PEOPLE V YADAO

FACTS:
Philippine National Polices Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then
headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed
11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.
SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation
Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a
shoot-out between the police and those who were slain. After
investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs
absolved all the police officers involved.
On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the
finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers
involved before the Sandiganbayan. RTC of Quezon City ordered
the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause
to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the
principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the
private complainants. The case was reopened but the CA
rendered a Decision, granting Lacsons petition on the ground of
double jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the
RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by
Judge Yadao. Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against
Lacson and other police officials for lack of probable cause.Thus,
prosecution filed the present special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE: WON Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when

she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of
probable cause
RULING: The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely
abused her discretion when she set the motions for
determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the
issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark
its evidence and argue its case.
The prosecution stresses that under Section 6, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court Judge Yadaos duty was to determine probable

cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on

the basis of the investigating prosecutors resolution as well as
the informations and their supporting documents. And, if she
had some doubts as to the existence of probable cause, the
rules required her to order the investigating prosecutor to
present additional evidence to support the finding of probable
cause within five days from notice. Rather than take limited
action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up and adopted
the Ombudsmans findings when the latter conducted its
preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery in 1996.
The judge is not required, when determining probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a
de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the
initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause
to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. But here, the
prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain
in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they
earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the
purpose
of
determining
probable
cause
based
on
those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent
statements and related documents that the witnesses
themselves brought up and were part of the records. The SC
held that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause against the respondents.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal
action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel
of prosecutors to present additional evidence. Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options
upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable
cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause;
and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence
of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory. The courts first option under the
above is for it to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. That is the
situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish

probable cause against the respondents. Discounting the

affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in
the record that presents some doubtful probability that
respondents committed the crime charged. In the absence of
probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple
murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

DE LOS SANTOS DIO V CAGUIOA

FACTS:
Dios, the majority stockholder of the HS equities invested
$1.150M to SBMEI for the construction of an Ocean Park. Dio
claimed that Desmond(CEO of SBMEI) had a capital of 5.5M
inclusive of the value of animals. Dio invested again in SBMEI for
the construction of Miracle Beach but this time as representative
of Westdale Company. Dio found out that SBMEI actually had no
capacity to deliver on its guarantees and as of 2001 it was
incurring losses

on record plainly fails to establish probable cause. In this case, it

cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime
estafa had already been established.

Dio filed two criminal complaints for estafa through false

pretenses and with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
through misappropriation on conversion against Desmond. After
the preliminary investigation, the city prosecutor issued a
resolution finding a probable cause against desmond: that
Desmond persuaded Dio with false statements, and that there
were misrepresentations.
Desmond filed a motion for judicial determination. RTC: no
probable cause and that there was no personal assurance from
Desmond which is an element of estafa through false pretenses.
CA: Upheld the ruling of RTC.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject information for
lack of probable cause?
HELD:
Determination of probable cause may be either executive or
judicial. Executive is made by the public prosecutor during
preliminary investigation where he is given broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists. Judicial is made by
the Judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued.
While a judges determination of probable cause is generally
confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Sec 5
Rule 112 states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
However it must be done in clear cut cases when the evidence

YOUNG V. PEOPLE
On separate dates, Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force
[RAHTTF] of the PNP conducted surveillance operations at Jaguar
KTV bar in Cebu. In the entrapment operation, police officers,
acting as poseur customers, handed 15k worth of marked
money to the mamasang/ manager in exchange for sexual
service.
At the arranged signal, RAHTTF members raided the said bar,
resulting to multiple arrests, seizure of sexual paraphernalia,
recovery of marked money from one Jocelyn Balili and rescue of
146 women and minors. 6 women [AAA Group] who all worked
at Jaguar executed affidavits and identified the petitioner, Tico
and Ann as the owners. Criminal complaint for violation of RA
9208 was filed against them.
Vinson denied ownership of Jaguar and asserted that he had
sold his rights and interests therein to one Charles Theodore
Rivera pursuant to a Deed of Assignment. He is not the manager
nor owner of Jaguar, therefore he has no control of the 6
women. He was not even present during the raid. He raised
mistake in identity as defense. He was not the same person
identified by the women in their affidavits.
OCP found probable cause, ordered the indictment of the
petitioners. Receipt and marked money from Balili constituted
prima facie evidence that there was transaction to engage in
sexual service for a fee. Documentary evidence pertaining to
Jaguars business operations and positive identification of the
women sufficiently established petitioners as owners. While the
women retracted their statements, such retractions were found
to hold no probative value. Qualified the crime of trafficking for
being committed by syndicate.
Petitioners filed an omnibus motion for a judicial determination
of probable cause, praying that the issuance of corresponding
warrants of arrest be held in abeyance pending resolution
thereof, and the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause.
RTC granted omnibus motion and dismissed the case for lack
of probable cause. Affidavits of RAHTTF and the women failed to
show that petitioners had knowledge or participated in the

recruitment of 146 women and minors rescued. Recantations of

the women effectively cleared petitioners of any knowledge in
Jaguars operation. Deed of assignment showed that Vinson has
already ceded his rights and interests in Jaguar.
CA reversed RTC. It held that RTC committed GADLEJ.
ISSUE/S: WON CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC in dismissing the criminal case against
petitioners for lack of probable cause. NO.
HELD:
Determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial in
nature.
EXECUTIVE - duty of the public prosecutor during preliminary
investigation for the purpose of filing an information in court.
Evaluates if the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. JUDICIAL - refers to the prerogative of
the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. Judge makes a preliminary examination of
the evidence submitted, and on the strength thereof, and
independent from the findings of the public prosecutor,
determines the necessity of placing the accused under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Santos-Dia v. CA- A judge may dismiss the case for lack of
probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on
record plainly fails to establish probable cause - that is when the
records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts
which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements o f
the crime charged.
Applying the standard set forth in Santos-Dia, the evidence on
record herein does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut
absence of probable cause against petitioners. Examination
thereof shows that the prosecution was able to establish a
prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4
(a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208.
Petitioners recruited and hired the A A A Group and,
consequently, maintained them under their employ in Jaguar for
the purpose of engaging in prostitution. Probable cause exists
to issue warrants for their arrest.

SOLIVEN V MAKASIAR

FACTS:
Luis Beltran is a columnist of Philippine Star while Max Soliven is
its publisher. Beltran wrote an article saying that Pres. Cory
Aquino hid under the bed during one of the coup attempts in
1987. Pres. Aquino thereafter filed a libel case against him and
Soliven.
ISSUE: WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause NO
RULING: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation
of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown
that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed
procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of
arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

ROBERTS V CA
FACTS:
A Joint resolution was released after the investigations of
Prosecutors which recommended the filing of an information
against petitioners for violation of Art 318 of RPC. An
information for estafa was filed against the President (Roberts)
and Board of Directors of Pepsi Cola.
Private complaints alleged that Pepsi launched a Number Fever
Promotion and announced in all medias that all holders of
crowns and or caps of Pepsi, Miranda, Mountain Dew, and 7up
bearing the 3 digit number with different security codes to
prevent from tampering, will win the full amount of prize
enticing the public to buy Pepsi products.
But the said accused after their TV announcement that the
winning number was 349, failed to give the prize to
complainants who were able to buy pepsi with the number 349.
(These are two complainants who have the same numbered
crown with different security code in the crown so as to be a
measure against tampering or faking of crowns).
Petitioners filed with the Office of the city prosecutor a motion
for reconsideration of the Joint resolution alleging that (a) there
was fraud since it had always been clear that to be entitled to
the prize it must have the correct security code; (b) failed to
prove prima facie evidence of specific over criminal acts; (c)
compromise agreement is not an admission of guilt.
Petitioners filed with the DOJ petition for review the same
grounds. Case was raffled to RTC Quezon and Prosecutor filed an
Ex parte motion for Issuance of Warrants of Arrest while accused
filed to hold in Abeyance issuance of warrant of arrest since the
DOJ had take cognizance of the petition for review. RTC Judge
Asuncion issued warrant of arrest and denied the motions of
petitioners citing the case of Crespo v Mogul that the Sec of
Justice should refrain from entertaining a petition for review
when the information has already been filed. Petitioners filed
certiorari in CA contending that there was no probable cause to
hold them criminally liable. Petitioners claim that Judge
Asuncion has no basis to determine probable cause.

CA ruled that that the Joint Resolution was sufficient in itself to

have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing
himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of
issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest.
ISSUE: WON Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the issuance of warrant of arrests without
examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2)
if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
It must be emphasized that judges must not rely solely on the
report or resolution of the fiscal (now prosecutor); they must
evaluate the report and the supporting documents
This requirement of evaluation not only of the report or
certification of the fiscal but also of the supporting documents
was further explained in People vs. Inting] where this Court
specified what the documents may consist of, viz., the affidavits,
the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification
which are material in assisting the Judge to
make his determination of probable cause.
In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its
filing. Only a copy of the joint resolution was forwarded to the
trial court. No other supporting documents were attached. Judge
did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutors
finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no
specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the
issuance of warrants of arrest after June 21, 1993. It may,
however, be argued that the directive presupposes a finding of
probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional

requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left

to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.

PEOPLE v. GREY
FACTS
An Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph
Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son, respondent
Francis Grey; and two others for the death of Rolando Diocton
before the RTC of Gandara, Samar.
The Information was accompanied by other supporting
documents and a motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Meanwhile, Presiding Judge Rosario Bandal denied the motion
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge Bandal found the
prosecutions evidence to be insufficient to link respondents to
the crime charged. She directed the prosecution to present,
within five days, additional evidence.

arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

He should not rely solely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor. It is not mandatory in the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
The judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and
evidence before him, determined that there was probable cause
to issue the warrants of arrest after the provincial prosecution,
based on the affidavits presented by complainant and her
witnesses, found probable cause to file the criminal Information.
This finding of the Provincial Prosecutor was affirmed by the
Secretary of Justice.

Later, the judge inhibited herself. Thereafter, the venue was

changed and Judge Naviadad continued the proceedings of the
case. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari seeking TRO and
preliminary injunction alleging that the filing of the murder
charge are based on perjured statements since Joseph Grey
announced his candidacy for the Congressional election. The CA
held that Judge Naviadad failed to abide with the constitutional
mandate of personally examining the existence of probable
cause. Thus, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Naviadad erred in personally
examining for the existence of probable cause.
Ruling: No. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require
the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in

OKABE V GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
Maruyama sued Okabe for estafa. It was alleged in the
complaint that Maruyama entrusted to Okabe a sum of money
for the latter, who was engaged in the business of door to door
delivery, to remit to the Philippines. Okabe failed to remit such
amount. During the preliminary investigation, both Okabe and
Marumaya
were
given
the
chance
to
adduce
evidences/affidavits on their behalf.
The 2nd assistant city prosecutor found probable cause and
issued a resolution and the corresponding information.
Appended thereto was the Maruyamas complaint affidavit.
These documents were forwarded to the city prosecutor for
approval. Then the information was filed with the RTC of Pasay. A
warrant of arrest was issued but Okabe was able to post bail in
the amount of 40,000 thereby allowing her to freely leave the
Philippines for Japan. Upon the instance of the prosecution, a
hold-departure order was issued by the court.

warrant of arrest, the judge should not rely solely on the

prosecutors report. The judge should consider not only the
report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties,
the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.
This rule is now embodied section 7(a) of Rule 112 which
mandates that an information filed in court shall be supported
by affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their
witnesses, other supporting documents and the resolution of the
case. The reason for this rule is because the law aims not only
to acquit the innocent but to likewise insulate the clearly
innocent from false charges and from the strong arm of the law.

