i d e r thaL t h e
t o t a l f i g u r e of 28 s q u a d r o n s s h o u l d s t a n d . A d d i t i o n a l a i r c r a f t f or u s e
by the Turks c a n be s u p p l i e d from r e s o u r c e s i n t h e Middle E a s t if p r i
o r i t y over o t h e r commitments is c o n s i d e r e d t o j u s t i f y such a c n u r s e .
LAYD;
7 2 H.A.A.
g u n s f o r d e f e n s e of I s t a n b u l , e t c .
96 H . A . A .
guns
215 L t .
A.A.
guns)
f o r a i r f i e l d defense.
4 B a t t a l i o n s f o r defense o f t h e L.
of C.
I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e Turks w i l l r e g a r d t h e p r o v i s i o n of armored
f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s as an added inducement. I n view o f t h e Turks' i n a b i l i t y
t o use o r m a i n t a i n armored f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s w e s h o u l d p r e f e r t o s u p p l y
complete armored f o r m a t i o n s w i t h our own p e r s o n n e l , and t h i s w e s h o u l d
be p r e p a r e d t o d o .
NAVAL:
17.
1 s t r i k i n g f o r c e o f s u b m a r i n e s , M.T.B.'s and p o s s i b l y d e s t r o y e r s .
The n e x t s t e p i s t o b u i l d up f o r c e s t o u n d e r t a k e o f f e n s i v e
o p e r a t i o n s and t o s e c u r e a i r b a s e s i n T u r k e y . T h i s i s c o n s i d e r e d i n
P a r t 111.
PART 1 x 1
DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFENSIVE
18.
Turkey w i l l b e of v a l u e t o t h e A l l i e s as an o f f e n s i v e b a s e f o r
a i r r a t h e r t h a n l a n d o p e r a t i o n s . Owing t o t h e i n i t i a l d e f e n s i v e needs of
27
t h e Turks it w i l l b e i m p o s s i b l e t o i n c l u d e i n t h e f i r s t a i r c o n t i n g e n t a
s t , r i k i n g f o r c e adequate f o r a widespread heavy and s u s t a i n e d o f f e n s i v e .
S i n c e , however, t r a n s - A n a t o l i a n communications w i l l be s t r e t c h e d t o t h e
l i m i t of
t h e i r c a p a c i t y , the f i r s t s t e p must be t o open up t h e Aegean
s u f f i c i e n t l y t o make u s e of T u r k i s h p o r t s . For o u r u s e Smyrna i s
Of
p r i m a r y importance.
19.
011
Any land o f f e n s i v e we may wish t o mount from Turkey m u s t b e based
T h r a c e , b u t t h e T u r k s t h e m s e l v e s will be making g r e a t demands on
tile l i m i t e d Tkiracian p o r t s and commimications f o r t h e i r own maintenance.

PXASE I - OPENlNG TEE AEGEAN
20.
It is c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e opening o f t h e Aegean c o u l d be a c h i e v e d
b y t h e c a p t u r e of t h e Dodecanese. W i t h a i r p r o t e c t i o n b a s e d on Turkey
and t h e Dodecanese i t s h o u l d t h e n be p o s s i b l e t o p a s s s u f f i c i e n t s h i p
p i n g through t o make f u l l use of T u r k i s h p o r t c a p a c i t i e s i n s p i t e of t h e
A x i s t h r e a t from C r e t e and Greece.

t?l.
The c a p t u r e of t,he IJodecanese i s a t p r e s e n t b e i n g s t u d i e d by the
Yiddle East.:'
\Ye e s t , i m a t e t h a t .
a f o r c e oi' some three d i v i s i o n s w i l l be
r e q u i r e d , s u p p o r t e d b y 1%squadrons of a i r c r a f t o p e r a t i n g from Southwest

. i n a ~ o l i a .These sqimclrons w i l l have t,o be i n c l u d e d i n t h e i n i t i a l f o r c e
s e n t t o Turkey. A i r f i e l d s i n t h e c o a s t , a l a r e a o p p o s i t e Xhodes w i l l have
t o b e c o n s t r u c t e d i n advance and s t o c k e d w i t h s u p p l i e s s o t h a t o p e r a
t , i o n s can b e g i n as e a r l y as p o s s i b l e . The s u b s e q u e n t g a r r i s o n s m i g h t be
f'ound by our Balkan a l l i e s
PKOTECTION O F SHIPPING:
22.
A s soon a s t h e Dodecanese have been c a p t u r e d i t w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y
t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of o u r s h i p p i n g t h r o u g h t h e Aegean. The
e s t i m a t e d f o r c e s r e q u i r e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e a r e g i v e n below.
NAVAL:
23.
W i t h C r e t e s t i l l i n enemy hands, s h i p p i n g m u s t b e r o u t e d a s f a r
ea.st of t h a t i s l a n d a s p o s s i b l e . I t is n o t l i k e l y t h a t t h e t h r e a t . i n t h e
Aegean w i l l exceed t h a t of submarines, E-boats and a i r c r a f t . I t is e s t i
mated t h a t S-knot
convoys o f 30 s h i p s r u n n i n g e v e r y 14 d a y s b e t w e e n
A l e x a n d r i a and I s t a n b u l w i l l meet r e q u i r e m e n t s and would need a n e s c o r t

::: V i d e a s t t e l e g r a m CC 1136 d a t e d 29/12/42
U.
SECRET
BRITISH XOST S E C R E T
S.
group of about 8 s h i p s .
AIR:
24.
A r e g r o u p i n g of t h e s q u a d r o n s a l r e a d y i n Turkey s h o u l d s u f f i c e
b o t h f o r p r o t e c t i o n of s h i p p i n g and g e n e r a l d e f e n s i v e r e q u i r e m e n t s . The
necessary a i r f i e l d s e x i s t b u t must b e developed and s u p p l i e d i n advance.
LAND:
25.
K O a d d i t i o n a l l a n d f o r c e s w i l l b e r e q u i r e d o t h e r t h a n a few
L. of C.. b a t t a l i o n s and a n t i a i r c r a f t p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e new p o r t s and

a i r f i e l d s b r o u g h t i n t o u s e , f o r which a b o u t 19 Heavy and 84 L i g h t A . A .
guns w i l l be n e e d e d .
PHASE I1
SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS
THE TASK OF OFFTNSIVE FORCES

AIR:
26.
A i r f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g from Turkey w i l l be r e q u i r e d f o r :
(a) A t t a c k s on Rumanian o i l r e f i n e r i e s and t h e i r communications.
T h i s i s t h e primary t a s k .
(b) A t t a c k s on Icalkan chrome mines and communications g e n e r a l l y ,
b o t h of Hhich are d i f f i c u l t t a r g e t s .
(c) A t t a c k s a g a i n s t A x i s s h i p p i n g i n t h e B l a c k S e a and t h e
Aegean.
(d) Support of any A l l i e d land o p e r a t i o n s .
(e) A s s i q t a n c e t o t h e R u s s i a n s i n t h e Ukraine.
For t h e s e p u r p o s e s a f o r c e o f 15-20 Heavy Bomber s q u a d r o n s w i l l
be r e q u i r e d and c o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h Smyrna. E x i s t i n g a i r f i e l d s
i n Northwest Turkey w i l l r e q u i r e development.

NAVAL:
27.
While t h e B l a c k Sea s h o u l d become a Russo-Turkish s p h e r e o f re
sponsibility, B r i t i s h l i g h t naval forces w i l l b e r e q u i r e d f o r the a t t a c k ,
i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e Turks, on A x i s communications i n t h e Aegean.

LAND:
28.
T h e o b j e c t of a l a n d o f f e n s i v e from Thrace would be t o s t r e t c h
Axis f o r c e s and t o s u p p o r t Balkan p a t r i o t s . The mounting of any o f f e n s i v e

i s dependent on t h e Turks h o l d i n g an adequate b r i d g e h e a d i n Europe.
29.
There a r e two a l t e r n a t i v e l i n e s o f advance from Thrace i n t o t h e
Balkans: h o r t h i n t o B u l g a r i a ; o r West i n t o Macedonia.
ii. 5 . SECOET
3QITISV (YOST SECQET

NORTH I N T O BULGARIA:
30.
The o b j e c t i v e s f o r a n o r t h w a r d d r i v e would be A x i s communica
t i o n s i n t h e Danube B a s i n and t h e o i l f i e l d s o f P l o e s t i , which a r e s o

v i t a l t o Germany t h a t s h e would defend them i f n e c e s s a r y a t t h e expense
of o t h e r a r e a s . The l i n e of advance would b e t h r o u g h a h o s t i l e c o u n t r y ,

where c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , which a l w a y s s t r o n g l y f a v o r t h e enemy, a r e i n i
t i a l l y s o bad a s p r o b a b l y t o p r e v e n t much p r o g r e s s b e i n g made. T h i s
c o u r s e might c o n t a i n some A x i s f o r c e s , b u t would have l i t t l e e f f e c t on
t h e Balkans g e n e r a l l y .
WEST INTO MACEDONIA:
31.
The o b j e c t i v e f o r a w e s t w a r d d r i v e would b e S a l o n i k a . Once
e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e , f u r t h e r f o r c e s c o u l d b e l a n d e d and arms f o r p a t r i o t
f o r c e s of Greece, A l b a n i a , and S o u t h e r n Y u g o s l a v i a i m p o r t e d . I t should
t h e n be p o s s i b l e , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e p a t r i o t s ,
t o s e v e r A x i s com
m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h S o u t h e r n Greece and t o g a i n c o n t r o l o f t h e whole a r e a .

32.
T h i s s h o u l d r e s u l t i n t h e abandonment of Crete b y t h e Axis.
i t might be d e s i r a b l e t o c a p t u r e C r e t e a t an e a r l i e r
s t a g e t o a s s i s t i n o p e r a t i o n s on t h e Greek mainland. Such a n o p e r a t i o n
would be b e s t mounted i n A f r i c a , though some a i r s u p p o r t c o u l d b e given
Alternatively,
from t h e Dodecanese and Southwest A n a t o l i a .

33.
The c a p t u r e of S a l o n i k a from Thrace w i l l , however, be a formid
a b l e and l e n g t h y o p e r a t i o n if t h e enemy p u t s u p much r e s i s t a n c e . Com

m u n i c a t i o n s a r e b a d , b u t n o t s o g r e a t l y i n t h e German's f a v o r as t h o s e
i n t o B u l g a r i a . By s u p p l e m e n t i n g r o a d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h c o a s t w i s e
s h i p p i n g i t s h o u l d b e p o s s i b l e t o m a i n t a i n 2-1/2 d i v i s i o n s , b u t i n
w i n t e r c o n d i t i o n s t h i s would b e v e r y d i f f i c u l t . A f u r t h e r 2-1/2 d i v i
s i o n s c o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d by r a i l a s f a r f o r w a r d as r a i l h e a d , b u t t h e
l i n e i s a n e a s y one f o r t h e enemy t o d i s r u p t and r e p a i r s m i g h t t a k e a
v e r y long t i m e .
31.
A f u r t h e r a d v e r s e f a c t o r i s t h a t w h i l e t h e l i n e of advance
i t s e l f i s b a d l y s e r v e d w i t h a i r f i e l d s , i t i s f l a n k e d by a l i m i t e d number
o f i n d i f f e r e n t a i r f i e l d s i n enemy h a n d s w i t h i n S . E . f i g h t e r r a n g e .
T h e r e f o r e , a i r f i e l d s w i l l have t o be p r o v i d e d i n T u r k i s h Thrace b e f o r e
o p e r a t i o n s can s t a r t , and o t h e r s c o n s t r u c t e d as t h e advance p r o g r e s s e s .
This w i l l take t i m e .
35.
I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o a s s e s s t h e chances of s u c c e s s of l a n d opera
t i o n s t h r o u g h Vacedonia w i t h o u t making a d e t a i l e d s t u d y , and w i t h o u t a

30
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
firmer f o r e c a s t t h a n i s now p o s s i b l e of t h e A x i s m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n a s i t
w i l l then b e . The p r i z e is g r e a t b u t t h e p r o s p e c t s are poor.
SUMMARY
COURSE OF OPERATIONS:
36.
O f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s might t a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g course:
(a) The c a p t u r e o f t h e Dodecanese and t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of n a v a l

and a i r f o r c e s f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s h i p p i n g t o I s t a n b u l ,
i n o r d e r t o open t h e E a s t e r n Aegean,
(b) The assembly o f a i r f o r c e s i n A n a t o l i a f o r o f f e n s i v e opera
t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e Balkans and s e a communications.
(c) A p o s s i b l e l a n d o f f e n s i v e f r o m T h r a c e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t
Salonika.
(d) After r e i n f o r c e m e n t through S a l o n i k a , t h e s e v e r a n c e of Axis
communications w i t h S o u t h e r n Greece and a s s i s t a n c e t o guer
r i l l a f o r c e s i n Greece, A l b a n i a , and S o u t h e r n Yugoslavia.
(e) The e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e A x i s from Greece and Crete.
PART IV
SUMMARY OF FORCES REQUIRED
AIR:
37.
Immediate A i r Defense
6 Squadrons
Balance of Defensive Requirements
20 Squadrons
Opening of t h e Aegean and Support o f Land Offensive
12 Squadrons ( a d d i t i o n a l t o t h o s e above)
Bomber Offensive
15-20 Heavy Bomber Squadrons
LAND:
38.
Defensive Requirements
for l o c a l defense
168 Heavy A.A. guns ) For p o r t s , a i r f i e l d s and
215 L i g h t A.A. guns ) v i t a l a r e a s .
4 battalions
31
U . S. SECRET
Opening t h e Aegean
3 divisions
3 b a t t a l i o n s f o r l o c a l derense
18 tieavy A.A.
guns )
84 L i g h t A.A.
guns )
For p o r t s and a i r f i e l d s .
O p e r a t i o n s i n Greece
2-1/23 t o 5 d i v i s i o n s , i n c l u d i n g ) With p o s s i b l e s u b s e q u e n t
a t l e a s t 1 Armored d i v i s i o n
) r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f up t o 4
divisions
( t o include
Crete)
NAVAL:
39.
F o r c e s as n e c e s s a r y t o a s s i s t , i n t,he c a p t u r e o f t h e Dodecanese.
A s t r i k i n g f o r c e o f d e s t r o y e r s , submarines, M.T.B.'sandM.G.B.'s.
A commitment o f a b o u t 8 e s c o r t , v e s s e l s f o r s h i p p i n g i n t h e
Aegean.
PART V
CONCLUSIONS
40..
(a) We do n o t c o n s i d e r that, 'Turkey w i l l e n t e r t h e war u n l e s s the

g e n e r a l s i t u a t i o n i s such that. she i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t s h e can
i n i t i a l l y hold Thrace w i 1 , h o i i l . A l l i e d a s s i s t a n c e and t h a t im
mediate a i r d e f e n s e i s f'rlrt,Iicoming
(b) Turkey w i l l b e of v a l u e t o t h e A l l i e s a s a n o f f e n s i v e b a s e
f o r a i r r a t h e r than l a n d o p e r a t i o n s "
POLICY TO HASTEN TtRKEYOS ENTRY I N T O THE: WAR:
41..
(a) P o l i t i c a l :
W
e s h o u l d make c l e a r t o Turkey t h a t o u r good o f f i c e s a t t h e
P e a c e C o n f e r e n c e w i l l deperid upon h e r e n t r y i n t o t h e war
without delay.
(b) F i n a n c i a l and Economic:
Turkey s h o u l d b e a s s u r e d of' t h e c o n t i n u a n c e o f our p r e s e n t

economic and f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . T h i s m i g h t b e e x t e n d e d
t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of wheat, and s u g a r i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e ,
b u t our commitments elsewhere i n t h e Middle E a s t may p r e v e n t
this
II. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
(c) E i l i t a r y :
We should o f f e r :
(1) An "iminediate a i r d e f e n s e " c o n t i n g e n t f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n
of v i t a l c e n t e r s i n Western Turkey (paragraph 1 6 ) .

(2) The b a l a n c e o f f o r c e s up t o t h e l i m i t o f t r a n s - A n a t o l i a n
communications ( p a r a g r a p h 16)
(3) M i l i t a r y equipment t o b r i n g a l l T u r k i s h i n f a n t r y
forma
t i o n s i n T h r a c e up t o a s a t i s f a c t o r y s c a l e of weapons.
(4) Armored f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s o n l y i f t h e s e a r e c o n s i d e r e d
n e c e s s a r y from t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l point of view^ We should

p r e f e r t o send armored f o r m a t i o n s s i n c e t h e Turks cannot
be r e l i e d upon t o o p e r a t e o r m a i n t a i n armored f i g h t i n g
vehicles efficiently,
ALLIED MILITARY POLICY:

42.
(a) The p r o v i s i o n of a s s i s t a n c e t o Turkey as i n p a r a g r a p h 11 ( c )
above.
(b) Onening of t h e Aegean by t h e c a p t u r e of t h e Dodecanese,,
( c ) Gevelopment o f t h e a i r o f f e n s i v e from Turkey

(d) I f p r a c t i c a b l e ,
t o open up and rearm t h e B a l k a n s by a n ad
vance westwards from Thrace w i t h l i m i t e d f o r c e s d i r e c t e d on

S a l o n i kaPREPARATORY MEASURES IN TURKEY:
43.
( a ) A i r f i e l d Development
C e r t a i n a i r f i e l d developments a r e a l r e a d y included i n t h e
Sprawl P l a n , , We s h o u l d p r e s s f o r f u r t h e r development of a i r
f i e l d s and s u p p l i e s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g a r e a s :
(1) I n t h e I s t a n b u l and Ankara areas t o o p e r a t e f i g h t e r s f o r
t h e d e f e n s e of t h o s e s i t e s . .
(2) I n t h e Southwest o f Turkey t o a s s i s t our c a p t u r e o f t h e
Codecanese .,
(3) I n A n a t o l i a a n d A r m e n i a t o o p e r a t e b o m b e r s a g a i n s t
Rumanian o i l , Balkan communications, and i n s u p p o r t of

t h e Russian southern f r o n t ,
We must i n s u r e t h a t t h e a i r d e f e n s e e q u i p m e n t , i n c l u d i n g
A.A.
g u n s , ammunition and R , , D . . F . , n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e d e f e n s e
of a t least t h o s e a i r f i e l d s which w i l l b e used by our i n i t i a l

a i r c o n t i n g e n t , i s r e a d y i n Turkey f o r immediate o p e r a t i o n .
33
I'. S. S T C Y E T
3 1 I T I . V VO.ST S E C l E T
(b) P e r s o n n e l :
\Ye s h o u l d send i n t o Turkey under c o v e r t h e f o l l o w i n g p e r

sonne 1:
(1) Such s p e c i a l i s t s a s a r e a c c e p t a b l e b y t h e Turks t o i n
s u r e p r o p e r i n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e and u s e of
t h e A l l i e d m i l i t a r y equipment.
(2) Reconnaissance p a r t i e s f o r p r e p a r i n g t h e l a y o u t of a i r
f i e l d d e f e n s e s and f o r s t u d y i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n problems.
A number of T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g
liaison officers
s h o u l d be
c o l l e c t e d i n t h e Yiddle E a s t .
( c ) Communications
We s h o u l d c o n t i n u e and, where n e c e s s a r y , augment s u p p l i e s %of

l o c o m o t i v e s , r o l l i n g s t o c k and p o r t f a c i l i t i e s . The p r o v i
s i o n o f coal dumps a t s t r a t e g i c c e n t e r s i s i m p o r t a n t f o r t h e
o p e r a t i o n of communications.
RECOMMENDAT IONS
44.
We recommend t h a t :
(a) The F o r e i g n O f f i c e b e i n v i t e d t o examine t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s
of d i p l o m a t i c a c t i o n i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e s u g g e s t i o n s con
t a i n e d i n t h i s p a p e r . ,Ye p a r t i c u l a r l y u r g e t h a t a f i r m
p o l i c y s h o u l d be d e c i d e d w i t h r e g a r d t o our post-war a t t i t u d e
on t h e D a r d a n e l l e s q u e s t i o n and o t h e r m a t t e r s of a primary
i n t e r e s t t o t h e Turks.
(b) A copy o f t h i s p a p e r s h o u l d h e s e n t t o t h e Commanders-inChief, Viddle E a s t ,
i n r e p l y t o t h e i r t e l e g r a m (C.C./166
d a t e d December 2 9 , 1942) and t h a t t h e y s h o u l d be i n v i t e d t o

comment on t h e p r o p o s a l s c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n .
ENCLOSURE "A"
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY
FINANCIAL :
1.
Under t h e Agreements made a f t e r t h e c o l l a p s e of F r a n c e i n 1940
U. S . S E C R E T
the United Kingdom assumed l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e u n u t i l i z e d French s h a r e of

t h e 25 m i l l i o n Pound c r e d i t f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of war m a t e r i a l , which was
agreed under t h e S p e c i a l Agreement of 19.19. Under t h i s c r e d i t we a r e now
supplying Turkey w i t h a l l t h e arms, e t c . ,
2.
which are a v a i l a b l e .
A s r e g a r d s n o n - m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s , we have o f f e r e d t o l e n d Tun.
key s t e r l i n g t o e n a b l e h e r t o p a y f o r her e s s e n t i a l n e e d s f r o m t h e
s t e r l i n g a r e a . She i s a t p r e s e n t a v a i l i n g inersr.lf of Lhese f a c i l i t i e s t o
the e x t e n t o f approximately 2 m i l l i o n Pounds.,
3.
Turkey's e x i s t i n g f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s a r e those of i n t e l n a l
f i n a n c e . I n r e g a r d t o t h i s we can g i v e no r c a l h e l p .
ECONOMIC:
4.
Our economic a s s i s t a n c e i s as g r e a t as o u r s h i p p i n g r e s o u r c e s
and t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of a v a i l a b l e p o i n t s of e n t r y i n i u Turkey w i l l p e r r n i t There is, however, one form of a s s i s t . m i c e which i s now under act,ive
COII-.
s i d e r a t i o n , namely, t h e s u p p l y of' wheat., o f which Turkey i s i n u r g e n t

need t o t h e e x t e n t o f 1.50,noo- 2nn,o0n t o n s f o r 13.31
v i t a l n e c e s s i t y and s h e h a s asked f o r about
20,CJOO
t,or:s
Sugar i s also n
Success
iii
prn
v i d i n g t h e s e two e s s e n t i a l s would do much Lo h i r i d Turkey t o u s
5.
A form of a s s i s t a n c e rvhjch would p r o v e o f e r e a t v a l u e i n t h e
f u t u r e would b e t h e s u p p l y o f lororriot,i~vesand r c r l ~ il ilg s t o c k , o f w h i r h

t h e Turks are i n g r e a t n e e d
IVe a r e doi~rng t,hr? b e s t , we c a n t o s u p p l y
Turkey's n e e d s , b u t our own demands f o r m j ~ l i t a r yp u r p o s e s a r e n a t u r a l ! y

making t h i s d i f f i c u l t , (See Enc:losure "D"
1.
p a r a g r q 1 i : s 3 and 4
A s a r e s u l t o f t h e s t a f f c o n v e r s a t , i o n s i n 4nkar;i
~iii
Cicr.ot>ei
1941, we h a v e p r o m i s e d t o a s s i s t , t,he .Turks 1 * i t ~ t r the folicwirrg for-(:<,

s h o u l d T u r k e y be a t t a c k e d :
2 Armored DiTJisiollS
2 Army Tank Ilrigadcs

4 Infantry Divisions
25 Squadrons R. L F .
With t h e e x c e p t i o n o f f o u r s q u a d r o n s R . A F
which a r e t o be
d i s p a t c h e d t o Western Turkey immediately t h e T u r k i s h f r o n t i e r i s c r o s s e d .
35
.-.~.sEt';.r
ti..;.
:vas mads s u b j e c t t o o u r o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s e l s e w h e r e
and L k p r o v i s i o n of a d e q u a t e m a i n t e n a n c e f a c i l i t i e s .
A p l a n (Sprawl P l a n ) has a l r e a d y aeen worked o u t f o r t h e move of
2.
:,:i?~.!
a . i r c o n t i n g e n t of 26 squadrons t o a i r f i e l d s i n Turkey s o u t h of a
l i n e ;iea of ~ l a r m n r a - A l e x a n d r e t t a (See Map "C")
, accomp8nied
by an A r m y
cor,!ponrnt of f o u r b r i g a d e g r o u p s f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f a i r f i e l d s . The
ntairitendnce @ f
t h i s f o r c e i s e q u i v a l e n t t o t h a t of 2-1/2 d i v i s i o n s . , The
a i r t'orce c o n s i s t s o f :
12 Sho:t-range
I I,or.g-range
ti
I. ig h t,
F i g h t e r Squadrons
F i g h t e r Squadroil
Squadr oris
il ombe r
2 :.'c(>?mi: 1:omDer Squadrons

7, Ar'eix C o o p e r a t i o n Squadrons
1 General Reconnaissance Squadron
1 l o r p e d o Eomber Squadron
3.
:iirl
I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t moving by road and r a i l i n summer t.he whole

S o r c e c o u l d b e e s t a b l i s h e J i n a b o u t 45 d a y s , w h i l e t h e f i r s t
gi'oiij! r,f' 6 f i g h t , e r s q u a d r o n s w i t h 6,ccompanyirig u n i t s woiild be
ill
posi
t i o n a t nandirma and B a l e k e s i r i n a b o u t t n e l v e d a y s .
1.
Tk!re.:e
This
p l a n w a s d e s i g n e d t o a s s i s t i n t h e T u r k i s h d e f e n s e of
arid X e s t e r n A n a t o l i a . I t was n o t i n t e n d e d t o he a p r e l u d e for.
o f f e n s k i t ? o p e r a t . i o n s which we o u r s e l v e s might wi.sh t o u n d e r t a k e i n t h e

Fa 1ks I??,
36
U, S.
SECRET
BRITISK MOST SECRET
ENCLOSURE "C"
R - A = F . AND ARiMy STOWS AUIEADY DUMPED INTO TURREY
( i n tons)
R,A.F.
P.O.L.
B a l i k e s i r Area
Kutahya iirea
Bfyon Area
483
1,785.1
5,466.7
Bombs
...
181
773.2
Adam Area
357
i l l u k l s l a Area
231
...
...
8,322.8
954.2
A r m y ( i n tons)
Amn.
18.2
Sups.
455
...
P.O.L. Amn.
322
326
R.E.
Stores Sups.
112
...
...
.-...
21.9
83
3,367.3
1,288
728
1,047
457
...
1,022
366
639.9
735
284
5,000
135.1 4 , 4 6 2 . 2
4,095
2,480
5,000
...
T o t a l R.A.F.
--
13,874.3 tons
T o t a l Army
--
tons
2 7 , 1 1 5 . 3 tons
37
13,241
658
224
392
280
1,666
U. S . S E C R E T
B F I T I S K VOST S E C R E T
ENCLOSURE "D"
SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT
1.
The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e shows t h e number o f c e r t a i n main i t e m s of
e q u i p m e n t which had b e e n s h i p p e d t o T u r k e y up t o irovember 2 0 , 1912

(column ( b ) ) , and t h e number a l l o c a t e d o r o r d e r e d t o be s e n t t o Turkey
up t o d a t e (column ( c ) )
. Column
(d) g i v e s a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e q u a n t i t i e s
which might be a l l o c a t e d t o Turkey if her p r i o r i t y v i s - a - v i s
ters remains unchanged.

2.
A l l o c a t e d up t o
end of 1912 b u t
Possible future
allocation
I tem
Shipped
not yet shipped
(a)
(b)
(C)
S t u a r t l i g h t tanks
o t h e r thea
40
(d)
171
2 00
Valentines
37-mm. A/Tk.
guns
116
?92
50 p e r month
3.7-in.
guns
208
l?
3 p e r month
40-mm A .A. guns
...
I s9
18 p e r month
Searchlights
111
...
F i e l d guns
101
25
GO
...
Medium machine guns
1,075
205
50 p e r month
L i g h t machine guns
5,450
...
\fiddle East t o l d
A.A.
Uedium hows.
t o s u p p l y 150
p e r month
Sub-machine guns
G ,500
2 .so0
Anti-tank r i f l e s
673
275
81-mm m o r t a r s
3 00
R.D.F.
51) per month
Order completed
l i g h t warning
25
sets
T h i s a d d i t i o n a l a l l o c a t i a n ( i n column (c) a b o v e ) i n c l u d e s t h e
f o l l o w i n g s p e c i a l o f f e r made b y t h e r r i m e Y i n i s t e r i n September:
S t u a r t l i g h t tan!.-s
.3G
I n f a n t r y tanks
200
37-mm.
13s
a n t i - t a n k guns
40-mm. Bofors
3s
25
S SECRET
3.
The fol.lowing i t e m s have been promised t o Turkey by t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom :
(a) A i r c r a f t
Tomahawks
Promises
Fulfilled
42
76
Vastage
Elenheim IV's
D oniini e
4 by end of
..
l'arch 1942
..
..
R u r r i c a n e s IIG li: bovember
o r IIC
@) P.C.F.
10 receniber
F,et?
'Twelve m o b i l e s e t s a r e now b e i n g p a c k e d i n U n i t e d Kingdom
f o r d i s p a t c h t o Turkey b > s e a v i a biiddle E a s t , and a f u r t h e r

t h i r t e e n have been promised.
(c) P e t r o l
Yidrlle E a s l . h a v e i i n d e r t a k e n t o n t a i ~ n t a i ns i x months' s u p p l y
f o r t h e T u r k i f k i Air T-orrc.. 'io in:Tilenierit t h i s a b o n t 3,000
t o n s a r e s e n t pack qiiart.t=r.
The f o l l o w i n g l o c o n ! o t i v ? s arid r o l l i n g s t o c k have b e e n o r d e r e d

and s h i p p e d , a s shown, f o r 'rurkey:
4.
(a ) L o c o m o t i v e s
C ' h i p p e d ~? 5
(b) Wagons
O r d e r e d l,2l? o f r l i i c i ,
7 9 2 have been
5.
skinped
I f f u l l b e n e f i t i s t o be g a i n e d b y t h e e n t r y o f Turkey i n t o t h e
war, t h e supply o f locomotives and r o l l i n g s t o c k must keep pace w i t h the

development o f r a i l w a y s . Tlie commitment would be c o n s i d e r a b l e and might
have t o be a t t h e expense of o t h e r t h e a t e r s .
39
U . S . SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 19, 1943
158

AXIS OIL POSITION
Note by A s s i s t a n t C h i e f o f t h e B r i t i s h A i r S t a f f
(Intelligence)
1. Reproduced below are s t a t e m e n t s from:

( a ) "The A x i s O i l P o s i t i o n i n E u r o p e , November 1 9 4 2 , " by t h e
Hart l e y Commi t t e e
(b) "German S t r a t e g y i n 1943,
"
by t h e J o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e
Sub
committee i n London, December 3 r d , 1942.

2.
E x t r a c t s from t h e H a r t l e y Committee's Report:
S t a t i s t i c a l Review o f t h e P o s i t i o n from May 1st t o O c t o b e r l s t , 1942.

Tons
Production during period:
7,895,000
Consumption by Armed Forces:
4,510,000
Balance a v a i l a b l e f o r c i v i l i a n consumption:3,355,000
According t o p r e v i o u s e s t i m a t e s , t h e n o n - m i l i t a r y r e q u i r e m e n t s
f o r t h e p e r i o d s h o u l d have amounted t o 4,334,000 t o n s , if i n d u s t r i a l ef
f i c i e n c y was t o b e m a i n t a i n e d . To t h i s s h o u l d h e a d d e d , s a y , 150,000
f o r Occupied R u s s i a making an a p p a r e n t t o t a l d e f i c i e n c y of about 1,150,000
tons.
T h i s d e f i c i e n c y might have been met by:
Tons
Reduction of consumption i n Germany
and Occupied T e r r i t o r i e s
GL50,000
Withdrawal from s t o c k s
500,000
TOTAL
1,150,000
Evidence confirms t h a t s t o c k s have a l r e a d y been so reduced t h a t

d i s t r i b u t i o n i s becoming d i f f i c u l t and t h a t t h e d a n g e r l e v e l has b e e n
r e a c h e d . A r e d u c t i o n by ,500,000 below t h i s l e v e l would impose a g r e a t
s t r a i n on t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s y s t e m which c o n s e q u e n t l y i s l i k e l y t o be
exceptionally s e n s i t i v e to dislocation.
F u t u r e Trend o f O i l P o s i t i o n :
D u r i n g t h e s i x months November 1942 t o May 1943 t h e s i t u a t i o n
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH YOST SECRET
may improve by:

(a) I n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n :
Tons
I n c r e a s e from S y n t h e t i c P l a n t s
100,000
E x p l o i t a t i o n of Waikop o i l f i e l d
(b) Reduced consumption:
M i l i t a r y - by reduced a c t i v i t y i n R u s s i a
100,000
500,000
180,000
C i v i l - b y u s e o f producer gas
TOTAL
880,000
Balance S h e e t November 1912 - May 19.13

The a p p r o x i m a t e b a l a n c e s h e e t f o r t h e n e x t s i x months on t h e
b a s i s of t h e above f i g u r e s would t h e r e f o r e be:
Tons
Produc t i o n
L e s s S e r v i c e consumption
,I
m0,ooo
,
I e a v i n g b a l a n c e f o r c i v i l i a n consumption
2,060,000
8,100,000
E s t i m a t e d minimum c i v i l i a n r e q u i r e m e n t s
(assuming r e s t r i c t i o n s c o n t i n u e d and pro
ducer gas f u r t h e r e x p l o i t e d )
3 , G54,OOO
SURPLUS:
406,000
Assuming, t h e r e f o r e , reduced a c t i v i t y on t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t , ex
p l o i t a t i o n of Maikop, c o n t i n u a n c e o f p r e s e n t r e s t r i c t i o n s and i n c r e a s e d
use o f p r o d u c e r gas, Germany m i g h t b e a b l e t o r e p l e n i s h h e r s t o c k s by
some 400,000 t o n s d u r i n g t h e n e x t s i x months. She would b e u n l i k e l y ,
however, t o be i n a p o s i t i o n t o r e s t o r e t h e c u t s i n c i v i l i a n consumption
or t o u n d e r t a k e t h e mechanized e x p l o i t a t i o n of R u s s i a f o r t h e 1943 h a r
v e s t . I n t h e meantime, t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s , which c o n t r i b u t e 33 p e r
cent of t o t a l A x i s s u p p l i e s , would remain o f v i t a l importance t o h e r .
T h e p r o d u c t i o n t r e n d i s i n c r e a s i n g . By t h e m i d d l e of 1943,
a d d i t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n a t t h e r a t e of one m i l l i o n t o n s p e r y e a r may b e
expected from s y n t h e t i c o i l p l a n t s now i n c o u r s e of e r e c t i o n . T h i s w i l l
p o s s i b l y b e i n c r e a s e d by a f u r t h e r 500,000 t o n s a n n u a l c a p a c i t y b y t h e
end of 1913.
3.
E x t r a c t s from J o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e Subcommittee's R e p o r t :
Germany's
o i l s i t u a t i o n is c r i t i c a l . She c a n n o t hope t o o b t a i n
any s u b s t a n t i a l a d d i t i m a l s u p p l i e s from h e r p r e s e n t r e s o u r c e s b e f o r e
the middle of 1943, e v e n if she r e t a i n s Vaikop. D e s p i t e r u t h l e s s econo
mies i n s e r v i c e a n d c i v i l i a n u s e , t h e r e a r e a l r e a d y d i s t r i b u t i o n a l
41
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H KOST S E C R E T
breakdowns which a r e b e g i n n i n g t o a f f e c t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . During the
n e x t s i x months a t l e a s t h e r o i l s i t u a t i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e t o e m b a r r a s s
h e r o p e r a t i o n s and r e s t r i c t h e r p l a n s . I t w i l l p r e v e n t h e r from provid
i n g t h e o i l n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e 1943 U k r a i n i a n h a r v e s t , w i t h o u t which her
food p o s i t i o n w i l l remain p r e c a r i o u s , and w i l l c o n t i n u e t o d e p r e s s h e r
i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y . If, i n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , s h e i s f o r c e d t h i s win
t e r t o consume o i l f o r m i l i t a r y purposes a t the same r a t e a s i n t h e win
t e r o f 1911-42,
s h e w i l l be i n c r e a s i n g l y h a n d i c a p p e d i n h o l d i n g h e r
p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n and w i l l be u n a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e an o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t
S o u t h o r e v e n N o r t h C a u c a s i a i n t h e summer o f 1913. I n t h e s e c i r c m
s t a n c e s s h e may be f o r c e d o r m a y d e c i d e t o s h o r t e n her l i n e . On t h e o t h e r
hand, i f s h e i s a l l o w e d t o remain i n a c t i v e d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r , t h e r e
s u l t a n t s a v i n g i n o i l , p l u s t h e new s o u r c e o f d o m e s t i c s u p p l y t h a t w i l l
become a v a i l a b l e t o h e r i n t h e m i d d l e o f 1943, s h o u l d e n a b l e h e r t o
u n d e r t a k e t h e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t n e c e s s a r y a t l e a s t t o complete t h e occupa
t i o n of North Caucasia.
If Germany i s g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o m p l e t e n e x t y e a r t h e
o c c u p a t i o n o f N o r t h C a u c a s i a and s e c u r e s t h e s e a p a s s a g e a c r o s s t h e
B l a c k Sea, s h e s h o u l d command enough o i l ( i n c l u d i n g i n c r e a s e d domestic
s u p p l i e s , which a r e e x p e c t e d i n mid-1943)
commitments,
t o m e e t her future m i l i t a r y
t o i n s u r e a s u b s t a n t i a l g r a i n s u r p l u s from t h e Ukraine i n
t h e 1944 h a r v e s t and t o p r o v i d e h e r i n d u s t r y w i t h t h e minimum r e q u i r e

ments f o r h e r war e f f o r t . I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, s h e h a s s h o r t e n e d h e r
l i n e and abandoned hope o f C a u c a s i a n o i l and i s h e a v i l y engaged by the
A l l i e s , h e r s u p p l i e s w i l l be so l i m i t e d as t o d e p r i v e h e r o f a l l power
o f u n d e r t a k i n g major o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .
4.
S i n c e t h e two above p a p e r s were w r i t t e n , t h e r e have b e e n t h e
f o l l o w i n g developments:
The R u s s i a n c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e i s f o r c i n g t h e Germans t o r e t r e a t
on a l m o s t e v e r y s e c t i o n o f t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t , i n c l u d i n g t h e Caucasus.
Not o n l y , t h e r e f o r e ,
a r e t h e c h a n c e s o f Germany o b t a i n i n g o i l from
Maikop d u r i n g 1913 remote, b u t i t now a p p e a r s u n l i k e l y t h a t any r e s p i t e
w i l l be g i v e n t o t h e Germans t h i s w i n t e r t o remain i n a c t i v e i n o r d e r t o
c o n s e r v e t h e i r o i l s u p p l i e s f o r a new o f f e n s i v e i n t h e North Caucasus
d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r o f t h e y e a r . Fven a withdrawal t o a s h o r t e r l i n e w i l l
r e s u l t i n a heavy e x p e n d i t u r e of o i l r e s o u r c e s .
Germany i n h e r campaigns i n 1913 w i l l ,
42
t h e r e f o r e , have t o r e l y
U. S . SECRET
on:
(a) The lxumanian O i l t i e l d s
(b) S y n t h e t i c P r o d u c t i o n
( c ) Producer Gas
She w i l l b e u n a b l e up t o Xay 1943 t o make t h e s a v i n g of 500,000 t o n s by
a reduced a c t i v i t y on t h e n u s s i a n F r o n t , nor w i l l s h e have a v a i l a b l e t h e

100,000 t o n s from t h e C a u c a s u s .
Her a s s e t s d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d w i l l ,
t h e r e f o r e , b e 600,000 t o n s l e s s t h a n t h o s e e s t i m a t e d i n t h e H a r t l e y
report
5.
.
I t , i s of i n t e r e s t t h a t i n s t a n c e s have a l r e a d y o c c u r r e d of f l y i n g
t r a i n i n g b e i n g d i s o r g a n i z e d and c u r t a i l e d by s h o r t a g e of f u e l .
43
U. S . S E C R E T
C.C.S. 159/1
January 2 0 , 1943

THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA
Memorandum by t h e Combined Chiefs o f S t a f f

The o b j e c t s of t h e bomber offensive from North Africa w i l l be,
i n order t o time:
(a) The furtherance of operations for t h e e v i c t i o n of a l l Axis
f o r c e s from Africa.
1.
(b) When (a) has been achieved, i n f l i c t i o n of the heaviest pos
s i b l e l o s s e s on the Axis A i r and Naval forces i n preparation
for "HUSKY", i n c l u d i n g bombing r e q u i r e d b y cover p l a n s .

(c) The d i r e c t furtherance of operation "HUSKY".
(d) The d e s t r u c t i o n of the o i l r e f i n e r i e s a t P l o e s t i .
2.
So f a r a s is p o s s i b l e without p r e j u d i c e t o t h e achievement of
o b j e c t s ( a ) , (b) and (c) above, bombing o b j e c t i v e s w i l l be chosen w i t h
a view t o weakening t h e I t a l i a n w i l l t o continue t h e war.
NOTE: T h i s paper is i d e n t i c a l t o C.C.S. 159 except for d e l e t i o n of "The

proposals of the B r i t i s h Chiefs of S t a f f a r e a s follows," a t head
ing of paper; and addition of "including bombing required by cover
plans," following "HUSKY" a t c l o s e of paragraph l ( b )
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S.
1m
January 19, 1943

M I N I M U M ESCORT REQUIREMENTS TO M A I N T A I N THE SEA
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

R e p o r t by t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s
PART I - ATLANTIC
U s K . DRY CARGO IMPORT SITUATION:

1.
The minimum i m p o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r t h e U n i t e d Kingdom d u r i n g
1943 a r e 27 m i l l i o n t,ons.
I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t w i t h U . S.. a s s i s t a n c e on
the s c a l e e n v i s a g e d i t should he p o s s i b l e t o import 12 m i l l i o n t o n s dur

ing t h e f i r s t s i x months l e a v i n g a b a l a n c e of 15 m i l l i o n t o n s t o h e i m
p o r t e d i n t h e second h a l f of t h e y e a r
2.
I t i s o f p r i m a r y importance t h a t U
K , imports i n the f i r s t h a l f
of t h e y e a r s h o u l d n o t f a l l s h o r t o f t h e t a r g e t f i g u r e o f 12 m i l l i o n
t o n s , s i n c e any d e f i c i t w i l l b e c a r r i e d i n t o t h e second h a l f of t h e y e a r ,
and w i l l t h u s impose a n e v e n more s e v e r e s t r a i n on U n i t e d N a t i o n s r e
s o u r c e s , which w i l l h e s e v e r e l y t a x e d i n o r d e r t o a c h i e v e t h e b a l a n c e of
15 m i l l i o n t o n s . An a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n f o r m a i n t a i n i n g t h e r a t e of im-.
p o r t s i s t h a t a d e c i s i o n t o remount BOLERO would i n v o l v e t h e movement of

an a d d i t i o n a l 100-200 s h i p s a month i n t h e l a t t e r h a l f o f t h e y e a r ,
which w i l l s t i l l f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e o u r e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s
3.
I f , by t h e p r o v i s i o n of improved p r o t e c t i o n , the average r a t e of
l o s s i n t h e North A t l a n t i c were reduced by 25 p e r c e n t , from F e b r u a r y i t

is e s t i m a t e d t h a t by t h e end of June t h e g a i n i n U . X. i m p o r t s would h e
450,000 t o n s : A f u r t h e r g a i n c o u l d h e o b t a i n e d by c l o s i n g t h e t r a n s -
A t l a n t i c convoy c y c l e i n F e b r u a r y from 10 t o 8 days-.
T h i s would amount
t o 150,000 t o n s , making a t o t a l of 600,000 t o n % F u r t h e r , t h e 25 p e r c e n t

r e d u c t i o n r e f e r r e d t o above would p r e s e r v e 3 / 4 , m i l l i o n d - w t.. of s h i p
ping i n t h e whole Korth A t l a n t i c which w i l l o t h e r w i s e b e l o s t
U. IE, AND NORTH AFRICAN OIL IMPORT SITUATION:

4.
The measures r e c e n t l y a g r e e d t o remedy t h e s e r i o u s o i l p o s i t i o n
i n t h e U. K .
i n c l u d e t h e r u n n i n g of
Dutch West I n d i e s t o U . K .
( a ) a d i r e c t t a n k e r convoy from t h e
on a 20 day c y c l e ;
45
@) a d i r e c t f a s t t a n k e r
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH WOST SECRET
convoy from t h e C u t c h West I n d i e s t o t h e TOUCH a r e a . T h e s e commitments
w i l l c o n t i n u e t h r o u g h o u t t h e y e a r s i n c e t h e y do n o t s u f f i c e t o b u i l d up
s t o c k s b u t merely t o meet consumption.
CONVOYS TO N O R T H RUSSIA:
5.
With t h e i n c r e a s i n g h o u r s o f d a y l i g h t and t h e more s o u t h e r l y
l i m i t reached by t h e i c e i n t h e s p r i n g , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o i n c r e a s e t h e
s c a l e of e s c o r t t o convoys t o K o r t h R u s s i a , i n o r d e r t o d e a l w i t h the
t h r e a t of a t t a c k from German s u r f a c e and a i r f o r c e s . I t i s considered
t h a t i n t h e circumstances prevailing,
a minimum s t r i k i n g f o r c e o f 15
F l e e t d e s t r o y e r s i s r e q u i r e d i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e convoy e s c o r t .
U . . S~ EAST COAST:
6.
Although U-boat a c t i v i t y on t h e e a s t c o a s t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
a n d Canada h a s r e c e n t l y b e e n much r e d u c e d , t h e volume o f s h i p p i n g i n

t h i s a r e a p r e s e n t s s u c h a v u l n e r a b l e t a r g e t t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o pro
v i d e for i t s p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t a renewal of heavy a t t a c k .
CARIBBEAN AREA AKD GULF OF MEXICO:
7.
The p r o t e c t i o n o f s h i p p i n g employed i n t h e t r a n s p o r t of v i t a l
o i l s u p p l i e s f r o m t h e o i l p o r t s t,o t h e e a s t e r n s e a b o a r d i s one f o r which

adequate p r o v i s i o n s must b e made.
TRINIDAD SOUTH ATLANTIC SHIPPING:

8.
Vie have s u f f e r e d heavy l o s s i n t h i s a r e a t h r o u g h which a l a r g e
volume o f s h i p p i n g t o and from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , S o u t h A m e r i c a and
S o u t h A f r i c a must p a s s . Adequate p r o v i s i o n must be made t o s a f e g u a r d
t h i s v i t a l r o u t e , w h i c h c a r r i e s among o t h e r s t h e i m p o r t a n t b a u x i t e
supplies
UNITED KINGDOM-WEST AFRICAN CONVOYS:
9.
These convoys were t e m p o r a r i l y suspended i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e es
c o r t s f o r TORCH- I t was n o t , however, p r a c t i c a b l e t o s u s p e n d t h e flow

of s h i p p i n g t o and from West a n d S o u t h A f r i c a and S o u t h America s i n c e
t h i s s h i p p i n g c a r r i e s m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s t o t h e Middle E a s t and b r i n g s
b a c k a b o u t o n e - t h i r d o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom i m p o r t s . The e x p e r i m e n t of
s a i l i n g such outward bound s h i p p i n g i n s o u t h e r l y r o u t e d t r a n s - A t l a n t i c
convoys and b r e a k i n g i t off
i n m i d - . A t l a n t i c h a s p r o v e d t o o c o s t l y and
h a s been d i s c o n t i n u e d . S i m i l a r l y t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r homeward bound ship

p i n g t o r e t u r n v i a t h e e a s t c o a s t of the United S t a t e s , has r e s u l t e d i n
a most u n e c o n o m i c a l u s e o f t o n n a g e a n d h e a v y l o s s e s i n t h e Cape S a n
Roque a r e a .
I t i s t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r y t o r e c o n s t i t u t e t h e s e convoys on a
46
minimum c y c l e o f 2 0 d a y s .
R E O P E N I N G T i B \IEDITEKRANEAN:
10
The s h i p p i n g running t o
considerably.
'
E a s t has a l r e a d y been r e d u c e d
I t i s p r o p o s e d , when t h e ! ' e d i t e r r a n e m r o u t e i s reopened, t o r u n

a convoy of t h i r t y c a r g o s h i p s e v e r y t e n d a y s t o s u p p l y and r e p l e n i s h
the 'diddle h a s t and l n d i a . '?he e s c o r t commitments i n v o l v e d can be met by
the f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e l o c a l l y supplemented by s m a l l s a v i n g s which w i l l b e
a v a i l a b l e f r o m t h e r e d u c e d s c a l e o f e s c o r t r e q u i r e d on t h e F r e e t o w n
r o u t e when t h e ' Y e d i t e r r a n e a n i s opened t o c a r g o s h i p s .
11
Although t h e p r o t e c t i o r . of' slijppin,< i n t h e P a c i f i c h a s n o t y e t
become a problem of g r e a t magnitude, i t may b e e x p e c t e d t o d e v e l o p . The

expanding campaign w i l l r e q u i r e i n c r e a s e d s h i p p i n g t o s u s t a i n i t
The
submarine and a i r t h r e a t a g a i n s t t h i s i n c r e a s e d s h i p p i n g w i l l grow i n

i n t e n s i t y i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e p r o g r e s s of' t h e campaign. E s c o r t r e q u i r e
ments f o r p r o t e c t i o n w i l l i n c r e a s e c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y .
P A X T I 1 1 - T!IE
12
U-BOAT
THREAT
The s c a l e of LI-boat t h r e a t a g a i n s t which North A t l a n t i c convoys
r e q u i r e t o be p r o t e c t e d i s s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s i n g . U-boats a r e now o p e r a t
ing i n g r o u p s o f 12-18;
hence t h e s c a l e o f a t t a c k a g a i n s t any convoy
may be t a k e n as a b o u t 15 U-boats.
13
The s c a l e of s u r f a c e e s c o r t r e q u i r e d t o s e c u r e convoys a g a i n s t
a t t a c k of t h i s i n t e n s i t y i s g r e a t e r than we can hope t o meet by t h e p r o

v i s i o n of s u r f a c e e s c o r t s a l o n e . F u r t h e r , i t h a s b e e n proved t h a t a com
b i n a t i o n of a i r and s u r f a c e e s c o r t i s more economical and e f f i c i e n t t h a n
s u r f a c e e s c o r t a l o n e . I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , n e c e s s a r y t o make p r o v i s i o n for
a i r cover t o a l l ocean convoys. S i n c e n e i t h e r s h o r e b a s e nor c a r r i e r
borne a i r c r a f t can be r e l i e d upon t o be always o p e r a b l e , b o t h forms of
a i r cover a r e r e q u i r e d .
A program of c o n s t r u c t i o n o f e s c o r t c a r r i e r s t o meet o u r n e e d s
is a l r e a d y i n hand and cannot be g r e a t l y a c c e l e r a t e d

future, therefore,
For t h e immediate
a i r e s c o r t c a n o n l y b e i n s u r e d b y the p r o v i s i o n of
47
U. S. SECRET
3RITIS.H MOST SECRET
shore based a i r c r a f t
14.
I n a s s e s s i n g t h e s c a l e of e s c o r t , r e q u i r e d f o r t h e v a r i o u s con
voys account must b e t a k e n o f :

(a) The d i s t a n c e o f t h e convoy r o u t e from t h e U-boat b a s e s
(b) The a v a i l a b i l i t y o f shore based a i r cover
(c) The a v a i l a b i l i t y of e s c o r t c a r r i e r s .
The f o l l o w i n g s c a l e s of o c e a n - g o i n g e s c o r t v e s s e l s
( o v e r 200 f e e t i n
l e n g t h ) a r e c o r i s i d e r e d t o b e t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e :
(1) For convoys o p e r a t i n g i n a r e a s where p a c k s of U b o a t s
are l i k e l y t o be e n c o u n t e r e d and assuming a d e q u a t e a i r

c o v e r t h e minimum e s c o r t i s a s s e s s e d a s 3 p l u s 1 f o r
e v e r y 10 s h i p s i n t h e convoy,
(2) F o r convoys o p e r a t i n g i n a r e a s where pack t a c t i c s a r e

u n l i k e i y and assuming a d e q u a t e a i r e s c o r t i s a v a i l a b l e
minimum e s c o r t 1 p l u i 1 f o r e v e r y 10 s h i p s i n t h e convoy
(3) P a r convoys o p e r a t i n g i n a r e a s where p a c k t a c t i c s a r e
u n l i k e l y , s t r o n g a i r s u p p o r t i s n o r m a l l y a v a i l a b l e and
e s c o r t s can be s t r e n g t h e n e d by v e s s e l s under 206 f'set i n
lengCh
%iriimum e s c o r t 1 p l u s 1 f o r e v e r y 20 s h i p s i n
con ..oy
(4,
T h e t a b l e s ha>ie been prepared on t h e b a s i s t h a t adequate
a i r cover is a v a i l a b l e
T h
minimum e s c o r t g i v e n & m e
s h o u l d be doubled j~fadequate a i r cover i s n o t a - v a i l a b l e
In o t h e r words, e s c o r t s t r e n g t h ( w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e g a r d
1.0
(1)) i s dependent upon v i s i b i l i t y and weather condi...
Lions i n which a i r coverage can be c o n s i d e r e d e f f e c t i v e

1:uririg t h e w i n t e r months i n North A t l a n t i c , w i t h l o n g
n i g h t s arid u n f a v o r a b l e weather c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s t o be
a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t t h e e f f e c t i v e u s e of e s c o r t c a r r i e r s
w i l l be v e r y much r e s t r i c t e d , and t h a t s h o r e based A i r
w i l l . riot f u l l y p r o v i d e for a i r e s c o r t i n the Middle A t
lantic
Llnder such c o n d i t i o n s e s c o r t s t r e n g t h as c a l c u . .
l a t e d under (1) must be i n c r e a s e d

15.
The above assumptions i n r e g a r d t o e s c o r t s t r e n g t h c o n t e m p l a t e
as s t a t e d , t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e
O p e r a t i n g w i t h t h i s minimum i t i s not
f e l t t h a t measures c a n be t a k e n t o accomplish d e s t r u c t i o n of submarines
at the desired r a t e (i e
i n e x c e s s of t h e p r o d u c t i o n r a t e )
48
U. S. SECRET
16.
If convoys a r e o p e r a t e d w i t h e s c o r t s i n s t r e n g t h s less t h a n t h a t
given i n p a r a g r a p h 1 4 , i n c r e a s e d l o s s e s a r e t o b e e x p e c t e d . T h e a c c e p t
ance of i n c r e a s e d l o s s e s must b e b a l a n c e d a g a i n s t t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f
other a c t i v i t i e s t h a t n e c e s s i t a t e the i n t e r f e r e n c e .
17.
Taking i n t o a c c o u n t a l l t h e p o i n t s d i s c u s s e d , t h e s c a l e of e s
c o r t s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e major ronvoys has been c a l c u l a t e d i n Enclosure "An.

I n E n c l o s u r e "B" wehave p r e s e n t e d t h e s e same a s s e s s m e n t s a s p a r t
of a world-wide e s t i m a t e of t h e F l e e t D e s t r o y e r s and ocean-going e s c o r t

v e s s e l s r e q u i r e d t o o p e r a t e w j t h t h e major n a v a l f o r c e s , s e c u r e impor
t a n t f o c a l p o i n t s o u t s i d e t h e g e n e r a l convoy system and conduct c o a s t a l
traffic.
I n E n c l o s u r e "C" t h e f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e a r e compared w i t h t h e
r e q u i r e m e n t s c a l c a l a t e d from E n c l o s u r e "B"
I n E n c l o s u r e "E" t h e r e q L i r e m e n t s and a v a i l a b i l i t y o f e s c o r t
c a r r i e r s i s considered
I n E n c l o s u r e "En c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s g i v e n t o t h e world-wide
re
q u i r e m e n t s of s h o r e b a s e d a i r c r a f t f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t r a d e corn
munications
18
CONCLUSION:
On t h e b a s i s of t h e t a b l e s i n c l u d e d i n t h e e n c l o s u r e s i t w i l l b e
seen t h a t minimum a c c e p t a b l e r e q u i r e m e n t s a s t o e s c o r t c r a f t w i l l b e m e t
a p p r o x i m a t e l y i n August and September
W
e w i l l n o t he i n a p o s i t i o n ,
however, t o g i v e f u l l y adequate p r o t e c t i o n t o ocean-going convoys t o t h e

e x t e n t of s i n k i n g a t t a c k i n g s u b m a r i n e s a t a r a t e e v e n c o m p a r a b l e t o
t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n o u t p u t b e f o r e t h e end of t h e y e a r
49
U. S . SECRET
J R I T I S K MOST SECRET
ENCLOSUXE "A"
DETAILED ESTIMATE OF CONVOY ESCORT REQUIREMENTS
(Vessels over 200 f e e t i n l e n g t h )
North Russian
Days
Special
30
U.S -U. K.
1s
(Note: iiussian convoys a r e supported by f l e e t

destroyer s t r i k i n g forces)
S.C. & H.X.

S.C.
\lid-Ocean
40
11
40
..
..
..
24
10
110
& 1 i . X . Western
Local
8 6 4
Canadian Local Convoys
..
..
D.W.1.-U.K.
40
20
10
30
24
30
30
30
16
18
60
16
12
36
U.K. -Freetown
40
20
11
33
U.S.-TORCH
(Troop)
20
25
18
U.S. -TORCH
(Cargo)
45
25
Special
A
10
30
New York-Key West
18
Guantanamo-New Yor k
30
15
Guantanamo-Key West
10
Guantanamo-Tr i n i d a d
23
Guantanamo-Panama
14
Special
24
38
6
Tanker
Tanker
D.W.1.-TORCH
U.K. -Gibral tar
U.K.
(OG/HG)
TORCH (KMF/WS)
(ms)
6 t o 10
15
..
3
..
Special
..
10
20
..
Special
..
..
..
Key West-Galveston &

P i 1ottown
Trinidad-Baia
U.S.-Iceland
Shuttle
Service
U.S.
P a c i f i c Convoys
..
..
..
..
..
36
511
50
U. S . S E C R E T
BRITISH X O S T S E C R E T
ENCLOSURE "B"
WORLD-WIDE ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS O F
FLEET DESTROYERS AND OCEAN- G O I N G ESCORT VESSELS
( O v e r 200 f e e t i n l e n g t h )
Fleet
Escort
Destroyers
Vessels
30
North R u s s i a n Convoys
18
T r a n s a t l a n t i c Convoys
PRESENT BRITISH RESPONSIBILITIES:

Home F l e e t
110
\lid-ocean e s c o r t s
-
fx
Canadian L o c a l Convoys
24
Freetown Convoys
33
DWI-UK Tanker Convoys
30
Wester-n L o c a l e s c o r t s
UK- G i b r a1t ar Convoys

-
54
E a s t C o a s t Convoys
52
L o c a l !iome Commands
28
M i n e l a y i n g Squadron
15
G i b r a l t a r L o c a l E s c o r t s & I n s h o r e Sq..
39
Freetown L o c a l e s c o r t s
18
South A t l a n t i c Local e s c o r t s
18
UK-Torch and
lli S.
Convoys
UK-Local E s c o r t s
E a s t e r n Medi t e rr ane a n Squadron
Eastern Fleet
East I n d i e s L o c a l E s c o r t s
20
E a s t Medi terr anean
28
Red Sea
A u s t r a l i a 9r P a c i f i c
74
54 5
125
U - S. P a c i f i c Convoys
36
Atlantic Fleet
48
U . S.-Torch Troop Convoys
18
t a1
PRESENT U . S. RESPONSIBILITIES:
P a c i f i c Fleet
51
rscort
iiessels
i~.
T . Torch Car50 Convoys
3':
Tanker ionvoys
i:bI--'?orcii
h-ew York--Ney
hest
Cuai?taiiaii;o--~~ew
York
Guantanaino--Key
15
\lest
Guant anamo--'Tr i n i d ad
15
Cuan t ananlo--!ariama
3
6
Key \$est--Galveston and P i l o t t o w n

Trinidad--Baia
U. S.--Iceland S h u t t l e S e r v i c e
20
6
Total
107
ENCLOSURE "C"
FLEET DESTROYERS AND OCEAN-GOING
ESCORT VESSELS
( O v e r 200 f e e t i n l e n g t h )
COMPARISON OF M I N I M U M REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY
The sum of minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s shown i n E n c l o s u r e "Bn i s :
P r e s e n t l y under B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
P r e s e n t l y under U . S. r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
Total
Fleet
Ocean Going
Destroyers
E s c o r t Vessels
74
546
235
107
309
653
The f o r c e s auailable d u r i n g e a c h month o f 1943 have been e s t i

mated i n t h e t a b l e h e r e u n d e r :
(a) Allowance i s made f o r a p e r i o d of one months working up be

tween c o m p l e t i o n and r e a d y f o r s e r v i c e .
(b) Allowance i s made f o r a number of v e s s e l s b e i n g withdrawn
from o p e r a t i o n a l commands f o r e x t e n s i v e r e p a i r s or modern
i z a t i o n (U.S.-33. BR.-21)
(c) A t t r i t i o n rates a r e b a s e d on p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , namely:

F l e e t Destroyers
Escort Vessels
52
5 p e r month
5 p e r month
U S SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
Fleet Destroyers
us
BR
Ocean-Going E s c o r t V e s s e l s ( o v e r 2 0 0 f t . )
us
ri
rd
.d
"
RR
To s e r v i c e
.
l
Jan 1943
c
o
L QI
idUrl.4
186
72
us
BR
Constr
Constr
<E z z z
.3 0
a-0 m
1Jan 1M3
riZ
uoi
oi.3
c
U L o i O
CdUri'3
To s e r v i c e
3m.4
um
0c 3
uo
'3 0
a**
m
0.3
l
.3
uO oC
id@
>Q
Gi
63
437
us
RR
Constr
Constr
rd
rlunu
SCdL32
2S @
uoi> oi
*d
d.u
January
10
264
January
500
February
10
270
February
496
March
10
276
March
496
April
12
286
April
499
May
June
10
292
510
12
300
May
June
16
17
538
July
11
309
July
26
568
August
13
318
August
32
12
607
September
10
325
September
38
11
65 1
326
October
37
13
696
November
11
337
November
49
18
758
December
10
343
December
56
20
829
October
ENCLOSURE "D"
UNITED NATIONS REQUIREMENTS OF ESCORT CARRIERS
REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVOY ESCORT:
I t is c o n s i d e r e d t h a t e v e r y ocean convoy e s c o r t s h o u l d i n c l u d e
an e s c o r t c a r r i e r i n a r e a s where a t t a c k s b y p a c k s of U-boats may b e

expected On t h i s b a s i s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s t h e e s t i m a t e d number r e q u i r e d .
North A t l a n t i c .
Trans a t l a n t i c convoys
10
Freetown cony oys
DWI-UK Tanker convoys
DWI- Torc h Tanker convoys
The N o r t h R u s s i a n convoys have t o b e f o u g h t t h r o u g h a heavy

s c a l e of a i r a t t a c k d u r i n g t h e months when h o u r s of d a y l i g h t are l o n g .
It can be assumed t h a t s u c h a t t a c k w i l l be c o n c e n t r a t e d l a r g e l y on t h e
53
L J . S . SECRET
e s c o r t c a r r i e r . The p r o b a b l e l o s s of a l l f i g h t e r p r o t e c t i o n i f o n l y one
e s c o r t c a r r i e r were s e n t w i t h e a c h convoy would have s u c h consequences
t h a t i t i s c o n s i d e r e d t h a t two e s c o r t c a r r i e r s s h o u l d be p r o v i d e d f o r
e a c h convoy. The r e q u i r e m e n t i s t h e r e f o r e :
North Russian convoys
T o t a l Requirements of Convoy
escort
25
AVAILABILITY:
After allowance i s made f o r working up and a t t r i t i o n i t i s e s t i

mated t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g number of e s c o r t c a r r i e r s w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e for
service:
u. s.
BRITISH
End J a n u a r y
11
End February
13
End March
13
End A p r i l
11
19
End May
18
26
TOTAL
End J u n e
21
11
32
End J u l y
24
13
37
14
.22
28
End August
A p a r t from o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a l l o w a n c e must b e made f o r a
number o f t h e s e c a r r i e r s b e i n g employed on t r a i n i n g , a n t i - r a i d e r d u t i e s
and a i r c r a f t t r a n s p o r t i n g , w h i l e 20 p e r c e n t w i l l b e undergoing r e f i t a t
any one t i m e .
ENCLOSURE 'E"
UNITED NATIONS REQUIREMENTS O F SHORE BASED

AIRCRAFT FOR THE DEFENSE OF TRADE COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION 1 - THE NORTH ATLANTIC:
1.
The V.L.R.
Area:
Very l o n g r a n g e a i r c r a f t a r e r e q u i r e d t o e s c o r t c o n v o y s and
operate a g a i n s t U-boats i n t h e North A t l a n t i c a t r a n g e s g r e a t e r t h a n
500 m i l e s from airdromes i n G r e a t B r i t a i n , I c e l a n d (C) and Newfoundland.

T h i s area i s known as t h e V.L.R.
Area.
They a r e a l s o r e q u i r e d t o e s c o r t convoys as f a r s o u t h as 5 2
54
N.
S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
[I.
so t h a t f l e x i b i l i t y may be g i v e n t o r o u t i n g .
I t must b e assumed t h a t any convoy p a s s i n g
l i a b l e t o be p i c k e d up and shadowed by a U-boat. I t
the shadower d i v e . IVe s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e a b l e t o
during d a y l i g h t h o u r s . W i t h i n t h e V.L.R. a r e a t h i s
through t h i s a r e a is
i s e s s e n t i a l t o make
e s c o r t e v e r y convoy
p r o b a b l y means a b o u t
three convoys d a i l y .
The o p e r a t i o n of t h r e e s t r o n g packs of U-boats s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n
e must b e p r e
the North A t l a n t i c i s w e l l w i t h i n t h e enemys r e s o u r c e s . W
pared f o r two convoys t o b e a t t a c k e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and s h o u l d b e a b l e
t o r e i n f o r c e e a c h of t h e s e w i t h l o n g r a n g e a i r c r a f t t o h a r a s s and s i n k
the U-boats
These a i r c r a f t would a l s o b e u s e d f o r sweeps f o r t h e same
purpose
For t h e s e t a s k s i t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t 80 V.L.R.
a i r c r a f t are re
quired, of which GO m i g h t b e based i n t h e United Kingdom and 20 i n North

America.
2.
The Bay of B i s c a y Area:

The r e q u i r e m e n t s i n t h e Bay a r e a a r e b a s e d on t h e development of
a s t r o n g o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t U-boats
on p a s s a g e t o and from t h e i r b a s e s ,
the e s c o r t of convoys p a s s i n g i n t h a t area and f l e e t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e d u t y .
Northern Approaches:
I t is n e c e s s a r y t o have enough a i r a c t i v i t y t o t h e approaches t o

the Minches and S t
G e o r g e P s Channel t o i n s u r e t h a t U-boats cannot c l o s e
I n and o p e r a t e i n our f o c a l p o i n t s w i t h i m p u n i t y . The p a s s a g e of new

U-boats around t h e North of t h e Faroes p r o v i d e s o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r i n t e r
ception F l e e t o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Northern a r e a r e q u i r e reconnaissance
and e s c o r t a i r c r a f t , An a i r c r a f t s t r i k i n g f o r c e f o r t h e N o r t h S e a and
Northern w a t e r s i s a l s o n e c e s s a r y .
4,
E a s t Coast:
b e h: R
Squadron i s r e q u i r e d i n t h e E a s t Coast t o assist i n t h e
p r o t e c t i o n o f our convoys a g a i n s t U-boat a t t a c k .

5.
Gibraltar:
The d e f e n s e o f t h e f o c a l p o i n t s i n t h e approaches t o t h e hlediter
ranean r e q u i r e s t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f s u i t a b l e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and a n t i
submarine a i r c r a f t a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e d a y and n i g h t o p e r a t i o n s .
SECTION 2
EAST COAST OF U
S , AND CANADA:
The f o c a l p o i n t s of t r a d e r o u t e s on t h e U.
require a l a r g e s c a l e of a i r p r o t e c t i o n
55
S . A t l a n t i c seaboard
P r a c t i c a l l y a l l A t l a n t i c convoy
C. S.
SECRET
B P I T I S R ,h:OST S E C K X
r o u t e s converge i n t h i s arcla.
SECTIOK 3 - THE CARIBBEAN:
The s h i p p i n g r o u t e s t o t h e o i l f i e
Is o f Venezuela a n
Trir
lad
and t o t h e Panama Canal c r o s s t h i s a r e a . These same r o u t e s converge i n

t h e v a r i o u s p a s s a g e s tkirough the West I n d i e s , producing many f o c a l points
which r e q u i r e a i r covcrage.
SECTION 4 - NORTHWEST AND WEST AFRICA:
Shore b a s e d a i r c r a f t a r e r e q u i r e d t o s e c u r e t h e f o c a l a r e a s off
t h e Nort,liwest and West, A f r i c a n p o r t s , t,o e s c o r t t h e convoys moving i n
t h e A t l a n t i c i n t h e s e l a t i t u d e s and t,o m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l o f t h e narrows.
SECTION 5
SOUTH AMERICAN EAST COAST AiVD AqCENSION ISLAND:
Due t o d i s t a n c e s , t h e submarine menace h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l y re
~
d u c e d . However, s u r f a c e r a i d e r s o p e r a t e c o n t i n u o u s l y i n t h i s a r e a and
a i r p a t r o l s a r e r e q u i r e d t o g u a r d a g a i n s t them.
SECTION 6 - THE MEDITERRANEAN [EXCLUDING GIBRALTARj :
In t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n t h e s e a communications a r e c o n t r o l l e d t o a
major degree b y s h o r e ba.sed a i r c r a f t . Requirenients f o r a l l t y p e s of a i r

c r a f t f o r c o o p e r a t i o n over t h e s e a a r e c o n s i d e r a b l e .
SECTION 7 - I N D I A N OCEAN:
The s i t u a t i o n i n t h e Irtdian Ocean has g e n e r a l l y improved. We are
however f a c e 2 w i t h :
( a ) A s u r f a c e and submarille t h r e a t i n t h e Bay o f Bengal.
(b) A submarille t h r e a t i l l t h e I n d i a n Ocean g e n e r a l l y b u t p a r
t i c u l a r l y i n t h e Mozambique Charmel and i n t h e o i l r o u t e
from t h e P e r s i a r r G u l f .
SECTION R
THE SOLTII PACIFIC:
No f i g u r e s a v a i l a b l e .
~
SECTION 9 - THE SO1JTIlWE:ST PAC.IFIC:

SECTIOK 10 - THE WEST COAST OF NORTI1 AIIERICA:
Tile subriiarine menace o f f t h e t h r e e major p o r t s i n t h i s a r e a has
been r e l i e v e d by a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Far E a s t . However, t h e s e a r e a s
must be p a t r o l l e d p a r t i c u l a r l y a g a i n s t s u r f a c e r a i d s on l a r g e convoys.
SECTION 11 - ALASKA:
SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS:
The s h o r e b a s e d a i r c r a f t r e q u i r e d t o meet t h e commitments s t a t e d
U. S. S E C R E T
BG'ITISH MOST S E C R E T
i n t h e above s e c t i o n s a r e s e t o u t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e d u l e :
SCHEDULE V
SCHEDULE OF REQUIREMENTS OF SHORE-BASED AIRCRAFT
FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE COMMUNICATIONS
Section
Area
1
North A t l a n t i c t o 2S0iY.
F'B
VLR
LR
31R
MR/TB
and European ( i n c l . Gib) 108, 140

180
S- 21 i n North A f r i c a
North A t l a n t i c , E a s t
Coast 1J.S. & Canada
Caribbean
West A f r i c a 2G01<. t o
96
72
120
18
P o r t u g u e s e West A f r i c a
.45
E a s t Coast S+uth America
48
Xedi t e r r a n e a n
1s
I n d i a n Ocean
South P a c i f i c
Southwest P a c i f i c
10
Hest Coast of .America
11
Alaska
12
South A f r i c a
117
.
24
. 150
. 72
12
.
.
24
SR
T/F
200
250
180
32
80
80
96
80
96
95
120
Iio d a t a a v a i l a b l e
140 d a t a a v a i l a b l e
72
30
110
No d a t a a v a i l a b l e
F l y i n g Boats
.
)
Very Long Range ) E s t i m a t e d f o r convoy c o v e r a g e s a t s e a .
Long Range
)
A l l o t h e r p l a n e s r e q u i r e d f o r coverage of h a r b o r s , s t r a i t s
and f o c a l p o i n t s of t r a d e r o u t e s .
57
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H NOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 20, 1943
161

OPERATION "HUSKY"
Memorandum b y t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f
OUTLINE PLAN:
1.
The main f e a t u r e s o f t h e p l a n a r e :
(a) B r i t i s h a s s a u l t s :
(1) On t h e s o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of t h e i s l a n d by t h r e e d i v i s i o n s '
on D d a y t o s e c u r e t h e a i r f i e l d s i n t h a t a r e a and t h e
p o r t s o f S y r a c u s e and A u g u s t a . These a i r f i e l d s a r e re
q u i r e d t o e n a b l e t h e a s s a u l t on C a t a n i a t o be p r o t e c t e d .
(2) On C a t a n i a by one d i v i s i o n on D 3 t o s e c u r e t h e p o r t and
airfields.
(b) American a s s a u l t s :
(1) On t h e s o u t h w e s t s h o r e by one d i v i s i o n on D d a y t o se
c u r e t h e a i r f i e l d s i n t h a t a r e a . These a i r f i e l d s are
r e q u i r e d t o c o v e r t h e a s s a u l t s on P a l e r m o
(2) On t h e Palermo a r e a b y two d i v i s i o n s on D 2 t o c a p t u r e
t h e p o r t of P a l e r m o and a d j a c e n t p o r t s and a i r f i e l d s .
E s c o r t c a r r i e r s w i l l p r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r the
assault.
(c) Follow-up:
One B r i t i s h d i v i s i o n w i l l b e l a n d e d t h r o u g h C a t a n i a and one
American d i v i s i o n t h r o u g h Palermo.
FORCES REQUIRED:
2.
The f o r c e s r e q u i r e d a r e shown i n E n c l o s u r e s u b d i v i d e d i n t o Amer
i c a n and B r i t i s r i commitments.
MOUNTING OF BRITISH PORTION:
3.
I t is assumed t h a t t h e U S S O A Sw i l l r e q u i r e F r e n c h North A f r i c a n
p o r t s f o r t h e mounting of t h e i r s h a r e of t h e o p e r a t i o n . Such p a r t o f t h e
B r i t i s h e x p e d i t i o n as i s mounted i n s i d e t h e Y e d i t e r r a n e a n mus't t h e r e f o r e
De mounted from Middle E a s t p o r t s , e . g
Malta.
, Haifa,
L i m i t a t i o n s of p o r t c a p a c i t y make
Alexandria, P o r t Said,
i t i m p o s s i b l e t o mount t h e
whole o f t h e B r i t i s h s h a r e from t h e Middle E a s t u n d e r any c o n d i t i o n s .
S, SECRET
BRITTSH MOST SECRET
U.
4.
In ordeF t o u s e b a t t l e - e x p e r i e n c e d
t r o o p s of t h e E i g h t h A r m y ,
they would have t o b e moved back t o Egypt f o r t r a i n i n g arrl l o a d i n g a f t e r

the conclusion of o p e r a t i o n s i n T u n i s i a
If t h e e x p e d i t i o n i s t o be
mounted w i t h i n r e a s o n a b l e t i m e , i t w i l l n o t b e p o s s i b l e t o employ more

than about one b a t t l e - e x p e r i e n c e d d i v i s i o n i n HUSKY
PROVISION OF ARMY FORCES:
5
There a r e two a l t e r n a t i v e methods:

A
T o f i n d t h e t h r e e d i v i s i o n a s s a u l t from t h e U
C a t a n i a a s s a u l t (one d i v i s i o n ) and t h e follow-up
and t h e
(one d i v i
s i o n ) from t h e Middle E a s t
B
T o f i n d t h e t h r e e d i v i s i o n a s s a u l t and t h e f o l l o w - u p
(one
d i v i s i o n ) from t h e hliddle E a s t and t h e C a t a n i a a s s a u l t
(one
d i v i s i o n ) from t h e U.
K.
ALTERNATIVE A
6
(a) Advantages:
(1) P r o v i d e d North A f r i c a i s c l e a r e d of t h e enemy by A p r i l
3Oth, i t e n a b l e s t h e B r i t i s h a s s a u l t s t o b e c a r r i e d o u t
i n l a t e July,
(2) It i s more economical i n s h i p p i n g .
@ ) Disadvantages :
(1) I t d o e s n o t u s e f o r c e s i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t which a r e
a v a i l a b l e o v e r and above s e c u r i t y commitments
(2) I t i n v o l v e s t h e p a s s a g e of a l a r g e a s s a u l t convoy through
t h e S i c i l i a n n a r r o w s i n m i n e a b l e w a t e r s and u n d e r a i r
a t t a c k . T h i s i s an u n a c c e p t a b l e r i s k t o t h e s p e a r h e a d of
the attack.
ALTERNATIVE B
(a) Advantages:
(1) I t p e r m i t s a s l i g h t r e d u c t i o n i n e s c o r t .
(2) I t o b v i a t e s t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e s o f A ,
and, t h e r e f o r e ,
g i v e s t h e o p e r a t i o n g r e a t e r chances of t a c t i c a l s u c c e s s .
@ ) Disadvantages:
(1) P r o v i d e d N o r t h A f r i c a i s c l e a r e d of t h e enemy on A p r i l
59
U.
S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S H <YOST SECRET
3 0 t h , the B r i t i s h a s s a u l t s c o u l d t a k e p l a c e a t t h e end
o f S e p t e m b e r . T h i s i s n e a r t h e t i m e when t h e w e a t h e r
breaks.
(2) I t i n v o l v e s t h e d i s p a t c h o f 16 p e r s o n n e l s h i p s t o the
M i d d l e E a s t which a r e n o t o t h e r w i s e r e q u i r e d i n t h a t
area.
(3) I t i s w a s t e f u l of s h i p p i n g a n d w i l l p r e v e n t us making
any a p p r e c i a b l e B r i t i s h c a r g o s h i p p i n g c o n t r i b u t i o n t o
Bolero.
(4) W i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o t h e M i d d l e
E a s t w e cannot s t a t e
w h e t h e r t h e p o r t and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e
Middle E a s t a r e c a p a b l e of mounting an a s s a u l t o f t h i s
size.
PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES:
8.
The B r i t i s h Naval f o r c e s c a n b e p r o v i d e d .
0.
I n t h e c a s e of e s c o r t s , by t h e end of August t h e U n i t e d Nations
e x p e c t t o be a t l e a s t 16 e s c o r t s below our minimum e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s .
Thus t h e y can o n l y p r o v i d e t h e e s c o r t r e q u i r e d i f t h e i n c r e a s e d r i s k in
v o l v e d i n t a k i n g them o f f convoy p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e p e r i o d o f t h e oper
a t i o n can be a c c e p t e d
10.
Even i f i t were p o s s i b l e , t h e m o u n t i n g of a l l a s s a u l t s from
N o r t h A f r i c a would n o t r e s u l t i n any f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n o f e s c o r t s , as
t h e l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i s the number r e q u i r e d f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s h i p
p i n g and c r a f t o f f b e a c h e s .
PROVISION OF A I R FORCES :
11.
The B r i t i s h a i r f o r c e s r e q u i r e d w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e i n North
A f r i c a and t h e Middle E a s t .
PROVISION OF LANDING CRAFT:
12.
B r i t i s h l a n d i n g c r a f t r e q u i r e m e n t s c a n b e made a v a i l a b l e pro
v i d e d e x p e c t e d d e l i v e r i e s from t h e U . S. a r e p u n c t u a l .
There may,how
e v e r , be d i f f i c u l t y i n g e t t i n g t h e r e q u i r e d number s h i p p e d t o t h e Middle
E a s t i n t i m e . . T h i s w i l l r e q u i r e d e t a i l e d examination.
13.
Any l a r g e i n c r e a s e i n t h e u s e of L . C . I . (L) and L.S.T. f o r the
American a s s a u l t w i l l p r o b a b l y have t o b e a t t h e e x p e n s e of t h e p r e s e n t
B r i t i s h a l l o t m e n t . T h i s would p r e v e n t our a s s a u l t s b e i n g u n d e r t a k e n as
proposed.
li. S . SECRET
PROVISION OF SHIPPING:
14.
The s h i p p i n g c a n be p r o v i d e d .
AMERICAN SHARE OF THE OPERATIOX:

15.
The American s h a r e of t h e o p e r a t i o n i s shown i n t h e E n c l o s u r e . he
have n o t a t t e m p t e d to e s t i m a t e whetkier t h i s c a n bc met b u t must p o i n t

out t h a t i f t h e I t a l i a n F l e e t i s n o t d r i v e n up t h e A d r i a t i c ,
t h e United
S t a t e s w i l l have t o p r o v i d e a heavy n a v a l c o v e r i n g f o r c e i n a d d i t i o n t o
the f o r c e s shown.
LAMBE,
STEWART,
ELLIOT
ENCLOSLijRE
F0INX.S IILQLiIRF.;>
XAVAL
ilritish
Battleships
U.S.
Total
r l e e t Carriers
Escort Carriers
Crnisers
10
14
Pestroyers
30
20
50
Escorts
69
55
124
Minesweepers S s m a l l c r a f t
ARMY
British
u s
Total
(a) , A s s a u l t .
Infantry Divisions
1 1/3
7--1/3
Armored Regiments
Parachute Srigades
(b) F a 1 1 ow - U p
Infantry Civisions
U. S . SECRET
SPITISH MOST S E C R E T
AIR FORCES
British
American
m - LL- i l
51
S.E.F.
T.E.F.
(day)
T.E.F.
(P-38)
12
T.E.F.
(Xight)
L i g h t - V e d i u m Bombers
2c
!ieavy Bombers (Day)
Ill
G.R.
F i g h t e r Xecre.
P . i t . u.
Transport
2
Torpedo Bombers
SHIPS AND L A N D I N G CRAFT
British
l~i.
0. S h i p
L . S . I . (L)
American
13
rota1
5
21
1 . . S . I . (I?)
L.S.2.
L.S.T.
56
11
100
L.C.A.
98
C?
150
L.C.P.
100
190
2 90
L.C.S.
14
12
2fi
?00
71
271
3U
3u
120
L.C.T.
72
Personnel Ships
?O
23
Ill
Ships
31
77
171
.
L . C .I . (I.)
I.. C !i.
H.T.
62
c,
U.
S. SECRET
BRITISH YOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 21, 1943
lOl/l

OPE RAT I ON
" IIUSKY"
R e p o r t b y E r i t i s h .ioint, P l a n n i n g S t a f f
EARLIEST DATE FOit TM! A'iSAirLT:
1.
After f u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n we have concluded:: t h a t t h e e a r l i e s t
s a f e d a t e on which we c a n r e l y f o r t h e R r i t i s h a s s a u l t s i s August 3 0 t h
a d d o n o t c o n s i d e r t h a t t h i s d a t e can be advanced u n l e s s o p e r a t i o n s i n
Tunisia conclude c o n s i d e r a b l y e a r l i e r t h a n a n t i c i p a t e d .
The u s e o f a i r t r a n s p o r t
t o move the l e a d i n g b r i g a d e of
the
d i v i s i o n from T u n i s i a t o ligypt f o r t r a i n i n g might, e n a b l e us t o advance

the a s s a u l t d a t e from August 3 0 t h t o a h o u t August 15th. T h i s i s , however,
the d a t e of fill1 moon.
I f t h e B r i t i s h c o u l d use A l g i e r s and a s e c t o r of t h e e a s t c o a s t
of T u n i s i a f o r t h e t r a i n i n g and l o a d i n g o f one o f t h e i r d i v i s i o n s , t,he
2.
e a r l i e s t d a t e b y which t h e E r i t i s h c o u l d a s s a n l t c o n l d he advanced b y
one month. F u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n b y t h e U . S. P l a n n i n g S t a f f s may? however,
show t h a t T u n i s i a i s e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e ' A m e r i c a n s t o mount t h e i r t w o s h o r e
t o shore a s s a u l t s . I n t h i s e v e n t t h e s h i p - b o r n e p o r t i o n o f t h e E r i t i s h
a s s a u l t (about 40 s h i p s ) would have t o p a s s t h e S i c i l j a n Narrows on 1)
day.
.3.
The U. S . P l a n n i n g S t a f f have n o t had time t o a s s e s s i n d e t a i l
how t h e i r p o r t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n w i l l be c a r r i e d o u t and i n c o n s e q m n c e
the t y p e s a n d numbers of l a n d i n g c r a f t t h e y w i l l u s e g o r t h e d a t e on
which t h e y c a n mount t h e o p e r a t i o n . ' T h e l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s are t,he p r o
v i s i o n of t r a i n i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s and o r g a n i z a t ' i o n and e a r l y p r o v i s i o n
of l a n d i n g c r a f t , and n o t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of army f o r c e s Landing c r a f t

must i n a n y c a s e b e d e l i v e r e d i n N o r t h A f r i c a i n a d v a n c e o f p r e s e n t
scheduled d a t e s .
PROVISION OF RESOURCES:
4.
The U. S . P l a n n e r s c o n s i d e r from p r e l i m i n a r y e x a m i n a t i o n t h a t
the f i r s t f l i g h t of t h e American a s s a u l t s s h o u l d b e i n a r m o r e d
craf't
* Vide
tinclosure " A "
U. S . SECRET
o t h e r than L.C.I.
(L) s u p p o r t e d by L.C.S. No c r a f t of t h i s t y p e e x i s t
e x c e p t B r i t i s h L.C.A. and L.C.S., b u t s u f f i c i e n t c o u l d p r o b a b l y be made
a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e B r i t i s h and American a s s a u l t s a t t h e c o s t of cross-
Channel o p e r a t i o n s .
IMMEDIATE ACTION:
5.
Beach r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , e x p a n s i o n o f t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s i n North
A f r i c a and Middle E a s t , and a c o m p r e h e n s i v e program o f a i r f i e l d con

s t r u c t i o n must b e p u t i n hand a t o n c e .
ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND:
6.
We c o n s i d e r t h a t a Supreme Commander must a t once b e appointed
f o r O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.
7.
Navy, Army and A i r Commanders s h o u l d a l s o b e a p p o i n t e d sub
o r d i n a t e t o t h e Supreme Commander. Under t h e s e Commanders w i l l be two

T a s k Forces--a
Western and a n E a s t e r n . The a p p o i n t m e n t s o f t h e s e Com
manders and t h e i r S t a f f s s h o u l d b e made a t o n c e .
8.
The o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d i n t h e main b e p l a n n e d from North Africa.
9.
The J o i n t U . S. S t a f f P l a n n e r s have informed us t h a t t h e y agree
w i t h p a r a g r a p h s 6 t o 8 above.
(signed)
C . E , LAMBE
G , M , STEWART
W, ELLIOT
ENCLOSURE "A"
OPERATION HUSKY
OUTLINE PLAN:
1.
The main f e a t u r e s of t h e p l a n are:
(a) B r i t i s h a s s a u l t s :
(1) On t h e s o u t h e a s t c o r n e r of t h e i s l a n d by t h r e e d i v i s i o n s
on D. day t o s e c u r e t h e a i r f i e l d s i n t h a t a r e a and the
p o r t s of S y r a c u s e and Augusta. These a i r f i e l d s are re
q u i r e d t o e n a b l e t h e a s s a u l t on C a t a n i a t o be p r o t e c t e d .
(2) On
C a t a n i a b y one d i v i s i o n on D 3 t o s e c u r e t h e p o r t
and a i r f i e l d s .
64
S. SECRET
[I.
(b) American a s s a u l t s :
(1) On t h e s o u t h w e s t s h o r e by one d i v i s i o n on D d a y t o s e
c u r e t h e a i r f i e l d s i n t h a t a r e a . These a i r f i e l d s a r e
r e q u i r e d t o c o v e r t h e a s s a u l t s on P a l e r m o .
(2) On t h e Palermo a r e a by two d i v i s i o n s on D 2 t o c a p t u r e
t h e p o r t of Palermo and a d j a c e n t p o r t s and a i r f i e l d s .
E s c o r t c a r r i e r s w i l l provide a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e
assault.
( c ) Follow up:
One B r i t i s h d i v i s i o n w i l l be landed t h r o u g h C a t a n i a and one
American d i v i s i o n through Palermo.
FORCES REVJIRED:
2.
The f o r c e s r e q u i r e d are shown i n Enclosure "B" s u b d i v i d e d
into
American and B r i t i s h commitments.
MOUNTING OF BRITISH PORTION:

3.
I t i s assumed t h a t t h e U.S.A.
w i l l r e q u i r e French North A f r i c a n
ports f o r t h e mounting of t h e i r s h a r e of t h e o p e r a t i o n . Such p a r t of t h e

B r i t i s h e x p e d i t i o n as is mounted i n s i d e t h e Mediterranean must t h e r e f o r e
be mounted from Middle E a s t p o r t s , e . g . ,
Haifa, A l e x a n d r i a , P o r t S a i d ,
T r i p o l i and Malta. L i m i t a t i o n s of p o r t c a p a c i t y make i t i m p o s s i b l e t o

mount t h e w h o l e of t h e B r i t i s h s h a r e f r o m t h e Middle E a s t under any
conditions.
PROVISION OF ARMY FORCES:
4.
The r i s k i n v o l v e d i n p a s s i n g a l a r g e convoy (some 90 s h i p s ) from
t h e U . K . t h r o u g h S i c i l i a n n a r r o w s i n m i n e a b l e w a t e r s and u n d e r a i r
a t t a c k i s u n a c c e p t a b l e for t h e i n i t i a l a s s a u l t s . The t h r e e d i v i s i o n
a s s a u l t on D day on t o t h e S.E. c o r n e r of t h e i s l a n d must t h e r e f o r e be
mounted i n t h e Middle E a s t . The f o l l o w up must be mounted from TRIPOLI
or nearby p o r t s if l a n d i n g c r a f t are t o be used and economy of s h i p p i n g

is t o be e f f e c t e d .
Thus t h e C a t a n i a D + 3 a s s a u l t (onedivision) c a n o n l y b e mounted
from t h e U . K. and we must a c c e p t t h e r i s k of p a s s i n g t h i s a s s a u l t con
voy through t h e S i c i l i a n narrows on about D + 2 .
I t might be p o s s i b l e t o t r a i n and mount one of t h e above B r i t i s h
d i v i s i o n s i n Algeria and T u n i s i a , b u t t h i s w i l l s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l t h e
American f a c i l i t i e s f o r mounting t h e i r s h a r e of t h e o p e r a t i o n s , and w i l l
complicate t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e a s s a u l t .
U S , SECRET
T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e of mounting two d i v i s i o n s from t h e Middle East
and f o u r d i v i s i o n s from N o r t h A f r i c a would r e s u l t i n t h e B r i t i s h share
o f the a s s a u l t b e i n g r e a d y by August 1 s t . I t may, however, w e l l result
i n t h e American s h a r e o f t h e a s s a u l t b e i n g d e l a y e d beyond August 31st.
No a d v a n t a g e i n d a t e would t h e r e f o r e be g a i n e d , and c o n s i d e r a b l e com

p l i c a t i o n s would be added.
The mounting of t h e B r i t i s h s h a r e must t h e r e f o r e t a k e the fol
lowing form:
3 divisions ( i n i t i a l assault)
from Middle E a s t
1 d i v i s i o n (D + 3 a s s a u l t )
from U. K .
1 division
from T r i p o l i t a n i a
( f o l l o w up)
PROVISION OF ARMY FORCES FOR INITIAL ASSAULT:

5,
There a r e four p o s s i b i l i t i e s :
(A) Use 5 t h and 5 6 t h from P e r s i a - I r a q and N.Z.
d i v i s i o n from T u n i s i a
d i v i s i o n or 78th
(B) Use 5 t h d i v i s i o n from P e r s i a - I r a q

N.Z. d i v i s i o n )
from T u n i s i a
78th d i v i s i o n )
(C) Use 5 t h D i v i s i o n from P e r s i a - I r a q
1 division )
from U . K . s h i p p e d round Cape t o Egypt
4 division )
@) Use 5 t h D i v i s i o n from P e r s i a - . I r a q
1 D i v i s i o n o r 4 D i v i s i o n from U. K.
t o Egypt. 5 6 t h , N.Z.
s h i p p e d round Cape
or 78th d i v i s i o n -
ESTIMATED TIME TABLE:

6.
The l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s i n d e c i d i n g t h e e a r l i e s t d a t e o f t h e a s s a u l t
are t h e time r e q u i r e d f o r t r a i n i n g and i n t h e case o f a l t e r n a t i v e s (C) and

(D) t h e t i m e needed t o move t h e f o r m a t i o n s t o t h e Middle E a s t . . These a r e
examined i n E n c l o s u r e "C" from which we conclude t h a t t h e e a r l i e s t d a t e s
of assault are:
(A) August 3 0 t h
(B) August 3 0 t h
(C) September 2 5 t h
@) September 1 0 t h
7..
There i s no a d v a n t a g e i n moving f o r m a t i o n s from U.. K,, t o Middle
E a s t v i a t h e cape^ Thus, w e must a d o p t c a s e (A) or (B)
Although Case (B)
employs two seasoned f o r m a t i o n s , we recommend Case (A) because:

66
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S B MOST SECRET
(a) Only one i n s t e a d of two b r i g a d e s must b e b a c k from T u n i s i a
i n t i m e t o s t a r t t r a i n i n g on June 1st. It may be p o s s i b l e t o
withdraw one b r i g a d e i n time t o do t h i s .
(b) Only one i n s t e a d of two d i v i s i o n s w i l l have t o b e r e f i t t e d
i n Egypt a f t e r r e t u r n from T u n i s i a .
(c) Two o u t of t h r e e i n s t e a d o f one d i v i s i o n w i l l be a v a i l a b l e
f o r p l a n n i n g from March onwards. With Case (B) two d i v i s i o n

s t a f f s c o u l d n o t a r r i v e i n Egypt more t h a n a b o u t one month
b e f o r e t h e d e t a i l e d p l a n must be completed.
8.
We, t h e r e f o r e , recommend Case (A) be adopted and t h e t a r g e t d a t e
f o r t h e a s s a u l t be f i x e d a t August 3 0 t h . T h i s w i l l mean t h e t h r e e d i v i
s i o n D. day a s s a u l t s h o u l d be mounted w i t h :
5 t h and SGth D i v i s i o n s from Persia-Iraq.
N 2
and 7 8 t h D i v i s i o n s from T u n i s i a .
PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES.

9
The B r i t i s h Naval f o r c e s can be provided
I n t h e c a s e of e s c o r t s , by t h e end of August t h e United Nations
10.
expect t o be a t l e a s t 46 e s c o r t s below our minimum e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s .

Thus t h e y c a n o n l y p r o v i d e t h e e s c o r t r e q u i r e d if t h e i n c r e a s e d r i s k
i n v o l v e d i n t a k i n g them off convoy p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e p e r i o d of t h e
o p e r a t i o n c a n be a c c e p t e d .
Even i f i t were p o s s i b l e , t h e mounting o f a l l a s s a u l t s f r o m
11.
North A f r i c a would n o t r e s u l t i n any f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n o f e s c o r t s , as

t h e l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i s t h e number r e q u i r e d f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of s h i p
ping and c r a f t o f f b e a c h e s .
PROVISION OF A I R FORCES:
12.
The B r i t i s h a i r f o r c e s r e q u i r e d w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e i n North Africa
and t h e Middle E a s t .
PROVISION OF LANDING CRAFT:
13.
B r i t i s h l a n d i n g c r a f t r e q u i r e m e n t s c a n b e made a v a i l a b l e pro
vided e x p e c t e d d e l i v e r i e s from t h e U , S. are p u n c t u a l
There may, how
ever, be d i f f i c u l t y i n g e t t i n g t h e r e q u i r e d number shipped t o t h e Middle

East i n time. T h i s w i l l r e q u i r e d e t a i l e d examination
14.
Any l a r g e i n c r e a s e i n t h e u s e of L . C . I . ( L )
and L,S.T.
for the
American a s s a u l t w i l l p r o b a b l y have t o be a t t h e expense of t h e p r e s e n t

B r i t i s h a l l o t m e n t . T h i s would p r e v e n t our a s s a u l t s b e i n g u n d e r t a k e n as
proposed
67
U. S . SECIiET
B Q I T I S B MOST S E C R E T
PROVISION OF SHIPPING:
15.
The s h i p p i n g can be provided.
AMERICAN SHARE OF THE OPERATION:

16.
The American s h a r e of t h e o p e r a t i o n i s shown i n E n c l o s u r e "B*.
We have n o t a t t e m p t e d t o e s t i m a t e whether t h i s can be m e t b u t must point

o u t t h a t i f t h e I t a l i a n F l e e t i s n o t d r i v e n up t h e A d r i a t i c , t h e United
S t a t e s w i l l have t o p r o v i d e a heavy naval c o v e r i n g f o r c e i n a d d i t i o n to
t h e f o r c e s shown.
(Signed) C.E.
LAMBE
. . STEWART
G W
W . ELLIOT
ENCLOSURE "B"
FORCES REQUIRED
NAVAL
British
U.S.
Total
Battleships
Fleet Carriers
Cruisers
10
.1
14
Destroyers
30
20
50
Escorts
60
55
124
U.S.
Total
Escort c a r r i e r s
Minesweepers
& small craft
ARMY
B r i t is h
(a) Assault.:
Infantry Divisions
4-1/3
7-1 /3
Armored Regiments
P a r a c h u t e Brigades
(b) Follow-up:
I n f a n t r g L)ivis i o n s
68
U. S. SECRET
BRITISB MOST SECRET
A I R FORCES
:*
u. s.
British
U.E.
Groups
21
432
480
54
240
Squadrons
S.E.F.
T.E.F.
day
U.E.
U. S. Groups
P-38.
T.E.F.
night
54
Ex c l u d i ng
d e f e n s e North
Africa.
L i g h t Bombers
108
57
Includes
observation &
Army s u p p o r t
Squadrons.
Medium Bombers
90
285
Heavy Bombers
2
3
36
48
215
80
57
G.R.
(V.P.B.)
Torpedo
8-26 Torpedo
Bombers.
PRU
T o t a l Combat
Transport
35
13
938
1,376
80
312
These f i g u r e s a r e f o r a l l A l l i e d a i r c r a f t c o n c e n t r a t e d i n
t h e Central Mediterranean f o r offensive operations prepara
t o r y t o and d u r i n g BCJSKY. They exclude a i r c r a f t f o r d e f e n s e ,
p r o t e c t i o n of s h i p p i n g , r e s e r v e s f o r Turkey, e t c . , e l s e w h e r e
i n t h e Mediterranean.
SHIPS AND LANDING C R m
British
American':'"
Total
H . 2 . Ship
L.S.I.
(L)
13
21
L.S.I.
(M)
L.S.D.
L.S.T.
56
44
100
59
U. S. S E C R E T
BRITISH /*fOST S E C R E T
SHIPS AND LANDING CRAFT
(Continued)
British
American':"
Total
L.C.A.
59
52
150
L.C.P.
100
190
290
L.C.S
14
12
26
L.C.M.
200
170
370
90
30
120
L.C.T.
72
72
Personnel S h i p s
20
20
40
Ships
91
77
171
L.C.I.
'V.T.
(L)
::"American
f i g u r e s a r e given in terms of B r i t i s h
types of l a n d i n g c r a
E"-LOSURE
"C"
EXAMINATION OF EARLIEST DATE OF ASSAULT

ALTERNATIVES :
Persia-Iraq
D i v i s i o n s from:
Tunisia
U.K.
v i a Cape
1 (h.Z.
or 7 8 t h )
2 fLJ.2.
& 78th)
The Overseas A s s a u l t Force cannot a r r i v e i n t h e Hiddle East

b e f o r e Yay 1 5 t h .
T r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e h!iddle E a s t can if n e c e s s a r y b e
expanded by \lay 1 s t t o d e a l w i t h t h e b a s i c t r a i n i n g of two
b r i g a d e g r o u p s a t a time.
F i n a l r e h e a r s a l can if n e c e s s a r y be c a r r i e d o u t b y twobrig
ade groups a t a t i m e i n t h e Overseas a s s a u l t Force.
P r i o r i t y must be g i v e n f o r t h e shipment of l a n d i n g c r a f t t o
t h e 'diddle E a s t from b o t h U . I{. and U.S.A.
We have assumed t h a t t h e New Zealand and 7 8 t h d i v i s i o n s i n
70
U. S, S E C R E T
T u n i s i a c a n be r e l e a s e d i n time t o s t a r t t r a i n i n g i n Egypt
b y June 1 s t
(f) W
e have assumed t h a t none of t h e s h i p p i n g saved as a r e s u l t
o f t h e r e c e n t c u t on Middle E a s t and I n d i a n maintenance c a n
b e used f o r t r a n s p o r t i n g t h e U. K . d i v i s i o n s round t h e Cape.
I n consequence, t h e s a i l i n g d a t e of t h e s e d i v i s i o n s i s de
p e n d e n t upon t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h e Torch b u i l d up.
CASE A
harch I - A p r i l
Ma) 1 - J u n e 3 0
30 ( a ) B a s i c t r a i n i n g f i r s t d i v i s i o n from P.A.I.C.
( b ) E a s i c t r a i n i n g s e c o n d d i v i s i o n f r o m P.A.I.C.
71
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S B MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
162
J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1943
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF'

U s S - A I D TO RUSSIA
J o i n t Memorandum a g r e e d by Lord L e a t h e r s and
L i e u t e na n t General Somervell
1.
E x i s t i n g U. S. e s t i m a t e s on t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of s h i p p i n g and the
p o s s i b i l i t y of moving t r o o p s , n a v a l forces, s u p p l i e s and equipment during

1043 allow f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g U. S. s a i l i n g s f o r R u s s i a n a i d .
TABLE
J a n Feh Mar Apr May June
Total
(a) To North R u s s i a
(b) To P e r s i a n Gulf
(c) I n P a c i f i c
15
15
15
15
15
15
90
and R u s s i a n P o o l ) 3 1
31
31
31
31
31
186
46
46
46
46
46
46
276
(Average from U. S
Shipments beyond June are e s t i m a t e d a t t h e same rate

2,
Owing t o l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y of P e r s i a n Gulf p o r t s and t h e d i s
c o n t i n u a n c e of t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c r o u t e , U
commitments u n d e r t h e
e x i s t i n g P r o t o c o l have been o n l y a h o u t 50 p e r c e n t of r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
t h e l a s t s i x months, n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e shipment of t h r e e - f o u r t h s of the
year's t o t a l d u r i n g t h e f i r s t h a l f of t h e y e a r 1943. T h i s w i l l r e q u i r e a
t o t a l of 1 3 2 s a i l i n g s f r o m t h e U L S , t o R u s s i a p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1943.
If P r o t o c o l commitments a f t e r J u l y 1 a r e a t t h e same r a t e a s f o r t h e
year p r i o r t o t h a t t i m e , t w o - t h i r d s t h i s number, or 288 s a i l i n g s , w i l l
be r e q u i r e d .
$s t h e r o u t e t h r o u g h t h e P a c i f i c i s s u b j e c t t o i n t e r r u p t i o n b y
t h e J a p a n e s e a t any moment and as arms and ammunition do n o t move v i a
t h a t r o u t e , i t c a n n o t b e r e l i e d on f o r a n y g r e a t i n c r e a s e above t h e
3.
present s a i l i n g s .
4.
I t is e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y of P e r s i a n Gulf p o r t s c a n be
expanded t o h a n d l e a t o t a l of 26 s h i p s p e r month by J u n e 1943.

5.
For t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e on t h e b a s i s of 1 2 B r i t i s h c a r g o s h i p s
and two t a n k e r s t h e r e would remain a v a i l a b l e 16 s a i l i n g s from t h e U. S.

72
U.
S., S E C R E T
every convoy. Owing t o the r e s t r i c t e d supply of e s c o r t s , i t seems t h a t
the convoy i n t e r v a l w i l l not be reduced below 42 days. With ice hazards
and the menace o f submarines and a i r a t t a c k s , i t is hardly p o s s i b l e t h a t
t o t a l s a i l i n g s w i l l exceed t h i s r a t e .
6.
The t o t a l s a i l i n g s for t h e year could t h e r e f o r e be on the fol
lowing order:
TABLE I1
Jan
Feb
16
16
Mar
NORTH RUSSIA
June J u l y Aug Sep
Apr
May
16
16
Oct
Nov
16
16
31
63
16
16
Dec
Total
16
128
16
16
16
222
31
31
31
31
372
47
63
63
47
722
PERSIAN ROUTE
16
18
20
22
24
26
16
16
PACIFIC ROUTE
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
TOTAL
63
65
51
69
71
57
63
S a i l i n g s on t h i s order would f a i l t o meet Protocol requirements i n J u l y

by 56 s h i p s , b u t would permit meeting f u l l commitments by the end of the
calendar year.
7.
I t w i l l be noted from Tables I and I1 t h a t the following addi
t i o n a l s a i l i n g s would be r e q u i r e d for such a program r e s u l t i n g i n t h e

necessity for t h e use o f a d d i t i o n a l cargo s h i p s f o r the period o f a year.,
TBBLE I11
Jan
17
8.
Feb
Mar
ADDITIONAL SAILINGS REQUIRED
Apr May June J u l y Aug Sep Oct
Nov
Dec
Total
5
23
25
11
17
17
1 17
17
1
170
19
The e f f e c t of meeting the Russian P r o t o c o l on the movement of
U. S. t r o o p s overseas and maintaining them t h e r e a f t e r would be on t h e

following o r d e r :
TBBLE I V
1943
No, of troops
1st Q u a r t e r
46,000
2nd Q u a r t e r
82,000
3rd Quarter
55,000
4 t h Quarter
4,000
TOTAL
187,000
73
17. S . SECRET
9.
As requirements f o r o t h e r t h e a t e r s a r e more or l e s s f i x e d , the
blow would f a l l on movements t o t h e U. K. Some a d j u s t m e n t might be

n e c e s s a r y i n t i m i n g of Russian shipment t o a v o i d i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h
s p e c i a l requirements.
10.
A d d i t i o n a l tonnage above t h a t assumed i n e x i s t i n g e s t i m a t e s
might be made a v a i l a b l e :
( a ) by r e d u c t i o n i n t h e r a t e of submarine
l o s s e s below t h e 2 . 6 p e r c e n t assumed i n t h e s e c a l c u l a t i o n s ;
e l i m i n a t i n g conversion of 100 EC Z S s i n t o t r a n s p o r t s ;
through t h e use of t h e Mediterranean r o u t e ;
(b) by
(c) b y savings
(d) r e l e a s e of U . S . from
o b l i g a t i o n t o r e p l a c e B r i t i s h l o s s e s i n l i k e amount.
11.
A r e d u c t i o n i n r a t e of l o s s of United Nations s h i p p i n g from
2.6 percent per month t o only 2.0 percent per month would i n c r e a s e t h e
t r o o p c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y i n 1943 by 500,000 men. Even a t h i r d of t h i s ,
or a reduction of t h e l o s s r a t e t o 2.4 p e r c e n t , would make these s h i p

ments t o Russia p o s s i b l e , without l e s s e n i n g t r o o p movements, With the
measures projected b y t h e J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f , such an improvement i s
a possibility.
12.
If conversion of EC Z S s were stopped a t t h e end of February, a
g a i n i n t r a n s p o r t c a p a c i t y of 153,000 would be p o s s i b l e .
If l o s s e s are
not reduced o r no a s s i s t a n c e from B r i t i s h sources f o r t h i s purpose can

be obtained, such a course would be d e s i r a b l e .
13.
The B r i t i s h have a l r e a d y discounted t h e e s t i m a t e d g a i n i n t,he
Mediterranean b y d i v e r t i n g t h i s tonnage t o B r i t i s h imports
14.
Supplement B r i t i s h a s s i s t a n c e , a s p r e v i o u s l y a g r e e d , up t o
300,000 tons per month, cumulative. Even on t h i s b a s i s , with a reduction
i n sinkings, there may be some r e l i e f on t h i s s c o r e "
It i s concluded from t h e above t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s of

meeting Russian P r o t o c o l d e l i v e r i e s on t h e p r e s e n t s c a l e d u r i n g 1943
15.
without reducing t e n t a t i v e s c h e d u l e s , but t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s

t h a t movements t o t h e U . K. may be reduced by a s much as 100,000 men.
The advantages of f u r n i s h i n g a i d t o Russia a r e such t h a t t h i s hazard
should he accepted. Owing t o t h e s c a r c i t y of shipping, t h e r e should b e
a general agreement t h a t a l l tonnage above minimum requirements shouid
be assigned t o U. S . t r o o p movements.
74
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 20, 1943
162/1
COMBINED CHIEFS O F STAFF
U.
S . A I D TO RUSSIA
Memorandum p r e p a r e d by L i e u t e n a n t General Somervell
1.
E x i s t i n g U. S. e s t i m a t e s on t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of s h i p p i n g and t h e
p o s s i b i J i t y o f moving t r o o p s , n a v a l f o r c e s , s u p p l i e s and e q u i p m e n t
d u r i n g 1943 a l l o w f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g U . S . s a i l i n g s f o r R u s s i a n a i d .
TABLE I
J a n Feb Mar
Apr
May
June
Total
(a) To North R u s s i a
(b) To P e r s i a n Gulf
15
15
15
15
15
15
90
31
31
31
31
31
46
46
46
46
46
Shipments beyond June are e s t i m a t e d a t t h e same rate.
31
46
186
276
(c) I n P a c i f i c
(Average from U. S .
and Russian Pool)
2.
Owing t o l i m i t e d c a p a c i t y of P e r s i a n G u l f p o r t s and t h e d i s
c o n t i n u a n c e of t h e h o r t h A t l a n t i c r o u t e , U.
S . commitments under t h e
e x i s t i n g P r o t o c o l have b e e n o n l y a b o u t 50 p e r c e n t o f r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
t h e l a s t s i x months, n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e shipment of t h r e e - f o u r t h s of t h e
y e a r ' s t o t a l d u r i n g t h e f i r s t h a l f of t h e year 1943. T h i s w i l l r e q u i r e a
t o t a l of 432 s a i l i n g s f r o m t h e U. S . t o R u s s i a p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1943.
If P r o t o c o l commitments a f t e r J u l y 1 a r e a t t h e same r a t e as f o r t h e
year p r i o r t o t h a t t i m e , t w o - t h i r d s t h i s number, or 288 s a i l i n g s , w i l l
be r e q u i r e d .
3.
A s t h e r o u t e t h r o u g h t h e p a c i f i c i s s u b j e c t t o i n t e r r u p t i o n by
t h e J a p a n e s e a t any moment and a s arms and ammunition do n o t move v i a

t h a t r o u t e , i t c a n n o t be r e l i e d on f o r a n y g r e a t i n c r e a s e above t h e
present s a i l i n g s
I t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e c a p a c i t y of Persian G u l f p o r t s c a n b e
expanded t o handle a t o t a l of 26 s h i p s per month by June 1943.
5.
For t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e on t h e b a s i s of 12 B r i t i s h c a r g o s h i p s
and two t a n k e r s t h e r e would remain a v a i l a b l e 16 s a i l i n g s from t h e U. S .
4.
75
U. S. S E C R E T
e v e r y convoy. Owing t o t h e r e s t r i c t e d s u p p l y o f e s c o r t s , i t seems t h a t
t h e convoy i n t e r v a l w i l l n o t be reduced below 42 days. With i c e hazards
and t h e menace of submarines and a i r a t t a c k s , i t i s h a r d l y p o s s i b l e t h a t
t o t a l s a i l i n g s w i l l exceed t h i s r a t e .
6.
The t o t a l s a i l i n g s f o r t h e y e a r could t h e r e f o r e be on t h e f o l
lowing o r d e r :
TABLE I1
NORTH RUSSIA
Jan
16
Feb
16
Mar
Apr
May
16
16
June
July
16
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Total
16
16
128
16
16
16
16
222
31
31
31
31
31
372
63
47
63
63
47
722
16
PERSIAN ROUTE
16
18
20
22
24
26
16
16
PACIFIC ROUTE
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
TOTAL
63
65
51
69
71
57
63
S a i l i n g s on t h i s o r d e r woilld f a i l t o meet P r o t o c o l r e q u i r e m e n t s i n J u l y
by 56 s h i p s , b u t would p e r m i t meeting f u l l commitments by t h e end o f the
calendar year.
I t w i l l be n o t e d from T a b l e s I and I1 t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g a d d i
7.
t i o n a l s a i l i n g s would be r e q u i r e d f o r s u c h a program r e s u l t i n g i n t h e
n e c e s s i t y f o r t h e u s e o f a d d i t i o n a l c a r g o s h i p s for t h e p e r i o d o f a year.
TABLE I11
ADDITIONAL SAILINGS REQUIRED
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
17
19
23
25
8.
The e f f e c t o f m e e t i n g t h e R u s s i a n P r o t o c o l on t h e movement of
U. S.
t r o o p s o v e r s e a s and m a i n t a i n i n g them t h e r e a f t e r would be on t h e
June
July
Bug
Sep
Oct
Nov
17
17
17
17
11
following order:
TABLE I V
1943
1st Q u a r t e r
No
of t r o o p s
46,000
2nd Q u a r t e r
82 000
3rd Quarter
55,000
4 t h Quarter
4,000
187,000
TOTAL
7fi
Dee
1
Total
170
S. SECRET
B R I T I S K MOST S E C R E T
[I.
9.
A s r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r o t h e r t h e a t e r s a r e more or less f i x e d , t h e
blow would f a l l on movements t o t h e U. K . Some a d j u s t m e n t m i g h t b e
necessary i n t i m i n g of R u s s i a n shipment t o a v o i d i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h
special requirements.
10.
A d d i t i o n a l t o n n a g e above t h a t assumed i n e x i s t i n g e s t i m a t e s
might b e made a v a i l a b l e :
( a ) by r e d u c t i o n in t h e r a t e of
submarine
l o s s e s below t h e 2 . G p e r c e n t assumed i n t h e s e c a l c u l a t i o n s ;
e l i m i n a t i n g c o n v e r s i o n o f 100 kC 2's i n t o t r a n s p o r t s ;
through t h e u s e of t h e Y e d i t e r r a n e a n r o u t e ;
(b) b y
( c ) by s a v i n g s
(d) r e l e a s e of U . S . from
o b l i g a t i o n t o r e p l a c e B r i t i s h l o s s e s i n l i k e amount.
11.
A r e d u c t i o n i n r a t e of l o s s of U n i t e d N a t i o n s s h i p p i n g from
2.6 p e r c e n t p e r month t o o n l y 2.0 p e r c e n t p e r month would i n c r e a s e t h e
troop c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y i n 1943 by 500,000 men. Even a t h i r d of t h i s ,
or a r e d u c t i o n of t h e l o s s r a t e t o 2.4 p e r c e n t , would make t h e s e s h i p
m n t s t o R u s s i a p o s s i b l e , w i t h o u t l e s s e n i n g t r o o p movements. With t h e
measures p r o j e c t e d by t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f , such an improvement i s
a possibility.
12.
If c o n v e r s i o n of EC 2's were s t o p p e d a t t h e end of F e b r u a r y , a
gain i n t r a n s p o r t c a p a c i t y of 153,000 would b e p o s s i b l e . If l o s s e s are
not reduced o r no a s s i s t a n c e from B r i t i s h s o u r c e s f o r t h i s purpose c a n
be o b t a i n e d , s u c h a c o u r s e would be d e s i r a b l e .
13.
The B r i t i s h have a l r e a d y d i s c o u n t e d t h e e s t i m a t e d g a i n i n t h e
Mediterranean by d i v e r t i n g t h i s tonnage t o B r i t i s h i m p o r t s .
14.
The U. S . i s committed t o r e p l a c e l o s s e s i n B r i t i s h tonnage i n
accordance w i t h an agreement d a t e d November 30, 1942. If t h e r e is a re

duction i n t h e number of s i n k i n g s t h e a s s i s t a n c e r e q u i r e d w i l l b e r e
duced. A s a r e d u c t i o n is expected i n some measure t h e r e w i l l be a c r e d i t
on t h i s a c c o u n t .
15.
I t i s c o n c l u d e d from t h e above t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s o f
meeting R u s s i a n P r o t o c o l d e l i v e r i e s on t h e p r e s e n t s c a l e d u r i n g 1943
without r e d u c i n g t e n t a t i v e s c h e d u l e s , b u t t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s
t h a t movements t o t h e U. K . may b e r e d u c e d b y as much as 100,000 men.
The a d v a n t a g e s of f u r n i s h i n g a i d t o R u s s i a a r e s u c h t h a t t h i s h a z a r d
should b e a c c e p t e d . Owing t o t h e s c a r c i t y o f s h i p p i n g , t h e r e s h o u l d b e
a g e n e r a l agreement t h a t a l l tonnage above minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s s h o u l d

be a s s i g n e d t o combined t r o o p movements.
77
ll S SECRET
B R I l I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
163
J a n u a r y 20, 1943
SYSTEM OF A I R COMMAND I N THE MDITERRANEAN

Proposals of the B r i t i s h Chiefs of S t a f f
1.
There s h a l l h e a p p o i n t e d a n A i r Commander-in-Chief
o f t h e whole
h!editerranean T h e a t e r w i t h h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s a t A l g i e r s u n d e r whom w i l l
h e the A.O.C.
Piddle East
2.
i n C. Northwest A f r i c a (General ' S p a a t z ) , t h e A.O.C.

( A i r Chief Marshal Douglas) and A.O.C.
in C
Malta.
The r e l a t i o n s h i p and mutual r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e A i r Commander
i n C h i e f , h'rediterranean, and t h e Commander- i n - C h i e f , Northwest A f r i c a n

Theater, are defined as follows:
(a) The A i r Commander-in C h l e f i s s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e Commander
i n - C h i e f , A l l i e d E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force j n Northwest A f r i c a , i n
respect of:
(1) The a i r f o r c e s s t a t i o n e d from t i m e t o time i n t h e North
west A f r i c a n T h e a t e r and t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s
(2) T h e o p e r a t i o n s of o t h e r Mediterranean a i r f o r c e s i n con
j u n c t i o n w i t h o p e r a t i o n s conducted i n o r from t h e North
west A f r i c a n T h e a t e r
(p) The Commander- i n - C h i e f , A.E.F,
i n Northwest A f r i c a , w i l l
a f f o r d t o t h e A i r Commander- i n . C h - e f , M e d i t e r r a n e a n
all
p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t and f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e N o r t h w e s t A f r i c a n
T h e a t e r f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n a i r f o r c e s
and f o r t h e i r e f f i c i e n t c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e l a n d and s e a
forces i n the theater
3.
NORTHWEST AFRICA:
T h i s w i l l b e d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e suhcommands:
(a) Iieavy and medium bombers and a p p r o p r i a t e e s c o r t f i g h t e r s
(h) General r e c o n n a i s k a n c e and f i g h t e r s f o r t h e d e f e n s e of s h i p
p i n g , p o r t s and hack a r e a s .
(c) An A i r S u p p o r t Command, which i s d e a l t w i t h i n d e t a i l in
paragraph 4 below.
The d e t a i l e d o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Command m u s t , however, h e l e f t
t o t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e A i r Commander-in-Chief
78
when he i s a p p o i n t e d
U. S. S E C R E T
A i r Force s u p p l y , m a i n t e n a n c e , and r e p a i r arrangements i n t h e whole o f
Northwest A f r i c a s h a l l be c e n t r a l i z e d u n d e r one c o n t r o l , d i r e c t under
t h e A.O.C.
4.
i n C . Northwest A f r i c a .
I n o r d e r t h a t l a n d o p e r a t i o n s may be e f f e c t i v e l y s u p p o r t e d by
t h e Combined a i r f o r c e s t h e r e must be one Army Commander o r Depnty Com

mander-in-Chief
a p p o i n t e d t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n s of a l l t h r e e
a r m i e s i n t h e T u n i s i a n Theater--the
B r i t i s h 1st Army, t h e American-French
Army under General F r e d e n d a l l , and t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Arw. The A i r O f f i c e r

Commanding t h e A i r Support Command must s i m i l a r l y c o o r d i n a t e t h e o p e r a
t i o n s o f t h e A i r F o r c e s s u p p o r t i n g a l l t h r e e armies, and w i l l s h a r e an
advanced h e a d q u a r t e r s w i t h t h e Deputy Commander-in-Chief,
whence he c a n
d i r e c t t h e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e A i r Fopces t o t h e b e s t advantage o f t h e l a n d
battle.
Army Support Wings w i l l be a t t a c h e d t o each of t h e three armies
The Wing Commanders w i l l a c t as A i r A d v i s e r s t o t h e Army Commanders and
w i l l command s u c h a i r f o r c e s as may from t i m e t o t i m e be a s s i g n e d t o

them by t h e A.O.C. Army Support Command i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e Deputy
Supreme Commander.
5.
MIDDLE FAST:
T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of Middle E a s t w i l l remain as i t i s a t p r e s e n t
e x c e p t t h a t Malta w i l l be d e t a c h e d and come d i r e c t under A i r Commander

i n - C h i e f , Mediterranean. F u r t h e r , c e r t a i n a i r f o r c e s employed i n c l o s e
s u p p o r t of t h e 8 t h A r m y w i l l p a s s u n d e r t h e commard o f t h e A . O . C .
Support under A.O.C.
i n C . Northwest A f r i c a .
79
Air
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S.
lfi4
J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1913

OPERATION ANAKIM--PROVISION
OF FORCES
Report b y B r i t i s h J o i n t Planning S t a f f
1.
The g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM h a s a l r e a d y been s e t
o u t i n C.C.S.
151.
ASSUMPTION:
2.
It is assumed t h a t Operation ANAKIM w i l l b e launched i n November
1913, s o g i v i n g f i v e t o s i x months of d r y weather i n which t o reopen the

Burma Road.
AVAILABILITY OF FORCES:
3.
U n t i l an o u t l i n e p l a n i s r e c e i v e d from I n d i a no a c c u r a t e e s t i
mate c a n be made. The f o r c e s r e q u i r e d and t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y , a s now

f o r e c a s t , are:
AVAILABLE FROM
REQUIRED
BRITISH RESOURCES
(a) N a v a l Forces:
G-8 E s c o r t c a r r i e r s
40 D e s t r o y e r s and e s c o r t s
Submarines and mine-
REMARKS
The p r o v i s i o n of naval
sweepers w i l l prob-
f o r c e s must be decided
8 Submarines
a b l y be a v a i l a b l e
upon a t a l a t e r
date
6 F l e e t minesweepers and
O f t h e remainder
W i l l be a v a i l a b l e
i n
cover by heavy f o r c e s
t h e B r i t i s h a r e un
depending on t h e s i t u
l i k e l y t o be a b l e t o
ation a t the t i m e .
p r o v i d e more t h a n
half.
(b) Army:
8 Infantry df--isions
I n d i a by October 1 ,
Yes
including sufficient
1 Armored d i v i s i o n
a s s a u l t t r a i n e d troops.
(c) A i r :
28 Bomber squadrons
W i l l be found from a i r
Yes
f o r c e s a l r e a d y i n In
17 F i g h t e r squadrons
dia, raised
4 C o a s t a l squadrons
t o requi
s i t e strengthbytrans
f e r from Middle E a s t
SO
U. S . S E C R E T
AVAILABLE
REQUIRED
mOM
BRITISH RESOURCES
REMARKS
(d) A s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and
Landing Craft:
1 H.Q.
Ship
(L)
(2)
9 L.S.I.
40 L.S.T.
5 L.S.5.
10 L.C.T.
(5)
120 L.C.M.
Yes
Yes
From 7-13
NO
from B r i t i s h r e s o u r c e s
No
w i l l r e q u i r e t o b e pro
100 only
v i d e d a n d manned b y
.$.A.
Yes
40 L.C.P.
Yes
100 L.C.A.
16 L.C.S.
This deficiency w i l l
10
have t o be m e t b y i m
provisat ion.
(e) Shipping:
No estimate
T h i s requirement has
60 M.T.
yet possible
n o t y e t been confirmed
ships
b y C--in-C I n d i a .
CONCLUSION:
4. The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f a r e asked t o :
(a) Approve November 1 5 , 1943, a s p r o v i s i o n a l d a t e for ANAKIM

assault
(b) Approve p r o v i s i o n a l s c h e d u l e of f o r c e s l a i d o u t i n paragraph 3
above, i t being recognized t h a t a c t u a l p r o v i s i o n o f n a v a l
f o r c e s , a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g , l a n d i n g c r a f t and s h i p p i n g must
depend on s i t u a t i o n i n l a t e summer o f 1943.
(c) Agree t o c o n f i r m i n J u l y 1943 d e c i s i o n t o u n d e r t a k e o r t o

p o s t p o n e O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM.
81
li S . S E C R E T
C.C.S. 164/1
J a n u a r y 21, 1943
OPEIIAXON INAXI6i--PROVISION
OF FORCES
Report by B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f
1.
The g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM h a s a l r e a d y been s e t
o u t i n C.C.S.
154.
ASSUMPTION:
I t i s assumed t h a t O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM w i l l be launched i n November

1943, s o g i v i n g f i v e t o s i x months of d r y weather i n which t o reopen t h e
Burma lload..
AVAILABILITY OF FORCES:
3
U n t i l a n o u t l i n e p l a n i s r e c e i v e d from I n d i a no a c c u r a t e e s t i
2.
mate c a n be made. The f o r c e s r e q u i r e d a n d t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y ,
a s now
f o r e c a s t , are:
REQUIHED
AVAILABLE FROM
BRITISH RESOURCES
REMARKS
( a ) Naval F o r c e s :
6 Escort c a r r i e r s
40 j!estroyers
and e s c o r t s
Submarines and mine- The p r o v i s i o n o f naval
sweepers w i l l prob-
f o r c e s must be decided
8 Submarines
a b l y b e a v a i l a b l e . O f upon a t a l a t e r d a t e .
6 F l e e t minesweepers and
t h e remainder, t h e
cover b y heavy f o r c e s
B r i t i s h are unlikely
depending on t h e s i t u
t o be a b l e t o p r o v i d e
a t i o n a t t h e time.
more t h a n h a l f .
W i l l be available i n
I n d i a by October 1, in
(b) Army:
8 Infantry divisions
Yes
c l u d i n g s u f f i c i e n t as
s a u l t t r a i n e d troops.
1 Armored d i v i s i o n
(c) A i r :
28 Bomber squadrons
W i l l b e found from a i r
Yes
17 F i g h t e r squadrons
forces already i n In
4 C o a s t a l squadrons
d i a , r a i s e d t o requi
s i t e s t r e n g t h b y trans
f e r from
ranean.
82
t h e Mediter.
S . SECRET
RE$ U I RED
AVAILBBLE FROM
BRITISH
REMARKS
RESOURCES
(d) A s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and
Landing Craft,:
Ship
Yes
L.S.I.
(L)
Yes
4 0 L.S.T.
(2)
From 7-13
1 H.Q.
5 L.S.D.
KO
10 L . C . T .
120 L.C.M.
(5)
YO
100 only
Ex IIusky o r o t h e r Med
i t e r r a n e a n Operations.
Balance not available

from B r i t i s h r e s o u r c e s
w i l l r e y u i r e t o b e pro
v i d e d a n d manned
by
u . s .A.
40 5.C.P.
Yes
100 L . C . A .
Yes
16 L.C.S.
10
T h i s deficiency w i l l
h a v e t o b e met by i m
prov i s a t i on.
(e) Shipping:
60 M.T.
ships
No e s t i m a t e
This requirement has
yet possible
n o t y e t been confirmed
by C-in-C
India.
CGYCLUSIOK:
4.
The Combined C h i e f s o f F t a f f a r e a s k e d t o :
!a) Approve Vovember 15, 1 9 4 3 , a s p r o v i s i o n a l d a t e f o r AFAKIhI
assault.
( b ) Approve p r o v i s i o n a l s c h e d u l e of f o r c e s l a i d o u t i n paragraph 3
a b o v e , i t b e i n g r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a c t u a l p r o v i s i o n of
f o r c e s , a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g , l a n d i n g c r a f t and s h i p p i n g
naval
must
depend on s i t u a t i o n i n l a t e summer of 1943.

