UNFAIR

LABOR PRACTICES
Test to determine ULP
G.R. No. L-25291
January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE
GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

FACTS:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU
(hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), entered into separate CBAs with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU
Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was
formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions
and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular
issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from
disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no
avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as
assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was hired as
personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel
for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.

Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the
Unions proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result
of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for deadlock on collective
bargaining. The issue was dropped subsequently (in short, nagkasundo). But, the parties

negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the
matter of salary increases.

Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in
responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to
strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.

On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, sent to each of
the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:

We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.

However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:

1.
Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.

2.
Take your meals within the office.

3.
Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office

where comfortable cots have been prepared.

4.
Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.

5.
Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.

6.
Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.

Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were
convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958,
some management men tried to break thru the Unions picket lines xxx succeeded in
penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the
picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.

Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the
Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscals Office of
Manila.xxx
Another letter was sent by the company to the individual strikers:

The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.

Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our
decision.

We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for
long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.

If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no
criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at
the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your
replacement.

Before, the decisions was yours to make.

So it is now.

Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions,
except 3, were dismissed by the fiscals office and by the courts. These three cases involved
slight physical injuries against one striker and light coercion against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as
the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be
replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on
June 2, 1958.

* However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscals Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee
initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted
immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscals

office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscals
office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials
and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they
committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents, without however stating the
specific acts allegedly committed. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified
months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given
separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now
have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.

CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic
Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out
individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a
promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by
warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be
replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to
work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the
strike.

ISSUE:
W/N Respondent Company is guility of ULP.

HELD:
Yes.

RATIO:
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following
unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and
that their jobs were open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair
labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing
with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives.

Although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union
as the employees bargaining representative.

Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his
representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair

labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to
undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free
from the employers molestation.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to bribe the strikers with
comfortable cots, free coffee and occasional movies, overtime pay for work performed in
excess of eight hours, and arrangements for their families, so they would abandon the strike
and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently,
of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer
reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since
the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of
returning to work would be.

ULP also: (super short cut na to) Hiring of Enage and Garcia with attractive compensations;
respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in
responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions; respondents,
thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of nonstrikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the
three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters
wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the
Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers;
respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not
dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions,
the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining
the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the
Companies gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to
and from, out and in, of the Companies buildings.

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters,
exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme
to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.

II. The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They
separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on
the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after
they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal
charges filed against them.

It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges
of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents delegated
the power to readmit to a committee.

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was
given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier
mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the
respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but
when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances,
the respondents still refused to take them back.

Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not
indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.



Case: De Leon vs. NLRC (GR No. 112661)

Facts: Petitioners alleged that they were regular employees of Fortune Tobacco Corporation
(FTC) which was also using the corporate names Fortune Integrated Services, Inc. (FISI) and
Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. (MISI). They were assigned to work as security guards at the
company's main factory plant, its tobacco redrying plant and warehouse. Petitioners claimed
that their dismissal was part of respondents' design to bust their newly-organized union which
sought to enforce their rights under the Labor Standards law. FTC maintained that there was no
employer-employee relationship between FTC and petitioners. FISI denied the charge of illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice. It argued that petitioners were not dismissed from service
but were merely placed on floating status pending re-assignment to other posts. It alleged that
the temporary displacement of petitioners was not due to its fault but was the result of the
pretermination by FTC of the contract for security services.

Issue: Whether respondents were guilty of unfair labor practice

Held: Yes. An examination of the facts of this case reveals that there is sufficient ground to
conclude that respondents were guilty of interfering with the right of petitioners to selforganization which constitutes unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
Petitioners have been employed with FISI since the 1980s and have since been posted at the

premises of FTC -- its main factory plant, its tobacco redrying plant and warehouse. It appears
from the records that FISI, while having its own corporate identity, was a mere instrumentality
of FTC, tasked to provide protection and security in the company premises. FTC, without any
reason, preterminated its contract of security services with MISI and contracted two other
agencies to provide security services for its premises. This resulted in the displacement of
petitioners. As MISI had no other clients, it failed to give new assignments to
petitioners. Petitioners have remained unemployed since then. All these facts indicate a
concerted effort on the part of respondents to remove petitioners from the company and thus
abate the growth of the union and block its actions to enforce their demands in accordance with
the Labor Standards laws. The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced
employees within the meaning of section (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in
conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees'
rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any
employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is
a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on
self-organization and collective bargaining.
Petition is GRANTED.

ULP OF EMPLOYERS
Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers
Facts:When complainant union (respondents) was certified as the collective bargaining
representative, petitioners refused to sit down w/ the union for the purpose of entering into a
CBA. The workers including complainants were not given work for more than 1 month. In
protest, they staged a strike w/c was however settled upon the signing of a MOA.
Subsequently, alleging that complainants failed to load some wagons, petitioners
reneged on its commitment to bargain collectively & employed all means including the use of
private armed guards to prevent the organizers from entering the premises. No work
assignments were given to complainants w/c forced the union to stage a strike. Due to
conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another MOA was signed by the parties & they met in a
conciliation meeting. When petitioners again reneged on its commitment, complainants filed a
complaint. Petitioner accused respondents of refusing to work & being choosy in the kind of
work they have to perform.

The NLRC ruled that petitioners were guilty of ULP & that the respondents were illegally
dismissed. The CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they
were considered to be merely on leave during the off-season & were therefore still employed by
petitioners.
The CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they were
considered to be merely on leave during the off-season and were therefore still employed by
petitioners. Moreover, the workers enjoyed security of tenure. Any infringement upon this right
was deemed by the CA to be tantamount to illegal dismissal.Hence this petition.
Issue:W/N the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRCs
conclusion that private respondents were illegally dismissed, that petitioner[s were] guilty of
unfair labor practice, and that the union be awarded moral and exemplary damages. -NO
Held: The Court found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice. It ruled as follows:
Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements
resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to
prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot
but conclude that respondents did not want a union in their hacienda clear interference in the
right of the workers to self-organization.
We uphold the CAs affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual findings of labor
officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Their findings are binding
on the Supreme Court.Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal,
especially when supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound
to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that these
were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.
The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction of moral
and exemplary damages.
Petition Denied.

Refusal to bargain collectively
Divine Word vs Secretary of Labor (1992)

Facts:
Divine Word University Employees Union became the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
University and they submitted their bargaining proposals. The University replied and requested
a preliminary conference. However, two days before the scheduled conference, DWUEUs
resigned vice-president Mr. BrigidoUrminita (or Urmeneta) withdrew the CBA proposals.
Consequently, the preliminary conference was cancelled.

Employees Union are hereby directed to enter into a collective bargaining agreement by
adopting the Unions CBA proposals sent to the DWU President

ISSUE: In the absence of a certified CBA and there having been no certification election held, is a
certification election mandatory?

After almost three years, DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the Associated Labor Union,
requested a conference with the University to continue with the collective bargaining
negotiations. With no reply from the University, DWUEU-ALU sent a follow-up letter. With
another follow-up, the University remained silent, which prompted the Union to file a notice of
strike with DOLE. Thereafter, conferences were held. But an hour before the start of
conciliation, the University filed a petition for Certification Election with the regional office of
DOLE.

HELD:

While there is no question that the petition for certification election was filed by the herein
petitioner after almost four years from the time of the certification election and, therefore,
there is no question as to the timeliness of the petition, the problem appears to lie in the fact
that the Secretary of Labor had found that a bargaining deadlock exists.

On the other hand, DWUEU-ALU, submitted its collective bargaining proposals but were ignored
by the University. Thereafter, through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of
Region VIII, marathon conciliation conferences were conducted but to no avail.

The Med-Arbiter, acting on the petition for certification election, issued an order directing the
conduct of such election. Because of this the Union filed an urgent motion with the Secretary to
enjoin MIlado from further acting on the matter of certification election, which was granted.

The Secretary of Labor ruled that there exists a bargaining deadlock, which as a matter of fact, is
being conciliated by the NCMB at the time the University filed its Petition for Certification
Election, and therefore the Divine Word University of Tacloban and the Divine Word University

In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer who is requested to bargain

collectively may file a petition for certification election any time except upon a clear showing
that one of these two instances exists: (a) the petition is filed within one year from the date of
issuance of a final certification election result or (b) when a bargaining deadlock had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or
lockout. (Sec. 3 RV B5)

A "deadlock" is defined as the "counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of
inaction or of neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of factions (as in
government or a voting body): standstill." There is a deadlock when there is a "complete
blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed forces; as, the deadlock of
a jury or legislature." The word is synonymous with the word impasse which, within the meaning
of the American federal labor laws, "presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining
which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties."

A study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining"
specially on the part of the University. Its indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining
inevitably resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that
unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there was no "counteraction"
of forces. While collective bargaining should be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding
responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in some manner to such acts.

GROSS VIOLATION OF CBA

EMPLOYEES UNION OF BAYER PHILIPPINES-FFW v. BAYER PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
-

Petitioner EUBP is the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of Bayer
Philippines, and is an affiliate of the Federation of Free Workers. EUBP, headed by its
president Juanita S. Facundo, negotiated with Bayer for the signing of CBA.
Pending the resolution of the dispute, respondent Avelina Remigio and 27 other union
members, without any authority from their union leaders, accepted Bayers wageincrease proposal. EUBPs grievance committee questioned Remigios action and
reprimanded Remigio and her allies. Eventually, the DOLE Secretary issued an arbitral
award ordering EUBP and Bayer to execute a CBA retroactive to January 1, 1997 and to
be made effective until December 31, 2001.
Barely six months from the signing of the new CBA, during a company-sponsored
seminar, Remigio solicited signatures from union members in support of a resolution
containing the decision of the signatories to: (1) disaffiliate from FFW, (2) rename the
union as Reformed Employees Union of Bayer Philippines (REUBP), (3) adopt a new
constitution and by-laws for the union, (4) abolish all existing officer positions in the
union and elect a new set of interim officers, and (5) authorize REUBP to administer the
CBA between EUBP and Bayer. The said resolution was signed by 147 of the 257 local
union members. A subsequent resolution was also issued affirming the first resolution.
A tug-of-war then ensued between the two rival groups, with both seeking recognition
from Bayer and demanding remittance of the union dues collected from its rank-and-file
members. Bayer responded by deciding not to deal with either of the two groups, and
by placing the union dues collected in a trust account until the conflict between the two
groups is resolved.EUBP filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (first ULP complaint)
against Bayer fornon-remittance of union dues. While the first ULP case was still

pending and despiteEUBPs repeated request for a grievance conference, Bayer decided
to turn over the collected union dues amounting to P254,857.15 to the Treasurer of
REUBP.
Aggrieved by the said development, EUBP lodged a complaint against Remigios group
before the Industrial Relations Division of the DOLE praying for their expulsion from
EUBP for commission of acts that threaten the life of the union.
Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. dismissed the first ULP complaint for lack
of jurisdiction because the root cause for Bayers failure to remit the collected union
dues can be traced to the intra-union conflict between EUBP and Remigios group and
that the charges imputed against Bayer should have been submitted instead to
voluntary arbitration. EUBP did not appeal the said decision.
Petitioners filed a second ULP complaint against respondents. Three days later,
petitioners amended the complaint charging the respondents with unfair labor practice
committed by organizing a company union, gross violation of the CBA and violation of
their duty to bargain. Petitioners complained that Bayer refused to remit the collected
union dues to EUBP despite several demands sent to the management. They also
alleged that notwithstanding the requests sent to Bayer for a renegotiation of the last
two years of the 1997-2001 CBA between EUBP and Bayer, the latter opted to negotiate
instead with Remigios group.
On even date, REUBP and Bayer agreed to sign a new CBA.
Later, petitioners filed a second amended complaint to include in its complaint the issue
of gross violation of the CBA for violation of the contract bar rule following Bayers
decision to negotiate and sign a new CBA with Remigios group.
Meanwhile, the Regional Director of the Industrial Relations Division of DOLE issued
decision dismissing the issue on expulsion filed by EUBP against Remigio and her allies.
EUBP seasonably appealed the said decision to the Bureau of Labor Relations(BLR)
which reversed the Regional Directors ruling and ordered the management ofBayer to
respect the authority of the duly-elected officers of EUBP in the administration of the
prevailing CBA.
Unfortunately, the said BLR ruling came late since Bayer had already signed a newsboy
with REUBP. The said CBA was eventually ratified by majority of the bargaining unit.
Labor Arbiter Waldo Emerson R. Gann dismissed EUBPs second ULP complaint for lack
of jurisdiction and observed that the case involves intra-union disputes and thus is
bereft of any jurisdiction pursuant to Article 226 of the LC.
On June 28, 2000, the NLRC resolved to dismiss petitioners motion for a restraining
order and/or injunction stating that the subject matter involved an intra-union dispute,
over which the said Commission has no jurisdiction.

Aggrieved by the Labor Arbiters decision to dismiss the second ULP

petitioners appealed the said decision, but the NLRC denied the appeal.
EUBPsmotion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

complaint,

ISSUE: W/N RESPONDENTS COMPANY, LONISHEN AND AMISTOSO COMMITTED AN ACT OF

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

HELD:
-

Respondents Bayer, Lonishen and Amistoso, contend that their acts cannot constitute
unfair labor practice as the same did not involve gross violations in the economic
provisions of the CBA, citing the provisions of Articles 248 (1) and 261 of the Labor Code,
as amended.Their argument is, however, misplaced.
Indeed, in Silva v. National Labor Relations Commission, we explained the correlations of
Article 248 (1) and Article 261 of the Labor Code to mean that for a ULP case to be
cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, and for the NLRC to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereon, the allegations in the complaint must show prima facie the concurrence of two
things, namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; and (2) the violation pertains to the
economic provisions of the CBA.
This pronouncement in Silva, however, should not be construed to apply to violations of
the CBA which can be considered as gross violations per se, such as utter disregard of
the very existence of the CBA itself, similar to what happened in this case. When an
employer proceeds to negotiate with a splinter union despite the existence of its valid
CBA with the duly certified and exclusive bargaining agent, the former indubitably
abandons its recognition of the latter and terminates the entire CBA.
Respondents cannot claim good faith to justify their acts. They knew that Facundos
group represented the duly-elected officers of EUBP. Moreover, they were cognizant of
the fact that even the DOLE Secretary himself had recognized the legitimacy of EUBPs
mandate by rendering an arbitral award ordering the signing of the 1997-2001 CBA
between Bayer and EUBP. Respondents were likewise well-aware of the pendency of
the intra-union dispute case, yet they still proceeded to turn over the collected union
dues to REUBP and to effusively deal with Remigio. The totality of respondents conduct,
therefore, reeks with anti-EUBP animus.

