Sincere Humans and Insincere Beasts:

Ciceros Politics of Humanity

ABSTRACT
This article analyses the politics of humanity in Ciceros philosophical and rhetorical works, the practice of projecting and shifting
the moral and political boundary that separates the human from the
inhuman, the inept at being human, and the undeserving of being
human. This practice has many affinities with the relatively modern
phenomenon of dehumanisation. In the first part, the emphasis is on
Ciceros humanism, in particular his ideas on human nature as they
appear in De Officiis. Here I also show the impact of this practice on
Roman ideas of self-fashioning, sincerity and social performance. In
the second part, I observe the way in which Ciceros political and
legal theory fits within this ideological project. I further argue that
Ciceros humanism provided a conceptual background to the
rhetorical dehumanisation of his political enemies, that is, to the
claims in his invective that these men could no longer be considered
as proper human beings. My final suggestion is that the goal of this
practice, at least some of the time, was to make a case for excluding
these individuals from the states legal system and thus depriving
them of its protections.

The war with beasts and human outlaws who make beasts of
themselves is fundamental to civil human order.
S. Clark, Good and Bad Ethology.
It is often asserted that in Roman politics personalities were more important
than political programs, and that Roman politicians usually judged it more
expedient to defame the character of a political opponent than to attack his
political principles. In their invective, Roman orators sought not only to
defame their enemies but to exclude them entirely from the community,1 and
one of the central strategies of such rhetorical exclusions can be labelled as
dehumanisation. Cicero was particularly fond of dehumanisation and would
often attack his enemies by arguing that their crimes were sufficient to
exclude them from the common body of humanity and to earn them the label

A. Corbeill, Ciceronian Invective, in J.M. May (ed.), Brills Companion to Cicero, Oratory
and Rhetoric (Leiden 2002) 198-217, at 208; S. Koster, Die Invektive in der griechischen und
rmischen Literatur (Meisenheim am Glan 1980) 38-9.

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of subhuman beasts or monsters.2 Such attacks are usually seen as purely

rhetorical, as one of several techniques of defamation suited to this genre,
with the result that the dehumanising insults are often regarded as
metaphorical commonplaces, perhaps not meant to be taken seriously. 3
Nevertheless, we may be justified in assigning to this strategy a more
prominent place within the ideological superstructure formed by Ciceros
intellectual, political and literary activity during the last years of the
Republic. In this paper, I consider dehumanisation in Ciceros invective in
the context of the larger framework of Ciceros thought, his political and
legal theory and in particular his humanism, which, as Bauman has observed,
often acted as a philosophical gloss on the politics of humanity: 4
As a philosophical issue, humanism is an ethical discourse though more
often than not it appears in ontological disguise. Ostensibly, it is about human
nature and the human beings natural endowments. However, defining human
nature also means drawing a boundary around the human to make sense of
the already drawn or intended to be drawn political boundary separating
human from inhuman (or more to the point, from inept at being human,
undeserving to be human, or bound to be humanised. The politics of
humanity is the practice of projecting and shifting such boundaries the very
practice on which humanism offers a philosophical gloss.

Ciceros humanism can be seen as having served such a role, that is, to have
provided a philosophical gloss for his own brand of the politics of
humanity, or his strategy of claiming human status for himself, while
denying the same to his political opponents. I will analyse this role in some
detail and further suggest that, at least some of the time, dehumanisation in
Cicero was akin to the more modern manifestations of this phenomenon,
where it involves the reclassification of human victims as animals in order to
deprive them of any rights or claims to moral consideration. 5 In other words,
I will argue that Cicero labelled his targets as subhuman beasts in order to
exclude them from the states legal system and thus deny them the legal
rights and protections claimable only by truly human citizens.
Furthermore, when analysing Ciceros politics of humanity, one can also
notice the impact of this practice on Roman ideas of sincerity, self-fashioning

J.M. May, Cicero and the Beasts, Syllecta Classica 7 (1996) 143-53; C. Lvy, Rhtorique
et philosophie: la monstruosit politique chez Cicron, REL 76 (1998) 139-57; I.
Gildenhard, Greek Auxilaries: Tragedy and Philosophy in Ciceronian Invective, in J. Booth
(ed.), Cicero on the Attack: Invective and Subversion in the Orations and Beyond (Swansea
2007) 149-83, at 149.

E.g. J.G.F. Powell, Invective and the Orator: Ciceronian Theory and Practice, in Booth
(ed.), Cicero on the Attack (n. 2) 1-25, at 18.

Z. Bauman, The Project of Humanity, in P. Sheenan (ed.), Becoming Human: New

Perspectives on the Inhuman Condition (Westport 2003) 127-47, at 127.

A. Montagu and F. Matson, The Dehumanisation of Man (New York 1983) 11; K. Thomas,
Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England, 1500-1800 (London 1983) 48.
See also E. Kahler, The Tower and the Abyss (New York 1967) 13.

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79

and the performance of the self on the social stage. Scholars working in this
area pay much attention to the ethical doctrine of the four-personae (actors
masks, roles, or characters) outlined in the first book of Ciceros De
Officiis, and usually conclude that ancient identity is best viewed as
something constructed and assumed like a mask, and then performed on
the social stage.6 These scholars often caution against the modern tendency to
associate this process with deception or insincerity, stressing that Romans
saw no moral issue in creating for themselves an effective socio-rhetorical
persona and performing it on the social stage in a way that would best secure
the support and admiration of ones fellow citizens. 7 They also remind us that
the Romans were accustomed to equating ones exterior with ones interior
and to regarding the persona as the way in which reality manifested itself.8
Nevertheless, while there is much to support this view, the association of
persona with insincerity is not solely a modern tendency. The meanings of
persona in Roman texts can range from the external and insincere, mask-like
self, 9 to the social role and even to the internal (true) self. 10 The clear
potential inherent in persona to contain these contradictory meanings forces

For a good overview of the scholarship on these topics, see D. Hammer, What is Politics in
the Ancient World?, in R.K. Balot (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political
Thought (Blackwell 2009) 20-35.