Okabe filed a motion for judicial determination of probable

cause. She claims that the documents attached to the resolution
of the investigating prosecutor were insufficient to warrant a
finding of probable cause. She contends that it behooved the
investigating prosecutor to submit the following to the trial court
to enable it to determine the presence or absence of probable
cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the
complainant; (b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and those of her
witnesses; (c) the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during
the preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents
presented during the said investigation.
ISSUE: WON the trial court judge should have required the
production of the affidavits of Maruyamas witnesses, their
documentary evidences, stenographic notes of the preliminary
investigation and Okabes counter-affidavit for the purposes of
determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest YES
RULING:
For the purposes of determining the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a

10

PEOPLE V JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:
Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of a drug store. 1 and a
half meter from him was the tricycle of Joseltio. Alonzo saw 2
men grappling for the possession of the bag of the woman. One
of the 2 men shot the woman in the head. The bag taken by the
man was brought to the tryc of the accused where someone
inside received the bag and the armed man sat behind Joselito.
Joselito then sped away.
Joselitos version: he was hired for to drive a certain Boy Santos
to a cockpit however, Boy asked him to go to a drug store and
there, Jun alighted from the tryc and accosted the woman.
Joselito tried to ask for help but Boy, who stayed in the tryc,
threatened him. And that if he ever informed the police, they
would harm his family. Joselito, Jun, Boy Santos, and Dodong
were charged with special complex crime of Robeery with
Homicide for having robbed Virginia, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of 200,000 in cash and jewelry and on occasion
thereof shot and killed her. Court a quo found Joselito guilty as
charged and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE: WON Joselitos arrest was unlawful since there was no
warrant thereof?
HELD:
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested during the
police raid at the place of Jun Marquez. A day after the incident.
In People vs Sucro we held that when a police officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he
may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5,
par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his
presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule
113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or
caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The
arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the
aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the
commission of the robbery with homicide.

On the other had, Sec 5 par. (b) Rule 113 necessitates two
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an
offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested had committed it.
Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between
the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest,
and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest
and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be
secured. In this case, the arrest came a day after the
consummation of the crime and not immediately after.
Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the
person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of
certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody
has committed the crime. The arresting officer officers had no
personal knowledge of facts since they were not present and
were not actual eyewitnesses to the crim, and they became
aware of his identity as the driver only during custodial
investigation.
However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot
affect the jurisdiction of the courta quo because even in
instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when
the person arrested submits to arraignment without any
objection, as in this case.
Del Rosarios defense of irresistible force was proven clearly
since he was threatened and a gun was directly pointed at him.
In other wors, he was just an instrument acting involuntarily
against his will.

11

HOMAR V PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner was found to possess one heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing shabu. PO1 Eric Tan was the lone
witness for the prosecution. He testified that around 8:50 in the
evening, he and civilian agent Tangcoy were ordered to go to
the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to the area
onboard a mobile hunter, they saw the petitioner crossing a "No
Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately
accosted him and told him to cross at the pedestrian crossing
area.
The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting
Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife.
Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the
petitioner's body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet
containing what he suspected as shabu. RTC convicted the
petitioner. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless arrest in this caseNO
RULING: To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence of or within the view of
the arresting officer.
Aside from the bare testimony of Tan as quoted by the CA in its
decision, the prosecution did not proffer any other proof to
establish that the requirements for a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest were complied with. Particularly, the prosecution
failed to prove that the petitioner was committing a crime
(failed to specifically identify the area where the petitioner
allegedly crossed, failed to prove that the portion of Roxas
Boulevard where the petitioner crossed was indeed a "no
jaywalking" area, petitioner not charged for jaywalking).

The burden of proof must be discharged. The filing of a criminal

charge and presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty are not sufficient.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or

she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the
part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
The testimony of Tan, as quoted in the CA decision, and the
findings of the RTC, cast doubt on whether Tan and
Tangcoy intended to arrest the petitioner for jaywalking. Q:
How did you accost the person? A: We accosted him and pointed
to him the right place for crossing. Tan and Tangcoy did not
intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his
liberty. This lack of intent was bolstered by the fact that there
was no criminal charge that was filed for jaywalking.
From Tan's testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only
came after they allegedly confiscated the shabu from the
petitioner, for which they informed him of his constitutional
rights and brought him to the police station.
According to the Court, due to the lack of intent to arrest, the
subsequent search was unlawful. This is notwithstanding the
fact that the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto for
violating an ordinance, could have been therefore lawfully
stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers.

12

PEOPLE V. DORIA
FACTS:
1. Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received
information that one Jun [Doria] was engaged in illegal
drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him
in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested.
2. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him,
and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house
of his associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the police
team to her house.
3. The team found the door open and a woman inside the
house. Jun identified her as Neneth, and she was
asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3
Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the
house]. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a
carton box under the dining table. One of the box s flaps
was open, and inside it was something wrapped in
plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
sold to him by Jun. His suspicion aroused, so he
entered the house and took hold of the box. He peeked
inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be
dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the
marked bills from Neneth and they arrested her. The
bricks were examined and they were found to be dried
marijuana leaves.
4. It turned out that Jun was Florencio Doria and Neneth was
Violeta Gaddao
5. Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with
violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972],
Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section
21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
ISSUE: WON warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao,
the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the
pieces of evidence obtained therefrom are valid?

1. The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was

arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and
seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were
likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed,
however, that the warrants were not necessary because
the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was
an incident to her lawful arrest.
2. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed
during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her
arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not
committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial
court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao
to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit. In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her.
3. Nor can it be Personal Knowledge of facts since must
be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
a. In this case, Gaddao was arrested solely on the
basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused.
b. Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his
associate in the drug business, but as person with
whom he left the marked bills.
c. This conclusion does not lead to the belief that she
is pushing drugs.
4. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao
was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and
home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and
marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her
arrest. Plain view doctrine doesnt apply.
DISPOSITIVE: ACQUIT

HELD:

13

PESTILOS V. GENEROSO
1. There was an altercation between the accused and Atty.
Generoso at 3:15 am at Brgy. Holy Spirit QC.
a. Atty. Generoso called the police and when they
came, they saw him badly beaten. He pointed the
petitioners as those who mauled him.
b. Officers invited the petitioners to go to the Police
station for investigation.
c. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor
found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso
with a bladed weapon but fortunately survived the
attack.
2. Petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
3. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that there was no lawful
arrest that took place.
a. No valid warrantless arrest since police officers
had no personal knowledge that they were the
perpetrators of the crime.
b. They [petitioners] were just invited to the police
station.
4. The RTC denied the motion and the CA affirmed the
denial.
ISSUE: WON petitioners validly arrested without warrant.
HELD:
YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without
warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that: When an offense has
just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
o An offense has just been committed;
o arresting officer has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the
offense has just been committed" and ''personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to

be arrested committed it" depended on the particular

circumstances of the case.
Element
of
''personal
knowledge
of
facts
or
circumstances", requires clarification.
o Circumstances may pertain to events or actions
within the actual perception, personal evaluation
or observation of the police officer at the scene of
the crime.
o Even though the police officer has not seen
someone actually fleeing, he could still make a
warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of
the crime, he could determine the existence of
probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime.
o However, the determination of probable cause
and the gathering of facts or circumstances should
be made immediately after the commission of the
crime in order to comply with the element of
immediacy.
With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that
the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time
that they have arrived at the scene of the crime, it is
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
justifying the petitioners warrantless arrests.
Petitioners
were
validly
arrested
and
the
subsequent inquest proceeding was likewise
appropriate.

14

#2 GO v. CA - MERCADO
TOPIC: Hot Pursuit
FACTS:
1. Petitioner entered a one-way street and travelled in the
opposite direction. Due to this, petitioners car nearly
collided with Maguans car.
2. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot
Maguan inside the car.
3. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take
down the plate number of the petitioners car.
4. The police arrived at the scene of the shooting and
retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol.
5. Upon verification at the LTO, it showed that the car was
registered to Elsa Go.
6. The following day, the police returned to the scene of the
shooting to verify the identity of the petitioner through
the security guard petitioner was positively identified.
7. Police launched a manhunt for the petitioner.
8. The petitioner presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police petitioner was detained.
9. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide against the petitioners with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor.
10.The Prosecutor informed the petitioner, in the presence of
his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation, but he must first sign a waiver
petitioner refused.
11.While the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and
before the information can be filed in court, the victim
Maguan dies of his gunshot wounds.
12.Prosecutor filed an information for murder before the RTC
and certified that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted because the accused did not sign a waiver.
13.Petitioner filed an omnibus motion for immediate release
and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted before the

information was filed and prayed that he be released on

recognizance or on bail.
14.Respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by
petitioner and ordered his release.
15.Prosecutor filed with the RTC a motion for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation and prayed that the
proceedings in court be suspended.
16.RTC granted leave to conduct preliminary investigation
and cancelled arraignment set.
17.Respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order:
a) Order which granted bail was recalled
b) Order which granted leave to prosecutor to conduct
preliminary
investigation
was
recalled
and
cancelled
c) Petitioners omnibus motion for immediate release
and preliminary investigation was treated as a
petition for bail and set for hearing.
18.Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus before the SC contending that the information
was null and void because no preliminary investigation
had been previously conducted.
19.Petitioner surrendered to the police.
20.SC remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus to the CA.
21.Respondent Judge issued an order setting the arraignment
of petitioner.
22.Petitioner filed with the CA a motion to restrain his
arraignment
23.Respondent Judge issued a Commitment Order directing
to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial
Jail.
24.Petitioner was arraigned, but he refused to enter a plea.
RTC entered for him a plea of not guilty.
25.Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the CA.
26.arraignment (moot and academic)
27.CA issued a writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the two
petitions, on the following grounds:
a) Petitioners warrantless arrest was valid because
the offense for which he was arrested and charged
had been freshly committed.

15

b) Petitioners act of posting bail constituted waiver of

any irregularity attending his arrest.
ISSUE: WON a lawful warrantless search was conducted by
the police - NO
HELD:
1. OSG Since petitioners identity as the gunman who had
shot Maguan had been sufficiently established by police
work, petitioner was validly arrested 6 days later.
2. Petitioner not lawfully arrested without warrant because
he went to the police station 6 days after the shooting he
had allegedly perpetrated. Also, none of the police officers
had personal knowledge required for warrantless arrest.
3. The reliance of both the petitioner and the SG upon Umil
v. Ramos is misplaced. In the said case, the Court
sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of the
petitioners made from 1-14 days after the actual
commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such
offenses constituted continuing crimes.
4. In the present case, the offense for which the petitioner
was arrested was murder (commenced and completed at
one definite location in time and space).
5. We do not believe that the warrantless arrests or
detention of petitioner in the case at bar falls within the
terms of the Criminal Procedure.
6. The arrest of the petitioner took place 6 days after the
shooting of Maguan.
7. The arresting officers obviously were not present at the
time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan (in flagrante
delicto).
8. Niether could the arrest effected 6 days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when the
shooting had in fact just been committed (hot pusuit).
9. Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any
personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner
was the gunman who had shot Maguan.
10.The information upon which the police acted had been
derived from the statements made by alleged eyewitness
to the shooting and another that was able to take down
the alleged gunmans cars plate number does not

constitute as personal knowledge.

