CONSTITUTIONAL I

File No. 2
e. Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit
Article XVI, Sec. 3, CONSTITUTION

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

Gen. Rule
Basis
:
Reason

:
The State may not be sued without its consent.
Sec. 3, Art. XVI of the Constitution.

:
There can be no legal right against the authority which
makes the
law on which the right depends.

When considered a suit against the State:

1.
2.
3.

The Republic is sued by name;

Suits against an un incorporated government agency;
Suits is against a government official, but is such that ultimate
liability shall devolve on the government:
a.
b.

When a public officer acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of

his authority, he can be held personally liable for damages.
BUT: If he acted pursuant to his official duties, without malice,
negligence, or bad faith, he is not personally liable, and the suit
is really one against the State.

Application / Prohibition of the rule:

1. This rule applies not only in favor of the Philippines but also in favor
of the foreign states.
2. The rule likewise prohibits a person from filing for interpleader, with
the State as one of the defendants being compelled to interplead.

CASES

The Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) is part of the government

being in fact an office under the office of the President and therefore,
cannot be sued without the consent of the State. The consent to be
effective must come from the State, acting through a duly enacted
statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant RCA agreed to had no
binding force in the government. That was clearly beyond the scope
of his authority (Republic vs. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470).

The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages

that the private respondent sustained with regard to its goods. To
permit private respondents claim to prosper would violate the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Since it demands that the
Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it
sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it
is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit
against the State. The Bureau of Customs, along with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty,
namely, taxation (Farolan vs. CTA, 217 SCRA 298).

It is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her

private or personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope
and even beyond her place of official functions, said complaint is not
then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the grounds relied upon by
the petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical
admission of the truth of the allegations therein, the case falls within
the exception to the doctrine of State immunity (USA vs. Reyes, GR
79233, March 1, 1993).

Feliciano was holding property title to which was evidenced by an

informacion posesoria. Proclamation no. 90 of President Magsaysay
included it among properties for subdivision and distribution.
Feliciano sued the Republic, represented by the Land Authority, to
recover possession of the land. The plaintiff has impleaded the
Republic as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like

any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property.

The State pleaded immunity from suit. The suit against the State
which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
showing that the State has consented to be sued. Informacion
posesoria had not been shown to have been converted into a record of
ownership.
It is nothing more than prima facie evidence of
possession. Feliciano must pursue to prove title. The consent of the
State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of
State Immunity can only be made by an act of legislative body
(Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424).

Forms of Consent

1. Express consent
2. Implied consent

i)

express consent

1.
When he law expressly grants the authority to sue the State or
any of its agencies.
2.
Examples:
a. A law creating a government body expressly
providing that such body may sue or be sued.
b. Art 2180 of the Civil Code, which creates liability against the
State when it acts through a special agent.

CASES

Respondent Singson cause of action is a money claim against the

government for the payment of the alleged balance of the cost of
spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways.
Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, mandamus is not
remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the State, but
an ordinary action for specific performance. The suit is against the
State which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except
with the consent of the State. The respondent should have filed his

claim with the general auditing office under the provision of

comm..act 327 which prescribe the condition under which money
claim against the government may be filed (Sayson vs. Singson, 54 SCRA
282).

By consenting to be sued, the State simply waives its immunity

from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to the plaintiff, or
create any cause of action in its favor, or extend its liability to any
cause not previously recognized. It merely gives remedy to enforce a
pre-existing liability and submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. The Government
of the Philippines is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers, and
employees when they act as special agents. A special agent is one
who receives a definite and fix order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official (Meritt vs.
Government, 34 Phil 311).

By engaging in business through the instrumentality of a

corporation, the government divests itself of its sovereign character
so as to render the corporation subject to the rules governing the
private corporations.
Garnishment is a proper remedy for a
prevailing party to proceed against the funds of a corporate entity
even if owned or controlled by the government. It is well settled that
when a government enters into commercial business it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated just like any other corporation
(PNB vs. CIR, 81 SCRA 314).