Training in rhetorical arts is often seen as providing Romans with the skills to assume and
create a suitable social persona as circumstances might demand. E.g. A.J. Boyle, Tragic
Seneca: An Essay in the Theatrical Tradition (London 1997) 116, observes training in
declamation . . . which required diverse and sustained role playing, gave to contemporary
Romans not only the ability to enter into the physical structure of another . . . but a
substantial range of improvisational skills to create a persona at will. See also W.M.
Bloomer, Schooling in Persona: Imagination and Subordination in Roman Education, CA
16 (1997) 57-79; D. Potter, Performance, Power and Justice in the High Empire, in W.
Slater (ed.), Roman Theater and Society (Ann Arbor 1996) 129-59, at 131.

E.g. A. Corbeill, Controlling Laughter: Political Humour in the Late Roman Republic
(Princeton 1996) 41, observes that: Whether in a dramatic or a political context, the persona
did not serve as concealment but as a visual clue to the person beneath. See also A. De
Pretis, Epistolarity in the First Book of Horaces Epistles (New Jersey 2004) 17; D. Burchell,
Civic Personae: MacIntyre, Cicero, and Moral Personality, The History of Political Thought
19 (1998) 101-18, at 114.

The word persona was originally an Etruscan word for mask, and among its several
meanings it also designated the theatrical mask worn by Greek and Roman actors. See e.g.
R.C. Elliot, The Literary Persona (Chicago 1982) 21; P.A. Taylor, Imaginative Writing and
the Disclosure of the Self , JAAC 57 (1999) 29-39, at 28. Cicero himself uses persona in this
way at Tusc. 5.73.3 when he lashes out at Epicurus for putting on the persona of a
philosopher, rather than actually being one; also, Att. 15.1. Rhetoricians often speak of
putting a persona on and off; e.g. Quint. 3.8.50. See also J.J. Hughes, Dramatic Ethos in
Ciceros Later Rhetorical Works, in J. S. Baumlin and T. F. Baumlin (eds), Ethos: New
Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory (Dallas 1994) 211-27.

10

Allport has summed up the meanings of persona in Ciceros writings, and observes meanings
ranging from the external and false to the internal and true self: see G.W. Allport,
Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York 1937) 26-8.

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us either to reject mapping persona onto a true/false axis of mind,11 or, as I

will propose below, to see it as the result of the two central functions it could
serve within ancient theory and practice. These functions can be identified by
observing the role of four-persona theory within Ciceros politics of
humanity. In the theatrical terms of this doctrine, Cicero claimed himself to
be a wearer of the first human persona, which in four-persona theory is
common to all members of the human race who chose to assume it. He then
argued that his enemies had failed to make this choice. Within this theory, the
issue of whether or not a particular person assumed the first persona
determined the function of the subsequent three individual and sociorhetorical personae and thus the meaning of the word persona. Assumed over
the first persona, the subsequent three would come to serve and thus
designate the social and external expression of ones inner human essence.
On the other hand, should one fail to assume the first persona, the subsequent
three would function as a human mask disguising the beast. In this case, the
word persona would retain its primary meaning mask.
1. THE MASK OF HUMANITY
Cicero derived the four-personae theory from the Stoic philosopher Panaetius, and the theorys purpose was to provide general guidance on how to
act on the social stage by discovering what the appropriate act was for any
given person in any given situation. The theory states (Off. 1.107-15):
We must bear in mind that we are endowed by nature with two characters, as
it were; one of these we have in common with other men, deriving from the
fact that we all partake in reason and possess those traits which elevate us
above the brutes. From this, all that is right and proper is derived, and we
depend on it for the method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is
the one that is assigned to each of us individually . . . To these two characters
is added a third, imposed on us by chance or some circumstance, and a fourth
also which we choose to assume.

The theatrical metaphor utilised here goes back to early Stoicism, where life
was perceived in terms of a role that had to be performed properly as if on a
stage and one of its central premises was that anyone can deliberately
choose and cultivate their own role or their own way of life. 12 Cicero advises
11

In her recent study, Shadi Bartsch, The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-Knowledge, and the
Gaze in the Early Roman Empire (Chicago 2006) 221-2, has rejected both of the above
positions as extreme, observing that they are difficult to map into Roman culture because
they map persona into a true/false axis in the mind rather than understanding it in terms of
propriety and impropriety, or in terms of Roman civic performativity. Inasmuch as an
individuals social and political roles constituted an important part of that person, she
observes, the persona was neither felt to be the whole of the individual nor a fake: the
persona represented an aspect of being, rather than an exposition or a dissimulation of that
person.

12

Zenos follower Aristo described the wise man as like the good actor who, whether he puts
on the mask of Thersites or Agamemnon, plays either part in a proper way: LS 58G.
Remember, says Epictetus (Encheiridion 17), that you are an actor in a drama, as the
director wants you to be. For a long history of acting as a metaphor for human social
existence, see C. Edwards, Acting and Self-Actualisation in Imperial Rome: Some Death

Ciceros Politics of Humanity

81

each person to discover what he had as his own peculiarity (quid quisque
habeat sui) and talent (ingenium) and then to choose a role in life, like a
good actor who picks only those roles suited to his/her nature and ability
(1.113-4). 13 If in time one should find this role to be unsuitable, Cicero
stresses further that one should discard it and assume another that is more
fitting (120).14
Scholars often view the above doctrine as a guide to self-fashioning,15 but
overlook some clear ethical boundaries imposed primarily by the first
persona beyond which this self-fashioning becomes something quite
different, namely the false humans performance of humanity. In the above
passage, Cicero treats the first human persona as one we all have in
common, but once we consider Ciceros views on human nature in more
detail, we see that this is only a potentiality.
In De Officiis Cicero briefly outlines the basic tenets of psychology,
which go at least as far back as Plato, where the human soul is divided
between appetites (appetitus) and reason (ratio): the former drags the man
off here and there (hominem huc et illuc rapit) while the latter teaches and
makes plain what should be done and what avoided (. . . docet et explanat,
quid faciendum fugiendumque sit, Off. 1.101). 16 According to this school of
thought, to be truly human is to ensure that reason governs and appetite
obeys (. . . ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet, Off. 1.101),17 because only
such inner hierarchy allows life in agreement with nature, which for

Scenes, in P. Easterling and E. Hall (eds), Greek and Roman Actors: Aspects of an Ancient
Profession (Cambridge 2002) 370-84, at 370-1. Also, A.A. Long, From Epicurus to
Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (Oxford 2006) 16.
13

R. Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death (Oxford
2006) 160.