11.There was no lawful warrantless arrest of the petitioner.
12.Petitioner was not arrested at all.
13.When he walked into the police station, he in fact placed
himself at the disposal of the police authorities.
14.He did not state that he was surrendering himself.
15.When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine
whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner
in court for killing Maguan.
16.Since petitioner had not been arrested, with or without
warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith
subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.
*OTHER ISSUE: WON the petitioner waived his right to
preliminary investigation NO
1. Posting bail did not waive the petitioners right to
preliminary investigation.
2. Petitioner asked for release on recognizance or on bail
and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus
motion. Thus, he claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved cash
bond.
DISPOSITIVE: GRANTED
RELEASE OF PETITIONER.

PETITION

AND

ORDERED

16

PEOPLE V TUDTUD
FACTS:
Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a
civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel
Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been
complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible
for the proliferation of marijuana in their area.
Members of the Intelligence Section conducted
surveillance in Soliers neighborhood. For 5 days, they
gathered information and learned that Tudtud was
involved in illegal drugs. According to his neighbors,
Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.
Solier informed the police that Tudtud headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with new
stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as bigbodied and short, and usually wore a hat.
The police thus awaited Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian
clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus
and helped each other carry a carton marked King
Flakes. Standing some 5 feet away from the men, the
officers observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds
description. The same man also toted a plastic bag.
They approached the suspects and identified themselves
as police officers. They informed them that the police had
received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be
arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtuds
description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1
Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the
box. Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright. Tudtud
opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The
box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two
bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and
another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to
unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to
the police officers as marijuana leaves.
The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion. The
two did not resist.
Tudtud, denying the charges against them, cried frameup. RTC, convicted both accused.

RULING: The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants

belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a
lawful arrest. It is significant to note that the search in question
preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest
must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause
to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question,
therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to
arrest Tudtud. The rule is that reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. For the exception in
Rule 113 Sec 5a to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.
In this case, there is no way the knowledge of the arresting
officers that Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described
as personal, having learned the same only from their
informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained
his information only from his neighbors and the friends of
Tudtud. Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police
conducted their own surveillance, which did not actually
consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his
illegal trade, but of a mere gathering of information from the
assets there. Information is also hearsay, not of personal
knowledge.
As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under the
recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the
marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence.
And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of
the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of
Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.

ISSUE: WON there was lawful warrantless arrest- NO

17

#4 PEOPLE VS ESCORDIAL - PELAYO

FACTS:
1. Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda and Mark Lucena were
playing inside a jeepney parked in front of a boarding
house at Libertad St. Bacolod City. One got hit on his head
on the rails of the jeepney, the boys were told by a man
sitting inside the jeepney to go home. The man was later
identified by Joniega and Esmeralda as Anthony Escordial.
2. MEANWHILE Living in a boarding house were Michelle
Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver.
3. They were asleep, they woke up cause of this man, his
head covered with a shirt and had a knife. The man was
able to get P500.00 from Erma and P3,100.00 from
Michelle.
4. After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma
to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold
Erma.
5. He blindfolded Michelle himself and then began touching
and raping her.
6. Michelle = blindfolded and could not see, she could feel
that the man had no cover on his face. She felt that his
chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her
hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough.
7. Erma = claimed she was able to see through her blindfold
and that she saw the man's face because of the light
coming from the lamp post outside the boarding house.
8. After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the
bed and talked. Sex ulit daw but Michelle pleaded with
him.
9. Man threatened to call his companions and more rape.
10.
He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach and then
inserted his penis into her anus. After he was done ->
covered with a blanket and returned earrings.
11.
Warned the women not to report the matter to anyone
or he would kill them. Then left. Girls didnt talk for 30
mins cause they were scared.

12.
They told their neighbor, Tiyo Anong and Allan Aguillon
son of the owner of the boarding house about the
incident.
13.
Policemen arrived, they asked to describe the attacker,
but could only identify his voice and his eyes. They looked
for the man but they did not find him. Subsequently they
were taken to the police station at Bac-Up for
investigation.
14.
But, at Michelle's request, Erma and Teresa did not tell
the others about rape. She went home, Michelle found her
aunt and uncle. She embraced them and told her about
the rape. Michelle was again taken to the police, where
she was referred to the Women's Desk to report the rape.
15.
The following day, P03 Nicolas Tancinco went around
Margarita Extension and learned about the children
playing on the street. The description of the suspect fitted
a worker at a caf called Coffee Break Corner, about two
houses away from the boarding house.
16.
They went there, asked the Security and asked the
Owner, Fidel. told them that Escordial was his helper and
that the latter had gone home Negros Occidental.
17.
Based on the information they looked for Escordial.
They found Escordial at the basketball court and "invited"
him to go to the police station for questioning.
18.
At the Bacolod police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa
Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda were asked
whether Escordial was the same person they saw on the
night of the incident. They were taken one by one to the
jail cell and asked to point to the person that they had
seen that night. They picked Escordial out of four people
who were inside the jail cell.
19.
He was charged with rape & robbery with rape. When
arraigned pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon
the two cases were jointly tried.
20.
Trial Court = Guilty. Escordial appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the out-of-court identification in the show up
at the police station, made after the start of the custodial
investigation, may be used in court.

18

HELD:
1. While it cannot be denied that Escordial was deprived of
his right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel, he has not
shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the
police obtained any statement from him whether
inculpatory or exculpatory - which was used in evidence
against him.
2. No uncounseled statement was obtained from Escordial
which should have been excluded as evidence against
him. However, Escordial was never assisted by counsel,
whether of his own choice or provided by the police
officers, from the time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the
Bacolod police station.
3. Although Escordial made no statement during this time,
this fact remains important insofar as it affects the
admissibility of the out-of-court identification of Escordial
by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday,
Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and
Jason Joniega.
4. As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of
counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually
not a part of the custodial inquest.
5. However, the previous cases are different inasmuch as
Escordial, having been the focus of attention by the police
after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the
possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under
custodial
investigation
when
these
out-of-court
identifications were conducted by the police.
6. An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made
in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is
brought face to face with the witness for identification,
while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a
witness from a group of persons gathered for that
purpose.

7. During
custodial
investigation,
these
types
of
identification
have
been
recognized
as
"critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which
necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This
is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings
"might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality."
8. The Court thus ruled that any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a
show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial
investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.
9. Herein, Escordial was identified by Michelle Darunda in a
show-up and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason
Joniega, and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various
dates after his arrest.
10.
Having been made when Escordial did not have the
assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications
are inadmissible in evidence against him. Consequently,
the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these
identifications should have been held inadmissible for
being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by
exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'"

19

#5 PEOPLE vs. DEL ROSARIO - SULLANO

FACTS:
1. Paul Vincent Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of
Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when
three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about
112 meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by Joselito
del Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo saw 2 men and
a woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for possession of a
bag.
2. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men (Ernesto
"Jun" Marquez) armed with a gun started chasing a man
who was trying to help the woman, while the other
snatcher ("Dodong" Bisaya) kicked the woman sending
her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned
and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her
on the head.
3. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was
able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also
recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest
police headquarters and reported the incident. Upon
finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, SP04
Geronimo de Leon and his team proceeded to Bakod
Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the
owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn
revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview.
4. Del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers on 13
May 1996. On the way to the police station, del Rosario
informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the
place where the hold-uppers may be found.
5. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of
15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted
from 1:00 to 4:00 p.m.

6. While all of these were happening, del Rosario was at the

back of the school, handcuffed by the police because
allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence
against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to
escape.
7. Del Rosario, on the other hand, claimed that he was hired
for P120.00 by "Boy" Santos to drive him to a cockpit at
the Blas Edward Coliseum but was directed him to
proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and
"Dodong" Bisaya; where the robbery homicide occurred.
He claimed that the 3 men alighted and warned del
Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the
incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed.
Del Rosario then went home.
8. Because of the threat, however, he did not report the
matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay
captain and the police. Del Rosario, Marquez, Santos, and
John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having
robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of
P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion
thereof shot and killed her.

ISSUE: WON del Rosario was deprived of his rights during

custodial investigation at the time he was invited for
questioning at the house of the barangay captain.

HELD:
1. Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was invited" for
questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was
already under effective custodial investigation, but he was

20

not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating

officers.
2. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver
and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and
senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution
failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to
remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in
the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible
against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards
provided by law and the Bill of Rights.
3. Herein, like victim Virginia Bernas, del Rosario too was a
hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons
with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del
Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Del
Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore
be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger.
4. A person under the same circumstances would be more
concerned with his personal welfare and security rather
than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first
time that day. On the other hand, conspiracy between him
and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of
a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of
any complicity in the crime charged.

21

#6 PEOPLE v. OLIVAREZ TING

FACTS:
1. Officer Juan followed up on the robbery with homicide in
Valenzuela.
a. He found out that Arellano, an employee of the said
establishment has not reported for work
b. When police approached Arellano, he allegedly
admitted to the crime, he was then arrested
2. A witness said that he saw the bodies of the owners of the
establishment dead on the day of the incident
3. Olivarez was likewise arrested because he was allegedly
seen a number of times before the incident in the area
a. The police apprised him of his constitutional rights but
he refused to get a lawyer
b. That the wristwatch and other belongings of the
owners were taken from him
4. Olivarez and Arellano were charged with homicide

a. Such invitation is in the nature of an arrest- purpose is

to conduct an interrogation
b. Mere invitation is covered by the proscription against
warrantless
arrests
because
the
purpose
is
investigation
c. Thus, any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible
(including the wristwatch)
5. Even if the accused only questioned the arrest after
arraignment, and have deemed to have waived such, the
evidence is still inadmissible
6. Note: confession was likewise obtained without counsel
DISPOSITIVE: Accused are acquitted.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of accused were valid

NO
HELD:
1. Robbery with homicide has elements: taking of personal
property with violence; property belongs to another;
intent to gain; homicide was committed
2. In this case, there is no direct evidence to peg Olivarez
and Arellano to the crime
a. The main evidence was the testimony of the police
who arrested, investigated and took their confession
3. The evidence taken from the accused are inadmissible
a. They were unlawfully arrested
b. At the time they were arrested, 2 days had already
lapsed
c. They were also not caught in flagrante delicto
d. And neither were they escapees
e. Thus, they do not fall under the cases of valid
warrantless arrests
4. The police argued they merely invited accused to the
police