Under its charter (RA 1161, Sec. 4K) the SSS can sue and be sued.
So, if assuming that the SSS enjoys immunity from suit as an entity
performing governmental functions by virtue of the explicit provision
of the enabling law, it can be sued. The government must be deemed
to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not
thereby concede its liability (SSS vs. CA, 120 SCRA 707).

ii)

implied consent

1. When the State enters into a private contract. The contract must be
entered into by the proper officer and within the scope of his

authority.
UNLESS: the contract is merely incidental to the
performance of a governmental function.
2. When the State enters into a business contract. UNLESS: The
operation is incidental to the performance of a governmental function
(e.g. arrastre services). Thus, when the State conduct business
operations through GOCC, the latter can be generally be sued, even if
its charter contains no express sue or be sued clause.
Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued
(US v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 6440;
Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign
functions. No implied consent (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487);
3. When it is a suit against an incorporated government agency
Unincorporated
a. Performs governmental functions: not suable without State consent
even is performing proprietary function incidentally.
b. Performs proprietary functions: suable.
4. When the State files suit against a private party UNLESS: the suit is
entered into only to resist a claim..

CASES

When the State files an action, it divests itself of the sovereign

character and shed its immunity from suit, descending to the level of
an ordinary litigant (RP vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 85384, February 28, 1990).

The claim for damages for the use of property against the
intervenor dependant Republic of the Philippines to which it was
transferred cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the
State from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge against, or
financial liability to, the Government and consequently cannot be
entertained by the courts except with the consent of the government
(Lim vs. Brownell, 107 Phil 344).

When the government enters into a commercial transaction, it

abandons its sovereign capacity and it is to be treated like any other
corporation (Malong Vs. PNR, 138 SCRA 63).

National Irrigation Authority is a government agency vested with

corporate personality separate and distinct from the government (Sec
.1, RA 3601), thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Under Sec. 2,
PD 552 NIA is allowed to collect fees and other charges as maybe
necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance, and insurance
and to recover the cost of construction, etc. NIA may also sue and be
sued in court. It is authorized to exercise the powers of a corporation
under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with
the provision of NIA charter (Fontanilla Vs. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486).

The application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been

restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The
mantel of State immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private
and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). If the contract was entered into
the discharge of its governmental functions, the sovereign State
cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit (JUSMAG vs.
NLRC, GR 198813, Dec. 15, 1994).

Petitioner filed an action in the CFI of Zamboanga City for the

revocation of a Deed of Donation which he had his wife had made to
the Bureau of Plant and Industry. He claimed that the donee failed
to comply with the condition of the donation. Ordinarily, a suit of
this nature cannot prosper. It would, however, be manifestly unfair
for the government, as donee, which is alleged to have violated the
condition under which it received gratuitously certain property, to
invoke its immunity. Since it would be against equity and justice to
allow such defense in this case, consent to be sued could be
presumed (Santiago vs. Republic, 87 SCRA 294).

When the government takes any property for public use, which is
condition upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a
court. The Court may proceed with the complaint and determine the
compensation to which the petitioner are entitle (Ministerio vs. CFI, 40
SCRA 464).

iii)

Consent to execution

Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of

judgment against it. Such execution will require another waiver, because
the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment, unless such disbursement is covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law (Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA
84).
Rules Regarding Garnishment or Levy of Government Funds in
Government Depository:
General Rule: Government funds deposited with PNB or authorized
depositories cannot be subject to garnishment.
Exceptions:
1. where law or ordinance has already been enacted appropriating a
specific amount to pay a valid governmental obligation (Municipality of
San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, GR No. L-61744, June 25, 1984).
2. funds belonging to government corporations which can sue and be
sues that are deposited with a bank (PNB v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595).
Rules Regarding Payment of Interests by Government in Money
Judgments Against it:
General Rule: Government cannot be made to pay interests;
Exceptions:
1. eminent domain;
2. erroneous collection of taxes; or
3. where government aggress to pay interest pursuant to law.

CASES

When a municipality fails or refuses without justifiable reason to

effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the
claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel
the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds
(Municipality of Makati vs. CA, 190 SCRA 206).