14

Cicero also illustrates the great variety of characters formed by nature and habits (mores) and
insists that none of them ought to be criticised (vituperari: 1.109).

15

The emphasis on theatricality in De Officiis, as Dugan has observed, invites each person to
adopt a quasi-aesthetic attitude towards himself and his life, and so it parallels the
assumption within rhetorical theory and practice that one can deliberately fashion a self: J.
Dugan, Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works (Oxford
2005) 5.

16

Plato is usually regarded as the first active exponent of the Beast Within in that he
presented in the Republic a psychological theory which proposed that the human soul
consists of three components: the rational (nous), the spiritive (thymos) and the appetitive
(epithymia) (580d-e). See also, H. Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and
Aristotle (Oxford 2006) 3; I.S. Gilhus, Animals, Gods and Humans: Changing Attitudes to
Animals in Greek, Roman and Early Christian Ideas (London 2006).

17

In the Republic Plato made it clear that a person is made most fully human by identifying
with reason and made least human by identifying with his or her bestial desires (589b-d).
Aristotle, who largely adopted Platos psychological theory, held that in the virtuous person
the appetite and the spirit are brought into perfect harmony with reason by being affected and
improved over time by the cultivation of virtuous habits of behaviour: Eth. Nic. 1.13.1102a
26-1103a3.

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humans means always being in accord with virtue (virtus).18

Accordingly, Cicero uses the word homo to identify a creature that is
superior to other animals by virtue of both possessing and exercising its
unique rational and moral capacities. 19 To be able to exercise these capacities
and be worthy of the title human, the individual is required to establish
within himself a hierarchy in which reason governs appetite. The fourpersonae theory expresses the establishment of such a hierarchy with the
theatrical metaphor of assuming the first persona.20 The person in whom the
proper inner hierarchy is disturbed, in whom reason obeys the lowly
appetites, would in these terms be said to have failed to assume the mask of
humanity.
Now, each wearer of the first persona is required to integrate it
successfully with the other three. Such integration, according to Cicero,
would ensure that the first persona is performed on the social stage with
decorum, that is, in a way that accords with each individuals particular
nature and circumstance. In De Officiis, decorum designates the outer face of
virtue, or the appropriate, beautiful and consistent performance of ones
primary role as a human being.21 Ciceros treatment of decorum is often seen
in scholarship as the point at which Cicero has blurred the line between moral
guidance and tips on social expertise,22 but, as a more detailed observation of
Ciceros decorum will demonstrate, this is not the case.
Cicero classifies decorum into two types. The first type is a general sort
18

It is important to note that in Cicero the term virtus does not usually denote what it
traditionally denoted in Rome, namely manliness or courage, but is a philosophical and
purely ethical concept, the result of the proper hierarchy in the human soul. See e.g. W.
Eisenhut, Virtus Romana (Munich 1973) 64-71; M. McDonnell, Roman Manliness: Virtus
and the Roman Republic (Cambridge 2006) 9. Also, A. Ernout and A. Meillet, Dictionnaire
etymologique de la langue latine, 4th edn (Paris 1960) 739.

19

In Paradoxa Stoicorum, for instance, he contrasts several great men from Roman history,
who were characterised by virtus, self-restraint and abstinence, with the pleasure seekers of
his own time. Only the former, Cicero asserts, are truly human, while the latter are merely
cattle who have accepted that there is really no difference between them and some fourfooted animal (1.14). See also H.C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought
(Cambridge 1965) 201; P. Veyne, Humanitas: Romans and Non-Romans, in A. Giardina
(ed.), The Romans (Chicago 1993) 342-69, at 342.

20

Cic. Off. 1.11-14, 101; Tusc. 2.47-48, 51-53; Rep. 1.60. As Hadot has observed, the first
persona requires that we exercise our share in the universal stock of reason . . . to recognise
ourselves as a part of the reason-animated cosmos: P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life:
Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Oxford 1995) 86. See also C. Gill, Peace of
Mind and Being Yourself: Panaetius to Plutarch, ANRW 2.36 (1994) 4599-640, at 4620;
Baldry, Unity of Mankind (n. 19) 201.

21

Cic. Off. 1.13-14, 94-8, 107, 110-1, 113-4, 120, 125. T.N. Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior
Statesman (Yale 1991) 35; P.H. De Lacy, The Four Stoic Personae, ICS 2 (1977) 163-72, at
165; C. Gill, Personhood and Personality: The Four-Personae Theory in Cicero, De Officiis
I, OSAP 6 (1988) 169-99, at 191-2.

22

E.g. Gill observes that in his treatment of decorum Cicero seems to presuppose a degree of
awareness of ones own actions and of others reactions that assimilates social life to a
theatrical performance: Personhood and Personality (n. 21) 194-5.

Ciceros Politics of Humanity

83

of propriety, which is found in moral goodness, and which embodies the

primary duty of decorum, namely, ensuring that reason is always in
command (ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet: 1.101). As a result, Cicero
asserts, decorum is inseparable from moral goodness, for what is morally
right is also appropriate and what is appropriate is morally right (quod decet
honestum est et, quod honestum est, decet).23
The second type is concerned with self-control and temperance (moderatio et temperantia) as well as with a certain outlook that characterises a
gentleman.24 This type of decorum is outwardly orientated and visible and
ensures that the inner hierarchies are properly manifested on the exterior,
providing it also with a certain polish.25 This polish, Cicero argues, has to
be provided by the outer persona of the social actor who handles himself
with manly dignity and who understands and knows how to adopt the suitable
pose at the suitable time. Accordingly, Cicero proceeds to outline what is
conducive to decorum in terms of speech, clothing, manners and walk.26
We need to acknowledge, therefore, that Cicero considers social theatrics
to be a legitimate means of social and political self-enhancement, but we
should not overlook the ethical boundaries beyond which such theatrics
become something quite different. It is necessary to remember that the social
persona can become an external manifestation, or the outer face of virtue,
only when assumed over the mask of humanity. Without this inner human
foundation, any subsequent persona inevitably becomes a deceptive mask
whose chief purpose is to cover up and hide the subhuman below. The sociopolitical aesthetics of the secondary decorum are now only human make-up
over the subhuman creature.
From this it follows that we need to grasp the double aspect of the first
persona. The first aspect is the performative, in which the first persona can
be envisioned as an external mask, made up of observable actions proper to
the role of a human being. The true human should behave, and be seen to
behave, in a rational and moral manner, while avoiding those irrational and
immoral actions which are unworthy of a human being and are outright
bestial. A passage in De Officiis expresses this idea clearly (1.41):
While wrong may be done in two ways, either by force or by deception, both
forms are bestial: deception is like the cunning fox, force like the lion. While
both are most unworthy of man, deception is the more odious. No form of
injustice is more flagrant than that practised by those who appear most
virtuous when in fact they are being most treacherous.

