RULES 23 32:

DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., respondents.
G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993
FACTS: American President Lines (APL) instituted an action
against Dasma to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as
an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses
APL filed a motion during the hearing praying that it intended to
take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei,
Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or
letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul
or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . .
"
Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that
since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in
Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu
thereof an office set up by the President "presently occupied by
Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.,"
it was necessary and it therefore prayed "that commission
or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin
Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center,
Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipei,
Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the
aforenamed persons.
Dasma opposed the motion on the ff grounds:
a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . .
that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;"
b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the
witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and
c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a
witness must be taken orally in open court and not by
deposition."
Later on, ACP submitted the ff to the RTC:
a) the letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R.
Roces of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., dated November 20,
1989, advising that "this Office can only take deposition upon
previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this
being "in consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative
Order requiring courts or judicial bodies to course their requests
through the Department of Foreign Affairs;" and
b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by a law firm in
Taipei, Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting
information inter alia of the mode by which, under the "Rules of
Court Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged copy" of
documents on file with a Taiwan Court may be obtained.
The RTC ruled in favor of ACP and opined that "the Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine
representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of plaintiff's
witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon written
interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses by serving cross-examination."
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES: WON Asia Exchange Center, Inc. may properly be
authorized to take depositions?
HELD: Yes. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They
are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in
the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in
some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other
modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for
admission by adverse party; production or inspection of
documents or things; physical and mental examination of
persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the
material and relevant facts, not only known to him and
his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party

and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the object of

discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a
case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from
whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that
their pleadings or motions may not suffer from
inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant
facts may be clearly and completely laid before the
Court, without omission or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties
as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts;
they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute
for the actual testimony in open court of a party or
witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for
oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing.
This is a requirement of the rules of evidence.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out
during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of
the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on
the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is
offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the
time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that
opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the
taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for crossexamination must be accorded a party at the time that the
testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during
the trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under
certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These
exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the
Rules of Court.
The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the
deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of
evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to
testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter,
may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had
the opportunity to cross-examine him.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may
be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or
abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his
deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary
public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or
country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a
secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, viceconsul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or
(b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by
commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be
taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of
the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been
served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After answer, whether the depositiontaking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside,
the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by
the court in the process, all that is required being that
"reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to
the action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the
deposition and the name and address of each person to be
examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or
group to which he belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court
intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or
shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice
and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or
impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not
be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present

except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel,"

etc.
(Sec.
16,
Rule
24),
or
(3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that
"it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or
party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country
where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such
person or officer as may be appointed by commission or
under letters rogatory.
A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued
by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to
authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other
act by authority of such court or tribunal". Letters
rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n
instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a
judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause
to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause
pending before the former, a witness who is within the
jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom such letters
are addressed". Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted states that a
commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated . . . either
by name or descriptive title," while letters rogatory are
addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign
state." Noteworthy in this connection is the indication in the
Rules that letters rogatory may be applied for and issued only
after a commission has been "returned unexecuted" as is
apparent from Form 21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms"
appended to the Rules of Court, which requires the inclusion in a
"petition for letters rogatory" of the following paragraph, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
3. A commission issued by this Court on the ______ day of ______,
19__, to take the testimony of (here name the witness or
witnesses) in (here name the foreign country in which the
testimony is to be taken), before _________________ (name of
officer), was returned unexecuted by __________________ on the
ground that ____________, all of which more fully appears from
the certificate of said __________ to said commission and made a
part hereof by attaching it hereto (or state other facts to show
commission is inadequate or cannot be executed) (emphasis
supplied).
In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a
commission to the "Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director
Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H. Lee
and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) .
. . ." It appears that said Center may, "upon request and
authority of the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of
Authentications" attesting to the identity and authority of
Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of China,
Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department of Consular Affairs of
the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex N of
the petition for review on certiorari) a prima facie showing not
rebutted by petitioner.
It further appears that the commission is to be coursed through
the Department of Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular No.
4 issued by Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee on April 6, 1987,
pursuant to the suggestion of the Department of Foreign Affairs
directing "ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN
CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS" "to course all requests for the taking of deposition of
witnesses residing abroad through the Department of Foreign
Affairs" to enable it and "the Philippine Foreign Service
establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and
expeditious manner;" this, "in the interest of justice," and to
avoid delay in the deposition-taking.
Petitioner would however prevent the carrying out of the
commission on various grounds.

The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign
jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'oneChina policy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters is that
the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting
by authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the
Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in
accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the
Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity
for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully
accorded to the adverse party.
Dasmarias also contends that the "taking of deposition is a
mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action
comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any
time after the institution of any action, whenever
necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before
it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after
pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of
witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment
of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in
the event of further proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134,
Rules of Court), and even during the process of execution of a
final and executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA
521, 544).
Dasmarias further claims that the taking of deposition under
the circumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where
the demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that it is
"inherently unfair" to allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in the
Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its
witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge
while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in
open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of
the Judge."
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a
"departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could
be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on that
account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken,
inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions
where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of
deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and
testimony of the deponent in open court and without
being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions
of the Judge." This is allowed provided the deposition is taken
in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court and the existence of any of the exceptions for its
admissibility e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and
at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of
trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears
that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc." (Sec.
4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis supplied) is first satisfactorily
established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95 Phil. 754).
The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the
depositions of the witnesses in question only by written
interrogatories, removing the proponent's option to take them
by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually
questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and
answers and observations of the parties being recorded
stenographically. The imposition of such a limitation, and the
determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the
Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court
for the condition that the deposition be taken "only upon
written interrogatories" is "so as to give defendant
(Dasmarias) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by
serving cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that
opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded the defendant
if the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination,
which, of course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to

be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still

accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the law,
either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the crossexamination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination
merely by serving cross-interrogatories.
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY,
LTD., ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases
recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial
evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its
witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial
indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness'
absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive
the accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.
FACTS: Petitioners were charged with Other Deceits under Art
318 of RPC before MeTC Manila and pleaded not guilty.
Trial dates were postponed due to the unavailability of private
complainant Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos,
Cambodia.
The Prosecution filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen
Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the
Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon
doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the
Philippines by reason of ill health.
The MTC granted the motion. ON certiorari, the RTC reversed the
MTC. Holding that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of
depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily
to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of
Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution
witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the
witness against him face to face.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC holding that no grave abuse
of discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the
deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping
because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of
depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners
would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the
complaining witness and make timely objections during the
taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or through
the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the
witness.
ISSUES: WON the taking of deposition of private complainant
would be a violation of petitioenrs right to a public trial and to
congront the witness face to face?
HELD: Yes. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of
an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered under
Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before
a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal
cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his
right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against
him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most
satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables the
judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and
deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions,
however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional
examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as
testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the
availability of conditional examination of witnesses both

for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The

Court's ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos explicitly
states that
"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide
for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by
a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to
perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule
119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination
of both the defense and prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring
supplied)
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows
the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary
public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or
place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine consular
official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer
oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional
requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other
party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal
cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who
would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least
before the judge, where the case is pending as required
by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he
may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where
the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the
same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution
witness must take place at no other place than the court
where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the
MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li
Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos,
Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this
wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of
advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that
he should be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of
Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to
present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose
demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge
presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No
where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside
the
Philippines
whether
the
deponent
is
sick
or
not. (Underscoring supplied)
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness
elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is
pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right
to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable
when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case
against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in
Vda. de Manguerra where we further declared that

While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the

testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection
of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony
during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of
the rules.
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness
Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial
and Confrontation of Witnesses.
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in
criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations no
less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right
to a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses.
In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the
deprivation of their constitutional rights to a public trial and
confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be
accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent witness and
raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same
manner as in a regular court trial.
We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the
face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the
presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a
witness in a foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence
of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo, the
Court noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness
testifying in open court.
As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused
in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as
meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of crossexamination," it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the
use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials.
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON.
RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY.
GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE, respondents.
G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008
FACTS: Respondents were charged with Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Document before RTC Cebu which arose
from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly
committed by respondents where they made it appear that
Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the
Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.
Petitioner Concepcion was then unexpectedly confined at the
Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding;
and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.
Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in
Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial
question.
They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action
for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be
resolved which was granted by the RTC.
The certiorari filed to question said order is still pending when
the case was elevated to the SC.
Concepcions counsel filed a motion before the RTC to take her
deposition explaining the need to perpetuate Concepcions
testimony due to her physical condition and old age, which
limited her freedom of mobility which was granted by the RTC.

