National and European identities: complementary or antagonistic?

Draft paper, please do not quote without permission

by

Laurent Licata
Universit Libre de Bruxelles
licata@ulb.ac.be

Paper prepared for the Conference on Europeanisation and Multiple Identities,

9-10 June 2000, EUI/RSC, Florence, Italy

Introduction
The development of a sense of European identity is currently one of the main concerns of
European Union institutions, and is at the core of this conference. There may be several reasons
why this issue attracts so much attention. The decline in average support for the EU during the
last decade is certainly one of them (Eurobarometer n 50). It seems that public opinion did not
accompany the institutional reforms or, worse, reacted against them. In order to account for this
lack of public support, many voices blamed the symbolic deficit of the EU (Mathieu, 1994). In
their present state, European institutions are too distant from the people; their decisions, in the
rare cases in which people are aware of them, are resented as extraneous actions rather than as the
expression of a collective will. In addition, the recent economic and political advances do not
have much meaning for the average European. In brief, it can be argued that the relationship
between the people and the EU is a rather cold one. According to this kind of critique this
relationship should become a warm one, endowed with clear meaning: people should identify
with the EU so that they will support its political project and participate in its development
(Albarran Cano, 1999). These three elements identity, meaning and participation are seen as
necessarily linked: identity and meaning being the necessary conditions for effective
participation. In other words, identification is considered important because it conditions the
development of a European citizenship.
In the present paper I shall briefly trace the origins of this conception of identity by referring to
the way theorists of nationalism have described its development in the framework of Nationbuilding. In the process, I shall examine how some social psychology models can contribute to a
better understanding of what these phenomena can imply for European integration. I will present
some survey results regarding the relationships between regional, national and European levels of
identification; expectations and attitudes towards the future evolution of the EU; and the factors
that best predict European identification. Finally I shall discuss the implications of the theoretical
reflection and of some of these results for the European integration project.

European Citizenship
Traditionally, citizenship is described as a two dimensional concept. The vertical dimension links
the individual to the state and refers to the concept of sovereignty. Despite some noticeable
differences among European countries regarding the criteria of attribution of this status (jus
sanguinis, jus solis, etc.), it is a de facto citizenship: people usually get it automatically. The
horizontal dimension links the community of citizens. It rests on the exercise of democratic
representation. It is the basis of concrete rights and duties. Whilst the vertical dimension is
passive, the horizontal axis demands active participation from citizens (Tel, 1995).
At the time being, European citizenship exists as an official status, which was implemented
through the Maastricht treaty. On the vertical dimension, European citizenship is also a de facto
status that derives from the belonging to a member state. But this new status introduces a novelty
in the traditional conception of citizenship, as European individuals are both directly linked to
2

their national state and to the European Union: they have a double citizenship. European
citizenship is a second layer citizenship that gives the individual specific rights linked to the
integration process (individual mobility, diplomatic protection by other member states, right to
elect the European Parliament, etc.). On the horizontal dimension, active participation in the
process of collective will formation is also encouraged, most noticeably through the role of the
political parties at the European level. The current debate about the future of the union relates to
the question of the evolution of this status: should it remain a double citizenship or should it
evolve towards a unique supranational European citizenship in the framework of a federal
Europe?
This double citizenship has objectively existed since 1992, a long enough time for specialists to
analyse its implications but a very short one for people to adapt themselves to this new reality.
There may be an important gap between objective and subjective realities. Hence, participation in
the 1999 European elections was disappointingly low in most European countries.
When the subjective aspects of citizenship is at stake, one cannot avoid raising the question of
identity. Even though these two ideas are conceptually distinct, they are tightly linked, even
confused in discourses from and about the European Union. For example, one finds as an
introduction to the Second report of the European Commission on Citizenship of Union (1997):
Citizenship of the Union conferred on nationals of all Member States by the Maastricht Treaty is
meant to make the process of European integration more relevant to individual citizens by
increasing their participation, strengthening the protection of their rights and promoting the idea
of an European identity. (cited in Albarran Cano, 1999). A sense of European identity is
sometimes seen as a means of developing citizenship; sometimes, the creation of the Citizen of
the EU is listed among other measures meant to promote European identity (Strauss, 1999).
Identity is relevant to the two dimensions of citizenship. On the vertical dimension, the State
defines the conditions of inclusion in the nation. In turn, identification with the nation conditions
loyalty to the State. On the horizontal dimension, identification with the nation insures a sense of
common good so that people are more likely to act as community members, to put collective
interests before their own (de Tocqueville, 1961). Of course, these two dimensions are
interrelated as the State derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is an emanation of the
community.
The development of national identification
In order to identify the factors that could facilitate the development of a European identity, one
must examine how such a sentiment emerged in the case of Nation-states. The example of
nationalism is worthy of our attention for a variety of reasons. First of all because, as a historical
fact, studying nationalism allows us to trace the origins of national identification while
highlighting the dangers inherent to their application. But also because, as an ideology (Billig,
1996), nationalism exerts an influence on lay people's representations of their geopolitical
identities. The nationalist model is so widespread in modern societies that it is often confused
with a natural state: " a man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears; a
deficiency in any of these particulars is not inconceivable and does from time to time occur, but
only as a result of some disaster, and it is itself a disaster of a kind" (Gellner, 1983, p. 6). In line
with social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961), the representation of the nation is
3

