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Bartolome
ARLENE N. LAPASARAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
In September 2001, private complainant Menardo Villarin
(Menardo) and his sister Vilma Villarin (Vilma) met petitioner Arlene N.
Lapasaran, who worked at Silver Jet Travel Tours Agency (Silver Jet)
at SIMCAS Building, Makati. For a fee of P85,000.00, petitioner
undertook the processing of the papers necessary for the deployment
(under a tourist visa) and employment of Menardo in South
Korea. Petitioner informed Menardo that he would be employed as
factory worker, which was, subsequently, changed to bakery
worker. Thereafter, Menardo paid the said fee in installments, the
first in September 2001 in the amount of P10,000.00, which was
received by a certain Pastor Paulino Cajucom; the second installment
was P35,000.00; while the third and last payment was P40,000.00;
the last two installments were delivered to the petitioner.
After two postponements in his flight schedule, Menardo finally
left for South Korea on November 25, 2001. Unfortunately, he was
incarcerated by South Korean immigration authorities and was
immediately deported to the Philippines because the travel documents
issued to him by the petitioner were fake. He immediately contacted
petitioner and informed her of what happened. Thereupon, petitioner
promised to send him back to South Korea, but the promise was
never fulfilled. Consequently, Menardo and his sister Vilma
demanded the return of the money they paid, but petitioner refused
and even said, Magkorte na lang tayo. It was later found out that
petitioner was no longer connected with Silver Jet.
Hence, the separate charges for illegal recruitment and estafa
against petitioner before the RTC of Manila. When arraigned, she
pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA ARE APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
Held:
Both laws are affirmative on both accounts. In the first case,
petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment, defined and penalized
by the Labor Code as amended R.A. No. 8042. Illegal recruitment is
committed when it is shown that petitioner gave the complainant the
distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the
complainant abroad for work, such that the latter was convinced to
part with his money in order to be employed. Petitioners
misrepresentations concerning her purported power and authority to
recruit for overseas employment, and the collection from Menardo of
various amounts, clearly indicate acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment. In the second case, petitioner was charged with violation
of Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes estafa.
The elements of the crime are: (a) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (b) damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party. Here, it has been sufficiently proven that petitioner represented
herself to Menardo as capable of sending him to South Korea for
employment, even if she did not have the authority or license for the
purpose. Undoubtedly, it was this misrepresentation that induced
Menardo to part with his hard-earned money in exchange for what he
thought was a promising future abroad. The act of petitioner clearly
constitutes estafa under the above-quoted provision. It is well
established in jurisprudence that a person may be convicted of both
illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason, therefore, is not hard to
discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa
is malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative.
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the act should involve two or more
persons to constitute recruitment and placement.
Held:
Negative. The proviso was intended neither to impose a
condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but
merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual
or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is
dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee,
an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring (of) workers."The number of persons dealt with is not an
essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of
workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b)
win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective
worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence
that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or
entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of
recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that
presumption. The four informations are reinstated.
Issue:
Whether or not it is in violation of Article III, Section 1 of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Held:
YES, VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE III SECTION 1 OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION. The Court concludes that the subject
clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of
months worth of basic salary. While the case was pending on appeal
with the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court ruled on Serrano v.
Gallant Maritime Services that the clause or for three months for
every year of the expired term, whichever is less is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not Serrano ruling should be applied to the
present case.
Held:
YES. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it had not been passed at all.
The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which
provides: Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or
practice to the contrary. The doctrine of operative fact serves as an
exception to the aforementioned general rule. It only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior
to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. This doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Following
Serrano, this case should not be included in the aforementioned
exception. After all, it was not the fault of Yap that he lost his job due
to an act of illegal dismissal committed by Thenamaris and Intermare.
To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to Yap and other OFWs, and
would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW s security of
tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit
from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law. Yap
awarded salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment
contract consisting of nine months.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos
employment was made with the knowledge and consent of
Sunace.
Held:
NO. There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship
when after the termination of the original employment contract, the
foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and entered
into
a
new
and
separate
employment
contract.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged
continuous communication was with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not
with the foreign employer.
The February 21, 2000 telefax message from the Taiwanese broker to
Sunace, the only basis of a finding of continuous communication,
reads verbatim:
xxxx
Regarding to Divina, she did not say anything about her saving
in police station. As we contact with her employer, she took
back her saving already last years. And they did not deduct
any money from her salary. Or she will call back her employer
to check it again. If her employer said yes! we will get it back
for
her.
Thank you and best regards.
(Sgd.)