( c ) A g e e t o c o n f i r m i n J u l y 1943 d e c i s i o n t o u n d e r t a k e or t o
p o s t p o n e O p e r a t i o n AkAKIV.
U . S . SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 22, 1943
165/2
DRaFT TELEGRAM
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE U N I T E D STATES
AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT B R I T A I N TO PREMIER STALIN
Prepared by t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
1.
We have been i n c o n f e r e n c e w i t h our M i l i t a r y A d v i s e r s f o r the
p a s t t e n days, and w e have decided t h e o p e r a t i o n s which a r e t o be under

t a k e n by American and B r i t i s h f o r c e s i n 1943. We t h i n k t h a t you would
w i s h t o know o u r i n t e n t i o n s a t once.
2.
We a r e i n no doubt t h a t o u r c o r r e c t s t r a t e g y i s t o c o n c e n t r a t e
on t h e d e f e a t o f Germany, w i t h a view t o a c h i e v i n g e a r l y and d e c i s i v e

v i c t o r y i n t h e European T h e a t e r . A t t h e same t i m e ,
we
must
maintain
s u f f i c i e n t p r e s s u r e on J a p a n t o r e t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n t h e P a c i f i c and
F a r E a s t , s u s t a i n China, and p r e v e n t t h e J a p a n e s e from e x t e n d i n g t h e i r
a g g r e s s i o n t o o t h e r t h e a t e r s s u c h as your Maritime P r o v i n c e s .
3.
A c o n s t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n h a s been t h e n e c e s s i t y of d i v e r t i n g
s t r o n g German l a n d and a i r f o r c e s from t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t and o f sending
t o R u s s i a t h e m a x i m u m flow of s u p p l i e s , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h e q u a l l y urgent
e s h a l l s p a r e no e x e r t i o n t o send you
requirements i n o t h e r t h e a t e r s . W
material a s s i s t a n c e by e v e r y a v a i l a b l e r o u t e , b u t i t would be no more
i n your i n t e r e s t t h a n o u r s t o do s o a t a c o s t which would c r i p p l e our
c a p a c i t y t o r e l i e v e p r e s s u r e on you by c o n t i n u i n g an i n t e n s i f i e d o f f e n
s i v e e f f o r t on our p a r t .
4.
Our immediate i n t e n t i o n i s t o c l e a r t h e Axis o u t o f North A f r i c a
and set up t h e n a v a l and a i r i n s t a l l a t i o n s t o open:
(a) An e f f e c t i v e passage through t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n f o r m i l i t a r y

t r a f f i c , and
(b) An i n t e n s i v e bombardment of i m p o r t a n t Axis i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n
S o u t h e r n Europe.
5.
We have made t h e d e c i s i o n t o launch large s c a l e amphibious oper
a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e moment. The prepa

r a t i o n f o r t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s i s now under way and w i l l i n v o l v e a c o n s i d
e r a b l e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f f o r c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y l a n d i n g c r a f t and s h i p p i n g
84
ll. S. SECRET
i n Egyptian and North A f r i c a n p o r t s . T h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n w i l l c e r t a i n l y
be known t o o u r e n e m i e s , h u t t h e y w i l l n o t know where o r when, o r i n
what s t r e n g t h , w e propose t o s t r i k e . They w i l l , t h e r e f o r e , he compelled
t o r e i n f o r c e w i t h b o t h l a n d and a i r f o r c e s t h e South of F r a n c e , C o r s i c a ,
S a r d i n i a , S i c i l y , t h e h e e l o f I t a l y , Y u g o s l a v i a , Greece, Crete, and t h e
Dodecanese
6~
These o p e r a t i o n s may r e s u l t i n t h e c o l l a p s e of I t a l y . T h e defec-.
t i o n of o t h e r German s a t e l l i t e s t a t e s would p r o b a b l y f o l l o w . Germany

would t h e n h e f a c e d w i t h t h e c h o i c e o f s h o r t e n i n g h e r e a s t e r n l i n e by a
major withdrawal on your f r o n t , or of a c c e p t i n g a s h o r t a g e of some f i f t y
d i v i s i o n s and 2,000 a i r c r a f t i n her g l o b a l r e q u i r e m e n t s ,
7?
I n Europe w e s h a l l i n c r e a s e t h e A l l i e d Bomber o f f e n s i v e from t h e
U, K - a g a i n s t Germany a t a r a p i d r a t e a n d , by midsummer, i t s h o u l d b e
more t h a n d o u b l e i t s p r e s e n t s t r e n g t h . , Our e x p e r i e n c e s t o d a t e have
shown t h a t t h e day bombing a t t a c k s r e s u l t i n d e s t r u c t i o n and damage t o
l a r g e numbers o f German F i g h t e r A i r c r a f t
W
e b e l i e v e t h a t an increased
tempo and weight o f d a y l i g h t and n i g h t a t t a c k s w i l l l e a d t o g r e a t l y i n

creased m a t e r i a l and morale damage i n Germany and r a p i d l y d e p l e t e German
f l g h t e r s t r e n g t h i n Germany and o c c u p i e d W e s t e r n E u r o p e . A s you a r e
aware, we a r e a l r e a d y c o n t a i n i n g more t h a n h a l f t h e German A i r F o r c e i n
Western Europe and t h e Mediterranean,, W
e have no d o u b t t h a t our g r e a t l y
i n t e n s i f i e d bombing o f f e n s i v e , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s which
we a r e u n d e r t a k i n g , w i l l compel f u r t h e r w i t h d r a w a l s of German a i r and
other f o r c e s from t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t . .
8<,
W
e s h a l l a l s o c o n c e n t r a t e i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t h e maximum
American l a n d and a i r f o r c e s t h a t s h i p p i n g w i l l p e r m i t
These, combined
w i t h t h e B r i t i s h f o r c e s i n t h e United Kingdom, w i l l h e h e l d i n c o n s t a n t
r e a d i n e s s t o r e e n t e r t h e C o n t i n e n t of Europe as soon as t h i s o p e r a t i o n
o f f e r s r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t of s u c c e s s . ,
9.
I n t h e P a c i f i c i t i s our i n t e n t i o n t o e j e c t t h e J a p a n e s e from
Rabaul w i t h i n t h e n e x t f e w months and t h e r e a f t e r t o e x p l o i t i n t h e gen

e r a l d i r e c t i o n o f J a p a n . We a l s o i n t e n d t o i n c r e a s e t h e s c a l e o f our
o p e r a t i o n s i n Burma i n o r d e r t o r e o p e n o u r c h a n n e l of s u p p l y t o C h i n a ,
We s h a l l n o t , however, a l l o w o u r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t J a p a n t o j e o p a r d i z e
our c a p a c i t y t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of any f a v o r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t may

present i t s e l f f o r t h e d e c i s i v e d e f e a t of Germany i n 1943..
NOTE. C.C.S. 165 and C . C . S . 165/1 were withdrawn inasmuch a s t h e i n f o r - .
mation c o n t a i n e d i n t h e s e p a p e r s w a s i n c l u d e d i n C.C.S. 165/2..
85
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S. 166
J a n u a r y 20, 1943
THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

Memorandum b y t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f
I t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g d i r e c t i v e be i s s u e d by the
Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e B r i t i s h and U . S. A i r Force
Commanders t o g o v e r n t h e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e B r i t i s h and American Bomber
Commands i n t h e United Kingdom.
DRAFT DIRECTWE
Your o b j e c t w i l l b e t h e p r o g r e s s i v e d e s t r u c t i o n and d i s l o c a t i o n
o f t h e German m i l i t a r y , i n d u s t r i a l and economic s y s t e m , and t h e under

mining of t h e m o r a l e of t h e German p e o p l e t o a p o i n t where t h e i r capa
c i t y f o r armed r e s i s t a n c e i s f a t a l l y weakened.
2.
Within t h a t g e n e r a l concept, your primary o b j e c t i v e s , s u b j e c t t o
t h e e x i g e n c i e s of w e a t h e r and of t a c t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y , w i l l f o r t h e
p r e s e n t be i n t h e o r d e r of p r i o r i t y set o u t below. T h i s o r d e r of p r i o r
i t y may b e v a r i e d from t i m e t o t i m e a c c o r d i n g t o d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e
strategic situation
I t i s n o t t o be taken t o p r e c l u d e a t t a c k s on B e r l i n
when c o n d i t i o n s are s u i t a b l e for t h e a t t a i n m e n t of s p e c i a l l y v a l u a b l e

r e s u l t s u n f a v o r a b l e t o t h e morale of t h e enemy o r f a v o r a b l e t o t h a t of
Russia.
(a) German s t b m a r i n e o p e r a t i o n a l b a s e s and c o n s t r u c t i o n y a r d s .
(b) The German a i r c r a f t i n d u s t r y .
(c) T r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
(d) S y n t h e t i c o i l p l a n t s .
(e) O t h e r targets i n enemy war i n d u s t r y .
3.
There may b e c e r t a i n o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s o f g r e a t b u t f l e e t i n g
importance f o r t h e a t t a c k of which a l l n e c e s s a r y p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s

s h o u l d be made. O f t h e s e ,
an example would b e i m p o r t a n t u n i t s of t h e
German F l e e t i n h a r b o r o r a t s e a .
4.
You s h o u l d t a k e e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t o a t t a c k Germany b y d a y , t o
d e s t r o y o b j e c t i v e s t h a t are u n s u i t a b l e f o r n i g h t a t t a c k , t o s u s t a i n
86
U. S . SECRET
continuous p r e s s u r e on German morale, t o impose heavy l o s s e s on t h e Ger

man day f i g h t e r f o r c e , and t o c o n t a i n German f i g h t e r s t r e n g t h away from
the Russian and Mediterranean t h e a t e r s o f war.
If and when i t is decided t h a t t h e A l l i e d armies should r e e n t e r

the C o n t i n e n t , you w i l l a f f o r d them a l l p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t i n t h e manner
most e f f e c t i v e .
6.
In a t t a c k i n g o b j e c t i v e s i n occupied t e r r i t o r i e s , you w i l l con
form t o s u c h i n s t r u c t i o n s as may b e i s s u e d from t i m e t o t i m e b y H i s
Majesty's Government t h r o u g h t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f .
5.
87
U. S
SECRET
B R I T I S H MUST ShCHli'1'
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 21, 1943
166/1/0
COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFT
THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED K I N G D O M

D i r e c t i v e t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e B r i t i s h and U. S.
A i r Force Commanders, t o govern t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e
B r i t i s h and U. S. Bomber Commands i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
(Approved by t h e Combined Chiefs o f S t a f f a t t h e i r
6 5 t h Meeting on January 21, 1943)
1.
Your primary o b j e c t w i l l be t h e p r o g r e s s i v e d e s t r u c t i o n and d i s . ~
l o c a t i o n o f t h e German m i l i t a r y , i n d u s t r i a l and economic system, and the

undermining of t h e morale o f t h e German p e o p l e t o a p o i n t where t h e i r
c a p a c i t y f o r armed r e s i s t a n c e i s f a t a l l y weakened.
2.
Within t h a t g e n e r a l concept, your primary o b j e c t i v e s , s u b j e c t t o
t h e e x i g e n c i e s of w e a t h e r and o f t a c t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y , w i l l f o r t h e
p r e s e n t b e i n t h e f o l l o w i n g o r d e r of p r i o r i t y :
(a) German submarine c o n s t r u c t i o n y a r d s .
(b) The German a i r c r a f t i n d u s t r y .
(c) T r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
(d) O i l p l a n t s .
(e) Other t a r g e t s i n enemy war i n d u s t r y .
The above o r d e r of p r i o r i t y may be v a r i e d from t i m e t o t i m e a c c o r d i n g t o

developments i n t h e s t r a t e g i c a l s i t u a t i o n . Moreover, o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s of
g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e e i t h e r from t h e p o l i t i c a l o r m i l i t a r y p o i n t o f view
must be a t t a c k e d , Examples o f t h e s e a r e :
(1) Submarine o p e r a t i n g b a s e s on t h e B i s c a y c o a s t . I f t h e s e can
b e p u t o u t o f a c t i o n , a g r e a t s t e p forward w i l l have been
taken i n t h e &boat
war which t h e C.C.S.
have agreed t o be a
f i r s t c h a r g e o n o u r r e s o u r c e s . Day and n i g h t a t t a c k s on t h e s e
b a s e s have been i n a u g u r a t e d and s h o u l d be c o n t i n u e d s o t h a t
an a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e i r e f f e c t s can be made as soon as p o s
s i b l e , , I f i t i s found t h a t s u c c e s s f u l r e s u l t s c a n b e achieved,.
t h e s e a t t a c k s should c o n t i n u e whenever c o n d i t i o n s are f a v o r
a b l e for as l o n g and as o f t e n as i s n e c e s s a r y . T h e s e o b ~
j e c t i v e s have n o t b e e n i n c l u d e d i n t h e o r d e r o f p r i o r i t y ,
88
U. S . SECRET
which c o v e r s long-term o p e r a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y as t h e b a s e s
are n o t s i t u a t e d i n Germany.
(2) B e r l i n , which s h o u l d b e a t t a c k e d when c o n d i t i o n s a r e s u i t
a b l e for t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f s p e c i a l l y v a l u a b l e r e s u l t s un
f a v o r a b l e t o t h e morale of t h e enemy o r f a v o r a b l e t o t h a t of
Russia
3.
You may a l s o b e r e q u i r e d , a t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t i m e ,
t o attack
o b j e c t i v e s i n Northern I t a l y i n connection w i t h amphibious o p e r a t i o n s i n

the Mediterranean t h e a t e r .
4.
There may b e c e r t a i n o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s of g r e a t b u t f l e e t i n g i m
p o r t a n c e f o r t h e a t t a c k o f which a l l n e c e s s a r y p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s
should be made. Of t h e s e , an example would be t h e i m p o r t a n t u n i t s of t h e
German F l e e t i n harbor o r a t s e a .
5.
You s h o u l d t a k e e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t o a t t a c k Germany by d a y , t o
destroy o b j e c t i v e s t h a t are u n s u i t a b l e f o r n i g h t a t t a c k , t o s u s t a i n con

tinuous p r e s s u r e on German morale, t o impose heavy l o s s e s on t h e German
day f i g h t e r f o r c e , and t o c o n t a i n German f i g h t e r s t r e n g t h away from t h e
Russian and Mediterranean t h e a t e r s of war.
6.
When t h e A l l i e d a r m i e s r e e n t e r t h e C o n t i n e n t , you w i l l a f f o r d
them a l l p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t i n t h e manner most e f f e c t i v e .

7.
I n a t t a c k i n g o b j e c t i v e s i n o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r i e s , you w i l l con
form t o such i n s t r u c t i o n s a s may be i s s u e d from t i m e t o t i m e f o r p o l i t i

c a l r e a s o n s by H i s h l a j e s t y ' s Government t h r o u g h t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f
Staff.
89
U S SECRET
B R I T I S A MOST S E C R E T
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 22, 1943
167

CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS I N 1 9 4 3
lleport by B r i t i s h J o i n t Planning S t a f f
1.
I n view o f t h e recommendations approved by t h e Combined C h i e f s
o f S t a f f i n C.C.S. 155/1, f o r t h e "Conduct of t h e War i n 1943," w e e x

amine below t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f cross-channel o p e r a t i o n s i n 1943.
OBJECT OF 0PEI:AlIONS:
2.
The o b j e c t s of cross--channel o p e r a t i o n s i n 1943 maybe s e t down as:

(a) Xaids w i t h t h e primary o b j e c t of provoking a major a i r b a t t l e
and causing t h e enemy l o s s .
(b) @ p e r a t i o n s w i t h t h e o b j e c t of s e i z i n g and h o l d i n g a b r i d g e
head and, i f t h e s t a t e o f German morale and s t r e n g t h of h e r
r e s o u r c e s p e r m i t , of e x p l o i t i n g s u c c e s s ,
( c ) O p e r a t i o n s on a l a r g e r s c a l e t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f German
disintegration.
ASSUMPTION AS TO DATE:
3.
I'ihere f i g u r e s a r e q u o t e d , we h a v e assumed a t a r g e t d a t e o f
August 1st.
RESOURCES:
4.
The number o f d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e w i l l be twelve B r i t i s h , i n ,
c l u d i n g one a i r b o r n e , and a b o u t f o u r American.
5-
T r a i n i n g of n a v a l crews w i l l be t h e l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i n t h e pro..
v i s i o n of l a n d i n g c r a f t f o r t h e i n i t i a l a s s a u l t s
I t is estimated t h a t ,
w i t h o u t U . S . a s s i s t a n c e , t h e maximum l i f t which c a n b e p r o v i d e d w i l l b e :
I n i t i a l a s s a u l t force:
Two b r i g a d e g r o u p s , w i t h p r o p o r t i o n of
Total lift including
Two i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s a n d one armored
i n i t i a l a s s a u l t force:
b r i g a d e on l i g h t s c a l e s , o f which two
armor and commandos.
b r i g a d e groups and a p r o p o r t i o n o f armor

can be mounted i n t h e i n i t i a l a s s a u l t .
NOTE: T h i s i s o n t h e assumption t h a t t h e B r i t i s h are n o t r e q u i r e d
t o provide t h e U-. S , w i t h armored l a n d i n g c r a f t f o r Xed..

iterranean operations,,
90
U. S. SECRET
5.
There w i l l by August 1943 be s u f f i c i e n t a i r f o r c e s , B r i t i s h and
American, t o s u p p o r t a l i m i t e d c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n e i t h e r a g a i n s t
the Pas de Calais o r t h e COTENTIN PENINSULA, p r o v i d e d o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n have n o t drawn t o o h e a v i l y on our F i g h t e r r e s e r v e s . The
d e c i s i o n t o c a r r y o u t s u c h an o p e r a t i o n would, however, e n t a i l a r e o r
g a n i z a t i o n of p a r t of t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n A i r F o r c e w i t h a consequent b r a k e
on its expansion and o p e r a t i o n a l e f f o r t .
ESTIMATED SCALE OF GERMAN RESISTANCE:
7.
I t may b e assumed t h a t t h e G e r m a n s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o d e v e l o p t h e i r
s y s t e m of c o a s t d e f e n s e s , b u t i t i s f a i r t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e f o r m a t i o n s
h o l d i n g t h e s e d e f e n s e s w i l l be of p o o r e r q u a l i t y t h a n a t p r e s e n t .
8.
The r e s e r v e s which t h e Germans w i l l he a b l e t o b r i n g a g a i n s t us
must depend e n t i r e l y on t h e p r o g r e s s of o p e r a t i o n s e l s e w h e r e i n Europe.

I n the w o r s t c a s e g if t h e y s u c c e e d e d w i t h o u t h e a v y l o s s e s i n
s t a b i l i z i n g t h e i r E a s t e r n f r o n t on t h e s h o r t e n e d l i n e of R . DNIEFER, and
i n c h e c k i n g our o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , t h e y m i g h t r e b u i l d
t h e i r reserves i n Northwest Europe t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e l e v e l o f Novem
b e r 1942, i . e
, 41 d i v i s i o n s
It is p o s s i b l e , however, t h a t t h e y may b e f o r c e d t o make f u r t h e r

s u b s t a n t i a l r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e number of t h e i r r e s e r v e f o r m a t i o n s i n
Northwest Europe, and t h a t t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o r e i n f o r c e Northwest F r a n c e
r a p i d l y may be d e c r e a s e d .
9
I t i s i m p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e German A i r F o r c e on
t h e Western F r o n t w i l l be l e s s t h a n i t h a s been d u r i n g t h e l a s t s i x
months, i a e ~ about
9
1,000 f i r s t l i n e a i r c r a f t of a l l t y p e s I n t h e e v e n t
of a c l e a r t h r e a t of a l a r g e s c a l e l a n d i n g by our f o r c e s i n North France
or i n t h e Low C o u n t r i e s , t h e G A.F. might b e p r e p a r e d t o withdraw f o r c e s

b o t h from t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and R u s s i a t o i n c r e a s e t h i s s t r e n g t h t o
1,500.
POSSIBLE AREAS FOR RAIDS:
10.
R a i d s of which t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t i s t o provoke a n a i r b a t t l e
would b e s t be conducted a g a i n s t t h e Pas de Calais, b u t t h e n a t u r e of t h e

defenses would b e e x t r e m e l y c o s t l y t o t h e a s s a u l t f o r c e s
POSSIBLE AREA FOR A LIMITED BRIDGEHEAD OPERATION:
11.
The COTENTIN PENINSULA i s t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i v e for of
f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s of which t h e o b j e c t is t o r e m a i n on t h e C o n t i n e n t ,
a s i t i s t h e o n l y a r e a w i t h a s h o r t and e a s i l y d e f e n s i b l e l i n e w i t h i n
91
U . S. S E C R E T
r e a s o n a b l e d i s t a n c e o f t h e b e a c h e s , and one which,
a t t h e same time,
permits reasonable a i r support.

COMBINED COMMANDERSb PLAN FOR ASSAULT O F THE
COTENTIN PENINSULA (OPERATION HADRIAN) :
12.
I n November 1942 t h e Combined Commanders i n London made a de
t a i l e d s t u d y of t h e problems i n v o l v e d i n a n a s s a u l t t o s e i z e and h o l d the
COTENTIN PENINSULA, o n t h e assumption t h a t theGermans could b r i n g up t o

15 r e s e r v e d i v i s i o n s a g a i n s t t h e a s s a u l t i n g f o r c e d u r i n g t h e f i r s t four
t e e n days. They concluded t h a t t h e minimum requirements f o r s u c c e s s were:
(a) I n i t i a l a s s a u l t t o be made by 5 b r i g a d e groups..

(b) A s s a u l t t o be s u p p o r t e d by 1 0 p a r a c h u t e b a t t a l i o n s and an
a i r b o r n e d i v i s i o n , l e s s one p a r a c h u t e b r i g a d e , f o r l i f t i n g
which 847 t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t would b e r e q u i r e d .
(c) The t o t a l f o r c e , i n c l u d i n g a s s a u l t f o r c e s , t o be appro xi,^
mately 8 divisions.
(d) The b u i l d - u p of f i g h t i n g t r o o n s t o be s u b s t a n t i a l l y complete
by evening of I! + 1.
General Eisenhower d i d n o t h i m s e l f s e e t h e p l a n , b u t his r e p r e
s e n t a t i v e s c o l l a b o r a t e d i n i t s p r e p a r a t , i o n and f u l l y c o n c u r r e d i n t h e
c o n c l u s i o n as t o minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s .
PRACTICABILITY OF OPERATION W I T H FORCES SET OUT I N PARAGRAPH 5'

13.
With t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e i n 1943, n e i t h e r t h e s i z e of t h e
seaborne a n d a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t f o r c e s n o r t h e r a t e o f b u i l d up c a n approach
t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e Combined Commanders
It is c l e a r , t h e r e f o r e ,
t h a t no o p e r a t i o n t o s e i z e and hold a f o o t i n g i n t h e COTENTIN PENINSULA

h a s any p r o s p e c t of s u c c e s s u n l e s s t h e German r e s e r v e s have b e e n v e r y
g r e a t l y r e d u c e d . S i m i l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s would a p p l y t o a l i m i t e d opera^
t i o n anywhere on t h e F r e n c h c o a s t .
14.
There i s , however, a good p r o s p e c t t h a t t h e German r e s e r v e s w i l l
i n f a c t b e g r e a t l y reduced by August-. I t w i l l ,
t h e r e f o r e , be n e c e s s a r y
t o make a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e :
(a) Whether w i t h t h e s m a l l a s s a u l t f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e , i t i s pos

s i b l e s u c c e s s f u l l y t o a s s a u l t t h e COTENTIN PENINSULA
(b) If such ah a s s a u l t i s p r a c t i c a b l e , t o what l e v e l German r e .
s e r v e s i n Northwest France must be reduced i n o r d e r t o give
15.
o u r f o r c e s a r e a s o n a b l e c h a n c e o f h o l d i n g t h e PENINSULA
I t c a n , however, be s a i d a t once, w i t h o u t f u r t h e r examination,
that:
92
IT. S . S E C R E T
(a) A m i n i m u m of four brigade groups i n the i n i t i a l a s s a u l t w i l l

almost c e r t a i n l y be necessary.
(b) Shortage of seaborne a s s a u l t troops w i l l make p r o v i s i o n o f
a i r b o r n e troops the more necessary.
(c) To i n s u r e t h e s u c c e s s of the i n i t i a l a s s a u l t a g a i n s t t h e
strong defenses of the French c o a s t , and t o reduce c a s u a l t i e s
among t h e a s s a u l t i n g t r o o p s , maximum a l l o t m e n t o f s u p p o r t
c r a f t w i l l be necessary.
(d) The l i m i t i n g f a c t o r i n t h e r a t e of subsequent build-up is
a v a i l a b i l i t y of ve h i c l e - c a r r ying c r a f t
POSSIBILITY O F EXPLOITING A LIMITED OF'ERATION:
In view of the l i m i t e d capacity o f the port o f CHERBOURG, opera
16.
tions t o e x p l o i t success must be designed t o secure a d d i t i o n a l p o r t fa-

c i l i t i e s s o as t o permit the maintenance of l a r g e r f o r c e s . Such opera
t i o n s might take the form of an advance by a mobile f o r c e , supported by
seaborne and a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t s , e i t h e r eastwards t o c a p t u r e t h e SEINE
ports o r southwestwards t o secure t h e BRETON p o r t s . I n e i t h e r instance,
preliminary operations would be necessary t o expand the bridgehead so a s
t o obtain the use of the port of CAEN and the group of a i r f i e l d s i n t h a t
area.
17.
The p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of u n d e r t a k i n g such subsequent o p e r a t i o n s
w i l l , however, depend e n t i r e l y on the s t a t e of German morale and on the
extent t o which they a r e able t o concentrate reserves t o oppose our f i r

ther advance. The r a p i d i t y with which such operations can be undertaken
w i l l i n any case depend on the r a t e a t which we a r e a b l e t o reconstruct
the p o r t s and t o b u i l d up our own f o r c e s and r e s e r v e s . Even i f German

opposition is n e g l i g i b l e , progress w i l l be slow onaccount o f our l i m i t e d
resources i n vehicle-carrying c r a f t s u i t a b l e for landing over beaches
~
OPEFLATIONS ON A LARGER SCAIE TO TdXE

ADVANTAGE O F GERMAN DISINTEGRBTION:
18.
The r e t u r n t o t h e Continent i n t h e case of German d i s l n t e g r a
t i o n w i l l be p r i m a r i l y an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problem. The Combined Corn-.
menders i n London should t h e r e f o r e be i n s t r u c t e d t o make t h e necessary
plans
CONCLUSIONS:
19.
(a) Unless t h e Germans are forced t o reduce t h e i r reserves end
93
U. S. S E C 8 E T
B R I T I S I j YOST SECRET
t h e i r b e a c h d e f e n s e s i n Northwest Europe s u b s t a n t i a l l y , no
l i m i t e d o p e r a t i b n t o s e i z e and h o l d a f o o t i n g i n F r a n c e i s
p r a c t i c a b l e w i t h the resources l i k e l y to be a v a i l a b l e i n
194.1.
(b) A d e t a i l e d p l a n f o r a n o p e r a t i o n t o s e i z e and h o l d t h e COTEN-
TIN PENINSULA s h o u l d b e made on t h e b a s i s o f r e s o u r c e s l i k e l y

t o be a v a i l a b l e .
(c) An e x a m i n a t i o n s h o u l d b e made t o d e t e r m i n e t o what l e v e l
German r e s e r v e s i n N o r t h w e s t E u r o p e must s i n k i n o r d e r t o
g i v e s u c h an o p e r a t i o n a r e a s o n a b l e chance i f s u c c e s s .
(d) P r e p a r a t i o n s s h o u l d b e made t o mount t h e o p e r a t i o n by Aug
u s t l s t , b u t t h e d e c i s i o n t o p u t this p l a n i n t o e x e c u t i o n
should be 4 e f e r r e d u n t i l a reasonably f i r m e s t i m a t e o f the
German r e s e r v e s on t h a t d a t e c a n b e made.
( e ) O u t l i n e p l a n s s h o u l d be made f o r f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s t o ex
p l o i t s u c c e s s i n t h e e v e n t o f a breakdown i n German morale,
e.g.,
t o e x t e n d t h e b r i d g e h e a d t o i n c l u d e CAEN and s u b s e
q u e n t l y t o s e c u r e e i t h e r t h e NORTH SEINE o r BRETON groupof

ports.
( f ) The Combined Commanders j n London s h o u l d b e i n s t r u c t e d t o
draw up p l a n s for a r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t i n t h e c a s e of
German d i s i n t e g r a t i o n .
( 9 ) U. S . Government w i l l have t o p r o v i d e :
(1) A s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and l a n d i n g c r a f t , manned b y U . S.

c r e w s , t o c a r r y a t l e a s t two b r i g a d e g r o u p s a t a s s a u l t
scales
(2) Such a d d i t i o n a l p a r a c h u t e b a t t a l i o n s and t r a n s p o r t a i r
c r a f t a s may b e n e c e s s a r y .
(h) A l l p o s s i b l e s t e p s should b e t a k e n t o p r o v i d e :
(1) Support c r a f t f o r t h e a s s a u l t .
(2) The maximum number o f i m p r o v i s e d c r a f t f o r c a r r i a g e of
vehicles.
(Signed) C. E. LAMBE
G. M. STEWART
W. ELLIOT
94
SECRET
C C.S, 168
S
J a n u a r y 22, 1943
COMBINEB CHIEFS OF STAFF
CONDUCT OF THE W A R I N THE PACIFIC THEATER I N 1943
Memorandum b y J o i n t L'.
1.
S . C h i e f s of S t a f f
J a p a n h a s expanded t h e s c o p e o f tier o c c u p a t i o n s o t h a t i t i n
c l u d e s n o t o n l y h e r former h o l d i n g s of
(1) Korea and Manchuria on t h e
mainland o f A s i a and (2) a c o n s i d e r a b l e p a r t o f China ( i n c l u d i n g a l l of

the c o a s t ) , b u t i n tkie p a s t y e a r ,
(3) a l l o f Indo-China,
l a n d , most of Burma, arid as w e l l ,
(1) a l l of t h e F h i l i p p i n e s and (5) t h e
Malaysia, T h a i
Dutch E a s t I n d i e s .
2.
T h e u l t i m a t e d e f e a t o f J a p a n p r o p e r w i l l be a c c o m p l i s h e d by
measures which g r e a t l y r e s e m b l e t h o s e which would be e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t
the B r i t i s h Isles- blockade
( a t t a c k on s h i p s a n d s h i p p i n g ) , bombing
( a t t a c k on f o r c e s , d e f e n s e s , i n d u s t r i e s , and m o r a l e ) , and a s s a u l t ( a t t a c k
v i a t h e s e a ) . Of
t h e s e m e a s u r e s , a t t a c k s on s h i p s and s h i p p i n g a l o n g
enemy l i n e s o f communications a r e i n h e r e n t i n a l l o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s ;
i t i s our purpose d u r i n g 1 W 3 t o work toward p o s i t i o n s from which J a p a n

c a n b e a t t a c k e d by l a n d b a s e d a i r ; a s s a u l t on J a p a n i s r e m o t e and may
w e l l n o t be found n e c e s s a r y . A l l i e d o f f e n s i v e measures i n 1913 comprise
c o n t i n u e d and i n t e n s i f i e d a t t a c k s on enemy s h i p s and s h i p p i n g ,
in
the
c u t t i n g o r t h r e a t e n i n g t o c u t enemy l i n e s o f communication between Japan

and Japanese h o l d i n g s , and i n a t t a c k s onenemy s e a , a i r , and ground f o r c e s
by o b l i g i n g them t o f i g h t t o r e t a i n t h e i r h o l d i n g s and t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r
l i n e s of communication.
The scope and i n t e n s i t y o f t h e A l l i e d war e f f o r t i n t h e P a c i f i c
d u r i n g 1913, w h i l e c o n d i t i o n e d on t h e premise t h a t Germany i s t h e p r i n

c i p a l enemy, r e q u i r e s t h a t s u f f i c i e n t means be i n hand s u r e l y t o c o u n t e r
enemy p o t e n t i a l i t i e s ( p a r a g r a p h 1 t o f o l l o w ) a n d , f u r t h e r , must t a k e
care t h a t t h e means i n hand a r e a c t i v e l y employed t o b e s t advantage
The
g e n e r a l c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e A l l i e d e f f o r t i n t h e P a c i f i c i n 19-13 comprise:
(a) Keep J a p a n from f u r t h e r e x p a n s i o n , and f r o m c o n s o l i d a t i n g and
exploiting her current holdings-.
(b) M a i n t a i n t h e v i t a l Midway Hawaii l i n e (key t o t h e P a c i f i c )
(c) S e c u r e t h e 1ineofcommunicationstoAustralia and N e w Zealand
95
U. S. SECRET
(d) Block enemy a p p r o a c h e s t o A u s t r a l i a (1) from t h e Northward
' v i a Elabaul;
( 2 ) from t h e Northwestward v i a t h e Malay b a r r i e r ,
(e) A t t a i n p o s i t i o n s which menace enemy l i n e o f communication

w i t h t h e Dutch E a s t I n d i e s , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , and t h e South
China S e a .
(f) Open t h e l i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a v i a Burma--in

o r d e r t o make u s e o f C h i n e s e g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n
(as to
a t t a c k enemy l i n e o f communication i n Formosa S t r a i t s and

a l o n g t h e c o a s t o f C h i n a , p e r h a p s t o bomb J a p a n )
..
(9) Make r e a d y t o s u p p o r t R u s s i a i n c a s e o f war w i t h J a p a n .

(h) Continue and i n t e n s i f y a t t r i t i o n of enemy s t r e n g t h by l a n d ,
a i r , and s e a ( i n c l u d i n g submarine) a c t i o n ,
4.
Japan's p o t e n t r a l i t z e s f o r o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n d u r i n g 1943 embrace:

( a ) The h:aritime P r o v i n c e s ( E a s t e r n S i b e r i a ) -.Russia.
@) Alaska v i a t h e A l e u t i a n s
(c) The h:idway-Hawaii l i n e - . key t o t h e P a c i f i c

(d) The Hawaii-Samoa- F : i j i - N e w
C a l e d o n i a l i n e , which c o v e r s the
l i n e o f communications t o A u s t r a l i a and N e w Zealand..
(e) A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand-via

theBismark Archipelago and/or
t h e Solomons.
( f ) A u s t r a l i a - - . v i a t h e Malay b a r r i e r
(g) India-.-.via Burma.
(h) China,
(a) i s s t a t i c u n l e s s and u n t i l war t a k e s p l a c e

between Hussia and Japan; (b) h a s p r o v e d , and w i l l c o n t i n u e ,
u n p r o f i t a b l e t o Japan; ( c ) h a s been t r i e d and may b e t r i e d
(i) Of t h e . a b o v e
again b u t i s u n l i k e l y t o succeed;
(d) i s now u n p r o f i t a b l e
e x c e p t v i a t h e G i l b e r t and E l l i c e I s l a n d s toward Samoa ( t h e

Jaluit-Samoa l i n e ) ;
forces;
(e) i s n o w under c o n t e s t by United Nations
( f ) i s u n p r o f i t a b l e e x c e p t t o f o r e s t a l l A l l i e d ad
(g) i s f e a s i b l e e x c e p t t h a t
enemy p o s i t i o n i s a l r e a d y w e l l e x t e n d e d ; (h) same a s (g)-
vance from Northwest A u s t r a l i a ;
profitable chiefly t o f o r e s t a l l Allied action.

5.
A l l i e d s e i z u r e and o c c u p a t i o n , now i n p r o g r e s s , of t h e N e w Cal
edonia-New tiuinea l i n e has f o r o b j e c t i v e s :

(a) S e c u r i t y o f t h e l i n e ofcommunications from U . S. t o A u s t r a l i a
and N e w Zealand;
96
U. S . S E C R E T
(b) B l o c k i n g of enemy a p p r o a c h e s t o E a s t e r n A u s t r a l i a ;
(c) Points d'appui for further action;
6.
( d ) A t t r i t i o n of enemy f o r c e s w h i c h o p p o s e o u r o c c u p a t i o n .
A d d i t i o n a l to t h e o b j e c t i v e s a t t a i n e d by t h e s e i z u r e and occupa
t i o n of t h e New Caledonia-New Guinea l i n e (paragraph E. a b o v e ) , t h e o t h e r

f e a s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s f o r u s appear t o be:
( a ) J a p a n v i a t h e M a r i t i m e P r o v i n c e s ( E a s t e r n S i b e r i a ) noted
o n l y f o r r e c o r d t o o f f s e t 4 ( a ) above.
(b) J a p a n v i a t h e A l e u t i a n s and Xuriles--from
Alaska.
( c ) Advance from Midway t o w a r d s Truk-Guam l i n e v i a Wake a n d

Korthwesterly Marshall I s l a n d s .
(d) Advance on t h e S a m o a - J a l u i t l i n e v i a E l l i c e and G i l b e r t
I sl a n d s .
( e ) Advance from R a b a u l a r e a o n Truk-Guam
(f) D u t c h E a s t I n d i e s v i a \ f a l a y b a r r i e r
line.
( a s Timor).
(9) P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n AKAKIY.
(h)
of
t h e above
(which a r e s e t down t o match t h e i t e m s of para
graph 4 above):
( a ) Is m e r e l y p o t e n t i a l u n l e s s and u n t i l war t a k e s p l a c e
between J a p a n and H u s s i a ;
(b) Is u n p r o f i t a b l e w i t h meam i n s i g h t i n 1943 and i s b e s t
undertaken, if a t a l l , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h ( a ) ;
(c) Is most u s e f u l , n o t o n l y as t o
(I) R e t e n t i o n o f i n i t i a t i v e ;
( 2 ) P a r t i a l c o u n t e r t o enemy p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of p a r a
g r a p h 4 ( c ) ; and, p a r t i c u l a r l y ,
(3) T o draw o f f enemy f o r c e s involved i n h o l d i n g Rabaul
area;
(d~) Is e f f e c t i v e
(1) To f o r e s t a l l enemy p o t e n t i a l i t i e s in p a r a g r a p h 4 (d) ;
(2) To make tie. l i n e of c o m m n i c a t i o n s t o A u s t r a l i a and
Yew Z e a l a n d f u l l y s e c u r e ; and
(3) To draw off enemy f o r c e s involved i n Rabaul a r e a ;
(e) Cannot be done u n t i l a f t e r c o n s o l i d a t i c n of t h e R a b a u l

a r e a upon c o m p l e t i o n of o p e r a t i o n s now i n h a n d - - s e e
p a r a g r a p h 5 above--but
be u n d e r t a k e n ;
s h o u l d , perhaps must, e v e n t u a l l y
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
(f) Useful on l i m i t e d s c a l e
(1) To c o u n t e r e n e m y p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of p a r a g r a p h 4 (f);
(2) T o draw o f f enemyforces elsewhere i n t h e P a c i f i c j
(3) To employ f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e i n A u s t r a l i a [ a f t e r
completion of paragraph 5 ) which would n o t o t h e r
wise be employable;
N.B.
are n o t t o be developed f u l l y , as
t h i s might l e a d t o e x t e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s
of t h e n a t u r e of f r o n t a l a t t a c k s . .
- Attacks
(g) Not e f f e c t i v e b e f o r e November though f o r c e s c o n t r i - .

b u t e d would l i k e l y have t o b e made a v a i l a b l e i n
ANAKIM i s o f s u c h i m p o r t a n c e i n r e
October--but
s p e c t of i t s o b j e c t i v e
( b r i n g i n g C h i n e s e manpower
and g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n t o b e a r on J a p a n e s e f o r c e s
and p o s i t i o n s ) as t o merit t h a t p r i o r i t y which may
be found i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o mount i t .
7.
R e f e r r i n g now t o t h e g e n e r a l c a p a b i l i t i e s of A l l i e d a c t i o n l i s t e d
i n p a r a g r a p h 3 above, s e t o f f a g a i n s t enemy p o t e n t i a l i t i e s i n paragraph

4 above, we i n t e n d , a s t o t h e f e a s i b l e o b j e c t i v e s of paragraph 6 above
a d d i t i o n a l t o t h o s e of paragraph 5 above- t o :
~
( a ) a nd ( b ) Make t h e A i e u t . i a . n as s e c u r e as may be
implement 3 ( a ) . ( g j
N.B.
which w i l l
(h);
- Germany c a n be e x p e c t e d t o i n t e n s i f y p r e s s u r e on Japan
t o a t t a c k R u s s i a i n S i b e r i a (Maritime P r o v i n c e s )
( c ) U n d e r t a k e a d v a n c e f r o m Midway t o w a r d s Truk-Guam
practicable--to
l i n e as
implement 3 ( a ) 7 ( b j . ( e ) , (h) and, p a r t i c u
l a r l y , when 6 (e) i s undertaken;

(d) Undertake advance a l o n g Samoa-Jaluit
l i n e t o implement 3 ( a ) .
( C ) f (h) ;
( e ) R e f r a i n from advance from Rabaul area towards Truk-.Guam l i n e
u n l e s s and u n t i l f o r c e s are i n hand t o e n a b l e i t t o be cap

r i e d through and followed up. Noted t h a t i t implements 3 ( a j
( b ) , (d) il),( e ) , ( h ) ;
( f ) Undertake advance on t h e Malay b a r r i e r (as Timor) on l i m i t e d
s c a l e t o c o u n t e r enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s and d i v e r t h i s f o r c e s
t o implement 3 ( a ) , (d) ( 2 ) , ( e )
(h)
(9) P a r t i c i p a t e i n ANAKIMasmay be found i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o mount

ing i t .
98
U . S . SECRET
C.C.S.
169
J a n u a r y 2 2 , 1943
COMBIKZD CHIEFS O F STAFF
PROPOSED OFCAN12ATIO? OF COVilAbE, C O K T E O L , PLANKING

AKC T T A I N I P t i FOE. OPEFATIOKS F O R A E E E K T F Y T O THE
A C r O S S THE CHANNEL,
CONTIKEE:T
BEGIPFIEG IF 1943
( h o t e by t h e Combined F t a f f s )
1.
S t r a t e g i c B a s i s : The Combined C h i e f s of F t a f f a g r e e t h a t t h e r e
i s no c h a n c e of o u r b e i n g a b l e t o s t 8 g e a l a r g e s c a l e i n v a s i o n of t h e
Continent a g a i n s t unbroken o n p o s i t i o n d u r i n g 1947. T h e i r p o l i c y i s , h o w
ever, t h a t we should:
(a) [ J n d e r t a k e such l i n i i t e d o p e r a t i o n s as may be p r a c t i c a b l e w i t h
t h e f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e and
( b ) Assemble
the strongest Fossible force (subject t o certain
p r i o r commitments i n o t h e r t h e a t e r s ) i n c o n s t a n t r e a d i n e s s
t o r e e n t e r t h e C o n t i n e n t a s s o o n a s German r e s i s t a n c e
is
wemakened t o t h e r e q u i r e d e x t e n t .
2.
The o r g a n i z a t i o n s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e provicge for:

( a ) Small s c a l e amphibious o p e r a t i o n s , s u c h a s t h e p r o g r e s s i v e
r e o c c u p a t i o n of t h e Channel I s l a n d s .
(Note: R a i d s a r e a l r e a d y a d e q u a t e l y t a k e n c a r e of b y
the
e x i s t i n g organization.)
( b ) The need t o r e e n t e r t h e C,ontinent w i t h a l l a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s
a t t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e n o t i c e i n t h e e v e n t of a sudden a d
u n e x p e c t e d c o l l a p s e of German r e s i s t a n c e . T h e aim would b e
t o seize c r i t i c a l p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y c e n t e r s i n Germany
i n t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e time.
t o seize a b r i d g e h e a d l a t e i n 1923, l e a d i n g Up t o
a r a p i d e x p l o i t a t i o n or
(d) An i n v a s i o n i n f o r c e i n 1944.
3.
Need for a D i r e c t i v e : The f i r s t t h i n g t h a t is e s s e n t i a l , what
e v e r o r g a n i z a t i o n i s s e t u p , is a c l e a r d i r e c t i v e from t h e combined
C h i e f s o f S t a f f s e t t i n g o u t t h e o b j e c t s of t h e p l a n s and t h e r e s o u r c e s
l i k e l y t o be a v a i l a b l e . I n t h i s l a t t e r c o n n e c t i o n sane i n e v i t a b l e diffi
c u l t y a r i s e s from t h e f a c t t h a t - - e x c e p t for t h e o p e r a t i o n i n p a r a g r a p h
(c) Operations
99
U . S . SECRET
2 ( a ) - p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e o t h e r p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n s must h e based, not
on any g i v e n s t r e n g t h o f f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e nor on any f i x e d e s t i m a t e of
enemy o p p o s i t i o n t o h e e n c o u n t e r e d , b u t on t h e maximum f o r c e s t h a t a r e
l i k e l y t o b e a v a i l a b l e i n t h e U. K . a t any g i v e n t i m e .
Moreover, i t Is
v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o f i x a d a t e , because t h a t must depend e n t i r e l y on

t h e s t a t e of enemy r e s i s t a n c e on t h e Continent.
A l l p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s must t h e r e f o r e be extremely f l e x i b l e ,
4.
T r a i n i n g : I n o r d e r t h a t t r a i n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e f o r c e s
may n o t b e unduly hampered by t h e maintenance of an u n n e c e s s a r i l y h i g h
s t a t e of r e a d i n e s s , t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f s h o u l d i s s u e i n s t r u c
t i o n s on t h i s p o i n t I n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , t h e d e g r e e of n o t i c e might
b e f i x e d a t t h r e e months. But p l a n n i n g f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n
paragraph 2 (h) above must be on t h e b a s i s of immediate r e e n t r y i n t o the
Continent a t t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e n o t i c e with whatever r e s o u r c e s are
available a t the t i m e
5.
P r i n c i p l e s of Command and P l a n n i n g : I t i s s u g g e s t e d t h a t 2 ( a ) ,
small s c a l e o p e r a t i o n s , such a s t h e Channel I s l a n d s , s h o u l d t h e y b e con

s i d e r e d d e s i r a b l e e i t h e r s e p a r a t e l y or a s p a r t of a l a r g e r o p e r a t i o n ,
could a d e q u a t e l y h e d e a l t w i t h by C ' C . 0
' s o r g a n i z a t i o n on t h e same
l i n e s a s was t h e Dieppe r a i d
6-
As r e g a r d s t h e l a r g e r o p e r a t i o n s i n 2 (b)
( c ) , and (d)
the
g o v e r n i n g p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d h e t h a t t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p l a n n i n g and
t r a i n i n g s h o u l d rest w i t h , o r under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f , t h e Commanders who
w i l l have t o c a r r y o u t t h e p l a n s ? who w i l l b e t h e same Commanders for
a l l three o p e r a t i o n s , These s h o u l d be d e s i g n a t e d a t
7;
once^
Supreme Command: T h i s r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f a Supreme Commander..
I t i s c o n s i d e r e d t h a t when t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n 2 (b) t o (d) become reason

a b l y imminent, a Supreme Commander must be a p p o i n t e d , H e s h o u l d have a
s m a l l combined s t a f f of B r i t i s h and American o f f i c e r s of a l l t h r e e 'serv
i c e s , and under him w i l l be s u b o r d i n a t e commanders, a i r , l a n d and s e a i
c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n j u s t approved f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n
the Mediterranean
I t i s c o n s i d e r e d d e s i r a b l e t h a t t h e Supreme Commander s h o u l d be
appointed a t once
J f t h i s i s n o t f e a s i b l e , h i s Chief o f S t a f f o r Ueputy
and a n u c l e u s of t h e combined s t a f f s h o u l d b e a p p o i n t e d immediately t o

g i v e t h e n e c e s s a r y impetus and c o h e s i o n t o p l a n n i n g .
8.
The p r e s e n t "Round-up" P l a n n i n g S t a f f : For some months a s p e c i a l

100
SECRET
U. S .
inter-Allied
s t a f f drawn from a l l t h r e e s e r v i c e s h a s b e e n i n e x i s t e n c e
working t o g e t h e r i n one b u i l d i n g i n London, s t u d y i n g t h e p r o b l e m and

planning f o r a r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t . I n t h i s way much s p e c i a l i z e d ex
p e r i e n c e h a s b e e n g a i n e d and p l a n n i n g h a s p r o g r e s s e d f a r beyond t h e
staff study stage. In p a r t i c u l a r ,
has been done and measures--such
airfields--actually
9.
a great d e a l of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e work
a s t h e a c q u i s i t i o n and p r e p a r a t i o n of
p u t i n hand.
T h i s s p e c i a l p l a n n i n g st aff s h o u l d b e a d a p t e d t o t h e new condi
t i o n s and s t r e n g t h e n e d by t h e a d d i t i o n o f American p e r s o n n e l . They

should work, under t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e Supreme Commander (or h i s deputy
u n t i l he i s a p p o i n t e d ) , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e n u c l e u s of h i s combined
s t a f f i n London.
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e p l a n n i n g w i l l have t o b e done v e r y l a r g e l y by t h e
normal a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f s i n t h e S e r v i c e D e p a r t m e n t s and i n H . Q .
E.T.O.
U.S.A.
These H e a d q u a r t e r s s h o u l d , however, a p p o i n t r e p r e s e n t a
t i v e s t o form, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e S t a f f i n Norfolk House,

a j o i n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p l a n n i n g s t a f f for t h e r e e n t r y t o t h e C o n t i n e n t .
One o f t h e f i r s t t a s k s o f t h e Supreme Commander (or h i s deputy)
should be t o s i m p l i f y t h e e x i s t i n g system o f i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l adminis
t r a t i v e p l a n n i n g which, a t p r e s e n t , i s unduly cumbersome
101
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S S MOST SECRET
c.c.3.
170
J a n u a r y 22, 1913

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
Note
by t h e S e c r e t a r i e s
I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e d i r e c t i o n s of t h e Combined C h i e f s of
S t a f f a t t h e i r fi5th Meeting ( I t e m 6 ) , a d r a f t r e p o r t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t
and Prime M i n i s t e r of t h e d e c i s i o n s reached subsequent t o t h e submission
of C.C.S.
153/1 i s c i r c u l a t e d h e r e w i t h f o r a p p r o v a l .
V . DYKES,
J . R. DEANE,
ENCLOSURE
DRAFT REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

I n a p r e v i o u s memorandum (C.C.S.
155/1) t h e Combined C h i e f s of
S t a f f p r e s e n t e d t h e i r p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e Conduct o f t h e W a r i n 1313. These

p r o p o s a l s were i n broad o u t l i n e , and we have s u b s e q u e n t l y examined them
and reached c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s o n p o i n t s of d e t a i l . We have a l s o s t u d i e d
a number of m a t t e r s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e s e p r o p o s a l s . The p r e s e n t mem
orandum c o n t a i n s a summary of what has been accomplished.
1.
SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS:

A c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e minimum e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s t o main
t a i n t h e s e a communications of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e d
(C.C.S.
1GO).
I n t h e c o u r s e o f t h i s examination we have l a i d down c e r t a i n
s c a l e s of o c e a n - g o i n g e s c o r t v e s s e l s as t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e . Our
b r o a d c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e r e q u i r e m e n t s of e s c o r t
e s h a l l not
c r a f t w i l l n o t be met u n t i l about August or September 1943. W
be i n a p o s i t i o n t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of submarines a t a r a t e i n
e x c e s s o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n r a t e b e f o r e t h e end of t h e y e a r - If i t i s d e
s i r e d t o p r o v i d e e s c o r t s f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of
i n c r e a s e d l o s s e s must b e h a l a n c e d a g a i n s t t h e importance o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s
102
[I.
S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S F MOST S E C R E T
i n q u e s t i o n . We have adopted t h e f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n s onmeasures neces
s a r y t o i n t e n s i f y the anti-U-boat war. (C.C.S. 6 5 t h Meeting, Item 1)
2.
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA I N RELATION T O OTHER COMMITMENTS:

We have examined t h e e x t e n t of t h e s h i p m e n t s t o R u s s i a r e q u i r e d
t o f u l f i l l United S t a t e s and B r i t i s h o b l i g a t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t 1943 w i t h a

view t o e s t i m a t i n g t h e e f f e c t of t h e s e s h i p m e n t s on o t h e r commitments.
Our c o n c l u s i o n is t h a t , p r o v i d e d a s h i p p i n g l o s s r a t e of n o t more t h a n
2.4% p e r month can be r e l i e d on, i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e t o meet f u l l commit-.
m n t s by t h e end of t h e c a l e n d a r y e a r 1913; and we have approved a p r o

gram of shipments on t h i s b a s i s s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s o t h a t s u p p l i e s t o
R u s s i a s h a l l n o t b e c o n t i n u e d a t p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t t o t,he United N a t i o n s
effort.
An e s s e n t i a l p o i n t i s t h a t an a g r e e d l o s s p a t e f o r l W 3 s h a l l be
e s t a b l i s h e d so t h a t a l l B r i t i s h and American c a l c u l a t i o n s can be made on
the same b a s i s . We have a c c o r d i n g l y d i r e c t e d t h e Combined M i l i t a r y T r a n s - ~ .
p o r t a t i o n Committee t o make an a g r e e d estimate
W
e are a g r e e d t h a t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e n e x t P r o t o c o l w i t h
Russia ( s h o u l d t h i s be n e c e s s a r y j t o c o v e r t h e p e r i o d a f t e r J u l y 1, 1943,
a c l a u s e s h o u l d be i n s e r t e d t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e commitments i n c l u d e d
i n t h e P r o t o c o l may be reduced i f t h e s h i p p i n g l o s s e s
OP
the necessities
of o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s r e n d e r t h e i r f u l f i l l m e n t p r o h i b i t i v e
Meeting,
3.
(C..C , S 6
~3 r d
Item 1, and C . C < S . 162)

OPERATIONS I N THE MEDITERRANEAN:
(a) O p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e C a p t u r e of S i c i l y .
We have c a r e f u l l y examined p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Medi
t e r r a n e a n t h e a t e r and we have r e c o r d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g conclu
sions:
(C-C.S, 6 6 t h Meeting, Item 2 , and C . C S . 161/1)
(1) To
a t t a c k S i c i l y i n 1943 w i t h t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon a s
the target date
(2) To i n s t r u c t G e n e r a l Eisenhower t o r e p o r t n o t l a t e r t h a n
March 1: f i r s t , w h e t h e r any i n s u r m o u n t a b l e d i f f i c u l t y
a s t o r e s o u r c e s and t r a i n i n g w i l l c a u s e t h e d a t e of t h e
a s s a u l t t o b e d e l a y e d beyond t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon;
and, secondly, i n t h a t event t o confirm t h a t t h e d a t e
w i l l n o t b e l a t e r t h a n t h e f a v o r a b l e August moon,
(3) T
hat t h e f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d be t h e Command s e t - . u p f o r t h e
operation :
103
U. S . SECRET
a. G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r t o b e i n Supreme Command w i t h
G e n e r a l Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief,
re
s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n
and f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n when
launched.
h. A d m i r a l Cunningham t o b e Naval Commander, and A i r

C h i e f M a r s h a l T e d d e r t h e A i r Commander
c . Recommendations f o r t h e o f f i c e r s t o b e appointed West

e r n and E a s t e r n T a s k Force Commanders t o b e submitted
i n due c o u r s e by General Eisenhower
(4) T h a t G e n e r a l Eisenhower s h o u l d b e i n s t r u c t e d t o s e t up
f o r t h w i t h , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h General Alexander, a
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f ,
own Chief o f s t a f f ,
with its
f o r p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r i n g t h e opera
t ion
The n e c e s s a r y d i r e c t i v e t o General Eisenhower conveying the
above d e c i s i o n s h a s been d r a f t e d ,
@) Cover P l a n s :
We i n t e n d t o i n s t r u c t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a g e n c i e s i n Washington
and London and t h e Commander-in-Chief,
A l l i e d Expeditionary
Force i n North A f r i c a , t o draw up a comprehensive cover plan
f o r t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n The p o s s i b i l i t y o f c a r r y i n g o u t f e i n t s
o r minor o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e E a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n w i l l be
examined
(c) Command i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n T h e a t e r :
W
e have a g r e e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g Command a r r a n g e m e n t s i n the
Mediterranean:
(C.C.S.
63rd Meeting, I t e m 4 and C.C.S
163)
(1) Sea:
For O p e r a t i o n HUSKY t h e Naval Commander Force X w i l l as
sume t h e t i t l e of Commander-in-Chief,
p r e s e n t Commander-in-Chief,
n a t e d Commander-in-Chief',
M e d i t e r r a n e a n " The
Eediterranean, willbedesig
Levant
The boundary between
t h e two Commands w i l l b e drawn from Z a n t i t o B a r d i a

Commander-in-Chief,
The
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , w i l l , however, be re
s p o n s i b l e f o r n a v a l matters which a f f e c t t h e Mediterranean
as a whole.
104
u. s.
SECPE"7
BRITISH MOST SECRET

( 2 ) Land:
A t a moment t o be d e t e r m i n e d a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army
h a s c r o s s e d t h e T u n i s i a n b o r d e r , G e n e r a l Alexander w i l l
become Deputy Commander-in-Chief
t o G e n e r a l Eisenhower,
t h e 8th Army a t t h e same time b e i n g t r a n s f e r r e d t o General

Eisenhower's command. S u b j e c t t o t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of Gen
e r a l Eisenhower, General Alexander's primary t a s k w i l l
b e t o command t h e e l l i e d f o r c e s on t h e T u n i s i a n f r o n t
w i t h a s m a l l H e a d q u a r t e r s of h i s own p r o v i d e d from t h e
M i d d l e E a s t . A f t e r t,he c o n c l u s i o n of t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s ,
h e w i l l t a k e c h a r g e of O p e r a t i o n HUSKY, The b o u n d a r y
between t h e ? ' o r t h e f r i c a n and Middle E a s t Commands w i l l
b e the Tunisian-Tripolitania
frontier,
(3) A i r :
r e have a g r e e d t h a t A i r Chief L a r s h a l S i r A r t h u r Tedder

s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d A i r Commander-in-Chief
of t h e whole
Hediterranean t h e a t e r w i t h h i s Headquarters at Algiers,.

Under h i m w i l l b e t h e A i r O f f i c e r Commanding i n C h i e f ,
K o r t h w e s t A f r i c a ( G e n e r a l S p a a t z ) , and t h e A i r O f f i c e r
Commanding
C h i e f , Middle E a s t (Air Chief Marshal S i r
i~ii
S h o l t o Douglas)
We h a v e d e f i n e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p and
m u t u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e A i r Commander . i n - C h i e f ,
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , and t h e Commander-in-Chief,
p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e s i n Northwest A f r i c a ,
A l l i e d Ex.
and we have l a i d
down c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e Medi
t e r r a n e a n A i r Comnard s u b j e c t t o any minor changes which
t h e A i r Commander-.-in-Chief may f i n d n e c e s s a r y a f t e r h i s
appointment
( d ) The Bomber O f f e n s i v e f r o m N o r t h A f r i c a :
W
e have l a i d down t h e f o l l o w i n g a s t h e o b j e c t s of t h e bomber
o f f e n s i v e from North A f r i c a i n o r d e r o f time: ( C , C . S - 159/1)
(1) The f u r t h e r a n c e of o p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e e v i c t i o n of a l l
A x i s F o r c e s from A f r i c a .
( 2 ) When (1) h a s been a c h i e v e d , i n f l i c t i o n o f t h e h e a v i e s t
p o s s i b l e l o s s e s o n t h e Axis A i r and Naval Forces i n prep
a r a t i o n f o r HUSKY, i n c l u d i n g bombing r e q u i r e d by c o v e r
plans
(3) The d i r e c t f u r t h e r a n c e o f O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.
105
U . S . SECRET
(4) T h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e o i l r e f i n e r i e s a t P l o e s t i
So f a r a s i s p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e achievement
of o b j e c t s (l), ( 2 ) , and (3) above, hombing o b j e c t i v e s w i l l
he chosen w i t h a view t o weakening t h e I t a l i a n w i l l t o con

t i n u e t h e war
4.
OPERATIONS IN AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM:

(a) T h e O p e r a t i o n of A i r Forces from t h e United Kingdom:
We have agreed t h a t t,he United S t a t e s Heavy Bombardment Units
i n t h e United Kingdom s h a l l o p e r a t e under t h e s t r a t e g i c a l d i
r e c t i o n of t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f o f t h e A i r S t a f f
Under t h i s
g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n t h e United S t a t e s Commanding G e n e r a l w i l l
d e c i d e upon t h e t e c h n i a u e and method t o b e employed
(C.C.S.>
6 5 t h L e e t i n g , Item 2)
he have a g r e e d upon a d i r e c t i v e t o h e i s s u e d t o t h e B r i t i s h
Commander- in-Chief Bomber Command and t o t h e Commanding Gen
e r a l United S t a t e s A i r F o r c e s i n t h e United Kingdom t o govern
t h e bomber o f f e n s i v e from t h e United Kingdom; a copy of this
d i r e c t i v e i s a t Annex *A'
(C.G.S.
166/1/3)
@ ) BOLERO
(c) Amphibious O p e r a t i o n s i n 1943 from t h e United Kingdom:
C.S, 167 and 169 and C.C.S.
(C
68th M e e t i n g , I t e m 2)
W
e have examined t h e problem o f amphibious o p e r a t i o n s from
t h e United Kingdom i n 1943 There a r e t h r e e t y p e s of o p e r a . .
t i o n f o r which p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s must now h e made:
(1) Raids w i t h t h e primary o b j e c t of provoking an a i r b a t t l e
and c a u s i n g enemy l o s s e s
(2) O p e r a t i o n s w i t h t h e o b j e c t o f s e i z i n g a n d h o l d i n g a
b r i d g e h e a d a n d , i f t h e s t a t e of German m o r a l e and t h e
s t r e n g t h o f h e r resources permit. o f e x p l o i t i n g successes
(3) A r e t i i r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f German
disintegration
P l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r (1) above w i l l proceed a s a t pfes
enc
An a t t a c k on t h e Channel I s l a n d s i s an example ofthet
t y p e of o p e r a t i o n which we have i n mind

W
e p r o p o s e t o p r e p a r e f o r an o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e Cotentin
P e n i n s u l a w i t h r e s o u r c e s which w i l l h e a v a i l a b l e , t h e t a r g e t
d a t e b e i n g s e t a t August 1, 1943. T h i s o p e r a t i o n c o m e s u n d e r
106
U. S .
SECRET
B R I T I S R MOST S E C R E T
t y p e ( 2 ) above.
'l'e have a g r e e d t o e s t a b l i s h f o r t h w i t h a Combined S t a f f under
a B r i t i s h C h i e f o f S t a f f u n t i l s u c h t i m e as a Supreme Com
mander i s a p p o i n t e d . A d i r e c t i v e t o g o v e r n t h e p l a n n i n g i s
i n c o u r s e of p r e p a r a t i o n . !Ye i n t e n d t o i n c l u d e i n t h i s d i - .
reCtiVe p r o v i s i o n f o r a r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t under
(3)
above w i t h t h e f o r c e s which w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e purpose

i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom month by month. The d i r e c t i v e w i l l
a l s o make p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e p l a n n i n g of a n i n v a s i o n of t h e
C o n t i n e n t i n f o r c e i n 1941
5.
PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER:

(a) O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c T h e a t e r :
(C.C.!;
168 and C C S
6 7 t h Meeting, Item 1)
The f o l l o w i n g i s a n o u t l i n e of t h e o p e r a t i o n s which i t i s
i n t e n d e d t o c a r r y out i n t h e P a c i f i c i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e
p r o v i s i o n s of our p r e v i o u s r e p o r t (C C S
15.5/1):
(1) O p e r a t i o n s t o make t h e A l e u t i a n s as s e c u r e as may b e

(2) An advance from Midway towards Truk Guam a s p r a c t i c a b l e
and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n s now
i n hand f o r t h e c a p t u r e of Rabaul
(3) An advance a l o n g t h e l i n e Samoa~J a l u i t
(4) An advance on t h e Malay B a r r i e r ( a s Timor) on a l i m i t e d
s c a l e t o c o u n t e r enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d d i v e r t h i s f o r c e s
( 5 ) I t i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o advance from t h e Rabaul a r e a t o
wards t h e Truk-Guam l i n e u n l e s s and u n t i l f o r c e s are i n

hand t o e n a b l e t h e advance t o b e c a r r i e d t h r o u g h and f o l
lowed up.
( b ) Reconquest of Burma:
We have approved November 15, 1913, a s t h e p r o v i s i o n a l d a t e

f o r t h e ANAKIM a s s a u l t . I t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y t o d e c i d e i n
J u l y 1943 whether t o u n d e r t a k e or t o postpone t h e o p e r a t i o n ,
(C.C.S.
6 5 t h il4eeting, Item 1)
We have p r e p a r e d a p r o v i s i o n a l s c h e d u l e of t h e f o r c e s r e q u i r e d
f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n and have i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
t h e i r provision
The l a n d and s e a f o r c e s c a n b e p r o v i d e d . The
p r o v i s i o n of n a v a l f o r c e s - a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g , l a n d i n g c r a f t
and s h i p p i n g c a n n o t be g u a r a n t e e d s o f a r i n advance and must
107
S SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
U
depend upon t h e s i t u a t i o n e x i s t i n g i n t h e l a t e summer of

1943. (C.C.S.
6.
164)
THE AXIS O I L POSITIOh:
We have had l a i d b e f o r e us c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n from B r i t i s h

s o u r c e s on t h e Axis o i l p o s i t i o n (C.C.S. 1 5 8 ) . I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t addi
t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n Washington may modify t h e c o n c l u s i o n s
which have been drawn by t h e B r i t i s h . W
e have a c c o r d i n g l y d i r e c t e d the
Combined I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee t o submit as e a r l y as p o s s i b l e an agreed
a s s e s s m e n t of t h e A x i s o i l s i t u a t i o n b a s e d on t h e l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n
a v a i l a b l e from both B r i t i s h and United S t a t e s sources. I n t h e meanwhile,

w e have t a k e n n o t e t h a t t h e A x i s o i l s i t u a t i o n i s so r e s t r i c t e d t h a t i t
i s d e c i d e d l y advantageous t h a t bombing a t t a c k s on t h e s o u r c e s o f Axis
o i l , nemely, t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s and o i l t r a f f i c v i a t h e Danube, and
t h e s y n t h e t i c and producer gas p l a n t s i n Germany, be undertaken a s soon
a s o t h e r commitments a l l o w ( C . C . S . 62nd D'eeting, Item 1).

7.
NAVAL AND AIR COMMAND I N WEST AFRICA:
We have agreed upon t h e f o l l o w i n g n a v a l and a i r arrangements t o
c o v e r t h e F r e n c h West A f r i c a n C o a s t (C.C.S.
(a) T h a t t h e H e s t A f r i c a n C o a s t
61st M e e t i n g , I t e m 3 ) :
( o f f s h o r e ) from Cape Bojador
( R i o d ' 0 r o ) southward s h a l l b e an a r e a under command of a

B r i t i s h haval O f f i c e r f o r n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s and of a B r i t i s h
A i r O f f i c e r f o r a i r o p e r a t i o n s i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h naval
forces
(b) T h a t s u b j e c t t o (a) a s u b - a r e a e x t e n d i n g from Cape Bojador

t o t h e western boundary of S i e r r a Leone and a l l f o r c e s oper
a t i n g t h e r e i n s h a l l be under French Command.
(c) T h a t i n t h e French sub-area t h e i n t e n t i o n w i l l be t o enable
F r e n c h air u n i t s t o t a k e over a i r d u t i e s a s r a p i d l y as equip
ment and t r a i n i n g permit
8..
TURKEY:
W
e have agreed upon t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e measures n e c e s s a r y t o give
e f f e c t t o t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t a l l m a t t e r s connected with Turkey s h o u l d be
handled by t h e B r i t i s h (C.C.S.
63rd Meeting,
108
Item 2 ) .
U. S. SECQET
B R l T I S Y NOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 23, 1943
17011
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

:lemorandum by t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f
155/1) t h e Combined C h i e f s Of
S t a f f p r e s e n t e d t h e i r p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e Conduct o f t h e War in 1 9 1 3 .
These p r o p o s a l s were i n b r o a d o u t l i n e and w e have s u b s e q u e n t l y examined
them and r e a c h e d c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s on p o i n t s of d e t a i l . We have a l s o
s t u d i e d a number o f m a t t e r s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e s e p r o p o s a l s .
The
p r e s e n t memorandum c o n t a i n s a s m m a r y of what has been accomplished.

1.

A c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e mihimum e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s t o main
t a i n t h e s e a communication5 o f t h p U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e d
(C.C.S.
1 6 0 ) . I n t h e c o u r s e of t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n we have l a i d down c e r
t a i n s c a l e \ of ocean-going e s c o r t v e s s e l s as t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e . Our

Lroad c o n c l u s i o n is t h a t t h e m i n i m u m a c c e p t a b l e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f e s c o r t
c r a f t w i l l n o t b e met u n t i l a b o u t uugust o r September 1943. We ought n o t
t o c o u n t on t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of s u b m a r i n e s a t a r a t e i n e x c e s s of t h e
p r o d u c t i o n r a t e b e f o r e t h e end o f t h e y e a r . I f i t i s d e s i r e d t o p r o v i d e
e s c o r t s f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of i n c r e a s e d l o s s e s
must be b a l a n c e d a g a i n s t t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n .
We have a d o p t e d c e r t a i n r e s o l u t i o n s on measures n e c e s s a r y t o i n t e n s i f y
t h e a n t i U-boat war (C.C.S.

2.
6 5 t h U e e t i n g , Item 1).
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA I N iU3LATION T O OTHER COMHIT%3NTS:

We have examined t h e e x t e n t o f t h e shigments t o R u s s i a r e q u i r e d

view t o e s t i m a t i n g t h e e f f e c t of t h e s e s h i p m e n t s on o t h e r commitments.
Our c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t , provirled a s h i p p i n g l o s s r a t e o f n o t more t h a n
2.4 p e r c e n t p e r month can be r e l i e d on, i t w i l l b e p o s s i b l e t o meet f u l l

c o m i t m e n t s by t h e end of t h e c a l e n d a r y e a r 1943, and w e have approved a
prograi:] of s h i p m e n t s on t h i s b a s i s s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s o t h a t s u p p l i e s
t o R u s s i a s h a l l n o t be c o n t i n u e d a t p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t t o t h e U n i t e d
iqations e f f o r t .
A n e s s e n t i a l p o i n t i s t h a t a n a g r e e d l o s s r a t e f o r 1943 s h a l l be
S . SECRET
[I.
e s t a b l i s h e d s o t h a t a l l B r i t i s h and American c a l c u l a t i o n s c a n be made on

t h e same b a s i s . We have a c c o r d i n g l y d i r e c t e d t h e Combined V i l i t a r y Trans
p o r t a t i o n Committee t o m a k e an a g r e e d e s t i m a t e .
We are a g r e e d t h a t i n the p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e n e x t P r o t o c o l w i t h
R u s s i a ( s h o u l d t h i s be n e c e s s a r y ) t o c o v e r t h e p e r i o d a f t e r J u l y 1, 1913,
a c l a u s e s h o u l d be i n s e r t e d t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e commitments included
i n t h e P r o t o c o l may be reduced i f the s h i p p i n g l o s s e s or t h e n e c e s s i t i e s
of other operations render t h e i r fulfilment p r o h i b i t i v e
(C C.S.
63rd
M e e t i n g , I t e m 1, and C.C.S. 1 6 2 ) .
3.
OPERATIONS I N THE MEDITERRANEAN:
(a) O p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e Capture of S i c i l y :
We have c a r e f u l l y examined p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Medi
t e r r a n e a n theater and we have r e c o r d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g conclu
sions:
(C.C.9
66th Meeting, I t e m 2 , and C.C.S.
161/1")
(1) To a t t a c k S i c i l y i n 1313 w i t h t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon a s

the t a r g e t date
(2) To i n s t r u c t G e n e r a l Eisenhower t o r e p o r t n o t l a t e r than
March 1st: f i r s t l y , whether any i n s u r m o u n t a b l e d i f f i c u l t y
a s t o r e s o u r c e s and t r a i n i n g w i l l c a u s e t h e d a t e of the
a s 5 a u l t t o b e d e l a y e d beyond t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon;
and, s e c o n d l y , i n t h a t event t o confirm t h a t the date
w i l l n o t be l a t e r t h a n t h e f a v o r a b l e August moon
(3) That t h e f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d be t h e Command s e t - u p for the
operation:
a. General Eisenhower t o be i n Supreme Command
w i t h Gen
e r a l Alexander as Deputy Commander- i n - C h i e f , respon

s i b l e f o r t h e d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n and
for t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e a c t u a l operationwhenlaunched.
b _ . A d m i r a l Cunningham t o b e Naval Commander, a n d A i r
C h i e f M a r s h a l T e d d e r t h e A i r Commander.
c_. Recommendations f o r t h e o f f i c e r s t o b e a p p o i n t e d West
e r n and E a s t e r n Task Force Commanders t o b e submitted
i n due c o u r s e by General Eisenhower.
(1) That G e n e r a l Eisenhower s h o u l d b e i n s t r u c t e d t o s e t up
f o r t h w i t h , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h G e n e r a l Alexander, a
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f , w i t h i t s
own C h i e f of S t a f f , f o r p l a n n i n g a n d p r e p a r i n g t h e
operat ion
110
U . S. S E C R E T
The n e c e s s a r y d i r e c t i v e t o General Eisenhower conveying t h e above

d e c i s i o n s has been d r a f t e d .
(b) C o v e r P l a n s :
V:e i n t e n d t o i n s t r u c t the a p p r o p r i a t e a g e n c i e s i n V a s h i n g t m
Allied Expeditionary
F o r c e i n Korth A f r i c a , t o draw up a comprettensive cover p l a n
f o r t h e ilediterrctnean. The p o s s i b i l i t y of c a r r y i n g o u t f e i n t s
o r minor o p e r a t i o n s i n tkie E a s t e r n V e d i t e r r a n e a n w i l l b e
examined.
(c) C
ommand i n t h e h i e d i t e r r a n e a r l T h e a t e r :
We have a g r e e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g Command a r r a n g e m e n t s i n t h e
Mediterranean:
(C.C.?.
63-d V e e t i n g , I t e m
A,
arid C.C.S.
163)
(1) Sea:

F o r o p e r a t i o n W > K Y t h e ? a v a l Cor!tmander F o r c e X w i l l
assume t h e t i t l p of Commarider-in-Cliief,
The p r e s e n t Commarider-in-Cliief,
Fediterranean.
Xediterranean, w i l l be
d e s i g n a t e d C . ~ , , a r i d e r - i n - C t , i e f , Levant.. The b o u n d a r y
b e t w e e n t h e two Commands w i l l b e drawn from Z a n t i t o
E a r d i a . The Commader-in-Chief,
V e d i t e r r a n e a n , w i l l , how
e v e r , b e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r n a v a l ~m a t t e r s which a f f e c t t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n as a whole.
(2) L a n d :
A t a moment t o b e d e t e r m i n e d a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army
h a s c r o s s e d t h e T u n i s i a n b o r d e r , General Alexander w i l l
become Ceputy Commander-in-Chief
t o General Eisenhower,
t h e 8 t h A r m y a t t h e same t i m e b e i n g t r a n s f e r r e d t o Gen
e r a l Eisenhowers command
S u b j e c t t o t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of
General Eisenhower, General Alexanders primary t a s k
w i l l b e t o command t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s on t h e T u n i s i a n
f r o n t w i t h a small H e a d q u a r t e r s of h i s own p r o v i d e d from
t h e Middle E a s t and a f t e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e s e o p e r
a t i o n s t o t a k e c h a r g e of O p e r a t i o n HI!SKY.
The boundary
between t h e F o r t h A f r i c a n and H i d d l e E a s t Commands

b e the Tunisian-Tripolitania
W i l l
frontier.
(3) A i r :
l;e have a g r e e d t h a t A i r Chief Marshal S i r Arthur Tedder

s h a l l b e avT-ointed A i r Commander-in-Chief
111
o f t h e whole
U . S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST ' S E C R E T
Mediterranean theater with h i s headquarters a t Algiers.

Under him w i l l b e t h e A i r O f f i c e r Commanding i n C h i e f ,
Northwest A f r i c a
( G e n e r a l S p a a t z ) , and t h e A i r O f f i c e r
Cornanding i n C h i e f , Middle E a s t (Air C h i e f Marshal S i r

Sholto Douglas). W
e have d e f i n e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p and
m u t u a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f t h e A i r Commander-in-Chief,
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , and t h e Commander-in-Chief
A l l i e d Expe
d i t i o n a r y F o r c e s i n Korthwest A f r i c a , and we have l a i d

down c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n A i r Command s u b j e c t t o any minor changes
which t h e A i r Commander-in-Chief
may f i n d n e c e s s a r y after
h i s appointment.
( d ) T h e Bomber O f f e n s i v e f r o m K o r t h A f r i c a :
We have l a i d down the f o l l o w i n g as t h e o b j e c t s o f t h e b o d e r
o f f e n s i v e from North a f r i c a i n o r d e r of time (C.C.S.
159/1):
( 1 ) The

f u r t h e r a n c e o f o p e r a t i o n s f o r t h e e v i c t i o n of a l l
A x i s F o r c e s from A f r i c a .
( 2 ) When ( I ) h a s been a c h i e v e d , i n f l i c t i o n of t h e h e a v i e s t
p o s s i b l e l o s s e s on t h e A x i s A i r a n d Kaval f o r c e s i n
p r e p a r a t i o n for HUSKY, i n c l u d i n g bombing r e q u i r e d by
c over plans.
(3) The d i r e c t f u r t h e r a n c e of O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.

(4) T h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e o i l r e f i n e r i e s a t P l o e s t i .
S o far a s i s p o s s i b l e without p r e j u d i c e t o t h e achieve
m e n t o f o b j e c t s (I), (2) a n l (3) above, bombing o b j e c t i v e s
w i l l b e chosen w i t h a view t o weakening t h e I t a l i a n w i l l

t o c o n t i n u e t h e war.
4.
O P E W I C N S I N AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM:

( a ) The O p e r a t i o n o f A i r F o r c e s from t h e U n i t e d Kingdom:
W
e have a g r e e d t h a t t h e h i t e d S t a t e s Heavy Bombardment U n i t s
i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom s h a l l o p e r a t e u n d e r t h e s t r a t e g i c a l
d i r e c t i o n o f t h e , B r i t i s h C h i e f of t h e Air S t a f f . Under t h i s
g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Commanding General w i l l
d e c i d e upon t h e t e c h n i q u e and method t o he e w l o y e d (C.C.S.
6 5 t h Meeting, Item 2 ) .
We have agreed upon a d i r e c t i v e (C.C.S.
t o t h e B r i t i s h Commander-in-Chief
112
166/1/0) t o be i s s u e d
Bomber Command and t o t h e
U. S . S E C R E T
Commanding G e n e r a l U n i t e d S t a t e s A i r F o r c e s i n t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom.
(b) BOLERO:
(C.C.S.
172 and C.C.S.
6 8 t h M e e t i n g , I t e m 1.)
A s t u d y h a s b e e n made of t h e s h i p p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r BOLERO
b u i l d - u p i n 1M3.
With t h e d a t a a v a i l a b l e a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e and making a number
of a s s u m p t i o n s w h i c h a r e s e t o u t i n f u l l i n C.C-S. 1 7 2 ,
E n c l o s u r e "C", we c a l c u l a t e t h a t t h e U. S . f o r c e s as shown
i n t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e w i l l be a v a i l a b l e f o r C o n t i n e n t a l
o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e U . K on t h e d a t e s shown. The f i g u r e s g i v e n
i n t h e l a s t column i n c l u d e t h e b u i l d - u p o f t h e a i r c o n t i n g e n t
t o 172,000.
T o t a l Numbers
Division
Equipped
384,000
September 15
509,000
October 15
634,000
November 15
12
759,000
December 31
15
938,000
By August 15
T h i s i s b a s e d on (1) t h e f i g u r e s of 50,000 t r o o p s p e r d i v i
sion w i t h supporting troops;
( 2 ) 45 d a y s a l l o w a n c e between
s a i l i n g d a t e and a v a i l a b i l i t y d a t e .
A s t h e movement p r o c e e d s t h e o v e r - a l l number o f men
per
d i v i s i o n w i l l d e c r e a s e and by t h e end of t h e y e a r i t may b e

down t o 1 0 , 0 0 0 , i n which c a s e t h e number of d i v i s i o n s a v a i l
a b l e on December 31st may be 19 i n s t e a d of 15.. The number of
d i v i s i o n s e a r l i e r i n t h e y e a r is u n l i k e l y t o b e i n c r e a s e d .
(c) Amphibious O p e r a t i o n s i n 1943 from t h e U n i t e d Kingdom:
(C.C.S.
167 and C.C,.S. 6 8 t h Meeting, I t e m 2 )
We have examined t h e problem of amphibious o p e r a t i o n s from

t h e U n i t e d Kingdom i n 1943. There are t h r e e t y p e s of o p e r a
t i o n f o r which p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s must now b e made:
(1) R a i d s w i t h t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t of p r o v o k i n g a i r b a t t l e s
(2) O p e r a t i o n s w i t h t h e o b j e c t o f s e i z i n g a n d h o l d i n g a
b r i d g e h e a d a n d , i f t h e s t a t e o f German m o r a l e and r e
s o u r c e s p e r m i t , of e x p l o i t i n g s u c c e s s e s .
113
U " S. SECRET
(3) A r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of German
disintegration.
P l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r
(1) above w i l l p r o c e e d a s a t
p r e s e n t . An a t t a c k on t h e Channel I s l a n d s i s an example
of t h e t y p e o f o p e r a t i o n which w e have i n mind,
W
e propose t o p r e p a r e f o r an o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t the
C o t e n t i n P e n i n s n l a w i t h r e s o u r c e s which w i l l be a v a i l
a b l e , t h e t a r g e t d a t e b e i n g set a t August 1, 1943- This
o p e r a t i o n comes under t y p e (2) aboveWe have a g r e e d t o e s t a b l i s h f o r t h w i t h a Combined S t a f f
under a R r i t i s h Chief of S t , a f f u n t i l such t i m e a s a

Supreme Commander i s a p p o i n t e d . A d i r e c t i v e t o g o v e r n the
p l a n n i n g i s i n c o u r s e of p r e p a r a t i o n . W
e i n t e n d t o in
clude i n t h i s d i r e c t i v e provision for a r e t u r n t o the
C o n t i n e n t under (3) above w i t h t h e f o r c e s which w i l l be
a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e purpose i n t h e United Kingdom month by
month. The d i r e c t i . v e w i l l a l s o make p r o v i s i o n f o r t h e
p l a n n i n g o f a n i n v a s i o n o f t h e C o n t i n e n t i n f o r c e i n 1944"
5.
PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER:

(a) O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c T h e a t e r :
(C.C.S. 1C8 and C.C.S. G7th Meeting, I t e m 1.)
The f o l l o w i n g i s a n o u t l i n e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s which i t is
i n t e n d e d t o c a r r y o u t i n t,he P a c i f i c i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e
p r d v i s i o n s o f our p r e v i o u s r e p o r t (C.C.S.
155/1),:
(1) O p e r a t i o n s t.o make t h e A l e u t i a n s a s s e c u r e as may b e .

(2) An advance from llidway towards Truk- Guam as p r a c t i c a b l e
and p a r l . i c u l a r l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n s now
i n hand f o r t h e c a p t , u r e o f nabaul..
(3) A n advance a l o n g t,he l i n e S a m o a - J a l u i t

(4) An ad~vance on t h e hfalay E a r r i e r ( a s Timor) on a l i m i t e d
s c a l e t o c o u n t e r enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d d i v e r t h i s
forces,
(5) I t i s n o t i n t e n d e d t o advance from t h e Rabaul a r e a t o
wards t h e Truk-Gum l i n e u n l e s s and u n t i l f o r c e s a r e i n
hand t o e n a b l e t h e a d v a n c e t o b e c a r r i e d t h r o u g h and
f o l l o w e d up.
114
U. S. SECRET
(b) Xeconquest o f Burma:
We have approved November 1 5 , 1943, as t h e p r o v i s i o n a l d a t e
f o r t h e ANAKIM
assault^
I t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y t o d e c i d e i n
J u l y 1943 w h e t h e r t o u n d e r t a k e o r p o s t p o n e t h e o p e r a t i o n
fi5th Ueeting, Item 4 ) .
Be have p r e p a r e d a p r o v i s i o n a l s c h e d u l e of t h e f o r c e s r e
(C.C.S.
q u i r e d f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n and have i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
o f t h e i r p r o v i s i o n . T h e l a n d and a i r f o r c e s c a n be
pro
v i d e d . The p r o v i s i o n o f n a v a l f o r c e s , a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g ,
l a n d i n g c r a f t and s h i p p i n g c a n n o t be g u a r a n t e e d s o far i n
advance and must depend upon t h e s i t u a t i o n e x i s t i n g i n t h e
l a t e summer of 1943 ( C . C . S .
6
164).
THE AXIS OIL POSITION:

Me' have l a i d b e f o r e u s c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n from B r i t i s h s o u r c e s
on t h e A x i s o i l p o s i t i o n (C.C.S.
158). I t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t a d d i t i o n a l
i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n Washington niay modify t h e c o n c l u s i o n s which

have been drawn by t h e B r i t i s h :
Xe have accordingly d i r e c t e d the Combined
I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee t o submit a s e a r l y a s p o s s i b l e an agreed assess.

ment of t h e A x i s o i l s i t u a t i o n based on t h e l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e
from b o t h B r i t i s h and U n i t e d S t a t e s s o u r c e s . , I n t h e meanwhile, we have
taken n o t e t h a t t h e A x i s o i l s i t u a t i o n i s so r e s t r i c t e d t h a t i t i s d e c i d , .
edly advantageous t h a t bombing a t t a c k s on t h e s o u r c e s o f A x i s o i l , namely,
t h e Xumanian o i l f i e l d s and o i l t r a f f i c v i a t h e Danube, and t h e s y n t h e t i c
and producer gas p l a n t s i n G e r m a n y , be u n d e r t a k e n a s soon a s o t h e r commit
ments allow (C,,C.S. 62nd Meeting, Item 1)

7,
NAVAL AND A I R COMMAND I N WEST AFRICA:
~
We have a g r e e d upon t h e f o l l o w i n g n a v a l and a i r arrangements t o

cover t h e F r e n c h West A f r i c a n Coast (C ,C.S. 61st Meeting, Item 3) :
(a) T h a t t h e West A f r i c a n C o a s t ( o f f s h o r e ) from Cape B o j a d o r

( H i 0 d'Oro)
s o u t h w a r d s h a l l b e a n a r e a under command o f a
B r i t i s h Naval O f f i c e r f o r n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s and of a B r i t i s h
A i r Officer f o r a i r operations i n cooperation with naval

forces.
(b) ,That s u b j e c t t o (1) a s u h . . a r e a e x t e n d i n g from Cape B o j a r d o r
t o t h e w e s t e r n boundary o f S i e r r a Leoneand a l l f o r c e s o p e r .
a t i n g t h e r e i n s h a l l be under French Command.
(c) That i n t h e [ b e n c h sub - a r e a t h e i n t e n t i o n w i l l be
115
t o enable
11 S S E C R E T
brench a i r u n i t s t o t a k e over a i r d u t i e s a s r a p i d l y a s equip

ment and t r a i n i n g permit
8
TURKEY:
W
e have agreed upon t h e administrative measures n e c e s s a P y t o g i v e
e f f e c t t o the d e c i s i o n t h a t a l l matters connected w i t h Turkey should be

handled by the B r i t i s h ( C C S
63rd Meeting
116
Item 2 j
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 23, 1 9 4 3
17O/Z

SYMBOL
b'inal I i e p o r t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and Prime M i n i s t e r
Summarizing D e c i s i o n s by t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
155/1)
t h e Combined C h i e f s o f
S t a f f p r e s e n t e d t h e i r p r o p o s a l s f o r t h e Conduct of t h e War i n 1943..

These p r o p o s a l s were i n b r o a d o u t l i n e , and w e have s u b s e q u e n t l y examined
them and r e a c h e d c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s on p o i n t s of d e t a i l - \lie have a l s o
s t u d i e d a number of m a t t e r s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e s e p r o p o s a l s
The p r e s
ent memorandum c o n t a i n s a summary of what has been accomplished

1

A c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e minimum e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s t o main
t a i n t h e sea c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s h a s b e e n c o m p l e t e d
(C.C.S.
160)
I n t h e c o u r s e of t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n we have l a i d down c e r
t a i n s c a l e s of ocean-going e s c o r t v e s s e l s a s t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e
Our
broad c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t t h e minimum a c c e p t a b l e r e q u i r e m e n t s of e s c o r t
c r a f t w i l l n o t b e m e t u n t i l about August or September 1943 W e ought n o t
t o count on t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f U - b o a t s a t a r a t e i n e x c e s s o f t h e p r o
If i t is desired t o provide
e s c o r t s f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of i n c r e a s e d l o s s e s
d u c t i o n r a t e b e f o r e t h e end of t h e y e a r
must be b a l a n c e d a g a i n s t t h e importance of t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n
W
e have adopted c e r t a i n r e s o l u t i b n s on measures n e c e s s a r y t o i n t e n s i f y
the a n t i - U - b o a t war.
2"
(C.C.S.
6 5 t h hfeeting, Item 1 )
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA I N RELATION TO OTHER COMMITMENTS:

We have examined t h e e x t e n t of t h e sliipments t o R u s s i a r e q u i r e d

view t o e s t i m a t i n g t h e e f f e c t o f t h e s e s h i p m e n t s on o t h e r commitments
Our c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t , p r o v i d e d a s h i p p i n g l o s s r a t e of n o t more t h a n
2,4 p e r c e n t p e r month can b e r e l i e d on, i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e t o meet f u l l
commitments by t h e end of t h e c a l e n d a r y e a r 1943, and we have approved a
program o f shipments on t h i s b a s i s s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s o t h a t s u p p l i e s
t o R u s s i a s h a l l n o t b e c o n t i n u e d a t p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t t o t h e United Na
tions effort
An e s s e n t i a l p o i n t i s t h a t an agreed l o s s r a t e for 1943 s h a l l b e
117
SECRET
S R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
U
e s t a h l i s h e d so t h a t a l l B r i t i s h and American c a l c u l a t i o n s can be made on

Vie have a c c o r d i n g l y d i r e c t e d t h e Combined M i l i t a r y
t h e same b a s i s
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Committee t o make an a g r e e d e s t i m a t , e
We a r e agreed t h a t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e n e x t P r o t o c o l w i t h
Russia
(should this be necessary) t o cover t h e period a f t e r J u i y 1 ,
1943. a c l a u s e s h o u l d b e i n s e r t e d t o t h e e f f e c t t,hat t h e commitment,s in

c l u d e d i h t h e P r o t o c o l may he reduced i f t h e s h i p p i n g 7 o s s e ; o r t h e ne-
c e s s i t i e s of o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s r e n d e r t h e i r f u l f i l m e n t p r o h i b i t i v e .
( C C - S
3
6 3 r d H e e t i n g , I t e m 1 , and C C . S .
162,)
OPERATIONS Ih- THE ME1)ITERRANEAN:

( a j O p e r a t i o n s For The C a p t u r e o f S i c i l y :
We have c a r e f u l l y examined p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Illedi..
t e r r a r i e a n t h e a t e r and we have r e c o r d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g con-..
clusions
(C C S
6 6 t h Meet,ing., I t e m 2, and C C . . S 161/1)2
( 1 ) To a t t a c k S i c i l y i n 1943 w i t h t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon
as t h e t a r g e t d a t e
( 2 ) To i n s t r u c t . General Eisenhower t o r e p o r t not l a t e r t h a n
March 1st. f i r s t l y , w h e t h e r a n y insurmountab7.e d i f f i ~ .
c u l t y a s t o r e s o u r c e s and t r a i n i n g w i l l c a u s e t h e d a t e
o f t h e a s s a u l t t o b e d e l a y e d beyond t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y
moon, a n d , s e c o n d l y
i n t h a t event t o confirm t h a t the
d a t e w i l l n o t be l a t e r than t h e f a v o r a b l e August moon
( 3 ) T h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d b e t h e Command s e t u p f o r t h e
operation:
General Eisenhower t o he i n Supreme Command w i t h Gen-.

e r a 1 Alexander a s Deputy Commander-in--Chief, charged
w i t h t h e d e t a i l e d p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n and w i t h
t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n when launched
h A d m i r a l Cunningham t o h e Naval Commander,, and A i r
C h i e f V a r s h a l T e d d e r t h e A i r Commander
C-
We have a g r e e d t h a t w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c i n g t h e J u l y d a t e f o r t h e o p e r a
t i o n , a n j n t e n s e e f f o r t w i l l h e made d u r i n g t h e n e x t t h r e e weeks t o
a c h i e v e by c o n t r i v a n c e and i n g e n u i t y t h e f a v o r a b l e J m e moon p e r i o d as
t h e d a t e f o r the operation
I f a t t h e end o f t h e t h r e e weeks o u r e f
f o r t s have proved s u c c e s s f u l , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o G e n e r a l Eisenhower
w i l l he modified a c c o r d i n g l y
118
c . Recommendations

f o r t h e o f f i c e r s t o b e a p p o i n t e d West
e r n and E a s t e r n Task Force Commanders t o be s u b m i t t e d
i n due c o u r s e by General Eisenhower.
(4) T h a t G e n e r a l Eisenhower s h o u l d h e i n s t r u c t e d t o s e t up
f o r t h w i t h , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h General A l e x a n d e r , a
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f , w i t h i t s
own Chief o f S t a f f , f o r p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r i n g t h e oper
ation.
The n e c e s s a r y d i r e c t i v e t o General Eisenhower conveying t h e
above d e c i s i o n s has been d r a f t e d .
(b) Cover P l a n s :
W
e i n t e n d t o i n s t r u c t , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a g r n c i e s i n Washington
Allied Expeditionary
Force i n North A f r i c a , t o draw np a comprehensive c o v e r p l a n
f o r t h e Y e d i t e r r a n e a n . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f c a r r y i n g o u t
f e i n t s o r minor o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e E a s t e r n !:fediterranean w i l l
h e examined.
( c ) Command i n t h e Mediterranean T h e a t e r :
We have a g r e e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g Command a r r a n g e m e n t s i n t h e
63rd f l e e t i n g , Item 1 and C.C.S.
\ f e d i t e r r a n e a r l : (C.C.S.
163).
(1) Sea:

F o r o p e r a t , i o n HUSKY t h e N a v a l Commander F o r c e X w i l l
assume t h e t i t l e of Commander-in-Chief,
The p r e s e n t Commander-i+Chief,
d e s i g n a t e d Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean.
Xediterranean, w i l l be
Levant. T h e boundary be
tween t h e two Commands w i l l b e d e t e r m i n e d l a t e r . The

Commander-in-Chief,
Wediterranean, w i l l
however, b e r e
s p o n s i b l e f o r n a v a l m a t t e r s which a f f e c t t h e W e d i t e r
ranean a s a whole.
(2) Land:
A t a moment t o h e d e t e r m i n e d a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army
h a s c r o s s e d t h e T u n i s i a n b o r d e r , General Alexander w i l l
become Deputy Commander-in-Chief
t o General E i s e n h o w e r ,
t h e 8 t h Army a t t h e same t i m e b e i n g t r a n s f e r r e d t o Gen

e r a l Eisenhower's command. S u b j e c t t o t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of
General Eisenhower, General Alexander's primary t a s k
w i l l b e t o command t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s on t h e T u n i s i a n
119
U S, S E C R E T
BRITISH <MlrOST SECRET
f r o n t w i t h a s m a l l Headquarters of h i s own provided from
t h e ?.fiddle E a s t and a f t , e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e s e opera-.
t i o n s t o t a k e c h a r g e of O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
The boundary
between t h e North A f r i c a n and Middle E a s t Commands w i l l

be t h e T u n i s i a n - T r i p o l i t , a n i a f r o n t i e r
(3) A i r :
We h u e a g r e e d t h a t . A i r . Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
s h a l l be a p p o i n t e d A i r Commander-in- Chief 0.f t h e whole

Mediterranean t h e a t e r w i t h h i s Headquarters a t A l g i e r s ~
Under h i m w i l l be t h e A i r O f f i c e r Commanding i n C h i e f ,
Northwest A f r i c a
(Gene]-a1 S p a a t z )
Commanding i n C h i e f
S h o l t o Douglas)
and t h e A i r O f f i c e r
Middle E a s t , ( A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r
W e have d e f i n e d t h e r e l a C i o n s h i p and
mutual r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e A i r Commander i n . C h i e f ,
Mediterranean
and t h e Commander- i n - Chief All.ied Expedi
t i o n a r y F o r c e s i n N o r t h w e s t A f r i c a . and we have l a i d
down c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e o r g w i z a r . l o n of t h e %fed-
i t , e r r a n e a n A i r Command sllbjec.t, t o any m i n o r c h a n g e s
w h i c h t h e A i r Commander i n C h J e f m a y f i n d n e c . e s s a r y
a f t e r his a p p o i n i m e n t
jd) The Bomber Offensive from Nort,h A f r i c a .
We have l a i d down 1.he f o l l o w i n g as t,he o b j e c t s o f t h e bomber
o f f e n s i v e from North A f r l c a i n o r d e r of t i m e (C C S
159,'l):
(lj The f u r t , h e r a n L e of operaT,ions f o r t h e e , < i r l , i o n of' a l l

A x i s Fort-es from A f r i c a
( 2 j \\'hen (1) ht>.s been a c h i e v e d , , i n f l i c t i o n of t h e h e a v i e s t
p o s s i b : l e l o s s e s on t h e A x i s A i r a n d Naval f o r ~ c e si n
p r e p a r a t , i o n f o r HUSKY., i n c l u d i n g bombing r e q u i r e d h y
cover p l a n s
( 3 ) The d i r e c t . f u r t h e r a n c e o f O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
(4) The d e s r , r u c i , i o n o f t h e o i l r e f i n e r i e s a t P l o e s i i
S o f a r a s i s p o s s i b l e without, p r e j u d i c e t o t h e achievement
of 0 b j e e t . s (1)
( 2 ) . and (3j above, bombing o b j e c t i v e s w i l l b e
chosen w i t . h a view t o weakening t h e I t a l i a n w i l l t.0 c o n t i n u e

t h e war
120
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH .YOST SEC7ET
4.
OPERATIONS I N AND FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM:

(a) The O p e r a t i o n of A i r Forces from the United Kingdom:
We h a v e a g r e e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Heavy Bombardment
U n i t s i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom s h a l l o p e r a t e under t h e s t r a
t e g i c a l d i r e c t i o n of t h e B r i t i s h Chief of t h e A i r S t a f f . Un
d e r t h i s g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n t h e United S t a t e s Commanding Cen
e r a 1 w i l l d e c i d e upon t h e technique and methcd t o be employ
ed.
(C.C.S.
6 5 t h Veeting, Item 2.)
We have a g r e e d u p m a d i r e c t i v e (C.C.S. 166/l/D) t o be i s

sued t o t h e B r i t i s h Commander-in-Chief Bomber Command and t o
t h e Commanding General United S t a t e s A i r F o r c e s i n t h e United
Kingdom.
@) BOLERO:
(C.C.S.
172 and C.C.S.
I t e m 1)
6 8 t h I'eeting,
A s t u d y has been madeof
t h e s h i p p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s forBOIERO
b u i l d - u p i n 1913.
V i t h t h e d a t e a v a i l a b l e a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e and making a num
b e r o f assumptions which are s e t o u t i n f u l l i n C.C.S.
Enclosure 'C",
172,
we c a l c u l a t e t h a t t h e U. S . Forces a s s h o w n i n
t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e w i l l be a v a i l a b l e f o r C o n t i n e n t a l opera
t i o n s i n t h e U . I<. on t h e d a t e s shown. The f i g u r e s g i v e n i n
t h e l a s t column i n c l u d e t h e b u i l d - u p of t h e a i r c o n t i n g e n t
t o 1 7 2 , 0 0 0 . They may be r e g a r d e d a s t h e minimum, and e v e r y
e f f o r t w i l l be made t o i n c r e a s e t h e number of t r a i n e d and
equipped d i v i s i o n s i n t h e United Kingdom by August 1 5 t h .
Division
T o t a l Numbers
Equipped
By August 15
384,000
By September 15
509,000
By October 15
634,000
12
759,000
By November 15
By December 31
15
938,000
T h i s i s based on (1) t h e f i g u r e s o f 50,000 t r o o p s p e r d i v i s
ion w i t h supporting troops;
(2) 45 d a y s a l l o w a n c e between
s a i l i n g d a t e and a v a i l a b i l i t y d a t e .
A s t h e movement proceeds t h e o v e r - a l l number ofmen per d i v i

s i o n w i l l d e c r e a s e a n d b y t h e e n d o f t h e y e a r i t may he
121
6' S. SECRET
down t o 40,000 i n w h i c h c a s e t h e number o f d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e
on December 31st may be 19 i n s t e a d o f 1 5 .
The number of d i v i
s i o n s e a r l i e r i n t h e y e a r i s u n l i k e l y t o be i n c r e a s e d
( c ) Amphibious O p e r a t i o n s i n 19.13 from t h e United Kingdom:
(C.C.S.
167 and 169 and C . C . S
6 8 t h Meeting, Item 2 . )
Ve have examined t h e problem o f amphibious o p e r a t i o n s from

t h e United Kingdom i n 1043
There are t h r e e t y p e s of opera
t i o n f o r which p l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s must now be made:

(1) R a i d s w i t h t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t of p r o v o k i n g a i r b a t t l e s
(2) O
p e r a t i o n s w i t h t h e o b j e c t of s e i z i n g a n d h o l d i n g a
b r i d g e h e a d a n d , i f t h e s t a t e of German m o r a l e and r e
s o u r c e s p e r m i t , of v i g o r o u s l y e x p l o i t i n g s u c c e s s e s I
r3) A r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of German
disintegration
P l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r (1) above w i l l proceed as a t p r e s
ent
An a t t a c k on t h e Channel I s l a n d s i s an example of t h e
t y p e of o p e r a t i o n which we have i n mind

We propose t o p r e p a r e f o r an o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C o t e n t i n
P e n i n s u l a w j t h r e s o u r c e s which w i l l be a v a i l a b l e , t h e t a r g e t
d a t e b e i n g set at, August 1: 1943
t y p e (2) above
We have a g r e e d
t.0
T h i s o p e r a t i o n comes under
e s t a b l i s h f o r t h w i t h a Combined S t a f f under
a B r i t i s h C h i e f of S t a f f u n t i l s u c h t i m e as a B r i t i s h Su
preme Commander, w i t h an American Deputy Commander, j~sap.-.

pointed
A d i r e c t . i v e t o g o v e r n t h e p l a n n i n g i s i n c o u r s e of
preparat,ion
We i n t e n d t o i n c l u d e i n t h i s d i r e c t i v e p r o v i -
s i o n f o r a retur-n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t under
(3) above w i t h t h e
f o r c e s which w i l l be a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e purpose i n t h e United

Kingdom month by m0nr.h
9
PACIFiC AND FAR EAST THEATER:
(a, O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c T h e a t e r :
( C . C S . 1 6 8 and C C S~ 6 7 t h M e e t i n g , I t e m 1 j
T h e f o l l o w i n g i s an o u t l i n e of t h e o p e r a t i o n s which it i s
intended t o c a r r y out i n t h e P a c i f i c i n conformity with the,
p r o v i s i o n s of our p r e v i o u s r e p o r t (C C S 155/1):
(1) Operat,ions to make t h e A l e u t i a n s as s e c u r e as may be
122
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
(2) An advance from Midway towards Truk-Guam as practicable

and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n conjunction w i t h t h e o p e r a t i o n s now
i n hand for the capture of Xabaul.
(3) An advance along the l i n e Samoa-Jaluit.
(4) An advance on t h e Malay B a r r i e r (as Timor) on a l i m i t e d
s c a l e t o c o u n t e r enemy c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d d i v e r t h i s forces.
(5) I t is n o t intended to advance from t h e Rabaul a r e a to
wards the Truk-Guam l i n e u n l e s s and u n t i l f o r c e s a r e i n

hand t o e n a b l e t h e advance t o be c a r r i e d through and
followed up.
(b) Support of China:

(1) Immediate Operations:
Subsequent to t h e o p e r a t i o n s now i n p r o g r e s s which a r e
aimed a t t h e c a p t u r e o f Akyab, a l i m i t e d advance from
A s s a m w i l l be c a r r i e d out to gain bridgeheads for f u r t h e r

o p e r a t i o n s ; t o improve t h e a i r t r a n s p o r t r o u t e t o China
by enabling a i r c r a f t to f l y a t lower a l t i t u d e s ; and, if
Chinese c o o p e r a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e , t o g a i n ground f o r
a d d i t i o n a l a i r f i e l d s a n d t o e x t e n d t h e a i r w a r n i n g system.
(2) Operations I n China:

I n o r d e r t o support t h e Chinese war e f f o r t , t o provide
means for i n t e n s i f y i n g a t t a c k s on Japanese shipping, and
t o s t r i k e a t Japan h e r s e l f when o p p o r t u n i t y o f f e r s , i t
i s intended to improve a i r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n t o C h i n a by
supplying a d d i t i o n a l transport a i r c r a f t , and t o b u i l d up
t h e U. S . A i r Forces now operating i n C h i n a t o the maxi
mum e x t e n t t h a t l o g i s t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s and o t h e r impor

t a n t c l a i m s w i l l p e r m i t # We hope t h a t more s u s t a i n e d
o p e r a t i o n s with i n c r e a s e d A i r F o r c e s may b e g i n i n t h e
s p r i n g , and we regard t h i s development a s of g r e a t i m
p o r t a n c e i n t h e general scheme.
(3) Reconquest of Burma and Reopening of The Burma Road:

We have approvedNovember 15, 1943, a s the p r o v i s i o n a l
d a t e f o r t h e ANAKIM a s s a u l t . It w i l l be necessary t o de
c i d e i n J u l y 1943 whether t o undertake o r t o postpone
t h e o p e r a t i o n (C,C.S.
6 5 t h Meeting, Item 4 ) .
We have prepared a p r o v i s i o n a l schedule of t h e f o r c e s
123
S SECRET
r e q u i r e d f o r t h e o p e ? a t i o n and have i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r p r o v i s i o n
The l a n d and a i r f o r c e s
c a n h e p r o v i d e d . The p r o v i s i o n of n a v a l f o r c e s , a s s a u l t
s h i p p i n g , l a n d i n g c r a f t and s h i p p i n g cannot h e guarantesed
s o f a r i n advance and must depend upon t h e s i t u a t i o n ex

i s t i r i g i n the l a t e swmer of 1913 (C.C.S.
6-,
164).
TIIE AXIS O I L POSITIOK:
W
e h a v e had l a i d b e f o r e u s c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n from B r i t i s h
s o u r c e s on t h e Axis o i l p o s i t i o n
(C.C.S.
1 5 8 ) . I t is b e l i e v e d t h a t addi
t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n F a s h i n g t o n may modify t h e c o n c l u s i o n s
which have b e e n drawn by t h e B r i t i s h , We have a c c o r d i n g l y d i r e c t e d t h e
Combined I r i t e l l i g e r i c e Committee t o submit as e a r l y as p o s s i b l e an agreed
a s s e s s m e n t of t h e Axis o i l s i t u a t i o n b a s e d on t,he l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n
a v a i l a b l e from b o t h E r i t i s h arid 1:niterl r t a t e s s o u r c e s ; I n t h e meanwhile,
we have t a k e n n o t e t h a t t h e Axis o i l s i t . i i a t , i o n i s s o r e s t r i c t e d t h a t i t
i s d e c i d e d l y a d v a n t a g e o u s t h a t bombing a t t a c k s on t h e s o u r c e s o f Axis
o i l , namely, t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s and o i l t r a f f i c v i a t h e Danube, and
t h e s y r i t h e t , i c and producer g a s p l a n t s i n Cermany, he u n d e r t a k e n a s soon
a s o t h e r commitments a l l o w
YAVBL AIW A I R C
( C . C ~ F . 62nd V e e t i n g ,
I t e m 1)
Ph'O IN 1WST A F P I C A :
We have agreed upon t h e f o l l o w i n g n a v a l and a i r arrangements t o

c o v e r t h e French Hest A f r i c a n Coast (C*C.S- 6 1 s t 'rleeting, Item 3 ) :
( a ) T h a t t h e V$est A f r i c a n C o a s t ( o f f s h o r e ) from Cape B o j a d o r
(Ria d ' 0 r o )
s o u t h w a r d s h a l l h e an a r e a u n d e r command o f a
B r i t i s h Kaval O f f i c e r f o r n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s and of a B r i t i s h
A i r Officer f o r a i r o p e r a t i o n s i n cooperation with naval
force's
@ ) T h a t s u b j e c t t o ( a ) a sub a r e a e x t e n d i n g from Cape E o j a d o r
t o the w e s t e r n boundary of S i e r r a Leone and a l l f o r c e s oper.

a t i n g t h e r e i n s h a l l be under French Command
( c ) That i n t h e French sub.-area t h e i n t e n t i o n w i l l b e t o e n a b l e
French a i r u n i t s t o t a k e o v e r a i r d u t i e s as r a p i d l y as e q u i p
ment and t r a i n i n g p e r m i t
8
TLTIKEY:
We have agreed upon t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e measures n e c e s s a r y t o give
e f f e c t t o t h e d e c i s i o n t h a t a l l m a t t e r s c o n n e c t e d w i t h Turkey s h o u l d h e
handled b y t h e B r i t i s h (C.C.S.
6 3 r d Meeting, Item 2)"
124
U. S. S E C R E T
B t I T I S H M O S T SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 22, 1943
171
DIRECTIVE
OPEPATIOh HlJSKY
E n c l o s e d i s a d r a f t d i r e c t i v e t o G e n e r a l Eisenhower r e g a r d i n g
O p e r a t i o n HtSKY which is s u b m i t t e d t o t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f for
approval
\7.
DYKES,
, J . R . DEANE,
Combined S , e c r e t a r i a t
LliC1,CST:rE
T h e Combined Chiefs o f S t a f f have r e s o l v e d t h a t a n a t t a c k a g a i n s t
S i c i l y w i l l b e lsunched in 1943.
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f have f u r t h e r a g r e e 3 t h a t t h e follow
i n g command s e t - u p s h a l l be e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n :
( a ) You a r e t o b e t h e Supreme Commander w i t h General Alexander
a s Deputy Commander-in-Chief,
responsible for the detailed
p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n and f o r t h e e x e c u t i o n of the a c t u a l

o p e r a t i o n when launched.
( b ) Admiral of t k F l e e t Cunningham is to be t h e Naval Commander
and A i r Chief harshal Tedder t h e A i r Commander.
You w i l l submit t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f your recommenda
t i o n s f o r t h e O f f i c e r s t o b e a p p o i n t e d h e s t e r n and E a s t e r n Task F o r c e
Commanders
I n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h General Alexander you w i l l s e t up a t once a
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f , w i t h i t s own C h i e f of
Staff,
f o r p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n .
The p r o v i s i o n o f t h e n e c e s s a r y f o r c e s and t h e i r t r a i n i n g i n time
f o r t h e a s s a u l t on the t a r g e t d a t e g i v e n above have been t h e s u b j e c t of

e x h a u s t i v e s t u d y b y t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f and t h e i r S t a f f s , A
Memorandum s e t t i n g out t h e v a r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and t h e o u t l i n e p l a n
125
IT'. S . SECRET
for t h e o p e r a t i o n which formed t h e b a s i s of t h i s s t u d y , i s a t t a c h e d for

your i n f o r m a t i o n (C.C.S. 161/1). Case A ( v i d e C.C.S. 161/1, Enclosure
" A , " p a r a g r a p h 5 ) was a c c e p t e d by t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f for t h e
p r o v i s i o n of t h e B r i t i s h Ground F o r c e s . The d e t a i l s of t h e a d d i t i o n a l
forces which w i l l be made a v a i l a b l e t o y o u for t h e o p e r a t i o n w i l l be com
municated s e p a r a t e l y by t h e United S t a t e s and B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f .
A copy of t h e Minutes of t h e 66th Meeting of t h e Combined Chiefs
of S t a f f h e l d a t Casablanca on J a n u a r y 2 2 , 1943, which l e d t o t h e above
d e c i s i o n s , i s a t t a c h e d for your i n f o r m a t i o n .
You are t o r e p o r t t o them n o t l a t e r t h a n March l s t , whether any
i n s u r m o u n t a b l e d i f f i c u l t y as t o r e s o u r c e s and t r a i n i n g w i l l c a u s e t h e
d a t e of t h e a s s a u l t t o be delayed beyond t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon. I n the
e v e n t of t h e r e b e i n g such a d e l a y you w i l l confirm t h a t t h e a s s a u l t d a t e
w i l l n o t be later t h a n t h e f a v o r a b l e August moon.
U. S . SECRET
S R I T I S H MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
J a n u a r y 23, 1943
171/2/~1

OPERATION HUSKY
D I R E C T I V E TO COMMANIER I N CHIEF,
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FOHCE I N NORTH AFKICA
(Approved b y Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f a t t h e i r 6 9 t h Meeting)
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f have r e s o l v e d t h a t a n a t t a c k against

S i c i l y w i l l b e l a u n c h e d i n 194.3, w i t h t h e t a r g e t d a t e as t h e p e r i o d of
t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon (Code d e s i g n a t i o n HUSKY).
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f have f u r t h e r a g r e e d t h a t t h e fol-.
lowing command s e t u p s h a l l be e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n :
(a) You a r e t o be tile Supreme Commander w i t h G e n e r a l Alexander
a s Deputy Commander i n C h i e f , charged w i t h t h e d e t a i l e d p l a n
n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n a n d w i t h t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e a c t u a l
o p e r a t i o n when l a u n c h e d ,
(b) Admiral of t h e 1 , l e e t Cunninghahi i s t o h e t h e Naval Commander
and A i r Chief hlarshal Tedder t h e A i r Commander.
You w i l l submit to t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f your recommenda
t i o n s f o r t h e O f f i c e r s t o he appointed Western and Eastern Task fiorce
Commanders
I n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h S e n e r a l Alexander you w i l l s e t up a t once
a s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f , w i t h i t s own Chief o f
S t a f f , f o r p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g cover p l a n s
The p r o v i s i o n of t h e n e c e s s a r y f o r c e s and t h e i r t r a i n i n g i n time
The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f have a g r e e d t h a t w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c i n g t h e

J u l y d a t e for t h e o p e r a t i o n , a n i n t e n s e e f f o r t w i l l be made d u r i n g t h e
n e x t t h r e e weeks t o a c h i e v e by c o n t r i v a n c e and i n g e n u i t y t h e f a v o r a b l e
J u n e moon p e r i o d a s t h e d a t e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n , I f a t t h e end of t h e
t h r e e weeks t h e i r e f f o r t s have p r o v e d s u c c e s s f u l , y o u r i n s t r u c t i o n s
w i l l be m o d i f i e d a c c o r d i n g l y
NOTE: T h i s paper i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h C ~ C . S ,171/1/D
e x c e p t f o r a d d i t i o n o f above f o o t n o t e .
127
d a t e d J a n u a r y 23, 1943,
U,. S . SECRET
f o r the a s s a u l t on the t a r g e t d a t e given above have been t h e s u b j e c t of

e x h a u s t i v e s t u d y by t h e Combined Chiefs of S t a f f and t h e i r s t a f f s . A
Memorandum s e t t i n g out t h e v a r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and t h e o u t l i n e p l a n
for t h e operation which formed t h e b a s i s of t h i s study i s attached f o r
your information (C.C.S. 161/1). Case A (vide C.C.S. 161/1, Enclosure
"A," paragraph 5 ) was accepted by t h e Combined Chiefs of S t a f f f o r t h e
p r o v i s i o n of t h e B r i t i s h Ground Forces. The d e t a i l s of t h e a d d i t i o n a l
f o r c e s which w i l l be made a v a i l a b l e t o you f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n w i l l be
conmunicated s e p a r a t e l y b y t h e United S t a t e s and B r i t i s h Chiefs of S t a f f .
A copy of t h e Minutes of the 66th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs
of S t a f f held a t Casablanca on January 22, 1943, which l e d t o t h e above
d e c i s i o n s , is attached f o r your information.
You a r e t o r e p o r t t o them not l a t e r than March 1st whether any

insurmountable d i f f i c u l t y a s t o r e s o u r c e s and t r a i n i n g w i l l cause the
date of t h e a s s a u l t t o be delayed beyond the favorable J u l y moon. In the
event of t h e r e being such a delay you w i l l confirm t h a t the a s s a u l t date
w i l l not be l a t e r than the favorable August moon.
The code designation t o be communicated t o you l a t e r w i l l apply

t o a l l general preparations f o r HUSKY i n the Mediterranean Theater, i n
cluding t r a i n i n g , cover plans and preliminary a i r o p e r a t i o n s . Specific
openations w i l l be given s p e c i a l code designations.
128
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S. 172
J a n u a r y 22, 1943

SHIPPING CAPABILITIES FOR BOLERO BUILD-UP
Note by L i e u t e n a n t General B. B. Somervell
1.
The a t t a c h e d t a b l e s ( E n c l o s u r e s "A" and "B")
show t h e p o s s i b i l i
t i e s w i t h e x i s t i n g and p r e s e n t l y p r o j e c t e d s h i p p i n g of moving t r o o p s and

equipment from t h e U. S . t o t h e U . K. E s t i m a t e s of c a p a b i l i t y of B r i t i s h
s h i p p i n g have b e e n p r e p a r e d on t h e b a s i s o f s h i p s a i l i n g s p r o v i d e d by
the !,!inistry o f War T r a n s p o r t ; e s t i m a t e s on American s h i p p i n g have been
p r e p a r e d by t h e Commanding General, S e r v i c e s o f S u p p l y , United S t a t e s
Army. The assumptions on which t h e s e t a b l e s have been p r e p a r e d a r e shown

In Enclosure "C".
2.
There seems l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y i n t h e f i r s t h a l f of t h e y e a r t o
improve t h e s i t u a t i o n . By c o r i v e r s i o n , i n c r e a s i n g t h e c a p a c i t y of t r o o p
s h i p s and o t h e r c o m b i n a t i o n s t h e r e d o e s seem t o b e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
some i n c r e a s e i n t h e l a t t e r h a l f o f t h e y e a r . T h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s re
s t r i c t e d i n t h e winter months by t h e l i m i t a t i o n s on U.. X, p o r t and r a i l
way c a p a c i t i e s under b l a c k o u t c o n d i t i o n s .
ConCinuing s t u d y w i l l b e g i v e n t o s e c u r i n g s u c h i n c r e a s e s a s may
3.
be p o s s i b l e
4.
I n terms o f d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e f o r C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s , t h e
U. S . F o r c e s i n t h e U. K. over and above t h e b u i l d - u p of
t h e a i r contin
gent t o 172,000 are a s f o l l o w s :

T o t a l Numbers
Division
By Aug. 15
S e p t , 15
O c t . 15
Nov. 15
Dec. 31
Equipped
384 000
7
9
12
15
509,000
634,000
759,000
938,000
T h i s i s b a s e d on (1) t h e f i g u r e of 50,000 t r o o p s p e r d i v i s i o n
with supportjng troops;
( 2 ) 45 days a l l o w a n c e between s a i l i n g d a t e and
availability date.
129
!sKumFs "A"
U. S . SECRET
SHIPPING CAPABILITIES ON BOLERO BUILD-UP
Present or &route
Dec.
31, 1942
I-
Grand T o t a l
1st Q
2d Q
3d Q
4th Q
1943
by 12/31/43
C a p a b i l i t y of U. S. Cargo Ships
80,000 116.000 369.000
491.000
1,056,000
C a p a b i l i t y of U. K. Cargo Ships
53,000
15,000
63.000
131,000
169,000 384,000
554,000
1.187,000
80,000
Total C a p a b i l i t y o f Cargo Shipping
::
T o t a l for
Q u a r t e r l y Increments during '43
C a p a b i l i t y o f U. S . Troop Ships
103.000
105.000
235,000
299,000
742,000
C a p a b i l i t y of U. K. Troop Ships
40,000
105,000
140.000
60,000
345,000
375,000
359,000
1,087.000
359,000'
Total C a p a b i l i t y of Personnel Shipping
143,000 210.000
Rate of h i l d - u p i n U. K.
Cunulated S t r e n g t h i n U
K.
135,000
80.000
169,000
375,000
215,000
384.000
759,000 1,118,000
I t i s estimated by B r i t i s h M i n i s t r y of War Transport

t h a t t h e above f i g u r e s m u l d i n v o l v e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 150
BOLERO cargo s h i p s p e r month i n t h e l a s t q u a r t e r o f t h e
y e a r . P r o v i d e d U. S. dock l a b o r and l o c o m o t i v e s a r e
forthcoming a s s t i p u l a t e d , t h i s r a t e i s p o s s i b l e d u r i n g
t h e summer b u t n o t d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r months.
983,000
1,118,000
SECRET
R R I T I S H MOST SECRET
S
ENCLOSURE
PROJECTED U
TROOP MOVEMENTS IN 1943
Present or
Elroute
Total for
Grand Total by
Dec. 31, 1943
2nd Q
3rd (2
4th 0
1943
224,000
48,700
3 0 . son
24,500
7,S O 0
111.200
335,200
31 000
7,500
7 500
15 000
3 0 ,o m
6 1 , oon
216,000
58,000
116,0Cfl*
184.000
400,no0
Bases
454 000
4 on0
4,000
4,000
17,400
471 400
135.000
80,000
16Q,OOO
375.000
359.000
983,000
1,118,on0
208,200
327 no0
418.500
371,900
'heater
S.
and S.W. Pacific
ma
?'"
Africa and Husky
Dec. 31, 1943
1st
0
F
K
Totals
1,060,000
5,400
One division (16,000 troops) c m b a t loaded from U. S
1,32S1500
2,385,600
U., S I SECRET
B R I T I S K MOST SECRET
ENCLOSURE " C "
ASSUMPTIONS FOR CALCULATIONS OF
U. S . SHIPPING CAPABILITIES
UNDER PLAN ADOPTED BY C , C . S , FOR 1943
1,.
Loss r a t e i n d r y c a r g o s h i p s t a k e n a t 2 . 6 $ p e r month.,
2,
U. S . c o n t r o l l e d d r y cargo s h i p p i n g t a k e n at. 9,185,000 DWT on
October 1, 1942.
3,
B r i t i s h c o n t r o l l e d dry cargo shipping t a k e n a t 19,700,000 DIVT on
October 1, 1942.
4.
U. S. c o n s t r u c t i o n program for 1343 a s reported i n Anfa No, 339,
i - e . , 15,440,000 DWT of dry cargo s h i p s , o f which 357,000 UiVT w i l l be
converted t o t a n k e r s . C o n s t r u c t i o n i s e s t i m a t e d to proceed a t t h e following r a t e :
Nov. 15 Program
Jan. 1 6 Program
Increase
1st Q t r .
2nd Qtr-
.1,2s5,000
3 519,000
254,000
3,222,000
4,106,000
aw,ooo
3rd Qtr..
2,214,000
3,745,000
531,000
4th Qtr,
3 ,1~1,000
3,717,000
526,000
T o t a l i ) r y Cargo
12,802,000
5.
2,19.5,000
118,ooo
:J ,475,000
357,000
16,(;i0,000
18,562,000
2,552,000
Tankers
Total
i~.o87,000
:{,
B r i t i s h and Canadian c o n s t r u c t i o n programs as furnished by b l u n i
t i o n s Assignments Board.
6.
Excess o f B r i t i s h l o s s e s over c o n s t r u c t i o n i n U. K
and Canada
r e p l a c e d from U . S. c o n s t r u c t i o n . T h i s w i l l permit t h e reestablishment

of t h e B r i t i s h Import Program a t a l e v e l c o n s i d e r e d a s meeting t h e i r
minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s .
7,
No E C Z ' s converted to t r a n s p o r t s through 1943.
8.
Five cargo s h i p s converted t o combat l o a d e r s by Navy each month,
November t o A p r i l , i n c l u s i v e . ,
9.
S h i p p i n g employed on a n average turn--around o f 2 1/23 months,
10.
11.
Repair r a t e taken at 12-1/2$
12.
Maintenance based on 1.3 s h i p t o n s per man per month e x c e p t for
of t o t a l d r y cargo fleet..
I n i t i a l movement based on 8 s h i p tons per manc
U . K. where i t i s reduced to 1.0 s h i p tons per man per month.,