objectified, so that people refer to it as if it was a real, concrete object. Hence, one can expect
nations to serve as anchors in the construction of social representations linked to a European
identity. This is the social cognitive process through which new elements are incorporated into
the network of pre-existing categories (Moscovici, 1961; Palmonari and Doise, 1986). Together
with objectification, anchoring is a major process in the creation of a social representation. It
ensues that people will use their representation of the nation to make sense of the new level of
identification they have to cope with. In addition, this sense of obviousness can also shape
experts and decision makers' representations of what Europe should become.
Despite important divergences regarding the origins of nations, most scholars acknowledge the
fact that the initiative of a nation's creation generally emanates from very small minorities (elites)
who frame and diffuse a discourse designated to convince the masses that they belong to a
common entity (Brass, 1979; Breuilly, 1982; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1991). As Prez-Agote (1999)
puts it: " we have to conceive the nation as a definition of reality, historically produced by its
elites, which has reached, through certain mechanisms, an important social diffusion and which
maintains itself depending on similar or distinct mechanisms" (p. 23).
In this sense, the geopolitical entity is always the product of a "classification struggle" (lutte des
classements) which purpose is to impose a legitimate definition of the divisions of the social
world (Bourdieu, 1982). Imposing a vision of the social world creates meaning and consensus
over this meaning, especially over the group's identity and unity, a process which in fact produces
the reality of the group's identity and unity. As such the nationalist discourse is a performative
process because diffusing the belief in the group's definition equates with forming a social
aggregate with the conscience of belonging. When all the individuals accept the definition, the
social group is fully realised (Prez-Agote, 1999).
This definition can take diverse forms depending on the particular context in which it is shaped
and diffused, but it generally possesses invariant features. Hence, Gellner (1983) proposed two
minimal conditions for a nation to exist:

Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture;

Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognise each other as belonging to the
same nation.

Culture and homogeneity

Nationalism generally involves references to a culture that is supposed to be shared by all the
members of a nation. As such, nationalist discourse often acquires its legitimacy in the name of
folk culture, secular traditions, and unquestionable symbols. In fact, as many authors remarked
(Brass, 1979; Gellner, 1983; see Jaffrelot, 1991 for a review), the nationalist process rather
implies a radical transformation of pre-existing cultures that were much more diverse and many
of the allegedly secular traditions are in fact artificially constructed (Hobsbawm and Ranger,
1983; Thiesse, 1999). A new culture is shaped and is spread across the whole national territory.
The new "high" culture usually borrows from one or some of the ancient local cultures. In social
psychological terms, it is a case of cognitive anchoring. References to ancient folklore or
4