Edmund
President19
Wang
Facts:
Individual complainants, private respondents herein, have
been working for petitioner Makati Haberdashery, Inc. as tailors,
seamstress, sewers, basters (manlililip) and "plantsadoras". They are
paid on a piece-rate basis except Maria Angeles and Leonila Serafina
who are paid on a monthly basis. In addition to their piece-rate, they
are given a daily allowance of three pesos provided they report for
work before 9:30 a.m. every day. Private respondents are required to
work from or before 9:30 a.m. up to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. from Monday to
Saturday and during peak periods even on Sundays and holidays.
Issue:
Whether or not the employees paid on piece-rate basis
are entitled to service incentive pay.
Held:
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are considered as pakiao
workers and paid on the basis of their output hence they cannot
claim for the underpayment of wages.
the nature of petitioners tasks, their job of repacking snack food was
necessary or desirable in the usual business of private respondents,
who were engaged in the manufacture and selling of such food
products; second, petitioners worked for private respondents
throughout the year, their employment not having been dependent on
a specific project or season; and third, the length of time that
petitioners worked for private respondents. Thus, while petitioners
mode of compensation was on a per piece basis, the status and
nature of their employment was that of regular employees.
The Rules Implementing the Labor Code exclude certain
employees from receiving benefits such as nighttime pay, holiday pay,
service incentive leave and 13th month pay, inter alia, field personnel
and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by
the employer, including those who are engaged on task or contract
basis, purely commission basis, or those who are paid a fixed amount
for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof. Plainly, petitioners as piece-rate workers do
not fall within this group. As mentioned earlier, not only did petitioners
labor under the control of private respondents as their employer,
likewise did petitioners toil throughout the year with the fulfillment of
their quota as supposed basis for compensation.
Held:
The amount of back wages to which each petitioner is entitled,
however, cannot be fully settled at this time. Petitioners, as piece-rate
workers having been paid by the piece, there is need to determine the
varying degrees of production and days worked by each
worker. Clearly, this issue is best left to the National Labor Relations
Commission.
As to the other benefits, namely, holiday pay, premium pay,
13 month pay and service incentive leave which the labor arbiter
failed to rule on but which petitioners prayed for in their complaint, we
hold that petitioners are so entitled to these benefits. Three (3)
factors lead us to conclude that petitioners, although piece-rate
workers, were regular employees of private respondents. First, as to
th
2. EXEMPTED EMPLOYERS
The following employers are still not covered by P.D. No. 851:
d.
Employers of those who are paid on purely commission,
boundary or task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount
for performing specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in
the performance thereof, except where the workers are paid on
piece-rate basis in which case the employer shall grant the
required 13th month pay to such workers. (italics supplied)
The Revised Guidelines as well as the Rules and Regulations
identify those workers who fall under the piece-rate category as those
who are paid a standard amount for every piece or unit of work
produced that is more or less regularly replicated, without regard to
the time spent in producing the same.
As to overtime pay, the rules, however, are different. According
to Sec. 2(e), Rule I, Book III of the Implementing Rules, workers who
are paid by results including those who are paid on piecework, takay, pakiao, or task basis, if their output rates are in
accordance with the standards prescribed under Sec. 8, Rule VII,
Book III, of these regulations, or where such rates have been fixed by
the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the aforesaid section, are
not entitled to receive overtime pay. Here, private respondents did not
allege adherence to the standards set forth in Sec. 8 nor with the
rates prescribed by the Secretary of Labor. As such, petitioners are
beyond the ambit of exempted persons and are therefore entitled to
overtime pay. Once more, the National Labor Relations Commission
would be in a better position to determine the exact amounts owed
petitioners, if any.
of pieces they finished in a day, they were each given a daily pay of at
least P64.00.
On January 17, 1989, petitioners filed a complaint against
private respondents for illegal dismissal and sought recovery of
overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay on holiday and rest day,
service incentive leave pay, separation pay, 13th month pay, and
attorneys fees.
Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez found private respondents
guilty of illegal dismissal and accordingly ordered them to pay
petitioners claims.
Issue:
Held:
There is no dispute that petitioners were employees of private
respondents although they were paid not on the basis of time spent
on the job but according to the quantity and the quality of work
produced by them. There are two categories of employees paid by
results: (1) those whose time and performance are supervised by the
employer. (Here, there is an element of control and supervision over
the manner as to how the work is to be performed. A piece-rate
worker belongs to this category especially if he performs his work in
the company premises.); and (2) those whose time and performance
are unsupervised. (Here, the employers control is over the result of
the work. Workers on pakyao and takay basis belong to this
group.) Both
classes
of
workers
are
paid
per
unit
accomplished. Piece-rate payment is generally practiced in garment
factories where work is done in the company premises, while payment
on pakyao and takay basis is commonly observed in the agricultural
industry, such as in sugar plantations where the work is performed in
bulk or in volumes difficult to quantify. Petitioners belong to the first
category, i.e., supervised employees.
In determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, the following elements must be considered: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
employees conduct. Of these elements, the most important criterion
is whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control
the employee not only as to the result of the work but also as to the
means and methods by which the result is to be accomplished.