The rule is and has always been that all government funds
deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine
Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities remain
government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in
the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed,
the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined
exception, that it, when there is a corresponding appropriation is
required by law. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be
legally enforced by judicial processes (City of Caloocan vs. Allarde, GR
107271, Sept. 10, 2003).

iv)
Suits against foreign states
/ international organizations

CASES

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the
status of a foreign sovereign. The privilege of sovereign immunity in
this case was sufficiently established by the memorandum and
certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Where the plea of
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is
the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting the countrys foreign
relations. Pursuant to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and

administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action
relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state
for the purposes of the mission (Holy See vs. Rosario, GR 101949, December
1, 1994).

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being

sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver.
This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing
and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it
has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity
now extends only to acts jure imperii. A state may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters intyo
business contracts. The rule does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions and is not for
commercial or business purposes (USA vs, Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487).

International law is founded largely upon the principles of

reciprocity, comity, independence, and equality of States which were
adopted as part of the law of our land under Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
1987 Constitution. The rule that a State may not be sued without its
consent is necessary consequence of the principles and
independence and equality of States. However, the increasing need of
sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely
connected with the discharge of their governmental functions
brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. This concept,
the restrictive theory, holds that immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii, but
not with regard to private acts or jure gestionis. Is the foreign State
engaged in the regular conduct of business? If the foreign State is
not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, or if the
act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it
is an act jure imperii (Republic of Indonesia vs. Vinzon, GR 154705, June 25,
2003).

Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity

agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime
in the name of official duty. It is a well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his actdone with malice or
in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the
commission of a crime is not part of official duty (Liang vs. People, GR
125865, January 28, 2002).

3) CITIZENSHIP AND SUFFRAGE

a)

Citizenship Article IV, CONSTITUTION

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain
their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed,
under the law, to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national

interest and shall be dealt with by law.
i)
Concept,
distinguished from nationality, kinds
Citizenship is a membership in a political community which is
personal and more or less permanent in character. It is the status of
being a citizen, or of owing allegiance to a certain State for the privilege of
being under its protection.
Citizenship is political in character, nationality refers to a racial or
ethnic relationship.
Who are citizens of the Philippines?
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Note: The election must be made within
reasonable period
(within 3 yrs.) after reaching the age of majority.

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Caram Rule:
Under the 1935
Constitution, those born in the
Philippines of foreign parent, who before the adoption of the Constitution
had been elected to public office in the Philippines are considered
Filipino citizens.
FPJ Disqualification Case: The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
FPJ had seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate (Tecson vs. Comelec, GR. No. 161434, March 3,2004).

Natural-born citizens:
1. Citizens of the Philippines from birth who do not need to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
2. Those who elect Philippine citizenship under Art. IV, Sec. 1(3) of 1987
Constitution.

CASES

The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in

March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution which
prohibits alient to acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of
hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was
disqualified to acquire the land in question (Lee vs. Dir. Of Lands, GR
128195, October 3, 2001).

ii)
acquisition
1.

Modes

of

By birth

a. Jus Soli acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

b. Jus Sanguinis acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood
relationship.
2. By naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing
him with the privilege of a native-born citizen.
Effects of naturalization:
1. On the wife:
Vests citizenship on the wife who might herself be lawfully
naturalized. She need not prove her qualifications but only that she
is not disqualified (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Comm. Of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292).
2. On the minor children:
i) if born in the Philippines automatically becomes a citizen;
ii)
If born abroad before the naturalization of the father

a) residing in RP at the time of naturalization

automatically becomes citizens.
b) if not residing in RP at the time of naturalization
considered citizen only during minority, unless begins to
reside permanently in the Phils.

iii) If born outside the Philippines after parents naturalization

considered Filipino, provided registered as such before any Phil.
Consulate within 1 year after attaining majority age and takes oath
of allegiance.

3.

By marriage:
Marriage of Filipino with an alien:
General Rule:
The
Filipino
retains
Philippine
citizenship.
Exception:
If, by their act or omission they are
deemed under the law to have renounce it.

