CITIZENSHIP - ARTICLE 4

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law
1.POEGrace Poe was found abandoned as a 1) Is Poe, a foundling, 1) Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies
LLAMANZARES v
newborn infant in the Parish Church of a natural-born citizen? one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
COMELEC
Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar in 1968.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are
GR NO. 221697, March Parental care and custody over her was 2)After renouncing
typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
8, 2016
passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, her American
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
Emiliano Militar and his wife. Emiliano citizenship and after
99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of
reported and registered Grace Poe as a having taken her Oath her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
foundling with the Office of the Civil of Allegiance to the
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept
Registrar of Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr. Republic of the
the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe.
Philippines, has Poe
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born
re-acquired her status
citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
1991 Poe went to the US to be a
as a natural-born
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
permanent resident therein
Filipino citizen?
While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
2001 She became a naturalized US
3)Has Poe satisfied
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine
citizen
the 10 year residency
the intent of the framers.
requirement?
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
First quarter of 2005 she came back to
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a
the PH to permanently reside herein
signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as
having born of the country in which the foundling is found.
February 14, 2006- she went back to US
to dispose family belongings
2) After renouncing her American citizenship and after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to
July 18, 2006 she re-acquired Filipino
the Republic of the Philippines, has Poe re-acquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen?
citizenship
Yes, Poes repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.
According to Poe in her 2013 COC for
Senator, before the May 13, 2013 election,
she has been a resident of the Philippines
for 6 years and 6 months (reckoned from
year 2006 when she re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225).

A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former
status as natural born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on
Audit etc).

Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the

May 9, 2016 elections (hence, computing
from May, 2013, she has been a resident in
the Philippines for 9 years and 6 months
only)

[T]here is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to
permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.

However, in her COC, Poe declared that

3.) Yes, she will have been a resident for 10 years and 11 months on the day of the election.

Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US passport
showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled
abroad, email correspondences with freight company to arrange for the shipment of household

she is a natural born and her residence in

the Philippine up to the day before election
would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005 (when she returned
from the US to the Philippines for good).

items as well as with the pet Bureau; school records of her children showing enrolment in the
Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with
her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that when she returned in
May 2005, it was for good.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2013 COC was only a mistake in good faith. As
explained by Grace Poe, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of
residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency
from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband
returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence
could be counted from 25 May 2005. Such a mistake could be given in evidence against her but
it was by no means conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe.

2.TECSON v
COMELEC

3.CO v HOR

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a

petition before the COMELEC to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mom, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an
alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe
contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his marriage to
Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the
birth of respondent.
The HRET declared that respondent Jose
Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar
for voting purposes. The congressional
election for the 2nd District of Northern
Samar was held. Among the candidates
who vied for the position of representative
in the 2nd District are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong
was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of

Whether or Not FPJ is

a natural born Filipino
citizen.

YES. It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section
78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

Whether or not Jose

Ong, Jr. is a citizen of
the Philippines.

Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines
from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of
the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te
to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was
declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree
Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of
Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal
footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did
more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines.
On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to

4.YU v DEFENSORSANTIAGO

Northern Samar. The petitioners filed

election protests on the grounds that Jose
Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines and not a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.
Petitioner- a Portuguese National acquired
a Philippine citizenship by naturalization
on Feb. 10, 1978.
Despite naturalization on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued a
renewed Portuguese Passport by the
Consular Section of the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office
certifies that his Portuguese passport
expired on 20 July 1986.

establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a
rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be
eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution
only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
Whether or not
petitioners acts
constitute
renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship

Yes. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed

when required and suppressed when convenient. Petitioner, while still a citizen of the
Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true
faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai
Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal
capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine
citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of
his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had
become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino

signed commercial documents stating his
citizenship as Portuguese without the
authentication of an appropriate Philippine
Consul.
Petitioner was detained by the CID for
obtaining a Foreign passport while (at the
same time) holding a
Filipino citizenship as well.

5.LABO v COMELEC
GR 86564, Aug. 1,
1989, Cruz, J.