22

#7 PEOPLE v. AMESTUZO - MONTEALTO

FACTS:
1. A group of eight armed men wearing masks entered in the
house of the complainant Lacsamana and robbed the said
premises of valuables. In the course of the robbery, two
members of the gang raped the niece and employee of
complainant.
2. Amestuzo, Ampatin, Bagas, and Vias were charged with
the complex crime of robbery in band with double rape.
All accused pleaded not guilty to the charged.
3. Solicitor general presented the facts as follows:
Lacsamana overheard her maid cry aray aray and when
she went out, 2 masked men pointed the gun at her.
Lacsamana was forcibly brought down to the 2 nd floor and
there she saw 4 other male persons ransacking her
premises. She was then brought down to the masters
bedroom, and while on her way down she saw another 2
male inside the premises. A total of 8 persons.
4. After ransacking the room, Amestuzo brought her niece to
the bedroom and raped her. Her niece went out of the
room
with
bloodstains
on
her
shorts.
Almost
simultaneously, another accused raped the employee.
5. RTC: convicting all the accused with the complex crime of
Robbery in band with double rape.
6. Only accused appellant Bagas appealed based mainly on:
a. Alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to be
represented by counsel during his identification
b. Trial courts error in giving due weight to the open
court identification of him which was based on a
suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification.
7. Bagas alleged that a group of policemen together with
accused Ampatin went to where he works. They were
looking for a certain Mario and when they cant find
anyone. The police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck
with a gun and told him Magturo ka ng kahit sino.
Ampatin pointed at Bagas since he was the first one he
chanced upon.
8. Thereafter, they were boarded in the police vehicle where
Ampatin told him nagkamali ako, namukhaan lang kita.
They were brought to the station where the other accused

are. Complainants arrived at the station. Bagas was asked

to turn left and right and he was asked to talk.
9. Bagas alleges that the it deprived him of his right to be
represented by a lawyer during his investigation. That his
presentation to the complainants for identification without
counsel was a violation of consti right.
ISSUE: WON Bagass constitutional right to counsel was
violated when he was presented to the Complainants?
NO.
HELD:
1. The guarantees of the constitution (Miranda Rights) may
be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation.
a. Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect.
b. Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation. Hence, the right to counsel cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. This is because during
a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted
from the investigatory to accusatory and it is
usually the witness or complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the
course of lineup.
c. There was no showing that the police officers
elicited any admission or confession from appellant
during his identification.
2. Accused appellant argues that the identification process
was irregular as he was not placed in a police line up and
instead, made to stand before the complainants alone.
a. No merit. No law requiring a police line-up as
essential to proper identification. The fact that he
was made to stand alone does not detract from the
validity of the process.
3. However, the complainants out-of-court identification was
seriously flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In
resolving this, the court applied the totality of
circumstances test which lists the following factors:

23

a. Witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time

of the crime.
b. Witness degree of attention at the time
c. Accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness
d. Level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification
e. Length of time between the crime and
identification.
f. Suggestiveness of the identification process.
4. The out of court identification was improperly suggestive.
Even before complainants had the opportunity to view
accused, the police made an announcement that he was
one of the suspects in the crime and that he was pointed
to by accused Ampatin as one of the culprits.
a. It therefore detracts from the spontaneity of their
subsequent identification.
5. The trial court erroneously rejected accused.
a. Bagas was working at the factory at the time of the
crime. He rendered overtime work and had to stay
in the factory late. This was corroborated by his coworkers.
6. Ampatins testimony is credible absolving Bagas of the
crime. It is more consistent with human nature if he
implicated Bagas if he really was one of the gang.
DISPOSITIVE: ACQUITTED.

24

#9 PEOPLE v. SUELA ADOBO

TOPIC: Rights of the person under arrest
FACTS:
1. GERONIMO GABILO Y HOSTALLERO was robbed and killed
in his house in Quezon City.
2. Araceli Tubaga, Director Rosas executive secretary at his
DECS office, received a call from a male person who
requested to speak with Director Rosas. When Tubaga
requested to get his message as the director could not go
to the phone, he told her to relay to Rosas that he has
information as to the identity and whereabouts of those
responsible for the death of his friend, Gabilo.
3. He told her that he is willing to give the information in
writing in exchange for P200,000.00. Director Rosas,
accompanied by Tubaga, went to the Quirino District
Police Station to inform Capt. Casanova about the call.
Capt. Casanova came up with the plan to entrap the
caller.
4. He instructed Tubaga to meet him the following day at
noon at the Ninoy Aquino Park, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City. He told her to bring with her the amount of
P200,000.00 which should be placed in a plastic bag, and
to bring flowers with her so he could easily identify her.
5. The male person handed her an envelope while she
handed him the plastic bag containing the boodle money.
While he was untying the plastic bag to check its
contents, the police officers who were posted in the
vicinity pounced on him and effected his arrest. He was
brought to Police Station 9. This person was later
identified as appellant Edgar Suela.
6. The envelope contained a handwritten note which reads:
1. Nerio Suela ang utak nang pag-paslang 2. TV color and
ibedensia nasa bahay niya. Ang tunay na pangalan
National ngayon ay pinalitan nang Panasonic. 3. Ang knife
na ginamit nasa bahay niya
7. When he asked Edgar Suela who wrote it, he answered
Ako po, sir. When he further asked as to who is Nerio
Suela, Edgar answered that he is his brother and is the
driver of Director Rosas.

8. While under detention, the Suelas expressed their desire

to give an extra-judicial confession. They brought the
Suelas to the office of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. When the police informed them of their
purpose, Atty. Sansano separately interviewed each of the
Suelas first, informed them of their constitutional rights,
insured that they understood the import of their
confession, physically examined them for any sign of
maltreatment or force, and after satisfying himself that
the suspects intention was voluntary on their part and
that it was his legal assistance that they were willing to
secure, he allowed the police to take down their individual
extra-judicial confessions. Atty. Sansano was present all
throughout the time that the Suelas were individually
propounded with questions. Thereafter, both were brought
before the Assistant City Prosecutor where they affirmed
their confessions under oath in the presence of Atty.
Sansano who assisted them. The following morning,
January 20, 1996, the Suelas were again brought before
Assistant City Prosecutor Ibuyan for inquest investigation
where they again affirmed under oath the contents of
their extra-judicial confessions.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the extrajudicial confessions of appellants are
admissible in evidence;
(2) whether the wristwatch and the letter (of Nerio Suela) are
admissible in evidence;
HELD:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.

25

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any

other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and
contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer beside the
accused. Furthermore, an effective and vigilant counsel
necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present
and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the
confession is made voluntarily and that the person under
investigation fully understands the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his
constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be
antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to
counsel and to be presumed innocent.
True, counsel does not necessarily have to dissuade
the person under investigation from confessing. But his
bounden duty is to properly and fully advise his clients on the
nature and consequences of an extrajudicial confession.
With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his
extrajudicial confession was obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights. This appellant did not finish first year
high school. Yet Atty. Rous, who is touted by the prosecution
as a competent and independent counsel, interviewed
Batocan -- before the latter gave his confession -- for only
around five minutes.
After this initial interview, Atty. Rous just listened
nonchalantly to the questions propounded by the police and
to the answers given by Batocan. Counsel was not even sure

that he had explained to appellant the consequences of his

extrajudicial confession. Furthermore, Atty. Rous attention
was divided while attending the custodial investigation as he
was also looking over another paper work on his desk.
We are not convinced that counsel had fully explained
to Batocan his constitutional rights and what they entailed or
the nature and the consequences of an extrajudicial
confession -- explanations that would have enabled him to
make an informed judgment on whether to confess; and if so,
on what matters. There is no showing that Atty. Rous properly
explained the choices or options open to appellant, a duty
expected of any counsel under the circumstances. In sum, he
did not turn out to be the competent and independent
counsel envisioned by the Constitution.
As to the extrajudicial confessions of Edgar and Nerio
Suela. Atty. Sansano supposedly stood as counsel for the
Suela brothers during their custodial investigation. He
testified on how he discharged his duties as follows:
Edgardo Batocans confession to Rosas who is not a
police officer is admissible in evidence. The Rules state that
the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him. Batocans
verbal declarations are not covered by Sections 12 (1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution, because they were not
extracted while he was under custodial investigation.
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a
witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as
to the substance of what he heard is he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated
verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.
Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession
may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that
he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the
substance of the conversation or statement made by the
accused.

26

These pieces of evidence sufficiently prove beyond

reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of robbery
with homicide.

27

#10 LUNA v. PLAZA LACAP

TOPIC: MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION
FACTS:
1. A criminal action was commenced by T-Sgt. Candido
Patosa by filing with Municipal Judge Plaza a criminal case
of murder against the petitioner, Luna.
2. Together with the complaint were sworn statements of
witnesses for the prosecution
a. They were in the form of searching questions taken
by Patosa and sworn to before the Judge
b. Judge Plaza examined the prosecution witnesses by
reading to them all over again the questions and
answers in their statements in writing
c. The witnesses declared before the judge that their
answers were true and were freely and voluntarily
made
3. Based on the following sworn statement of the
witnesses, postmortem and autopsy report on the dead
body of the victim Jaime Ng, death certificate, and sketch
showing the the positions of the victim and the accused,
Judge Plaza concluded that there was probable cause to
believe that a murder was committed and that the
accused was probably guilty thereof.
4. As such, Judge plaza issued a warrant of arrest and an
order specifying that no bail would be accepted.
5. Petitioner filed an MR so that he may be allowed bail but it
was denied
6. However, the case was remanded to the Court of First
Instance, after the petitioner filed a waiver of his right to
preliminary investigation.
7. Petitioner, then, filed before the CFI a petition for writ of
habeas corpus claiming that he was deprived of his liberty
without the due process of law.
a. He claimed that the imprisonment and detention
was the result of the warrant of arrest issued by
Judge Plaza.
b. Since the case was remanded to the CFI, he prayed
for the annulment of the order of his arrest and his
discharge from confinement

8. Judge Plaza alleged that a motion to quash and not a

petition for habeas was the proper remedy
9. CFI: denied the petition for habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether the CFI erred in denying the writ of habeas
corpus on the ground. NO
HELD:

Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides in part,

as follows:
"SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.
If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge x x x and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process x x x or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed. x x x."
It is shown that petitioner is detained and is in the custody of
the respondent Provincial Warden by virtue of the
order of arrest dated and the order of respondent Judge, to
confine petitioner in the provincial jail. It is not disputed by
petitioner that respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the
warrant of arrest.
The trial Judge did not commit an error in denying the writ
of habeas corpus prayed for. At any rate, we believe that, if
at all, the remedy available to the petitioner herein, under
the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of
arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the
respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal.
We wish to stress, however, that what has been stated in this
opinion is certainly not intended to sanction the return to the
former practice of municipal judges of simply relying upon

28

affidavits or sworn statements that are made to accompany

the complaints that are filed before them, in determining
whether there is a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. That practice is precisely what is sought to
be voided by the amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic
Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a
municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first
satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining
the witnesses personally, and that the examination must be
under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching
questions and answers. It is obvious that the purpose of this
amendment is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against a person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses
who made, and swore to, their statements before a person or
persons other than the judge before whom the criminal
complaint is filed. We wish to emphasize strict compliance by
municipal or city judges of the provision of Section 87 (c) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act 3828,
in order to avoid malicious and/or unfounded criminal
prosecution of persons.
In the case now before Us, while it is true that the respondent
Municipal Judge did not himself personally cause to be
reduced to writing in the form of questions and answers the
examination of witnesses presented before him by the person
who filed the criminal complaint, We are satisfied that, as
shown by the evidence, respondent Judge had personally
examined the witnesses under oath and that the questions
asked by the Judge and the answers of the witnesses were
reflected in writings which were actually subscribed and
sworn to before him.
DISPOSITIVE: DECISION DENYING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
WAS AFFIRMED

29

#11 ALIMPOOS v. CA CLEMENTE

FACTS:
1. Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by the chief of police by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Judge
in a Criminal Case for Robbery with less serious physical
injuries. Sps. Eliseo and Ciriaca Alimpoos were the
offended parties.
2. Mosquito contends that the warrant was issued without
observance of the legal requirements for its issuance. A
petition for Habeas Corpus was instituted before the trial
court to assail the subject warrant.
3. On March 26, 1966 the trial judge declared the detention
of Mosquito as illegal; granting the writ of Habeas Corpus.
The trial judge also enjoined the Municipal Judge of
Bayuga, Agusan and the rest of the defendants from
proceeding with the Criminal Case. Costs was ordered
against defendants.
4. The Provincial Fiscal received copy of the order on March
31, 1966, he moved for extension but eventually desisted.
Counsel for herein petitioner (Alimpoos) received a copy
on April 4, 1966 when it was handed to him by Alimpoos.
5. On the same date, counsel mailed from Cebu City a Notice
of Appeal but was later denied for being filed out of time
(beyond 48 hrs. - Habeas Corpus)
6. Alimpoos resorted to Mandamus proceeding before the CA
which was also denied, hence, a petition for certiorari was
filed with the SC.

Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal. It is the general rule that

Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to when there is
another remedy available. Time and again, it has been
explained that Habeas Corpus cannot function as a writ of
error.
2. Service on the offended party, Eliseo Alimpoos, on March
31, 1966 cannot be deemed as notice in law to his
counsel.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy
where a warrant of arrest was issued without a
preliminary examination?
2. Service of notice.
HELD:
1. In a case where a warrant of arrest was assailed for an
alleged improper preliminary examination, the remedy
available is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a
petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a
reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal

30

#12 ILAGAN VS ENRILE CASTILLO

TOPIC: HABEAS CORPUS
DOCTRINES:
1. Special proceeding of habeas corpus inquires on the
legality of ones detention, but it is no longer proper if it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment, or order of
a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 102.
2. Right to preliminary investigation is waivable and do not
affect the validity of the Information filed nor the Courts
jurisdiction as provided in People vs. Casiano.
FACTS:
1. IBP, FLAG, and MABINI, filed herein petition for habeas
corpus on behalf of 3 arrested lawyers (Ilagan, Arellano,
and Risonar) pursuant to merely a Mission Order allegedly
issued by the Ministry of National Defense and were
detained at Camp Catitipan in Davao City.
2. The petitioners were arrested allegedly for their
participation in subversive actions in Davao City,
especially in the Welgang Bayan. Petitioners averred
that they were merely negotiating panels.
3. Respondents in their Return required by the Court averred
that arrests were pursuant to PDA issued by the President,
suspension of writ of habeas corpus (Proc. No. 2045-A),
state of rebellion in Davao City, and ruling in GarciaPadilla vs. Enrile that Courts lack authority to inquire to
the cause and validity of detention of persons pursuant to
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
4. For lack of evidence to link petitioners to the subversive
actions, the Court ordered their temporary release, but
the respondents filed an Urgent Motion that Information
for Rebellion was filed against the 3 before the RTC of
Davao City, thus, petition should be dismissed for being
moot and academic.
5. Petitioners filed their Opposition alleging there was no
preliminary investigation conducted, thus, violation of

their constitutional right to due process, hence,

Information is void. Furthermore, suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus was unconstitutional for lack of legal basis
as provided in the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. WON petition for habeas corpus should be granted?
NO.
2. WON Information was void and RTC had no jurisdiction for
lack of preliminary investigation? NO.
HELD:
First Issue: (MAIN)
1. See Doctrine No. 1. The proper remedy in this case is to
file in the RTC Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest,
and/or Information or to ask for reinvestigation of the
case.
2. Habeas corpus could not lie after warrant of commitment
was issued by the Court based on the Information filed. As
provided in Sec. 14, Rule 102, a prisoner lawfully
committed and charged with offense punishable by death,
shall not be released, discharged or bailed, but if not
punishable as such, may bail on judges discretion.
Second Issue: (SUB-ISSUE)
1. 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure requires that no
Information be filed to offenses cognizable by RTC without
first conducting preliminary investigation except those in
Sec. 7, Rule 112. However, the Verification filed by the
City Prosecutor stated that the Information was filed
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 and he found sufficient
ground to hold them for trial. Thus, preliminary
investigation is not required prior to filing of such
Information.
2. Sec. 5, Rule 113 provides for instances when warrantless
arrest is lawful. Thus if the 3 detained lawyers fall either in
a) of that rule (in flagrante delicto) or in b) (hot pursuit),
presentation of evidence is required, which is proper to be
done in court.

31

3. See Doctrine No. 2. The trial court should not dismiss the
Information if there is no preliminary investigation, but
hold it in abeyance then conduct its own investigation or
ask the fiscal to reinvestigate.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed for being moot and
academic because detained pursuant to the Warrant of
Arrests issued in relation to the criminal case of Rebellion
filed against them.

32

#13 TABAO v. JUDGE BARATAMAN - TANGONAN

FACTS:
1. Complainant Rasmia Tabao was the private complainant in
a criminal case for abandonment of minor.
2. On July 16, 1998, judge Acmad Barataman issued an
Order granting the motion for bail on recognizance filed
by the father of accused Samsodin Tabao pursuant to R.A.
No. 6036.
3. The motion of the prosecution to cancel bail on the
ground that accused is a certified public accountant and
can afford to post cash bond was denied by judge
Barataman.
4. Complainant averred that respondent judge a committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for bail
on recognizance because:
a) it was filed not by the accused but by his father,
Hadji Yusoph Tabao;
b) the prosecutor was not furnished a copy of the
motion and there was no hearing conducted;
c) it lacked the sworn statement of the accused
signed in the presence of two witnesses; and
d) the motion and its supporting affidavit were signed
by the father of the accused. She also contended
that the accused is not poor but is a certified public
accountant and operates a transport business in
Metro Manila.
6. Thus, it is urged that he should not have been released on
recognizance since he could put up a cash bond.
7. Later, Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco, Jr. found
judge Barataman guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
releasing the accused on recognizance before it could
acquire jurisdiction over his person since the accused was
still at large when the motion for bail was filed.
8. He likewise found the respondent judge to have violated
R.A. No. 6036. He also recommended that said judge be
ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00, considering that it is
his first offense, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Barataman erred in granting

the said bail on recognizance in favor of the accused.
HELD:
1. Yes, the respondent judge erred in granting said bail on
the ground that the required sworn statement supporting
the motion for bail was not signed by Samsodin but his
father, and that accused Samsodin was a certified public
accountant (CPA) and clearly able to post the required
bond.
2. R.A. No. 6036 requires that in order to grant a bail on
recognizance to an offense falling under its scope
a) the accused must sign in the presence of two
witnesses of good standing in the community a
sworn statement binding himself, pending final
decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of Court
hearing the case periodically every two weeks, and
b) the accused must be unable to post bail bond.
Clearly, the aforesaid requisites were not met by
the accused.
3. Furthermore, when the bail was granted the court had yet
to acquire jurisdiction over the accused. It is a basic
principle that bail is intended to obtain provisional liberty
and cannot be granted before custody of an accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities by his arrest or
voluntary surrender. It is self-evident that a court cannot
grant provisional liberty to one who is actually in the
enjoyment of his liberty for it would be incongruous to
give freedom to one who is free.
4. Thus, since the requisites under RA 6036 for granting a
bail on recognizance weren't met and the court had yet to
acquire jurisdiction over Samsodin, the order granting the
bail was premature and erroneously granted.

33

#14 LEVISTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS - NICHA

TOPIC: BAIL ON APPEALS
FACTS:
1. Jose Atonio Leviste was charged with the murder of Rafael
de las Alas and was convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide with an
indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
2. Pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, Leviste filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal,
cited his advanced age, health condition and absence of
any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
3. The CA denied application for bail and invoked the
bedrock principle that the discretion to extend bail during
the course of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.
4. CA ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detained or a petitioner needing medical care outside the
prison facility.
5. It also found that Leviste failed to show that he suffers
ailment of such gravity hat his continued confinement
during trial will permanently impair his health or put his
life in danger plus his physical condition does not prevent
him from seeking medical attention while confined in
prison.
6. The CA also considered the fact of Levistes conviction
and held that there was no reason substantial enough to
overturn his guilt.
7. Levistes motion for reconsideration was denied.
He argued that there was grave abuse of discretion
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of
bail under the 3rd paragraph of Sec.5, Rule114 was
present.
His theory was that where
the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than 6
years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of Sec.5 are absent, bail
must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE: WON an application for bail pending appeal by an

appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than 6 years absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in Sec. 5, Rule 114 means that bail
be automatically granted. - NO
HELD:
1. The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two
scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years.
The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated
in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated
by
the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from
legal confinement, evasion of sentence or
violation of the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability
of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
circumstances) not present.
The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least
one of the said circumstances.
2. In the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice
Florenz D. Regalado:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to
an accused may be summarized in the following rules:
a) After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not
more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of
discretion (Sec. 5);
b) After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not
more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances

34

stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is

present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said
court (Sec. 5)
3. Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter
of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion,
except when any of the enumerated circumstances under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall
be denied.
4. The judicial discretion granted to the proper court
(the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily
involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the
court.
(Judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice occurs
where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite
number (of options), there is more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the
decision maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a
clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.)
The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its
own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its
understanding of the applicable law on the matter.
In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should
consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the
accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his
conviction is affirmed.
It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters
beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record,

character and reputation of the applicant, among other

things.
More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or
disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at
the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not
frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which
must be determined by the appellate court.
In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail
is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely
intended
for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.
5. Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances
to the five situations mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bailnegating circumstances to those expressly mentioned,
petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio
alterius rule in statutory construction.
However, the very language of the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the
enumeration of the five situations therein was meant
to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to
the following or other similar circumstances.
Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations
other than those listed in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the
allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.
6. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted
by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal
should be guided by a stringent-standards approach.
It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock
principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be
allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons.

35

In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude

towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is
anchored on the principle that judicial discretion
particularly with respect to extending bail should be
exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for
strong reasons.
In this case, bail is a matter of judicial discretion. If
none of the circumstances are present as mentioned
in the Rules of Court, the court still has the discretion
to grant or deny bail. By denying Leviste's bail, it is
not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.

36

People v. Villanueva.
1. Accused Appellant Rogelio Villanueva
Raped his
daughter Reseilleta.
a. Accused told her daughters to do the laundry in
a nearby water pump but Reseilleta was told to
stay. She was asked to remove her panty and
when she resisted, he poked a knife at her and
forced her to lie down. When she again resisted
and tried to free herself, accused grabbed an
iron bar, struck her back twice and he punched
her in the abdomen, for which she fainted.
i. Reseilleta fled.
b. When Reseilleta fled, Mary Joy was sexually
assaulted [she almost got raped] May joy Fled
as well and told her aunt about it. Mary Joy was
accompanied to her mother in Davao, and they
reported the incident together with Reseilleta.
2. Accused was found guilty by the trial court of rape
and sentenced him to death. [qualified by minority of
the victim and her relationship with the accused]
Hence, this automatic review.
3. Appellant capitalizes much on Reseilletas testimony
that she was unconscious during the rape. Appellant
contends that if Reseilleta was unconscious she would
be incapable of knowing or remembering what
transpired. Hence, her assertion that he removed her
clothes and thereafter had sexual intercourse with her
is highly suspect.
ISSUE:
1. WON Accused was guilty of the crime charged. YES.
2. WON the court erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship. NO.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
Well settled is the rule that assessment of credibility of
witnesses is a function that is best discharged by trial
judge whose conclusion thereon are accorded much
weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on

appeal unless a material or substantial fact has been

overlooked or misappreciated which if properly taken
into account could alter the outcome of the case
Nave and unsophisticated as she was, Reseilleta could
not be expected to give flawless answers to all the
questions propounded to her. More importantly, it must
be stressed that the above-quoted testimony must be
taken as the logical conclusion of Reseilleta that it was
appellant who removed her clothes. Before she lost
consciousness following her fathers brutal
assault on her with an iron bar after she refused
to remove her panty, she was still wearing her
clothes and panty and appellant was the only
one who was with her at that time.
The circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of
events which inevitably points to appellant, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., they
are consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that appellant is guilty and at the same
time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except
that appellant is guilty
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
not only show that he was not present at the locus
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime,
but also that it was physically impossible for him to
have been present at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

SECOND ISSUE
Accused contends that in the event he is found guilty,
he should be convicted only of simple rape not
qualified. He argues that the information against him
failed to allege qualifying circumstance of relationship
between him and Reseilleta. NO
The qualifying circumstance of relationship of the
accused to the victim being father and daughter is so
alleged in the Information.
People v. Bali-Balita and People v. Rodriguez no longer
controlling.
There is no law or rule prescribing a specific location in

37

the Information where the qualifying circumstances

must exclusively be alleged before they could be
appreciated against the accused.
Nothing in Secs. 61 and 82 of Rule 110 mandates the
material allegations should be stated in the body and
not in the preamble or caption of the Information.
Instead, both sections state that as long as the
pertinent and significant allegations are enumerated in
the Information it would be deemed sufficient in form
and substance.
It is irrelevant and immaterial whether the qualifying
circumstance of relationship is mentioned in the
opening paragraph of the Information or in the second
paragraph which alleges the acts constituting the
crime charged since either paragraph is an integral
part of the Information.
The information sheet must be considered, not by
sections or parts, but as one whole document serving
one purpose, i.e., to inform the accused why the full
panoply of state authority is being marshalled against
him.
Allegations of qualifying circumstances should not be
declared insufficient merely by virtue of a perceived
formal defect in their locations, which do not otherwise
prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. As long
as they are adequately pleaded within the four corners
of the charge sheet, as in the instant case, they could
not be invalidated by the fact that they are found only

in the introductory paragraph.