This passage also touches on the second aspect of the first persona, which is
23

Conversely, to be morally wrong and unjust in ones actions is always inappropriate and
contrary to decorum (et iusta omnia decora sunt, iniusta contra, ut turpia, sic indecora: Off.
1.94).

24

Cic. Off. 1.96.

25

Cic. Off. 1.27, 96, 141.

26

Cic. Off. 1.126-32, 135-7, 144.

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to act as an internal mask, assumed in order that the human exterior, which
all members of the human race share, is an accurate representation of the
interior; that one is as human below as he/she appears to be on the surface. A
failure to assume the first persona is a failure to subject oneself to the rule of
reason and thus to meet the moral requirements for true humanity. The result
is that one only appears to be human but is an animal beneath the surface.
Cicero describes this state of affairs in De Re Publica in somewhat dramatic
terms (4.1):
And indeed if there is no one who would not rather die than be transformed
into an animal of any sort, even if he could retain the mind of a man, how
much more wretched is it to have the mind of a beast while retaining a human
body!

Retaining a human body here means retaining a human form but, as in the
previous passage, it can also refer to engaging in immoral and bestial
actions while making it appear that those actions are in fact moral and
human.
In Roman texts, the word which denoted the notion of playing a role false
to oneself was dissimulatio,27 but it is crucial to remember that not everything
we would regard as pretence was for the Romans dissimulatio. This term
designates a practice whereby the subhuman assumes the human mask in
order to deceive, which, in Cicero at least, is quite different to the situation in
which a true human assumes a false front (socio-rhetorical persona) to
serve some short-term goal. A brief analysis of the Roman idea of sincerity
will illustrate this difference clearly. The Latin term which comes nearest to
expressing the idea contained in our word sincerity is fides (trust, faith)
which Cicero sees as central to the business of society and at the heart of
justice itself (Off. 3.69-70). Fides helps to ensure that ones confidence in
ones fellow man is not abused; it described the honest dealings of honest
people, free from lies and deception on either part (3.69-70). As an example
of contrary behaviour, Cicero mentions taking advantage of a neighbours
ignorance in order to sell him deficient goods (3.72). Such immoral practices,
Cicero argues, undermine fides and are usually caused by a mistaken notion
about the relationship between the morally good and the expedient action
(3.72). 28 To take personal advantage of someone elses disadvantage or
ignorance is both useless and immoral and it ultimately causes one to lose
ones very humanity (3.82):
Is there anything so advantageous and valuable that will compensate you for
losing the name of a good man over it, for causing you to lose your sense of
27

Cic. Verr. 2.1.39, 2.4.6. See Bartsch, The Mirror of the Self (n. 11) 226.

28

Cic. Off. 3.72. In De Officiis Cicero dealt extensively with the relationship between virtuous
and advantageous conduct (honestum et utile), arguing that in essence they are one and the
same: every truly virtuous act is expedient and every truly expedient act is also virtuous. Off.
1.9, 2.9, 3.7. It is never expedient to do wrong, he asserts further, because that is always
immoral (turpe) and it is always expedient to be good because that is morally right
(honestum), Off. 3.64.

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honour and justice? For what difference does it make whether a man actually
changes into a beast or whether he keeps human appearance but has the
savage nature of a beast within?

The intention to deceive for ones personal advantage is immoral in that it

undermines trust and it may constitute what we would perhaps describe as
insincere behaviour. Nevertheless, the type of insincerity Cicero describes
above clearly goes well beyond mere lying to an unsuspecting party in order
to profit from this deception. This type of insincerity is the result of an
animal pretending to be a human being; this is the true pose of being similis
sui, the true dissimulatio.
Cicero urges his son Marcus to avoid such insincerity, or to really be
how he wishes to seem, by quoting the maxim, the nearest way to glory . . .
is to strive to become what you wish to be thought to be, and by contrasting
this virtuous state with pretence and empty show, dissembling in speech and
countenance (Off. 2.42-3). 29 Here, Cicero is not advising Marcus to be
sincere in the sense that his social comportment and professed views should
at all times accurately reflect his views and attitudes, but only that he should
be as human as he appears to be. In public life, this is accomplished once
the person identifies his own interests with the true interests of the state,
removing thus any possibility of conflict between virtuous and expedient
socio-political conduct. 30 The true human is always what he seems, even
when his social mask, constructed and calibrated for a desired effect, is not
reflective of his true views and attitudes. This is quite consistent with the
Roman idea of fides, which is different from what we understand by sincerity
in that it simultaneously contains within itself the idea of persuasiveness.31
Two passages in De Officiis provide good examples of distinct situations
where the persuasive aspect of fides demands that ones exterior resemble
ones inner disposition and where it does not; in both cases, neither humanity
nor the sincere aspect of fides is jeopardised. In both cases, everything comes
down to controlling the inner passions, but in the former case this control is
accurately reflected externally, and, in the latter, it is not. While advising on
what is appropriate in terms of conversation in social situations, Cicero states
(Off. 1.136):
It is a most excellent rule, for every phrase in life, to avoid exhibitions of
passion, that is, excessive emotions which are uncontrolled by reason. Our
conversation too ought to be free from such emotions: not affected by anger or
desire on the one hand, or by indolence and indifference on the other.

In this case, ones inner self-control is reflected on the surface in a controlled

manner of speech and this is both morally right and useful because, as Cicero
adds below, such a display of decorum is also persuasive, because it is sure to

29

See also Cic. Amic. 95-7.

30

Cic. Off. 1.153-7.

31

See R. Heinze, Fides, Hermes 64 (1928) 140-66.