CASES

The term natural-born citizens, is defined to include those who

are citizen of the Philippines. From birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Phil. Citizenship. Through the
constitution history, four modes of acquiring citizenship
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata, jus sanguinis had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli,
per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the
adoption of the 1935 constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Sec. of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth (Tecson vs.
COMELEC, GR 161434, March 3, 2004).

Under Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman

marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, become ipso facto a

Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the

Philippines under Sec. 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath
as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any
disqualifications under said Sec. 4. Ipso Facto as here use does not
mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens,
from the mere fact of relationship, necessary become such citizens
also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso
facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to
acquire such status. Under the second paragraph of Sec. 15, a minor
child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the
Philippine, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the
time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of a citizenship of
his parent, and the time when child become a citizen does not
depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the
Philippines (Moya Lim Yao vs Commissioner, 41 SCRA 292).

iii)
Reacquisition

Loss

and

How may one lose citizenship (C.A. No. 63)?

1. By naturalization in a foreign country.

2. By express renunciation of citizenship.
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to the laws or constitution of
a foreign country.
4. By serving in the armed forces of an enemy country.
5. By cancellation of certificates of naturalization.
6. By being a deserter of the armed forces of ones country.

1.

How may one reacquire citizenship?

By direct act of Congress

RA 9225 Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.

Approved on August 29, 2003 provides that, on taking the oath of
allegiance to the public:

a. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their

Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship and
b.
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectively
of the said RA
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain
their Philippine citizenship.
2.

By naturalization

3.

By repatriation

By RA 8171 is an act providing for the repatriation of:

a. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens and;
b. Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship
on account of political or economic necessity.
Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Phils. and registration in proper civil registry and
in Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of immigration shall thereupon
cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the
certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. It
allows the person to recover or return to his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship (Bengzon III v. HRET, GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001).
Derivative Citizenship The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of the said RA shall be
deemed citizens of the Philippines.

CASES

Sec 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified

voter must be among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Art. 5,

Sec.1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized

American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that
he had earlier renounce. At best, what might have happened as a
result of a lose of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a
stateless individual. Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officers entire tenure (Frivaldo vs. Comelec, 174 SCRA 245).

Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of

Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine
political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born
Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification
is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country
or a unit of territory thereof. The law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter
presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require
that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY
he seeks to govern. A person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law
for the purpose (Frivaldo vs. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727).

The term residence is to be understood not in its common

acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to
domicile or legal residence,that is, the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is
acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In the case at bar,
petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S.
citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and

until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship,

petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines
save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a
visitor or as a resident alien. The status of being an alien and a nonresident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the
status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at
the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien,
an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under Sec 13 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the
other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization
under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine
national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or
by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as
an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien (Coquilla vs.
Comelec, GR 151914, July 31, 2002).

Art. IV, Sec. 1 (4) states that citizens are those whose mothers are
citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority,
elect the Philippine citizenship. A minor who has not had the
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship, therefore, is still an alien,
his father being an alien. It is illogical that Delfin follow the
repatriation of his Filipino mother since he was never a Filipino,
therefore he could not reacquire it. No rule or right (even right of
mother to retain custody of a minor child) should frustrate
government's action against violators of immigration laws (Villahermosa
vs. Commissioner, 80 Phil 541).

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the
two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other
hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which

repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by

Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove
that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after
two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that
during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications 17 and none of the disqualifications mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes
by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political
and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering said
oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides
or last resided.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of,
Filipino citizens
which were not considered natural-born: (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those
born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,
elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at
birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they
also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as
natural-born. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category
for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they
would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof (Bengson vs. HRET, GR
142840. May 7, 2001).

iv)

Dual citizenship
9925, RA 7160 Sec. 40

Distinction between dual citizenship from dual allegiance

Dual Citizenship

Dual Allegiance

Arises when as a result of the

concurrent application of the

Refer to the situation in which a

person simultaneously owes by

RA

laws of two or more states, a

person
is
simultaneously
considered a citizen of those
states.

some positive act, loyalty to two

or more states.