Respondents argue that the petitioner was

in full knowledge and legal capacity when
he applied for a Philippine citizenship
through naturalization. He consequently
recognizes, identifies and agrees to the oath
taken which states to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty and pledged to maintain true
faith and allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Hence, petitioner then knows
the limitations or restrictions once
solemnizing said oath and it succeeding
consequences should they be violated.
Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian
citizen in the Philippines. He was granted
Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the
marriage was declared void for being
bigamous.
Labo returned to PH in 1980, using an
Australian passport, and obtained an Alien
Certificate of Registration. He later applied

1. Does the
COMELEC have the
jurisdiction to inquire
into Labo's
citizenship?
2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr.
a Filipino citizen?

1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did
not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as
a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the
COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still
complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities
should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this
case.
2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified

6.AZNAR v
COMELEC
G.R. No. 83820 May
25, 1990, Paras, J.

for change in status from immigrant to

returning Filipino citizen. But the
Commission on Immigration and
Deportation denied his application for the
since he has not applied for reacquisition of
his Filipino citizenship.

According to the records of the Australian

Embassy (as certified by the Australian
Consul), Labo was still an Australian
citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no
direct evidence was presented to prove that
he took an oath of allegiance as a
naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of
Australia at the time required any person
over the age of 16 years who is granted
Australian citizenship to take an oath of
allegiance. The text of this oath includes a
renunciation of all other allegiance.

Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City

in the local elections held on Jan 18, 1988.
The 2nd placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a
petition for quo warranto, alleging that
Labo is disqualified from holding public
office on the grounds of alienage, and
asking that the latter's proclamation as
Mayor be annulled.
1) On Nov 19, 1987, private respondent
Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate
of candidacy with the COMELEC for
Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in
the Jan 18, 1988 local elections.
2) On Jan 22, 1988, petitioner Jose Aznar,
incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with
the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent on
the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, but a citizen of the USA.
3) On Jan 27, 1988, petitioner filed a
Formal Manifestation submitting a
Certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago
certifying that private respondent is an
American and is a holder of Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) and
Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, issued in Manila.

3. Is he qualified to
hold public office in
the Philippines?
4. If Labo is not
eligible to serve as
Mayor, can
Lardizabal, as the
runner-up in the
elections, replace
him?

in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of

citizenship, and (3)subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods
prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.
Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual
citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national
interest. The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest
him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased
to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been
automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was
declared void on the grounds of bigamy.
The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino
citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even
alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of
res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.
3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter
when he was elected.
4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position
of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's
disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall
replace Labo.

Whether or not
respondent Osmena is
no longer a Filipino
citizen by acquiring
dual-citizenship?

SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELECs decision. The petitioner failed to
present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes
provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the Constitution or laws of a foreign country.
From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the 3 mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine
citizenship. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine
citizenship cannot be presumed.
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact
that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In
the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there
is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied."
.

4) During the hearing at the COMELEC

Private respondent, maintained that he is a
Filipino citizen, alleging: that he
is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.
Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late
President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he
is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport; that he has been
continuously residing in the country since
birth and has not gone out of the country
for more than 6 months;
and that he has been a registered voter in
the Philippines since 1965.

7.MERCADO v
MANZANO

5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988,

COMELEC dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having
been timely filed and for lack of sufficient
proof that private respondent is not a
Filipino citizen. Hence, the
petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private
respondent Eduardo Manzano are
candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections.
Private respondent was the winner of the
said election but the proclamation was
suspended due to the petition of Ernesto
Mamaril regarding the citizenship of
private respondent. Mamaril alleged that
the private respondent is not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
COMELEC granted the petition and
disqualified the private respondent for
being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local
Government code that provides that
persons who possess dual citizenship are
disqualified from running any public
position. Private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration which remained
pending until after election. Petitioner
sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification. COMELEC reversed the
decision and declared private respondent
qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to
the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of
canvassers proclaimed private respondent
as vice mayor. This petition sought the
reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC
and to declare the private respondent

Whether or Not
private respondent is
qualified to hold
office as Vice-Mayor.