traditions facilitate the adoption of the "high" culture as it insures that it will make sense for most
people.
Through the nation building process, the implicit identifications that prevailed in local
communities are made explicit (Azzi, 1998). Implicit identification prevailed in situations where
the individual was immersed in his groups culture, behaving and thinking according to its
values, symbols, and cultural rules, but without being aware of it. In these cases, culture was
lived, but not represented. These cultures were very diverse and flexible. The rigidity of
nationalist discourse must be understood as a reaction to the versatility of the implicit form of
cultural identity. It exerts social pressure on individuals in order to fix a precise idea of their
cultural group in their mind (Azzi and Klein, 1998).
This imposition through different means - large scale education systems, mass media,
administrations, routine use of national symbols (Billig, 1995) etc. - of common cultural
references that are supposed to provide a content to the group's identity leads to a homogenisation
of the national cultural space (Smith, 1991). The ultimate goal is close correspondences between
the community of people (the nation), a culture, and a state (Gellner, 1983).
Identity and differentiation
Gellner's second condition for the existence of a nation - Two men are of the same nation if and
only if they recognise each other as belonging to the same nation - points to the fact that a shared
culture is a necessary but not sufficient criteria to form a nation. In addition, people must be
conscious of the fact that they share a common identity. As Bar-Tal pointed out about social
groups in general (Bar-Tal, 1990), "there may be an important difference for the group between
the situations when a belief is held by one member of the group, or even by all the members, who
are not aware of sharing this belief, and the situations when a belief is held by all the members or
a portion of them, who are aware of this sharing" (p. 1). According to this author, these group
beliefs - which, in the case of nationalism, form a shared culture - serve, among other functions,
to mark the group's boundaries; to differentiate the in-group from the out-group. As such a group
exists if its members share at least one fundamental group belief: "We are a group".
This aspect of groups and nations formation clearly relates to the cognitive process of
categorisation. That is the process through which individuals reduce the complexity of the stimuli
they get from the physical world by classifying them in a limited number of categories. This
process implies both the maximisation of differences between members - objects or people - of
different categories (differentiation) and the minimisation of differences among members of the
same category.
Henri Tajfel placed the categorisation process at the heart of social identity theory, which he used
to explain large-scale intergroup relations. However, this theory does not reduce this issue to
cognitive factors as his most quoted definition of social identity reveals: " that part of the
individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group
(or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership"
(Tajfel, 1981, p.255). Evaluative and affective dimensions are also part of the picture. Hence,
according to Tajfel, the groups an individual belongs to are part of this individual's self-concept.
As people are motivated to gain or to maintain a sense of positive self-esteem, they also strive to
gain or maintain a sense of positive social identity. Following SIT, the only way to do so is to
5

engage in favourable social comparisons with other social groups: people want their group to
appear as different and superior to others. Hence people tend to show an in-group favouring bias
when comparing their in-group to out-groups (but see (Hinkle and Brown, 1990). Conversely,
there is empirical evidence that people tend to identify more strongly with high status groups than
with low status groups (Ellemers, 1993).
In the realm of ethnic or national groups, Tajfel's propositions stand in agreement with theories
regarding the importance of group boundaries in the process of their definition. Hence,
Armstrong postulates that ethnic groups tend to define themselves, not by referring to their own
characteristics, but by exclusion, through the comparison with "strangers" (Armstrong, 1982).
However, it is very unlikely that these individual psychological processes, even if they are
universal, could on their own account for the existence of shared beliefs about large-scale groups
(Cinnerella, 1996). Social representational processes always mediate people's perceptions of
large-scale social categories. In other words, intra-individual processes cannot thoroughly explain
homogenisation and differentiation at the collective level (Azzi, 1998a). Some political
ideologies and discourses may trigger these mechanisms by imposing a particular representation
of the group whilst others may prevent them to happen.
Embedded identities
According to Self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg et al., 1987), which developed the
cognitive aspects of social identity theory, there is a functional antagonism between different
levels of categorisation. It means that only one categorisation can be salient at one time. For
example, if group categorisation is salient, then the perception of individual differences is
inhibited, as is the perception of inter-group similarities. One could apply this principle to the
relationship between local subgroups and the nation. In effect, nation building has implied an
antagonism between sub-ordinate ethnic groups and the super-ordinate national group.
Nationalism imposes an exclusive identification with the nation. It promotes a direct relationship
between the individual and the State and does not recognise the legitimacy of intermediate
entities.
Again we should not imply from the existence of this intra-individual mechanism of functional
antagonism that the historical antagonism between super-ordinate (national) and subordinate
(ethnic or regional) levels of social identification is natural. This antagonism may not be due to
mechanisms linked to the cognitive categorisation process as much as it may be produced by
political ideologies (Azzi, 1998). Political ideologies can amplify these cognitive mechanisms as
well as they can inhibit them.
Instrumental motives
According to some authors, instrumental motives lay at the core of ethnic or nationalist
movements (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; Brass, 1979). Hence, Glazer and Moynihan present the
ethnic group as an interest group that uses values and symbols to legitimise its claims. In that
view, ethnicity or nationalism are strategic choices adopted to defend social, economic, or
political interests. The perception of potential gains or losses that could result from the
membership in a social group may therefore condition people's identification with it.
When dealing with super-ordinate categories, subordinate group's interest as well as individual
interests can condition identification. It has been proposed, for example, that the enthusiastic
6