ULP OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

Salunga vs CIR
Petitioner had, since 1948, been an employee of the Company, which, on October 2, 1959,
entered with the Union, of which respondent John de Castillo is the president, into a collective
bargaining agreement, effective up to June 30, 1962.
Petitioner was a member of the Union since 1953. For reasons later to be stated, on August 18,
1961, he tendered his resignation from the Union, which accepted it on August 26, 1961, and
transmitted it to the Company on August 29, 1961, with a request for the immediate
implementation of said section 3. The Company having informed him that his aforementioned
resignation would result in the termination of his employment, in view of said section, petitioner
wrote to the Union, on August 31, 1961, a letter withdrawing or revoking his resignation and
advising the Union to continue deducting his monthly union dues. He, moreover, furnished a
copy of this communication to the Company. The latter, in turn, notified the Union of the receipt
of said copy and that "in view thereof, we shall not take any action on this case and shall
consider Mr. Francisco Salunga still a member of your union and continue deducting his union
dues." On September 8, 1961, the Union told the Company that petitioner's membership could
not be reinstated and insisted on his separation from the service
Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of ULP.
Held: NO. Although petitioner had resigned from the Union and the latter had accepted the
resignation, the former had, soon later upon learning that his withdrawal from the Union
would result in his separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shop provision above
referred to revoked or withdrawn said resignation, and the Union refused to consent thereto
without any just cause therefor. The Union had not only acted arbitrarily in not allowing
petitioner to continue his membership.
The Company was reluctant if not unwilling to discharge the petitioner. When the Union
first informed the Company of petitioner's resignation and urged implementation of section 3 of
the bargaining contract, the Company advised petitioner of the provision thereof, thereby
intimating that he had to withdraw his resignation in order to keep his employment. Besides,
the Company notified the Union that it (the Company) would not take any action on the case
and would consider the petitioner, "still a member" of the Union. When the latter, thereafter,
insisted on petitioner's discharge, the Company still demurred and explained it was not taking

sides and that its stand was prompted merely by "humane" considerations, springing from the
belief that petitioner had resigned from the Union without realizing its effect upon his
employment. And, as the Union reiterated its demand, the Company notified petitioner that it
had no other alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the service,
although with "regret".
Under these circumstances, the Company was not "unfair" to the petitioner. On the contrary, it
did not merely show a commendable understanding of and sympathy for his plight. It even tried
to help him, although to such extent only as was consistent with its obligation to refrain from
interfering in purely internal affairs of the Union. At the same time, the Company could not
safely inquire into the motives of the Union officers, in refusing to allow the petitioner to
withdraw his resignation. Inasmuch as the true motives were not manifest, without such inquiry,
and petitioner had concededly tendered his resignation of his own free will, the arbitrary nature
of the decision of said officers was not such as to be apparent and to justify the company in
regarding said decision unreasonable. Upon the other hand, the Company can not be blamed for
assuming the contrary, for petitioner had appealed to the National Officers of the PAFLU and
the latter had sustained the Union. The Company was justified in presuming that the PAFLU had
inquired into all relevant circumstances, including the motives of the Union Officers.

WHEN NOT ULP
GENERAL SANTOS COCA-COLA PLANT FREE WORKERS UNION-TUPAS VS COCA-COLA BOTTLERS
PHILS., INC. (GENERAL SANTOS CITY)

FACTS: Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. (CCBPI) experienced a significant decline in
profitability due to the Asian economic crisis, thus to curb the negative effects on the company,
it implemented three (3) waves of an Early Retirement Program.

An inter-office memorandum was also issued mandating to put on hold all requests for hiring
to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions in [the] Head Office and in the
Plants.

Faced with the freeze hiring directive, CCBPI Gen San engaged the services of JLBP Services
Corporation (JLBP), a manning agency.

Petitioner then filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of
Strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor practice committed by CCBPI Gen San for
contracting-out services regularly performed by union members.

In a Resolution, the NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice for contracting
out jobs to JLBP. NLRC held that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the
system was meant to curtail the right to self-organization of petitioners members. On appeal,
CA upheld the NLRCs finding that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair labor practice. It held that the
contract between CCBPI and JLBP did not amount to labor-only contracting. It found that JLBP
was an independent contractor and that the decision to contract out jobs was a valid exercise of
management prerogative to meet exigent circumstances. Hence, this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: WON CCBPI was guilty of unfair labor practice.

HELD: NO. CCBPI did not engage in labor-only contracting and, therefore, was not guilty of
unfair labor practice. The companys action to contract-out the services and functions
performed by Union members did not constitute ULP as this was not directed at the members
right to self-organization.

ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE OF EMPLOYERS. It shall be unlawful for an employer to

commit any of the following unfair labor practices:

(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such
will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization;

The Union filed a complaint before the labor arbiter praying for reinstatement. They challenged
the validity of the lay-off saying that MMC was not suffering from business losses and that they
are guilty of unfair labor practice. Respondents justified the temporary lay-off as bona fide in
character and a valid management prerogative pending the issuance of the permit to
continuously operate.

ULP refers to acts that violate the workers right to organize. The prohibited acts are related
to the workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element,
the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practices. The contract between CCBPI and JLBP did
not amount to labor-only contracting. JLBP was an independent contractor and that the decision
to contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management prerogative to meet exigent
circumstances.

ISSUE:

Manila Mining Corp. Employees Association, et al. vs.. Manila Mining corp, et al., G.R. Nos.
178222-23, 29 September 2010

No. The lay-off is neither illegal nor can it be considered as unfair labor practice. Despite all
efforts exerted by MMC, it did not succeed in obtaining the consent of the residents of the
community where the tailings pond would operate, one of the conditions imposed by DENREMB in granting its application for a permanent permit. It is precisely MMCs faultless failure to
secure a permit which caused the temporary shutdown of its mining operations. Unfair labor
practice cannot be imputed to MMC since, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the call of MMC for
a suspension of the CBA negotiations cannot be equated to refusal to bargain.

FACTS:

STRIKES, PICKETING AND LOCK OUTS

Moreover, petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor practice. It was the Union
that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor
practice, which burden it failed to discharge. Petition is hereby DENIED.

Respondent Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) is a publicly-listed corporation engaged in largescale mining for gold and copper ore. Upon expiration of the tailings permit, DENR-EMB did not
issue a permanent permit due to the inability of MMC to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate. Hence, it was compelled to temporarily shut down its mining operations, resulting in
the temporary lay-off of more than 400 employees in the mine site. It also called for the
suspension of negotiations on the CBA with the union until resumption of mining operations.

WON the petitioners termination is considered as unfair labor practice

HELD:

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
Lapanday v. NLRC
FACTS: Lapanday Agricultural Workers Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of
rank and file employees of Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation. Before the
expiration of the existing CBA, Lapanday Corp. contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and
Security to provide security services within the premises. The Union branded the security guards

as the goons of Lapanday as they were harassed and intimidated by them. The Union filed a
Notice of Strike on August 25, 1988 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
and accused the company of unfair labor practice, coercion and intimidation of employees and
unionbusting. On August 29, the NCMB called for a conciliation conference and agreed that the
security guards will follow a guideline drawn up by a committee. However, tension rose again
when a member of the Board of the Directors of the Union, Danilo Martinez, was funned down
in his house by one of the security guards on September 8. On September 9, the workers
refused to work and were accused by the corporation of economic sabotage. On September 14,
the corporation filed charges against the union for illegal strike and unfair labor practice. On
September 23, the workers carried placards and posters asking the corporation to remove the
security guards and oust management officials. In a last ditch effort, Mayor Duterte intervened
but the workers still refused to report to work. On October 3, a strike vote was conducted
among members of the Union. A majority vote was submitted to the NCMB on October 10,
1988. Two days later, the Union struck.
ISSUE: whether or the strike was illegal?

Great Pacific Life Employees Union vs. Grepalife, 303 SCRA 113 [1999]
Facts: A contract of group life insurance was executed between Grepalife and DBP. The former
agreed to insure the lives of eligible housing loan mortgagors of DBP. Dr. Leuterio applied
membership in the group life insurance plan. He answered in the application form that he has
never consulted a physician for heart condition, high blood pressure, cancer, diabetes, lung,
kidney, or stomach disorder or any other physical impairment, and that to the best of his
knowledge he is in good condition. During the subsistence of the insurance he died from
massive cerebral hemorrhage. Grepalife denied the claim because of concealment since it was
discovered that he had high blood. His widow filed a claim.

Issue: Whether or not there was misrepresentaion so as to warrant denial of claim; Whether or
not the widow of Leuterio is a real party in interest

HELD: YES. According to Article 263(f) of the Labor Code, the union or employer shall furnish the
Ministry the results of the voting at least 7 days before the intended strike or lockout subject to
the coolingoff period. The Court has ruled in National Federation v. Overseas that these rules
are mandatory in character. The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department
of Labor and Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries
the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. In Batangas Laguna tayabas v. NLRC, The
right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an
instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this
right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more
energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to employers
intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely
because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the
workers own hands.. In this case, the strike was held just two days after a copy was given to
the Ministry. Hence, the strike was illegal. The officers of the Union are dismissed from
employment. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate themselves. They admitted knowledge
of the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which ironically was
cast to promote their interest.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that there was no sufficient proof that the insured suffered from
hypertension. It is a well-settled ruled that the fraudulent intent on the part of the insured must
be established to entitle the insurer to rescind the contract. As regards the second issue, the
widow can be regarded as real party in interest because in mortgage redemption insurance the
mortgagor and not the mortgagee is the contracting party. The mortgagor merely assigns the
proceeds to the mortgagee. Therefore, since by principle of succession the widow may claim.

MASS LEAVE IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO STRIKE
ALEX Q. NARANJO, DONNALYN DE GUZMAN, RONALD V. CRUZ, ROSEMARIE P. PIMENTEL, and
ROWENA B. BARDAJE,Petitioners, v. BIOMEDICA HEALTH CARE, INC. and CARINA "KAREN" J.
MOTOL, Respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

HELD: The petition is meritorious.

FACTS:

LABOR LAW: illegal dismissal; mass leave; strike

Petitioners Alex Naranjo (Naranjo), Ronald Allan Cruz, Rowena Bardaje, Donnalyn De Guzman
and Rosemarie Pimentel were all employees of Biomedica Health Care, Inc. (Biomedica).

On November 7, 2006, Naranjo, et al. were all absent for various personal reasons. The next day,
Naranjo, et al. came in for work but were not allowed to enter the premises. Carina Motol
(Motol), Biomedicas president, informed them using foul language, to just find other
employment.

Subsequently, Biomedica issued notices to Naranjo, et al. accusing them of having conducted an
illegal strike and were accordingly directed to explain within twenty-four (24) hours to explain
why they should not be held guilty of and dismissed for violating the company policy against
illegal strikes under Article XI, Category Four, Sections 6, 8, 12, 18 and 25 of the Company
Policy.Biomedica, however, failed to furnish them with the copy of the said company policy.

Naranjo, et al. failed to submit their written explanation. Thus, Biomedica served Notices of
Termination stating that Naranjo, et al. engaged in illegal strike. Consequently, Naranjo et al.
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA dismissed the complaint. The NLRC reversed the LA.
On appeal to the CA, the CA reinstated the decision of the LA.

ISSUE: Whether or not Naranjo, et al. were illegally dismissed?

Petitioners were not afforded procedural due process.Thus, the Court elaborated in King of
Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac that a mere general description of the charges against an
employee by the employer is insufficient to comply with the above provisions of the law. Clearly,
petitioners were charged with conducting an illegal strike, not a mass leave, without specifying
the exact acts that the company considers as constituting an illegal strike or violative of
company policies.

Further, while Biomedica cites the provisions of the company policy which petitioners
purportedly violated, it failed to quote said provisions in the notice so petitioners can be
adequately informed of the nature of the charges against them and intelligently file their
explanation and defenses to said accusations.

Moreover, the period of 24 hours allotted to petitioners to answer the notice was severely
insufficient and in violation of the implementing rules of the Labor Code. Under the
implementing rule of Art. 277, an employee should be given "reasonable opportunity" to file a
response to the notice. King of Kings Transport, Inc. elucidates in this wise: " Reasonable
opportunity under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must
accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be
construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the
employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or
lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the
complaint."

In addition, Biomedica did not set the charges against petitioners for hearing or conference in
accordance with Sec. 2, Book V, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code and in line with ruling in King of Kings Transport, Inc., where the Court explained: "After
serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference
wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to
the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the
evidence presented against them by the management."

Petitioners were denied substantive due process. Clearly, to justify the dismissal of an employee
on the ground of serious misconduct, the employer must first establish that the employee is
guilty of improper conduct, that the employee violated an existing and valid company rule or
regulation, or that the employee is guilty of a wrongdoing. In the instant case, Biomedica failed
to even establish that petitioners indeed violated company rules, failing to even present a copy
of the rules and to prove that petitioners were made aware of such regulations.

Petitioners did not stage a mass leave. The term "Mass Leave" has been left undefined by the
Labor Code. Plainly, the legislature intended that the terms ordinary sense be used. "Mass" is
defined as "participated in, attended by, or affecting a large number of individuals; having a
large-scale character." While the term "Leave" is defined as "an authorized absence or vacation
from duty or employment usually with pay." Thus, the phrase "mass leave" may refer to a
simultaneous availment of authorized leave benefits by a large number of employees in a
company. It is undeniable that going on leave or absenting ones self from work for personal
reasons when they have leave benefits available is an employees right. Here, the five (5)
petitioners were absent on November 7, 2006. The records are bereft of any evidence to
establish how many workers are employed in Biomedica. There is no evidence on record that 5
employees constitute a substantial number of employees of Biomedica.

Petitioners did not go on strike. Art. 212(o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as "any temporary
stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of any industrial or labor

dispute." "Concerted" is defined as "mutually contrived or planned" or "performed in unison." In

the case at bar, the 5 petitioners went on leave for various reasons.Petitioners were in different
places on November 7, 2006 to attend to their personal needs or affairs. They did not go to the
company premises to petition Biomedica for their grievance. This shows that there was NO
intent to go on strike.

Dismissal is not the proper penalty. But setting aside from the nonce the facts established
above, the most pivotal argument against the dismissal of petitioners is that the penalty of
dismissal from employment cannot be imposed even if we assume that petitioners went on an
illegal strike. It has not been shown that petitioners are officers of the Union. On this issue, the
NLRC correctly cited Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC, wherein We ruled that: "An
ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There
must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike."

The CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The NLRC is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION.