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen
because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
lasses of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers
and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the
Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such
children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation
in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that
he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that
he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws
of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of
allegiance to the Philippine, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,

8.IN RE:
APPLICATION FOR
ADMISSION TO THE
BAR OF VICENTE
CHING

9.BENGZON ILL v
HRET

10.MO YA LIM YAO

v COMMISSIONER
of IMMIGRATION

disqualified to hold the office of the vice

mayor of Makati.
Vicente Ching is born from a Filipino
mother and a father of Chinese national on
April 11, 1964. He took the bar exam
subject upon submission of proof of his
Phil. Citizenship. He passed the bar at the
age of 35 years old. There was a question
regarding his citizenship therefore he was
not allowed to take oath. The Solicitor
General was asked to give comment on the
case
at bar.

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen

of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of
Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985,
respondent Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the
US. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz
reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under RA No. 2630.
He was elected as the Representative of the
2nd District of Pangasinan. He won over
petitioner Antonio Bengzon III, who was
then running for reelection.
Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) claiming that respondent
Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution.
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its
decision dismissing the petition
and declared Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the 2nd District of
Pangasinan. The HRET likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung
applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the
interrogation made in connection with her
application for a temporary visitor's visa to
enter the Philippines, she stated that she

WON Ching can be

admitted to take oath
in consideration of the
status of his
citizenship.

Whether or Not
respondent Cruz is a
natural born citizen of
the Philippines in
view of the
constitutional
requirement that "No
person shall be a
Member of the House
of Representative
unless he is a naturalborn citizen.

practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
The court ruled that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother
born under the 1935
Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of
majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Manner in
which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother
is a Filipino Citizen." He should
elect his Phil. Citizenship within a reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority
which is 21 years old at that time.
With almost 14 years that elapsed upon reaching his age of majority, Ching failed to exercise
such right of citizenship election
beyond a reasonable period of time therefore he cannot be admitted in the Phil. Rolls of atty. for
being a Chinese citizen.
The petition is without merit. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. (CA) No. 63,
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
(1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; (3)service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. If he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the US. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Whether Lau Yuen

Yeung ipso facto
became a Filipino
citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino
citizen.

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born
or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the

11.REPUBLIC v LIM
G.R. No. 153883.
January 13, 2004.,
Ynares-Santiago.

was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,

Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her
great grand uncle Lau Ching Ping for a
period of one month. She was permitted to
come into the Philippines on 13 March
1961, and was permitted to stay for a
period of one month which would expire on
13 April 1961. On the date of her arrival,
Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount
of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that
said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart
from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay
in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow. After
repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was
allowed to stay in the country up to 13
February 1962.
On 25 January 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner
of Immigration to confiscate her bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation,
after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought an action for injunction with
preliminary injunction.
At the hearing which took place 1 and a
half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either
English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English
or Tagalog. She could not name any
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the
names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-inlaw. The CFI of Manila denied the prayer
for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao
and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an
illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. Shefiled a petition to the
court for correction of four erroneous
entries in her birth certificate to wit: (1) her
surname Yu was misspelled as Yo (2) her
fathers name was written as Yo Diu To (Co

naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow
of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it
should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain
common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no
such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she
may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that
the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January
1962.

1.Whether or not
respondent needs to
elect Filipino
citizenship upon
reaching the age
of majority?

1. The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply

only to legitimate children. The case at bar clearly states that respondent is an
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father. By being an illegitimate child
of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth.
2. No. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of
electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority as mandated in Article IV,

Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio

To,(3) her nationality was entered as
Chinese when it should have been Filipino,
(4) that she was a legitimate child when
she should have been described as
illegitimate
considering that her parents were never
married.
After the trial court conducted the
appropriate proceeding, it granted the
petition sought by respondent to set the
records straight and in their proper
perspective.
However, petitioner herein filed an appeal
specifically on the correction of her
citizenship (from Chinese to Filipino) not
having complied with the legal
requirements for election of citizenship.
It cited Article IV, Sec 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution and Sec 1, CA No. 625 which
provides the election of citizenship of a
legitimate child of a Filipino mother and
alien father upon reaching the age of
maturity.
12.ALTAJEROS v
COMELEC