132
IT.
S . SECRET
13.
Navy employment o f d r y c a r g o tonnage i n 4 t h Q u a r t e r of 1942
averages 1,160,000 DWT a n d i s i n c r e a s e d by 300,000 DWT e a c h q u a r t e r of
1943 as assumed in J.P.S. 57/3.
14.
The t r a n s f e r o f v e s s e l s between oceans t o meet t h e a t e r r e q u i r e
ments.
15.
U . S. shipping f o r w a r economy and defense a i d t a k e n a t 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
tons supplemented by 170 v o y a g e s i n i t u s s i a n a i d accordingtoC.C.S.
162/1.
L i f t r a t i o between North A t l a n t i c andSouth and Southwest P a c i f i c

16.
taken a t 1.4 t o 1.
17. B r i t i s h a i d reckoned a s follows:
1st 2
SHIPPING
Personnel ( l i f t )
40,000
Cargo (1000 shpg tons)
2nd
(4
3rd Q
4th 3
TOTAL
105,000
140,000
60,000
345,000
500
no0
800
1,600
ivOTES:
( a ) The f i g u r e s a r e based on a very r a p i d e s t i m a t e and must, o f
c o u r s e , be s u b j e c t t o check a f t e r d e t a i l e d examination
(b) The a s s i s t a n c e shown i s dependent on t h e f o l l o w i n g assump.
tions:
(1) That no s h i p p i n g can be taken from t h e U. K.
Import P r o
gram.
(2) That

TORCH build-up c e a s e s with D l S l l a n d t h a t t h e r e a f t e r
t h e B r i t i s h s h i p p i n g r e l e a s e d ,from TORCH can be employed
on BOLERO a s s i s t a n c e e x c e p t f o r t h e demands of IIUSKY and
ANAKIM.
(3) That t h e K i n i s t r y o f W a r Transport a r e a b l e t o c o n t i n u e t o
provide shipping t o cover a l l o t h e r m i l i t a r y requirements
on t h e a g r e e d minimum l e v e l w i t h o u t e n c r o a c h i n g on t h e
TORCH p o o l o
(4) That i t i s p o s s i b l e t o f i n d e s c o r t s f o r t h e convoy p r o .
gram i n v o l v e d ,
18.
Idovements t o U . S. b a s e s w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d to 17,400 t o I r a n . .
19.
ktequirements f o r HUSKY as decided i n C,C.S.
20.
Any e x c e s s movements t o S o u t h and Southwest P a c i f i c and Burma
161/1 ( P l a n A)
j,
over 141,200 t o be by Navy tonnage

21.
U. S. movements t o North A f r i c a t o c e a s e when t o t a l o f 400,000 i s
reached. One d i v i s i o n (16,000 troops) t o b e combat loaded from t h e United

States.
22.
E s c o r t s a r e not l i m i t i n g f a c t o r .
133
C A S A B L A N C A
JANUARY
C O N F E R E N C E
19113
MINUTES O F ANFA MEETINGS

( P r e s i d e d Over By The P r e s i d e n t And The Prime M i n i s t e r )
PAGE
ANFA
1st Meeting
A R F A 2nd Meeting
A N F A 3 r d Meeting
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
139
I112
I59
U. S . SECRET
ANFA 1st kleeting
MINUTES of Meeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp,

on F r i d a y , J a n u a r y 15, 1943, a t 1730.
PRESENT
The R t . Hon. Winston S. C h u r c h i l l
[Prime h ! i n i s t e r and M i n i s t e r of
Defense)
The P r e s i d e n t
General G.
C. Marshall
Admiral E . J . King
L t . G e n e r a l D. D. Eisenhower
Admiral o f t h e F l e e t S i r Uudley
Pound
F i e l d Marshal S i r J o h n D i l l
hlr. H a r r y Hopkins
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F . Brooke
L t . Colonel E l l i o t R o o s e v e l t
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r C. P o r t a l
L t . G e n e r a l H. H . Arnold
L t . F r a n k l i n D.
Roosevelt, Jr.,
USNFI
G e n e r a l t h e Hon. S i r Harold
Alexander
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r A r t h u r
Tedder
Vice-Admiral t h e Lord L o u i s
Mountbatten
Lt., General S i r H a s t i n g s L . Ismay
SECRETARIAT
Brig
G e n e r a l J. R e Deane
B r i g a d i e r E,, I.. C. J a c o b
134
U. S . S E C R E T
THE SITUATION I N NORTH AFRICA
GEWERAL EISENHOWER gave a review of t h e s i t u a t i o n on h i s f r o n t .
He e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s which landed i n French Vorth A f r i c a
were e q u i p p e d t o c a u t u r e t h r e e p o r t s . They were n o t a mobile army and
had l i t t l e s t r e n g t h f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s arrangement had been
necessary s i n c e t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e French was an u n k m w q u a n t i t y . Gen
e r a l Anderson had advanced w i t h great boldness and r a p i d i t y t a k i n g e v e r y
k i n d of r i s k i n an a t t e m p t t o g e t i n t o T u n i s and R i z e r t e i n t h e f i r s t
r u s h , H e had f i n a l l y been s t o p p e d by d i v e bombing when he g o t i n t o t h e
open c o u n t r y n e a r Tunis, and by wet weather which hampered movement o f f
t h e r o a d s . E v e r y e f f o r t had t h e n b e e n made t o r e i n f o r c e t h e f o r w a r d
t r o o p s , u n i t s b e i n g moved from Oran and from C a s a b l a n c a . I t was hoped
t o launch an o f f e n s i v e on Gecember 22nd t o c a p t u r e T u n i s , making u s e of
s u p e r i o r gun Power. The weather had t u r n e d a g a i n s t us and i t had proved
necessary t o c a l l o f f t h e o f f e n s i v e . A means of c a r r y i n g o u t o p e r a t i o n s
i n t h e d r i e r c o u n t r y i n t h e s o u t h had then been sought and an o p e r a t i o n
h a d now been p l a n n e d f o r t h e c a p t u r e of S f a x which would b e g i n on Janu
a r y 2 4 t h . H e had been w a i t i n g , however, f o r a c h a n c e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g
ac
t i o n w i t h General Alexander, a s i t was i m p o r t a n t t h a t the timing s h o u l d

f i t i n w i t h t h e movements of t h e 8 t h Army
GENERAL EISENHOWER t h e n gave d e t a i l s of how i t was proposed t o
It
was i n t e n d e d t o u s e t h e American F i r s t Armored D i v i s i o n (less one l i g h t
conduct t h e f o r t h c o m i n g o p e r a t i o n and o f t h e f o r c e s t o be employed
b a t c a l i o n ) , a r e g i m e n t a l combat team and a d d i t i o n a l u n i t s of a r t i l l e r y ,

and a l s o t o u s e t h e a i r f i e l d s i n t h e Gafsa a d Tebessa a r e a s f o r Support
i n g a i r c r a f t . The Germans had d i s p o s e d t h e i r armor n o r t h e a s t of Pont du
Fahs, and i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o guard a g a i n s t a c o u n t e r s t r o k e towards

t h e r e a r of t h e f o r c e s a t t a c k i n g Sfax. I t was hoped t o p u t s u p p l i e s i n t o
Sfax b y s e a from t h e e a s t w a r d t o e a s e t h e maintenance problem. I t was
hoped t h a t t h i s o p e r a t i o n would b e o f r e a l a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e 8 t h b m y be
cause t h e Germans were sending s u p p l i e s by r a i l t o Sfax whence t h e y were
sending s m a l l c o a s t i n g v e s s e l s t o R o m e l . The Sfax f o r c e would b e sepa
r a t e d by 7 5 m i l e s of rough c o u n t r y from t h e B r i t i s h 1st Army, i n which
t h e r e were two c r i t i c a l p o i n t s : P o n t du F a h s and Foudouk, which were
h e l d by t h e F r e n c h , Apart from one r e g i m e n t i n A l g i e r s , and p a r t of a
I35
SECRE7'
BRITISH MOST
smefir
d i v i s i o n i n O r a r i , the5.e was v i r t u a l l y n o t h i n g between t h e t,roops in t h e

f r o n t l i n e and :lorocco
Troops i n t h e l a t t e r p l a c e were t o o f a r away t o

move up o v e r t h e l o n g and d i f f i c u l t l i n e o f communications. T h e I s t . Army
had 7 t o 10 d a y s ' s u p p l i e s o f a l l
e d by the !:errnaris t , h q
k i n d s , and s o i f an opening were off'cr
c o u l d 1aurlt:h a n a t t a c k . I n t,he whole t , h e a t e r of
Mar t h e r e were now alionr. :??0,000 t r o o p s . ? u p p l i e s were a m p l e i n t h e

C a s a b l a i v n a r e a , but, a g a i n d i f f ' i c u l t,y o f t r e n s p o r t . a t i o l 1 p r e v e n t e d much
b e i n g moved i ' o r v o r d .
CIEKERAL EISE3'HOWK t,hen gave
EI
desC~'iptiOll o f t h e v a r i o u s a i r
f i e l d s b e i n g used by t h e A l ~ J i ~Adi r T'orcQs, and of the d i f f i c u l t , i e s of

k e e p i n g them s e r v i c e a b l e , fie t , h r n r e f e r r e d t o t h e p o l l t i c a l s i t u a t i o n
and p o i n t e d o u t t,hat i t was vex->-c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e m i l j t a r y s i t u a
t i o n i n view of t h e v e r y v : i l i ~ ~ r a b lne a t u r e o f t,he l i n e of coniniunications
f o r t h e g u a r d i n g of which F r e n c h t.roops were r e s p o n s i b l e . K e t u r n i n g t o
t , h e a i r s i t u a t i o r i h e s a i d t h a t A i r r h i e f Marshal Tedder had t.wice v i s i t e d
A l g i e r s and d e t a i l e d p l a n s had been w o r k d o u t t o i n s u r e t h e c o o r d i n a t e d
a c t i o n of t h e A i r F o r c e s from t.hc V i d d l e E;ist,,
V a l t a a n d F r e n c h Worth
\!ediuni bombers b a s e d on PhillippevDle were now b e i n g rised w i t h
Africa
e f f ec t a g a i n s t , shi p p i rig
GENERbL NZXAh'Pl.11 their ga've an a c c o u n t of t h e operat,ioris of t h e
8 t h Army
He s a i d t h a t t h e E l Alamein p o s i t i o n was about 40 n i i l e s l o n g
a n d uas occupied by the German 1 5 t h I'anzer, 2 1 s t Parrzer, 90t,h 1.igt:t
and
1 M t . h I n f a n t r y R i v i s i o r i s which were a t f u l l s t r e n g t h i n men and equip^.

merit
and b y 1 0 I t a l i a n U i v i + i o r r s
The p o s i t i o n had no open f l a n k s o
t h e problem was one of punching a h o l e through which t h e armor could be

launched
O.:tober
The a t t a c k went in wider a v e r y heavy b a r r a g e o f 500 guns on

24th
6 ,000 y a r d s
I n f a n t r y advanced t h r o u g h d e e p m i n e f i e l d s f o r 4 , 0 0 0 t o
For t h e n e x t t e n d a y s t h e r e was s e v e r e f i g h t i n g d e s i g n e d
i o e a t lip t h e enemy's r e s e r v e s and prepare t h e
through
WRY
f o r t h e f i n a l break
On November 4 t h . t h e f r o n t was broken and t h e o p p o r t u n i t y came
f o r t h e f i n e American Skierman tanks t o pour through
I n two weeks Tobruk
was r e a c h e d and by t h e end of a montli t h e army w a s a t A g h e i l a
They had
t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f advancing t w i c e a s f a s t a s Rommel had been a b l e t o

moue d u r i n g our r e t r e a t
The Germans had n o t enough t r a n s p o r t t o g o
round and so they had made c e r t a i n t h a t what t h e r e wa5 was u s e d f o r t h e

German u n i t s
Our c a s u a l t i e s i n t w e l v e d a y s were 16,000; t h e enemy's
136
U. S , S E C R E T
must have t o t a l l e d between 60,000 a n d 70,000 a n d Rome1 must have l o s t
n e a r l y 5,000 v e h i c l e s . None of t h i s would have been p o s s i b l e had i t n o t
been f o r t h e a i r s u p e r i o r i t y gained by t h e A i r Forces who had throughout
done m a g n i f i c e n t work.
For t h e f u r t h e r advance beyond A g h e i l a e v e r y t h i n g depended upon

t h e u s e o f Benghazi. The h a r b o r was l e f t b y t h e Germans i n a t e r r i b l e
mess
However by d i n t o f f i n e work on t h e p a r t of t h e Navy, a flow of
3,000 t o n s per day was reached. A s e v e r e g a l e which a g a i n b r e a c h e d t h e
mole and sank s e v e r a l s h i p s i n t e r r u p t e d t h e f l o w , b u t i t was now b a c k

a g a i n t o 2,000 t o n s p e r d a y . S i r t e was u s e l e s s b u t t h e r e was a m a l l
p l a c e n e a r A g h e i l a where 400 t o n s p e r d a y had b e e n u n l o a d e d .
The p l a n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s which had now begun was an a t t a c k by
the 7 t h Armored D i v i s i o n , t h e N e w Zealand D i v i s i o n and t h e 51st Highland
D i v i s i o n who were c a r r y i n g w i t h t h e m 10 d a y s ' s u p p l i e s and 500 miles of
p e t r o l . I t was hoped t o r e a c h T r i p o l i by J a n u a r y 26th.
The enemy's f i g h t i n g v a l u e was h a r d t o a s s e s s b u t he w a s b e l i e v e d
t o have a t h i s d i s p o s a l t h e f o l l o w i n g f o r c e s :
50 a d d i t i o n a l
2 1 s t Panzer D i v i s i o n w i t h about 27 tanks)
t a n k s were be
1 5 t h Panzer D i v i s i o n w i t h 30 t a n k s
lieved t o be
ready i n T u n i s i a .
' 9 0 t h L i g h t D i v i s i o n ) b o t h weak i n s t r e n g t h
164th Division
) and s h o r t of a r t i l l e r y .
Ahout 9 I t a l i a n D i v i s i o n s .
The t o t a l s t r e n g t h might be assessedat50,OOO Germans and 30,000
I t a l i a n s , though o n l y a b o u t 20,000 of t h e former were s t r i c t l y f i g h t i n g
troops
The enemy's o r g a n i z a t i o n was much b r o k e n up a n d h e was v e r y
s h o r t o f a r t i l l e r y . F u r t h e r m o r e , h i s army h a d r e t r e a t e d 1,000 m i l e s ,
which must have h a d i t s e f f e c t on m o r a l e . Our s u p e r i o r i t y r e s t e d i n
tanks and guns, of which w e had ample. General L e C l e r c ' s advance through
Fezzan had been a f i n e p i e c e o f work b u t would n o t e x e r c i s e a n i n f l u e n c e
on t h e p r e s e n t b a t t l e
137
11 S. S E C R E T
If we g o t t o T r i p o l i a c c o r d i n g t o p l a n t h e 8 t h Army would be
q u i t e i m m o b i l i z e d u n t i l t h e p o r t was o p e n , T h i s would t a k e p r o b a b l y
s e v e n o r t e n d a y s , though i n t h e w o r s t c a s e i t might t a k e t h r e e months.
t w a s hoped to work up t o 3 , 0 0 0 t o n s a day and i f t h i s was achieved i t

w w l d b e p o s s i b l e t o a t t a c k t h e X a r e t h L i n e towards t h e middle o f barch
J
w i t h 2 Armored and 4 I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n s . We were g e t t i n g photographs of

t h e Mareth L i n e , which was c e r t a i n l y a n r e p a r e d p o s i t i o n , t h o t g h l a c k i n g
i n depth
great
I t s h o u l d be r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e d i s t a n c e s i n v o l v e d were v e r y
From B u e r a t t o T r i p o l i was 248 m i l e s and from T r i p o l i t o Gabes
was 220 m i l e s
I t would, of c o u r s e , b e p o s s i b l e , i f t h e enemys resist
a n c e proved weak, t o advance t o t h e Mareth L i n e w i t h v e r y l i g h t f o r c e s

somewhat e a r l i e r
D i s c u s s i o n t h e n t u r n e d upon t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i o n s
o f Dhe 8 t h A r m y and of t h o s e of G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r s command, GXNERAL
EISENHOWER i n q u i r e d what Rommelss p o s i t i o n would b e i f t h e 8 t h Army cap
t u r e d T r i p o l i and if he c a p t u r e d Sfax
Could t h e 8 t h A r m y k e e p R o m e 1
e n g a g e d s o t h a t t h e f o r c e s a t S f a x c o u l d n e g l e c t i t s r i g h t f l a n k and
t u r n a l l i t s a t t e n t i o n towards t h e North?
GENERAL ALEXAbDER s a i d t h a t Rommel was l i v i n g v e r y much from
hand t o mouth f o r s u p p l i e s a n d i f he l o s t all h i s p o r t s he would c e r t a i n .
l y be t r a p p e d ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e v e r y c a r e f u l
s t u d y t o t h e Sfax o p e r a t i o n I t s h o u l d b e r e a l i z e d t h a t if a f o r c e ad
vanced on S f a x , Rommel would r e a c t l i k e l i g h t n i n g and h i s plan would b e
the best possible
G r e a t c a r e would b e n e c e s s a r y t o i n s u r e t h a t undue
r i s k s were n o t t a k e n
SIP ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t a g r e a t d e a l depended upon t h e t i m i n g

o f the Sfax operation
I t might be u n f o r t u n a t e i f t h e f o r c e a r r i v e d a t
S f a x j u s t a t t h e time t h a t t h e 8 t h A r m y had r e a c h e d T r i p o l i and were

immobilized f o r l a c k o f s u p p l i e s
I t was g e n e r a l l y a g r e e d t h a t t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of t h e a c t i o n of
t h e two a r m i e s was a m a t t e r o f t h e h i g h e s t i m p o r t a n c e and t h e p r e s e n t
o p p o r t u n i t y should be u t i l i z e d t o the f u l l
t 38
U.
S . SECRET
D i s c u s s i o n t h e n t u r n e d o n t h e s t r e n g t h r e q u i r e d t o h o l d t h e North
African s h o r e when i t had been c o m p l e t e l y c l e a r e d of t h e enemy. GENERAL
ALEXANDER s a i d t h a t he had c a l c u l a t e d t h a t two d i v i s i o n s w i t h a mobile
r e s e r v e would be s u f f i c i e n t f o r C y r e n a i c a and T r i p o l i t a n i a . GENERAL
EISENHOWER s a i d t h a t he c o n s i d e r e d f o u r d i v i s i o n s should be h e l d t o watch
Spanish Moroccoand t h a t one i n f a n t r y and one armored d i v i s i o n would c e r
t a i n l y b e n e c e s s a r y i n A l g e r i a a n d T u n i s i a . T h e r e were a t p r e s e n t s i x
U. S . d i v i s i o n s i n French North A f r i c a and t h r e e more were s e t up i n t h e

o r i g i n a l p l a n t o come. If t h e s e were s h i p p e d t h e r e would be t h r e e IJ- S
d i v i s i o n s over and above d e f e n s i v e r e q u i r e m e n t s . He t h o u g h t i t would be
unwise t o hand over t h e d e f e n s e of T u n i s i a too e a r l y t o t h e French. The
PRIME MINISTER a g r e e d . He s a i d t h a t i t a p p e a r e d t h a t t h e r e would b e
some t h i r t e e n d i v i s i o n s i n t h e whole North A f r i c a n t h e a t e r a v a i l a b l e f o r
future operations.
I n r e p l y t o an i n q u i r y SIR ARTHUR TEDDER s a i d t h a t he w a s of t h e
opinion t h a t convoys c o u l d be passed through t h e Mediterranean when a i r
f i e l d s had been e s t a b l i s h e d and when t h e T u n i s i a n t i p h s d been c l e a r e d
S I B DUDLEY POUND a g r e e d . H e reckoned t h a t if t h i r t y s h i p s c o u l d b e p a s s e d

t h r o u g h e v e r y t e n d a y s t h e whole o f t h e Cape t r a f f i c c o u l d be done
away w i t h and 2 2 5 s h i p s would t h u s be r e l e a s e d f o r o t h e r u s e s . I t was
hard t o e s t i m a t e t h e r e l a t i v e l o s s e s which might be i n c u r r e d , b u t though
t h e p e r c e n t a g e o f l o s s m i g h t be s l i g h t l y h i g h e r t h r o u g h t h e M e d i t e r r a
nean t h e t o t a l would be less as fewer s h i p s would be involved. The hledi
t e r r a n e a n r o u t e would b e more expensive i n e s c o r t s , b u t t h e r e would b e a
saving i n t h e t i m e of voyages.
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t t h e o p e n i n g o f t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n
would have i t s e f f e c t on t h e a t t i t u d e of Turkey; moreover, t h e B r i t i s h
1 0 t h Army, c o n s i s t i n g of s i x d i v i s i o n s , which had b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d I n
P e r s i a w i t h t h e o b j e c t of meeting t h e t h r e a t t h r o u g h t h e Caucasus, was
now a v a i l a b l e t o encourage and s u p p o r t t h e Turks.
I n d i s c u s s i o n i t was suggested t h a t i t might be worth while c a l
c u l a t i n g what s p e c i a l i z e d u n i t s would b e r e q u i r e d t o r o u n d o u t t h e
T u r k i s h Army. S I R ALAN BROOKE p o i n t e d o u t t h a t up t o t h e p r e s e n t t h e
Turks had been s u p p l i e d w i t h t e c h n i c a l m a t e r i a l and a r m s , b u t a l t h o u g h
t h e i r Army c o n s i s t e d of f i r s t - r a t e m a t e r i a l , a s i n f a n t r y , t h e y tended t o
139
li S SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
misuse t e c h n i c a l equipment a n d allow i t t o d e t e r i o r a t e
He d i d n o t t h i n k
t h e i r army would e v e r be f i t t o o p e r a t e o f f e n s i v e l y o u t s i d e Turkey. I t

m i g h t , however, s e r v e t o h o l d T u r k e y a s a b a s e from which our f o r c e s
could operate
S I R AHTHUR TEDDER s a i d t h a t t h e Turks had a s m a l l a i r f o r c e t o

w h i c h we g a v e a l i m i t e d number o f a i r c r a f t ; i t would n e v e r b e f i t t o
f i g h t Our p l a n was t o o p e r a t e i n i t i a l l y some t w e n t y . f i v e f i g h t e r a n d
bomber s q u a d r o n s from a i r f i e l d s i n Turkey which had b e e n p r e p a r e d and
s t o c k e d . F u r t h e r a i r f i e l d s wouldbe r e q u i r e d i f we were t o o p e r a t e offen
s i v e l y and p l a n s were a l l drawn up f o r t h e i r p r e p a r a t i o n . I t was intend
e d to move a n t i a i r c r a f t d e f e n s e s i n w i t h t h e squadrons
S I R ARTHUR TEDDER t h e n gave an a c c o u n t of t h e p a r t p l a y e d b y

He emphasized
t h e A i r Force i n t h e r e c e n t v i c t o r i e s i n t h e Kiddle E a s t
t h a t t h e i r t a s k began d u r i n g t h e B r i t i s h r e t r e a t from Gazala
Since that
time t h e enemy a i r f o r c e had been b e a t e n down and g r e a t e f f o r t s had been

made t o s t o p !:ommel's
supplies
The a c t i o n o f an a i r f o r c e i n o p e r a t i o n s
o f t h i s k i n d was d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n c o n c i s e l y , e x t e n d i n g as i t d i d over
g r e a t a r e a s and d i v e r s e t a s k s
The M i d d l e E a s t A i r F o r c e s had f i r s t
s t r u c k a t Xommel's s u p p l i e s and then a t t h e s u p p l i e s t o T u n i s i a ; f o r the

l a t t e r p u r p o s e Malta had been r e i n f o r c e d t o t h e utmost and a i r c r a f t had
been t r a n s f e r r e d t o T u n i s i a
The c o o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e A i r F o r c e s o f the
Middle E a s t , hlalta and T u n i s i a was a c o m p l i c a t e d problem and h e was very

g l a d t o have t h e p r e s e n t o p p o r t u n i t y o f m e e t i n g G e n e r a l Eisenhower and
discussing i t
GENERAL EISENHOWER e x p l a i n e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s u n d e r which t h e
A i r F o r c e s i n T u n i s i a were o p e r a t i n g i n s u p p o r t o f t h e A r m y
There were
o n l y two a i r f i e l d s a v a i l a b l e f o r f i g h t e r s arid even t h e s e were 100 m i l e s
from t h e f r o n t l i n e
The Germans, on t h e o t h e r hand, had two a l l weather
a i r f i e l d s i n Tunis
In the early stages U
a = u n i t s from t h e Western
Zone h a d b e e n moved up a n d p l a c e d u n d e r S r i t i s h command; A i r Marshal

Welch kiad d i s p o s e d them i n t h e T e b e s s a a r e a
For t h e o p e r a t i o n now con
t e m p l a t e d t n e B r i t i s h f i g h t e r f o r c e would o p e r a t e from Souk E l Arba under

Lawson a n d t h e U
Crane
S . f i g h t e r s would o p e r a t e i n t h e S o u t h u n d e r General
H i s own c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e l a y o u t on t h i s f r o n t w a s t h a t t h e B r i t
i s h Army Commander s h o u l d c o n t r o l i t a l l s i n c e t h e r e wasno sound a r r a n g e . .

m e n t b y which t h e f r o n t c o u l d b e d i v i d e d
140
The French, however, had r e f u s e d
S. S E C R E T
t o s e r v e u n d e r B r i t i s h command. T h i s had meant t h a t he had had t o es
t a b l i s h a Command P o s t from which t o d i r e c t o p e r a t i o n s . H e hoped t o
overcome t h i s k i n d of d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e .
T h e PRIhlE MIKISTET i n y u i r e d whether t h e r e was any danger o f t h e
Germans s t r i k i n g t h r o u g h G e n e r a l A n d e r s o n ' s l e f t f l a n k r a t h e r i n t h e
manner a d o p t e d by t h e 8 t h Army a t E l Alameln. GEKEFAL EISZNHOWER s a i d
that t,he 1st Army had such s u p e r i o r i t y over t h e enemy i n a r t i l l e r y t h a t

h e d i d n o t t h i n k t h e r e w a s rmch f e a r o f t h i s . Though the enemy's s p e c i a l
i s t and t a n k u n i t s were good, h i s i n f a n t r y had n o t seemed t o b e up t o

t h e same s t a n d a r d ,
In c o n c l u s i o n i t was emphasized t h a t e v e n t s had reached a c r u

c i a l s t a g e i n t h e North A f r i c a n T h e a t e r and t h a t t h e e v e n t s of t h e n e x t
two o r t h r e e weeks would b e of v i t a l i m p o r t a n c e . The p r e s e n t was t h e
t i m e a t which t o c o n s i d e r what a c t i o n s h o u l d b e t a k e n when t h e North
A f r i c a n s h o r e had f i n a l l y been c l e a r e d .
0. S .
SECRET
ANFA 2nd Meeting
MINUTES of Meeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp,

on \!onday,
J a n i i a r y 18, 1913, a t 1700.
PRESENT
The F t . lion. Minston S . Churchil:
(Prime V i n i s t e r and V i n i s t e r of
Ce f e n s e )
General G . C .
liarshall
Admiral E . J .
King
Admiral of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudlej
Pound
L t . G e n e r a l H . H . Arnol~d
\fr FIarry Ilopkins
F i e l d Marshal Sir J o h n D i l l
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F. Brooke
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r C. P o r t a l
Vice Admiral t h e Lord L o u i s
Wountbat t e n
L t . G e n e r a l 5 i r H a s t i n g s L. Ismay
SECRETARIAT
Hrig. General J. R.
E r i g a d i e r h.
Deane
I. C . Jacob
142
il. S . S E C R E T
The PRESIDENT and t h e PRIME MINISTER a s k e d t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f
f o r a r e p o r t of p r o g r e s s r e g a r d i n g t h e c u r r e n t c o n f e r e n c e s .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s t a t e d t h a t a f t e r seven days of argument h e f e l t
t h a t d e f i n i t e p r o g r e s s had been made. A document i s now b e i n g p r e p a r e d
s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y f o r 1943. T h i s w i l l b e gone
over i n d e t a i l a t t h e C . C . S . meeting on t h e morning of J a n u a r y 1 9 t h .
EIFf ALAh BPOOKr summarized t h e document as follows:

1.
A s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e measures t o b e taken t o combat t h e
s u b m a r i n e menace a r e a f i r s t c h a r g e on t h e r e s o u r c e s of t h e
U n i t e d h a t i o n s and p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y f o r a l l o f our o p s a t i o n s .
2.
A s t a t e m e n t t h a t we s h a l l c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e d e f e a t of
Germany f i r s t which w i l l b e followed by t h e d e f e a t of Japan.

3.
Our e f f o r t s i n d e f e a t i n g Germany w i l l be concerned f i r s t
w i t h e f f o r t s t o f o r c e them t o withdraw ground and a i r f o r c e s

from t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t . T h i s w i l l be accomplished by o p e r a t i o n s
f r o m N o r t h A f r i c a by which S o u t h e r n E u r o p e , t h e Dodecanese
I s l a n d s , Greece, C r e t e , S a r d i n i a , and S i c i l y w i l l a l l b e t h r e a t
e n e d , t h u s f o r c i n g Germany t o d e p l o y h e r f o r c e s t o meet e a c h
t h r e a t . The a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n d e c i d e d upon i s t h e c a p t u r e of
Sicily.
A t t h e same time, we s h a l l go on w i t h p r e p a r i n g f o r c e s
and assembling l a n d i n g c r a f t i n England f o r a t h r u s t a c r o s s t h e
Channel i n t h e event t h a t t h e German s t r e n g t h i n France d e c r e a s e s ,
e i t h e r through withdrawal of her t r o o p s or because of an i n t e r n a l
collapse.
4.
O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c a r e t o be continued t o i n c l u d e
t h e c a p t u r e of Rabaul and E a s t e r n New Guinea w h i l e p l a n s are t o

b e prepared t o extend t h e o p e r a t i o n s t o t h e Marshall I s l a n d s and
t h e c a p t u r e of Truk i f the s i t u a t i o n permits.
5.
P l a n s and p r e p a r a t i o n s t o u n d e r t a k e O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM
l a t e i n 1943 a r e t o be i n s t i t u t e d a t once w i t h t h e understandirlg

t h a t t h e United S t a t e s w i l l a s s i s t t o make up d e f i c i e n c i e s i n
l a n d i n g c r a f t and naval v e s s e l s needed for t h i s o p e r a t i o n . The
o p e r a t i o n is t o be planned for December o f 1943 w i t h t h e view t o
c a p t u r i n g Burma andopening t h e Burma road p r i o r t o t h e monsoon
s e a s o n of 1944.
143
P. S. C E C W T
9 0 T T I S Y 6fOCT SECOET
0.
The maximnm combined a i r o f f e n s i v e w i l l b e conducted
a g a i n s t Germany from the J n i t e d Kingdom. By t h i s and e v e r y other

a v a i l a b l e means, a t t e m p t s w i l l b e made t o undermine Germany's
morale
7 ,
E v e r y e f f o r t w i l l b e made, p o l i t i c a l and o t h e r w i s e , t o
i n d u c e Turkey t o e n t e r t h e w a r i n o r d e r t h a t we may e s t a b l i s h
a i r b a s e s t h e r e f o r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t Rumania.
e.
O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS w i l l be u n d e r t a k e n f o r t h e purpose of
e s t a b l i s h i n g b r i d g e h e a d s o v e r t h e Chindwin R i v e r , and a l s o t o
p r e p a r e r o a d s and a i r f i e l d s i n n o r t h e r n Burma which w i l l f a c i l i
t a t e t h e m o u n t i n g o f O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM toward t h e end of t h e year.
I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , O p e r a t i o n CANNIBAL i s now b e i n g u n d e r t a k e n
w i t h a view t o s e c u r i n g a i r b a s e s i n t h e Akyab area.
SIR ALAN BROOKE e x p l a i n e d t h a t Chiang Kai-shek wishes t o p o s t

pone n i s p a r t of O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS u n t i l t h e r e i s more n a v a l s u p p o r t i n
t h e Bay o f F e n g a l . iie added t h a t t h i s was s t r a t e g i c a l l y sound a s t h e
C h i n e s e o p e r a t i o n would be more e f f e c t i v e i f c o o r d i n a t e d a s a p a r t of
ANAKIM
He s a i d RAVENOUS r e q u i r e s no Naval s u p p o r t .
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n e x p l a i n e d t h a t w h i l e t h a t p a r t of t h e
C h i n e s e o p e r a t i o n which was t o c o n s i s t of a n advance from Yunnan could
b e a d v a n t a g e o u s l y p o s t p o n e d , t h e advance from Ramgarh c o u l d w e l l be in
i t i a t e d a s p a r t of o p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e s e c u r i t y f o r
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a r o a d southward from Ledo. However, t h i s w i l l have
t o have t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o .
The PRIME UINISTER t h e n s t a t e d t h a t he wished i t made c l e a r t h a t
i f and when H i t l e r b r e a k s down, a l l of t h e B r i t i s h r e s o u r c e s and e f f o r t
w i l l b e t u r n e d toward t h e d e f e a t of J a p a n .
Iie s t a t e d t h a t n o t o n l y a r e
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d , b u t h e r honor is engaged.
If i t were thought
w e l l f o r t h e e f f e c t on t h e p e o p l e of t h e United S t a t e s o f America, t h e
B r i t i s h Government would e n t e r i n t o a t r e a t y o r c o n v e n t i o n w i t h t h e U. S.
Government t o t h i s e f f e c t
The PRESIDENT s t a t e d t h a t a f o r m a l agreement r e g a r d i n g B r i t i s h
e f f o r t s a g a i n s t J a p a n was e n t i r e l y u n n e c e s s a r y . ile s a i d , however, t h a t
e f f o r t s s h o u l f i b e made t o o b t a i n an engagement from R u s s i a t o concen
t r a t e on t h e d e f e a t o f .Japan a f t e r Germany had b e e n e l i m i n a t e d from
144
SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
ll. S.
the war. He t h o u g h t t h a t R u s s i a would p r o b a b l y want t o come i n w i t h t h e

United N a t i o n s i n t h a t e v e n t , b u t he would l i k e t o have an e x p r e s s i o n
from them a s t o w h e t h e r t h e y w i l l come i n and how.
MR. CHURCHILL t h e n d i s c u s s e d o p e r a t i o n SLEDGEHAMMW. He thought

i t s h o u l d b e g i v e n a s h a r p e r p o i n t and t h a t p l a n s s h o u l d be made t o
undertake i t , i n c l u d i n g t h e appointment of a Commander and t h e f i x i n g o f
a target d a t e . H e had n o t been i n f a v o r of such a n o p e r a t i o n i n 1942 b u t

he f e l t t h a t i t w a s our d u t y t o engage t h e enemy on a s wide a f r o n t and
as c o n t i n u o u s l y a s p o s s i b l e , and as t h e o n l y way of s t o p p i n g an o p e r a t i o n
with t h e f u l l f o r c e o f t h e B r i t i s h M e t r o p o l i t a n a i r f o r c e s and t h e U. S .
sir f o r c e s i n G r e a t B r i t a i n i s t o do a SLEDGEHAMMER, h e t h o u g h t w e
s h o u l d d o e v e r y t h i n g w e could t o make t h e o p e r a t i o n p o s s i b l e t h i s summer
The PRESIDENT a g r e e d w i t h t h e Prime M i n i s t e r and f u r t h e r sug
g e s t e d t h a t w e j o i n t o g e t h e r t o b u i l d up f o r c e s i n t h e United Kingdom.
He s a i d t h a t i t would be d e s i r a b l e t o p r e p a r e a schedule of t h e b u i l d - u p
of f o r c e s by month i n o r d e r t h a t w e would know what t h e p o t e n t i a l e f f o r t
might be a t any time, and p l a n s should b e made f o r u t i l i z i n g t h i s poten
6ial a t any time t h a t t h e r e are s i g n s of Germanys d e t e r i o r a t i o n .

The PRIME MINISTER t h e n d i s c u s s e d p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n s from t h e
Mediterranean a g a i n s t t h e Dodecanese
He c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e s e might be
developed e i t h e r as f e i n t s i n o r d e r t o c o n c e a l t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e main
e f f o r t a g a i n s t S i c i l y , or p e r h a p s a s a r e a l a t t a c k
message from t h e t h r e e Commanders-in-Chief
He had r e c e i v e d a
i n t h e Middle E a s t informing
him t h a t p l a n s t o t h i s e f f e c t were under way
He d e s i r e d t h a t t h e f i n a l
document p r e p a r e d b y t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f c o v e r i n g t h e strategy f o r 1943

should i n c l u d e some mention of t h e Dodecanese.
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t he f e l t t h a t G e n e r a l C h e n n a u l t * s
a i r f o r c e i n China s h o u l d be r e i n f o r c e d . He s t a t e d t h a t General Wave11

concurred i n t h i s view.
The PRESIDENT s t a t e d t h a t t h e e f f e c t s of h e l p t o China would be
l a r g e l y p o l i t i c a l . A s m a l l e f f o r t t o send a i d would have a tremendously
f a v o r a b l e e f f e c t on Chinese m o r a l e . T h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o h a s been d i s a p
pointed w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e Burma o p e r a t i o n s . He h a s c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i
c u l t y i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e l o y a l t y of some of t h e Chinese p r o v i n c e s . Any

thing t h a t we can do t o h e l p China and t o h u r t JEpan w i l l have a h e a r t e n
ing e f f e c t on him.
145
S . SECRET
The PRESIDENT s t a t e d t h a t r e i n f o r c i n g our a i r power i n China
would a l s o be a s e v e r e blow t o J a p a n . He s a i d t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e people
p a n i c e a s i l y . T h i s was e s p e c i a l l y t r u e a t t h e time o f t h e i r e a r t h q u a k e .
Mr Grew, t h o U n i t e d S t a t e s Ambassador, i n r e p o r t i n g t h i s i n c i d e n t ,
s t a t e d t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e J a p a n e s e b r o a d c a s t t o a d o p t every
means p o s s i b l e t o q u i e t t h e p e o p l e .
The PRLCIDfNT c o n s i d e r e d t h a t we s h o u l d s e n d f r o m 200 t o 750
p l a n e s to China. T h i s s h o u l d i n c l u d e heavy b a n k e r s which, because of the
d i f f i c u l t i e s of s u p p l y , c o u l d be based i n I n d i a . They c o u l d b e used t o
o p e r a t e i n r a i d s over Japan proper by r e f u e l i n g i n China o n t h e i r way t o
a n d from s u c h m i s s i o n s .
He t h o u g h t t h a t t h e U n i t e d K a t i o n s s h o u l d commit themselves t o
t h i s l i n e of a c t i o n and t h a t whoever o f t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f was n e x t t o
see t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o , s h o u l d i n f o r m him t o t h i s e f f e c t .
The PRESICEKT t h e n d i s c u s s e d o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
He s a i d w e had been extremely f o r t u n a t e in O p e r a t i o n TORCH. He was w o r r i e d ,
however, a b o u t news c o n c e r n i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S i c i l y r e a c h i n g
Germany. To p r e v e n t t h i s , h e t h o u g h t t h a t w e s h o u l d g i v e t h e o p e r a t i o n s
i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n some s u c h name a s "UNDERBELLY" and c o n t i n u a l l y
t h i n k of them a s b e i n g aimed at any one of a number of o b j e c t i v e s , know
i n g s e c r e t l y a l l t h e w h i l e , t h a t t h e y were t o be toward S i c i l y .
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t d e c e p t i o n c o u l d be w e l l achieved b y t h e
u s e of c o v e r p l a n s , , H e s a i d t h a t t h e document t h a t i s now i n p r e p a r a t i o n
and w i l l b e d i s c u s s e d o n J a n u a r y 1 9 t h goes a l o n g way toward e s t a b l i s h i n g
a p o l i c y o f how we a r e t o win t h e war. I t h a s t a k e n some d a y s f o r t h e
C h i e f s of S t a f f t o e x p r e s s t h e m s e l v e s b u t i n p r i n c i p l e t h e y a r e a l l
a g r e e d . He e x p r e s s e d t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e document b e i n g p r e p a r e d Would
b e approved a f t e r a s h o r t d i s c u s s i o n a n d w i t h minor amendments. H e s a i d
t h a t he p e r s o n a l l y would l i k e t o have had i t expanded t o p r e s e n t a com
p l e t e c o n c e p t f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h e war b u t t h a t h e was w e l l p l e a s e d w i t h
i t as i t i s ,
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t when t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of
S t a f f came t o t h e c o n f e r e n c e ,
they p r e f e r r e d t o undertake Operation
ROUNDUP i n 1943. The d e c i s i o n , h o w e v e r , h a s b e e n made t o u n d e r t a k e

O p e r a t i o n HUSKY b e c a u s e w e w i l l have i n North A f r i c a a l a r g e number of
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U. S . SECRET
troops a v a i l a b l e and because i t w i l l e f f e c t an economy of tonnage which
is t h e major c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t i s e s t i m a t e d t h a t p o s s e s s i o n of t h e n o r t h
c o a s t of A f r i c a and S i c i l y w i l l r e l e a s e approximately 225 v e s s e l s which
w i l l f a c i l i t a t e o p e r a t i o n s i n Burma, t h e Middle E a s t , and t h e P a c i f i c . H e
f e l t t h a t t h e c a p t u t e of S i c i l y would do much t o imprdve t h e a i r cover
age for our s h i p p i n g i n t h e Mediterranean. T h i s w i l l add c o n s i d e r a b l y t o

t h e s a f e t y of t h e p a s s a g e . He s a i d t h a t Admiral Cunningham and o t h e r
naval o f f i c e r s had i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e c a p t u r e of S i c i l y would n o t b e of

great b e n e f i t i n t h e p r o t e c t i o n of our corlvoys, Admiral Cunningham hav
ing s t a t e d t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n of S i c i l y would o n l y make u s 5 p e r c e n t
more e f f e c t i v e i n t h e p r o t e c t i o n of convoys.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL thought t h e r e had been a misunderstanding of
Admiral Cunningham's views. He f e e l s t h a t without S i c i l y w e w i l l l o s e 15
s h i p s o u t of 100, or be 85 p e r c e n t e f f e c t i v e . W
e w i l l l o s e only 10 s h i p s
out of 100, 90 p e r c e n t e f f e c t i v e , w i t h S i c i l y i n o u r p o s s e s s i o n . The
number of t h e s h i p s l o s t is t h e r e f o r e 50 p e r c e n t greater with S i c i l y i n
possession of t h e A x i s .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h e second c o n s i d e r a t i o n which b r o u g h t
a,bout t h e d e c i s i o n t o o p e r a t e a g a i n s t S i c i l y was t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
e l i m i n a t i n g I t a l y from t h e war and t h u s n e c e s s i t a t i n g Germany's t a k i n g
over t h e p r e s e n t commitments of t h e I t a l i a n s .
GENEHAL MARSHALL emphasized t h a t ROUNDUP would be a d i f f i c u l t if
not i m p o s s i b l e o p e r a t i o n t o u n d e r t a k e once w e have committed o u r s e l v e s
t o O p e r a t i o n HUSKY, He s a i d t h a t t h e United Kingdom m a i n t a i n s a s m a l l
spearhead of amphibious f o r c e s c o n s i h t i n g of a b o u t 20,000 t r o o p s which
are a v a i l a b l e a t a l l times for an o p e r a t i o n a c r o s s t h e Channel. T h i s
f o r c e c o u l d b e augmented by f o l l o w - u p t r o o p s c a r r i e d i n s m a l l c r a f t
which might be a v a i l a b l e i n England. Unless t h e r e i s a complete c r a c k i n
German m o r a l e , o p e r a t i o n s a c r o s s t h e Channel w i l l have t o be e x t r e m e l y
limited. I t w i l l be f u l l y a s d i f f i c u l t t o assemble l a n d i n g c r a f t follow
ing O p e r a t i o n HUSKY and send them t o England a s i t w i l l be t o assemble

them a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e of Rabaul and send them t o Burma. Probably t h r e e
months w i l l be r e q u i r e d t o accomplish t h i s i n e i t h e r c a s e .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t sudden s i g n s of d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e
Axis f o r c e s m i g h t t a k e two forms; f i r s t , a c o l l a p s e i n t h e i n t e r i o r w i t h

147
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S P NOST SECRET
t h e t r o o p s i n i t i a l l y h o l d i n g f a s t ; a n d , s e c o n d , by t h e withdrawal of
t r o o p s from F r a n c e . I n t h e l a t t e r c a s e , we s h o u l d make e v e r y e f f o r t t o
c r o s s t h e Channel and i n doing s o , u t i l i z e any means t h a t a r e a v a i l a b l e .
H e s a i d t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y i n s e t t i n g up s t r e n g t h f o r ROUNDUP i n
a d d i t i o n t o O p e r a t i o n HUSKY is t h e l a c k o f e s c o r t v e s s e l s and landing

craft.
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n d i s c u s s e d i n c r e a s i n g t h e a i r f o r c e i n
C h i n a . The United S t a t e s now h a s an agreement t o i n c r e a s e t h e Chinese
a i r f o r c e t o t h e e x t e n t t o which i t can be s u p p l i e d .
The i n c r e a s e will
be much more t h a n t h e f o r c e i s now. I t i s contemplated s e n d i n g a group
of heavy bombers which may be used t o s h u t t l e back and f o r t h from China

t o I n d i a . T h e r e w i l l be 2 5 t o 3 0 a d d i t i o n a l medium bombers w i t h the
a p p r o p r i a t e a i r c r a f t t o f u r n i s h them f i g h t e r p r o t e c t i o n . tie emphasized
t h a t w h i l e we a r e committed t o t h e b u i l d - u p of t h e Chinese a i r f o r c e s ,
i t i s a tremendously expensive o p e r a t i o n . The a i r t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s which

must b e u t i l i z e d i n t h e i r s u p p l y c o u l d be u t i l i z e d w i t h g r e a t e f f e c t
elsewhere.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t i n t h e agreements reached by the Com
b i n e d C h i e f s of S t a f f , e f f e c t i v e measures had b e e n a d o p t e d t o improve
t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e P a c i f i c . He s a i d he hoped t h e s e were s u f f i c i e n t t o
i n s u r e t h a t w e would n o t a g a i n b e t h r e a t e n e d by a s e r i e s o f c r i s e s ,
s i n c e s u f f i c i e n t forces would be made a v a i l a b l e t o i n s u r e our maintain
i n g p r e s s u r e on Japan.
GENERAL MARSHALL. s a i d t h a t a s summer a p p r o a c h e s , t h e Combined
C h i e f s of S t a f f s h o u l d meet a g a i n t o make t h e n e c e s s a r y r e a d j u s t m e n t s
i n t h e d e c i s j o n s made now.
He t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e u s e of U n i t e d S t a t e s bombers i n England.
Ile t h o u g h t t h a t t h e y s h o u l d be under t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n of t h e
B r i t i s h , who s h o u l d p r e s c r i b e t h e t a r g e t s and t h e t i m i n g o f a t t a c k s .
C o n t r o l of o p e r a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e and t e c h n i q u e s h o u l d remain under t h e

United S t a t e s Commanders. The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f w i l l a t t e m p t t o
p r e s c r i b e g e n e r a l p r i o r i t i e s of bombing o b j e c t i v e s
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d we s h o u l d c o o r d i n a t e a n d improve our

methods i n combating t h e submarine menace and t h a t t h i s a l s o would be a
s u b j e c t of d i s c u s s i o n d u r i n g t h e c o n f e r e n c e s .
148
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S Y I'OST S E C P T T
A n o t h e r v i t a l q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h e Combined C h i e f s of s t a f f i s
how t o m a i n t a i n t h e R u s s i a n f o r c e s a t t h e i r maximum e f f o r t b o t h by
f o r c i n g a w i t h d r a w a l of German p r e s s u r e on t h e i r f r o n t and a l s o by i n
s u r i n g t h e flow of m u n i t i o n s t o them. I t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e t o what e x t e n t
t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s can t a k e t h e l o s s e s of tonnage i n c i d e n t a l t o e s c o r t
i n g t h e n o r t h e r n convoys. I t may b e p o s s i b l e t o d e c r e a s e t h e i n t e r v a l s
between convoys o r add t o t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e i r e s c o r t s . However, i t i s
e n t i r e l y w i t h i n t h e power of Germany t o a d m i n i s t e r s u c h l o s s e s as t o
make i t n e c e s s a r y t o d i s c o n t i n u e t h i s r o u t e t o R u s s i a .
GENERAL MARSIUL s a i d t h a t he does n o t b e l i e v e i t n e c e s s a r y t o
t a k e e x c e s s i v e punishment i n r u n n i n g t h e s e convoys s i m p l y t o k e e p Mr.
S t a l i n p l a c a t e d . I n any e v e n t , he f e e l s t h a t i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o
inform Mr. S t a l i n t h a t t h e convoys would have t o be d i s c o n t i n u e d d u r i n g
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t t h e agreements t e n t a t i v e l y a r r i v e d a t
would b e v e r y h e l p f u l from t h e a i r p o i n t o f view. They w i l l f a c i l i t a t e
the a l l o c a t i o n o f a i r c r a f t and t h e development of procedure and t e c h n i q u e .
T h e PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t s i n c e we have s u r v e y e d t h e whole
f i e l d of s t r a t e g y , it w i l l now be n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f t o
g o i n t o ways and means b y w h i c h t h e a d o p t e d s t r a t e g y c a n b e accomplished.

They must d e t e r m i n e where r i s k s s h o u l d b e i n c u r r e d and where t h e reduc
t i o n of f o r c e s i s n e c e s s a r y . T h i s may t a k e s e v e r a l d a y s . I t w i l l i n v o l v e
the b r o a d d i s t r i b u t i o n of o u r r e s o u r c e s . !Ie a g r e e d w i t h General Marshall
t h a t a n o t h e r m e e t i n g s h o u l d b e h e l d b e f o r e summer a n d e x p r e s s e d h i s
p l e a s u r e t o t h e P r e s i d e n t of t h e United S t a t e s , and t o t h e U .
S. C h i e f s
of S t a f f , f o r a r r a n g i n g t o a t t e n d t h i s c o n f e r e n c e .
The PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t he p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r e c i a t e d h a v i n g S i r
John D i l l a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e s s i n c e he would be t h e i n d i v i d u a l who would
c a r r y o n t h e l i a i s o n between t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f i n London and t h e C h i e f s
of S t a f f i n Washington between whom he c o n s t i t u t e d an i n d i s p e n s a b l e l i n k .
SIR DUDLEY POUND. t h e n s a i d t h a t w e must g o i n t o ways and means
Of
i m p l e m e n t i n g o u r a g r e e d d e c i s i o n s . Two p r o b l e m s i n v o l v e d a r e t h e
s e c u r i t y of t h e A t l a n t i c convoys and t h e e x t e n t t o which i t w i l l b e

n e c e s s a r y t o d e c r e a s e such s e c u r i t y when O p e r a t i o n HUSKY i s u n d e r t a k e n .
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C S SECRET
H e s a i d t h a t i n c r e a s e d p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t t h e submarine menace must be
maintained by adequate coverage of our convoys and by s t r i k i n g a t p l a c e s

where submarines a r e manufactured and assembled. I f t h i s i s done, t h e
s i t u a t i o n may be c o n s i d e r a b l y improved by t h e t i m e o p e r a t i o n HUSKY i s
undertaken
tle a g r e e d w i t h General M a r s h a l l t h a t i t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y
d u r i n g Operat,ion HGSKY t o d i s c o n t i n u e t h e n o r t h e r n convoys

The %I$!VIKISTEF s a i d t h a t t h i s would be an added r e a s o n f o r
i n c r e a s i n g t h e tonnage s e n t t o R u s s i a p r i o r t o O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
SIR DUDLEY POIJW r e p l i e d t h a t t h i s c o u l d be done p r o v i d e d t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s would h e l p i n t h e e s c o r t problem^,
The PRESIDENT t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s s e m b l i n g a
l a r g e number of r i v e r and l a k e c r a f t a v a i l a b l e i n t h e United S t a t e s and
s e n d i n g them q u i e t l y t o Europe i n o r d e r t o t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s a c r o s s t h e
Channel i n c a s e Germany c r a c k s
L0R.D h!OUKTEiATTEK
s t a t e d t h a t f i v e G r e a t Lakes s t e a m e r s had a l -
ready been s e n t
The PRESIDENT t o l d Admiral King t o s u r v e y t h e s i t u a t i o n and s e e
what c o u l d b e done i n t h i s r e s p e c t
SIR J O H N DILL e x p r e s s e d h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n over t h e p r o g r e s s of
t h e p r e s e n t conferences
The PRIYE MIKISTER t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e s i t u a t i o n i n T u r k e y , He
s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had some r i g h t t o e x p e c t Turkey t o e n t e r t h e war
when t h e Balkans were invaded, b u t i n view of our own weakness t o h e l p
Turkey t h e y d i d n o t p r e s s i t
Turkey w i l l be i n a weak p o s i t i o n a t t h e
peace t a b l e f o l l o w i n g t h e w a r i f s h e has n o t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n i t
I t was
p o s s i b l e t o g i v e them a g u a r a n t e e f o r e x i s t i n g t e r r i t o r y , and f o r t h e i r
r i g h t s o v e r passage through t h e D a r d a n e l l e s The United Nations s h o u l d
b e p r e p a r e d t o p r o v i d e Turkey w i t h a n t i a i r c r a f t , f l a k , t a n k s and o t h e r
mechanized v e h i c l e s and a l s o b e p r e p a r e d t o send some of t h i s equipment
manned with u n i t s , s i n c e T u r k i s h troops d o not handle machinery pWtiCU
l a r l y w e l l , He f e e l s t h a t Turkey might be i n f l u e n c e d t o e n t e r t h e war b y
t h e s u c c e s s e s o f R u s s i a n t r o o p s on t h e n o r t h and t h o s e of t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s - - U n i t e d Kingdom t r o o p s o n t h e s o u t h , A t p r e s e n t they a r e a n g r y with
t h e B u l g a r i a n s and i t would n o t b e s u r p r i s i n g if they d i d e n t e r t h e W a r . .
U. S . SECRET
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t s i n c e m o s t of t h e t r o o p s which
would be i n v o l v e d i n r e i n f o r c i n g Turkey would be B r i t i s h , h e asked t h a t
t h e B r i t i s h b e a l l o w e d t o p l a y t h e T u r k i s h h a n d , j u s t as t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s is now h a n d l i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o China. The B r i t
i s h would keep t h e United S t a t e s advised a t a l l times a s t o t h e p r o g r e s s
being made.
The PFESIDEPT c o n c u r r e d i n t h i s v i e w and a l s o s a i d t h a t i f
ROUKDUP s h o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n , he f e l t t h a t i t s h o u l d b e under B r i t i s h
c ommand
The PRIME MIFISTER s a i d t h a t he thought t h e q u e s t i o n o f command

i n ROUNDUP o p e r a t i o n might be d e t e r m i n e d l a t e r , b u t he a g r e e d t h a t i t
would be a d v i s a b l e t o d e s i g n a t e a B r i t i s h commander a t t h i s t i m e who
could u n d e r t a k e t h e p l a n n i n g of t h e o p e r a t i o n . I n h i s v i e w , t h e command
o f o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d a s a g e n e r a l r u l e b e h e l d by an o f f i c e r of t h e
n a t i o n which f u r n i s h e s t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e f o r c e s .
He s a i d t h a t i n perhaps f i v e weeks s i x d i v i s i o n s of t h e 8 t h Army
would e n t e r T u n i s i a , and i t was u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e y would, of c o u r s e ,
come under command of General Eisenhower. He t h o u g h t , however, i t would
be a d v i s a b l e f o r General Alexander t o b e d e s i g n a t e d as t h e Deputy Com
mander o f t h e A l l i e d F o r c e s
T h e PRESIDENT and GFNEFd HAFSHALL b o t h expressed agreement, and

t h e l a t t e r s a i d he t h o u g h t i t would b e p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r a b l e s i n c e
t h e r e would b e two B r i t i s h a r m i e s i n v o l v e d in t h e T u n i s i a n f r o n t .
ADMIRAL K I N G suggested t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f u n i f y i n g command p r i o r
t o t h e 8 t h A r m y s e n t r y i n t o T u n i s i a , f e e l i n g t h a t t h e r e were many mat

t e r s common t o b o t h t h e A l l i e d E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e s and t h e 8 t h Army
which s h o u l d be c o o r d i n a t e d . A f t e r d i s c u s s i o n , i t was a g r e e d t h a t d a t e
of appointment s h o u l d be l e f t f o r f u t u r e d e c i s i o n .
GENERAL MAFiSHALL informed t h e b i m e M i n i s t e r and t h e C h i e f s of
S t a f f of t h e g r e a t c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t Admiral Cunningham had made t o t h e
s m c e s s of Operation TORCH. He wished t o express t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n O f the
United S t a t e s C h i e f s o f S t a f f n o t o n l y for t h e s k i l l t h a t Admiral Cun
ningham had d i s p l a y e d , b u t a l s o f o r h i s s p i r i t o f h e l p f u l n e s s and for
h i s cooperation.
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SECRET
11
The PRIME MIRISTEH thanked G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l and d i r e c t e d that

General M a r s h a l l s comments be i n c l u d e d i n t h e minutes i n o r d e r t h a t he
c o u l d p r e s e n t them t o t h e Cabinet
A f t e r being informed t h a t t h e agreements a r r i v e d a t a t t h e con
f e r e n c e would b e included i n a p a p e r , t h e PRIVE MINISTM suggested t h a t
one s h o u l d be drawn up f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n t o Premier S t a l i n . He f e l t t h a t
t h e S o v i e t i s e n t i t l e d t o know what we i n t e n d t o do, but t h a t i t should
b e made c l e a r t h a t t h e paper expressed our i n t e n t i o n s and d i d n o t consti
t u t e promises
The PRESIDENT brought up t h e s u b j e c t of p r e s s r e l e a s e s concern
i n g t h e c u r r e n t conferences
He s a i d t h a t a photograph s h o u l d be made of
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e conference and be g i v e n out w i t h a r e l e a s e date

which might be s e t a s t h e day t h a t he and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r d e p a r t e d ,
The PFISE ? P I F T I F s u g g e s t e d t h a t a t t h e same time we r e l e a s e a
s t a t e m e n t t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e I l n i t e d Nations a r e r e s o l v e d t o pursue
t h e war t o t h e b i t t e r end, n e i t h e r p a r t y r e l a x i n g i n i t s e f f o r t s U n t i l
t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r of Germany and Japan h a s been a c h i e v e d , He
s a i d t h a t b e f o r e i s s u i n g such a s t a t e m e n t , he would l i k e t o c o n s u l t w i t h
h i s c o l l e a g u e s i n London
FIELD MARSHAL F I L L t h e n asked t h e P r e s i d e n t i f t h e r e were any
i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g General r e G a u l l e .
The PRESIDENT r e p l i e d t h a t he had arranged t o have General Giraud
come h e r e f o r a conference, b u t t h a t so f a r t h e Prime V i n i s t e r had been
unable t o e f f e c t such arrangements with General De G a u l l e .
The PRIME h!IhISTIi5\ s a i d t h a t General De G a u l l e had r e f u s e d , say
ing t h a t i f t h e P r e s i d e n t wished t o s e e him, he would no d o u b t i n v i t e

D e G a u l l e had s a i d t h a t he would n o t meet
G i r a u d i n an a t m o s p h e r e d o m i n a t e d by t h e High Command o f t h e U n i t e d
N a t i o n s The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d t h a t he had s e n t an i n v i t a t i o n t o De
him t o come t o Washington
G a u l l e t o come, and t h e i n v i t a t i o n had b e e n s e n t i n t h e name of t h e

P r e s i d e n t and himself
He i n d i c a t e d t o General D e Gaulle t h a t if he r e
f u s e d t h e i n v i t a t i o n , i t would be n e c e s s a r y f o r him and t h e P r e s i d e n t t o

c o n s i d e r whether or n o t he was a l e a d e r who m e r i t e d t h e i r s u p p o r t
S. S E C R E T
The PRESIDENT s t a t e d t h a t General Giraud had informed him t h a t
t h e r e were s u f f i c i e n t F r e n c h o f f i c e s s and noncommissioned o f f i c e r s i n
North A f r i c a t o e n a b l e t h e French t o raise an army of 250,000 meno H e
thought G e n e r a l Giraud s h o u l d be i n s t r u c t e d t o r a i s e such an army, and
t h a t we s h o u l d make e v e r y e f f o r t t o p r o v i d e him w i t h equipment. He s a i d
t h a t General Giraud was d e s i r o u s o f b e i n g r e l i e v e d of sme of his c i v i l
ian responsibilities.
The P5Ib:E MINISTEP s a i d t h a t he thought t h e p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s m t
a t i V e s of t h e United S t a t e s a n d t h e United Kingdom s h o u l d be a t a l l times
r e p r e s e n t e d i n whatever c o n t r o l l i n g machinery i s set up, and t h a t even
General Eisenhower s h o u l d p r e s e n t h i s demands t o t h e French Government
through c i v i l i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , e x c e p t i n t h o s e c a s e s where he wished
t o e x e r c i s e h i s p r e r o g a t i v e s as a m i l i t a r y commander of an o c c u p i e d
country.
SIR ALh\
BFOOKE s a i d t h a t t h e French have a c o n s i d e r a b l e number
o f French 7 5 mm. guns on hand t o g e t h e r with ammunition. They were t o re

c e i v e t h e t a n k s from t h e B r i t i s h 6 t h Armored D i v i s i o n when t h i s u n i t
r e c e i v e d i t s Sherman t a n k s from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . He s a i d t h a t t h e r e
were a l s o some a n t i a i r c r a f t , weapons a v a i l a b l e which c a n b e g i v e n t o
t h e French. GENEKAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t he thought i t n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e
t h e French t h e b e s t equipment o b t a i n a b l e , and t h a t he proposed t o do so
from United S t a t e s r e s o u r c e s s u b j e c t t o s h i p p i n g l i m i t a t i o n s . H i s i d e a
was t h a t if we are t o e q u i p t h e French, we must make good u n i t s of them
The PRESIDENT t h o u g h t i t would b e d e s i r a b l e t o u t i l i z e some
F r e n c h u n i t s i n O p e r a t i o n HUSKY e v e n i f o n l y a s a r e s e r v e ,
The PRIhlE MINISTER t h e n e x p r e s s e d t h e hope t h a t t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s would b r i n g t o F o r t h A f r i c a t h e remaining t h r e e d i v i s i o n s which

a r e s c h e d u l e d t o come h e r e .
GEEETIAL VAFSHALL r e p l i e d t h a t t h e r e had been no change i n sched
u l e y e t , b u t t h a t a f t e r the complete d e t a i l s f o r Operation HUSKY had been

worked o u t , a d e t e r m i n a t i o n could be made as t o what d i v i s i o n s s h o u l d be
brought o r what o t h e r changes might be made.
153
ANFA 3rd ! e e t i n g
MINUTES o f Meeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp,

on S a t u r d a y , J a n u a r y 23, 1943, a t 1700.
PRESENT
TIW IVesj~dent
itr:nerxl C . C. M a r s h a l l
,Admiral E. J . King
1.t
G e n e r a l 11.
fi. Arnold
The ilt. Hon. Winston S. C h u r c h i l l

(Prime W i n i s t e r and M i n i s t e r of
Defense)
Admiral of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
L , Ccnrral R . R . Somervell
a f r , L a r r y Eopkins
F i e l d Varshal S i r John D i l l
G e n e r a l Sir Alan F. Brooke
Commander R . F. Libby
A i r Chief Marshal S i r C . P o r t a l
Mountbat t e n
L t , G e n e r a l S i r H a s t i n g s L.
SECRETARIAT
brig^ G e n e r a l J .
n.
Deane
Brigadier 8 . I . C. Jacob
Ismay
U. S . SECRET
The PRESIDENT s u g g e s t e d d i s c u s s i n g t h e r e p o r t s u b m i t t e d t o him
and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r i n C.C.S.
170/1, p a r a g r a p h b y p a r a g r a p h .
Both t h e P r e s i d e n t and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r , b e f o r e s t a r t i n g t h e

d i s c u s s i o n , s a i d t h a t t h e y wished t o c o n g r a t u l a t e t h e Chiefs o f S t a f f
on t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e work which had been done d u r i n g t h e c o n f e r e n c e s .
The Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d i t was t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e he knew o f when m i l i
t a r y l e a d e r s had remained t o g e t h e r s o l o n g , f r e e from p o l i t i c a l con

s i d e r a t i o n s , and had devoted t h e i r f u l l thought t o t h e s t r a t e g i c a s p e c t s
o f t h e war.
The PRESIDENT a g r e e d t o t h i s and r e c a l l e d an i n c i d e n t i n t h e
l a s t war when Marshal Foch, F i e l d Marshal Haig and General P e r s h i n g had
had a s i m i l a r c o n f e r e n c e which l a s t e d b u t 5 hours.
1.
SECURITY OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS.

I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e s e c u r i t y o f s e a c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , t h e PRIME
MINISTER i n d i c a t e d t h a t he wished German submarines t o b e r e f e r r e d t o a s

TJ-Boats" r a t h e r t h a n d i g n i f y i n g them by c a l l i n g them "submarines."
2.
ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA.
A discussion regarding a s s i s t a n c e t o Russia i n r e l a t i o n t o
o t h e r commitments t h e n f o l l o w e d
The PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t i n March we w i l l b e f a c e d w i t h t h e
r e c e s s i t y of a r r a n g i n g t o e x t e n d t h e R u s s i a n P r o t o c o l . H e t h o u g h t t h e
l a s t s e n t e n c e i n paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 170/1 which p r o v i d e s t h a t "supply

to R u s s i a w i l l n o t b e c o n t i n u e d a t p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t t o t h e U n i t e d Na
t i o n s ' e f f o r t s " s h o u l d s t a n d and asked h l r . Hopkins for h i s view on t h e
abject.
MR
HOPKINS s a i d t h a t t h e p r e s e n t P r o t o c o l h a s s u c h a c l a u s e
b u t t h a t , o f c o u r s e , i t c a n n o t be e x e r c i s e d w i t h o u t r a i s i n g v i o l e n t
o b j e c t i o n s from P r e m i e r S t a l i n .
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t a i d t o R u s s i a must h e pushed, and
no i n v e s t m e n t c o u l d p a y a b e t t e r m i l i t a r y d i v i d e n d . The United N a t i o n s
cannot l e t R w s i a down. Ile s a i d t h a t t h e C h i e f s o f S t a f f had been con
s i d e r i n g whether o r n o t 16 d e s t r o y e r s c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e from t h e
United S t a t e s i n o r d e r t o r e d u c e t h e l e n g t h of t h e convoy t u r n a r o u n d
from 40 t o 27 d a y s .
1.55
U. S. SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e d e s t r o y e r s simply were n o t a v a i l a b l e . ,
The e s c o r t v e s s e l s i t u a t i o n i s s o t i g h t a s t o make i t n e c e s s a r y t o
e l i m i n a t e t h e 5 u s s i a n convoys s t a r t i n g about J u n e 1 4 t h i n o r d e r t o take
c a r e of t h e n e e d s of O p e r a t i o n HUSXY
He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e i s a l
r e a d y a s h o r t a g e of G 5 e s c o r t s t o p r o t e c t t h e convoys i n t h e A t , l a n t i c
s e r v i c e and t h a t t h e HUSKY o p e r a t i o n w j l l make t h i s s h o r t a g e more acute.
MR
HOPKINS s u g g e s t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s t o p p i n g t h e convoys
e n t i r e l y if w e c o u l d g i v e R u s s i a something t h a t s h e had n o t p r e v i o u s l y
e x p e c t e d and s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h i s b e a i r p l a n e s ,
The PRESIDENT asked what new e s c o r t c o n s t r u c t i o n would b e a v a i l
a b l e by June of 1943,
ADMIRAL K I N G r e p l i e d t h a t t h e r e would b e 100 e s c o r t ' v e s s e l s
c o m p l e t e d b u t t h a t , , i f t h e p r e s e n t l o s s r a t e s c o n t i n u e d , t h i s number
would r e p r e s e n t o n l y a s m a l l ne.t g a i n
SIR DUDIEY POUND s a i d t h e r e i s no s u b s t i t u t e f o r d e s t r o y e r s i n
p r o t e c t i n g convoys. A t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e we a r e u - i l i z i n g 16 d e s t r o y e r s
and 8 s h i p s of o t h e r t y p e s w i t h t h e convoys r u n n i n g on a 40-day c y c l e
If t h i s were t o be reduced t o 27 d a y s , i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o double
t h i s f o r c e i n o r d e r t o have two convoys i n o p e r a t i o n
MH 'HOPKINS asked whether t h e d e s t r o y e r s and e s c o r t v e s s e l s t h a t

a r e now w i t h t h e s e convoys c o u l d n o t h e r e l e a s e d f o r u s e e l s e w h e r e i f
t h e convoys were e l i m i n a t e d e n t i r e l y
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h e e s c o r t ' v e s s e l s would b e r e l e a s e d , ex
c e p t f o p t h e Home F l e e t d e s t r o y e r s which must b e k e p t a v a i l a b l e t o -#watch
for a break-.out i n t o t h e A t l a n t i c o f t h e German f l e e t :
MH HOPKINS r e p e a t e d t h a t some c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e g i v e n by
t h e Chiefs of S t a f f r e g a r d i n g t h e e n t i r e e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e Russian con
'voys v i a t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e
He s a i d t h a t i t m i g h t b e p o s s i b l e t o
i n c r e a s e t h e d e l f v e r y o f m u n i t i o n s t o R u s s i a Over t h e P e r s i a n r o u t e and
v i a Alaska a l t h o u g h t h e R u s s i a n s o b J e c t t o h a n d l i n g some types of muni
t i o n s Over t h e s e r o u t e s . . A t t h e same t i m e , we c o u l d i n c r e a s e t h e P r o t o
c o l i n c e r t a i n t y p e s of m u n i t i o n s s u c h as a i r c r a f t - , If t h i s were done,
t h e r e would b e a s a v i n g i n t h e u s e of t h e 500,000 t o n s of s h i p p i n g from
156
U, S. SECRET
t h e R u s s i a n convoys. The c o n s i d e r a b l e l o s s e s of s h i p p i n g connected w i t h

t h e n o r t h e r n convoys would b e e l i m i n a t e d , a s well as t h e c a r g o e s which
a r e l o s t when s h i p s a r e sunk. He f e l t t h a t t h e C h i e f s o f S t a f f have been
i n c l i n e d t o c o n s i d e r a i d t o R u s s i a a s a p o l i t i c a l e x p e d i e n t and t h a t
a c t u a l l y t h e q u e s t i o n s h o u l d b e ' v i e w e d from t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f m i l i t a r y
necessity
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d i t would b e a g r e a t t h i n g i f we c o u l d

c o n t i n u e t h e R u s s i a n convoys throughout t h e HUSKY O p e r a t i o n . 'He thought
i t b e t t e r t o c o n t i n u e them on a 40-day c y c l e r a t h e r than a t t e m p t t h e 27

day c y c l e p r i o r t o HUSKY and t h e n s t o p t h e corivoys while'HUSKY was b e i n g
undertaken. H e s a i d w e have n e v e r made any p r o m i s e s t h a t we would t a k e
s u p p l i e s t o R u s s i a " We have merely committed o u r s e l v e s t o making muni
t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o them a t our p o r t s ,
GENERAL SOMERWELL s a i d t h a t by J u l y l s t w e w i l l be a b l e t o s e n d 30
s h f p s a month t o t h e P e r s i a n Gulf p o r t s , and t h i s would o f f e r good pros

p e c t s f o r i n c r e a s i n g t h e supply t o Russia.
T h e PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t s u p p l y i n g R u s s i a i s a paying investment,.
S t o p p i n g t h e convoys i n J u l y and August would o c c u r j u s t a t t h e t i m e

when t h e R u s s i a n s would b e engaged i n t h e i r most s e v e r e f i g h t i n g - H e
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o s a y now j u s t what t h e s i t u a t i o n
r e g a r d i n g s h i p p i n g l o s s e s w i l l be i n J u l y o r August, o r what t h e condi
t i o n s w i l l b e a l o n g t h e r o u t e o f t h e n o r t h e r n c o n v o y s , He s a i d , f o r
example, a t t h e t i m e o f t h e l a s t c o n f e r e n c e i n J u n e 1942, t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s was s u f f e r i n g g r e a t s h i p p i n g l o s s e s along h e r e a s t e r n c o a s t
This
a r e a h a s now been almost c l e a r e d of submarines, and t h e g r e a t e s t l o s s e s

a r e now o c c u r r i n g off t h e c o a s t o f South America,
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t w e a r e d e f i n i t e l y committed t o mounting
Operation HUSKY and t h a t e v e r y t h i n g must b e done t o i n s u r e i t s s u c c e s s ,
i n c l u d i n g t h e e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e R u s s i a n convoys if t h a t be n e c e s s a r y , ,
GENERAL MARSHALL, i n r e f e r r i n g t o hlr. Hopkins' o p i n i o n of t h e
C h i e f s of S t a f f ' s a t b i t u d e towards a i d t o R u s s i a , s a i d t h a t i n t h e cur

r e n t c o n f e r e n c e s , i t had been d e c i d e d t h a t t h e f i r s t c h a r g e a g a i n s t t h e
United N a t i o n s was t h e d e f e a t of t h e submarine menace and a i d t o R u s s i a
had t o come n e x t . He s a i d t h a t if w e had t o t a k e t h e l o s s e s which had
157
ll S SECRET
been s u f f e r e d i n t h e Murmansk convoys, t h e y would h u r t H u s s i a a s much a s
t h e U . S. and U . K. S u c h l o s s e s make i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r u s t o a t t a c k on
o t h e r f r o n t s and t h u s e l i m i n a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f o r c i n g t h e Germans
t o withdraw g r o u n d and a i r t r o o p s from t h e I u s s i a n f r o n t . Fie s a i d these
l o s s e s l a s t y e a r came j u s t a t t h e time t h a t we were l a b o r i n g t o b u i l d up
BOLERO. I t must b e made c e r t a i n t h a t we d o n o t h a z a r d t h e s u c c e s s of
O p e r a t i o n HUSKE,
The PRIME MINISTER a g r e e d t h a t i f p a s s a g e o f convoys on t h e
n o r t h e r n r o u t e were p r o h i b i t i v e i n c o s t , t h e y must b e s t o p p e d . M
e thought
i t would be r i g h t t o h a v e i n o u r minds t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n t i n u i n g
c o n v o y s t h r o u g h t h e HUSKY p e r i o d , b u t t o make no p r o m i s e s t o S t a l i n .
S I R DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h i s must b e t h e c a s e b e c a u s e i f we were
committed t o c o n t i n u i n g t h e s e convoys, t h e !ioyal Navy c o u l d n o t p l a y i t s
p a r t i n O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t t h e d i s c u s s i o n s h o u l d rest on t h e
p o i n t t h a t t h e d i s c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e s e - convoys w i l l d e p e n d upon t h e
l o s s e s t h a t a r e s u f f e r e d . He s a i d we must t e l l Mr. S t a l i n t h e f a c t s ,
t h a t he must r e l y on a 40-day s c h e d u l e . A l s o t h a t we c a n n o t promise t h e
continuance of t h e convoys while O p e r a t i o n HUSKY i s b e i n g undertaken, He
s a i d i t s h o u l d a l s o be made c l e a r t o h I r o S t a l i n t h a t t h e U. S. and U . K .
are under no o b l i g a t i o n t o c o n t i n u e t h e convoys.

The PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t t h e d r a f t message t o blr. S t a l i n would
r e q u i r e some r e v i s i o n .
I t must b e remembered t h a t t h e R u s s i a n General
S t a f f a r e making p l a n s on t h e assumption t h a t t h e m u n i t i o n s c a l l e d f o r
i n t h e P r o t o c o l w i l l be a v a i l a b l e . I n j u s t i c e t o them, t h e y s h o u l d know
j u s t what i s i n t e n d e d . lie asked how a 2.4yL p e r month l o s s r a t e would
r e l a t e t o t h e 700,000 t o n s l o s s of s h i p p i n g p e r y e a r .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d he t h o u g h t t h e l o s s r a t e o f 2.4% would reduce
t h e l o s s e s i n s h i p p i n g t o less t h a n 700,000 t o n s . He r e c a l l e d t h e Prime
: v ! i n i s t e r ' s h a v i n g s a i d b e f o r e t h e Eouse o f Commons t h a t i f o u r l o s s e s
c o u l d be r e d u c e d below 500,000 t o n s p e r y e a r , t h e s h i p p i n g s i t u a t i o n
would be s a t i s f a c t o r y .
The PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t t h e s h i p p i n g s i t u a t i o n i s bound t o
i m p r o v e d u r i n g t h e c o m i n g y e a r as a r e s u l t o f n e a r l y d o u b l i n g t h e
158
U~ S, SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
c o n s t r u c t i o n program a n d by r e a s o n o f t h e more e f f e c t i v e a n t i s u b m a r i n e
measures which are t o be taken.

A D M I M I KING a g r e e d w i t h t h i s and s a i d t h a t t h e g r e a t l o s s e s on
t h e e a s t e r n c o a s t o f t h e United S t a t e s were p o s s i b l e i n l a r g e measure

because of a l a c k o f e f f e c t i v e means to combat t h e submarines. H e s a i d
t h a t g r e a t improvement h a s been made i n t h i s r e s p e c t .
The PRIME MINISTER s u g g e s t e d t h a t i t s h o u l d be decided t h a t if
t h e s h i p p i n g s i t u a t i o n i s b e t t e r t h a n we e x p e c t , we s h a l l c o n t i n u e t h e
40-day convoy t h r o u g h o u t O p e r a t i o n HUSKY, b u t t h a t w e s h o u l d n o t commit
o u r s e l v e s e i t h e r way. He s a i d t h a t , w h i l e i t might be p o s s i b l e t o con
t i n u e t h e convoys, t h e y must be s t o p p e d if t h e l o s s e s are t o o g r e a t .
ADMIRAL K I N G suggested t h a t b e f o r e d e c i d i n g on d i s c o n t i n u i n g the

convoys, t h e s i t u a t i o n should be reviewed as of t h e f i r s t of May.
OPERATIONS I N THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The d i s c u s s i o n t h e n t u r n e d t o O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
The PRIME MINISrER s a i d he w i s h e d t o s e t t h e t a r g e t d a t e as t h e
p e r i o d of t h e f a v o r a b l e J u n e moon r a t h e r t h a n t h a t o f J u l y .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e m a t t e r o f t r a i n i n g must b e con
s i d e r e d as w e l l as o t h e r f e a t u r e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s
f o r O p e r a t i o n HUSKY. He s a i d t h a t a l l t r a i n i n g and p r e p a r a t i o n s must b e
scheduled, and t h a t i f an i m p o s s i b l e or improbable t a r g e t d a t e was set
and then l a t e r changed t o one t h a t was p r a c t i c a b l e , a l l of t h e schedules
would be o u t of a d j u s t m e n t
T h i s might result i n compromising o u r s e l v e s
with r e g a r d t o e v e r y a s p e c t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n . The s u b j e c t of t h e t a r g e t
d a t e had been q u i t e e x h a u s t i v e l y s t u d i e d , a n d i t i s g o i n g t o be d i f f i c u l t
t o mount O p e r a t i o n HUSKY w i t h p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d f o r c e s even i n J u l y .
The PRESIDENT asked i f t h e f i x i n g o f t h e t a r g e t d a t e i n J u l y was
made on t h e assumption t h a t t h e Axis f o r c e s would be d r i v e n from T u n i s i a
by t h e end of A p r i l . He a s k e d what t h e e f f e c t would be i f t h e y were t o
be e l i m i n a t e d from A f r i c a by t h e end of hlarch.
GENERAL MARSHAIL r e p l i e d t h a t s u c c e s s i n T u n i s i a a t t h e end o f
March would improve t h e s i t u a t i o n somewhat b u t was n o t t h e l i m i t i n g f a c
t o r . The l i m i t i n g f a c t o r w a s o n t h e n a v a l s i d e w i t h r e s p e c t t o o r g a n i z i n g
159
SECRFT
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R F T
U
S.
crews and a s s e m b l i n g l a n d i n g c r a f t . A f t e r t h i s h a s been accomplished,

t h e n a v a l crews and l a n d i n g c r a f t must b e made a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e t r a i n
i n g of t h e t r o o p s . He s a i d t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n i n T u n i s i a might r e s u l t i n
d e l a y i n g O p e r a t i o n HliMKY b u t t h a t an e a r l i e r s u c c e s s t h e r e would n o t
h e l p i n movirg t h e t a r g e t d a t e f o r w a r d .
ACMIFAL ICIFC s a i d i t was a q u e s t i o n a s t o whether t h e a s s a u l t on
S i c i l y s h o u l d be made by p a r t i a l l y or f u l l y t r a i n e d f o r c e s .
The PRLSIiXb'T s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n might be e a s i e r than
O p e r a t i o n TOFCH i n view of t h e b e t t e r weather f o u n d i n t h e Nediterranean.
IQPD MOWlllATTEh' s a i d t h a t t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f t h e HUSKY Operation

w a s n o t i n t h e w e a t h e r b u t t h e e x c e l i e n c e t h a t might be expected i n the
e nemy s d e f e n s e s
GE:.E!ERBZ, MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t some of t h e e r r o r s t h a t had been
made i n t h e T O n C H o p e r a t i o n t h r o u g h l a c k of adequate t r a i n i n g , Some of

t h e l a n d i n g b o a t s went t o t h e wrong p l a c e . One Ranger u n i t had t h e
m i s s i o n o f t a k i n g a s h o r e b a t t e r y and c l e a r i n g a c e r t a i n a r e a . I t actu
a l l y landed 18 m i l e s away from i t s o b j e c t i v e .

The PFESIDEhT s a i d he thought t h i s m i @ t have been t h e r e s u l t of
poor n a v i g a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n a l a c k of adequate t r a i n i n g .
GENEFAL MAPSHALL r e p l i e d t h a t w h i l e we d o have d i v i s i o n s w i t h
a m p h i b i o u s t r a i n i n g , we d o n o t have t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t o r c r e w s - . The
c r a f t must b e b u i l t a n d t h e c r e w must be t r a i n e d
The PFIME MIKISTER a g r e e d t h a t r e n e r a l h ! a r s h a l l ' s p o i n t t h a t the
t a r g e t d a t e f o r HUSKY d i d n o t depend on t h e T u n i s i a n o p e r a t i o n s b u t
r a t h e r on the n e c e s s i t y o f t r a i n i n g was a good o n e .
He s a i d , however, t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e t o s e n d t h e i r overseas
a s s a u l t f o r c e which has a c a p a c i t y of 7 b r i g a d e groups t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY- He had b e e n t o l d t h a t t h i s c o u l d n o t l e a v ? England
u n t i l March 1 4 t h and then must undergo some t r a i n i n g i n t h e e a s t e r n Medi
t e r r a n e a n . . He s a i d h e f e l t s u r e t h a t t h e f o r c e c o u l d be s e n t e a r l i e r . In
t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , LORE LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t he had b e e n informed
that i t c o u l d b e s e n t by t h e end of F e b r u a r y .
160
U. S. SECQET
SeITISi' MOST SECrlET
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t t h i s would he done. lie t h e n d i s
cussed t h e q u e s t i o n of n a v i g a t i o n . When o p e r a t i o n s of t h e importance of
HUSKY a r e t o he undertaken, no e f f o r t should be s p a r e d t o o b t a i n capable
n a v i g a t o r s . He s u g g e s t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of combing t h e navy, p a r t i c u
l a r l y t h e "R"
c l a s s b a t t l e s h i p s , w i t h t h e purpose of s e t t i n g up a s p e
c i a l group of n a v i g a t o r s .
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t s k i l l e d n a v i g a t o r s could n o t he taken
from t h e navy without s e r i o u s e f f e c t s and, i n any e v e n t , t h e y would have
t o he supplemented by i n e x p e r i e n c e d men and t h e t r a i n i n g p e r i o d c o u l d
not t h e r e f o r e be s h o r t e n e d .
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t he f e a r e d t h e gap of perhaps f o u r
months d u r i n g t h e summer when no U . S. o r B r i t i s h troops would be i n
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e Germans.
The PRESIDENT agreed and s a i d t h a t t h i s gap might have a s e r i o u s
e f f e c t a l l over t h e world.
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f had e x
amined t h e t i m i n g of t h e o p e r a t i o n most c a r e f u l l y . September was t h e
f i r s t d a t e t h a t had been put forward and t h i s t h e y had r e j e c t e d . F u r t h e r

s t u d y had brought t h e d a t e back t o t h e end of August. The Combined C h i e f s
of S t a f f had t h e n p u t on t h e same k i n d of p r e s s u r e t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t
and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r were now a p p l y i n g , w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t J u l y had
been t e n t a t i v e l y f i x e d , though August remained a more l i k e l y d a t e . He
was i n agreement w i t h General Marshall t h a t t o t r y and f i x t o o e a r l y a
d a t e would p r e j u d i c e t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s . I t was i m p o s s i b l e t o s h o r t e n t h e
loading p e r i o d , and t h u s t h e o n l y p r o c e s s off which time might b e lopped
was t r a i n i n g . I f t h i s were c u r t a i l e d , t h e r e s u l t m i g h t he d i s a s t r o u s .
The PRIME MINISTER thought t h a t by i n t e n s e e f f o r t s t h e l o a d i n g
might be a c c e l e r a t e d . S i m i l a r l y i f l a n d i n g c r a f t now employed i n main
t a i n i n g t h e 8 t h Army could be r e c o v e r e d f o r t h w i t h , t r a i n i n g m i g h t s t a r t
e a r l i e r . A l l t h e s e p o i n t s must h e r i g o r o u s l y examined b e f o r e t h e J u l y
d a t e could be a c c e p t e d .
GENERAL MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i f t h e d a t e were t o b e made

e a r l i e r , i t would have t o he by a complete f o u r weeks u n l e s s t h e added
r i s k s of rroonlight were a c c e p t a b l e .
161
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
T h e PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t t h e p r e s e n t p r o p o s a l s were b a s e d on a
l a r g e number of f a c t o r s which might well prove c o r r e c t , b u t w h i c h were

e s t i m a t e s . Another e s t i m a t e which must be t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t was t h e
s t a t e of morale i n I t a l y , which r e c e n t r e p o r t s showed t o be d e t e r i o r a t
i n g . If t h i s p r o c e s s c o n t i n u e d , t h e Germans might be f a c e d w i t h an I t a l y
i n r e v o l t , a n d i t w o u l d t h e n be e s s e n t i a l for us t o have our p r e p a r a t i o n s
f a r enough advanced t o b e a b l e t o a c t , n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n S i c i l y but
p e r h a p s i n S a r d i n i a , o r even i n I t a l y . For t h i s r e a s o n he would l i k e t o
s e t t h e d a t e of t h e o p e r a t i o n i n June, i t b e i n g understood t h a t i t might

have t o be c a r r i e d o u t i n J u l y i f t h e enemy's s t r e n g t h remained as a t
present.
GENERAL MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t o b r i n g back t h e d a t e a t the
expense of adequate p r e p a r a t i o n would n o t make i t any e a s i e r t o s t a g e an
i m p r o v i s e d o p e r a t i o n d u r i n g t h e i n t e r v e n i n g months. T h e t r o o p s would
have b e e n moved i n t o p l a c e q u i t e e a r l y i n t h e p r e p a r a t o r y p e r i o d , s o
t h a t t h e y would be s t a n d i n g ready i f r e q u i r e d .
SIR ALAN BROOKE a g r e e d and p o i n t e d o u t t h a t we s h o u l d probably
g e t some advance i n d i c a t i o n of an I t a l i o n c o l l a p s e which would enable us
t o speed up t h e lau&hing of a smaller f o r c e . I t would be q u i t e wrong t o
r i s k a c o s t l y f a i l u r e by unduly c u r t a i l i n g t h e p e r i o d of p r e p a r a t i o n .
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t General Marshall was p l e a d i n g f o r
t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e o p e r a t i o n , and t h e arguments which he had employed
were most c o n v i n c i n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he was n o t h i m s e l f y e t corlvinced
t h a t t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e o p e r a t i o n c o u l d n o t be maintained w i t h a June
d a t e . Some q u i c k e r methods might be found of moving t r o o p s i n t o p l a c e .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h i s a l s o had been examined. He pointed
o u t t h a t t h e p e r i o d a f t e r t h e f a l l of Tunis would n o t be one of i n a c t i v
i t y , as a growing a i r bombardment of I t a l y would be launched. We ought
t o p l a c e o u r s e l v e s i n a p o s i t i o n t o do t h e hard o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t S i c i l y
while b e i n g r e a d y t o improvise if t h e enemy weakened. The i n i t i a l land
i n g i n S i c i l y w a s o n a l a r g e r s c a l e t h a n had been envisaged for Operation
ROUNDUP.
The PRESIDENT i n q u i r e d whether any easement could be secured if
t h e Spanish s i t u a t i o n c l e a r e d s t i l l f u r t h e r d u r i n g t h e S p r i n g .
162
0 S SECRET
B R I T I S B ,MOST S E C R E T
GEFERAL MARSHAIL s a i d that i n any c a s e t h e t r o o p s s t a n d i n g ready
t o move i n t o S p a n i s h Morocco wouldbe s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t r a i n i n g for S i c i l y
ADMIRAL KIKG s a i d t h a t one o f t h e innimierable item; which had t o
b e considered
j ~ nt
h i s o p e r a t i o n was t,he p r o v i s i o n of armored l a n d i n g
c r a f t , which he and Lord 1,ouis broiJntbatteri a g r e e d were e s s e r i t , i a l

o f t.liese was a t p r e s e n t a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e
TI.
S..
None
f o r c e s . lie a g r e e d t,hat
the i d e a l method o'f launching t h e o p e r a t i o n would be t o f o l l o w i n on t h e

h e e l s of t h e Germens f l e e i n g f'rm T u i i i s . !:e was coiivinced, however,
that
t h e c l o s e s t we c o u l d come t o this i d e a l w e s J u l y . I:e would have l i k e d

J u n e , b u t f e l t i t i m p o s s i b l e t,o n r o m i s e such a d a t e .
The PRESIELFT s a i d t h a t t h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t was t o r e t a i n a
f l e x i b l e mind i n t h e m a t t e r s o t h a t , a d v a n t a g e c o u l d b e t a k e n of e v e r y
opportunity
GLFEPAI, 4lAI?CtiBLL s a i d t,hat he iiad f'el t ritiinrrassed over t h e d a t e

of
t h i s
o p e r a t i o r , remembering a s
iie
d i d the i n c e n t i v e wiiicli h a d e x i s t e d
f o r hast,enirrg TCFCI' j u v i e w of t , i e I:. . C ~ . elecl.inris. In siiit,c
(if
that, it
had n o t proved p o s s i b l e t o advaricc, the dat,e.

F s a i d tiiere had b e e r ! nnicti admiration j ~ nFngland
The PT;T!% i i I h T
o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h c i e l e c t , i o n iiad !lot b c e n a l l o w e d t,o infl~iiericei n (fie
s 1 i p ; h t e s t t,he c o u r s e of m i l i t a r j e v e n t s .
A f t e r sor!c f u r t h e r d i : < c n s s i o n , i l was agreed t h a t :
( a ) O?erarioris f o r t,he C a ~ . t n r eof S i c i l y :

T h e ,July dat,e stiniild s t a r i d s u i j j w t t o an i n s t , r i i c t j o n t.hat i n the.
next t,hree weeks, w i t t ? o i i t , p r e j u d i w L o tiie . J u l y d a t e , t l i e r c s h o u l d be
all
i n t , e n s e e f f o r t , made t o t r y and aci;ieve t i i e f a v o r a l i l e ,?line m o m a s t h e

da.te of' t h e o p e r a t , i o n
co:ild
i f at. t.tir pnd of t.Iiis t , h r e e weeks.
ti,(. ,inrle t i a t # :
h e f i x e d , General k i s c n h o w e r ' s i n s t r l l c t i n n s c o u l d b e modified i o
conform
( b ) Cover P l a n s :
'i'lic r?'Ii:L ~:IYILTT' siiggest,ed t,iiat !~orP-a5 S ~ i < J ? I ~a dg a i n p l a y a p w t
i n t h e c o v ~ rp l a n s .
::In bLAt: EI:Oi!HL poiritrri out, t h a t i t mjglrt b e awkirzard f o r t h e

t i u s s i a n convoys i f we gave tile (;ermarr; cause f o r r e i n f o r c i u g Korlvay
thought t h a t m c h t h e b e s t cover w o l r l d be give1, by t,he a c t i v e p r e p a r a t i o n s
S . SECRET
B R I T I S R NOST S E C R E T
g o i n g on a l l o v e r t h e N o r t h A f r i c a n s h o r e . T h e s e would n o t o n l y d i s
g u i s e t h e o b j e c t i v e , b u t would c a u s e d i s p e r s i o n o f enemy f o r c e s .
The PR.ESIRENT t h o u g h t t h a t t h e c r e a t i o n of G e n e r a l C,iraud's
F r e n c h army might a l s o p l a y a p a r t i n making t h e enemy t h i n k t h a t the
s o u t h e r n c o a s t of F r a n c e was o u r o b j e c t i v e .
( c ) Command of
t h e Mediterranean Theater:
The PEIME VIFISTER s a i d t h a t he t h o u g h t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s had

b e e n v e r y g e n e r o u s and broad-minded
i n t h e command a r r a n g e m e n t s " He
t h o u g h t t h a t t h e most n a t u r a l method of procedure would be a t t h e appro

p r i a t e moment t o announce t h a t t h e 8 t h A r m y , on e n t e r i n g T u n i s i a , had
p a s s e d under t h e commandof General Eisenhower, and t h a t C e n e r a l Alexander
had been a p p o i n t e d a s h i s deputy.
( d ) The Bomber O f f e n s i v e f r o m E o r t h A f r i c a :
The PRIM3 VIFIIETER t h o u g h t t h a t i t would b e a d v i s a b l e t o main
t a i n t h e t h r e a t of bombardment a g a i n s t Rome, b u t t h a t i t s h o u l d not
a c t u a l l y be c a r r i e d o u t w i t h o u t f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i o n .
The PRESIDENT a g r e e d .
4
OPERATIONS
I N A" FROM
'rm UKITZI?
KJFFTOM.
( b ) BOLERO:
The PRIME MINISTLE t h o u g h t t h a t i t was v e r y d i s a p p o i n t i n g t h a t
K. by August
1 5 t h . He i n q u i r e d whether by u s i n g the Queens, t h e number f o r September
t h e r e would o n l y b e 4 11. S. d i v i s i o n s e q u i p p e d i n t h e U.
c o u l d n o t b e achieved i n August.
GENERAL SOMER\'EI,I, s a i d t h a t t h e 1 , i m i t i n g f e c t o r i n t h e f i r s t
h a l f o f t h e y e a r was c a r g o s h i p s , and in t h e second h a l f of t h e year i t
w a s p e r s o n n e l s h i p s , To move more men o v e r i n t h e f i r s t h a l f would only

r e s u l t i n t h e i r a r r i v i n g i n E n g l a n d w i t h no e q u i p m e n t , and t h u s t h e i r
t r a i n i n g would b e i n t e r r u p t e d . The Queens were a l l f u l l y employed i n
v a r i o u s p a r t s of t h e w o r l d .
GENETiAL MAPSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e f i g u r e s i n t h e t a b l e were
a minimum, and t h e
4 d i v i s i o n s shown f o r August 1 5 t h would p r o b a b l y
b e 19 r a t h e r t h a n 15. Allowance had t o be m a d e i n t h e e a r l y build-up for

t h e A i r Corps p e r s o n n e l
U S SECRET
The PRIME MINISTER i n q u i r e d whether t h e i n i t i a l equipment of 8
t o n s p e r man, and t h e m a i n t e n a n c e c f 1 . 3 t o n s p e r man p e r month, c o u l d
not be reduced; s i m i l a r l y , c o u l d n o t s a v i n g s be made on r e s e r v e s and on
v e h i c l e s . For t h e t y p e of o p e r a t i o n s which would be u n d e r t a k e n i n F r a n c e
i n 1913, a b i g advance was n o t l i k e l y . F i g h t i n g men f o r t h e beaches were

the prime e s s e n t i a l .
GEhTRAL SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e rate of b u i l d
up had been made on t h e b a s i s o f one t o n p e r man p e r month. The o t h e r
f a c t o r s m e n t i o n e d b y t h e Prime M i n i s t e r had a l s o been t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t ,
and e v e r y t h i n g would be d o n e t o r e d u c e a n y u n n e c e s s a r y volume t o b e
t r a n s p o r t e d . He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e was a 45-day i n t e r v a l between t h e
a r r i v a l o f a d i v i s i o n and i t s a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r operations; t h u s , the
d i v i s i o n s which were shown a s b e i n g a v a i l a b l e on August 15th would have
s a i l e d b y J u l y 1 s t . If t h e B r i t i s h could l e n d a d d i t i o n a l c a r g o s h i p p i n g
i n the e a r l y p a r t of t h e y e a r , t h e flow of t r o o p s c o u l d be i n c r e a s e d
The PRIME MINISTER s a i d t h a t i t w a s i n t h e e a r l y p a r t o f t h e year
t h a t t h e B r i t i s h s h i p p i n g s h o r t a g e would be most a c u t e " H e s u g g e s t e d
t h a t i t s h o u l d be r e c o r d e d t h a t t h e f i g u r e s shown i n t h e r e p o r t were a
minimum and t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t would be made t o i n c r e a s e them
( c ) Amphibious C p e r a t i o n s i n 1 % 3 from t h e U . K
The PRIME MINISTER s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e word " v i g o r o u s l y " s h o u l d
be i n s e r t e d b e f o r e t h e word " e x p l o i t i n g " i n s u b p a r a g r a p h ( 2 ) of t h i s
s e c t i o n o f t h e r e p o r t . T h i s was a g r e e d t o .
The PRESIDENT i n q u i r e d w h e t h e r a n o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e B r e s t
P e n i n s u l a c o u l d n o t be s t a g e d i n s t e a d of a g a i n s t C h e r b o u r g - The advan
t a g e s of t h e former were v e r y much g r e a t e r . He a l s o i n q u i r e d a b o u t t h e
d a t e proposed f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n s .
LORD MUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d that t h e d a t e f o r t h e Channel I s l a n d

o p e r a t i o n s had b e e n chosen s o as t o f i t i n w i t h O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
A dif
f i c u l t y had a r i s e n i n t h a t t h e armored c r a f t r e q u i r e d b y t h e Americans

f o r HUSW would have t o come from t h e B r i t i s h Channel A s s a u l t F o r c e
t e l e g r a m had been s e n t t o t h e Admiralty a s k i n g t h a t the o u t p u t of t h e s e

c r a f t s h o u l d be doubled s o a s t o produce 160 more i n t h e n e x t four months
T h i s m i g h t be done p r o v i d e d 400 a d d i t i o n a l S c r i p p s F o r d c o n v e r s i o n
165
U: S
SECRET
e n g i n e s were a l l o c a t e d t o t h e U., K., from t h e U % A ,
Ile u n d e r s t o o d t h i s
p o i n t was under i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
The PRESIDENT i n q u i r e d whether some Ford t a n k e n g i n e s could not
b e produced and t a k e n b y a i r t r a n s p o r t from t h e U , . S . A . t o t h e U . K , He
u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h e e n g i n e was much t h e same.
GENERAL SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t t h e r e was a d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e engines,
though t h e same f a c i l i t i e s were r e q u i r e d t o produce b o t h . Ile could not
a t present s t a t e the production p o s s i b i l i t i e s .

The FRIME MINISTER s u g g e s t e d t h a t some r e d u c t i o n o f t a n k engine
o u t p u t c o u l d be a c c e p t e d if n e c e s s a r y .
SIR ALAN BROOKE a g r e e d .
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t resources
would o n l y p e r m i t of a n i n i t i a l a s s a u l t b y 2 b r i g a d e g r o u p s w i t h a n i m
m e d i a t e f o l l o w up o f one b r i g a d e g r o u p and some armor. T h i s c o u l d only
b e i n c r e a s e d w i t h U.. S . h e l p .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t a l l a v a i l a b l e U. S . r e s o u r c e s would be
d e v o t e d t o O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
On t h e q u e s t i o n o f command t h e PmSIDENT i n q u i r e d whether suf

f i c i e n t d r i v e would be a p p l i e d if o n l y a Chief of S t , a f f were appointed.
H e hoped t h e r e would n o t b e a l o n g d e l a y b e f o r e a Supreme Commander was
selected
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d he u n d e r s t o o d i t was a q u e s t i o n o f the
a v a i l a b i l i t y of t h e r i g h t man
SIR ALAN BROOKE t h o u g h t t h a t t h e C h i e f o f S t a f f , i f a man w i t h
t h e r i g h t q u a l i t i e s were c h o s e n , c o u l d d o what w a s n e c e s s a r y i n the
early stages
Tne PRIME MINISTER s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n any c a s e an American Deputy
t o t h e Supreme Commander s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d .
S I R ALAN BROOKE a n d GENERAL MARSHALT, a g r e e d

The PRESIDENT s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e o f t h i s s e c t i o n
s h o u l d be p m i t t e d . T h i s was a g r e e d t o .
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BRITISH MOST SECRET
5.
PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER.

The PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t he was d i s t u r b e d t o f i n d t h a t t h i s sec
t i o n c o n t a i n e d no r e f e r e n c e t o o p e r a t i o n s i n o r from China. O p e r a t i o n s
i n Burma, though d e s i r a b l e , would n o t have t h e d i r e c t e f f e c t upon t h e
Chinese which was n e c e s s a r y t o s u s t a i n and i n c r e a s e t h e i r war e f f o r t
Similarly, an island-to-island
advance a c r o s s t h e P a c i f i c would t a k e t o o
long t o reduce the Japanese power. Some o t h e r m e t h o d o f s t r i k i n g a t Japan

must be found. The o p p o r t u n i t y was p r e s e n t e d by Japari's
tion.
shipping s i t u a
She began t h e war w i t h 6,000,000 t o n s . I n t h e f i r s t y e a r o f t h e
war 1,000,000 t o n s n e t had been sunk, l e a v i n g h e r w i t h 5,000,000, When

thZs was reduced t o 4,000,000, J a p a n would be h a r d p r e s s e d t o m a i n t a i n
her g a r r i s o n i n t h e c h a i n of i s l a n d s s t r e t c h i n g a l l t h e way from Burma
t o N e w Guinea and would have t o s t a r t p u l l i n g i n h e r l i n e s . The most
e f f e c t i v e weapon a g a i n s t s h i p p i n g was t h e submarine, and t h e U . S, sub
m a r i n e s were a c h i e v i n g n o t a b l e r e s u l t s . T h e r e was a n o t h e r method o f
s t r i k i n g a t t h e J a p a n e s e s h i p p i n g , and t h a t was by a t t a c k i n g t h e r o u t e s
running c l o s e t o t h e A s i a t i c s h o r e from Korea down t o Siam. T h i s c o u l d
be done by a i r c r a f t o p e r a t i n g from China. He t h o u g h t t h a t 200 a i r c r a f t
should be o p e r a t i n g i n China by A p r i l . They c o u l d spend most o f t h e i r
time i n a t t a c k s on s h i p p i n g , b u t o c c a s i o n a l l y t h e y c o u l d make a s p e c i a l
r a i d on Japan. There seemed t o be two methods of a c h i e v i n g t h i s o b j e c t :
e i t h e r t h e p l a n e s c o u l d be b a s e d and m a i n t a i n e d i n China o r e l s e t h e y
could b e b a s e d i n I n d i a , moving t o China e a c h t i m e f o r a m i s s i o n , re
t u r n i n g t o t h e i r b a s e s i n I n d i a on c o m p l e t i o n An i n d i c a t i o n of t h e
shortage of J a p a n e s e s h i p p i n g was t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y were b u y i n g up
j u n k s t o r e p l a c e c o a s t a l s t e a m e r s , s o t h a t t h e y c o u l d employ t h e s e on
t h e i r maintenance r o u t e s .
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t he was f u l l y aware o f t h e need f o r r e
i n f o r c i n g t h e U . S. A i r Force i n China. One g r o u p o f a i r c r a f t was j u s t
p r e p a r i n g t o l e a v e t h e U.S.A.;
and h e would e x a m i n e , when h e g o t t o
India, t h e b e s t m e t h o d o f o p e r a t i n g t h e a i r c r a f t . He hoped t h a t e f f e c t i v e
o p e r a t i o n s would s t a r t b e f o r e A p r i l . I t s h o u l d be remembered, however,
t h a t t h e r e were l a r g e demands f o r t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t i n o t h e r t h e a t e r s ,
and t h e s e could n o t be n e g l e c t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he hoped t o have 135-150
t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s o p e r a t i n g on t h e India-China r o u t e b y t h e e n d o f t h e F a l l .
167
0. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H MOST. SECRET
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n o f t r a n s p o r t planes for
I n d i a competed w i t h u r g e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r HUSKY, and for cross-channel
o p e r a t i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he f e l t i t was v i t a l t o s t e p up t h e e f f o r t in
China, and t h i s would be done.
The PRIME MINISTER e x p r e s s e d h i s agreement w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
p r o p o s a l s . He s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e document s h o u l d now be r e c o n s i d e r e d by
t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f , and amendments a r i s i n g o u t of t h e present
d i s c u s s i o n s h o u l d b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n a f i n a l e d i t i o n . The docunent rould
t h e n f i t t i n g l y embody t h e r e s u l t s of a r e m e r k a b l e p e r i o d of s u s t a i n e d
work.
The PRESIDENT agreed w i t h t h i s p r o p o s a , and e x p r e s s e d h i s con
g r a t u l a t i o n s t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f on t h e r e s u l t s which they
had a c h i e v e d .
168
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C . C . S . 58th Meeting
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59th Meeting
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6 0 t h Meeting
C.C.S.
6 1 s t Meeting
C.C.S.
62nd Meeting
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63rd Meeting
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64th Meeting
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65th Meeting
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C.C.S. 68th Meeting

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5 5 t h Meeting

MINUTES o f Meeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp
on T h u r s d a y , J a n u a r y 14, 1943, a t 1030.
PRESENT
General G .
C . M a r s h a l l , USA
G e n e r a l S i r A l a n F. Brooke
Admiral E. J . King, USN

L t . G e n e r a l H. H. A r n o l d , USA
Pound
A i r C h i e f Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
P . A. P o r t a l
THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT
L t , General B. B. S o m e r v e l l , USA
Rear Admiral C. hl. Cooke, J r , USN
Brig. General A. C . Wedemeyer, USA
F i e l d hlarshal S i r John D i l l
Mountbat t e n
L t , General S i r H a s t i n g s L
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V. D y k e s
B r i g . General J . R. Deane, USA
169
Ismay
SECRET
S
GENEHAL MARSHALL, o u t l i n e d t h e broad problem f a c i n g t h e Combined

C h i e f s o f S t a f f as t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s between t h e two major
t h e a t e r s of war--the
A t l a n t i c (which i n c l u d e d f o r t h i s purpose t h e Med
i t e r r a n e a n ) and t h e P a c i f i c . H e s u g g e s t e d as a concept on which t o work

t h a t t h i s broad a l l o c a t i o n s h o u l d c o n s i s t o f 70 p e r c e n t i n t h e Atlantic
t h e a t e r and 30 p e r c e n t i n t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o h i s e s t i m a t e s we were at
p r e s e n t engaging o n l y 15 p e r c e n t o f our t o t a l r e s o u r c e s a g a i n s t t h e Jap
anese i n t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r , which f o r t h i s purpose i n c l u d e d t h e Indian
Ocean a n d Burma. I n h i s view t h i s was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o p r e v e n t Japan
c o n s o l i d a t i n g h e r s e l f and t h e r e b y p r e s e n t i n g u l t i m a t e l y t o o d i f f i c u l t a
problem. The J a p a n e s e were f i g h t i n g a d e l a y i n g a c t i o n i n t h e Solomon Is
l a n d s and digging i n a l o n g t h e whole l i n e of t h e Netherlands E a s t Indies
and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . They were s h i p p i n g back raw m a t e r i a l i n t o Japan as
f a s t as t h e y c o u l d , He f e l t t h a t b e f o r e t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
turned t o t h e discussion o f p a r t i c u l a r operations they should f i r s t fix
t h e general p r o p o r t i o n of e f f o r t t o be a p p l i e d i n t h e two main t h e a t e r s .
SIR ALAN BnOOKE s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n f i x i n g t h i s balance o f e f f o r t
between t h e two t h e a t e r s , i t would be wise f i r s t t o t r y and weigh up the
enemy s i t u a t i o n a s b o t h t h e U. S. and B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f saw i t . The
U. S. Chiefs of S t a f f would n a t u r a l l y know m o r e o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Japan
t h a n t h e B r i t i s h . H e e x p r e s s e d t h e a d m i r a t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of
S t a f f on t h e m a g n i f i c e n t work o f t h e U. S. F o r c e s d u r i n g t h e l a s t twelve
months a f t e r t h e e a r l y d i s a s t e r s o f t h e war a g a i n s t J a p a n , A t one t i m e
i t seemed as i f n o t h i n g would stem t h e t i d e of t h e J a p a n e s e , b u t t h e posi

t i o n was now v e r y d i f f e r e n t . The Japanese were d e f i n i t e l y on a defensive
b a s i s and *om i n t e l l i g e n c e r e c e i v e d i t appeared as i f t h e y were taking
q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t o u t l o o k on t h e war now from what t h e y had been some
months ago. They were w o r r i e d a b o u t t h e s i t u a t i o n o f t h e i r European
allies.
The s e c u r i t y of t h e United S t a t e s and t h e United Kingdom had al
ways been b a s i c f a c t o r s i n o u r s t r a t e g y . The t h r e a t t o t h e United King
dom had b e e n a t one time s e r i o u s , b u t as a r e s u l t o f o u r l a t e s t review
of t h i s danger i t was f e l t t h a t t h e f o r c e s i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom could

b e r e o r i e n t a t e d from a d e f e n s i v e t o a n o f f e n s i v e b a s i s . The greatest
d a n g e r a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e was t o our communications. The s h o r t a g e of
170
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BRITISH MOST SECRET
s h i p p i n g was a s t r a n g l e h o l d on a l l o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s and u n l e s s we
could e f f e c t i v e l y combat t h e U-boat menace, w e might n o t b e a b l e t o win
the war.
Germanys s i t u a t i o n was u n d o u b t e d l y d e v e l o p i n g f a v o r a b l y from
o u r p o i n t o f v i e w . She was s t a g g e r i n g u n d e r t h e f a i l u r e o f h e r s e c o n d
o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t i i u s s i a , a n d f k e l i n g must b e growing i n t h a t c o u n t r y t h a t
i t was i m p o s s i b l e f o r h e r t o d e f e a t i:ussia. Her s u c c e s s e s i n 1942 a g a i n s t
Russia had been v e r y much s m a l l e r i n s c a l e t h a n i n 1941. She had f a i l e d
i n h e r main o b j e c t o f t h e 1942 campaign, t h e c a p t u r e o f t h e Caucasus o i l .
By f a i l i n g t o c a p t u r e even t h e p o r t o f Tuapse, s h e had f a i l e d i n s e c u r ~ .
i n g t h e f a c i l i t i e s t o e x p o r t s u c h o i l a s s h e had c a p t u r e d a t Grozny,
Her n o r t h e r n f l a n k was i n danger as a l s o were t h e t r o o p s i n t h e Caucasus
salient.
The l t u s s i a n o f f e n s i v e had b e e n w e l l c a r r i e d o u t and had now
reached w i t h i n f i f t y m i l e s o f Llostov. Germany had o n l y two c o u r s e s open
t o h e r , e i t h e r t o push back t h e i l u s s i a n s i n t o S t a l i n g r a d , which would b e
almost i m p o s s i b l e d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r , o r t o s h o r t e n h e r l i n e . The l a t t e r ,
t h e r e f o r e , was t h e m o r e p r o b a b l e c o u r s e ; and t h a t would i n v o l v e r e v e r t i r g
t o t h e 1941 l i n e , The p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t o f t h i s w i t h d r a w a l would b e
v e r y s e r i o u s i n Germany.
Germany was t h u s on t h e d e f e n s i v e b o t h i n l i u s s i a a u d i n N o r t h
Africa.
I n t h e o p e r a t i o n s which had l e d t o t h e d e f e a t of t h e Germans i n
North A f r i c a a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h d e f e a t a t Tohruk v e r y g r e a t a s s i s t a n c e
had been g i v e n by t h e t i m e l y a r r i v a l o f American Sherman t a n k s and S . P
guns..
Germany was a l r e a d y h a v i n g t r o u b l e among h e r a l l i e s . The Xuman
i a n s had s u f f e r e d s e v e r e l y i n t h e C r i m e a b u t had been f o r c e d t o c a r r y on,
although g r e a t l y weakened i n s t r e n g t h . The I t a l i a n t r o o p s on t h e lcussian
f r o n t had a l s o s u f f e r e d heavy l o s s e s and t h e Hungarian f o r c e s , which had
never had much stomach f o r t h e f i g h t , were a l s o i n bad s h a p e - I t a l y was
becoming more and more shaky; a n d i f s h e c o l l a p s e d , Germany w o u l d n o t o n l y
have t o b o l s t e r up I t a l y b y s e n d i n g t r o o p s i n t o t h e c o u n t r y b u t would
a l s o have t o r e p l a c e t h e numerous German d i v i s i o n s i n Y u g o s l a v i a and i n

Greece. A l t e r n a t i v e l y s h e would have t o withdraw a l t o g e t h e r from t h e B a L
kans and I t a l y , a n d l e a v e i t open t o t h e A l l i e s .
171
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A l l i n d i c a t i o n s showed t h a t Germany's manpower was f a i l i n g and
t h a t some c a n n i b a l i z a t i o n of h e r d i v i s i o n s would have t o be c a r r i e d o u t .

The l a t e s t e s t i m a t e was t h a t s h e would l o s e t e n d i v i s i o n s i n t h i s way
d u r i n g t h e f i r s t q u a r t e r o f 1943. Lack o f o i l was a n o t h e r o f Germany's
major d i f f i c u l t i e s which would h i t h e r p a r t i c u l a r l y h a r d d u r i n g t h e next
s i x months.
Taking a l l t h e s e f a c t o r s i n t o a c c o u n t , i t seemed a t l e a s t possi-
b l e t h a t t h e p r e c a r i o u s i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n o f Germany might make i t pos
s i b l e t o a c h i e v e a f i n a l v i c t o r y i n t h e European t h e a t e r b e f o r e t h e end
o f 1943. The immediate problem was how b e s t t o a p p l y o u r a v a i l a b l e r e
s o u r c e s i n o r d e r t o t a k e advantage of Germany's p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n .
The means we had a t o u r d i s p o s a l were b r o a d l y t h r e e i n number.
F i r s t t h e r e was R u s s i a , which c o n s t i t u t e d t h e l a r g e s t l a n d power; h e r
e f f i c i e n c y was r i s i n g and t h e work of moving !:ussian manufacturing p l a t s
t o t h e eastward away from t h e German i n v a s i o n had been v e r y w e l l c a r r i e d
o u t , . R u s s i a ' s o i l s i t u a t i o n was now more s a t i s f a c t o r y t h a n had seemed
l i k e l y e a r l i e r i n t h e y e a r , b u t she was s h o r t of g r a i n . I n o r d e r t o g e t
t h e b e s t v a l u e o u t of i t u s s i a , we must support h e r i n e v e r y way we could.
Our second main weapon was a i r bombardment, by U. S. and B r i t i s h f o r c e s -
T h i s we must k x p l o i t t o t h e m a x i m u m . Our t h i r d means o f s t r i k i n g a t Ger

many was by amphibious o p e r a t i o n s wriich i n c l u d e d i n v a s i o n o f t h e Contin
ent
The p o s s e s s i o n o f s e a power e n a b l e d u s t o t h r e a t e n t h e enemy a t
s e v e r a l p o i n t s and t h e r e b y compel him t o d i s p e r s e h i s f o r c e s , . Once com

m i t e d t o a p o i n t o f e n t r y , however, t h e enemy would be a b l e t o c0ncen.h
t r a t e h i s f o r c e s a g a i n s t u s , and i t was t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r y t o choose

t h i s p o i n t of e n t r y w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t c a r e a t t h e p l a c e where t h e enemy
w a s l e a s t able t o concentrate larg e forces.
A s a p o i n t of r e e n t r y t o t h e C o n t i n e n t , France had great advan
t a g e s . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e t h e s e a - - c r o s s i n g was s h o r t , and w e had b e t t e r
f a c i l i t i e s f o r g i v i n g a i r s u p p o r t t o o u r i n v a s i o n . O n t h e o t h e r hand t h e
German d e f e n s e s i n t h i s a r e a were most s t r o n g and Germany's power of c o w
c e n t r a t i n g a g a i n s t u s was g r e a t e s t , A r e c e n t s t u d y had shown t h a t t h e
East--West communications a c r o s s t h e C o n t i n e n t e n a b l e d Germany t o move
seven d i v i s i o n s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f r o m t h e k s s i a n f r o n t t o t h e West i n about
twelve t o f o u r t e e n days. The North-South communications on t h e Continent
172
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were n o t n e a r l y s o good. Not more t h a n one d i v i s i o n a t a t i m e could be
moved from t h e N o r t h t o t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n f r o n t . The I t a l i a n r a i l w a y s
were c l o s e t o t h e c o a s t and v u l n e r a b l e t o i n t e r r u p t i o n from t h e sea, and

i n t h e Balkans t h e r e was o n l y a s i n g l e l i n e o f r a i l w a y p a s s i n g through
Nish. From this p o i n t of view, t h e r e f o r e , t h e Southern f r o n t seemed t o o f f e r
b e t t e r p r o s p e c t s f o r amphibious o p e r a t i o n s .
TORCH o p e r a t i o n s i n North Africa had been a n o u t s t a n d i n g example
of s u c c e s s f u l c o o p e r a t i o n between U. S. end B r i t i s h f o r c e s , a n d t h e B r i t
i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f wished t o e x p r e s s t h e i r a d m i r a t i o n of t h e v e r y a b l e
manner i n which General Eisenhower had overcome t h e e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t
problems w i t h which he had been f a c e d . h o r t h A f r i c a would p r o v i d e a val
uable base from which e i t h e r t o t h r e a t e n S o u t h e r n Europe o r t o undertake
o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s . By t h i s u s e w e c o u l d compel t h e Germans t o d i s p e r s e
t h e i r f o r c e s i n o r d e r t o r e i n f o r c e t h r e a t e n e d p o i n t s . I n t h i s way w e
could p r o b a b l y g i v e g r e a t e r a s s i s t a n c e t o R u s s i a t h a n i f w e committed
o u r s e l v e s d e f i n i t e l y t o N o r t h e r n F r a n c e . Once w e had c a p t u r e d B i z e r t e ,
we could p a s s merchant s h i p convoys through t h e X e d i t e r r a n e a n . T h e i r v e r y
passage would compel t h e Germans t o f i g h t i n the a i r , s i n c e i f t h e y l e t
them p a s s through u n m o l e s t e d t h e e f f e c t o f t h e i r U-boat o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t
our s h i p p i n g would b e l a r g e l y n u l l i f i e d . These a i r b a t t l e s a g a i n s t t h e

German A i r Force would be of t h e greatest importance. Already more t h a n
h a l f t h e German A i r Force was deployed on f r o n t s o t h e r t h a n t h e Hussian.,
I n a l l Mediterranean o p e r a t i o n s S p a i n , of c o u r s e , was a most i m
p o r t a n t f a c t o r . There must be a l w a y s some a n x i e t y t h a t S p a i n would c l o s e
t h e door behind u s , b u t a l l r e c e n t o p i n i o n tended t o show t h a t S p a i n was
t u r n i n g away from Germany a n d t h a t i t w a s a t l e a s t h i g h l y i m p r o b a b l e
t h a t she would e v e r g r a n t f r e e a c c e s s t o German f o r c e s . The more s u c c e s s e s
we had i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n t h e more l i k e l y i t was t h a t t h i s f a v o r a b l e
t e n d e n c y i n s p a i n would c o n t i n u e . Spain knew t h a t from t h e economic p o i n t
of view she must depend p r i m a r i l y on t h e A l l i e s . A g a i n s t t h i s t h e r e was,

of c o u r s e , t h e f e a r o f Communism i n Spain i f t h e A l l i e s were v i c t o r i o u s
and Aussia o v e r r a n Germany. G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , however, t h e f e e l i n g of
t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f was t h a t w e had no c a u s e f o r a n x i e t y a b o u t
Spain a t t h e p r e s e n t time.
Another i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n was Turkey' T h a t
c o u n t r y no doubt would e i t h e r t r y and keep o u t of t h e war a l t o g e t h e r o r
173
SECRET
S
a t l e a s t j o i n i n on t h e s i d e o f t h e A l l i e s o n f y a t t h e e l e v e n t h h o u r .
There were, however,
r e a s o n s t o hope t h a t i f w e l l h a n d l e d , Turkey might
be b r o u g h t i n e a r l i e r . A s an inducement we s h o u l d have to g i v e h e r equip

ment, t e c h n i c a l p e r s o n n e l and i n s t r u c t o r s . I t d i d n o t seem wise t o p r e s s
Turkey t o u n d e r t a k e an advance i n t o t h e B a l k a n s b u t r a t h e r t o h o l d her
p o s i t i o n and a f f o r d us b a s e s from which t o a t t a c k Germany, i n p a r t i c u l a r
t h e Xumanian o i l . lVe m i g h t a l s o obt,ain a f r e e p a s s a g e to t h e B l a c k Sea
as a n o t h e r means o f s t r i k i n g a t Germany.
Summing up p r o s p e c t s i n t h e European T h e a t e r , S I R ALAN BROOKE
s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f f e l t t h a t w e s h o u l d f i r s t expand
t h e bomber o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t t h e Axis t o t h e maximum and t h a t o p e r a t i o n s
i n t h e l e d i t e r r a n e a n o f f e r e d t h e b e s t chance o f c o m p e l l i n g Germany t o
d i s p e r s e h e r r e s o u r c e s , . K i t h t h i s end i n v i e w we s h o u l d t a k e as our immec.~.
i a t e o b j e c t i v e t h e knocking o u t o f I t a l y . A t t h e same t i m e , we should t r y
and b r i n g i n Turkey on our s i d e . . By t h i s means w e s h o u l d g i v e Germany no
r e s p i t e a t a l l i n 1943 a n d we s h o u l d g i v e t h e b e s t a i d t o H u s s i a , whom
we must c o n t i n u e t o s u p p l y w i t h a l l t h e equipment which we c o u l d send.,
The d i f f i c u l t y , o f c o u r s e , was t h a t many o f t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s were mutu..
a l l y exclusive
F o r example, t o s e n d l a r g e s u p p l i e s t o i t u s s i a u s e d up
g r e a t q u a n t i t i e s o f a v a i l a b l e e s c o r t v e s s e l s . . T h i s n a t u r a l l y c u t down
our c a p a c i t y t o u n d e r t a k e amphibious o p e r a t i o n s . A b a l a n c e would have t o

be s t r u c k between t h e s e v a r i o u s commitments, and we s h o u l d have t o f a c e
t h e necessity f o r accepting considerable l o s s e s i n shipping, providing
t h e s e p a i d a good d i v i d e n d .
W
e must be i n a p o s i t i o n t o t a k e advantage of a c r a c k i n Germany
i n t h e l a t e summer. There were a l r e a d y i n d i c a t i o n s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e Ger.
man w i t h d r a w a l s from F r a n c e t o t h e e a s t w a r d . If Germany were compelled
t o withdraw c o n s i d e r a b l e numbers of t r o o p s from F r a n c e , t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s
of a n i n v a s i o n a c r o s s t h e Channel would b e much g r e a t e r , . The e s t i m a t e o f

t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f s t a f f was t h a t by August 1943 t h e r e would be a v a i l . .
a b l e f o r c r o s s c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s some 13 B r i t i s h and 9 U.. S . d i v i s i o n s
w h e t h e r o r n o t we u n d e r t o o k l i m i t e d o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
Mediterranean o p e r a t i o n s , however, would produce o t h e r s h o r t a g e s , n o t a b l y
i n A s s a u l t S h i p p i n g ; a n d i t might b e d i f f i c u l t ,
if n o t i m p o s s i b l e ,
to
t r a n s f e r l a n d i n g c r a f t from t h e h l e d i t e r r a n e a n t o t h e United Kingdom o r t o

t h e Burma f r o n t i n time,
174
U . S. SECRET
BRITISB MOST SECRET
I n a l l amphibious o p e r a t i o n s t h e p r o v i s i o n o f l a n d i n g c r a f t w a s
the c r i t i c a l f a c t o r . Not o n l y had t h e crews t o be, provided b u t t h e n a v a l
crews t o man them h a d t o be t r a i n e d and t h e l a n d f o r c e s had t o b e t r a i n e d
t o work from them. This t r a i n i n g was a slow process.