REQUISITES FOR VALID STRIKE OR LOCK OUT
FIRST CITY INTERLINK TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. vs. HON. SECRETARY MA. NIEVES ROLDANCONFESOR
G.R. No. 106316; May 5, 1997

FACTS:
The labor union representing the employees of the petioner, First City Interlink, filed a notice of
strike. After conciliation proceedings failed, the union went on strike. Several workers were
dismissed. The labor union time alleged ULP, massive dismissal of union officers and members,
coercion of employees and violation of workers rights to self-organization. The pickets were
lifted on August 1986. The Minister of Labor ordered all striking employees (except those that
had been dismissed) to return to work and for the petitioner to accept all returning employees
under the same terms prior to their dispute. The petitioner moved to reconsider this order. In

the meantime, in 1987, the DOLE (which replaced the Minister of Labor) issued a writ of
execution ordering the NLRC to cause the return of the employees. On May 1990, the Secretary
of Labor issued an order awarding backwages, hence this petition for certiorari questioning the
Secretary of Labors orders. The petitioner maintains that the strike was illegal because no
strike vote was taken before the strike was called.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the strike conducted by the labor union of Petitioners employees was illegal for
lack of a strike vote.

HELD:
YES. The strike was illegal. Article 263(c)(f) of the Labor Code provides the following mandatory
requirements for a valid strike:

(1) a notice of strike filed with the Department of Labor at least 30 days before
the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice;
(2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose;
(3) notice given to the Department of Labor and Employment of the results of
the voting at least 7 days before the intended strike.

The court here looked at the evidence and found that among the voluminous pleadings filed by
the Labor Union, none of its pleadings shown that it had taken a strike vote before declaring a
strike. The Unions failure to present such evidence raises the strong possibility that no such
vote had been taken. Moreover, even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, we agree
with petitioner that the Union nevertheless failed to observe the required seven-day strike ban
from the date the strike vote should have been reported to the DOLE up to the time the Union
staged the strike on June 17, 1986.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of respondent Secretary of Labor is SET ASIDE.

L. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCK-OUTS; 3. REQUISITES FOR VALID STRIKE OR LOCK-OUT

G.R. No. 160058 June 22, 2007

PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
PILIPINO TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PILTEA), PELAGIO S. BRIONES II, GEORGE L.
DE LEON, LECEL M. FIDEL, AUGUSTO C. FRANCISCO, OLIVER B. ANTONIO, RONALDO B.
CORONEL, CHRISTOPHER L. HERRERA and GEM TORRES, respondents.

FACTS:
The Union submitted to the Company its proposals for the renegotiation of the nonrepresentation aspects of their CBA. As there was a standstill on several issues, the parties
submitted their dispute to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for preventive
mediation. The conciliation proceedings failed.

On July 13, 1998, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB for unfair labor practice due
to the alleged acts of restraint and coercion of union members and interference with their right
to self-organization committed by the Company to wit:

Requiring employees to execute undated resignation letters prior to regularization as a
condition for continued employment.

Preventing employees from displaying Union flags and CBAs slogans.

Prohibiting employees from conducting and preventing employees from participating in Union
activities.

Requiring employees to render forced overtime to prevent them from attending Union
meetings and activities after office hours.

Using vulgar and insulting language such as Kahit sa puwet nyo isaksak ang mga banderang
yan!

Threatening employees who join concerted Union activities with disciplinary action.

Discouraging employees from participating in Union activities by branding the activities illegal
and prohibited by law.

 Abuse of Company Rules and Regulations to prevent the free exercise by the Union and its
members of their right to self organization and free expression (e.g. issuing show cause
memos for refusal to render overtime and vandalism).

Utilizing security guards to harass employees who participate in Union activities by requiring
the guards to take down the names of employees who participate in the Union activities.6

The Union filed a second Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the grounds of: a) union busting, for
the alleged refusal of the Company to turn over union funds; and b) the mass promotion of
union members during the CBA negotiation, allegedly aimed at excluding them from the
bargaining unit during the CBA negotiation. On the same day, the Union went on strike.

The company assailed the CA decision decreasing the penalty of the union officers while the
Union and its dismissed officers assailed the decision declaring the strike illegal.

ISSUE:
W/N the Unions strike is illegal.

HELD:
Yes.

RATIO:
Article 263 of the Labor Code, outline the following procedural requirements for a valid strike:

1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the
Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;

2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual execution
of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in case of unfair
labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the unions existence is threatened,
the cooling-off period need not be observed.

4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with
a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot
approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.

5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before
the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.

It is settled that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply therewith
renders the strike illegal.

In the case at bar, the Union staged the strike on the same day that it filed its second notice of
strike. The Union violated the seven-day strike ban. This requirement should be observed to give
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an opportunity to verify whether the
projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of the union members.


Case: Toyota Motor Phils Workers Association (TMPCWA) vs. NLRC (GR Nos. 158786 &158789)

Facts: Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota, but the
latter refused to negotiate in view of its pending appeal challenging the certification of the
Union. Consequently, the Union filed a notice of strike based on Toyotas refusal to bargain. The
notice of strike was converted into a preventive mediation case on the ground that the issue of
whether or not the Union is the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees
was still unresolved by the DOLE Secretary. Union officers and members failed to render the
required overtime work, and instead marched to and staged a picket in front of the BLR office in
Intramuros, Manila. The Union also requested that its members be allowed to be absent to
attend the hearing and instead work on their next scheduled rest day. This request however was
denied by Toyota. Despite denial of the Unions request, more than 200 employees staged mass
actions in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and anti-union stance
of Toyota. Due to the deliberate absence of a considerable number of
employees Toyota experienced acute lack of manpower in its manufacturing and production
lines, and was unable to meet its production goals resulting in huge losses of PhP 53,849,991.
On March 1, 2001, the Union submitted an explanation in compliance with the February 27,
2001 notices sent by Toyota to the erring employees. The Union members explained that their
refusal to work on their scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exercise of
their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. It further argued that the demonstrations staged by the employees on February 22
and 23, 2001 could not be classified as an illegal strike or picket, and that Toyota had already
condoned the alleged acts when it accepted back the subject employees. Toyota terminated the
employment of 227 employees for participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of
Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code. On April 10, 2001, the DOLE

Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued an Order certifying the labor
dispute to the NLRC. In said Order, the DOLE Secretary directed all striking workers to return to
work at their regular shifts by April 16, 2001. On the other hand, it ordered Toyota to accept the
returning employees under the same terms and conditions obtaining prior to the strike or at its
option, put them under payroll reinstatement. The parties were also enjoined from committing
acts that may worsen the situation. The Union ended the strike and the union members and
officers tried to return to work but were told that Toyota opted for payroll-reinstatement
authorized by the Order of the DOLE Secretary. Despite the issuance of the DOLE Secretarys
certification Order, several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged a protest rally in
front of Toyotas Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers. At the same time, some twentynine (29) payroll-reinstated employees picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plants main entrance,
and were later joined by other Union members.

Issue: Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal
strikes; and

Held: Yes. The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at
the Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes. In the present case, there was an on-going labor
dispute arising from Toyotas refusal to recognize and negotiate with the Union, which was the
subject of the notice of strike filed by the Union. A strike means any temporary stoppage of
work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. Applying
pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence, we rule that the protest actions undertaken by the
Union officials and members on February 21 to 23, 2001 are not valid and proper exercises of
their right to assemble and ask government for redress of their complaints, but are illegal strikes
in breach of the Labor Code. The Unions position is weakened by the lack of permit from the
City of Manila to hold rallies. Shrouded as demonstrations, they were in reality temporary
stoppages of work perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees who deliberately
failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE
offices in Intramuros, Manila. It becomes obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is
to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the
company. This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of
grievance. The concerted actions were undertaken without satisfying the prerequisites for a
valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code. The Union failed to comply with the following
requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date of
strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least

seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a
union to comply with them renders the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in
requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike,
which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. When
is a strike illegal? Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal
strike, viz:
(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees
performing governmental functions; or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor
Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to
commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a
widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of
the Labor Code]; or
(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction,
prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the
Labor Code]; or
(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive
arbitration clause.
Petitions in G.R. Nos. 158786 and 158789 are DENIED while those in G.R. Nos. 158798-99 are
GRANTED.


SIX CATEGORIES OF ILLEGAL STRIKE
ECONOMIC STRIKE/LOCK OUT
Capitol Medical Center Alliance V. Laguesma
Facts:Respondent union filed petition for certification election. The Med-Arbiter granted the
petition for certification election. Respondent Capitol Medical Center (CMC) appealed to the
Office of the Secretary. But the Order granting the certification election was affirmed.
On December 9, 1992, elections were held with respondent union garnering 204 votes,
168 in favor of no union and 8 spoiled ballots out of a total of 380 votes cast. Med-Arbiter issued
an Order certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank and file employees at CMC.

Respondent CMC again appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor the result of the
election, it was denied. MR also denied. Respondent CMCs contention was the supposed
pendency of its petition for cancellation of respondent unions certificate of registration. In the
said case, the Med-Arbiter therein issued an Order which declared respondent unions
certificate of registration as null and void. However, this order was reversed on appeal by the
Officer-in-Charge of the BLR in her Order. The said Order dismissed CMCs motion for
cancellation of the certificate of registration of respondent union and declared that it was not
only a bona fide affiliate or local of a federation, but a duly registered union as well.
Respondent union, after being declared as the certified bargaining agent of the rankand-file employees of respondent CMC, presented proposals for the negotiation of a CBA.
However, CMC contended that CBA negotiations should be suspended in view of the Order
declaring the registration of respondent union as null and void. In spite of the refusal of
respondent CMC, respondent union still persisted in its demand for CBA negotiations, claiming
that it has already been declared as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of the hospital.
Due to respondent CMCs refusal to bargain collectively, respondent union filed a notice
of strike and later staged a strike on April 15, 1993. The case was certified to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration.
It is at this point that petitioner union, on March 24, 1994, filed a petition for
certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of the Capitol Medical Center
Inc. It alleged in its petition that: 1) three hundred thirty one (331) out of the four hundred (400)
total rank-and-file employees of respondent CMC signed a petition to conduct a certification
election; and 2) that the said employees are withdrawing their authorization for the said union
to represent them as they have joined and formed the union Capitol Medical Center Alliance of
Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE). They also alleged that a certification election can now be
conducted as more that 12 months have lapsed since the last certification election was held.
Respondent union opposed the petition and moved for its dismissal. It contended that it
is the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the Hospital, which was
confirmed by the Secretary of DOLE and by this Court. It also alleged that it was not negligent in
asserting its right as the certified bargaining agent for it continuously demanded the negotiation
of a CBA with the hospital despite the latters avoidance to bargain collectively.

May 12, 1994, Med-Arbiter BrigidaFadrigon, issued an Order granting the petition for
certification election among the rank and file employees. On appeal by respondent union, the
public respondent Laguesma reversed and favored the respondent union. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:Was there a bargaining deadlock between CMC and respondent union.
Held:While it is true that one year had lapsed since the time of declaration of a final certification
result, and that there is no collective bargaining deadlock, public respondent did not commit
graveabuse of discretion when it ruled in respondent unions favor since the delay in the forging
of the CBA could not be attributed to the fault of the latter.
After respondent union was certified as the bargaining agent of CMC, it invited the
employer hospital to the bargaining table by submitting its economic proposal for a CBA.
However, CMC refused to negotiate with respondent union and instead challenged the latters
legal personality through a petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration which
eventually reached this Court. The decision affirming the legal status of respondent union
should have left CMC with no other recourse but to bargain collectively; but still it did not.
Respondent union was left with no other recourse but to file notice of strike against CMC for
unfair labor practice with the NCMB. This eventually led to a strike.
A deadlock is the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage; There is a
deadlock when there is a complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and
opposed forces. The word is synonymous with the word impasse, which presupposes reasonable
effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement
between the parties.
Although there is no deadlock in its strict sense as there is no counteraction of
forces present in this case nor reasonable effort at good faith bargaining, such can be
attributed to CMCs fault as the bargaining proposals of respondent union were never answered
by CMC. In fact, what happened in this case is worse than a bargaining deadlock for CMC
employed all legal means to block the certification of respondent union as the bargaining agent
of the rank-and-file; and use it as its leverage for its failure to bargain with respondent union.
We can only conclude that CMC was unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with

respondent union. CMC has not at any instance shown willingness to discuss the economic
proposals given by respondent union.
It is only just and equitable that the circumstances in this case should be considered as
similar in nature to a bargaining deadlock when no certification election could be held. This is
also to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for the circumvention of the law by
unscrupulous employers to prevent any certified bargaining agent from negotiating a CBA. Thus,
Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Implement Rules should be interpreted liberally so as to include
a circumstance, e.g. where a CBA could not be concluded due to the failure of one party to
willingly perform its duty to bargain collectively.
Petition Dismissed

Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation
(respondents) are sister companies engaged in the garment business.

On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welgangbayan to protest the accelerating prices
of oil. Petitioner-unions, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting
respondents to filea petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with
procedural requirements.

WELGA NG BAYAN NOT A VALID PURPOSE

However, when the union officers and the striking employees finally wanted to go back to work,
Biflex and Filflex locked the union officers out.

G.R. No. 155679 December 19, 2006

BIFLEX PHILS. INC. LABOR UNION (NAFLU), PATRICIA VILLANUEVA, EMILIA BANDOLA, RAQUEL
CRUZ, DELIA RELATO, REGINA CASTILLO, LOLITA DELOS ANGELES, MARISSA VILLORIA, MARITA
ANTONIO, LOLITA LINDIO, ELIZA CARAULLIA, LIZA SUA, and FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND
MANUFACTURING LABOR UNION (NAFLU), MYRNA DELA TORRE, AVELINA AONUEVO,
BERNICE BORCELO, NARLIE YAGIN, EVELYN SANTILLAN, LEONY SERDONCILO, TRINIDAD CUYA,
ANDREA LUMIBAO, GYNIE ARNEO, ELIZABETH CAPELLAN, JOSEPHINE DETOSIL, ZENAIDA
FRANCISCO, and FLORENCIA ANAGO, petitioners, vs. FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION and BIFLEX (PHILS.), INC., respondents.

A labor case ensued and the labor arbiter ruled that Biflex and Filflex had the right to not accept
the union officers back since said officers engaged in an illegal strike, hence, they are declared
to have lost their employment status by the employer. The National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed the ruling of the LA. The Court of Appeals reinstated the ruling of the LA.

FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union and Filflex Industrial and
Manufacturing Labor Union. The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), are the respective collective bargaining agents of the
employees of corporations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the union officers engaged in an illegal strike.