support that the Italians give to the EU be due to the fact that they have the most to gain
economically (Cinnerella, 1997). Similarly, Mlicki and Ellemers, proposed that the strong
European identification reported by their polish students is due to their aspiration for political
change (Mlicki and Ellemers, 1996).
European identification
There are different lessons to learn from what precedes. First of all, in a pragmatic sense, it
follows that, in order to promote a sense of European identification as strong and durable as the
sense of national identification that resulted from nation building processes, the E.U. would have
to :

Construct a culture that every European would be likely to adopt. If we refer to social
representation theory, it implies that this European overarching culture should feature
elements that would enable people from the different cultural groups to anchor the new
culture in their familiar frame of reference.

Diffuse this culture and encourage the integration of pre-existing cultures in order to
homogenise the European cultural space.

Encourage comparisons with out-groups.

Affirm the superiority and distinctiveness of Europe compared to other geopolitical entities.

Convince people that the unification process will promote their individual and/or collective
interests.

There are many reasons for doubting the desirability, let alone the feasibility of this program. I
shall not discuss them as the topic that is being treated regards how the nationalist model can
influence people's relationship with Europe.
If we rest on the assumption that people derive their vision of the European integration from their
knowledge of the nation-state model, it follows that they will expect this process to lead to a
standardisation of the European space. Inasmuch as people already identify with other
subordinate groups - most of all to their nations -, one can predict that the prospect of
standardisation will lead to negative evaluations and condition people's identification with
Europe (Sanchez-Mazas, 1996). Conversely, one can argue that a representation of Europe as
complementary to the nation should lead to a stronger European identification.

Some results
We conducted an exploratory questionnaire survey, with French-speaking Belgian undergraduate
psychology students (N = 269)1. Questionnaires were administered during social psychology
seminar sessions. Questions tapped (among others) identifications, perception of the control
Belgium has on EU decision making, attitudes towards European unification; and predictions
regarding the evolution of the EU (homogenisation / preservation of diversity). There are of
course important limitations inherent to this kind of survey. Hence, it should be kept in mind that
this sample is neither representative of the Belgian youth nor of the whole Belgian population, let
1

Three questionnaires were administered in three sessions. The total number of participants is 269, although only 89
of them completed the three questionnaires.

alone the European population. It does not allow for generalisations. In addition, this is a
correlational study, which does not allow for clear identification of causal relationships. The aim
of this research was to identify relationships between variables. It was carried out, in the prospect
of a potential international survey, to identify relevant variables and build efficient research tools.
Identification with the region, the nation and Europe
Three identification variables were calculated by averaging 8 items2 (Cronbach's alphas: region =
.82; nation = .88; Europe = .85). Results shown in table 1 reveal that, in average, national and
European identifications are not significantly different while regional identification is weaker. It
also shows that the three identification variables are positively correlated. People who identify
with one level usually also identify with the others. This suggests that the three levels of
identification are not seen as antagonistic.
(insert Table 1)
In addition, both Belgian and European identification correlate with an item explicitly addressing
the issue of the compatibility Vs antagonism between national and European identifications (see
Table 2). It shows that the more people identify with Belgium, the more they believe this
identification is compatible with European identification. Although it is a weak correlation, it
implies that people who identify with Europe also believe that European identity is compatible
with national identity. Similar results are obtained with an item explicitly addressing the
independence between Belgian and European identifications: the more people identify (with
Europe and with Belgium), the more they believe those are not independent levels of
identification.
(insert Table 2)

Identification and attitude towards immigrants

Participants were told that the proportion of strangers in Belgium was currently 8,9 % and were
then asked to state the proportion that they believed was desirable for Belgium (adapted from
Sanchez-Mazas, 1996). Three groups were then constituted according to participants' answer to
that question: people who desire less strangers (xenophobic); people who think the proportion of
strangers should remain more or less the same (status quo); and people who desire more strangers
(xenophiles)3. One way analyses of variance were carried out with this categorisation as an
independent variable and the three levels of identification as dependent variables. No significant
result was found with the national and regional identification variables. But there was a
significant difference with the European identification variable: the xenophobes (6,92) tend to
identify more with Europe than the xenophiles (5,39) and the status quo (5,89. F = 3,89; p = .02).