Involuntary

Is voluntary and illegal.

(Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630)

CASES

Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises

when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1)
Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2)
Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such children are
citizens of that country;
(3)
Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country
the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission
they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Sec. 5 of the Constitution

provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law." The Court held that in
including Sec. 5 Art. IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not on dual citizens per se, but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. By filing a certificate of
candidacy when he ran for his present post, Manzano elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. What the law prohibits is dual allegiance, and not dual
citizenship (Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630).

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus

sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was
born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia,
to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically,
this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at
that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts by which the United States governed the
country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the
Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children were deemed to be Philippine
citizens. By virtue of the same laws, Telesforo's daughter, herein
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines (Valles vs. Comelec, GR 137000, August 9, 2000).

b)

Suffrage Article V, CONSTITUTION

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the

Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines

for at least one year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote,
for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed
on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the
illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until
then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such
rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect
the secrecy of the ballot.

i) Concept,
exercise

qualifications,

occasions

for

Suffrage right to vote in elections.

Qualifications:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Citizen of the Philippines

Not disqualified by law.
At least 18 years old
Resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year.
Resident of the place wherein he/she proposes to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election.

Residency requirement under Art. V has 2 senses:

1. Domicile this is in reference to the 1 year residency requirement in
the Philippines.
The principal elements of domicile physical presence in the country
and intention to adopt it as ones domicile must concur.

2. Temporary Residence This is in reference to the 6 mos. Residency

requirement in the place where one wants or intend to vote. Residence
can either mean domicile or temporary residence.

CASES

The right to vote has reference to a constitutional guarantee of the

utmost significance. It is a right without which the principle of
sovereignty residing in the people becomes nugatory. It is a political
right enabling every citizen to participate in the process of
government to assure that it derives its power from the consent of the
governed. The COMELEC is not empowered to decide questions
involving the right to vote. The power to determine whether or not a
person can exercise or precluded from exercising the right of suffrage
is a judicial question, and the power to resolve such question has
been excluded from the Commission's power to be judge of election
contests (Pungutan vs. Abubakar, GR No. L-33541, Januray 20, 1972).

If the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend

itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited,
then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet.
For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an
abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been the constant
holding of the Court that this preferred freedom calls all the more for
the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination
of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of
suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose
censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional
right is directed. The power of decision of the Commission is limited
to purely 'administrative questions. It could not have been otherwise,
that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in
conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than
the Constitution. There could be no justification then for lending
approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission,
the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right
as free speech (Mutuc vs. Comelec, 32 SCRA 228).

The right to abstain from voting for a position deserves the same
respect as the exercise of the right to vote. To compel the COMELEC
to conduct a special for the position of congressman as demanded by
petitioners would be to nullify the decisions of the voters who cast
their votes in the May 1992 elections (Caram vs. Comelec, GR No. 1052 14,
August 30, 1993).

ii) Absentee voting Republic Act 9189

Sec. 4 of RA 9189 says: Sec. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the
Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at
least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, mat vote for
president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
This rule applies to those who have not lost their domicile in the
Philippines.
To whom does absentee voting apply?
1. Persons who have the qualifications of a voter but who happen to be
temporarily abroad.
2. Qualified voters who are in the Philippines but are temporarily absent
from their voting places.

CASES

Sec. , Art. V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage

may be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not
otherwise disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age, (4)
who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. Under Sec. 5(d) of RA 9189, one of those
disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who
is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an
affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years
from approval of his/her registration under said act.

Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of an execution of

an affidavit to qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrant or
permanent residents, to vote. He focuses solely on Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Sec. 5 (d)
of RA 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering
Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.
It is clear from the discussions of the members of the Constitutional
Commission that they intended to enfranchise as much as possible
all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos
who reach voting age abroad who parents' domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for
Sec. 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Sec. 1. By the
doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, the
strategic location of Sec. 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency
requirement of Sec. 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The
same commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who
are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote eventhough they do
not satisfy the residency requirement in Sec. 1, Article V of the
Constitution (Macalintal vs. Comelec, Gr No. 157013, July 10, 2003).