In this case, private respondents exercised control over the
work of petitioners. As tailors, petitioners worked in the companys
premises from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. daily, including Sundays and
holidays. The mere fact that they were paid on a piece-rate basis
does not negate their status as regular employees of private
respondents. The term wage is broadly defined in Art. 97 of the
Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed
in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece
or commission basis. Payment by the piece is just a method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. Nor
does the fact that petitioners are not covered by the SSS affect the
employer-employee relationship.
Indeed, the following factors show that petitioners, although
piece-rate workers, were regular employees of private
respondents: (1) within the contemplation of Art. 280 of the Labor
Code, their work as tailors was necessary or desirable in the usual
business of private respondents, which is engaged in the tailoring
business; (2) petitioners worked for private respondents throughout
the year, their employment not being dependent on a specific project
or season; and, (3) petitioners worked for private respondents for
more than one year.
The Labor Arbiter awarded backwages, overtime pay, holiday
pay, 13th month pay, separation pay and attorneys fees,
corresponding to 10% of the total monetary awards, in favor of
petitioners.
As petitioners were illegally dismissed, they are entitled to
reinstatement with backwages. Considering that petitioners were
dismissed from the service on January 17, 1989, i.e., prior to March
21, 1989, the Labor Arbiter correctly applied the rule in the Mercury
Drug case, according to which the recovery of backwages should be
limited to three years without qualifications or deductions. Any award
in excess of three years is null and void as to the excess.
The Labor Arbiter correctly ordered private respondents to give
separation pay. Considerable time has lapsed since petitioners
dismissal, so that reinstatement would now be impractical and hardly
in the best interest of the parties. In lieu of reinstatement, separation
Held:
Facts:
Since 24 May 1995, respondent Antonio Bautista has been
employed by Autobus Transport Systems Inc. as driver- conductor
with travel routes Manila- Tuguegarao via Baguio, BaguioTuguegarao via Manila and Manila- Tabuk via Baguio. Antonio was
paid on commission basis, 7% of the total gross income per travel, on
a twice a month basis. In January 2000, while he was driving his bus
he bumped another bus owned by Autobus. He claimed that he
accidentally bumped the bus as he was so tired and that he has not
slept for more than 24 hours because Autobus required him to return
to Isabela immediately after arriving at Manila. Damages were
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that Nestles sales personnel are not
entitled to holiday pay for they are considered field personnel. Article
82 of the Labor Code states that field personnel shall refer to nonagricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from
the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and
whose actual hours of work cannot be determined with reasonable
certainty. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be
reasonably ascertained. The company has no way of determining
whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to office
before 8:00am prior to the field work and come back at 4:30pm, really
spend the hours in between in actual field of work. The requirement
for the salesman and other similarly situated employees to report for
work at 8:00am and return at 4:00pm or 4:30pm is not within the
realm of work in the field as defined in the code but an exercise of
purely management prerogative of providing administrative control
over such personnel.
When he was not given any job, Fermin Agao asked for a
certificate of employment but petitioner refused to issue the
certificate unless he submitted his resignation. Since private
respondent refused to submit such letter unless he was given
separation pay, petitioner prevented him from entering the
premises.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private
respondent who actually abandoned his work. It claimed that
the latter failed to report for work after his leave had expired
and was, in fact, absent without leave for three months.
Petitioner further claims that, nonetheless, it assigned private
respondent to another vessel, but the latter was left behind on
September 1, 1990. Thereafter, private respondent asked for
a certificate of employment on September 6 on the pretext that
he was applying to another fishing company. On September
10, 1990, he refused to get the certificate and resign unless he
was given separation pay
February 18, 1992, Labor Arbiter Arthur L. Amansec rendered
a decision in favour of the private respondent granting him
reinstatement with backwages, pay him his 13th month pay
and incentive leave pay for 1990
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which, on August 30, 1993,
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC dismissed
petitioners claim that it cannot be held liable for service
incentive leave pay by fishermen in its employ as the latter
supposedly are field personnel and thus not entitled to such
pay under the Labor Code
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent Fermin Agao can be
considered as field personnel as provided in the Labor Code
of the Philippines, as amended which will entitle him for service
incentive leave pay?
Held:
...
...
...
Facts:
Petitioner Roque S. Duterte seeks the review and setting aside
of the decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
71729, as reiterated in its resolution affirming an earlier
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which ruled that petitioner was not illegally dismissed from
employment due to disease under Article 284 of the Labor
Code.
In September 1993, petitioner was hired as truck/trailer driver
by respondent Kingswood Trading Company, Inc. (KTC) of
which co-respondent Filemon Lim is the President.