The B r i t i s h l a n d i n g c r a f t r e s o u r c e s were b e i n g formed i n t o two
main f o r c e s , one earmarked f o r o p e r a t i o n s on t h e C o n t i n e n t and one f o r

o p e r a t i o n s f u r t h e r a f i e l d , such as Burma. As r e g a r d s o p e r a t i o n s i n Burma,
a l i m i t e d o f f e n s i v e was n.ow b e i n g u n d e r t a k e n w i t h the o b j e c t o f c a p t u r i n g
Akyab, on which t h e 1.4th I n d i a n 1Division was now c l o s i n g . O p e r a t i o n s
i n t k f North of Eurma p r e s e n t e d v e r y d i f f i c u l t l o g i s t i c a l problems owing
t o t h e absence o f r o a d s .
The c o m p l e t e c o n q u e s t o f Burma was a much b i g g e r problem, and
naval supremacy i n t k e Fa.y o f EengaJ w,ould be r q u i r e d f o r i t . I t would
be n e c e s s a r y t o uridertake s i n n i l t a n e n u s o f f e n s i v e s a g a i n s t Pangoon and
Moulmein s i n c e Pangoon c o u l d n o t b e t a k e n i f t h e 'Vooulmein a i r f i e l d s
were i n t h e hands o f t h e J a p s . P a i l communications between T h a i l a n d and
Burma were b e i n g improved and i t might be n e c e s s a r y t o e x t e n d t h e occu
p a t i o n o f Burma by g o i n g some d i s t a n c e i n t o T h a i l a n d a s w e l l . For t h i s
major o p e r a t i o n s e v e n d i v i s i o n s were b e i n g p r e p a r e d i n I n d i a ; and two
African d i v i s i o n s , one from t h e East andone from t h e West, c o u l d b e found,
both composed of seasoned n a t i v e t r o o p s w e l l adapted t o j u n g l e f i g h t i n g ,
I f t h e , Germans were compelled t o abandon t h e i r Caucasus o f f e n s i v e ' , t r o o p s

could a l s o be, found from I r a q and P e r s i a . T h e r e appeared, t h e r e f o r e , no
particular d i f f i c u l t y i n finding the land divisions; the d i f f i c u l t y l a y
r a t h e r i n t h e p r o v i s i o n o f the n e c e s s a r y n a v a l f o r c e s . I t must be real
i z e d , however,
t h a t once s t a r t e d o p e r a t i o m f o r t h e r e c a p t u r e of Burma
would d e v e l o p i n t o a f u l l - s c a l e campaign.
SIR DTJDLEY POUND s t a t e d t h a t i n t h e A t l a n t i c t h e g r e a t e s t con
c e r n s t o t h e Home F l e e t were: f i r s t , t o p r e v e n t a b r e a k - o u t of t h e Ger
man n a v a l f o r c e s ; a n d , s e c o r d , t o p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n for convoys t o N o r t h
Russia.
A t f i r s t , t h e W s s i a n convoys ditl n o t p r e s e n t any g r e a t d i f f i
c u l t y . T h e i r e a r l y s u c c e s s gave everyone a f a l s e s e n s e of s e c u r i t y . Ger
man i n t e r f e r e n c e , however, h a s been i n c r e a s i n g c o n s t a n t l y , c u l m i n a t i n g

with t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f t h e i r s u r f a c e v e s s e l s on t h e c o a s t o f Norway;
17.5
SECRET
B P I T I S H M O T d SECRET
Ll.
namely, t h e TIRPITZ, LUTZOW, HIPPER,
ECHAFA'HORSI',
and P R I N Z EUGEN, a l l of
which have now been completely r e p a i r e d . A f o r c e of 20 U-boats was main

t a i n e d i n n o r t h e r n w a t e r s , as well a s c o n s i d e r a b l e a i r f o r c e . The secur
i t y of R u s s i a n convoys is- a f f e c t e d c h i e f l y by t t e hours of d a r k n e s s and

the i c e l i m i t . For t h e next t h r e e m n t h s , t h e i c e l i m i t w i l l only permit
u t i l i z i n g a c h a n n e l a b o u t 220 m i l e s i n widtli whjch c a n b e k e p t under

c l o s e a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e by t h e , Germans. The p a s s a g e o c c u p i e s about
t w e l v e d a y s , and v e s s e l s a r e u n d e r a t t a c k a l l b u t two of them.
F o r t h e l a s t convoy of 1C. s t r i p s t h e r e were 12 e s c o r t v e s s e l s of

t h e c o r v e t t e t y p e and 4 d e s t r o y e r s . Two s i x - i n c h c r u i s e r s were employed
t o g i v e c o v e r a g a i n s t s u r f a c e a t t a c k ; t h e Commander o f t h e convoy had
p l a c e d t h e c r u i s e r s between t h e v e s s e l s b e i n g e s c o r t e d and t h e o p e r a t i o n a l
b a s e o f t h e German s u r f a c e v e s s e l s .
However,
t h e HIPPER and LUTZOW
a t t a c k e d from t h e o t h e r s i d e and came i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h t h e 4 B r i t i s h

d e s t r o y e r s . l l n t i l j o i n e d by t h e two c r u i s e r s , the d e s t r o y e r s prevented
a n a t t a c k on t h e convoy f o r some f o r t y minutes and drove t h e enemy ships
o u t o f gun r a n g e o f t h e convoy, a l t h o u g h one o f o u r d e s t r o y e r s and a
minesweeper were sunk. A s soon a s t h e c r u i s e r s app?,ared, t h e HIPPER and
LUTZOW withdrew. The Germans t h u s s a c r i f i c e d a s p l e n d i d o p p o r t u n i t y t o
e f f e c t some s e r i o u s damage on an i n f e r i o r f o r c e .
I t was f i r s t thought t h a t t h e German Admiral commanding had made

a n e r r o r i n judgment, b u t i t was l a t e r l e a r n e d t h a t he had r e c e i v e d orders
from t h e German a u t h o r i t i e s a s h a r e t o e x p e d i t e h i s withdrawal. T h i s would
seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e Germans a r e f o l l o w i n g a p o l i c y of preventing

t h e i r s h i p s from r e c e i v i n g any damage. I t c a n p o s s i b l y b e e x p l a i n e d by
t h e i r d e s i r e t o keep them i n t a c t p r e l i m i n a r y t o a b r e a k - o u t
i n t o the
Atlantic
SIR DUDLEY POUKSC s t a t e d t h a t b e f o r e s u c h a b r e a k - o u t i n t o t h e
A t l a n t i c c o u l d be e f f e c t e d , t h e Germans must s e n d o u t o i l e r s which w i l l
e n a b l e them t o r e f u e l a t s e a , s i n c e h e d o u b t e d i f t h e Germans would
a g a i n a t t e m p t t o r e t i r e t o B r e s t i n view of t h e i r p r e v i o u s experience
there
E u r i n g t h e months o f l o n g d a y l i g h t , t h e d a n g e r o f a i r a t t a c k
p r e c l u d e d t h e u s e o f c r u i s e r s w i t h t h e P u s s i a n convoys; and t h e i r e s c o r t s
c o n s i s t e d o n l y o f a powerful d e s t r o y e r f o r c e . Convoys can t h e n only be
176
U. S . SECRET
run e v e r y t h i r t y - s i x t o forty-two days. Twelve days are r e q u i r e d f o r t h e
j o u r n e y , t h r e e d a y s f o r r e f u e l i n g , twelve d a y s f o r t h e r e t u r n j o u r n e y ,
and t h e remainder f o r b o i l e r c l e a n i n g , e t c . The R o y a l Navy d o e s n o t httve
s u f f i c i e n t d e s t r o y e r s t o o p e r a t e two convoys s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I f , t h e r e
f o r e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o s e n d more t h a n t h i r t y s h i p s t o R u s s i a e v e r y
f o r t y d a y s , i t w i l l h e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e United S t a t e s t o f u r n i s h some
assistance i n escort vessels.
SIR DUDIEY POUND t h e n s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e t r a f f i c

between Japan and Germany, Japan sending t o Germany rubber and o t h e r raw
m a t e r i a l s o b t a i n e d i n t h e F a r E a s t i n r e t u r n f o r machinery and machine
parts.
I t was i m p o r t a n t t o s t o p t h i s t r a f f i c a t o n c e , T h e r e a r e two
p l a c e s from which t h i s c a n h e b e s t accomplished: f i r s t , i n t h e Bay o f

Biscay by a i r and submarine a c t i o n , and second, i n t h e A t l a n t i c narrows.
For t h e l a t t e r a B r i t i s h t a s k f o r c e was b e i n g b u i l t up on t h e e a s t s i d e
and a U . S. t a s k f o r c e was o p e r a t i n g from t h e United S t a t e s on t h e west
side
SIR DUDLEY POUND t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e I n d i a n

Ocean. I t had a t f i r s t been h o p e d t o c r e a t e a c o n s i d e r a b l e E a s t e r n F l e e t ,
but t h i s h a s been s e r i o u s l y reduced i n s i z e by TORCH and o t h e r opera
t i o n s ; and i t now a p p e a r s t h a t i t s remaining c a r r i e r , t h e I l l u s t r i o u s ,
may be needed f o r f u t u r e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n ~ If t h i s i s s o j
now w m l d h e an opportune t i m e t o withdraw i t from t h e I n d i a n Ocean f o r
r e p a i r s and t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f t h e most modern f i g h t e r d i r e c t i o n d e v i c e s
Without t h e p r o t e c t i o n of c a r r i e r a i r c r a f t , t h e E a s t e r n F l e e t i s u n a b l e
t o o p e r a t e i n t h e e a s t e r n p a r t of t h e I n d i a n Ocean a g a i n s t Japanese naval
f o r c e s accompanied by a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s .
I n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n a r e a , Admiral Cunningham h a s a f o r c e o f
t h r e e b a t t l e s h i p s and two a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s . One of t h e d u t i e s of t h i s
Task Force c o n s i s t s i n c o n t a i n i n g t h r e e modern I t a l i a n b a t t l e s h i p s which
are a t pr e se nt unlocated.
I n t h e Eastern Mediterranean, B r i t i s h naval
f o r c e s had b e e n h e a v i l y engaged i n t h e s u p p l y of t h e 8 t h A r m y i n t h e
E a s t e r n North A f r i c a n p o r t s . What t h e f u t u r e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e Medi
t e r r a n e a n n a v a l f o r c e s w i l l h e must h e b a s e d on t h e f u t u r e s t r a t e g y t o
be adopted.
SIR DUDLEY POUND t h e n d i s c i i s s e d t h e German U-boat s i t u a t i o n ,
A t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e t h e Germans have one hundred and t e n submarines i n
177
U. S . SECRET
B P I T I S H MOST SECRET
t h e A t l a n t i c i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o s e i n t h e Mediterranean and off t h e coast
of Norway. I t i s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t new p r o d u c t i o n w i l l go t o t h e A t l a n t i c .
T h e Germans a r e a p p a r e n t l y c o n c e n t r a t i n g t h e i r submarines i n t o
l a r g e g r o u p s , e a c h o f which i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a c e r t a i n a r e a . One of
t h e s e has b e e n l o c a t e d o f f t h e c o a s t of hewfoundland, one i n t h e Central
A t l a n t i c , and one o f f Southwest I r e l a n d . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a convoy may
a t any time b l u n d e r i n t o a pack of German submarines i f our i n t e l l i g e n c e
is a t f a u l t .
R e c e n t l y t h e r e were two convoys from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , each
a t t a c k e d b y a c o n s i d e r a b l e number o f German submarines, one convoy l o s i n g
two v e s s e l s and t h e o t h e r l o s i n g none. T h i s w a s a c c o m p l i s h e d by pro
v i d i n g a i r c o v e r a g e f o r t h e convoys w i t h L i b e r a t o r a i r p l a n e s n h i c h r e
s u l t e d i n keeping t h e U-boats down d u r i n g t h e day. While t h e y were down,
t h e convoys were a b l e t o a l t e r t h e i - c o u r s e and, by n i g h t f a l l , l e a v e the
submar i n e s behind.
SIR DUDLEY F'OUND t h e n d e s c r i b e d an experiment which had been made
owing t o s h o r t a g e of e s c o r t s due t o TORCH,
i n sending cargo v e s s e l s
bound f o r Freetown o u t w i t h a t r a n s - A t l a n t i c convoy, t h e v e s s e l s bound

f o r Freetown b r e a k i n g o f f from t h e convoy a t a s u i t a b l e moment and pro
c e e d i n g t o t h e i r d e s t i n a t i o n independently. The experiment was unsuccess
f u l and t h e l o s s amounted t o t e n p e r c e n t . S e v e n t e e n o u t of f o r t y - f o u r
s h i p s were l o s t i n one convoy. The B r i t i s h h a v e , t h e r e f o r e ,
found i t
n e c e s s a r y t o resume t h e Freetown convoys.

SIR DUDLEY POUND s t a t e d t h a t e s c o r t s t o convoys must b e s u f f i
c i e n t l y l a r g e t o d e a l w i t h a heavy a t t a c k . H e s a i d o u r aim must b e t o
g e t a long-range a i r p r o t e c t i o n and a d d i t i o n a l e s c o r t v e s s e l s . He added
t h a t i t would be d e s i r a b l e t o o b t a i n more long-range a i r c r a f t p r o t e c t i o n
t o e s c o r t s from t h e United S t a t e s .
SIR DUDLEY WUND i n d i c a t e d t h a t we must make s p e c i a l e f f o r t s t o
p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e p r o t e c t i o n i n t h e e a r l y p a r t o f 1943 i n o r d e r t h a t we
may be a b l e t o meet t h e g r e a t demands i n t h e b u i l d - u p of BOLERO
i n the
l a t t e r p a r t of t h e year.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e a i r s i t u a t i o n . He s t a t e d
t h a t our e x p e r i e n c e so f a r has been t h a t t h e German o p e r a t i o n s are d e f i
n i t e l y t i e d up w i t h t k e adequacy of t h e i r a i r power. H e f e l t t h a t t h i s
178
IT. S. SECQET
BRITISH VOST SKCPVT
w i l l be as t r u e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e German d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s as i t h a s
been i n t h e i r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t ions
The p r e s e n t s t a t e o f t h e German a i r f o r c e is c r i t i c a l . The s t a m i n a
of t h e a i r p l a n e c r e w s is d e c r e a s i n g ; t h e c r e w s l a c k i n t e r e s t a n d a r e
l e s s d e t e r m i n e d , and t h e i r t r a i n i n g i s d e t e r i o r a t i n g . One e x p l a n a t i o n f o r
t h i s i s t h a t t r a i n i n g u n i t s and p e r s o n n e l a r e b e i n g used f o r c m b a t pur
poses b e c a u s e o f a s h o r t a g e of a i r c r a f t . Ke f e l t t h a t t h e r e i s no d e p t h
behind t h e German f r o n t l i n e of a i r c r a f t . The B r i t i s h I n t e l l i g e n c e Serv
i c e i s of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t i f the United Nations c a n keep Germany f i g h t
ing w i t h a i r c r a f t , they w i l l s u f f e r l o s s e s from whicfl they c a n n o t r e c o v e r .
Ye f e l t c e r t a i n t h a t t h e y a r e i n c a p a b l e of conducting l a r g e s c a l e
o p e r a t i o n s on two f r o n t s and t h a t if t h e y a r e kept f i g h t i n g through t h e
w i n t e r and s p r i n g t h e y w i l l have i n t h e summer a s h o r t a g e of from s e v e n
hundred t o two tbousand f i r s t - l i n e a i r c r a f t below what w i l l b e necessary
for a l l fronts.
lie s t a t e d t h a t German prodiictiorr f o r n e x t y e a r w i l l b e a b o u t
twenty-three
thousand a i r c r a f t ; I t a l y w i l l produce t h r e e o r f o u r thou
sand; and .Japan w i l l produce a h o u t s e v e n t h o u s a n d . On t h e o t h e r h a n d ,

the l o w e s t e s t i m a t e s f o r t h e ilnited X a t i o n s ' a i r c r a f t p r o d u c t i o n w i l l be
one hundred t h o u s a n d combat a i r p l a n e s o r a b o u t f o u r t i m e s t h a t o f t h e
A x i s powers.
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t o u r g r e a t e s t need i s t o f o r c e t h e
Germans t o e x t e n d t h e use of t h e i r a i r c r a f t t o as many a r e a s as p o s s i b l e
and t h u s d e s t r o y and b l e e d them. T h e b e s t ways t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s a r e :
(1) t o engage t h e m w h i l e t h e y a r e i n s u p p o r t of l a n d o p e r a t i o n s
e v e r t h i s i s o n l y p o s s i b l e a t p r e s e n t on t h e Russian f r o n t . ) ;
(flow
(2) t o meet
them w h i l e they are a t t e m p t i n g t o s t o p o u r amphibian o p e r a t i o n s ; and (3)

by d i r e c t i n g o p e r a t i o n s d i r e c t l y a t Germany.
lie s t a t e d t h a t one o f t h e most p r e s s i n g q u e s t i o n s was how we
s h o u l d accomplish our a i r a t t a c k a g a i n s t Germany. The U n i t e d Kingdom i s

t h e most a d v a n t a g e o u s b a s e f o r such o p e r a t i o n s and one o f t h e most i m
p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s b e f o r e t h e p r e s e n t , c o n f e r e n c e i s t o d e c i d e on where
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s bombers a r e t o be u s e d .
He i n d i c a t e d t h a t d a y l i g h t a t t a c k s b y U n i t e d S t a t e s bombers
s h o u l d be c o n t i n u e d , a s t h i s h a s a s e r i o u s e f f e c t on t h e German A i r F o r c e ,
179
(I.
S . SECRET
on t h e i r i n d u s t r i e s ~ ,a n d on t h e i r morale. The q u e s t i o n o f whether t o
s t r i k e I t a l y f r o m t h e U n i t e d Kingdom or from N o r t h A f r i c a i s s t i l l an
open q u e s t i o n ; b u t b e f o r e d e c i d i n g t o b u i l d up a s t r o n g bomber f o r c e i n
North A f r i c a , i t i s d e s i r a b l e t o be c e r t a i n t h a t t h i s a c t i o n i s more ad
vantageous t h a n c o n c e n t r a t i n g them i n t h e United Kingdom.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t i n s o f a r as t h e e s t i m a t e s presented
b y t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f c o n c e r n i n g Germany, R u s s i a , and t h e occu
p i e d c o u n t r i e s a r e concerned, t h e United S t a t e s Chiefs of S t a f f are i n
f u l l accord.
He a l s o e x p r e s s e d concurrence i n t h e i d e a t h a t t h e U-boat menace

i s t h e paramount i s s u e and t h a t e v e r y t h i n g must be done t o combat i t by
d i r e c t i n g our a t t a c k s a g a i n s t i t from t h e p l a c e o f m a n u f a c t u r e o f sub

m a r i n e s t o t h e p l a c e s where t h e y a r e u s e d .
He state,' t h a t t h e J a p s a r e d i g g i n g i n , i n a n e f f o r t t,o b u i l d up
a d e f e n s i v e f r o n t from t h e Solomons, through New Guinea and Tirnor, par
t i c u l a r l y with t h e i r air forces.
He p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e United S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f a r e anxious
t o f i n d some method whereby t h e y c a n s t r i k e i n t h e r e a r and a g a i n s t t h e
f l a n k of t h e J a p a n e s e d e f e n s e s . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , t h e y f e e l t h a t o p e r a
t i o n s i n Burma w i l l s e r v e t o weaken t h e J a p s ' d e f e n s i v e f r o n t and t h a t ,
t h e r e f o r e , t h e y are most a n x i o u s t o u n d e r t a k e O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS
They f e e l t h a t a r e v e r s e i n t h i s o p e r a t i o n would n o t b e a calamity
b u t t h a t a s u c c e s s would b r i n g a d v a n t a g e s a l l
o u t o f p r o p o r t i o n t o the
r i s k s i n v o l v e d . I t would have an e f f e c t n o t o n l y i n t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c
area b u t would e n a b l e us t o f u r n i s h s t r o n g s u p p o r t to China
A successful
O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS would r e s u l t i n a n e v e n t u a l economy o f t o n n a g e by

r e l i e v i n g t h e Japanese p r e s s u r e i n t h e Southwest
pacific^
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n s t a t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of
S t a f f are concerned as t o whether o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n a r e a
would b r i n g advantages commensurate w i t h the r i s k s i n v o l v e d , He s a i d t h a t
t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f are i n c l i n e d t o l o o k f a v o r a b l y on an o p e r a t i o n
from t h e U n i t e d Kingdom b e c a u s e of t h e s t r o n g a i r s u p p o r t t h a t c a n be
f u r n i s h e d from t h a t b a s e a s w e l l as t h e r e l a t i v e e a s e w i t h which i t can
b e s u p p l i e d from the U n i t e d S t a t e s .
180
U. S. S E C P E T
B R I T I S H MOST S E C R t T
H e r e p e a t e d t h a t our f i r s t c o n c e r n must b e t h e d e f e a t of Ger
manys s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e .
S I R CHARLEF WET& t h e n s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f
a l s o f e l t t h a t t h e d e f e a t o f t h e submarine menace must b e g i v e n f i r s t
p r i o r i t > i n t h e u s e of a i r power, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f our
1i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .
F o r l o n g range a n t i s u b m a r i n e o p e r a t i o n s n o t o n l y t h e p r o v i s i o n
o f s u i t a b l e a i r c r a f t had t o be c o n s i d e r e d b u t s l s o t h e b a s e s from which
t h e y a r e t o be u s e d . The Elritiski a r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e a d v i s a b i l i t y o f
e s t a b l i s h i n g a n a i r b a s e i n G r e e n l a n d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . They were most
g r a t e f u l f o r t h e 21 L i b e r a t , o r s p r o v i d e d b y t h e t..S.A.
f o r t h e Ray of
B i s c a y . T h e r e a r e t h r e e p o s s i b l e met,!!ods o f a t t a c k on s u b m a r i n e s :
along the s e a lanes;
(1) a g a i n s t , b a s e s
i i i
(1)
t h e Eay of Bisctly; and (3)
a g a i n s t f a c t o r i e s i n which submarines a r e b u i l t . The E r i t i s h now propose

making a i r a t t a c k s i n s u f f i c i e n t force t o d e s t , r o y t h e e n t i r e p o r t i n
which t h e s u b m a r i n e s a r e b a s e d r a t h e r than c o n f i n i n g t h e i r a t t a c k s t o
t h e submarine, pens alrd s u r r o u n d i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n s . Ilo p o i n t e d o u t t h a t no
one c a n b e c e r t a i n a s t o how much damage can be done i n t h e p o r t towns

themselves and t h a t t h e method proposed w i l l b e i n t h e n a t u r e of an ex
p e r i m e n t , t h e r e s u l t s of which w i l l n o t be known f o r f i v e o r s i x months.
ADMIrAL KIFG then asked whether t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n c e n t r a t i n g
a l l a i r a t t a c k s on t h e b u i l d i n g y a r d s had been c o n s i d e r e d .
SIP C,HAFLLF POPTAL r e p l i e d t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g yards a r e n o t s u f f i

c i e n t l y l a r g e t o be c e r t a i n o f h i t t i n g them a t n i g h t , .
AEMIEAL KIFC s a i d t h a t he f e l t t h e most f a v o r a b l e t a r g e t s a g a i n s t
t h e submarine menace were t h e yards a t which t h e y a r e assembled and a t
t h i r b a s e s . He s a i d t h a t he had t h e p e r s o n a l impression t h a t t h e r e has

not been a program u n d e r t a k e n t h e r e that, h a s k e n c o n s i s t e n t l y followed
He f e l t t h a t t h e a t t a c k s had b e e n s p o r a d i c . Iie t h o u g h t t h a t a t t a c k s
s h o u l d be aimed: f i r s t , a g a i n s t f a c t o r i e s where component p a r t s are made;
s e c o n d l y , a t y a r d s where t h e submarines a r e assembled; t h i r d l y , a t b a s e s ;
and f o u r t h l y , a t s e a .
GENERAL Al?XOLE s a i d he f e l t we s h o u l d a t t e m p t t o f i n d what com
ponent p a r t o r p a r t s o f submarines c o n s t i t u t e a b o t t l e n e c k and t h e n S t r i k e
a t f a c t o r i e s where they a r e made.
S. S E C V E T
YQITISH VOST SECqGT
U.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s t a t e d t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t b o t t l e n e c k w a s the

h a l l b e a r i n g s , b u t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i t would be t a c t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o
destroy the factories.
GENERAL ARNOLD drew a t t e n t i o n t o the n e c e s s i t y f o r a d e c i s i o n a s
t o where a i r p l a n e s a r e t o be u t i l i z e d b e f o r e t h e y l e f t t h e f a c t o r y . T h i s
i s s o h e c a u s e d i f f e r e n t t h e a t e r s r e q u i r e d i f f e r e n t equipment on a i r c r a f t .
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s now i n t h e
p r o c e s s of r e c a s t i n g i t s t r o o p deployments. A s an example, he i n d i c a t e d
t h a t i t had become p o s s i b l e t o reduce t h e s i z e o f t h e Caribbean g a r r i s o n
c o n s i d e r a b l y . He s t a t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s a l s o c o n s i d e r i n g r e
d u c i n g t h e s i z e of t h e I c e l a n d g a r r i s o n and i n t h a t c o n n e c t i o n he thought
i t would b e d e s i r a b l e t o have o p i n i o n s of t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f

on t h e h a z a r d s t h a t now f a c e I c e l a n d . The p u r p o s e o f t h i s s c a l i n g down
o f f o r c e s wherever i t c a n be accomplished i s f o r s a v i n g s h i p p i n g .
182
II. S . SECRET
S R I T I S B MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
56th Meeting
MINUTES of Meeting h e l d a t Ahfa Camp
on Thursday, J a n u a r y 14, 1943, a t 1430.
PRESENT
General G. C. M a r s h a l l , USA
General S i r Alan F. Brooke
Pound
L t . General 11. H. Arnold, USA
A i r Chief Marshal S i r C h a r l e s
F . A. P o r t a l
L t . G e n e r a l B. B. S o m e r v e l l , USA
Rear Admiral C . M. Cooke, J r . , USN
F i e l d Marshal S i r John D i l l
Brig. General A. C . Wedemeyer, USA
Mountbat t e n
Commander R . E. Libby, USN
L t . General S i r H a s t i n g s L. Ismay
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r 'V. Dykes
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0. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
COMBINED STRATEGY
SIR ALLEN BROOKE s a i d t h a t he would l i k e t o h e a r t h e ' v i e w s of

t h e United S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f r e g a r d i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e p a c i f i c .
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t of t h e n i n e f r o n t s on which t h e United

N a t i o n s are now e n g a g e d , f o u r a r e i n t h e P a c i f i c .
These i n c l u d e the
Alaska-Aleutian a r e a , t h e Hawaiian-Midway a r e a , t h e South and Southwest

P a c i f i c areas, and t h e Burma-China a r e a .
He s a i d t h a t when h e t o o k o f f i c e a s Commander-in-Chief of t h e
United S t a t e s F l e e t on December 30, 1941, he immediately s e n t a d i s p a t c h
t o t h e Commander-in-Chief
of t h e P a c i f i c F l e e t s t a t i n g t h a t h i s mission
was, f i r s t , t o h o l d t h e Hawaiian-Midway l i n e and t h e communications with

t h e P a c i f i c c o a s t ; and, s e c o n d l y , t o h o l d t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e l i n e of
communications t o A u s t r a l i a and N e w Zealand.
The N&vy had a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d a r e f u e l i n g p o i n t a t Bora Bora
which was s u f f i c i e n t l y f a r t o t h e r e a r t o i n s u r e i t s b e i n g h e l d . hlarines
had been s e n t t o Samoa and t h e r e were a l s o t r o o p s i n t h e Fiji I s l a n d s .
S t e p s had been t a k e n t o e s t e b l i s h t h r e e s t r o n g p o i n t s on t h e l i n e o f
communications: Samoa, t h e F i j i I s l a n d s , and New C a l e d o n i a . The J o i n t
C h i e f s of S t a f f had t h e n e s t a b l i s h e d a b a s e f o r t h e Navy i n Auckland
with an advanced b a s e a t Tongatabu. A s time went on, t h e United S t a t e s

f o r c e s went i n t o t h e New Hebrides t o E f a t e and E s p e r i t u S a n t o s .
Meanwhile, t h e r e had been engagements w i t h t h e Japanese n e a r t h e
biarshall Islands, t h e I s l a n d o f Wake, and i n t h e Coral Sea.
The J a p a n e s e had advanced a s f a r s o u t h a s T u l a g i w i t h t h e appar
e n t i n t e n t of u s i n g i t as a b a s e from which t o o p e r a t e a g a i n s t our l i n e
o f communications.
ADMIRAL X I N G s a i d t h a t had we been s e t a t t h e t i m e of Midway,
we c o u l d have made g r e a t p r o g r e s s i n an a t t a c k on t h e Solomon I s l a n d s .
The o p e r a t i o n was i n p r e p a r a t i o n i n J u l y and took p l a c e on August 7 t h b u t
we d i d n o t have s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e e v e n a t t h a t time t o e x p l o i t our s u c c e s s
beyond t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f T u l a g i and G u a d a l c a n a l . The J a p a n e s e r e a c t i o n
t h e r e was more ' v i o l e n t and s u s t a i n e d t h a n had been a n t i c i p a t e d . Another
reason why we c o u l d n o t proceed f u r t h e r w i t h t h e Solomon o p e r a t i o n s was
184
ll, S'. SECRET

t h a t O p e r a t i o n TORCHhadbeen decided upon andmuch of our a v a i l a b l e means
had t o be d i v e r t e d t o i t .
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d , however, t h a t w e have a t t e m p t e d t o go on

with theSolomon o p e r a t i o n s . The Japanese r e a c t i o n was, a t f i r s t , probably
designed t o "save f a c e " b u t e v e n t u a 1 l y t h a t became a minor c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
The J a p a n e s e have a l o n g l i n e o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and i t soon became
apparent t h a t t h e y were f i g h t i n g a d e l a y i n g a c t i o n t o c o v e r t h e Nether
l a n d s E a s t I n d i e s and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s where t h e " t r e a s u r e s " a r e t o b e
found.
He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t we have had some s u c c e s s i n t h e a t t r i t i o n o f
the Japanese f o r c e s b u t n o t a s much a s h a s been claimed. A t p r e s e n t , t h e
T u l a g i a r e a i s p r e t t y well s t a b i l i z e d and G e n e r a l \lacArthur h a s d r i v e n
t h e J a p a n e s e o u t o f t h e Papuan P e n i n s u l a on Mew G u i n e a . T h e enemy i s
r e i n f o r c i n g Lae and Salamaua.
T h e main o b j e c t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s h a s b e e n t h e s a f e t y o f t h e
a p p r o a c h e s t o n o r t h e a s t e r n A u s t r a l i a , and t h e k e y t o t h e s i t u a t i o n i s
Rabaul
The campaign i n t h e Solomons was t o b e d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e p a r t s :
(1) t h e c a p t u r e of T u l a g i , (2) s e c u r i n g t h e n o r t h e a s t c o a s t o f N e w Guinea,

and (3) t h e c a p t u r e of Rabaul. The p r o c e s s h a s been slow h u t t h e United
S t a t e s f o r c e s a r e g o i n g on w i t h i t . T h e immediate q u e s t i o n i s where t o
go when t h i s campaign h a s been completed,
ADMIRAL KING s t a t e d t h a t he f e l t t h e P h i l i p p i n e s s h o u l d be o u r
o b j e c t i v e r a t h e r t h a n t h e N e t h e r l a n d s E a s t I n d i e s , The P h i l i p p i n e s could
be c a p t u r e d by a f l a n k a c t i o n whereas t h e c a p t u r e o f t h e N e t h e r l a n d s
East I n d i e s must of n e c e s s i t y b e t h e r e s u l t o f a f r o n t a l a t t a c k
The most
l i k e l y i n t e r m e d i a t e o b j e c t i v e , o n c e Rabaul i s c a p t u r e d , i s Truk and

thence t o t h e Marianas,
P r i o r t o t h e war, e v e r y c l a s s a t t h e Naval War C o l l e g e was
r e q u i r e d t o p l a y t h e game o f t h e P a c i f i c I s l a n d s irivolving t h e r e c a p t u r e
of t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . There a r e t h r e e ways i n which t h e P h i l i p p i n e s may be
taken: first,, t h e d i r e c t r o u t e which would c o n s t i t u t e a f r o n t a l a t t a c k ;

second, t h e s o u t h e r n r o u t e which i s o u t f l a n k e d by t h e enemy a l o n g much
of i t s c o u r s e ; and t h i r d , t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e t h r o u g h t h e A l e u t i a n s t o
185
U. S. SECRET
t h e n o r t h e r n t i p o f t h e I s l a n d of Luzon. The n o r t h e r n r o u t e would include
establishing a base i n
t h e n o r t h w e s t e r n M a r s h a l l I s l a n d s and t h e n pro
c e e d i n g t o Truk and t h e M a r i a n a s . The Marianas a r e t h e key of t h e sit

u a t i o n b e c a u s e of t h e i r l o c a t i o n on t h e J a p a n e s e l i n e o f communica
t i o n s . Any l i n e o f a c t i o n d e c i d e d upon r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a b l e f o r c e ,
e s p e c i a l l y a i r s t r e n g t h . A l l of t h e n e c e s s a r y o p e r a t i o n s a r e amphibious.
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t Mr. S t a l i n had b e e n good enough t o say

t h a t t h e Solomons o p e r a t i o n s have b e e n o f C o n s i d e r a b l e a s s i s t a n c e t o
Russia.
He p o i n t e d o u t t h e i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e J a p a n e s e o f occupying t h e
h!aritime P r o v i n c e s i n o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h e Japanese I s l a n d s , ; He f e l t t h a t
such a c t i o n would b e n e c e s s a r y and t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e s h o u l d a t t a c h more
importance t o them t h a n h o l d i n g t h e N e t h e r l a n d s E a s t ' I n d i e s .
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e a r e now r e p l e n i s h i n g Japan
w i t h raw m a t e r i a l s and a l s o f o r t i f y i n g an i n n e r d e f e n s e r i n g a l o n g t h e
l i n e o f t,he N e t h e r l a n d s E a s t I n d i e s and t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . F o r t h e s e
r e a s o n s , h e b e l i e v e d t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s t o
p r e v e n t t h e Japanese having t i m e t o c o n s o l i d a t e t h e i r g a i n s . He compared
t h i s s i t u a t i o n w i t h t h e p r e s e n t d e s i r e of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s t o avoid
g i v i n g Germany a r e s p i t e d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r m o n t h s ~
ADMIRAL K I N G t h e n s a i d t h a t t h e i d e a o f u t i l i z i n g 30 p e r c e n t of
t h e United Nations war e f f o r t a g a i n s t Japan was a concept r a t h e r t h a n an
a r i t h m e t i c a l c o m p u t a t i o n . He had caused s t u d i e s t o b e made o f how much
of t h e t o t a l war e f f o r t i s now b e i n g a p p l i e d t o J a p a n and found i t t o be

approximately 15 p e r c e n t . H e s a i d t h a t t h i s i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o do more
t h a n h o l d ; i t i s n o t e n o u g h t o p e r m i t m a i n t a i n i n g p r e s s u r e on t h e
Japanese.
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t we a r e c o n t i n u o u s l y e x p l o r i n g p o s s i
b i l i t i e s of a n a t t a e k a g a i n s t Japan by t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e a n d c a l l e d a t t e n
t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s had j u s t c a p t u r e d Amchitka-.
A l l o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c a r e l i m i t e d by t h e amount of a v a i l a b l e
shipping"
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e J a p a n e s e r o u t e f o r a na'rall
e f f o r t against Siberia is secure
H e s a i d t h a t he had r e c e n t l y had a
186
S SECRET
survey made of ParamushirOIsland, t h e n o r t h e r n m o s t of t h e K u r i l e I s l a n d s .
T h i s r e v e a l e d t h a t i t would be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y a s a b a s e f o r o p e r a t i n g
against Japan.
I t would be d e s i r a b l e t o have t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f t h e R u s s i a n s
i n t h i s r e s p e c t b u t t h e r e has been d i f f i c u l t y i n o b t a i n i n g any informa
t i o n from them. The b e s t means of o b t a i n i n g i n f o r m a t i o n s o f a r h a s been
by d i r e c t correspondence between t h e P r e s i d e n t and M r . S t a l i n .
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n r e v i e w e d t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s t r o o p s i n a l l of t h e i s l a n d s of t h e P a c i f i c , g i v i n g t h e s t r e n g t h
of e a c h i n g r o u n d and a i r t r o o p s and i n a i r c r a f t . H e p o i n t e d o u t t h e
l o g i s t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of supplying these forces.
ADMIRAL K I N G t h e n gave t n e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e Marine f o r c e s
which amount t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y 60,000 men i n t h e area from Midway t o t h e
South P a c i f i c I s l a n d s .
GENEXAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e l o g i s t i c a l r e q u i r e
ments i n t h e P a c i f i c , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' i n t e r e s t i n u n d e r t a k i n g a n
o p e r a t i o n t o open t h e Burma Roau c o u l d b e w e l l u n d e r s t o o d . G e n e r a l
S t i l w e l l and F i e l d Uarshal Wave11 would have t o determine t,he l o g i s t i c a l
requirements of s u c h an o p e r a t i o n b u t , i n any e v e n t , t h e y would be minor
i n comparison t o the requirements i n t h e Operation TORCH
Any s u c c e s s i n
t h e O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS would have a tremendous e f f e c t i n t h e P a c i f i c

c h i e f l y by making i t n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e J a p a n e s e t o d i v e r t f o r c e s t o t h e
Burma o p e r a t i o n s , t h u s l e s s e n i n g t h e p r e s s u r e i n t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c and
t h e consequent demands on our a v a i l a b l e s h i p p i n g
GENERBL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t t h e p e a c e of mind o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f was g r e a t e r now t h a n i t had been a year ago. The
Japanese a r e now on t h e d e f e n s i v e and must be c a r e f u l of a s u r p r i s e move
from u s . However, h e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t we must s t i l l w o r r y a b o u t t h e
l o c a t i o n s of t h e J a p a n e s e a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s b e c a u s e t h e y c o n s t i t u t e a
c o n s t a n t t h r e a t a g a i n s t our l i n e of canmunications and f o r r a i d i n g pur
poses a g a i n s t our west c o a s t .
We must n o t a l l o w t h e J a p a n e s e any p a u s e . They f i g h t w i t h n o

i d e a o f - s u r r e n d e r i n g and t h e y w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be a g g r e s s i v e u n t i l
a t t r i t i o n h a s d e f e a t e d them. To a c c o m p l i s h t h i s , w e .nust m a i n t a i n t h e
i n i t i a t i v e and f o r c e them t o meet u s .
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B R l T I S H MOST S E C R E T
GENERAL ARNOLD t,hen d i s c u s s e d t h e United S t a t e s e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n
information concerning Hussia
H e s t a t e d t h a t when theGermans t h r e a t e n e d
t o c a p t u r e t h e Caucasus, t h e R u s s i a n s began t o be f e a r f u l t h a t t h e s u p p l y
o f a i r p l a n e s from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s v i a t h e s o u t h e r n r o u t e would be
e l i m i n a t e d , They, t h e r e f o r e , r e q u e s t e d t h e United S t a t e s t o s t a r t d e l i v
e r y of a i r p l a n e s from A l a s k a a t o n c e , T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a g r e e d t o t h i s
p r o v i d i n g t h e R u s s i a n s would d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e r e were s u f f i c i e n t
f a c i l i t i e s a v a i l a b l e t o make p o s s i b l e t h e d e l i v e r y of one hundred and
f i f t y p l a n e s a month
The R u s s i a n s d i d n o t have t h e s e f a c i l i t i e s a t t h e
time bxt, b u i l t them r a p i d l y ~A t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , b o t h t h e s o u t h e r n r o u t e

and t h e A l a s k a n r o u t e a r e i n u s e . I n t h e coming y e a r , the d e l i v e r y t o
R u s s i a amounts Lo f o u r hundred a i r p l a n e s a month. These w j ~ l lbe d i v i d e d
over t h e two r o u t e s Bombers a r e flown L o B a s r a b u t t h e f l i g h t i s s o 1.ong
t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s r e f u s e t o a c c e p t t h e e n g i n e s and t h i s n e c e s s i t a t e s
r e p l a c i n g them
The n o r t h e r n r o u t e w i l l be used f o r t h i s purpose as much
as p o s s i b l e inasmuch a s i t e l i m i n a t e s f i f t y h o u r s o f f l y i n g Lime on t h e
journey
GENERAL ARNOLD t h e n s t a t e d that t h e U . S.. C h i e f s o f S t a f f were
d e s i r o u s of lolowing what f a c i l i t i e s were a v a i l a b l e i n s o u t h e r n S i b e r i a

and V l a d i v o s t o k i n o r d e r Lo s e e if t h e y could b e of a s s i s t a n c e Lo H u s s i a
i n c a s e R u s s i a was a t t a c k e d by the J a p a n e s e
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t h f r
S t a l i n had f i n a l l y g i v e n General
B r a d l e y p e r m i s s i o n tomake a survey.. General B r a d l e y , however, c o n s i d e r e d

t h a t i t would be b e t t e r t o p r e s e n t t h e R u s s i a n s w i t h a s p e c i f i c p r o p o s a l
H e r e t u r n e d t o the United S t a t e s , and i t w a s decided t o o f f e r R u s s i a one
hundred heavy bombers s e v e n t y . t w o days a f t e r t h e o u t b r e a k of war between

R u s s i a and J a p a n
Mr
S t a l i n had r e j e c t e d t h i s o f f e r
and s a i d h e would
l i k e 100 a i r c r a f t a t once f o r u s e a g a i n s t Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL a l s o s t a t e d t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s o b j e c t Lo t h e
p r e s e n c e o f " g o s s i p y " p e o p l e from t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s and t h a t t h e y were
a f r a i d t h a t t h e I J n i t e d K a t i o n s p e r s o n n e l c o u l d n o t p u t up w i t h t h e
c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h a r e imposed on R u s s i a n t r o o p s .
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s t a t e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had o p e r a t e d s u c c e s s
f u l l y w i t h t h e R u s s i a n navy i n the Murmansk a r e a b u t t h a t t h e y had t h e
same e x p e r i e n c e s W i t h t h e R u s s i a n army a s t h e U - S , h a d ,
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GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n d e s c r i b e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s which t h e u n i t e d
S t a t e s C n i e f s of S t a f f had had c o n c e r n i n g s e n d i n g a i r u n i t s t o t h e
C a u c a s u s , The H u s s i a n s had s t a t e d d e f i n i t e l y t h a t t h e y d i d n o t d e s i r e
u n i t s b u t a i r p l a n e s o n l y . T h e r e had b e e n some s e n t i m e n t a m o n g t h e u n i t
ed S t a t e s a u t h o r i t i e s t o f u r n i s h s u f f i c i e n t a i r p l a n e s f o r t n e purpose of
p l a c a t i n g Mr. S t a l i n , However, t o do s o , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e c a s e of heavy
bombers, would n e c e s s i t a t e i m m o b i l i z i n g t h e s e a i r p l a n e s f o r as much as
s i x months w h i l e t h e R u s s i a n s were l e a r n i n g t o o p e r a t e them and e s t a b

l i s h i n g ground crews f o r t h e i r maintenance
General Marshall s t a t e d t h a t
i n h i s o p i n i o n i t was unwise t o w i t h h o l d t h i s s t r i k i n g power a g a i n s t t h e

enemy f o r so long a p e r i o d .
ADMIRAL K I N G t h e n asked t,he B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f i f t h e y had

t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s were u n w i l l i n g t o h e l p t h e m s e l v e s The
Germans were s u c c e s s f u l l y o p e r a t i n g a i r f o r c e s o u t o f t h e n o r t h e r n p a r t
of Norway and t h e R u s s i a n s had a p p a r e n t l y made no e f f o r t , t o s t o p them
a l t h o u g h t h e y were w e l l w i t h i n range
SIR DUDLEY POUND s t a t e d t h a t the R u s s i a n s do send d e s t r o y e r s o u t
t o meet convoys
They i n v a r i a b l y s t a t e ; however,
t h a t t h e y have run o u t
o f f u e l b e f o r e completing t h e i r t a s k and then l e a v e t h e convoy f o r home

a t a r a t e of 28 k n o t s , which i s h a r d l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a s h o r t a g e o f
f u e l . T h e i r A i r F o r c e h a s n o t f u r n i s h e d much p r o t e c t i o n .
SIR CliAHLES PORTAL s t a t e d t h a t he f e l t t h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s was
t h a t t h e i r a i r p e r s o n n e l i s n o t p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d The R u s s i a n s had made
some a t t e m p t s t o s t r i k e a t t h e German f o r c e s b u t had been u n s u c c e s s f u l
GENERAL MARSHALL a s k e d why t h e R u s s i a n s were w i l l i n g t o r i s k
whole d i v i s i o n s b u t n o t t h e i r n a v a l f o r c e s
S I R DUDU3Y POUND r e p l i e d that they a r e c o n t i n e n t a l people who do

n o t understand naval a c t i o n
ive u n i t s of t h e i r navy
T h e i r submarines have been t h e o n l y e f f e c t
SIR ALAN BROOKE a g r e e d w i t h t h i s s t a t e m e n t and added t h a t w h i l e

t h e y d o n o t know what d a n g e r s are i n v o l v e d i n e s c o r t i n g convoys, t h e y
a r e v e r y f r e e t o o f f e r s i l l y a d v i c e a s t o how s e c u r i t y s h o u l d be a t t a i n e d
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n d e s c r i b e d t h e development o f t r o o p s o f t h e
United S t a t e s , whichwas p r o c e e d i n g v e r y w e l l
189
He a d d e d t h a t u n i t e d S t a t e s
U S SECRET
B R I T I S E UOST SECRET
t r o o p s , b o t h i n t h i s and t h e l a s t war, appeared t o " v e t e r a n i z e " quickly
i n the f i e l d . The young o f f i c e r s andnon-commissioned o f f i c e r s had exhib
i t e d a remarkable f a c i l i t y f o r e l i m i n a t i n g e r r o r s r a p i d l y . We may expect
t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s t o i n c r e a s e enormously i n a s h o r t t i m e .
H e t h o u g h t w e were p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t u n a t e i n t h e d e a d l y char
a c t e r of the P a c i f i c f i g h t , s i n c e our f o r c e s which have been engaged i n
t h e P a c i f i c have become imbued w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t i t i s " k i l l or be
k i l l e d " ; and t h i s a t t i t u d e g i v e s promise of tremendous power f o r f u t u r e
o p e r a t i o n s . T h e s t a f f s a r e sound and t h e e n g i n e e r s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y
e f f e c t i v e . H e r e c a l l e d a remark t h a t hadbeen made i n t h e War Department,

when F i e l d Marshal Wavell q u e s t i o n e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of b u i l d i n g a road
which could s u p p o r t the Burma o p e r a t i o n s , t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t "Wavell does
n o t know General Wheeler," the United S t a t e s e n g i n e e r i n t h i s t h e a t e r .
SIR ALAN BROOKE i n q u i r e d how f a r f o r w a r d t h e U , S " C h i e f s of
S t a f f envisaged i t would be n e c e s s a r y t o go i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t the Jap
a n e s e from d i g g i n g themselves i n He f e a r e d t h a t if o p e r a t i o n s were too
extended i t would i n e v i t a b l y l e a d t o an a l l - o u t war a g a i n s t Japan and i t
was c e r t a i n t h a t we had n o t s u f f i c i e n t r e s o u r c e s t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s a t the
same time a s a major e f f o r t a g a i n s t Germany. Would i t b e p o s s i b l e for the
forces a t present i n the P a c i f i c t o hold the Japanese without incurring
t h e a d d i t i o n a l d r a i n on our r e s o u r c e s which would r e s u l t fren pushing
f o r w a r d our p r e s e n t d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s ?
GENERAL MARSHALL e x p l a i n e d t h a t i t had b e e n e s s e n t i a l t o a c t
o f f e n s i v e l y i n o r d e r t o s t o p the J a p a n e s e advancing. For example, i n
N e w Guinea i t had been n e c e s s a r y t o push t h e J a p a n e s e back t o prevent
them c a p t u r i n g P o r t Moresby. I n o r d e r t o do t h i s , e v e r y d e v i c e for rein
f o r c i n g t h e t r o o p s on t h e i s l a n d had had t o be employed, The same con
s i d e r a t i o n s a p p l i e d i n Guadalcanal. I t had been e s s e n t i a l t o t a k e offen
s i v e a c t i o n t o s e i z e t h e i s l a n d S h o r t of o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n of t h i s nature,
t h e o n l y way of s t o p p i n g t h e Japanese was b y complete e x h a u s t i o n through
a t t r i t i o n , I t was v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o pause; t h e p r o c e s s of w h i t t l i n g away

Japan had t o be continuous.
SIR CHAHLES PORTAL asked whether i t was n o t p o s s i b l e t o s t a n d on
a l i n e and i n f l i c t heavy l o s s e s on the Japanese when they t r i e d t o break
through i t , From t h e v e r y f a c t t h a t t h e Japanese continued t o a t t a c k , i t
190
U. S.,SECRET
was c l e a r t h a t t h e y had a l r e a d y been pushed back f u r t h e r t h a n t h e y c a r e d
t o go. R e a l s o i n q u i r e d whether t h e U. S . C h i e f s o f S t a f f t h o u g h t i t
would be p o s s i b l e t o g a i n a d e c i s i o n by a i r bombardment of J a p a n a l o n e .
GENERAL ARNOLD p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s i n t h e South
west P a c i f i c were now o p e r a t i n g from t h e t , i p s of two narrow s a l i e n t s .
T h e Japanese had g r e a t e r width i n t h e i r l i n e and could t h e r e f o r e o p e r a t e
on a larger s c a l e t h a n t h e f o r c e s which we could b r i n g t o b e a r .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t i n Papua i t would be p o s s i b l e t o g a i n

a d d i t i o n a l a i r f i e l d s a l o n g s i d e our p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n , b u t t h i s was n o t
t h e c a s e i n G u a d a l c a n a l where o n l y a small s t r i p of s u i t a b l e t e r r i t o r y
was a v a i l a b l e . To broaden our base t h e r e , w e s h o u l d have t o have New B r i t

a i n and New I r e l a n d . As r e g a r d s a i r bombardment of J a p a n , t h e U. S. view
was t h a t J a p a n e s e i n d u s t r i e s were s o v u l n e r a b l e t o t h e a i r t h a t heavy
a t t a c k would u l t i m a t e l y d e s t r o y her c a p a c i t y t o m a i n t a i n her war e f f o r t
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s u g g e s t e d t h a t i t should be p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r - .

mine what i t was t h a t we had t o p r e v e n t t h e J a p a n e s e from d o i n g , and
what f o r c e s we s h o u l d r e q u i r e f o r t h e p u r p o s e . W
e s h o u l d t h e n see what
f o r c e s remained f o r u s e e l s e w h e r e i n t h e world.
ADMIRAL K I N G observed t h a t u n l e s s some e f f o r t was made t o a s s i s t
Chiang Kai-shek, t h e Chinese might p u l l o u t of t h e war. The 30 p e r c e n t
e f f o r t t o which he had r e f e r r e d would, o f c o u r s e , i n c l u d e o p e r a t i o n s i n
Burma
SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed t h a t o p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS might be s u c c e s s . .

f u l but when we had reached t h e o b j e c t i v e we should s t i l l have t o defend
our l i n e of communication a g a i n s t J a p a n e s e a t t a c k from t h e f l a n k . I t was

c a l c u l a t e d t h a t t h e r o u t e would o n l y s u f f i c e t o m a i n t a i n two D i v i s i o n s ,
and t h i s would l e a v e l i t t l e if any c a p a c i t y f o r t h e s u p p l y a i r f o r c e s
o p e r a t i n g i n China
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o opening t h e s u p p l y
r o u t e t o China, RAVENOUS would g a i n t h e t e r r i t o r y n e c e s s a r y t o s e c u r e
t h e a i r s u p p l y r o u t e from I n d i a t o C h i n a ,
SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed t h a t i t would be w e l l worth w h i l e t a k i n g
a r i s k on RAVENOUS s i n c e i t would n o t c u t a c r o s s t h e main e f f o r t a g a i n s t
Germany, whereas ANAKIM would.
191
SECRET
S
GENERAL MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t the Chinese o n l y r e q u i r e d about

h a l f t h e maintenance tonnage r e q u i r e d b y w h i t e t r o o p s . I n any e v e n t , even
a s m a l l r e s i d u a l t o n n a g e f o r s u p p l i e s t o C h i n a would p r o b a b l y be f a r
g r e a t e r t h a n could be t r a n s p o r t e d by a i r . Twelve bombers i n China under
G e n e r a l Chennault had done wonderful work; and i f he had even 5 0 , the
r e s u l t s they might a c h i e v e w o u l d b e v e r y g r e a t . For t h i s r e a s o n t h e U . S.
C h i e f s of S t a f f
thought t h a t RAVENOUS was a gamble w e l l worth w h i l e . It
s h o u l d a l s o be remembered t h a t any h e l p g i v e n t o C h i n a which would

t h r e a t e n J a p a n m i g h t have a most f a v o r a b l e e f f e c t on S t a l i n .
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t General Cliennault claimed he could drive
t h e Japanese A i r Force o u t of C h i n a i f he had 175 a i r c r a f t . T h i s m i g h t be
a n e x a g g e r a t e d c l a i m , b u t there was no d o u b t a d d i t i o n a l a i r f o r c e s in
China would have a v e r y g r e a t e f f e c t . By Leccmber i t w a s hoped t o h a v e 150
t r a n s p o r t s working from I n d i a t o C h i n a , n i t h a maximum d e l i v e r y estimated
a t 10,000 t o n s per month.
ADMIRAL K I N G a s k e d on whom would f a l l t h e p r i n c i p a l b u r d e n of

h e a t i n g J a p a n once Germany had been knocked o u t .
S I R A L A N BROOKE s a i d t h a t once Germany was d e f e a t e d , p r a c t i c a l l y
a l l the S r i t i s h n a v a l f o r c e s w o u l d b e r e l e a s e d f o r t h e war a g a i n s t Japan.

Forces d e s t i n e d for t h e r e c a p t u r e o f Burma and Malaya were a l r e a d y form
i n g i n I n d i a . H e d i d n o t t h i n k i t w i s e , nowever, t o embark on Operation
ANAKIM u n l e s s w e were q u i t e p r e p a r e d f o r a f u l l - s c a l e campaign,
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t I n d i a had a l r e a d y been asked t o p r o
v i d e a i r f i e l d s f o r double the number of a i r f o r c e s w e were e v e r l i k e l y t o
have a v a i l a b l e b e f o r e t h e d e f e a t of Germany.. These were i n t e n d e d f o r the
campaign a g a i n s t J a p a n . He had n o doubt t h a t as s o o n as Germany was
d e f e a t e d t h e B r i t i s h Government would t u r n the whole of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s
a g a i n s t Japan.
GENERAL MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t o depend on s e a o p e r a t i o n s

a l o n e a g a i n s t Japan was hazardous, owing t o t h e r a p i d i t y w i t h which the
balance of s e a power could change i n t h e e v e n t o f a r e v e r s e . For example,
i n t h e Widway b a t t l e t h e U. S . Forces had been a b l e t o g e t a l l their a i r
c r a f t i n t o t h e a i r b e f o r e t h e Japanese a t t a c k developed. I n c o n s e q u e n c e ,
t h e Japanese h a d l o s t f o u r c a r r i e r s as a g a i n s t one American. N i t h a l i t t l e
192
SECRET
BPI7 1 S r i MOST S E C Q E T
i l l - . f o r t u n e t h e r e v e r s e might have t a k e n p l a c e ; and i n t h a t c a s e , t h e
whole o f t h e w e s t c o a s t of America would have b e e n open t o J a p a n e s e
carrier-borne attack
T h e J a p a n e s e t e r r i t o r i e s were n o t n e a r l y so v u l
nerable i n t h i s r e s p e c t
K1F.i: s a i d t h a t t h e 2apanese might w e l l s t r i k e a g a i n a t
AT'JiIkBL
Midway. They werp on i n t e r i o r l i n e s , and i t was e a s i e r f o r tliem t o t a k e

t h e i n i t i a t i v e a g a i n s t u s ; A t t,he p r e s e n t t i m e it, l o o k e d a s i f t h e i r
c a r r i e r s were beirrg p r e p a r e d f o r a n o t h e r a t t a c k somewhere, p e r h a p s on
Midway o r Samoa. I t was e s s r n t i a l , t h e r e f o r e , t o m a i n t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e
a g a ~ 8 s tt h e J a p a n e s e and n o t w a i t f'or t,hem t o come a g a i n s t u s .
L;r;?LT.U 5;AF5VAl.I, e x n l a i ! ! e d tile d i r f i c u l t i e s w i t h which h e had
been f a c e d i n finiiirrg even tlir small f o r c p s rt?qi!ir~trl by General S t , i l w e l l

t o support
r.
?Cb.
5:iinping colild riot be s p a r a l f o r them i n t h e absence
of some d e f i n i t , e assurerice from Ciliang :<ai-stioL and agreement
wit11
Field
Marshal. Wave11 on t h e o p e r a t i o n s t o tie u n d e r t a k e n . Ry the t i m e t h e s e had

been o b t a i n e d mucki time had been l o s t arid s h i p u i n g had t o b e found b y
drawing i t away from o t h e r commitments i n t h e P a c i f i c snch a? Alaska and
Hawaii, G e n e r a l MacArthur was some 20,000 men s b o r t of h i s r e q u i r e m e n t s ,
and p r o v i s i o n of' tlrese reinforcement,s liad hacl t o b e d e f e r r e d , By t h e most
r i g i d economy s u f f i c i e n t s h i p p i n g had a t l a s t been found t o move 6,000
men t o G e n e r a l S t i l w e l l
In o r d e r t o c o t down numbers t o t h o minimum,
u n i t s had b e e n s t r i p p e d t o t h e bone of a l l p e r s o n n e l which w e r e n o t abso

lutely essential
I t was c e r t a i n l y f o r t u n a t e t , h a t l o s s e s s u s t a i n e d i n
t h e P a c i f i ' c from s u b m a r i n e s had b e e n s o s m a l l

AEMIFAI., K I V G s a i d he was p u z z l e d t o know why t h e s e l o s s e s had
been s o s m a l l and what, t h e ..Japanese were k e e p i n g t h e i r s u b m a r i n e s f o r , ,

SIF, DrmLEY POtiP-i! s a i d t h a t , i n n r i t i s h e x p e r i e n c e , .Japanese sub
marines were much l e s s of a menace t h a n t h e German
They were l e s s e f f i -
c i e n t l y o n e r a t e d , and q u i t e s m a l l e s c o r t s were s u f f i c i e n t to d r i v e them

away. He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i t was i n a way t o our advantage t o a l l o w t h e
Japanese t o d i g i n w e l l i n places w h i c h a e d i d n o t mean to a t t a c k a s t h i s
dispersed t h e i r forces. Tu recapture the Philippines before the defeat
of Germany was i m p o s s i b l e ; arrl i t w a s , t h e r e f o r e , a l l t o t h e good if t h e
J a p a n e s e l o c k e d up t r o o p s i n t h e s e I s l a n d s
The q u i c k e s t way of r e c a p
t u r i n g t h e P h i l i p p i n e s would be t o d e f e a t Germany
193
I t seemed t o him t h a t
SECRET
t h e c o r r e c t s t r a t e g y was t o e s t a b l i s h a l i n e where w e had b e t t e r a i r
f a c i l i t i e s t h a n t h e J a p a n e s e and t h e n t o a l l o w them t o wear o u t t h e i r
a i r f o r c e s by a t t a c k i n g w on t h a t l i n e , Would i t be of any advantage t o

go a s f a r forward as Truk i n t h e immediate f u t u r e r a t h e r than j u s t before
t h e main a t t a c k on t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ? Even i f w e had Truk he questioned
whether w e c o u l d o p e r a t e s u r f a c e f o r c e s a g a i n s t t h e J a n a n e s e l i n e s of
communication a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e .
ADMIRAL K I N G agreed t h a t t h e r e c a p t u r e of t h e P h i l i p p i n e s must
p r o b a b l y await t h e d e f e a t of Germany. On t h e o t h e r hand, he would be i n
f a v o r o f s e i z i n g Truk a d going forward t o the t i a r i a n a s i n o r d e r t o dom
i n a t e t h e Japanese sea r o u t e s t o t h e eastward t h u s f r e e i n g our submarines
f o r t h e more covered J a p a n e s e supply r o u t e t o t h e westward
He f e l t i t
was n e c e s s a r y t o s o f t e n up t h e J a p a n e s e b e f o r e making our main e f f o r t

and n o t s i m p l y t o a l l o w them t o do what t h e y wanted, w h i l e w e h e l d a
s t a t i c position
The 30 p e r c e n t a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s which he had
s u g g e s t e d would c e r t a i n l y s u f f i c e f o r t h e r e c a p t u r e of Rabaul.
A f t e r some f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n ,
THE COMMITTEE:
Agreed t o d i r e c t t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s to r e p o r t , on t h e
b a s i s t h a t Germany i s t h e p r i m a r y enemy, what s i t u a t i o n do we
wish t o e s t a b l i s h i n t h e E a s t e r n T h e a t e r ( i - e - , t h e P a c i f i c and
Burma) i n 1943, and what f o r c e s w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h
that situation,
194
U. S. SECRET
BRITISK MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
57th Meeting

MINUTES of Meeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp
on F r i d a y , January 15, 1943, a t 1430.
PRESENT
General G . C .
Marshall, USA
Pound
A i r Chief Marshal S i r Charles
F. A. P o r t a l
L t . General H.
H,
Arnold, USA
L t - General B. B. Somervell, USA

L t . General D . D. Eisenhower, USA
(For Item 2)
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, J r . , USN
Brig. General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Vice Admiral t h e Lord Louis
Mountbat t e n
Lt.. General S i r Hastings L
Captain C
Brigadier G
Lambe, RN
Stewart
A i r Commodore W . E l l i o t
SECRETARIAT
Brigadier V
Rrig
General J
Dyke-
i3
195
Deane,
USA
Ismay
U. S - S E C R E T
1 . AA'TISUEMAXIt!E WARFARE.
SIR DLDLEY Wm!D s a i d t h a t t h e four p o i n t s a t which t h e U-boats
c o u l d be a t t a c k e d were t h e f a c t o r i e s and b u i l d i n g y a r d s , t h e o p e r a t i n g
b a s e s , t h e r o u t e s t o t h e i r h u n t i n g g r o u n d s , a n d t h e h u n t i n g grounds
themselves. He had s e n t f o r ck t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n concerning the construe
t i o n b o t t l e n e c k s . As r e g a r d s t h e o p e r a t i n g b a s e s , t h e B r i t i s h Government
had a g r e e d t o i n t e n s i f y a i r a t t a c k s on F r e n c h p o r t s which were used as
b a s e s . The only q u e s t i o n now a t i s s u e was t h a t o f g i v i n g some warning t o
t h e French i n h a b i t a n t s .
At,tacks on t h e 11-boats on passage t o the h u n t i n g grounds had been
s u c c e s s f u l f o r a time and c o n s i d e r a b l e damage and d e l a y had been i n f l i c t e d
on them as l o n g a s t h e C-boats d i d not know when t h e a i r c r a f t , were d e t e c t
i n g them w i t h t h e i r A . S . V .
equipment. T h i s equipment was u s e d i n con
j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e Leigh l i g h t a t n i g h t . Now, however, U-boats were f i t t e d

w i t h l i s t e n i n g d e v i c e s which c k t e c t e d t h e A . S . V .
l i g h t , Ten-centimeter A . S . V ' s .
o u t s i d e t h e range of t h e
were now b e i n g introd.uced, b u t no doubt
i n t i m e t h e Germans would f i n d a c o u n t e r t o them. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i f we

were s u c c e s s f u l even i n compelling them t o remain submerged i n darkness,
i t would have the e f f e c t o f making them s u r f a c e i n d a y l i g h t t o r e c h a r g e

batteries,.
For d e a l i n g with the submarines on t h e h u n t i n g grounds, t h e two

r e q u i r e m e n t s were f i r s t : a s much a i r c o v e r a s p o s s i b l e , and s e c o n d :
a d e q u a t e e s c o r t s . A rough r u l e of thumb f o r t h e nunber of e s c o r t s was t o
h a v e t h r e e s h i p s w i t h e v e r y convoy p l u s one f o r e v e r y t e n s h i p s i n t h e
convoy. A convoy of f o r t y s h i p s would t h u s have seven e s c o r t s . I n prac
t i c e , however, w e were never a b l e t o supply t h i s n m b e r of e s c o r t s , and
a s a g e n e r a l r u l e we never had m r e t h a n s i x w i t h a n y convoy. When e s c o r t
i n g v e s s e l s had t o be withdrawn f o r o p e r a t i o n s , t h e r e was no p o o l from
which t o r e p l a c e thew. We had now new commitments i n t h e S i e r r a Leone
convoys which had had t o be r e - s t a r t e d ,
and t h e convoys b r i n g i n g 0 1 1
from t h e Dutch West I n d i e s t o t h e United Kingdom and to North Africa. As

a minimum s i x t y - f i v e more e s c o r t v e s s e l s were r e q u i r e d i n t h e A t l a n t i c
a l o n e . B e f o r e any d e c i s i o n s , were t a k e n on our s t r a t e g y f o r 1943, i t
seemed e s s e n t i a l t o weigh c a r e f u l l y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s i n e s c o r t Vessels
f o r any o p e r a t i o n s t o be u n d e r t a k e n . Once an o p e r a t i o n was launched and
e s c o r t s were withdrawn f r w convoys, t h e y c o u l d n o t be r e t u r n e d u s u a l l y
196
U S SECRET
f o r f o u r o r f i v e months, d u r i n g w h i c h a n a c u t e s h o r t a g e w a s f e l t . t h e o n l y
r e l i e f d u r i n g s u c h a p e r i o d would be t h e i n t a k e from new c o n s t r u c t i o n .
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t t h e a i r had proved t h e most e f f e c
t i v e weapon a g a i n s t t h e U-boat.
The e s t i m a t e d German o u t p u t of U-boats
was twenty a month. He gave t h e f o l l o w i n g f i g u r e s f o r a t t a c k s on U-boats

d u r i n g t h e l a s t two months:
Kovember
U-Boats sunk
U-Boats damaged )
U-Boats sunk
8
by a i r c r a f t
24
U-Boats damaged )
December
by o t h e r means
A i r p a t r o l s over t h e U-boat
r o u t e s t o t h e h u n t i n g grounds were
v e r y c o s t l y i n a i r c r a f t s i n c e i t was c a l c u l a t e d t h a t t h e r e was o n l y one

s i g h t i n g f o r 250 h o u r s f l y i n g time. N e v e r t h e l e s s , even i f a large number
of U-boats were n o t a c t u a l l y d e s t r o y e d by t h i s means, a i r c r a f t p a t r o l s

had a good e f f e c t i n compelling U-boats t o remain submerged and thereby
r e d u c i n g t h e i r time on t h e h u n t i n g grounds
A f u r t h e r method of a t t a c k
on U - b o a t s was t h e l a y i n g of mines from t h e a i r a t t h e e x i t s of t h e

U-boat b a s e s and c o n s t r u c t i o n y a r d s
GENERAL ARNOLD i n q u i r e d whether i t w a s n o t p o s s i b l e t o use f l y i n g
b o a t s f o r a n t i - s u b m a r i n e work, b o t h over t h e h u n t i n g grounds and on t h e
r o u t e s t o them. T h i s would avoid t h e use of v a l u a b l e l o n g range bombers.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t t h e long range bomber was e s s e n t i a l
for work over t h e convoys, s i n c e f l y i n g b o a t s , o w i n g t o t h e i r slow speed,

took t o o l o n g t o r e a c h them a f t e r a c a l l f o r a s s i s t a n c e . Moreover, t h e
load of t h e f l y i n g b o a t i n bombs and d e p t h c h a r g e s was l e s s t h a n t h a t of
t h e L i b e r a t o r . I n a d d i t i o n t h e y were n o t processed f o r t h e 10-centimeter
A.S.V.
A c o n s i d e r a b l e number of C a t a l i n a s were b e i n g u s e d i n s p i t e of
I t w a s e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
t h e whole of t h e A t l a n t i c a n d B r i t i s h Home Waters was between 120 and 135
long range bombers N e w d e v i c e s were b e i n g d e v e l o p e d t o c o m b a t t h e German
l i s t e n i n g a p p a r a t u s which d e t e c t e d t h e presence of A , S . V . a i r c r a f t
these disadvantages
ADMIRAL K I N G a s k e d whether economy i n l o n g r a n g e bombers could

n o t be e f f e c t e d by u s i n g C a t a l i n a s f o r p a t r o l lrork and r e s e r v i n g l o n g
197
U. S. S E C R E T
B R I T I S K <YOST SECRET
r a n g e bombers f o r emergency c a l l s when convoys were a c t u a l l y attacked.
The C a t a l i n a had a v e r y l o n g endurance and c o u l d b e k e p t i n t h e air for
twenty-four
h o u r s if t h e crew was l a r g e enough t o p r o v i d e two watches.
One a d v a n t a g e of t h e f l y i n g b o a t was t h a t any s h e l t e r e d w a t e r c o u l d be

used for a base i n s t e a d of a i r f i e l d s .
SIR CHARLES WZTAL s a i d t h a t C a t a l i n a s were b e i n g u s e d t o the
maximum. A s u r v e y had b e e n made o f t h e West A f r i c a n r o a s t and i t was
found t h a t two d e p o t s h i p s for C a t a l i n a s would s u f f i c e on t h e n o r t h e r n
p a r t , but t h i s d i d n o t cover t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e I n d i a n Ocean or the
;out11 A t l a n t i c .
SIX DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t a n t i - s u b m a r i n e a i r c r a f t were e s s e n t i a l

i n t h e a r e a n o r t h of Freetown. The r e q u i r e m e n t s i n l o n g r a n g e bombers
which had been s t a t e d were an a b s o l u t e minimum, e v e n a l l o w i n g f o r the
m a x i m u m u s e of f l y i n g b o a t s .
S I Z CHARLES F'OZTAL asked whether t h e a i r c r a f t i n t h e P a c i f i c , de
t a i l s of which had been g i v e n a t a meeting on t h e p r e v i o u s day, were a v a i l

a b l e f o r a n t i - s u b m a r i n e work as w e l l as l o c a l d e f e n s e of t h e I s l a n d s
themselves,
ADMIXAL K I N G s a i d t h a t f o r t u n a t e l y t h e J a p a n e s e had n o t y e t made

any g r e a t u s e of submarines i n t h e P a c i f i c ,
p o s s i b l e t o work w i t h o n l y s m a l l e s c o r t s .
became more a c t i v e ,
and i t wasg t h e r e f o r e ,
If t h e J a p a n e s e s u b m a r i n e s
a i r c r a f t would have t o be u s e d a g a i n s t them. f h e
t o t a l r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e , h o w e v e r , were i n s u f f i c i e n t
for security
e v e r y w h e r e . When A l a s k a was t h r e a t e n e d , f o r c e s had t o b e s e n t up from
a l l q u a r t e r s . The a c u t e s h o r t a g e of e s c o r t v e s s e l s was of c o u r s e f u l l y
recognized.
SIR DUDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t h a t where l o n g r a n g e s h o r e based
a i r c r a f t c o u l d n o t b e employed t o cover t h e w h o l e p a s s a g e , a s f o r example
i n t h e d i r e c t convoys from t h e Dutch West I n d i e s t o t h e United Kingdom,
a u x i l i a r y a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s had t o be u s e d w i t h t h e convoys t h e m s e l v e s ,
On t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e i t was hoped t o e s t a b l i s h b a s e s f o r l o n g r a n g e
a i r c r a f t i n Newfoundland t o j o i n up w i t h a i r c r a f t working from t h e United

Kingdom.
GENERAL AIINOLD s a i d t h a t Greenland would b e o f l i t t l e u s e f o r
t h i s purpose owing t o t h e l o n g hours of d a r k n e s s a n d t h e v e r y bad weather.
198
SECRET
B R I T I S B MOYT SECRET
S
ADMIRAL COOKE asked whether f u l l use was b e i n g made of d i r e c t i o n

f i n d i n g a p p a r a t u s t o p i c k up t h e s h o r t range inter-communication r a d i o of
U-boats working i n packs. The Japanese had developed t h i s technique t o a
high degree.
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t a l l d e s t r o y e r s and most c o r v e t t e s ,
were f i t t e d w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y a p p a r a t u s f o r t h i s purpose. T h i s u s e was
b e i n g developed t o t h e m a x i m u m .
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s u g g e s t e d t h a t i t would be d e s i r a b l e t o have
an assessment made of t h e t o t a l r e s o u r c e s r e q u i r e d i n e s c o r t v e s s e l s and
a i r c r a f t t o combat t h e submarine menace, i n o r d e r t h a t t h e Combined C h i e f s
of S t a f f s h o u l d have a p i c t u r e of what would be l e f t over f o r o f f e n s i v e
o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e coming y e a r .
THE COMMIlTEE.'
Agreed t o d i r e c t t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s t o examine and r e
p o r t t h e minimum r e q u i r e m e n t s of e s c o r t s ( i n c l u d i n g a i r c r a f t
c a r r i e r s ) and a i r c r a f t which s h o u l d be devoted t o t h e s e c u r i t y
of t h e s e a communications o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s d u r i n g 1943.
(GENERAL EISENHOWER e n t e r e d t h e M e e t i n g a t t h i s p o i n t . )
2,.
SITUATION I N NORTH AFRICA.

GENERAL EISENHOWER gave a resume of t h e s i t u a t i o n i n North A f r i c a
a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e - . O p e r a t i o n s i n December had b e e n h e l d up by b a d
w e a t h e r and mud which r e s t r i c t e d t h e u s e o f v e h i c l e s e n t i r e l y t o t h e
r o a d s . , S i n c e t h i s c h e c k e v e r y e f f o r t had b e e n m a d e t o b u i l d up f o r an
a t t a c k i n t h e North b y i n c r e a s i n g our a i r power, improving t h e communi
c a t i o n s t o t h e f r o n t a n d r e . e q u i p p i n g t h e 6 t h Armored D i v i s i o n w i t h
Sherman Tanks. By t h e end o f December, however, i t was c l e a r t h a t t h e
weather c o n d i t i o n s would compel postponement o f a n y a t t a c k f o r a c o n s i d e r ,
a b l e t i m e , A t t e n t i o n had t h e n b e e n d i r e c t e d t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n
a t t a c k f u r t h e r t o t h e s o u t h where ground c o n d i t i o n s were b e t t e r . . For t h i s
purpose f o r c e s composed o f t h e 1st U , S , Armored D i v i s i o n and two U.. S Regimental Combat teams w i t h A n t i - A i r c r a f t and A n t i ,Tank U n i t s were b e i n g
c o n c e n t r a t e d , A t f i r s t o p e r a t i o n s on t h e r i g h t f l a n k had been looked upon
p r i m a r i l y a s a d i v e r s i o n , b u t i t now seemed p r o b a b l e t h a t i t would be
p o s s i b l e t o advance on Sfax and h o l d i t with i n f a n t r y w h i l e withdrawing
199
3. SECRET
11.
the 1st Armored D i v i s i o n a s a mobile r e s e r v e f u r t h e r t o t h e r e a r , where
i t c o u l d b e m a i n t a i m d more e a s i l y . . T h i s mobile r c s e r v s wou!d be a v a i l

a b l e , t o d e a l w i t h a t h r e a t e i t h e r from t h e North o r from Rommel's forces
r e t i r i n g from t h e d i r e c t i o n of T r i p o l i . The p l a n was t o l a u n c h the a t t a c k
on Sfax on J a n u a r y 2 4 t h . Although t h e roecl t,o Gabes was b e t t e r , t h e time
f a c t o r made i t n e c e s s a r y t o g o d i r e c t f o r S f a x . There seemed, however,
e v e r y r e a s o n t o hope t h a t Sfax cou1.d b e s u c c e s s f u l l y t a k e n .
SI:: ALAN X O O K E p o i n t e d o u t t h e need f o r c a r e f u l c o o r d i n a t i o n of
t h e a t t a c k on S f a x w i t h G e n e r a l Anderson's o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e North and
t h o s e of t h e 8 t h Army i n t h e South. If weather c o n d i t i o n s made i t impossi
b l e f o r G e n e r a l Anderson t o move f o r w a r d , e x c e p t on t h e r o a d s , b e f o r e
?.larch 1 5 t h t h e r e seemed t o b e
it
d a n p r t h a t t h e Germans would t h i n out
i n t h e North and d e f e a t t h e s f a x f o r c e s i n d e t a i l , I t would t a k e some time

b e f o r e t h e 8 t h Army c o u l d b r i n g p r e s s u r e t o b e a r from t h e southward i n
s u p p o r t of t h i s f o r c e , s i n c e even a t t h e b e s t General Montgomery d i d n o t
e x p e c t t o r e a c h T r i p o l i b e f o r e t h e m i d d l e o f Februirry; and b e f o r e he
c o u l d advance from t h e r e t h e p o r t would have t o b e c l e a r e d i n o r d e r t o
supply h i s f o r c e s w i t h p e t r o l f o r a f u r t h e r advance..
GENEXAL EISENII0WE:I a g r e e d t h & t i t was improbable t h a t a n y move

ment o f f t h e r o s d s would b e p o s s i b l e i n t h e N o r t h b e f o r e Xarch 1 5 t h ,
though General Anderson had s e v e n d a y s ' reserves b u i l t up which wouldbe
kept i n t a c t f o r an a t t s c k whenever c o n d i t i o n s p e r m i t t e d , , He hoped t h a t
General. Montgomery would push on through T r i p o l i as f a s t as p o s s i b l e . By
the end of January t h e 4 6 t h D i v i s i o n would b e c n n c e n t r h t e d forward under
General .Anderson and t h e 1.8th Regimental Combat Team would b e withdrawn
i n t o r e s e r v e , A s l o n g as t h e 1st U .
S. Armored D i v i s i o n was k e p t f o r
c o u n t e r a t t a c k , he f e l t t h a t he c o u l d d e a l w i t h any t h r e a t t o t h e Sfax
f o r c e . Ile hoped, however, t o h e a b l e t o d i s c u s s t h e whole problem w i t h
General Alexander and t o make any n e c e s s a r y a d j u s t m e n t s i n t h e p l a n on
the latter's arrival.
S I X a A N L1::OOKE
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a f t e r twomonths o f "an a c t i v e
d e f e n s i v e , " t h e 7 8 t h D i v i s i o n would n o t b e i n v e r y good c o n d i t i o n f o r

the a t t a c k i n t h e North and s u g g e s t e d t h a t i t would be b e t t e r t o l e t a
f r e s h d i v i s i o n form t h e s p e a r h e a d .
G3NEsa EISENHOWEn s a i d t h a t he was f a c e d w i t h t h e dilemma of
e i t h e r a l l o w i n g t h e t r o o p s i n t h e N c r t h t o d e t e r i o r a t e by r e m a i n i n g
200
U. S. SECRET
39ITIS.q XOST SECFET

i n a c t i v e i n t h e mud o r s u f f e r i n g some l o s s e s t o t h e m through keeping them
more a c t i v e . I n h i s opinion t h e l a t t e r w a s t h e lesser of two e v i l s . Also
t h a t a c t i v e p a t r o l l i n g would r e v e a l any t h i n n i n g o u t of t h e Axis f o r c e
i n t h e North.
The l a t e s t i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s p l a c e t h e A x i s s t r e n g t h i n North
Africa a t about 65,000. Every e f f o r t had been made t o r e t a r d t h e i r b u i l d
up b u t t h e a p p a l l i n g c o n d i t i o n s of t h e a i r f i e l d s and t h e bad w e a t h e r
had l a r g e l y c l o s e d down air o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t them r e c e n t l y . A t t h e
p r e s e n t t i m e i t was c a l c u l a t e d t h a t t h e A x i s were g e t t i n g i n a b o u t 750
men a day w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y s u p p l i e s f o r them, i n a d d i t i o n t o a c e r t a i n
amount of supplies f o r Rommel.
The French f o r c e s i n t h e middle o f t h e f r o n t were p l a y i n g a most
important p a r t s i n c e t h e y were h o l d i n g t h e l i n e between t h e B r i t i s h
in
t h e North and t h e American f o r c e s i n t h e South. Unless t h e y h e l d f i r m ,
a s e r i o u s s i t u a t i o n would develop. Moreover, he was completely dependent

on them f o r t h e working of h i s long l i n e of communication and t h e p o r t s .
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s n e c e s s i t a t e d c a r e f u l h a n d l i n g of t h e F r e n c h . The
French u n i t s themselves were b a d l y equipped and some o f t h e m w e r e p o w
l y t r a i n e d . T h e F r e n c h t r o o p s from T u n i s i a were somewhat u n r e l i a b l e s i n c e

t h e i r f a m i l i e s were now i n t h e German area. I n one b a t t a l i o n t h e r e had
been 132 d e s e r t i o n s . T h e French Generals B a r r e and J u i n were c o o p e r a t i n g
e x c e l l e n t l y w i t h General Anderson and General F r e d e n d a l l . U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,
General J u i n was n o t b e i n g g i v e n v e r y much scope by General Giraud.
The
l a t t e r might be a g o d D i v i s i o n Commander b u t he had no p o l i t i c a l s e n s e

and no i d e a of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . He was d i c t a t o r i a l by n a t u r e and seemed
t o s u f f e r from megalomania. I n a d d i t i o n he was v e r y s e n s i t i v e and always

ready t o t a k e o f f e n s e . He d i d n o t seem t o be a b i g enough man t o c a r r y
t h e b u r d e n of c i v i l government i n any way. I t had b e e n f a r e a s i e r t o
d e a l w i t h Admiral Darlan.
C i v i l a f f a i r s , which i n c l u d e d economic as w e l l a s p o l i t i c a l
m a t t e r s , had of c o u r s e , g i v e n a g r e a t d e a l of a n x i e t y . There were many
a g e n c i e s involved b u t t h e n e c e s s a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n t o d e a l w i t h a l l t h e s e
problems was b e i n g improved.
R a i l communications f o r w a r d were v e r y l i m i t e d in c a p a c i t y a t
p r e s e n t . E a s t of A l g i e r s t h e d a i l y tonnage which c o u l d b e c a r r i e d amounted
201
U S. SECRET
SPITISK MOST SECFET
t o a b o u t 2,200 t o n s b u t w i t h a d d i t i o n a l r o l l i n g s t o c k and l o c o m o t i v e s
which were b e i n g s e n t from t h e l l n i t e d S t a t e s , i t w a s hoped t o i n c r e a s e
t h i s t o 4 , 4 0 0 . From Casablanca t o Oran the d a i l y tonnage was o n l y about
900. P o r t c l e a r a n c e was improving. A t Oran i t averaged 5,000 t o n s a day.
A t A l g i e r s t h e d a i l y c l e a r a n c e was n o t s o g r e a t and i n i t i a l l y i t had been

much reduced by t h e presence o f French s h i p s l y i n g a t many of t h e b e r t h s .
L o s s e s o f s h i p p i n g had been s u s t a i n e d b y a i r a t t a c k a t Bougie and Bone.
A i r d e f e n s e o f t h e p o r t s was b e i n g s t e a d i l y improved. A l l a v a i l a b l e
F r e n c h a n t i a i r c r a f t weapons h a d b e e n b r o u g h t i n t o a c t i o n and n i g h t
f i g h t e r s had been s e n t from t h e United Kingdom. Radar had been i n s t a l l e d
t o c o v e r t h e s t r e t c h from Bone t o A l g i e r s and some had a l s o been provided
a t Oran and C a s a b l a n c a . P a s s i v e a i r d e f e n s e measures i n t h e p o r t s were

b e i n g improved and a s s i s t a n c e had b e e n g i v e n by a n e x p e r t s e n t from the
U n i t e d Kingdom who had done v e r y good work a t Algiers. One d i f f i c u l t y
was t h a t t h e r e was no r i g i d c o n t r o l o v e r t h e French c i v i l p o p u l a t i o n .

S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t t h e Radar c o v e r b e t w e e n Bond and
A l g i e r s w a s n o t y e t e f f e c t i v e below 10,000 f e e t . ie had made arrangements
f o r a d d i t i o n a l equipment t o be provided t o make good t h i s d e f i c i e n c y . He
i n q u i r e d what a i r defense c o u l d b e p r o v i d e d f o r S f a x .
GENERAL EISENHOWER s a i d t h a t t h e r e was good n a t u r a l c o v e r f o r
t h e t r o o p s i n S f a x . One a i r f i e l d t h e r e was p r a c t i c a l l y complete and t h e r e
was a n o t h e r a t Gabes. The improvement o f a i r f i e l d s had been one o f t h e

g r e a t e s t problems
Approximately 2,000 t o n s o f s t e e l m a t t i n g w e r e r e q u i r e d
f o r a s i n g l e runway and t h i s q u a n t i t y used up t h e c o m p l e t e c a p a c i t y of

r a i l r o a d s i n t h e forward a r e a s f o r a whole day. Every p o s s i b l e e x p e d i e n t
had been t r i e d t o u s e l o c a l m a t e r i a l b u t broken s t o n e merely s a n k i n t o t h ?
mud.
Once t h e weather i m p r o v e d a l l t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s would v a n i s h
s i n c e t h e r e were l a r g e a r e a s i n t h e forward zone which c o u l d be used a s

a i r f i e l d s w i t h l i t t l e o r no p r e p a r a t i o n a t a l l .
(GENERAL EISENHOWER w i t h d r e w a t t h i s p o i n t .)
3.
STRATEGY I N THE EUROPEAN TliEATER<

SIR ALAN BROOKE o u t l i n e d two b r o a d p o l i c i e s w h i c h s h o u l d b e
followed i n t h e European T h e a t e r d u r i n g 1943. The f i r s t was t o c l o s e down
in t h e Mediterranean as soon as t h e North A f r i c a n c o a s t had been c l e a r e d

and t h e s e a r o u t e t h r o u g h t h e Mediterranean had been opened, and t o d e v o t e
202
U. S . S E C R E T
B R I T I S H WOST S E C R E T
every e f f o r t t o b u i l d i n g up i n t h e United Kingdom f o r a n i n v a s i o n of t h e
North of France a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e moment. T h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of
S t a f f had examined t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s and c a l c u l a t e d t h a t 21 t o 23 d i v i
s i o n s c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e for t h i s purpose by September 1 5 t h . I t had
a t f i r s t been thought t h a t p o r t a n d r a i l w a y c a p a c i t y wouldbe t h e l i m i t i n g
f a c t o r on t h e build-up of American t r o o p s ' expansion b u t i t looked as i f
t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i d s could be overcome i f t h e expansion o f r e c e i v i n g d e p o t s
f o r s u p p l i e s were pushed a h e a d . As a b a s i s o f c a l c u l a t i o n , a monthly
movement o f 120 merchant v e s s e l s from t h e U . K. t o t h e U.S.A. had been
t a k e n , t h e corresponding t r o o p l i f t b e i n g 120,000. T h i s would a l l o w 9 t o
12 U. S . d i v i s i o n s t o be t r a n s p o r t e d t o t h e U. K. by September 1st. T h e
number of t r o o p s which c o u l d be p u t i n t o F r a n c e was s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d ,

however, by t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f l a n d i n g c r a f t and o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
f a c i l i t i e s i n France.
Three p o s s i b l e a r e a s f o r i n v a s i o n had been considered:
(a) The Calais-Boulogneareawhich, a l t h o u g h h e a v i l y defended,
was w i t h i n f i g h t e r cover of t h e United Kingdom;
(b) Cherbourg P e n i n s u l a , which c o u l d be s e i z e d by a compar
a t i v e l y small f o r c e ;
( c ) B r e s t P e n i n s u l a , w h i c h was a more worth w h i l e o b j e c t i v e ,
would r e q u i r e a much l a r g e r f o r c e , s a y , a t l e a s t 1 5 d i v i s i o n s
t o hold t h e 150 k i l o m e t e r s of f r o n t .
One o f t h e o b j e c t i o n s t o o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e North o f France
was t h e e x c e l l e n t r a i l w a y c o n n e c t i o n s a c r o s s Europe which would e n a b l e
t h e Germans r a p i d l y t o r e i n f o r c e t h e invaded area. Moreover, i t would
n o t b e p o s s i b l e t o b e g i n t h e o p e r a t i o n u n t i l t h e e a r l y autumn and no
s u p p o r t would t h e r e f o r e be g i v e n t o R u s s i a throughout t h e summer. T h l s
l a s t f a c t o r seemed t o be t h e p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n . A l a n d i n v a s i o n on a
small s c a l e would have l i t t l e more t h a n a l o c a l e f f e c t e x c e p t f o r t h e
a i r f i g h t i n g which would i n e v i t a b l y ensue from i t .
The o t h e r b r o a d p o s s i b i l i t y was t o m a i n t a i n a c t i v i t y i n t h e
Mediterranean while building, up themaximum a i r o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t Germany
from t h e U . K. and p u t t i n g i n as many t r o o p s as c o u l d b e s p a r e d w i t h a
View
t o u n d e r t a k i n g a c o m p a r a t i v e l y small o p e r a t i o n s u c h a s s e i z i n g
Cherbourg P e n i n s u l a .
203
U. S. S E C F E T
BilITISH WOST S E C Y E T
The Mediterranean o f f e r e d many c h o i c e s : S a r d i n i a , S i c i l y , Crete,
and t h e Dodecanese. Our amphibious power enabled us t o t h r e a t e n a l l these
p o i n t s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y and t h e r e b y c a u s e t h e Germans t o d i s p e r s e t h e i r
f o r c e s . Unless t h e y were t o r i s k t h e l o s s of t h e s e i s l a n d s , t h e y would
be compelled t o r e i n f o r c e them a s w e l l as t h e c o a s t s of I t a l y , Greece,
and F r a n c e . If I t a l y c o u l d b e knocked o u t , Germany would be i n v o l v e d i n
l a r g e new commitments i n a n a t t e m p t t o b o l s t e r h e r up and r e p l a c i n g
I t a l i a n t r o o p s i n t h e Balkans. Other German s a t e l l i t e s might a l s o f a l l
o u t . The B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d t h a t our b e s t p o l i c y would
be t o t h r e a t e n Germany everywhere i n t h e Mediterranean, t o t r y t o knock
o u t I t a l y , and t o b r i n g i n Turkey on o u r s i d e . I t was n o t , of c o u r s e ,
c e r t a i n t h a t we could b r i n g Turkey i n b u t by a combination of inducements
and p r e s s u r e we might be s u c c e s s f u l . W i t h Turkey a s a b a s e , we c o u l d
a t t a c k t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s and open u p t h e B l a c k Sea Route t o Russia.
If t h i s p o l i c y was a d o p t e d , we s h a l l have t o make a c a r e f u l

c h o i c e of our o b j e c t i v e . T h e main c h o i c e seemed t o l i e between t h e cap
t u r e of S a r d i n i a and C o r s i c a and t h e c a p t u r e of S i c i l y . S i c i l y would b e
t h e b i g g e r p r i z e b u t would be a b i g g e r u n d e r t a k i n g and t h e o p e r a t i o n
could not be s t a g e d u n t i l l a t e i n t h e summer. The t h r e a t , however, would

compel d i s p e r s i o n on Germany l o n g b e f o r e t h e o p e r a t i o n i t s e l f was
launched. A s f o r S a r d i n i a and C o r s i c a , t h e s e i n c r e a s e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s
o f a i r a t t a c k a g a i n s t I t a l y by p r o v i d i n g b a s e s f o r f i g h t e r e s c o r t e d
bombers. The o p e r a t i o n might be combined w i t h o p e r a t i o n s from t h e Widdle
E a s t a g a i n s t t h e Dodecanese.
One of t h e g r e a t advantages of a d o p t i n g t h e J i e d i t e r r a n e a n p o l i c y
w a s t h a t a larger f o r c e of heavy bombers could be b u i l t up i n t h e United

Kingdom f o r t n e a t t a c k on Germany than i f w e c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r a n i n v a s i o n
of F r a n c e . For t h e l a t t e r purpose, a much l a r g e r p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e l i g h t
e r t y p e of bomber and ground s u p p o r t p l a n e s would be n e e d e d a n d t h e

number of heavy bombers would s u f f e r a c c o r d i n g l y .
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t themore t r o o p s t h a t w e c o n c e n t r a t e d
i n t h e Mediterranean, t h e more l i k e l y Germany was t o move i n t o Spain i n
o r d e r t o c u t our l i n e of communications through t h e s t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r .
An i n v a s i o n of Northern France such a s t h e s e i z u r e of t h e Brest P e n i n s u l a
would n o t n e a r l y s o l i k e l y p r e c i p i t a t e s u c h an e v e n t . H e doubted whether
204
SECRET
ll
t h e S p a n i a r d s could be r e l i e d upon t o o f f e r a n y t h i n g more t h a n g u e r i l l a

r e s i s t a n c e t o a German i n v a s i o n .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f d i d n o t
c o n s i d e r i t was a t a l l p r o b a b l e t h a t Spain would permit f r e e passage t o
t h e German f o r c e s . I t was c a l c u l a t e d t h a t some 20 d i v i s i o n s would b e
n e c e s s a r y t o occupy t h e c o u n t r y i f t h e S p a n i a r d s r e s i s t e d a t a l l . T h i s
would be a v e r y l a r g e commitment f o r Germany. In any e v e n t , w e would he
a b l e t o s e c u r e t h e s o u t h s i d e o f t h e S t r a i t s o f G i b r a l t a r by occupying
S p a n i s h Morocco and t h i s would p r e v e n t t h e complete r l o s u r e of t h e sea
r o u t e . He d i d n o t t h i n k i t would be p o s s i b l e f o r Germany t o s e i z e t h e
Spanish a i r f i e l d s i n t h e S o u t h by parachute t r o o p s . The p r o b l e m o f s u p p l y
i n g them by a i r would be extremely d i f f i c u l t ,
SIR CHARLES PORTAL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t if t h e S p a n i a r d s allowed t h e
Germans fFee passage we s h o u l d d e c l a r e war on S p a i n which was depending
on us f o r many of t h e n e c e s s i t i e s o f l i f e
Even i f t h e Germans d i d go i n ,
we should be b e t t e r a b l e t o a f f o r d a i r c r a f t f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f s h i p p i n g
through t h e S t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r t h a n c o u l d t h e Germans f o r i t s a t t a c k
I t would be much more advantageous f o r the Germans i f w e b u i l t up a g a i n s t
France and l e f t t h e Mediterranean alone
They would t h e n he a b l e t o w i t h
draw large numbers of a i r f o r c e s f r o m t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and r e i n f o r c e t h e

R u s s i a n F r o n t , r e l y i n g on t h e s t r o n g d e f e n s e s o f N o r t h e r n F r a n c e t o
r e s i s t an i n v a s i o n , On t h e o t h e r hand if w e k e p t t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n a c t i v e ,
t h e y would be compelled t o keep l a r g e a i r f o r c e s t h e r e t h e whole time
T h i s was of t h e g r e a t e s t importance s i n c e Germany's main s h o r t a g e s were
a i r f o r c e s and o i l .
C o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c u s s i o n f o l l o w e d on t h e d e t a i l s and t i m i n g s o f
o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S i c i l y and S a r d i n i a i n which t h e f o l l o w i n g were t h e
p r i n c i p a l p o i n t s made:
(a) If t h e c a p t u r e of S i c i l y was mounted from t h e United King

dom and t h e United S t a t e s , i t could be c a r r i e d o u t e a r l y i n Aug
u s t , b u t would r e q u i r e some 190 e s c o r t v e s s e l s If i t was mounted
from North Africa some 65 e s c o r t s would be s a v e d , b u t i t s launch
i n g would be d e l a y e d about one month. T h i s d e l a y was due t o t h e
time r e q u i r e d f o r a m p h i b i o u s t r a i n i n g i n N o r t h A f r i c a where
f a c i l i t i e s were e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d ,
205
U S SECRET
(b) The c a p t u r e of S a r d i n i a could be undertaken i n about May,
i.e
t h r e e months earlier t h a n S i c i l y A i r cover f o r t h e Sardinia
o p e r a t i o n , however, would be more d i f f i c u l t owing t o its greater

d i s t a n c e from North A f r i c a . ,
( c ) The t o t a l c o a s t l i n e of S i c i l y w a s a b o u t 500 m i l e s and i t

was a n t i c i p a t , e d t h a t some 7 t o 8 enemy d i v i s i o n s wouldbedefend
i n g t h e i s l a n d . T h i s compared v e r y f a v o r a b l y w i t h t h e c o a s t l i n e
o f N o r t h e r n F r a n c e which was t h e s a m e l e n g t h , more s t r o n g l y

f o r t i f i e d and would be d e f e n d e d by 15 d i v i s i o n s .
(d) P a r t o f the a i r cover f o r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S i c i l y could
b e p r o v i d e d from Malta from which a b o u t 300 f i g h t e r s c o u l d be
operated. Additional f i g h t e r p r o t e c t i o n c o u l d b e g i v e n i f P a n t e l 1
a r i a was s e i z e d i n a p r e l i m i n a r y o p e r a t i o n . The t r o o p s required
f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n amounted to some 9 d i v i s i o n s , 10 t o 12 brigade

groups b e i n g employed as a s s a u l t i n g t r o o p s .
(e) I t was d o u b t f u l whether t h e w h o l e o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t S i c i l y
could be u n d e r t a k e n by t r o o p s a l r e a d y i n t h e Mediterranean owing
t o t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t r a i n i n g them i n t i m e i n N o r t h A f r i c a .
Assembly a n d r e p a i r o f l a n d i n g c r a f t was a n o t h e r b o t t l e n e c k , ,
SIR DUDIEY POUND e s t i m a t e d t h a t once t h e North A f r i c a n Coast had

been c l e a r e d , even w i t h o u t having S i c i l y i n our p o s s e s s i o n , i t would be
p o s s i b l e t o run a convoy o f t h i r t y s h i p s once e v e r y t e n days through t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , i n s u b s t i t u t i o n f o r t h e p r e s e n t s h i p p i n g t o t h e Middle
E a s t , P e r s i a n Gulf and I n d i a , which moved v i a t h e Cape,. T h i s would e f -
f e c t a s a v i n g of some 225 s h i p s . The average l o s s e s per month on t h e Cape
r o u t e are a t p r e s e n t a b o u t 15 s h i p s The e s t i m a t e d l o s s e s if t h e Medi..
t e r r a n e a n r o u t e were used s h o u l d o n l y be a b o u t 9 a month even a l l o w i n g
a h i g h e r p e r c e n t a g e of
loss,^
H e u n d e r s t o o d , however, t h a t t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s e s t i m a t e was 18.
206
SECRET
U. S .
C.C.S.
5 8 t h Meeting

o n S a t u r d a y , J a n u a r y 16, 1943, a t 1030.
PRESENT
A d m i r a l o f t h e F l e e t S i r Dudlej
Pound
F. A. P o r t a l
G e n e r a l C. C. h a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E . J . King, USN
L t . lienera1 H.
H.
A r n o l d , USA
L t . G e n e r a l B . B. S o m e r v e l l , USA
Rear Admiral C. 111. Cooke, Jr.,USN
(For f i r s t h a l f of meeting)
B r i g . G e n e r a l A. C. Wedemeyer,USA
(For f i r s t h a l f o f m e e t i n g )
Vice Admiral t h e L o r d L o u i s
h!ountbat t e n
L t . G e n e r a l S i r H a s t i n g s L.
Major G e n e r a l J . N .
Jsrnay
Kennedy
A i r V i c e M a r s h a l J . C. S l e s s o r
Colonel J. E. S m a r t , USA
( F o r f i r s t h a l f of m e e t i n g )
Commander R . E . L i b b y , USN
SECRETARIAT
B r i g . G e n e r a l J . H . Deane, USA
(The m e e t i n g a d j o u r n e d from 1300 t o 1530)
207
U. S . S E C R E T
B e I T I S K MOST S E C R E T
1.
THE NORTH AFRICAN SITUATION.

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave an account of a conference between General
A l e x a n d e r and G e n e r a l Eisenhower r e g a r d i n g t h e coming o p e r a t i o n s i n

T u n i s i a and Libya. General Eisenhower had planned a n o f f e n s i v e against
Sfax t o b e l a u n c h e d o n J a n u a r y 2 4 t h . The p l a n p r e s e n t e d some d i f f i c u l t i e s .

The 1st Army cannot a t t a c k p r i o r t o March 1 5 t h . T h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army ex
p e c t s t o take T r i p o l i by J a n u a r y 2 4 t h . A t t h a t t i m e t h e y w i l l be o u t
Of
f u e l f o r t h e i r v e h i c l e s and a c e r t a i n amount o f r e o r g a n i z i n g w i l l be
n e c e s s a r y . I t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e 8 t h Army w i l l n o t be a b l e t o a t t a c k
Rommel's f o r c e s o n t h e Mareth l i n e p r i o r t o February 1 5 t h . Thus they
W i l l
be t o o l a t e t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of t h e f a v o r a b l e s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d by
General Eisenhower's a t t a c k on Sfax and consequently Rommel w i l l be free
f o r a p e r i o d of time t o o p e r a t e a g a i n s t General E i s e n h o w e r ' s s o u t h e r n

f o r c e s and perhaps f o r c e him towithdraw from Sfax. This might be coupled
w i t h a German a t t a c k f r o m t h e northwhichwould p l a c e General Eisenhower's
s o u t h e r n f o r c e s i n an extremely p r e c a r i o u s p o s i t i o n .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s t a t e d t h a t i t had been d e c i d e d t h a t t h e Sfax
a t t a c k would be c a n c e l e d . I n s t e a d , r a i d s would be conducted a g a i n s t t h e
German l i n e of communications from Sfax b u t t h e b u l k of General Eisen
hower's f o r c e s c o n s i s t i n g of t h e 1st Armored D i v i s i o n , r e i n f o r c e d , would
be h e l d in t h e v i c i n i t y of Tebessa p r e p a r e d t o a s s i s t General Alexancer
i n h i s a t t a c k on Rommel's f o r c e s o r t o assist t h e 1st Army t o t h e n o r t h .
The Sfax a t t a c k mightbeaccomplished l a t e r and, i f s o , i t would be timed
by agreement between General Alexander and General Eisenhower who w i l l
confer frequently.
2.
THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR 1943 I N THE EUROPEAN THEATER.

GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t t h e United S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f
were anxious t o l e a r n t h e B r i t i s h concept as t o how Germany is t o be de

f e a t e d . I t has been t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e United S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f
t h a t Germany must b e d e f e a t e d by a p o w e r f u l e f f o r t on t h e c o n t i n e n t ,
c a r r y i n g o u t t h e BOLERO-ROUNDUP p l a n s . Aid t o R u s s i a i s r e g a r d e d as
being of paramount importance in order t o assist t h e Russian Army t o ab
s o r b t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e German ground and a i r f o r c e s .
H e s a i d w e must d e v i s e means t o e n a b l e R u s s i a t o c o n t i n u e aggres
s i v e l y through 1943 by p r o v i d i n g them w i t h s u p p l i e s . The amount of such
s u p p l i e s and t h e methods of d e l i v e r i n g them must be determined upon. The
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U. S
German a i r and ground f o r c e s brought t o b e a r a g a i n s t Russia must be r e

duced. Any method of tccomplishing t h i s o t h e r than on t h e Continent is a
d e v i a t i o n from t h e b a s i c p l a n . The q u e s t i o n i s t h e n t o what e x t e n t must
t h e United N a t i o n s adhere t o t h e g e n e r a l concept and t o what e x t e n t do
t h e y undertake d i v e r s i o n s f o r t h e purpose o f a s s i s t i n g E u s s i a , improving
the tonnage s i t u a t i o n , and m a i n t a i n i n g momentum.
I n commenting on the B r i t i s h p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i r p l a n s f o r the
Mediterranean, CEhEFAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t t h e United S t a t e s C h i e f s of'
S t a f f would l i k e t o have f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s :
( a ) W r e n o t t h e E a s t - b e s t canmunications i n n o r t h e r n Europe,
which t h e B r i t i s h c o n s i d e r c a p a b l e of moving s e v e n d i v i s i o n s
e v e r y t w e l v e days, s u b j e c t t o s e v e r e i n t e r f e r e n c e by heavy a i r
a t t a c k s from E n g l a n d ?
@) If t h e Mediterranean o p e r a t i o n s were undertaken and t h e r e
were a b r e a k i n t h e German s t r e n g t h , might i t occur s o r a p i d l y

t h a t f u l l advantage could n o t ke taken of i t ? I t was, t h e r e f o r e ,
d e s i r e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f expand o n what t h e ton
nage savings from t h e Mediterranean o p e r a t i o n s might be i n o r d e r
t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e y were worth t h e c o s t s i n v o l v e d
( c ) What would be t h e e f f e c t s o f Mediterranean o p e r a t i o n s on
t h e t i m i n g of t h e United N a t i o n s c o n c e n t r a t i o n s i n England? I n
G e n e r a l Eisenhower's o p i n i o n , i t was unwise t o count on f u r t h e r
u s e of l a n d i n g c r a f t used i n t h e i n i t i a l l a n d i n g s f o r any o t h e r
operation
pated
A f i f t y or s e v e n t y - f i v e p e r c e n t l o s s should be a n t i c i
G e n e r a l Eisenhower a l s o t h o u g h t t h a t o p e r a t i o n s on t h e
C o n t i n e n t t o e s t a b l i s h a bridgehead would r e q u i r e more d i v i s i o n s

t h a n had o r i g i n a l l y b e e n t h o u g h t n e c e s s a r y
(d) What were t h e r e l a t i v e m e r i t s o f u n d e r t a k i n g an o p e r a
t i o n against S i c i l y o r Sardinia, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n regard t o the
e f f e c t s on tonnage, and t h e development o f f o r c e s i n t h e United
Kingdom?
( e ) Was an o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t S i c i l y m e r e l y a means towards
a n end o r a n end i n itself7 Is i t t o be a p a r t of an i n t e g r a t e d
p l a n to win t h e war or simply t a k i n g advantage of an OpportIInity?
GENERBL MARSHALL s a i d t h e United S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f a g r e e d

t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t must be made t o b u i l d up f o r c e s t o s u p p o r t Turkey i n
o r d e r t o be a b l e t o r e i n f o r c e h e r for r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t t h e A x i s powers
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li S . S E C R E T
a n d t o s e c u r e t h e u s e of h e r a i r f i e l d s f o r bombing o p e r a t i o n s by t h e
United Nations..
H e thought t h a t if o p e r a t i o n s are t o be u n d e r t a k e n i n t h e bledi

t e r r a n e a n , t h e y s h o u l d be f i n a n c e d by t h e t r o o p s now i n North A f r i c a .
One of t h e s t r o n g e s t arguments for undertaking such an o p e r a t i o n i s that
t h e r e w i l l be an excess of t r o o p s i n North A f r i c a once T u n i s i a has been
c l e a r e d of t h e Axis f o r c e s .
AI?k!IRAL K I K G s t a t e d t h a t he thought i t most important t o d e t e r
mine how t h e war i s t o te conducted. The p e r c e n t a g e of t h e war e f f o r t t o

b e a p p l i e d t o Germany and t o Japan must be determined a s w e l l as o v e r - a l l
p l a n s for t h e d e f e a t of each. He asked if R u s s i a i s t o c a r r y t h e burden
as f a r as t h e ground f o r c e s a r e concerned; a l s o , if t h e United Nations

were t o invade t h e C o n t i n e n t , and when. He s a i d t h a t s i n c e Europe is i n
t h e B r i t i s h a r e a o f s t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , h e would l i k e t o hear t h e i r
V i e w s o n t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . He t h o u g h t i t s h o u l d b e d e c i d e d whether a
planned step-by-step
p o l i c y was t o be pursued or whether w e s h o u l d r e l y
on seizing opportunities.
GENERAL &FOLD
s t a t e d t h a t he was i n t e r e s t e d t o know whether an
a t t a c k on S i c i l y was to be a means t o a n end o r an end i n i t s e l f and what

r e l a t i o n s u c h an a t t a c k would have t o t h e whole s t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t i o n ,
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t , when p l a n n i n g f o r GYMKAST, w e were
a t t e m p t i n g t o undertake an o p e r a t i o n "on a shoe s t r i n g . " H e s a i d w e then
changed t o t h e IIOIXFO-ROUP~UP concept and h a d t o p r e p a r e f o r SLEDGEHAMMER
b e c a u s e of t h e s t r o n g p o s s i b i l i t y of a R u s s i a n c o l l a p s e l a s t autumn.
Troop c o n c e n t r a t i o n s had been s t a r t e d and p r o d u c t i o n programs r e a r r a n g e d
f o r BOLERO* T h i s c r e a t e d d i f f i c u l t c o m p l i c a t i o n s . The naval program was

u p s e t because of t h e n e c e s s i t y t o u n d e r t a k e t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of l a n d i n g
craft^,
I t was then d e c i d e d t o u n d e r t a k e O p e r a t i o n TORCH i n which g r e a t
r i s k s were i n v o l v e d b u t i n which we have b e e n a b n o r m a l l y f o r t u n a t e ,

GENERAL MARSHALL d e s c r i b e d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h which the United
S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f were f a c e d over q u e s t i o n s o f p r i o r i t i e s i n pro

d u c t i o n . . I t was e s s e n t i a l t o fix our s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y as c a r e f u l l y as
p o s s i b l e i n o r d e r t o avoid production d i f f i c u l t i e s .
GENERAL W S H A I L thought i t i m p o r t a n t t h a t w e now r e o r i e n t our

s e l v e s and decide what t h e "main p l o t " i s t o be. Every d i v e r s i o n o r s i d e
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U. S SECRET
i s s u e from t h e main p l o t a c t s as a " s u c t i o n pump." H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e
o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S i c i l y appeared t o b e advantageous because of t h e
e x c e s s number of t r o o p s i n North A f r i c a b r o u g h t a b o u t by t h e s p l e n d i d
e f f o r t s of t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army. However, b e f o r e d e c i d i n g t o u n d e r t a k e
such an o p e r a s i o n , he t h o u g h t i t n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e j u s t what p a r t
i t would p l a y i n t h e o v e r - a l l s t r a t e g i c p l a n .
S I E ALAK DEOOKE s a i d t h a t on t h e C o n t i n e n t R u s s i a is t h e o n l y
a l l y h a v i n g l a r g e l a n d f o r c e s i n a c t i o n . Any e f f o r t of t h e o t h e r a l l i e s
must n e c e s s a r i l y b e so small as t o br unimportant i n t h e o v e r - a l l p i c t u r e
He f e l t t h a t ground o p e r a t i o n s by t h e rlnited S t a t e s and t h e I h i t e d King
dom would n o t e x e r t any g r e a t i n f l u e n c e u n t i l t h e r e were d e f i n i t e s i g n s
t h a t Germany was weakening.
GENERAL MAPSHALL s t a t e d t h a t i t was d e s i r a b l e t o f o r c e t h e enemy
t o meet u s i n a i r combat. He asked S i r A l a n Brooke t o d i s c u s s t h e e f f e c t s

of a i r s u p e r i o r i t y o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s on t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f g r o u n d
t r o o p s o f t h e C o n t i n e n t , H e f e l t t h a t i f a b r i d g e h e a d were e s t a b l i s h e d
and Germany d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o meet our a i r s u p e r i o r i t y , t h e b r i d g e h e a d
could b e expanded, On t h e o t h e r hand, i f t h e y d i d meet our a i r s u p e r i
o r i t y , I t would n e c e s s i t a t e withdrawing large a i r f o r c e s fran t h e n u s s i a n
front.
H e r e f e r r e d t o a s u g g e s t i o n by Mr, Molotov t h a t we send a ground
f o r c e t o t h e C o n t i n e n t s u f f i c i e n t t o d i v e r t f o r t y German d i v i s i o n s from
the R u s s i a n f r o n t , He s a i d t h a t t h i s was out of t h e q u e s t i o n and t h a t our
aim s h o u l d b e t o weaken t h e German a i r power i n t h e R u s s i a n t h e a t e r
r a t h e r t h a n t h e ground f o r c e s .
SIC ALAN BROOKE s t a t e d t h a t w i t h l i m i t e d ground f o r c e s , he d i d

n o t b e l i e v e t h a t we could c o n s t i t u t e s u f f i c i e n t t h r e a t i n Korthern F r a n c e
t o t h e Germans t o f o r c e them t o withdraw much o f t h e i r a i r power from

the R u s s i a n f r o n t . The Germans have f o r t y - f o u r
d i v i s i o n s i n France, son13
of which have been moved s o u t h a s a r e s u l t of O p e r a t i o n TOFCH. However,

t h e Germans s t i l l have s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h t o overwhelm us on t h e grourrl
and p e r h a p s hem u s i n w i t h w i r e o r c o n c r e t e t o s u c h an e x t e n t t h a t any
e x p a n s i o n o f t h e b r i d g e h e a d would b e e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t . M o r e o v e r ,
we c a n n o t u n d e r t a k e any o p e r a t i o n i n K o r t h e r n France u n t i l v e r y l a t e i n
the summer of 1933. S i n c e , t h e r e f o r e , w e cannot go i n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t i n
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U S, SECRET
f o r c e u n t i l Germany weakens, w e s h o u l d t r y t o make t h e Germans d i s p e r s e

t h e i r f o r c e s as much as p o s s i b l e . T h i s can be accomplished by a t t a c k i n g
t h e German a l l i e s , I t a l y i n p a r t i c u l a r . T h i s would r e s u l t i n a c o n s i d e r
a b l e s h o r t a g e of German t r o o p s on t h e Russian f r o n t . An e f f o r t should be
made t o put I t a l y o u t of t h e w a r , l a r g e l y by bombing a t t a c k s on t h e n o r t h
from t h e United Kingdom and i n t h e s o u t h from North A f r i c a and S i c i l y .
Our p o l i c y s h o u l d be t o f o r c e I t a l y o u t of t h e war a n d b r i n g
Turkey i n . I f I t a l y were o u t o f t h e war, Germany wouldbe f o r c e d t o occupy
t h a t c o u n t r y w i t h a c o n s i d e r a b l e number of d i v i s i o n s and a l s o would be
f o r c e d t o r e p l a c e I t a l i a n d i v i s i o n s i n o t h e r A x i s occupied c o u n t r i e s
SUCII
as Yugoslavia and Greece.

F r e p a r a t i o n s f o r an a t t a c k a g a i n s t S i c i l y would be known t o t h e
Germans and would n e c e s s i t a t e t h e d i s p e r s i n g o f t h e i r f o r c e s t o meet any
of t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f our amphibious f o r c e s . They would have t o be pre-.
pared t o meet us i n S a r d i n i a , S i c i l y , C r e t e , Greece and t h e Dodecanese,
and t h i s would g i v e g r e a t o p p o r t u n i t y f o r d e c e p t i o n p l a n s . He f e l t t h a t
t h i s would cause a much g r e a t e r withdrawal of s t r e n g t h from t h e R u s s i a n
f r o n t t h a n any o p e r a t i o n s which we might u n d e r t a k e a c r o s s t h e c h a n n e l ,
The p r o t e c t i o n of t h e sea r o u t e a l o n e would b r i n g on a c o n s i d e r a b l e a i r
b a t t l e i n t h e Mediterranean which w i l l g i v e r e l i e f t o t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t .
A i r p l a n e s which normally l e a v e R u s s i a d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r months and p a r
t i c i p a t e i n o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Mediterranean would be unable t o r e t u r n t o
t h e Russian f r o n t i n the spring.
SIR A L A N BROOKE s a i d t h a t a t t h e s a m e t i m e as o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t
S i c i l y were b e i n g u n d e r t a k e n , t h e r e must be a c o n t i n u e d b u i l d - - u p of t h e
United N a t i o n s f o r c e s i n t h e United Kingdom. These must b e p r e p a r e d t o
u n d e r t a k e t h e f i n a l a c t i o n of t h e war a s soon as Germany g i v e s d e f i n i t e
s i g n s o f weakness.
SIR ALAN BROOKE d i d n o t b e l i e v e w e c o u l d u n d e r t a k e any f u r t h e r
o p e r a t i o n s i n I t a l y from S i c i l y i n 1943, u n l e s s I t a l y c o l l a p s e d
corn.^.
p l e t e l y , We s h o u l d b e v e r y c a r e f u l of a c c e p t i n g any i n v i t a t i o n t o s u p p o r t
an a n t i - F a s c i s t
i n s u r r e c t i o n . To do s o might o n l y immobilize a c o n s i d e r
a b l e f o r c e t o no u s e f u l p u r p o s e ,
SIR ALAN BROOKE d i d n o t f e e l t h a t a i r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e
German and F r e n c h r a i l w a y s y s t e m s i n t h e n o r t h would be p a r t i c u l a r l y
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e f f e c t i v e o r do anything morethan impose d e l a y . There were somany alter

n a t i v e r o u t e s . On t h e o t h e r hand, o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e n o r t h - s o u t h
r a i l w a y l i n e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e i n I t a l y , c o u l d b e made e f f e c t i v e
because o f t h e c l o s e proximity of t h e l i n e s t o t h e s h o r e which makes them
v u l n e r a b l e t o commando r a i d s a s well as t o a i r a c t i o n .
SIR DUDLEY POUND d i s c u s s e d t h e e f f e c t s t h a t t a k i n g S a r d i n i a and
S i c i l y would have on t h e p a s s a g e of corlvoys. He s a i d t h a t s e c u r i n g e i t h e r
of these i s l a n d s w i l l n o t have as much e f f e c t a s s e c u r i n g T u n i s i a , He
a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t when T u n i s i a i s g a i n e d , w e s h a l l b e a b l e t o corlvoy
t h i r t y c a r g o s h i p s through t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n e v e r y t e n d a y s which w i l l
r e s u l t i n t h e r e l e a s e o f two hundred and twenty f i v e s h i p s f o r o t h e r
purposes The r o u t e would n o t b e s a f e f o r personnel s h i p s o r t a n k e r s . The
c a p t u r e o f S a r d i n i a would have l i t t l e e f f e c t on t h e movements of s h i p
ping. On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e c a p t u r e o f S i c i l y would e n q b l e u s t o move
t r o o p convoys a s w e l l a s c a r g o convoys t h r o u g h t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n w i t h
r e l a t i v e s a f e t y - The t r o o p convoys, however, w i l l , i n t h e f u t u r e , b e
l i m i t e d a l m o s t e n t i r e l y t o r e p l a c e m e n t t r o o p s for t h e Middle E a s t He s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e w i l l a l s o be a s a v i n g i n t a n k e r s because of
the p o s s i b i l i t y of s u p p l y i n g t h e n e c e s s i t i e s f o r o i l i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n
from Haifa r a t h e r t h a n b r i n g i n g o i l from t h e United S t a t e s ,
SIR ALAN BROOKE r e c a p i t u l a t e d t h e comparative merits o f a n a t t a c k
on S a r d i n i a and S i c i l y a s f o l l o w s - The l o s s of S i c i l y would be a much
h e a v i e r blow t o I t a l y than S a r d i n i a and would e f f e c t i v e l y s e c u r e the s e a
r o u t e through t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n On t h e o t h e r hand, i t was a much more
ambitious o p e r a t i o n and would have t o b e mounted l a t e r , S a r d i n i a was a
s m a l l e r u n d e r t a k i n g , and c o u l d b e mounted e a r l i e r I t would p r o v i d e an
excellent air base for attackonIndustria1 I t a l y , particularlyffcopsioar
were taken a s w e l l .
SIR CHARLES PORTAL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i f S i c i l y had t o b e t a k e n
l a t e r i n t h e y e a r and i f t h e Germans i n consequence were a b l e t o r e i n
f o r c e i t more s t r o n g l y , i t would be a much tougher n u t t o c r a c k On t h e

o t h e r hand, once i n p o s s e s s i o n of t h e S i c i l i a n a i r f i e l d s w e c o u l d m a k e
i t v e r y d i f f i c u l t indeed f o r t h e A x l s t o r e i n f o r c e t h e i s l a n d The r a i l
ways a l o n g t h e I t a l i a n c o a s t s i n t h e two were v u l n e r a b l e to' a i r a t t a c k
and r a i d i n g ; and t h e r e were n a r r o w d e f i l e s l e a d i n g from t h e p o r t of
hlessina i n t h e i s l a n d i t s e l f .
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U. S . SECRET
SIR CHARLES WRTAL referred t o t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we m i g h t be
a b l e t o o f f s e t i n f e r i o r i t y i n l a n d f o r c e s i n N o r t h e r n F r a n c e by t h e
g r e a t l y s u p e r i o r a i r f o r c e s which c o u l d b e o p e r a t e d from t h e United King
dom. So f a r as t h e B r e s t P e n i n s u l a was c o n c e r n e d , no f i g h t e r s u p p o r t
could be g i v e n from t h e United Kingdom, s i n c e i t was o u t of range. The
Cherbourg P e n i n s u l a was b e t t e r from t h i s p o i n t of view and o f f e r e d some
p o s s i b i l i t i e s as a p r e l i m i n a r y o p e r a t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , w i t h t h e l i m i t e d
a i r f a c i l i t i e s i n t h e P e n i n s u l a we should probably f i n d o u r s e l v e s pinned
down a t t h e neck o f t h e P e n i n s u l a by ground f o r c e s whose s u p e r i o r i t y we
s h o u l d be u n a b l e t o o f f s e t by t h e use o f a i r . We s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y be
opposed by s t r o n g German a i r f o r c e s there. Once w e were committed i n
Northern France t h e Germans would q u i c k l y b r i n g up t h e i r a i r f o r c e s from
t h e Mediterranean, r e a l i z i n g t h a t w e c o u l d n o t u n d e r t a k e amphibious opera
t i o n s on a c o n s i d e r a b l e s c a l e b o t h a c r o s s t h e channel and i n t h e Medi
t e r r a n e a n . On t h e o t h e r hand, by t h r e a t e n i n g i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n we
s h o u l d c a u s e a f a r g r e a t e r d i s p e r s i o n of German a i r f o r c e s .
SIR CHARLES WRTAL s a i d t h a t i n h i s view i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o

map o u t a d e t a i l e d p l a n f o r winning t h e war, b u t Germany's p o s i t i o n , if
we knocked o u t I t a l y , would undoubtedly be most s e r i o u s . Her a b i l i t y t o
c o n t i n u e t h e f i g h t depended on (a) t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e n e c e s s a r y re
s o u r c e s and (b) t h e w i l l t o f i g h t on. A s r e g a r d s r e s o u r c e s , her main
S h o r t a g e s a t p r e s e n t were o i l and a i r power. We had no e x a c t knowledge
of h e r o i l p o s i t i o n , b u t i f s h e had n o t succeeded i n g a i n i n g t h e Caucasus
o i l , and i f h e r s y n t h e t i c o i l p l a n t s were a t t a c k e d by p r e c i s i o n bombing
i n d a y l i g h t , t h e r e could be l i t t l e doubt t h a t h e r f o r c e s would r a p i d l y
become immobilized from l a c k of o i l .
As r e g a r d s h e r a i r f o r c e s , c a l c u l a t i o n s had b e e n made by t h e
B r i t i s h Air I n t e l l i g e n c e S t a f f s o f C e r m a n d e f i c i e n c i e s under t h e following
hypot h e s e s :
Case A
I t a l y f i g h t i n g and Germany c o n t i n u i n g t h e o f f e n s i v e i n
Case B
Case C
Caucasia
A s f o r A, b u t I t a l y knocked o u t .
I t a l y f i g h t i n g and Germany holding a s h o r t e n e d l i n e i n
Case D
R u s s i a by w i t h d r a w i n g t o Rostov.
A s for C, but I t a l y not fighting.
2 14
U S
SECRET
German d e f i c i e n c i e s i n June 1943 were c a l c u l a t e d as follows:
Deficiencies i n
Deficiencies i n
F i r s t Line A i r c r a f t
Divisions
1700
2250
34
54
700
1250
30
Case
A
Germany's w i l l t o f i g h t depended l a r g e l y on h e r c o n f i d e n c e i n
u l t i m a t e s u c c e s s . I f we and t h e h u s s i a n s began t o s c o r e c o n t i n u a l suc
c e s s e s a g a i n s t Germany, which s h e c o u l d n o t d e f e a t owing t o h e r l a c k of
means, s h e would b e g i n t o r e a l i z e t h a t t h e p r o s p e c t s were h o p e l e s s . She
might be faced w i t h t h e dilemna of withdrawing a l l her t r o o p s from France
and c o n c e n t r a t i n g i n t h e E a s t a g a i n s t R u s s i a . The way t o d e f e a t Germany,
t h e r e f o r e , seemed t o be t o t a k e e v e r y chance o f a t t a c k i n g h e r o i l s u p
p l i e s ; t o i n c r e a s e t h e a i r bombardment of Germany i t s e l f w i t h i t s i n e v i
t a b l e r e s u l t s on German morale, a n d o n i n d u s t r i a l c a p a c i t y and i t s e f f e c t
i n producing heavy c a s u a l t i e s i n her p o p u l a t i o n and g r e a t m i s e r y by t h e
d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e i r d w e l l i n g s . If we c o u l d achieve as well a s e r i e s o f
s u c c e s s e s , even though t h e s e might b e c o m p a r a t i v e l y small i n e x t e n t , i t
seemed f a i r l y c e r t a i n t h a t a p o i n t would be r e a c h e d a t which Germany
would s u d d e n l y c r a c k . No one, however, c o u l d s a y p r e c i s e l y when o r how
t h e c o l l a p s e would come.
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d h e u n d e r s t o o d t h e g e n e r a l concept o f t h e B r i t i s h
C h i e f s o f S t a f f was t o make u s e o f R u s s i a ' s g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and
h e r r e s e r v e s of manpower t o make t h e m a i n e f f o r t on l a n d a g a i n s t Germany
and t o s u p p o r t R u s s i a by d i v e r t i n g a s many German f o r c e s as p o s s i b l e
from t h e E a s t e r n f r o n t . T h i s r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n as t o whether w e s h o u l d
not g i v e R u s s i a l a r g e r s u p p l i e s of equipment
Once t h e North A f r i c a n c o a s t had been c l e a r e d i t seemed t h a t w e
s h o u l d have a s u r p l u s of t r o o p s i n North A f r i c a a n d t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n
whom we could n o t r e a d i l y move elsewhere
I t seemed t h e r e f o r e economical
t o use them i n that a r e a i f p o s s i b l e . S i c i l y seemed undoubtedly t o o f f e r

a g r e a t e r d i v i d e n d though i t s c o s t would be h i g h e r t h a n S a r d i n i a
'Phc
q u e s t i o n was whether w e could a f f o r d t o d e l a y s o long b e f o r e t a k i n g fur

t h e r o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n a g a i n s t Germany and whether t h e R u s s i a n s would be
s a t i s f i e d u n l e s s a "second f r o n t " was opened i n F r a n c e
The c h i e f b o t t l e
neck seemed t o be t h e p r o v i s i o n o f l a n d i n g c r a f t . O p e r a t i o n s i n horway
21s
ti. S . SECRET
seemed t o be worth examining though they would almost i n e v i t a b l y l e a d t o
a demand from Sweden for a s s i s t a n c e and equipment.