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leave a lasting impression on ones social peers. 32 Having framed his advice
on how to be persuasive in social situations in terms of ones control over
ones irrational passions, Cicero clearly assimilates it to advice on the proper
conduct for a human being. Nevertheless, the moral imperative of inner
control can sometimes demand an opposite external effect, or a false front,
which is also more persuasive. This passage comes immediately after the one
quoted above, and it clearly demonstrates the relationship between the
immutable first persona and the more flexible and changeable social one
(1.136-7, 144):
Sometimes, however, rebukes are necessary. On such occasions we should,
perhaps, allow ourselves to raise our voice and use more forcible and severe
words. We may even appear to be angry . . .We may seem angry, but anger
should be kept at distance; for nothing right or generous can be done in anger.

So not only could the true human legitimately assume a false front without
jeopardising his humanity or the sincere aspect of fides, he may actually be
required to do so. Cicero advises an appearance of anger because it is useful
and persuasive, while adding that a display of true emotion should be
avoided; the passage above makes it clear that such a display of anger is
dehumanising as it indicates that reason is no longer in charge. The very
falsity of the exterior is a testament to the supremacy of reason within that
individual.
It is not sufficient, therefore, to dismiss links between ancient and modern
notions of sincerity, to consider the former as concerned solely with
propriety and persuasiveness rather than, as the latter, with the inner realities.
Instead, we need to be aware that we are potentially dealing with two types of
sincerity in the ancient world, and I will refer to them from this point on as
primary and secondary. Primary sincerity satisfies the moral imperative of
being human below the surface; a person who is sincere in this sense utilises
his socio-rhetorical persona as an outer face of virtue, in order to reveal his
inner humanity (the first persona) rather than to disguise his inner
inhumanity. Secondary sincerity is concerned with ones social and rhetorical
comportment, which needs to be calibrated for its effect and does not
necessarily involve the sincere disclosure of every aspect of ones inner
views or attitudes. The person who is sincere on the primary level can be
insincere on the secondary without engaging in dissimulatio or jeopardising
his primary sincerity, but the person who is insincere on the primary level is
always and necessarily insincere at the secondary level, and this insincerity
always constitutes dissimulatio.
2. THE FALSE HUMANS FALSE STATE
In De Officiis Cicero states: The men we live with are not perfect and allwise, but are admired for their behaviour if they possess but the semblance of
virtue (simulacra virtutis: 1.46). The statement that simulacra virtutis is
morally sufficient has sometimes been seen as evidence that there was no
32

Cic. Off. 1.102.

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difference for Romans between comporting oneself as a virtuous individual

and actually being one. This misunderstanding is clarified once we remember
that the official source and model for De Officiis is a work by Panaetius
entitled, On Proper Functions (Peri Kathkontn). Stoics differentiated
between kathekonta (appropriate actions), which ordinary moral agents
perform, and katorthomata (virtuous actions), of which only the sage is
capable, because only he performs it from a virtuous disposition so to act.33
In Cicero, the division is between mean duties (officia media), the duties
demanded by natural law and by society whose institutions and customs
accurately reflect this law, and the perfect and absolute right (recta perfecta
atque absoluta) of the Wise Man.34 Performance of officia media is sufficient
for morality and humanity; to perform them is to perform the role of a human
being properly. Nevertheless, because the performance is largely conducted
under external constraint, the actor cannot be said to be truly virtuous but
only to possess a semblance of virtue.35
In De Officiis, therefore, the possession of a semblance of virtue implied
a lack of moral self-sufficiency, which meant that one relied on an external
constraint to exist as a human being. This idea underlies much of Ciceros
political and legal theory, where people become truly human only with the
help of the states laws and institutions.36 In De Re Publica, Cicero argues
that a governments domination over its subjects is of two aspects: (1) as the
mind governs the body, which he equates to a kings rule over his subjects or
a fathers over his children, and (2) as reason rules the passions, which he
equates to a masters rule over his slaves. 37 Cicero holds that both of these
aspects of domination could potentially be found in the rule of one individual
and, provided that the king was a creature of reason, argues that kingship was
probably the best single form of government: the early Romans, he asserts,
were turned away from their savagery by King Numas reforms. 38 Of course,
33

E.g. P. Mitsis, Natural Law and Natural Right in Post-Aristotelian Philosophy: The Stoics
and their Critics, ANRW 2.36.7 (1994) 4812-50, at 4843, observes that both the wise and
unwise perform the kathekonta enjoined by the natural law; but while their actions share the
same descriptive content, there is a crucial difference in intentional content. Also, M.
Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichte eine geistigen Bewegung, 3rd edition (Gttingen 1964) 186ff;
M. Reesor, The Indifferents in the Old and Middle Stoa, TAPA 82 (1951) 102-10.

34

Cic. Off. 3.13-14, 17; Am. 20-1; Fin. 4.15; Leg. 2.8, 1.18-19.

35

See also Cic. Fin. 4.15; Leg. 1.18-19, 30, 2.8; Am. 21.

36

This idea can be traced to Greek writers and theorists who often asserted that only in a
functional human state could members of the human species forsake beastly violence in
favour of peaceful and mutually advantageous social co-operation. Aristotles famous
definition of the human being as a political animal (politikon zoon), for example, excluded
from the human community anyone who was not subject to the laws and norms of the polis;
such individuals, according to Aristotle, are either gods or beasts: Pol. 1.1.1; Balot, Greek
Political Thought (Oxford 2006) 22; R. Trigg, Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical
Introduction (Oxford 1988) 32-4.

37

Cic. Rep. 3.38.