Petitioner was on the 6:00 a.m. 6:00 p.m. shift. He averaged
21 trips per month, getting P700 per trip. When not driving,
petitioner was assigned to clean and maintain respondent
KTCs equipment and vehicles for which he was paid P125 per
day. Regularly, petitioner would be seconded by respondent
Filemon Lim to drive for one of KTCs clients, the Philippine
National Oil Corporation, but always subject to respondents
convenience.
Petitioner, Roque Duterte, suffered two heart attacks. On his
first heart attack he was confined for two weeks at the
Philippine Heart Center (PHC). This was confirmed by
respondent KTC which admitted that petitioner was declared
on sick leave with corresponding notification. Then petitioner
suffered a second heart attack and was again confined at the
PHC. Upon release, he stayed home and spent time to
recuperate.
Petitioner attempted to report back to work but was told to look
for another job because he was unfit. Respondents refused to
declare petitioner fit to work unless physically examined by the
company physician. Respondents promise to pay petitioner
his separation pay turned out to be an empty one. Instead,
petitioner was presented, for his signature, a document as
proof of his receipt of the amount of P14,375.00 as first
installment of his Social Security System (SSS) benefits.
Having received no such amount, petitioner refused to affix his
Issue:
Whether or not Roque Duterte can be considered as field
personnel and therefore cannot avail of the holiday pay and
service incentive leave pay.
Whether or not Art. 284 on disease as ground for
termination is the basis for the illegal dismissal or Art. 279.
Whether or not there was illegal dismissal.
Ruling:
The Court notes that the NLRC, as sustained by the CA,
considered the petitioner as a field worker and, on that basis,
denied his claim for benefits under Articles 94 to 95 of the
Labor Code, such as holiday pay and service incentive leave
pay. Article 82 of the Code lists personnel who are not entitled
to the benefits aforementioned. Among the excluded group are
field
personnel, referring
to nonagricultural employees who regularly perform their duties
away from the principal place of business or branch office of
the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field
cannot
be
determined
with
reasonable
certainty.
As a general proposition, field personnel are those whose
job/service are not or cannot be effectively monitored by the
employer
or his representative, their workplace being away from the
principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty. Field personnel are paid
specific amount for rendering specific service or performing
specific work.
If required to be at specific places at specific times,
employees, including drivers, cannot be said to be field
personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away
from the principal office of the employer. Thus, to determine
whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary
to ascertain if actual hours of work in the field can be
determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so
doing, an inquiry must be made as to whether or not the
employees time and performance are constantly supervised
by the employer
Petitioner was definitely a regular employee of respondent
company and not its field personnel, as the term is used in the
Labor Code. As it were, he was based at the principal office of
the
respondent company. His actual work
hours, i.e., from 6:00
a.m. to 6:00
p.m.,
were ascertainable with reasonable
certainty.
He
averaged 21 trips per month. And if not driving for the
Issue:
Whether or not Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees
from marrying an employee of a competitor company is valid.
Held:
YES. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic
interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes
the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect
its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and
growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it
does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the
workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which
are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
As explained by the Court of Appeals:
The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage.
An employee of the company remains free to marry anyone of his or
her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal
prerogative that belongs only to the individual. However, an
employees personal decision does not detract the employer from
exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and
business success.
Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment and the
penalty be imposed to him if guilty of the act.
Held:
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA
7877.Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this
wise:
Issue
Whether or not it is unfair labor practice and if not an
unfair labor practice, whether or not it was tainted with
arbitrariness.
18. From: Ms. Laingan
PHILIPPINE GRAPHIC ARTS, petitioner, IGMIDIO R. SILVERIO
AND CARLOS CABAL, private petitioners
vs
NLRC, respondent
Facts:
In October, 1984, the petitioner corporation was forced by
economic circumstances to require its workers to go on mandatory
Held:
After considering the petition and treating the comments of the
private respondents and the Solicitor General as Answers, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition and decide it on the basic
merits.
The court was convinced that there was no unfair labor
practice. As found by the NLRC, the private respondents themselves
never questioned the existence of an economic crisis but, in fact,
admitted its existence.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an illegal reduction of work
when Linton implemented a compressed workweek by reducing
from six to three the number of working days with the employees
working on a rotation basis.
Ruling:
The Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE, moreover,
released a bulletin providing for in determining when an employer can
validly reduce the regular number of working days. The said bulletin
states that a reduction of the number of regular working days is valid
where the arrangement is resorted to by the employer to prevent
serious losses due to causes beyond his control, such as when there
is a substantial slump in the demand for his goods or services or
when there is lack of raw materials. Although the bulletin stands more
as a set of directory guidelines than a binding set of implementing
rules, it has one main consideration, consistent with the ruling in
Philippine Graphic Arts Inc., in determining the validity of reduction of
working hours that the company was suffering from losses.
Issue:
Whether the pro-rated computation of the 13th month pay and
the other bonuses in question is valid and lawful in the CBA.
Held:
The petition lack merit. A collective bargaining agreement
refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor
organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and
all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.