I feel attached to the Belgian / Brussels or Walloon / European soil; I would miss Belgium if I had to leave it
forever; My destiny is linked to every other Belgian's one; I have strong feelings of solidarity with all the other
Belgians; I don't have clear feelings about the fact that I am Belgian (rev.); Being Belgian is something I rarely think
about (rev.); There is no reason to be proud to be Belgian (rev.); I am proud to tell my friends I am Belgian (1 =
totally disagree, 11 = totally agree).
3

This was done as this variable's distribution was not a normal one.

Predictions regarding the evolution of the European Union

A list of propositions describing the possible evolution of the European Union was submitted to
the participants. They had to indicated on 11 points bipolar scales whether they thought each
possibility was probable (1 = very unlikely, 11 = very likely) and to express their attitude towards
each particular evolution (1 = very unfavourable, 11 = very favourable). Table 3 summarises the
mean results obtained for each item according to these two dimensions (probability and attitude).
(insert Table 3)
Despite some apparent inconsistencies regarding the items related to education, it seems that
most possible evolutions in the direction of an increasing uniformity in the European space are
both seen as unlikely to happen and judged negatively. In average, participants believe that their
nation's symbols are still going to be used in the future, that language and culture will not be
standardised and that the Belgian state will preserve its sovereignty, and they agree with this
evolution. The only thing they think is unlikely to happen but desirable is the adoption of a
common History course. More interesting are the two predictions that are judged both likely to
happen and unfavourable as they reveal a perception of threat. These items relate to the loss of
national states' power and to the lack of respect for local cultures.
The relationships between these predictions, their judgements and European identification, were
examined (Table 4).
(insert Table 4)
Table 4 shows that participants who identify with Europe also tend to believe that both European
and national hymns will be played on sport or diplomatic events, that Nation-states will retain
sovereignty over their territories and that school programs will continue to be defined by each
country. In terms of attitude, they tend to express positive attitudes towards these predictions
(except the correlation with the last item, which is not significant). In addition, while they don't
believe more than others that the unification process will lead to a cultural standardisation, they
tend to hold less negative attitudes towards this prospect.
Together with the relationships between levels of identification and their correlation with the
representation of these relationships (Tables 1 and 2), these results confirm the fact that a strong
European identification is linked to the belief that the unification process will preserve the
nation's importance and with a positive attitude towards this preservation. Paradoxically, high
European identifiers display less reluctance towards European cultural standardisation. It is
possible that the political and cultural domains are being dissociated. In effect, it appears that
culture is not represented as a political issue. For instance, in the framework of a word
association task with Europe as the inductive term, culture was generally associated with
positively evaluated terms such as exchange, languages, diversity, meetings, holidays, open mind,
communication, etc. In cultural domains, European identification is seen as promoting personal,
regional and national interests (see table 5 below).
Instrumental motives
Participants were asked whether they believed that the current changes regarding "the distribution
of political power", "the distribution of economic resources" and "the cultural domain" would
either threaten or promote their interests at the personal, regional and national levels.
9