38

Cicero describes Numas introduction of religion as motivated by a desire to turn the warlike
Romans from savagery to humanity and gentleness (quibus rebus institutis ad humanitatem

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Cicero is not a spokesman for monarchy or for any of the simple

constitutions such as aristocracy or democracy because these, he argues,
could easily degenerate into tyrannies. 39 Regardless of whether a society
succumbs to the tyranny of one or of many, in each case the human
community is destroyed: the subjects of tyrants are slaves and thus not proper
human beings,40 while the collective irrationalism of the democratic masses
transforms them into a giant tyrannical beast (belua) that only dissimulates
as a populus (Rep. 3.45).
The false populus is an important concept in De Re Publica, where
Cicero argues that a mass of human beings herded together do not necessarily
constitute a society or a people (populus). A collection of uncivilized
savages or a gang of robbers cannot be designated as a populus any more
than a pack of animals can; neither are rational creatures, nor are they
participating in a truly human community. 41 The truly human populus in De
Re Publica is that which associates on the basis of a consensus in respect to
justice (iuris consensus : 1.39), itself possible only under a constitution that
will enable it in the long term. As a model of a constitution that could ensure
this permanence, Cicero adopts Polybiuss mixed constitution, or a
balanced combination of the basic forms of monarchy, aristocracy and
democracy, and argues that this model is the most stable, a device for
protecting the status quo by preventing both tyranny from below, the rule of
the licentious masses, and tyranny from above, brought on by the
corruption of the monarchy or the aristocracy. 42
Cicero claims that one of the reasons for the longevity (and potential
immortality) of the republican constitution was that the magistrates did not
rule in their own name but subordinated their individual identity to their roles
as representatives of the state: it was the place of a magistrate, he argues, to
bear in mind that he represents the state (se gerere personam civitatis) and
that it is his duty to uphold its honour and its dignity.43 Cicero here affirms
that magistrates bear in themselves the character or persona of the state or, as
atque mansuetudinem revocavit animos hominum studiis bellandi iam immanis ac feros . . . :
Rep. 2.27). Cicero has Scipio argue that kingship is probably the best single form of
government, and the argument he particularly emphasises is that everything in the universe is
ruled by the authority of one, and most importantly, as he forces Laelius to concede, the
different parts of a humans mind should all be ruled by one single force reason: Rep. 1.5460.
39

Cic. Rep. 1.50, 1.68, 3.43, 3.45.

40

See below, nn. 76 and 77.

41

Cic. Rep. 1.39. Cicero often presents humanitas as the difference between primitive, illordered societies with brutish concerns and brutish habits and those where unity, justice and
order prevail: Rep. 2.27; Off. 1.90, 3.32; Part. Or. 90; De Or. 1.33; Leg. 2.36; Mitchell,
Cicero (n. 21) 38.

42

Cic. Rep. 1.45, 53, 2.55-6, 69; Leg. 3.5.8, 10, 11, 24, 28; Polyb. 4, 6. See also Pl. Leg. 3-4;
Arist. Pol. 1293a-1295b, 1318b-1319a; Mitchell, Cicero (n. 21) 52; E. Asmis, A New Kind
of Model: Ciceros Roman Constitution in De Re Publica, AJP 126 (2005) 377-416.

43

Cic. Off. 3.60.

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89

Wood has observed, that the public office carries with it the persona or mask
of state authority, and each of the magistrates wears this same persona,
losing their individual identity in a single common role or function. 44 Cicero
often describes this function in terms of magistrates men superior in virtus
who rule over their moral inferiors taming the fierce beast within peoples
souls.45 He argues that this arrangement is ordained by Nature and necessary
for humanity to flourish: a human being, after all, is the product of a situation
in which the best, the mind and reason, rules the worst, the irrational
passions.46
The idea of living in accordance with human nature is also expressed in
Stoicism in terms of ones subjection to the natural law, which outlines the
specific rules and prohibitions necessary to obey if one is to live as a human
being.47 Cicero defines the law of Nature as the highest reason . . . which
commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite, insisting that
disobedience of this law entails the denial of ones humanity. 48 In De Legibus,
Cicero clearly identifies the natural law with the Roman legal system; he
treats it as a supra-legal sanction to which every state law in force ought to
conform, 49 and repeatedly asserts that the laws and traditions of Rome can
indeed be identified with it. 50 By such a treatment of natural law Cicero
clearly implies, therefore, that subjection to Roman laws is the essential
condition of humanity; whoever disobeys them disobeys the law of Nature
and with that rejects the nature of man.51
In Ciceros political and legal theory, therefore, the Roman state performs
44

N. Wood, Ciceros Social and Political Thought (Oxford 1988) 135-36. Referring to his post
in Sicily, Cicero relapses into theatrical analogy and says, When I was a quaestor in Sicily I
felt all mens eyes directed upon me and me only. I imagined myself and my office staged in
a theatre and the entire world as my audience: Verr. 2.5.35.

45

Cic. Rep. 1.45, 2.45, 2.67-8.

46

Cicero argues that a distinction between the highest and most distinguished individuals and
the lowest and meanest ones is necessary in every people and that those men who are
superior in virtue and in spirit should rule the weaker (imbecillioribus) while the weaker
should be willing to obey the stronger: Rep. 1.51-3, 3.34-8.

47

On Stoic natural law, see J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford 1993) 302; Mitsis,
Natural Law (n. 33) 4813.

48

Cic. Leg. 1.18; Rep. 1.39, 3.33.

49

He argues that civil law (lex civilis), the statutory and customary law of any state and people,
should conform to the universal ethical principles of the law of nature if it fails to do so, by
definition it is not a true law (Leg. 2.13). Cicero refers to true law as right reason squared
with nature (Leg. 1.28, 3.33), the beginning of justice (Leg. 1.18), and the supreme mind
(mens) of God and divine wisdom (Leg. 2.8.10); M.R. Wright, Self-Love and Love of
Humanity in De Finibus 3, in J.G.F. Powell (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers
(Oxford 1995) 189.

50

Cic. Leg. 1.22.58, 2.24.61-2; Rep. 3.22.33.

51

Cic. Rep. 3.22.33. See also J. Ferrary, The Statesman and the Law in the Political
Philosophy of Cicero, in A. Laks and M. Schofield (eds), Justice and Generosity: Studies in
Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy, Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum (Cambridge 1995) 48-73, at 69.