Honda wanted to implement a pro-rated computation of the
benefits based on the "no work, no pay" rule. According to the
company, the phrase "present practice" as mentioned in the CBA
refers to the manner and requisites with respect to the payment of the
bonuses, i.e., 50% to be given in May and the other 50% in December
of each year. Respondent union, however, insists that the CBA
provisions relating to the implementation of the 13th month pay
necessarily relate to the computation of the same.
Facts:
wages they would receive. All seamen, whether members of the crew
or deck officers or engineers, have been furnished free meals by the
ship owners or operators. All the shipping articles signed by the
master and the crew members, contained, among others, a
stipulation, that "in consideration of which services to be duly
performed, the said master hereby agrees to pay to the said crew, as
wages, the sums against their names respectively expressed in the
contract; and to supply them with provisions as provided herein ..."
,and during the duration of the contract "the master of the vessel will
provide each member of the crew such daily subsistence as shall be
mutually agreed daily upon between said master and crew; or, in lieu
of such subsistence the crew may reserve the right to demand at the
time of execution of these articles that adequate daily rations be
furnished each member of the crew.". It is, therefore, apparent that,
aside from the payment of the respective salaries or wages, set
opposite the names of the crew members, the petitioners bound
themselves to supply the crew with daily subsistence or daily rations,
which include food.
This was the situation before August 4, 1951, when the
Minimum Wage Law became effective. After this date, however, the
companies began deducting the cost of meals from the wages or
salaries of crew members; but no such deductions were made from
the salaries of the deck officers and engineers in all the boats of the
petitioners. Under the existing laws, therefore, the query converges on
the legality of such deductions. While the petitioners herein contend
that the deductions are legal and should not be reimbursed to the
respondent union, the latter, however, claims that same are illegal and
reimbursement should be made.
The CIR ruled in favour of the union, denying the MR of the
petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the CIR erred in holding that inasmuch as
with regard to meals furnished to crew members of a vessel,
section 3(f) of Act No. 602 is the general rule, which section 19
thereof is the exception, the cost of said meals may not be
legally deducted from the wages or salaries of the aforesaid
crew members by the herein petitioners.
Held:
We hold that such deductions are not authorized. In the
coastwise business of transportation of passengers and freight, the
men who compose the complement of a vessel are provided with free
meals by the shipowners, operators or agents, because they hold on
to their work and duties, regardless of "the stress and strain
concomitant of a bad weather, unmindful of the dangers that lurk
ahead in the midst of the high seas."
Section 3, par. f, of the Minimum Wage Law, (R.A. No. 602), provides
as follows
(f) Until and unless investigations by the Secretary of Labor on his
initiative or on petition of any interested party result in a different
determination of the fair and reasonable value, the furnishing of meals
shall be valued at not more than thirty centavos per meal for
agricultural employees and not more than forty centavos for any other
employees covered by this Act, and the furnishing of housing shall be
valued at not more than twenty centavos daily for agricultural workers
and not more than forty centavos daily for other employees covered
by this Act.
Section 3, par. f, of the Minimum Wage Law, (R.A. No. 602), provides
as follows
(f) Until and unless investigations by the Secretary of Labor on his
initiative or on petition of any interested party result in a different
determination of the fair and reasonable value, the furnishing of meals
shall be valued at not more than thirty centavos per meal for
agricultural employees and not more than forty centavos for any other
employees covered by this Act, and the furnishing of housing shall be
valued at not more than twenty centavos daily for agricultural workers
and not more than forty centavos daily for other employees covered
by this Act.
However, section 19, same law, states
SEC. 19. Relations to other labor laws and practices. Nothing in this
Act shall deprive an employee of the right to seek fair wages, shorter
working hours and better working conditions nor justify an employer in
violating any other labor law applicable to his employees, in reducing
the wage now paid to any of his employees in excess of the minimum
wage established under this Act, or in reducing supplements furnished
on the date of enactment.
Sec 3 is the general rule and sec 19 is the exception. There is no
conflict; the two provisions could, as they should be harmonized. And
even if there is such a conflict, the respondent CIR should resolve the
same in favor of the safety and decent living laborers (Art. 1702, new
Civil Code).
It is argued that the food or meals given to the deck officers,
marine engineers and unlicensed crew members in question, were
mere "facilities" which should be deducted from wages, and not
"supplements".
"Supplements", therefore, constitute extra remuneration or
special privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over
and above their ordinary earnings or wages. "Facilities", on the other
hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborer's and his
family's existence and subsistence so that by express provision of law
(Sec. 2[g]), they form part of the wage and when furnished by the
employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so furnished,
the laborer would spend and pay for them just the same.