A cursory reading of the Information hereto fore
recited readily reveals more than satisfactory
compliance with the Rules, specifically Sec. 8, Rule
110, of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Unquestionably, there is concurrence in the allegations
of relationship and minority in the Information
HOWEVER, even if the qualifying circumstance of
relationship is appreciated, the qualifying circumstance
of minority is not.
Records show that they is a perceivable
variance as to the age of the victim.
No independent evidence on record that could
accurately shor the age of the victim.

DISPOSITIVE: Acussed guilty of simple rape, not qualified.

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint of information. A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed. When the offense is committed by
more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the facts of omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it (underscoring supplied).

38

#2 PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN & CASTILLO

MERCADO
TOPIC: The complaint/ information; test of sufficiency
FACTS:
1. Castillo was elected as mayor of the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite.
2. An information was filed against Castillo charging him
with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
in relation to the alleged illegal operation of the Villa
Esperanza dumpsite.
3. According to the information, Catillo, in the performance
of his official functions as Mayor, gave unwarranted
benefits to his co-accused Melancio and Emerenciano
Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the dumpsite
without the Environmental Compliance Certificate and
permit from the Environment Management Bureau.
4. An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had
been previously filed against Castillo also in relation to the
illegal operation of the dumpsite.
5. Office of the Ombudsman guilty of the administrative
charge.
6. On appeal, CA set aside the decision of the Ombudsman
and ordered the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against Castillo.
7. Castillo filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Dismiss
or Terminate Proceedings denied.
8. Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the same does not charge
an offense. He claimed that a public officer may only be
held liable for the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act if he caused undue injury to the government
or any private person. Also, he argued that the undue
injury must not only be mentioned in the Information, its
extent must be specified.
9. Sandiganbayan Special Division granted Castillos
Supplemental Motion. The court notes the failure to
quantify the alleged unwarranted benefits supposedly
given by movant to his co-accused as well as the undue
injury caused to the residents and students of the area
affected by the dumpsite. Thus, it is required that the

undue injury be specified, quantified, and proven to the

point of moral certainty.
ISSUE: WON an Information alleging the grant of
unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury must
state the precise amount of the alleged benefit and identify,
specify, and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral
certainty NO.
HELD:
1. The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an
accused is formally informed of the facts and the acts
constituting the offense charged.
2. When insufficient, an accused can file a motion to have
the Information quashed and/or dismissed before he
enters his plea.
3. The courts must look into three matters: what must be
alleged in a valid Information, what are the elements of
the crime charged, and whether these elements are
sufficiently stated in the Information.
4. Sufficiency of Complaint or Information A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.
5. Cause of the accusation acts or omissions must be
stated in ordinary concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
6. Purposes of this rule - enables accused to suitably
prepare his defense and allows accused, if found guilty, to
plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense.
7. True test of sufficiency of an Information is whether the
crime is described in intelligible terms with such

39

particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable

certainty, of the offense charged.
8. Information filed against Castillo and his co-accused is
sufficient.
9. As long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have
been alleged, an Information charging a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act need not state, to the
point of specificity, the exact amount of the unwarranted
benefit granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the point
of moral certainty, the undue injury caused.
10.The details required by the Sandiganbayan are matters of
evidence best raised during the trial; these need not be
stated in the Information.
11.The outright quashal of the information is not proper if
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment.
12.Hence, even assuming that the Information was defective,
the Sandiganbayan should have ordered its amendment
and not its quashal.
DISPOSITIVE: PETITION IS GRANTED. SANDIGANBAYAN
REVERSED.

40

#3 RODRIGUEZ VS PONFERRADA CASTILLO

TOPIC:
Person
prosecuting
criminal
intervention of offended party through
prosecutor.

action;
private

DOCTRINES:
1. The offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a
crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the
nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no
civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2)
when, from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are
entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive the right to
institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so
or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In any of these
instances, the private complainants interest in the case
disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole
function of the public prosecutor.
2. Election of remedies is the adoption of one of two or more
coexisting ones, with the effect of precluding a resort to the
others.
FACTS:
1.
Mary Ann Rodriguez (pet) issued a bouncing check to
Gladys Nocom (private resp.). Upon finding probable cause,
Asst. City Prosecutor of QC filed Informations for Estafa under
Art. 315 par. 2(d) as amended by PD 818 and for violation of
BP 22 (Bouncing Checks).
2. Estafa case was raffled to RTC-QC, presided by respondent
judge Ponferrada, while the BP 22 case was raffled to MeTCQC. Private prosecutor filed for Formal Entry of Appearance
with the Estafa case, but the accused filed his Opposition.
3. RTC held that the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense is deemed instituted, unless
offended party (1) waives the civil action, (2) reserves the
right to institute it separately, or (3) institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action. Since, offended party had paid
filing fee for the Estafa case prior to the filing of the BP 22
case with MeTC, it allowed the private prosecutor to appear
and intervene in the proceedings. MR filed by pet also
denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON private prosecutor be allowed to intervene in

Estafa case for civil liability arising from issuance of the
check, which is also subject matter of the pending B.P. 22
case?YES.
RATIO:
1. To summarize rule in the Rules of Court, Rule 110, sec. 16
(Intervention of the offended party in criminal action) and
Rule 111, sec.1 (Institution of criminal and civil actions), See
Doctrine No. 1. However, none of the exceptions apply in the
case, thus, offended party may intervene in the criminal
cases.
2. CIVIL ACTION IN BP 22 CASE DOES NOT BAR CIVIL
ACTION IN ESTAFA CASE. In Banal vs. Tadeo, the Court
ruled that while an act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not because it
is a crime but because it caused damage to another. In a
single act of issuing a bouncing check, it gave rise to 2
separate crimes, Estafa and violation of BP 22. The Rules of
Court allows the offended party through his counsel to
intervene in both proceedings for the civil aspect. However,
although the law allows 2 simultaneous remedies, recovery of
civil liability in 1 bars recovery in the other for there is only a
single injury sustained by the offended party.
3. See Doctrine No. 2. In Mellon Bank vs. Magsino, the Court
ruled that the purpose of the doctrine of election of remedies
is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent
double redress for a single wrong. It applies the law of
estoppel, where a party cannot, in the assertion of his right
occupy inconsistent positions which form the basis of his
respective remedies. However, when a set of facts entitles a
party to alternative remedies, these remedies are not
considered inconsistent, thus, invocation of one remedy is
not an election which will bar the other, unless the suit upon
the remedy first invoked has reached final adjudication or the
plaintiff have gained an advantage or caused detriment or
change of situation to the other.
4. In the case at bar, no judgment on the civil liability has
been rendered in either criminal case so the offended party is
not yet required to elect remedies and after choosing a
remedy, be barred from others.

41

5. Therefore, the institution of the civil action in the Estafa

cases and the deemed inclusion of another set of civil
actions in BP 22 case are not exactly repugnant or
inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies
that the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal
case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the
institution in an Estafa case of the corresponding civil action,
even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same
check.
6. The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by
Justice Regalado, that the special rule on BP 22 cases was
added, because the dockets of the courts were clogged with
litigations where creditors used the courts as collectors
because ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual
damages in criminal cases. Therefore, the rule on the
necessary inclusion of a civil action with the payment of filing
fees based on the face value of the check involved was laid
down to prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat
of a criminal prosecution to collect on their credit free of
charge not to preclude the prosecution of the civil action that
corresponds to the Estafa case, should the latter also be filed.
7. Moreover, crimes of Estafa and violation of BP 22 are
different and distinct from each other. Furthermore, the fact
that the Rules do not allow the reservation of civil actions in
BP 22 cases cannot deprive offended party of the right to
protect her interests in the criminal action for Estafa for
nothing in the current law or rules on BP 22 vests the
jurisdiction of the corresponding civil case exclusively in the
court trying the BP 22 criminal case.
DISPOSITIVE:
Respondents won.

Petition

dismissed.

RTC

affirmed.

42

#4 GOAN V YATCO LAZATIN

DOCTRINE: While criminal actions as a rule are prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal, an offended
party may intervene in the proceeding, personally or by
attorney. The law makes no distinction between cases that
are public in nature and those that can only be prosecuted at
the instance of the offended party. The only exception to this
rule is when the offended party waives his right to civil action
or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the
termination of the case.
FACTS:
A case for grave threats was filed against Co Peng alias
Tony Tan. Petitioner is one of the offended parties.
Co Peng was arraigned and his case set for hearing.
After the first witness for the prosecution testified,
counsel
for
private
prosecution
moved
for
postponement due to the sickness of their witness.
Motion was granted.
On the given date, counsel for private prosecution
moved for continuance of trial. Again granted.
On the given date, counsel again filed a motion for
postponement, seeking the transfer of the case to San
Pablo, alleging that his witnesses, as well as
defendants, were residents of the same.
o Motion was objected to by the defense and the
fiscal
Defense said that since the private
prosecutor was acting under the direction
and control of the fiscal and the latter had
registered his objection, he found no
reason for him to insist on his petition
more so when his appearance in this case
was not as a matter of right but merely by
tolerance on the part of the court.
Counsel for private prosecution asked for
a ruling on whether his appearance in the
case was a matter of right or a matter of
tolerance.