After several motions for change of venue of the depositiontaking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken on March 9,
2001 at her residence
On certiorari, the CA reversed the RTC holding that there was a
defect in the respondents petition by not impleading the People
of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding,
the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring
that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present
case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The
latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil
cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119,
Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the
judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of
Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus,
in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave
abuse of discretion.
ISSUES: WON Rule 23 on depositions in civil actions may apply
in the present criminal action?
HELD: No. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their
testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the
judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order
that (1) the accused may be afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine
the
witnesses
pursuant
to
his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to
face. (2) It also gives the parties and their counsel the
chance to propound such questions as they deem
material and necessary to support their position or to
test the credibility of said witnesses. (3) Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23
to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different
modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to
an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate
the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In
criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both
the defense and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a
prosecution witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too
sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of
Rule 119 thus comes into play.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health
condition exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt
Concepcion from the coverage of Rule 119 is at once the
ground which places her squarely within the coverage of
the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness
may be conditionally examined:
1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or
2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite
date of returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken,
had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have
been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the
trial court, she would have been compelled to appear before the
court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the
case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination
be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend
the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after

reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules

mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.

said persons are all residents of the United States and may not
therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court
had no jurisdiction over them.

Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to

Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules, and now Section 13,
Rule 119 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
may be taken before any "judge, or, if not practicable, a
member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge
in the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior
jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be designated therein,"
the examination of a witness for the prosecution under
Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court
where the case is pending."

The Prosecution filed its opposition, alleging, among others that

Rule 24, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court has no application in
criminal cases; that Rule 119, Sec. 4, being a mode of discovery,
only provides for conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused before trial and not during trial; and that conditional
examination of witnesses outside the Philippine jurisdiction is
not sanctioned under Sec. 5 of Rule 199.

Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of

a prosecution witness shall be made before the court where the
case is pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is
nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted to mean
that such requirement applies only to cases where the witness is
within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is
kilometers away, as in the present case. Therefore, the court
may not introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may it
engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not
contemplated. When the words are clear and categorical, there
is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application.
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case,
because the rules on civil procedure apply suppletorily to
criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or
criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules
of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases.
However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and
squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find
no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or
otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution
witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this
rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made
elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he
is under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures
that the judge would be able to observe the witness
deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This
is especially true when the witness testimony is crucial to the
prosecutions case.
While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve its
witness testimony to prove its case, we cannot disregard rules
which are designed mainly for the protection of the accuseds
constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the
general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of
the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict
construction of the rules.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, respondent.
G.R. No. 132577. August 17, 1999
FACTS: Webb was the accused in the criminal case entitled
People vs. Webb then pending before RTC Paranaque.
During the proceedings, Webb filed a Motion To Take Testimony
By Oral Deposition, praying that he be allowed to take the
testimonies of certain persons based in US before the general
consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines
in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that the

The RTC denied the motion of Webb. On certiorari, the CA

reversed the RTC.
ISSUE: WON Rule 23 is applicable in criminal cases?
HELD: No. As defined, a deposition is
The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or
written interrogatories, not in open court, but in
pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by
court, or under a general law or court rule on the
subject, and reduce to writing and duly authenticated,
and intended to be used in preparation and upon the
trial of a civil or a criminal prosecution. A pretrial
discovery device by which one party (through his or her
attorney) ask oral questions of the other party or of a
witness for the other party. The person who is deposed is
called the deponent. The deposition is conducted under oath
outside of the court room, usually in one of the lawyer's offices.
A transcript word for word account is made of the
deposition. Testimony of [a] witness, taken in writing, under oath
or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to
questions or interrogatories . .
and the purposes of taking depositions are to:
1.] Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the
truth and in checking and preventing perjury;
2.] Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false,
fraudulent claims and defenses;
3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way,
facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great
difficulty;
4.] Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of
their claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements;
5.] Expedite litigation;
6.] Safeguard against surprise;
7.] Prevent delay;
8.] Simplify and narrow the issues; and
9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in
keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should
be taken before and not during trial. In fact, rules on
criminal practice particularly on the defense of alibi, which is
respondent's main defense in the criminal proceedings against
him in the court below states that when a person intends
to rely on such a defense, that person must move for the
taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time
provided for filing a pre-trial motion.
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for
seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses is "to foreclose
any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the
admissibility of Defense Exhibits "218" and "219"." This issue
has, however, long been rendered moot and academic by the
admission of the aforementioned documentary exhibits by the
trial court in its order dated July 10, 1998.
In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the
evidence to be obtained through the deposition-taking would be
superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful examination of
Exhibits "218" and "219" readily shows that these are of the
same species of documents which have been previously
introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court in its
order dated July 18, 1997 which We noted in Webb, et al. v.
People of the Philippines, et al. wherein We pointed out, among

others, "[t]hat respondent judge reversed this erroneous ruling

and already admitted these 132 pieces of evidence after finding
that "the defects in (their) admissibility have been cured though
the introduction of additional evidence during the trial on the
merits".
It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing are factual
circumstances only; serves to underscore the immutable fact
that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S.
based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in
nature and in denying respondent's motion to take them, the
trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived
to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction
thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the
evidence already on record. In this regard, it bears stressing that
under Section 6, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. The court
may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any
particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that
more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably
expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution. (emphasis and italics supplied.)
Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of
caution in denying respondent's motion considering that under
the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than
ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense. Certainly,
a party can not feign denial of due process where he had the
opportunity to present his side. It must be borne in mind in this
regard that due process is not a monopoly of the defense.
Indeed, the State is entitled to due process as much as the
accused. Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is a truism that every case must be prosecuted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice.
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge. The deposition taking can not be
based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion has to
be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with
the spirit of the law. There is no indication in this case that in
denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial judge acted
in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave
abuse of discretion ". . . implies such capricious, and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or,
in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act all in contemplation of Law.
Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given ample
opportunity to prove his innocence and whether or not a further
prolongation of proceedings would be dilatory is addressed, in
the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial judge. If
there has been no grave abuse of discretion, only after
conviction may this Court examine such matters further. It is
pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fiftyseven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four (464)
documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as
those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign
deponents. Under the circumstances, we sustain the proposition
that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of discretion if she
decide that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in
the United States could not possibly add anything substantial to
the defense evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation
that the American public officers and the bicycle store owner
can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person
mentioned in the public and private documents. Neither is it
shown in this petition that they know, of their own personal
knowledge, a person whom they can identify as the respondentaccused who was actually present in the United States and not
in the Philippines on the specified dates.
ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.,
vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and CHERRY VALLEY FARMS LIMITED,

respondents.
G.R. No. 118438. December 4, 1998
FACTS: Cherry Valley, a corporation based in England, sued
Allied Agri for collection of sum of money before RTC Makati
alleging, among others, that the latter purchased in ten (10)
separate orders and received several duck hatching eggs and
ducklings which in value totaled 51,245.12 and did not pay the
same despite repeated demands
Allied filed an Answer denying the allegations and averring,
among others, that not all ducks and ducklings covered and
represented by Cherry were actually ordered by Allied
Cherry served on Allieds counsel a Request for Admission on
the ff matters:
1. That the chairman of the board of directors and president of
your corporation is Mr. Ricardo V. Quintos;
2. That out of the 3,000,000 subscribed shares of stock,
1,496,000 shares is (sic) owned by Mr. Ricardo Quintos and
1,432,000 shares is(sic) also owned by his wife, Agnes dela
Torre;
3. That for a period of six (6) months starting from 1 September
1982, your corporation ordered and received from CHERRY
VALLEY duck eggs and ducklings with a total value of
51,245.12 as reflected on CHERRY VALLEY invoices issued to
you;
4. That you received a letter dated 22 March 1985 from Mr.
P.R.C. Braithwaite, solicitor of CHERRY VALLEY, demanding
settlement of your unpaid account of 52,245.12 for the abovestated purchases;
5. That instead of paying your obligation to CHERRY VALLEY, Mr.
Ricardo Quintos, in his capacity as president of your corporation,
sent a letter to CHERRY VALLEY dated 17 July 1985 proposing
the setting up of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY
refusing acceptance of your proposal;
6. That you received a letter dated 26 September 1985 from Mr.
J. Cross, Director and Secretary of CHERRY VALLEY refusing
acceptance of your proposal;
7. That Mr. Ricardo Quintos in a letter dated 8 October 1985
admitted your indebtedness in the sum of English Sterling
Pounds 51,245.12.
It is further requested that said sworn admission be made within
10 days from receipt of this request.
Allied filed its Comment/Opposition stating the ff:
(a) the admissions requested were matters which the private
respondent had the burden to prove through its own witness
during the trial and thus petitioner need not answer; and,
(b) the request for admission regarding the ownership set-up of
petitioner corporation was immaterial and improper for not
having been pleaded in the complaint.
Cherry filed its Reply maintaining that there was no need on its
part to produce a witness to testify on the matters requested for
admission, for these pertained to incidents personal to and
within the knowledge of petitioner alone.
RTC issued an Order disregarding Allieds Comment/Opposition;
denied ensuring MR; directed the latter to answer the request
for admission within a nonextendible period of five (5) days from
receipt of the order and that in view of its non-compliance with
Sec. 2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court and directing ALLIED to
answer the request for admission within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order, otherwise, the matters contained in the
request would be deemed admitted.
Allied failed to comply with the order and Cherry moved for
summary judgment. The RTC rendered a decision against Allied.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: WON failure of Allied to answer the request for
admission is an implied admission on its part?