In short, the benefit or privilege given to the employee which
constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic or
ordinary earning or wage, is supplement; and when said benefit or
privilege is part of the laborers' basic wages, it is a facility. The
criterion is not so much with the kind of the benefit or item (food,
lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but its purpose.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed.
sions,
among
which
were (a)
an increase
of P0.50 inwages, (b) commutation of sick and vacation leave if notenj
oyed during the year, (c) various privileges, such as free medical care,
medicine, and hospitalization, (d) right to a closed shop, check off,
etc., (e) no dismissal without prior just cause and with a prior
investigation, etc.- Some of the demands, were granted by
the petitioner, and the others were rejected. Hearings were held in the
respondent court (CIR).
After the hearings the respondent court rendered a decision
fixing the minimum wage for the laborers at P3.20,
declaringthat additional compensation representing efficiency bonuss
hould not be included as part of the wage, and making
theaward effective from September 4, 1950 (the date of thepresentati
on of the original demand, instead of from April 5,1951, the date of the
amended demand.
Issues:
WON the Court of Industrial Relations erred in fixing the
minimum wage at P3.20.
WON the Court of Industrial Relations erred in declaring
that the additional compensation representing the efficiency
bonus should not be included as part of the wage.
WON the Court of Industrial Relations erred in making the
award effective from September 4, 1950
23. From: Mr. Martin
ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING CO., INC., petitioner
vs
ATOK BIGWEDGE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION, respondent
Facts:
On September 4, 1950, a demand was submitted
to petitionerby respondent union through its officers for variousconces
Held:
1. NO. Petitioner contends that the laborer and his family need only
the amount of P2.58 for food so this should be the basis for
thedetermination of his wage, not what he actually spends.Furthermor
e, that it is not justifiable to fix a wage higher than that provided
by Republic
Act No.
602 and
1989, nine lawyers of petitioner Banks Legal Department, in a letterpetition to the Chairman of the Board of Directors, accused
respondent Sadac of abusive conduct and ultimately, petitioned for a
change in leadership of the department. On the ground of lack of
confidence in Sadac, under the rules of client and lawyer relationship,
petitioner Bank instructed respondent Sadac to deliver all materials in
his custody in all cases in which the latter was appearing as its
counsel of record. In reaction thereto, Sadac requested for a full
hearing and formal investigation but the same remained unheeded.
On 9 November 1989, respondent Sadac filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with damages against petitioner Bank and individual
members of the Board of Directors thereof. After learning of the filing
of the complaint, petitioner Bank terminated the services of
respondent Sadac. Finally, on 10 August 1989, Sadac was removed
from his office.
Labor Arbiter rendered decision that Sadacs termination was
illegal and entitled to reinstatement and payment of full back wages.
NLRC affirmed the decision upon appeal by the Bank. Sadac filed for
execution of judgment where it gave its computation which amounted
to P 6.03 M representing his back wages and the increases he should
have received during the time he was illegally dismissed. The Bank
opposed to Sadacs computation. The Labor Arbiter favor Sadacs
computation. NLRC, upon appeal by the bank, reversed the decision.
CA reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the computation of back wages shall
include the general increases.
Ruling:
Facts:
Ricardo Sadac was appointed Vice President of the Legal
Department of petitioner Bank effective 1 August 1981, and
subsequently General Counsel thereof on 8 December 1981. On June
Issue:
25. From: Mr. Rivera
MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE, petitioner
vs
HON. FRANKLIN DRILON and MEYCAUAYAN FACULTY
ASSOCIATION, respondent
Facts:
are their rights arising from different sources, one as statutory right
and the other is a contractual right.
Issue:
Can the PT&T Corp. be compelled to pay simultaneously
the wage increase as provided in the wage orders and CBA?
Held:
The court ruled in negative. The CBA provision in this case
shall prevail. The CBA provides that, The parties agree that in the
event of additional wage increases, bonuses, or allowances which
during the life of this agreement being made mandatory as a matter of
law, such that the minimum wage including bonuses and allowances
shall be greater than the wage provided therein, then such wages
shall ipso facto become the total remunerations under such
agreement in lieu of all other remuneration and increase herein
provided.
Of these four, the Court says that it is the power of control that is
the most important.
Argument of Orozco: PDI has control by virtue of the content of
the column, as to time, space and as to discipline. But, the Court says
that it is not the control that the law envisions. The so called control as
to time, space, and discipline are dictated by the very nature of the
newspaper.
According to the Court, the main determinant of the power of
control is whether or not the rules set by the employer are meant to
control not just the result but also the means and method to be used
by the hired party in order to achieve success such result.
The facts leading to the conclusion that there was no power of
control over Orozco are as follows:
1. She failed to show that she was dictated how she was to write
or produce her articles each week.
2. There was no restraint in her creativity
3. She was free to write her column in the manner and style she
was accustomed to and to use whatever research method she
deemed suitable for her purpose.
to
Orozcos
ABS-CBN, respondent
Issue:
Whether or not Sonza, being a broadcaster, an employee
of ABS-CBN.
