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162
44 S.Ct. 62
68 L.Ed. 228
BUTTERS et al.
v.
CITY OF OAKLAND
No. 16.
Submitted Oct. 3, 1923.
Decided Nov. 12, 1923.
The authority to order such improvements is vested by the statute in the city
council, which before making an order, must pass a resolution of intention to do
so, setting forth specified details. In a case such as is here presented, the
council may delimit the district to be benefited and make the expense
chargeable upon it. Public notice of the contemplated improvement is to be
given, and, within stated times thereafter, the owner of any assessable property
may protest in writing against either the proposed work or the extent of the
district to be assessed, or both. Such protest must be heard and passed upon by
the council and 'its decision shall be final and conclusive.' If the protest be
denied, the council may order the proposed improvement. Provision is made
for inviting bids and awarding and making contracts therefor and for reviewing
the proceedings at the instance of any interested person. Where the cost of the
The trial court found the issues of fact and of law against plaintiffs and entered
judgment accordingly, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal for the First
Appellate District. 53 Cal. App. 294, 200 Pac. 354. A petition to have the cause
heard in the state Supreme Court was denied, and it comes here by writ of error
to the District Court of Appeal. The federal question raised in the court below
and presented here is that the state statute and the assessment against plaintiffs'
properties offend against the federal Constitution in that the one arbitrarily
authorizes and the other arbitrarily imposes a tax upon plaintiff's properties for
local improvement in excess of the benefits received and without providing for
resulting damages, and thereby they are deprived of their property without due
process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Several grounds are
urged in support of this contention, which we consider in their order.
1. Plaintiffs in error content that the assessment was not in proportion to the
benefits because certain property, also benefited by the improvement, was
omitted from the district. Without reviewing the circumstances said to establish
this contention, it is enough to say that the municipal authorities were
empowered to establish the district benefited and to assess the tax in proportion
to the benefits. Ample provision is made for a hearing and a hearing was
accorded. There is nothing to justify the conclusion that the authorities acted
arbitrarily or fraudulently. The assessment was reviewed upon appeal by the
city council, and that body, after a hearing, altered it in some particulars, and
caused a new warrant of assessment to be issued. Its action, under the statute,
was final and conclusive and is not open to attack in this proceeding. Fallbrook
Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 167-170, 175, 17 Sup. Ct. 56, 41
L. Ed. 369; Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S. 310, 321-323, 24 Sup. Ct. 88, 48 L. Ed.
195; Jelliff v. Newark, 48 N. J. Law, 101, 109, 2 Atl. 627; Embree v. Kansas
City, etc., Road District, 240 U. S. 242, 247-249, 36 Sup. Ct. 317, 60 L. Ed.
624.
2. Upon review by the city council deductions were made from the amounts
assessed upon certain areas included within the district and a sum equal to the
aggregate thereof was distributed over and assessed upon the entire district,
resulting in some increase in the assessment upon plaintiffs' properties. It is
urged that this establishes, to the extent of the increase, that the assessment was
arbitrary, and not according to benefits. The Supreme Court of California in
another case, involving the same assessment has held otherwise. Rockridge
Place Co. v. City Council, 178 Cal. 58, 62, 63, 172 Pac. 1110. The whole
matter seems to have been fully heard and carefully considered by the city
council and its adjustment upon the basis that the assessment upon some
property within the district was too high and that upon the remainder too low
cannot be upset merely because the aggregate amount deducted from the one
coincides with that applied upon the other, since the council after a full hearing,
expressly found that the assessment as finally made was in accordance with the
benefits. It is impossible for us to say that the property assessed did not receive
an additional benefit to the extent of the amount thus proportionately
distributed. The determination of the council is so largely a matter of opinion
that in the absence of convincing evidence of error it will not be disturbed. See
Jelliff v. Newark, supra; Walker et al. v. City of Aurora, 140 Ill. 402, 411, 29
N. E. 741; Sanitary District v. Joliet, 189 Ill. 270, 272, 59 N. E. 566; State,
Pudney, pros. v. Village of Passaic, 37 N. J. Law, 65, 67, 68.
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4. The statute provides that the expense of the work may be chargeable upon
the district which the city council declares to be benefited by the improvement,
and that such cost shall be assessed upon the several lots in the district 'in
proportion to the estimated benefits to be received by each'; and it is urged by
plaintiffs that the cost may exceed the benefits, in which event the
proportionate assessment of the estimated benefits may, in fact, be greater than
the actual benefits received. We are not impressed with his contention. It is not
unreasonable to assume that ordinarily the cost of street grading and paving,
within municipalities such as this statute deals with, will not exceed the benefits
which the adjoining land owners will receive, and it is neither alleged nor
proven that it has in fact done so in the present case. The method of assessment
provided for is an old and familiar one and embodies a principle too well
established to be overturned by the suggestion of a theoretical possibility that
there may not be an exact and mathematical relation between cost and benefit in
particular instances. See L. & N. R. Co. v. Barber, 197 U. S. 430, 433, 434, 25
Sup. Ct. 466, 49 L. Ed. 819; Martin v. District of Columbia, 205 U. S. 135,
138-140, 27 Sup. Ct. 440, 51 L. Ed. 743.
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Affirmed.