(insert Table 5)
These results show that European unification is generally seen as promoting rather than
threatening people's interests (general mean = 6.78). This is particularly true in the cultural
domain. It is the national level that is judged to benefit the most from the European unification.
And it is in the cultural domain that these benefits are the most acknowledged.
It should be noted here that these results must be interpreted by taking the Belgian context into
account. In effect, our sample is issued from a small country and it is possible that small countries
see more political and economic opportunities in European integration than large ones (see
below). In addition, Belgium does not possess a distinctive and prestigious culture, which could
explain that integration is not envisioned as threatening in this domain.
We examined the relationship between European identification and the "perceived interest"
variables. No significant correlation was found, which suggests that European identification does
not depend on the perception of potential gains or losses implied by being part of Europe, be it at
the individual, regional or a national levels. There does not seem to be direct instrumental
motives behind these participants' identification with Europe.
Perceived status and relative power of the nation over European decision making
Until now, we have addressed this issue as if European unification only affected the relationship
between vertical levels of inclusion. A horizontal dimension must also be taken into account: the
relationship between regions and between nations. We will limit ourselves to the international
relations issue. The relative situation of an individual's nation among other nations might
condition her perception of the unification process. Hence the perception of one's nation as low
status compared to others could lead to envision unification as an opportunity to improve this
status. In the same line of arguments, perceiving one's nation as having not enough power over
the EU's decision making compared to others could lead to envision the unification process as an
opportunity to increase this power. Both eventualities would represent instrumental motives
susceptible to increase identification with Europe.
Participants were asked to rate each of the 15 member states according to their status in different
domains - political power, military power, history, culture, diplomacy, economy, quality of life,
human rights - by attributing a score between 0 and 10 for each domain. Then they had to judge
the power each state had over EU's decision making in different domains - political decisions,
financial decisions, relations with non member dates, economic decisions, employment policy,
cultural affairs - on a bipolar 9 points scale (from "not enough" to "too much power"). Global
measures of perceived status and of judgement of power were then calculated4 (see Table 6).
(insert Table 6)

Global status: high Cronbach alphas were found for each country: (min = .78 Great Britain; max = .88 Sweden;

global mean = .845).

Judgement of power: high Cronbach alphas were found for each country: (min = .78 Luxembourg; max = .88 Sweden;
global mean = .824).

10

In average all the countries are attributed positive statuses, but France, Great Britain and
Germany are clearly perceived as higher status countries. Those three countries are the only ones
to be judged as having too much power over the EU's decision making.
On average, Belgium is considered as a medium status country (not significantly different from
the general mean value). It is judged as having not enough power, but this value is not
significantly different from the general mean value either.
We examined the relationships between these measures and the identification measures.
(insert Table 7)
Results presented in Table 7 show that Belgium's perceived status is correlated with the
judgement of its decisional power: the higher the status, the stronger the perceived power. This is
also true for all other member states (with the exception of Greece). Perceived status of Belgium
is positively correlated with national identification but is not linked to European identification.
On the other hand, judgement of Belgium's power is not correlated with national identification,
but is negatively correlated with European identification. The more participants judged their
country as not having enough decisional power, the more they identified with Europe. This
tendency reveals an instrumental motive that is independent from symbolic factors. This
interpretation is supported by the fact that the judgement over decisional power is also negatively
correlated with the valence attributed to changes due to the unification process at the national (.229) and at the regional (-.232) levels. The more people judge Belgium not to have enough
decisional power, the more they tend to believe that the unification process will bring positive
changes to their region and their nation. It is also negatively correlated with the personal interests
(see before) in the political (-.209) and the economic (-.229) domains. People who think Belgium
does not have enough power tend to believe the unification process will promote their personal
interests in the political and economic realms.
Variables that best predict European identification
Various linear regression analyses were performed with European identification as the dependent
variable and a number of factors combinations: regional and national identifications, perceived
interests, importance and valence of changes due to the unification process, perceived status of
Belgium, judgement of Belgium's power, and probability and valence of predictions regarding the
evolution of the EU. This statistical analysis allows for the identification of independent effects
of the factor variables.
The best model we found explains a fair proportion of the variance in European identification (R2
= .49; F = 17.78; p < .0001). It shows positive effects of national identification (Beta = .38; T =
4.54; p < .0001) and of attitude towards cultural homogenisation (Beta = .27; T = 3.19; p < .01),
and negative effects of the judgement of Belgian control over EU decision-making (Beta = -.31;
T = -3.72; p < .001) and of the belief that the unification process will lead to a loss in national
sovereignty (Beta = -.40; T = -4.78; p < .0001).
This analysis shows that European identification is linked to different kinds of factors:
identification (with the nation), instrumental motive (decisional power of the nation), future
expectations (subsistence of national sovereignty) and attitude (towards cultural standardisation).
Conversely, participants who identify weakly with Europe also tend to identify weakly with the
nation, to believe that their country has enough decisional power, believe that European
11

unification will lead to a loss of national sovereignty and hold negative attitudes towards cultural
standardisation. Among these factors, the perceived threat of a loss of national sovereignty and
national identification have the most important weights.