HELD: Yes. As a rule, when union officers engage in an illegal strike, the employer may declare
that they have lost their employment status.

The welgangbayan was a general strike or an extended sympathy strike. Here, there was really
no labor dispute between the unions and the employers. The unions merely sympathized in a

strike of a more general concern. However, they did so without asking permission from their
employer. Worse, after the welgangbayan, they staged a work stoppage ,which crippled the
operation of the corporations.

It is true that the act of the unions in joining the welga ngbayan may be just a form of exercising
their freedom of expression, still such right is not absolute. The right of the corporations to
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth are also considered.

Further, the unions did not follow the prescribed procedure in staging a strike, to wit:

(1) filing of notice of strike;

(2) securing a strike vote, and
(3) submission of a report of the strike vote to the Department of Labor and Employment.

And even if assuming arguendo that they followed the above procedure, their strike became
illegal because apparently during the strike, the strikers prevented other employees from going
to and from the workplace they blocked the egress and ingress of the work area. Such
constitute an act of illegal strike and that makes the union officers liable.

No lawful purpose when conducted by a union which is not a legitimate labor organization
PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL) v. MANILA
DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION

FACTS:
-

The Diamond Hotel Employee's Union (the union) filed a petition for Certification
Election before the DOLE-National Capital Region (NCR) seeking certification as the

exclusive bargaining representative of its members. The DOLE-NCR denied said petition
as it failed to comply with the legal requirements.
The Union later notified petitioner hotel of its intention to negotiate for collective
bargaining agreement (CBA). The Human Resource Department of Diamond Hotel
rejected the notice and advised the union since it was not certified by the DOLE as the
exclusive bargaining agent, it could not be recognized as such. Since there was a failure
to settle the dispute regarding the bargaining capability of the union, the union went on
to file a notice of strike due to unfair labor practice (ULP) in that the hotel refused to
bargain with it and the rank-and-file employees were being harassed and prevented
from joining it. In the meantime, Kimpo filed a complaint for ULP against petitioner
hotel.
After several conferences, the union suddenly went on strike. The following day, the
National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN)
joined the strike and openly extended its support to the union. The some of the
entrances were blocked by the striking employees. The National Labour Relations
Commission (NLRC) representative who conducted an ocular inspection of the Hotel
premises confirmed in his Report that the strikers obstructed the free ingress to and
egress from the Hotel. The NLRC thus issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
directing the strikers to immediately "cease and desist from obstructing the free ingress
and egress from the Hotel premises. During the implementation of the order, the
striking employees resisted and some of the guards tasked to remove the barricades
were injured. The NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and that the union officers
and members who participated were terminated on the grounds of participating in an
illegal strike.
The union contended that the strike was premised on valid ground and that it had the
capacity to negotiate the CBA as the representatives of the employees of Diamond
Hotel. The union contended that their dismissal is tantamount to an unfair labour
practice and union busting.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC Resolution dismissing the complaints
of Mary Grace, Agustin and Rowena and of the union. It modified the NLRC Resolution,
however, by ordering the reinstatement with back wages of union members.

ISSUE: W/N THE DISMISSAL OF THE UNION MEMBERS IS VALID ON THE GROUNDS OF
PARTICIPATING IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE

HELD:

Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the
means employed are illegal. Thus, the employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or
coercion in carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to the rights to property
renders a strike illegal. And so is picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property
or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when accompanied by intimidation,
threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute nuisance.
As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed for staging
and participating in the illegal strike, following paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor
Code which provides that ". . .any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during strike may be declared to have lost his employment status . . ."
An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union
officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or
committing an illegal act during a strike.

Abaria vs NLRC
Facts:
The consolidated petitions involve the legality of mass termination of hospital employees who
participated
in
strike
and
picketing
activities.

In a letter addressed to Nava, Ernesto Canen, Jr., Jesusa Gerona, Hannah Bongcaras, Emma
Remocaldo, Catalina Alsado and Albina Baz, Atty. Alforque suspended their union membership
for
serious
violation
of
the
Constitution
and
By-Laws.

Upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union
members.The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of
mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital
premises and putting up placards, posters and streamers.
For their continued picketing activities despite the said warning, more than 100 striking
employees were dismissed.

Several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the terminated
employees against MCCHI, Rev. Iyoy, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI.

LA dismissed the complaints for unfair labor practice which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondents are illegally dismissed?
Held: Yes. NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not the labor organization certified or designated by the majority
of the rank-and-file hospital employees to represent them in the CBA negotiations but the NFL,
as evidenced by CBAs concluded in 1987, 1991 and 1994. MCCHI therefore cannot be faulted
for deferring action on the CBA proposal submitted by NAMA-MCCH-NFL in view of the union
leaderships conflict with the national federation.
Considering their persistence in holding picketing activities despite the declaration by the NCMB
that their union was not duly registered as a legitimate labor organization and the letter from
NFLs legal counsel informing that their acts constitute disloyalty to the national federation, and
their filing of the notice of strike and conducting a strike vote notwithstanding that their union
has no legal personality to negotiate with MCCHI for collective bargaining purposes, there is no
question that NAMA-MCCH-NFL officers knowingly participated in the illegal strike. The CA
therefore did not err in ruling that the termination of union officers Perla Nava, Catalina Alsado,
Albina Baz, Hannah Bongcaras, Ernesto Canen, Jesusa Gerona and Guillerma Remocaldo was
valid and justified.

LAWFUL MEANS
DO 9, RULE 22 SEC 10-13
UNITED SEAMENS UNION VS DAVAO SHIPOWNERS ASSOCIATION

FACTS: United Seamen's Union of the Philippines resented a set of demands to respondent
Davao Shipowners Association for union recognition, union security, standardization of wages

and other benefits. In its answer, the Shipowners invited USUP's attention to the existence of a
collective bargaining agreement with the Davao Marine Association to which all the crewmen of
their launches belonged. Since the Shipowners were bound by said collective bargaining
agreement until the end of that year (1959), it suggested that USUP first take the necessary
steps to be certified as the collective bargaining agent of the employees before they could
negotiate in connection with its proposals. USUP then filed a notice of strike against all the
individual shipowners. The parties then decided to adopt a covenant however subsequent to the
covenant of August 20, the respondent shipping companies separately served notices of
termination of service.

top officials and members of the union in an attempt to prevent the other willing laborers to go
to work," it was held that "a strike hold under those circumstances cannot be justified in a
regime of law for that would encourage abuses and terrorism and could subvert the very
purpose of the law which provides for arbitration and peaceful settlement of labor disputes."
A labor organization is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of promoting the interests
of labor without unnecessary labor disputes. That is why it is given personality and recognition
in concluding collective bargaining agreements. But if it is made use of as a subterfuge, or as a
means to subvert valid commitments, it defeats its own purpose, for it tends to undermine the
harmonious relations between management and labor. The situation does not deserve any
approving sanction from the Court.

ALMIRA VS B.F. GOODRICH

USUP then filed a notice to strike and a complaint for unfair labor practice. They then staged a
strike and in the course of the picketing violence and harassment took place.

FACTS:

ISSUE: WON the strike staged by the members of the USUP unjustified and illegal.

During a strike, illegal and unlawful acts were committed by the respondents such as physically
blocking and preventing the entry of complainant's customers, supplies and other employees
who were not on strike, both in complainant's premises in Makati and Marikina, Rizal.

HELD: The means employed to stage the strike were far from legitimate. In cases not falling
within the prohibition against strikes, the legality or illegality of a strike depends first, upon the
purpose for which it is maintained, and, second, upon the means employed in carrying it on.
Thus, if the purpose which the laborers intend to accomplish by means of a strike is trivial,
unreasonable or unjust (as in the case of the National Labor Union vs. Philippine Match Co., 70
Phil. 300), or if in carrying on the strike the strikers should commit violence or cause injuries to
persons or damage to property (as in the case of National Labor Union, Inc. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., 68 Phil. 732), the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may
be declared by the court illegal, with the adverse consequences to the strikers." (Luzon Marine
Dept. Union vs. Roldan, 86 Phil. 507, 513).

Where, "in carrying out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violation with physical injuries,
sabotage and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed by the

Injuries likewise were inflicted on certain employees of complainant. Such acts of violence and
intimidation appear to be of such a widespread nature so as to create an impression that there
is a common pattern of action set into motion by the respondents. The actuations of
respondents are likewise illegal. In the premises of complainant at Makati, Rizal, the
respondents who picketed the same on April 20, 1971 were identified ...

Similarly, some of the respondents who picketed the Marikina premises of complainants were
identified. Further: 'The complainant caused the publication of notices in both the Manila Times
and Daily Mirror, newspapers of general and wide circulation ... for all employees not
participating in the illegal strike to report for work on or before April 23, 1971, otherwise such
failure will be considered as participation therein. Such notices were accompanied by

instructions to personnel at all levels on how reporting for work will be accomplished,
considering the precarious situation in relation to the safety of employees brought about by the
strike of respondents. With respect to this particular aspect, certain of the respondents who
were not seen in the picket line on or before April 23, 1971 were identified as having failed to
report for work. It would appear, however, that these listed respondents who failed to report
for work likewise were seen picketing the premises of complainant after April 26, 1971. Then
came this portion: "It would seem that the picketing by respondents has continued up [to] the
present under the same pattern of coercive activities narrated in our Order Of July 1, 1971.
Physical injuries where inflicted on complainants personnel manager. Mass picketing with the
employment of intimidatory statements have again started on January 3, 1972. The roof of the
complainants Makati Recap Plant was set on fire on January 13, 1972 ..."

Based on the above facts, it was in the appealed order of Judge Salvador; "On the basis,
therefore, of the motivation as well as the conduct of the strike, the respondent are declared to
have committed an illegal strike, which is likewise an unfair labor practice" As consequence, in
the dispositive portion, petitioner where "declared to have lost their status of employees of the
complainant corporation as of April 19, 1971" The appealed order was handed down on
February 4, 1972. Had greater awareness been displayed to the approach followed by this court
in a 1968 decision, Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Cement Workers Union, as well as to Shell Oil
Workers' Union v. Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. there would have been less certitude
displayed in the opinion of Judge Salvador as to the correctness of its decision. Moreover, as
stated at the outset, if there be deference to what of late has been so evident, even on the
assumption of the illegality of the strike, there need not be the automatic termination of the
employment relationship, especially so in view of the command of the present Constitution as
to the security of tenure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the strike was legal.

HELD:
The appealed order of February 4, 1972 as affirmed in a resolution of March 14, 1972 is
reversed and set aside. Petitioners against whom no criminal charges filed in relation to their
acts referred to in this decision are still pending are ordered reinstated to their employment,
with the right to backpay corresponding to eighteen (18) months, at the respective rates of
compensation they were being paid on February 4, 1972, without any deduction corresponding
to any possible income earned elsewhere since their dismissal to the present. Those petitioners
against whom criminal complaints have been filed shall be reinstated, with the right to backpay
as herein indicated, only upon the final dismissal of said cases or their acquittal therein.
Respondent Court is hereby ordered to implement this decision as expeditiously as possible. No
costs.

Nonetheless, there was this commendable admission in the appealed order of Judge Salvador;
"Lest we be miscontrued, the ilegality of the strike for recognition as general proposition is not
absolute. We declare such strike illegal on the basis of the attendant circumstances in this case.
It mentioned the attendant circumstances, but as was apparent in an earlier portion of such
order, what respondent Judge apparently could not resist was the compelling force of what by
now should be an outmoded view of a strike being "by its very nature ... coercive ... ." To display
such a predisposition is to ignore the leading case of Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Cement
Workers Union. For, as was therein pointed out, the ruling in National Labor Union, Inc. v.
Philippine Match Factory to the effect that a strike "is an economic weapon at war with the
policy of the Constitution and the law," resort to which "is not, in plain terms, outlawed,
although certainly discouraged, is obsolete, for as was so clearly pointed out by Justice J. B. L.
Reyes in Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Cement Workers Union:"For a time, decisions on the issue
under consideration were characterized by strict adherence to the ruling in the Philippine Match
Factory Case." Further, it was stated by him: "The actual break-away from the doctrine laid
down in the Philippine Match Factory case came in Dinglasan v. National Labor Union, when the
discretionary power of the Court of Industrial Relations to grant affirmative relief was
recognized. ... Thereafter, the doctrine enunciated in Interwood Employees Association ... that
good faith of the strikers in the staging of the strike is immaterial in the determination of the
legality or illegality of the strike, was abandoned. In the case of Ferrer v. CIR, et al. the belief of

the strikers that the management was committing unfair labor practice was properly considered
in declaring an otherwise premature strike, not unlawful, and in affirming the order of the Labor
Court for the reinstatement without back wages of said employees." This 1968 decision of this
Court, if present in the consciousness of respondent Judge Salvador, certainly could have
caused, at the very least, a hesitancy on his part to declare the strike illegal. This is not to deny
that the labor union ought not to have declared a strike under such circumstances, but at least,
while premature, it could have been plausibly viewed as inspired by good faith, although
perhaps not guided by sound legal advice.

ICTI v. NLRC
FACTS: The Manila International Container Terminal (MICT) was initially operated by the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) under the DOTC. Subsequently The management of MICT was
awarded to several corporations: MIPTI (1979), Metrostar Port (1986) and back to MICT in 1987.
On May 1988, PPA awarded the management to the International Container Terminal Services
Inc (ICTSI). In the contract between ICTSI and PPA, it was agreed that ICTSI shall employ PPAs
present employees as may be needed in cargohanding subject to the condition that ICTSI will
conduct individual screenings. As a result, more the 600 workers of the MICT were not absorbed
by ICTSI when it took over on June 12, 1988. In compliance with their agreement, ICTSI also
sought a CBA negotiation with the Associated Port Checkers and Workers Union (APCWU).
ADSULU and LISLU filed a petition for certification election which led to the suspension of the
negotiation. ADSULU and LISLU jointly filed a Notice of Strike on August 4, 1988. Due to
petitioners failure to personally appear, ADSULU and LISLU jointly staged their first strike on
August 16, 1988. Several employees also filed a case for illegal dismissal. On February 2, 1989,
ADSULU filed a Notice of Strike and conducted two illegal strikes on August 1988 and March
1989. ADSULU and 21 individual members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and prayed for
reinstatement since the 21 individual members merely participated in the strike. ICTSI
contended that they were leaders and union officers.
ISSUE: whether or not the dismissal of the union officers was illegal?