A s r e g a r d s t h e Brest P e n i n s u l a , i t was worth n o t i n g t h a t once we
were e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e , U . S. t r o o p s could be moved i n d i r e c t from Amer
i c a without t h e need fo r trans-shipment i n t h e United Kingdom. The e f f e c t
of c a p t u r i n g Brest on t h e U-boat war needed c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t B r e s t was one o f t h e f o u r B i s c a y
p o r t s u s e d by t h e Germans as U-boat bases, b u t he d o u b t e d whether t h e
p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p e n i n s u l a would g r e a t l y a s s i s t t h e p r o p o s e d heavy bomber
a t t a c k s on L o r i e n t , La P a l l i c e and Bordeaux. A l l t h e s e were w i t h i n e a s y
range of t h e United Kingdom and t o o p e r a t e a g a i n s t them from t h e B r e s t
P e n i n s u l a would i n v o l v e p u t t i n g i n a d d i t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s t h e r e , The air
f i e l d s i n t h e p e n i n s u l a were l i k e l y t o be f u l l y employed i n t h e a i r de
f e n s e o f t h e a r e a and d i r e c t s u p p o r t o f t h e army, l e a v i n g n o t h i n g t o s p a r e
f o r f i g h t e r e s c o r t s f o r d a y l i g h t bombing a t t a c k s on t h e Biscay p o r t s .
The n e x t p o i n t d i s c u s s e d was t h e effect of M e d i t e r r a n e a n opera
t i o n s on BOLERO.
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e number o f d i v i s i o n s which
t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f c a l c u l a t e d c o u l d b e made a v a i l a b l e by Sep
tember 1 5 t h f o r o p e r a t i o n s from t h e United Kingdom i n t o Northern France
were:
21-24 if t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n were c l o s e d down,
16-18 i f M e d i t e r r a n e a n o p e r a t i o n s were u n d e r t a k e n -
If t h e c a p t u r e o f S i c i l y were undertaken, t h e number o f l a n d i n g c r a f t l e f t

a v a i l a b l e f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n N o r t h e r n F r a n c e would be l e s s , SIR WDLEY
POUND observed t h a t a l l c a l c u l a t i o n s o f t h e number of d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e
f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n N o r t h e r n France were based o n t h e d a t e ofSeptember 1 5 t h .
I n h i s view t h i s was t o o l a t e s i n c e t h e weather was l i a b l e t o b r e a k i n
t h e t h i r d week i n September and i t was e s s e n t i a l t o have a p o r t by then.
The first a s s a u l t should n o t b e l a t e r t h a n August 1 5 t h
GENERAL MARSHALL i n q u i r e d whether c o n s i d e r a b l e numbers o f l a n d i n g
c r a f t would n o t be r e q u i r e d f o r t h e maintenance of S i c i l y a f t e r i t was
taken,
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t once S i c i l y had been o c c u p i e d t h e
a i r d e f e n s e o f t h e p o r t s should p r e s e n t n o p a r t i c u l a r d i f f i c u l t y . W
e were
a b l e t o p u t large s h i p s i n t o Malta which was v e r y exposed t o air a t t a c k .
216
U,. S. SECRET
The number of enemy a i r f i e l d s i n t h e t o e of I t a l y was s m a l l , and f i g h t e r s
on t h e S i c i l i a n airdromes s h o u l d b e a b l e t o d e a l w i t h d i v e bombers.
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN t h e n reviewed t h e B r i t i s h l a n d i n g c r a f t

s i t u a t i o n . Available landing c r a f t w e r e b e i n g a l l o c a t e d broadly a s follows:
(a) A g r o u p i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom of t h e s m a l l e r t y p e s o f
cross-channel c r a f t s u f f i c i e n t t o l i f t 4 brigade groups w i t h
t h e i r v e h i c l e s , o r 7 b r i g a d e g r o u p s l o a d e d for r a i d s when v e r y
f e w motor v e h i c l e s would b e t a k e n .
( b ) A g r o u p i n t h e Western M e d i t e r r a n e a n s u f f i c i e n t t o l i f t
1 b r i g a d e group complete.
( c ) A similar g r o u p i n t h e E a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
(d) A group i n I n d i a s u f f i c i e n t t o t r a i n 1 b r i g a d e g r o u p , b u t
n o t enough t o l i f t t h e b r i g a d e g r o u p i f i t had t o u n d e r t a k e
actual operations.
(e) A n o v e r s e a a s s a u l t f o r c e , a s a s t r a t e g i c r e s e r v e , s u f f i
c i e n t t o l i f t 6 b r i g a d e g r o u p s . The p e r s o n n e l would b e c a r r i e d
i n combat l o a d e r s b u t t h e y c o u l d n o t a l l be p u t a s h o r e i n t h e
f i r s t f l i g h t as t h e s h i p s c o u l d n o t c a r r y s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g
c r a f t f o r the purpose.
Every a t t e m p t was b e i n g made t o o r g a n i z e l a n d i n g c r a f t b a s e s i n
s o as t o g i v e t h e maximum f l e x i b i l i t y and t h u s a l l o w f o r a
change of p l a n . The s w i t c h o v e r from ROUNDUP t o TORCH had c a u s e d g r e a t
the U. K.
d i f f i c u l t i e s owing t o t h e f a c t t h a t b a s e s p r e p a r e d f o r ROUNDUP were i n

t h e S o u t h o f England whereas S c o t t i s h b a s e s had t o b e u s e d f o r TORCH.
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN observed t h a t hewas working o n t h e assump

t i o n t h a t any U . S. t r o o p s would b e c a r r i e d i n l a n d i n g c r a f t manned by
t h e U. S. I n t h e TORCH l a n d i n g s t h e m a j o r i t y of U. S . f o r c e s a t Oran and
A l g i e r s had been l a n d e d i n B r i t i s h manned c r a f t . He emphasized t h e need
f o r working o u t a l l o c a t i o n s o f l a n d i n g c r a f t w e l l ahead owing t o t h e long

time i n v o l v e d i n t r a i n i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y crews.
GENERAL SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e L.S.T.
t h e L.C.I.
craft;
and
n e c e s s i t a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e change i n our i d e a s a b o u t l a n d i n g
t h e former c a r r i e d some 150 i n f a n t r y as well as t a n k s , and t h e
l a t t e r 250 i n f a n t r y . He c a l c u l a t e d t h a t i f a l l t h e a v a i l a h l e l a n d i n g c r a f t
were c o n c e n t r a t e d i n North A f r i c a we s h o u l d b e a b l e t o l i f t a t o t a l of
some 80,000 men by A p r i l . Allowing f o r t h e u s e of 105-foot and 50-foot
217
U. S . SECRET
c r a f t as w e l l ,
t h i s l i f t would probably i n c r e a s e t o a b o u t 90,000 i n June.
If t h i s f o r c e of l a n d i n g c r a f t were used f o r a second and t h i r d ferrying

f l i g h t , o n a s h o r t s e a c r o s s i n g , t h e i r l i f t would p r o b a b l y b e a b o u t 60,000
i n t h e second f l i g h t and 45,000 i n t h e t h i r d f l i g h t , a l l o w i n g f o r inevi
t a b l e c a s u a l t i e s i n c r a f t . H e considered t h e use of t h e s e l a n d i n g c r a f t ,
w o r k i n g t o b e a c h e s , a sounder p r o p o s i t i o n t h a n t h e r i s k i n g of l a r g e ships
under a i r a t t a c k . The l a t t e r should be r e s e r v e d f o r t h e long ocean hauls.
To t r a n s f e r l a n d i n g c r a f t from t h e Mediterranean t o t h e United
Kingdom
for a subsequent o p e r a t i o n l a t e r i n t h e y e a r p r e s e n t e d consider
a b l e problems, I t was c e r t a i n l y e s s e n t i a l t o have c o n s i d e r a b l e numbers

of l a n d i n g c r a f t i n t h e United Kingdom w e l l i n advance f o r t r a i n i n g pur
poses.
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n e r s had calcu
l a t e d A u g u s t as t h e e a r l i e s t d a t e f o r t h e a t t a c k on S i c i l y . If t h e whole
o p e r a t i o n were mounted from North Africa i n o r d e r t o save e s c o r t s , the
d a t e would be postponed u n t i l t h e end of August. H i s own view was t h a t ,
even under t h e l a t t e r c o n d i t i o n , t h e d a t e might be advanced t o J u l y .
Assuming t h a t t h e a t t a c k be launched about J u l y ZOth, he e x p e c t e d t h a t
we might g a i n c o n t r o l of t h e I s l a n d w i t h i n about s i x weeks.
GENERAL MARSHALL i n q u i r e d when, on t h e above assumptions, t h e r e

would be s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t i n t h e United Kingdom t o t a k e advantage
of a c r a c k i n Germany.
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t t h r e e months would have t o be

allowed from t h e time when t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t could be d i s p e n s e d w i t h t o
t h e t i m e when t h e y wouldbe ready f o r a c t i o n a g a i n i n t h e United Kingdom.
The l a r g e types of sea-going landing v e s s e l s p r e s e n t e d no d i f f i c u l t y but
small 5 0 - f o o t c r a f t were e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e a s s a u l t l a n d i n g . Both t h e

United S t a t e s and B r i t i s h P l a n n e r s were agreed t h a t i t was n o t p o s s i b l e
t o use t h e large c r a f t f o r t h e f i r s t f l i g h t s . These s m a l l c r a f t had t o be
c o l l e c t e d from t h e s i t e of o p e r a t i o n s , t r a n s p o r t e d t o S c o t l a n d , d i s t r i
buted f o r r e p a i r , reassembled and t h e n a g a i n t r a n s p o r t e d by s h i p t o t h e
South of England Par a C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n .
There would be i n E n g l a n d , however, a t a l l t i m e s t h e a s s a u l t
f o r c e t o which he had p r e v i o u s l y r e f e r r e d which c o u l d l i f t 4 B r i g a d e
Groups w i t h t h e i r t r a n s p o r t f o r a n a s s a u l t a g a i n s t heavy o p p o s i t i o n .
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0. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
In s d d i t i o n , f o r t h e follow-up t r o o p s , a g r e a t number o f l a n d i n g b a r g e s
and s m a l l c o a s t i n g v e s s e l s were b e i n g p r e p a r e d . The spearhead w o u l d n o t b e
a f f e c t e d a t a l l by o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and would always b e
kept i n t a c t . Any l a n d i n g c r a f t r e c o v e r e d from t h e l l e d i t e r r a n e a n would
t h e r e f o r e be i n t h e n a t u r e of a bonus.
ADhlIBAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e i n t e n d e d u s e of combat l o a d e r s f o r an
a s s a u l t on S i c i l y g r e a t l y d i s t u r b e d h i m . He had hoped t h a t i t would b e

p o s s i b l e t o u s e t h e l a r g e r t y p e s o f l a n d i n g c r a f t i n s t e a d . lle f e a r e d t h a t
a l a r g e number o f t h e s e v a l u a b l e combat l o a d e r s would be l o s t i n t h e
operation.
M R D MUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t i n t h e HUSKY p l a n a l l a v a i l a b l e

I.,.S.T.'s
and L . C . I . ' s
would b e used, b u t i n a d d i t i o n , 26 combat l o a d e r s
were r e q u i r e d f o r t h e a s s a u l t t r o o p s . Oft,hese, t h e B r i t i s h could p r o v i d e

half.
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e two main f a c t o r s i n w i n n i n g

t h e war were manpower and m u n i t i o n s .
I n r e s p e c t t o m i l i t a r y manpower,
t h e B r i t i s h Commonwealth had presumably m o b i l i z e d p r a c t i c a l l y up t o t h e
l i m i t . The United S t a t e s a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e had r e a c h e d a b o u t 60% o f

t h e i r c o n t e m p l a t e d s t r e n g t h i n m i l i t a r y manpower t h o u g h t h e p o s i t i o n
had n o t y e t c o m p l e t e l y s t a b i l i z e d . His own g u e s s a t : i u s s i a ' s p o s i t i o n
was t h a t s h e had m o b i l i z e d a b o u t NO$ o f a v a i l a b l e m i l i t a r y manpower.
,
India
China's r e s o u r c e s i n manpower were s t , i l l r e l a t i v e l y ~ ~ n t o u c h e dand
l i k e w i s e was s c a r c e l y tapped.
A s r e g a r d s m u n i t i o n s , t h e g r e a t e s t p o t e n t i a l 1a.y i n t h e United
S t a t e s . Xext came Great B r i t a i n , h u t she could n o t s u p p l y t h e f u l l needs

of t h e E r i t i s h Commonwealth f o r c e s . I l u s s i a was more self- supporting t h a n
a t f i r s t a p p e a r e d l i k e l y b u t had t o r e c e i v e a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f
a s s i s t a n c e from t h e Allies. I-rom t h e m u n i t i o n s p o i n t of view, China and
I n d i a were l i a b i l i t i e s s i n c e t h e i r a v a i l a b l e manpower enormously ex
ceeded t h e i r i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n .
In t h e European t h e a t e r ; : u s s i a was most a d v a n t a g e o u s l y p l a c e d f o r
d e a l i n g w i t h Jermany i n view o f h e r g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and manpower;
i n t h e k a c i f i c , China b o r e a s i m i l a r r e l a t i o n t o t h e J a p a n e s e . I t should
b e o u r b a s i c p o l i c y t o p r o v i d e t h e manpower r e s o u r c e s o f R u s s i a and
China w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y equipment t o e n a b l e them t o f i g h t . h i t h t h i s i n
mind,
t h e :Inited S t a t e s C h i e f s o f S t a f f s e t g r e a t s t o r e by O p e r a t i o n
219
5'. 5. S E C R E T
BRITISH MOST C T C R S T
JAVENOUS.
I t seemed l i k e l y t h a t oiie of' the m a j o r B r i t i s h c o n t r i b u t i o n s
t o t h e d e f e a t o f J a p a n would b e t o cortiplet,e t h e r e c o n q u e s t o f Burma and

t h e o p e n i n g o f the Ihrrna h a d .
GENERAL. MARSIIALI, o b s e r v e d t h a t , w i t r r r e g a r d t o O p c r a t i o n RAVENOUS,
Chian:: K a i - s n e k kiad now wit:iilraw~i front h i s u n d e r t a k i n g t o move i n from

Yunnari on tlie g r o u n d s t h a t F i e l d \ l a r s h a l 'Vavell c o u l d n n l y p r o v i d e very
l i m i t e d B r i t i s h f o r c e s and there would b e no I % r i t i s nu a v a l s t r e n g t h i n
the Bay o f 9etigal t o c u t tiic .Japauese r e i n f o r c e m e n t s r o u t e t o Xangoon.

G e n e r a l S t i l w e l l was c e r t a i n l y p l a c e d i n n v e r y d i f f i c u l t , p o s i t i o n a t
the present time.
D i s c u s s i o i r t t i e r i t u r n e d on tlie n e e d f o r l o n g - r a n g e p l a n n i n g i n
o r d e r t h a t p r o d u c t i o n p o l i c y c o u l d be c o o r d i n a t e d w i t i i s t r a t e g y .
GENERAL ARVOLD p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i f o p e r a t i o n s
ill
the :[editerranem
were u n d e r t a k e n , t h e s e i z u r e of Drest, i n tlie B r i t i s h view, would n o t be

p o s s i b l e t h i s y e a r . F u r t h e r , t h a t even i f Cherbourg or Brest were taken,
o u r f o r c e s would n o t b e a b l e t o b r e a k o u t f o r a f u r t h e r i n v a s i o n of t h e
C o n t i n e n t . I t l o o k e d v e r y rnncli as i f no C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s oti any
s c a l e were i n p r o s p e c t b e f o r e t h e s p r i n g o f 1 3 4 . iYe should :lave t,o de
c i d e n o t o n l y w h a t we were g o i n g t o do i n 13.13 b u t a l s o i r r 1'144 s i n c e
o t h e r w i s e , owill:
t o tire t , i n i e l a g , o u r p r i o r i t i e s i n prixiui!tior~ might be
wrongly d e c i d e d .
313 ALAX fi11OOI<Ii: i:xpre.ssed
t,:ie v i e w t,,int. wr s i i o i i l cl i l c ? i ! i i t e l )
c o u n t on r e e i r t , e r i n g t h e C o n t i n e n t i n 1 1 J M oti a l a r ~ es c a l c .
SIR CII.UUES PORTAL p o i n t e d out, t,iiat p r o d u c t t i o n p l a n s coulil iicver

f'ollow s t r a t e g y p r e c i s e l y s i r i c e t h e s i t u a t i o n chaiiged s o f r e q u e l i t , i y i n
war. ? h e b e s t t h a t c o u l d b e h o p e d f o r was t o t a k e b r o a d d e c i s i o n s on
inajor q u e s t i o n s and t h e s e would always b e i n tlie uat,ure of romprimises.
F o r example, when c o i l s i d e r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e e n t e r i n g t,he Z o n t i n e i i t ,
i t had b e e n d e c i d e d t h a t we must t r e a t i t as a f o r t r e s s and t h a t heavy

i n i t i a l bombardment would b e r e q u i r e d t o b r e a k i n t o i t . I t iiad t:ierrt'orc
been d e c i d e d t o T i v e v e r y h i g h p r i o r i t y t o the p r o d u c t i o n of h e a v y b o m b c r s
whicii would b e i i s e d to s o f t e n up Germany b e f o r e tile i i i v a s i o r i of' t,lie

Continent.
0. S . S E C R E T
F u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n t h e n followed on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a German
crack i n 1943.
S I E JOHN TILL f e l t t h a t there was q u i t e a p o s s i b i l i t y of b e a t i n g
Germany t h i s y e a r . We should t h e r e f o r e s t r a i n every nerve t,o e f f e c t t,tiis
s i n c e t h e sooiler we b e a t Germany t h e sooner we c o u l d t u r n o n .Tapan. we
must n o t l e t Japan consoJ i d a t e her p o s i t i o n f o r t o o l o n g . ,Japan c e r t a i n l y

could n o t be b e a t e n t h i s y e a r , but Cerniariy might.
A J N I F A L K1h.C. d o u b t 4 wliether 1:eriiiany c o u l d b e d e f e a t e d b e f o r e
1944. He f e l t t h a t her d e f e a t could orily be e f f e r t , e d by d i r e c t m i l i t a r y

a c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n by a f a i l u r e i n h e r morale. Vas i t n e c e s s a r y , however,
t o a c c e p t t h a t we could d o n o t h i n g i n Yortliern F r a n c e b e f o r e A p r i l 19441
SIF CHAPLE5 PG1:'TiiI. s a i d th%t this denended e n t i r e l y on Germany's
power of r e s i s t a i i c e .
t h i s year,
I f we conceiitrat.er! e v e r y t l i i n g we c o u l d
OU
Germany
i t was y o s s j b l ~t i , a t w e irtigiit, c a u s e h e r t o criimbJ~eand t h u s
be a b l e t o move i n t o ;ermariy witii c o w y a r a t i v e l y rntall f o r c e s . !!nt,il

c o n d i t i o n iiad b e e n p r o d u c e d , tiowever,
SOII!~
?!:
this
d i v i s i o n s would g e t u s
nowhere on t h e C.ontirient,. A f a c t o r which must n o t be f o r g o t t e n w a s t h e

t e r r i f i c l a t e n t power of t h e onpressed p e o p l e wiijch c o u l d o n l y cane i n t o
p l a y when t h e crumbling p r o c e s s s t a r t e d . a t t h a t moment, tiowever, t h e i r
e f f o r t s might c o n t r i b u t e g r e a t l y t o t h e f i n a l c o l l a r ~ s e . Ile d i d n o t s e e
Germany f i g h t i n g on arid on, complet,ely surroundrc! by t h e armed f o r c e s o f
t h e A l l i e s . A p o i n t would come a t which t h e whole s t r u c t , u r e of Germany
and t h e Nazi P a r t y would c o l l a p s e , arid t h i s moment, niight well come d u r i n g
the current year.
I t was e s s e n t i a l t h e r e f o r e t o have r e a d y a p l a n and
some r e s o u r c e s i n t h e Thit,er! Kingdom t o t,ake a d v a n t a g e of a c r a c k
In
o r d e r t o produce t b e c r a c k , however, wemust keep up t h e m a x i m u m p r e s s u r e

on Germany by l a n d o p e r a t i o n s ; a i r bombardment a l o n e was n o t s u f f i c i e n t
I n f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n t h e importance of d e c i d i n g t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s
and a v a i l a b i l i t y o f e s c o r t v e s s e l s w a s emnhasjzerl. 'These appeared t o b e
one of t h e p r i n c i p a l l i m i t i n g f a c t , o r s .
AnVIKbL KI?T s a i d ttist, t l i e r e was no r e s e r v e o f e s c o r t v e s s e l s
b u t i f O p e r a t i o n HlItW were d e r i d e d iinon:
t,he V , i t e d ? t a t , e s and E r i t i s h
Navies would have t o f i n d t h e escort, v e s s e l s somehow j u s t a s t,hey had i n

t h e c a s e of TOECH.
S SECRET
A f t e r some f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n ,
THE COMMITTEE:
Agreed t o d i r e c t t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s t o reexamine t h e
B r i t i s h p l a n f o r HUSKY i n t h e l i g h t of t h e American and B r i t i s h
r e s o u r c e s of a l l k i n d s t h a t can b e made a v a i I a h l e f o r i t , and t o
c a l c u l a t e t h e e a r l i e s t d a t e by which t h e O p e r a t i o n c o u l d b e
mounted.
3,
SIIFPLIES. TO EIIFEIA.
SIII DUDLEY POTJhD r e c a p i t u l a t e d t h e f a c t o r s g o v e r n i n g PQ convoys
t o North R u s s i a . With t h e p r e s e n t r e s o u r c e s o f t h e Home F l e e t n o t more

t h a n one 30-ship convoy c o u l d be run e v e r y 4 0 t o 4 2 d a y s . Each convoy
had t o c o n t a i n two o i l e r s , l e a v i n g a n e t t o t a l o f 28 c a r g o s h i p s . With
more d e s t r o y e r s i t would b e p o s s i b l e t o d o u b l e - e n d t h e c o n v o y s , re..
d u c i n g c y c l e t o 27 d a y s i n s t e a d of 4 0 - 4 2 .
d e s t r o y e r s w o u l d b e r e y u i r e d from t b e
F o r t h i s p u r p o s e a b o u t 12
r ; . Kavy. He wished t o emphasize,
TI.
however, t h a t i f t h e Germans employed t h e i r s u r f a c e s h i p s b o l d l y and kept

up t h e same amount of air and Ti-boats
as l a y t year, i t w a s w i t h i n t h e i r
power t o s t o p t h e PQ convoys a l t o g e t h e r .
6LNERAL SOMERVLLL r e v i e w e d t,he g e n e r a l p r o b l e m o f s u p p l y i n g
H:r;sia
The n o r t h e r n r o u t e vas a t p r e s e n t t h e b e s t s i n c e t h e t u r w r o u n d
was s h o r t e s t
months
The t u r n - r o u n d on t h e P e r s i a n G u l f r o u t e was a b o u t f i v e
Some f i f t e e n s h i p s a month a r e now b e i n g used on t h i s r o u t e b u t
t h e flow was r e s t r i c t e d by p o r t and i n l a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n d e f i c i e n c i e s

Once t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n was opened some r e l i e f might be g i v e n by t h e u s e
o f HAIFA ,and t h e o v e r l a n d r o u t e from t h e r e t o Bagdad. For t h i s purpose

a d d i t i o n a l heavy t r u c k s f o r t h e road haul would b e needed U . S , Tech
n i c a l t r o o p s were b e i n g d i s p a t c h e d t o P e r s i a t o improve t h e t r a n s - P e r s i a n
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s , and i t was hoped t o i n c r e a s e t h e s e t o a b o u t
20,000 t o n s p r day. If t h i s c o u l d b e achieved, 4 0 s h i p s a month i n s t e a d
o f 15 c o u l d b e s e n t i n t o t h e P e r s i a n G u l f , .
The s e a r o u t e from S e a t t l e t o V l a d i v o s t o k was a l s o b e i n g u s e d
f o r n o n n i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s and r a w m a t e r i a l s . Twelve s h i p s manned by t h e
FUssians were now working t h i s r o u t e , an3 i t was hoped t o add 10 s h i p s a

month i n t h e f u t u r e .
The u s e of t h i s r o u t e n a t u r a l l y depended on non
i n t e r f e r e n c e by t h e J a p a n e s e .
222
SECRET
A11 these p o t e n t i a l increases i n shipping t o Pussia n a t u r a l l y
would have t o b e found by c u t t i n g down elsewhere. If t h e opening of t h e

Hediterranean saved some m i l l i o n and a h a l f t o n s of s h i p p i n g , t h i s would
p r o v i d e a s u r p l u s f o r t h e p u r p o s e ; b u t t h e r e a p p e a r s t o b e no o t h e r
sources. I t s h o u l d b e p o s s i b l e f o r Great B r i t a i n and t h e United S t a t e s t o
keen t h e p i p e l i n e f u l l even i f t h e s e p o t e n t i a l i n c r e a s e s were made. The
maximum tonnage might be a s h i g h a s 10 m i l l i o n t o n s p e r annum; t h e t a r g e t
f o r t h e c u r r e n t y e a r w a s 4 m i l l i o n b u t i t was d o u b t f u l i f i t would b e
reached. One m i l l i o n deadweight torisot' s n p p l ~ i e sfor F u s s i a were a w a i t i n g
shipment now i n IT. S . p o r t s .
SI: U' BTOOKf o b s e r v e d t h a t one u v s a t i s f a c t o r y f e a t u r e of t h e

whole b u s i n e s s o f s u p p l y i n g l . u s s i a was t h e i r r e f u s a l t o p u t t h e i r c a r d s
on t h e t a b l e . I t might w e l l be t h a t w e were s t r a i n i n g o u r s e l v e s unduly
and t a k i n g g r e a t r i s k s when tliere was no r e a l n e c e s s i t y t o d o s o .
4.
EwLoY\!n;?' OF FrLbcii N F C Z
I? W C T H GT,ICA.
GEPJ3AL MAJSIIALL a s k e d f o r t,he v i e w s of t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of
S t a f f on t h e employment of French d l v i s i o n s . The k i t e d S t a t e s Chiefs of

S t a f f f e l t t h a t t h e y c a n b e e f f e c t i v e l y u s e d and t h a t t h e i r u s e w i l l
e f f e c t a c o n s i d e r a b l e economy of f o r c e . The F r e n c h d i v i s i o n s regarded a s
b e i n g t h e b e s t must b e r e e y u i p p e d a s soon a s p r a c t i c a l . T h i s , however,
h a s p o l i t i c a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s which must be r e s o l v e d .
S I T mar; 8T;OOIiE a g r e e d t h a t we s h o u l d e x p l o i t t h e u s e of French
t r o o p s i n ? o r t h A f r i c a t o t h e maximum, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r g a r r i s o n work..
W e s h o u l d have t o p r o v i d e them v i t h a c o n s i d e r a b l e q u a n t i t y o f a n t i a i r - .
c r a f t weapons. T h e i r u s e f u l n e s s would depend g r e a t l ~ yon whether we c o u l d

e s t a b l i s h a s a t i s f a c t o r y French government. Good l e a d e r s h i p was r e q u i r e d
t o r e k i n d l e i n them t h e d e s i r e t o f i g h t . Too marly of t h e French were Only
w a i t i n g f o r t h e end o f t h e war.
GENEXAL MARSHALL asked what t h e e f f e c t would be on S p a i n if French
t r o o p s were s t a t i o n e d o p p o s i t e t h e b o r d e r o f S p a n i s h Morocco. There seemed
n o doubt t h a t some v e r y u s e f u l French d i v i s i o n s c o u l d be formed i n North

Africa.
SIR ALAN BEOOKE t h o u g h t t h a t i t would b e wise t o k e e p U. S .
f o r c e s on t h e $ p a n i s h b o r d e r a s w e l l a s F r e n c h t r o o p s . T h i s would t e n d
SECRET
R R I T I S H MOST S E C R E T
t o a l l a y Spanish s u s p i c i o n s o f the French i n t e n t i o n s and at the same time

remove any temptation from the Spanish t o c r o s s the f r o n t i e r if they
thought the French t r o o p s of i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y .
U S SECRET
C.C.S.
59th b:eeting

MINUTES o f Veeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp
on Sunday
Janrrarv 1 7 , 1043, at 1030
PRESENT
G e n e r a l C,. C . U a r s h a l l . IjSA
Admiral E
Lt
G e n e r a l S i r Alan 1.
K i n g , IJSN
G e n e r a l 11.
ti.
Brooke
Admiral o f t h e F l e e 1 S i r D i i d l e y
Pound
Air C h i e f h!arshal S j r C h a r l e s
F A ?orr,aP
A r n o l d , TjSA
THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO 1'RESENT
Lt
C-?neral FJ1 R
Rear admiral^ C
Brig. General A .
Commander R . E.
Somervell
h:.
Cooke. J r
IJSA
P l e i d i : a r s h a l Sir -John D i l l
.VSN
V i c e Adniiral the I m r d Idorris

h: oiin tb a ft , e n
C . Wedemeyer,:iSA
1.t
I , i h b y , CYg
Gerrrraj S i r i j a s t , i n g s 1 .
h l n j o r G e n e r a l .J
Kennedy
A i r Vlee Marsllal'l % J , C
SECRETARIAT
Brigadier V
Brig. General J
225
Dykes
FI
D e a n e , USA
Ismag
Sl.essor
S SECRET
1.
THE EASTERN THEATER,
GENERAL MARSHALL p r o p o s e d d i s c u s s i n g a p a p e r p r e p a r e d by t h e
United S t a t e s J o i n t S t a f f P l a n n e r s r e g a r d i n g t h e f o r c e s needed i n t h e
P a c i f i c T h e a t e r i n 1943.
The H r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f s t a t e d t h a t t h e y would l i k e t o have
an o p p o r t u n i t y t o s t u d y t h e p a p e r b e f o r e d i s c u s s i n g i t i n d e t a i l .
GENERAL MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the

I~iritishP l a n n e r s , t h e United S t a t e s P l a n n e r s were t o l d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
< i d n o t f e e l t h a t ANAKIM was p o s s i b l e of accomplishment d u r i n g t h e dry

s e a s o n o f 1913-1911. lie s a i d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f are
i i a r t , j c u l a r l y concerned about t h e t i m i n g o f t h i s o p e r a t i o n because of the
s e r i o u s n e s s of t h e s i t u a t i o n r e g a r d i n g China'
ADMIRAL K I N G added t h a t O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM was a l s o of importance
w i t h r e g a r d t o o u r s t r a t e g y i n d e f e a t i n g Japan.,
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e r e were two s t u m b l i n g b l o c k s t o
O p e r a t i o n A N A K I M i n 1943.. These a r e n a v a l c o v e r and t h e assemblage of
l a n d i n g c r a f t i n s u f f i c i e n t time t o p e r m i t adequate t r a i n i n g , He f e l t the
la.nd f o r c e s c o u l d b e found b u t t h a t i t , would b e d i f f i c u l t t o assemble
t ; i v l d n d i n g c r a f t , f o l l o w i n g O p e r a t i o n MISKY
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t i n o r d e r t o do O p e r a t i o n TORCH,
it
had b e e n n e c e s s a r y t o withdraw a c o n s i d e r a b l e f o r c e from t h e E a s t e r n

I l e e t and t h a t i t was p r o b a b l e t h e same c o n d i t i o n s would p e r t a i n i n
o p e r a t j o n s u n d e r t a k e n i n o t h e r t h e a t e r s i n 1943.
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t ANAKIM was a t l e a s t t e n months o f f . He
added t h a t t o postpone t h e d a t e would p u t us i n a c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . I t
i s a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l t h a t we u t i l i z e C h i n a ' s g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n
and t h e i r manpower and ANAKIhI i s a s t e p i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n .

ADMIRAL COOKE s a i d t h a t he f e l t t h e o p e r a t i o n c o u l d b e s t a r t e d
i n Xovember o r December o f 1943 and t h e a c t u a l l a n d i n g s b e made i n
January
Fle s a i d t h a t t h e r e wouldbe c o n s i d e r a b l e l a n d i n g c r a f t a v a i l a b l e
from p r o d u c t i o n between A p r i l of 1943 and J a n u a r y of 1944. Some of t h i s

a d d i t i o n a l l a n d i n g c r a f t w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e f o r Burma i n O c t o b e r . There
f o r e , t h e requirements f o r landing c r a f t could probably be m e t .
As
f o r t h e n a v a l f o r c e , he c o n s i d e r e d t h a t w e would o n l y n e e d c a r r i e r s ,
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U. S . SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
Re d i d n o t f e e l t h a t b a t t l e s h i p s would b e
n e c e s s a r y if t h e J a p a n e s e were b e i n g c o n t a i n e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
d e s t r o y e r s , and c r u i s e r s .
F l e e t i n t h e P a c i f i c . T h e r e a l b o t t l e n e c k i s t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of s h i p p i n g
ADMIRAL X I N G s a i d t h a t he d e f i n i t e l y c o n s i d e r e d t h a t O p e r a t i o n
ANAXIM must b e aimed a t i n 1943 and c a r r i e d t h r o u g h i f t h e s i t u a t i o n

permits.
SIR DUDLEY POUND c o n s i d e r e d i n such an i m p o r t a n t o p e r a t i o n t h a t
b a t t l e s h i p cover would b e n e c e s s a r y .
ADMIRAL K I N G a g a i n p o i n t e d nut t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n would n o t b e
u n d e r t a k e n f o r a t l e a s t t e n months
13y t h i s t i m e t h e d e s t r o y e r program
s h o u l d b e w e l l a l o n g , t h e s u b m a r i n e menace s h o u l d b e r e d u c e d , and t h e
s h i p p i n g s i t u a t i o n much improved t h r o u g h i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n and t h e
opening of t h e U e d i t e r r a n e a n
To p o s t p o n e t h e o p e r a t i o n i n 1943 would
r e s u l t i n n o t u n d e r t a k i n g i t f o r a l m o s t two y e a r s .
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n informed t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f of a message

which G e n e r a l i s s i m o Chiang Kai-shek
had s e n t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t i n which
h e r e g r e t t e d t h a t C h i n e s e t r o o p s would n o t b e a b l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n
Operation RAVENOUS, t h e r e a s o n s b e i n g t h a t t h e B r i t i s h ground f o r c e s a r e

i n a d e q u a t e and t h a t t h e B r i t i s h w i l l n o t a g r e e t o e n g a g e t h e E a s t e r n F l e e t
i n t h e Bay of Bengal t o i n t e r r u p t t h e J a p a n e s e l i n e of communications.

M R D LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s t a t e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f
a g r e e t h a t t h e Burma road must be opened and t h a t t h e e n t i r e q u e s t i o n i s
one of t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f r e s o u r c e s
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e l l n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f recog
n i z e Germany i s o u r prime enemy and t h a t t h e i r s t r a t e g y does n o t e n v i s a g e
a complete d e f e a t of Japan b e f o r e d e f e a t i n g Germany. H e added, however,
t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t must b e a p p l i e d which w i l l p u t u s i n a p o s i t i o n o f
r e a d i n e s s from which we can o p e r a t e a g a i n s t Japan a f t e r Germany has been
defeated.
SIR ALAN BROOKE a g r e e d t o t h i s u n l e s s t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f s u c h
p o s i t i o n s o f r e a d i n e s s would d e l a y o r j e o p a r d i z e t h e d e f e a t o f Germany
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t h e f e l t i t w a s a q u e s t i o n of c r e a t i n g
more t h a n p o s i t i o n s o f r e a d i n e s s a s f a r a s t h e J a p a n e s e a r e concerned.
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U. S . SECRET
W
e must m a i n t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e a g a i n s t them by o f f e n s i v e moves on our
p a r t . The p r e s e n t o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c a r e tremendously ex
p e n s i v e i n merchant v e s s e l s , n a v a l v e s s e l s , and e s c o r t s . The s i t u a t i o n
i s a l s o f r a u g h t w i t h t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a sudden r e v e r s e and t h e conse

q u e n t l o s s of s e a power.
He s a i d t h a t he i s most a n x i o u s t o open t h e
Burma Road, n o t s o much f o r t h e m o r a l e e f f e c t on China a s f o r t h e need

t o p r o v i d e a i r s u p p o r t t o China f o r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t J a p a n and Japanese
s h i p p i n g . He s a i d t h e e x p e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s i n which we a r e now engaged
i n t h e South P a c i f i c r e a c t on e v e r y t h i n g e l s e t h e United Nations attempt
t o do whether i t b e i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , t h e United Kingdom, o r e l s e
where. He d i s c u s s e d t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e P a c i f i c as b e i n g so c r i t i c a l as
t o make i t a p p e a r a t one t i m e t h a t O p e r a t i o n TORCH would have t o be
c a l l e d o f f . H e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t u n l e s s O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM could b e under
t a k e n , he f e l t t h a t a s i t u a t i o n might a r i s e i n t h e P a c i f i c a t any time
t h a t would n e c e s s i t a t e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s r e g r e t f u l l y w i t h d r a w i n g from
t h e commitments i n t h e European t h e a t e r .
GENERAL MARSHALL spoke of o u r commitments i n t h e P a c i f i c , o f our
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e t o t h e number o f g a r r i s o n s
we have on s m a l l i s l a n d s and t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of l e t t i n g any o f them
down. lie i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d n o t s t a n d f o r a n o t h e r
R a t a a n , Ee s a i d t h a t he i s d e s i r o u s of u n d e r t a k i n g t h e 19urma o p e r a t i o n
i n o r d e r t o r e d u c e o u r h a z a r d s i n t h e P a c i f i c and t h u s u n d e r t a k e t h e
campaign a g a i n s t Germany.
GENERAL MARSHALL spoke o f o t h e r commitments i n t h e P a c i f i c t h a t
a r e s e r i o u s h u t i n which we have been w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h e h a z a r d s
In
t h i s c o n n e c t i o n he p o i n t e d t o t h e J a p a n e s e o p e r a t i o n i n t h e A l e u t i a n s
and t h e n e c e s s i t y of p r o t e c t i n g t h e Hawaiian-Midway
l i n e o f communica
t i o n s . I n t h e s e i n s t a n c e s he f e l t t h a t , while w e were v u l n e r a b l e t o Jap

a n e s e a t t a c k , s u p p o r t from t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d b e f u r n i s h e d q u i c k l y
because of t h e r e l a t i v e l y short d i s t a n c e s i n v o l v e d .
GENERAL MARSHALL informed t h e C h i e f s o f S t a f f t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t
i s d e s i r o n s of g i v i n g a d d i t i o n a l a i r s u p p o r t t o China. T h i s w i l l b e d o n e
because o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e s u l t s t o be achieved d e s p i t e t h e f a c t
t h a t i t i s a tremendously expensive operation.
ADMIRAL KING p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e demands i n t h e P a c i f i c a r e
enormous and c o n t i n u o u s . hiany o f t h e demands a r e made by A u s t r a l i a ,
228
U. S . S E C R E T
a,Cominion of t h e B r i t i s h Commonwealth. A u s t r a l i a i s i n t h e a r e a of t h e
:;nited S t a t e s s t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and most o f o u r e f f o r t s have been
devoted t o p r o t e c t i n g i t s l i n e o f communications.
Re s a i d , i n this con
n e c t i o n , t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n s a r e i n t e r l o c k e d and
t h e s e f a c t o r s must h e c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r when d e c i d i n g what o p e r a t i o n s
a r e t o h e u n d e r t a k e n . H e r e p e a t e d t h a t w e must p l a c e o u r s e l v e s i n p o s i
t i o n s of r e a d i n e s s f o r t h e t i m e when a l l t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e U n i t e d
Nations w i l l h e brought a g a i n s t Japan.
2.
ICELAND
GENERAL MARSHALL asked f o r t h e v i e w s of t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f
S t a f f on t h e s i z e o f t,he g a r r i s o n which should h e m a i n t a i n e d i n I c e l a n d .
A t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e t h e r e were some 40,000 (United S t a t e s ' ground t r o o p s

i n t h e i s l a n d and two s q u a d r o n s o f f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t , t o g e t h e r w i t h a
squadron of n a v a l p a t r o l c r a f t . lie was anxious t o c u t down t h e s e numbers.
S I R DUDLET POUND s a i d t h a t t h e n r i t i s h g a r r i s o n had been a b o u t
22,000 men. I n h i s view an i n v a s i o n of I c e l a n d by t h e Germans was q u i t e

o u t o f t h e q u e s t i o n . T a k i n g i n t o account, t h e g e n e r a l a t t i t u d e of t h e
Germans and t h e i r u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o r i s k t h e i r s h i p s w i t h o u t heavy a i r
c o v e r i n N o r t h e r n w a t e r s , he d i d r i o t t h i n k even a t i p and r u n r a i d was
a t a l l l i k e l y . I t was p o s s i b l e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e y m i g h t change t h e i r
p o l i c y , h u t t h e o n l y o b j e c t o f a German a t t e m p t t o s e i z e t h e i s l a n d
would b e t o deny i t t o u s a s an a i r b a s e
Our p o s s e s s i o n of i t made o u r
c o n t r o l of t h e Northern e x i t t o t h e A t l a n t i c more s e c u r e
I t seemed much
more l i k e l y t h a t i f t h e Germans wished t o a d o p t a more a c t i v e p o l i c y ,

t h e y would u s e t h e i r s u r f a c e s h i p s a g a i n s t o u r convoys r a t h e r t h a n f o r
a h a z a r d o u s e x p e d i t i o n a g a i n s t I c e l a n d . These were h i s f i r s t t h o u g h t s
and h e would l i k e t o h a v e a more c o n s i d e r e d o p i n i o n p r e p a r e d f o r the
b n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f .
ADMIRAL K I N G was i n g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e v i e w s o f S i r
Dudley Pound.
He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e German s i t u a t i o n had g r e a t l y
changed d u r i n g t h e l a s t s i x months,
THE COMMITTEE:
Took n o t e t h a t t h e R r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f would p r e p a r e f o r t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h p U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f a memorandum
s e t t i n g o u t t h e i r v i e w s on t h e d e f e n s e o f I c e l a n d
229
U . S . SECRET
BRITISH ,MOST SECRET

3.
:WSSIAN A I R ASSISTANCE FOR P. Q. CONVOYS.

ADMIRAL K I N G s u g g e s t e d t h a t more s h o u l d b e done t o i n d u c e t h e
:Iiissians t o a t t a c k t h e 'erman
a i r f o r c e s i n N o r t h e r n Norway which were
s u c h a menace t o t h e !.lurmansk convoys. The Serman a i r b a s e s were out of

r a n g e from t h e U n i t e d Kingdom h u t t h e Russiams c o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y do
something i f t h e y wished t o . The Xurmansk r o u t e was t h e most important
of t h e f o u r r o u t e s f o r Xussian s u p p l i e s , and he f e l t w e ought t o p r e s s
t h e A u s s i a n s t o g i v e u s more a s s i s t a n c e .
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had p r e s s e d t h e Xussians

i n 3.342 t o a s s i s t w i t h e s c o r t s and w i t h a i r a t t a c k . They d i d p r o v i d e
some a s s i s t a n c e w i t h e s c o r t s , h u t always found some r e a s o n f o r n o t send
i n g t , h e i r s u r f a c e s h i p s o u t as f a r as Bear I s l a n d where t h e danger was
g r e a t e s t . Whatever t h e y m i g h t u n d e r t a k e t o d o , h o w e v e r , i t would be
q u i t e u n s a f e t o r e l y on t h e i r p r o m i s e s , and r e d u c e t h e s c a l e o f our own
protection.
A s r e g a r d s a i r , t h e ? r i t i s h ?!issiorr had p r e s s e d t h e l u s s i a n s
h a r d f o r a s s i s t a n c e , and t h e Prime l d i n i s t e r had a l s o communicated w i t h
!Jr. S t a l i . n = I n t h e end some Xussian Army bombers had been s e n t North t o

a L t a c k t h e ;erman
airdromes
Such a c t i o n , h o w e v e r , was o n l y of v e r y
-:mited v a l u e . I t would be no u s e a s k i n g t h e m t o a t t a c k t h e 5erman s h i p s

s i n c e t h e y were u n t r a i n e d i n t h i s work. 'Two n r i t i . s h squadrons of Hampdens
had bier1 s e n t up t o Uorth R u s s i a l a s t y e a r . At t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e win
t e r t h e ::ritish p e r s o n n e l had been withdrawn, and t h e s e were now manned

by tlie .:ussians.
R e c e n t l y , however, when t h e Lutzow and Hipper came o u t ,
t,he 3iissians f a i l e d t o t a k e any a c t i o n a g a i n s t them w i t h t h e s e a i r c r a f t ,
a l t h o u g h asked t o do s o .
SIR CHAXES POSTAL s a i d t h a t t h e Zermans hadsome s e v e n a i r f i e l d s
bctween 3odo and Petsamo, a l l w e l l defended. The R u s s i a n s had t h r e e a i r
f i e l d s i n t h e :.!urmansk-Archangel
a r e a . Bombing o f a i r f i e l d s was v e r y un-
p r o f i t a b l e . For example, : l a l t a had o n l y t h r e e a i r f i e l d s w i t h i n 100 m i l e s

of S i c i l y but a v e r y l a r g e f o r c e of German bombers had been q u i t e unable
t o p r e v e n t us u s i n g them. Whatever t h e y d i d , t h e X u s s i a n s would n o t b e

a b l e t o s t o p t h e German a i r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . , :Xedium bombers and l o n g
range f i g h t e r s f o r t h e i r e s c o r t s w o u l d b e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e ; German
f i e l d s were o u t of range of d i v e bombing a t t a c k .
230
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S. SECRET
B R I T I S H nlOST SECRET
S I R ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f amphibious opera-.
t i o n s t o c a p t u r e tkie German a i r f i e l d s had been most e x h a u s t i v e l y examined
by t h e B r i t i s h S t a f f s , b u t t h e y h a d n o t b e e n f o u n d p r a c t i c a b l e , The
e f f e c t of TORCH, however, iiad been v e r y g r e a t i n ca.using w i t h d r a w a l s of
German a i r c r a f t from Sorway. T h e i r p r e s e n t s t r e n g t h was o n l y a b o u t 5 3
a i r c r a f t a l l t o l d , whereas t h e y had had up t o 300 p r e v i o u s l y .
S I R DUDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t1:a.t one o f the g r e a t e s t , d i f f i c u l -
t i e s was t n a t t h e convoys were opeii t o a t t a c k f o r a b o u t t e n d a y s . T h i s
enatlled t h e Germans t o r e i n f o r c e t h e i r a i r f i e l d s i n Korthern Norway from

elsewhere b e f o r e tile convoy was o u t of t n e danger zone.
0. S.
SECRET
C.C.S.
60th Meeting

MINUTES of Meeting held a t Anfa Camp
on Monday, January 18, 1943, a t 1030.
PRESENT
General G " C . V a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN

Admiral o f t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
L t . General H. H. Arnold, USA
A i r Chief Marshal Sir Charles

F. A. P o r t a l
L t . General B. B. Somervell, USA

Rear Admiral C. hl. Cooke, J r . , USN
B r i e . General A. C. Wedemeyer. USA
Brig. General J . E. Hull, USA
Colonel J. E. Smart, USA
Commander R . E . Libby, USN
Y
Admiral S i r Andrew B. Cunningham

( f o r t h e l a s t item)

Mount b a t t e n
L t , General S i r Hastings L
Major General J. N
Kennedy
A i r Vice Marshal J . C
Slessor
Captain C . E. Lambe, RN':
M. Stewart*
A i r Commodore W. E l l i o t t "
B r i g a d i e r 11- W. M . Macleode
L t . Colonel W. A. Howkins"
Brigadier G.
Brigadier E . I . C " Jacob""
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V.
B r i g . General J . R.
Dykes
Deane, USA
(The meeting adjourned from 1300 t o 1500)

For p a r t of the meeting
For second p a r t of t h e meeting
**
,232
Ismay
U . S~ S E C R E T
1.
OPEFiATIONS I N BUFMA.
(C.C.S. 154)
A t t h e r e q u e s t of GENERAL MARSHAI
ADMIRAL COOKE d i s c u s s e
the
l a n d i n g c r a f t s i t u a t i o n i n r e g a r d t o O p e r a t i o n ANBXIM. He said the United
S t a t e s P l a n n e r s had e s t i m a t e d th? number of l a n d i n g c r a f t of t y p e s b u i l t
b y t h e United S t a t e s which would be r e q u i r e d f o r O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM would
be a v a i l a b l e i n Povember 1943. These r e q u i r e m e n t s can be made a v a i l a b l e
fpom United e t a t e s p r o d u c t i o n am! t h e y w i l l be i n a d d i t i o n t o a l l o c a t i o n s
of' l a n d i n g c r a f t a l r e a d y vade. There has been u n c e r t a i n t y a s t o what the
p r o d u c t i o n of l a n d i n g c r a f t would be because o f the n e c e s s i t y of r e v i s

i n g t h e w h o l e p r o d u c t , i o n rirograni i n t h e I J n i t e d S t a t e s .
SI1: AIABE ET!OOXli
askt-d i f tiiis number of l a n d i n g c r a f t would b e
a v a i l a b l e over and above t h o s e rieeded i n a l l o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s under con

s i d e r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g Fl?lih'IW.
BDhlIRAL COCKE r e p l i e d t h a t t,Ilf' l a n d i n g c r a f t which would be made
a v a i l a b l e f o r AFAKIS' would he from i ' n i t e d f:t,ates ?roduct,ion t h a t w i l l be

t o o l a t e f o r o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s i n 1949 which a r e b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d ,
LOPP LOUIS MWFTEATTI3 s t a t e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h w i l l be u n a b l e t o

m a n a d d i t i o n a l l a n d i n g c r a f t beyond t h o s e f o r which they a r e a s k i n g
SIR ALAK EFOOKE t h e n d e p c r i b e d t h e p r o p o s e d O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM.
The o p e r a t i o n must s t a r t by t h e middle of December i n o r d e r t o c l e a r up

t h e communications t o t h e n o r t h a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e o f Pangoon. To p r o t e c t
t h e f l a n k i t would b? n e c e s s a r y t o occupy Moulmein and t h e a i r p o r t s on
t h e west c o a s t o f T h a i l a n d . I t w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o p r o t e c t t h e east
f l a n k t o p r e v e n t t h e .Japanese from coming i n from T h a i l a n d by r o u t e s
t h a t are c a p a b I e o f s u s t a i n i n g a maximum o f f i v e d i v i s i o n s , i n o r d e r t o
i n s u r e / t h a t once i n Burma, our f o r c e s remain t h e r e . T h e r e a f t e r , i t w i l l
a l s o be n e c e s s a r y t o m a i n t a i n adequate a i r and n a v a l cover t o keep open
t h e l i n e s of communication t o Cangoon.
SIP ALAF BROOKE p o i n t e d o u t t h a t n a v a l f o r c e s must b e b u i l t up
f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n . A s f a r as a i r power i s c o n c e r n e d , 18 s q u a d r o n s w i l l
be a v a i l a b l e and can be p r o v i d e d . The l a u d i n g c r a f t i.s tk' most t i c k l i s h
q u e s t i o n . Landing c r a f t t r a i n i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s have now been p r o v i d e d
f o r two b r i g a d e g r o u p s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and one i n I n d i a . T h e r e i s
a l s o a m o b i l e o v e r s e a s r e s e r v e b u t i t w i l l t a k e t h r e e months t o move
2 $3
U . S. S E C R E T
t h i s a f t e r i t c o m p l e t e s o p e r a t i o n s e i t h e r i n t h e Mediterranean o r oper
a t i o n s from t h e United Kingdom. He b e l i e v e d t h a t t h ? n e c e s s a r y shipping
c o u l d b e made a v a i l a b l e b u t t h a t t h e two main b o t t l e n e c k s were naval
c o v e r a g e and l a n d i n g c r a f t .
LDDMIRAL KIFG s t a t e d t h a t w e can c o u n t on s h i p p i n g some landing
c r a f t from t h e Southwest P a c i f i c t o Burma t o g e t h e r w i t h o p e r a t i n g crews.

These c o u l d p r o b a b l y b e made a v a i l a b l e i n Burma i n November. While the
o p e r a t i o n was a t l e a s t t e n months o f f , he d i d n o t s e e why n e c e s s a r y naval
c o v e r a g e c o u l d n o t be assembled, e i t h e r by h a v i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s re
l i e v e t h e E r i t i s h from n a v a l m i s s i o n s e l s e w h e r e s o t h a t t h e y could fur
n i s h t h e Burma c o v e r a g e , o r by s u p p l y i n g t h e d e ' f i c i e n c y from t h e United
S t a t e s n a v a l u n i t s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e Burma o p e r a t i o n . He s t a t e d t h a t
h e was w i l l i n g t o commit h i m s e l f t o a s s i s t i n g t h e B r i t i s h i n these
operations.
BCMIIiAL. K I X G s t a t e d t h a t our use of l a n d i n g c r a f t i n t h e P a c i f i c
would b e i n t h e Fabaul O p e r a t i o n s p r i m a r i l y . O p e r a t i o n s beyond Rabaul

would n o t r e q u i r e l a n d i n g c r a f t , of t h e t y p e s n e e d e d f o r R a b a u l . The
Rabaul o p e r a t i o n s would~becompleted l o n g b e f o r e ANAKIK would be mounted.
H e added t h a t even though we had gone beyond Rabaul i n t h e P a c i f i c , the
o p e r a t i o n s c o u l d be c u r t a i l e d or lessened i n o r d e r to i n s u r e t h e success
o f ANAKIM i n view of i t s importance.
LOED LOUIS MOUNTEATTEN s a i d t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s e c u r i n g
h e l p from t h e P a c i f i c a l t e r e d t h e whole s i t u a t i o n a s far a s t h e B r i t i s h

w e r e c o n c e r n e d and t h a t w i t h t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f t h e T'nited S t a t e s , he
thought t h a t t h e n e c e s s a r y landing c r a f t could be assembled.
CENEFAL MBRSHaLL t h e n asked S i r Alan Brooke t o d i s c u s s t h e r e l a
t i o n between O p e r a t i o n RAVEAOZIC and O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM.
SIR ALAN ER,OOKE s a i d t h a t O p e r a t i o n CMWTIEALnow b e i n g undertaken

was f o r t h e purpose o f s e c u r i n g t h e a i r p o r t i n Akyab. T h i s i s n e c e s s a r y
i n order t o f u r n i s h a i r support f o r f u t u r e operations.
He d e s c r i b e d
Akyab as a l o c a l i t y i n no man's l a n d l i g h t l y g a r r i s o n e d by b o t h s i d e s .
He d e s c r i b e d O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS as one t o improve t h e l i n e of
communications p r e p a r a t o r y t o O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM,
i n order t o drive i n
from t h e N o r t h a t t h e same t i m e a s t h e o f f e n s i v e fran the South. A B r i t i s h
2 34
SECRET
c o r p s i s t o s e c u r e b r i d g e h e a d s o v e r t h e Chindwin R i v e r and improve t h e
r o a d between Imphal and Kalewa, t o c o n n e c t i t w i t h the Chindwin R i v e r
f o r u s e as a s u p p l y l i n e t o t h e South., The Famgarh f o r c e was t o advance
on MyitKyna from Led0 which w i l l a l s o e n a b l e u s t o b u i l d a r o a d between
t h e s e two p o i n t s . T h i s road w i l l be of v a l u e i n s u p p l y i n g our f o r c e s i n
O p e r a t i o n AXAKIP and a l s o w i l l be used a s a c o n n e c t i n g road t o j o i n w i t h
t h e main Burma r o a d i n t o China.
SIR ALAJ E.FOOK& gave a resumeof t h e p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s o f r o a d s

i n Burma which i n d i c a t e d t , h s t a l l . a r e badly i n need o f improvement- He
s a i d t h a t a l l of t h e conlponent o n e r a t i o n s of RAVEbOUS a r e independent of
each o t h e r . The o p e r a t i o n o f t h e n r i ~ t i s h2nd Corps from Imphal i s t h u s

independent of t h e a c t i o n t a k e n by t h e Chinese Famgarh and Yunnan f o r c e s
The improvement o f t h e road f r m Led0 was only p o s s i b l e t o t h e e x t e n t of
t h e advance made by t h e Pamgarh force.
SIT, A1J.l:
BFGOKE s a i d t h a t A M K I K i s now d e f i n i t e l y on t h e books.
i s b e i n g p l a n n e d , and sIion11J b? put, t o t h e f r o n t . V ; i t l r t h e a s s i s t a n c e

from t h e U n i t e d C t , a t e s Favy i n p r o v i d i n g l a n d i n g c r a f t ,
the operation
would b e f e a s i b l e .
LORI) ILIUIC. %!OI~iFTELTE>:t,hen d i s c u s e d a g a i n t h e q u e s t i o n of land
i n g c r a f t w i t h p a r t i c u l a r reference t o paragraph
r e p l y t o a q u e s t i o n from 1:EY:EFAl. \:Ai:?liATL,
I)
(d) o f C.C.S.
154
In
he s t a t e d t h a t t h e a s s a u l t
f o r c e i n England would remain t h e r e a s a permanent spearhead i n c a s e of

a c r a c k i r r German morale. The o v e r s e a s a s s a u l t f o r c e c o n t a i n s s u f f i c i e n t
l a n d i n g c r a f t t o u n d e r t , a k e t h e o p e r a t i o n i n Burma b y O c t o b e r 1st
v i d e d t h a t t h e y had n o t been used i n o p e r a t i o n s e l s e w h e r e
pro^
If t h e y had
b e e n s o u s e d , t h e i r u s e i n Burma would be d e l a y e d f o r a p e r i o d of t h r e e
mont,hs f o l l o w i n g t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i o n i n which they had been
e n g a g e d H e added, however,
t h a t w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e promised by Admiral
King from t h e South P a c i f i c , Ire f e l t t h a t s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t c o u l d

b e assembled t o mount AKAKIY
F I T CHAFUS POFTAL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e amphibious o p e r a t i o n s i n

Ah~AKIh. would have t o be s i m m r t e d b y a i r c r a f t , based on c a r r i e r s
ADCLIFIAL K I F G s a i d t h e main p o i n t was t h a t , we shoiild p l a n t o d o
ANAKIM i n 1943.
SECRET
(i
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Agreed t h a t a l l p l a n s and n e c e s s a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s should be
made f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f mounting ANAKIM i n 194%
(b) Agreed t h a t t h e a c t u a l mounting of O p e r a t i o n ANAKIM would
b e d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f i n the summer
of 194.7 ( p r e f e r a b l y n o t l a t e r t h a n J u l y ) i n t h e l i g h t of the
s i t u a t i o n then existing.
( c ) Took n o t e t h a t
i f ANAKIhl i s mounted i n 1943, t,he U n i t e d
S t a t e s w i l l a s s i s t i r i making up d e f i c i e n c i p s i n t h e necessary
l a n d i n g c r a f t and naval f o r c e s by d i v e r s i o n from t h e P a c i f i c
T h e a t e r , and i n merchant s h i p p i n g , i f rrecessar-3;.
z,,
THE SITIYATION
To
EL C F L A T L ~18- YF
all;r.F:
T H L A T ~ .(THZ PACIFIC
AND BIBMA) II 194.1.

(C.C.S.
153 and 1 5 ? / 1 )
SIF A U K ET001<li g t a t e d t h a t , t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f tookex.

c e p t i o n t o p a r a g r a p h 1 of C . C . S .
15.1 i n t h a t i t d i d n o t p r o v i d e t h a t
Germany must bc3 defeat,ed b e f o r e u r i d e r t a k i n g t,he defeat, of t h e J a p a n e s e

GENERAL $EAR$HALL s t a t e d t h a t ,
i n h i s o p i n i o n , t h e B r i t i s h Chiefs
o f S t a f f w i s h e d t o b e c e r t a i n t h a t we k e e p t h e enemy engaged i n t h e
X e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d t h a t a t t h e same time m a i n t a i n a s u f f i c i e n t , f o r c e i n
t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t o t a k e advantage o f a r r a c k i n t,he German s t r e n g t h
e i t h e r from t h e withdrawal o f t h e i r f o r c e s i n F r a n c e o r because of low
e r e d morale
H e i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e E r i t i s h C h j e f s of S t a f f would p r e f e r
t o m a i n t a i n s u c h a f o r c e i n t h e IJnited Rj.ngdom dormant and a w a i t i n g an

o p p o r t u n i t y r a t h e r t h a n have i t u t i l i z e d i n a s u s t a i n e d a t t a c k elsewhere.
T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f know Chat they c a n u s e t h e s e f o r c e s

o f f e n s i v e l y i n t h e P a c i f i c T h e a t e r . He f e l t t h a t t h e y u e s t i o n r e s o l v e d
i t s e l f i n t o whether we would m a i n t a i n a l a r g e f o r c e i n t h e United King
dom a w a i t i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y o r keep t h e f o r c e engaged i n an a c t i v e of^
fensive i n the P a c i f i c
GENERAL MARCHALL s a i d t h a t t h e number o f t r o o p s u s e d i n t h e
P a c i f i c would n o t have much e f f e c t on t h e b u i l d - u p
of f o r c e s i n t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom. The c o n f l i c t a r i s e s c h i e f l y i n t h e u s e o f l a n d i n g c r a f t
a n d s h i p p i n g . He s a i d t h a t t o a l a r g e measure t h e s h i p p i n g u s e d i n t h e
P a c i f i c i s a l r e a d y committed and, t h e r e f o r e , c o u l d n o t b e made a v a i l a b l e
f o r a b u i l d - u p of f o r c e s i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom and t h e n e c e s s i t y o f
236
17. S
SECRET
m a i n t a i n i n g them, These f o r c e s a r e a t the erd of a long l i n e of c o m m i

c a t i o n s and t,he y u e s t i o n a r i s e s a s t o whether we s h o u l d l e t them remain
t h e r e , p r e c a r i o u s l y o r do something t o improve t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . ,
SIP ALAP VFOORT s t a t e d t h a t we have r e a c h e d a s t a g e i n t h e war

w h e r e ve mist, r e v i e w t h e c o r r c c t , n e s s of o u r b a s i c s t r a t , e g i c c o n c e p t
which c a l l s f o r the d e P e 8 t o f Sermany f i r s t . 5e was c o n v i n c e d t h a t we
c a n n o t d e f e a t Cermany and J a n a n s i m i i l t a n e o u s l y . The E r i t i . s h C h i e f s of
S t a f f have a r r i v e d a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t i t w i l l be b e t t e r t o concen
t r a t e o n Germany. P e c a n s e of t h e d i s t a n c e s i n v o l v e d , t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s
o f " t a f f b e l i e v e t h a t t h e d e f e a t of' J a p a n f i r s t i s i m p o s s i b l e and t h a t
i f we a t t e m p t t o d o s o , we! s h a l l l o s e t h e war.
Fie s a i d t h a t h a v i n g d e c i d e d t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y t,o d e f e a t
Germany f i r s t , t h e immediate q u e s t i o n i s whether t o a t t e m p t t o do so by
a n i r i v a s i o n o f F o r t h e r n F r a n c e o r t,o e x p l o i t o u r s u c c e s s e s i n N o r t h
Africa
T h e F r i L i s l i C h i e f s o f ' 5.taff c o n s i d e r t h a t an a l l - o u t h i e d i t e r r a m
ear1 e f f o r t i s best, b u t t h a t i t m n s t . be " a l l - o u t . "

H e s a i d t h e E r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f a p p r e c i a t e t h e p o s i t i o n .in
t h e P a c i f i c and t h a t
t,tiey w i l l do e v e r y t h i n g t h e y c a n t o m e e t i t b u t
t h a t t,hey f e e l we mnst g i v e f i r s t c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o t h e d e f e a t of Germany.

T h i s can be, done b y f i n i s h i n g T u n i s i a a n d then o p e r a t i n g i n t h e Mediter
ranean s o as t o draw t h e maximum number of German ground and a i r f o r c e s

from t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t
I n u n d e r t a k i r i g o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Filediterranean,
a s s i s t a n c e from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s n e c e s s a r y
He f e l t t h a t i f w e do n o t
m a i n t a i n c o n s t a n t p r e s s u r e on Germany, t h e y w i l l be g i v e n an o p p o r t u n i t y
t o recover and t h u s p r o l o n g t h e war
GTNNEFAI, VAT.SHALL s a i d t h e T h i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f do n o t
propose doing nothing i n t he Mediterranean o r i n France;
t h e y have no
i d e a t h a t w e , s h o u l d n o t c o n c e n t r a t e f i r s t on d e f e a t i n g Germany. The
q u e s t i o n t h a t i s t o b e d e c i d e d i s how t h i s c a n b e s t b e a c c o m p l i s h e d .
On t h e o t h e r hand, i t i s t h e view o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f
t h a t the war s h o u l d b e e n d e d a s q u i c k l y a s p o s s i b l e ,
which c a n n o t b e
a c c o m p l i s h e d i f w e n e g l e c t t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r e n t i r e l y and l e a v e t h e
J a p a n e s e t o c o n s o l i d a t e ' t h e i r g a i n s and u n n e c e s s a r i l y s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r
position.
GENEEAL MAESHALL s a i d t h a t h e a d v o c a t e d a n a t t a c k on t h e Conti

n e n t b u t t h a t he was opposed t o immobilizing a l a r g e f o r c e i n t h e United
237
S..S E C R E T
Kingdom, awaiting a n u n c e r t a i n p r o s p e c t , when t h e y might b e b e t t e r engaged
i n o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s which are p o s s i b l e
GEKEFBZ, MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t i t was a p p a r e n t l y a g r e e d by the
Combined Chiefs of S t a f f t o give Russia every p o s s i b l e a s s i s t a n c e and t o

e n d e a v o r t o b r i n g Turkey i n t o t h e war. His p r i m a r y c o n c e r n w i t h t h e
o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c was t o i n s u r e that, our p o s i t i o n s would be s o
s t r e n g t h e n e d as t o p r o v i d e u s w i t h t h e means f o r n e c e s s a r y o p e r a t i o n s
r a t h e r than t o c o n t i n u e conducting them on a shoe s t r i n g . He f e l t that
t h i s would u l t i m a t e l y reduce t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r tonnage i n t h e P a c i f i c
a n d t h i s was h i s c h i e f r e a s o n f o r a d v o c a t i n g o p e r a t i o n s i n Burma..
$ I F AIAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e P r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f c e r t a i n l y
d i d n o t want t o keep f o r c e s t i e d up i n F.urope doing n o t h i n g . Curing the

b u i l d - . u p p e r i o d , however, t h e f i r s t f o r c e s t o a r r i v e from America could
n o t be used a c t i v e l y a g a i n s t t h e enemy; a c e r t a i n minimum concentration
h a d t o be e f f e c t e d b e f o r e t h e y c o u l d be employed. His p o i n t w a s t h a t we
s h o u l d d i r e c t our r e s o u r c e s t o t h e d e f e a t o f Germany f i r s t . He agreed as
t o the d e s i r a b i l i t y of ANAKIK s i n c e i t appeared t h a t f o r t h i s o p e r a t i o n
w e could u s e f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e i n t h e t h e a t e r w i t h o u t d e t r a c t i n g from the

e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d e f e a t of Germany T h i s conception was focused i n para
g r a p h 2 (c) of t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t Planning S t a f f s paper ( C . C . S , . 153/1)
i n which i t was s t a t e d t h a t we agreed i n p r i n c i p l e with t h e U. S . s t r a t - .
egy i n t h e P a c i f i c provided always t h a t i t s a p p l i c a t i o n does n o t preju
d i c e t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d e f e a t o f Germany,
ADMIRBI, K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h i s e x p r e s s i o n might be r e a d a s
meaning t h a t a n y t h i n g which was done i n t h e P a c i f i c i n t e r f e r e d with the

e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d e f e a t of Germany and t h a t t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r should
t h e r e f o r e remain t o t a l l y i n a c t i v e ,
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t t h i s was c e r t a i n l y n o t t h e u n d e r
s t a n d i n g o f t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f who had always a c c e p t e d t h a t

p r e s s u r e should be maintained o n J a p a n , They had, perhaps, misunderstood
t h e U.
S. C h i e f s of S t a f f and thought t h a t t h e p o i n t a t i s s u e was whether
t h e main e f f o r t s h o u l d b e i n t h e P a c i f i c or i n t h e United Kingdom
The
B r i t i s h view was t h a t f o r g e t t i n g a t Germany i n t h e immediate f u t u r e ,

t h e k1editerranea.n o f f e r e d b e t t e r p r o s p e c t s t h a n N o r t h e r n F r a n c e . For
t h i s purpose t h ? y were a d v o c a t i n g Mediterranean o p e r a t i o n s w i t h amphib
i o u s f o r c e s w h i l e c o n c e n t r a t i n g , so f a r a s t h e U n i t e d Kingdom was
238
SECRET
concerned, on b u i l d i n g up a l a r g e heavy b m b e r f o r c e , which was t h e o n l y

form of f o r c e t h a t c o u l d o p e r a t e c o n t i n u o u s l y a g a i n s t germ any^
GEP'EFBL i!AAFS!IALI, s a i d t h a t he was most a n x i o u s n o t t o become
committed t o i n t e r m i n a b l e o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Xedi t e r r a n e a n . lie wished

N o r t h e r n F r a n c e t o b e t h e s c e n e of t h e main e f f o r t a g a i n s t Germany-
t h a t had a l w a y s been h i s c o n c e p t i o n .
S I F CHAFLIC POTTAI. s a i d t h a t i t was i m n o s s i b l e t o s a y e x a c t l y
where we s h o u l d s t o p i n t h e j ' e d i t e r r a n e s n sirlce we hoped t o knock I t a l y

o u t a l t o g e t h e r . T h i s a c t i o n would g i v e t h e g r e a t e s t s u p p o r t t o P w s s i a
and m i g h t open t h e d o o r t o an i n v a s i o n o f F r a n c e .
GEKI!BAL Y A M H L L I . p o i n t e d nut that, extended o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Med
i t e r r a n e a n a s w e 1 1 as t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n of f o r c e s i n E n g l a n d f o r t h e
i n v a s i o n o f Korthern France might w e l l p r e v e n t
11s
from u n d e r t a k i n g opera.
t i o n s i n Burma; he was n o t a t a l l i n f a v o r of t h i s . . Moreover, American

f o r c e s a t p r e s e n t i n t h e S o u t h w ? s t P a c i f i c were d e s p e r a t e l y s h o r t a t
p r e s e n t o f t h e i r immediate r e y u i r e m e n t s .
AEYIFAL KINr s a i d t h a t we had on many o c c a s i o n s been c l o s e t o a
d i s a s t e r i n t h e P a c i f i c . The r e a l p o i n t a t i s s u e was t o d e t e r m i n e t h e
b a l a n c e between t h e e f f o r t t o be put a g a i n s t Germany and a g a i n s t J a p a n ,
b u t we must have enough i n t h e P a c i f i c t o m e . i n t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e against
t h e J a p a n e s e . The U . S. i n t e n t i o n s were n o t t o p l a n f o r a n y t h i n g beyond
gaining p o s i t i o n s i n readiness f o r t h e f i n a l offensive against Japan
He
f e l t v e r y s t r o n g l y , however, t h a t t h e details of such o p e r a t i o n s m u s t be

l e f t t o t h e U . S. C h i e f s o f S t a f f , who were s t r a t e g i c a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e
f o r t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r . He d i d n o t f e e l t h i s was a q u e s t i o n for a d e c i -
s i o n of t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f . The U .
S , C h i e f s of S t a f f had n o t
been c o n s u l t e d b e f o r e t h e B r i t i s h undertook o p e r a t i o n s i n Madagascar and

French Eomaliland--nor d i d t h e y expect t o be; b u t t h e same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
a p p l i e d t o t h e d e t a i l s of operations i n t h e P a c i f i c .
I n h i s view t h e r e would b e p l e n t y of f o r c e s i n t h e t h e a t e r f o r
a l l n e c e s s a r y o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n aml i t was now determined
t h a t s u c h o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d be, u n d e r t a k e n , The o p e r a t i o n s c o n t e m p l a t e d
i n t h e P a c i f i c , however, would have no e f f e c t on what c o u l d be done i n
t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n o r from t h e I r n i t e d Kingdom.
SIR. CHARIZES P O I ! T I ; s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f would

be s a t i s f i e d if t h e y c o u l d be a s s u r e d of this p o i n t , T h e i r f e a r was t h a t
U.
S. SECRET
t h e result of extended o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c might b e a n i n s t f f i c i e n t
c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f a c r a c k i n
Germany.
GEhEML UAFSHAIL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e whole concept of defeating
Germany f i r s t had been j e o p a r d i z e d by t h e l a c k of r e s o u r c e s i n t h e Pa

c i f i c . Heavy bombers s e t up t o go t o t h e I l n i t e d Kingdom had had t o be
d i v e r t e d t o t h e South P a c i f i c t o avoid d i s a s t e r t h e r e . Fortunately
d i s a s t e r had been avoided; but i f i t had o c c u r r e d , t h e r e would have been
t . e f f o r t t o t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r . The U. S. had
n e a r l y been compelled t o p u l l o u t of TOFCH and t h e d e c i s i o n t o s p a r e t h e
a huge d i v e r s i o n of T!.
n e c e s s a r y n a v a l f o r c e s from t h e P a c i f i c had been a most courageous one

on t h e p a r t of Admiral King. A hand-to-mouth
p o l i c y of t h i s n a t u r e was
most uneconomical. H e was a n x i o u s t o g e t a s e c u r e p o s i t i o n i n t h e P a c i f i c
s o t h a t we knew where we w e r e . The r e c o n y u e s t o f Burma would b e an

enormous c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h i s and would e f f e c t u l t i m a t e l y a g r e a t economy
o f forces.
D i s c u s s i o n t h e n t u r n e d on t h e o p e r a t i o n s proposed t o secure t h e
P a c i f i c t h e a t e r , which were set o u t i n C.C.S.
SIR
153
ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t i n the B r i t i s h view i t would b e suf
f i c i e n t t o s t o p a t Rabaul and ANAKIM and t h a t t o go on t o Truk would

t a k e up t o o much f o r c e . There would i n e v i t a b l y be l a r g e s h i p p i n g l o s s e s
i n t h e c o u r s e of s u c h o p e r a t i o n s , which would b e a c o n t i n u o u s
d r a i n on
our resources
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e proposed o p e r a t i o n s would be
c a r r i e d o u t one a f t e r t h e o t h e r . A f t e r Rahaul had been c a p t u r e d , t h e
same f o r c e s might be employed t o go on t o t h e M a r s h a l l s . Rabaul might be

t a k e n by May and ANAKIM c o u l d n o t s t a r t b e f o r e Eovember. During t h e in
t e r v e n i n g months, s u r e l y t h e t r o o p s i n t h e t h e a t e r should n o t be allowed
t o remain i d l e b u t s h o u l d be employed t o k e e p u p p r e s s u r e on t h e Japanese
a n d m a i n t a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e . Only by t h i s means c o u l d w e o f f s e t t h e ad
v a n t a g e which t h e J a p a n e s e had i n t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n o f i n t e r i o r l i n e s .
O p e r a t i o n s i n t o t h e M a r s h a l l s could be stopped a t any p o i n t d e s i r e d and
were n o t a n u n l i m i t e d commitment which had t o be s e e n t h r o u g h t o t h e
e n d , It might w e l l be t h a t Truk would, a f t e r a l l , be found impossible t o
c a p t u r e this year.
240
SECRET
GENEFAL MAESHALL s a i d t h a t t h e r e seemed g e n e r a l agreement a s t o

t h e need f o r t h e c a p t u r e of Rabaul and t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f ANAKIM.. Could
i t n o t b e a g r e e d t h a t o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d he c o n t i n u e d a s f a r a s Truk i f
i t were p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e a t t h a t time? There should be
no q u e s t i o n o f s a c r i f i c i n g AhAKIY f o r Truk
SIF; CHAPLEZ PORTAL s a i d he would n o t l i k e t o b e committed t o
ANAKIM, even w i t h f o r c e s r e l e a s e d a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e o f F a b a u l , w i t h o u t
f i r s t r e v i e w i n g whether some o t h e r o p e r a t i o n more p r o f i t a b l e t o t h e war
a s a whole might n o t b e d e s i r a b l e . F o r example,
t o t a k e a n extreme c a s e ?
suppose a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e of nabaul a good o p p o r t , u n i t y a r o s e i owing t o a

c r a c k i n Germany, o f b r e a k i n g i n t o F r a n c e . Ctiould we r e f u s e t o take Rd.
v a n t a g e o f i t b e c a u s e we were a l r e a d y committed t o A!AKIM?
GEKEPAL I:A:CHALL f e l t t h a t i f such a s i t u a t , i o n a r o s e w e s h o u l d

c e r t a i n l y s e i z e ths o p F r t u n i t y . Ile agreed t h a t a furt,Iier meeting of t h e
Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f m i g h t be, n e c e s s a r y i n the summer t o d e c i d e
these questions
S I P ALAN BPOOKE proposed t h a t at, the p r e s e n t time we should l i m i t
o u r o u t l o o k i n t h e P a c i f i c t o b.abaul, which s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y b e under

t a k e n , and t o p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r AKAKIM, the d e c i s i o n t o l a u n c h t h i s b e i n g
taken l a t e r
S i m i l a r l y , any d e c i s i o n on Truk s h o u i d be d e f e r r e d
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e e f f e c t of t h i s wouidhe s t r i c t l y
t o l i m i t commitments i n t h e P a c i f i c ,
a l t h o u g h t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of
S t a f f a p p a r e n t l y c o n t e m p l a t e d a n u n l i m i t e d commitment i n t h e European
theater.
GXNEEAJ, MARSHALL a g r e e d t h a t a d e c i s i o n on AhAKIM a n d T r u k
c o u l d be l e f t u n t i l l a t e r
He p o i n t e d out, t h a t C C S
153 m e r e l y p r o
posed a s e r i e s o f o p e r a t i o n s which might be c a r r i e d out. i n 1943 with t h e

means a v a i l a b l e
ALIMIPAL K I N G s a i d t h a t on l o g i s t i c g r o u n d s a l o n e i t would b e
i m p o s s i b l e t o b r i n g f o r c e s from t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r t o t h e E u r o p e a n
t h e a t e r . AYAKIM was n o t t h e r e f o r e an a l t e r n a t i v e t o o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e
European t h e a t e r
GENERAL SOMERVELL s u p p o r t e d t h i s v i e w , He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t , once
Rabaul had &,en s e i z e d , s h i p s would b e r e q u i r e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e g a r r i s o n
241
SECRET
S
t h e r e and t h e s e c o u l d be m p l o y e d t o e x p l o i t s u c c e s s by minor o p e r a t i o n s
against other islands:,
As r e g a r d s l a n d i n g c r a f t , t h e U .
S . C h i e f s o f S t a f f had committed
t h e m s e l v e s t o s u p p l y a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e c r a f t nceckd f o r LYAKIM.
O p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e P a c i f i c I s l a n d s r e q u i r e d combat, l o a d e r s and n o t
t h e tank-landing s h i p s and tank-landing c r a f t which were needed elsewhere
ADMIRaL COOKE s a i d t h a t a v e r y l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e U.. S
s h i p p i n g i n t h e P a c i f i c w a s needed f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e F l e e t ,
which was o p e r a t i n g 7 , 0 0 0 m i l e s from i t s home b a s e s : T h i s requirement
would c o n t i n u e whether o r n o t o p e r a t j o n s a g a i n s t Truk were u n d e r t a k e n ,
U , S . p r o d u c t i o n of L.S.T.'s
month
would s h o r t l y amount, t o a b o u t f i f t e e n p e r
These c o u l d n o t b e r e a d y i n time f o r M e d i t e r r a n e a n o p e r a t i o n s i n
t h e summerl b u t would b e a v a i l a b l e f o r ANAKIX

t h e f i g u r e of 250,000 p u t down i n C.C.P.
As r e g a r d s l a n d f o r c e s ,
153 i n c l u d e d 150,000 men now i n
movement o r set up t o move, and a n o t h e r two d i ~ v i s i o r i sw h i c h h e u n d e r s t e a d

w e r e a l r e a d y e a r m a r k e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n Eurma t h i s y e a r from I n d i a
T h i s l e f t a t o t a l o f o n l y some 5 0 , 0 0 0 men a d d i t i o n a l f o r t h e whole

Pacific theater
SIP, CHAF.LES. PORTAL r e i t e r a t e d t h a t i t would be unwise t o accept
a d e f i n i t e commitment f o r BFiAKIbl now s i n c e a f a v o r a b l e s i t u a t i o n might

a r i s e i n Europe d u r i n g t h e year which would make o p e r a t i o n s i n the Euro
p e a n t h e a t e r more p r o f i t a b l e t h a n a n y t h i n g i n t h e F a c i f i z
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t f o r c e s s e t o u t i n C C . S
153 c o n s t i t u t e d
t h e minimum n e c e s s a r y t o m a i n t a i n p r e s s u r e on t h e J a p a n e s e
.Aithough the
f o r c e s i n t h e P a c i f i c were p r i m a r i l y f o r d e f e n s i v e p u r p o s e s . many of
t h e m c o u l d be m e d siml t a n e o u s l y f o r minor o f f e n s i - v e s . such
bardment of J a p a n e s e b a s e s
9s
a i r bom
F a v o r a b l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s might then b e s e i z e d
for exploitation
GENERAL MAKSHALZ. s u g g e s t e d t h a t p a r a g r a p h 11 ( c ) of C C S
153
c o u l d be r e v i s e d t o r e a d " s e i z u r e a n d o c c u p a t i o n of G i l . b e r t I s l a n d s ,
M a r s h a l l I s l a n d s , C a r o l i n e I s l a n d s up t o and i n c l u d i n g T r u k w t t h t h e re
s o u r c e s a v a z l a b l e in t h e t h e a t e r
(The meeting adjourned a t t h i s p o i n t )

On t h e r e s u m p t i o n of t h e i r meeting t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
h a d b e f o r e them a d r a f t n o t e s e t t i n g o u t t e n t a t i v e a g r e e m e n t s which
a p p e a r e d t o have b e e n r e a c h e d i n t h e p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n
242
IT
SECREI
After some f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n ,
THE C OMi!ITTEE:
( a ) I n v i t e d G e n e r a l I s m a y and General Hu
t o redraft t
t o i n c l u d e f u r t h e r p o i n t s which had been r a i s e d
n o .e
(b) I n s t r u c t e d t h e F e c r e t a r i e s t o c i r c u l a t e this d r a f t f o r d i s
cussion a t the next m e t i n g .

3
ZSCORT V 3 CSEL!
SIR 01:I:TTY
ICUT
emphasized. tht= need f o r t h e Combined. C h i e f s o f
S t a f f h a v i n g b e f o r e them a m o p e r s u r v e y of t h e e s c o r t v e s s e l p o s i t i o n
b e f o r e t a k i n g any f i n a l d e c i s i o n o n o p e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e coming year
He
r e c a p i t u l a t e d t h e 1 : r i t i s h needs f o r a d d l t i o r j a l e s c o r t s i n t h e A t l a n t i c and
pointed out that considerable
T.
C.
a s s i s t a n c e waul d b e r e y u i r e d n o t o n l y
i n t h e A t l a n t i c b u t a l s o f o r WSIWif t h a t o p e r a t , i o n w e r e u n d e r t a k e n
e s c o r t s were withdrawn f o r a n o p e r a t , i o n such as TORCH o r FIIICKY,
a b s e n t from t h e i r normal d u t i e s f o r a b o u t f o u r months
When
they were
It, took at, l e a s t
one month t o c o l l e c t them b e f o r e h a n d from t h e v a r i o u s convoys on which

t h e y were working and a s i m i l a r p e r i o d t o r e d i s t r i b u t e them a f t e r t h e
o p e r a t i o n . E x p e r i e n c e i n TORCH had shown that i t was n o t p o s s i b l e t o re..
l e a s e them from t h e o p e r a t i o n i t s e l f u n d e r a b o u t two mont,hs
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t w i t h t h e U. S , and I;. K c o n s t r u c t i o n

coming o u t d u r i n g t h e n e x t s i x months, t h e p o s i t i o n s h o u l d b e e a s i e r b y
J u l y , when HUSKY was t o be l a u n c h e d ~ He t h o u g h t i t s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e t o
f i n d a d d i t i o n a l e s c o r t s f o r t h e A t l a n t i c a s well a s t h o s e r e q u i r e d f o r
HUSKY., If t h e u s e o f combat l o a d e r s f o r HUSKY c o u l d b e c u t t o t h e mini
m u m , e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s would be c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y r e d u c e d
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t new c o n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e U , K , was

c o m p a r a t i v e l y s m a l l d u r i n g t h e f i r s t h a l f o f 1943 and would d o l i t t l e
more t h a n make good r e c e n t heavy l o s s e s
ADMIRfi COOKE s a i d t h a t the emamination of t h e e s c o r t p o s i t i o n

by the B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f was p r o g r e s s i n g w e l l but i t appeared
t h a t t h e t o t a l number o f I;. 6 . and B r i t i s h e s c o r t v e s s e l s would n o t b e
s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v i d e any s u r p l u s a f t e r p r o v i d i n g f o r normal convoy work
Any o p e r a t i o n s u n d e r t a k e n would t h e r e f o r e i n v o l v e a c c e p t i n g i n c r e a s e d
l o s s e s i n normal convoys.. The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f would have t o
d e c i d e what l o s s e s would b e a c c e p t a b l e ,
243
SECRET
c'
The d i s c u s s i o n t h e n t u r n e d on t h e r e l a t i o n of P s Q sconvoys to
M e d i t e r r a n e a n o p e r a t i o n s ,,
SIR DUDLEY POTIN! s a i d t h a t one problem w a s whether a 30--ship
convoy e v e r y f o r t y d a y s would b e c o n s i d e r e d s u f f i c i e n t f o r R u s s i a o r
w h e t h e r we s h o u l d be p r e s s e d , as we had been i n t h e p a s t , t o i n c r e a s e
R u s s i a n d e l i v e r i e s . The w o r s t t h r e e mont.hs were from F e b r u a r y t o the
m i d d l e o f Yay when d a y l i g h t h o u r s were i n c r e a s i n g and t h e c h a n n e l was
r e s t r i c t e d by i c e
L a t e r i n t h e year t h e f c e r e t r e a t e d and a l t h o u g h the
d a y s were l o n g e r , t h e p a s s a g e o f convoys became l e s s d a n g e r o u s .

WNERAL MARSHALL f e l t t h a t we s h o u l d n o t a g a i n r i s k t h e same
heavy l o s s e s which had been s u s t a i n e d on t h e E u s s i a n convoys i n 1942.

Such l o s s e s were l i k e l y t o c r i p p l e our whole o f f e n s i v e e f f o r t a g a i n s t
t h e enemy. He s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f should include
a r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s e f f e c t i n t h e n o t e which was b e i n g d r a f t e d
One
a l l e v i a t i n g f a c t o r was t h e improvement i n t h e P e r s i a n Gulf r o u t e which

would o f f s e t r e d u c t i o n s on t h e Murmansk r o u t e
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t t h e Prime h!inister

t o Mr
S t a l i n t h a t we might have t o c a l l o f f P.Q.
had made i t c l e a r
convoys if t h e s c a l e of
German a t t a c k became t o o heavy. If warning was g i v e n o f o u r i n t e n t i o n t o

s t o p t h e c o n v o y s , t h e r e was l i k e l y t o b e heavy p r e s s u r e t o i n c r e a s e
d e l i v e r i e s d u r i n g t h e e a r l y p a r t of the y e a r , when, as he had p r e v i o u s l y
e x p l a i n e d , c o n d i t i o n s were most d i f f i c u l t
This meant e i t h e r i n c r e a s i n g
t h e s i z e o f t h e convoys o r r e d u c i n g t h e c y c l e T h e dangers which w e were
l i k e l y t o f a c e this y e a r were much g r e e t e r than l a s t year
4
POTENTIALITIES OF POLISH FORCES.

SIR ALAN BROOKE',
i n answer t o a q u e s t i o n by GENERAL MBRSHALL,
s a i d t h a t t h e P o l i s h f o r c e s c o n s i s t e d (1) o f a " s e c r e t " army i n s i d e

P o l a n d and ( 2 ) o f r e g u l a r P o l i s h t r o o p s o u t s i d e t h e c o u n t r y
As regards
t h e f i r s t , t h e r e was a d e f i n i t e o r g a n i z a t i o n of d e t e r m i n e d men; w i t h
l e a d e r s , though t h e y were a l m o s t e n t i r e l y unarmed
Their intelligence
s e r v i c e had been good, but r e c e n t l y many of t h e i r age,nts had b e e n caught

b y t h e Germans and less i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t German f o r c e s was now coming
o u t from P o l a n d , C,eneral S i k o r s k i claimed t h a t by t h e use of t h i s o r g a n i

z a t i o n he c o u l d d o g r e a t damage on t h e P o l i s h r a i l w a y s t o i n t e r r u p t
German communications a t a c r i t i c a l m = n t
244
There c o u l d be no doubt that
U.
SECRET
S.
t h i s s e c r e t army would p l a y a v a l u a b l e p a r t i n t h e f i n a l r i s i n g a g a i n s t
Germany, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f combined w i t h s i m i l a r a c t i o n i n a d j a c e n t Balkan

c o u n t r i e s . There was always a danger o f a premature r i s i n g , however.
The P o l i s h f o r c e s o u t s i d e P o l a n d c o n s i s t e d of a n armored d i v i s i o n
and a p a r a c h u t e b r i g a d e w i t h c e r t a i n o t h e r u n i t s i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom
and2 d i v i s i o n s and ? b r i g a d e groups i n the Middle E a s t . General S i k o r s k i ' s

conception w a s t o g e t some of these t r o o p s i n t o Poland t o s u p p l e m n t t h e
s e c r e t army. The d i f f i c u l t y was t h e methodof t r a n s p o r t , on which General
S i k o r s k i was r a t h e r v a g u e . He e n v i s a g e d t h e u s e o f a i r t r a n s p o r t and
p a r a c h u t e s , b u t t h e r e were o b v i o u s l i m i t a t i o n s i n t h i s .
GEhZFAL b!AF!SHLLI, i n q u i r e d whether any s t e p s had b e e n t a k e n t o
meet a r e q u e s t of General S i k o r s k i f o r t h e bombing o f a n a r e a i n Poland

from which t h e Germans were c l e a r i n g o u t a l l P o l i s h i n h a b i t a n t s under
circumstances of g r e a t b r u t a l i t y .
SIB. CHAPLES PORTAL s a i d t h e P o l e s had b e e n informed t h a t t h i s

o p e r a t i o n was i m p r a c t i c a b l e , h u t s t e p s would b e t a k e n t o p u b l i c i z e t h e
presence o f P o l i s h a i r f o r c e s i n t h e r a i d s on B e r l i n which might b e con
s i d e r e d p a r t l y a s a r e p r i s a l on b e h a l f of P o l a n d .
5
RAIDS ON BERLIN.
S I R CHARLES PORTAL g a v e d e t a i l s o f t h e r e c e n t r a i d s on B e r l i n ,
and e s t i m a t e d t h a t , making a l l a l l o w a n c e f o r t h e c o m p a r a t i v e s i z e s of
London a n d B e r l i n a n d t h e t i m e i n t e r v a l ,
t h e two r a i d s on B e r l i n on
s u c c e s s i v e n i g h t s had h i t B e r l i n a b o u t t w i c e a s h a r d a s London had been

h i t i n t h e two h e a v i e s t r a i d s o f A p r i l and May 1931. The a g g r e g a t e l o s s e s
i n the two B e r l i n r a i d s amounted t o 6 p e r c e n t , t h e f i g u r e expecte,d b e i n g
10 p e r c e n t , The e f f e c t o f t h e r a i d s would be l a r g e J y m o r a l e though t h e r e

were i m p o r t a n t e l e c t r i c a l works i n t h e a r e a a t t a c k e d " They would b e a
g r e a t encouragement t o t h e R u s s i a n s as w e l l as t h e P o l e s .
(SIR ANDREW CUTWINGHAM e n t e r e d t h e meeting at t h i s p o i n t . )
6
NAVAL SITUATION I N THE WSTERh' MEDITERRANJ3AN.
ADMIRAL C U N N I N G H A M s a i d t h a t t h e Germans m i g h t t h r e a t e n o u r
s h i p p i n g p a s s i n g t h r o u g h t h e S t r a i t s of G i b r a l t a r b y U - b o a t s and b y
a i r c r a f t and c o a s t d e f e n s e g u n s from S o u t h e r n S p a i n . He c o n s i d e r e d t h e
r i s k from U-boats
w a s c o m p a r a t i v e l y s m a l l . . The Germans had n e v e r b e e n
245
li
S. S E C R E T
a b l e t o m a i n t a i n many U-boats
i n t h e S t r a i t s where c u r r e n t s made their
o p e r a t i o n d i f f i c u l t , The d a n g e r from a i r c r a f t would b e no l e s s than to

c o a s t a l convoys a l o n g t h e e a s t c o a s t of E n g l a r d . Provided we had f i g h t e r s
e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e a i r f i e l d s o f Cpaniski h!orocco,
we s h o u l d he a b l e t o
d e a l w i t h t h i s t h r e a t . Coast, d e f e n s e g u n s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e g r e a t e s t
d a n g e r , biv.t o n l j e x p e r i e n c e rwuJd show liow bad t,l-.is would b e . The guns
were sunposeri t o h a v e I a d a r rar!g,e-findjrig
apnarat,us h u t we had means of
jamniing t i i j ~ sviijci! v o i i l d n r o b a b J ) be t x f ' f p r : t i v e . ?he guns would have t o

h e n e u t r a l i z e d b y c o u n t , e r - b a t t e r y from t h e s o u t h e r n s h o r e and by a i r
bombardmerit
:Ie t.Iiougkit, that, s h i p s wit,li a srped of
g e t througli t h e s t r a i t s wit,hout Iieavy I n s
1~?
Imots and upwards would
even w i t h t h e Germans i n
S o u t h e r n S p a i n p r o v i d r d we h e l d L p a n i s h ::orocco.
Even w i t h o u t i t , we
shouJd he a b l e t,o g e t some convoys through b y n i g h t . The P l a n n i n g S t a f f s

a t A l g i e r s liRd been examining t h e problem and t h e i r g r e l i m i n a r y conclu
s i o n s were t h a t
jf
we s e i z e d L a j o r c a we s h o u l d he a b l e t o p r e v e n t the
Germans b u i l d i n g up a l a r g e a i r s t , r e n g t h i n S o u t h e r n S p a i n .
SIP EI,PL?Y PGUbJ? s a i d t h a t i n s p i t e of t h e German c o a s t defense
guns on t h e French s h o r e of t h e S t r a i t s of Dover,we had n o t l o s t a s h i p
from them
The r a n g e . however, was some 38,000 y a r d s , whereas t h e d i s
t a n c e a c r o s s the S t r a i t s o f G i b r a l t a r w a s o n l y a b o u t h a l f t h a t -
SIR A M - HPOOKE s a i d t h a t a p l a n had been p r e p a r e d for s e i z i n g

Southern Spain w i t h a f o r c e o f about s i x d i v i s i o n s
s i b l e , however,
I t would n o t he pos
t o do t h i s a t t h e same time a s HUSKY
I t must he remem
b e r e d t h a t even if t h e S p a n i a r d s o f f e r e d no r e s i s t a n c e at, a l l i t would

t a k e some t i m e f o r t h e Germans t o become f u l l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n S o u t h e r n
Spain
AEVIrAI, CTIh'NIh~GIiAhi, r e f e r r i n g t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of c a p t u r i n g
S i c i l y , s a i d t h a t he d i d n o t a n t i c i p a t e , v e r y heavy s h i p p i n g l o s s e s i n
the o p e r a t i o n b u t t h e a c t u a l a - s a u l t o f t h e beaches would he a v e r y ex
p e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n . He d i d not c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n of t h e i s l a n d
would v e r y g r e a t l y add t o t h e s e c u r i t y o f t h e sea r o u t e t h r o u g h t h e Med
i t e r r a n e a n . If w e were i n C i c i l y , he would e s t i m a t e t h i s r o u t e as b e i n g
90 p e r c e n t o r more s e c u r e ; w i t h o u t S i c i l y , i t would h e a b o u t 85 p e r c e n t
s e c u r e , once we h e l d t h e whole of t h e North A f r i c a n c o a s t .
U. S. S E C R E T
S I F CHBRLPS PORTAL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t from t h e a i r p o i n t of view
t h e p o s s e s s i o n of S i c i l y would make a v e r y c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e . If
t h e Germans were n o t i n t h e i s l a n d , i t would be d i f f i c u l t f o r them t o
o p e r a t e a g a i n s t o u r s h i p p i n g a t a l l ; t h e y would hav?
to use bases i n
S a r d i n i a and t h e mainland of I t a l y , which were a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s t a n c e

from t h e Xaarrows.
C: ' : ' I l ~ L LCIIYYIKGFIAM
then described th e naval s i t u a t i o n i n the
T u n i s i a a r e a . The Germans had made heavy a t t a c k s on Eone o n t h r e e

s u c c e s s i v e d a y s damaging f o u r m e r c h a n t s h i p s and a c r u i s e r , b u t t h e
d e f e n s e s were now much improved and o u r c r u i s e r s were s t i l l o p e r a t i n g
from t h e p o r t . i , e h a d a t f i r s t sunk about one ship a day, b u t t h e Germans
were g e t t i n g f a r t o o many s h i p s i n t o T u n i s i a now. We s h o u l d b e a b l e t o
i n f l i c t much g r e a t e r damage on them a s soon a s we had f u l l y o r g a n i z e d
o u r arrangements. S t e p s were now b e i n g taken t o b l o c k t h e channel between

t h e I t a l i a n m i n e f i e l d s w i t h our own mines.
24 7
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S.
61st M e e t i n g
MINUTES of h!eeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp
on T u e s d a y , J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1943, a t 1000.
PRESENT
G e n e r a l G. C,, M a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E. J. King, USN
L t . General H .
H.
Pound
F. A. P o r t a l
A r n o l d , USA

Lt
General B. B
S o m e r v e l l , USA
Rear Admiral C. hl. Cooke, Jr.,USN
Vice Admiral t,he Lord L o u i s
Moun t b a t t e n
B r i g . General J. E . H u l l , USA
Brig.
L t . G e n e r a l S i r H a s t i n g s L. Ismay
G e n e r a l A . C. Wedemeyer,USA
Kennedy
Colonel J. E. Smart, USA
Major G e n e r a l J. N
Commander R. E. L i b b y , USN
A i r Vice Marshal J~ C - S l e s s o r
SECRETARIAT
Brig. General J. R.
B r i g a d i e r E.
Dykes
Deane, USA
I. C. Jacob
L t . C o l o n e l L. T. Grove, USA
24 8
U. S SECRET
CONDUCT OF THE WAR I N 1943.
1..
(C.C.S.
155)
The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d a d r a f t memorandum p r e -

pared a s a r e s u l t o f t h e i r meeting t h e p r e v i o u s day. C e r t a i n amendments
were s u g g e s t e d and a g r e e d .
THE COMMITTEE:
Approved t h e memorandum* a s amended.
2., SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE AGENDA OF THE

CONFERENCE.
(C . C .S 455/1)
I
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d a n o t e , p r e p a r e d b y t h e
Combined S t a f f s s u g g e s t i n g the procedure t o be followed f o r d e a l i n g w i t h
t h e major q u e s t i o n s on t h e agreed Agenda of t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f
(C.C.S
140) ., C e r t a i n a l t e r a t , i o n s were s u g g e s t e d t o t h e t e n t a t i v e program
o f meetings set, o u t i n t h e annex t o t h e s e m i n u t e s ,
THE COMMITTEE:
Approved t h e s u g g e s t e d p r o c e d u r e s u b j e c t t o t h e Annex b e i n g
r e v i s e d a s a g r e e d a t t h e i r meeting.:::::
3,
STRATEGIC RESPONSIBILITY AND COMMAND SET U P FOR DAKAR

FRENCH WEST AFRICA.
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t no q u e s t i o n o f l a n d f o r c e s was i n v o l v e d
i n West A f r i c a . , A d m i r a l G l a s s f o r d h a d p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e West A f r i c a n
Coast from Cape B o j a d o r t o t h e Western boundary of S i e r r a Leone s h o u l d
b e p l a c e d under F r e n c h n a v a l command
The F r e n c h n a v a l f o r c e s s h o u l d b e
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s u c h o p e r a t i o n s o f f s h o r e as m i g h t b e n e c e s s a r y i n t h a t
area. He u n d e r s t o o d t h a t M , B o i s s o n a n d A d m i r a l C o l l i n e t were b o t h a g r e e
able t o t h i s suggestion,,
The propos.ed a r r a n g e m e n t would i n c l u d e t h e a i r c o v e r f o r o f f
s h o r e o p e r a t i o n s . The d i f f i c u l t y would be t h e l a c k o f e q u i p m e n t of t h e
French a i r f o r c e s
He s u g g e s t e d t h a t toovercome t h i s d i f f i c u l t y w e s h o u l d
s e t o u t t o f a m i l i a r i z e t h e F r e n c h w i t h modern a i r c r a f t , To d o t h i s i t
w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e tnem u p t o - d a t e e q u i p m e n t a n d a d e q u a t e
::
:CV
S u b s e q u e n t l y i s s u e d as C C S
Annex
249
155,l
U S SECRET
t r a i n i n g and t o i n c l u d e them, s o f a r as p o s s i b l e , i n a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n s
He s a i d t h a t t h e Mest A f r i c a n c o a s t from Cape Bojador southwards was a
B r i t i s h s p h e r e , and h i s p r o p o s a l w a s t h a t the French i n t h e i r a r e a s h o u l d
work under Admiral Pegram. M
e should have t o d e c i d e whether t o d e a l w i t h
t h e F r e n c h as f u l l a l l i e s o r whether i t would be n e c e s s a r y t o e x e r c i s e
some d e g r e e o f c o n t r o l over them.
S I R DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t he had formed t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t
Admiral C o l l i n e t was a l l o u t t o h e l p and t h a t t h e a r r a n g e m e n t which
A d m i r a l G l a s s f o r d proposed was based on t h e assumption t h a t t h e French
would f u l l y c o o p e r a t e .
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t he w a s i n g e n e r a l agreement w i t h
t h e s u g g e s t i o n s p u t f o r w a r d by Admiral King.
I t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t a l l c o a s t a l a i r o p e r a t i o n s i n Mest A f r i c a
s h o u l d be c o o r d i n a t e d by t h e B r i t i s h A i r Commander who would be working

i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e B r i t i s h Naval Commander
Be was f u l l y a l i v e t o
t h e importance of g i v i n g t h e F r e n c h airmen a t Dakar some equipment t o

e n a b l e them immediately t o take a s h a r e i n a i r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e proposed
French s u b - a r e a . For t h i s purpose he proposed, s u b j e c t t o t h e agreement
of t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f , t o a l l o t them 2 Sunderland F l y i n g Boats
and 4 Hudson p a t r o l bombers which, t o b e g i n w i t h , would be o p e r a t e d by
B r i t i s h crews w i t h themore experienced French crews a l o n g s i d e them u n t i l
t h e y were f i t t o t a k e over themselves
He was l e s s a n x i o u s a b o u t t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e F r e n c h t h a n
about t h e i r t e c h n i c a l a b i l i t y and t r a i n i n g \ S o f a r , t h e y had n e i t h e r t h e
equipment, t r a i n i n g or e x p e r i e n c e of c o a s t a l a i r o p e r a t i o n s ' i n modern
war, H e proposed, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t t h e less experienced French a i r crews,
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e maintenance p e r s o n n e l , s h o u l d be withdrawn
t o B r i t i s h t r a i n i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s , w i t h t h e o b j e c t o f forming them, if
t h e y t u r n e d o u t t o be any good and a s soon as t h e equipment c o u l d be
made a v a i l a b l e i n t o two squadrons, one o f c a t a l i n a s and one of Wellington
p a t r o l bombers H e agreed t h a t t h e equipment o f t h e s e c o a s t a l squadrons
i n West A f r i c a s h o u l d be a B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , b u t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t ,
owing t o p r e s e n t s h o r t a g e o f s u i t a b l e a i r c r a f t a n d t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r
adequate t r a i n i n g o f crews, the formation o f t h e proposed two squadrons
was n o t l i k e l y t o be p r a c t i c a b l e i n t h e immediate f u t u r e .
250
SECRET
U
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t t h e United S t a t e s concept was g r a d u a l l y

t o draw i n French a i r f o r c e p e r s o n n e l a s t h e y became t r a i n e d a n d e q u i p p e d
f o r o p e r a t i o n a l work o v e r a p e r i o d o f a b o u t a y e a r . He a g r e e d t h a t i n
French Mest A f r i c a t h i s would be a B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
GENERAL MARSHAIL s a i d t h a t he was i n f a v o r o f p r o c e e d i n g w i t h a
d e f i n i t e program f o r r e e q u i p p i n g t h e F r e n c h f o r c e s . T h i s would, of
c o u r s e , imply F r e n c h a c c e p t a n c e of our o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d t r a i n i n g methods,
and would i n e v i t a b l y d e l a y t h e p r o g r e s s o f e q u i p p i n g our own f o r c e s , . H e
t h o u g h t , however, t h a t we s h o u l d d o tr.e t h i n g w h o l e - - h e a r t e d l y ; and h e
was p r e p a r e d , s u b j e c t t o General Eisenhower's v i e w s , t o m o d i f y t h e United
S t a t e s p r o g r a m in o r d e r t o e q u i p F r e n c h f o r c e s up t o a s t r e n g t h of
250,000. A l l t h e equipment provided f o r t h e F r e n c h would be a t t h e expense
of United S t a t e s t r o o p s forming i n America. lie p r o p o s e d t o make u s e o f
French s h i p p i n g t o b r i n g i t , o v e r :
GENERAL SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t G e n e r a l G i r a u d had a g r e e d t o t u r n
o v e r 1 6 0 , 0 0 0 t o n s o f F r e n c h s h i p p i n g t,o t h e A l l i e d p o o l . Out of t h i s
tonriage G e n e r a l G i r a u d proposed t h a t 85,000 t o n s s h o u l d b e a l ~ l o c a t e dt o
meet F r e n c h c i v i l r e q u i r e m e n t s , l e a v i n g 75,000 t o n s f o r s h i p p i n g e q u i p - .
ment f o r tne F r e n c h f o r c e s . General Somervell c a l c u l a t e d t h a t t h i s would
e n a b l e them t o be equipped a t t h e r a t e of a b o u t one d i v i s i o n a month. No
allowance was made i n t h i s program f o r t h e c a r r i a g e o f c o a l and o i l which
was a t p r e s e n t b e i n g s h i p p e d by the B r i t i s h
THE COMMITTEE:
Agreed:
(a)
T h a t t h e West A f r i c a n C o a s t ( o f f s h o r e ) from Cape B o j a d o r
(Rio d ' 0 r o )
southward s h a l l b e a n area u n d e r command of a
B r i t i s h Naval O f f i c e r f o r n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s a n d o f a B r i t i s h
A i r Officer f o r a i r operations i n cooperation with naval

(b)
forces.
T h a t s u b j e c t t o ( a ) , a s u b , - a r e a e x t e n d i n g from Cape B o j a - .
d o r t o t h e w e s t e r n boundary of S i e r r a Leone and a l l f o r c e s
o p e r a t i n g t h e r e i n s h a l l be under F r e n c h Command.
(c)
That i n t h e French sub-area t h e i n t e n t i o n w i I l be t o e n a b l e

F r e n c h a i r u n i t s t o take over a i r d u t i e s as r a p i d l y as
e q u i p m e n t and t r a i n i n g p e r m i t ,
251
17 S
SECRET
4
PUBLICATION OF RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE

S I R ALAN BROOKE d r e w t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e Committee t o t h e
d e c i s i o n which t h e F r e s i d e n t and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r had made a t t h e i r

meeting t h e previous day t h a t :
( a ) The r e s u l t s of t h i s c o n f e r e n c e s h o u l d be communicated t o
S t a l i n i n tkie form of a document s e t t i n g o u t o u r i n t e n t i o n s f o r
1943.
(b) A communique s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d f o r i s s u e t o t h e P r e s s
when t h e c o n f e r e n c e i s f i n i s h e d . .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s u g g e s t e d t h a t a s m a l l subcommittee s h o u l d be
a p p o i n t e d t o d r a f t a s u i t a b l e document f o r a p p r o v a l b y t h e Conunittee a t
t h e end of t h e c o n f e r e n c e .
THE COMMITTEE 2
Agreed:
To a p p o i n t a s u b c o m m i t t e e f o r t h i s p u r p o s e c o n s i s t i n g o f :
United S t a t e s Representatives:
B r i g a d i e r General Hull
C o l o n e l Smart
Commander L i b b y
B r i t i s h Representatives :
L t . G e n e r a l Ismay
Major G e n e r a l Kennedy
A i r Vice Marshal S l e s s o r
252
17 S SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
ANNEX TO MINUTES 6 1 S T MEETING
R E V I S E D PROGRAM OF MEETINGS
TUESDAY, 1 9 t h :
Liscussion o f f u t u r e procedure.
S y s t e m o f command i n F r e n c h Nest A f r i c a .
T u r k e y and A y i s o i l .
WEDNESDAY, 2 0 t h :
O r g a n i z a t i o n of command and a l l o c a t i o n of s p h e r e s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
A s s i s t a n c e t o R u s s i a i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r commitments.
HUSKY
B o m b e r O f f e n s i v e from N o r t h A f r i c a .
THIJH.&IAY, 2 1 s t :
U Boat R a r ~
Landing C r a f t .
FRIDAY, 22nd:
somber O f f e n s i v e from U . K
BOLERO B u i l d - u p
1913 L i m i t e d O p e r a t i o n s from U .
K.
SATURDAY, 2 3 r d :
ANAKIM.
SOUTHWE3T P A C I F I C .
253
U. S. SECRET
C.C.S.
82nd Meeting

on Tuesday, J a n u a r y 1 9 , 1943, a t 1600.
PRESENT
G e n e r a l G. C . M a r s h a l l , USA
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Pound
A i r Chief Marshal Sir C h a r l e s
F. A . P o r t a l
THE FOLLOWING WERE AISO PRESENT
L t . General B . B. Somervell, USA

Rear Admiral C . M. Cooke, Jr., USN
B r i g . General J . E. I i u l l , USA
F i e l d Marshal S i r John Dill

Mountbatten
L t - General S i r H a s t i n g s L
C o l o n e l J . E . S m a r t , USA
Major General J . N . Kennedy
Commander R. E. Libby, USN
A i r Vice Marshal , J .
Major C
R . Codman, USA
:%:%
Ismay
C. Slessor
A i r Vice Marshal F. F . I n g l i s ::
L t . Colonel C . E . R . H i r s c h
G e n e r a l Henri Giraud ++
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V. Dykes
B r i g . G e n e r a l J . R. Deane, USA
B r i g a d i e r E . I. C . Jacob
,: For Item 1
a* For I t e m 3
251
:
:
U.. S . SECRET
B R I T I S F MO.CT SECRET
1.
AXIS OIL POSITION.

(C.C.S.
158)
THE CObfBlNED CHIEFS O F STAFF had b e f o r e them a n o t e b y t h e
A s s i s t a n t C h i e f of B r i t i s h $ir S t a f f
( I n t e l l i g e n c e ) summarizing t h e l a b
e s t B r i t i s h views on t h e Axis o i l p o s i t i o n ( C . C . 3 .
158).
SIZ CIIAXLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had f u l l y r e a l i z e d the

g r e a t s t r a t e g i c a l importance of o i l t a r g e t s i n Germany, b u t f o r t a c t i c a l
r e a s o n s t h e s e were e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t o a t t a c k . The most i m p o r t a n t
t a r g e t s were t h e s y n t h e t i c o i l p l a n t s and t h e ilumanian o i l r e f i n e r i e s .
U n f o r t u n a t e l y t h e l a t t e r , from b a s e s a t p r e s e n t a v a i l a b l e , were a t extreme
range of our bombers; and he f e l t t h a t i t would b e a mistake tomake l i g h t
and s p o r a d i c a t t a c k s on P l o e s t i , which would d o l i t t l e harm and o n l y
r e s u l t i n an i n c r e a s e of the German a i r d e f e n s e s . I t would b e b e t t e r t o
w a i t u n t i l w e had t h e T u r k i s h a i r bases b e f o r e s t a r t i n g our a t t a c k s . The
s y n t h e t i c o i l p l a n t s were i n t h e Ruhr and e l s e w h e r e , b u t t h e y were v e r y
small t a r g e t s which needed p r e c i s i o n bombing t o p u t o u t o f a c t i o n . Recent

d e v e l o p m e n t s i n r a d i o n a v i g a t i o n i n c r e a s e d t h e c h a n c e s of s u c c e s s on
t h e s e t a r g e t s , and g r e a t hopes were p l a c e d on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of d a y l i . g h t
p r e c i s i o n bombing by t h e U . S. Air F o r c e s . When a s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e had
b e e n b u i l t u p i n a few m o n t h s '
t i m e , i t m i g h t b e p o s s i b l e t o resume
a t t a c k s on t h e s e t a r g e t s more e f f e c t i v e l y , p r o v i d e d of c o u r s e t h a t t h i s
c o u l d be a c h i e v e d w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c e t o t h e li-boat
warfare.
GENERAL ARNOLD p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e P l o e s t i f i e l d s - - w h i c h
r o u g h l y e q u i d i s t a n t from S i c i l y , Benghazi, C d i r o , andAleppo--were
range o f t h e 6-24 w i t h a l o a d o f 4,000 pounds of bombs
OT
were
within
under.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t one o f t h e c h i e f d i f f i c u l t i e s
was g e t t i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y m e t e o r o l o g i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , without which l o n g - .

d i s t a n c e a t t a c k s of t h i s n a t u r e were u n l i k e l y t o b e s u c c e s s f u l . I t w a s
becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n from s e c r e t r a d i o
s t a t i o n s i n t h e Balkans owing t o t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Gestapo.
A I R V I C E MARSHAL INGLIS c o n f i r m e d t h a t i n t h e B r i t i s h v i e w t h e
Rumanian o i l s u p p l i e s were v i t a l t o Germany. Her s t o c k s were so low t h a t

s h e depended on Rumanian o i l f o r about t h i r t y - t h r e e p e r c e n t o f h e r t o t a l
need.
GENERAL SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t t h e l a t e s t American estimate was l e s s

255
11. S.
SECR5T
Y P I T I S Y YOST SECilET
o p t i m i s t i c about t h e s h o r t a g e of o i l i n \Germany t h a n the B r i t i s h . I t was
b e l i e v e d t h a t Germany would have a s u r p l u s o f ahoirt 40,000,000 b a r r e l s
a t t h e e n d o f 1943 i n s t e a d of t h e 1 0 , 0 0 0 , O U O b a r r e l s which s h e had a t
t h e end o f 1 9 1 2 , owing t o t h e opening up o f new s o u r c e s i n Ilungary and
e l s e w h e r e . I t was, t h e r e f o r e , c a l c u l a t e d t h a t even i f t h e whole of the
Rumanian p r o d u c t i o n were knocked o u t e a r l y i n t h e y e a r , s h e would s t i l l
h a v e e n o u g h f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n 1 9 1 4 . T h e r e w e r e two t e t r a e t h y l l e a d
f a c t o r i e s h o w e v e r , t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f w h i c h would h a m s t r i n g l i e nro
d u c t i o n of German a v i a t i o n f u e l .
SIR CHARLES WRTAL s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h i s l a t e s t 4merican information
s h o u l d be i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n t o t h e B r i t i s h i n t e l l i g e n c e S t a f f s w i t h a
view t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n of a n agreeii e s t i m a t e .
GENERAL MARSHALL e m p h a s i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of making g r e a t
e f f o r t s a g a i n s t German o i l if we c o u l d b e s u r e t h a t i t formed a r e a l l y
c r i t i c a l t a r g e t . U . S. a i r c r a f t i n t h e S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c were bombing
t a r g e t s a t a g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e from t h e i r b a s e t h a n Humania from t h e
p r e s e n t b a s e s a v a i l a b l e . We might have t o w a i t a l o n g time b e f o r e t h e
T u r k i s h b a s e s c o u l d be u s e d .
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t we must b e s u r e our bombing would

b e r e a l l y e f f e c t i v e . The v a l u e of a t t a c k s on German o i l had t o be balanced
a g a i n s t t h e needs of HUSKY, f o r which we s h o u l d t r y t o c a u s e t h e maxi
m u m l o s s t o the German air f o r c e s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n d u r i n g the coming
months
Only b y t h i s means c o u l d we hope t o o b t a i n t h e n e c e s s a r y a i r
s u p e r i o r i t y on which depended t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n
A f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n ,
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Took n o t e t h a t t h e Axis o i l s i t u a t i o n i s s o r e s t r i c t e d t h a t

i t i s d e c i d e d l y a d v a n t a g e o u s t h a t bombing a t t a c k s on t h e
s o u r c e s of A x i s oil--namely, t h e Rumanian o i l f i e l d s and o i l
t r a f f i c v i a t h e Danube, and t h e s y n t h e t i c and p r o d u c e r g a s
p l a n t s i n Germany--be u n d e r t a k e n as soon as o t h e r commit
ments a l l o w .
(b) D i r e c t e d t h e Combined I n t e l l i g e n c e Committee t o s u b m i t a s
e a r l y a s p o s s i b l e a n a g r e e d a s s e s s m e n t of
2 56
the A x i s o i l
U. S. S E C R E T
J R I T I S Y MOST SECIIET
s i t u a t i o n based on t h e l a t e s t i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e from b o t h
B r i t i s h and U . S. s o u r c e s .
2.
ALLIED PLANS REIATING TO TURKEY.

( C . C . S . 157)
157, SIR ALAN BROOICE s a i d t h a t , t h e p l a n s
I n d i s c u s s i n g C.C.S.
f o r i n d u c i n g Turkey t o e n t e r t h e w a r on t h e s i d e of t h e United Nations

were l a r g e l y p o l i t i c a l and t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s were d e s i g n e d t o
further the p o l i t i c a l negotiations.
He s a i d t h a t Turkey i s i n need of s p e c i a l i z e d equipment and t h a t
i t would be p r e f e r a b l e t o f u r n i s h o p e r a t i n g u n i t s r a t h e r than the equip
ment a l o n e . The Turkish people are not, p a r t i c u l a r l y a d e p t i n h a n d l i n g m c h
a n i z e d e q u i p m e n t , b u t t h e y seem t o have a s t r o n g i\i!sjre t o a t t e m p t
i t . A s a r e s u l t , we s h a l l p r o b a b l y have t o f u r n i s h t,he equipment w i t h

c e r t a i n personnel t o t r a i n Turkish t r o o p s i n i t s u s e .
S J R ALAN BROOKE t h e n p r e s e n t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n
which he recommended be approved by t h e Combined C h i e f s of Staff..
"The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f r e c o g n i z e t h a t Turkey l i e s w i t h i n
a t h e a t e r o f B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and t h a t a l l matt,ers con
n e c t e d w i t h Turkey should be handled by t h e E r i t i s h i n t h e s a m e
way t h a t a l l matters c o n n e c t e d w i t h China a r e h a n d l e d by t h e
United S t a t e s of America.
" I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e B r i t i s h should be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r framing and
p r e s e n t i n g t o b o t h Assignment Boards a l l b i d s f o r equipment f o r

Turkey. The onward d e s p a t c h t o Turkey from t h e Middle E a s t of
s u c h e q u i p m e n t w i l l b e a f u n c t i o n of command of t h e B r i t i s h
Commanders-in-Chief
i n t h e Middle E a s t . They w i l l n o t d i v e r t
much e q u i p m e n t t o o t h e r u s e s e x c e p t f o r u r g e n t o p e r a t i o n a l
r e a s o n s , and w i l l r e p o r t s u c h d i v e r s i o n s t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
%{unit
i o n s Assignment Board."
GENERAL SOMERVELL s t a t e d t h a t j u s t p r i o r t o h i s d e p a r t u r e from
Washington, an agreement had been reached between t h e S t a t e Department

and t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t S t a f f M i s s i o n as t o methods by which m u n i t i o n s
s h o u l d be s u p p l i e d t o Turkey.
257
ll. S . SECRET
BRITISH 'IOST SGCRET
S I R ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h i s agreement was n o t a c c e p t a b l e i n
London. He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t any agreements p r e v i o u s l y made were super
s e d e d by t h e a g r e e m e n t a r r i v e d a t on J a n u a r y 1 8 t h b e t w e e n t h e Prime
M i n i s t e r and t h e P r e s i d e n t which p r o v i d e d t h a t a l l m a t t e r s connected
w i t h Turkey s h o u l d be handled by t h e B r i t i s h i n t h e same way t h a t a l l
m a t t e r s connected w i t h China a r e handled by t h e United S t a t e s .
GENERAL MARSHALL S t a t e d t h a t he d e s i r e d more time t o s t u d y the

r e s o l u t i o n r e f e r r e d t o above and r e q u e s t e d t h a t a c t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o
i t be postponed u n t i l t h e meeting of J a n u a r y 2 0 t h . He s a i d t h a t t h e r e
was some c o n f u s i o n i n h i s mind as t o j u s t what was i n t e n d e d w i t h regard
t o Turkey. The P r e s i d e n t had s a i d t h a t he had hoped t o a r r a n g e f o r Tur
k e y ' s p e r m i s s i o n f o r t h e passage of munitions en r o u t e t o Russia through
T u r k i s h t e r r i t o r y . C.C.S.
157 i n d i c a t e s t h a t c e r t a i n arrangements have
a l r e a d y been made r e g a r d i n g t h e supply of munitions t o R u s s i a . I n addi

t i o n , t h e d e c i s i o n has been reached t o make c e r t a i n t r o o p c o n c e n t r a t i o n s
a v a i l a b l e t o a s s i s t Turkey i n t h e e v e n t t h a t s h e e n t e r s i n t o t h e war on
t h e s i d e of t h e United N a t i o n s . I f e asked S i r Alan Rrooke what h e consid
e r e d t h e p r o b a b i l i t i e s w i t h regard t o Turkey would b e .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e E r i t i s h had an agreement t o assist
Turkey i f s h e were a t t a c k e d . The agreement i n c l u d e s f u r n i s h i n g Turkey
26 squadrons of p u r s u i t a v i a t i o n . I n o r d e r t h a t t h e s e squadrons might be
a b l e t o o p e r a t e q u i c k l y , c e r t a i n n e c e s s a r y equipment had a l r e a d y been

s e n t t h e r e . T h i s had been a d e f e n s i v e a g r e e m e n t , b u t t h e i n t e n t i o n i s
now t o o p e r a t e an o f f e n s i v e from T u r k e y . The p r e s e n t p l a n is t h a t Turkey
s h o u l d merely h o l d t h e Axis f o r c e s beyond her f r o n t i e r and t h u s s e c u r e
a i r b a s e s from which t h e United Nations c o u l d o p e r a t e a g a i n s t Rumania.
He s a i d i t was hoped t h a t w e c o u l d induce Turkey t o come i n t o
t h e war. T h i s might be a c c o m p l i s h e d b y p o l i t i c a l moves. C e r t a i n t e r r i t o r
i a l p r o m i s e s m i g h t b e made t o Turkey a t t h i s t i m e . F o r example, t h e y

m i g h t be promised t h e "Duck's B i l l " i n S y r i a , c o n t r o l of t h e Dodecanese,
c e r t a i n p a r t s of B u l g a r i a , and assurance t h a t her communications i n t h e
Bosphorus w i l l be unhampered. The more a p p a r e n t a v i c t o r y by t h e United
K a t i o n s becomes, t h e more w i l l Turkey d e s i r e t o have a p l a c e a t t h e
p e a c e t a b l e . T h i s might be s u f f i c i e n t inducement f o r h e r t o j o i n t h e
United Nations. I n any e v e n t , our e f f o r t s w i t h r e g a r d t o Turkey w i l l not
be v e r y c o s t l y , b u t t h e y may p r o v i d e a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a p p r e c i a b l e g a i n s .
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GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t he had no d o u b t about t h e v a l u e of

b r i n g i n g Turkey i n t o t h e war. H e thought t h a t i f she could be induced t o
j o i n u s a t t h e r i g h t moment, t h e r e s u l t s might p l a y a d e t e r m i n i n g p a r t
i n t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e war. He a s k e d S i r Alan Brooke what he thought
Turkey's r e a c t i o n might be if w e e f f e c t e d a l a r g e c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t h e
r e a r of h e r b o r d e r s .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d i t would s t r e n g t h e n t h e United Nations i n
t h e e y e s ofTurkey and g i v e t a n g i b l e evidence t h a t w e a r e ready t o assist
h e r . H e s a i d t h a t t h e c a p t u r e of t h e Dodecanese by t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s
would g i v e Turkey a f e e l i n g of c o n f i d e n r e i n t h e i r power b u t t h a t t h e s e

i s l a n d s c o u l d be much more e a s i l y c a p t u r e d by an o p e r a t i o n from Turkey,
once s h e had j o i n e d i n w i t h
US.
He added t h a t t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y
of d o i n g o p e r a t i o n HUSKY and c a p t u r i n g t h e Dodecanese s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .

SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t h o l d i n g t h e Dodecanese would f a c i l
i t a t e o p e r a t i o n s i n Turkey by i n s u r i n g t h e use o f t h e p o r t of Smyrna.
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Agreed t o c o n s i d e r t h e proposed r e s o l u t i o n on Turkey, quoted
above, a t t h e meeting on January 2 0 t h .
(b) Took n o t e of t h e paper under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
3.
MEETING WITH GENERAL GIRAUD.

GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f were
much honored by t h e p r e s e n c e o f G e n e r a l G i r a u d and were v e r y p l e a s e d

t h a t i t had been p o s s i b l e t o a r r a n g e t h e meeting. H e hoped t h a t General
Giraud would e x p r e s s h i s views, and i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t he would i n d i c a t e

t h e p r e s e n t s t a t u s of t h e French f o r c e s and t h e r a p i d i t y w i t h which they
c o u l d be b u i l t up.
GENERAL GIRAUD s a i d t h a t he was proud a t b e i n g a b l e t o p a r t i c i

p a t e i n t h e work of t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f
The F r e n c h army had
now r e e n t e r e d t h e war and had n o t o n l y t h e w i l l t o f i g h t b u t a l s o t h e

e x p e r i e n c e and knowledge.
A s a n e x a m p l e , he m i g h t m e n t i o n a message
which he had t h a t morning r e c e i v e d on t h e t e l e p h o n e from h i s Chief of

S t a f f ; t h i s w a s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e Germans had y e s t e r d a y a t t a c k e d
t h e j u n c t i o n of t h e B r i t i s h and French armies between Xedjes e l Dab and
P o n t du Fahs w i t h 80 t a n k s s u p p o r t e d by i n f a n t r y . On t h e B r i t i s h f r o n t
t h e a t t a c k had c o m p l e t e l y broken down and 10 t a n k s had been knocked o u t .
259
SECRET
S.
On t h e French f r o n t a n a t t a c k by 50 t a n k s had been made a g a i n s t a b a t t a l

i o n l o c a l i t y . The b a t t a l i o n had h e l d i t s ground a l l day, and i t was not
u n t i l t h e evening t h a t c e r t a i n advanced p o s t s were e v a c u a t e d by o r d e r of
t h e b a t t a l i o n commander. He had n o t had any f u r t h e r news b u t he under
s t o o d t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n was i n hand
t h e French t r o o p s
The a c t i o n showed t h e q u a l i t y of
They had n o t been a b l e t o knock o u t a n y t a n k s as they
had no a n t i t a n k g u n s . They h a d , however, p r e v e n t e d t h e German i n f a n t r y

from s u p p o r t i n g t h e i r t a n k s and had h e l d t h e i r ground.. S i m i l a r examples
had o c c u r r e d on t h e whole f r o n t d u r i n g t h e l a s t two months: Such t r o o p s
were worthy of modern a r m s
On t h e e x i s t i n g c a d r e s , t h e French army c o u l d form t h r e e armored
d i v i s i o n s and t e n m o b i l e i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s
I t would a l s o b e p o s s i b l e
t o r a i s e the following a i r forcest

50 f i g h t e r squadrons w i t h 500 a i r c r a f t
30 l i g h t bomber squadrons w i t h 300 a i r c r a f t , ,
200 t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t
Such a f o r c e w a s an i n d i s p e n s a b l e accompaniment f o r a modern army
French p i l o t s had a l r e a d y g i v e n proof of what t h e y c o u l d do
The
One squad.
r o n o f t h e Croupe L a f a y e t t e , armed w i t h 12 P ~ . 4 0a i r c r a f t , had been f i g h t

i n g f o r t h e l a s t s i x d a y s ; t h e y had s h o t down f i v e enemy a i r c r a f t f o r
t h e l o s s of o n e . He w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious t o r e c e i v e : f i r s t , f i g h t e r
a i r c r a f t i n t h e s u p p l y of which he hoped t h e B r i t i s h would p a r t i c i p a t e ,

a n d , s u b s e q u e n t l y , l i g h t bombers s o t h a t he c o u l d e q u i p t h e p i l o t s o f
whose q u a l i t y he had i n t i m a t e knowledge and who would q u i c k l y master the
new equipment. H e r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e r e were c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s due
t o t h e s h o r t a g e of s h i p p i n g and t h e needs o f t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s
Some o f
t h e a i r c r a f t , however, c o u l d f l y from America, and p o s s i b l y the f i g h t e r s

m i g h t be flown i n from a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s . , He f e l t c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e
French army c o u l d make a g r e a t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e European campaign i f
i t were p r o p e y l y e q u i p p e d , He e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e r a m p a i g n i n N o r t h A f r i c a
would be over i n two monthss t i m e , and i n t h i s campaign he i n c l u d e d t h e
c a p t u r e of S i c i l y , S a r d i n i a and C o r s i c a , which h e r e g a r d e d as forming a
d i r e c t p r o l o n g a t i o n of A f r i c a and a s b a s e s f o r f u r t h e r a c t i o n
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t he was v e r y g l a d t o have h e a r d '>en

e r a 1 G i r a u d i s views. S p e a k i n g o n b e h a l f o f t h e U . S . Army, a i r and ground.
h e e x p l a i n e d t h a t he was g o i n g i n t o t h e d e t a i l s o f how q u i c k l y modern
260
U. S. SECRET
equipment c o u l d be p r o v i d e d f o r t h e French Army. He k n e w t h a t t h e s h i p
ping q u e s t i o n was under d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n byAdmiral King and I'rench
Naval o f f i c e r s . !;enera1 S o n i e r v e l l , t h e Head of t h e S e r v i c e s of' Supply,
had a l r e a d y c a l l e d on G e n e r a l " r r a u d t o d i s c u s s t h e s e matters and ha11
r e p o r t e d t h e r e o n t o h i m . The q u e s t i o n of p r i o r i t y of d e l i v e r y of i t e m s
and t h e method t o be adopted i n e q u i p p i n g French [ J n i t s would be taken up
w i t h .General G i r a u d . G e n e r a l A r n o l d had been c o n f e r r i n g w i t h F r e n c h
o f f i c e r s t o s e e what c o u l d b e done t o p r o v i d e a i r equipment. I t was i n

t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e U . S . A ,
t o b r i n g t h e French f o r c e s t o a h i g h s t a t e
of e f f i c i e n c y , and e v e r y t h i n g p o s s i b l e would b e done t o o b v i a t e t h e d i f ~ .

f i c u l t i e s of d i s t a n c e . I t was n o t a q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t o e q u i p the
French Army, b u t r a t h e r o f how t o c a r r y i t o u t . A v a i l a b i l i t y of equipment
was n o t t h e l i m i t i n g f a c t o r , b u t t r a n s p o r t
SIR ALAN BROOKE e x p r e s s e d , on b e h a l f of the ! ; r i t , i s t r Chiefs o f
S t a f f , g r e a t p l e a s u r e a t t h e r e p o r t which S e n e r a 1 G i r a u d had g i v e n o f
t h e s t a t e of t h e F r e n c h Army. !Vith t h e more l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s a t t h e
d i s p o s a l of t h e B r i t i s h , t h e y would d o w h a t t h e y c o u l d t o h e l p i n pro
v i d i n g modern equipment. We f u l l y r e a l i z e d t h e i m p o r t a n t p a r t which t h e
French f o r c e s would p l a y i n b r i n g i n g t h e war t o a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t s were w e l l i n hand f o r t h e

r e h a b i l i t a t i o n i n r o t a t i o n of t h e French w a r s h i p s . R e s o u r c e s would n o t
p e r m i t of them b e i n g d e a l t w i t h a l l a t o n c e - He welcomed t h e o f f i c e r s
and men of t h e F r e n c h Navy who were now j o i n i n g i n t h e s t r u g g l e f o r
victory.
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t t h e n a v i e s of t h e A l l i e s were now
f i g h t i n g i n e v e r y o c e a n o f t h e world and t h e U-boats were e x t e n d i n g t h e i r
a c t i v i t i e s f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r a f i e l d . . The combined B r i t i s h and American
n a v a l f o r c e s were less t h a n w e s h o u l d l i k e t o have t o meet t h i s menace.
and t h e h e l p of t h e French n a v a l f o r c e s would be most welcome From h i s
e x p e r i e n c e a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e war, h e knew t h e v a l u e of F r e n c h
n a v a l a s s i s t a n c e , and he knew a l s o t h a t t h i s h e l p would b e of t h e s a m e
q u a l i t y now as t h e n
SIR CHARLES POHTAL s a i d t h a t he had t h e c l e a r e s t r e c o l l e c t i o n

from two wars of t h e s k i l l and h i g h performance o f t h e French a i r f o r c e s
He, t h e r e f o r e , hoped t h a t t h e y c o u l d be equipped a s soon a s p o s s i b l e t o
261
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S K YOST SECRET
f i g h t once more a l o n g s i d e t h e A l l i e s . W i t h i n t h e l i m i t of B r i t i s h r e
s o u r c e s , which were c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r a i n e d , e v e r y t h i n g would b e done t o
h a s t e n t h e day of t h i s c o l l a b o r a t i o n .
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t he had b e e n t r y i n g f o r some time t o
f i n d t h e most e f f e c t i v e u s e f o r the F r e n c h p i l o t s , who had proved t h e i r
a b i l i t y t o t a k e over and o p e r a t e s k i l l f u l l y American equipment. !le hoped
that this s t u d y would soon he completed.

SIR J O H N D I L L s a i d t.mt 'he f e l t i n s p i r e d by t h e p r e s e n c e of
G e n e r a l G i r a u d , knowing as he d i d .how muck! G e n e r a l Giraud had s u f f e r e d
f o r F r a n c e . I t was a m a t t e r o I ' ;;re;rt p l e a s u r e , t h e r e f o r e , t o have the

; e n e r a 1 back t o l e a d France t o v i v t o r y .
GENERAL GIRAUO s a i d t i r a t i n t h e e a r l y d a y s of t h e war he had
w ~ r k e di n the c l o s e s t touch w i t h t h e B r i t i s h A r m y . The c o o p e r a t i o n be

tween a l l arms a t t h a t t i m e , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y between t h e 1 s t French
A r m y and t h e Second Corps, of v h i c h S i r John D i l l was t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e d
Commander, h a d showed how c l o s e s u c h c o n t a c t c o u l d b e . how once more

c o o p e r a t i o n had been resumed. I n September l!Y%O, when he was i n a German
p r i s o n camp, he had t o l d t h e German g e n e r a l s that t h e y had l o s t t h e war.
? h e i r a t t e m p t t o i n v a d e Great 3 r i t a i n had f a i l e d , and though he c o u l d
:rot p r o p h e s y how long the war would l a s t , Germany c o u l d never win. Sooner
or ii.Ler t h e 'J. S. would come t o t h e h e l p of G r e a t R r i t a i n . The Germans
nail asked him t o s i g n a papor t o s a y t h a t he would n o t e s c a p e d u r i n g the
p e r i o d of* t,wo h o u r s e a c h d a y when the French g e n e r a l s were a l l o w e d o u t

s i d e . He had s a i d t h a t he r e f u s e d t o s i g n any paper i n German. They had
a s k e d him whether he w a s p l a n n i n g t o e s c a p e as he had done i n 1915. He
had s a i d , "Never mind what I am t h i n k i n g . You a r e my j a i l e r s , I am your
prisoner.
I t i s your d u t y t o g u a r d me; i t i s my d u t y t o e s c a p e . L e t us
s e e who c a n c a r r y o u t h i s d u t y b e s t . I t took a y e a r t o g e t away? b u t now
I am h e r e amongst you once more."

The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f e x p r e s s e d w i t h a p p l a u s e t h e i r w a r m
a p p r o v a l of t h e s t a t e m e n t made by General Giraud who t h e n withdrew from
t h e rneetiiig.
2 62
U.
SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
S.
C.C.S.
6 3 r d Meeting
CODWINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES of M e e t i n g h e l d a t Anfa Camp

on Wednesday, J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1943, a t 1000.
PRESENT
General G.
Pound
L t . G e n e r a l H. H. Arnold,USA
F. A. P o r t a l

Lord L e a t h e r s (For Item 1)
L t . G e n e r a l B. B . S o m e r v e l l , USA
Rear Admiral C . M. Cooke, J r . , U S d
F i e l d Marshal S i r J o h n Dill
Brig. G e n e r a l J . E. H u l l , USA
B r i g . General A. C . Wedemeyer, USA
Mountbatten
C o l o n e l J . E. S m a r t , USA
L t . G e n e r a l S i r H a s t i n g s L . Ismay
Commander R . E . L i b b y , USN
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V . Dykes
Brig. G e n e r a l J. R . Deane, USA
B r i g a d i e r E . I. C . J a c o b
L t . C o l o n e l L. T . Grove, USA
263
U. S. SECRET
1.
U.
S. A I D TO XUSSIA.
(C.C.S.
162)
GENERAL MARSHALL r e q u e s t e d Lord L e a t h e r s t o g i v e h i s comments on

C.C.S.
162.
LORD LEATHERS s t a t e d t h a t t h e b u l k o f t h e m u n i t i o n s s e n t t o
S u s s i a under t h e P r o t o c o l a r e f r o m t h e United S t a t e s . ?Ie s a i d t h a t C.C.S.
162 does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a p a p e r w i t h which he i s i n f u l l agreement a s is
i n d i c a t e d i n i t s heading. He cannot b e c e r t a i n o f t h e b a s i c f i g u r e s pre

s e n t e d because he does n o t know t h e b a c k l o g of m u n i t i o n s t o i l u s s i a t h a t
a r e now i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . He d i d , however, concur i n .;enera1 Somer
v e l l ' s c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e p a p e r .
LORD LEATHEXS s t a t e d t h a t a n a g r e e m e n t h a d b e e n a r r i v e d a t
between t h e United S t a t e s and B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s i n Washington, includ
i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f b o t h Navies, t h a t all c a l c u l a t i o n s f o r t h e a l l o c a
t i o n of s h i p p i n g i n 1 9 4 3 s h o u l d be b a s e d o n a l o s s r a t e of 1.9%p e r month,
whereas General Somervell used a r a t e of Z . f $ % i n h i s p r e p a r a t i o n o f C . C . S .
162. He s a i d t h a t if t h e 1 . 9 %f i g u r e works o u t c o r r e c t l y , more shipping
w i l l be a v a i l a b l e t h a n i s i n d i c a t e d i n t h i s p a p e r .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d he had no knowledge of s u c h an agreement and

thought t h a t 1.9% w a s o p t i m i s t i c . T h i s was t h e f i g u r e f o r December 1942
which was p a r t i c u l a r l y f a v o r a b l e .
GENERAL SOMERVELL agreed t h a t i f w e a r e a b l e t o reduce t h e l o s s e s

i n s h i p p i n g from 2.6%t o 2 % p e r mouth, a n a d d i t i o n a l t r o o p l i f t of 500,000
men t o England would be p o s s i b l e i n 1943. If i t were f u r t h e r reduced t o
1 . 3 $ , an a d d i t i o n a l 50,000 c o u l d be l i f t e d .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t i f we a c c e p t G e n e r s l S o m e r v e l l ' s l o s s

r a t e , t h e q u e s t i o n as t o what can be s e n t t o a u s s i a must b e reexamined.
I t must also be d e t e r m i n e d whether we s h o u l d u n d e r t a k e s u c h a program

c o n s i d e r i n g i t s e f f e c t s on t r o o p l i f t .
GENERAL SOMERVELL added t h a t he r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be
an improvement i n t h e l o s s r a t e i n 1943 over t h a t which was s u s t a i n e d i n
1942 because of t h e more e f f e c t i v e anti-submarine measures which a r e con
t e m p l a t e d . tie f e l t i t safer, however, t o p l a n on t h e c o n t i n u a n c e of t h e

1942 r a t e u n t i l i t c o u l d b e e f f e c t i v e l y d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h e l o s s e s
264
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H XOST SECRET
would d e c r e a s e . , Xe s a i d t h a t it, was r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n t,hat tile l o s s r a t e
would d r o p as low as2.4% p e r month.. I n t h i s c a s e , a l l of t h e coirmitmerrts
under t h e ::ussian P r o t o c o l c o u l d b e f u l f i l l e d . If' the r a t e improves i
an a d d i t i o n a l t r o o p l i f t f o r BOLE110 w i l l become a v a i i i d l e .
2.4$,
1.0i:D
LE.kT'HEIIS s t a t e d that. i t i s p a r t i c n l a r l y i ~ a p o r t , a ~t.0

~ t ,+,stah
l i s h an a g r e e d esti.mated l o s s r a t e f o r p l a n n i n g p u r p o s e s .
s u r e t h a t a l l t h o s e concerned w i . t i i s l l i p p i n g proht~w:.s w
;.I
!!,is w i i l in..
I b.! .,,,i.aki:~~!,6
t h i n k i n e i n t h e same t,;?rms when p l a n n i n g t r o o p o r c a r g o nioi
x 1
,~,mt:itts.
SIX DUDLEY POTiXI) s a i d that, t l ~ ef i g u r e s i n the p a p c r a p p a r p n t l q

a r e b a s e d on t h e assumpt,ion t h a t t h e n o r t h e r n routr! t o .::issia a i l 1 b e
opeii throughout t,he y e a r . !:e s t a t e d t h a t t h i s w i l l n o t be t h e c a s e , p a r
that
t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d of O p e r a t i o n IIUSKY.. I!e fiirLher, t.~~oi~;;ht
t h e p a p e r s h o u l d i n c l u d e some st.ut,eaicnt i n d i c a t i n g trit,?,
::ussia
rniiuni t.;nents
t,o
w i l l o n l y be f u l f i l l e d p i - o u j ~ d f d tliey w i l l n o t e n t a i ~ l$ ) r o h i b i t
losses i n shipping.
GENERAL SOMEZVELL s a i d t h a t s t o p p i n g t,he northcrrr convoys
dtipipg
t h e p e r i o d o f O p e r a t i o n Il~S!iI' woiild eliiniiiat,e 54 s a i l i n g s f o r which t h e

c a p a c i t y was a v a i l a b l e on t h e P e r s i a n r o u t e . I n r e p l y t,o a quest,io!i h:y
i Z r l m i r a l King as t o why tile siiipinents t o t h e P e r s i a n ;ul.f
June
dropped o f f .ill
G e n e r a l Sotnerve11 s a i d t h a t t h e commithents t o dussia would llot
r e q u i r e t h e t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f a l l r o u t e s and t i n t , t i t o r e f o r e , a reduced
r a t , e had hceii a p p l i e d t.o t h e P e r s i a n r o u t e which had t h e l o n g e s t t u r r i
a r o u n d - T h i s w i l l p r o v i d e a s a f e t y m a r K i r i t o t a k e c a r e of c o n t i n g e n c i e s
s u c h as s t o p p i n g t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t e d u r i n g Operat,ion HUSKY.
LOXD LEATHERS p o i n t e d o u t t h a t C . . C . S , 162 a p p l i e s o n l y t o a i d
from t h e I l n i t e d S t a t e s
Xe s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h c a n o v e r t a k e t , h e i r back
l o g of d e l i v e r i e s a b o u t t h e end o f J u n e ; a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l number of
B r i t i s h shipments i s involved
Assuming a convoy e v e r y 27 d a y s , t h e r e
w i l l b e 11 or 12 s h i p s i n e a c h , whereas if t h e y were t o b e r u n e v e r y 43
d a y s , e a c h convoy must i n c l u d e 15 B r i t i s h s h i p s .
GENERAL SOMERVELL proposed an amendment t o c l a r i f y p a r a g r a p h 14
of C . C . S .
162,;: He t h e n a s k e d f o r a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e con-.
c l u s i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n P a r a g r a p h 15 o f t h e p a p e r
:: C o r r e c t e d v e r s i o n c i r c u l a t e d as C . C , S , 162/1
255
U. S. SECRET
LORD LEATHERS s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e t h e p h r a s e
" a s s i g n e d t o U n i t e d S t a t e s t r o o p movements" be changed t o " a s s i g n e d t o
combined t r o o p movements."
SIR CHLTLES PORTAL a s k e d if i t would b e p o s s i b l e t o frame our
commitment t o R u s s i a so as t o make i t c l e a r t h a t some c u r t a i l m e n t i n the
d e l i v e r y o f m u n i t i o n s might b e r e q u i r e d because o f o p e r a t i o n a l n e c e s s i t i e s .
He f e l t t h a t thecombined C h i e f s o f s t a f f were t a k i n g a b i g s t e p i n making
a f i r m commitment r e g a r d i n g t h e d e l i v e r y of m u n i t i o n s t o R u s s i a a t the
expense of a l l o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s .
LOIU) LEATHERS s t a t e d t h a t we have r e 4 e r v e d t h e r i g h t i n t h e p a s t
t o c u r t a i l shipments of munitions t o X u s s i a b u t t h a t R u s s i a d i d n o t l i k e
t o have such r e s e r v a t i o n s made andalways o b j e c t e d when a n a c t u a l c u r t a i l
ment became n e c e s s a r y . A n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s was t h a t t h e y agreed
t h a t t h e n o r t h e r n convoys b e d i s r o n t i n u e d d u r i n g O p e r a t i o n TORCH.
GENERAL SOMERVELL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e c u r r e n t P r o t o c o l which
e x p i r e s i n ,June of 1943 does i n c l u d e such a r e s o l u t i o n . T h e new P r o t o c o l
w i l l be framed b y t h e S t a t e Department a n d t h e F o r e i g n O f f i c e , b u t a c t u a l l y
triere w i l l be ample o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f t o r e

view i t b e f o r e the n e g o t i a t i o n s between governments a r e i n i t i a t e d . I t
w i l l thus be p o s s i b l e t o i n s u r e t h a t a s a f e t y c l a u s e i s included i n the
b a s i c document.
THE COkBfITTEE:
(a) Agreed t h a t a l o s s r a t e of n o t more t h a n 2 . 4 % p e r month

c o u l d be r e l i e d on w i t h s u f f i c i e n t c e r t a i n t y t o w a r r a n t t h e
Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f g i v i n g t h e i r a p p r o v a l t o t h e t o t a l
s h i p p i n g commitments s e t f o r t h i n P a r a g r a p h 6 , T a b l e I1 of
C.C.9
152. s u b j e c t t o t h e p r o v i s o t h a t s u p p l i e s t o R u s s i a
s h a l l n o t be c o n t i n u e d a t p r o h i b i t i v e c o s t t o t h e United
Nations' e f f o r t .
(b) Took n o t e t h a t t h e P e r s i a n Gulf r o u t e c o u l d make good t h e
l o s s of 64 North R u s s i a n s a i l i n g s i f t h e s e had t o be e l i m i
n a t e d i n t h e l a t t e r p a r t of t h e y e a r owing t o o t h e r o p e r a
tions.
U. S. S E C e E T
R q I T I S I ! WOST SECRET
( c ) Agreed t o d i r e c t t h e Combined ! . l i l i t a r y T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Com
m i t t e e t o make a n a g r e e d e s t i m a t e o f t h e r a t e of U n i t e d
Nations'
s h i p p i n g l o s s e s i n 1913 which c a n b e u s e d b y a l l
United K a t i o n s ' Agencies f o r p l a n n i n g p u r p o s e s .

(d) Agreed t o amend<: p a r a g r a p h 15 of C.C.S.
162
SO
as t o d e l e t e
t h e words "United S t a t e s " i n t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e and s u b s t i t u t e

t h e word "Combined" t h e r e f o r .
(e) Agreed t h a t , i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e n e x t P r o t o c o l w i t h
R u s s i a , a c l a u s e should be included t o the e f f e c t t h a t t h e

commitment,s i n c l u d e d i n t h e P r o t o c o l ma.y he reduced if s h i p
ping losses or the necessities of other operations render
t h e i r fulfillment prohibi t ive
-.
3
BRITISH RESPOh'SIBILITY FOR TUKKEY.

(C.C.S.
62nd X e e t i n g , Item 2 )
GENERAL MARSHALL s u g g e s t e d t h e a d d i t i o n o f t h e words " t i l r o u g h

t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f " a f t e r "Assignment, B o a r d s " i n t h e f i r s t ,
s e n t e n c e of the second p a r a g r a p h o f t h e d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n proposed b y t h e
B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f a t t h e i r p r e v i o u s meeting.
BRIGADIER JACOB e x p l a i n e d t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r t h e s u b m i s s i o n of
T u r k i s h b i d s t o t h e 'dunitions Assignments Boards i n London and Washington.
T n r k i s h r e q u i r e m e n t s were, i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , s c r u t , i n i z e d and c o o r d i
n a t e d by a Committee i n Ankara c o n t a i n i n g U .
S . , B r i t i s h and T u r k i s h
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . T h i s Committee t r a n s m i t t e d r e q u i r e m e n t s t o London. The

l~.ondon\:unitions Assignments Board p a s s e d on t o the Washington Roard b i d s
f o r a l l m a t e r i a l which c o u l d n o t b e s u p p l i e d from the U . K. The b i d s were

p r e s e n t e d b y t h e B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f t h e Washington M u n i t i o n s
$ s s i g n m e n t s Board. D i f f i c u l t y was c a u s e d , however, by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
T u r k i s h Embassy i n Washington w a s a p t t o a p p r o a c h t h e War D e p a r t m e n t
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h r e q u e s t s f o r equipment and, as a r e s u l t , d u p l i c a t i o n
t o o k p l a c e . T h e o b j e c t of t h e p r o p o s a l of t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f
was t o c a n a l i z e a l l T u r k i s h demands f o r m u n i t i o n s t h r o u g h London where
t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e s e demands were met. Turkey w a s o n l y one of a l a r g e
number of c l a i m a n t s f o r m a t e r i a l , and t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e f o l l o w e d was
t h a t a l l t h e s m a l l European n a t i o n s d e a l t w i t h t h e London Board i n t h e
f i r s t . i n s t a n c e , whereas t h e S o u t h American Republics and China d e a l t w i t h

.': C o r r e c t e d v e r s i o n c i r c u l a t e d as C.C.S.
2 67
16211.
U. S. SECRET
B R I T I S H #YOST SECRET
Washington. For example, any demands made by t h e C h i n e s e i n London were
r e f u s e d , and t h e Chinese were t o l d t o p r e s e n t them d i r e c t t o Washington.
He f e a r e d t h a t i f a l l b i d s had t o be p a s s e d through t h e Combined Chiefs
of S t a f f , t h e y would be smothered i n a mass of d e t a i l .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d h i s o n l y c o n c e r n was t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e Com

b i n e d C h i e f s of S t a f f had a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e
a c t i o n s of t h e M u n i t i o n s Assignments Boards i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h T u r k i s h
bids.
THE COMXITTEE:
(a) A
greed t h a t Turkey l i e s w i t h i n a t h e a t e r of B r i t i s h respon
s i b i l i t y , and t h a t a l l m a t t e r s c o n n e c t e d w i t h Turkey should
be h a n d l e d by t h e B r i t i s h i n the same way t h a t a l l m a t t e r s
c o n n e c t e d w i t h C h i n a a r e h a n d l e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s of
Amer i c a .
(b) Agreed t h a t , i n p a r t i c u l a r , u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l d i r e c t i o n of
t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f , t h e B r i t i s h s h o u l d b e respon
s i b l e f o r framing and p r e s e n t i n g t o b o t h Assignments Boards
a l l b i d s f o r e q u i p m e n t f o r T u r k e y . T h e onward d i s p a t c h t o
Turkey from the \ f i d d l e East of such equipment w i l l be a func
t i o n of command o f t h e B r i t i s h Commanders-in-Chief
i n the
E i d d l e E a s t . They w i l l n o t d i v e r t s u c h e q u i p m e n t t o o t h e r
u s e s e x c e p t f o r u r g e n t o p e r a t i o n a l r e a s o n s , and w i l l r e p o r t
s u c h d i v e r s i o n s t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e Munitions Assignments
Board
3.
THE BOMEiER OFFEKSIVE FROM NORTH AFRICA.

(C.C.S. 159)
The Committee had b e f o r e them a memorandum by t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s
of S t a f f s e t t i n g o u t i n order of time t h e p r o p o s e d o b j e c t i v e s f o r t h e
bomber o f f e n s i v e from North A f r i c a .
I n d i s c u s s i o n c e r t a i n amndments were s u g g e s t e d and a g r e e d .
THE COMMITTEE:
Approved t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f memorandum a s amended i n
the discussion.:?
S u b s e q u e n t l y c i r c u l a t e d as C.C.S.
2 68
1531
S. S E C R E T
YI1ITISh' MOST SECPET
c'.
4.
COMMAND I N THE hlEDITERRANEAN
(C.C.S. 163)
The Committee had b e f o r e them a mePorandm by t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s
o f S t a f f g i v i n g t h e i r recommendations f o r t h e s e t - u p o f a i r command i n
t h e \!editerranean.
S I R ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t w i t h t h e 8 t h Army a p p r o a c h i n g T u n i s i a
t h e t i m e was n e a r when i t would he n e c e s s a r y t o p l a c e i t under General

Eisenhower's command. I t was, t h e r e f o r e , proposed t h a t General Alexander
s h o u l d come i n a s Deputy Commander-in-Chief
under General Eisenhower w i t h
t h e p r i m a r y t a s k o f commanding t h e group o f armies on t h e T u n i s i a n f r o n t .

iie would b e accompanied by a s m a l l nucleus s t a f f w i t h t h e n e c e s s a r y sig
n a l s . This p r o p o s a l , if a c c e p t e d , would l e a v e General Eisenhower
in
su
preme command over:
(a) The group o f a r m i e s
on t h e T u n i s i a n f r o n t .
(b) T h e 'J. S . 5 t h Army i n 'Jorocco.
(c) French f o r c e s under General J u i n .

He would s t i l l h a v e , i n a d d i t i o n , h i s p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n
horth Africa.
T h e p o s i t i o n was s l i g h t l y c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e 8 t h
Army must s t i l l b e s u p p l i e d f r o m t h e E a s t . T h i s c o u l d , h o w e v e r , b e a r r a n g e d
and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e Middle E a s t was q u i t e adequate f o r t h e t a s k .
SIR ALAN BROOKE t h e n p o i n t e d o u t t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p l a n n i n g
HUSKY, o r whatever o p e r a t i o n i n t h e I f e d i t e r r a n e m might b e d e c i d e d upon,

must soon be f i x e d . I t would p r o b a b l y be thought t h a t General Eisenhower
was t h e a p p r o p r i a t e man t o assume t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
If t h a t were
d e c i d e d , he would have General Alexander a v a i l a b l e t o t a k e charge of t h e

n e c e s s a r y work.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t i n t e n s i v e a i r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e

E a s t e r n Wediterranean were coming t o an end, b u t t h a t many of t h e b a s e s ,
s u c h as Malta, i n t h a t a r e a as w e l l a s t h e v e r y l a r g e maintenance organ
i z a t i o n which had been e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e , would s t i l l b e a v a i l a b l e . I t
was e s s e n t i a l t h a t the a c t i o n of a l l o p e r a t i o n a l a i r f o r c e s i n t h e !'edi

t e r r a n e a n a r e a s h o u l d be c o o r d i n a t e d by one Commander.
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t c e r t a i n minor changes i n t h e proposed
o r g a n i z a t i o n would a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y b e n e c e s s a r y , b u t t h e g e n e r a l s e t
up was a c c e p t a b l e t o h i m .
2 69
S SECRET
B R I T I S H MCST S E C R E T
SIR CHARLES PORTAL a g r e e d and s a i d t h a t s u c h changes c o u l d most
e a s i l y be made by t h e A i r Commander-in-Chief
once he had been a p p o i n t e d .
ADMIRAL K I N G asked what d i v i d i n g l i n e was p r o p o s e d between the

Middle E a s t and Northwest A f r i c a n t h e a t e r s .
S I R ALAN BROOKE r e p l i e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f when

c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s m a t t e r had thought that a l i n e from t h e T u n i s i a - T r i p o l i
t a n i a f r o n t i e r t o C o r f u would be most s u i t a b l e .
SIR D U D L E Y POUND t h e n r e f e r r e d t o the q u e s t i o n o f t h e n a v a l
r o m a n d which would be n e c e s s a r y f o r HUSKY. H i s p r o p o s a l was t h a t Admiral
Cunningham s h o u l d become Commander-in-Chief,
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , and t h a t
Admiral Harir.ood s h o u l d a d o p t t h e t i t l e o f Commander-.in.-.Chief, 1 , e v a n t .
Tkie boundary might be t h e l i n e B a r d i a - % a n t i . Thus Malta would come under
Admiral Cunningham who would b e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a l l move-~
ments and m a t t e r s which a f f e c t t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n as a whole. He wonld
a l s o be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f f o r c e s between t h e blediter
r a n e a n and Levant Commands
THE COKMITTEE :
(a) A ccepted t h e p r o p o s a l s c o n t a i n e d i n C . C . S .
163, s u b j e c t t o
a n y minor changes which might b e found n e c e s s a r y by t h e Air

Commander-in-Chief
a f t e r h i s appointment ,,
(b) Took n o t e w i t h a p p r o v a l t h a t i t had been a g r e e d t h a t , a t a

time t o be determined a f t e r t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army had c r o s s e d
t h e T u n i s i a n b o r d e r , G e n e r a l Alexander s h o u l d become i)eputy
Commander--in-ChieftoGeneral Eisenhower, and t h a t t h e B r i t i s h

8 t h Army s h o u l d a t t h e same time b e t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e command
o f General hisenhower, a l t h o u g h i t would c o n t i n u e t o be based
on t h e hliddle E a s t .
(c) Agreed t h a t , s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of General Xisenhower;
G e n e r a l A l e x a n d e r ' s p r i m a r y t a s k would be t o command t h e
A l l i e d f o r c e s on t h e T u n i s i a n f r o n t w i t h a s m a l l h e a d q u a r t e r s
o f h i s own, p r o v i d e d from t h e Middle E a s t , and t h a t a f t e r
t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s he s h o u l d t a k e c h a r g e of'
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY.
270
L' S . SECRET
(d) Took n o t e of t h e p r o p o s a l s o f t h e F i r s t Sea Lord a s s e t o u t
above f o r Naval command i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n d u r i n g HUSKY!
i . e . , Western and E a s t e r n Commands under Commander-.in~
C hici'
:.!edi t e r r a n e a r ] arid Commande r - i n - C h i e f L e v a n t , r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
w i t h Commander-in-Chief ?ledit e r r a n e a n r e s p o n s i b l e f o r gener a 1
coordination.
( e ) Agreed t , h a t G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r s h o u l d be i n f o r m e d o f t h e
above d e c i s i o n s .
271
II
S . SECRET
C.C.S. C 5 t h Meeting
MINU'rJTES o f \leeti!ig Iic.111 a t Arifa Carny,

on Mednesday, January 211, 1!113. a t 1130
PRESENT
General F . C . M a r s h a l l , USA
( ~ e r i c i ' a l S i r A l a n I'. Ijrooke
Admiral E . J , King, U S N
Adiiiiva 1 ,>f t,lie I'leet, S i r Dudley

P<,urlli
L t . General H-.I i ~ Arnold, IlSA
A i r Ctriel' M a r s h a l S i r C h a r l e s
F A Por1,a.l
THE FOLLOWING WRlC AI.SO PRb:SENT
L t , . General B , R
Hear Admiral C.
S o m r r v e l l , USA
!I.
Cooke, J r
1"ield 'Mrstit~l S i r Joiin D i l l
LISN
B r i g . General J . E.. H u l l , I:SA

General A . ,-,, \?ledemeyer, I;SA
\ i c e Ailmiral
t IP
\loi!!it,l~att c i i
1,t
(;t,iicral S i r Ilast,ings L . Ismay
?fa,jor GPricraI .I
Colonel J . E , Smart, USA

Commander R . E. Libby, I:SN
J.ord Louis
A i r 17ii:v V a r s h a l J
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r IT
I:>krs
B r i g , General J . H , lleanf:, CSA
L t , C o l o n e l I,, T , Grove, I S A
272
Kerrnedy
C
Slessor
U S
SECRET
1
HUSKY.
( C . C , S , 161)
The Committee had b e f o r e them a memorandum by t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t
Planning S t a f f .
SIR ALAN BROOKE o u t l i n e d t h e B r i t i s h p r o p o s a l s f o r undertakiil,,

t h i s o p e r a t i o n He s a i d t h a t t h e r e were two broad a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r c a r r y
i n g o u t t h e B r i t i s h p o r t i o n of t h e a s s a u l t - - - - . e i t h e rt o mount the a s s a u l t
i n g f o r c e i n t h e U., K" and b r i n g t h e fol.low-.up from the Middle E a s t , o r
t o mount t h e major p a r t of t h e o p e r a t i o n from t h e Middle E a s t . . Tile former
would e n a b l e us t o s t a r t a t an e a r l i e r d a t e b u t , i t i n v o l v e d a g r a v e r i s k
i n p a s s i n g t h e s p e a r h e a d of t h e a s s a u l t f o r c e s t h r o u g h t h e S i c i l i a n
n a r r o w s i n m i n e a b l e w a t e r s and u n d e r a i r a t t a c k , For t h i s r e a s o n t h e
H r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e second a l t e r n a t i v e s h o u l d be
adopted
If t h e major p o r t i o n of t h e a s s a u l t w a s t o be mounted from N o r t h
A f r i c a , i t seemed t h a t t r a i n i n g would b e the b o t t l e n e c k .

LORE MUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t a B r i g a d e r e q u i r e d t,hree weeks
t r a i n i n g b e f o r e i t was f i t t o take p a r t i n t h e a s s a u l t . A B r i g a d e which
had had p r e v i o u s t r a i n i n g c o u l d be " b r u s h e d up" i n a b o u t t e n days
In
e i t h e r c a s e , a f u r t h e r two weeks' t r a i n i n g was n e c e s s a r y f o r f i n a l r e

hearsals
Time could o n l y be saved by a r r a n g i n g f o r two or more B r i g a d e s
t,o be t r a i n e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , I t was n o t p o s s i b l e t o reduce the t r a i n i n g

p e r i o d s below the f i g u r e s he had g i v e n . .
SIR ALAN BROOKE a g r e e d t h a t t h e s e t r a i n i n g t i m e s c o u l d n o t be
f u r t h e r reduced
He t h o u g h t , however, t h a t w e c o u l d n o t a c c e p t t h e end
o f S e p t e m b e r as t h e e a r l i e s t d a t e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n
Various devices
were b e i n g examined, s u c h a s t h e s e t t i n g up of a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g e s t a b
lishmerits and making use o f a wider range of p o r t s i n t h e Middle E a s t ;
and i t was hoped t o b r i n g f o r w a r d t h i s d a t e t o a b o u t the end o f August

I t w a s assumed t h a t T u n i s i a would have been c l e a r e d by t h e end of A p r i l .
ADMIRAL K I N G asked what d i v i s i o n s were now w i t h t h e 8 t h Army and
whether any d i v i s i o n s were a v a i l a b l e i n t h e Middle E a s t which c o u l d s t a r t
t r a i n i n g a t once
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e r e were some d i v i s i o n s
273
U. S SECRET
n o t a c t i v e l y engaged i n t h e p r e s e n t b a t t l e , t h e y would a l l be r e q u i r e d
f o r o p e r a t i o n s a f t e r t h e c a p t u r e of T r i p o l i . .
BRIGADIER GENERAL WEDEMEYER s a i d t h a t no d i f f i c u l t y was f o r e s e e n
i n f i n d i n g t h e l a n d f o r c e s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e U. S. p o r t i o n o f t h e o p e r a
I t was assumed t h a t t n e d i v i s i o n s r e q u i r e d would be t a k e n from

Morocco and n o t from T u n i s i a . The A i r b o r n e D i v i s i o n would h a v e t o cane
tion.
from t h e U.S.A,. C e r t a i n t y p e s of a i r c r a f t would a l s o have t o be brought

o v e r , b u t t h e m a j o r i t y were a l r e a d y a v a i l a b l e i n North A f r i c a
A l l could
c e r t a i n l y b e p r o v i d e d . He f e l t t h a t some d a t e a t t h e end o f J u l y o r t h e
b e g i n n i n g o f August s h o u l d be p o s s i b l e .
REAR ADMIRAL COOKE: m i d t h a t a g r e a t d e a l o f r e s e a r c h i n t o t h e

c a p a c i t y o f Northwest A f r i c a n p o r t s and t h e p r o v i s i o n of l a n d i n g c r a f t
would be n e c e s s a r y . T h i s was a l r e a d y i n hand
On t h e q u e s t i o n o f timing,
h i s view was about two months b e f o r e a p l a n n i n g s t a f f c o u l d be assembled

and d e t a i l e d p l a n s c o u l d be produced
He a g r e e d t h a t i t m i g h t be pos-.
s i b l e t o s t a r t t h e o p e r a t i o n i n .July
SIR CHARLES PORTAL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n must depend on
when t h e B r i t i s h c o u l d be r e a d y and when t h e Americans c o u l d be ready
and t h e l a t e r d a t e s e t a s D . d a y . He s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e s e s h o u l d be worked
o u t s e p a r a t e l y , , I t might be found t h a t the l a t e r d a t e was t o o l a t e t o be
a c c e p t a b l e , I-Ie thought t h a t if T u n i s i a were c l e a r e d by t h e end o f A p r i l ,
a f u r t h e r two months s h o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f a i r
f i e l d s i n the Tunisian t i p
GENERAL MARSHALL r e f e r r e d
t o t h e t r a n s p o r t b y a i r o f 20,000
Chinese t o Ramgarh and a s k e d whether time might n o t ~ b es a v e d by making

u s e o f a i r t r a n s p o r t t o c a r r y p e r s o n n e l from N o r t h w e s t A f r i c a t o t h e
Middle E a s t . He s u g g e s t e d t h a t , r a t h e r t h a n t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s t o t h e
Middle E a s t v i a t h e Cape, t h e y might be s h i p p e d t o North A f r i c a , c a r r y
o u t t h e i r t r a i n i n g t h e r e , and then be t a k e n by a i r t o t h e Middle E a s t ,, By
t h a t time t h e p a s s a g e o f t h e n e c e s s a r y l a n d i n g c r a f t s h o u l d have b e e n
completed- H e s a i d t h a t S i c i l y was our g o a l and t h a t w e ought n o t t o b e
d i v e r t e d from i t b y t h e a p p a r e n t d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h e u n d e r t a k i n g
ADMIRAL K I N G a g r e e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h f o r t h e a s s a u l t t h e c a p a c i t y
of t h e Northwest A f r i c a n p o r t s might be b a r e l y s u f f i c i e n t , i t s h o u l d b e
p o s s i b l e t o f i n d room f o r t r a i n i n g B r i t i s h a s w e l l as American f o r m a t i o n s
274
S SECRET
i n t h i s a r e a . He a s k e d w h e t h e r t h e T u n i s i a n p o r t s were b e i n g u s e d f o r
the assault,
BRIGADIER GENERAL WEDEMEYER s a i d t h a t i t was i n t e n d e d t o make
u s e o f B i z e r t e , T u n i s , and Sousse f o r t h e U . S . p o r t i o n of t h e a s s a u l t .
F o r t r a i n i n g he a g r e e d t h a t i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o s q u e e z e u p fyirther
west a n d s o l e a v e some of t h e s e p o r t s f o r t r a i n i n g B r i t i s h format^:1 011.5
if r e q u i r e d .
S I R ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t e v e r y p o s s i b l e p e r m u t a t . i o n must b e
examined and t h a t we s h o u l d a i m a t a r r i v i n g a t a s t a r t i n g d a t e i n J u l y
Two p o i n t s c a l l e d f o r e a r l y d e c i s i o n - . - f i r s t , the s e t . up of ar? o r g a n i z a
t i o n t o p l a n t h e whole o p e r a t i o n ; and, second, t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o ? a c o v e r
p l a n which would need t o be i n t e g r a t e d between t h e U . S . A . ,
C - K , , North
west A f r i c a , and t h e Middle E a s t and p u t i n t o e f f e c t a t a n e a r l ) d a t e .

He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e Germans would be f o r c e d t o d i v e r t , t,r,oops from
t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t a s s o o n a s our p r e p a r a t i o n s made i t c l e a r t h a t a n
o f f e n s i v e was i m p e n d i n g somewhere. The e f f e c t o f t.he o p e r a t i o n would,
t h e r e f o r e , be f e l t l o n g b e f o r e t h e a c t u a l a s s a u l t was l a u n c h e d
THE COMMITTEE:
(A) D i r e c t e d t h e U. S. and B r i t i s h P l a n n i n g S t a f f s to:
(1)E x a m i n e a l l p o s s i b l e e x p e d i e n t s f o r s p e e d i n g up t h e
p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r HUSKY a n d t o r e p o r t o n t h e e a r l i e s t
p o s s i b l e d a t e b y which t h e o p e r a t i o n c o u l d be mounted
(2)Recommend how t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n for p l a n n i n g HUSKY s h o u l d
b e s e t up
FUTURE BUSINESS
S I R A L A N BROOKE s u g g e s t e d t h a t i t m i g h t be p o s s i b l e t o b r i n g
~
forward c e r t a i n i t e m s on t h e Agenda so as t o complete the c o n f e r e n c e as
e a r l y as possible. After a short discussion,

THE COMMITTEE:
Agreed on t h e f o l l o w i n g program:
THURSDAY
FRIDAY
U b o a t War
Bomber O f f e n s i v e from
HUSKY
Great B r i t a i n .
ANAKIM
BOLERO ( i f t i m e p e r m i t s ) .
Limited Operations
S . W , ~P a c i f i c .
Landing C r a f t
2 75
,,
U . S . SECRET
C.C.S.
6 5 t h Meeting

on T h u r s d a y , J a n u a r y 21, 1943, a t 1 0 0 0 .
PRESENT
G e n e r a l S i r Alan F . Brooke
Pound
G e n e r a l G . C . M a r s h a l l , USA
L t . G e n e r a l H.H. A r n o l d , U S A
F. A. P o r t a l

L t . General B. B .
Rear Admiral C. h!.

B r i g . General A . C.
Cooke, J r . , USN
Wedemeyer, USA

Mountbatten
Colonel J . E. Smart, USA
L t . General S i r H a s t i n g s I,. Ismay
Major G e n e r a l J . N. Kennedy
A i r Vice Marshal J . C . S l e s s o r
'SECRETARIAT
Dykes
B r i g . G e n e r a l J. R . Deane, USA
B r i g a d i e r E . I . C. J a c o b
276
SECRET
il
THE U BOAT WAR

(C.C.S. 160)
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f had b e f o r e them a r e p o r t , by t h e

Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s on minimum e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s t o m a i n t a i n t h e
s e a communications o f t h e United N a t i o n s (G.C.S.
160).
S I R DUDLEY P O U N D s a i d t h a t most of t,he p o i n t s i n t h e body of t h e
p a p e r had been touched on i n t h e c o u r s e of p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n s , b u t he

drew p a r t , i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o p a r a g r a p h 14 e m p h a s i z i n g t h e n e e d for
adequate a i r c o v e r if t h e numher of e s c o r t s was t o h e k e p t t o a minimum=
Schedule V on t h e l a s t page of t h e p a p e r showed t h e l a r g e numher o f e s
c o r t s r e q u i r e d f o r this p u r p o s e ; The t a b l e i n E n c l o s u r e "C" showed t h e
s m a l l numbers o f e s c o r t v e s s e l s which would b e coming o u t of p r o d u c t i o n
d u r i n g t,he f i r s t h a l f of 1943.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e c a t e g o r i e s of a i r c r a f t i n
t h i s Schedule were a s f o l l o w s :
V.L.R.
A i r c r a f t w i t h a r a n g e o v e r 2,000 miles, such as L i h e r

a t o r s , and s p e c i a l l y p r e p a r e d H a l i f a x e s w i t h a range of
a b o u t 2,100 m i l e s which were t e m p o r a r i l y a s s i g n e d t o
a n t i s u b m a r i n e work.
A i r c r a f t w i t h a r a n g e between 1,200 and 2,000 m i l e s .
L.H.
h! R .
A i r c r a f t w i t h a r a n g e b e t w e e n 600 and 1 , 2 0 0 m i l e s .
He i n q u i r e d whether i t c o u l d b e t a k e n t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f
S e c t i o n 2 i n S c h e d u l e V (North A t l a n t i c , E a s t Coast U. S o and Canada) in
~jill-ved no commitments f o r t h e United Kingdom.
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t h e had n o t t h e e x a c t f i g u r e s , b u t he had

no r e a s o n t o doubt t h a t t h i s commitment would b e f u l f i l l e d by t h e U.
S.
and Canada e n t i r e l y . The Caribbean and t h e E a s t Coast o f South America

were a l s o , o f c o u r s e , e n t i r e l y U , . S. commitments. T h e full d e t a i l s o f
t h e TJ
f i g u r e s were n o t a v a i l a b l e a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , b u t h e sug
gest.ed t h a t t h e r e p o r t s h o u l d b e a c c e p t e d as a working b a s i s .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e r e p o r t of t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s
on t h e W h o a t war, whlch had b e e n o r d e r e d b y t h e Combined C h i e f s o f

S t a f f a t a r e c e n t m e e t i n g i n Washington, s h o u l d b e r e a d y v e r y s h o r t l y T h i s would c o n t a i n t h e f u l l U. S. f i g u r e s .
277
U. S. SECRET
SIR DUDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i n t h e i r agreed p o l i c y f or t h e
conduct of t h e war i n 1943 (C.C.S. 155/1), t h e Combined Chiefs o f S t a f f
had s a i d t h a t t h e d e f e a t of t h e U-boat must remain t h e f i r s t charge on
t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e IJnited N a t i o n s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t had been decided
t h a t t h e Rabaul and HUSKY o p e r a t i o n s were t o be c a r r i e d o u t , and t h e s e
would i n e v i t a b l y d e t r a c t from t h e a n t i - s u b m a r i n e e f f o r t . H e f e l t t h a t
t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f s h o u l d c l e a r l y r e c o r d t h e i r r e a s o n s f o r
t h u s d i v e r g i n g from t h e anti-submarine e f f o r t as a f i r s t o b j e c t i v e . ' H e
p a s s e d around d r a f t c o n c l u s i o n s on t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s ' r e p o r t ,
which he had d i s c u s s e d w i t h Admiral King, b u t s u g g e s t e d t h a t s i n c e t h e
f i r s t two of these were b o u n d u p w i t h t h e d i r e c t i v e f o r t h e bomber offen

s i v e from t h e U . K . , which was t o b e d i s c u s s e d n e x t , t h e s e s h o u l d be
t a k e n up a f t e r t h a t i t e m .
A f t e r an adjournment,
THE COMXITTEE:
(a) Took n o t e o f C.C.S. 160.

( h ) Agreed t h a t :
(1) I n t e n s i f i e d bombing of [!-boat o p e r a t i n g b a s e s s h o u l d be
carried out.
(2) I n t e n s i f i e d bombing o f U-boat c o n s t r u c t i o n a l y a r d s
should be c a r r i e d out.
(3) U ,
S.
a n d B r i t i s h Naval S t a f f s s h o u l d :
a . Scrutinize the dispositions o f a l l ex istin g destroyers
and e s c o r t c r a f t ;
b.
A l l o c a t e a s much new c o r ~ s t r u c t i o n ,o r v e s s e l s r e l e a s e d
by new c o n s t r u c t i o n , as p o s s i b l e toconvoy p r o t e c t i o n ,
The above w i t h a view t o e a c h n a t i o n p r o v i d i n g , t o t h e

g r e a t e s t e x t e n t p o s s i b l e , h a l f of t h e p r e s e n t d e f i c i e n c y
of s i x t y - f i v e
e s c o r t s f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of Atlantic
convoys
(4) U .
S. and B r i t i s h Naval S t a f f s s h o u l d p r o v i d e a u x i l i a r y
e s c o r t c a r r i e r s f o r working with A t l a n t i c convoys a t t h e

e a r l i e s t p r a c t i c a b l e moment .,
(5) Long d i s t a n c e shore--.based a i r c o v e r s h o u l d be provided

over t h e f o l l o w i n g convoy r o u t e s as a m a t t e r of urgency:
-a . North A t l a n t i c convoys ( U , S,-U,. K . ) --from b o t h s i d e s
of t h e A t l a n t i c
278
U.. S S E C R E T
b.
D.W.I.
o i l convoys from t h e West I n d i e s and U.
K,,
C. TORCH o i l convoys from t h e West I n d i e s and G i b r a l t a r .
d . U. K.-Freetown convoys from Northwestand!Vest A f r i c a .

(6) Greenland a i r d r o m e s s h o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d f o r u s e by L.R
or V . L . R . a i r c r a f t ,
(7) Non-ocean-going e s c o r t s s h o u l d b e used f o r HUSKY t o t h e
maximum p o s s i b l e e x t e n t .
2.
THE BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM.

(C.C.S. 165)
The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f had b e f o r e them a d r a f t d i r e c t i v e
f o r t h e bomber o f f e n s i v e from t h e United Kingdom s u b m i t t e d by t h e B r i t - .

i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f
(C.C.S. 156)
S I 3 CHARLES POiITAL, i n answer t o a q u e s t i o n by General M a r s h a l l
on t h e p r e c i s e i m p l i c a t i o n s of p a r a g r a p h 5, s a i d t h a t p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d
e r a t i o n s o f t e n o v e r r i d e m i l i t a r y expediency i n t h e c a s e of o b j e c t i v e s
i n t h e o c c u p i e d c o u n t r i e s . The B r i t i s h Government, on r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
from one o f t h e e x i l e d Governments, sometimes p l a c e d a p o l i t i c a l embargo
on some e x c e l l e n t m i l i t a r y t a r g e t . I n such c a s e s d e c i s i o n s had o f t e n t o
be t a k e n v e r y q u i c k l y , and i t would n o t be p r a c t i c a b l e t o d e a l w i t h t h e
m a t t e r t h r o u g h t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f i n Washington.
GENERAL MARSHALL s u g g e s t e d , and t h e Committee a g r e e d , t h a t t h e
words "for p o l i t i c a l r e a s o n s " s h o u l d be i n s e r t e d i n p a r a g r a p h 6 i n o r d e r
t o make t h i s c l e a r
I n d i s c u s s i o n i t w a s a l s o a g r e e d t h a t t h e word " s y n t h e t i c '
s h o u l d be d e l e t e d from p a r a g r a p h 2 ( d ) .
SIR CHARLES PORTAL r e f e r r e d t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y which always a r o s e
i n s u c h d i r e c t i v e s over t h e p r e c i s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p l a c i n g t h e German
submarine b a s e s and c o n s t r u c t i o n y a r d s f i r s t i n o r d e r of p r i o r i t y . T h i s
might be h e l d t o p r e c l u d e a t t a c k s on any o t h e r t a r g e t s ~A t t h e p r e s e n t
time t h e U
S . 8 t h Bomber Commwrd had U-boat
t a r g e t s a t t h e t o p of t h e i r
l i s t and a t t a c k e d them on e v e r y p o s s i b l e o c c a s i o n w i t h good r e s u l t s

There had b e e n , however, c o n s i d e r a b l e c r i t i c i s m i n t h e U . K = b e c a u s e
t h e y never a t t a c k e d targets i n Germany.. If t o o l i t e r a l an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
of t h e o r d e r of p r i o r i t y were t a k e n and t h e e n t i r e weight of o u r bomber

e f f o r t were p l a c e d on t h e German s u b m a r i n e b a s e s , t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of
279
U. S . SECRET
t a r g e t s i n Germany, t h e r e would b e v e r y s e r i o u s c r i t i c i s m i n d e e d . H i s
own view was t h a t o t h e r t a r g e t s b e s i d e s t h e s u b m a r i n e b a s e s and y a r d s
s h o u l d n o t b e e x c l u d e d and t h a t p a r a g r a p h 2 o f t h e p a p e r r e q u i r e d some
r e d r a f t i n g t o make i t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e was no i n t e n t i o n t o c o n c e n t r a t e
on what were s t r a t e g i c a l l y d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e
offensive.
GENERAL MAITSHALL s a i d t h a t he f u l l y a p p r e c i a t e d t h i s d i f f i c u l t y .
SIR DUDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e of l a r g e - s c a l e
amphibious o p e r a t i o n s f o r 1943 must i n e v i t a b l y d e t r a c t from t h e a n t i
submarine e f f o r t and e v e r y endeavor s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , he made t o o f f s e t
t h i s by a h i g h e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h e a i r e f f o r t a g a i n s t &boat t a r g e t s .
He b e l i e v e d t h a t i f we p u t t h e maximum e f f o r t o n t o t h e Biscny b a s e s now,
and d e s t r o y e d a l l t h e f a c i l i t i e s and accommodations i n t h e towns, we
s h o u l d v i t a l l y s f f e c t , German c a p a c i t y t o c a r r y on t h e IT--boat campaign.
I t was no good making s p o r a d i c a t t a c k s ; t h e p r e s s u r e had t o be c o n t i n u e d
f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d . If t.he Germans had gone on bombing Plymouth,

L i v e r p o o l and Glasgow i n s t e a d of s t o p p i n g when t h e y d i d , w e s h o u l d have
been p l a c e d i n a v e r y d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n i n d e e d ,
He c o u l d n o t s e e t h a t t h e r e was any r e a l d i f f e r e n c e
s o - c a l l e d o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e bombing
between
Both were d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t
t h e power of t h e enemy t o c a r r y on t h e wari
ADMIRAL. K I N G a g r e e d t h a t t h e bombing o f t h e &boat b a s e s s h o u l d

h e s u s t a i n e d . H i s i m p r e s s i o n was t h a t t h e bombing of a n t i - s u b m a r i n e
t a r g e t s had s o f a r been s p o r a d i c . For example, i t a p p e a r e d t h a t B e r l i n
h a d h a d i n two r a i d s t w i c e t h e w e i g h t o f bombs d r o p p e d on L o r i e n t
recently.
S I R CHARLES PORTAL a g r e e d t h a t i t would h e a s o u n d move t o

d e s t r o y c o m p l e t e l y t h e f o u r Hiscay b a s e s i f e x p e r i e n c e showed t h i s was
p o s s i b l e . . A t t a c k s would h e c o n t i n u e d on L o r i e n t , b u t s o f a r w e had
no
i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e r e s u l t o f t h e r e c e n t c o n c e n t r a t e d bombardments, I t
had had a greater weight of bombs dropped on i t t h a n Plymouth. I n com
p a r i n g t h i s w i t h t h e weight on D e r l i n , r e g a r d must b e p a i d t o the com
p a r a t i v e s i z e o f t h e s e two t a r g e t s . Weight i n r e l a t i o n t o a r e a was much
greater a t Lorient than Berlin,
280
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH illOST SECRET
SIR ALAN BHOOKE d i d n o t t h i n k t h a t we c o u l d win by d e f e a t i n g t h e
U-boat
a l o n e . 'Ye s h o u l d be c a r e f u l , t h e r e f o r e , n o t t o a l l o t more e f f o r t
t h a n was a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . The bombing of Germany

c o n t r i b u t e d d i r e c t l y t o t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f German power, whereas t h e
bombing of TI-boat t a r g e t s was o n l y an i n d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n .
GENEZIAL MAltSHALL r e c a l l e d t h a t i n t h e bombing d i r e c t i v e f o r t h e

M e d i t e r r a n e a n t h e emphasis had been l a i d on p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r HUSKY. He
asked what would be done from t h e United Kingdom t o s u p p o r t an i n v a s i o n
of Europe.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t t h i s p o i n t was covered by paragraph
5 of t h e d r a f t d i r e c t i v e . T a r g e t s would be s e l e c t e d i n accordance w i t h
t h e p l a n of t h e Commander-in-Chief,
so as t o g i v e t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e sup
p o r t t o t h e o p e r a t i o r i s of t h e Army. Whenever o p e r a t i o n s were immediately

i n p r o s p e c t , a t t a c k s on what might be c a l l e d t h e long-term targets, such
as i n d u s t r y , had t o g i v e way t o immediate o p e r a t i o n a l needs.

GENEXAL AnNOLD s a i d t h a t no one was keener t o go f o r t a r g e t s i n
Germany t h a n t h e IJ.
S . A i r Commanders i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom. They had
been d i r e c t e d on t o U-boat
t a r g e t s by G e n e r a l Eisenhower as a d i r e c t
m e a n s o f s u p p o r t i n g TORCH. About h a l f t h e 17. S. bomber f o r c e i n t h e U. K.

had a l r e a d y been withdrawn from t h e United Kingdom t o North A f r i c a , b u t
l a r g e i n c r e a s e s i n i t s s t r e n g t h were now i n p r o s p e c t . We should soon be
a b l e t o t h i n k i n terms of hundreds of bombers where we were now t h i n k i n g
i n tens.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e c o n t r o l o f bomber o p e r a t i o n s by

t h e U. S . A i r F o r c e s i n t h e United Kingdom would be i n t h e hands of t h e
B r i t i s h . I t would be a m a t t e r of command r a t h e r t h a n of agreement w i t h
t h e U . S. Commanders. I t would be t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f t h e U. S. Com
manders t o d e c i d e t h e t e c h n i q u e and method t o be employed.
A f t e r an adjournment,
THE COMMITTEE:
Approved, s u b j e c t t o minor amendments, a r e v i s e d d r a f t d i r e c t i v e
p r e p a r e d by t h e B r i t i s h Chiefs of S t a f f ( c i r c u l a t e d subsequently
as C.C.S.
166/1/D)
.
28 1
U S
SECRET
DRAFT TELEGRAM TO M c STALINo

(C.C.S. 165)
S I R ALAN BROOKE s u g g e s t e d t h a t p a r a g r a p h 5 of t h e d r a f t telegram
p r e p a r e d f o r t h e F r e s i d e n t and Frime M i n i s t e r t o send t o Premier S t a l i n

b e amended Dy c h a n g i n g t h e f i r s t s e n t e n c e t o r e a d , "Me h a v e t a k e n t h e
d e c i s i o n t o l a u n c h wide s c a l e amphibious o p e r a t i o n s a t t h e e a r l i e s t pos
s i b l e moment" a n d t o amend t h e s e c o n d s e n t e n c e t o r e a d , " t h e p r e p a r a
t i o n s f o r these o p e r a t i o n s a r e now underway and w i l l i n v o l v e a consid
e r a b l e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f f o r c e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y l a n d i n g c r a f t and s h i p p i n g
i n North A f r i c a n p o r t s . "
These changes were a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f .
SIR JOHN D I L L s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n p a r a g r a p h 5 t h e 5 t h s e n t e n c e be
t e r m i n a t e d w i t h t h e word " s u b j e c t e d " and t h a t t h e remainder of t h e sen
t e n c e be d e l e t e d .
S I R CHARIES PORTAL s u g g e s t e d t h a t p a r a g r a p h 8 s h o u l d b e s t r e n g t h
ened i n view of t h e much g r e a t e r A l l i e d bomber o f f e n s i v e which w i l l be
undertaken a g a i n s t Germany as t h e r e s u l t o f t h e i n c r e a s e d bomber s t r e n g t h
which i s i n v i e w , The B r i t i s h w i l l i n c r e a s e t h e i r heavy bomber s t r e n g t h
from 600 t o 1,000 a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ' i n c r e a s e w i l l be from 200 t o

900. T h i s w i l l e n a b l e t h e i n t e n s i t y of t h e bombing a t t a c k a g a i n s t
Germany t o b e a t l e a s t d o u b l e d , a f a c t t h a t M .
S t a l i n should be glad
t o learn
ADMIRAL K I N G s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e l a s t two s e n t e n c e s o f p a r a g r a p h
5 b e d e l e t e d from t h a t p a r a g r a p h and amalgamated w i t h t h e r e d r a f t of
p a r a g r a p h 8, s u g g e s t e d above b y S i r C h a r l e s P o r t a l .
I t was a g r e e d t h a t t h e l a s t two s e n t e n c e s of p a r a g r a p h 5, para

g r a p h 7 , and a more p o s i t i v e s t a t e m e n t o f p a r a g r a p h 8 b e amalgamated
i n t o one p a r a g r a p h .
THE COMMITTEE:
D i r e c t e d t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Combined S t a f f s be d i r e c t e d
t o r e v i s e t h e d r a f t telegram t o M , S t a l i n i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e
d i s c u s s i o n g i v e n above
282
t.
ANAKIM.
(C.C.S.
Ifid)
GEXEKAL MARSHALL s u g g e s t e d that, i n t h e remarks on t h e bottom of
page 80 c o n c e r n i n g tile a v a i l a b i l i t y of a i r f o r c e s , t h e l a s t two words,

":liddle
East,
I'
be d e l e t e d and t h e words, " h f e d i t e r r a n e a n a r e a " be s u b
stit,iited tiieref'or.
A i l.i s
nl
change was a g r e e d t o b y tile Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f .
SIR ALAN 33OO:CE
s t , a t e d t i i a t iie b e l i e v e d t l i e t a r g e t d a t e o f
November 1943, Aiven a s an assumption i n p a r a g r a p h 2, w a s p r o b a b l y t o o

e a r l y f o r a c t u a l accooiplisiiiiieiit, but tiiat i t s h o u l d do no harm t o l e t i t
s t a n d as a t a r g e t d a t e t o be aimed a t .
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Took n o t e of C.C,.S.
164 a s amended':
and agreed:
(1) To a p p r o v e November 15, 1943, a s t h e p r o v i s i o n a l d a t e
f o r t h e ANAKIM a s s a u l t .
(2) To approve t h e p r o v i s i o n a l s c h e d u l e of f o r c e s l a i d o u t
i n p a r a g r a p h 3 o f C.C.S.
161, r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h e
actual provision of naval forces, assault shipping,

l a n d i n g c r a f t , and s h i p p i n g must depend on t h e s i t u a t i o n
i n t h e l a t e summer o f 1943.
(3) To c o n f i r m i n J u l y 1943 t h e d e c i s i o n t o u n d e r t a k e o r t o
postpone Operation LNAKIM.

5.
BOLERO BUILD-UP.
The Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f were informed t h a t a p a p e r on t h e
s u b j e c t , b e i n g p r e p a r e d by t h e B r i t i s h J o i n t P l a n n i n g S t a f f , was n o t
ready f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
GENERAL MARSHALL s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e r e be some g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n

r e g a r d i n g BOLERO p r i o r t o r e c e i p t of t h e B r i t i s h p a p e r . H e s t a t e d t h a t
i t had a l r e a d y been d e c i d e d t o keep p l a n s f o r a c r o s s - c h a n n e l
up t o d a t e on a month-by-month
operation
b a s i s i n o r d e r t o be r e a d y a t any time
t o i i i i t i a t e such o p e r a t i o n s .
SIR ALAK BROOKE a g r e e d w i t h t h i s s t a t e m e n t .
::: T o be s u b s e q u e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a s C.C.S.
164/1.
U. S. SECRET
RYlTISN MOST S E C e E T
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n s a i d he wished t o d i s c u s s t h e q u e s t i o n of
o r g a n i z a t i o n . iie a s k e d what i s t o be done i n England and a l s o how the
p l a n s r e g a r d i n g BOLERO a r e t o c r y s t a l l i z e
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e S r i t i s h can a b s o r b American troops
a t t h e r a t e of 120,000 p e r month. I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , GENERAL SOMERVELL
s a i d t h a t t h e number t o a r r i v e would be somewhat l e s s t h a n 120,000 per
month up t o J u l y b u t c o n s i d e r a b l y more t h e r e a f t e r .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t one of t h e g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t i e s r e
g a r d i n g t h e r e c e p t i o n of American t r o o p s i n England is t h e l a c k of s u f
f i c i e n t r e c e i v i n g d e p o t s f o r equipment. I t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o con
s t r u c t a d d i t i o n a l d e p o t s . The B r i t i s h have s t o p p e d s u c h c o n s t r u c t i o n
b e c a u s e of t h e manpower s i t u a t i o n and b e c a u s e t h e y have o n l y b e e n com
m i t t e d t o r e c e i v e f i v e a d d i t i o n a l American d i v i s i o n s , or a t o t a l of
427,000 t r o o p s . The c o n s t r u c t i o n which must be u n d e r t a k e n and t h e oper
a t i n g f o r c e r e q u i r e d f o r new r e c e p t i o n d e p o t s w i l l r e q u i r e p e r s o n n e l
from t h e United S t a t e s . These should be i n c l u d e d i n t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e
t r o o p convoys t o t h e U. K.
An a r e a has been r e s e r v e d i n s o u t h w e s t e r n England for t h e United
S t a t e s t r o o p s which w i l l be n e x t t o t h e a r e a r e s e r v e d f o r B r i t i s h t r o o p s
in s o u t h e a s t e r n England. These a r e a s w i l l f a c e F r a n c e . The a r e a t o be

occupied by t h e United S t a t e s t r o o p s is b e i n g c l e a r e d of B r i t i s h f o r c e s .
T h e i r accommodations, e x c e p t f o r some which c a n n o t b e moved, s u c h a s
s c h o o l s , w i l l be a v a i l a b l e t o t h e American f o r c e s .
He s a i d t h a t t h e immediate n e c e s s i t y was t h e a p p o i n t m e n t of a
Commanding General and s t a f f . The B r i t i s h are now engaged i n r e o r g a n i z
i n g t h e i r f o r c e s from d e f e n s i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , s u p p l i e d from f i x e d
b a s e s , t o o f f e n s i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s which i n c l u d e t h e i r own mobile s e r v i c e
e l e m e n t s . It is e x p e c t e d t h a t 12 d i v i s i o n s w i l l be s o o r g a n i z e d b y J u l y
and 15 b y O c t o b e r . The new o f f e n s i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s w i l l b e d i v o r c e d
e n t i r e l y from t h e d e f e n s i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s of t h e B r i t i s h Isles. Each
w i l l b e u n d e r a s e p a r a t e commander. The B r i t i s h o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s ,
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h o s e b e i n g b u i l t up b y t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g a i r
f o r c e s , s h o u l d come under a supreme commander who s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d i n
the near f u t u r e .
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t G e n e r a l Andrews is now g o i n g t o
2 a4
U. S. S E C R E T
B,?ITISH MOST S.TC'1ET
E n g l a n d t o r e p l a c e G e n e r a l H a r t l e and u n d e r t a k e t h e same d u t i e s t h a t
General Eisenhower performed p r i o r t o O p e r a t i o n TORCH. ile w i l l have t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of r e c e i v i n g American d i v i s i o n s i n England; a n d , a s soon
a s t h e s e d i v i s i o n s a r e r e a d y , General Andrews w i l l t u r n them over t o t h e
Supreme Commander f o r a s s i g n m e n t t o t h e c r o s s - c h a n n e l t a s k f o r c e . He
assumed t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e B r i t i s h c o n t e m p l a t e d s e t t i n g up a s e p a r a t e
Home Defense f o r c e , t h e c r o s s - c h a n n e l
t a s k f o r c e would a l s o have t o be
on an a l e r t s t a t u s and c o n s i d e r e d a s a v a i l a b l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e
defense of the B r i t i s h Isles.
SIR A I A N BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e r e were two t y p e s of p l a n n i n g i n
v o l v e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e cross-channel
o p e r a t i o n s ; one was for a l i m i t , e d
o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n which m i g h t be e x p e c t e d i n 1 9 4 3 , and t n e o t h e r w a s
f o r t h e l a r g e r t a s k of an a l l - o u t i n v a s i o n of t h e C o n t i n e n t . I n t h e l a t
t e r c a s e , t h e d e c i s i o n must be made a s t o t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e a t t a c k
once t h e l a n d i n g was e f f e c t e d . I t must be decided whether such an a t t a c k
would be aimed a t Germany o r a t o c c u p i e d F r a n c e . P l a n s m i g h t w e l l b e
made t o meet b o t h c o n t i n g e n c i e s .
H e s a i d t h a t p l a n s must e n v i s a g e making t h e maximum u s e o f
S.O.E.
a c t i v i t i e s a n d . t h a t t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s mustbe c a r e f u l l y c o o r d i n a t e d
w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s proposed. T h i s has n o t always been done i n

the p a s t .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d he considered t h a t t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f a supreme
commander was u r g e n t .
GENERAL SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t he had u n d e r s t o o d S i r Alan Brooke
t o s a y t h a t t h e B r i t i s h c o u l d e b s o r b 120,000 t r o o p s p e r month w i t h o u t
a s s i s t a n c e from t h e United S t a t e s . T h i s i s c o n t r a r y t o a n o p i n i o n which
General Somervell a t t r i b u t e d t o Lord L e a t h e r s , t h a t a s s i s t a n c e would b e
r e q u i r e d from t h e United S t a t e s if t h e flow of t r o o p s t o England e x
ceeded 70,000 per month. General Somervell s a i d i t would be n e c e s s a r y t o
d e t e r m i n e a t once which e s t i m a t e is c o r r e c t . He a l s o s a i d t h a t he under
s t o o d i t would be n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e United S t a t e s t o f u r n i s h some loco
m o t i v e s and r o l l i n g s t o c k t o t h e B r i t i s h i n o r d e r t o a s s i s t i n t h e
i n c r e a s e d t r a f f i c r e s u l t i n g from t r o o p movements.
He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e s p e e d of s e n d i n g t r o o p s t o t h e U. K .
would depend l a r g e l y upon t h e s u c c e s s a t t a i n e d i n c o m b a t i n g t h e submarine
2 85
0 S SUCRET
B R I l I S H MOST SECRET
menace. H e u r g e d t h a t t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r e f f o r t s i n
t h i s respect.
GENERAL SOMERVFLL s a i d t h a t t h e l o c a t i o n o f United S t a t e s troops
i n England must b e made w i t h an eye t o t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s . The t r o o p s
w i l l need amphibious t r a i n i n g f o r which few facilities a r e a v a i l a b l e i n
s o u t h e r n England. He c o n c l u d e d t h a t , from a s u p p l y p o i n t o f view, an

e a r l y d e c i s i o n was n e c e s s a r y a s t o t h e s i z e o f t h e b u i l d - u p of United
S t a t , e s f o r c e s c o n t e m p l a t e d and t h e t y p e of o p e r a t i o n s i n which t h e y
wouldbeengaged, These d e c i s i o n s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y n e c e s s a r y with r e s p e c t
t o t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f tonnage
SIR A L A N BROOKE s a i d t h a t any o p e r a t i o n i n 1943 w i l l of neces
s i t y b e l i m i t e d s i n c e an a l l - o u t o f f e n s i v e a c r o s s t h e Channel can h a r d l y
be undertaken u n t i l 1914. With r e g a r d t o t h e r o l l i n g s t o c k f o r t h e r a i l
r o a d s , h e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t when an i n v a s i o n o f t h e C o n t i n e n t i s under
t a k e n , t,he Germans w i l l make e v e r y e f f o r t t o deny o u r u s e of t h e i r r o l l
ing s t o r k
For t h i s r e a s o n i t h e United N a t i o n s must b e p r e p a r e d t o
follow t h e i n i t i a l a s s a u l t with such equipment,

H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h now s e n d t h e i r t r o o p s from s o u t h e r n
England t o S c o t l a n d o r Northern I r e l a n d by b r i g a d e g r o u p s f o r amphibious
training^ IIe s u g g e s t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f United S t a t e s t r o o p s s t o p p i n g

o f f i n I r e l a n d o r S c o t l a n d f o r s u c h t r a i n i n g on t h e i r way t o t h e f i n a l
a s s e m h l i n g a r e a i n s o u t h w e s t e r n England,, The g r e a t e s t d i f f i c u l t y i s i n
t h e t r a i n i n g of' armored u n i t s , and t h a t a s f a r a s p o s s i b l e i t would he
b e t t e r i f t,he U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s c o u l d have t h i s t r a i n i n g p r i o r t o
t , h e i r d e p s r t u r e from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t,hat t h i s can e a s i l y b e a r r a n g e d . I t must
be remembered t h a t t h e f o r c e s u s e d i n t h e TORCH o p e r a t i o n were h u r
r i e d l y g a t h e r e d t o g e t h e r and t h a t t h e t r a i n i n g o f t h e t r o o p s , p r i o r t o
t h e i r d e p a r t u r e from t h e United S t a t e s , had been d i f f i c u l t - The build-up
f o r BOLERO c a n b e a c c o m p l i s h e d more d e l i b e r a t e l y a n d w i l l e n a b l e t h e
armored u n i t s t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n m a j o r m a n e u v e r s and c o m p l e t e t h e i r
t a r g e t p r a c t i c e p r i o r t o d e p a r t u r e , U n i t s w i l l b e f r o z e n t h r e e months
p r i o r t o l e a v i n g t h e United S t a t e s , and t h i s w i l l f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r t r a i n
i n g . He p o i n t e d out, t h a t f i r i n g r a n g e s have been made a v a i l a b l e f o r u s e
by u n i t s i n s t a g i n g a r e a s en r o u t e t o p o r t s of d e b a r k a t i o n .
286
U. S SECRET
I n r e p l y t o a q u e s t i o n from Lord L o u i s M o u n t b a t t e n , he s t a t e d
t h a t i n s o f a r as p o s s i b l e , all u n i t s would have had amphibious t r a i n i n g
p r i o r t o t h e i r d e p a r t u r e from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had s e t u p a n
amphibious t r a i n i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t a t Appledore on t h e B r i s t o l Channel,

The n o r t h e r n p a r t of t h i s t r a i n i n g a r e a h a s b e e n t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e
Americans f o r amphibious t r a i n i n g . F l a t b e a c h e s , changes of t i d e s , and
all means of p o s s i b l e d e f e n s e are a v a i l a b l e t o i n s u r e t h e t h o r o u g h n e s s

of t h e t r a i n i n g . Another amphibious t r a i n i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t w i l l be
a v a i l a b l e i n t h e C l y d e a r e a i n two months a n d , i n a d d i t i o n ,
one i n
n o r t h e r n I r e l a n d which h a s b e e n s t a r t e d by A d m i r a l B e n n e t t
GENERAL \IATSHALL s a i d t h a t he assumed t h a t t h e American t r o o p s
i n c l u d e d i n t h e a s s a u l t waves of a c r o s s - c h a n n e l a t t a c k would have t o be
r e h e a r s e d i n amphibious o p e r a t i o n s , b u t t h a t t h e great b u l k of American
t r o o p s would n o t need s u c h r e h e a r s a l s
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN t h e n p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i t would b e w e l l
t o a r r a n g e t o have American f o r c e s u s e l a n d i n g c r a f t manned by American
c r e w s , w i t h which General M a r s h a l l a g r e e d
GENERAL SOMEnVELL s t a t e d t h a t t h e movement of American f o r c e s t o
England must be c o n s i d e r e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e e s c o r t v e s s e l s a v a i l
a b l e f o r convoys,
ADMIRAL K I N G a g r e e d t h a t t h e BOLERO t r o o p movements would con
s t i t u t e an a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t f o r e s c o r t v e s s e l s
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d t h a t a i r f o r c e s m u s t b e r e o r g a n i z e d
w i t h BOLERO i n view. A t p r e s e n t t h e R , A , F
o p e r a t e s from s t a t i c b a s e s .
Mobile a i r u n i t s must be o r g a n i z e d t o s u p p o r t c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s
He s u g g e s t e d t h a t American f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t s h o u l d b e under t h e o p e r a
t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h i n t h e same manner as had a l r e a d y been
d e c i d e d f o r heavy bombardment a i r c r a f t
S I R CHAI&ES PORTAL c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t a d e c i s i o n
must be made as t o whether t o u t i l i z e t r o o p - l i f t
c a p a c i t y from t h e United
S t a t e s t o G r e a t B r i t a i n f o r ground t r o o p s or f o r t h e ground e c h e l o n s o f
the air force.
Ile a l s o s t a t e d t h a t a d e c i s i o n m i g h t b e f o r c e d on t h e
287
ii S S E C R E T
H R I T I S H YOST S E C R E T
Combined W i e f s o f S t a f f w i t h r e g a r d t o u t i l i z i n g some of t h e shipping
erigaged in t h e d e l i v e r y o f m u n i t i o n s t o R u s s i a i n t h e b u i l d - u p of a
I! 01,FPO f o r c e
GXhXFAl. ',O\fWWLL s a i d t h a t a p a p e r was b e i n g p r e p a r e d , designed
t o slnw llnw inmny t r o w s
r:,
K.
?ile
CWI
be t . r a n s m r t e d froni t,kie r r i i t e d S t a t e s t o the
r i a p e r h a t i t,o h e Lia.sed on a g r e a t man) a s s u m p t i o n s and t h e
f ' i g u r e ? which i t w o u l d c o n t a i n c o u l d n o t b e c o r r s i d e r e d as a r e l i a b l e
e s t i m n r e iuit,il c e r t a i n d e c i s i o n s havp been a r r i v e d a t w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o

n
l h e r :,per.a t i o r i s , not,atrlg !Hi5?<1. Assuniing t h a t illrF-KY i s mounted i n
liigiist, and t h a t an a t t a c k will he mourit,ed Tram i ~ ~ g l a non

d August 1 5 t h ,
i t worilrl he y o s s i b l r t o bririg i n approximately 400,Ooa t r o o p s t o England

b y . J i i l y 1 s t T h i s w u u l d g i v e t h e m s i x weeks t o s e t t l e down i n o r d e r t o
tie a v a i l a b l e f o r an a t , t , a c k August W t h . The 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s mentioned
i n c l u d e d those now in Prigland, C f t h e t o t a l number, approx-iniately 172,000
ih'ould h e a i r c o r n s t r o o n s and t,liere would b e f i v e t o s i x ground d i v i
s
ions
lle s a i d t , h a t , assuming 150 s h i p voyages c o u l d b e made a v a i l a b l e
f r o m I . r i t i s h i m p o r t s , t h e number c o u l d b e r a i s e d from s e v e n t o n i n e
d iv is ions
SIR A L A V BROOKE s t a t e d t h a t these f i g u r e s b o r e o u t h i s p r e v i o u s

e s t , i m a t e s t.hat t h e r e would b e ' from 18 t o 21 d i v i s i o n s a v a i l a b l e i n Eng
l a n d i n t h e l a t t , e r p a r t of t h e summer
GTh-EFAI. S0VEnVU.L s a i d t h a t if t h e a t t a c k from England were' not
o b e mounted u n t i l September 1 5 t h , f o u r a d d i t , i o n a l d i v i s i o n s c o u l d be
i , r a n s p o r t e d from t,he U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h r e e i n American, and one i n B r i t
i s h s t i i p p i n g ~ The r a t e o f f o u r d i v i s i o n s p e r month c o u l d b e m a i n t a i n e d
t h e r e a f t e r inasmuch a s most of t h e overhead p e r s o n n e l would be i n c l u d e d
i II the e a r l i e r sliipmei. ts
S I F ALAN El:001?E asked what r a t e of flow c o u l d b e e x p e c t e d from
\ m e r i c a m o n t h l y , assuming an a t t a c k from England i n Sept,ember
Would one
d i v i s i o n p e r month b e t h e maximum?
?:l?SPI~tAI,FO.IEPVEL1. rep1 i e d t h a t t h e f i g u r e would g r e a t l y exceed
t h i s a s f a r a s shippirig was concprifed. However, i f t h e t r o o p s were t o be

t , r a n s p o r t e d t,n F r a n c e , the number would be 1i.mited by t h e p o r t f a c i l i t i e s
a v a i l a I > I e ? o r t h i s r e a s o n , any p l a n s m a d e s h o u l d e n v i s a g e t h e c a p t u r e of
s riff i c i eu t p o r t
f a c i 1i t i e s
U S
SECRET
B R I T I S H .MOST S E C R E T
ADMIRAL X I N G a g r e e d t h a t t h i s should b e g i v e n careful c o n s i d e r a
t i o n i n planning the operation.

CEKLnAL 11APSHALL s u g g e s t e d t h a t once t h e o p e r a t i o n is i n i t i a t e d ,
i t would p r o b a b l y b e n e c e s s a r y t o c o n d u c t s e p a r a t e o p e r a t i o n s t o g a i n
a d d i t i o n a l port, f a c i I i t i e s
SIP A L N r!'OOIiL
s a i d iie thought i t would be e a s i e r t o e s t a b l i s h
a bridgehead arid wirlpn i t ont by overland o p e r a t i o n s i n o r d e r t o c a p t u r e

t h e p o r t s t h a t would be r i e c e s s a r y . Iip s a i d t h a t , a t l e a s t two or t h r e e
p o r t s would be r e q u i r e d b e f o r e ar!y a t , t e m p t c o u l d be made t o advance
f u r t h e r i n l a n d . tie t h o n g h t t h a t t,hr n o r t , s from C a l a i s t o Bordeaux were
t h e most d e s i r a b l e . When tile I i r i t , i s h were j n F r a n c e , t h e y o p e r a t e d from
L o r i e n t t o C a l a i s and t h a t even w i t h t h e s e p o r t s , i t r e q u i r e d a l o n g
p e r i o d of t i m e t o b u i l d up n i n e d i v i s i o n s .
GYKEEAL h!ARSHALL s a i d t h a t a f t e r t h e d i r e c t c r o s s i n g had been
a c c o m p l i s h e d , he t h o u g h t i t would be d e s i r a b l e t o f i n d some method o f

making a f l a n k a t t a c k i n o r d e r t o s h o r t e n t h e o p e r a t i o n s . I n t h i s con-.
n e c t i o n , he had c o n s i d e r e d the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f Holland and Denmark.
SIR ALAS BPOOXL s a i d t h a t b e f o r e a s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e c o u l d b e
b u i l t up f o r a d i r e c t a t , t a c k , t h e Germans, b e c a u s e of t h e i r s u p e r i o r
communications, c o u l d c o n c e n t r a t e a g a i n s t our f o r c e s i n s u p e r i o r numbers
T h i s w i l l b e t r u e u n l e s s German d i v i s i o n s a r e f o r c e d t o withdraw from
F r a n c e because t h e Russian "steam r o l l e r " had s t a r t e d r o l l i n g .

S I R EUELEY POIINT: s a i d t h a t Penmark d i d n o t o f f e r good oppor.~.
t u n i t i e s f o r h o s t i l e l a n d i n g s because of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s of a i r c o v e r - ,
a g e and a l s o because o f t h e l a c k of p o r t s on h e r w e s t e r n c o a s t . Holland
i s u n d e s i r a b l e b e c a u s e of her c a n a l system which f a v o r s t h e d e f e n s e i n

r e t a r d i n g f o r w a r d movements,,
S I n ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t i t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o d e t e r m i n e
a c c u r a t e l y w h a t flow o f r e i n f o r c e m e n t s from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d
b e exaected
GEiWML SOMEDVELL s t a t e d t h a t he would b e p r e p a r e d t o p r e s e n t
s u c h d a t a w i t h i n from 8 t o 10 h o u r s a f t e r a d e c i s i o n c o n c e r n i n g Opera..
t i o n HUSKY had k e n made
789
U. S .
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G t h e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t l i m i t e d o p e r a t i o n s p r o p o s e d
from England i n 1943 b e d i s c u s s e d .
The B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f
s t a t e d t h a t t h e y had a p a p e r on
t h i s s u b j e c t i n t h e p r o c e s s of p r e p a r a t i o n and would b e p r e p a r e d t o
d i s c u s s i t d u r i n g t h e m e e t i n g o f J a n u a r y 22nd.
SIR A L A N BROOKE b r o u g h t up t h e q u e s t i o n of what o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
s e t - u p f o r BOLERO would be.
Both t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f a g r e e d t h a t
t h e y had n o t d i s c u s s e d t h i s m a t t e r among themselves and had n o t come t o
a d e f i n i t e conclusion.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e r e were two methods of o r g a n i z a
t i o n t h a t m i g h t b e f o l l o w e d : e i t h e r a Deputy Commander o r a Chief'
of
S t a f f c o u l d be s e t up w i t h an a p p r o p r i a t e s t a f f ; or a Commanding General
c o u l d b e s e l e c t e d a t once and o r g a n i z e his own s t a f f . . I n e i t h e r c a s e ,
t h e p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g f o r t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d b e u n d e r t a k e n a t
once and c a r r i e d o u t on a m o n t h - t o - m o n t h b a s i s , r e a d y a t any t i m e t o
undertake a cross-channel
o p e r a t i o n i f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y was p r e s e n t e d .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was a combined staff i n London

now which might b e a n u c l e u s around which t h e BOLERO p l a n n i n g o r g a n i z a
cion could be b u i l t .
IQRD M U I S MOUNTBATTEN p o i n t e d o u t t h a t any o p e r a t i o n s u n d e r

t a k e n t h i s y e a r would b e v e r y s m a l l ,
SIR ALAN BROOKE c o n s i d e r e d t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of how s m a l l t h e
o p e r a t i o n s might b e , t h e y s h o u l d b e t i e d i n w i t h t h e d v e r - . a i l p l a n f o r
the all-out
i n v a $ i o n of t h e C o n t i n e n t and d e s i g n e d t o f u r t h e r t h o s e
o p e r a t i o n s i n some way.
THE COMMITTEE:
Agreed t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Combined S t a f f s s h o u l d p r e
p a r e and submit recommendations t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f ,
t o b e r e a d y n o t l a t e r t h a n t h e a f t e r n o o n of J a n u a r y 22, r e l a t i v e
t o t h e command, o r g a n i z a t i o n , p l a n n i n g a n d t r a i n i n g s e t - u p
n e c e s s a r y f o r e n t r y o f C o n t i n e n t a l E u r o p e from t h e U. X
1943 and 1944.
290
in
S . SECRET
6-
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TIHE PRIME MINISTER

hithout discussion,
THE COMMITTEE:
D i r e c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i a t t o prepare a d r a f t report of d e c i
s i o n s reached subsequent t o t h e s u b m i s s i o n o f C . C . S .
291
153/1.
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S.
6 6 t h Meeting
MINUTES o f Meeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp

on F r i d a y , J a n u a r y 22, 1943, a t 1015.
PRESENT
General G. C . M a r s h a l l , U S A
Admiral o f t h r F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
F. A. P o r t a l

n e a r Admiral C . M. Cooke, J r . , USN
Brig. General J . E. H u l l , USA
B r i g . General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA*
Vice A d m i r a l t h e Lord Louis
Mountbatten
Lt.
Sir
L * Ismay
Major General J . N . Kennedy *
A i r Vice Marshal J . C. S l e s s o r
A i r Vice Marshal F. F. I n g l i s
L t . Colonel C. E . R. H i r s c h
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V. Dykes
B r i g a d i e r E. I. C. J a c o b
L t . Colonel L. T . Grove, USA
For P a r t o f Meeting
:>:>
292
For I t e m
**
*
**
U. S. SECRET
1.
D R U T O F TELEGRAM TO Mr, STALIN.

(C.C.S.
165/1)
A f t e r s e v e r a l m i n o r amendments h a d b e e n a g r e e d upon,
THE COIvIMITT%E:
D i r e c t e d t h a t t h e d ~ r a f t t e l e g r a m as amended b e s u b m i t t e d t o the
P r e s i d e n t and t h e Prime h i i n i s t e r f o r t h e i r a p p r o v a l .
2 . HUSKY.
(C.C.S.
Ifil/l.)
F . I F A L f i : f!'(!OKi
s a j d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h F l a n r i e r s had examined
v a r i o u s p e r m u t a t i o n s and c o m b i n a t i o n s w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o a s s e m b l i n g and
t r a i n i n g t h e r e q u i s i t e f o r c e s f o r C p e r a t i o n HU>KY and concluded t h a t i t
c o u l d be. mounted by August I O t h ,
with the p o s s i b i l i t y of p u t t i n g the
d a t e forward t o August 1 5 t h . T h e E r i t i s h C h i e f s of l t a f f were i n f a v o r

o f Plan A described i n C.C.S.
Lnclosure "A",
2.61,'1,
paragraph 5 . H e s a i d
t h a t August 2 m d would b e t h e b e s t d a t e b e c a u s e of t h e f a v o r a b l e s t a t e
o f t h e moon. The d a t e c o u l d b e s e t s t i l l e a r l i ~ e r i f t h e T u n i s i a n p o r t s
were made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e B r i t i s h f o r l o a d i n g .
The R r i t i s h w i l l r e y u i r e 5 d i v i s i o n s i n a l l f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n , ,
T h e s e would p r o b a b l y b e t h e 5 t h , M t h , 7 8 t h f o r t h e f i r s t a s s a u l t ; one
d i v i s i o n i n from U .
1'.
f o r t h e C a t e n i a a s s a u l t on
Zealand d i v i . s i o n f o r t h e follow-up.
r: +
3; and t h e New
I t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y t o move t h e o v e r - .
s e a s A s s a u l t Force from England t o the e a s t e r n Y e d i t e r r a n e a n about

Uarch 15th,. Once t h i s h a d b e e n accomplished, t h e B r i t i s h wouldbe commit
t e d t o O p e r a t i o n HUSKY t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of RF.I?iSTO~SE.
GEE~EPAL \fArc'HAI.I, s a i d t h a t w h i l e t h e U .
S. Planning Staff d i d
n o t have complete d a t a a v a . i l a b l e at t h i s time, t h e U . S . Chiefs of Staff

a r e of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t as f a r a s the I i n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s a r e concerned,
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY c o u l d be mounted by August 1st or e a r l i e r . He r e f e r r e d
t o a s t a t e m e n t made i n paragraph 4 of t h e o u t l i n e p l a n ( m c l o s u r e "A"
C.C.S.
to
165/1) t h a t if t h e B r i t i s h f o r c e s used t h e A l g e r i a n and T u n i s i a n
p o r t s i n o r d e r t o be r e a d y by August I s t , t h e American s h a r e of t h e
a s s a u l t might be d e l a y e d beyond August 31sto The United S t a t e s C h i e f s of
S t a f f were of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h c o u l d u t i l i z e a l l t h e p o r t s
f r o m B i z e r t e e a s t w a r d and t h e United S t a t e s f o r c e s c o u l d s t i l l b e made
S u b s e q u e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a s C.C.E..
165/3.
2 93
ll. S. S E C R E T
r e a d y by August 1 s t . The o n l y u s e r e q u i r e d by t h e American f o r c e s of
R i z e r t e a n d p o r t s t o t h e e a s t w a r d would be f o r r e f u e l i n g p u r p o s e s , He
s t a t e d t h a t a s f a r as l a n d i n g c r a f t is concerned, l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y would
b e e n c o u n t e r e d . The l i m i t i n g f a c t o r would b e t h e " d e g r e e of
finished
t r a i n i n g " t h a t would be n e c e s s a r y . One d i v i s i o n t o come from tlie United

S t a t e s i s u n d e r g o i n g thorough amphibious t r a i n i n g a t this t i m e . The remain
i n g d i v i s i o n s t o p a r t i c i p a t e a r e now i n North e f r i c a . They have a l r e a d y
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s , and t h e i r f u r t h e r t r a i n i n g p r e s e n t s
n o p r o b l e m . The q u e s t i o n o f r e l i e v i n g t h e s e d i v i s j o n s which a r e now
b e i n g h e l d r e a d y f o r ariy e v e n t u a l i t y i n S p a n i s h iiorocco w i l l r e q u i r e
careful
planning.
SIR ALAF BPOOKE s a i d t h a t t h e F r i t i s h P l a n n e r s t h o u g h t t h a t i t
m i g h t be n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e F r i t . i s l i t o have p o r t s somewhat f u r t h e r west

t h a n B i z e r t e ' i n o r d e r t o meet a t a r g e t date of August 1 s t .
ADh!IFAL COOKE s a i d t h a t t h e R r i t i s h coiild t r a i n a t Bougie and do
t h e i r l o a d i n g i n t h e T u n i s a r e a . :!e c o u l d s e e no r e a s o n why a l l t h e
f o r c e s c o u l d n o t meet a t a r g e t d a t e of August 1st. Xe r e a l i z e d t h a t the
Germans might do c o n s i d e r a b l e damage t o the p o r t s of B i z e r t e and Tunis,
b u t he e s t . i m a t e d t h a t b y h l a s t i n g p r o c e s s e s t h e p o r t s c o u l d b e c l e a r e d
for use by the time t h e a i r f o r c e s were ready t o o p e r a t e
S I R ALAb EROORZ p o i n t e d o n t t h a t t h e E r i t i s h p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s
f . w t h e t a r g e t da.te were based
OII
an e s t i m a t e t h a t t h e A x i s f o r c e s would
b e d r i v e n from T u n i s i a by k p r j l 7Otti. I f t h i s i s a c c o m p l i s h e d s o o n e r ,
i h e target d a t e c o u l d be moved forward a c c o r d i n g 1y ,
ADMIRAL COOKE p o i n t e d oirt t h a t t h e r e i s s t i l l u n c e r t a i n t y r e g a r d
i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e b e a c h e s i n $ . i c i l y . They might n o t b e s u i t a b l e
f o r t h e new t y p e s o f l a n d i n g c r a f t , and t h i s would i n v o l v e a change of
plans
H e a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t Admiral C'nnnirigham w i l l be p r e s e n t e d with
some d i f f i c u l t i e s when l a n d i n g c r a f t arid combat l o a d e r s a r e moved i n t o

t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n - I t w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o do t h i s i n time f o r them t o
be available for training
The American f o r c e s w i l l r e q u i r e some of t h e
new t y p e LCA l a n d i n g c r a f t - These weigh 8 t o n s empty, 1 3 t o n s loaded,

a n d c a r r y 36 men. The d a v i t s on t h e IT. S. combat l o a d e r s may have t o be
r e p l a c e d o r a d j u s t e d i n o r d e r t o be c a p a b l e of h a n d l i n g such weight,,
LORD LOI!IS \:OUK'YBATl'EX
s a i d t h e E r i t i s h a r e b u i l d i n g 30
LCA
U. S. SECRET
3 7 I T I S H MOST SECRET
type l a n d i n g c r a f t p e r m o n t h i n E n g l a n d . The number needed by t h e American
f o r c e s c o u l d e i t h e r b e s e n t t o America from England or t h e b l u e p r i n t s
c o u l d be s e n t t o America and t h e c r a f t c o u l d be c o n s t r u c t e d t h e r e . The
d e s i g n i s c o m p a r a t i v e l y s i m p l e , and he thought t h a t t h e y could e a s i l y be
manufactured i n t h e United S t a t e s . If t h e c r a f t were t o be manufactured
i n E n g l a n d , i t would b e n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e United S t a t e s t,o f u r n i s h the
e n g i n e s r e q u i r e d . The s h i p p i n g of some 60 LCA t o t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , how
e v e r , would n o t be an e a s y problem.
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d i t was a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e whole p l a n might
r e q u i r e some changes; t h e r e might b e some u n f o r e s e e n and insurmountable
d i f f i c u l t i e s which would n e c e s s i t a t e t h e p o s t p o n i n g of t h e t a r g e t dat,e
t o o l o n g . He t h o u g h t t h a t , i n t h i s c a s e , we s h o u l d be p r e p a r e d w i t k r an
alternative.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t .he u n d e r s t o o d t h e o n l y p o s s i b l t
a l t e r n a t i v e was O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE and i n d i c a t e d t h a t he would l i k e t o

d i s c u s s f r a n k l y t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t o p e r a t i o n .
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t O p e r a t i o n BRIKSTONE would a f f o r d a base
f o r t h e bombing o f t h e whole of I t a l y ; it would b e a n easier o p e r a t , i o n
t o u n d e r t a k e ; and i t c o u l d be a c c o m p l i s h e d e a r l i e r . I t d o e s n o t a s s i s t
i n c l e a r i n g t h e Mediterranean f o r s h i p p i n g , and i t would n o t be a s g r e a t ,
a blow t o I t a l y . However, he f e l t i t e s s e n t i a l t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE, as a p o s s i b i l i t y , b e n o t d e l a y e d s o l o n g a s t o
l e a v e u s w i t h no a l t e r n a t i v e f o r 1913 if i t were found that, HUSKY c o u l d
n o t be accomplished.
GENERAL SIARSHALL s a i d i t was t h e o p i n i o n of t h e U . S. C h i e f s of'
S t a f f t h a t w h i l e O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE would produce a n a d v a n t a g e as f a r
as a i r a t t a c k a g a i n s t I t a l y is c o n c e r n e d , i t would postpone IIUSKY. Any

o p e r a t i o n i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n would p o s t p o n e t h e BOLERO b u i l d - u p .
lle
c o n s i d e r e d BRIMSTONE a minor o p e r a t i o n which would r e s u l t i n many m i l i
t a r y r e s t r i c t i o n s . E i t h e r HUSKY o r c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s w i l l p r o
d u c e g r e a t r e s u l t s , whereas BRIMSTONE m e r e l y g i v e s an a i r a d v a n t a g e .
A t t h e same time, i t j e o p a r d i z e s t h e p r o s p e c t s of e i t h e r HUSKY or c r o s s
channel operations.
GENERAL MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t German r e s i s t a n c e t o O p e r a t i o n
BRIMSTONE c o u l d n o t b e d i s c o u n t e d . I n e s t i m a t i n g t h e c a p a b i l i t j e s of t h e
295
S. SECRET
BRITISY M9ST SECRET
U.
United Nations,
i t must b e assumed t h a t t h e G e r m a n s a r e aware t h a t
S a r d i n i a c a n be u n d e r t a k e n a t an e a r l i e r d a t e t h a n HUSKY. They will

undoubtedly make t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n s a c c o r d i n g l y . I!e added t h a t t h e under
t a k i n g of BRI!.ISTONE would d e s t r o y t h e cover f o r f u t u r e o p e r a t i o r i s u n l e s s
t h e Germans c o n c l u d e t h a t we p r o p o s e t o b y - p a s s
S i c i l y e n t i r e l y and
a t t a c k s o u t h e r n F r a n c e . iie t h o u g h t i t h a r d l y l i k e l y that t h e Germans

would come t o s u c h a c o n c l u s i o n .
IIe s a i d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f a r e more c o n c e r n e d
w i t h a d d i n g t o t h e s e c u r i t y of s h i p p i n g t h r o u g h t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n and
w i t h t h e immediate e f f e c t s
of o u r o p e r a t i o n s on Germany's s t r e n g t h
a g a i n s t t h e :lussians t h a n t h e y a r e w i t h e l i m i n a t i n g I t a l y from t h e war.

He t h o u g h t t h a t t o u n d e r t a k e O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE would be t o s e e k t,lie
s o f t e s t s p o t b e f o r e t u r n i n g t o t h e h a r d e r s p o t and i n s o d o i n g we might
make t h e h a r d e r s p o t h a r d e r .
AtE4I:UL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e a i r f i e l d s i n S a r d i n i a have a
r e l a t i v e l y small c a p a c i t y and t h a t t h e y would have t o be d e v e l o p e d .
lVhile t h e p o s i t i o n o f S a r d i n i a d o e s b r i n g n o r t h e r n I t a l y and s o u t h e r n
F r a n c e w i t h i n r a n g e o f o u r f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t , i t i s , by t h e same t o k e n ,
w i t h i n range o f A x i s a i r c r a f t based i n those a r e a s .
GENERAL AiWOLD s a i d t h a t i n o r d e r t o g e t f i g h t e r p r o t e c t i o n from

S a r d i n i a we must c a p t u r e C o r s i c a .
GENERAL !,IASHALL s a i d t h a t t h e IJnited S t a t e s C h i e f s o f S t a f f a r e
v e r y much opposed t o t h e O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE.
SIX ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t he a g r e e d w i t h a l l of t h e s e arguments,

and he f e l t t h a t we must go a l l o u t f o r S i c i l y . A t t h e same t i m e , he
f e l t t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e an a l t e r n a t i v e upon which we c o u l d f a l l b a c k
i n c a s e of a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y .
AD!,IIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e i d e a l would be t o a t t a c k S i c i l y a t
tkle same t i m e t h e <Germans were e v a c u a t i n g T u n i s . The l o n g e r t h e a t t a c k
a g a i n s t S i c i l y i s d e l a y e d beyond t h a t d a t e , t h e s t r o n g e r w i l l b e tire
d e f e n s e s of S i c i l y . He t h o u g h t i t i m p o r t a n t ,
therefore,
that every
e f f o r t b e made t o r e d u c e t h i s l a p s e o f t i m e t o t h e minimum.
L0I:D
LOUIS XOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n t h e i d e a l would
U. S. SECRET
BRITISB MOST SECRET
be t o t a k e S a r d i n i a d u r i n g t h e time t h a t T u n i s was b e i n g e v a c u a t e d by
t h e Axis f o r c e s . I!e f e l t t h a t t h e A x i s powers would t h e n b e g i v i n g l i t t l e
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e d e f e n s e s of S a r d i n i a . He t h o u g h t t h a t t h e e a r l i e r d a t e
upon which t h e O p e r a t i o n BRElSTONE c o u l d b e a c c o m p l i s h e d , t h e s e c u r i n g
of a i r bases from which t o a t t a c k n o r t h e r n I t a l y , and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
c o n d u c t i n g Commando r a i d s a l l a l o n g t h e c o a s t of I t a l y , combined t o make
O p e r a t i o n BXIhlSTONE v e r y a t t r a c t i v e .
GENEXAL !?IIAnSHALL a s k e d Lord L o u i s : . f o u n t b a t t e n i f t h e t r a i n i n g
d i f f i c u l t i e s would b e r e d u c e d i f we were a b l e t o a t t a c k S i c i l y a t t h e
same time t h a t T u n i s w a s b e i n g e v a c u a t e d by t h e A x i s f o r c e s .
LOXD LOUIS MOIJNTBATTEN s a i d he d i d n o t t h i n k so inasmuch as t h e
e v a c u a t i o n would have s m a l l e f f e c t on t h e f i x e d d e f e n s e s of S i c i l y .
SI:( DIJDLEY POUND p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i f t h e o p e r a t i o n were t o be
mounted b e f o r e August ?2nd, i t s h o u l d be moved f o r w a r d t o J u l y 2 5 t h i n
o r d e r t o t a k e f u l l a d v a n t a g e of t h e f a v o r a b l e s t a g e of t h e moon.
ADMIRAL K I N G s u g g e s t e d t h a t f o r p u r p o s e s of s u r p r i s e i t might
be w e l l t o mount t h e o p e r a t i o n a t a time o t h e r t h a n when t h e moon was i n
its best stage.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t o a v o i d undue r i s k o f
a e r i a l t o r p e d o a t t a c k t h e p e r i o d s of t h e f u l l moon s h o u l d b e a v o i d e d
and t h a t t h e a s s a u l t s h o u l d be made only when t h e r e was moonlight d u r i n g
t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s . There was a p e r i o d o f from 5 t o 6 days i n e a c h
month which would be s u i t a b l e .
ADIIIRAL K I N G s a i d he thought t h a t J u l y 2 5 t h s h o u l d be s e t as t h e
t a r g e t d a t e f o r p l a r i n i n g p u r p o s e s and t h a t t h e a t t a c k s h o u l d o n l y be
p o s t p o n e d t o August if J ~ l y
proved t o be i m p o s s i b l e
LORD LOUIS XOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t a c l e a r s t a t e m e n t s h o u l d b e

made by t h e n a v a l f o r c e s as t o when t h e i r t r a i n i n g can be c o m p l e t e d . Ile
prophesied t h a t naval t r a i n i n g w i l l be the b o t t l e n e c k ,
SIX C H L L E S PORTAL a g r e e d w i t h A d m i r a l King t h a t J u l y s h o u l d b e

s e t as t h e t a r g e t d a t e i n o r d e r t h a t w e might s t r i v e f o r t h e b e s t . He
added t h a t we s h o u l d a l s o be p r e p a r e d f o r t h e w o r s t . :!e
pointed out t h a t
t h e c r i t i c a l t i m e on t h e A u s s i a n f r o n t i s i n .4ugust and September. I f

237
U. S . SECRET
t h e t a r g e t d a t e f o r HUSKY had t o be postponed beyond September, i t would
be of l i t t l e v a l u e , H e c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h e c o l l a p s e of I t a l y would have
t h e most f a v o r a b l e e f f e c t on t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t . S i n c e t h i s m i g h t b e
a c c o m p l i s h e d b y O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE, he thought t h a t w e s h o u l d b e p r e p a r e d
t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s o p e r a t i o n ifHUSKY had t o b e d e l a y e d t o o long., BRIMSTONE
i n .June w o u l d b e b e t t e r t h a n HUSKY i n September; but a d e c i s i o n t o under
t a k e BXIhfSTONE must b e made b y March 1 s t ; o t h e r w i s e the l a n d i n g c r a f t
would be a t t h e wrong end of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
GENERAL. MARSHALL s a i d he thought t h e r e s h o u l d b e no l o o s e n e s s i n
our d e t , e r m i n a t i o n t o u n d e r t a k e O p e r a t i o n HUSKY. He r e c o u n t e d t h e d i f f i .
c u l t i e s r e g a r d i n g t h e changes and d e l a y s i n BOLERO i n 1942.
S I R ALAN B!IOOKE
and SIIl CHARLES PORTAL a g r e e d w i t h t h i s v i e w .
GENERAL MklSHALL s a i d t h a t we must be d e t e r m i n e d t o do t h e h a r d

t h i n g and p r o c e e d t o do
it^ He d i d n o t a g r e e w i t h S i r C h a r l e s P o r t a l
t h a t t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f I t a l y from t h e war w a s t h e most i m p o r t a n t t h i n g

t h a t c o u l d be done. To a c c e p t t h i s premise might make i t a b s o l u t e l y nec
e s s a r y t o t u r n t o O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE i n o r d e r t h a t I t a l y c o u l d b e
e l i m i n a t e d i n time. Ile f e l t t h a t t h i s s h o u l d b e avoided because O p e r a t i o n
BRIMSTONE would n e u t r a l i z e t h e e f f o r t s of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s f o r 1943.
H e s a i d t h a t i n BRIMSTONE we s h o u l d b e a d v a n c i n g i n t o a s a l i e n t w i t h
l i m i t e d a i r s u p p o r t where w e might b e s h o t a t from t h r e e d i r e c t i o n s , The
s u p p l y of S a r d i n i a e n t a i l s an i n c r e a s e i n our l i n e of communications and
adds a t h r e a t t o our l i m i t e d s h i p p i n g .
SIR DUDLEY POUND s a i d t h a t i f O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE i s u n d e r t a k e n ,
HUSKY would have t o be d e l a y e d u n t i l t h e p e r i o d o f b a d weather i n October
or l a t e r ,
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE would n o t b e an
e a s y o p e r a t i o n . F i g h t e r s u p p o r t would b e i n a d e q u a t e , and i t would be
n e c e s s a r y t o f i g h t o u r way n o r t h w a r d t h r o u g h t h e e n t i r e i s l a n d , He
b e l i e v e d t h a t we s h o u l d g o b a l d - h e a d e d f o r S i c i l y . H e f e l t t h a t t h e
c a p t u r e of S i c i l y would have more e f f e c t on t h e war.. He added, however,
t h a t if by March 1st i t d e v e l o p s t h a t O p e r a t i o n HUSKY c a n n o t be mounted
u n t i l t o o l a t e , i t was i m p o r t a n t f o r u s t o have a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o t u r n
t o i n o r d e r t h a t w e do n o t remain i d l e f o r t h e e n t i r e y e a r "
238
K S . SECRET
The d i s c u s s i o n t h e n turned on t h e Command and S t a f f o r g a n i z a t i o n
which would be r e q u i r e d f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n .
ADMIRAL COOKE s a i d t h a t thecombined S t a f f P l a n n e r s f e l t s t r o n g l y
t h a t one man should be made r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e w h o l e o f t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s ;
o t h e r w i s e , i t was v e r y u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e n e c e s s a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s could b e
c o m p l e t e d w i t h i n t h e s h o r t t i m e a v a i l a b l e . A s p e c i a l s t a f f would b e
required f o r the purpose
I n t h e d i s c u s s i o n t h i s need was f u l l y a c c e p t e d , and i t was
r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e Chief o f S t a f f must b e c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d ,
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) R e s o l v e d t o a t t a c k S i c i l y i n 1943 w i t h t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y
moon as t h e t a r g e t d a t e
@) Agreed t o i n s t r u c t G e n e r a l Eisenhower t o r e p o r t n o t l a t e r
t h a n March 1st: (1) whether a n y insurmountable d i f f i c u l t y as

t o r e s o u r c e s and t r a i n i n g w i l l cause t h e d a t e o f t h e a s s a u l t
t o b e d e l a y e d beyond t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon; and,
(2) i n
t h a t e v e n t , t o confirm t h a t t h e d a t e w i l l n o t b e l a t e r t h a n
t h e f a v o r a b l e August moon
(c) Agreed t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g s h o u l d h e t h e Command s e t - u p for
the operation:
(1) General Eisenhower t o be i n Supreme Command w i t h General
Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief,
r e s p o n s i b l e for
t h e d e t a i l e d planning and p r e p a r a t i o n and for t h e execu

t i o n of t h e a c t u a l o p e r a t i o n when launched
(2) Admiral Cunningham t o b e t h e Naval Commander, and A i r

Chief Marshal Tedder t h e A i r Commander
(3) Recommendations f o r t h e o f f i c e r s t o b e appointed Western

and E a s t e r n Task Force Commanders t o be submitted i n due
course by General Eisenhower
(d) Agreed t h a t General Eisenhower s h o u l d b e i n s t r u c t e d t o s e t
up f o r t h w i t h , a f t e r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h G e n e r a l Alexander, a
s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f , w i t h i t s own
Chief of S t a f f , f o r p l a n n i n g and p r e p a r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n .
(e) I n s t r u c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i e s t o d r a f t f o r t h e i r a p p r o v a l t h e
n e c e s s a r y d i r e c t i v e t o General Eisenhower conveying t h e
above d e c i s i o n s .
299
U.. S. SECRET
B R I T I S R MOST SECRET
C.C.S.
6 7 t h Meeting

on F r i d a y , J a n u a r y 22, 1343, a t 14.70.
PRESENT
General G. C. M a r s h a l l , USA
A d m i r a l E . J . King, USN
A d m i r a l of t h e F l e e t S i r Dudley
Pound
L t . General H . 11. Arnold, USA
A i r Chief Marshal Sir C h a r l e s

F. A. P o r t a l

Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
B r i g . General J . E. H u l l , USA
B r i g . General A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
Vice A d m i r a l t h e Lord Louis
Mountbatten
Lt*
Sir
Ismay
Air Vice Marshal J . C. S l e s s o r
SECRETMIAT
Dykes
B r i g a d i e r E.
I. C. Jacob
L t . Colonel L . T . Grove, USA
300
u. s.
smEr
SRITISH VOST SECRET

1.
CONDUCT OF THE W A R I N THE PACIFIC THEATER I N 1943.

(C.C.S.
168)
The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f had b e f o r e t h e m a memorandum by the

J o i n t U. S . Chiefs of S t a f f which Admiral Ring e x p l a i n e d w i t h t h e a i d of
a map o f t h e P a c 5 f i c t h e a t e r .
GENEHAL ARNOLD, i n r e p l y t o a q u e s t i o n by S i r C h a r l e s P o r t a l ,
s a i d t h a t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l r a d i u s of a c t i o n of t h e B - 2 9 and B-32 was
1 , 6 0 0 miles. T h i s would be s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e bombardment of Tokyo from
t h e Nanchang a r e a . T h e b e s t b a s e s f o r t h e bombardment o f Japan were i n
t h e Maritime P r o v i n c e s where t h e r e were known t o be t w e n t y - f i v e a i r
f i e l d s . No d e t a i l s , however, were a v a i l a b l e r e g a r d i n g t h e i r c o n d i t i o n .
THE COMMITTEF.:
Took n o t e of t h e p r o p o s a l s of t h e J o i n t U .
S . C h i e f s of S t a f f
f o r t h e c o n d u c t of t h e war i n t h e P a c i f i c t h e a t e r i n 1 9 1 3 , a s
s e t o u t i n C.C.S.
2.
168.
PRESS COMMUNIQUEo
( P r e v i o u s r e f e r e n c e C.C.S.
6 1 s t V e e t i n g , Item I )
The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f t o o k n o t e t h a t t h e E r e s i d e n t and

Prime ' V i n i s t e r were t h e m s e l v e s p r e p a r i n g t h e communique f o r i s s u e t o
t h e p r e s s a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e C o n f e r e n c e , and t h a t i t would n o t ,
t h e r e f o r e , be n e c e s s a r y f o r them t o submit a d r a f t .
3.
CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS I N 1943.

(C.C.S.
167)
The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f had b e f o r e them a r e p o r t by t h e

B r i t i s h J o i n t Planning S t a f f o n C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s in1943,C.C.S.167.
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d that paragraph 2 (c) was somewhat misleading
i n i t s p r e s e n t form s i n c e t h e r e c o u l d , i n f a c t , be no half-way
house
between t h e l i m i t e d o p e r a t i o n s d e s c r i b e d i n (a) and (b) of t h e paragraph

and r e t u r n t o t h e C o n t i n e n t i n f u l l . H e proposed t h a t s u b p a r a g r a p h (c)
s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , be amended t o r e a d , "Return t o t h e Continent t o t a k e
advantage of German d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . "
The p o l i c y which t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f recommended was
c o n t a i n e d i n p a r a g r a p h 1 9 of t h e p a p e r .
3 01
U. S . SECRET
BRITISH YOST SECPET
The p r o v i s i o n of a d d i t i o n a l a i r b o r n e f o r c e s from t h e U. S. would
b e e s s e n t i a l s i n c e HUSKY would u s e up a l l B r i t i s h r e s o u r c e s i n t h i s
respect.
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN agreed and emphasized t h e need f o r a i r

borne f o r c e s t o t u r n t h e beach d e f e n s e s . Without t h e s e and armored f o r c e s
t o f o l l o w up, t h e a s s a u l t on t h e n o r t h e r n c o a s t of F r a n c e was, i n h i s
o p i n i o n , q u i t e i m p r a c t i c a b l e . tle drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e note a t t h e end
of paragraph 5 r e l a t i n g t o armored l a n d i n g c r a f t .
THE COMMITTEE:
Agreed t o d e f e r f i n a l acceptance of t h e p r o p o s a l s of t h e B r i t i s h
Chiefs of S t a f f pending f u r t h e r s t u d y .
4.
ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND, CONTROL, PLANNING AND T R A I N I N G ElOR

CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS.
(C.C.S.
169)
The Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f had b e f o r e them a n o t e by t h e

Combined S t a f f s , C.C.S.
169.
SIR ALAN BROOKE thought t h a t i t would be premature t o d e s i g n a t e

a Supreme Commander f o r l a r g e - s c a l e o p e r a t i o n s on t h e C o n t i n e n t a t
p r e s e n t i n view of t h e l i m i t e d o p e r a t i o n s which c o u l d be c a r r i e d out

w i t h a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s i n 1 9 4 3 . A s p e c i a l s t a f f was, however, necessary
f o r c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s and s h o u l d , he t h o u g h t , be s e t up without
delay.
GENERAL MARSHALL a g r e e d t h a t a Supreme Commander would make a
top-heavy o r g a n i z a t i o n a t p r e s e n t , b u t thought t h a t i t was d e s i r a b l e t o
p u t a s p e c i a l s t a f f under a s e l e c t e d Chief of S t a f f of s u f f i c i e n t stand
i n g ; such an o f f i c e r would perhaps s u f f i c e f o r t h e cmmand of limitedcp
e r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e summer. T h i s s p e c i a l s t a f f c o u l d work o u t t h e i r
p l a n s on t h e b a s i s of c e r t a i n f o r c e s b e i n g a v a i l a b l e , even though t h e y
were n o t i n a c t u a l c o n t r o l of t h e t r o o p s themselves.
SIR ALAN BROOKE s a i d t h a t t h e s t a f f which was a t p r e s e n t working
on cross-channel o p e r a t i o n s belonged t o v a r i o u s Commanders i n t h e United
Kingdom. I t would be n e c e s s a r y t o t a k e them away from t h e i r p r e s e n t
Commanders and s e t them up independently.
302
U. S . SECRET
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Accepted t h e p r o p o s a l s c o n t a i n e d i n C.C.S.
169, except f o r
t h e immediate appointment of a Supreme Commander.
@) Agreed t h a t a Supreme Commander w i l l u l t i m a t e l y be n e c e s s a r y
f o r t h e r e e n t r y t o the Continent, b u t t h a t he should not b e

appointed a t the present t i m e .
(c) A g r e e d t h a t a B r i t i s h C h i e f of S t a f f , t o g e t h e r w i t h a n
i n d e p e n d e n t U. S . - B r i t i s h s t a f f s h o u l d b e a p p o i n t e d a t once
f o r t h e c o n t r o l , p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g o f c r o s s - c h a n n e l
o p e r a t i o n s i n 1943.
(d) I n v i t e d t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e i r
a p p r o v a l a d r a f t d i r e c t i v e t o g o v e r n t h e p l a n n i n g and conduct
of c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s i n 1943 i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e
d e c i s i o n s t o b e reached on C.C.S.
167.
(e) Agreed t h a t t h e above d i r e c t i v e should make p r o v i s i o n f o r a

r e t u r n t o the Continent w i t h t h e f o r c e s t h a t w i l l b e a v a i l
a b l e f o r t h i s p u r p o s e i n t h e United Kingdom month by month.
5.
LANDING CRAFT,
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN gave an account o f t h e B r i t i s h e x p e r i e n c e s
i n b u i l d i n g up a n A s s a u l t F l e e t . H e d e s c r i b e d how t h e L.C.I.
(L) had been
produced and e x p l a i n e d t h e d i s l o c a t i o n which had b e e n caused by TORCH.
For t h a t o p e r a t i o n i t had been n e c e s s a r y t o s t o p t h e e n t r y and t r a i n i n g
of B r i t i s h c r e w s s o t h a t U. S. combat teams c o u l d have t h e u s e o f t h e

t r a i n i n g c e n t e r a t I n v e r a r a y , A s a r e s u l t , a s i t u a t i o n had a r i s e n i n
which t h e B r i t i s h were t e m p o r a r i l y u n a b l e t o man a l l t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t
a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l . The p o s i t i o n was now i n hand, and t h e r e would b e no
d i f f i c u l t y i n manning a l l t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t e x p e c t e d by n e x t A u g u s t ,
He drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s h o r t a g e o f s p a r e p a r t s which had
r e c e n t l y f o r c e d him t o c o n s i d e r t h e c a n n i b a l i z a t i o n o f 25% o f t h e l a n d i n g
c r a f t a t h i s d i s p o s a l . T h i s p o s i t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o Admiral Cooke, a l s o
was now i m p r o v i n g ; b u t he emphasized t h e v e r y g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e of pro
v i d i n g ample s p a r e s p a r a l l e l w i t h t h e p r o d u c t i o n of c r a f t .
H e described t h e organization of t h e B r i t i s h Assault F l e e t s .
B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , t h e r e were l o c a l f o r c e s o r g a n i z e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n
home waters, w e s t e r n and e a s t e r n Mediterranean, and I n d i a . B e s i d e s t h e s e
l o c a l f o r c e s , t h e r e was an o v e r s e a s A s s a u l t Force w i t h a l i f t o f 30,000
303
U. S . SECRET
p e r s o n n e l , 3,300 v e h i c l e s and 200 t a n k s . The purpose o f t h i s F o r c e was t o
r e i n f o r c e t h e l o c a l A s s a u l t F l e e t i n whichever t h e a t e r might be t h e cen
t e r of a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s .
T h i s F o r c e would b e r e a d y t o s a i l f o r t h e
M e d i t e r r a n e a n by March 1 5 t h , t o t a k e p a r t i n HUSKY.
IIe d e s c r i b e d t h r e e i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n s of amphibious o p e r a t i o n s
which had s o f a r emerged:
(a) For any amphibious campaign i n v o l v i n g a s s a u l t s o n s t r o n g l y
defended c o a s t s h e l d by a determined enemy, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t
t h e l a n d i n g s h i p s and c r a f t s h a l l b e o r g a n i z e d w e l l i n advance
i n t o p r o p e r a s s a u l t f l e e t s . T h e s e m u s t h a v e a coherence anddegree
of permanence comparable t o t h a t of any f i r s t - l i n e f i g h t i n g for

mation. D i s c i p l i n e , t r a i n i n g , and t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y are j u s t
as n e c e s s a r y f o r a s s a u l t f l e e t s as f o r n a v a l , m i l i t a r y and a i r
combat f o r m a t i o n s . T h i s was t h e o v e r r i d i n g l e s s o n o f Dieppe.
(b) No combined o p e r a t i o n c a n be c a r r i e d o u t w i t h r e a s o n a b l e
hope o f s u c c e s s w i t h o u t adequate beach r e c o n n a i s s a n c e beforehand.
He had now o r g a n i z e d s p e c i a l l y t r a i n e d beach r e c o n n a i s s a n c e par
t i e s which had a l r e a d y done most v a l u a b l e work.