The court ruled that in cases of this

nature which do not involve any
civil liability the appearance of a
private prosecutor cannot be
considered as a matter of right and
if allowed it would only be upon
tolerance of the court and of the
parties.
Nevertheless, counsel for the
private prosecution cannot claim
any prejudice for he could continue
appearing as such by tolerance of
the court until after the final
termination of the case.
Thus, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON in the prosecution of a criminal case,

commenced either by complaint or by information, an
offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney, as a
matter of right as claimed by petitioner, or upon mere
tolerance, as ruled by respondent judge.
RULING:
Section 4, Rule 106, provides that "all criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the fiscal."
Section 15, Rule 106, also provides that "unless the
offended party has waived the civil action or expressly
reserved the right to institute it after the termination
of the criminal case, . . . he may intervene, personally
or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense."
While criminal actions as a rule are prosecuted under
the direction and control of the fiscal, an offended
party may intervene in the proceeding, personally or
by attorney, especially in cases of offenses that cannot
be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended
party.
o The only exception to this rule is when the
offended party waives his right to civil action or

43

expressly reserves his right to institute it after

the termination of the case, in which case he
loses his right to intervene upon the theory that
he is deemed to have lost his interest in its
prosecution.
The law makes no distinction between cases that are
public in nature and those that can only be prosecuted
at the instance of the offended party. In either case the
law gives to the offended party the right to intervene,
personally or by counsel, and he is deprived of such
right only when he waives the civil action or reserves
his right to institute one.
o The respondent judge, therefore, erred in
considering the appearance of counsel merely
as a matter of tolerance.
While the ruling of the judge is erroneous,
he has however caused no prejudice to
counsel
since
he
has
expressly
manifested in his order that he could
continue representing the interest of his
client. The action of the judge may at
most be considered an error of judgment
which can be remedied by appeal, not
certiorari.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition denied.

44

#5 PEOPLE v. ABAD SANTOS - SULLANO

Facts:
1. An appeal from the decision of the RTC Branch 81 of
Romblon, Romblon finding accused-appellants guilty of
the murder of Reynaldo M. Abrenica and sentencing
each of them to reclusion perpetua. The body of
Reynaldo was found by his wife on the landing of the
stairs of their house. An autopsy conducted by Dr.
Villaseor of the PNP Crime Laboratory yielded to the
conclusion that the cause of death is intracranial
hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury.
2. Three years after Reynaldos death, the case was filed
after an alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor, surfaced
and implicated the accused-appellants. Based on the
testimony of this witness, the accused- appellants
were found guilty in the aforementioned decision.
3. The accused-appellants, in their appeal, alleged that
the trial court erred in failing to resolve doubts and
discrepancies in its findings of fact in favor of the
accused and that the court erred in finding credible the
testimonies of Mercy Villamor and Dr. Villaseor.
4. The complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief
separate from that which the OSG would file, by way of
an answer to the brief of accused-appellants. This
motion was denied. The OSG subsequently filed a
Manifestation recommending the acquittal of accusedappellants. In view of the position taken by the OSG,
complainant filed a Memorandum for the Private
Complainant (after filing a Manifestation and Motion to
File Brief) which was noted by the Court.

may be affected by the judgment.

2. The complainant has an interest in the civil liability
arising from the crime. Hence, in the prosecution of
the offense, the complainants role is that of a witness
for the prosecution.
3. Ordinarily, the appeal of the criminal cases involves as
parties only the accused, as appellants, and the State,
represented by the SolGen, as the appellee. The
participation of the private offended party would be a
mere surplusage if the State were simply to seek
affirmation of a judgment of conviction.
4. However, where the OSG takes a contrary position and
recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the
accused, the complainants right to be heard as
regards indemnity and damages arises.
5. Nevertheless, the evidence is insufficient to sustain the
accused-appellants conviction. Mercy Villamors
testimony
is
riddled
with
inconsistencies,
improbabilities and uncertainties which relate to
material points. Evidence, to be believed, must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but
must itself be credible

Issue:
WON any party may appeal from a final order or judgment
Held:
1. Rule 122, Sec.1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order, unless the accused will be
placed in double jeopardy. It has been held that the
word party in the provision includes not only the
government and the accused but other persons who

45

#6 People vs Abad Santos- TING

1. Arache has been accused of treason.
a. He sold several properties to the Japanese imperial
forces in Manila during enemy occupation, and sold
other similar equipments
2. After arraignment and during trial, counsel of Arache
petitioned for the prosecution to clarify and other similar
equipments provided in the information
a. Prosecution objected because it was already filed out
of time- after arraignment
b. Judge granted the petition- the prosecutor must give a
bill of particulars. The case was temporarily postponed
3. Instead of submitting the bill of particulars, prosecutor
filed an MR of the said order, because the proper remedy
is amendment and not a bill of particulars- Judge denied
4. Prosecutor filed a petition for certiorari in the SC
questioning the order of the court
WON court was correct in granting the motion for a
bill of particulars YES
1. There is no specific provision of law authorizing the filing
of bill of particulars in criminal cases
a. However, in the absence of specific provisions of law
prohibiting the filing of specifications or bills of
particulars in criminal cases, their submission may be
permitted, as they cannot prejudice any substantial
rights of the accused
b. Such will serve to apprise the accused clearly of the
charges filed against them, and thus enable them to
prepare intelligently whatever defense or defenses
they might have.
2. General rule is, all defects in the accusation (except lack
of jurisdiction) may be cured by submission of sufficient
evidence in case no objection was made by the defense
a. However, the accused must always be apprised fully of
the true charges against them to avoid any possible
surprise which might be detrimental to their rights
b. Especially because in criminal cases, the life and
liberty of the accused is at stake
c. Ambiguous phrases therefore should not be permitted
in criminal complaints

46

#7 ROCABERTE V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
1. The case at bar treats of the sufficiency of the
averment in the information of the time of the
commission of felony ascribed to petitioner.
2. The information filed against petitioner reads as
follows: That on or about the Period from 1977
to December 28,1983 . The accused conspiring,
confederating, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
take, steal and carry away sledge hammers, block
aluminums, steel plate.
3. The accused moved to quash the information alleging
that the time of commission of the felony charged
(check #2) was fatally defective that there:
a. There was so great a gap as to defy
approximation in the commission of one and the
same offense.
b. The variance is certainly unfair to the accused
for it violates their constitutional right to be
informed before the trial of the specific charge
against them and deprives them of the
opportunity to defend themselves.
4. Motion was denied. Accused filed an MR and presented
an alternative remedy which is Section 4, Rule 117 3.
Still it was denied by respondent judge.
ISSUE: WON the information should be amended?
HELD:
1. The rules of criminal procedure declare that:
a. A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the defendant; the
designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

approximate time of the commission of the

offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
And as regards the time of the commission of the
offense, particularly that:
a. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise time at which the
offense was committed except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense, but the act
may be alleged to have been committed at any
time as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed as the information or
complaint will permit.
A variance of few months between the time set out in
the indictment and that established by the evidence
during the trial has been held not to constitute an error
so serious as to warrant reversal of conviction solely
on that score.
HOWEVER, in this case, there was a variance of several
years between the time state in the information, 1947,
and the proof of its actual commission adduced at the
trial, 1952.
The statement of the time of the commission of the
offense which is so general as to span a number of
years has been held to be fatally defective because it
deprives the accused an opportunity to prepare his
defense.
Note: A defect in the averment as to the time of the
commission of the crime charged is not a ground for a
motion to quash under Rule 116 since it can be cured
by an amendment.
The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege
the time of the commission of the offense with
sufficient definiteness is a Motion for Bill of
Particulars.

DISPOSITIVE: Directing the amendment of the information.

Amendment of complaint or information. If the motion to quash is

based on an alleged defect in the complaint or information which can be
cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made.

47

#8 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTORIA

ARAMBULO AND MIGUEL ARAMBULO, JR - ADOBO

R.

FACTS:
Respondent Victoria R. Arambulo, Emerenciana R.
Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo Reyes,
Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of
Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped
Estate Inc. was incorporated as part of the estate
planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the
estate of Pedro Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.

Jose Buban, as Vice-President and General Manager of

Anaped Estate Inc., filed a complaint for estafa against
Victoria and her husband Miguel because of failure to
remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership
of the commercial apartments was transferred to
Anaped.
Respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on
the ground of a prejudicial question in view of the
pendency of two intra-corporate cases pending before
the RTC of Quezon City and Makati City. SEC Case No.
05-97-5659 is a petition filed by Victorias brother
Oscar for accounting of all corporate funds and assets
of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership
and damages.4 SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition
filed by Victoria and her brothers Reynaldo and
Domingo questioning the authority of their elder
sibling Rodrigo Reyes and Emerenciana R. Gungab, as
well as the Anaped Board of Directors and officers,
including private complainant Buban to act for and in
behalf of the corporation.

ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that

there exists a prejudicial question which calls for the
suspension of the criminal proceedings before the trial court.

HELD:

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the

resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
The requisites of prejudicial question are (1) the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined;
and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal.
SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial
question to the criminal case for estafa. It is an action for
accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped,
annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and damages.
Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they
will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It also does
not automatically follow that an accounting of corporate
funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of
corporate assets would result in the conviction of
respondents in the estafa case.
With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, a prejudicial
question exists. The Complaint in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259
prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors
and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the issue is the
authority of the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the
corporation.
The issue in the criminal case pertains to whether
respondents committed estafa. In this case, the resolution of
the issue of misappropriation by respondents depends upon
the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. If it is ruled in the SEC

48

case that the present Anaped directors and officers were not
validly elected, then respondent Victoria may have every
right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the
essential element of misappropriation in estafa may be
absent in this case.
It appears from the record of the case that Victoria Arambulo
for the last twenty (20) years had been tasked with the
management and collection of rentals of the real properties
the Reyes siblings inherited from their parents, Ana and
Pedro Reyes. SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a petition filed by
Victoria and her brothers Domingo and Reynaldo questioning
the very authority of their elder siblings Rodrigo and
Emerenciana, as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and
Officers, including Buban to act for and in behalf of the
corporation.
Should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-996259, then Buban, who does not own either by himself or in
behalf of Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore
managed by Victoria, cannot demand remittance of the
rentals on the property and Victoria does not have the
obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban. Verily, the result
of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or
guilt of respondents in the criminal case for estafa.

49

#9 CONSING, Jr v. PEOPLE LACAP

TOPIC: INDEPENDENT ACTION FOR FRAUD; NOT
PREJUDICIAL
DISCLAIMER: Sorry ang haba ng facts but youll understand
why. Promise.
FACTS:
10.Petitioner, Consing, negotiated and obtained for himself
and his mother (Cecilia De La Cruz) various loans from
Unicapital Inc.
11.The loans were covered by a real estate mortgage on a
parcel of land
a. Loan contained an option wherein Unicapital
may purchase the mortgaged property and offset the payment with the amount due from the
loan
b. Unicapital agreed to purchase half of the
property
c. The other half was purchased by Plus Builders,
joint venture partner of Unicapital
12.Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the
property, they found out that the title to the property was
really in the names of Po Yu and Juanito Teng.
a. They acquired the property from Consings
mother, de la Cruz.
13.Unicapital demanded the return of the amount paid for
the property (P41.3m)
14.Instead of heading to the demands, Consing filed a civil
case for injunctive relief to enjoin Unicapital from
proceeding against him for the collection of the P41.3m
PASIG CIVIL CASE
a. He claimed that he was merely an agent of his
mother
15.On the same day, Unicapital initiated a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of public
documents against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati
City Prosecutors Office.
a. MAKAI The prosecute filed against Consing and
De la Cruz an information for estafa in the RTC
Makati MAKATI CRIMINAL CASE

16.Unicapital also sued Consing in the RTC Makati for the

recovery of a sum of money and damages with an
application for preliminary attachment. MAKATI CIVIL
CASE
17.Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati
Criminal Case on the ground of existence of a prejudicial
question due to the pendency of the Makati and Pasig
civil cases.
18.RTC: suspended the criminal case on the ground of
prejudicial question
19.CA: upheld RTC decision
a. It held that the resolution of the issue in the
Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private
respondent may be held liable in the questioned
transaction, will determine the guilt or
innocence of private respondent Consing in both
the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
20.MEANWHILE, Plus Builders also commenced its own suit
against Consing in RTC Manila MANILA CIVIL CASE
a. AND an information for estafa for falsification in
RTC Cavite CAVITE CRIMINAL CASE
b. Consing also filed a motion to defer arraignment
on the ground of prejudicial question
c. RTC: denied motion to defer arraignment
d. CA: reversed
e. Consing appealed with the SC through petition
for review ruled that no prejudicial question
that would satisfy the suspension of the Cavite
Criminal Case.
i. the determination of the issue involved in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the respondent in the
criminal
case
for
estafa
through
falsification of public document
21.Going back to the Makati Criminal Case, CA amended its
decision and ruled that similar with the Cavite Criminal
case, no reason to suspend Makati Criminal Case.

