Case for Biotic Rights

Intro
o Few subjects have generated more moral
confusion, and sometimes nonsense, than that of
rights of nature
o Confusion exists in the claims of proponents and
opponents, in theological and philosophical
ethics, and in arguments of animal rights
advocates and unrepentant anthropocentrist
(*note= anthropocentricm is the belief that
human beings are the central or most significant
species on the planet
o Misconceptions and absurdities have prejudiced
the debate each contributor probably
contributed to the confusion
o Question of rights of nature cannot be
summarily dismissed as the morally irrelevant
ponderings of persons beyond the fringe of
intellectual respectability this is cheap
caricature and ad hominem not rational
refutation
o The rights of nature is the most interesting issue
on the frontiers of ethics because it points to the
fundamental importance of redefining
responsible human relationships with the rest of
nature, of which humans are parts and products
o Main question: Are moral concepts of justice,
in addition to concepts of benevolence,
applicable to human interactions with nonhuman
lifeforms or ecosystems?
If yes who or what has rights than
humanity must honor and what are these
rights
o Purpose of the paper: offer a rudimentary
interpretation and defense of the conception of
prima facie biotic rights, with the hope of
reducing the prevailing confusion
o Biotic rights =/= rights of nature (latter is a
generic metaphor that covers human
responsibilities for the whole biophysical world)
o biotic rights ethic is vital but insufficient on its
own
o to be adequate must respect both lifeforms
(individual and species) and collective
connections (the common good of ecosystems
and the ecosphere, which provide the essential

conditions for the realization of the rights of all

species and their members, including humans)
o ecological ethic must reject
totalitarian and often misanthropic
implications of ethical interpretations which
value only ecological wholes
nonecological atomism which respects only
individuals or species in isolation form the
ecological common good
o individualistic and holisticpoles (rights ethic and
a land ethic) are not alternative but a tandem
o biotic rights are not alien to human behaviour
humans functionally recognize the rights of
other creatures every time they treat them
caringly and avoid treating them cruelly for their
own sakes
Necessity of the concept of rights
o Some critics of rights are still responding to 17th
and 18th century individualistic and libertarian
conception of rights, which have been
discredited and abandoned
o This paper assumes biotic rights
o This affirmation assumes distributive justice
(not only benevolence) is an essential means of
ordering relationships and defining
responsibilities in both social and ecological
contexts
o Rights are
essential instruments or standards of justice
a way of conceptualizing the basic demands
of distributive justice and of giving
substance to its abstract and formal
principles about who should get what and
why
specifications of the content of what is due
and what is to be distributed in both social
and ecological contexts
o Justice is rendering to all their rights out of
respect for their intrinsic value as ends and
goods themselves
Extending rights to the other kind
o If justice is excluded in human relationships
with otherkind mystifying why benevolence
or any other virtuous behaviour should be
included

o Nothing relevant hinders the formulation of

standards of justice that apply to human
interactions with nonhuman organisms
o Such formulation is necessary because
nonhumans are regularly abused by humans by
acting as profligate predators
o Biotic rights- morally justified claims or
demands on behalf of nonhuman organisms,
either as individuals or aggregates, against all
moral agents for vital interests or imperative
conditions of well-being for nonhumankind
o 5 important implications
1. Rights-demands need not be by the aggrieved
parties can be made on behalf of
nonhumankind nonhumans do not have the
rational and moral capacities to represent
themselves, they can be represented bymoral
counsel
2. Biotic rights are held only against humans, not
otherkind, because humans are moral agents
capable of practicing justice and injustice.
3. Biotic rights apply to both species and individuals
of species it is not enough to say that only
individuals have rights because individuals exist
as temporary incarnations of a species and
carriers of its genetic past and future not
enough to say only species have rigths because
noe species exist without individuals to represent
and reproduce the genetic lineage
4. Biotic rights imply neither equal rights with
humans not the same rights as humans Justice
is not the equivalent of equality differential
treatment is warranted when morally relevant
differences in value-creating and valueexperiencing capacities between humans and all
other species (ex. No voting rights for monkeys,
or rights for parasites)
5. Biotic rights are moral rights, not necessarily
legal rights or culturally recognized rights
Duties of
benevolence
Stressed by Holmes
Rolston III
Arise solely from the
demands internal to
the individual his

Duties of justice
James Nash
Arise from external
demands on moral
agents and their

good will, virtuous

character, con
discretionary

1.