HELD: Yes. The purpose of the rule governing requests for

admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite
trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will
not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Each of the matters of
which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted unless within a period designated in the request
which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service
thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on
motion, the party to whom the request is directed files
and serves upon the party requesting the admission a
sworn statement either denying specifically the matters
of which an admission is requested or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit
or deny those matters.
Upon service of request for admission, the party served may do
any of the following acts:
(a) he may admit each of the matters of which an admission is
requested, in which case, he need not file an answer;
(b) he may admit the truth of the matters of which admission is
requested by serving upon the party requesting a written
admission of such matters within the period stated in the
request, which must not be less than ten (10) days after service,
or within such further time as the court may allow on motion
and notice;
(c) he may file a sworn statement. denying specifically the
matter of which an admission is requested; or,
(d) he may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the
reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny the
matters of which an admission is requested.
The records show that although petitioner filed with the trial
court its comments and objections to the request for admission
served on it by private respondent, the trial court disregarded
the objections and directed petitioner after denying its motion
for reconsideration, to answer the request within five (5) days
from receipt of the directive; otherwise, the matters of which the
admission was requested would be deemed admitted.
Petitioner failed to submit the required answer within
the period. The matters set forth in the request were
therefore deemed admitted by petitioner,
The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon
whom notice is served to avoid the admission rather
than upon the party seeking the admission. Hence, when
petitioner failed to reply to a request to admit, it may
not argue that the adverse party has the burden of
proving the facts sought to be admitted. Petitioner's
silence is an admission of the facts stated in the
request.
This Court finds that the motion for summary judgment filed by
respondent CHERRY VALLEY on the ground that there were no
questions of fact in issue since the material allegations
of the complaint were not disputed was correctly granted
by the trial court. It is a settled rule that summary judgment
may be granted if the facts which stand admitted by reason of a
party's failure to deny statements contained in a request for
admission show that no material issue of fact exists. By its
failure to answer the other party's request for admission,
petitioner has admitted all the material facts necessary for
judgment against itself.
SPOUSES
VICENTE
AFULUGENCIA
and
LETICIA
AFULUGENCIA, Petitioners,
vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L.
ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff, Province of Bulacan, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014
FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for nullification of mortgage,
foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other
documents, with damages against Metrobank before RTC
Malolos.

After the pre-trial was concluded, petitioners filed a Motion for

Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require
Metrobanks officers to appear and testify as the petitioners
initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the
documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as
those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of
petitioners 200-square meter land in Meycauayan, Bulacan
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20411
Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a
proper notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied; that being
a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a date and
time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro
forma; that pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules,
Metrobanks officers who are considered adverse parties may
not be compelled to appear and testify in court for the
petitioners since they were not initially served with written
interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality
and relevance of the documents sought to be produced in court;
and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.
Petitioners filed a reply alleging that that the lack of a proper
notice of hearing was cured by the filing of Metrobanks
Opposition; that applying the principle of liberality, the defect
may be ignored; that leave of court is not necessary for the
taking of Metrobanks officers depositions; that for their case,
the issuance of a subpoena is not unreasonable and oppressive,
but instead favorable to Metrobank, since it will present the
testimony of these officers just the same during the
presentation of its own evidence; that the documents sought to
be produced are relevant and will prove whether petitioners
have paid their obligations to Metrobank in full, and will settle
the issue relative to the validity or invalidity of the foreclosure
proceedings; and that the Rules do not prohibit a party from
presenting the adverse party as its own witness.
The RTC denied the petitioners motion for failure to comply with
the requirements fo valid notice of hearing. Moreover, the
defendant bank and its officers are adverse parties who cannot
be summoned to testify unless written interrogatories are first
served upon them, as provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: WON written interrogatories should have been served
first to Metrobank and its officers before the latter may be called
to testify?
HELD: Yes. As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the
adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied
in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent
fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to
maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be
presumed that a party who does not serve written
interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely
be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call
the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead,
the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an
attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant
result that a prior written interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse
partys testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the
witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own
case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or
information useful to its case through the facility of
written interrogatories or other mode of discovery, then
the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand
could only serve to weaken its own case as a result of
the calling partys being bound by the adverse partys
testimony, which may only be worthless and instead
detrimental to the calling partys cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written

interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is
relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from
straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the
latter to the stand.
Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from
unwarranted surprises or harassment; it likewise
prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing
expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment
and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute,
and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair
court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or
altogether ruining their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary
processes can only constitute a waste of the courts precious
time, if not pointless entertainment.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobanks officers
to the witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to
present documents in Metrobanks possession as part of their
principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners
may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present
Metrobanks officers who are considered adverse
parties as well, based on the principle that corporations
act only through their officers and duly authorized
agents as their main witnesses; nor may they be
allowed to gain access to Metrobanks documentary
evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is
tantamount to building their whole case from the
evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and
evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners
cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the
adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself
from its own defense.
It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause
shown and to prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give
testimony in court by the adverse party who has not served
written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against
the very principles of justice and fair play; they would want that
Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to prosecute
and build their case from the start. This they may not be allowed
to do.
Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible
consequences of such a move by petitioners. As one of their
causes of action in their Complaint, petitioners claim that they
were not furnished with specific documents relative to their loan
agreement with Metrobank at the time they obtained the loan
and while it was outstanding. If Metrobank were to willingly
provide petitioners with these documents even before
petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they were
never furnished the same, any inferences generated from this
would certainly not be useful for Metrobank. One may be that by
providing petitioners with these documents, Metrobank would be
admitting that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners with these
documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement, and while
the loan was outstanding, in violation of the law.
With the view taken of the case, the Court finds it unnecessary
to further address the other issues raised by the parties, which
are irrelevant and would not materially alter the conclusions
arrived at.

G.R. No. 180564

June 22, 2010

FACTS: In 1989 respondent Republic of the Philippines,

represented in this case by the PCGG, wanted petitioner Jesus P.
Disini to testify for his government in its case against
Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) before the US
District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that
Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed
against the Republic before the International Chamber of
Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second
cousin, Herminio T. Disini (Herminio), as an executive in the
latters companies from 1971 to 1984. The Republic believed
that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered by one of Herminios
companies, had been attended by anomalies.

On February 16, 1989 respondent Republic and petitioner Disini

entered into an Immunity Agreement under which Disini
undertook to testify for his government and provide its lawyers
with the information, affidavits, and documents they needed for
prosecuting the two cases. Acknowledging Disinis concern that
the Republic could become a party to yet other proceedings
relating to the matters subject of his testimony, the Republic
guaranteed that, apart from the two cases, it shall not compel
Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding
brought by the Republic against Herminio.

The Agreement included that should the Republic of the

Philippines name Herminio T. Disini a defendant in any of the
above-referenced matters, or in any resulting arbitration
proceeding, or any other proceeding ancillary to said matters,
the Republic of the Philippines shall not call Jesus P. Disini to
testify as a witness in said matters on any claim brought by the
Republic of the Philippines against Herminio T. Disini. Nothing
herein shall affect Jesus P. Disinis obligation to provide truthful
information or testimony.

Petitioner Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later

or on February 27, 2007, upon application of respondent
Republic,
respondent
Sandiganbayan
issued
a
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum against Disini,
commanding him to testify and produce documents before that
court on March 6 and 30, 2007 in an action that the Republic
filed against Herminio. Disini filed a motion to quash the
subpoena, invoking his immunity agreement with the Republic,
but respondent Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a
new subpoena, directing him to testify before it on May 6 and
23, 2007.