HELD: NO. Union officers may be dismissed not only for their knowing participation in an illegal
strike, but also for their commission of illegal acts in the course of a strike, whether legal or
illegal, but union members may only be dismissed for their participation in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike, whether legal or illegal. For a worker or union member to suffer the
consequence of loss of employment, he must have knowingly participated in the commission of
illegal acts during the strike i.e., infliction of physical injuries, assault, breaking of truck side and
windows, throwing of empty bottles at nonstrikers. In the case at bench, there is nothing in the
records which show that private respondent Paano and the 20 others expressly admitted that
they are the leaders of the strike. Furthermore, petitioner did not present evidence that
respondents were agitating, cajoling or leading others to join the strike. We can only conclude
that at the very least, they were merely members of the union. The act of private respondents in
failing to heed the order of their superior from joining the picket line is only tantamount to
insubordination which cannot be considered as an illegal or unlawful act committed during the
strike to justify their dismissal from employment.

Asso.ofIndep. Unions of the Phils., supra., 305 SCRA 219 (1999)
FACTS: In CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation, the collective bargaining representative of all rank
and file employees was CENAPRO Employees Association (CCEA) with which respondent
company had a collective bargaining agreement. Their CBA excluded casual employees from
membership in the incumbent union. The casual employees who have rendered at least one to
six years of service sought regularization of their employment. When their demand was denied,
they formed themselves into an organization and affiliated with the Association of Independent
Unions of the Philippines. Thereafter, AIUP filed a petition for certification election, which
petition was opposed by the respondent company. The CCEA anchored its opposition on the
contract bar rule.
The union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote, and the needed documentation with
the DOLE. The notice of strike cited as grounds there for the acts of respondent company
constituting unfair labor practice, more specifically coercion of employees and systematic union
busting.

The union proceeded to stage a strike, in the course of which, the union perpetrated illegal acts.
The strikers padlocked the gate of the company. The areas fronting the gate of the company
were barricaded and blocked by union strikers. The strikers also prevented and coerced other
non-striking employees from reporting for work. Because of such illegal activities, the
respondent company filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC, which granted a Temporary
Restraining Order, enjoining the strikers from doing further acts of violence, coercion, or
intimidation and from blocking free ingress and egress to company premises.
The respondent company filed a complaint for illegal strike. The petitioners filed a complaint for
unfair labor practice and illegal lockout against respondent company.
In a consolidated decision, the Labor Arbiter declared as illegal the strike staged by the
petitioners, and dismissed the charge of illegal lockout and unfair labor practice. The officers
who participated in the illegal strike and declared to have lost their employment status.
CENAPRO is directed however to reinstate the other workers and CENAPRO is being absolved
from the charges of illegal lockout and unfair labor practice.
The respondent company appealed the decision insofar as it ordered the reinstatement of some
of the strikers. The petitioners also appealed the same decision of the Labor Arbiter.
NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiters decision. Respondent company moved for
reconsideration of that portion of the NLRCs decision ordering the reinstatement of the said
strikers. Acting thereupon, the NLRC modified its decision, by ordering the payment of
separation pay in lieu of the reinstatement of the petitioners, deleting the award of backwages,
and the declaring the loss of employment status of one petitioner.

It is undisputed that at the time the petition for certification election was filed by AIUP, the
petitioner union, there was an existing CBA between the respondent company and CCEA, the
incumbent bargaining representative of all rank and file employees. The petition should not
have been entertained because of the contract bar rule.
The strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal for the reasons that (1)the strikers
committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. (2)And violated the TRO enjoining the union
and/or its members from obstructing the company premises and ordering the removal there
from of all the barricades.
Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be
declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.
The dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid. Their dismissal as a
consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in Art. 264(a) of the
Labor Code, pertinent portion of which provides: x xAny union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status. x x.
Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so,
the officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their
dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers
responsibility is greater than that of the members.

An ordinary striking employee can not be terminated by mere participation in an illegal strike.
There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the striker who
participated in the commission of the illegal act must be identified.

ISSUE: Whether or not the strike is valid.

Note: Violence committed on both sides during the strike

HELD: No. When they filed the notice of strike, petitioners cited as their grounds there for
unfair labor practice, specifically coercion of employees and systematic union busting. But the
said grounds were adjudged as baseless by the Labor Arbiter.

LIABILITY OF UNION OFFICERS AND MEMBERS

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION vs. CA and POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA

G.R. No. 144412

November 18, 2003

Carpio, J.

Facts:

Private respondentis an employee of petitioner, hired as an accountant-bookkeeper and
eventually promoted as an assistant manager which included his transfer to several branches
nine times. His appointment was covered by a Notice of Personnel Action which provides as
one of the conditions of employment the provision on petitioners right to transfer employees
on as a regular appointment as the need arises in the interest of maintaining smooth and
uninterrupted service to the public.

Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner
listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside
ofCebu City. However, private respondent refused to be transferred to Bacolod City in a letter
by reason of parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that would result if he is away from
his family. He thereafter filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner informed private respondent that he was to report to the
Tagbilaran City Branch, however, private respondent again refused. As a result, petitioner
warned and required him to follow the said orders; otherwise, he shall be penalized under the
companys discipline policy. Furthermore, private respondent was required to explain and
defend himself. The latter replied stating that whether he be suspended or dismissed, it would
all the more establish and fortify his complaint pending before the NLRC and further charges
petitioner with discrimination and favoritism in ordering his transfer. He further alleges that the
managements discriminatory act of transferring only the long staying accountants of Cebu in
the guise of its exercise of management prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior

motive is to accommodate some new officers who happen to enjoy favorable connection with
management.
As a result, petitioner, through a Memo, informed private respondent that Allied Bank is
terminating him. The reasons given for the dismissal were: (1) continued refusal to be
transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work despite
the denial of his application for additional vacation leave.

The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner had abused its management prerogative in
ordering private respondents transfer and the refusal by the latter did not amount to
insubordination. The NLRC likewise ruled that: (1)petitioner terminated the private respondent
without just cause considering family considerations; (2) the transfer is a demotion since
the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a regional office,
and because the bank wanted him, an assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in
the Tagbilaran branch; (3) the termination was illegal for lack of due process as no hearing
appears to have been conducted and that petitioner failed to send a termination notice and
instead issued a Memo merely stating a notice of termination would be issued, but petitioner
did not issue any notice; and (4) petitioner dismissed private respondent in bad faith,
tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal undermined the latters right to security
of tenure and equal protection of the laws. The ruling of NLRC was later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

Issues:
1. WHETHER THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT
PREROGATIVE.
2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS REFUSAL TO TRANSFER CONSTITUTES
VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES WARRANTING THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
3. WHETHER PETITIONER DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN
DIRECTING HIS TRANSFER.
4. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TRANSFER CONSTITUTES A DEMOTION.
5. WHETHER PETITIONER IS COMMITTED ULP.

6. WHETHER ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE RESPONDENT DUE PROCESS.

Held:
1. Yes. The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of
the employers prerogatives. The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an
employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the
transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employees salary,
benefits and other privileges.In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of
showing that the transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced
employee.
2. Yes. Private respondent was well aware of petitioners policy of periodically
transferring personnel to different branches. The assignment to the different branches of
Allied Bank was a condition of his employment and he consented to this condition when he
signed the Notice of Personnel Action.
The Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his
employers decision to transfer him to another work place, there being no bad faith or
underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is the employees wishes that should be
made to prevail.
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a
lawful order of an employer.Employees may object to, negotiate and seek redress against
employers for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and
unless these rules or orders are declared illegal or improper by competent authority, the
employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. Therefore, private respondents continued
refusal to obey Allied Banks transfer orders warrants just cause in his dismissal in
accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code and thus not entitled to reinstatement or
to separation pay.
3. No. Allied Banks letter of13 June 1994showed that at least 14 accounting officers
and personnel from various branches, including private respondent, were transferred to
other branches. Allied Bank did not single him out. The same letter explained that he was
second in line for assignment outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for seven years

already. It must be noted that none of the other transferees joined private respondents in
his complaint or corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination and favoritism.
4. No. No evidence was presented showing that the transfer would diminish his
salary, benefits, or privileges. On the contrary, petitioners letter of 13 June 1994 assured
private respondent that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and that the
transfer would involve the same rank, duties and obligations.
5. No. Unfair labor practices relate only to violations of the constitutional right of
workers and employees to self-organization and are limited to the acts enumerated in
Article 248 of the Labor Code, none of which applies to the present case. There is no
evidence that private respondent took part in forming a union, or even that a union existed
in Allied Bank.
6. Yes. To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which provides:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282
of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds
of termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii)
A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating
that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.
The first written notice was embodied in Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994. The first
notice required private respondent to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him for his refusal to comply with the transfer orders. On the requirement of a hearing, the
Court has held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. An actual
hearing is not necessary. The exchange of several letters gave him an opportunity to respond to
the charges against him.


The Memo, although captioned Transfer and Reassignment, did not preclude it from
being a notice of termination. The Court has held that the nature of an instrument is
characterized not by the title given to it but by its body and contents. Moreover, private
respondent himself regarded the Memo as a notice of termination. The Memo shows that it
unequivocally informed private respondent of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him and
discussed the findings of the Investigation Committee that served as grounds for the
dismissal. In addition, the Memo also refuted the charges of discrimination and demotion.

However, the Memo suffered from certain errors. Although the Memo stated that
termination was to be effective as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8 September
1994. More importantly, private respondent only received a copy of the Memo on 5 October
1994, or more than a month after the supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a written
notice of termination must be served on the employee. Allied Bank could not terminate him
on 1 September 1994 because he had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Banks
decision to dismiss him. The dismissal could only take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his
receipt of the Memo. For this reason, private respondent is entitled to backwages for the period
from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994.

Fallo:
CA and NLRC affirmed. Case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the computationof the
backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due to private respondent from 1
September 1994 until 4 October 1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are ADMONISHED to be
more careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the future (Dosch v. NLRC).

C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC., vs.COURT OF APPEALS et. al.

FACTS:
The employer is C. Alcantara and Sons, a manufacturer of plywood. The union,
NagkahiusangMamumuosaAlsons-SPFL, and the employer entered into a CBA that had a no

strike and no lockout clause. Nevertheless, due to a deadlock over some economic provisions,
the Union held a strike. The company filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration Board to
declare the strike illegal citing the violation of the CBAs no strike no lockout clause the petition
impleaded some union members who committed prohibited acts during the strike. The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision holding the strike illegal and that union officers are deemed to have
forfeited their employment with the company but that the members impleaded in the decision
should be reinstated. The NLRC affirmed the Arbiters decision and held that those members
impleaded in the employers petition should be dismissed as well. The CA reinstated the
Arbiters decision. Pending appeal, the Arbiter issued a resolution acknowledging the
impracticality of reinstatement due to prolonged litigation and ordered the payment of
separation pay instead. The NLRC reversed the Arbiters decision.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the union officers can be terminated from employment.

HELD:
YES, the union officers may be terminated. In the first place, the strike is illegal because it
violated the no strike no lockout clause of the CBA. Since the Unions strike has been declared
illegal, the Union officers can, in accordance with law be terminated from employment for their
actions.They cannot be shielded from the coverage of Article 264 of the Labor Code since the
Union appointed them as such and placed them in positions of leadership and power over the
men in their respective work units.

As regards the rank and file Union members, Article 264 of the Labor Code provides that
termination from employment is not warranted by the mere fact that a union member has
taken part in an illegal strike. It must be shown that such a union member, clearly identified,
performed an illegal act or acts during the strike. In this case though, the NLRC found that some
union members committed illegal acts for which they were criminally charged before various
courts for threatening, obstructing and defying NLRC orders among others.

Lastly, the court granted an award of reasonable financial assistance to the terminated
employees in lieu of separation pay and backwages. This was done to further the laws policy of
compassionate justice.

K. STRIKES, PICKETING AND LOCK-OUTS; 3.3.1 STRIKE VOTE/LOCK-OUT VOTE

G.R. No. 119467 February 1, 2000


SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA MOLDEX PRODUCTS, INC., ALEGRIA AQUINO AND 62
OTHERS AS APPEARING IN ANNEX "A", petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER EDGARDO MADRIAGA, MOLDEX
PRODUCTS, INC. AND MR. JACINTO UY, respondents.

FACTS:
After the negotiations for the renewal of collective bargaining agreement between petitioner
Union and private respondent Moldex Products, Inc. ended with a deadlock, petitioner filed a
notice of strike before the NCMB. A strike vote was conducted, but the results thereof were
never submitted to NCMB. Petitioner went on strike. On private respondents petition, it was
declared as illegal by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal to the NLCR, the case was remanded to the
Labor Arbiter for reception of additional evidence, thus this petition.

ISSUE:
W/N the strike staged by the petitioner was illegal.

HELD:
Yes.

RATIO:
Art. 264 of the Labor Code provides in part that no strike shall be conducted without having first
filed a notice of strike, or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained
and reported to the Ministry.

In this case, the result of the strike vote was not submitted to the NCMB making the strike
staged illegal. Also, they committed acts of violence, threats, coercion and intimidation during
the strike.

The employment of the members and of the officers who committed prohibited acts in the
course of the strike were declared forfeited.


Notice of strike/lock-out

Case: San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC (GR No. 99266)

Facts: San Miguel Corporation, alleging the need to streamline its operations due to financial
losses, shut down some of its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant. Consequently, the
private respondent union filed several grievance cases for the said retrenched employees. The
grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to Sections 5 and 8, Article VIII of the parties
1990 Collective Bargaining Agreement. During the grievance proceedings, most of the
employees were redeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a result only 17
employees remained when the parties proceeded to the third level of the grievance
procedure. Petitioner informed private respondent union that if by October 30, 1990, the
remaining 17 employees could not yet be redeployed, their services would be terminated on
November 2, 1990. Private respondent filed a notice of strike on the following
grounds: a) bargaining deadlock; b) union busting; c) gross violation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), such as non-compliance with the grievance procedure; d) failure to provide
private respondent with a list of vacant positions pursuant to the parties side agreement that
was appended to the 1990 CBA; and e) defiance of voluntary arbitration award. Petitioner on
the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike but the NCMB failed to act on the motion.
SMC filed a complaint praying for: (1) the dismissal the notice of strike; (2) an order compelling
the respondent union to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed in the notice of
strike; (3) the recovery of the expenses of litigation.