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through its leaders, institutions and laws an important and necessary

humanising function, without which its citizenry would have reverted to its
primordial bestial state. Nevertheless, the imaginary settings for the
dialogue of De Re Publica belonged to the past, when Cicero considered the
Roman state as still functional and perfectly able to perform this crucial role.
In his own day, however, he saw this ability as severely compromised. Cicero
often describes the Roman state of his day as a dysfunctional shadow of its
former self, as a false state, a state only in form, entirely deprived of
substance. 52 Cicero most often attributes this falsity to the indiscriminate
pursuit of military or civil offices and glory.53 He argues that these pursuits
undermined the common good, serving only as a pretext for the selfaggrandisement of the Republics enemies. 54 The disregard of these men for
common welfare strikes at the very heart of justice and thus of human society
itself. 55 It is no surprise, therefore, to find that disregard for the common
good is a particularly serious offence in Cicero and one which warrants the
culprits exclusion from the common body of humanity; he who makes his
own advantage the sole standard for all his actions, Cicero insists, has the
savage nature of a beast within (. . . immanitatem gerat beluae: Off. 3.82).56
The enemies of the Roman state are, of course, Ciceros own enemies;
men who in their reckless self-regard have forsaken their humanity and thus
become insincere false humans or beasts. The persona they wear is not
collective and representative of the state but personal and very much
deceptive. Cicero often laments the insincerity of his political enemies and
objects to them being referred to as populares (friends of the people) when
they only hypocritically and deceptively (ficte et fallaciter) pose as
populares; true populares, he insists, are men like himself (boni),
concerned for the salus of the populus.57 Unlike the selfless boni, the false
populares are at their core self-serving individuals and this selfishness makes
their insincerity go much deeper than mere lying to the gullible masses: they
are animals posing as human beings.
Accordingly, in Ciceros invective Clodius appears as a foul and noxious
52

Cic. Off. 2.1-6, 23-29, 3.4, 83-5; Rep. 5.2. Suetonius reports that Caesar commented that the
Republic was a contentless artefact an imago sine re: Suet. Iul. 77.

53

Cic. Off. 1.26.

54

Cic. Off. 1.65, 1.68, 85-7. See also Long, Ciceros Politics in De Officiis, in Laks and
Schofield (eds), Justice and Generosity (n. 51) 213-40, at 216, 226.

55

In his youthful De Inventione, Cicero defines justice as a mental disposition which gives
every man his deserts (dignitatem) while preserving the common interest (communi utilitate
conservata: Inv. 2.160). His definition of justice in De Re Publica emphasises its role as
guardian of the common good (3.24), while, in De Officiis, the greatest emphasis is on its
common utility (1.15, 20-49, 153-9, 2.38-43).

56

Cic. Off. 3.76, 82; Leg. 28.49.

57

Cic. Sest. 97-8, 103-27, 138. On true and false populares, see Leg Agr. 1.23, 25; Cat. 4.2;
Dom. 77, 88; Phil. 7.4; De Or. 3.138; R. Seager, Cicero and the Word Popularis, CQ 22
(1972) 328-38, at 333; R. Morstein-Marx, Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late
Roman Republic (Cambridge 2004) 148.

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91

beast (taetram immanemque beluam),58 Catiline as a monster who wishes to

eliminate senators and ravage the earth with fire and slaughter, 59 Piso as a
beast (belua), a gelded pig (maialis), a most foul and inhumane monster
(inhumanissimum ac foedissimum monstrum).60 Cicero also argues that these
men betrayed their beastly nature in their walk (incessus) and expression
(vultus), 61 utilising, for example, the word truculentus, commonly used to
denote the behaviour of beasts, in order to describe the physical deportment
of Rullus and Piso. 62 Finally, in order to describe these unscrupulous
politicians collectively, Cicero uses the term grex, which usually denotes a
herd of animals.63 What these men aim for is to overrun all laws of gods and
men and become the most horrible of all beasts, the tyrant: 64
For as soon as this king 65 turned to mastery, he instantly became a tyrant; and
no creature is more vile or horrible than a tyrant, or more hateful to gods and
men; for, though he bears a human form, the ferocity of his character
surpasses the most monstrous of the wild beasts. For how could the title of
human be given justly to the creature who desires no community of justice, no
relationship with his fellow-citizens or with any part of the human race?

Rep. 2.48
The concept of tyranny in the ancient world signified autocracy as well as a
manner of inhuman behaviour marked by a total lack of morality. 66
Accusations of aiming for tyranny and possessing tyrannical vices are
commonplace in the Roman invective of the late republican period. 67
58

Cic. Sest. 16.

59

Cic. Cat. 1.2-3.

60

Cic. Pis. 1, 19, 31; V. Arena, Roman Political Invective, in W. Dominik and J. Hall (eds), A
Companion to Roman Rhetoric (Malden 2007) 149-90, at 152.

61

The notion that the face and body mirror the soul is commonplace in Roman moralising texts.
In De Officiis, for example, Cicero argues that disturbed inner hierarchies tend to manifest
externally through a distorted voice, posture or face. Not only our minds, Cicero argues,
but the bodies as well are disordered by such appetites (. . . non modo animi perturbantur,
sed etiam corpora: 1.102). When men are no longer subject to the law of Nature, their faces,
voices and motions undergo a change (. . . voltus, voces, motus statuesque mutantur: 1.102).
See also A. Corbeill, Nature Embodied: Gesture in Ancient Rome (Princeton 2004) 148-50.

62

Cic. Sest. 17. Corbeill, Nature Embodied (n. 61) 119.

63

Cic. Sest. 38. For more examples see Lvy, Rhtorique et philosophie (n. 2) 139-57; May,
Cicero and the Beasts (n. 2) 43-153; Wood, Populares and Circumcelliones: The
Vocabulary of Fallen Man in Cicero and St Augustine, History of Political Thought 7
(1986) 33-51, at 35.

64

See also, Cic. Off. 1.26, 2.23.

65

This passage refers to Tarquin the Proud, who was reputedly a notorious despot.

66

The psychological basis of tyranny is . . . the appetite . . . it is a brutal and lawless appetite
the lust of the flesh and pride of power which man has in common with beasts: Barker, in
J.R. Dunkle, The Rhetorical Tyrant in Roman Historiography: Sallust, Livy and Tacitus,
CW 65 (1971) 12-20, at 16. See also S. Forsdyke, The Uses and Abuses of Tyranny, in
Balot (ed.), Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought (n. 6) 231-46.

67

The vices characteristic of a tyrant are avarice (avaritia), force (vis), arrogance (superbia),
lust (libido), and cruelty (crudelitas). Ciceros Verrine Orations provide abundant examples

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Nevertheless, while to some extent we might be justified in regarding insults

such as belua as metaphorical commonplaces, we should not overlook an
additional suggestion that the person accused no longer participates in the
human community and as a consequence has lost, or should lose, any right of
protection under human laws. This view comes across most clearly in
Ciceros justification of Caesars assassination: Caesar lost his claim to
humanity in his attempt to destroy the human community, so killing him was
morally justified, even required (Off. 3.32): 68
We have nothing in common with tyrants, on the contrary, we have the
bitterest feud . . . All of that pestilent and unholy breed should be exterminated from the human community. Just as certain body parts are amputated
if they have shown signs of lacking blood and vitality, jeopardising thus the
health of other parts, so those savage monsters in human disguise should be
cut off from what might be called the common body of humanity.