JESUS P. DISINI, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, as represented by the PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON
GOOD
GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), Respondents.

On July 19, 2007 the PCGG issued Resolution 2007-031, revoking

and nullifying the Immunity Agreement between petitioner Disini
and respondent Republic insofar as it prohibited the latter from
requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. On August 16, 2007

respondent Sandiganbayan denied Disinis motion to quash

subpoena, prompting the latter to take recourse to this Court.

ISSUE: WON Disini can be compelled to testify despite the

existence of the Immunity Agreement?

HELD: No. The Court has ruled in a previous case that the scope
of immunity offered by the PCGG may vary. It has discretion to
grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the
situation of the witness and his relative importance to the
prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in
this case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to
induce cooperation.

The language of Section 5, E.O. 14, said the Court, affords

latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of that criminal
immunity. In petitioner Disinis case, respondent Republic, acting
through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and civil
immunity but also immunity against being compelled to
testify in any domestic or foreign proceeding, other than
the civil and arbitration cases identified in the Immunity
Agreement, just so he would agree to testify. Trusting in
the Governments honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and
fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play,
which is the essence of due process, should hold the Republic on
to its promise.

The Republic of course points out that the immunity from

criminal or civil prosecution that Section 5 of E.O. 14 authorizes
does not cover immunity from giving evidence in a case before a
court of law.

But in reality the guarantee given to petitioner Disini against

being compelled to testify in other cases against Herminio
constitutes a grant of immunity from civil or criminal
prosecution. If Disini refuses to testify in those other cases he
would face indirect contempt, which is essentially a prosecution
for willful disobedience of a valid court order, a subpoena. 11 His
refusal to testify will warrant the imposition against him of the
penalty of fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not
exceeding 6 months or both fine and imprisonment.

Here, petitioner Disinis refusal to testify as ordered by

the Sandiganbayan is certain to result in prosecution for
criminal contempt. It constitutes criminal contempt since guilt
would draw a penalty of fine or imprisonment or both. Said the
Court in Montenegro v. Montenegro:

Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal

depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act.
Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority
and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring
the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil
contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a
court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and
is therefore an offense against the party in whose behalf the
violated order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is
criminal in nature, but if to compensate, then it is civil.

In criminal contempt, the proceedings are regarded as criminal

and the rules of criminal procedure apply. What is more, it is
generally held that the State or respondent Republic is the real
prosecutor in such a case. The grant, therefore, of immunity
to petitioner Disini against being compelled to testify is
ultimately a grant of immunity from being criminally
prosecuted by the State for refusal to testify, something
that falls within the express coverage of the immunity
given him.

Respondent Republic claims that the grant of immunity to

petitioner Disini against being compelled to testify against
Herminio contravenes the states public policy respecting the
recovery of illegally acquired wealth under the regime of former
President Marcos.

But the same authority that adopted such policy, former

President Corazon C. Aquino, is the same authority that gave the
PCGG the power to grant immunity to witnesses whom it might
use to recover illegally acquired wealth during that regime. In
the case of Tanchanco v. Sandiganbayan, the Court regarded as
valid and binding on the government the immunity it gave
former National Food Authority Administrator, Jesus Tanchanco
for all "culpable acts of his during his service in the Marcos
government," which would include possible prosecution for any
illegal wealth that he may himself have acquired during that
service. The Court did not regard such immunity in
contravention of the state policy on recovery of ill-gotten wealth
under the auspices of the Marcos regime.
True, respondent Republic may have other cases in which it also
needed petitioner Disinis testimony. But such circumstance
does not necessarily invalidate the concession it gave himthe
freedom from being compelled to give evidence in specific
cases. It may be assumed that the Republic regarded Disinis
testimony in the two cases covered by the agreement more
important and critical than those other cases. It is well known
that the cases with Westinghouse before the New Jersey District
Court and the International Arbitration Tribunal concerning the
construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant had so huge a
financial impact on the Republic that it was willing to waive its
power and right to compel petitioner Disinis testimony in other
cases.

A contract is the law between the parties. It cannot be

withdrawn except by their mutual consent. This applies with
more reason in this case where petitioner Disini had already
complied with the terms and conditions of the Immunity
Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the Agreement at
this late stage will run afoul of the rule that a party to a
compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its
benefits.

her shorts and panty. He then removed his pants, went on top of
her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant removed
his penis after he ejaculated and told her not to report what had
happened. Appellant forced her and she was not able to resist
because she was still young during that time. She reported the
incident to her mother and the police.

On re-direct examination, AAA testified that she filed the case

against the appellant so that the latter would no longer box and
maltreat her and because he raped her. On re-cross, it was
revealed that appellant was neither armed during the incident
nor covered her mouth when he laid her down. She did not
shout because she was afraid. Appellant threatened her before
he raped her.

Final Note

The Court should not allow respondent Republic, to put it

bluntly, to double cross petitioner Disini. The Immunity
Agreement was the result of a long drawn out process of
negotiations with each party trying to get the best concessions
out of it.22 The Republic did not have to enter that agreement. It
was free not to. But when it did, it needs to fulfill its obligations
honorably as Disini did. More than any one, the government
should be fair.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court in toto.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of raping his daughter?

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and ANNULS

Resolution 2007-031 dated July 19, 2007 of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and the Resolution dated
August 16, 2007 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Civil Case
0013, Republic of the Philippines v. Herminio T. Disini, et al.

HELD: Yes. It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for

rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the
testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.11 Jurisprudence is likewise instructive that the factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape
victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,

vs.
ROMEO BUSTAMANTE y ALIGANGA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 189836

June 5, 2013

In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found AAA to be a credible witness and her testimony worthy of
full faith and credit. After a careful review of the records of this
case, we find no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower
courts.

FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with rape of her

daughter AAA and was found guilty by the trial court.
Since the incident at issue happened prior to the enactment of
Republic Act No. 8353, the trial court correctly applied Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
During pre-trial, appellant made an admission with regard to the
identity of the victim in this case. Trial on the merits thereafter
commenced.
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
AAA testified that she lived with his father, the appellant in this
case, mother and younger siblings, 3 brothers and a sister, in x
x x, Alcala, Cagayan. At about lunch time or thereafter on
February 17, 1997, she was alone in the second floor in their
house when the appellant arrived. Her younger brother Jayjun
was playing outside while her mother went to clean their ginger
garden. The appellant laid her down on the floor and removed

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and

10

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is

demented.

Therefore, according to the aforementioned provision, the

elements of rape are (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of
the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force and
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of
age.

We agree with the appellate court that the following portion of

AAAs testimony indicated the presence of the foregoing
elements of the crime of rape in this case.

Clearly, the element of carnal knowledge is present in the

foregoing narration. Furthermore, despite the absence of any
evident force and intimidation, the same is still appreciated in
the case at bar because it is doctrinally settled that the moral
ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it
unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in
rape committed by a close kin, such as the victims father,
stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother,
moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.

In his defense, appellant interposes denial while also ascribing ill

motive on the part of the victim, his own biological daughter, for
accusing him of rape. However, it is well-settled that denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a selfserving assertion that deserves no weight in law because denial
cannot prevail over the positive, candid and categorical
testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive
declaration of the complainant and the negative statement of
the appellant, the former deserves more credence. Likewise, the
testimonies of the witnesses presented by appellant failed to
buttress his defense of denial as they merely related to
tangential matters which do not seriously affect the issue of
AAAs credibility.

Under the old rape law which is applicable in this case, the
death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
under certain enumerated circumstances which would designate
the crime as qualified rape. One such particular circumstance is
when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The minority of
the victim and her relationship to the accused were duly proven
by her birth certificate. However, due to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the trial
court correctly imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

In view of the foregoing, we therefore affirm the conviction of

appellant for qualified rape for which he is to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in consonance
with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No.
9346. The award of civil indemnity and exemplary damages is
likewise upheld. However, in line with jurisprudence, the award
of moral damages is increased from Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00).

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successorin-interest of ASIAN BANK CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON.
EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR.
and HON. RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA (in their capacities as
Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Second Division of
SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 169677 | February 18, 2013 (1D)
Facts:

With regard to the allegation that the accusation of rape was

motivated by ill will and revenge, this Court is not surprised at
this rather common excuse being raised by offenders in rape
cases. We have consistently held that such alleged motives
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of
complainants who remained steadfast throughout the
trial. Jurisprudence tells us that it is against human nature for a
young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well
as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge
could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her own
father.