Issue: Whether NLRC has the duty to enjoin a strike in violation of a no strike clause

Held: Yes. In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by the private respondent
union are non-strikeable. The issues which may lend substance to the notice of strike filed by
the private respondent union are: collective bargaining deadlock and petitioners alleged
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. These grounds, however, appear more illusory
than real. Collective Bargaining Deadlock is non-existent in the present case since there is a
Board assigned on the third level of the grievance machinery to resolve the conflicting views of
the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five representatives each from
the company and the union, to decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and
thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery
and arbitration proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of
strike should have been dismissed by the NLRC and private respondent union ordered to
proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. As regards the alleged violation of the
CBA, we hold that such a violation is chargeable against the private respondent union. In
abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under

the CBA, private respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement.

Petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner and private respondent San Miguel Corporation
Employees Union - PTGWO are hereby directed to complete the third level of the Grievance
Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if necessary.


Filipino Pipe V. NLRC
Facts:On February 10, 1986, respondent National Labor Union-Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (NLU), a national federation of labor unions, filed with the Ministry of Laborand
Employment, in behalf of its local chapter, the Filipino Pipe Workers Union-National Labor Union
(the Union), a notice of strike signed by its national president, Atty. EulogioR. Lerum, against the
petitioner, Filipino Pipe and Foundry Corporation, alleging as grounds therefor union busting
and non-implementation of the CBA.
The initial conciliation conference was set on February 24, 1986 but due to lack of notice
thereof to petitioner company, as well as the failure of the Union to furnish the latter a copyof
the notice of strike, the initial conciliation conference was re-set to March 3, 1986.
In the early morning of March 3, 1986, without waiting for the outcome of the
conciliation conference scheduled on said date, the Union staged the strike in question which
lasted until June 13, 1986, when a return to work agreement was reached by the Union and
petitioner company.
On April 8, 1986, petitioner company interposed before the Arbitration Branch of the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment, a petition to declare the strike illegal with prayer for
damages against the Union, NLU and its national president, Atty. EulogioLerum.
On December 23, 1988, petitioner company moved for the partial dismissal of the
Complaint against 43 officers and members of the Union, but maintained the action against the
NLU and Atty. Lerum.
On August 31, 1992, the Labor Arbiter came out with a decision for petitioner company,
finding that the strike held was illegal and directing NLU to pay damages, absolving Atty. Lerum.

7. Both parties appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the complaint against NLU and Atty.
Lerum.
ISSUE:W/N NLU, the Federation, should be held responsible for the illegal strike staged by the
Union. -NO

Held:The mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, has the status of an agent while
the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to serve the common interest of
all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the
association. (Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512
[1975])
The same is true even if the local union is not a legitimate labor organization.
Conformably, in the abovecited case the Court ruled that the mother federation was a mere
agent and the local chapter/union was the principal, notwithstanding the failure of the local
union to comply with the procedural requirements that would make it a legitimate
labororganization.
It would not affect its status as the principal and basic unit of the association. The
requirement laid down in the Progressive Development case, that the local union must be a
legitimate labor organization, pertains to the conditions before a union may file a petition for
certification election and to be certified as sole and exclusive bargaining agent. In the present
case, there is no dispute that THE UNION is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
the rank and file employees of petitioner company. The union's status as a legitimate
labororganization is therefore of no moment in the resolution of the controversy here.
Furthermore, the petitioner company is now estopped from reneging on the recognition
it extended to the FPUW-NLU as the bargaining representative of its rank and file workers, by
belatedly attacking its status which petitioner company had voluntarily recognized. It should be
noted that even as earlyas 1981, when the collective bargaining agreement sought to be
implemented by the union was entered into, the latter was already the bargaining
representative of the employeesconcerned. It is not, therefore, true that it was respondent NLU
which formed FPWU. At most, the entry into the picture of the private respondent on March 23,

1983, merely affirmed the status of FPWU as the recognized bargaining representative of the
rank and file employees of petitioner company.

Labor and Employment (MOLE) ordered thestriking workers to return to work. Only 66
employees were accepted, conditioned on the submission of certain requirements.

Evidently, direct and primary responsibility for the damages allegedly caused by the
illegal strike sued upon fall on the local union FPWU, being the principal, and not on respondent
NLU, a mere agent of THE UNION which assisted the latter in filing the notice of strike. Being just
an agent, the notice of strike filed by Atty. EulogioLerum, the national president ofNLU, is
deemed to have been filed by its principal, the THEUNION. Having thus dismissed the claim for
damages against the principal, THE UNION, the action for damages against its agent, respondent
NLU, and Atty. Lerum, has no more leg to stand on and should also be dismissed.

Petition is Denied

ISSUE : WON the strike was illegal.

SEVEN DAY STRIKE BAN

HELD : Yes. It was not shown in the pleadings that a strikevote was obtained before the
declaration of strike. Thestatement in the same order of the Labor Secretary that anotice of
strike had been filed because several conciliationconferences failed due to management's
consistent refusalto appear is contrary to evidence because management wasduly represented
during the conciliation proceedings prior to the strike.

G.R. No. 106316 May 5, 1997

FIRST CITY INTERLINK TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., doing business under the name and style
FIL TRANSIT, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in
her capacity as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
FIL TRANSIT-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NMF-NFL), respondents.

FACTS: Fil Transit Employees Union filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR) because of alleged unfair labor practice of petitioner company. Despite several conciliation
conferences, the parties failed to reach an agreement, the union went on strike, as a reason
several workers were dismissed.

The union filed another notice of strike allegingULP, massive dismissal of union officers and
members,coercion of employees and violation of workers' rights toself-organization.
Conciliation conferences were held but the union again went on strike. The then Minister of

The Secretary of Labor ruled for thelegality of the strike and awarded backwages andseparation
pay to the strikers. Petitioner, however, alleged that nostrike vote was obtained, the result
thereof was not reported to the MOLE, the strikers engaged in violent, illegal andcriminal acts,
and it complied with the return to work order.

Even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, the strike called by the Union was illegal
because of nonobservance by the Union of the mandatory seven-day strike ban counted from
the date the strike vote should have been reported to the Department of Labor and
Employment up to the time the Union staged the strike on June 17, 1986. I

The union was in bad faith whenit conducted the strike because instead of attending
theconciliation meetings with petitioner, it went on strike. Thestrike was attended by pervasive
and widespread violencesuch as the hijacking of Fil-Transit buses, barricading of the terminal in
Alabang, puncturing of tires, cutting of electric wirings, water hoses and fan belts, use of
Molotov bombs, and theft of expensive equipment such as fuelinjections. The commission of

these illegal acts was neither isolated nor accidental but deliberately employed tointimidate and
harass the employer and the public.

However, only the union officers and strikers who engagedin violent, illegal and criminal acts
against the employer aredeemed to have lost their employment status in accordance with Art.
264 of the Labor Code.

CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS
GTE DIRECTORIES CORPORATIONvs. SANCHEZ

FACTS:
-

GTE Directories Corporation (hereafter, simply GTE) is a foreign corporation engaged in

the Philippines in the business of publishing the PLDT (Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company) telephone directories for Metro Manila and several provinces.
The practice was for its sales representatives to be given work assignments within
specific territories by the so-called "draw method."A territory was not fully released to
the salesperson for handling at one time, but assigned in increments or partial releases
of account. This practice was observed. When GTE realized that competition among
media for a share of the advertising revenue had become so keen as to require quick
reaction.
The new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was thereafter drawn up. It appears
that the new policy did not sit well with the union. It demanded that it be given 15 days
"to raise questions or objections to or to seek reconsideration of the sales and
administrative practices issued by the Company.
GTE next formulated a new set of "Sales Administrative Practices,GTE's Sales Manager
sent another Memorandum to "all premise sales personnel.But as before, the sales
representatives did not submit the reports. Instead their union, GTE Directories
Corporation Employees Union (hereafter, simply the union), sent a letter to the Sales
Manager.
The union filed in behalf of the sales representatives, a notice of strike grounded on
alleged unfair labor practices of GTE

In due course, the Bureau of Labor Relations undertook to conciliate the dispute.
GTE sent still another memorandum to sixteen (16) of its premise sales
representatives.GTE gave its sales representatives an ultimatum.
During all this time, conciliation efforts were being exerted by the Bureau of Labor
Relations, including attempts to prevent the imposition of sanctions by GTE on its
employees, and the strike itself. When these proved futile, Acting Labor Minister
Vicente Leogardo, Jr. issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. The Acting
Secretary opined that the dispute "adversely affects the national interest, GTE, a "100%
foreign owned" company, (was) being threatened because of the strike;" and "top
officers of the union were dismissed during the conciliation process thereby
compounding the dispute,"
Reconsideration of this Order was sought by GTE. GTE reiterated its previously declared
"position that with or without the order now being questioned, it will accept all striking
employees back to work except the fourteen (14) premise sales representatives who
were dismissed for cause prior to the strike."By Resolution of then Labor Minister Blas
Ople, GTE's motion for reconsideration was denied.
In a clarificatory, Minister Ople reiterated the proposition that "promulgations of
company policies and regulations are basic management prerogatives," and that "unless
shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law," they are "generally binding and valid
on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended unilaterally or
preferably, through negotiations or by competent authorities."
Adjudication of the dispute on the merits was made by Order of Minister Ople's
successor, Augusto Sanchez.
GTE for its part, argued that the termination of the employment of its fourteen (14)
premise sales representatives prior to the strike should have been upheld. It also filed
an opposition to the union's motion for reconsideration.
The motions were resolved in a "Decision" handed down by Minister Sanchez.
Accordingly, he directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to hear said "other issues raised
by the union and to submit its findings and recommendations thereon within 20 days
from submission of the case for decision."
Again GTE moved for reconsideration; again it was rebuffed. The Labor Minister denied
its motion .
The Minister accordingly annulled and set aside his order for the Bureau of Labor
Relations to conduct hearings on said issues since he had already resolved them, and
affirmed his Order

GTE thereupon instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar praying for
invalidation, because rendered with grave abuse of discretion, of the Labor Minister's
orders.
GTE had cause to dismiss the fourteen (14) premise sales representatives who had
repeatedly and deliberately, not to say defiantly, refused to comply with its directive for
submission of individual reports on specified matters.

ISSUE: W/N THE EMPLOYEES REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH RULES AND REGULATIONS BY SIMPLE
EXPEDIENT OF CHALLENGING REASONABLENESS IS ALLOWED?

HELD: NO.
-

Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules, defiance of management authority by the

employees cannot be countenanced, until and unless the rules or orders imposed by the
employers are declared to be illegal or improper by competent authority, the employees
ignore or disobey them at their peril.
To sanction disregard or disobedience by employees of a rule or order laid down by
management, on the pleaded theory that the rule or order is unreasonable, illegal, or
otherwise irregular for one reason or another, would be disastrous to the discipline and
order that it is in the interest of both the employer and his employees to preserve and
maintain in the working establishment and without which no meaningful operation and
progress is possible.
Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules, defiance of management authority cannot
be countenanced. This is not to say that the employees have no remedy against rules or
orders they regard as unjust or illegal. They may object thereto, ask to negotiate
thereon, bring proceedings for redress against the employer before the Ministry of
Labor.
But until and unless the rules or orders are declared to be illegal or improper by
competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. It is
impermissible to reverse the process: suspend enforcement of the orders or rules until
their legality or propriety shall have been subject of negotiation, conciliation, or
arbitration.

On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-18094, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal
transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members, (5)
labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of
duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice.
The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president Edilberto Galvez,
raising similar grounds
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss,
on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four
corporations which are separate and distinct from each other
After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the real issues
involved are non-strikeable. Hence on May 2, 1994, he issued separate letter-orders to both
union groups, converting their notices of strike into preventive mediation.
The NLRC on June 13, 1994 resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing free
ingress to and egress from petitioners plants, without prejudice to the unions right to peaceful
picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.
To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner on June 16, 1994, entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent-union, calling for a lifting of the picket lines and
resumption of work in exchange of good faith talks between the management and the labor
management committees. The MOA, signed in the presence of Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) officials, expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will
continue and will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement.[20] The picket
lines ended and work was then resumed.

NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis.
It found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no longer constituted an actual
or threatened commission of unlawful acts.

San Miguel Corp. vs NLRC

Issue: Whether or not the injunction be granted.

Held: Yes. One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for
the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes,[29] this requirement has been
held to be mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal
In the present case, NCMB converted IBMs notices into preventive mediation as it found that
the real issues raised are non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the NCMBs duty to exert
all efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the parties to settle the dispute amicably, and
in line with the state policy of favoring voluntary modes of settling labor disputes. In accordance
with the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, the said conversion has the effect of dismissing
the notices of strike filed by respondent.

GOOD FAITH STRIKE
PHIL. METAL FOUNDRIES VS. CIR, SUPRA., 90 SCRA 135

As this Court has held in Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. v. CIR (90 SCRA 135 [1979]), a no-strike
clause in a CBA is applicable only to economic strikes. Corollarily, if the strike is founded on an
unfair labor practice of the employer, a strike declared by the union cannot be considered a
violation of the no-strike clause. An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or
other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant (Consolidated
Labor Association of the Philippines v. Marsman & Co., Inc., 11 SCRA 589 [1964]). In this case,
petitioners enumerated in their notice of strike the following grounds: violation of CBA or the
Corporations practice of subcontracting workers; discrimination; coercion of employees;
unreasonable suspension of union officials, and unreasonable refusal to entertain grievance.
Professor Perfecto Fernandez, in his book Law on Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts (1981 edition,
pp. 144-145), states that an economic strike involves issues relating to demands for higher
wages, higher pension or overtime rates, pensions, profit sharing, shorter working hours, fewer
work days for the same pay, elimination of night work, lower retirement age, more healthful
working conditions, better health services, better sanitation and more safety appliances. The

demands of the petitioners, being covered by the CBA, are definitely within the power of the
Corporation to grant and therefore the strike was not an economic strike

NOT A GOOD DEFENSE IN CASES OF PROCEDURAL IMMUNITY
Grand Boulevard Hotel vs. Genuine Labor Organizations of Workers in Hotel Restaurant and
Allied Industries, G.R. No. 1534664, 18 July 2003

FACTS
- Respondent Genuine Labor Organization of W orkers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries
Silahis International Hotel Chapter (Union) and the petitioner Grand Boulevard Hotel (then
Silahis International Hotel, Inc.) executed a CBA covering the period from July 10, 1985 up to
July 9, 1988.
- Thereafter, Union filed several notices of strike on account of alleged violations of CBA, illegal
dismissal and suspension of EEs. In these instances, SOLE issued a status quo ante bellum order
certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g)
of LC. After notice was given by Hotel re its decision to implem ent retrenchm ent
program, Union informed the DOLE that the union will conduct a strike vote referendum. The
members of the Union voted to stage a strike. Union inform ed the DOLE of the results of
the strike vote referendum. SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order certifying
the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoining the parties from engaging in
any strike or lockout. Then, another notice of strike was filed by Union on account of the illegal
dismissal of EEs pusrsuant to Hotels act of retrenching around 171 EEs. Officers of the
respondent union and som e members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel, obstructing
the free ingress and egress thereto. Because of this, they were terminated.
- Hotel filed a complaint with NLRC for illegal strike against the

union, its members and officers. Petitioner Hotel alleged inter alia that the union members
and officers staged a strike on November 16, 1990 which lasted until November 29, 1990
without complying with the requirem ents provided under Articles

Union. Sol-Gen opined that even if the strike was staged without the proper notice and
compliance with the cooling-off period, resort thereto was simply triggered by the
petitioners' belief in good faith that Hotel was engaged in ULP. Hence, this petition

263 and 264 of the Labor Code. It further alleged that the officers

and members of the respondent union blocked the main ingress to and egress from the hotel.