Facts:
May 1994. ABS-CBN signed an agreement with MJMDC, Mel
and Jay Management and Development Corporation. Jay Sonza is
the President and General Manager and Carmela Tiangco as EVP
and Treasurer.
April 30, 1996. Sonza filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before
the Department of Labor and Employment, NCR, in Quezon City.
Sonza complained that ABS-CBN did not pay his:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Salaries
Separation Pay
Service Incentive Leave
13th Month Pay
Signing Bonus
Travel Allowance
Amounts due under the Employees Stock Option Plan.
The fact that per the May 1994 Agreement complainant was
accorded some benefits normally given to an employee is
inconsequential. Whatever benefits complainant enjoyed arose from
specific agreement by the parties and not by reason of employeremployee relationship
Facts:
Since 1968, respondent Basiao has been an agent for
petitioner company, and is authorized to solicit within the Philippines
applications for insurance policies and annuities in accordance with
the existing rules and regulations of the company. In return, he would
receive compensation, in the form of commissions.
Some four years later, in April 1972, the parties entered into
another contract an Agency Manager's Contract and to
implement his end of it Basiao organized an agency or office to which
he gave the name M. Basiao and Associates, while concurrently
fulfilling his commitments under the first contract with the Company. In
May, 1979, the Company terminated the Agency Manager's Contract.
After vainly seeking a reconsideration, Basiao sued the Company in a
civil action and this, he was later to claim, prompted the latter to
terminate also his engagement under the first contract and to stop
payment of his commissions starting April 1, 1980.
Basiao thereafter filed with the then Ministry of Labor a
complaint against the Company and its president. The complaint
sought to recover commissions allegedly unpaid thereunder, plus
attorney's fees. The respondents disputed the Ministry's jurisdiction
over Basiao's claim, asserting that he was not the Company's
employee, but an independent contractor.
Issue:
Whether there exists an employer-employee relationship.
Held:
Not every form of control that the hiring party reserves to
himself over the conduct of the party hired in relation to the services
rendered may be accorded the effect of establishing an employer-
No showing has been made that any such rules or regulations were in
fact promulgated, much less that any rules existed or were issued
which effectively controlled or restricted his choice of methods or
the methods themselves of selling insurance. Absent such
showing, the Court will not speculate that any exceptions or
qualifications were imposed on the express provision of the contract
leaving Basiao "..free to exercise his own judgment as to the time,
place and means of soliciting insurance." The Court, therefore, rules
that under the contract invoked by him, Basiao was not an employee
of the petitioner, but a commission agent, an independent contractor
whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an
ordinary civil action. NLRC Decision set aside.
NLRC, respondent
Facts:
Angelina Francisco was hired by the Kasei Corporation during
the incorporation stage. She was designated as Accountant and
Corporate Secretary. She was assigned to handle all accounting
needs . She was also a liaison officer to the City of Makati. She
performed the work of Acting Manager for five years but later she was
replaced by Liza R. Fuentes as Manager. Then, Kasei Corporation
reduced her salary and was not paid her mid-year bonus allegedly
because the company was not earning well. She made repeated
follow-ups with the company cashier but she was advised that the
company was not earning well. Ultimately, she did not report for work
and filed an action for constructive dismissal before the labor arbiter.
Issue:
Whether or not she was considered as an employee.
Held:
In certain cases where the control test is not sufficient to give a
complete picture of the relationship between the parties, owing to the
complexity of such a relationship where several positions have been
held by the worker. There are instances when, aside from the
employers power to control the employee with respect to the means
and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, economic
realities of the employment relations help provide a comprehensive
analysis of the true classification of the individual, whether as
employee, independent contractor, corporate officer or some other
capacity.
ALU-TUCP, petitioner
vs
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL
STEEL CORPORATION, respondents
Facts:
Alan
Jerry
Edgar
Osias
Leonido
Darrell
Gerry
Barinque
Bontilao
Bontuyan
Dandasan
Echavez
Eltagonde
Fetalvero
8.
Eduard
9.
Russell
10.
Jose
11.
Eusebio
12.
Bonifacio
13. Romeo Saron
Fookson
Gacus
Garguena
Mejos
Mejos
Issue:
Held:
YES. Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment The
provisions of the written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding
and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, and employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee
who has rendered at least one year service, whether such service is
continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists.
It is evidently important to become clear about the meaning
and scope of the term project in the present context. The project
for the carrying out of which project employees are hired would
ordinarily have some relationship to the usual business of the
employer. Exceptionally, the project undertaking might not have an
ordinary or normal relationship to the usual business of the employer.