The Republic brought a complaint for reversion,

reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages in
the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr.,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other
defendants.
Republic then moved for the amendment of the
complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an
additional defendant.
In its reply to Asian Banks comment, the Republic
maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was
proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank
was entirely distinct and independent from its cause of
action against the original defendants
The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution
granting the Republics motion for separate trial
Asian Bank moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution, but the Sandiganbayan denied its motion
through the second assailed resolution.
Hence, Metrobank commenced this special civil action
for certiorari as the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank
and transferee of the properties.
Anent the first issue, Metrobank states that the holding
of a separate trial would deny it due process, because
Asian Bank was entitled to contest the evidence of the
Republic against the original defendants prior to Asian
Banks inclusion as an additional defendant; that Asian
Bank (Metrobank) would be deprived of its day in court
if a separate trial was held against it, considering that
the Republic had already presented such evidence prior
to its being impleaded as an additional defendant; that
such evidence would be hearsay unless Asian Bank
(Metrobank) was afforded the opportunity to test and to
object to the admissibility of the evidence; that
because Asian Bank disputed the allegedly ill-gotten

11

character of the properties and denied any involvement

in their allegedly unlawful acquisition or any
connivance with the original defendants in their
acquisition, Asian Bank should be given the opportunity
to refute the Republics adverse evidence on the
allegedly illgotten nature of the properties
Issue: Whether or not the holding of a separate trial for the case
of Metrobank is improper
Held: Yes

The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in

Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 2. Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of

convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim,
or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the
discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim,
cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or
of any separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues should be held, provided that the exercise of
such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice to any party.
Several US laws cited by the Court in its decision
herein:
o
Courts order separate trials only when "clearly
necessary." (Corrigan v. Methodist Hospital)
o
In Miller v. American Bonding Company, the
US Supreme Court has delimited the holding of
separate trials to only the exceptional
instances where there were special and
persuasive reasons for departing from the
general practice of trying all issues in a case
at only one time, stating:

In actions at law, the general practice is to try

all the issues in a case at one time; and it is
only in exceptional instances where there are
special and persuasive reasons for departing
from this practice that distinct causes of
action asserted in the same case may be
made the subjects of separate trials. Whether
this reasonably may be done in any particular
instance rests largely in the courts discretion.
Further, Corpus Juris Secundum makes clear
that neither party had an absolute right
to have a separate trial of an issue;
hence, the motion to that effect should
be allowed only to avoid prejudice,
further convenience, promote justice,
and give a fair trial to all parties, to wit:

Generally speaking, a lawsuit should not be

tried piecemeal, or at least such a trial should
be undertaken only with great caution and
sparingly. There should be one full and
comprehensive trial covering all disputed
matters, and parties cannot, as of right, have
a trial divided. It is the policy of the law to
limit the number of trials as far as possible,
and separate trials are granted only in
exceptional cases. Even under a statute
permitting trials of separate issues, neither
party has an absolute right to have a separate
trial of an issue involved. The trial of all issues
together is especially appropriate in an action
at law wherein the issues are not complicated,
x x x, or where the issues are basically the
same x x x
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and
parameters defined by the relevant US case law, we

conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave

abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate
trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground
that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct
and separate from that against the original
defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered
away from the general rule of having all the issues
in every case tried at one time, unreasonably
shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a
"single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense,
and inconvenience to the parties and the courts."
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only
when there are extraordinary grounds for
conducting separate trials on different issues
raised in the same case, or when separate trials
of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials of the issues will further
convenience, or when separate trials of the
issues will promote justice, or when separate
trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all
parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.
As we see it, however, the justification of the
Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did not
constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the
exceptions.
o
To begin with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank
was not complicated. In that context, the
separate trial would not be in furtherance of
convenience.
o
And, secondly, the cause of action against
Asian Bank was necessarily connected with
the cause of action against the original
defendants.
Should
the
Sandiganbayan
resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a
separate trial on the basis of the evidence
adduced against the original defendants, the
properties would be thereby adjudged as illgotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the
Republic without Metrobank being given the
opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The
outcome would surely be prejudicial towards
Metrobank.
The representation by the Republic in its comment to
the petition of Metrobank, that the latter "merely seeks
to be afforded the opportunity to confront the
witnesses and documentary exhibits," and that it will
"still be granted said right during the conduct of the
separate trial, if proper grounds are presented
therefor," unfairly dismisses the objective possibility of
leaving the opportunity to confront the witnesses and
documentary exhibits to be given to Metrobank in the
separate trial as already too late.
o
The properties, though already registered in
the name of Asian Bank, would be meanwhile
declared liable to forfeiture in favor of the
Republic, causing Metrobank to suffer the
deprivation of its properties without due
process of law. Only a joint trial with the
original defendants could afford to Metrobank
the equal and efficient opportunity to confront
and to contest all the evidence bearing on its
ownership of the properties. Hence, the
disadvantages that a separate trial would
cause to Metrobank would far outweigh any
good or benefit that the Republic would
seemingly stand to gain from the separation of
trials.
We must safeguard Metrobanks right to be heard in
the defense of its registered ownership of the
properties, for that is what our Constitution requires us
to do. Hence, the grant by the Sandiganbayan of the
Republics motion for separate trial, not being in
furtherance of convenience or would not avoid
prejudice to a party, and being even contrary to the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence, was arbitrary,
and, therefore, a grave abuse of discretion amounting

12

to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the

Sandiganbayan.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REGION III,
Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR. and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF OLONGAPO CITY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 199501 | March 6, 2013 (2D)
Facts:

The present controversy involves a parcel of land

situated in Nagbaculao, Kalaklan, Olongapo City, which
was once classified as forest land by the Bureau of
Forest Development. The property was originally
occupied by a certain Valentin Fernandez (Valentin) in
1968 by virtue of a Residential Permit issued by the
same government office.
Upon Valentins death, his son, Odillon Fernandez
(Odillon), continued to occupy the property, together
with spouses Ruperto and Matilde Apog. Sometime in
1969, Odillon sold the property to a certain Mrs.
Florentina Balcita who, later on, sold the same property
to Oribello. Oribello filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), which denied the application
since the land remained forest land.
The subject property was then declared open to
disposition under the Public Land Act. Thus, Oribello
filed another Miscellaneous Sales Application on 6 April
1987.
On 27 March 1990, the Director of Lands issued an
Order for the issuance of a patent in favor of Oribello.
On even date, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 12756
and OCT No. P-5004 were issued to Oribello.
Matilde Apog (Apog) and Aliseo San Juan (San Juan),
claiming to be actual occupants of the property,
protested with the DENR the issuance of the sales
patent and OCT in favor of Oribello. They sought the
annulment of the sales patent,
After investigation, the Regional Executive Director of
the DENR found substantial evidence that fraud and
misrepresentation were committed in the issuance of
the sales patent in favor of Oribello, warranting a
reversion suit.
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing
petitioner, instituted a complaint for reversion and
cancellation of title before the RTC.
The trial of the consolidated cases continued and the
reception of evidence of the private parties proceeded.
However, in its Order of 21 February 2005, the trial
court dismissed the consolidated cases without
prejudice for non-substitution of the deceased plaintiff
(Oribello) and his counsel.
Petitioner contends that the 12 September 1997 Order
of the trial court, deeming it to have abandoned the
case, is interlocutory in nature; thus, is not appealable.
Respondents argue otherwise, maintaining that such
Order is a dismissal of the complaint on the ground of
failure to prosecute which is, under the Rules,
considered an adjudication on the merits, and hence
appealable.

Issue: Whether or not the consolidated cases are subject to

multiple appeals
Held: Yes

Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a
common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all
the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the
actions consolidated, and it may make such orders

concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid

unnecessary costs or delay.
Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in
deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that
the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously and with economy while providing justice
to the parties. To promote this end, the rule allows the
consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the
courts docket, or the consolidation of issues within
those cases. The Court explained, thus:
In the context of legal procedure, the term
"consolidation" is used in three different senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed
until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one
trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually
consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasiconsolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose
their separate identity, and become a single action in
which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated
by a situation where several actions are pending
between the same parties stating claims which might
have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual
consolidation)

(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried

together but each retains its separate character and
requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of
consolidation does not merge the suits into a single
action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties
to the other. (consolidation for trial)
In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by
petitioner (Civil Case No. 225-0-92) was consolidated
with the complaint for recovery of possession filed by
Oribello (Civil Case No. 223-0-91). While these two
cases involve common questions of law and fact, each
action retains its separate and distinct character.
o
The reversion suit settles whether the subject
land will be reverted to the State, while the
recovery of possession case determines which
private party has the better right of
possession over the subject property.
o
These cases, involving different issues and
seeking different remedies, require the
rendition and entry of separate judgments.
The consolidation is merely for joint trial of the
cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery of
possession proceeded independently of the
reversion case, and was disposed of
accordingly by the trial court.
Since each action does not lose its distinct character,
severance of one action from the other is not necessary
to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action.
There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a
judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is
consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is
within the sound discretion of the court for convenience
or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the
Rules of Court that the court sever one case from the
other cases before a party can appeal an adverse ruling
on such case.