ISSUES

- The respondent Union denied the material allegations of the

1 WON the strike staged by the respondent union on Nov16-29, 1990 is legal

complaint and alleged that the petitioner committed ULP prior to the filing of the Nov. 16, 1990
notice of strike. Hence, there was no need for the union to com ply with A263 and 264 of LC, as
the notice

2 WON the dismissals of the officers and som e members of the Union as a consequence of the
strike on Nov16-29, 1990 are valid.

- LA Linsangans Ruling: Unions failure to com ply with the requirem ents laid down in A263
and 264 of LC, the strike that was staged was illegal. Considering the admissions of the
individual respondents that they participated in the said strike, the termination of their
employment by the petitioner was legal. LA noted that if as alleged by the respondent union
the petitioner was guilty of ULP, it should have filed a complaint therefor against the Hotel
and/or its officials for which the latter could have been meted penal and administrative
sanctions as provided for in A272 of LC. The Union failed.
- Appeal by Union to NLRC: that it had complied with the requirements laid down in A263 and
264 of LC because its Nov 16, 1990 notice of strike was a mere reiteration of its Sept 27, 1990
notice of strike, which, in turn, complied with all the requirem ents of the aforementioned
articles, i.e., the cooling-off period, the strike ban, the strike vote and the strike vote report.
- NLRC affirmed LA Decision. Compliance of the requirements laid down in A263 and 264 of LC
respecting the Sept 27, 1990 notice of strike filed by the union cannot be carried over to the Nov
16, 1990 notice of strike. Resultantly, for failure of the union to comply with the requirem ents,
the strike staged on November 16 up to Novem ber 29, 1990 was illegal.
- CA reversed NLRC and LA: It took into account the observation of the Sol-Gen that the Hotel
retrenched EEs pending the resolution of the certified cases respecting the alleged illegal
suspension and dismissals effected by Hotel during and prior to the notices of strike filed by

HELD
1. NO
Re: Procedural Requirem ents
- Under A263 (c) and (f) of LC, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (a) a notice of strike
fled with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of ULP;
(b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by secret ballot in a m eeting called for that purpose; (c) notice given to
the DOLE of the results of the voting at least
7 days before the intended strike. The requisite 7-day period is intended to give the DOLE an
opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the majority of
the union members. The notice of strike and the cooling-off period were intended to provide an
opportunity for mediation and conciliation. The requirements are mandatory and
failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. A strike simultaneously with or
immediately after a notice of strike will render the requisite periods nugatory.
- In this case, union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on Nov 16,

1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel, in violation of the law.
Union cannot argue that since the notice of strike on Nov 16, 1990 were for the same grounds
as those contained in their notice of strike on September 27, 1990 which complied with the
requirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike ban, strike vote and strike vote report,
the strike staged by them on Nov16, 1990 was lawful. The matters contained in the notice of
strike of Sept 27, 1990 had already been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on Oct
31, 1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining union from intending
or staging a strike. Despite SOLE order, the union nevertheless staged a strike on Nov16, 1990
simultaneously with its notice of strike, thus violating A264(a) LC
Grounds
- A strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or certification
order, becomes a prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC: No strike or
lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or
during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
- Even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company was committing an
unfair labor practice, if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted, the said strike is
illegal.

2. YES
Re: Effect of Illegality
Ratio Since a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or
certification order, becomes a prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC, the
union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their em ployment status for
having know ingly participated in an illegal act.

EFFECT OF NO STIKE / NO LOCK OUT CLAUSE IN CBA

Master Iron Labor Union v. NLRC
FACTS: Master Iron Work Construction Corporation is engaged in steel fabrication. The
Corporation entered into a CBA with Master Iron Labor Union (MILU) for a period of 3 years
from December 1, 1986 to November 30, 1989. In the CBA, section 1 provides: That there shall
be no strike and no lockout, stoppage or shutdown of work, or any other interference with any
of the operation of the COMPANY during the term of this AGREEMENT, unless allowed and
permitted by law." Furthermore, the company shall provide a service allowance for those
assigned to work outside the plant, whether in Metro Manila or outside. Right after signing the
CBA, the Corporation subcontracted those assigned to work outside, reducing the work hours to
10 working days a month. On April 8, 1987, MILU filed a notice of strike with DOLE. Both parties
agreed to give back the regular work. Nonetheless, the Corporation continued hiring the outside
workers. The Corporation insisted that it was exercising its management prerogative. On July 24,
MILU staged a strike. On August 4, the Corporation filed a petition to declare the strike illegal.
The NLRC declared that the strike was illegal relying on the nostrike nolockout provision in the
CBA.
ISSUE: whether or not the Union violated the nostrike nolockout provision in the CBA?
HELD: NO. As this Court has held in Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. vs. CIR (90 SCRA 135 [1979]),
a nostrike clause in a CBA is applicable only to economic strikes. Corollarily, if the strike is
founded on an unfair labor practice of the employer, a strike declared by the union cannot be
considered a violation of the nostrike clause. An economic strike is defined as one which is to
force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. On
the contrary, petitioners decry the violation of the CBA, specifically the provision granting them
service allowances. Petitioners are not, therefore, already asking for an economic benefit not
already agreed upon, but are merely asking for the implementation of the same. They aver that
the Corporation's practice of hiring subcontractors to do jobs outside of the company premises
was a way "to dodge paying service allowance to the workers. Much more than an economic
issue, the said practice of the Corporation was a blatant violation of the CBAan unfair labor
practice on the part of the employer under Article 248(i) of the Labor Code. Although the end
result, should the Corporation be required to observe the CBA, may be economic in nature

because the workers would then be given their regular working hours and therefore their just
pay, not one of the said grounds is an economic demand within the meaning of the law on labor
strikes.

ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION
LMG CHEMICALS CORP, LMG CHEMICALS CORP vs.THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, and CHEMICAL WORKERS
UNION

G.R. No. 127422 April 17, 2001
FACTS: LMG Chemicals Corp, (petitioner) is a domestic corp engaged in the manufacture and
sale of various kinds of chemical substances, including aluminum sulfate which is essential in
purifying water, and technical grade sulfuric acid used in thermal power plants. Petitioner has
three divisions, namely: the Organic Division, Inorganic Division and the Pinamucan Bulk
Carriers. There are two unions within petitioners Inorganic Division. One union represents the
daily paid employees and the other union represents the monthly paid employees. Chemical
Workers Union, respondent, is a duly registered labor organization acting as the collective
bargaining agent of all the daily paid employees of petitioners Inorganic Division.

Sometime in December 1995, the petitioner and the respondent started negotiation for a new
CBA as their old CBA was about to expire. They were able to agree on the political provisions of
the new CBA, but no agreement was reached on the issue of wage increase. The economic
issues were not also settled.

With the CBA negotiations at a deadlock (StrikeSecretary assumed jurisdiction)

Secretary of Labor and Employment granted an increase of P140 (higher than the offer of
petitioner-company of P135). Also, as to the effectivity of the new CBASec held:

3. Effectivity of the new CBA

Article 253-A of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that when no new CBA is signed during a
period of six months from the expiry date of the old CBA, the retroactivity period shall be
according to the parties agreement, Inasmuch as the parties could not agree on this issue and
since this Office has assumed jurisdiction, then this matter now lies at the discretion of the
Secretary of labor and Employment. Thus the new Collective Bargaining Agreement which the
parties will sign pursuant to this Order shall retroact to January 1, 1996.

petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion when he
ordered that the new CBA which the parties will sign shall retroact to January 1, 1996

ISSUE: Whether or not the new CBA shall retroact?

HELD:

Petitioner insists that public respondents discretion on the issue of the date of the effectivity of
the new CBA is limited to either: (1) leaving the matter of the date of effectivity of the new CBA
is limited to either: (1) leaving the matter of the date of effectivity of the new CBA to the
agreement of the parties or (2) ordering that the terms of the new CBA be prospectively applied.


It must be emphasized that respondent Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute because
it is impressed with national interest. As noted by the Secretary, the petitioner corp was then
supplying the sulfate requirements of MWSS as well as the sulfuric acid of NAPOCOR, and
consequently, the continuation of the strike would seriously affect the water supply of Metro
Manila and the power supply of the Luzon Grid. Such authority of the Secretary to assume
jurisdiction carries with it the power to determine the retroactivity of the parties CBA.

It is well settled in our jurisprudence that the authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and controversies arising
therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and
efficiently dispose of the primary dispute.

This Court held in St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. vs. Torres:

Therefore in the absence of the specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the
effectivity of the arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code, such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary
powers to determine the effectivity thereof.

PETITION DENIED.
DISCRETION OF THE SECRETARY
FEATI UNIVERSITY vs. HON. BAUTISTA and FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU

FACTS:

The President of the Feati University Faculty Club (Faculty Club) wrote to the President of Feati
University informing her of the organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union.
He then wrote the President of the university another letter containing demands in connection
with the club members employment. The university was not able to give in to the demands, so
the Faculty Club filed a notice of strike. Attempts at conciliation failed and thus the Faculty Club
commenced a strike. From these events, 3 separate cases were filed which were consolidated
at the Supreme Court. The pivotal issue appears to be whether or not the Court of Industrial
Relations has jurisdiction over the controversy. Feati University contended that since it was an
educational institution, the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875) did not apply to it, therefore, the
CIR does not have jurisdiction over them. Nevertheless, the CIR, under respondent Judge
Bautista held that their dispute fell within the Industrial Peace Act and ordered a return to work
on March 30, 1963. In spite of this order, the University refused to accept the professors who
had gone on strike.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CIR has acquired jurisdiction over this case.

HELD:
YES, the CIR has jurisdiction over this dispute. In the first place, Feati University operated as a
for profit institution, thus it fell under the definition of employer under the Industrial Peace
Act. Secondly, the CIR did not have discretion in the matter because this very dispute was
certified to it by the President of the Philippines. Specifically, Section 10 of R.A. No. 875
provides that when in the opinion of the President, there exists a labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the President may certify the dispute to the CIR who may
then issue a restraining order forbidding strikes or lockouts. In cases where the President
certifies a case to the CIR, it subsequently acquires jurisdiction over the case.


K. STRIKES, PICKETING AND LOCK-OUTS; 3.3.1 STRIKE VOTE/LOCK-OUT VOTE

G.R. No. 151379 January 14, 2005

UNIVERSITY of IMMACULATE, CONCEPCION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE UIC TEACHING and NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL
AND EMPLOYEES UNION, LELIAN CONCON, MARY ANN DE RAMOS, JOVITA MAMBURAM,

ANGELINA ABADILLA, MELANIE DE LA ROSA, ZENAIDA CANOY, ALMA VILLACARLOS, JOSIE

BOSTON, PAULINA PALMA GIL, GEMMA GALOPE, LEAH CRUZA, DELFA DIAPUEZ, respondent.


FACTS:
This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner University of
Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non- Teaching
Personnel and Employees Union (UNION). The UNION, as the certified bargaining
agent of all rank and file employees of the UNIVERSITY, submitted its collective bargaining
proposals to the latter on February 16, 1994. However, one item was left unresolved and this
was the inclusion or exclusion of some positions in the scope of the bargaining unit.

The UNION it filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and ULP. During the
thirty (30) day cooling-off period, two union members were dismissed by petitioner.
Consequently, the UNION went on strike.

On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, issued an Order
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.

On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the
UNIVERSITYs termination of the individual respondents. The UNION alleged that the
UNIVERSITYs act of terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the Order of the
Secretary of Labor.

On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued another Order reiterating the directives
contained in the January 23, 1995 Order. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the
individual respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor
dispute.

The UNIVERSITY filed a MR. In the Order dated August 18, 1995, then Acting Secretary Jose S.
Brilliantes denied the MR.

The CA affirmed the orders of the Secretary.

ISSUE:
W/N the orders of the Secretary that suspended the effects of the termination of the 12
employees who were not part of the bargaining unit were proper.

HELD:
Yes.

RATIO:
In St. Scholasticas College v. Torres, the Court, citing International Pharmaceuticals
Incorporated v. the Secretary of Labor, declared that:

The Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, the
authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all
questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has
exclusive jurisdiction.

The UNIVERSITY contends that the Secretary cannot take cognizance of an issue involving
employees who are not part of the bargaining unit. It insists that since the individual
respondents had already been excluded from the bargaining unit by a final and executory order
by the panel of voluntary arbitrators, then they cannot be covered by the Secretarys
assumption order.

This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITYs contention. In Metrolab Industries, Inc. v. RoldanConfessor,this Court declared that it recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and it
often declines to interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer. This is in
keeping with the general principle embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, which
is further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code.However, as expressed in PAL v. National
Labor Relations Commission,this privilege is not absolute, but subject to exceptions. One of
these exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes
involving industries indispensable to the national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code. This provision states:

(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically
enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all

striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout.

When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the termination
of the individual respondents, the Secretary did not exceed her jurisdiction, nor did the
Secretary gravely abuse the same. It must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the
further detriment of the national interest. In her Order dated March 28, 1995, the Secretary of
Labor rightly held:

It is well to remind both parties herein that the main reason or rationale for the exercise of the
Secretary of Labor and Employments power under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended,
is the maintenance and upholding of the status quo while the dispute is being adjudicated.
Hence, the directive to the parties to refrain from performing acts that will exacerbate the
situation is intended to ensure that the dispute does not get out of hand, thereby negating the
direct intervention of this office.