(c) Adequate f i r e s u p p o r t f o r t h e a s s a u l t a g a i n s t a s t r o n g l y
defended c o a s t was most e s s e n t i a l . A s c a l e of 100 guns (48 s e l f
propelled i n L.C,T.
L.C.G.)
and 52 i n t,he new gun c r a f t t o be known a s
f o r each a s s a u l t b r i g a d e had been recommended. He handed
a r o u n d d r a w i n g s o f a t y p e of a m p h i b i o u s c l o s e s u p p o r t v e s s e l
which had been d e s i g n e d f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . These s p e c i a l assault
c r a f t were p r i m a r i l y i n t e n d e d f o r R O U N D W , and none c o u l d b e r e a d y
i n time f o r HUSKY.
IIe t h e n handed around a t a b l e * showing t h e e s t i m a t e d a v a i l a b i l i t y
of B r i t i s h and American b u i l t l a n d i n g s h i p s and c r a f t . R e f e r r i n g t o t h i s

t a b l e , he p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e main B r i t i s h d e f i c i e n c i e s by n e x t August
would b e i n L . S . T .
and L . C . I . ( L j .
He urged most s t r o n g l y t h a t a l l o c a t i o n s
t o t h e B r i t i s h of b o t h t h e s e t y p e s should be i n c r e a s e d t o make up t h e s e
deficiencies
H e c o n f i r m e d t h a t p r o v i s i o n s h a d a l r e a d y been made f o r
manning t h e f u l l number of a l l t y p e s of c r a f t which had been asked f o r

by n e x t August t o g e t h e r w i t h 50 p e r c e n t s p a r e c r e w s ,
:: ANNEX
304
U.
S.
SECRET
S I I T I S H !?OST SECrlET
GENERAL SOMERVEU confirmed t h a t , s o f a r a s c o u l d be f o r e s e e n ,
s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t c o u l d be made a v a i l a b l e f o r b o t h t h e
U. S. and
B r i t i s h p o r t i o n s of HUSKY as now planned.
ADMIRAL K I N G drew a t t e n t i o n t o t h e g r e a t d i v e r s i t y of t y p e s of
B r i t i s h b u i l t s h i p s a n d c r a f t . He asked whether a g r e a t e r degree o f s t a n d
a r d i z a t i o n would n o t he p o s s i b l e . I n r e p l y LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN ex
p l a i n e d t h a t d i f f e r e n t types had been developed independently by t h e two
n a v i e s ; improvements had been made a s a r e s u l t of e x p e r i e n c e . Some
Of
t h o s e shown i n t h e t a b l e were now o u t of d a t e .

ADMIRAL COOKE e x p r e s s e d t h e view t h a t t h e p r o d u c t i o n of landing
c r a f t would be a t l e a s t a s g r e a t a s t h e a b i l i t y of t h e U. S . and B r i t i s h
Navies t o man them. He e x p l a i n e d t h e heavy demand f o r t h e P a c i f i c where
r a t e of wastage was h i g h and maintenance f a c i l i t i e s e x t r e m e l y l i m i t e d .

He confirmed t h e s h o r t a g e of s p a r e e n g i n e s . S p a r e s had been used t o f i t
up new h u l l s which had come o u t of p r o d u c t i o n i n l a r g e numbers.
iie e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l s p l i t of L.Y.T.
f o r ROUNDUP, as
between U. S. and B r i t i s h , had b e e n i n t h e p r o p o r t i o n of 125 t o be manned

by t h e U. S . and 7 9 b y the F r i t i s h . A l l o c a t i o n s now proposed b y t h e U. S.
Navy Department gave a higher p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e B r i t i s h , h a l f of t h e 168
proposed f o r t h e European T h e a t e r going t o t h e B r i t i s h and h a l f t o t h e
U. S . ; 117 of t h e s e c r a f t would he a l l o c a t e d t o t h e P a c i f i c . Ile t h e n

of which t h e U . S. had none a t a l l . H e
understood t h a t 96 of t h e s e c r a f t were r e q u i r e d f o r t h e B r i t i s h p o r t i o n
r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n of L.C.A.,
of HUSKY, and he thought t h a t a s i m i l a r number would be r e q u i r e d f o r t h e
U. S . p o r t i o n as w e l l .
LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n of t h e s e c r a f t
would need c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n . I t m i g h t h e found b e s t t o s e n d t h e
drawings t o America s o t h a t they could be b u i l t i n U. S . yards.
THE COMNITTEE:
(a) Agreed t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n should he reviewed by J u l y 1, 1943,

w h e t h e r t h e number of L . S . T . ( 2 )
t o he a l l o c a t e d t o t h e
B r i t i s h from t h e t o t a l U. S. p r o d u c t i o n of 390 can be r a i s e d

from t h e f i g u r e o f 1 2 0 now proposed by t h e U. S. Navy Depart
ment t o 150 which w a s t h e f u l l B r i t i s h requirement.
305
S . SECRET
(b) Took n o t e t h a t t h e U
S o Navy Department would i n v e s t i g a t e
whether t h e follow-up o r d e r f o r 44 L.C.I.(L)
can b e r e s t o r e d
and h a l f of t h i s p r o d u c t i o n a l l o c a t e d t o t h e B r i t i s h
(C) Took n o t e t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t n e e d s o f t h e B r i t i s h Combined
O p e r a t i o n s Naval Command were f o r :
(1) L.C.M. (3)
o f w h i c h 646 had been asked f o r by t h e B r i t i s h
by August 1, 1943, b u t t h e d e t a i l e d a l l o c a t i o n of which

was n o t y e t a v a i l a b l e . .
( 2 ) S c r i p p s - F o r d c o n v e r s i o n e n g i n e s for L.C.A.,
o f which a
l a r g e a d d i t i o n a l number would h e needed i f L.C.A.

b u i l t i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom f o r t h e U. S
( 0 ) S p a r e p a r t s ,
were
a s a m a t t e r of g r e a t u r g e n c y , f o r l a n d i n g
c r a f t i n t h e United Kingdom, t o b e s u p p l i e d i n t h e f i r s t
i n s t a n c e on t h e r e q u i s i t i o n s a l r e a d y s u b m i t t e d t o t h e
U.
6.
S . Navy Department by Comamphoreu.
SYSTEM OF COMMAND FOR COM31NED U

(C.C.S.
AND BRITISH OPERATIONS
75/3)
( P r e v i o u s r e f e r e n c e : C.C.S.
4 5 t h Meeting, I t e m 1)
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e p a p e r under con

s i d e r a t i o n was t o l a y down g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of
command where U.
S . and B r i t i s h f o r c e s were engaged i n combined opera
t i o n s under a Supreme Commander. The s y s t e m s o f command employed by t h e

two n a t i o n s f o r t h e i r own f o r c e s d i f f e r e d f u n d a m e n t a l l y , H e r e c a l l e d
t h a t when F i e l d Marshal Wave11 had been s u d d e n l y c a l l e d upon t o form a
combined h e a d q u a r t e r s a t s h o r t n o t i c e i n t h e S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c h e had
had c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n a r r a n g i n g s a t i s f a c t o r i l y t h e g e n e r a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n o f h i s command
S i m i l a r cases might o c c u r i n t h e f u t u r e ,
and i t would h e o f g r e a t a s s i s t a n c e t o have g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s a g r e e d

beforehand.
D i s c u s s i o n f o l l o w e d on t h e p r e c i s e c h a n n e l s f o r t h e communica
t i o n of o r d e r s which would b e used i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n shown i n t h e d i a
gram a t t a c h e d t o t h e p a p e r .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c h a i n of command shown

i n t h e d i a g r a m , i t must h e remembered t h a t a l l S u b o r d i n a t e Commanders
act as t h e a g e n t s of t h e Supreme Commander. The a u t h o r i t y of Task Force

Commanders was c o m p l e t e i n r e s p e c t of t h e i r own t a s k f o r c e s I t would
n o t b e n e c e s s a r y , however, f o r t h e Naval Commander a l w a y s t o t r a n s m i t
306
SECRET
o r d e r s a f f e c t i n g n a v a l f o r c e s t h r o u g h t h e Supreme Commander, and t h e
T a s k F o r c e C o m a n d e r t o t h e n a v a l component. of t h e t a s k f o r c e . He would
b e an o f f i c e r of e x p e r i e n c e a.nd d i s c r e t i o n and would avoid i s s u i n g o r d e r s
which would e n c r o a c h upon t h e a u t h o r i t y o f Task F o r c e Commanders. T l i e
c h a n n e l s were n o t r i g i d . Taking t h e example of' I ~ I ~ S l ~ he
Y , explained t h a t
t h e A i r Comnander w i t h Geueral I-isenhower woul(1 have t,wo main f u n c t i o n s
a p a r t from a d v i s i n g t h e Supreme Commander. He v o u l d a r r a n g e f o r t h e a i r
bombardment r e y u i r e d t o s o f t e n t h e d e f e n s e s o f tile i s l a n d , and command
t h e a i r forces a l l o t t e d t o t h i s task.
He ir'oulr! a l s o answer c a l l s f o r
a s s i s t a n c e f r m t h e t a s k f o r r e s . There would be
110
o b j e c t i o n t o such
c a l l s b e i n g p a s s e d d i r e c t from t h e A i r Conimanders i n t,he t a s k f o r c e s t o

t h e A i r Commander a t t h e main h e a d q u a r t e r s .
THL COXhlITTEE:
Accepted t h e b a s i c s y s t e m of u n i f i e d command i n combined U , S
B r i t i s h o p e r a t i o n s a s set o u t i n C.C.S.
207
75/.1.
SECRET
S
ANNEX
LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT
E s t i m a t e d A v a i l a b i l i t y o f B r i t i s h Types
Numbers
Estimated T o t a l A v a i l s b l e ,
existing
a l l o w i n g for a t t r i t i o n , on
December
TYPE OF SHIP OR CRAFT
1, 1942.
Landing Ships
A p r i l 1, 1943
Aug. l i 1943
Infantry (Large)
White E n s i g n
4 (a)
In f a n t ry (Large )
Red h s i g n
10
15
15
I n f a n t r y (Medium)
13
15
22
"
"
"
"
"
Landing C r a f t
I
(Small)
(IJand h o i s t i n g :
Headquarter
Tank, Class I
Stern
Gantry
15.
55
13
38
Tank, Mark I
"
n
"
"
"
"
I1
"
I11
102
109
119
"
IV
44
142
233
125
161
201
15
32
Mechanized, Mark I
I n f a n t r y (Small)
274
Assault
402 ( b )
624 ( c )
195
195
55
55
F l a k (Large)
16
26
s u p p o r t (L8 r ge )
12
24
49
69
380
380
380
P e r s o n n e l (Small)
(Medium)
(Medium)
Landina Barges
NOPE ( a ) Two of t h e s e ere undergoing long r e p a i r s .

( b ) I n c l u d e s 30 b u i l d i n g i n I n d i a .
( c ) I n c l u d e s 150 b u i l d i n g i n I n d i a .
308
U.
S , SECRET
ANNEX
LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT ( C o n t ' d )
American B u i l t Types t o be Manned by B r i t i s h
April
sked
for
Lsndlng S h r p s , Tank, Class 2
"
Dock
Craft
Tank
"
11
"
*
105
P
--
1, 1' 1
A1 location
proposed
by USN
Dept.
68
Short
ksked
for
37
150
ust 1. 1
A1loca
tion
proposed
by VSN
Dept.
Short
84
66
5
Mark V
150
150
646
150
194
150
762
762
832
Vehicles
293
299
299
299
Vehicles & Personnel
150
150
Mechanized. Mark I11
501
I n f a n t r y (Large)
150
P e r s o n n e l (LargeFSRarnped)
?
44
?
160
-
NOTE It i s hoped t h a t t h e t a r g e t figure of 150 f o r L.S.T. (2) may be completed

d u r i n g 1944, i f i t cannot be reached i n 1943.
Unless adequate s p a r e p a r t s can be provided w i t h h i g h p r i o r i t y , up to 25%

of Landing C r a f t w i t h American e n g i n e s w i l l have to be c a n n i b a l i z e d t o keep
t h e remainder running.
309
L. S . SECRET
C.C.S.
6 6 t h Meeting
COMBINED CHXEFS OF STAFF
on Sat.urday, J a n u a r y 23, 1943, a t 1000.
PRESENT
General G . C. b l a r s h a l l , USA
Admiral E . J. King, USN
L t . G e n e r a l H. H . Arnold, IJSA
Pound
F. A. P o r t a l

L t , General 3. B . Somervell, USA
Rear Admiral C. M. Cooke, J r . , USN
F i e l d Marshal Sir John D i l l

Mountbat t e n
A i r Vice Marshal J . C. S l e s s o r
A i r Vice Narshal F. F. I n g l i s
SECRETARIAT
B r i g a d i e r V . Dykes
Brig. G e n e r a l J . R . Deane, USA

B r i g a d i e r E. I . C. Jacob
3 10
U S SECRET
B R I T I S H M O S T SFCRET
ixmro
UIJ I LO-UP
(C.C.S.
172)
GEKERAL SOjiEP\'i:LL
s a i ~ dt h a t h i s p a p e r h a d b e e n p r e p a r e d i n
c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t t i Lord L . e a t h e r s , and t h e f i g u r e s o f I i .
9 . troops to
a r r i v e i n t,he I ' n i terl Kingdom i n 1943 were dependent on c e r t a i n a s s i s t a n c e

b e i n g p r o v i d ~ i lby tiie 1 : r i t i s h .
A f i g u r e o f 50,000 nien P e r d i v i s i o n had
b e e n l,a!ierl a s a l i a s j s o f c a l c u l a t i o n , but, this was v e r j high owing t o

I hr. i n c l u s i o n of a l a r g e overliead i n t h e f i r s t . i l a l f y e a r
would be rediiced t.o about, A 0 , O O O i n t h e l a t , t e r p a r t of
The f i g u r e s
the y e a r
In t h i s
c v e n t . t h e t o t a l number of d i v i s i o n s might r i s e frm! f i f t e e n t o n i n e t e e n

b y t h e end o f t h e y e a r .
i v c r h virar!s w o i r l d b e u s e d o f i n c r e a s i n g the
nunllier o f
t,roops siiipne(! by adrlitiortal l o a d i n g s i n personnel
d u r i n g the
suiiiiwr
ships
niont,lis a n d t , l i ~f ' i t , t i n g , of Fnre c a r g o ships f o r troop
c n r r y i rig
TlIL CCi'. ',iI'j-TLL:
Took n o t e of ?lamer
(.~.('.!.t ~ T ; > .
(C
.c
5..
lf7)
(Previous rpference C . C , . F .
C 7 t h Ileeting, I t e m 3 )
(X?IU!AL \.'BPMAJ.I. s a i d t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l s i n t,he p a p e r by t.he
B r i t j s t i - J o i n t P l a n n i r i g Lt,af'f were a c c e n t a b l e t,o thr 1'. S , C h i e f s o f

S t a f f s u b j e c t t o t h e f ' o l l o u ' i n g conimerits:
I t a p p e a r e d t , l , a t t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of tiie i - r i t , i s l i a i r b o r n e d i v i
s i o n referred t o
n f HI?,IiY
j ~ p
i aragravi!
WBC
!.o!' doiibtf'i!I i n view of t h e demands
7'1:e d i s n a t c i i of a n b . n : ~ r i r a i s airborr:e d i v i s i o n t o t h e I h i t e d
Kingdom. n o s s i b l y i n .Tune, w a s , t h e r e f o r e , heirig c o n s i d e r e d by t h e U

Chief's of S t a f f
'!'lie f i r s t , a i r b o r n e d j v i s i o n which would b e r e a d y f o r
< , v e r s e a s n o n l d b e r e q u i r e d f o r !II:?KY
The c h i e f d i f f i c u l t y l a y i n t h e
p r o v i s i o n of t h e n e c e s s a r y a i r t r a n s p o r t s , b u t t h e s e c o u l d b e moved
a c r o s s t,o t h e U . R
more q u i c k l y t h a n t h e p e r s o n n e l , who would have t o
g o by sea
The I J . S
C h i e f s of S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d it m o s t d e s i r a b l e t h a t any
o p e r a t i o n of t h e t y p e mentioned i n p a r a g r a p h 2 (a) o f t h e p a p e r ; e g
,,
a g a i n s t t h e Channel I s l a n d s , s h o u l d b e c o o r d i n a t e d i n t i m e w i t h HUSKY
A s r e g a r d s t h e l a r g e r o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t the C o t e n t i n P e n i n s u l a ,
f o r which t h e t a r g e t d a t e , g i v e n i n p a r a g r a p h 19 (b) was August 1 s t . i t
U. S . SECRET
B R I T I S H KOST SECRET
must b e made c l e a r t h a t t h e p l a n was o n l y t o b e b a s e d on t h e U.
S.
r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e a t t h a t t i m e i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom. F i r s t p r i o r i t y
was g i v e n t o HUSKY, and t h e U. S. d i d n o t w i s h t o a c c e p t any a d d i t i o n a l

commitment f o r o p e r a t i o n HADXIAN beyond what was a t p r e s e n t envisaged.
I t w a s h i g h l y i m p r o b a b l e t h a t any U. S. l a n d i n g c r a f t c r e w s would be
a v a i l a b l e f o r o p e r a t i o n s from t h e IJnited Kingdom t h i s summer.
SIR ALAN BBOOKE s a i d t h a t , as a r e s u l t of t h e d e c i s i o n on HUSKY,
paragraph 4 w a s n o t now c o r r e c t . There would o n l y b e l l B r i t i s h d i v i s i o n s
and a p a r t of one B r i t i s h a i r b o r n e d i v i s i o n a v a i l a b l e .
THE COMMITTEE:
Approved t h e p r o p o s a l s c o n t a i n e d i n C.C.S.
167 s u b j e c t t o the
r e s e r v a t i o n s of t h e T J ~ S . C h i e f s o f S t a f f r e c o r d e d above.
3.
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRI!dE bIINISTER.

(C.C.S.
170)
THE COX+IIIITTEE:
(a) ~4pprovedt h e d r a f t s u b m i t t e d by t h e S e c r e t a r i e s , s u b j e c t t o
minor amendments a g r e e d i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n , and t h e i n c l u s i o n
of a p a r a g r a p h on t h e BOLERO b u i l d - - u p b a s e d on C.C.S.
(b)
172.
I n s t r u c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i e s t o p r e p a r e and s u b m i t a f i n a l
d r a f t forthwith.
OPEXATION HUSKY--DIRECTIVE
TO GENERAL EISENHOWER.
(c.c.s.
171)
GENEIlAL. MAXSHALL proposed c e r t a i n amendments t o t h e t e x t of t h e
d r a f t d i r e c t i v e , which were a c c e p t e d
Q::
THE COMMITTEE:
Approved t h e d i r e c t i v e a s amended and i n s t r u c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i e s
t o t r a n s m i t i t t o General Eisenhower
5.
LANDING CRAFT.
LOXD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN s a i d t h a t t h e Admiralty had been asked t o

c o m p l e t e a n o t h e r 150 L . C . A .
d u r i n g t h e n e x t f o u r months t o p r o v i d e
American r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r HUSKY and t r a i n i n g .
B r i t i s h L.C.A.
*::
He m i g h t have t o s e n d
from F o r c e J ( t h e Channel A s s a u l t F o r c e ) f o r t h e U .
S u b s e q u e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a s C.C.S.
S u b s e q u e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a s C.C.S.
3 12
172/1.
171/1.
s.
U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET
b u t i t w a s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e s e s h o u l d be r e p l a c e d i n
s h a r e of HUSKY,
t i m e t o e n a b l e c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s t o be u n d e r t a k e n t h i s summer.
A l l L C.A.
e n g i n e s come from America; and he would, t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e
400 S c r i p p s - F o r d
c o n v e r s i o n e n g i n e s a t t h e r a t e of 100 a month f o r t h e
n e x t f o u r months. Each c r a f t had two e n g i n e s , and 25 p e r c e n t s p a r e s were

r e q u i r e d . I t was o f g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e t h a t t h e C h a n n e l A s s a u l t F o r c e
s h o u l d be k e p t i n b e i n g , even though t e m p o r a r i l y s h o r t of L.C.A.
t o make
up U. S . r e q u i r e m e n t s . Otherwise, t h e r e would be no f o r c e a v a i l a b l e f o r
cross-channel
o p e r a t i o n s . Once b r o k e n u p , t h i s f o r c e would b e v e r y
d i f f i c u l t t o re-form
again.
ADXIRAT, K I N G s a i d t h a t no f i r m promise c o u l d b e g i v e n t h a t t h i s
l a r g e number o f e n g i n e s would be p r o v i d e d from t h e U

t i o n r e s o u r c e s were a l r e a d y s t r a i n e d
where produc
1:e u n d e r t o o k t o s e e what c o u l d be
done
THE COMMITTEE:
(a) Agreed t h a t i t was most d e s i r a b l e f o r t h e Channel A s s a u l t
Force t o be k e p t i n b e i n g f o r c r o s s - c h a n n e l o p e r a t i o n s t h i s
summer.
(b) Took n o t e t h a t t h e U. S. would endeavor t o p r o v i d e t h e nec
e s s a r y e n g i n e s f o r any L.C.A.
a i n d u r i n g t h e coming months..
3 13
h u l l s produced i n G r e a t B r i t
U. S . SECRET
C.C.S.
5 3 t h Meeting
COSIBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
!JINUTES o f !deeting h e l d a t Anfa Camp

on S a t u r d a y , J a n u a r y 23, 1343, a t 2130.
FI1ESENT
General ? i r Alan P. Brooke

Pound
General G C M a r s h a l l , U S A
Admiral E. J . King, IJSN
L t . General H. H. Arnold, U S A
A i r Cnief i l a r s h a l S i r C h a r l e s
F. A. P o r t a l
THE FOLLOViINCr NERE ALSO PZESENT

L t . General B. B. Somervell, ::SA
F i e l d ?darshal S i r John D i l l
?,ear Admiral C . M . Cooke, J r . , ZISY

Mountbatten
B r i g . General J . E. H u l l , USA
~
~cenera1
i
A~
. C . .wedemeyer, USA

Commander R. E. Libby, U S N
SECRET An I AT
B r i g . G e n e r a l J . 3. Deane, USA
3 14
REPORT TO TEE PXESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER.

( C . C . S . 171) I )
T!IE C03NITTEE:
(a) AArePd, a f t e r d i s c u s s i o n ,
C.C.S.
t o a number o f a.mendments t o
170j'l.
(b) I n s t r u c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i e s t o i n c o r p o r a t e t h e s e amendments
i n a f i n a l r e p o r t : : : t o be submitted t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and
prime V i n i s t e r .
2.
OPERATION IlUSKY--DIRECTIVE TO GEKERAL EISENHOWER.
( C . C .S
. 1 7 1 / 1 /C)
T I E COMMITTEE:
(a) Agreed t o an amendment t o t h e d i r e c t i v e t o General Eisenhower
(C .C.S.
in C.C.S.
171il/D)
c o n s e q u e n t upon t h e amendments a g r e e d t o
17012.
(b) D i r e c t e d t h e S e c r e t a r i e s t o t r a n s m i t t h e amended directive::"::

t o General Eisenhower.
3.
ASSAULT SHIPPING.
SIR ALAN BROOKE r e a d a n o t e by Lord L e a t h e r s e x p r e s s i n g concern

a t t h e use of l a r g e p a s s e n g e r s h i p s a s a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g . (A copy o f t h i s
n o t e i s a t t a c h e d as an Annex t o t h e s e ? > i n u t e s . )
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t i t was t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n which had moved

h i m t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e a s s a u l t i n O p e r a t i o n HUSKY s h o u l d b e c a r r i e d out
as far a s p o s s i b l e i n t h e l a r g e r type of l a n d i n g c r a f t a n d n o t in a s s a u l t
shipping.
THE COMMITTEE:
Took n o t e :
(a) O f t h e n o t e by Lord L e a t h e r s .
(b) That the B r i t i s h Chiefs o f S t a f f would submit p r o p o s a l s f o r
r e d u c i n g t o t h e minimum t h e u s e of l a r g e p a s s e n g e r s h i p s as
assault ships.
4.
CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE.
GENERAL MARSIiALL, a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e c o n f e r e n c e a t Cas

a b l a n c a , e x p r e s s e d h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e r e a d i n e s s of t h e E r i t i s h
*
%::
Subsequently c i r c u l a t e d a s C.C.S.
l';u;2.
Yubsequently c i r c u l a t e d as C . C . S .
T7FlXI
315
U.. S. SECRET
C h i e f s of S t a f f t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e U .
S. p o i n t o f v i e w and o f t h e f i n e
s p i r i t of c o o p e r a t i o n which t h e y had shown d u r i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n s . He

f e l t s u r e t h a t t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f would g r e a t l y p r o f i t by
t h e i r c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s and t h e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
e a c h o t h e r ' s problems which had been i n s u r e d . He p a i d a t r i b u t e t o t h e

work o f t h e B r i t i s h 8 t h Army and e x p r e s s e d h i s a d m i r a t i o n of t h e i r e n e r
g e t i c p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n T r i p o l i t a n i a . He went on t o t h a n k
S i r John D i l l f o r accompanying t h e U . S. C h i e f s of S t a f f t o t h e c o n f e r
e n c e and f o r paying a v i s i t t o I n d i a t o c o n t i n u e h i s v a l u a b l e work as a
l i n k between t h e U . S.
and B r i t i s h S t a f f s .
SIR ALAN BROOKE thanked General M a r s h a l l f o r h i s words and s a i d

t h a t he r e c i p r o c a t e d most w h o l e - h e a r t e d l y General M a r s h a l l ' s e x p r e s s i o n
o f t h e g r e a t b e n e f i t which h a d a c c r u e d from t h e c o n f e r e n c e . M u t u a l
a p p r e c i a t i o n of each o t h e r ' s problems was o n l y p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h p e r s o n a l

c o n t a c t s . S i r John D i l l was performing a g r e a t service as a l i n k between
t h e B r i t i s h and U.
S . C h i e f s of S t a f f . A g r e a t s t e p f o r w a r d had been
t a k e n i n a g r e e i n g upon a b a s i c s t r a t e g y f o r t h e f u t u r e p r o s e c u t i o n of
t h e war.
S I R CHARLES PORTAL s a i d he was s u r e he was s p e a k i n g on b e h a l f of
a l l t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f i n e x p r e s s i n g h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e
g r e a t h o s p i t a l i t y which had been g i v e n by t h e U . S. F o r c e s and of t h e

e x c e l l e n t arrangements f o r t h e c o n f e r e n c e which had been made by General
P a t t o n and t h e t r o o p s under h i s command.
SIR JOHN DILL t h a n k e d t h e c o m b i n e d C h i e f s of S t a f f and emphasized

t h e g r e a t v a l u e of t h e f r a n k d i s c u s s i o n s which had been h e l d .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d he f u l l y agreed w i t h Sir Alan Brooke as t o t h e

g r e a t v a l u e of t h e b a s i c s t r a t e g i c p l a n which had been worked o u t a t t h e
c o n f e r e n c e . I n h i s view t h i s was t h e b i g g e s t s t e p forward t o t h e Winning
of t h e war. Much had a l r e a d y been done t o f i l l i n t h e d e t a i l s of t h i s

p l a n and more would b e done i n t h e f u t u r e , b u t t h e d i s c u s s i o n s which had
been h e l d had e n a b l e d a t r u e m e e t i n g of minds t o t a k e p l a c e between t h e
B r i t i s h and U. S. C h i e f s of S t a f f .
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t he f u l l y a s s o c i a t e d h i m s e l f w i t h t h e s e
views.
3 16
GENERAL MAKSHALL s a i d t h a t b e f o r e t h e c o n f e r e n c e broke up he

woiilil l i k e t o pay t r i b u t e t o the v e r y v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e s performed by the
Combined S t a f f planners and the S e c r e t a r i a t .
317
U. S. S E C P E T
B t I T I S H NOST SECPET
ANNEX
I and my a d v i s e r s a r e much c o n c e r n e d b y t h e p r e s e n t p o l i c y of
u s i n g l a r g e passenger s h i p s as L.S.I.
I know t h a t L . S . I . ( L ) ' s
(L) Is.
a r e e s s e n t i a l t o t h e s u c c e s s of l a r g e
amphibious o p e r a t i o n s ; and i n t h e absence of any more s u i t a b l e s h i p p i n g ,

l a r g e t r o o p s h i p s have had t o h e c o n v e r t e d f o r t h i s u s e . T h i r t e e n such
s h i p s were employed i n t h e TORCH a s s a u l t , and 3 were l o s t . We have now
had t o s e l e c t 5 more f o r c o n v e r s i o n .
A p a r t from t h e l o s s of 3 L . S . I . ( L ) ' s
i n TORCH, we a l s o l o s t 5
o t h e r l a r g e t r o o p s h i p s i n t h e o p e r a t i o n ; t h e t o t a l t r o o p i n g c a p a c i t y of
t h e 8 s h i p s was over 21,000.
The l o s s e s t o b e e x p e c t e d i n f u t u r e a s s a u l t o p e r a t i o n s on a l a r g e
s c a l e a g a i n s t determined o p p o s i t i o n a r e bound t o be much h i g h e r . W
e must
r e a l i z e t h a t f u r t h e r heavy l o s s e s o f t h i s t y p e of s h i p would have a
c r i p p l i n g e f f e c t on our s t r a t e g y by d e s t r o y i n g our a b i l i t y t o c a r r y out
large-scale
t r o o p i n g movements, a s r e p l a c e m e n t of t h i s t y p e of s h i p is
impossible.
I wonder w h e t h e r i t would b e p o s s i b l e f o r t h e V.S.A.
t o help
u s o u t w i t h Combat Loaders, w h i c h a r e r e p l a c e a b l e from c u r r e n t p r o d u c t i o n ,

w h i l e the big troopships are not replaceable.
We c o u l d , o f c o u r s e , make up t o t h e Americans t h e l o s s i n t h e i r
t r o o p i n g c a p a c i t y by l e n d i n g them some of our t r o o p s h i p s .
(Signed) LEBTHERS
J a n u a r y 23, 1913.
318
17 S . SECRET
INDEX
A
Aegean, Opening t h e , 28
Agend~a of t h e C,onference
S u g g e s t e d p r o c e d u r e for d e a l i n g
w i t h t h e , 2 0 , 2.19
Agreements on N o r t h A f r i c a c o a s t
command, 251
Agreements r e a c h e d a s t o c o n d u c t of
w a r i n 1943, 16, 18
Aid t o R u s s i a , V.S.,
17, 22, 72, 75,
1492
255, 264
Aid t o China, 145
A i r Command
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , System o f , i n , 78
West A f r i c a , Waval a n d , i n , 115,
124
Aircraft
Requirements o f share-based air
c r a f t f a r t h e d e f e n s e of Trade Com
munications, United Nations, 54, 57
A i r F o r c e s i n T u n i s i a , 140
Alexander a c c o u n t of 8 t h Army opera
t i o n , 136
Allied
Yanpower, 219
P l a n s r e l a t i n g t o T u r k e y , 23, 257
Allocation of adeqnate forces i n
P a c i f i c , 17, i g
A l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s o u t l i n e d by
General M a r s h a l l , 170
Amphibious o p e r a t i o n s f r o m t h e
U n i t e d Kingdom, 122
A N A K I M , 21, 283
Burma, R e c o n q u e s t o f , 12
Forces, Provision of, 80, 82
ANFA C o n f e r e n c e
M e e t i n g , M i n u t e s o f , 134
Annex
M i n u t e s 6 1 a t M e e t i n g , 253
M i n u t e s 6 7 t h M e e t i n g , 308
M i n u t e s 6 9 t h M e e t i n g , 317
A n t i s u b m a r i n e W a r f a r e , 196
A s s a u l t s h i p p i n g , 315
Assistance t o Russia i n r e l a t i o n t o
o t h e r commitments, 109, 117
A t l a n t i c , 45
n
B e r l i n , P a i d s on, 245
BOLERO, 113, 121
Build-up, 21, 311
S h i p p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r , 129
E n c l o s u r e I'AI',
130
F , a c l o s u r e "B", 1 3 1
E n c l o s u r e IICII, A s s u m p t i o n s f o r
c a l c u l a t i o n s o f 11. S . s h i p p i n g
c a p a b i l i t i e s u n d e r plan a d o p t e d
f o r 1943, 132
by C.C.S.
Bomber o f f e n s i v e from N o r t h A f r i c a ,
The, 44, ue, 266
Bomber o f f e n s i v e f r o m t h e I!nited
Kingdom, The 21, 8 6 , 88, 279
Bombing A x i s o i l s o u r c e % , 124
B r i t i s h agreement f o r B r i t i s h
e f f o r t s a g a i n s t Japan u n n e c e s s a r y ,
244
B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Turkey,
267
B r i t i s h w i l l handle Turkish m a t t e r s ,
124
Burma, O p e r a t i o n s i n ,
Reconquest o f , 12
Burma Road, The, 11
B u s i n e s s , F u t u r e , 275
II
C
C a l c o l a t i o n s of T u r k i s h equipment
and n e e d s , 139
C a p t u r e of D o d e c a n e s e , 2 8 , 145
Cxang X a i - s h e k d e s i r e s p o s t p o n e
ment of O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS, 144
China
Communications, O v e r l a n d , w i t h , l a
Improvement of a i r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
into,
123
NOTE: Numerals i n I t a l i c s r e f e r t o r a g e s i n Minutes of Meetings

Numerals i n p l a i n type r e f e r t o Pages of C.C.S. P a p e r s .
319
U . S . SECRET
Imm
Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f
F i n a l r e p o r t t o The P r e s i d e n t a n d
Prime M i n i s t e r summarizing deci
s i o n s b y t h e , 117
Memorandum by t h e , 109
M i n u t e s o f m e e t i . n g s , 269
Papers, I
C o m b i n e d S t r a t e g y , 184
Command
D a k a r , F r e n c h Vest A f r i c a , s t r a
t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and s e t u p f o r ,
24 9
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , i n t h e , 269, i i g
Naval a n d a i r , i n West Africa, 115,
249
P a c i f i c T h e a t e r , i n t h e 9 5 , ?a1
Conference
C o n c l u s i o n o f t h e , 315
D r a f t r e p o r t on t h e w o r k o f t h e ,
10 2
P u b l i c a t i o n o f r e s u l t s of t h e , 252
C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s i n 1943, g o ,
301, 311
Convoy, 46
Vscort requirements, lietailed esti
m a t e o f , 50
Russian air assistance f o r P.C.,
23 0
124
System o f
A i r , i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , 78
Combined l : . S . - B r i t i s h
Operations
for, 1, 3 0 6
V n i f i e d command f o r combined o p e r
ations, I
Command, c o n t r o l , p l a n n i n g a n d
t r a i n i n g f o r o p e r a t i o n s f o r a re
entry t o the Continent across the
C h a n n e l , b e g i n n i n g i n 1943, P r o
posed o r g a n i z a t i o n o f , 9 9 , 302
Commanders
Land, n a v a l and a i r , 2
Supreme, 2
Task f a r c e , 2
Commitments
T u r k e y , Our m i l i t a r y , t o , 35
Communications
C h i n a , O v e r l a n d , w i t h , 12
D e f e n s e of t r a d e , U n i t e d N a t i o n s '
r e q u i r e m e n t s of s h a r e - b a s e d air
craft f o r the, 54
J a p a n e s e , II
S e a , o f t h e r l n i t e d N a t i o n s , Minimum
escort requirements t o maintain
t h e , 45, 5 7 , log
E n c l o s u r e IfA", 50
Enclosure "B", 5 1
Enclosure "C", 5 2
E n c l o s u r e " D I f , 53
E n c l o s u r e IfEI', 5 4
Sea, S e c u r i t y o f , 1x7, 155
C o m m u n i q u e , P r e s s , 301
Conclusion o f t h e Conference,
C o n d u c t o f t h e War i n 1943, 1 6 , ~ b ,
C o o r d i n a t i o n of 8 t h Army and risen

hower Army, 138
C r a f t , L a n d i n g , 303, 3 1 2
Dakar, F r e n c h Weest Africa, S t r a t e g i c

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and command aet--up
f o r , 249
D e f e a t of t h e ['Boat,
16, 18
Defensive Pequirements of North

Africa, 139
Destroyer (see F l e e t Destroyer), 51
D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e O f f e n s i v e , a7
Directive
A l l i e d F x p e d i t i o n a r y Force i n North
A f r i c a , To C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f ,
G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r , t o 312, 31.5
O p e r a t i o n HUSKY, 125, 127
P o d e c a n e s e , C a p t n r e o f , 28, 145
Draft--Operation
HUSKY, 125
D r a f t r e p o r t O n t h e work o f t h e
C o n f e r e n c e , 102
Draft telegram from t h e P r e s i d e n t
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d t h e P r i m e
M i n i s t e r of Great B r i t a i n t o P r e
mier S t a i i n , 84, 282, 293
Dry cargo import s i t n a t i o n , U . K , , 45
315
Eastern Theater,
226
NOTE: Numerals i n I t a l i c s r e f e r t o Pages i n Minutes of' Meetings.

Numerals i n P l a i n Type r e f e r t o Pages of C . C . S . Papers.
320
LT. S. S E C R E T
S i t u a t i o n t o be c r e a t e d i n , 4,
Enclosure "A", 4
INDEX
236
Enclosure %",
7
Eisenhower, G e n e r a l , D i r e c t i v e t o ,
3122315
D e s c r i p t i o n of a i r f i e l d s u s e d by
A l l i e d F o r c e s , 136
Proposal f o r c o n d u c t i o n of f o r t h
coming o p e r a t i o n , 135
Review of s i t u a t i o n on h i s f r o n t ,
135
Employzent of French Forces i n North
A f r i c a , 223
Enemyls f i g h t i n g v a l u e , 137
E n t r y of Turkey i n t o t h e War on t h e
s i d e o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 23
E q u i p m e n t , S u p p l y of ( T u r k e y ) , 38
Escort
C a r r i e r s , United Nations I r e q u i r e
ments o f , 53
Convoy, r e q u i r e m e n t s , D e t a i l e d e s
timate of, 50
Requirements t o m a i n t a i n t h e sea
c o m m u n i c a t i o n 8 of t h e Unit&
N a t i o n s , Xinimam, 45
E n c l o s u r e "A", so
E n c l o s u r e "Bit; $1
E n c l o s u r e FIG", $2
E n c l o s u r e "D", 53
E n c l o s a r e 'lE"; 54
R e q u i r e m e n t s , World-wide e s t i m a t e
o f , of F l e e t D e s t r o y e r s and ocean-.
g o i n g e s c o r t vessels, 5 1
V e s s e l s , 243
Enropean T h e a t e r
S t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t f o r 1943 i n t h e ,
F l e e t Destroyers
R e q u i r e r e n t s o f , and o c e a n - g o i n g
e s c o r t vessels, World-wide e s t i m a t e
o f , 51
F r e n c h F o r c e s i n N o r t h A f r i c a , Em
ployment o f , 223
F n t u r e b u s i n e s s , 275
G
G i r a n d , G e n e r a l , Meeting w i t h , 259
H
E a r t l e y Committee, The, 40, 43
EUSKY, O p e r a t i o n , 5 8 , 637 273
Date f o r t h e assault, E a r l i e s t , 63?
70
D i r e c t i v e , IZS
Allied Expeditionary Force i n

N o r t h A f r i c a , t o Commander-in-.
C h i e f , 127
G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r , t o , 312 315
Draft? rag
E n c l o s u r e " A " , 64
E n c l o s u r e "B", F o r c e s R e q u i r e d , 68
EnclosnPe "C", Examination of Ear-.

l i e s t Date of A s s a u l t , 70
I c e l a n d , 229
I n d i a n Ocean S i t u a t i o n ,
177
208
S t r a t e g y i n t h e , 202
J
F
F i n a l R e p o r t t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and
Prime M i n i s t e r summarizing d e c i
s i o n s by t h e Combined C h i e f s of
S t a f f , 117
F i n a n c i a l and economic a s s i s t a n c e
f o r T u r k e y , 34
F i ~ emain l i n e s o f a c t i o n i n Enro
pean t h e a t e r , 16, :.8
Japanese
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , 11
S t r a t e g y , 184
J o i n t I n t e l l i g e n c e Subcommittee
R e p o r t , E x t r a c t s f r o m , 41
L
Landing C r a f t ,
303>
312
NOTE: Numerals i n I t a l i c s r e f e r t o Pages i n Minutes o f ?Xeetings.

Numerals i n p l a i n type r e f e r t o Pages of C . C , S . Papers.
321
S SECRET
BRITISH IIOST SECRET

