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Air France v Carrascoso (Torts)

AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28, 1966 AIR FRANCE, petitioner,


vs. RAFAEL
CARRASCOSO
and
the
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila
for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to
Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he
was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to
vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. After some
commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by
way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip BangkokRome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of
the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20
to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations
for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a
first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made
him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give
way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is
bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for
ulterior purpose."

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The
stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This
is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.
SC affirmed judgment of the CA.
Vicente Calalas v. Court of Appeals , Eliza Jujeurche Sunga and Francisco Salva May 31,
2000 332 SCRA 356
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Sunga, then freshman at Siliman University, took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
capacity, Sunga was given by the conductor an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back
of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. When the jeepney stopped to a let passenger off
and Sunga was about to give way to the outgoing passenger, an Izuzu truck driven by
Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. Sunga sustained
multiple injuries and remained on a cast for three months.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, for breach of contract of carriage.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third party complaint against Francisco Salva, the
owner of the truck. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva and absolved
Calalas of liability. It took cognizance of other case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which branch 37 of the same court held
Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney
The CA reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground that Sungas cause of action was
based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to
exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the
third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
Issue: Whether or not Calalas is liable for damages to Sunga.
Held:

In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the


basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely
by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the
common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or have acted negligently unless
they proved that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755
of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and
the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in action for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation
is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law
is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
Heirs of Guaring Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. And
Angeles Cuevas
G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997
FACTS:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by Teodoro Guaring Jr. collided with the Philippine
Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio
Enriquez, along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a
consequence, Guaring died who was driving the Lancer.
Petitioners, heirs of Guaring Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi-delict.
The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where
the accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out
that the deceased was the one who acted negligently.
The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the civil case filed against him be
extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability necessarily follows the
extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from his criminal
liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should
pursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his
acquittal.
RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable
doubt, which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of
action of the heirs was based on quasi-delict.
Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the acquittal of the
bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a
finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that
the judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when
it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist.
Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the
court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in
nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed
by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability
does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
acquitted.
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil case of the said
incident must continue for the recovery of damages of the victims heirs. The case was
remanded to the trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused.

Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (BLTB Co.) vs CA, G.R. No. L-33138-39, June 27, 1975
This is a case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana filed against BLTB Co. and his driver for the vehicular
accident which resulted to death and damage to properties.
Facts of the Case:
On the morning of February 18, 1963, Andres I. Ilagan drove the passenger bus owned by BLTB Co. along Manila
South Super Highway on its way to Lemery, Batangas while Ricardo de los Reyes with his Chevrolet car left
Calamba, Laguna with Eduardo de los Reyes, Jean Elizondo, Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema, and Ursula Bayan, and
bound for Manila. In the ensuing event, both vehicles collided with each other. The tragic accident occurred when
the bus driven by Ilagan overtook a big cargo truck. The bus took the left or the lane on which the car driven by de
los Reyes was traveling. The latter being in the best position to see the fast approaching bus tried to swerve to the
right to avoid the bus but was too late and hit in the left front side up to the driver's door. Both de los Reyes and
Elizondo were rushed to the Phil. General Hospital but were pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital while
the rest of the fatalities were brought to Manila Rail Road Hospital for treatment.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against Ilagan for reckless imprudence and the injured parties sought for
payment of their hospital bills and other expenses from the petitioners but the latter refuse, thus, two civil cases
were filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for recovery of damages.
he lower court decided in favor of the plaintiffs and award damages. The respondents not contented, appeal the
decision to the Court of Appeals but was denied, thus this appeal by certiorari in the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not BLTB Co. and Andres I. Ilagan are liable for damages for the injury inflicted to the plaintiffs.
Whether or not the doctrinal rule on Corpus vs Paje is applicable to the case.

Ruling:
Yes, BLTB Co. and Andres I. Ilagan are liable for damages and the case of Corpus vs Paje is not applicable to the
case.
Under the law, "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relations between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict.
Further, the "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees xxx acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry." In this case,
undisputable facts were established by both the trial and appellate courts on the reckless and imprudent acts by
the driver of the bus. Though BLTB Co and his driver-co-appellants, Ilagan asserted that they had exercise
extraordinary diligence of a good father and the accident was fortuitous in character, and that the accident was
due to the negligence of Ricardo de los Reyes were presumptive and unproven by the appellants.
Further, appellants reliance on the case of Corpus vs Paje that "Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his
civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute a
separate civil action. From which, they would infer that the criminal action against petitioner Ilagan must first be
resolved by respondent Court of Appeals and, until final resolution thereon, it is premature to proceed in the two
civil cases was came too late because it was never raised in the lower and appellate courts and the facts were
dissimilar to the case, thus, not controlling said the Supreme Court. In fact, the liability of appellants was not
predicated on criminal negligence but rather on being a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is an independent source of
obligation between two persons not so formerly bound by any juridical tie, thus the awards for damages against
appellants were proper and just.
Accordingly, the lower court and court of appeals decision is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Philippine Bank Of Commerce V. CA (1997) G.R. No. 97626