RULES 33 38:
[G.R. No. 143370. ]
MARIO J. MENDEZONA and TERESITA M. MENDEZONA,
LUIS J. MENDEZONA and MARICAR L. MENDEZONA and
TERESITA ADAD VDA. DE MENDEZONA, petitioners, vs.
JULIO H. OZAMIZ, ROBERTO J. MONTALVAN, JOSE MA.
OZAMIZ, CARMEN H. OZAMIZ, PAZ O. MONTALVAN, MA.
TERESA O.F. ZARRAGA, CARLOS O. FORTICH, JOSE LUIS O.
ROS, PAULITA O. RODRIGUEZ, and LOURDES O. LON,
respondents.

13

Facts: A suit for quieting of title was instituted by petitioners

involving a parcel of land in Banilad Estate, Lahug, Cebu City.
They claimed that their titles can be traced from a notarized
Deed of Absolute Sale with Carmen Ozamiz.
The petitioners prayed to remove a cloud on their said titles
caused by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens
brought by a Special Proceeding for guardianship over the
person and properties of the named seller Carmen Ozamiz
initiated by the respondents.
The petition for guardianship was file in RTC-Oroquieta City,
alleging therein that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an
illness had become disoriented and could not recognize most of
her friends; that she could no longer take care of herself nor
manage her properties. The respondents opposed the
petitioners claim of ownership of the Lahug property since the
titles issued in the petitioners names are defective and illegal
as it was acquired in bad faith.
The trial court held that Carmen Ozamiz validly sold to [her
nephews] herein petitioners, Mario, Antonio and Luis, all
surnamed Mendezona, the parcels of residential land in Cebu,
per a Deed of Absolute Sale with reservation of usufructuary
rights by Carmen Ozamiz, The sale was voluntarily and
deliberately entered into while the latter was of sound mind.
The CA reversed the findings of the trial court and ruled that the
Deed of Absolute Sale was a simulated contract since the
petitioners failed to prove that the consideration was actually
paid, and, furthermore, that at the time of the execution of the
contract the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already
seriously impaired.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the appellate court. Subsequent thereto, the petitioners filed a
motion for a new trial and/or for reception of evidence.

Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited

from him by questioning.
It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the
newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the
pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in
the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was
made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons
who were likely to know the facts in question, especially where
information was not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to
seek evidence available through public records; there is a failure
to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining
party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in other
evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available discovery
procedures. Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial.
[G.R. No. 146845. July 2, 2002]
SPOUSES
MICHAELANGELO
and
GRACE
MESINA,
petitioners, vs. HUMBERTO D. MEER, respondent.
Facts: Respondent Humberto Meer is a registered owner of a
parcel of land in Pandacan, Manila. He discovered that his
certificate of title has been cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
166074, was issued in the name of spouses Sergio and Lerma
Bunquin. The latter acquired said property by virtue of a deed of
sale in 1985 purportedly executed by respondent in their favor.
Respondent Meer sought the cancellation of said TCT No.
166074 with the MeTC Manila, and a notice of lis pendens was
annotated at the back of its title.
However, the subject property covered by TCT No. 166074 was
again conveyed while the case was pending and prior to the
annotation of lis pendens in favor of herein petitioners spouses
Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina, hence, TCT No. 166074 was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 216518 issued in the name of
the Mesinas.

Petitioners contended, among other things, that the appellate

court ignored the testimony of Judge Teodorico Durias regarding
the mental condition of Carmen Ozamiz a month before the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question. The said
testimony was taken in the Special Proceeding No. 1250 in the
RTC-Oroquieta. However, Judge Durias was not presented as a
witness in the civil case in RTC-Cebu. Petitioners alleged that
Judge Duriass testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which
could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court
below by the exercise of due diligence. The CA denied. Hence,
the instant petition.

Thus, Meer impleaded Sps. Mesina as additional party

defendants. Defendant-spouses Bunquin never appeared during
the hearings and thus, was declared in default.

Issue: Whether the testimony of Judge Durias is a newlydiscovered evidence?

Comes now this Petition for Review raising as issue the

availability of Petition for Relief under Rule 38, as a remedy
against the judgment of the Court of Appeals promulgated in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. If the remedy is thus
available, petitioners pray that this Court rule whether or not the
grounds relied by them are sufficient to give due course to the
petition.

Held: No. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly
discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is
concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence
had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have
been discovered and produced during trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is
material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or
impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would
probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must
characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new
trial.
The requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by
the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the
name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible
witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the
respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of
suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to
choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias
testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered
evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which
were existing before and during the trial, could have been
presented by the petitioners at the trial below. The testimony of

The RTC ruled that the alleged sale between Meer and Bunquin
was fraudulent. However, petitioners Sps. Mesina were adjudged
buyers in good faith and hence, entitled to the possession of the
property.
Meer filed an Appeal with the RTC which court reversed the
ruling of the MeTC. The CA affirmed on appeal.

Issue: Whether the petitioners course of relief under Rule 38 is

proper.
Held: No. Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is
allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present.
Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy
such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse
decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.
Under the Rules, the petition for relief must be filed within 60
days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or
other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners
good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case
may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court
which rendered the decision, viz:

14

Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or

other proceedings. - When a judgment or final order is
entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against
a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or
proceeding be set aside.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners
allegation of extrinsic fraud should have been brought at issue
in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe that the
default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they
should have questioned this from the beginning. Yet, they chose
to participate in the proceedings and actively presented their
defense. And their efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan
Trial Court ruled in their favor.
When the respondent appealed the case to the RTC, they never
raised this issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the
finding of the MeTC, and the Court of Appeals sustained this
reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for
consideration. This Court will not allow petitioners, in guise of
equity, to benefit from their own negligence.
[G.R. No. 119010. September 5, 1997]
PAZ T. BERNARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE and FLORITA RONQUILLOCONCEPCION, respondents.
Facts: Paz T. Bernardo was originally charged with four (4)
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the RTC-Quezon City.
After the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, the
following transpired in open court:

Where does it appear?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
It is at the back of Exhibit A, your honor.
COURT:
Is it mark(ed)?
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
Your honor, it states here, deposited to Philippine
National Bank, West Avenue, Quezon City which is at
the check marked as exhibit A-4.
COURT:
So, that takes jurisprudence. The elements happened
in Quezon City.
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
Yes, your honor.
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
The notation read by counsel, your honor, was not
marked in evidence, what was marked is B-4
appearing at the dorsal portion of the check which
pertains only for (sic) the dishonor, the initial and the
date. Nothing was presented as to the fact. If that is
so, that was indeed deposited at West Avenue,
Quezon City.
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:

COURT:

There is, your honor. The stamp received by the

Cashier Division, PNB, Quezon City, West Avenue.

Alright, prosecution having rested, defense will now

present its evidence. Proceed.

COURT:

ATTY. MIRAVITE:
Your honor, we respectfully ask for a resetting, for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence
(underscoring supplied).
COURT:
On what ground?
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
On the ground that the prosecution failed to elicit the
fact where the checks were issued and where they
were actually dishonored. This is material, your
honor, for purposes of determining jurisdiction. Also,
your honor, as we mentioned in our comments to the
evidence presented by the prosecution, there has
been no valid notice of dishonor of the subject checks
upon the accused. So, upon those grounds, we
believe that the prosecution has not duly made out a
case against the accused, and we feel those are
sufficient for the dismissal of the case as against the
accused.
COURT:
So as to avoid reviewing the records, would you admit
that there is no proof where the checks were issued
and where they were dishonored?
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
No, we would not admit that, your honor. They were
dishonored actually in Manila, but the check was
deposited in the bank of PAR CREDIT ENTERPRISES in
Quezon City, and it was naturally forwarded to PNB
where the same was returned to the bank of PAR
CREDIT ENTERPRISES here in Quezon City.
COURT:

Anyway, was there an offer of that document?