In this latter case, the determination of the scope and parameters of
the project becomes fairly easy. It is unusual (but still conceivable)
for a company to undertake a project which has absolutely no
Facts:
Petitioner company was engaged in a construction business
where respondents were hired on different dates from 1976 to 1992
either as laborers, road roller operators, painters or drivers
In 1997, respondents filed two separate complaints for illegal
dismissal against the company and its General Manager, Oscar
Banzon, before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Petitioners allegedly dismissed
them without a valid reason and without due process of law. The
complaints also included claims for non-payment of the 13th month
pay, five days' service incentive leave pay, premium pay for holidays
and rest days, and moral and exemplary damages.
LA declared respondents as regular employees because they
belonged to a "work pool" from which the company drew workers for
assignment to different projects, at its discretion. He ruled that
respondents were hired and re-hired over a period of 18 years, hence,
Issue:
Held:
The court ruled that respondents were regular employees.
However, we take exception to the reasons cited by the LA (which
both the NLRC and the CA affirmed) in considering respondents as
regular employees and not as project employees.
Contrary to the disquisitions of the LA, employees (like
respondents) who work under different project employment contracts
for several years do not automatically become regular employees;
they can remain as project employees regardless of the number of
years they work. Length of service is not a controlling factor in
determining the nature of one's employment.
Moreover, employees who are members of a "work pool" from
which a company (like petitioner corporation) draws workers for
deployment to its different projects do not become regular employees
by reason of that fact alone. The Court has enunciated in some
Issue:
Whether or not Jamin is a project employee.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that Jamin is a regular employee.
Jamins employment history with DMCI stands out for his continuous,
repeated and successive rehiring in the companys construction
business. In all the 38 projects where DMCI engaged Jamins
services, the task he performed as a carpenter were indisputably
necessary and desirable in the DMCIs construction business. Citing
the case of Maraguinot, the court held that once a project or work pool
employee has been 1. continuously, as opposed to intermittently,
rehired by the same employer for the same task or nature of task and
2. these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual
business or trade of the employer, then the employee must be
deemed a regular employee.
P1.50
1963-1965
P2.00
1965-1967
P3.00
1967-1970
P4.00
1970-1973
P5.00
1973-1975
P5.00
1975-1978
P6.00
1978-1979
P7.00
Private respondent Aurora Cruz in her answer to petitioners'
complaint denied that said petitioners were her regular
employees and instead averred that she engaged their
services, through Spouses Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa
Mercado, their "mandarols", that is, persons who take charge
in supplying the number of workers needed by owners of
various farms, but only to do a particular phase of agricultural
work necessary in rice production and/or sugar cane
production, after which they would be free to render services
to other farm owners who need their services.
Respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino ruled in favor of
private respondents and held that petitioners were not regular
and permanent workers of the private respondents, for the
nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that
they were required to perform phases of agricultural work for a
definite period of time after which their services would be
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are regular and permanent
workers and therefore entitled to benefits they pray for.
Held:
pretext that the result was on appeal, refused to sit down with the
union for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining
agreement. Moreover, the workers including complainants herein
were not given work for more than one month. In protest,
complainants staged a strike which was however settled upon the
signing of a Memorandum of Agreement. However, because the
petitioners were unable to comply with one of the stipulation in the
MOA, respondents reneged on its commitment to sit down and
bargain collectively. Moreover, starting September 1991, respondents
did not any more give work assignments to the complainants forcing
the union to stage a strike on January 2, 1992. But due to the
conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another Memorandum of Agreement
was signed by the complainants and respondents.
The National Labor Relations Commission ruled in favour of
the workers which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The CA
affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature,
they were considered to be merely on leave during the off-season and
were therefore still employed by petitioners. Moreover, the workers
enjoyed security of tenure. Any infringement upon this right was
deemed by the CA to be tantamount to illegal dismissal.The appellate
court found neither "rhyme nor reason in petitioner's argument that it
was the workers themselves who refused to or were choosy in their
work." As found by the NLRC, the record of this case is "replete with
complainants' persistence and dogged determination in going back to
work."
Issue:
Whether or not the workers are considered regular
employees.
Held:
YES. Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, states:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions
of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the
termination was for a valid and authorized cause. In the case at bar,
petitioners failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of
respondents who, as discussed above, are regular employees.
Held:
Issues:
Whether or not the ruling in the case of Mercado Sr. v.
NLRC, following the Doctrine of Stare Decisis should be applied
in the case.
however, no proof that they were hired for the duration of one season
only. The petitioners did not present any evidence that the
respondents wererequired to perform certain phases of agricultural
work for a definite period of time. The payrolls, submitted in evidence
bythe petitioners, show that they availed the services of the
respondents since 1991. Absent any proof to the contrary, thegeneral
rule of regular employment should therefore stand. It bears stressing
that the employer has the burden of proving the lawfulness of his
employees dismissal. The primary standard for determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or
business of the employer. There is no doubt that the respondents
were performing work necessary and desirable in the usual trade or
business of an employer. Hence, they can properly be classified as
regular employees.