2.

3.

4.

communities by or on
behalf of the
aggrieved parties
mandatory

Is there boundary to rights?

Boundary-setting criteria include rationality,
sentience, and self-consciousness not
satisfactory seem arbitrary and
anthropocentric
Not necessary to recognize a boundary
But drawing a line seems valuable if rights talk
is to make practical sense however
environmental care is mandated
This paper rejects biotic egalitarianism
Bill of biotic rights
The right to participate in the natural dynamics of
existence.
a. This is a right to flourish as nature
provides this, without undue human
alteration of the genetic or behavioral
otherness of non-human creatures.
The right to healthy and whole habitats.
a. The right to flourish on natures terms and
contribute to the common ecological good
assumes and requires that other kind enjoy
the essential conditions which appropriate
habitat provides.
3. The right to reproduce their own kind
without humanly-induced chemical, radioactive,
hybridized, or bioengineered aberrations.
a. This right asks human respect for genetic
integrity, evolutionary legacies, and
ecological relationships. By implication, it
demands and defends biodiversity.
The right to fulfill their evolutionary potential
with freedom from human-induced extinctions.
a. Extinctions are a natural part of
evolutionary process, but human-induced
extinctions are unjust. Humanitys
exercise of its power ought not to
undermine the existence of viable
populations of non-human species in
healthy habitats until the end of their
evolutionary time.

5. The right to freedom from human cruelty, flagrant

abuse, or profligate use.
a. Minimal harm to other kind within
necessary usage ought to characterize
human treatment of non-human life.
6. The right to reparations or restitution through
managerial interventions to restore a semblance
of natural conditions disrupted by human abuse.
a. Because of human abuse of natural
environments in the past, interventions are
often necessary to enable a return to an
approximation of previous ecosystem
relationships.
7. The right to a fair share of the good necessary
for individuals and species.
a. Fair share is, of course, a vague
criterion. Yet it is possible to determine
ways in which human populations can
coexist with viable populations of
humanly unthreatened species and thereby
preserve for them a fair share of the
shared ecological good.
Balancing competing rights
o Moral rights, even human rights, are not
absolute and inviolable unless they are stated
either so generally that they are almost useless
for practical reason or so precisely that
qualifiers or exceptions are built into the
definition
o Moral rights are prima facie rights which we
have strong reasons for honoring
o Overriding a species rights is rarely justified
and then only for compelling reasons
o The rebuttable character of biotic rights is
critically important because humans as
predatorial consumers in the biosphere could not

survive and exercise our creative potential if

nonhuman rights are absolute
Just causes for overriding the rights of the
otherkind
Satisfaction of basic human needs
The realization of valuable human benefits
such as means of transportation but always
within bounds of frugality and sustainability
Self-defense against nonhumans such as crop
destroying insects and harmful bacteria
The control of population of prolific species
to prevent them from exceeding the carrying
capacities of their environments
The special protection of endangered species
against their natural predators
Principle of proportionality applies infliction
of harm only when necessary and only to the
extent necessary and only if the social and
ecological values realized outweigh the
inevitable values lost resulting from destructive
means
Conclusion
Concern for biotic rights not academic concern
but matter of moral urgency at a time when the
reductions of nonhuman populations and
extinctions of species are proceeding at an
appalling pace
Concept of biotic rights is a forceful reminder
that even though human existence and
civilization obviously depend on killing and
using other creatures and destroying their
habitats, we are bound by moral limits