March 14, 1997

FACTS:

May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976: Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC
funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for
the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of Rommels
Marketing Corporation (RMC) with Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC);

They were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to

Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas;


Romeo Lipana never checked their monthly statements of account reposing

complete trust and confidence on PBC;


Irene Yabut's modus operandi was to furnish 2 copies of deposit slip upon and

both are always validated and stamped by the teller Azucena Mabayad;
Original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account

number - retained by the bank;


Duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of

the account holder was left blank;


After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left

blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number to RMC's account
number;
This went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's

knowledge;
Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from PBC the return of

its money and later on filed in the RTC.


RTC: PBC and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable.
CA: affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.
ISSUE:
1. W/N applying the last clear chance, PBC's teller is negligent for failing to avoid the
injury by not exercising the proper validation procedure.
2. W/N there was contributory negligence by RMC.
HELD: 60-40 ratio. Only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the PBC.
1. YES.
The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in

accepting deposits should not relieve the PBC of responsibility


The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital

information (Name of the account holder) should have already put Ms.
Mabayad on guard.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part

of the bank itself in its lack in selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank
and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation
of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated
in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures until 7 years later

Last clear chance/supervening negligence/discovered peril


Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably

later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose
fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof.
Antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages

for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by
another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Here, assuming that RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest

employee, yet it cannot be denied that PBC bank, thru its teller, had the last
clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure.
Art. 1173:
The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in
the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be
required. In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is
more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature
of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.

2. YES.

It cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in

not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company
would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC
by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an
amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little
vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to
contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded
to the private respondent
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code:

When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
MAXIMINO SOLIMAN JR., represented by guardian VIRIGINIA SOLIMAN vs. HON. JUDGE
TUAZON and REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES (G.R.66207, May 18, 1992)
FACTS:
1. Security guard JIMMY SOLOMON, who was on duty at the time of the incident in the Republic
Central Colleges, shot petitioner Maximino on the abdomen. Maximino was treated at the
Angeles Medical Center and as per doctors opinion, he may not be able to attend to his
regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration
of three to four months.
2. Petitioner Maximino filed a civil complaint for damages against Republic Central Colleges
and Jimmy Solomon.
3. Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss stating that the complaint stated no
cause of action against it.
a. It was not the employer of the security guard.
b. Art. 2180 does not apply to it because said par. Holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices while security guard Jimmy was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the school.
4. Lower court granted the MTD.
5. Hence this petition. It is contended that the trial judge committed GAD when he refused to
apply the provisions of Article 2180 as well as 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Colleges is liable.
HELD: YES.
The first par. Of 2180 offers no basis for the liability of the Colleges for the alleged wrongful acts of
the security guard because it is not the employer of the said security guard.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer
agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. 3 As a general rule, a client or customer
of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; thse duty to observe the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded
from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards.
Similarly the 7th par. Of the same article is not available in imposing liability since clearly Security
Guard Solomon is not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school. The school had no substitute
parental authority over Solomon.
School is liable on the basis of its contractual obligation.
In the case of PSBA vs. CA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable
where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did
not exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the Court stressed

that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students
for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which
contract results in obligations for both parties.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to
comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and
skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing
their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies
of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences
when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around
the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must
ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof
As PSBA, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious
error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss
but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting
breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.

Maria Benita A. Dulay, Et Al., V. The Court Of Appeals, Et Al.(1995)


G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
FACTS:

December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security

guard on duty at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay
Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own

behalf and in behalf of her minor children filed an action for damages against
Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm and
Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or Superguard
Security Corp. (Superguard) as employers for negligence having failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and control
of its employee to avoid the injury
SAFEGUARD/Superguard:

Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was

committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Civil action filed by petitioners is founded on a delict and not on a quais-delict

as the shooting was not attended by negligence.


CA Affirmed RTC: dismissing the case of Dulay.
ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard committed an actionable breach and can be
civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for homicide.

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the merits.
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for

limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional.
Elcano vs Hill: Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not

only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award
of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
Extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,

whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused.
It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon
Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela
was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's
employer and responsible for his acts.