Topic: May give an award higher than what was agreed upon by the management and union

Case: Cirtek Employees Labor Union FFW vs. Cirtek Electronics (GR No. 190515)

Facts: Prior to the 3rd year of the CBA, Cirtek Electronics, Inc. (respondent) and Cirtek
Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers (petitioner) renegotiated its economic
provisions but failed to reach a settlement, particularly on the issue of wage
increases. Petitioner declared a bargaining deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike. Respondent,
upon the other hand, filed a Notice of Lockout. As amicable settlement of the CBA was
deadlocked, petitioner went on strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the
controversy and issued a Return to Work Order which was complied with. Before the Secretary
of Labor could rule on the controversy, respondent created a Labor Management Council (LMC)
through which it concluded with the remaining officers of petitioner a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) providing for daily wage increases of P6.00 per day effective January 1, 2004
and P9.00 per day effective January 1, 2005. Petitioner submitted the MOA via Motion and
Manifestation to the Secretary of Labor, alleging that the remaining officers signed the MOA
under respondents assurance that should the Secretary order a higher award of wage increase,
respondent would comply. The Secretary of Labor resolved the CBA deadlock by awarding a

wage increase of fromP6.00 to P10.00 per day effective January 1, 2004 and from P9.00
to P15.00 per day effective January 1, 2005, and adopting all other benefits as embodied in the
MOA.

Issue: Whether the Secretary of Labor is empowered to give arbitral awards in the exercise of
his authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes.

Held: Yes. The then Acting Secretary of Labor acted well within his jurisdiction in ruling that the
wage increases to be given are P10 per day effective January 1, 2004 and P15 per day effective
January 1, 2005, pursuant to his power to assume jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor
Code. While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered
into by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power of the State thru the
Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the award can be considered as an
approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered
into by the parties. Hence, it has the force and effect of a valid contract obligation between the
parties. In determining arbitral awards then, aside from the MOA, courts considered other
factors and documents including, as in this case, the financial documents submitted by
respondent as well as its previous bargaining history and financial outlook and improvements as
stated in its own website.

Petition denied.

Asia Brewery v. TunaynaPagkakaisangManggagawa
Facts:After 18 sessions of negotiations, it still resulted to a deadlock. After the union filed a
notice of strike with the NCMB, still they did not come to terms.
When union conducted a strike vote with a768/840 voted in favor of holding a strike,
the corporation then petitioned the Secretary of DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the parties
labor dispute, invoking Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. Union opposed the assumption of
jurisdiction, reasoning therein that the business of petitioner corporation is not in dispensable
to the national interest. The public respondent, through Undersecretary/Acting Secretary

issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the Respondent union and

Secretary of Labor herself to petitioner corporation to submit its complete audited financial

petitioner corporation. It then resolved the deadlock and granted arbitral awards.

statements, but this may have resulted to a wage award that is based on an inaccurate and
biased picture of petitioner corporations capacity to pay one of the more significant factors

Upon appeal to the CA, it ordered that the assailed Decision of the respondent Secretary
with respect to the issue on salary increases is remanded to her office for a definite resolution
using as basis the externally audited financial statements to be submitted by corporation.
ISSUE:W/N the order of the CA remanding the issue on salary increase to the Secretary of Labor
is proper. -YES

in making a wage award. The appellate court, thus, correctly remanded this case to the
Secretary of Labor for the proper determination of the wage award which should utilize, among
others,

the

audited

financial

statements

proper. The Supreme Court has recognized the Secretary of Labors distinct expertise in the

ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGEvs. TORRES

FACTS:

evidence, are entitled not only to great respect but even to finality. But at the same time, the

Court also recognize the possibility that abuse of discretion may attend the exercise of the
Secretarys arbitral functions; his findings in an arbitration case are usually based on position
papers and their supporting documents (as they are in the present case), and not on the
thorough examination of the parties contending claims that may be present in a court trial and

in the face-to-face adversarial process that better insures the proper presentation and
appreciation of evidence, etc.
The SC held that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused her discretion when she relied
on the unaudited financial statements of the corporation in determining the wage award
because such evidence is self-serving and inadmissible. Not only did this violate the Order of the

corporation.

EFFECT OF DEFIANCE OF RETURN TO WORK ORDERS

also well-settled that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if supported by substantial

petitioner

Petition Denied.

Held: The remand of this case to the Secretary of Labor as to the issue of wage increase was

study and settlement of labor disputes falling under his power of compulsory arbitration. It is

of

On 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholastics College (COLLEGE, for brevity) and private
respondent Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika- NAFTEU
(UNION, for brevity) initiated negotiations for a first ever collective bargaining
agreement. A deadlock in the negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4 October
1990 a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DEPARTMENT,
for brevity).
On 5 November 1990, the UNION declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of
the COLLEGE. Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public respondent
SECRETARY immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued on the
same day, 5 November 1990, a return-to-work order. The following day, 6 November
1990, the UNION was served the Order. On 7 November 1990, instead of returning to
work, the UNION filed a motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order
questioning inter alia the assumption of jurisdiction by the SECRETARY over the labor
dispute.
On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to the striking employees
enjoining them to return to work not later than 8:00 oclock A.M. of 12 November 1990
and, at the same time, giving notice to some twenty- three (23) workers that their

return would be without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against them. In
response, the UNION presented a list of six (6) demands to the COLLEGE in a dialogue
conducted on 11 November 1990. The most important of these demands was the
unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But these were flatly
rejected.
Likewise, on 9 November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied reconsideration of his
return-to-work order and sternly warned the striking employees to comply with its
terms. On 12 November 1990, the UNION received the Order.
Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the parties held conciliation
meetings before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board where the UNION
pruned down its demands to three (3), that striking employees be reinstated under the
same terms and conditions before the strike; that no retaliatory or disciplinary action be
taken against them; and, that CBA negotiations be continued. However, these efforts
proved futile as the COLLEGE remained steadfast in its position that any return-to-work
offer should be unconditional.
On 16 November 1990, the COLLEGE manifested to respondent SECRETARY that the
UNION continued to defy his return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 so that
appropriate steps under the said circumstances may be undertaken by him.
On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed individual notices of termination to the
striking employees, which were received on 26 November 1990, or later. The UNION
officers and members then tried to return to work but were no longer accepted by the
COLLEGE.
On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against the UNION, its
officers and several of its members before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return- to work order before respondent
SECRETARY, citing selective acceptance of returning strikers by the COLLEGE. It also
sought dismissal of the complaint. Since then, no further hearings were conducted.
Respondent SECRETARY required the parties to submit their respective position papers.
The COLLEGE prayed that respondent SECRETARY uphold the dismissal of the employees
who defied his return-to-work order.
On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order which, inter alia,
directed the reinstatement of striking UNION members, premised on his finding that no
violent or otherwise illegal act accompanied the conduct of the strike and that a
fledgling UNION like private respondent was naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if
inexperienced enthusiasm, in asserting its existence.2 Nevertheless, the aforesaid

Order held UNION officers responsible for the violation of the return-to-work orders of
5 and 9 November 1990, correspondingly, sustained their termination.
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration of the Order, with petitioner COLLEGE
questioning the wisdom of the reinstatement of striking UNION members, and private
respondent UNION, the dismissal of its officers.
On 31 May 1991, in a Resolution, respondent SECRETARY denied both motions. Hence,
this Petition for Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order.

ISSUE: W/N STRIKING UNION MEMBERS TERMINATED FOR ABANDONMENT OF WORK AFTER
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH RETURN-TO-WORK ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT SHOULD BY LAW BE REINSTATED.

HELD: NO.
-

A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the

filing of a motion for reconsideration. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that
if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, all striking x x x employees
shall immediately return to work. This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work
order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration (University of Sot. Tomas v. NLRC). It must be strictly complied with
even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity (Union of Filipro
Employees v. Nestl Philippines, Inc., supra). After all, the assumption and/or
certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARYs compulsive
power of arbitration and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to
immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor
Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of
Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an
illegal act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a
return-to-work order may, consequently, be declared to have lost his employment
status.

Allied Banking Corp vs NLRC

The dispute between petitioner and respondent Union started when their collective
bargaining agreement which was to expire on June 30, 1984 came up for renewal. They failed to
reach an amicable settlement particularly on the wage increase issue. Respondent Union
thereupon filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
On December 16, 1984, then Minister of Labor and Employment, Blas Ople assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The orders enjoined the Union from declaring a strike and the management from
effecting a lock out.
Respondent Union staged a strike upon the Union president's contention that the Labor
Minister's assumption order was a mere scrap of paper.

which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and
Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal
act. Therefore, any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a
return-to-work order may as a result thereof be considered to have lost his employment status.

Solidbank vs. Gamier et al, GR 159460, 15 Nov 2010; Solidbank vs. Solidbank Union et al., GR
159461, 15 Nov 2010

Dismissal; illegal strike; distinction between union officers and mere
members. The liabilities of individuals who participate in an illegal strike must
be determined under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code which makes a
distinction between union officers and mere members. The law grants the
employer the option of declaring a union officer who knowingly participated in
an illegal strike as having lost his employment. However, a worker merely
participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment if he
does not commit illegal acts during a strike. Hence, with respect to
respondents who are union officers, their termination by petitioners is valid.
Being fully aware that the proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still
pending as in fact they filed a motion for reconsideration, they cannot invoke
good faith as a defense. For the rest of the individual respondents who are
union members, they cannot be terminated for mere participation in the illegal
strike.

Petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment a Manifestation and Urgent Motion
praying for a return-to-work order. On January 6, 1985, Minister Ople granted the motion and
issued a return-to-work order which included a P1,000.00 grant per employee chargeable to
future CBA benefits.
Thereafter, the strike resumed. Respondents failed to return to work despite orders.
Respondents explained that the resumption of their picketing activities was brought about by
their belief that Minister Ople's decision, dated January 31, 1985, was not based on justice,
equity and reason.
Petitioner however refused to accept them back on the ground that the strikers have already
been dismissed for abandonment of work when they failed to obey the assumption order.
Issue: Whether or not respondents be reinstated.
Held: No. We agree with respondents' contention that mere participation of union members in
an illegal strike should not automatically result in their termination from employment. However,
the case at bar involves a different issue as a perusal of the records shows that respondents
were terminated from employment by reason of their defiance to the return-to-work order of
the Secretary of Labor.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately
comply with the return-to-work order, are clearly spelled out in Article 264 of the Labor Code

DANILO ESCARIO ET AL VS. NLRC, GR 160302, 27 SEPT 2010.

Facts:
Petitioners are merchandisers of respondent company. They withdraw stocks from the
warehouse , fix the prices, price-tagging, displaying the products and inventory. They were paid
by the company through an agent to avoid liability. They claim that they were under the control

and supervision of the company. They asked for regularization of their status. They were then
given notice of their termination. The company denied any employer-employee relationship.
They claim that they used an agent or independent contractors to sell the merchandise. The
Labor Arbiter ruled that there was an employer-employee relationship. The NLRC set aside the
decision and said that there was no such relationship. The agent was a legitimate independent
contractor.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are employees of the company.

Held:
The Court ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship and that petitioners are
employees of the agent. The agent is a legitimate independent contractor. Labor-only contractor
occurs only when the contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job for
a principal. The labor-only contractor doesnt have substantial capital or investment and the
workers recruited perform activities directly related to the principal business of the employer.
There is permissible contracting only when the contractor carries an independent business and
undertakes the contract in his own manner and method, free from the control of the principal
and the contractor has substantial capital or investment. The agent, and not the company, also
exercises control over the petitioners. No documents were submitted to prove that the
company exercised control over them. The agent hired the petitioners. The agent also pays the
petitioners, no evidence was submitted showing that it was the company paying them and not
the agent. It was also the agent who terminated their services. By petitioning for regularization,
the petitioners concede that they are not regular employees.
PICKETING AND OTHER FORMS OF CONCERTED ACTIVITIES
PAFLU v. Cloribel

FACTS: The Philippine Association for Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) and its members demonstrated
or picketed in front of or along the common passageway of Wellington Building owned by
Wellington Investment and tenanted by different business firms. PAFLU was picketing against
Metropolitan Bank or Metbank at the ground flour. Wellington complained that the picketers
were blocking the common passageway which affected the peaceful enjoyment and free access
of business firms . Wellington charged PAFLU for damages and the Court issued a preliminary
injunction. PAFLU filed a petition with the Court alleging that the lower court and the presiding
judge, Judge Cloribel, acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. In
compliance with the same resolution, Judge Cloribels corespondents Wellington and METBANK
filed their answers to the petition, separately but actually advancing the same defenses, to wit:
That since Civil Case No. 64831 of the Court of First Instance of Manila did not involve nor arise
out of a labor dispute between the parties thereto, namely, Wellington, alone as plaintiff, and
PAFLU, et al., as defendants, conformance with the provisions of section 9 of Republic Act No.
875 was not necessary, that since the same case was primarily for an injunction with damages,
as shown by the averments in Wellingtons complaint, said lower court had the jurisdiction; that
the mere inclusion of METBANK as one of the present respondents, although it was not an
original party below, did not convert the case into a labor injunction suit.
ISSUE: whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction?
HELD: YES. A cursory examination of the record before us reveals that there exists no labor
dispute between petitioner PAFLU and either of the two complainants in the court a quo,
namely, Wellington in Civil Case No. 64831 and Galang in Civil Case No. 64909. It is an admitted
fact that the strike and the picket are directed against METBANK, an entirely different and
separate entity without connection whatsoever with Wellington and Galang other than the
incidental fact that they are the banks landlord and colessee in the Wellington Building,
respectively. a labor dispute exists regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.The applicable law, therefore, is Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court on injunction. The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute
is a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution.6 If peacefully carried out, it
can not be curtailed7even in the absence of employer employee relationship. The right is,
however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise
of free speech, we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of

communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with
related interest, and to insulate establishments or persons with no industrial connection
or8having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated
at the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders if it appears that the inevitable result of
its exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection
or interest exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights.

Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71 production personnel were
also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the
three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due
to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day
was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget. On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a
Petition to Declare Strike Illegal

Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant EEs Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Inc., 512 SCRA 437 [2007]

Issue: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.

Facts: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid noncommission-earning employees of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta.
Rosa, Laguna plant.

Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its
terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company
discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the
AlyansangmgaUnyonsa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The
Union officers and members also insisted that their wages be based on their work shift rates.
For its part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not members
of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its
various
plants;
and
is
not
a
registered
labor
organization.
Thus,
an impasse ensued.

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of
Strike with the NCMB. The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the
Alyansa in front of the Companys premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket
along
the
front
perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the

Held: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA,
the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking
employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of
the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.

Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a
labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more
persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of
peaceable persuasion. The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to
and fro in front of the companys premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a
concerted activity which already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted
activity constituted a strike. For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided
by Art 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days
before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote
approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the
results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are
mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in

this case that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their
illegal strike. Petition denied.