Discussion
In brief, these research results showed that the regional, national and European levels of
identification were seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. Moreover, it appeared that
European identification was linked to the extent to which national and European identities were
judged as compatible. In addition, participants who expected national sovereignty to subsist and
local cultures to be respected tended to express stronger European identification. However, EU
identification was also linked to a less negative attitude towards cultural standardisation. Finally,
despite the fact that direct measures of instrumental motives appeared to be independent from
identification, it was found that people's belief that Belgium's decisional power over EU decision
making was insufficient also lead to stronger EU identifications. We interpreted this last result as
revealing the existence of an instrumental motive, assuming that participants expected the ongoing European integration to increase Belgium's decisional power.
These results suggest that, in order to develop a sense of European identity, European integration
should be presented as a process that will preservve national sovereignty, as the possibility of its
disappearance appears to be threatening. Integration should also bring benefits for the nation, at
least in the political realm.
These conclusions should of course be taken with caution, first of all because of the limits
inherent to this kind of method. But also because these results might only make sense in the
framework of the Belgian situation. Belgium comprises two main linguistic communities - the
Dutch speaking (Flemings) and the French speaking (Walloons and Brusselers) - that have
different relationships with the Nation-state. Large-scale survey data showe that the Flemish
Region and Community provide a large part of its inhabitants with their primary level of
identification (39%) while a majority of Walloons (55 %) and of Brusselers (61%) primarily
identify with Belgium (De Winter, Frognier et al., 1998). Identification with the Walloon or
Brussels Region or with the French-speaking Community is a marginal phenomenon in Wallonia
and in Brussels. Other empirical findings show that many Flemings express regionalist attitudes
(32,8 %) whilst regionalism only concerns 19,1 % of the Walloons (Maddens, Beerten et al.,
1998). From a French speaking perspective, in a situation where regional autonomy is at the
agenda of many Flemish politicians, Europe can be seen as a solution to preserve Belgium from
splitting into separate entities. One could predict that region would be a more significant group
for Flemish subjects.
Whatever subordinate level of inclusion to be taken into account, preserving its existence within
Europe certainly limits the extent to which Europe's political and cultural space can be
homogenised. Now, if we go back to the nation building example, that would imply that a strong
European identity will probably not develop. There are two remarks I would like to express here.
First, the fact that cultural homogenisation and inter-group differentiation were used in order to
promote national identification during the nation building process does not imply that those are
necessary conditions for the development of this sentiment. There might be other ways to
promote identification with a social category; perception of interdependence or common destiny
might serve this purpose. Regarding the contribution of social psychology to the European
identity issue, it should be emphasised that the isomorphism between intra-individual
12

psychological mechanisms and large-scale social groups' phenomena does neither mean that
these phenomena derive from psychological mechanisms nor that they are natural and
unavoidable. Political actors may take advantage of these mechanisms and endeavour to
maximise their effects whilst others may aim to inhibit them, depending on the political project
they hold (Klein and Azzi, 1999).
Second, going back to the introduction of this paper, it should be reminded that the central
question, in my point of view, is not how to develop a sense of European identity but how to
promote active citizenship in the European context. If a sense of identity seems to be necessary to
attain such an objective, it might not imply the kind of "warm" identification that characterised
nationalism. In addition our finding that xenophobe attitudes were linked to European
identification rather than to national identification is indicative of the dangers that such activation
represents.
As Habermas (1992) and Ferry (1992) advocated, what is needed is a consensus over a definite
set of political values and principles (constitutional patriotism); the other aspects of culture must
not indispensably be shared. Trying to discover the common roots of European identity or
creating a large homogenous cultural space equates with reproducing the nationalist model at the
European level. If we take into account, on the one hand, the fact that nationalism did not only
bring positive outcomes and that identifications with subordinate groups subsist, we can conclude
that developing a "mild" identification with Europe on the basis of a common political culture
might stand as a realistic solution to promote active European citizenship.