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
Yes, there was an offer of exhibit A-4, your honor. The
record would show that we manifested that exhibit B4 are stamps of the bank reading DAIF over which
there are other stamps.
COURT:
You are saying that the word DAIF was marked at the
back and offered as proof of the dishonor and the
place was evidence?
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
Yes, your honor, immediately on top of the word, DAIF.
COURT:
Is there any evidence testimonial that these were
encashed and dishonored?
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
Yes, your honor, the testimony of this witness is very
clear that the checks were deposited and the same
was (sic) dishonored by the bank.
COURT:
Do you admit that there was no notice of dishonor?
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
We dont admit that, your honor. In fact, there are
admissions in handwriting regarding the claim.
COURT:
Is there any evidence presented that these checks
were not paid up to now?

15

PRIVATE PROSECUTOR:
Yes, your honor. First, is the oral testimony of the
witness, that it has not been paid; second, exhibits 1
and 1-1, which is the Complaint Affidavit of the
witness.
COURT:
Alright, in view of the objections, and in view of the
manifestations of the private prosecutor, the defense
grounds for demurrer, the same not being well taken
is hereby DENIED (underscoring supplied). You will
now present your evidence.
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
If your honor please, may we just ask for a
reconsideration (underscoring supplied)?
COURT:
If you will waive your right to present your evidence,
the Court will give you a period to file a demurrer to
evidence. And, if you dont present your evidence
now, you will be considered to have waived your right
to present evidence (underscoring supplied).
xxxx
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
If your honor please, we would like to reiterate our
motion to file a demurrer to evidence (underscoring
supplied)?
COURT:
But you have already orally made that demurrer
which has been denied (underscoring supplied).
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
In which case your honor, if there is no leave of court,
we will be filing our demurrer to evidence, your honor
(underscoring supplied).
COURT:
That is tantamount to postpone (sic) this case. The
Court considers that motion dilatory (underscoring
supplied).
ATTY. MIRAVITE:
Your honor, I think within the option of the parties to
take remedies and at this point, we did prepare for
our purposes, that instead of presenting the accused
or presenting our witnesses, we would just prefer to
move for a demurrer to evidence (underscoring
supplied).
COURT:
You may include that in your motion for
reconsideration. Alright, the prosecution having
rested, and the defense having been considered to
have waived his right to present his evidence, this
case is deemed submitted for decision. Set the
promulgation of this case to June 6, 1994 at 8:30 o
clock in the morning.

reception of evidence for the petitioner." Petitioner moved for

partial reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals
but her motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits that when her counsel moved for leave to file
a demurrer to evidence, this meant that she intended to make a
written demurrer after extensive research and with proper
authorities to support the same. So when the RTC denied her
motion, it was in effect a denial only of the motion for leave to
file demurrer to evidence and not the demurrer to evidence
itself.
Issue: Whether the CA erred when it refused to allow petitioner
to demur to the evidence.
Held: We cannot sustain petitioner.
Under the rule on demurrer to evidence, the accused has the
right to file a demurrer to evidence after the prosecution has
rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court
before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his
demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of
court, or after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right
to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant
leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine
whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the
proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20
May 1994 the trial court denied her motion for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence. In such case, the only right petitioner has
under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court after having been
denied leave to submit a demurrer is to adduce evidence in her
defense. However, even without express leave of the trial court
and after her motion for leave was denied, petitioner insisted on
filing a demurrer instead of presenting evidence in her defense.
Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is
discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow the accused to
present evidence after he was denied prior leave to file
demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior leave is denied and the
accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss,
the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to
present evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. And, unless there is grave abuse thereof amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the
instant case, the trial courts denial of prior leave to file demurrer
to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed.
However, any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be
elevated by the accused to the appellate court.
[G.R. No. 138739. July 6, 2000]
RADIOWEALTH
FINANCE
COMPANY,
petitioner,
vs.
Spouses VICENTE and MA. SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO,
respondents.
FACTS: The respondents spouses jointly and severally executed,
signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a
promissory note for Php138,948.00.

Petitioner assailed the Order of respondent judge and elevated

the matter to the CA by way of certiorari. Petitioner argued that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in considering her
to have waived her right to present evidence after the denial of
her motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence.

The promissory note provides that payment will be in

installment basis i.e. Php11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive
months and with a late penalty charge of 2.5% shall be added to
each unpaid installment from due date thereof until fully paid. It
is also agreed that if there be delay in the payment of any of the
installments or late payment charges thereon as and when the
same becomes due and payable, the total principal sum then
remaining unpaid, together with the agreed late payment
charges thereon, shall at once become due and demandable
without need of notice or demand.

CA modified the questioned Order of the RTC which states that

"the defense having been considered to have waived her right
to present her evidence, this case is deemed submitted for
decision by directing the trial court to set the case "for trial for

Respondents defaulted on the monthly installments and despite

demands, they failed to pay their obligations. Thus, Radiowealth
filed a complaint for the Collection of a Sum of Money before
RTC - Manila.

16

During the trial, Radiowealths collection and credit officer

Jasmer Famatico presented in evidence the check payments, the
demand letter, the customers ledger card, another demand
letter and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. He, however,
admitted that he did not have any personal knowledge of the
transaction or the execution of any of the documentary
evidence which had been merely endorsed to him. The trial
court issued an order terminating the presentation of evidence
by Radiowealth. Thus, the latter formally offered its evidence
and exhibits and rested its case.
Respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of
cause of action. Said motion was granted on the ground that the
evidence presented by Radiowealth were merely hearsay. On
appeal, however, the CA reversed ruling that the judicial
admissions (i.e. the due execution and genuineness of the
promissory note and demand letter) of the spouses established
their indebtedness to Radiowealth nevertheless. The CA ordered
that the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.
Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the case
be remanded to the RTC instead of rendering judgment on the
basis of petitioners evidence.
RULING: The Petition has merit. While the CA correctly reversed
the RTC, it erred in remanding the case "for further
proceedings."
Rule 33 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is
denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the
Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana pronounced:
The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical.
The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for
a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiffs evidence) on the ground
that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law,
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies
the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiffs evidence is
sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary
evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which
should then proceed to hear and receive the defendants
evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending
parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well
as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost.
The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural
precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally
receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render
its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus
assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the
material before them necessary to make a correct judgment,
and avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or
reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility
thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant
delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same
token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the
order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his
right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been
deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of
plaintiffs case and evidence. In such event, the appellate
court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed
to render judgment on the merits on the basis of
plaintiffs evidence.
In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the
plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present their own
evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court

agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees

with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the
defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The
appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render
judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to
discourage prolonged litigations.
Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA
should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly
ruled that the documentary evidence submitted by the
[petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated xxx, and
that the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary
exhibits xxx enumerated in the appealed order, we agree with
petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to
decide the collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by
the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of the
facts on record.
[G.R. No. 117032, July 27, 2000]
MA. PATRICIA GARCIA, BELEN G. GUTIERREZ, NICANOR
GUTIERREZ, GRACE M.B. GUTIERREZ, CAROLYN M.B.
GUTIERREZ, GERWIN GARCIA, GERSON GARCIA, and
GILMER GARCIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan;
RURAL BANK OF SARA, INC., RAFAEL C. DINGLASAN, JR.,
MARIA ELENA I. DINGLASAN, ANTHONY CABUGSO and
LEDA SUELLO, respondents.
Facts: Florencio Junior Garcia, representing himself as attorney
in fact of petitioners, brought in the name of the latter, an action
for collection of sum of money, against the private respondents
in RTC-Kalibo, Aklan.
Respondent Rural Bank of Sara, Inc., Anthony Cabugso, and
Leda Suello, (manager and cashier, respectively, of respondent
bank), filed their answer contending by way of special and
affirmative defenses that the Complaint states no cause of
action against the defendants in as much as the deposit alleged
have not at all authorized and empowered alleged attorney-infact, Florencio Junior Garcia, to transact with the defendant
bank. And as such, he has no capacity to sue and be sued, being
not the real party interest.
The respondent spouses, Rafael Dinglasan and Maria Elena
Dinglasan, likewise filed their answer contending that there is no
privity of contract between plaintiffs and defendants and
Attorney-in-Fact Florencio Junior Garcia has no apparent
authority from plaintiffs to file the instant complaint.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asseverating
that they are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, since
the pleadings and supporting affidavits submitted are barren of
any genuine issue which may be controverted which the RTC
denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioners went to the CA, however, the appellate
court came out with its assailed Decision upholding the order of
the RTC.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the
order of the RTC denying the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Held: The Petition is devoid of merit.
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 34, of the Rules of Court provide:
"SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served,
move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment
in his favor upon all or any part thereof."
"SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. - The motion
shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time
specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the