i;
INDEX
!1
Operation
Meeting
P'FP,
'34
Annex t o 5 1 s t , X i n u t e s , 25.7
Annex t o 6 7 t h , M i n u t e s , ,308
Annex t o 6 9 t h , M i n u t e s , 317
c.c.s., 1 S q
G e n e r a l G i r a u d , w i t h , 250
SYYHOL, 117
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , 20
A i r command, S y s t e m o f , in t h e , 7 8
Command i n t h e , 260
N a v a l s i t u a t i o n in t h e W e s t e r n , 215
O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e , 110, 118, 159
Y e o p e n i n g t h e , 47
Memorandum by t h e Combined Chiefs of
S t a f f , 109
Military
A s s i s t a n c e t o T u r k e y , I n i t i a l , 25
r o m m i t m e n t s t o T u r k e y , Our, 35
l i i n u t e s of M e e t i n g s ,
Annex t o , 6 1 s t , 257
Annex t o , h 7 t h , 308
Pnnex t o , O g t h , 317
114
A N A K T M , 12, 14, 2 1 , h o , b a ,
BOLPFO, 1 1 3 , L Z L , 24'1, 911
Shipping c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r , build-~
129
F n c l o s u r e IIAII,
mlclosnre "B",
'~30
13,
~
~ for ~
c a l c u l a t i o n s o f 11. S. s h i p p i n g
c a p a b i l i t i e s under p l a n adopted
f o r ~ 9 4 ~ 31, 3 2
by C . C . S
HUSKY, 58, 0 3 , 27;
A l t e r n a t i v e jCA'l, s g
A l t e r n a t i v e IIHII, s y
D i r e c t i v e , 12s
A l l i e d P x p e d i t i o n a r y Force in
N o r t h A f r i c a , t.o Commaocler- i n
Chief, 127
E I I C I O ~ ~ Titril,
~
D r a f t , 125
? n c l o s u r e "AtI, 6 4
~~~h~~~~
lwti,
i w p i w a h,,
E n c l o s u r e "Ctl, I'xamina.tion o f l a r ~
l i e s t Date o f A s s a u l t , 7 0
T a r g e t d a t e , 1i;S
SLEDGEtlkWTQ, 1.: '1
UNDERBFILY, 14 6
Operations
R u r m a , J a n u a r y - P p r l l , , 9 4 3 , in, 1 1 ,
~
Naval a n d a i r command i n West
213
A f r i c a , 1x5, 1 2 4
Naval s i t u a t i o n i n t h e W e s t e r n
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , 24~5
North Africa
Bomber o f f e n s i v e f r o m , T h e , 44,
C o n t i n e n t a l , i n 1 n . 1 ~go,
~ :lol. ~ ( 1 1
C o t e n t i n P e n i n s u l a . 722
E a s t e r n T h e a t e r , 6 , 8, ~xg
E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r , i n t h e , 18
M e d i t e r r a n e a n , i n t h e , 'LIO, 118,
268
rmployment of F r e n c h F o r c e s i n , 223
S i t n a t i o n i n , T h e , 135 199; 208
Offensive
Bomber, f r o m N o r t h Africa,
2
me, 44,
68
B o m b e r , f r o m t h e l i n i t e d Kingdom,
21, 8 6 , 8 8 , 279
P e v e l o p m e n t of t h e ( T n r k e y ) ,
O i l
h i s , p o s i t i o n , 40, 115, 124,
27
';9
S o u t h w e s t P a c i f i c , ~n t h e , 2 2
S y s t e m o f command f o r c o m b i n e d
I!, S.- . B r i t i s h , i i 306
S y s t e m o f u o t f i e d command f o r
combined, 1
T n r k e y , s u b s e q u e n t , ag
U n i t e d Kingdom, i n a n d f r o m t h e ,
112, 121.
164
O r g a n i z a t i o n o f command, c o n t r o l ,
p l a n n i n g a n d t r a i n i n g f o r cross-
c h a n n e l , 9 9 , 302
O v e r l a n d communications w i t h China,
12
255
NOTE: >umerals i n I t a l i c s r e f e r t o pages i n Minutes of Meetings

Knmerals i n Plain Type refer t o pages of C C S Papers
322
S . SECRET
INDEX
P
P a c i f i c , The, 47
P a c i f i c Theater
Conduct of t h e W a r i n t h e , g S r 114,
1.22~
301
F a r E a s t and, 167
Plans
Sprawl, The, zsl 27> 33s 36
T u r k e y , A l l i e d , r e l a t i n g t o , 23?
Russia-continned
R e l a t i o n t o o t h e r commitments, i n ,
109, 1x7
Russian air a s s i s t a n o e f o r P.Q.
c o n v o y s , 230
Sea eoimnnicatians,
257
1x7, 155
Shipging
A s s a u l t , 315
BOLERO build-up,
P o l i s h F o r c e s , p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of,
24 4
P r e s s Communique, 301
Prime M i n i s t e r t s a p p r a i s a l o f Tnrk
i s h s i t u a t i o n , 150
P r o g r a m of M e e t i n g s , r e v i s e d , 253
P r o p o s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n o f command,
c o n t r o l , p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g f o r
operations for a reentry t o the
C o n t i n e n t a c r o s a t h e C h a n n e l , be
g i n n i n g i n 1 9 4 3 ~g g l 302
P r o v i s i o n a l d a t e f o r ANAKIM a s s a u l t ,
123
P u b l i c a t i o n of r e s u l t s
c o n f e r e n c e , 252
of t h e
R
R a i d s on B a p l i n , 245
R e c a p t u r e of P h i l i p p i n e s , d i s c u s s i o n
o f , 93
Reconquest of Burma, l a
R e e n t r y t o t h e C o n t i n e n t across
t h e C h a n n e l , b e g i n n i n g i n 1943?
P r o p o s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n of command,
c o n t r o l , p l a n n i n g and t r a i n i n g f o r
o p e r a t i o n s for ai 9gr 302
R e p o r t t o The P r e s i d e n t and P r i m e
M i n i s t e r , loap 109, 291 312. 315
E n c l o s u t e , Draft R e p o r t on thework
of t h e Conference, 102
F i n a l , summarizing d e c i s i o n s by t h e
Combined Chiefs of S t a f f , 117
R..A.F. and Army s t o r e s dumped i n t o

T u r k e y , 37
Russia
A s s i s t a n c e t o , 17, 2er 72, 7 S 1 155
s e c u r i t y of
capabilities for,
129
E n c l o s u r e A, 130
E n c l o s u r e B, 131
E n c l o s a r e C, 132
C a p a b i l i t i e s u n d e r p l a n a d o p t e d by
C . C . S . for 1 9 4 3 ~ A s s u m p t i o n s f o r
c a l c u l a t i o n s of U ; S.,
132
HUSKY, p r o v i s i o n o f , 6 1
S i t u a t i o n i n North A f r i c a , The, 135J
1997 208
S i t u a t i o n t o be c r e a t e d i n E a s t e r n
Theater, 4
Enclosure A, 4
Enclosure B, 7
P a c i f i c and Burma i n 1Q43s 236
SLEDGEHAMMER, O p e r a t i o n , 145
Somervell, L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l , T5.B.Note by (BOLERO), 129
Sprawl P l a n , as> 17, 33, 36
S t a l i n , Premier
Draft t e l e g r a m from t h e P r e s i d e n t
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d P r i m e
M i n i s t e r of G r e a t B r i t a i n t o , 84,
282,
293
S t a t e of German A i r F o r c e , 179
S t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t for 1943 i n t h e
E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r , T h e , 208
S t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and command
s e t - u p f o r D a k a r , F r e n c h West
A f r i c a , 249
Strategy
C o m b i n e d , 184
E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r , i n t h e , 202
264
NOTE: Numerals i n I t a l i c s refer t o pages i n Minutes of Meetings.

Numerals i n P l a i n Type refer t o pages o f C . C . S papers.
323
U S SECRET
INDEX
Summarizing d e c i s i o n s by t h e Com
bined C h i e f s of S t a f f , F i n a l r e p o r t
t o The P r e s i d e n t and P r i m e Min
i s t e r , 117
Summary of c u r r e n t c o n f e r e n c e s by
S i r Alan Brooke, 143
S u p p l i e s t o R u s s i a , 222
S u p p l y of e q u i p m e n t ( T u r k e y ) , 38
Turkey--continned
Offensive, Development o f t h e , 27
Phase I--Opening t h e Aegean, 28
P h a s e 11--Subsequent o p e r a t i o n s
29
System of
Command, a i r , i n t h e Mediterranean,
78
Command f o r combined U.S.-Britinh
o p e r a t i o n s , I> 306
[ J n i f i e d command f o r c o m b i n e d
operations, 1
Recommendations, 34
S t o r e s , R.A.F. and Army, a l r e a d y
damped i n t o , 37
Slrbaeqnent o p e r a t i o n s
P h a s e I , a8
P h a s e 11, ag
Summary, 31
E n c l o s u r e "A", 34
E n c l o s u r e " B " , 35
E n c l o s u r e " C " , 37
E n c l o s n r e "D", 38
SYMROL,
1.17
Telegram f r o m The P r e s i d e n t of t h e
United S t a t e s and t h e P r i m Minis
t e r of G r e a t B r i t a i n t o P r e m i e r
S t a l i n , 8 4 9 282, 293
Theater
E a s t e r n , s i t n a t i o n t o be c r e a t e d
i n , 4, 226 236
E n c l o s u r e "A", 4
Enclosure "B", 7
European
S t r a t e g i c concept f o r 1943 i n t h e ,
208
S t r a t e g y i n t h e , 202
P a c i f i c and Far E a s t , LL+? 122, 167
P a c i f i c , conduct of t h e War i n t h e ,
9Sj 301
Turkey, z i p 116, 124
Aegean, Opening the--Phase I, a8
A l l i e d p l a n s r e l a t i n g t o , 23r 257
B r i t i s h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , 267
Commitments, Onr m i l i t a r y , t o , 35
Conclusions, 32
Dodecanese, Capture o f , 28, 145
E n t r y o f , i n t o t h e W a r on t h e s i d e
o f t h e United Nations,, 23
Equipment, Supply of, 38
F i n a n c i a l and e c o n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e
for, 34
M i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o , I n i t i a l , 25
M i l i t a r y commitments t o , Oar; 35
U-.Boat
T h r e a t , T h e , 47
Warfare, ao , 277
U n i t e d Kingdom
Bomber o f f e n s i v e from t h e ,
21, 8 6
8 8 , 279
Dry c a r g o import s i t u a t i o n . 4 5
O p e r a t i o n s i n and f r o m t h e : I 12
1
164
1 ~
United Nations
A i r c r a f t f o r t h e d e f e n s e of 1 r a . d
c ommnnications, r e q u i r e m e n t s rrf
shore--based, 54
U n i t e d S t a t e s , a i d t o R u s s i a , 17,
2a1 72, 75,
155
264
United S t a t e s Forces f o r C o n t i n e n t a l
o p e r a t i o n s , IZL
United S t a t e s t r o o p s t o U K . , 284
Iv
War
Conduct o f ,
i n 1 9 4 3 ~ 1.6, 1.8, 249
301
U-Boat, The, m , 277
W a r f a r e , A n t i s n b m a r i n e , 196
West A f r i c a
Naval and a i r command i n , x i s 9 1.24
Dakar, S t r a t e g i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
a n d command s e t - u p f o r , 249
Nm: Numerals i n I t a l i c s r e f e r to Pages i n Minutes of M e e t i n g s

Numerals i n P l a i n Type r e f e r t o Pages of C C S Papers
324
C A S A B L A N C A
C O N F E R E N C E
JANUARY
19U3
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETINGS
Edited and Printed in the
Offrce, U. S. Secretary
Office of the Combaned Chrefs of Staff
1w3
SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MINUTES
PAGE
J.C.S.
5 0 t h Meeting (Casablanca)
President's V i s i t
Agenda f o r Coming Conferences
F u r t h e r Conferences
A d m i r a l G l a s s f o r d ' s Report
J.C.S.
51st Meeting (Casablanca)

Operation S r i t i s h Eastern F l e e t
Assignment o f Keavy Bombers t o China
Procedure t o Adopt a t Forthcoming Conference
O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Mediterranean
O p e r a t i o n s i n and from t h e United Kingdom
P r i o r i t y Bombing Programs
Proposed O p e r a t i o n s and Commands
J.C.S.
52nd Meeting (Casablanca)
13
P r i o r i t y Rombing Program
Command i n England
O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Mediterranean
Landing C r a f t
General S t r a t e g i c P o l i c i e s
J.C.S.
5 3 r d M eeting (Casablanca)
22
P a c i f i c and F a r E a s t T h e a t e r
A t t i t u d e of S t a l i n towards U . S.
Landing C r a f t
Continental Operations
Operations i n S i c i l y
U. S. Aid t o R u s s i a
J.C.S. 5 4 t h M eeting (Casablanca)
S y n t h e t i c Rubber Program
Report of Conversation between t h e Prime M i n i s t e r
and Admiral King
General Somervell on Tonnage, V i s i t t o R u s s i a , and
Command of Eisenhower
O p e r a t i o n i n Far E a s t and Mediterranean
O b j e c t i o n s t o B r i t i s h Concern i n our S t r a t e g i c T h e a t e r
S t r a t e g i c P o l i c y Considered i n Mediterranean & Far E a s t
iii
27
SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
J.C.S.
5 5 t h Meeting

(Casablanca)
Conduct o f War i n 1943
32
S y n t h e t i c Rubber Program
Command Set-up f o r Dakar-French
North-West A f r i c a
Required P r e s i d e n t i a l Action
P l a n n i n g S t a f f f o r HUSKY
Army and Navy Command Set-up i n H e d i t e r r a n e a n

J.C.S.
5 6 t h M eeting (Casablanca) .
Commitments t o Turkey
37
Dodecanese O p e r a t i o n
U.
S. Aid t o R u s s i a
General S t r a t e g i c P l a n f o r 1943
Shipping f o r 0 p e r a . t i o n i n t h e P a c i f i c
Proposed Mediterranean A r m y and A i r Command Set-np

J.C.S.
5 7 t h Meeting (Casablanca)
Despatches from' Eisenhower and Hurley
A n t i suhmar i n e :car f a r e
41
The Bomber O f f e n s i v e from t h e I h i t e d Kingdom
ANAKIM
D r a f t Telegram t o M. Sta1i:i
A s s a u l t Date f o r O p e r a t i o n HUSKY
Routes through t h e Levant
E v i c t i o n of Axis from T u n i s i a
T r a i n i n g of French P i l o t s
J.C.S.
5 8 t h X eeting
(Casablanca)
45
D r a f t Ileply t o M. S t a l i n
O p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Southwest P a c i f i c
HUSW
J.C.S.
5 9 t h M eeting (Casablanca)
Shipping C a p a b i l i t i e s f o r BOLERO Build-up
O p e r a t i o n HUSW
Report t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and Frime M i n i s t e r
47
SECRET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Joint Chiefs of Staff Meetings
(Presided over by the President)
51
58
Minutes of Conference, January 15, 1943

Visit of General Nogues and the Sultan of Morocco
with the President
The President's Program
The British Strategic Concept
Antisubmarine Warfare
Operation RAVENOUS
Command Situation in Europe
Operations in Tunisia
Minutes of Conference, January 16, 1943

Strategic Concept for 1943
Operations in the Mediterranean and on the Continent
Position of Turkey
British Strategic Concept
Aircraft to China
President's Suggestion of Proposed Plans
Aid to Russia
Information from Southern Europe
Equipment f o r the French
Operations in Tunisia
Supply Situation
French Shipping in Martinique
Operations in Pacific
INDEX
. .
. 67
SECRET
J.C.S.
5 0 t h Meeting
(Casablanca)
J O I N T CHIEFS OF STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held on Wednesday, J a n u a r y 13, 1943, a t 1500
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l G.
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J . R . Deane, IJSA
ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PRESENT

L t . General M. W.
C l a r k , USA
Rear Admiral C . M . Cooke, J r . , USN
and
Mr.
Reilly
SECrlET
1.
P!ESIDENT'S VISIT.
GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL K I N G d i s c u s s e d w i t h h!R.

c e r t a i n s e c u r i t y measures w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s
REILLY
V i s i t
in
North A f r i c a . They d e c i d e d t h a t h i s p a r t y s h o u l d come d i r e c t l y t o Anfa

Camp and n o t d e l a y a t Marrakech. A t e l e g r a m t o t h i s e f f e c t was s e n t t o
Admiral Leahy.
They then d i s c u s s e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s v i s i t i n g
Marrakech f o r a few d a y s and i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e Prime M i n i s t e r might
urge s u c h a v i s i t . The J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f f e l t t h a t s e c u r i t y measures
were n o t s u f f i c i e n t i n %!arrakech and t h a t t o make them s u f f i c i e n t would
n e c e s s i t a t e t h e s e n d i n g o f a d d i t i o n a l t r o o p s and t h a t would be unsound
from a t a c t i c a l p o i n t of v i e w . Yr. R e i l l y agreed.
The q u e s t i o n of t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s v i s i t t o t h e f r o n t was t h e n d i s
c u s s e d , and GENERAL MARSHALL p r o p o s e d t h a t . h e l e a v e . h e r e by motor t o
Rabat where .he would see two d i v i s i o n s and s p e a k t o c e r t a i n s e l e c t e d men.
He would t h e n p r o c e e d t o P o r t Lyautey and s e e a d i v i s i o n t h e r e . From

P o r t Lyautey.he could proceed t o General C l a r k ' s h e a d q u a r t e r s .
ADMIRAL K I N G s u g g e s t e d t h a t c e r t a i n s e l e c t e d men m i g h t be flown

from t h e T u n i s i a n f r o n t t o meet t h e P r e s i d e n t a t General C l a r k ' s .head
quarters.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t h e f e l t t h e P r e s i d e n t , on t h e r e t u r n
t r i p , s h o u l d r e t u r n t o Marrakech and remain t h e r e long enough t o change
p l a n e s and t h e n have a n i g h t f l i g h t t o L i b e r i a .
MR. REILLY a s k e d i f t h e L i b e r i a n t r i p was n e c e s s a r y , and a l l
a g r e e d t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t would i n s i s t upon i t .
A l l a g r e e d t h a t i t would be d e s i r a b l e if t h e P r e s i d e n t and t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r went s e p a r a t e l y a f t e r l e a v i n g t h e meetings a t Anfa Camp.

2.
AGENDA FOR COMING CONFERENCES.

GENERAL MARSHALL r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n of.how t o proceed w i t h t h e
b u s i n e s s of t h e coming c o n f e r e n c e s .
ADVIRAL K I N G i m p l i e d t h a t he thought t h e y s h o u l d f i r s t d i s c u s s
world-wide s t r a t e g y , our b a s i c s t r a t e g i c concept.
GENERAL MARSHALL was concerned as t o how he should approach t h e

d i s c u s s i o n , f e e l i n g t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had t h e i r minds set on t h e o p e r a t i o n
BRIMSTONE and t h a t t h e i r whole thought would b e t u r n e d towards t h i s .
ADMI!IAL K I N G then p r e s e n t e d some n o t e s r e g a r d i n g what he thought

should be d i s c u s s e d i n i t i a l l y . H e d i v i d e d t h e i n i t i a l d i s c u s s i o n i n t o :
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Manpower.
hfunitions and equipment.
Manpower v s . munitions and equipment.
T h a t p a r t of t h e t o t a l e f f o r t t h a t s h o u l d b e d i r e c t e d
a g a i n s t Germany and a g a i n s t J a p a n .
These s u g g e s t i o n s were f u r t h e r subdivid.ed i n t h e n o t e s which he

presented t o the Chiefs o f S t a f f .
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t h e b e l i e v e d w e s h o u l d d i s c u s s world-wide
s t r a t e g y f i r s t b e f o r e g e t t i n g t o s p e c i f k c o p e r a t i o n s and t h a t w e should
r e s i s t any e f f o r t on t h e p a r t of t h e D r i t i s h t o d e v i a t e from t h i s .
GENERAL MARSHALL r e p e a t e d t h a t h e b e l i e v e d t h a t even i n t h e c a s e
of world-wide
s t r a t e g y , t h e B r i t i s h t h o u g h t would be a t a l l times d i
r e c t e d towards O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE while h e , p e r s o n a l l y , could n o t h e l p

b u t have t h e q u e s t i o n of tonnage uppermost 3.n h i s mind.
GENEXAL AEtNOLD s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h were n o t t h i n k i n g w o r l d

s t r a t e g y but o n l y o f t h e n e x t o p e r a t i o n .
The J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f then d i s c u s s e d t h e q u e s t i o n of Opera
t i on BRIMSTONE.
GENERAL SOXERVELL s a i d t h a t i f we can c l e a r t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n ,
he e s t i m a t e d t h a t we could save i n f i v e months 1,825,000 t o n s o f s h i p p i n g ;
t h a t t h e blow w e can s t r i k e anywhere depends on a v a i l a b l e tonnage; t h a t

at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , t h e b a l a n c e between c a p i t a l - l o a d e d t r a n s p o r t and
c a p i t a l - l o a d e d c a r g o vessels i s such t h a t we can move more t r o o p s t h a n
s u p p o r t i n g cargo; and t h a t i f w e can i n s t i t u t e t a n k s a i l i n g s from H a i f a
or f r o m t h e e a s t e r n Mediterranean to t h e North A f r i c a n t h e a t e r , w e can
save c o n s i d e r a b l e a d d i t i o n a l tonnage.
H e s a i d t h a t , f i g u r i n g t h e l o s s e s o n t h e same ra t e t h a t t h e y were
s u s t a i n e d i n t h e TORCH O p e r a t i o n , O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE c o u l d b e accom
p l i s h e d w i t h t h e l o s s of 45 s h i p s . He a l s o thought t h a t s e c u r i n g S i c i l y
would be e s s e n t i a l t o opening t r a f f i c i n t h e Mediterranean.
3
SECRET
GENERAL CLARK q u e s t i o n e d t h i s , s t a t i n g t h a t he f e l t w e c o u l d
p r o t e c t t r a f f i c through t h e Mediterranean by a i r coverage from T u n i s i a .
GENERAL ARNOLD a s k e d what t h e B r i t i s h l o s s e s had b e e n i n t h e
M a 1t a o p e r a t i o n .
GENERAL CLAFtK s t a t e d t h a t t h e y had s u f f e r e d a 60 p e r c e n t loss

b u t t h a t i t must be remembered t h a t t h e y had had no f i g h t e r c o v e r a g e .
ADMIRAL KING s t a t e d t h a t he thought t h e b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n as f a r

a s t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n i s c o n c e r n e d i s t o open i t , t h u s s a v i n g t h e long
voyage a r o u n d t h e Cape o f Good Hope. He f e l t t h a t t h i s was much more
i m p o r t a n t t h a n e l i m i n a t i n g I t a l y from t h e w a r .
GENERAL C L W s a i d t h a t Admiral Cunningham f e l t t h a t t r a f f i c
between S i c i l y a n d T u n i s i a c o u l d b e p r o t e c t e d once T u n i s i a i s i n o u r hands.
GENERAL MARSHALL asked t h e e f f e c t s of t h e German bombing on Bone
and A l g i e r s .
GENERAL C L m r e p l i e d t h a t Bone i s w i t h i n r e a c h o f German d i v e
bombers and t h a t w e had s u f f e r e d r a t h e r s e v e r e losses t h e r e . He f e l t ,
however, t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n i s now much improved because of a n t i a i r c r a f t
and f i g h t e r p r o t e c t i o n and a l s o b e c a u s e of t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of r a d a r
equipment. The bombing of A l g i e r s h a s been c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s e n e d s i n c e
w e have employed n i g h t f i g h t e r s t o p r o t e c t i t .
ADMIRAL COOKE s a i d t h a t a t p r e s e n t it looked as though w e would
n o t e x p e l t h e Germans from T u n i s i a u n t i l s p r i n g by which time w e would
have some 500,000 t r o o p s i n A f r i c a . The q u e s t i o n would t h e n a r i s e as t o
whether we s h o u l d u s e s h i p p i n g t o send some t r o o p s e l s e w h e r e o r t o u s e
them d i r e c t l y from North A f r i c a . I n any e v e n t , we must make our plans a t
least t h r e e months i n advance. The c a p t u r e of S a r d i n i a o r S i c i l y would

p r o b a b l y i n v o l v e some s h i p p i n g l o s s e s , b u t t h e s e would probably he o f f
s e t by i n c r e a s e d s a f e t y t o s u b s e q u e n t s h i p p i n g through t h e Mediterranean.
ADMIRAL K I N G t h e n asked why w e should c r e a t e such a l a r g e e x c e s s
f o r c e i n North A f r i c a .
GENERAL CLARK r e p l i e d t h a t i t would n o t be n e c e s s a r y t o do s o

u n l e s s w e were going t o u s e them i n t h i s a r e a . H e p o i n t e d o u t , however,
SECRET
t h a t t h e o c c u p a t i o n of S a r d i n i a o r S i c i l y would be a m c h more d i f f i c u l t
o p e r a t i o n t h a n T O K H had been
AnMIRAL fOOKE s a i d t h a t he f e l t t h a t we could mount a n o p e r a t i o n

a g a i n s t S a r d i n i a l a r g e l y by u s i n g l a n d i n g c r a f t o f t h e l a r g e r t y p e s i n
which we c o u l d a f f o r d t o t a k e some l o s s e s . I n r e p l y t o Admiral K i n g ' s
y u e s t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r b u i l d i n g up an e x c e s s f o r c e i n
F o r t h a f r i c a , he s t a t e d t h a t some e x c e s s was n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e i t would
t a k e many more t r o o p s t o e x p e l t h e Axis from T u n i s i a t h a n i t would t o

simply h o l d N o r t h A f r i c a orwe t h e Axis powers were d r i v e n o u t ; a l s o ,
t h a t tke hazard w i t h r e g a r d t o S p a n i s h borocco was g r e a t e r p r i o r to our
c a p t u r e of T u n i s i a and more t , r o o p s would b e r e q u i r e d t o s a f e g u a r d o u r
interests i n that area.
CEYEFAL CLAI'K s a i d t h a t i t was now e v i d e n t t h a t t h e e a r l i e s t
d a t e f o r an a l l - o u t
o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t T u n i s i a was l f a r c h 1 5 t h and, i n
view o f t h i s , a n o p e r a t i o n a g a i n F t e i t h e r S a r d i n i a o r S i c i l y c o u l d
s c a r c e l y b e u n d e r t a k e n b e f o r e slimmer.
CENERBI. MARSHALL a s k e d C e n e r a l C l a r k what number o f t r o o p s he

t h o u g h t would b e n e c e s s a r y t o m a i n t a i n i n F o r t h A f r i c a once the A x i s
f o r c e s were e x p e l l e d
tiENERAL CLARK r e p l i e d t h a t f o u r d i v i s i o n s would b e s u f f i c i e n t ,
This, i n c l u d i n g t h e s e r v i c e t r o o p s and t h e A i r Force, would m e a n a f o r c e

of about 250,000 men.,
GENERAL KATSHALL. p o i n t e d o u t t h a t the exuess f o r c e t h a t we'would
have a f t e r T u n i s i a had been c a p t u r e d would amourit t o a b o u t t h r e e U . S .

d i v i s i o n s and t h e B r i t i s h T.st Army
GENERAL MlnRSHALL asked General C l a r k f o r h i s views on the t r a i n
i n g n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e O p e r a t i o n BPIMSTONE,
GEfiG?EBT. CLAEX r e p l i e d t h a t h e thought i t should be accomplished
i n A f r i c a and t h a t i t should be completed a t t h e r a t e of about one d i v i

s i o n p e r month a f t e r t h e A r m y and Favy had c o m p l e t e d c e r t a i n b a s i c
training.
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n a s k e d i f t h e s u p p l y o f t h e t r o o p s i n
S a r d i n i a would p r e s e n t any g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y .
SECRET
GENERAL CLARK t h o u g h t i t c o u l d b e accomplished a l m o s t e n t i r e l y
b y a i r and l a n d i n g c r a f t .
GENERAL ARNOLD p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t b a s e d i n
North A f r i c a c o u l d o n l y o p e r a t e f o r a b o u t o n e - h a l f hour o v e r S a r d i n i a
even w i t h t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of b e l l y t a n k s .
GENERAL MARSHALL asked General C l a r k i f he thought i t was neces
s a r y f o r t h e 4 t h D i v i s i o n t o come t o North A f r i c a i n view o f t h e e x c e s s
number of t r o o p s t h a t would be a v a i l a b l e h e r e ,
GENERAL CLARK r e p l i e d t h a t i f no f u r t h e r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s
were contemplated after t h e c a p t u r e of T u n i s i a , i t would n o t b e n e c e s s a r y
f o r i t t o come. B e s t a t e d , however, t h a t t h e r e were s t i l l
lg
British
d i v i s i o n s t o a r r i v e i n North A f r i c a and t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e s e

t o come. He p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i n t h e n e x t few months t h e German t h r e a t t o
a doubtful
q u a n t i t y - . They a r e w a i t i n g t o s e e t h e r e s u l t s o f o u r T u n i s i a n o p e r a t i o n s .
S p a i n would b e c r i t i c a l . S p a i n i s , a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e ,
This being the case, i t i s necessary f o r us t o maintain a l a r g e force

a v a i l a b l e t o a c t a g a i n s t S p a n i s h Morocco, He f e l t t h a t once t h e A x i s
powers had been pushed o u t of T u n i s i a , S p a i n w i l l d e f i n i t e l y r e s i s t a
German i n v a s i o n and t h e danger i n s o f a r as S p a n i s h Morocco i s concerned
w i l l be decreased
GENERAL SOMERVELL a s k e d General C l a r k if any German t r o o p s had
come from S i c i l y , t o which GENERAL CLARK r e p l i e d t h a t he t h o u g h t n o t
ADMIRAL COOKE p o i n t e d o u t t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of t h e d e c i s i o n ,
whether i t be t o u n d e r t a k e O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE o r some o t h e r o p e r a t i o n ,
i t s h o u l d b e f i r m and t h a t w e s h o u l d n o t p e r m i t o u r s e l v e s t o b e f o r c e d
i n t o an operation without s u f f i c i e n t t i m e f o r preparation
GENERAL, SOMERVEIL asked General C l a r k when i t w a s e x p e c t e d t h a t

t h e B r i t i s h would have p o s s e s s i o n o f T r i p o l i , t o which G e n e r a l C l a r k
r e p l i e d t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e c o m p l e t e d on F e b r u a r y 1st.
3.
FURTHER CONFEFU3NCES
GENERAL MARSHALL s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f meet
a t 0830 and t h a t arrangements be made t o m e e t w i t h t h e B r i t i s h a t 1 0 3 0 ,

January 1 6 t h , t o which a l l agreed
!, E C R E T
4.
A I X X P A L GLASSFORDsS FEPORT.
AEMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t the Glassford Commission had j u s t about
completed i t s work and t h a t t h e i r r e p o r t h a d been blocked o u t . Re s a i d

t h a t i t would be s e n t f i r s t t o General Eisenhower f o r a p p r o v a l and t h e n
i t would be r e f e r r e d t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f e i t h e r a t Anfa Camp
or i n Washington.
Be s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e was one p o i n t upon which t h e e n t i r e Corn-.
mission a g r e e d ;
. e < , t h e d e s i r a h i l i t y o f g i v i r i g the Iirrnch c e r t a i n t a s k s
t o perform and t h e n l e t t i n g them perform them. He s t a t e d t h a t the F r e n c h

a r e w i l l i n g t o o p e r a t e u n d e r Bdmirsl i'egran wlio h a d been made a V i c e
Admiral.
He s a i d t h a t tkie E r i t i s i f had a g r e e d t o p e r m i t t b e F r e n c h t o
u n d e r t a k e t h e i n s h o r e n a v a l d e f e n s e s o f ;'ambia
a s p a r t o f F r e n c h West
A f r i c a , but t h a t the)- were riot irfclirred t.o p e r m i t t,Iie 1~'rencIi t,o under..
t a k e t h e a i r p r o t e c t i o n of
t.his a r e a .
!le suggested t h a t the J o i n t C h i e f s o f I t a f f ' i r i s i s t o n making the

maximum u s e o f F r e n c h f o r c e s b y g i v i n g t,l!em airl'ropriat~r. t a s k s and t h e n
t r u s t i n g them t o accomplish them.
He f e l t t h a t we woi11tl &et
SOIT'P
the R r i t ish.
o ~ i ! o s i t , i o i i i i i t l i i s r e s p e c t from
SECRET
J.C.S.
51st Meeting
(Casablanca)
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held on Thursday, January 14, 1943, a t 1030
MEMBERS PRESENT
General G.
C. Marshall, USA
L t . General H.
H.
Arnold, USA
SECRETARY
Brig. General J. R . Deane, USA
ADDITIONAL OFFICERS PPESENT

L t . General B. B . Somervell, USA
L t . General M. W .
Clark, USA
Rear Admiral C . M. Cooke, J r . , USN
B r i g . General A . C . Wedemeyer, USA
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t t h e Prime M i n i s t e r and t h e F i r s t Sea

Lord h a d , i n c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h h i m , d e p l o r e d t h e p r e s e n t s t a t e o f t h e
B r i t i s h E a s t e r n F l e e t , which t h e y s a i d w a s i m m o b i l i z e d b e c a u s e i t had
been s t r i p p e d of i t s d e s t r o y e r s and c a r r i e r s . J u s t where t h e c a r r i e r s
a r e was n o t s t a t e d . H.M. S - V i c t o r i o u s , which was s e n t t o t h e United S t a t e s
w i t h n o t h i n g b u t g r e e n p i l o t s , cannot be ready b e f o r e t h e 1st o f February.
I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e y may have 1oanedusH.M.S. V i c t o r i o u s and o f f e r e d

u s a n o t h e r c a r r i e r t o f u r t h e r t h e i r a p p a r e n t desire t o keep t h i s f l e e t
i m m o b i l i z e d . Admiral King f e e l s t h a t t h e B r i t i s h must make t h e n a v a l
e f f o r t t o c u t t h e J a p a n e s e l i n e s o f communications t o :Iangoon--which
t h e y now show no d i s p o s i t i o n t o do. Although i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t tlie
" l i m i t e d o b j e c t i v e " o p e r a t i o n s now c o n t e m p l a t e d a r e so dependent on t h e
o p e r a t i o n s of t h e B r i t i s h Eastern F l e e t as China appears t o t h i n k ,
n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s would g r e a t l y f a c i l i t a t e s n i p p i n g t o
C a l c u t t a . I f t h e Chinese make movement o f t h e B r i t i s h E a s t e r n F l e e t con
d i t i o n a l t o t h e u n d e r t a k i n g o f t h e c o n t e m p l a t e d o p e r a t i o n , t h e r e i s no
q u e s t i o n b u t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h s h o u l d make t h i s move.
GENERAL SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e o p e r a t i o n might pos
s i b l y b e s u p p o r t e d by r a i l from Bombay, such s u p p o r t would be v e r y slow

and p r o b a b l y dangerous t o r e l y upon.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h e Chinese f e a r e d .Japanese s e a b o r n e re..

i n f o r c e m e n t v i a Xangoon and i n q u i r e d what was n e e d e d t o c o u n t e r t h i s
threat.
ADMIRAL K I N G r e p l i e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h E a s t e r n F l e e t s h o u l d be
s u f f i c i e n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y a s we a r e k e e p i n g t,he :Japanese w e l l o c c u p i e d
elsewhere. He f e l t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h s h o u l d move as nraiiy e l e m e n t s o f t h i s
F l e e t as t h e y c o u l d c o v e r w i t h t h e i r a v a i l a b l e d e s t r o y e r s .
H e l f r i c h had t o l d
Admiral
King t h a t he kiad been urged by t h e B r i t i s h t o
go t o A u s t r a l i a , where he h a s two c r u i s e r s and two o r t h r e e d e s t r o y e r s

o p e r a t i n g u n d e r A d m i r a l Carpender.
He had i n q u i r e d as t o what t h e B r i t i s h E a s t e r n F l e e t c o u l d b e
e x p e c t e d t o d o . Admiral King had r e p l i e d t h a t h e had
110
information,
but t h a t when and if t h i s F l e e t moved t o Trincomalee, 'LLniral King would

send him b a c k t h e Dutch s h i p s . Such a move would klelp t o c l a r i f y t h e
c o m p l i c a t e d command s e t - u p i n t h e S o u t h w e s t ? a c i f i c .
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G f u r t h e r remarked t h a t t h e B r i t i s h E a s t e r n F l e e t
s e r v e d no purpose, s o f a r as he could see, b a s i n g a t K i l i n d i n i , b u t t h a t
t h e B r i t i s h would p r o b a b l y i n s i s t t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t b e moved because
of a l a c k o f d e s t r o y e r s . He f e l t t h a t p r e s s u r e s h o u l d be brought on them
t o cover t h e s h i p p i n g l i n e s t o C a l c u t t a n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e p r o j e c t e d
operation.
With r e g a r d t o s u b m a r i n e s i n t h e I n d i a n Ocean and t h e Bay o f
Bengal, t h e B r i t i s h and Dutch t o g e t h e r have a l i m i t e d number--less t h a n
10. I n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a B r i t i s h demand f o r a d d i t i o n a l s u b m a r i n e s ,
ADMIRAL K I N G i s w i l l i n g t o base s i x a t Trincomalee. Before t h i s can b e

done, a t e n d e r s h o u l d be s e n t t h e r e .
F u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n d e v e l o p e d t h a t U.
S. submarines b a s i n g at
Fremantle c o u l d probably o p e r a t e i n t h e Bay of Bengal as w e l l as i n t h e i r

p r e s e n t o p e r a t i n g areas.
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t he b e l i e v e d an a d d i t i o n a l g r o u p of
heavy bombers s h o u l d b e s e n t t o General S t i l w e l l i n o r d e r t o b u i l d up
h i s a v a i l a b l e heavy bombers t o a t o t a l o f two g r o u p s . He b e l i e v e s t h a t
t h e s e bombers w i l l r e t u r n more d i v i d e n d s o p e r a t i n g i n t h i s t h e a t e r t h a n
i n t h e e a s t e r n Mediterranean.
was of g r e a t importance t o open up

a lower a l t i t u d e r o u t e t o China and t h a t an i n c r e a s e i n t h e number o f
medium bombers a s s i g n e d t h i s t h e a t e r would make i t p o s s i b l e t o a t t a c k
ADMIRAL K I N G remarked t h a t
j t
J a p a n e s e s h i p p i n g i n o c c u p i e d Chinese p o r t s .
In d i s c u s s i n g t h e b e s t l i n e of p r o c e d u r e t o adopt a t t h e f o r t h
coming c o n f e r e n c e , ADMIRAL K I N G s t r e s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f m a i n t a i n i n g
t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n our hands. H e b e l i e v e s t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o a g r e e
upon Anglo-American world-wide s t r a t e g y , t h e b a s i c c o n c e p t , b e f o r e per
m i t t i n g any d i s c u s s i o n of d e t a i l s . The United Nations a r e now i n a p o s i
t i o n t o t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n t h e war; i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o f i x i n t h e
minds of t h e B r i t i s h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e b a s i c i s s u e must be d e t e r m i n e d
b e f o r e going i n t o d e t a i l s . The United S t a t e s now h a s t h e p r i n c i p a l power;
therefore, w e should take the lead.
GENERAL CLARK, i n r e p l y t o a q u e s t i o n from G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l ,

s a i d t h a t a l t h o u g h i t was n o t p o s s i b l e t o d i s p o s e l a n d i n g c r a f t a l o n g
t h e Mediterranean c o a s t unknown t o t h e G e r m a n s ,
10
i n h i s opinion t h i s d i d
SECRET
n o t p r e c l u d e t h e i r use f o r t h e BRIMSTONE o p e r a t i o n , inasmuch a s t h e Axis

could n o t know t h e o b j e c t i v e s p e c i f i c a l l y . While t h e y would undoubtedly
be u n d e r o c c a s i o n a l a t t a c k , t h e r e a l d a n g e r i s from d i v e bombers; i f
d i s p o s e d w e s t of A l g i e r s , t h e y would be immune from t h e s e a i r c r a f t .
He
agreed w i t h A d m i r a l King's i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e r e w a s a number of u s a b l e
small p o r t s where t h e s e c r a f t might b e loaded. I n s t a l l a t i o n o f a d d i t i o n a l

a i r f i e l d s i n North A f r i c a w i l l n o t d i s c l o s e our i n t e n t i o n s , inasmuch as
General E i s e n h o w e r h a s b e e n i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e s e f i e l d s s h o u l d b e s p o t t e d
f o r g e n e r a l use and n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n .
A!lMIW KING remarked t h a t t h e B r i t i s h concept of b r i n g i n g t r o o p s
from t h e U. K. and from t h e U. S . f o r such an o p e r a t i o n was designed f o r

s u r p r i s e , b u t t h a t i t a l s o r e s u l t e d i n b u i l d i n g u p a g r e a t e r e x c e s 4 of
t r o o p s i n North A f r i c a w i t h a c o r r e s p o n d i n g d i m i n u t i o n of t r o o p s which
c o u l d be b a s e d i n t h e U . K.
f o r p r o j e c t e d o p e r a t i o n s on t h e C o n t i n e n t .
He f e l t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h were fully aware of t h i s f a c t and, i n view of

t h e i r known o p p o s i t i o n t o any C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s , t h i s gave them a
good " o u t . "
GENEXAI. CLARK s a i d t h a t i t w a s h i s b e l i e f t h a t o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t
t h e B r e s t P e n i n s u l a would be v e r y hazardous, would r e q u i r e overwhelming
a i r s u p p o r t , e x t e n s i v e n a v a l s u p p o r t , and immediate and heavy f o l l o w up

Such an o p e r a t i o n should n o t be undertaken w i t h o u t adequate p r e p a r a t i o n .
Although many of our t r o o p s n e e d e d b a t t l e t r a i n i n g , h e b e l i e v e s t h a t
they were f u l l y c a p a b l e of s t a n d i n g up t o t h e German d e f e n s e . He b e l i e v e d
t h a t , i f s u c c e s s f u l , o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e B r e s t P e n i n s u l a would have
f a r g r e a t e r r e s u l t s t h a n a s u c c e s s f u l BRIMSTONE o p e r a t i o n .
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t maximum a i r e f f o r t from England c o u l d
s e r i o u s l y l i m i t t h e German a i r e f f o r t a g a i n s t t h e B r e s t P e n i n s u l a opera
t i o n . C u r r e n t German t a c t i c s i n o p p o s i t i o n t o F l y i n g F o r t r e s s e s was pro
d u c i n g a heavy a t t r i t i o n of t h e German A i r F o r c e s . If t h e y p e r s i s t i n
these t a c t i c s ,
t h e German A i r F o r c e w i l l b e p r a c t i c a l l y e l i m i n a t e d
within a year.
GENERAL SOSIERVELL s t a t e d t h a t i t p r o b a b l y would h e p o s s i b l e t o
t r a n s p o r t 300,900 U. S. t r o o p s t o t h e IJ. K. by September p r o v i d e d move
ments t o A f r i c a were suspended. He b e l i e v e s t h i s a more a c c u r a t e f i g u r e
t h a n t h e 150,000 e s t i m a t e d b y t h e B r i t i s h .
He s t a t e d t h a t based
on
p r e s e n t submarine l o s s e s , we s h a l l be a b l e t o move fewer t r o o p s i n 1944

11
SECRET
t h a n w e c a n i n 1943 d e s p i t e the s h i p b u i l d i n g program, and t h a t u n l e s s
e v e r y p o s s i b l e means--including an e f f e c t i v e a i r o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t sub
marine bases, b u i l d i n g yards and assembly p o i n t s , and e f f e c t i v e commando
raids i n f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e b a s e s - - i s u s e d , w e s h a l l be f a c e d w i t h a
d i m i n i s h i n g e f f o r t . If w e succeed i n opening t h e Mediterranean, w e can
probably i n c r e a s e p r e s e n t e s t i m a t e s of 1,000,000 t r o o p s moved t h i s year
by 150,000. H e p o i n t e d out t h a t s t a b i l i z a t i o n o f t h e North African s i t u a
t i o n would n o t g r e a t l y r e d u c e s h i p p i n g commitments i n the Middle E a s t
area because of forthcoming commitments i n s u p p o r t o f Turkey, movement
of U. S. t r o o p s i n t o Bum+ and supply o f e x i s t i n g p o s i t i o n s . H e j u s t i f i e d
h i s average turn-around of 2& months on t h e b a s i s t h a t i n 1943 P a c i f i c
t r o o p movements w i l l r e q u i r e approximately t h e same tonnage as those i n
the Atlantic.
GENERAT, ARNOLD s a i d that he d i d n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e B r i t i s h had
e v e r had a d e f i n i t e bombing pk-ogram. I n view of t h e l a r g e b u i l d up w i t h

U . S. bombers i n t h e U. I(. t o a f o r c e which w i l l g r e a t l y exceed t h e
B r i t i s h bombing f o r c e , he f e l t t h a t t h e Combined Chiefs o f S t a f f should
e s t a b l i s h a p r i o r i t y bombing program.
After c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e e x i s t i n g command set-up i n
t h e European Theater of Operations, i t was agreed:
(a) T h a t t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f s h o u l d recommend t h a t t h e
Combined Chiefs o f s t a f f e s t a b l i s h a p r i o r i t y bombingprogram;
(b) T h a t A i r hlarshal Harris s h o u l d o p e r a t e t h e bombers i n t h e
U . K. ( a l l u n d e r h i s command) u n d e r a d i r e c t i v e from t h e
Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f s e t t i n g f o r t h o b j e c t i v e s and
technique;
(c) T h a t upon t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n of the T u n i s i a n opera
t i o n , i t w i l l p r o b a b l y b e d e s i r a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h two s e p a r a t e
t h e a t e r s i n Europe ( t h e M e d i t e r i a n e a n and t h e U . K.-French
theaters) ;
(d) T h a t any o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C o n t i n e n t must be a combined
o p e r a t i o n which must r e c e i v e t h e f u l l cooperation and support
of the B r i t i s h .
12
SECRET
J.C.S.
52nd Meeting
( Casab 1anca)
J O I N T CHIEFS O F STAFF
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Saturday,
January 16, 1913, a t 0915.
MEMBERS PRESENT
General G . C . Marshall, USA
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J. R. Deane, USA

Rear Admiral C . M .
Cooke, Jr., USN

Colonel J . E . Smart, USA
13
SECRET
GENERAZ, ARNOLD s t a t e d t h a t p r i o r i t y o f b o m b i n g t a r g e t s was d e t e r
mined i n B r i t a i n by a committee composed of RAF o f f i c e r s , RAF Economic

Warfare R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , p l u s one United S t a t e s Army A i r F o r c e s Repre
s e n t a t i v e . The l i s t of t a r g e t s s o d e t e r m i n e d was t h e n s e n t t o General
Eisenhower f o r approval and a f t e r approval t o G e n e r a 1 Eaker, who s e l e c t e d
o b j e c t i v e s from t h i s l i s t which w e a t h e r and o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s made i t
p o s s i b l e f o r him t o r e a c h . A s t o c h o o s i n g between t a r g e t s i n France o r
i n Germany, t h e bombers p r e f e r r e d t a r g e t s inGermany because t h e y encoun
t e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s f i g h t e r o p p o s i t i o n t h a n t h e y d i d over t a r g e t , s
i n F r a n c e . General Eaker a l r e a d y h a s e i g h t a i r p l a n e s equipped w i t h t h e
new H2SL d e v i c e , which i s t h e f o r e r u n n e r of t h e l a t e s t p r e c i s i o n bombing
by r a d i o beam equipment. I t i s e x p e c t e d t h a t use of t h i s equipment w i l l
p e r m i t p r e c i s i o n bombing r e g a r d l e s s of weather and w i l l e n a b l e new low
a l t i t u d e bombing above t h e o v e r c a s t when such weather c o n d i t i o n s o c c u r .
I n answer t o a q u e s t i o n from A d m i r a l King, G e n e r a l Arnold s t a t e d t h a t
t h e r e were e i g h t r a d i o s t a t i o n s i n s o u t h e r n E n g l a n d from which t h e
n e c e s s a r y r a d i o beams were t r a n s m i t t e d .
With r e s p e c t t o n i g h t bombing, GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t two
g r o u p s o f United S t a t e s bombers i n t h e United Kingdom were now equipped
w i t h flame dampers, b u t t h a t much more t r a i n i n g w a s r e q u i r e d f o r n i g h t
bombing t h a n f o r d a y bombing i n o r d e r t o k e e p t h e l o s s e s down t o a

r e a s o n a b l e f i g u r e ; t h e r e f o r e , our f o r c e s were n o t y e t f u l l y p r e p a r e d f o r
n i g h t bombing.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t i t was s a t i s f a c t o r y t o General Eisen

hower t o t r a n s f e r General Andrews t o England a t any time i n o r d e r t o t a k e
command t h e r e ; i t was contemplated t h a t General B r e r e t o n would r e l i e v e
General Andrews o f h i s p r e s e n t command. A l l t h a t remained t o do was t o
p r e p a r e a d i r e c t i v e for General Andrews. Under t h i s d i r e c t i v e A i r Ilar
s h a l P o r t a l would be g i v e n o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l ( i . e . , d e s i g n a t i o n of
o b j e c t i v e s and times o f a t t a c k ) over United S t a t e s A i r F o r c e s o p e r a t i n g
from t h e United Kingdom.
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i t was e s s e n t i a l i n f r a m i n g t h i s
d i r e c t i v e t h a t " o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l " be c l e a r l y d e f i n e d .
During d i s c u s s i o n a s t o how b e s t t o p r e s e n t t h e v i e w s o f t h e
J o i n t l i n i t e d S t a t e s C h i e f s of S t a f f r e g a r d i n g p r o p o s e d M e d i t e r r a n e a n
o p e r a t i o n s t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f , ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h e
14
Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f s h o u l d n o t e t h a t t h e r e i s now i n North A f r i c a

a l a r g e number of t r o o p s - - p r o b a b l y
s u f f i c i e n t f o r the contemplated
o p e r a t i o n . T h e s e t r o o p s s h o u l d n o t s i t i d l e . Timing o f t h e p r o p o s e d
o p e r a t i o n i s of g r e a t importance. lie b e l i e v e d t h a t t r o o p s i n i i o r t h A f r i c a
now n o t a c t i v e l y engaged i n T u n i s i a c o u l d be t r a i n e d i n amphibious war
fare,
i n oriler t o advance t h e dat,e by which we c o u l d u n d e r t a k e e i t h e r
t h e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S a r d i n i a o r t h e o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t S i c i l y , wtiich
e v e r m i g h t b e d e c i d e d upon. O f t h e two, he f e l t S i c i l y was much more
d e c i s i v e a n d more c o m p l e t e i n i t s e l f , i n a s m u c h as l i t t l e was t o b e
g a i n e d by t h e S a r d i n i a n o p e r a t i o n .
If t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e S i c i l i a n
o p e r a t i o n can be done by t h e t r o o p s now i n h o r t h A f r i c a i s a c c e p t e d , i t

should be p o s s i b l e t o c o n t i n u e t h e flow of t r o o p s t o t h e United Kingdom.
On t h i s b a s i s , we c o u l d b o t h advance t h e d a t e of t h e S i c i l j a n o p e r a t i o n
and c o n t i n u e our p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n , c o n t i n u i n g t o
send t r o o p s and l a n d i n g c r a f t t o the United Kingdom.
GENERAL NARSHALL s a i d t h a t General Eisenhower had changed h i s

v i e w p o i n t a s a r e s u l t of h i s e x p e r i e n c e s t o d a t e and now f e l t t h a t i t
was i m p e r a t i v e t h a t we o r g a n i z e f o r ROUNDUP on a l a r g e s c a l e
He now
f e e l s t h a t approximately twice t h e f o r c e he o r i g i n a l l y contemplated w i l l

be r e q u i r e d
He f e e l s i t unsound t o c o u n t on more t h a n one t r i p from
l a n d i n g c r a f t used i n the f i r s t wave? a s o n l y a v e r y small p r o p o r t i o n of

t h e i n i t i a l wave i s l i k e l y t o bc a v a i l a b l e f o r a second t r i p ; t h e r e f o r e ,
t h e numbers o f l a n d i n g c r a f t i n i t i a l l y p r o v i d e d must b e many more t h a n
o r i g i n a l l y conceived
GE,NERAL SOMERW1.L s a i d t h a t G e n e r a l P a t t o n informed h i m t h a t
l o s s e s i n s m a l l l a n d i n g c r a f t were a b o u t 20 p e r c e n t i n t h e C a s a b l a n c a
landing.
ADMIRAL COOXE informed the J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
P l a n n e r s have made d e t a i l e d s t , u r i i e s of bot,h t h e S a r d i n i a a n d S i c i l y

o p e r a t i o n s , w h i c h t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f s h o u l d s e e . iie f e l t i t
e s s e n t i a l t o b r i n g some a d d i t i o n a l t r o o p s from t h e United S t a t e s , even
i f t h e y were used o n l y as rep1acement.s f o r t r o o p s now i n North A f r i c a
after t h e l a t t e r had been t r a i n e d i n amphibious o p e r a t i o n s . I t i s neces

s a r y t o r e t a i n a s t r o n g I J n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e on t h e b o r d e r o f S p a n i s h
iloroc c o .
The g r e a t e s t b o t t l e n e c k a p p e a r s t o be l a c k of h a r b o r s p a c e f o r
assembl i n g l a n d i n g c r a f t i n the I ' r d i t e r rariean. Pre 1iminar y i n v e s t i g a t i o n s
15
i n d i c a t e d t h a t n o t more t h a n 34 L S T ' s c o u l d b e accommodated w e s t o f

T u n i s i a ; t h e remainder would have t o be e a s t of there. These i n v e s t i g a
t i o n s had i n c l u d e d e i g h t p o r t s . Admiral H a l l was making a s u r v e y o f chi
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of accommodating LST's on t h e west c o a s t .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t , i f n e c e s s a r y , t h e r i s k o f n e s t i n g o r
banking t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t should be a c c e p t e d .
ADMIRAL COOKE s a i d t h a t , inasmuch a s a n amphibious d i v i s i o n was

a l r e a d y h e r e and i n view o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t , r a i n i n g t r o o p s n o t now
o p e r a t i n g i n T u n i s i a , he f e l t t h e B r i t i s h e s t i m a t e of a three-mont,li
d i f f e r e n t i a l between mounting of t h e S a r d i n i a n and S i c i l j ~ a no p e r a t i o n s
was t o o l a r g e , p a r t i c u l a r l y if t.ne T u n i s i a n o p e r a t j o n s a r e n o t completed
before nay.
GENERAL. ARNOLD q u e s t i o n e d t h e R r i t i s h st.atement, t h a t a I3rest

o p e r a t i o n meant fewer heavy bombers i.n Knglancl lh?cause ot' a d d i t i o n a l
r e q u i r e m e n t f o r l i g h t arid medium b o n i h r s .
GENERAL SOMERVELL, responding t o a r e q u e s t from S e n e r a 1 h'arshal i
t h a t lie o u t l i n e tkie mechanics of t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t , i o n , s a i d that.
( J i e
K e y t.o t h e s i t u a t i o n was t o make heavy use of l a n d i n g c r & f t . . Me

' now kmve
a v a i l a b l e 3 0 0 - f o o t I ISO-foot, and 1 0 5 f e ; i t . c r a f t wliich wc d i d n o t
110
b e f o r e . The f a c L i i i a t t h e s e c a n be u r r i i a d e d o v e r r h i Ue
m a t e r i a l l y changes tkie t y p e of' t h e o p e r a t i o n iriasmncli a s p o r ~f a c i l i t , i e s
a r e n o t r e q u i r e d . lie f e l t tkrat b y June i t s h o u l d be p o s s i b l t t o
90,000 t r o o p s i n t h e i n i t i a l a s s a u l t . These c r a f t . roiil8l theii
North A f r i c a f o r r e l o a d i n g . Allowing f o r l o s s e s , t h e se(:ond
j; I '
reiiirii
IVYII:'~
..
bli(
he a b l e t o e x p e d i t i o u s l y l i f t 60,000 t r o o p s and somc equipment,. I f
tiif:
Navy c o n c u r s i n t h e u s e of combat-loaded t r a n s p o r t s s u f f i c i e n t , t o l i l ' l

32,000 a d d i t i o n a l t r o o p s , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t d u r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g foui- t
(i
s i x weeks would be r e d u c e d t o a p p r o x i m a t e l y 38,000 t r o a p s . T h i s method

r e q u i r e s unloading l o t s of equipment, over t h e b e a c h c s , h u t i n c r e a s e s t.lie
s t r e n g t h o f t h e f i r s t wave by 32,000 t r o o p s . Once t h e l a n d i n g had h e r n
accomplished, s u p p l y would be by means of c o a s t e r s from tkie Ijnited King
dom and from E a s t A f r i c a i n o r d e r t o p e r m i t t h e use of h i g s h i p s e l s e
where and t o r e d u c e l o s s e s of c a r g o .
He agreed w i t h Admiral Cooke r e g a r d i n g the t r a i n i u g p o s s i h i l i t i e s .
w i t h General C l a r k r e g a r d i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f t r a i n i n g i n t h e Casab1anr:n
16
SECRET
a r e a , and w i t h G e n e r a l P a t t o n as t o t h e e x p e c t e d r e a c t i o n of S p a n i s h
Morocco, H e f e l t t h a t t h e t r o o p s now i n t h e Casablanca a r e a were r e t r o
grading and s h o u l d be a c t i v e l y employed by t r a i n i n g themfor t h e s e opera
t i o n s i n o r d e r t o keep them f i t .
Once t h e l a n d i n g was accomplished, t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t s h o u l d be
removed from t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n t o t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, which movement
should r e q u i r e about one month. I t i s e s s e n t i a l t o keep enough l a n d i n g
c r a f t i n t h e United Kingdom s o t h a t t r a i n i n g can c o n t i n u e . If w e send
only f i f t y LSTs t o t h e P a c i f i c , we s h o u l d be a b l e t o a c c o m p l i s h the
f o r e g o i n g ; however,
i f operations i n the Mediterranean w i l l prevent
o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e C o n t i n e n t , he f e l t t h a t t h e y s h o u l d n o t h e
undertaken
ADMIRAL COOKE s a i d t h a t t h e LST program should f u r n i s h 198 LST s
by March 15 and 15 a month t h e r e a f t e r , One hundred were now a l l o c a t e d
t o t h e P a c i f i c and 107 t o t h e A t l a n t i c , i n c l u d i n g B r i t i s h a l l o c a t i o n s
More t h a n 50 w i l l be r e q u i r e d i n t h e P a c i f i c . A t least two months were
r e q u i r e d a f t e r completion t o make t h e s e c r a f t ready f o r o p e r a t i o n s
The
B r i t i s h now have n o crews w i t h w h i c h t o man 11 c r a f t which w i l l b e

f i n i s h e d t h i s month and have o f f e r e d them t o us f o r
in t r a i n i n g
a month t o h e u s e d
He f e l t t h a t a s many l a n d i n g c r a f t a s t h e p o r t s would
accommodate c o u l d b e g o t t e n h e r e
ADMIRAL COOKE c a u t i o n e d a g a i n s t t h e t e n d e n c y t o l o o k b a c k
s a y i n g t h a t promising developments i n amphibious weapons--the A r m y

amphibious t r u c k , t h e a m p h i b i o u s t r a c t o r , e t c - - g r e a t l y
unloading
accelerated
Unloading of I S T s and X I S over t h e beaches i s complete,y
p r a c t i c a b l e , b u t he f e l t it would be d i s a s t r o u s t o a t t e m p t t o do s o i n
the case of combat-loaded t r a n s p o r t s , which would undoubtedly be sunk by
submarines o r by a i r before t h e y could be unloaded.
GENERAL WEDEMEYER s a i d t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t , i f w e s u b s c r i b e d
t o t h e B r i t i s h c o n c e p t , we s h o u l d d i s p e r s e our f o r c e s i n an a r e a which
e s h o u l d examine a p r o p o s i t i o n t o d e t e r
was n e i t h e r v i t a l nor f i n a l , W
mine how s u c c e s s i n t h e proposed o p e r a t i o n would improve our p o s i t i o n
The e f f o r t c o u l d b e j u s t i f i e d i f i t r e s u l t e d i n a m a t e r i a l s a v i n g i n
s h i p p i n g . Admiral Cunningham had s t a t e d t h a t he would r u n Mediterranean
convoys as soon as T u n i s i a had been c l e a r e d - - t h a t S i c i l y w a s n o t e s s e n
tial
He f e l t t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n would r e q u i r e up t o 12 d i v i s i o n s
17
SECRET
The B r i t i s h arguments a s t o A x i s c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r moving r e i n f o r c e m e n t s
s o u t h w e r e , he f e l t , s p e c i o u s . He b e l i e v e d a r a t i o of t h r e e t o s e v e n
more n e a r l y a c c u r a t e t h a n t h e one t o s e v e n r a t i o which t h e y advanced
Should t h e Germans move f i v e t o t e n d i v i s i o n s i n t o I t a l y , o p e r a t i o n s i n
c h a t p a r t of t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n w o u l d , he b e l i e v e d , r e q u i r e a m a j o r
e f f o r t on our p a r t which would ' v i t i a t e a C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n lie f e l t
our b e s t p r o c e d u r e was t o c o n t i n u e a heavy bombing o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t
Germany's l i n e s of' communication a c r o s s F r a n c e , c o n c e n t r a t i n g p a r t i c u
l a r l y on e i g h t m a r s h a l l i n g y a r d s . A f t e r t h a t , we s h o u l d proceed w i t h an
operation against the Brest Peninsula.
ADhlIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a . t he u n d e r s t o o d t h a t Admiral Cunningham
would u n d e r t a k e Mediterranean convoys once T u n i s i a had been c l e a r e d , but,

a n t i c i p a t e d heavy l o s s e s . . Fle f e l t we s h o u l d d e t e r m i n e f i r s t . what con
s t i t u t e s t h e " G e n e r a l F l a n " f o r t h e d e f e a t o f Germany, and t h e r e a f t e r
d e t e r m i n e how t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n f i t s i n t o t h i s p l a n
bridgehead s h o u l d be a t
Perhaps the
B r e s t , perhaps e l s e w h e r e i n n o r t h e r n Europe
The
S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n i s opportune b u t n o t d e f i n i t i v e , I t i s a l s o e s s e n t i a l
t h a t we work o u t a " G e n e r a l P l a n " f o r t h e d e f e a t of J a p a n
ALMIR4L COOKE s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h view was t h a t Germany c o u l d
be d e f e a t e d on l a n d o n l y on t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e ,
it
was e s s e n t i a l t h a t we a s s i s t t h e R u s s i a n s by o p e r a t i o n s t h i s summer
t o Japan,
As
t h e y s a y t h e y w i l l u s e t h e B r i t i s h F l e e t a f t e r t h e d e f e a t of
Germany b u t d o n o t s a y how or where

GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t w e wanted t o k e e p t h e German A r m y
engaged w i t h t h e R u s s i a n A r m y and we wanted t o make a l a n d i n g on t h e
Continent
Can w e d o t h a t i n t i m e t o s u p p o r t R u s s i a t h i s summer? W i l l
any o t h e r o p e r a t i o n d e s t r o y our a b i l i t y t o make a C o n t i n e n t a l l a n d i n g
our main o b j e c t i v e ? We must i n s u r e t h a t i t does n o t . If we do S i c i l y
we
might n o t have t h e means t o d o a n y t h i n g on t h e C o n t i n e n t b e f o r e October

W
e must d e t e r m i n e what must b e done t o s u p p o r t R u s s i a t h i s summer
i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t we a t t a c k , we must
d e t e r m i n e where
IT
15
Everythingnon.
b u i l d i n g up i n t h e United Kingdom i s composed of raw t r o o p s , w h i c h , h o #

e v e r , a r e b e t t e r t h a n p r e v i o u s unseasoned t r o o p s . Some l o a d e r s c o u l d b e
moved from t h e A f r i c a n t h e a t e r - A l t h o u g h h e f a v o r e d t h e C o n t i n e n t a l
o p e r a t i o n , he b e l i e v e d i t i m p o s s i b l e b e f o r e A u g u s t , ,
GENERAL il'EDEhfEYER s a i d t h a t , a f t e r t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e TORCH
o p e r a t i o n s , approximately 250,000 t r o o p s wouldbe r e q u i r e d t o c o n s o l i d a t e
18
SECRET
from t h e A t l a n t i c t o T u n i s i a . The B r i t i s h r e y u i r e a b o u t the sanie f r o n i
T r i p o l i t a n i a t o C a i r o . They m u s t i n a d d i t i o n move t r o o p s
beliiitil
i i i
Turkey. These d i s p s i t i o n s w i l l leave no troops f o r t h e Cent,ral \:miitc,r

ranean. We do riot d e s i r e t,o p u t more t r o o p s t h e r ? . If wi. unilrrt.aht. I l i v
S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n , i t must be i n s u f f i c i e n t streiigtli t o
assure%
sii~:ccss
He e s t i m a t e d t h a t a l m o s t a m i l l i o n t r o o p s would be r e q i r i r e i l
i l l
tli,,
African t h e a t e r .
WLI. s a i d t h a t the b i g g a i u t o be expwt,rrl f'rw t.tir

S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n w a s a s a v i n g of 1,800,000 t o n s of s h i p p i n g resiil t , i r i p
from o p e n i n g t h e h i e d i t e r r a r i e a n ; tkiat tkie Cerntairs coificl be Pxpect6.d t o
make a d e t e r m i n e d e f f o r t a g a i n - t I ' e d i t e r r a n e a i , roiivoj-s f r o n i C i c i l y and
elsewhere.
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t,hat i f an a i r umbrella vies niairitniiird ov?r

t,he convoys (which would r e y u i r e f i g h t e r bases r v p r j 100 niilcs a l o i i g
b!edit.erranean c o a s t )
?lit.
t h e l o s s e s s h o u l d be low; h u t t , l i a t a t nigiit and
d u r i n g bad weather t h e f i g h t e r s could o f f e r I i t t l e p r o t r r t , i o r i . 'I'h
t u r e of S i c i l y would remove an imntiiierit t h r e a t , t o thes? r o i i v o b s .

A J M I R A L K I K G p o i r , t e d o u t t i i a t or:e of' 1,lie Diirpnsrs
or
t nkirip
S i c i l y was t o push t h e &xis B i r back. I t would hrcome a liase f'ron; w l t i i - l ~

to i n l e r d i c t . h x i s Air frorii i . a r r 1 i i : i a ai8d f'roir: 11 a l y . T'urt,t,?r. i l
t h e danger of' d i v e bon'hers. lir s a i d t h a t ,
riiiiii,
i n cnrrsidt?ririg, the Jik?liiioocl
of g e t t i n g convoys through t h e h!editerraneai: w i t , l c L i v i l ? i n "is
l!aiiiih~
tli? B r i t i s k i r e c o r d i n k e e p i n g t h e E n g l ~ i s hC h a n i i e l open s 1 1 0 u l d not
?IP
t a k e n t o o s e r i o u s l y . inasmuch a s t h e t . y w o f skijnpiirg w a s n i a t e r i i i ! I )
different.
I n h i s o p i n i o n , t h e S . i c i l i a r r operat,ioii was wortit rlie < . f ' ! ' o r t ;
the Sardinian operation is not.
lie i s opnosed t o tile
loaded t r a n s p o r t s i n e i t h e r o p e r a t i o n .
timing--the b a l a n c e is d e l i c a t e - - b u t
I!SP
l?he main q u e s t i o n
ol' ronibat.
js o i i e
01'
he t h i n k s t h e o p e r a t i o n c a n b e riurit~
In r e s p o n s e t o an o b j e c t i o n from General Wedemeyer t h a t , up t o I 2 i i i v i

s i o n s would be r e q u i r e d , he p o i n t e d out, t h a t a d e q u a t e f o r c e s s l ~ o i i l dl ~ t .
a v a i l a b l e from t h o s e a l r e a d y i n Korth A f r i c a ; d i v i s j o n s now orellpied i n
T u n i s c o u l d b e moved t o t h e S p a n i s h hioroccan f r o n t , i e r f o r r e s t , arid
rehabilitation;
and we s h o u l d be a b l e t o u t i l i z e Frerich t r n o p s
I t is
e s s e r , t i a l t h a t we c o n v i n c e t h e R r i t i s h t h a t t h e y must f u l l y t , r n s t t,tie
French t r o o p s .
GENERAL WEDEMEYER s a i d t h a t we would have seven d i v i 7 i i i b s a i i d
t h e B r i t i s h a b o u t f o u r d i v i s i o n s b e t w e e n T u n i s i a and t h e A t l a n t i c
P l a c i n g f o u r F r e n c h and two U , . S , d i v i s i o n s n e a r t h e Moroccan b o r d e r

would r e l e a s e t h r e e [I.
S , arid p o s s i b l y f o u r B r i t i s h d i v i s i o n s . General
Alexander !;as a p p r o x i m a t e l y t e n , t h r e e of which h e n e e d s i n Libya and

t h r e e i n C a i r o ; he s h o u l d s e n d a t l e a s t a n a r m o r e d c o r p s t o G e n e r a l
Wilson i n t h e 'Turkish r e a r . fie p r o b a b l y c o u l d g i v e u s two d i v i s i o n s f o r
the S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n . .
before the J o i n t Chiefs o f St.aff
ADMIRAL K I N G p r o p o s e d t h a t
agreed t o t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n , B r i t i s h concurrence t o our p l a n s i n

t h e P a c i f i c should he a s s u r e d . T h e r e f o r e , t h e o b j e c t i v e s of the S i c i l i a n
o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d be s p e c i f i e d and t h e p o i n t emplrasized t h a t i t must b e
mounted i n time t o o f f e r r e a l a s s i s t a n c e t.o R u s s i a , remembering t h a t ,
e?ven if coniplet,ion of t h e Tunis o p e r a t i o n were d e l a y e d , t h a t o p e r a t i o n
s t i l l engaged German f o r c e s and c o n t r i b u t e d toward opening t h e Mediter-

ranean
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t , i n view of t h e J i r i t i s h a t , t i t u d e toward
o p e r a t i o n s on t h e Continent i n 1 M 3
this year;
he doubted t,hat any c o u l d bemounted
t h e r e f o r e , a V e d i t e r r a n e a n o p e r a t i o n of some s o r t was a
n e c e s s i t y i n o r d e r t o keep t h e R u s s i a n s encouraged
ADMIRAL K I N G , a g r e e i n g , s a i d t h a t t h i s emphasized t h e n e c e s s i t y
of o b t a i n i n g from t h e B r i t i s h t h e i r genera.1 p l a n . i e
what t h e y proposf
t o d o , when t h e y p r o p o s e t o d o i t , . . . i n p a r t i c u l a r a s t o C o n t i n e n t a l
ope c a t i 011s
GENERAL SOHERVEIL s a i d t h a t , i r i o r d e r t o i n c c e a s e m a t e r i a l a i d t o
Eussia
e f f o r t , was b e i n g made t o acid 25 shi~psp e r month t o s h i p p i n g t o
R u s s i a t o a t o t , a l of 150. and t h a t t,Iiis s h i p p i n g a p p a r e n t l y c a n come

only from s a v i n g s r e s u l t i n g from opening t h e V e d i t e r r a n e a n
have a l r e a d y t a k e n from I n d i a n Ocean s h i p p i n g t o t h e $rmy
ships for civilian trade
The B r i t i s h
there, 52
Ile fee1.s it. e s s e n t i a l t h a t a d d i t i o n a l s h i p s
f o r R u s s i a must come from E r i t i s h s h i p p i n g

ADMIRAL K I N G recommended t h a t we o b t a i n from t h e S r i t i s h t h e i r
g e n e r a l p l a n arrd l e t tneni t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n of
o p e r a t i o n s i n t,heir s t r a t e g i c s p h e r e
Ve must a l s o p r e s e n t t o them o u r
g e n e r a l p l a n f o r t h e P a c i f i c , a l a r g e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of which must be t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y of war between R u s s i a and Japan
A s t o t h a t , Russia w i l l not
f o r c e t h e i s s u e ; however, it, i s v i t a l t o ,Japan t h a t s h e s e i z e t h e Mari

time P r o v i n c e s i n o r d e r t h a t she niay be s e c u r e
20
T h e key t o our s u c c e s s f u l
SECRET
a t t a c k on t h e J a p a n e s e homeland i s t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and t h e
manpower o f China; i f w e a t t e m p t t o b e a t our way up through t h e Nether
l a n d s E a s t I n d i e s , we s h a l l make e x t r e m e l y slow p r o g r e s s . England c a n
b e s t o p e r a t e a g a i n s t J a p a n in Burma, T h a i l a n d , andIndo-China,
and should
l e a v e t o t h e United S t a t e s t h e "managing" o f China.

I n response t o a q u e s t i o n a s t o t h e a b i l i t y of t h e United Nations
promptly t o d i r e c t t h e i r f o r c e s a g a i n s t J a p a n i n t h e e v e n t of t h e d e f e a t
o f Germany, ADMIRAL KING remarked t h a t Great B r i t a i n might send h e r F l e e t
and c o u l d u s e some I n d i a n d i v i s i o n s , b u t c o u l d do l i t t l e e l s e u n t i l t h e
E u r o p e a n s i t u a t i o n was s t a b i l i z e d . T h e r e f o r e , u n l e s s t h e U .
S. a n d
B r i t a i n make some d e f i n i t e move t o w a r d t h e d e f e a t of Germany, R u s s i a

w i l l dominate t h e peace t a b l e .
21
SECRET
J,C.S.
53rd Meeting
(Casablanca)
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Sunday,
January 17, 1943, a t 0930.
hEMBERS PRESENT
General G . C. Marshall, USA
SECRETARY
L t . General B.
Rear Admiral C.
B r i g . General A.
Commander R.
B . Somervell, USA
M.
Cooke, J r . , U S N
C . Wedemeyer, USA
E . Libby, USN
22
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G r e a d a d e s p a t c h , summarizing t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e
A l e u t i a n I s l a n d s a n d i n t h e S o u t h P a c i f i c , which s a i d , among o t h e r
t h i n g s , t h a t 30 Japanese a i r c r a f t had been s h o t down.
GENERAL ARNOLD remarked t h a t B r i t i s h estimates p l a c e d t h e c u r
r e n t J a p a n e s e a i r p l a n e s t r e n g t h a t 2,500 f i r s t - l i n e a i r c r a f t , about 500
below t h e number e s t i m a t e d by our I n t e l l i g e n c e S e r v i c e s . Both B r i t i s h
and our e s t i m a t e s of c u r r e n t Japanese s t r e n g t h i n d i c a t e a r a p i d d e c l i n e
i n t h e i r a i r s t r e n g t h . Continued a t t r i t i o n a t p r e s e n t r a t e s w i l l ser
i o u s l y a f f k c t f u t u r e Japanese o p e r a t i o n s .
ADMIRAL COOKE r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s .had

agreed upon t h e P a c i f i c concept f o r 1943 e x c e p t as concerned o p e r a t i o n s
i n Burma, w h i c h t h e y b e l i e v e c o u l d n o t be mounted t h i s y e a r . Admiral
Cooke f e a r e d t h a t i f t h e o p e r a t i o n is n o t p l a n n e d f o r 1943 China may
drop o u t of t h e war; t h e r e f o r e , i n h i s o p i n i o n i b i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e
o p e r a t i o n b e p l a n n e d t o commence n o t l a t e r t h a n November, 1043. 13e had
informed t h e Combined P l a n n e r s t h a t i t was n o t t h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e
United S t a t e s t o undertake a l l t h e o p e r a t i o n s set f o r t h i n the p l a n
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , a l t h o u g h some p a r t of t h e Gilberts-Marshalls-Truk
opera
t i o n might b e i n i t i a t e d d u r i n g t h e p r o g r e s s of t h e Rabaul o p e r a t i o n ,
which i s e s t i m a t e d t o r e q u i r e from two t o f i v e months. The B r i t i s h
P l a n n e r s proposed t o f u r n i s h s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n a s t o what t h e y pro
posed i n Burma, b o t h now and i n t h e f u t u r e , f o r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o f t h e
Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f . The B r i t i s h c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t s u f f i c i e n t ,
naval f o r c e s and l a n d i n g c r a f t cannot be made a v a i l a b l e . Admiral Cooke
d i s a g r e e d and .had t o l d t h e B r i t i s h P l a n n e r s t h a t by t h e t i m e t h e opera
t i o n was t o be mounted, .he f e l t t h a t s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t would be
available.
I n answer t o General M a r s h a l l ' s q u e s t i o n as t o t h e e f f e c t f a i l
ure t o do O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS would have on O p e r a t i o n A N A K I M , ADMIRAL
COOKE s t a t e d t h a t our a i r a c t i v i t y would be g r e a t l y hampered inasmuch as

one of t h e purposes of O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS was t o e s t a b l i s h a i r f i e l d s i n
t h e r e g i o n f o r our p r o s p e c t i v e u s e . A s he u n d e r s t o o d t h e B r i t i s h p r o
p o s a l s , t h e y were t h a t nothing be done u n t i l Xovember, 1944. Although he

had a g r e e d t o l i s t f o r c e s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e ANAKIM o p e r a t i o n , he would
p r e f e r not t o . h a v e t h i s l i s t appear i n t h e p l a n .
ADXIRAL K I N G remarked t h a t w e should c e r t a i n l y i n c l u d e Operation
ANAKIM i n t h e P a c i f i c p l a n . Whether or n o t i t is c a r r i e d o u t f u l l y w i l l
23
SECRET
depend upon t h e s i t u a t i o n t h e n e x i s t i n g , b u t a t any r a t e it s h o u l d be
p l a n n e d . General Brooke had s a i d t h a t two A f r i c a n d i v i s i o n s were being
s h i f t e d Lo t h e I n d i a n T h e a t e r and p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e u t i l i z a t i O n of
t h e I n d i a n t r o o p s were i n hand; Vice Admiral Mountbatten .had s a i d t h a t
l a n d i n g c r a f t were b e i n g provided i n I n d i a ; t h e r e must be some o b j e c t i v e
f o r t h e s e moves. ile proposed t o a s k Admiral Pound Lo b a s e p a r t of t h e
E a s t e r n F l e e t a t Ceylon and would r e l e a s e t h e Dutch c r u i s e r s and d e s t r o y
e r s now o p e r a t i n g t h r o u g h S i c i l y t o s u p p o r t t h e E a s t e r n Fleet. i f t h e y
moved there; he would a l s o a r r a n g e t h a t s i x U . S. submarines now operat
i n g from Fremantle cover t h e n o r t h e r n end of t h e S t r a i t s of hlalacca. He
f e e l s it e s s e n t i a l t o g e t some B r i t i s h naval a c t i v i t y under w a y I n t h e
Bay of Bengal. S i n c e t h e Japanese F l e e t i s now l a r g e l y conta.ined in the
P a c i f i c , i t is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e y can d e t a c h much n a v a l s t r e n g t h f o r
o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Bay of Bengal. He suggested t h a t t h e P a c i f i c s i t u a t i o n
s h o u l d be d i s c u s s e d w i t h t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f a t t h i s morning's
meeting when t h e United S t a t e s Chiefs of S t a f f should i n s i s t t h a t Opera
t i o n RAVENOUS be c a r r i e d o u t and t h a t Operation ANAKIM be i n i t i a t e d n o t
l a t e r t h a n November 1, 1943. T h i s o p e r a t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l because of i t s

importance t o C h i n a and because t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and manpower of
China is t h e key t o t h e d e f e a t of Japan, j u s t as t h e geographica.1 p o s i
t i o n and manpower of R u s s i a is t h e key Lo t h e d e f e a t of Germany. There
f o r e , i t i s impossible t o omit t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s from our P a c i f i c concept.
Even if t h e q u e s t i o n is n o t t,obe s e t t l e d a t t h i s time, he f e l t i t neces
s a r y t o keep t h e B r i t i s h f u l l y aware of t h e P a c i f i c , The B r i t i s h proposal
Lo do n o t h i n g i n Burma u n t i l t h e end of n e x t F a r he c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s
f a n t a s t i c . The d i m i n i s h i n g p r o s p e c t of b e i n g a b l e t o use any a i r b a s e s
i n R u s s i a was a f u r t h e r r e a s o n which compelled us Lo o p e r a t e i n Burma.
GENERAL WEDEMEYER s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h were f i r m l y c o n v i n c e d

t h a t Germany would be d e f e a t e d i n 1913 and were, t h e r e f o r e , r e l u c t a n t t o
t a k e a n y r e s o u r c e s a w a y from t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, i n hopes t h a t t h e y

would be a b l e t o conduct a s u c c e s s f u l Channel o p e r a t i o n . He p e r s o n a l l y
f e l t i t e s s e n t i a l t h a t such an Operation RAVENOUS be done now when pos
s i b l e . The f u r t h e r t h e y go w i t h the o p e r a t i o n , t h e l e s s danger they w i l l
s u f f e r from m a l a r i a when t h e r a i n y s e a s o n s t a r t s . H e f e l t i t e s s e n t i a l
t h a t t h e B r i t i s h be p r e s s e d t o do e v e r y t h i n g they p o s s i b l y c o u l d now.
GENERAL K4FtSliAI.L s a i d t h a t we were s t i l l f a c e d w i t h t h e Chinese
r e l u c t a n c e t o do a n y t h i n g . To c a r r y o u t Operation RAVENOUS, t h e Chinese
24
must s t a r t f i r s t . The t a r g e t d a t e f o r t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h e deployment
w a s March 1st. I t would soon b e t o o l a t e t o meet t h i s d a t e .

GENERAL MARSHALL informed t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f t h a t S t a l i n
S. p e r s o n n e l i n R u s s i a .
The r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and s u r v e y c o n t e m p l a t e d by General B r a d l e y c o u l d n o t
had informed t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t he d e s i r e d no U .
now b e c a r r i e d o u t . S t a l i n d o e s n o t wish t o s e e G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l . The

R u s s i a n s w i l l a c c e p t p l a n e s and m a t e r i e l b u t no U. S. o r B r i t i s h s u r v e y
parties
GENERAI, SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t he and Admiral Mountbatten had d i s
cussed t h e B r i t i s h landing c r a f t s i t u a t i o n i n d e t a i l since t h e l a s t

meeting.
The p r i n c i p a l c o n t r i b u t i o n by G r e a t B r i t a i n t o t h e l a n d i n g
c r a f t p o o l w a s some 600 L.C.A.
(armored c r a f t ) . Mountbatten c o n c l u d e d
t h a t 150 of t h e s e would b e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e S i c i l i a n , o p e r a t i o n , l e a v i n g
450 i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom f o r t r a i n i n g and o t h e r p u r p o s e s . Lord Mount
b a t t e n had n o t f u l l y understood t h e d e c i s i o n o f t i m e r e q u i r e d t o r e h a b i l
i t a t e landing craft--he
had been t a l k i n g a b o u t s m a l l c r a f t whereas we
had been t a l k i n g a b o u t l a n d i n g s h i p s . Re had had no knowledge t h a t t h e

e n g i n e e r s ' amphibious f o r c e had completed r e p a i r s h e r e i n North A f r i c a
o f l a n d i n g c r a f t u t i l i z e d i n t h e O p e r a t i o n TOiX!!
combined o p e r a t i o n s were d i s l o c a t e d by t h e TO::C!I
B r i t i s h t r a i n i n g and
O p e r a t i o n and were now
t h r e e months i n a r r e a r s , b u t by August Admiral Mountbatten f e l t c o n f i

d e n t t h a t he c o u l d m a n a l l a v a i l a b l e l a n d i n g c r a f t .
I n L o r d M o u n t b a t t e n ' s o p i n i o n , any l a n d a t t a c k must be l e d by
L.C.A.'s,
t h e t a c t i c s b e i n g t o s e e k o u t a " s o f t s p o t " by a r e c o n n a i s
s a n c e i n f o r c e , and t h e n t o p o u r f o r c e s t h r o u g h t h e " s o f t s p o t " once

f o u n d . I t is a p p a r e n t t h a t more l a n d i n g c r a f t w i l l b e a v a i l a b l e t h a n
Lord Mountbatten had b e l i e v e d . Probably we can armor a c o n s i d e r a b l e num
b e r o f o u r s m a l l e r l a n d i n g c r a f t by September, b u t t h e number w e c o u l d
b u i l d b y J u n e would b e i n s i g n i f i c a n t . However, t,he B r i t i s h c a p a c i t y i n
t h a t d i r e c t i o n should s u f f i c e .
GENERAL. SOhIERVELL s a i d t h a t h e had r e v i e w e d w i t h Lord :.fount
b a t t e n c e r t a i n p l a n s f o r o p e r a t i o n s on t h e C o n t i n e n t . P l a n n i n g f o r t h e
B r e s t P e n i n s u l a h a d b e e n i n v e s t i g a t e d by c o n s i d e r i n g f o u r l i n e s o f
o p p o s i t i o n which might be r e a c h e d , i . e . ,
i n i t i a l and expanded p o s i t i o n s .
For e a c h l i n e , more f o r c e s were r e q u i r e d t h a n c o u l d b e s u p p l i e d by t h e

a v a i l a b l e p o r t s . T h e r e f o r e , i t was c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e B r e s t p l a n was
25
SECRET
i m p r a c t i c a b l e from a s u p p l y s t a n d p o i n t . The s i t u a t i o n i s becoming abso
l u t e l y i m p o s s i b l e i f t h e r e p o r t t h a t t h e Germans had mined a l l t h e docks
i n t h e proposed a r e a i s t r u e . On t h e o t h e r hand, o p e r a t i o n s a t Cherbourg
would be p o s s i b l e ; t h e same f a c t o r s which would make i t r e l a t i v e l y easy
t o h o l d , once c a p t u r e d , would make e x p l o i t a t i o n and expansion v e r y d i f
f i c u l t . Lord Mountbatten w a s i n f a v o r o f c a p t u r i n g t h e Channel I s l a n d s
b o t h as s t e p p i n g s t o n e s toward a p r o s p e c t i v e c o n t i n u a l o p e r a t i o n and as
a base from which t o o p e r a t e a g a i n s t sea-borne s u p p l y t o German submarine
b a s e s 011 t h e French c o a s t . Lord Mountbatten s t a t e d h e c o u l d c a p t u r e the
Channel I s l a n d s w i t h o u t h e l p from t h e United S t a t e s .
With respect t o Sicily.. discussion revealed t h a t the b a t t e r i e s
t h e r e were 4 . 6 i n c h and t h a t t h e most f e a s i b l e means o f r e d u c i n g them

would be by p a r a c h u t e a t t a c k . These p a r a c h u t e t r o o p s would probably have
t o b e c a r r i e d i n U. 5 . t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s . U s e o f t h e L . C . A . , ' s would re
q u i r e moving them by combat--loaded t r a n s p o r t s . I t was a g r e e d t h a t i t was
p r e f e r a b l e t h a t t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t s h o u l d s t a r t from North A f r i c a , and
t h a t i t was n o t e s s e n t i a l t o u s e armored b o a t s i f f u l l a d v a n t a g e was
taken of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s u r p r i s e . I t i s probable t h a t a l l troops
e n c o u n t e r e d i n S i c i l y would b e e i t h e r f i r s t - c l a s s German t r o o p s o r
I t a l i a n t r o o p s h e a v i l y l e a v e n e d w i t h German t r o o p s so t h a t t h e y would
b e e f f e c t i v e . There d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o b e room i n t h e I s l b n d f o r more
t n a n two a d d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s
A D X I I U K I N G , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e key t o t h e European s i t u a
t i o n was R u s s i a , s u g g e s t e d c o o r d i n a t i n g a l l s u p p l y t o R u s s i a under one
head and u n d e r one c o d e name, p l a c i n g one o f f i c e r i n g e n e r a l c h a r g e , .
T h i s o f f i c e r would t h e n have t h e t a s k o f e m p h a s i z i n g the n e c e s s i t y f o r
a i r a c t i o n a g a i n s t German a i r f i e l d s i n n o r t h e r n Norway.
A f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , i t w a s . a g r e e d t h a t t h e R u s s i a n s would
u n d o u b t e d l y a s k f o r a d d i t i o n a l heavy bombers, o s t e n s i b l y f o r t h i s pur

p o s e , and t h a t t h e a i r f i e l d s c o u l d n o t be r e n d e r e d i n e f f e c t i v e by means
o t h e r t h a n a combined o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t them.
SECRET
J.C.S.
5 4 t h Meeting
(Casablanca)
J O I N T CHIEFS O F STAFF
MINUTES O F MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Monday,
J a n u a r y 18, 1943, a t 0930.
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l G. C . Marshall, USA
L t . G e n e r a l H.
H.
A r n o l d , USA
SECRETARY

Rear A d m i r a l C. M. Cooke, Jr., USN
B r i g . G e n e r a l J . E . H u l l , USA
B r i g . G e n e r a l A. C . Wedemeyer, USA
C o l o n e l J. E. Smart, USA
27
SECRET
GENERAL MARSHALL r e a d a d e s p a t c h which s a i d t h a t t h e proposed
f r e e z e on 55 p e r c e n t of t h e s y n t h e t i c r u b b e r program would r e d u c e the
h i g h o c t a n e g a s o l i n e program by 5,000,000 b a r r e l s , t h e a i r p l a n e program
by 10,000 a i r p l a n e s , and would d e l a y t h e e s c o r t v e s s e l program from two
t o t h r e e months. H e recomnended t h a t t h e J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f p r e s e n t a
memorandum t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and a s k him t o i n s t r u c t Mr. Nelson n o t t o
a u t h o r i z e Alr. J e f f e r s ' proposed p r o c e d u r e .
ADMIRAL K I N G remarked t h a t he doubted t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t would

a g r e e t o f r e e z e t h e s y n t h e t i c r u b b e r program a t t h e 20 p e r c e n t l e v e l ,
inasmuch as p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s were i n v o l v e d .
ADMIRAL K I N G , r e c o u n t i n g h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e p r i m e M i n i s t e r
the previous evening, s a i d t h a t M r .
C h u r c h i l l had committed h i m s e l f t o
undertake ANAKIMin1943 and t h a t he w a s a g r e e a b l e t o Operation RAVENOUS,

concerning which t h e r e s t i l l remains t h e q u e s t i o n o f C h i n e s e c o o p e r a t i o n .
They had thoroughly d i s c u s s e d t h e submarine s i t u a t i o n ; and Mr. C h u r c h i l l
appeared a g r e e a b l e t o g i v i n g h i g h e s t p r i o r i t y t o bombing t h e submarine
b a s e s , b u i l d i n g y a r d s , and assembly p o i n t s , a l t h o u g h he s a i d t h e United
S t a t e s must h e l p . The Prime M i n i s t e r o b j e c t e d t o our " p u t t i n g t h e c a r t
b e f o r e t h e h o r s e " w i t h r e s p e c t t o P a c i f i c o p e r a t i o n s , and s a i d w e had
r e f u s e d t o g i v e t h e B r i t i s h a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n as t o our l a n d i n g c r a f t
program and as t o our d i s p o s i t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c . He appeared g r e a t l y
concerned over our s t a n d w i t h r e s p e c t t o P a c i f i c o p e r a t i o n s . With r e s p e c t
t o t h e Burma o p e r a t i o n , A d m i r a l King had t r i e d t o e x p l a i n t o t h e Prime
M i n i s t e r h i s concept r e g a r d i n g t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and manpower of
China. The P r e s i d e n t was anxious t o g e t a d d i t i o n a l a i r p l a n e s t o General
C h e n n a u l t , which c o u l d n o t be s u p p l i e d u n l e s s t h e upper Burma Road is
opened. Admiral King u n d e r s t a n d s t h e purpose of RAVENOUS t o be t o open
t h i s upper Burma Road i n o r d e r t o improve communications t o China. H e
f e e l s t h a t Chiang Kai-shek s h o u l d be u r g e d t o move a t once.
GENERAL SOMERVELL s a i d t h a t t h e tonnage q u e s t i o n had been under
d i s c u s s i o n ; t h a t i n v i e w of t h e message t h e P r e s i d e n t had r e c e i v e d from
S t a l i n , General Marshall ought n o t t o go t o Moscow; t h a t Mr. Hopkins had
informed him t h a t command of t h e 8 t h Army would p a s s t o General Eisen
hower as soon a s t h i s Army g o t i n t o t h e T u n i s i a n b a t t l e , Alexander be
coming E i s e n h o w e r ' s Deputy Commander-in-Chief
f o r t h e period of the
a c t u a l b a t t l e , but t h a t t h i s p r o p o s a l must come from t h e B r i t i s h .
28
GENERAL MARSHALL, r e f e r r i n g t o t h e Burma o p e r a t i o n , s a i d t h a t

S i r John D i l l b e l i e v e d General Wavell could move even if t h e Chinese d i d
n o t ; General Wavell might p o s s i b l y he b e t t e r o f f i n t h i s case i n v i e w of

the limited l o g i s t i c f a c i l i t i e s available t o h i s forces. He believed
t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o might r e v e r s e h i s p r e s e n t s t a n d p r o v i d e d he r e c e i v e s
r e a s s u r a n c e s from t h e Prime l l i n i s t e r r a t h e r t h a n from General Wavell-

t h a t t h e d e a l was n o t c o m p l e t e l y c l o s e d . Two c a r g o s h i p s have a l r e a d y
s a i l e d f o r G e n e r a 1 S t i l w e l l , and the remainder w i l l d e p a r t s h o r t l y . Troop
s h i p s a r e s a i l i n g today.
GENERAL WEDEYEYER s a i d i f t h e Ramgarh f o r c e were t o come down

a t t h i s t i m e , b u i l d i n g t h e r o a d as t h e y p r o g r e s s e d , i t would g r e a t l y
f a c i l i t a t e l a t e r c o o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n . Any l a n d i n g f i e l d s t h a t Wavell can
e s t a b l i s h by t h i s movement w i l l he of g r e a t a s s i s t a n c e t o a l a t e r ad
vance. A s t o t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n o p e r a t i o n , .he s a i d t h e B r i t i s h P l a n n e r s
now tended t o urge S a r d i n i a i n l i e u of S i c i l y , contending t h a t S a r d i n i a
would accomplish as much toward t h e s e c u r i t y of !Aediterranean s h i p p i n g
a s w i l l S i c i l y . I f t h e F i r s t Sea Lord's s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e minutes of
y e s t e r d a y ' s meeting a r e c o r r e c t , General Wedemeyer does n o t b e l i e v e w e
a r e j u s t i f i e d i n undertaking e i t h e r o p e r a t i o n .
ADMIRAL COOKE p o i n t e d o u t t h e n e c e s s i t y of d i s c u s s i n g w i t h t h e
B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f , p o i n t s i n which t h e P r e s i d e n t i s i n t i m a t e l y
concerned, i n o r d e r t h a t h i s s t a y here need n o t be prolonged. He o b j e c t e d
t o t h e B r i t i s h tendency t o go i n t o d e t a i l and t o concern themselves w i t h
o p e r a t i o n s i n our s t r a t e g i c t h e a t e r which were r e a l l y n o t t h e i r concern.
The Kiska o p e r a t i o n i s a n example. They argue t h a t a f t e r w e have s e i z e d
Kabaul, t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f s h o u l d t h e n d i c t a t e f u t u r e opera
t i o n s arid t h e i r timing. Admiral Cooke o b j e c t s t o t h i s . They have r i g h t l y
k e p t us i n t h e d a r k a s t o c e r t a i n of t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e i r own
t h e a t e r , and s h o u l d a c c o r d us t h e same p r i v i l e g e . T h e y i n s i s t t h a t we
s e t f o r t h i n d e t a i l t h e f o r c e s we propose t o employ, a n d , y e t , do n o t
u s e t h e same s y s t e m i n l i s t i n g t h e i r f o r c e s as we d o . A s f a r a s t h e
P l a n n e r s a r e concerned, t h e main p o i n t a t i s s u e seems t o b e : " S h a l l w e
d e f e a t Germany f i r s t ? " or: " S h a l l we b r i n g t h e war t o a s u c c e s s f u l con
c l u s i o n e x p e d i t i o u s l y ? " T h e B r i t i s h d e s i r e t o assemble i n t h e U n i t e d
Kingdom s u f f i c i e n t l a n d i n g c r a f t t o move on t o t h e C o n t i n e n t s h o u l d
Germany c r a c k . Admiral Cooke o b j e c t s t o h a v i n g f o r c e s s t a t i c i n t h e
United Xingdom i n s t e a d of employing them a c t i v e l y a g a i n s t Japan, and has
29
SECRET
made l a n d i n g c r a f t a l l o c a t i o n s on t h a t b a s i s . T h e s e c r a f t a r e badly
needed i n t h e P a c i f i c f o r General MacArthur and f o r o u r p l a n n e d opera
t i o n s . Because of s h o r t a g e i n n a v a l s h i p s and l a n d i n g c r a f t , t h e B r i t i s h
demur a t t h e Burma o p e r a t i o n . Admiral Cooke t h i n k s t h a t w e c a n make
l a n d i n g c r a f t a v a i l a b l e by t h a t t i m e and t h a t some a u x i l i a r y a i r c r a f t
c a r r i e r s w i l l a l s o b e a v a i l a b l e . We have a l l o c a t e d n o t h i n g i n l a n d i n g
c r a f t n o t s c h e d u l e d t o b e completed b e f o r e t h e 1 5 t h of March. I t i s d i f
f i c u l t t o s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l o c a t e f o r c e s i n advance f o r each s e p a r a t e
operatipn i n the Pacific.
A l l t h a t c a n b e done p r a c t i c a l l y i s t o a l l o
c a t e o u r p r o d u c t i o n t o areas and n o t t o s p e c i f i c campaigns. Although

d e l i v e r i e s h a v e been d e l a y e d , h e b e l i e v e s p r e s e n t a l l o c a t i o n s t,o be
s u f f i c i e n t f o r planned O p e r a t i o n s . A s a m a t t e r of a c t u a l f a c t , t h e B r i t
i s h cannot u s e i n t h e United Kingdom as many l a n d i n g c r a f t a s a r e a l r e a d y
allocated there.
ADMIRAL COOKE r e i t e r a t e d t h a t h e saw no r e a s o n why t h e B r i t i s h
should examine o u r proposed P a c i f i c campaign i n d e t a i l , and t h a t i f they
i n s i s t on d o i n g s o , w e s h o u l d p i n them down a s t o what f o r c e s t h e y w i l l
c o n t r i b u t e toward t h e d e f e a t o f J a p a n . He f e l t t h a t we s h o u l d t a k e t h e
p o s i t i o n t h a t d e t a i l s o f o u r o p e r a t i o n s were n o t a p r o p e r s u b j e c t f o r
the Agenda o f t h e s e m e e t i n g s a s i t was e s s e n t i a l t h a t we g e t on w i t h
combined c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
ADMI"&
K I N G s a i d t h a t w e f e l t i t necessary t o take act,ion t o
s e c u r e M e d i t e r r a n e a n communications and that t h e B r i t i s h were anxious

t o do something q u i c k l y i n o r d e r t o s a t i s f y t h e Russians. H e f e a r e d t,hat.
if we u n d e r t o o k t h e S a r d i n i a o p e r a t i o n ,
w e would b e a s k e d t o do t h e
S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n l a t e r . A s t o o u r P a c i f i c s t r a t e g y , we s h o u l d stanti on
t h e paper we have s u b m i t t e d . The B r i t i s h have always been opposed t o o u r
P a c i f i c p r o p o s a l s ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n s p i t e o f o u r P a c i f i c o p e r a t i o n s : we
can b r i n g a g a i n s t Germany, e i t h e r i n S i c i l y o r on t h e Brest P e n i n s u l a ,
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e w i l l i n g t o do. They have n o t y e t c l a r i
f i e d t h e i r own p o s i t i o n a s t o what t h e y p r o p o s e on t h e C o n t i n e n t . The
Burma o p e r a t i o n i s a t p r e s e n t a long-range c o n c e p t . He e x p e c t s t h e B r i t - .
i s h t o make an i s s u e o f t h e s h i p p i n g t o t h e P a c i f i c and t o attempt, t o
c o n t i n u e t o s i t i n r e v i e w on o u r o p e r a t i o n s .
Inasmuch a s t h e P r i m e
M i n i s t e r h a s committed h i m s e l f t o RAVENOUS and t o ANAKIM and t o p u t . t i n g

t h e maximum p r a c t i c a b l e a i r f o r c e i n t o China, Admiral King f e e l s t h a t no
e f f o r t should be spared t o c a r r y o u t t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s a s planned..
30
SECRET
The P r e s i d e n t and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s h o u l d i n f o r m t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o
t h a t RAVENOUS i s n o t t h e a l l - o u t Burma campaign, t h a t t h i s w i l l b e s e t
up a t a l a t e r d a t e , and t h a t b y t h i s t i m e n a v a l f o r c e s w i l l bemade a v a i l
a b l e . With r e s p e c t t o t h e Mediterranean, Admiral King i s u t t e r l y opposed
t o t h e S a r d i n i a n o p e r a t i o n , b u t f e e l s t h a t t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n should
be undertaken s i n c e t r o o p s and means w i l l be a v a i l a b l e , s i n c e S i c i l y i s
t h e s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n , and s i n c e t h e a l t e r n a t i v e - - s e n d i n g excess t r o o p s
from t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n T h e a t e r t o t h e U n i t e d Kingdom--accomplishes
real r e s u l t .
31
no
SECRET
J.C.S.
5 5 t h Meeting
(Casablanca)
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Tuesday,
January 1 9 , 1943, at 0930.
MEMBERS PRESENT
General G . C.
Marshall, USA
L t . General H .
H.
Arnold, USA
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J . R . Deane, USA

L t . General B. B.
Rear Admiral C . M.
Somervell, USA
Cooke, J r . ,
B r i g . General J.E.
Brig. General A.
USN
Hull, USA
C. Wedemeyer, USA
32
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G informed t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t 11 d e s t r o y e r s
had been t r a n s f e r r e d from e s c o r t d u t y i n t h e S e a F r o n t i e r s f o r use a s
ocean e s c o r t s , i n o r d e r t o improve t h e p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o o c e a n
escorts.
The . J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f d i s c u s s e d C.C.S.
155, t h e d r a f t memo
randum of "Conduct of t h e War i n 1 3 4 3 , " and a g r e e d upon c e r t a i n modifi

c a t i o n s which t h e y would p r e s e n t t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f . During
t h e d i s c u s s i o n , ADMIXAL K I N G remarked t h a t he saw no o b j e c t i o n t o c o ~ i
t i n u i n g i n the M e d i t e r r a n e a n beyond S i c i l y i f s u c h o p e r a t i o n s r e q u i r e d
no more r e s o u r c e s thau were t h e n p r e s e n t i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n T h e a t e r .
GENERAL MARSHALL r e a d a r e v i s e d d r a f t o f t h e memorandum t o t h e

P r e s i d e n t from! tire .Taint C h i e f s o f S t a f f c o n c e r n i n g t h e s y n t h e t i c rubber
program which was approved and which i s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as Annex " A ~ "
ADMIRAL K I N G o u t l i n e d h i s p r o p o s a l s as t o t h e command s e t - - u p i n
West A f r i c a which he f a v o r e d as a r e s u l t o f h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h
Admiral G l a s s f o r d . He would propose t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t
Vice Admiral C o l l i n e t , now i n command o f t h e n a v a l f o r c e s a t D a k a r ,
assume t h e s t a t u s o f a Naval D i s t r i c t Commander and t h a t t h e limits o f
h i s command e x t e n d from t.he n o r t h e r n boundary o f S i e r r a Leone t o Cape
B o j a d o r . \'ice
n d m i r a l C o l l i n e t , i n h i s s t a t u s o f Yaval D i s t r i c t Corn
mander, would o p e r a t e d i r e c t l y under Vice Admiral Pegram who, from h i s

h e a d q u a r t , e r s a t F r e e t o w n , would have command o f t h e West A f r i c a n Sea
Frontier.
Admiral K i n g p o i n t e d o u t t h a t Gambia, l y i n g i n Vice Admiral
C o l l i n e t ' s d i s t r i c t , would b e u n d e r h i s command. Admiral King f o r e s a w

some d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h e B r i t i s h c o n c e r n i n g c o n t r o l o f a i r a c t i v i t y i n
t h e French d i s t r i c t , and s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h p r o b a b l y would i n s i s t on
putt'ing i n t h e i r own a i r c r a f t because t h e y d i d n o t t r u s t t h e F r e n c h . He
u r g e d the n e c e s s i t y o f p l a c i n g f u l l t r u s t and c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e French
Army, Navy,
and A i r F o r c e s and i n e q u i p p i n g t t i e s e f o r c e s as r a p i d l y as
may be^
GENERAL MARSHALL a g r e e d , s a y i n g t h a t he thought i t i m p r a c t i c a b l e
t o go halfway w i t h t h e French. They must e i t h e r be t r u s t e d completely o r

n o t a t all. He had every r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t c e r t a i n French d i v i s i o n s ,
when e q u i p p e d , would b e e x c e l l e n t . He f e l t t h e o b j e c t i o n s t o p l a c i n g
f u l l t r u s t i n t h e French were more w i t h r e s p e c t t o t e c h n i c a l equipment

than a n y t h i n g e l s e . He foresaw d i f f i c u l t i e s a s t o c o n t r o l , i . e . ,
b u t f e l t t h a t tkiese problems c o u l d b e h a n d l e d as t h e y a r o s e .
33
command,
SECRET
During a d i s c u s s i o n as t o when t h e P r e s i d e n t would b e able t o
l e a v e , i t was concluded t h a t P r e s i d e n t i a l a c t i o n would be r e q u i r e d upon
t h e f o l l o w i n g four items:
(a) Approved s t r a t e g y .
(b) A t t i t u d e toward t h e French.
(c) Aid t o Russia.

(d) Turkey.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t had n o t d i s a g r e e d t o
t h e p r o p o s a l of t h e Prime M i n i s t e r t h a t o p e r a t i o n s i n s u p p o r t of Turkey
be e n t i r e l y B r i t i s h . The P r e s i d e n t would b e i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e p r o p o s a l s
c o n c e r n i n g a i d t o R u s s i a , b u t G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l b e l i e v e d he s h o u l d be
informed t h a t t h e J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f were opposed t o " d e s t r o y i n g our
selves" i n t h e a t t e m p t t o g e t s h i p s t o Murmansk a g a i n s t extremely s t r o n g

o p p o s i t i o n . I n r e p l y t o a s t a t e m e n t by A d m i r a l King t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t
wanted Turkey i n t h e w a r as a p a s s i v e r a t h e r t h a n an a c t i v e b e l l i g e r e n t ,
i n o r d e r t h a t t h e United N a t i o n s might u t i l i z e h e r a i r b a s e s t o a t t a c k
t h e Axis and h e r t e r r i t o r y t o e x p e d i t e s u p p l y i n g Russia, General Marshall
s a i d t h a t t h i s p a s s i v e a t t i t u d e on t h e p a r t of Turkey was p u r e l y a dip
l o m a t i c q u e s t i o n ; if and when t h e y e n t e r t h e w a r , i t w i l l be a m i l i t a r y
m a t t e r t o s e e t o i t t h a t t h e y do n o t advance.
ADMIRAL K I N G remarked t h a t he e x p e c t e d t h a t p o l i t i c a l problems

c o n c e r n i n g t h e French would d e l a y t h e P r e s i d e n t l o n g e r t h a n would t h e
b u s i n e s s of t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f .
The J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f next c o n s i d e r e d C.C.S.
156, "Suggested
Procedure f o r Dealing w i t h t h e Agenda of t h e Conference." ADMIFLAL COOKE

s a i d t h a t i t was i m p o r t a n t t o s e t t h e target d a t e f o r O p e r a t i o n HUSRY,
and t h a t t h e p l a n s h o u l d b e s e t up w e l l i n advance o f p r e p a r a t i o n and
t r a i n i n g of t h e f o r c e s i n v o l v e d . I n view o f t h e c o m p l i c a t e d n a t u r e of
t h e o p e r a t i o n , i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o i n d i c a t e , i n s o f a r as w e can, who w i l l
provide t h e f o r c e s i n s p e c i f i c areas. One of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s with TORCH
h a s been t h a t t h e p l a n s were n o t a d e q u a t e , and t h a t many c h a n g e s had
been made w h i l e t h e o p e r a t i o n was b e i n g mounted. A p l a n n i n g S t a f f , n o t
p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e b a t t l e i n T u n i s i a , s h o u l d b e s e t up now f o r t h i s
operation.
H e s a i d t h a t i t e m 2 c o u l d p r o d u c e no more t h a n a s t u d y which
would r e s u l t i n an approximation o f what a d d i t i o n a l l o s s e s w i l l r e s u l t
34
i ~ nc o n v o y s c a u s e d by e s c o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r HUSKY.
With r e s p e c t t o
command o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , Admiral Cooke had informed

t h e Combined P l a n n e r s as t o t h e proposed command arrangements on which
t h e Combined C h i e f s o f 3 t a f f must r e a c h g e n e r a l agreement c o n c e r n i n g
spheres of influence, e t c .
A M I K A L K I N G s a i d h e proposed a w e s t e r n Mediterranean a r e a under
commiuid o f a [ J n i t e d S t a t e s Yavy F l a g O f f i c e r who w i l l o p e r a t e d i r e c t l y

nnder Admiral Cunningham. Western North A f r i c a would be i n c l u d e d i n this
command. The B r i t i s h had approved t h i s p r o p o s a l .
GZNERAL MARSHALL r e v i e w e d t h e p r o p o s e d army command s e t - u p i n
t h e T u n i s i a r i a r e a , arid s a i d t h a t i t was h i g h l y d e s i r a b l e t h a t , a f t e r
completion o f t h e T r i p o l i op e r a t i o n ,
t h e F r e n c h occupy t h a t c o u n t r y .
When t h e A x i s had been c l e a r e d from North A f r i c a , General Alexander w i l l

c e a s e t o b e Deputy Commander-in-Chief;
t h e 8 t h Army w i l l p r o b a b l y move
t o t h e r e a r o f Turkey. He a g r e e d t h a t i t w a s n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h a
p l a n n i n g s t a f f f o r HUSKY, and t o d e t e r m i n e where and when t r a i n i n g f o r
t , h i s o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d be s e t up.
"ANNEX A"
J a n u a r y 18, 1943
M~MORAXDUM F O R THE PRESIDENT:
1.
The U.
S . J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f have r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n tkiat
:Ir. Celson h a s recommended t h e o u t r i g h t a l l o t m e n t of a l l m a t e r i a l s and
equipment, n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 55 p e r c e n t o f t h e e n t i r e
syiit,lietic r u b b e r program and t h a t J u s t i c e Byrnes i s a b o u t t o r e n d e r
decision i n the matter. In the f a l l M r .
Nelson made s u c h an a l l o t m e n t
f o r 20 p e r c e n t o f m a t e r i a l s and equipment n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e r u b b e r
pro^
gram. The , J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f gave t h e i r a p p r o v a l t o t h i s a l l o t m e n t

even tkiough i t was r e a l i z e d t h a t i t might i n t e r f e r e w i t h o t h e r s t r i c t l y
i n i l i t , a r y p r o g r a m s . We a r e c o n v i n c e d , however, t h a t t h e e f f e c t o f t h e
proposed i n c r e a s e t o 55 p e r c e n t of t h e program w i l l have s e r i o u s e f f e c t s
on tkie h i g h o c t a n e g a s , e s c o r t v e s s e l and a i r c r a f t programs.
2.
J u s t p r i o r t o o u r d e p a r t u r e from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a memorandum
t o you was p r e p a r e d by t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f which remained unde-.
l i v e r e d by r e a s o n o f Admiral L e a h y ' s i l l n e s s . I n t h i s memorandum we

c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t an e x t e n s i o n of t h e p r e s e n t a l l o c a t i o n
35
SECRET
beyond 20 p e r c e n t would b r i n g a b o u t a l o s s i n d e l i v e r y i n 1943 of
approximately 5,000,000 b a r r e l s o f h i g h o c t a n e g a s , o v e r 10,000 a i r c r a f t ,
and two t o t h r e e months d e l a y i n t h e completion of t h e e s c o r t v e s s e l pro
e a r e convinced t h a t t h e r e s u l t would
gram, a l l v i t a l t o t h e war e f f o r t . W
v e r y s e r i o u s l y j e o p a r d i z e t h e e f f e c t i v e p r o s e c u t i o n o f t h e war.
For
i n s t a n c e , t h e most s e r i o u s doubt a t t h e p r e s e n t moment i s whether or not

s u f f i c i e n t e s c o r t v e s s e l s c a n be p r o v i d e d d u r i n g t h e n e x t f i v e months:
(1) t o p e r m i t t h e Russian convoys t o b e s t e p p e d up from 42 days t o 2%
which now a p p e a r s p r a c t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e ;
( 2 ) t o e n a b l e t h e HUSKY (S)
O p e r a t i o n t o b e mounted; and (3) t o p e r m i t HUSKY t o b e mounted without

n e c e s s i t a t i n g t h e r u n n i n g of t h e Freetown convoys w i t h o u t e s c o r t - - a s
TORCH compelled u s t o do, r e s u l t i n g i n heavy l o s s e s . A d e l a y o f a r o n t h
i n t h e p r e s e n t e s c o r t program would have most s e r i o u s consequences. The
dangers of r e d u c t i o n s i n h i g h o c t a n e g a s ( a l r e a d y a s h o r t a g e ) and p l a n e s
on t h e eve o f heavy o p e r a t i o n s a r e e v i d e n t .
We, t h e r e f o r e ,
recommend t h a t J u s t i c e Byrnes b e i s s u e d i n s t r u c
t i o n s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e t e l e g r a m s u g g e s t e d below:
TELEGRAM TO BYRNES, WASHINGTON:
"Proposed e x t e n s i o n of f r e e z e i n
r u b b e r program from 20 t o 55 p e r c e n t of t o t a l w i l l have s e r i o u s

e f f e c t s o n o t h e r programs whose s u c c e s s f u l completion i s n e c e s s a r y
f o r t h e e f f e c t i v e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e w a r . Over-riding p r i o r i t i e s
w i l l n o t b e g r a n t e d t o more t h a n 20 p e r c e n t o f t h e r u b b e r pro
gram above e s c o r t v e s s e l s , a i r c r a f t , h i g h o c t a n e g a s , and o t h e r
i t e m s i n t h e number one g r o u p o f t h e m i l i t a r y program o f t h e
Chiefs of S t a f f . "
For t h e J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f :
( S i g n e d ) G.
C.
MARSHALL,
Chief of S t a f f ,
36
U . S . Army.
SECRET
J.C.S. 5 6 t h Meeting
(Casablanca)
MINUTFS OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on Wednesday,
J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1943, a t 0900.
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l G . C . Marshall, USA
Admiral E . J . King, USE
L t . G e n e r a l H. H. Arnold, USA
SECRETARY

L t . G e n e r a l B . B.
Rear Admiral C . M. Cooke, J r . , USh
B r i g . G e n e r a l J.E. H u l l , USA
B r i g . G e n e r a l A.
C. Hedemeyer, USA
C o l o n e l J. E. S m a r t , USA
37
SECRET
T h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f d i s c u s s e d c e r t a i n p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n
connectitxn w i t h t h e proposed movements of t h e P r e s i d e n t .
GENERAL MARSHALL gave some background i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e LendLease s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o Turkey. I t i s proposed t h a t t h e Prime

l l i n i s t e r w i l l proceed t o Cyprus t o meet T u r k i s h a u t h o r i t i e s t h e r e . I t i s
hoped t h a t h e c a n i n d u c e Turkey t o e n t e r t h e war on t h e s i d e of t h e
United N a t i o n s . Our o b j e c t i o n t o t h e proposed method of h a n d l i n g LendLease commitments is t h a t w e are, i n f a c t , s u r r e n d e r i n g c o n t r o l of U. S.
a l l o c a t i o n s t o Turkey s i n c e w e have no a s s u r a n c e of where t h e m a t e r i a l
i s u l t i m a t e l y s e n t . He remarked, however, t h a t t h e main p u r p o s e o f b r i n g

i n g p r e s s u r e t o b e a r on Turkey was t o u l t i m a t e l y permit t h e o p e r a t i o n of
American bombers from T u r k i s h s o i l ; s i n c e t h e o b j e c t a t s t a k e was s o
i m p o r t a n t , we c o u l d a f f o r d t o make c o n c e s s i o n s concerning t h e method of
a l l o c a t i n g m a t e r i a l t o t h i s t h e a t e r . He f e l t t h a t , i n any e v e n t , t h e
Combined Chiefs o f S t a f f should have a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o s e e r e q u e s t s sub
m i t t e d t o t h e C.hl.A.B.bythe
B r i t i s h , i n o r d e r t h a t a f t e r General Brooke
and General Marshall had determined what t h e y were s h o r t l y t o undertake

t o p r o v i d e T u r k e y , t h e C.M.A.B.
c o u l d i n f o r m t h e Combined C h i e f s of
S t a f f as t o t h e p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of t h e s e p r o p o s a l s .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t i n a d d i t i o n t o our p r e s e n t commitments t o
f u r n i s h equipment t o the F r e n c h i n N o r t h A f r i c a , t o R u s s i a , and t o China,

and s u p p l y i n g our own needs, w e were a p p a r e n t l y about t o undertake addi
t i o n a l commitments t o Turkey. He i n q u i r e d what we s h o u l d do ' i n o r d e r t o
i n s u r e t h a t Turkey understood t h e r e a l s o u r c e of t h i s m a t e r i a l . He won
d e r s i f a U . S . r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h o u l d n o t accompany t h e Prime Z l i n i s t e r
i n o r d e r t o h a n d l e American i n t e r e s t s and p o i n t up t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
United S t a t e s i s d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d . If B r i t a i n assumes r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r p r o c e s s i n g b i d s f o r supplying Turkey, t h e y should p r o p e r l y d e a l w i t h
t h e Combined M u n i t i o n s Assignments Board.
I n Admiral K i n g ' s o p i n i o n ,
t h e s e r e q u e s t s s h o u l d go t h r o u g h t h e Combined C h i e f s o f S t a f f . He i s
opposed t o p e r m i t t i n g t h e B r i t i s h t o go d i r e c t t o t h e Combined Munitions
Assignments Board, o b t a i n a d e c i s i o n from t h a t Board, and t h e n inform
t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f what had been d o n e . H i s main c o n c e r n i s t o
i n s u r e t h a t a l l m a t e r i a l a l l o c a t e d f o r t h i s purpose i s p u t t o use a g a i n s t
t h e enemy.
ADMIRAL COOKE was of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t i f r e q u e s t s from Turkey
were t o c o n t i n u e , t h e y s h o u l d p r o c e s s t h e i r own. H e f e l t , however, t h a t
f o r i n i t i a l b a r g a i n i n g t h e proposed arrangement was s a t i s f a c t o r y .
38
GEXEHtV, MARSHALL s a i d t h a t he t h o u g h t t h e B r i t i s h might under
t a k e o p e r a t i o n s i n t.he Dodecanese c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h o u r o p e r a t i o n s
a g a i n s t S i c i l y , u t i l i z i n g l a n d i n g c r a f t a s s i g n e d t o t h e Middle East, f o r
t h i s purpose.
I t , was brought o u t i n subsequent d i s c u s s i o n t h a t t h e i l i d d l e
E a s t a t p r e s e n t h a s l a n d i n g c r a f t s u f f i c i e n t o n l y t o t r a i n one b r i g a d e
t r o o p , and t h a t t h e U .
s.
could not supply a d d i t i o n a l landing c r a f t f o r
Ilodecariese o p e r a t i o n s w h i l e t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n w a s i n p r o g r e s s . I f
tile D o d e c m e s e o p e r a t i o n i s u n d e r t a k e n as a f o l l o w - u p t o S i c i l y , one
r e s u l t would be that, t h e r e s i d u a l l a n d i n & c r a f t earmarked f o r t h e U . K.
rvonld never r e a c h t l l e r e .
GEKERAL SOYERVJ~I,L,d i s c u s s i n g C . C . S .
lfi2, "U.
S. Aid t o R u s s i a , "
s a i d t,tiat s i i i c e t h e paper was p r e p a r e d , Lord L e a t h e r s had withdrawn his

c o n c u r r e n c e t o i t a s a j o i n t , p a p e r b e c a u s e he d i d n o t have f i r s t , - h a n d
knowledge o f t h e U .
S. p r o d u c t i o n b a c k - l o g .
General S o m e r v e l l ' s f i g u r e s . U.
He d i d , however, a c c e p t
S. c a l c u l a t i o n s of l o s s r a t e f o r dry
c a r g o s h i p p i f i g a r e 2 . 6 p e r c e n t . T h i s f i g u r e i s b a s e d upon t h e a c t u a l
l o s s r a t e d u r i n g 1342. The B r i t i s h f i g u r e o f 1 . 9 p e r c e n t i s an a t t e m p t
at. f ' o r e c a s t i i i g e x p e c t e d l o s s e s f o r 1947, arid U .
S. a u t h o r i t i e s b e l i e v e
i t too low. General Soinervell recommended changing t h e f i r s t s e n t e n c e o f
paraqravli 1.1 t o read:

IJ.
"Supplement B r i t i s h a s s i s t a n c e , i n accordanre wit.h
S . ~ ~ B r i t i sagreement
h
o f November 1 3 , 1 9 4 2 . " He b e l i e v e s t h a t , the
ilussiari . ? r o t , o r o l s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d i n t,he same s t a t u s as any u t h c r
up<1rat,ioii; that, i t should n o t be s a c r o s a n c t , b u t s u s c e p t i b l e of rediict,ion

i f such be n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e o f o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s of e q u a l i m p o r t a n c e
Tile ! ' r e s i d e n t , i s beginning t o b e l i e v e t h a t i t m a y be well t o have a show
ilonn wit,ti S t a l i n c o n c e r n i n g t h e n e c e s s i t y o f suspending Murmansk convoys,

p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e o t h e r means of s u p p l y t o X u s s i a a r e s t i l l a v a i l a b l e
k n e r n l Sonrervell p o i n t e d o u t tkie i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e l a s t s e n t e n c e i n
C . C . S. 162 arid s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n of t h e Combined
Ckiiefs o f S t a f ' f be i n v i t e d t o t h i s s e n t e n c e .
AD?IIK.AL K I N G , summarizing t h e g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i c p l a n f o r 1943.

poirit,ed o n t t , h a t o u r main r e l i a n c e i n E n r o p e was p l a c e d on ! l u s s i a
TLieret'ore, he f e l t that. no e f f o r t s h o u l d be s p a r e d t o p l a c e i n Russian

hands every p o s s i b l e t,ool o f war. T h e q u e s t i o n was n o t one of p l a c a t i n g
S t a l i n b u t of iinplenientirig t h e i l u s s i a n s t o o u r own i n t e r e s t . He a g r e e d
w i t h General \ f a r s h a l l t h a t i t was n o t wise t o a t t e m p t t o c o n t i n u e Hur
niansk convoys when t h e l o s s becomes p r o h i b i t i v e .
39
SECRET
GENERAL SOMERVELL and ADMIRAL COOKE informed t h e J o i n t C h i e f s
o f S t a f f t h a t n e c e s s a r y s h i p p i n g f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c had
a l r e a d y been a l l o c a t e d . They a g r e e d t h a t n o a c c u r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
t h e e f f e c t on l o s s r a t e produced by t h e new A i r and E s c o r t program could
b e d e t e r m i n e d b e f o r e J u n e b e c a u s e of t h e n e c e s s i t y o f i n t e g r a t i n g t h e
e f f e c t over an a p p r e c i a b l e t i m e .
GENERAL MARSHALL, d i s a u s s i n g t h e proposed Army and A i r Command
s e t - u p i n t h e U e d i t e r r a n e a n , informed t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t he
had r e c e i v e d a d r a f t p l a n f o r s u b d i v i d i n g the North A f r i c a n and European
T h e a t e r s , and t h a t General Andrews was working on t h e p r o p o s a l .
General
M a r s h a l l s a i d he had d i s c u s s e d w i t h S i r J o h n D i l l t h e q u e s t i o n of
Britain's
c o n t r o l o v e r U . S. h e a v y bombers i n E n g l a n d i n o p e r a t i o n s
which m i g h t i n v o l v e .heavy l o s s e s ; t h e U . S . Commander would a l w a y s have

t h e r i g h t t o a p p e a l . He b e l i e v e s B r i t i s h Command is l o g i c a l u n t i l such
time a s our f o r c e s outnumber t h e B r i t i s h and u n t i l we have demonstrated
t h e e f f i c a c y o f o u r day-bombing m e t h o d s . When t h i s t i m e a r r i v e s , a
reexamination of t h e command arrangements w i l l be i n o r d e r .
SECRET
J.C.S.
5 7 t h Meeting
(Ca sab 1a n c a )
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on T h u r s d a y ,
J a n u a r y 21, 1913, a t 0900.
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l G.
C. M a r s h a l l , USA
L t . G e n e r a l H.
H.
A r n o l d , USA
SECRETARY

Rear A d m i r a l C. M . Cooke, J r . , USN
B r i g . G e n e r a l J.E. H u l l , USA
B r i g . G e n e r a l A. C. Wedemeyer, USA
41
SECRET
GENERAL MARSBALL r e a d a despatch from General Eisenhower r e p o r t
ing an enemy a t t a c k i n T u n i s i a which r e s u l t e d i n some d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n of
t h e French d e f e n s e l i n e s , and s a i d t h a t Eisenhower was proceeding t o h i s
advance command p o s t ; Admiral Cunningham would be s e n i o r o f f i c e r a t
A l g i e r s u n t i l h i s r e t u r n . General Marshall a l s o r e a d a d e s p a t c h c o n t a i n
i n g a r e p o r t by G e n e r a l Hurley which emphasized t h e absence o f German
a i r from t h e R u s s i a n f r o n t .
ADMIRAL K I N G informed t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t t h e y c o u l d
e x p e c t A d m i r a l Pound t o propose a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e p h r a s i n g of t h e
paper on "Conduct of t h e Mar i n 1943" concerning a n t i s u h m a r i n e w a r f a r e .
Admiral King s a i d t h a t Admiral Pound had d i s c u s s e d w i t h him recommenda
t i o n s he f e l t s h o u l d b e made t o t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f r e g a r d i n g
t h i s s u b j e c t , b u t t h a t t h e s e recommendations were l a r g e l y a summary of
a c t i o n s which had a l r e a d y been t a k e n .

GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h were c o n s t a n t l y r a i s i n g
o b j e c t i o n s t o our p r o p o s a l s t h a t bombing of submarine t a r g e t s be i n t e n
s i f i e d on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g p o i n t s o f c e r t a i n i t e m s
e s s e n t i a l t o submarine c o n s t r u c t i o n were e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t t a r g e t s .
GENERAL MARSHALL remarked t h a t he had been g i v e n t o u n d e r s t a n d
t h a t a B r i t i s h Captain had been g i v e n t h e t a s k of s u r v e y i n g t h e g e n e r a l
a n t i s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e s i t u a t i o n , and t h a t he f e l t i t e s s e n t i a l t h a t
some s i m i l a r procedure w i t h r e g a r d t o t h i s important problem be adopted
by u s .
The J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f n e x t c o n s i d e r e d C.C.S.
160, "Minimum
E s c o r t R e q u i r e m e n t s t o M a i n t a i n t h e Sea Communications o f t h e U n i t e d
K a t i o n s . " I t w a s a g r e e d t h a t t h e p a p e r c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d a s a premise
f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n a t a f u t u r e d a t e , n o t i n g t h a t t h i s was o n l y one p h a s e
of a p a r a l l e l s t u d y of t h e o v e r - a l l antisubmarine p o s i t i o n which w a s now
b e i n g completed i n t h e United S t a t e s ,
The J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f n e x t c o n s i d e r e d C.C.S.
166, "The
Bomber O f f e n s i v e f r o m t h e U n i t e d Kingdom."
GENERAL MARSHALL d i d n o t c l e a r l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of
paragraph 6 and suggested t h a t we g e t t h e B r i t i s h t o e x p l a i n t h e meaning
of t h i s paragraph.
It a p p e a r e d t o G e n e r a 1 Illarshall t h a t t h e p r i m e M i n i s t e r
had probably i n s t i g a t e d t h e p a p e r .
42
SECRET
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t he understood t h e p a r a g r a p h t o imply t h a t
before l a y i n g waste t o whole c i t i e s i n o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r y , i t would h e
necessary t o o b t a i n t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e B r i t i s h C a b i n e t b e c a u s e o f t h e
p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of s u c h a n a c t .
GENERAL SOMERVELL s u g g e s t e d e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e word " s y n t h e t i c "
i n p a r a g r a p h 2 (d) of t h e p a p e r , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e two t e t r a e t h y l
p l a n t s i n Germany were v i t a l o b j e c t i v e s .
Discussing C.C.S.
164, ANAKIM,
i t was a g r e e d t h a t i t p r o b a b l y
would b e n e c e s s a r y t o s u p p l y s u p p l e m e n t a r y f o r c e s r e q u i r e d f r o m t h e
Pacific.
I t was f u r t h e r a g r e e d t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t i t a p p e a r i n
the minutes of' t h e Combined Chiefs o f S t a f f meeting t h a t t h e LSD may n o t

be ready i n t i m e f o r t h i s o p e r a t i o n , and t h a t i t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t TJnited
S t a t e s f o r c e s w i l l have t o be s h i f t e d t o t h e t h e a t e r i n October.
The J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f c o n s i d e r e d C.C.S,
165, "Draft Telegram
t o M. S t a l i n , " b u t t o o k no a c t i o n "
ADMIRAL K I N G remarked t h a t he was d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e l a t e
d a t e p r o p o s e d f o r o p e r a t i o n HUSKY
He f e l t i t i n d i c a t i v e t h a t n o t h i n g
would b e done on t h e C o n t i n e n t d u r i n g 1 9 4 3 " He a g r e e d w i t h G e n e r a l

Marshall I s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e Prime M i n i s t e r was anxious t o mount BRIM.-.
STONE and t h a t t h e l a t e d a t e f o r HUSKY may have been i n f l u e n c e d by t h i s
d e s i r e . H e f e e l s BRIMSTONE t o b e "doing something j u s t f o r t h e s a k e of
doing something";
t h a t e v e n i f BRIMSTONE i s a c c o m p l i s h e d , HUSKY w i l l
have t o f o l l o w , t h u s f u r t h e r d e f e r r i n g C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n any f o r c e s deployed i n

S a r d i n i a were i n a n e x t r e m e l y v u l n e r a b l e p o s i t i o n i n c a s e t h e Germans
advanced through Spain; t h a t t h e Axis might p e r m i t us t o occupy S a r d i n i a
w i t h l i t t l e o p p o s i t i o n , i n o r d e r t h a t t h e y might occupy S p a i n and com
p l e t e l y f l a n k our f o r c e s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n , On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e y
would b e f o r c e d t o r e s i s t s t r o n g l y i n S i c i l y .
ADMIRAL COOKE s a i d t h a t i t s h o u l d b e r e e m p h a s i z e d t h a t t h e e n t i r e
problem f o r e i t h e r o p e r a t i o n w i l l b e one o f t r a i n i n g and t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
a r e f u l l y c o g n i z a n t of t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t h e S i c i l i a n o p e r a t i o n , p a r t l y
as a r e s u l t of t h e i r e x h a u s t i v e s t u d y of O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE" They have

c o n s i d e r e d a n d e v a l u a t e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n a i r coverage o b t a i n a b l e between
43
SECRET
S i c i l y and S a r d i n i a , b u t , even s o , a p p e a r t o f a v o r t h e S a r d i n i a n opera

t i o n . Our c a l c u l a t i o n s f o r HUSKY a r e based upon completion of o p e r a t i o n s
i n T u n i s i a b y A p r i l 1. The B r i t i s h i n s i s t t h a t LCA(L) must be u s e d f o r
t h e a s s a u l t stage. They admit t o having 400 o f t h e s e c r a f t and p r o b a b l y
have more. We have none. We s h o u l d a s c e r t a i n f r o m them how many t h e y
w i l l g i v e u s f o r t h e a s s a u l t . The d i s a d v a n t a g e i s t h a t t h e y c a n b e
c a r r i e d o n l y by B r i t i s h combat-loaded
t r a n s p o r t s , inasmuch a s our d a v i t s
c a n n o t h a n d l e them. They have a r a d i u s o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 50 m i l e s .
He
agreed w i t h a s u g g e s t i o n by General Somervell t h a t t h e i r r a d i u s m i g h t b e

i n c r e a s e d by i n s t a l l i n g a u x i l i a r y t a n k s , w i t h a s l i g h t l o s s of p e r s o n n e l
capacity.
GENERAL SOM3RVELL, summarizing t h e c a p a c i t y of v a r i o u s r o u t e s

through t h e Levant, s a i d t h a t n o n e o f t h e m looked v e r y promising. T u r k i s h
r a i l w a y s are i n a d e q u a t e .
A l l r o u t e s r e q u i r e a l a r g e number o f h e a v y
t r u c k s and r o l l i n g s t o c k . He s a i d t h a t t h e r o u t e v i a t h e P e r s i a n G u l f ,
e x p e c t e d t o have a c a p a c i t y of 10,000 t o n s p e r month b u t s o f a r o n l y
a b l e t o handle from 4,000 t o 5,000 t o n s p e r month, would improve as soon
a s t h e n e c e s s a r y p e r s o n n e l (due a t t h e end of J a n u a r y ) a r r i v e d .
COLohEL SMART s u g g e s t e d t h a t , inasmuch as t h e f i n a l e v i c t i o n o f

t h e A x i s from T u n i s and B i z e r t e might t a k e on t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f
a n o t h e r Dunkirk, i t might b e a d v i s a b l e t o d e l a y t h i s e v i c t i o n u n t i l s u c h
time as w e were p r e p a r e d t o mount O p e r a t i o n HUSKY i n o r d e r t o t a k e ad
v a n t a g e o f t h e c o n f u s i o n and d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from t h e A x i s
e v a c u a t i o n of T u n i s i a "
GENERAL ARNOLD s a i d t h a t he had s e t t l e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f t r a i n i n g

F r e n c h p i l o t s w i t h G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r ; t h a t t r a i n i n g o f one f i g h t e r
group and one bombardment group i n t h e r e a r a r e a s was now i n hand. There
is an adequate number o f f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t a l r e a d y i n A f r i c a ; t h e q u e s t i o n
is one of d e p l o y i n g them i n t h e c o r r e c t s p o t s ,
44
SECRET
J.C.S.
58th Meeting
( Casab1anc a )
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on F r i d a y ,
January 2 2 , 1943, a t 0900.
MEMBERS PRESENT
General ti.
C. Marshall, USA
L t . General H.
Arnold, USA
H.
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J . R . Deane, USA
Lt.
General B . B.
Rear Admiral C.
M.
Somervell, USA
Cooke, J r . , USN
Brig. General J . E .
B r i g . General A.
Hull, USA
C. Wedemeyer, USA
Colonel J . E.
Smart, USA
Commander R. E . Libby, USN
45
SECRET
1.
CoCsSo 165/1--DRAFT
REFLY TO
M a
STALIN.
T h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f a g r e e d upon c e r t a i n m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o
be proposed t o t h e Combined Chiefs of S t a f f .
2.
C-CoS- 168--OPERATIONS I N THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
GENERAL MARSHALL q u e s t i o n e d t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of d e c l a r i n g o u r
i n t e n t i o n t o c l e a r t h e A l e u t i a n s of t h e enemy. H e s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
have been i n f o r m e d of t h e magnitude o f t h e Kiska o p e r a t i o n , a n d t h a t
t h i s gave them a y a r d s t i c k by which t h e y m i g h t attempt t o j u d g e t h e
magnitude of o t h e r o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c Theater. H e f e l t i t essen
t i a l t h a t t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h a t we w i l l n o t commit o u r s e l v e s t o become
involved i n any l a r g e - s c a l e o p e r a t i o n i n Alaska.
A f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , i t w a s a g r e e d :
T o change t h e p a p e r t o r e a d , make t h e A l e u t i a n s as s e c u r e a s
may b e , and t o i s s u e i t a s C.C.S.

3.
168.
C C S.. 161/1--HUSKY.
The J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f disciussed t h i s p a p e r by t h e Combined
S t a f f P l a n n e r s w i t h a view t o d e t e r m i n i n g how i t might b e p o s s i b l e t o

mount t h e o p e r a t i o n e a r l i e r t h a n p r o p o s e d i n t h e p a p e r . ADMIRAL KING
remarked t h a t i t appeared t h a t i t would be n e c e s s a r y t o u t i l i z e combat
loaded t r a n s p o r t s ; t h a t t h e B r i t i s h , a l t h o u g h m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t convoys
could be p a s s e d t h r o u g h t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n w i t h o u t o c c u p y i n g S i c i l y ,
s t i l l were r e l u c t a n t t o send a s s a u l t convoys by t h i s r o u t e , which p r e

vented t r a i n i n g and l o a d i n g combat-loaded
dom
t r a n s p o r t s i n t h e United King
Considerable work remains t o b e done a s t o r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of beaches.

I t was a g r e e d :
That t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f would inform t h e Combined Chiefs
of S t a f f t h a t t h e y d i d not f a v o r a l a t e HUSKY, and were u n a l t e r

a b l y opposed t o O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE a t any t i m e .
The J o i n t U. S. Chiefs of S t a f f b e l i e v e t h a t Operation HUSKY can
be mounted by t h e 1st of August w i t h o u t undue d i f f i c u l t y a l t h o u g h t h e
necessary documents a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e h e r e t o s u s t a i n t h i s b e l i e f .
ADMIRAL K I N G remarked t h a t we should meet t h i s d a t e and s h o u l d do what
ever h a s t o be done t o accomplish i t .
ADMIRAL COOKE p o i n t e d o u t t h a t i f t h e I t a l i a n F l e e t had n o t been

d r i v e n i n t o t h e A d r i a t i c b e f o r e t h e o p e r a t i o n was launched, it would b e
n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v i d e two naval covering f o r c e s ; b u t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h hoped
t o have d e a l t w i t h t h e I t a l i a n F l e e t b e f o r e t h e o p e r a t i o n was scheduled.
46
I.(
.S.
5 9 t h Meeting
i(n~at11anca)
MINUTES OF MEETING
Held a t Anfa Camp on S a t u r d a y ,
January 2 3 , 1 9 1 3 , at,
own.
MEMBERS PRESENT
G e n e r a l i.f
C , M a r s h a l l , IlSA
Admiral E
J - King, U S N
L t . General H .
It. Arnold. CSA
SECRETARY
B r i g . General J
R . Deane, USA
1 , t . General B . B . Somervell, 1:SA

Rear Admiral C., \ f ,
Cooke, J r . , USN
B r i g . General J. E.. H u l l , ITSA

B r i g . General A . C , . Wedemeyer, I!SA
C o l o n e l J. E~ S m a r t , IJSA
Commander R~ I?.
47
L i b b y , T!SK
SECRET
1.
C.C.S.
167--CONTINENTAL OERATIONS I N 1913.
GENERAL SOMERVELL remarked t h a t h e b e l i e v e d t h e number of U . S.

d i v i s i o n s should p r o p e r l y b e s t a t e d as f i v e i n s t e a d of f o u r , on the b a s i s
of 40,000 men p e r d i v i s i o n . One of t h e s e d i v i s i o n s w i l l probably be a i r
borne. H e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h r e s e r v a t i o n concerning t h e Metro
p o l i t a n A i r Force was i n t r o d u c e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n t h i s p a p e r , and
t h a t t h i s was t h e f i r s t i n t i m a t i o n t h a t t h e r e m i g h t be any d i f f i c u l t y
with respect t o a i r .
ADMIRAL K I N G remarked t h a t i f t h e p r o v i s i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o the

U.
S. f u r n i s h i n g a s s a u l t c r a f t were i n t e r p r e t e d l i t e r a l l y , i t might cut
i n t o what we were a b l e t o f u r n i s h i n t h e P a c i f i c .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t we must, i n a c c e p t i n g t h e p a p e r , note
t h e r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t w e would f u r n i s h o n l y the r e s o u r c e s remaining a f t e r
m o u n t i n g HUSKY and f i l l i n g P a c i f i c r e q u i r e m e n t s , and t h a t w e s e e no
p r o s p e c t of p r o v i d i n g U . S . crews or t h e t o t a l s of a s s a u l t s h i p p i n g and
l a n d i n g c r a f t s e t f o r t h i n t h i s paper by August 1 s t .
I t was a g r e e d :
(a) T h a t i n r e g a r d t o p a r a g r a p h 4,
o t h e r commitments must be
f i r s t met;
(b) That on o u r b a s i s of c a l c u l a t i o n , t h e number of U. S . d i v i
s i o n s would be f i v e i n l i e u of f o u r ;
(c) T h a t of t h e s e f i v e U . S . d i v i s i o n s , one w i l l p r o b a b l y be
airborne.
2.
C.C.S.
172--SHIPPING CAPABILITIES FOR BOLERO BUILD-UP.
GENERAL SOMERVELL e x p l a i n e d t h e b a s i s on which t h i s paper had

b e e n p r o d u c e d , e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t i t made p r o v i s i o n for s e n d i n g 1G,000
t r o o p s from t h e U. S . i n combat-loaded t r a n s p o r t s , and t h a t t h e s e had
b e e n computed on t h e b a s i s of one t r i p o n l y s o t h a t t h e t r a n s p o r t s
m i g h t be h e l d as l o n g a s n e c e s s a r y w i t h o u t d e t r i m e n t t o o t h e r c a l c u l a
t i o n s . A balance of combat l o a d e r s t o g i v e 23,000 troop l i f t remains f o r
the P a c i f i c .
3.
C.C.S.
171--OPERATION HUSKY.
A f t e r d i s c u s s i o n , i t was agreed:
(a) T h a t t h e f i r s t p a r a g r a p h s h o u l d i n c l u d e , " w i t h t h e t a r g e t
d a t e as t h e p e r i o d of t h e f a v o r a b l e J u l y moon. Code d e s i g
n a t i o n , HUSKY";
48
SECRET
(b) Under paragraph 1 of t h e command s e t - u p , t h e words, "respon
s i b l e f o r , " should be r e p l a c e d by "charged with";
(c) The d i r e c t i v e s h o u l d p r o v i d e f o r immediate p r e p a r a t i o n o f
cover plans;
(d) An o v e r a l l code d e s i g n a t i o n f o r a l l Mediterranean o p e r a t i o n s
should be made.
4.
C.C.S.
170--REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER.
D u r i n g t h e d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s p a p r , t h e q u e s t i o n a r o s e a s t o
what d u t i e s General Eisenhower would perform d u r i n g t h e c a r r y i n g o u t o f
Operation HUSKY. GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t he would be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
a l l o f A f r i c a , f o r i s s u i n g d i r e c t i v e s t o A i r Marshal Tedder h a v i n g no
immediate a p p l i c a t i o n t o HUSKY, e t c . He f e l t t h e command r e l a t i o n s h i p t o
be a formal one i n view of t h e preponderance of B r i t i s h f o r c e s .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t t h i s was i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e g e n e r a l
p r i n c i p l e t h a t immediate command v e s t e d i n t h e n a t i o n having a prepon
derance o f f o r c e s ; but t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d n o t be r i g i d l y a p p l i e d
and, i n f a c t , C.C.S.
7513 s h o u l d b e r e v i s e d b y i n s e r t i n g t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n
t h a t t h i s would be a normal, r a t h e r t h a n a r e q u i r e d arrangement under

these circumstances.
49
C A S A B L A N C A
C O N F E R E N C E
JANUARY
1943

MINUTES OF MEETINGS
( P r e s i d e d Over B y The P r e s i d e n t )
PAGE
ECinutes o f C o n f e r e n c e , J a n a u r y 15,
Minutes o f Conference,
January
16,
1943
19113
. . . .
. . . .
5i
58
SECRET
JOINT CHIEFS O F STAFF
MINUTES OF CONFERENCE
Held a t Anfa Camp, January 15, 1943, at, 1000
PRESENT
General Marshall
Admiral King
L t . General Arnold
M r . Harry Hopkins
Hr. A v e r i l l Harriman
B r i g . General Ueane
51
SECRET
1.
V I S I T O F GENERAL NOGUES AND THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO WITH THE

PRESIDENT
The PRESIDENT asked as t o t h e a d v i s a b i l i t y of h i s s e e i n g General
rogues and p o s s i b l y t h e S u l t a n of Morocco. GENERAL MARSHALL and A D M I W

K I N G b o t h s t a t e d t h e y f e l t t h a t General Eisenhower w a s i n a b e t t e r posi
t i o n t o a d v i s e t h e P r e s i d e n t on t , h i s s u b j e c t and he would^ no doubt d o s o

when he a r r i v e d a t Anfa Camp. Admiral King, however, q u e s t i o n e d whether
or n o t General Nogues m e r i t e d t h e honor of v i s i t i n g the P r e s i d e n t o f the

United S t a t e s .
2.
THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM.

GENERAL MARSHALL e x p l a i n e d t h a t it, had a t f i r s t been thought t h e
P r e s i d e n t would s t a y h e r e f o r a b o u t f o u r or f i v e d a y s ; t h e n l e a v e b y
motor f o r Rabst and P o r t Lyautey, where he would v i s i t t h r e e d i v i s i o n s
and i n t e r v i e w c e r t a i n s e l e c t e d o f f i c e r s and men; t h e n p r o c e e d by a i r t o
Oran, o b s e r v e t h e t r o o p s t h e r e and a l s o v i s i t a h o s p i t a l . From Oran, i t
was p l a n n e d t h a t he s h o u l d go t o h f a r r a k e c h , change p l a n e s a t t h e a i r f i e l d
t h e r e and t h e n r e t u r n t o t h e Unit,ed S t a t e s . He s t a t e d t h a t , i n view of
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c o n f e r e n c e would p r o b a b l y l a s t a b o u t t e n d a y s , t h e s e
p l a n s would of n e c e s s i t y have t o undergo some change. He s a i d that, i t i s
n o t d e s i r a b l e f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t t o v i s i t Marrakech and he s h o u l d refuse
any i n v i t a t i o n of t h e Prime M i n i s t e r t o d o s o .
GENERAL MARSHALL e x p l a i n e d t h a t hlarrakech i s i n l a n d , t h a t i t s
a i r f i e l d i s e n t i r e l y o p e n . No one knows how many A x i . s a g e n t s may b e
i n c l u d e d i n t h e c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s . He a l s o s a i d t h a t i t would b e
unwise t o have t h e P r e s i d e n t of t h e United S t a t e s i n a c i t y t h a t con
t a i n e d a b o u t one and one-half French d i v i s i o n s which have r e c e n t l y been
h o s t i l e t o u s and o n l y one r e g i m e n t o f American t r o o p s .
GENERAL MARSHALL s u g g e s t e d t h a t i f t h e Prime M i n i s t e r d e s i r e d t o

v i s i t Marrakech, he might do s o w i t h Mr. Hopkins; and t h i s would f u r n i s h
g o d cover f o r t h e r e a l l o c a t i o n of t h e P r e s i d e n t .
I t w a s d e c i d e d t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t would remain here and t h a t i f

t h e r e was any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t h i s p r e s e n c e h e r e had become known, he
would immediately s t a r t on t h e i n s p e c t i o n t o u r which had been p r e v i o u s l y
planned t o s t a r t a t t h e conclusion of h i s s t a y i n A f r i c a , except t h a t ,
when he r e t u r n e d t o t h e Marrakech a i r p o r t , he would change p l a n e s and
l e a v e t h e Marrakech a i r p o r t as though r e t u r n i n g t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .
52
A c t u a l l y , he would r e t u r n t o t h e Anfa Camp i n t i m e t o b e h e r e t o f i n i s h
up s u c h b u s i n e s s as might he n e c e s s a r y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e conference
I n d i s c t u s s i n g t h e p r o t e c t i o n a v a i l a b l e a t Anfa Camp, GEWRAL
ARNOLD b r o u g h t o u t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e was a F r e n c h s q u a d r o n e q u i p p e d
w i t h our P-40 a i r p l a n e s ; a n d , a t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e P r e s i d e n t , h e ex
p l a i n e d s o m e t h i n g of our program f o r e o u i p p i n g F r e n c h a i r w i t s .
3.
THE BRITISH STRATEGIC CONCEPT.

GENERAL MARSHALL g a v e t h e F r e s i d e n t a b r i e f summary o f t h e
R r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f concept r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o s p e c t s i n t h e European
t h e a t e r . They b e l i e v e t h a t w e s h o u l d f i r s t e x p a n d t h e bombing c t ' f o r t
a g a i n s t the Axis and t h a t o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e Mediterranean o f f e r t h e b e s t
chance of compelling Germany t o d i s p e r s e h e r a i r r e s o u r c e s . He e x ~ : l a i n e d
t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e now i n f a v o r o f a n a t t a c k a g a i n s t S i c i l y rn?,Iinr
t h a n S a r d i n i a and t h a t t h i s change of' a t t i t u d e was p r o b a b l y i n s p i r e d t,y
t h e Prime M i n i s t e r .
A t t h e same t i m e , t h e United Piations s h o u l d t r y t,n b r i n g Turkey

i n on our s i d e . Continued a i d s h o u l d b e g i v e n t o t,he R u s s i a n s . A b a l a n c e
w i l l have t o b e s t r u c k between t h e s e v a r i o u s commitmerits h e c a u s e t h e y
a r e mutually c o n f l i c t i n g .
T h ey a l s o f e e l t h a t we must be i n a p o s i t i o n t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e
of any weakness d e v e l o p i n g i n Germany b y b e i n g p r e p a r e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s

a c r o s s t h e E n g l i s h Channel.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t bot,h Lord Mountba.t.ten and G e n e r a l
C l a r k a g r e e d t h a t t h e r e must b e a l o n g p e r i o d o f t r a i n i n g b e f o r c a n y
a t t e m p t is made t o l a n d a g a i n s t d e t e r m i n e d r e s i s t a n c e . General C,lark had
p o i n t e d o u t many of t h e mishaps t h a t o c c u r r e d i n t h e l a n d i n g i n N o r t h
A f r i c a which would have been f a t a l had t h e r e s i s t a n c e b e e n more d e t e r
mined. General C l a r k was a l s o a p p r e h e n s i v e about our a t j i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n
a s u r p r i s e b e c a u s e of t h e n e c e s s i t y of l o c a t i n g l a n d i n g c r a f t a l o n g t h e
n o r t h e r n c o a s t o f A f r i c a p r i o r t o i n i t i a t i n g o p e r a t i o n s . General M a r s h a l l
s t a t e d t h a t G e n e r a l C l a r k f e l t t h a t , w h i l e t h i s p r e s e n t e d some d i f f i - .
c u l t i e s , t h e y c o u l d b e overcome.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h a r e e x t r e m e l y f e a r f u l
of any d i r e c t a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C o n t i n e n t u n t i l a d e c i d e d c r a c k i n t h e
German e f f i c i e n c y and morale h a s become a p p a r e n t . The B r i t i s h p o i n t o u t
53
t h a t t h e r a i l n e t i n Europe would p e r m i t t h e movement o f seven d i v i s i o n s

a d a y from e a s t t o w e s t , w h i c h would e n a b l e them t o r e i n f o r c e t t r i r
d e f e n s e s of t h e n o r t h e r n c o a s t of F r a n c e r a p i d l y . On t h e o t h e r hand,
t h e y can o n l y move one d i v i s i o n from n o r t h t o s o u t h e a c h day i n o r d e r t o
r e i n f o r c e t h e i r d e f e n s e of s o u t h e r n Europe.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t G e n e r a l C l a r k had e x p r e s s e d t h e
o p i n i o n t h a t o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n c o u l d b e mounted more
e f f i c i e n t l y from N o r t h A f r i c a . H i s r e a s o i l s a r e t h a t t h e l i n e s of com
m u n i c a t i o n would be s h o r t e r t h e r e , t h a t t h e t r o o p s i n North A f r i c a have
had e x p e r i e n c e i n l a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n s , and t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a n e x c e s s
number o f t r o o p s a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n once t h e . h i s have
':i.eii
f o r c e d o u t of T u n i s i a , and f i n a l l y t h a t t r a i n i n g will^ be inon? e f f e c t i v e

i f u n d e r t a k e n i n c l o s e c o n t a c t , w i t h t h e enemy.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t , while the C r i t i s h u-ish t o b u i l d 11p

a s t r o n g f o r c e i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom f o r p o s s i b l e n p e r B t i o n s rrg-ainst
Germany i n c a s e a weakness d e v e l o p s , i t must i ' c u n d e r s t o o d t h a t a.iiy
o p e r a t i o n i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n w i l l d e f i n i t e l y r e t a r d BOLERO.
ADMIRAL K I N G p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e l i n e o f i:ommunication i s t h e
b o t t l e n e c k i n any o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
MR, HOPKINS a s k e d i f t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of St.af~'f P e l t t h a t . t h e

l i n e s o f communication a r e s u f f i c i e n t .
GENERAL hZAHsHALI. s a i d t h a t t h e
two c r i t i c a l f a c t o r s i n t h e d e c i s i o n a s t o whet,her t h e o p e r a t i o n i s t,o

b e i n t h e n o r t h or t h e s o u t h were:
(1) t h e safet,y of t h e l i n e of com
m u n i c a t i o n s and ( 2 ) t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e w i l l b e an e x c e s s o f v e t e r a n
s o l d i e r s a v a i l a b l e i n N o r t h A f r i c a t o mount a n o p e r a t i o n .
I n d i s c u s s i n g T u r k e y , GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t,he B r i t i s h
8 t h Army would
be^ p r e p a r e d t o s e n d a c o n s i d e r a b l e f o r c e t h e r e or n e a r
t h e r e . The a i m o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s s h o u l d b e t o have T u r k e y r e s i s t
Axis a g g r e s s i o n and a t t h e same time p e r m i t and p r o t e c t our u s e of t h e i r

airfields.
The PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of b r i n g i n g Turkey i n t o t h e
war i s one f o r t h e d i p l o m a t s t o s e t t l e . I n c o n d u c t i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s , he
s t a t e d t h a t he and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r s h o u l d b e g i v e n i n f o r m a t i o n as t o
how much m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t t h e United Nations should be p r e p a r e d t o o f f e r
Turkey i n o r d e r t o accomplish what i s d e s i r e d . Re s t a t e d that, he d i d n o t
M
SECRET
want t o b e i n t h e p o s i t i o n of o v e r p r o m i s i n g a n y t h i n g t o t h e T u r k i s h
Government.
(The J o i n t S t a f f P l a n n e r s have been d i r e c t e d t o i n v e s t i g a t e
how much a i d i t would be n e c e s s a r y f o r u s t o f u r n i s h Turkey i n o r d e r t o

e n a b l e them t o p r o v i d e e f f e c t i v e r e s i s t a n c e t o a n Axis i n v a s i o n . )
I t was a g r e e d t h a t , r e g a r d l e s s o f whether Turkey came i n t o t h e
war on t h e s i d e o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , w e s h o u l d a s s e m b l e s u f f i c i e n t
f o r c e t o t h e e a s t of t h e T u r k i s h boundary t o e n a b l e t h e U n i t e d K a t i o m
t o r e i n f o r c e Turkey a s soon a s s h e d i d become i n v o l v e d i n t h e war. T h i s
can p r o b a b l y be accomplished by u s i n g p a r t o f t h e R r i t i s h 8 t h Army.
4 .
ANTISUBhlARINE WARFARE.
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n p o i n t e d out t h a t b o t h t h e American and t h e
B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f a g r e e d t h a t e f f e c t i v e measures must b e t a k e n
a g a i n s t t h e A x i s s u b m a r i n e s . He s a i d t h a t Admiral King had p o i n t e d o u t

t h a t t h e most e f f e c t i v e t a r g e t s would be a t t h e p l a c e s where t h e sub-.
marines a r e assembled. He a g r e e d w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t , which he a t t r i b u t , e d
t o S i r C h a r l e s P o r t a l , t h a t w e must keep hammering on one l i n k i n t h e
c h a i n , whether i t be t h e f a c t o r i e s which m a n u f a c t u r e component p a r t s ,
t h e submarine assembly y a r d s , submarine b a s e s , or s u b m a r i n e s a l o n g t.he
sea l a n e s .
5.
OPERATION RAVENOUS.
GENERAL MARSIIAIL informed t h e P r e s i d e n t of t h e B r i t . i s h a t t i t u d e
c o n c e r n i n g t h e O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS.
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t he had t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
were coming around t o t h e i d e a t h a t i t would be a p r o f i t a b l e gamhle.
GENERAL MARSHALL e x p l a i n e d t h a t t h e r e were h a z a r d s , p a r t i c u l a r l y
from Japanese a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e s o u t h e r n f l a n k , b u t t h a t if t h e opera

t i o n w a s s u c c e s s f u l , i t would s e c u r e f a v o r a b l e r e s u l t s f a r o u t of pro
p o r t i o n t o t h e r i s k s i n v o l v e d . The most i m p o r t a n t b e n e f i t t o b e hoped
f o r would b e a d e c r e a s e i n t h e Japanese p r e s s u r e i n t h e s o u t h e r n P a c i f i c
by f o r c i n g t h e J a p a n e s e t o d i v e r t t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e Burma t h e a t e r ;
and, even i n t h e e v e n t of f a i l u r e , i t would almost c e r t a i n l y r e s u l t i n a
j u n c t i o n of t h e Chinese f o r c e s now i n Burma w i t h t h o s e from Yunnan; a n d ,
i f a r e t i r e m e n t became n e c e s s a r y , a t r a i n e d Chinese army would withdraw
i n t o China.
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n spoke of t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o ' s r e f u s a l t o
mount t h e o p e r a t i o n . One r e a s o n g i v e n b y t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o i s t h e f a i l u r e
55
SECRET
t o s e c u r e B r i t i s h c o o p e r a t i o n i n assembling n a v a l f o r c e s i n t h e B a y of
Bengal, which he f e l t was a d e f i n i t e B r i t i s h commitment.
I t was a g r e e d t h a t a n e f f o r t s h o u l d b e made t o o b t a i n f i r m
B r i t i s h support f o r the operation before requesting the President t o
d i s c u s s t h e matter f u r t h e r w i t h t h e G e n e r a l i s s i m o .
The PRESIDENT added t h a t f o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s he thought i t
would be a d v i s a b l e t o double General Chennault's f o r c e i n China and a l s o

t o bomb J a p a n p r o p e r . GENERAL ARNOLD r e p l i e d t h a t he a g r e e d t h a t i t
would b e wise t o i n c r e a s e General C h e n n a u l t ' s f o r c e and e x p r e s s e d g r e a t
confidence i n h i s a b i l i t y t o operate e f f e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t the Japanese.
He s t a t e d , however, t h a t t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f s u p p l y i n g g a s o l i n e , s p a r e
p a r t s , and o t h e r maintenance n e c e s s i t i e s p r e v e n t e d d o i n g t h i s a t t h i s
t i m e . He i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h i s w a s one o f t h e most u r g e n t r e a s o n s f o r
o p e n i n g t h e Burma Road.
MR, HOPKINS asked General Marshall

of s u c c e s s i n Operation
w h a t he thought t h e prospeczs
RAVENOUS were.
GENERAL MARSHALL r e p l i e d t h a t he thought t h e y were b e t t e r than

fifty-fifty.
lie s a i d t h e B r i t i s h p r e s e n t e d a l l s o r t s of' d i f f i c u l t i e s
which must be overcome but t h a t he p e r s o n a l l y d i d n o t f e e l any of them

were i n s u r m o u n t a b l e . The t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s i n v o l v e d would n o t b e of
long d u r a t i o n , but i t w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y t o b u i l d an improved road r a p i d l y
b e f o r e t h e r a i n y s e a s o n s e t i n . He f e l t t h a t our e n g i n e e r s c o u l d do
t h i s , but t h e B r i t i s h were i n c l i n e d t o doubt i t . The B r i t i s h a l s o f e a r e d
t h e e f f e c t s of m a l a r i a , b u t GENERAL MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e i r
malaria p r e v e n t i v e methods d i d n o t approach t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of ours.

ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t he t h o u g h t i t w a s most e s s e n t i a l t o
undertake Operation RAVENOUS, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r i t s e f f e c t on t h e Japanese
i n the South P a c i f i c .
H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e y a r e o p e r a t i n g on i n t e r i o r
l i n e s , and i t was d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d why t h e y d i d n o t make some

s e r i o u s t h r u s t s a t Midway or o t h e r p o i n t s on our l i n e of communications..
6.
COMMAND SITUATION I N EUROPE.

GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t he had l e a r n e d t h a t t h e Prime
M i n i s t e r was concerned over t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of our bombing o p e r a t i o n s

i n Europe. The u t i l i z a t i o n of o u r bombing f o r c e i s t i e d up w i t h t h e
q u e s t i o n of command. A t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e General Eisenhower c o n t r o l s t h e
56
A i r F o r c e , b o t h i n North A f r i c a and i n England. W e a r e c o o p e r a t i n g w i t h

t h e B r i t i s h i n s e l e c t i n g t h e bombing o b j e c t i v e s , b u t w e a r e n o t s u b j e c t
t o t h e i r o r d e r s . GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t he f e l t t h e t i m e had come

when we s h o u l d e s t a b l i s h a s e p a r a t e U n i t e d Kingdom t h e a t e r . He s t a t e d
t h a t he had s e n t General Andrews t o C a i r o t o g i v e h i m some experi.ence i n
a n a c t i v e t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s and t h a t he now p r o p o s e d t o p u t h i m i n
command of t h e American t r o o p s i n t h e United Kingdom.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t s o f a r as o p e r a t i o n a l d i r e c t i o u of
bombing, i . e . , time and m i s s i o n , our bombers inEngland should Lie s u b j e c t
t o B r i t i s h command. So f a r a s t e c h n i q u e , e t c . , t h e y s h o u l d not, be p e r
m i t t e d t o d i c t a t e our procedure.
7.
OPERATIONS I N TUNISIA.
GENERAL MARSHALL i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e r e m a y b e a change i n t h e
B r i t i s h command i n t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n T u n i s i a . He s a i d t h a t . A d m i r a l
Cunningham a g r e e d t h a t t h e command had n o t been w e l l h a n d l e d . I n s t a n c e s
o c c u r r e d i n w h i c h t r a i n e d U n i t e d S t a t e s c o m l ~ a tt e a m s l o a n e d t,o t h e
B r i t i s h were b r o k e n u p , t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s . T h e r e had
a l s o b e e n i n s t a n c e s of' t h e m i s u s e of B r i t i s h p a r a c h u t e t r o o p s . T h i s
s i t u a t i o n i s now b e i n g c o r r e c t e d .
57
SECRET
MINUTES OF CONFERENCE
Held a t Anfa Camp, January 16, 1943, a t 1700.
PRESENT
General Marshall
Admiral King
L t . General Arnold
L t . General Somervell
Rear Admiral Cooke
B r i g . General Wedemeyer
Ib. flarry Ilopkins
Vr. A v e r i l l Harriman
B r i g . General Deane
58
ADMIRAL K I N G informed t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of
S t a f f have been a t t e m p t i n g t o o b t a i n t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s of S t a f f ' s con
c e p t as t o how t h e war s h o u l d be won. He s a i d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h have
d e f i n i t e i d e a s as t o what t h e n e x t o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e b u t do n o t seem
t o have a n o v e r - a l l p l a n f o r t h e conduct of t h e war.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t t h e P l a n n e r s are making a s t u d y of

what is r e q u i r e d i n t h e P a c i f i c i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n c o n s t a n t p r e s s u r e
on t h e J a p a n e s e and keep t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n t h a t t h e a t e r . The Combined
Chiefs of S t a f f have been p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned w i t h t h e s t r a t e g i c con
c e p t for 1843. They have had d i s c u s s i o n s on t h e Burma o p e r a t i o n s and
a l s o whether an immediate o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e planned for t h e Mediter
r a n e a n or f o r t h e C o n t i n e n t or b o t h . He s t a t e d t h a t t h e P l a n n e r s had
been i n s t r u c t e d t o e s t i m a t e t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e d a t e t h a t a n o p e r a t i o n
a g a i n s t S i c i l y c o u l d be mounted i n o r d e r t h a t t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f could
determine what r e s i d u e of f o r c e would be a v a i l a b l e for o p e r a t i o n s on t h e
Continent and i f such o p e r a t i o n s would b e a d v i s a b l e t h i s year.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t t h e most c r i t i c a l f a c t o r s i n t h e

coming o p e r a t i o n s a r e t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of l a n d i n g c r a f t , t h e t i m e neces
s a r y f o r amphibious t r a i n i n g , and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of e s c o r t v e s s e l s .
H e s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e w i l l be e x c e s s t r o o p s a v a i l a b l e i n North
A f r i c a when t h e A x i s powers have b e e n e x p e l l e d from K o r t h A f r i c a and
t h a t t h i s is one of t h e c h i e f r e a s o n s why Operation HUSKY a p p e a r s t o be
attractive.
The B r i t i s h have e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t S i c i l y
cannot be mounted p r i o r t o August, b u t f e e l t h a t t h e r e is a p o s s i b i l i t y
of moving t h i s d a t e up t o some time i n J u l y .

GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n b e i n g d e t e r m i n e d i s
whether w e c a n u n d e r t a k e an o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e C o n t i n e n t t o g e t h e r
w i t h O p e r a t i o n HUSKY o r s e p a r a t e l y and a t a l a t e r d a t e . The B r i t i s h
m a i n t a i n a spearhead i n t h e United Kingdom f o r an o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t t h e
Continent i n t h e event of a c r a c k i n German morale. T h i s i n c l u d e s enough
l a n d i n g c r a f t tomove f o u r brigade groups; and, a d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e B r i t i s h
are p u t t i n g motors i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1,000 b a r g e s which t h e y w i l l u s e ,

t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r small c r a f t , t o b r i n g i n t r o o p s f o l l o w i n g t h e spear
head.
59
SECRET
The PRESIDENT asked how many t r o o p s were i n E n g l a n d a t t h i s t i m e ,
t o which GENERAL MARSHALL r e p l i e d t h a t t h e r e were one t r a i n e d d i v i s i o n
and a b o u t 140,000 t o 150,000 men. H e s a i d t h a t by n e x t summer w e c a n
have s i x t o n i n e d i v i s i o n s i n t h e U n i t e d Kingdom, and t h e B r i t i s h w i l l
have t h i r t e e n .
GENERAL MEWHALL quoted S i r C h a r l e s P o r t a l a s s a y i n g a c r a c k i n

Axis m o r a l e may come a t any t i m e because of t h e e x p l o s i v e e l e m e n t s ex
i s t i n g i n t h e p o p u l a t i o n s of t h e occupied c o u n t r i e s . Sj.r C h a r l e s P o r t a l
f e e l s t h a t , if s u c h a n e x p l o s i o n comes, i t w i l l s t a r t i n t h e i n t e r i o r of
Germany b u t w i l l f i n a l l y r e a c h t h e f r o n t - l i n e
return t o their f a m i l i e s .
t r o o p s who w i l l d e s i r e t o
In t h i s c a s e , a n o c c u p a t i o n o f t h e C o n t i n e n t
would b e c o m p a r a t i v e l y s i m p l e .
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t r a i n i n g f o r amphibious o p e r a t i o n s i s
t h e most c r i t i c a l f a c t o r which we have t o f a c e . The t r a i n i n g must be of
much h i g h e r q u a l i t y t h a n t h a t g i v e n f o r TORCH. H e quoted Generel E i s e n
hower a s s a y i n g t h a t he b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e r e must b e a n i n v a s j ~ o non t h e
C o n t i n e n t b u t t h a t i t would r e q u i r e a minimum of 12 d i v i s i o n s , which i s
double p r e v i o u s e s t i m a t e s . General Eisenhower a l ~ s of e e l s t h a t t h e r e i s a
need f o r more t r a i n i n g . Other l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s t o any proposed. o p e r a t i o n
a r e t h e n e c e s s i t i e s of combating t h e s u b m a r i n e menace a n d f o r t h e de
l i v e r y of s u p p l i e s t o R u s s i a .
An o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t S a r d i n i a c a n b e a c c o m p l i s h e d a b o u t six
weeks e a r l i e r t h a n one a g a i n s t S i c i l y , b u t t,he r e s u l t s w i l l have l i t t l e
e f f e c t i n improving t h e s h i p p i n g s i t u a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n
The o n l y p o s i t i v e r e s u l t t o b e r e c e i v e d from t h e c a p t u r e o f S a r d i n i a
would b e t h e a b i l i t y t o bomb I t a l y a n d p e r h a p s t h e s o u t h e r n c o a s t of
France.
GENERAL ARNOLD p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e r e would be much b e t t e r a i r
coverage f o r O p e r a t i o n HUSKY t h a n c o u l d b e g i v e n t o O p e r a t i o n BRIMSTONE.
The PRESIDENT asked where t h e Germans had t h e b e s t d e f e n s e .
GENERAL MARSHALL r e p l i e d t h a t t h e i r d e f e n s e i n S i c i l y was b e t t e r

t h a n t h a t i n S a r d i n i a and t h a t by summer i t might b e e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e
Germans would have s i x t o e i g h t d i v i s i o n s t h e r e . G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l s a i d
t h a t t h e Combined C h i e f s of S t a f f were a l l a g r e e d on t h e n e c e s s i t y o f
p l a c i n g a d e q u a t e t r o o p s i n r e a r o f Turkey t o b e p r e p a r e d t o r e i n f o r c e
h e r f o r a r e s i s t a n c e t o Axis i n v a s i o n .
60
SECRET
The PRESIDENT remarked t h a t T u r k e y ' s e n t r y i n t o t h e w a r was a

d i p l o m a t i c q u e s t i o n , t o which GENERAL MARSHALL r e p l i e d t h a t he f e l t t h a t
t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s h o u l d be made r e g a r d l e s s of whether Turkey came i n t o
the war or n o t .
ADMIRAL K I N G s a i d t h a t ,
i n our endeavors t o o b t a i n a d e f i n i t e
s t r a t e g i c concept from t h e B r i t i s h C h i c f s o f S t a f f , i t had become appar

e n t t h a t t h e y i n t k n d e d u s i n g t h e g e o g r a p h i c a n d maupower p o s i t i o n of
R u s s i a t o t h e maximum. T h i s n e c e s s i t a t e s making e v e r y e f f o r t t o m a i n t a i n
t h e flow of s u p p l i e s t o R u s s i a and a l s o t o d i v e r t German a i r a n d grounri
t r o o p s from t h e Russian f r o n t . Re added t h a t t h e B r i t i s h make no mention
of where o r when a second f r o n t on t h e C o n t i n e n t s h o u l d be e s t , a b l i s h e d .
T h e PRESIDENT s a i d t h a t we now have a P r o t o c o l w i t h t h e R u s s i a n s which
i n v o l v e s a c e r t a i n d e l i v e r y o f m u n i t i o n s t o them arid t h a t t , h i s s h a l l
p r o b a b l y be c o n t i n u e d on t h e same s c a l e when t h e p r e s e n t P r o t o c o l e x p i r e i .
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t B r i t i s h convoys hy t h e n o r t h e r n r m t e
a r e s e t up f o r 30 s h i p s e v e r y 42 d a y s . W i t h an a d d i t i o n a l 12 d e s t r o y e r s
this c o u l d be improved t o a r a t e of 30 s h i p s e a c h 27 d a y s . H e st,al,ed
t h a t he d i d n o t b e l i e v e we s h o u l d b a s e our p l a n s t o c l a r g e l y on a con
t e m p l a t e d German c r a c k - u p .
I t now a p p e a r e d t h a t a r e a l ROUFLXT opera.
t i o n i s n o t f e a s i b l e b e f o r e A p r i l 19-24 b e c a n s e of U r j t i s h l a c k of
enthusiasm.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t . t , h e B r i t i s h would u n d e r t a k e a n Opera-.
t i o n SLEDGEHAMMER if t h e y saw s i g n s o f a b r e a k i n German m o r a l e . T h i s
would b e followed by a m a k e s h i f t ROUNDW o p e r a t i o n . He s a i d t h e B r i t i s h
f e e l t h a t t h e y cannot g a t h e r themeans f o r a r e a l t h r u s t a g a i n s t t h e Con

t i n e n t i n 1943, and t h a t Admiral Pound s t a t e s t h a t n o o p e r a t i o n s h o u l d be
u n d e r t a k e n a f t e r August. It i s a p p a r e n t t h a t B r i t i s h c o o p e r a t i o n cannot
b e o b t a i n e d u n l e s s t h e r e a r e i n d i c a t i o n s of t h e Germans weakening.
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t , if t h e o p e r a t i o n s on t h e Mediterranean
and on t h e Russian f r o n t caused t h e Germans t o w i t h d r a w t h e i r f o r c e s from
F r a n c e , t h e B r i t i s h would be w i l l i n g t o s e i z e t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o invade
the Continent.
GENERAL. MAHSHALL informed t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h were
n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n o c c u p y i n g I t a l y , irrasmuch a s t h i s would add t o o u r
b u r d e n s w i t h o u t commensurate r e t . u r n s .
61
SECRET
The PRESIDENT e x p r e s s e d h i s agreement w i t h t h i s view.

GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d t h a t i n h i s o p i n i o n we may be a b l e t o
o b t a i n a d e c i s i o n from t h e Combined Chiefs of S t a f f c o n c e r n i n g t h e opera
t i o n s i n t h e P a c i f i c by J a n u a r y 1 7 t h and t h a t t h e J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f
had come t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t O p e r a t i o n HUSKY s h o u l d b e u n d e r t a k e n ,
b u t t h e y had n o t y e t informed t h e B r i t i s h t o t h i s e f f e c t .
The PRESIDENT s t a t e d t h a t from t h e p o l i t i c a l p o i n t of view he
thought i t would be e x t r e m e l y wise t o send more a i r p l a n e s t o China. He
f e l t t h a t t h e y c o u l d be used t o g r e a t advantage t h e r e ; and i f p e r i o d i c
bombing r a i d s over Japan could be u n d e r t a k e n , t h e y would have a tremen
dous morale e f f e c t on t h e Chinese p e o p l e . GENERAL ARNOLD s t a t e d that. he
a g r e e d w i t h t h i s view b u t wished t o see f o r h i m s e l f whether o r not, an
i n c r e a s e d a i r f o r c e i n China c o u l d b e s u p p l i e d .
The PRESIDENT t h e n s t a t e d t h a t he thought i t was d e s i r a b l e t o
s e t up a d d i t i o n a l t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s t o i n s u r e a s u p p l y of a 1a.rger a i r
f o r c e i n China.
GENERAL MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s now a l l o c a t e d t o
China a r e s u f f i c i e n t and t h a t we must be e x t r e m e l y c a r e f u l about making
a d d i t i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n s . fie p o i n t e d o u t t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n t,o C h i n a , we
would r e c e i v e demands f o r t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s from Russia. We would need a.
c o n s i d e r a b l e number f o r t h e O p e r a t i o n HUSKY and a l s o f o r General WacArthur's forces i n the Pacific.
T h e PRESIDENT s u g g e s t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of p r e p a r i n g two o r
t h r e e p l a n s and making a l l p r e p a r a t i o n s t o c a r r y t h e m o u t , b u t l e a v i n g
the decision a s t o the objective u n t i l a l a t e r date.
ADMIRAL COOKE p o i n t e d o u t t h a t , i f p l a n s were made f o r Operation

HUSKY, t h e o b j e c t i v e could r e a d i l y b e changed t o e i t h e r t h e Dcdecanese,
Crete, or S a r d i n i a .
The PNBIDENT s a i d he would l i k e t o have some f l e x i b i l i t y t o t h e
p l a n s i n c a s e i t became a p p a r e n t t h a t Turkey might e n t e r t h e war. I n
t h a t case w e could t h e n adopt t h e o b j e c t i v e which would f i t i n b e s t w i t h
t h i s development.
GENERAL MARSHALL s t a t e d h e d i d n o t f e e l t h a t t h e Operation HUSKY

would i n t e r f e r e w i t h T u r k e y ' s e n t e r i n g i n t o t h e war, b u t r a t h e r t h a t a
s u c c e s s i n S i c i l y might be an added inducement t o h e r t o j o i n w i t h u s .
62
SECRET
The PRESIDENT t h e n d i r e c t e d t h e d i s c u s s i o n t o R u s s i a . He s a i d
that he had r e c e i v e d information t h a t t h e Russians d i d n o t d e s i r e any of
our p e r s o n n e l and a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e y would n o t welcome General

B r a d l e y ' s m i s s i o n t o make a s u r v e y of t h e a v a i l a b l e a i r f a c i l i t i e s i n
Siberia.
He asked General Somervell about t h e s u p p l y s i t u a t i o n t o R u s s i a .
GENERAL SOMERVELL r e p l i e d t h a t t h e P e r s i a n p o r t i s c a p a b l e o f
h a n d l i n g 15 s h i p s p e r month. The road and r a i l f a c i l i t i e s a r e capable of
h a n d l i n g about 10,000 t o n s p e r d a y , which a r e s u f f i c i e n t t o handle t h e
f r e i g h t from 40 s h i p s p e r month; and e f f o r t s a r e now b e i n g made t o ex
pand t h e p o r t f a c i l i t i e s t o make t h i s p o s s i b l e . . He t h e n went on t o de
s c r i b e t o t h e P r e s i d e n t s e v e r a l o v e r l a n d r o u t e s t o R u s s i a , a l l of which
are l i m i t e d by t h e a v a i . l a b i l i t y of t r u c k t r a n s p o r t , a t , l o n .
The PRESIDENT asked what might. happen i f Turkey remained n e u t r a l
b u t p e r m i t t e d our t r a n s p o r t i n g mwiit.ions and bombs through h e r t e r r i t o r y ,
GENERAL SOMERVELL r e p l i e d t h a t c e r t a i ~ nr o u t e s c o u l d be made
a v a i l a b l e by t h i s means; b u t , i f t h e y wei'e u s e d , it. wou16 be necessflrg
t o e s t a b l i s h a t r u c k a s s e m b l y p l a n t i n t h a t , areii.., He a d d e d t h a t h e
thought t h i s s h o u l d be done and that a l l a v a i l a b l e r o u t e s i n t o R u s s i a
s h o u l d be used.
The PRESIDENT asked General Somervell i f t r u c k b o d i e s could be
manufactured i n t h e Near E a s t , t o which GENERAL SOKERVELL r e p l i e d t h a t
lumber would have t o lie obt.ained from I n d i a
MR.. HARRIMAN s t a t e d t h a t , u n t i l a t r u c k assembly p l a n t could be

c o n s t r u c t e d , t h e one now a t C a i r o c o u l d be u s e d ,
ADMIRAL K I N G s t a t e d t h a t t h e l a s t convoy t o Murmansk a r r i v e d
w i t h o u t l o s s of any o f i t s 16 c a r g o s h i p s , b u t t h a t one d e s t r o y e r had
been sunk and a n o t h e r damaged. He s t a t e d t h a t we could h e l p Fbmsia more
if t h e y would h e l p u s t o do so.
The PRESIDENT asked i f we were g e t t i n g a s much i n f o r m a t i o n from

s o u t h e r n Europe a s a r e t h e B r i t i s h . GENERAL MARSHALL r e p l i e d t h a t he
would have t h i s i n v e s t i g a t e d .
(A message was s e n t t o G-2, A l l i e d Force
H e a d q u a r t e r s , a s k i n g f o r a r e p o r t as t o t h e amount of i n t e l l i g e n c e r e
c e i v e d o u t of s o u t h e r n Europe by U. S., I n t e l l i g e n c e a g e n c i e s and how our
e f f o r t s i n t h i s r e g a r d compared w i t h those of t h e B r i t i s h . )
SECREl
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n informed t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h
had a g r e e d t o t r a n s f e r t h e i r V a l e n t i n e t a n k s from t h e 6 t h Armored Divi
s i o n t o t h e French as soon as t h e B r i t i s h had r e c e t v e d o u r S h e r m a n tanks.
He a l s o s t a t e d he t h o u g h t i t n e c e s s a r y t o e q u i p t h e b e s t French d i v i
sions rapidly.
GENERAL MARSHALL t h e n informed t h e P r e s i d e n t r e g a r d i n g a d e c i
s i o n which had been made by General Eisenhower c o n c e r n i n g t h e T u n i s i a n
o p e r a t i o n s . A d r i v e towards Sfax, whichhadbeen p l a n n e d f o r J a n u a r y 24th,
h a s been c a l l e d o f f .
T h i s w a s n e c e s s a r y because t h e B r i t i s h 1st Army o n
t h e n o r t h could n o t a t t a c k n n t i l March 1 5 t h and General Alexander could

n o t a t t a c k Rommel's f o r c e s on t h e s o u t h u n t i l February 1 5 t h . I t was de
c i d e d t h a t t h e a t t a c k a g a i n s t Sfax might be premature and expose them to
an a t t a c k from t h e n o r t h b y German T u n i s i a n f o r c e s and from t h e s o u t h
by Hommel. I n s t e a d , General Eisenhower i s t,o hold h i s 1st Armored Divi
s i o n i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Tebessa p r e p a r e d t o a s s i s t e i t h e r A l e x a n d e r ' s
f o r c e s i n t h e s o u t h o r t,he 1st B r i t i s h Army i n t h e n o r t h ; and t h e at.tack
a g a i n s t Sfax w i l l be made by i n f a n t r y u n i t s a t a l a t e r d a t e , t o be co
o r d i n a t e d by General Eisenhower and General Alexander
I
The PRESIDENT t h e n a s k e d G e n e r a l 'Somervell a b o u t t h e g e n e r a l
supply s i t u a t i o n . GENERAE SOMERVEIL r e p l i e d t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t , s h o r t a g e s

i n North A f r i c a were i n r0a.d machinery and motor t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . Both of
.these a r e now b e i n g s e n t t o h o r t h A f r i c a . The machinery i.s needed t o
improve t h e r a i l r o a d s and a l s o f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n and improvement of
a i r f i e l d s . E f f o r t s a r e a l s o b e i n g made t o b r i n g i n needed l o c o m o t i v e s o
The PRESIDENT t h e n asked about t h e c i v i l i a n s u p p l y s i t u a t i o n .
GENERAL SOMEItvELL r e p l i e d t h a t i t was b e i n g h a n d l e d
satisfactorily,
e x c e p t t h a t v a l u a b l e c a r g o s p a c e was b e i n g u t i l i z e d b y some of t h e
c i v i l i a n a g e n c i e s i n t h e United S t a t e s i n s e n d i n g u n n e c e s s a r y and r i
diculous i t e m s .
The PRESIDENT t h e n informed t h e C h i e f s of S t a f f t h a t Admiral
Robert i n Martinique had r e c e i v e d a message from Laval t o s i n k h i s s h i p s
i m m e d i a t e l y upon r e c e i v i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t e n d e d
a c t i o n a g a i n s t M a r t i n i q u e . Lava1 r e q u i r e d Robert t o g i v e him an answer
a t o n c e . R o b e r t informed L a v a l w i t h i n f o u r h o u r s t h a t he would comply

w i t h h i s o r d e r s . T h i s d e f i n i t e l y e l i m i n a t e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of our ob
t a i n i n g t h e u s e of French s h i p p i n g now i n M a r t i n i q u e .
ADMIRAL COOKE t h e n informed t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e B r i t i s h were

becoming c o n s c i o u s of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e United S t a t e s was engaged i n a
war i n t h e P a c i f i c and d e s c r i b e d h i s d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e B r i t i s h S t a f f
P l a n n e r s , who recognized t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r adequate means b e i n g provided
t o h a n d l e t h e P a c i f i c s i t u a t i o n . H e s t a t e d , however, t h a t he d i d n o t
f e e l t h a t t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s o f S t a f f were a s y e t c o n v i n c e d of t h i s
n e c e s s i t y . The C h i e f s of S t a f f f e e l t h a t w e s h o u l d m a i n t a i n t h e s t a t u s
quo and s i m p l y h o l d , w h e r e a s t h e P l a n n e r s r e c o g n i z e t h a t a c o n s t a n t
p r e s s u r e must be kept on t h e Japanese and t h a t e v e r y e f f o r t must be made
t o keep China i n t h e war. The P l a n n e r s a d m i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e
C h i n e s e d r o p p i n g o u t o f t h e war.
The PRESIDENT t h e n d i s c u s s e d t h e proposed o p e r a t i o n s j n Burma.
GENERAL MARSHALL informed h i m t h a t j u s t as he f e l t t h a t we had convinced
t h e B r i t i s h t h a t O p e r a t i o n RAVENOUS s h o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n , t h e General
issimo had d e c l i n e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e . The reason g i v e n by t h e Generalissimo
is t h a t t h e B r i t i s h r e f u s e t o p l a c e a n a v a l f o r c e i n t h e B a y of Berigal
t o i n t e r r u p t t h e J a p a n e s e l i n e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . The G e n e r a l i s s i m o
f e e l s t h a t a d e f i n i t e commitment t o t h i s e f f e c t had b e e n made by t h e
Prime M i n i s t e r i n a t a l k l a s t y e a r b e f o r e t h e P a c i f i c C o u n c i l , GENERAL
MARSHALL s a i d t h a t t h e Prime M i n i s t e r probably had t h e ANAKIM o p e r a t i o n
i n mind.
ADMIRAL COOKE s t a t e d t h a t t h e B r i t i s h have no i n t e n t i o n of under

t a k i n g an o p e r a t i o n t o r e c a p t u r e Burma i n t h e p r e s e n t d r y s e a s o n ,
GENERAL MARSHALL p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e C h i n e s e , p a r t i c u l a r l y
G e n e r a l Hsiung, had b e e n l o u d i n t h e i r c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t f a i l u r e s t o
a s s i s t them; a n d now t h a t w e o f f e r them a s s i s t a n c e , t h e y r e f u s e our
help.
65
SECRET
INDEX
Brest Peninsula
Operations a g a i n s t , 26
BRIMSTONE, 3, 6
C o m p a r i s o n o f , w i t h r e s u l t s of
B r e s t P e n i n s u l a o p e r a t i o n , 11
Deception of l a n d craft, 11
Training, 5
British
Convoys, 6 1
Eastern Fleet, 9
A t Ceylon, a4
Possession of T r i p o l i , 6
S t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t o f c o n d u c t of
A
Admiral G l a s s f o r d l a r e p o r t , 7
Agenda
For coming conferences, a
Saggested procedure f o r d e a l i n g w i t h
t h e , 34
Aid t o Russia
Balance of commitments t o Russia and

Turkey, 53
Coordination o f supply, a6
General S o n e r v e l l ' e d i s c u s s i o n 0% 39
Througb C o n t i n e n t a l landing, 18
Aid t o Turkey, 5 5
A i r f o r c e s i n China, 56, 6 2
Aircraft o v e r T u n i s i a , 6
Aleutian I s l a n d s , 23
Operations i n , 46
Algiers, A i r s i t u a t i o n at, 4
Allocation f o r shipping i n t h e
P a c i f i c , 40
A l l o c a t i o n o f f o r c e s and p r o d u c t i o n ,
Discussion of, 30
Amphibious weapons, 17
ANAKIM, Ope rat i o n

C.C.S.
164, D i s c u s s i o n o f , 43
A f f e c t o f RAVENOUS on, 23
I n i t i a t i o n o f , 24
Prime M i n i s t e r ' s agreement, 28
Andrews General--proposed f o r command

of t r o o p s i n United Kingdom T h e a t e r
by General M a r s h a l l , 57
Anfa Camp, P r o t e c t i o n a v a i l a b l e , 53
Pnnex "A" t o J.C.S.

55th Meeting
Minutes-Xemorandnm
for the
P r e s i d e n t , 35
Pntisnbmarine w a r f a r e s u r v e y , 41, 55
Approach t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n
Admiral King's, 3
General M a r s h a l l ' s , 3
w a r , 39, 53, 6 1
Burma
Admiral Xingts c o n c a p t o 3 explained

t o Prime M i n i s t e r , a8
B r i t i a h c a n o p e r a t e a g a i n s t , re
g a r d l e s s o f China, a9
P l a n f o r o p e r a t i o n , a3
Burma Road, Reason f o r opening, 56
Byrnes, Telegram t o , 36
B
BOIERO build-up
Shipping c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r , 48
Bombing i n o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r y and
p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , 43
Bombers t o G e n e r a l S t i l w e l l , 10
Bone, A i r s i t n a t i o n a t , 4
Channel I s l a n d s
Lord M o n n t b a t t e n l s p l a n f o r
c a p t u r e , 16
Chennanlt G e n e r a l , A i r f o r c e s
u n d e r , 56
China
A i r f o r c e s i n , 56
T r a n s p o r t p l s n e s t o , 6a
Chinese r e l u c t a n c e t o begin
RAVENOUS, a4. 28
C i v i L i a n supply s i t n a t i o n , 64
C l e a r i n g t h e Mediterranean, 3
Combined Staff P l a n n e r s
P a c i f i c concept f o r 1943, 23
Requirements i n P a c i f i c , 59
S t r a t e g i c concept o f war i n
P a c i f i c , 59
Command
Amy and A i r , i n Mediterranean, 40
Discussion of, i n Enropean t h e a t e r ,
67
I2
England, i n , 14
set-up i n m n i s i a proposed by
General M a r s h d l , 35
SECRET
INDEX
Command-continued
S e t - u p i n West A f r i c a p r o p o s e d by
A d m i r a l K i n g , 33
Tunisian set-up following T r i p o l i
o p e r a t i o n , 35
Command s i t u a t i o n i n E u r o p e , 5 6
Communications, Mediterranean, 54
Conduct of t h e war i n 1943, Discus
s i o n o f , 33
Conferences
Agenda f o r coming, 2
Further, 6
Suggested p r o c e d u r e f a r d e a l i n g w i t h
t h e Agenda of t h e , 34
C o n t i n e n t a l i n v a s i o n , Forces f o r , 6 0
C o n t i n e n t a l l e n d i n g , 18
A s a i d t o R u s s i a , 18
O p e r a t i o n s i n 1943, 48
convoys
British, 61
C o n t i n u i n g , i n M e d i t e r r a n e a n , ~n
C o o k e , n d m i r a l , C. M . , J r .
Date suggested' f o r Operation
34
C r a f t , l a n d i n g , 17
Assembly i n U . K . , p g
C o n t r i b u t i o n by B r i t i s h , 2 5
D i s c u s s i o n o f , by G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l
a n d Lord M o u n t b a t t e n , 25
For I n d i a , 24
E i g h t h Army command t o Eisenhower. 28
Europe
Bombing o p e r a t i o n s e f f e c t i v e n e s s
i n , 56
Command s i t u a t i o n i n , 56
European t h e a t e r
D e c i s i o n s as t o command set-up, 12
E x p e l l i n g theGermans from T n n i s i a , 4
F
F i g h t e r a i r c r a f t over T a n i s i a , 6
Forces
A l l o c a t i o n of
D i s c u v s i o n o f 30
C o n t i n e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s , for, 6n
L i s t i n g o f , by U. K. and U . s., 1g
Fourth D i v i s i o n t o Yorth A f r i c a . 6
French
P i l o t s , T r a i n i n g o f , 44
S h i p s a t M a r t i n i q u e t o be s u n k , 64
Fxrther conferences, 6
BUSKY,
D
D e c i s i o n s r e a c h e d c o n c e r n i n g command
set-up i n Europeaa t h e a t e r , 12
D e f e a t of
Germany, Key t o , 24
Jhpan, Key t o , 24
Destroyers t r a n s f e r r e d
escorts, 33
Discussion
Admiral K i n g l a
Approach, Method o f ,
P r o c e d u r e , Method o f ,
General Marshall I s
Approach, Method o f ,
P r o c e d u r e , Method o f ,
Dodecanese, p l a n s f o r ,
t o ocean
German t h r e a t t o Spain, 6
G l a s s f o r d , Admiral, r e p o r t , 7
I1
Iligh o c t a n e g a s p r o d u c t i o n a f f e c t e d
by s y n t h e t i c r u b b e r program, 36
HUSKY, O p e r a t i o n
Agreement f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , 48
C a l c u l a t i o n s f o r , 44
Date proposed o b j e c t i o n a b l e t o
Admiral King, 43
D i s q u s s i o n of mounting, 46
T a r g e t d a t e s u g g e s t e d by P'dmiral
Coake, 34
I n f o r m a t i o n from Southern Furope, 6 3
Japan
Operations a g a i n s t , 56
Supplies to, 56
J a p a n e s e a i r s t r e n g t h , 23
J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f
Opposition t o s h i p p i n g v i a
67
E
Eastern Fleet, British, 9
A t Ceylon, 2 4
Murmansk, 34
68
INDEX
SECRET
J o i n t C h i e f s of S t a f f - - c o n t i n u e d
P r e s i d e n t i a l movements, P i s c u s s i o n
o f p r o p o s a l s o f , 38
Pecommendatians f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s t o
J u s t i c e Byrnes regarding s y n t h e t i c
r u b b e r f r e e z e , 36
Synthetic rubber m a t e r i a l allotments
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of M r . Nielson a p
p r o v e d by,
35
I(
X i n g , A d m i r a l E. J Appraisal and observation of United

$!ationst a b i l i t y t o t a k e i n i t i a t i v e
a n d V n i t e d S t a t e s ' power t o lead, 10
Approach t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n , H i s , 3
A t t i t u d e t o w a r d S a r d i n i a n and S i c i l . . ~
i a n o p e r h t i o n s , 31
N e d i t e r r a n e a n command proposal, 35
Summary o f g c e e r a l s t r a t e g i c plan
b y , 38
West A f r i c a command s e t - u p p r o
posals, 33
K i s k a o p e r a t i o n , P r e s i d e n t l s objec
t i o n t o R r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n , 29
ing, r7
?or I n d i a , 2 4
L a n d i n g on t h e European C o n t i n e n t , 18
As a i d t o D u s s i a , 18
Lend-Lease t o Torkey, 38
L e v a n t , C a p a c i t y of r o u t e s t h r o a g h ,
and U . S . ,
Marrakech,
Conditions in,
52
35
?\elson r e c o n m e n d a , t i o n f o r s y n t h e t i c
r u b b e r material a j l o t n e n t s , 3s
Fogues, G e n e r a l , V i s i t w i t h t h e
President, 52
North Africa
Supply s i t u a t i o n : 6q
T r a i n i n g i n , f o r l a n d i n g s , g:j
T r o o p s i n , :sg
Norway, Bombing of a i r f i e l d s , 26
Landing craft
A s s e m b l y in U - K . , 29
C o n t r i b u t i o n b y B r i t i s h , 25
C i s c u s s i o n of, by G e n e r a l M a r s h a l l
and L o r d M o u n t b a t t e n , 25
n i a p o s i t i o n f o l l ~ o w i n gS i c i l i a n l a n d
29
18
Memorandom f o r t h e P r e s i d e n t , Annex
"AN' t o J.C.S.
5 5 t h Meeting Minutes,
44
35
Commnnicaticns, 54
C o n t i n u a t i o n o f c o n v o y s by i i r i t i s b ,
X i n n t e s of M e e t i n g s , I
M o d i f i c a t i o n s t o C - C . S . 155, 3 3
M o r a l e o f t h e Axis, 6 0
for 2 9 4 3 , 39
I!. S . r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o a c c o m p a n y
Prime M i n i s t e r t o Tnrkey proposed
L i s t i n g of forces by U. K.
M a r s h a l l , G e n e r a l G . C.
Agreement t o Admiral K i n g ' s pro
p o s a l f o r f u l l t r u s t i n F r e n c h , 33
Approach t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n , :j
T u n i s i a n command s e t - u p f o l l o w i n g
t h e T r i p o l i Operation, 35
T u r k i s h L e n d - L e a s e s i t u a t i o n re
vealed b y , 3 6
Y a r t i n i q u e , Lava1 1s message t o Ad
miral Pobert, 64
M ed it e r r an e an
Army a n d A i r command i n , no
C l e a . r i n g a n d opening, 3
Command p r o p o s a l by A d m i r a l K i n g ,
O b j e c t i o n s t o B r i t i s h c o n c e r n i n our
s t r a t e g i c t h e a t e r , zg
Operation
Aleutians, 46
ANAKIM
P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s a g r e e m e n t , 28
R e l a t i o n t o RAVENOUS, a3
BOLERO b u i l d - u p ,
S h i p p i n g capa
b i l i t i e s f o r , 48
B r e s t P e n i n s a l a , 26
BPIMSTONE, 3, 6
C o m p a r i s o n o f , w i t h r e s u l t s of
B r e s t P e n i n s u l a o p e r a t i o n , II
69
SECRET
INDEX
Operation-continued
BRIMSTONE--continned
D e c e p t i o n o f l a n d i n g c r a f t , 11
Training, 5
Burma, 1 3
A d m i r a l King's concept explained
t o Prime M i n i s t e r , 28
B r i t i s h can o p e r a t e a g a i n s t r e g a r d
less o f C h i n e s e , 8 9
C o n t i n e n t a l , i n 1943, 28
HUSKY
Agreement f a l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n , 4 8
C a l c u l a t i o n s f o r , 44
Date p r o p o s a l o b j e c t i o n a b l e t o
A d m i r a l Xing, 43
D i s c u s s i o n of m o u n t i n g o p e r a t i o n ,
46
T a r g e t d a t e s u g g e s t e d by Admiral
Cooke, 14
Xiska
President's objection t o British
i n r e r e s t i n , r9
Southwest Paci.fic, Operations i n
t h e , 46
Korway
Bombing o f a i r f i e l d s , 2 6
Pacific
c o n c e p t f o r 1943, 2 3
P r i m e M i n i s t e r f s o b j e c t i o n t o op
e r a t i o n , 28
S h i p p i n g , 40
RAVENOUS
C h i n e s e r e l u c t a n c e t o b e g i n , 24, 6 5
P r i m e X i n i s t e r ' s a g r e e m e n t , -28
P r o s p e c t s f o r success, 56
P u r p o s e o f , 28
R e l a t i o n t o ANPXIM, 23
ROUNDUP
nate f e a s i b l e , 6 1
F o r c e s n e e d e d , 1s
Sicilian
Date for, 5 9
H e c h a n i c s and key t o , 16
SLEXFXA?fMER
B r i t i s h w i l l undertake, 6 1
TORCI3
Available troops following
c o m p l e t i o n , 18
u n i t e d Kingdom, i n a n d f r o m t h e , 1 3
Operations
C o n t i n e n t a l a n d HUSKY c o m b i n e d , 5s
L a n d i n g b a r g e s f o r , 59
J a p a n , A g a i n s t , 56
S a r d i n i a n , A d v a n t a g e s o f s u c c e s s , 60
T u n i s i a , I n , $9
P
Pacific
A l l o c a t i o n f o r s h i p p i n g , 40
B r i t i s h recognizance of necessary
A l l i e d a c t i o n , 65
C o n c e p t f o r 1943, 1 3
Prime X i n i s t e r l s o b j e c t i o n t o
o p e r a t i o n , 28
P e a c e t a b l e , Domination o f , 21
P o s s e s s i o n of T r i p o l i by B r i t i s h , 6
P r e s i d e n t , The
k t i o n required p r i o r t o departure,
34
Memorandum f o r , J n n e x ".4" t o 3.C S.
5 5 t h Meeting Minutes, 32
Ob j e c t i . o n . t o B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t
i o
U S s t r a t e g i ~ rt h e a t e r , 2 g
R e p o r t t o , a n d P r i m e M i n i s t e r ,
4~
Visit( 2
V i s i t of G e n e r a l K-ogurs air6
t h e
S u l t a n of Morocco w i t h , 52
P r e s i d e n t ' s P r o g r a m , The, 5 2
Prime M i n i s t e r ' s
i i g r e e m e n t t o O p e r a t i o n s ANAXIM
a n d
RAVENOTIS, 28
O b j e c t i o n t o P a c i f i c o p e r a t i o n , 28
R e p o r t t o P r e s i d e n t and, 49
P r i o r i t y bombing p r o g r a m , IY
P r o t e c t i o n a v a i l a b l e a t Anfa Camp, 53
RAVFNOUS, O p e r a t i o n
B r z t i s h a t t i t u d e c o n c e r n i n g , 55
C h i n e s e r e l u c t a n c e t o b e g i n , 2h1 65
E f f e c t on AhuKLM, 23
I n t t i a t i o n o f , 24
P r i m e M i n i s t e r ' s a g r e e m e n t , 28
P r o s p e c t s o f Success, 56
P u r p o s e o f , 28
Report t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and Prime
M i n i s t e r , 49
Resources t u be f u r n i s h e d f o l l o w i n g
m o u n t i n g IIUSKY, 48
R o b e r t , A d m i r a l , Message r e g a r d i n g
s h i p s from Laval, 64
ROWDUP O p e r a t i o n
F e a s i b l e d a t e f o r , 61
F o r c e s n e e d e d f o r , 15
Russia
Aj.d t o
C o n t i n e n t a l l a n d i n g , 18
C o o r d i n a t i o n o f , 26
O p p o s i t i o n of J o i n t C h i e f s o f S t a f f
t o s h i p p i n g v i a Murmansk, 34
70
INDEX
SECRET
Russia-continued
A i d to--continued
P a c i f i c p l a n , zo
R e j e c t i o n of U. S . and B r i t i s h per
s o n n e l , 2 5 , 63
Supply t o , 6 3
S
Sardinia
Advantages of c a p t u r e , 60
Mounting and o p e r a t i o n a g a i n s t , 5
O p e r a t i o n f a v o r e d o v e r S i c i l y , 29
Sfax, B r i t i s h d r i v e on, c a n c e l e d , 64
S h i p p i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r BOLERO
build-up, 48
Shipping f o r o p e r a t i o n s i n P a c i f i c , 40
Sicily
D a t e f o r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t , 59
Means of r e d u c i n g f o r t i f i c a , t i a n s , 26
One o f p u r p o s e s o f c a p t u r e , 19
S t r e n g t h i n , 26
S i t u a t i o n i n t h e a i r a t A l g i e r s and
Bone, 4
SLEDGEF'P?!MER, O p e r a t i o n
B r i t i s h t o undertake, 6 1
Somervell, General B. R
P i d t o R u s s i a d i s c u s s e d hy--C.C,,S,.
162, 39
O n t i i n e of m e c h a n i c s o f S i c i l i a n
operation, 16
Southwest P a c i f i c , O p e r a t i o n s i n , 46
S p a i n , German t h r e a t t o , 6
S t a l i n r e j e c t s U . S. a n d B r i t i s h
p e r s o n n e l , 25
S t r a t e g i c p o l i c i e s , General, 17
Submarines
Bombing o f , 2 8
I n d i a n O c e a n , I n , 10
1J. S. l o a n o f s i x , 10
S u l t a n of Morocco, V i s i t w i t h t h e
President, 52
S u m m a r i z i n g of g e n e r a l s t r a t e g i c
p l a n f o r 1943 by Admiral King, 39
S u p p l i e s t o General S t i l w e l l , 29
Supply s i t u a t i o n
C i v i l i a n , 64
I n North A f r i c a , 64
To Russia, 63
S y n t h e t i c r u h h e r program, 28
E f f e c t s on m i l i t a r y p r o g r a m s i n
c l u d i n g h i g h o c t a n e g a s and p l a n e
p r o d u c t i o n , 36
M a t e r i a l a l l o t m e n t recommended by
M r . Nelson, 35
Tanks of B r i t i s h t o French, 64
T e l e g r a m t o B y r n e s , Washington, 3 6
T h e a t e r , European
D e c i s i o n s r e a c h e d a t d i s c u s s i o n of
command s e t - u p i n , 12
TORCH, O p e r a t i o n , A v a i l a b l e t r o o p s
f o l l o w i n g c o m p l e t i o n o f , 18
Training
I n N o r t h A f r i c a f o r l a n d i n g s , 53
Of F r e n c h p i l o t s , 44
T r a n s p o r t p l a n e s f o r China, 6 2
T r i p o l i , B r i t i s h possession of, 6
Troops
Movement o f , 12
North A f r i c a , f o r m a i n t a i n i n g , S r 19
To General S t i l w e l l , 29
To United Kingdom,
11,
60
Truck assembly p l a n t , 6 3
Tnnisia
E x p e l l i n g t h e Germans from, 4
O p e r a t i o n s i n , 57
Turkey
Aid t o , 5 5
B r i t i s h 8 t h Army Force f o r , 54
Lend-.-Lease s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t
t o , 38
Passive b e l l i g e r e n c y , 34
U S r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o accompany
Prime M i n i s t e r t o Turkey proposed,
38
U
United Kingdom, O p e r a t i o n s i n and
f r o m t h e , 11
V i s i t o f G e n e r a l Nogoes a n d t h e S u l t a n
of Morocco w i t h t h e P r e s i d e n t , 5%
West A f r i c a ,
Command s e t - u p a s p r o
posed by Admiral King f o r , 33
71

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MINUTES OF THE WORLD WAR" INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCES

THE WORLD WAR II INTER-AWED CONFERENCES

SEXTANT/EUREKA (Cairo and Tehran, 22 November-7 December 1943). Principal partici

Note by the Secretaries

t o the authority contained is JC3 927jb95-3, thc following

- December 24, 1941 to January 14, 1942

Edited and firintea i n the

Office of the Combined ChCefs of Staff

Tbis voluqe Mas prepared under the auspices of

System of Command f o r Combined U . $ . - B r i t i s h

Situation? To Be Created I n The Eastern Theater

Operations I n Burma, 1943

Conduct Of The War I n 1943

Conduct O f The War In 1343

Suggested Procedure For Dealing W i t h The Agenda

The Bomber Offensive From North A f r i c a (See Note 159/1)

S i t u a t i o n To Be Created I n The E a s t e r n Theater

System O f A i r Command I n The Mediterranean

Operation ANAKIhG-Provision O f Forces

Draft Telegram To Premier, Stalian (See Note 165/2)

Draft Telegram To Premier S t a l i n (See Note 165/2)

Draft Telegram From The P r e s i d e n t O f The United

Operation ANAKII&I--Provision O f Forces

S t a t e s And The Prime Minister O f Great B r i t a i n

The Bomber Offensive From The United Kingdom

The Bomber Offensive From Tne United Kingdom

Conduct Of The War I n The P a c i f i c Theater I n 1943

Proposed Organization O f Command, C o n t r o l , Planning

And Training For Operations For A Reentry To The

Report To The P r e s i d e n t And Prime M i n i s t e r

O p e r a t i o n HUSKY (See Note 171/2/D)

E x p e d i t i o n a r y Force I n North Africa-Operation HUSKY

S h i p p i n g C a p a b i l i t i e s For BOLERO Build-up

The General S t r a t e g i c P o l i c y f o r 1943

General D i s c u s s i o n o f A l l o c a t i o n o f Resources Based

BRITISH MOST SECRET

The North African S i t u a t i o n

The S t r a t e g i c Concept f o r 1943 i n t h e European

Employment o f French Forces i n North A f r i c a

Conduct o f t h e War i n 1943

Meeting w i t h General Giraud

Command i n the Mediterranean

The Bomber O f f e n s i v e from t h e United Kingdom

Report t o t h e P r e s i d e n t and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r

System o f Command f o r Combined U, S . and B r i t i s h

October 24, 1942

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

The U. S o Navy members of t h e Combined S t a f f P l a n n e r s state t h a t

while t h i s paper does n o t i n i t s e n t i r e t y accord w i t h t h e i r v i e w s , i t i s

time. The U. S. Navy members b e l i e v e t h a t t h e s t a t u s o f t h e a s s i s t a n t s t o

SYSTEM OF UNIFIED COMMAND FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

The t e r m " j o i n t " r e f e r s t o p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f f o r c e s from two o r

The t e r m ncombinedn r e f e r s t o t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of f o r c e s of two

or more of t h e United Nations.

I n c a s e s where t h e governments c o n c e r n e d s o d e c i d e , a Supreme

Commander w i l l b e a p p o i n t e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s when f o r c e s of more t h a n one

H e w i l l b e a p p o i n t e d b y agreement between t h e governments con

Out of t h e means a l l o c a t e d t o him, he w i l l o r g a n i z e t a s k f o r c e s

as n e c e s s a r y , d e s i g n a t e t h e i r commanders, and a s s i g n t h e major t a s k s t o

LAND, NAVAL AND A I R COMMANDERS:

t o t a s k f o r c e s b y t h e Supreme Commander, w i l l a d v i s e t h e Supreme Com

of t h e Supreme Commander u n l e s s s p e c i f i c a l l y o r d e r e d o t h e r w i s e b y him,

of the o p e r a t i o n s t o b e performed. The t a s k f o r c e s w i l l i n c l u d e a l l t h e

task. The appointment of t h e Task F o r c e Commanders, s u b o r d i n a t e a s w e l l