In the Philippics, where Cicero waged a series of attacks on Caesars onetime deputy but now potential successor Antony, Cicero again justifies and
commends Caesars assassins for killing him (2.117), portraying this act as a
legitimate measure necessary to rid the Republic of the tyrant who destroyed
the libertas of the Roman people.69
In Philippics Cicero portrays Antony as sharing in all the beastly
tyrannical traits that also characterised Caesar. 70 Stevenson is right to observe
that Ciceros handling of the tyrant figure in Philippics is more elaborate than
usual, as though it is more than a conventional device for attacking a
powerful competitor. 71 Indeed, Antonys dehumanisation would ensure that,
when Cicero warns that Antony could well meet the same fate as Caesar
(2.118), it would have been clear to all concerned that, should this scenario
eventuate, the life that would end would not be a human life. Cicero also
associates Antony with Catiline (Phil. 2.118-19), whom Cicero put to death
as a public enemy during his consulship in 62.72 This act was illegal under C.
of his use of the terms rex, dominus and tyrannus to describe Verres (2.1.82, 2.5.103),
claiming that he exhibited every one of the tyrants vices and modes of behaviour during his
infamous governorship of Sicily (1.14, 2.2.9, 1.56, 2.1.14, 2.1.122-3). Similarly, Piso and
Gabinius are charged with superbia, crudelitas and libido (Prov. Cons. 6, 8). For more
examples, see Dunkle, The Rhetorical Tyrant (n. 66); see also R. Sklenar, La Rpublique des
Signes: Caesar, Cato and the Language of Sallustian Morality, TAPA 128 (1998) 205-20, at
207-11.
68

For a good discussion of Ciceros justifications of the murder of Caesar, see R.A. Belliotti,
Roman Philosophy and the Good Life (Lanham 2009) 143-79.

69

For Caesars suppression of libertas see e.g. Phil. 1.6, 1.13, 2.26, 11.36. For numerous other
examples, see E. Cowan, Libertas in the Philippics, in T. Stevenson and M. Wilson (eds),
Ciceros Philippics: History, Rhetoric and Ideology (Auckland 2008) 140-52.

70

For numerous examples of Antony being described in the Philippics as possessing tyrannical
traits, see T. Stevenson, Tyrants, Kings and Fathers in the Philippics, in Stevenson and
Wilson (eds), Ciceros Philippics (n. 69) 95-113, at 100-1.

71

Stevenson, Tyrants, Kings and Fathers (n. 70) 195.

72

Cowan, Libertas (n. 75) 145.

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93

Gracchus lex Sempronia of 123, which denied the right of a magistrate to

declare a Roman citizen a public enemy and execute him without a trial or
right of appeal.73 For this act, Cicero was forced into exile and was himself
accused of being a tyrant,74 but, at the time, he argued that Catiline and his
fellow conspirators were public enemies who had forfeited their rights as
Roman citizens (Cat. 410), and who therefore had no right of protection
under Roman law, including the lex Sempronia. In any case, Antonys
dehumanisation offered a potential solution, comparable to the one we
observed in De Officiis, to the legal and moral problem Antonys
assassination would present to the brave men who might opt to carry out this
great deed.75
It is clear therefore that Ciceros humanism has indeed provided a
philosophical gloss for the rhetorical denials of humanity in his invective,
which itself appears to be more than just another rhetorical strategy directed
towards the character assassination of his opponents. Dehumanisation in
Cicero actively marshals arguments for sidelining the moral and legal
considerations that would arise from his enemies murders. Dehumanisation
as a strategy is of particular value when the nature, extent or very existence of
the victims crime is uncertain, so we should not underestimate its
effectiveness simply because we know that the rhetorical charge of
disobeying the law of Nature did not constitute a crime or lead to any
convictions in court. It is its potential to help legitimise the removal of legal
and moral obstacles to murdering ones political enemies that makes
dehumanisation a central component within Ciceros politics of humanity,
that is, within his ideological effort to demarcate a clear boundary between
true and false humans in the Roman state.
3. CONCLUSION
A consideration of Ciceros humanism and his political and legal theory
against the background of his politics of humanity can clearly yield some
fresh insights into the ultimate purpose of dehumanisation in his speeches, as
well as into Roman ideas of sincerity, self-fashioning and persona. We
have seen that the Roman acceptance of the social aesthetics as a legitimate
means for social and political advancement did not mean that no moral value
was placed on one being what one seems to be. Within Ciceros humanism,
humanness was not the prerogative of all members of the human race but
only of those whose moral state allowed it. From this it follows that only true
73

See S.O. Shapiro, O Tempora! O Mores!: Ciceros Catilinarian Orations (Oklahoma 2005)
65, 190.

74

Cic. Fam. 7.24.1.

75

There is much in Philippics that would speak to potential assassins who may have been
contemplating such an act at the time of the speechs delivery. For example, recalling the
assassination of Caesar, Cicero states (2.117): Do you not understand that it is enough for
brave men to have realised how beautiful in act, how grateful in benefit and how glorious
tyrannicide is?

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humans were what they appeared to be and thus were fundamentally sincere,
regardless of the form their external persona might take to fit the immediate
requirements of a socio-political role. Cicero clearly transplanted these
philosophical ideas to the political arena where he often accused his
opponents of being beasts dissimulating as humans. Addition-ally, because
Ciceros legal theory was founded on the concept of the correspondence of
human and natural law, the charge of being a beast, no longer subject to the
law of Nature, implied that the accused was also an outsider with respect to
the states legal system, made by and for humans. The fact that Roman law
allowed such exclusions, as was the case with slaves and other undesirables,
should caution us further against regarding dehumanisation as only the
habitual character assassination of ones political opponents. Cicero certainly
employed it in order to make a case for depriving his enemies of their right to
moral consideration and the protection of such laws as the lex Sempronia.

Macquarie University

LAZAR MARIC
lmaric.lm@hotmail.com

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