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15

Tables
Table 1: Means and correlations between regional, national and European identifications.
Mean
(Min. = 1; Max.
= 11)

Regional identification

4,80a

National identification

5,51b

European identification

5,96b

National identification European

identification
,674**

,390**
,438**

N = 182
*p < .05
**p < .01

16

Table 2: Means of the "explicit relationships" items and correlations with the identification
variables
Mean
(Min. =
Max. = 11)

National identification

European
identification

1;

The more one feels Belgian, the more one should

feel European

5,87

,347**

,1452*

Feeling Belgian and feeling European are two

independent things

6,12

-,199**

-,239**

N = 182
*p < .05
**p < .01

17

Table 3: Estimations of probability and attitudes towards possible evolutions of the EU

Probability

Attitude
Positive

Negative

Likely

A European hymn will be played in addition National states will lose their power in favour
to the national hymn on diplomatic or sport events of a European "super-state" (6,26; 5,11).
(7,71; 7,88).
European unification will not lead to a greater
Member states will adopt a common school respect of European regions' local cultures * (6,01;
program defined by the EU (6,63; 6,54)
3,12).

Unlikely

All EU children will study the same History School programs will not be defined by
member states any more * (4,63, 4,84).
course (5,17; 6,97).
Each country's national hymn will not
continue to be played alone * (4,59; 5,14).
The EU will adopt a European hymn and
suppress the use of national hymns (4,20; 4,61).
The EU will promote the use of a single
language in every member state (4,73; 4,82).
European unification will lead to the
standardisation of member state's cultures (4,78;
3,31).
Nation states will not retain sovereignty over
their territory * (4,42; 4,42).
Citizens will not address their claims to
national institutions any more * (3,80; 4,34).

164 < N < 167

*Reverted items have been reworded for the sake of clarity.
(mean on the probability scale; mean on the attitude scale)

18

Table 4: Correlation between European identification and the judgements of probability and
valence of predictions.
Probability
Valence
A European hymn will be played in addition to the
national hymn on diplomatic or sports occasions.

.25**

.35**

All EU children will study the same History course.

.12

.24*

European unification will lead to the standardisation of

member state's cultures.

.10

.20*

Nation states will not retain sovereignty over their

territory.

-.32**

-.34**

School programs will not be defined by member states

any more.

-.21*

-.16

N = 106
*p .05
**p .01

19

Table 5: Judgement of the European unification as promoting or threatening personal, regional

and national interests in the political, economic and cultural domains (1 = will threaten my
personal / my region's / my country's interests; 11 will promote my () interests).
Domain
Level
Personal

Regional

National

Domain
means*

Political

6,41a

6,34a

6,86b

8,47

.000

6,53a

Economic

6,28a

6,43a

6,82b

9.32

.000

6,51a

Culture

7,42a

7,07b

7,43a

5,63

.004

7,31b

Means by Level

6,70a

6,61a

7,04b

11,49

.000

6,78

N = 167
*F = 22,03; P = .000
With the exception of the Domain means column, repeated measures Manova tests have been performed with the
level dimension as factor.

20

Table 6: Means of perceived status (0 = very low status; 10 = very high status) and judgement of
power (1 = not enough power; 9 = too much power) for each member state
Perceived status
Judgement of
Correlation
decisional power
France

7.57

5.98

,258*

Great Britain

7.56

5.82

,310*

Germany

7.27

5.76

,407*

Italy

6.56

4.58

,169*

The Netherlands

6.53

4.78

,367*

Belgium

6.45

4.52

,294*

Spain

6.31

4.45

,254*

Austria

6.22

4.50

,198*

Greece

6.05

4.06

,101

Sweden

6.05

4.26

,302*

Luxembourg

6.02

4.38

,330*

Denmark

6.00

4.31

,196*

Finland

5.91

4.30

,284*

Ireland

5.82

4.27

,281*

Portugal

5.63

3.98

292*

6,40

4,66

General Mean

Countries are presented in decreasing order according to their perceived status. They were presented in French
alphabetic order to participants.
*p < .05

21

Table 7: Correlation between national and European identifications, perceived status of Belgium
and judgement of decisional power
Judgement of
National
European
Belgium's decisional
identification
identification
power
Perceived status of
Belgium
Judgement of
Belgium's decisional
power

.294**

.211*

-.027

N = 127

N = 127

.066

-.266**

N = 117

N = 117

* p .05
** p .01

22