Ciceron P. Altarejos was a candidate for

mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto,
Masbate in the 10 May 2004 national and
local elections. On 15 January 2004, Jose
Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza,
registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate,
filed with the COMELEC, a petition to
disqualify and to deny due course or cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Altajeros on
the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen
and that he made a false representation in
his certificate of candidacy that [he] was
not a permanent resident of or immigrant to
a foreign country. Almie, et. al. alleged
that based on a letter from the Bureau of
Immigration dated 25 June 2001, Altajeros
was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident
visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration
E139507 issued on 3 November 1997, and
an Immigration Certificate of Residence
320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the
Bureau of Immigration. On 26 Jan 2004,
Altajeros filed an Answer stating, among
others, that he did not commit false

2. Whether the Court

of Appeals erred in
ordering the
correction of the
citizenship of
respondent Chule Y.
Lim from Chinese
to Filipino despite
the fact that
respondent never
demonstrated any
compliance with the
legal requirements for
election of
citizenship.
3. Whether the Court
of Appeals erred in
allowing respondent
to continue using her
fathers surname
despite its finding that
respondent is an
illegitimate child.

Whether Altajeros is
eligible to run as
mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate, in light of
his repatriation under
RA
8171.

Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 625. The
Supreme Court held that the two above provisions only apply to legitimate children. These do
not apply in the case of the respondent who was an illegitimate child considering that her
parents never got married. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent
automatically became a Filipino upon birth, and as such, there was no more need for her to
validly elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Also, she registered as a
voter inside the country when she reached 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
3. No. The Republics submission was misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow
respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers
misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. The court held that
prohibiting the respondent to use her fathers surname would only sow confusion. Also, Sec. 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 142 which regulates the use of aliases as well as the jurisprudence
state that it is allowed for a person to use a name by which he has been known since
childhood. Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from
using his surname. While judicial authority is required for a chance of name or surname, there is
no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using
since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family
relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in
great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is
involved or to the community in general. In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu
family in China would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief.
Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 provides that "Repatriation shall be effected by taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon
cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as
Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen." The law is clear that repatriation is effected by
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation
in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the
repatriation of a citizen. Herein, Altajeros took his Oath of Allegiance on 17 December 1997,
but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only
after 6 years or on 18 February 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on 1 March 2004.
Altajeros, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his
certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections. Republic Act 8171
has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree 725.
They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Courts
ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of
ones application for repatriation subsists. Accordingly, Altajeross repatriation retroacted to the
date he filed his application in 1997. He was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position
in the government in the 10 May 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant
of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying Altajeros to run as
mayor of San Jacinto,Masbate. However, considering that Altajeros failed to prove before the
COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation,as he submitted the

representation in his application for

candidacy as mayor because as early as 17
December 1997, he was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation by the Special
Committee on Naturalization, after he filed
a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA
8171. Thus, Altajeros claimed that his
Filipino citizenship was already restored,
and he was qualified to run as mayor in the
10 May 2004 elections. Altajeros sought
the dismissal of the petition. Atty. Zacarias
C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director
for Region V and hearing officer of the
case, recommended that Altarejos be
disqualified from being a candidate for the
position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate
in the 10 May 2004 national and local
elections; on the ground that Altajeros
failed to prove that he has fully complied
with requirements of Section 2 of Republic
Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and
reacquire his Filipino citizenship inasmuch
as he has not submitted any document to
prove that he has taken his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and that he has registered his
fact of repatriation in the proper civil
registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
In its Resolution promulgated on 22 March
2004, the COMELEC, First Division,
adopted the findings and recommendation
of Director Zaragoza. On 25 March 2004,
Altajeros filed a motion for reconsideration.
On 7 May 2004, the COMELEC en banc
promulgated a resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration for utter lack of
merit. On 10 May 2004, the election day
itself, Altajeros filed the petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
13.ARNARDO v
COMELEC
G.R. No. 210164,
August 18, 2015, Del
Castillo, J.

necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his
motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said
evidence.
It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to
be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is
questioned to prevent a repetition of the present case.