50

ISSUE: Whether the filing of a civil case involving the same

parties and the same transaction warrant the suspension of
the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question NO
HELD:
A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil case
reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This was
apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to
the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in
offering as security and later object of sale, a property which
they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title.
As such, the action was one that could proceed
independently of a criminal case.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation,
fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a
criminal case.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of
Consings being a mere agent of his mother who should not
be criminally liable for having so acted due to the property
involved having belonged to his mother as principal.
Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother
in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or
any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, determination of the issue in the civil
case for injuctive relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence
of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.

51

#10 PEOPLE v. BAYOTAS

Facts:
1. Bayotas was charged and convicted for the crime of
rape before the RTC of Roxas City.
2. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died,
consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal but required the Solicitor
General to file a comment as regards the civil liability
of Bayotas.
3. The Sol. Gen. recommended that the death of Bayotas
pending appeal of his conviction, did not extinguish his
civil liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his civil liability which is solely
based on the act complained of ?
HELD:
The civil liability of Bayotas was extinguished upon his death,
while his conviction is still under appeal.
Rules:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which
the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the
Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible privation of right by prescription.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives

notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19
Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20

52

#12 RIMANADO v. WINSTON TANGONAN

FACTS:
1. On January 21, 2004, an Information was filed before the
RTC charging petitioner Leonora Rimando of the crime of
estafa through the use of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations.
2. According to the prosecution, Rimando enticed Sps.
Aldaba to invest in her business under the assurance that
it is stable and that their money would earn 8% monthly
interest.
3. Convinced by Rimandos proposal and taking into
consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba gave
Rimando a check in the amount of P500k as investment in
her business.
4. Rimando then gave them 3 postdatedchecks, one for
P500k and the other two for P40k each, and made them
sign an investment contract with Multitel International
Holding Corp. (Multitel).
5. Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to
encash the same but were dishonored for being drawn
against insufficient funds.
6. Despite demands, Rimando still failed to settle the same.
Hence, the spouses filed a criminal complaint for estafa.
7. However, Rimando contends that they weren't friends and
she didn't entice them into investing in a business, rather
she just referred them to Multitel Investment Manager
Cayaban, who handled their investment.
8. The spouses later filed another criminal case against
Rimando for violated of BP 22 with the MTC.
9. The petitioner was acquitted both in the BP 22 case and
the estafa case, but was still held civilly liable towards the
Aldabas for P500k for being an accommodation party. The
CA affirmed the RTC's ruling.

1. Yes, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted

from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present
different causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from
each other.
2. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final
adjudication. It is well-settled that "the acquittal of the
accused does not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case.
3. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
4. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in
the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.
5. In this case, Rimandos civil liability didn't arise from any
purported act constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC
clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on
the Aldabas to induce them to invest money in Multitel.
6. Rather, her civil liability rooted from being an
accommodation party to the check for P500k. In lending
her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to
the latter, and assuch, she may be held directly liable for
the value of the issued check.
7. Since Rimandos said civil liability did not arise from or is
not based upon the crime she is charged with, and hence,
the CA correctly upheld the same despite her acquittal in
the estafa case.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Rimando was still civilly liable in

the estafa case despite her acquittal and exoneration from
civil liability in the BP 22 case.
HELD:

53

#13 TEEHANKEE v. MADAYAG - NICHA

TOPIC: AMENDMENT / SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
FACTS:
1. Claudio Teehankee, Jr. shot Maureen Hultman on the head
to which he was charged frustrated murder.
2. After the prosecution rested its case, Teehankee Jr. filed a
motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence but before
it could be filed, Hultman died.
3. Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio Vinluan filed an
omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended
information, from frustrated murder to murder, and to
submit said amended information.
4. Teehankee Jr. filed an opposition as well as rejoinder to the
reply of the prosecution.
5. The trial court admitted the amended information.
6. At the scheduled arraignment, Teehankee Jr. refused to be
arraigned on the amended information for lack of
preliminary investigation.
a) Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in
the amended information, that the accused ". . .
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the
said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who
was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal
wounds which directly caused the death of said
Maureen Hultman . . ." constitutes a substantial
amendment since it involves a change in the
nature of the offense charged, that is, from
frustrated to consummated murder.
b)
From this, he argues that there being a
substantial amendment, the same may no
longer be allowed after arraignment and during
the trial.
7. Judge Job Madayag ordered a plea of not guilty to be
entered for Teehankee Jr. then ordered the prosecution to
present its evidence.
8. Teehankee Jr.s counsel manifested that they would not
take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue
raised so the trial court appointed a counsel de officio to
represent Teehankee Jr.

ISSUE: WON an amended information (from frustrated

murder to
murder) without preliminary investigation, after the
prosecution rested on the original information, may legally
and validly be admitted.- YES
HELD:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment. The information or complaint
may be amended, in substance or form, without leave
of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial
as to all matters of
form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights
of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with
Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the
information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers
to the substitution of the information or complaint.
1. In determining whether there should be an
amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14,
Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the
second paragraph, the rule is that where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the first information, an amendment of the
information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new

54

information charges an offense which is distinct and different

from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
2. In the case, there is an identity of offenses charged
in both the original and the amended information.

4. It consequently follows that since only a formal

amendment was involved and introduced in the
second information, a preliminary investigation is
unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused.

What is involved is not a variance in the nature of different

offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution
of
thesame offense from frustrated to consummated
murder. This being the case, an amendment of the original
information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of
the amended information for murder is proper.

5. If the crime originally charged is related to the

amended charge such that an inquiry into one would
elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into
the
other
would
reveal,
a
new
preliminary
investigation is not necessary.

3. After arraignment and during the trial, amendments

are allowed, but only as to matters of form and
provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of
the accused.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition dismissed.

NOTES
DIFFERENCES BET. AMENDMENT AND SUBSTITUTION

The test of whether an amendment is only of form and an

accused is not prejudiced by such amendment has been said
to be whether or not a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be equally available after the
amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence the
accused might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other; if the answer is in
the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of
substance.
An objective appraisal of the amended information for
murder filed against petitioner will readily show that the
nature of the offense originally charged was not
actually
changed.
Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the
supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely
supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper
penalty for the crime. That the accused
committed
a
felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the
prosecution's theory. Under the circumstances
thus
obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information
for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form
which is allowed even during
the trial of the
case.

1. Amendment may involve either formal or

substantial changes, while substitution necessarily
involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be
effected without leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court as the original
information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is
no need for another preliminary investigation and the
retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of
information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and
the accused has to plead anew to the new information;
4. An amended information refers to the same offense
charged in the original information or to an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the original charge, hence substantial amendments to
the information after the plea has been taken cannot
be made over the objection of the accused, for if the
original information would be withdrawn, the accused

55

could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand,

substitution requires or presupposes that the new information
involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the
accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
FORMAL AMENDMENTS
The following have been held to be merely formal
amendments:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction;
(2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one;
(3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
(4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.

56

#14 RICARZE v. CA - MERCADO

TOPIC: Form and Content; Name of the accused and
offended party
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Ricarze was employed as a collector messenger
by the City Service Commission.
2. He was assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines,
Inc. (Caltex) and his primary task was to collect checks
payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier.
3. Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance Department
Manager Romano, filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor for
estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
4. Romano discovered that unknown to the department, a
company check (Check No. 74001) payable to Gutierrez
had been cleared through the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB).
5. An investigation also revealed that two other checks
(Checks No. 73999 and 740000) were missing and that in
Check No. 74001, his signature and that of another
signatory were forgeries.
6. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos. 74001
and 72922 were deposited at the BDO SM Makati Branch
under the Savings Account of Gutierrez.
7. Gutierrez disowned the savings account as well as his
signatures and denied having withdrawn any amount from
the said account.
8. PCIB credited the amount to Caltex. However, the City
Prosecutor was not informed to this development
9. Prosecutor filed 2 Informations for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents against the
petitioner before the RTC.
10.Petitioner was arraigned pleaded not guilty to both
charges.
11.The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices
(SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence.
12.Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that the
private complainant was represented by ACCRA Law

Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial,
and it was only after the prosecution rested its case that
SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor
representing the PCIB.
13.Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had
not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality
to appear as private prosecutor.
14.Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex
and not PCIB.
15.Petitioner averred that unless the Informations were
amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his
right as accused would be prejudiced. Also, he pointed out
that the Informations can no longer be amended because
he had already been arraigned under the original
Informations.
16.PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion and contended
that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to Caltex;
hence, it had been subrogated to the rights and interests
of Caltex as private complainant.
17.Petitioner averred that the substitution of PCIB as private
complainant cannot be made by mere oral motion.
18.PCIB averred that the erroneous designation of the name
of the offended party is a mere formal defect which can
be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in
the Information.
19.Petitioner averred that the substitution of PCIB as private
complainant cannot be made by mere oral motion.
20.RTC granted the motion for substitution of PCIB as
private complainant for Caltex, but denied petitioners
motion to have the formal offer of evidence of SRMO
expunged from the record.
21.CA denied the petition to annul the orders of the RTC
and declared that when the PCIB restored the amount of
checks to Caltex, it was subrogated to the latters right
against petitioner. Moreover, the court declared that in
offenses against property, the designation of the name of
the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as
long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified.

57

ISSUE: WON there is a valid subrogation of Caltex and PCIB YES

HELD:
1. Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial
amendment of the complaint or information may be made
without leave of court.
2. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may
be made but with leave of court and if it dies not prejudice
the rights of the accused.
3. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed
except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
4. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form.
5. The following have been held to be mere formal
amendments:
a) New allegations which relate only to the range of
the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction
b) An amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one
c) Additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has or will assume
d) An amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused
e) An amendment that merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and not to
introduce new and material facts, and merely
states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and
which adds nothing essential for conviction for the
crime charged
6. In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as
private complainant is not substantial amendment. The
substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, not did it result in any prejudice to

petitioner.
7. Petitioners argument on subrogation is misplaced. The
Court agrees with respondent PCIBs comment that
petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and
conventional subrogation.
8. The present case involves legal subrogation that occurs
by operation of law, and without need of debtors
knowledge.
9. Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB,
through counsel, has the right to intervene in the
proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to
restitution of its properties or funds, reparation, or
indemnification
10.Petitioners gripe that the charges against him should be
dismissed because the allegations in both Informations
failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold
water.
11.A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the offense;
and the place wherein the offense was committed.
12.The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or
information to state the name and surname of the person
against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed or any appellation or nickname by which such
person has been or is known and if there is no better way
of Identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious
name
13.In case of offenses against property, the designation of
the name of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in
the complaint or information can be properly identified.
DISPOSITIVE: PETITION DENIED.

58

59