17

day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the

hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleading, depositions, and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."
A summary judgment is one granted upon motion by a party for
an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that there are
no important questions or issues of fact posed (except as to the
amount of damages) and therefore, the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
The aforecited rule does not vest in the trial court jurisdiction to
summarily try the issues on depositions and affidavits but gives
it limited authority to render summary judgment only when
there is no genuine issue of material fact at bar. Upon a
motion for summary judgment, the sole function of the court is
to determine whether or not there is an issue of fact to be tried,
and any doubt as to the existence of an issue of fact must be
resolved against the movant. Courts are quite critical of the
papers presented by the moving party but not of the papers in
opposition thereto. Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most
favorable to the party against whom it is directed, giving such
party the benefit of all favorable inferences. That one may
surmise from plaintiff's showing that defendant is unlikely to
prevail upon a trial is not a sufficient basis to assume that the
allegations of defendant are sham, frivolous or unsubstantial. If
the defense relied upon by the defendant is legally sufficient
and does not appear patently sham, the motion for summary
judgment should be denied.
In the case under consideration, the pleadings and exhibits on
record reveal that there exist genuine issues on material or
pertinent facts i.e: "1. Whether or not Florencio Junior Garcia is
properly authorized to file the complaint for the plaintiffs named
in the title of the complaint.
Verily, there is a need to find out whether Florencio Junior Garcia
was duly authorized by the plaintiffs named the action to file the
complaint against the private respondents. It is worthy to note
that while the complaint states that the plaintiffs therein
mentioned empowered Florencio Junior Garcia to collect the
sums due them from the respondent bank, the records on hand
show that only four of the eight plaintiffs executed a special
power of attorney authorizing Florencio Junior Garcia to deal
with respondent bank.

National, and as having entered the Philippines as a

tourist. Invoking his constitutional right to an effective
counsel, appellant chides his former counsel for having
failed to secure and present his travel documents.
Issue: Whether or not the Motion for New Trial should be granted
Held: No

The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to

justify a new trial are that:
o
the evidence is discovered after trial;
o
such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and
o
the evidence is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and
of such weight that, if admitted, would likely
change the judgment.

Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant.

o
Appellants passport could have easily been
presented and produced during the trial. Then,
too, the presentation of appellants passport,
would hardly be material to the outcome of
the case.
o
Appellant was positively identified by the
prosecution
witnesses
as
being
the
perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly,
appellant even identified himself as Li Ka Kim
at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei, that
bolsters the conclusion
that appellant
deliberately concealed his true identity in the
nefarious enterprise.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and the SPOUSES
EDUARDO AND CARMEN YEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 138571 | July 13, 2000 (3D)
Facts:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LI KA KIM alias

ED, appellant.
G.R. No. 148586 | May 25, 2004 (EB)

Facts:

Lim Ka Kim was convicted by RTC for violation of

Section 15, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, as so
amended by Republic Act 7659 which imposed upon
him death penalty.
Kim was initially represented by one Atty. Eldorado Lim.
On 04 October 2002, Fernandez, Pacheco & Dizon Law
Offices filed its entry of appearance as being the new
counsel for appellant only to be substituted later by
Guzman, Tanedo, & Acain Law Offices.
On 10 June 2003, the Court noted and granted the
request of the law firm to be furnished with copies of all
motions, orders, resolutions and judgment in
connection with the case.
Kim then filed a motion to remand the case for new
trial. In his motion, appellant would attempt to overturn
his conviction or, at the very least, to be given a
chance for a new trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, because of newly
discovered evidence, i.e., his passport which would
establish his true identity as Huang Xiao Wei, a Chinese

Spouses Yee filed a complaint in the RTC against herein

private respondent for annulment and/or reformation of
contract of lease
On 28 February 1995, the lower court rendered
judgment in favor of petitioner corporation.
The former counsel for the private respondents, Atty.
Ralph Lou I. Willkom, received a copy of the decision on
3 March 1995 but did not inform them nor take any
step to protect the interests of his clients by presenting
a motion for reconsideration or taking an appeal. They
learned of the judgment only on 24 March 1995 when
they visited his office. The 15-day period within which
to appeal lapsed.
On 15 May 1995 Spouses Yee filed thru their present
counsel a petition for relief from judgment under Rule
38. The lower court denied the petition
Spouses motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
Aggrieved by the Order of the RTC, the spouses
Eduardo and Carmen Yee (YEES), the herein
respondents, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
granted their Petition
In reversing the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
inapplicable the general rule that notice to counsel is
notice to client
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence this
petition
where
the
petitioner,
Mercury
Drug
Corporation.
The petitioner contends that the respondents petition
for relief from judgment failed to comply with the
requirements of the Rules of Court inasmuch as the
petition was filed more than sixty days from the receipt
by their lawyer of the decision of the RTC. Petitioner
argues that it is long established by jurisprudence that
notice to the counsel is binding upon the client and that
the client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer

18

Issue: Whether or not the YEES timely filed their petition for
relief
Held: No

A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule

38 "RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER
PROCEEDINGS" - of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
Sections 1 and 3 of the aforementioned rule read:
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or
other proceedings. When a judgment or final order is
entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken
against a party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same case praying
that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Sec. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and
verification. A petition provided for in either of the
preceding sections of the Rule must be verified, filed
within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such
judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioners good and substantial cause
of action or defense, as the case may be.

A petition for relief from judgment is an

equitable remedy that is allowed only in
exceptional cases when there is no other
available or adequate remedy.
o
When a party has another remedy available to
him, which may be either a motion for new
trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the
trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence
from filing such motion or taking such appeal,
he cannot avail himself of this petition.
o
In order for a petition for relief to be
entertained by the court, the petitioner
must satisfactorily show that he has
faithfully and strictly complied with the
provisions of Rule 38.
o
It is also incumbent upon the petitioner to
show that the said petition was filed
within the reglementary period specified
in Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60)
days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment,
final
order,
or
other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment
or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken). And the rule is that
the reglementary period is reckoned from the
time the partys counsel receives notice of the
decision for notice to counsel of the decision is
notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of
Rule 38.
In the present case, the YEES were served a copy of the
judgment of the lower court through their counsel,
Attorney Ralph Lou I. Willkom on March 3, 1995. Thus,
the YEES are considered to have received notice on
March 3, 1995 when their counsel was served notice
and not on March 24, 1995 when they actually learned
of the adverse decision.
o
Consequently, their petition for relief, which
was filed on May 15, 1995 or over sixty days
from notice of their counsel, was filed out of
time. This Court has consistently held that the
failure of a partys counsel to notify him on
time of the adverse judgment to enable him to

appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not

excusable.
However, notice sent to counsel of record is
binding upon the client and the neglect or
failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to
appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face.

SPS. ROLANDO DELA CRUZ and TERESITA DELA CRUZ,

Petitioners, vs. SPS. FELICIANO ANDRES and ERLINDA
AUSTRIA, and the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 161864 | April 27, 2007 (2D)
Facts:

Spouses Rolando Dela Cruz and Teresita Dela Cruz filed

a complaint for annulment of title and/or reconveyance
with damages against spouses Feliciano Andres and
Erlinda Austria and the Director of Lands. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 523 and assigned to the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC).
The MCTC ordered the Director of Lands to cancel
Original Certificate of Title No. 11859 insofar as the 410
square meters owned and occupied by petitioners were
concerned. On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside
the decision of the MCTC.
On December 4, 2001, petitioners, assisted by Atty.
Rafael E. Villarosa, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review.
o
The appellate court dismissed the petition
since the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
was signed by Atty. Villarosa instead of
petitioners in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Thereafter, Atty. Villarosa withdrew his
appearance.
On May 6, 2002, petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for relief from judgment praying that
the dismissal of their petition for review be set aside
since the gross negligence of their previous counsel did
not bind them
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration,
petitioners came to this Court
Petitioners plead that they be spared the consequences
of their procedural lapse since it was caused by their
counsels gross negligence in ignoring a wellestablished rule that it is the party himself who should
verify and certify the pleading.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
petitioners counsel was not negligent and in fact did
his best since he filed the petition for review on time.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners can avail of a petition for relief

under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from a
judgment of the Court of Appeals due to their counsels
negligence when he signed the Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping
Held: No

A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
equitable remedy that is allowed only in
exceptional cases when there is no other
available or adequate remedy. It may be availed
of only after a judgment, final order or other
proceeding was taken against the petitioner in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence.

While the law uses the phrase "any court," it

refers
only
to
Municipal/Metropolitan and
Regional Trial Courts.
o
The procedure in the Court of Appeals and this
Court are governed by separate provisions of
the Rules of Court and may, from time to time,

19

be
supplemented
by
additional
rules
promulgated by this Court through resolutions
or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of
Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals allows the remedy of petition
for relief in the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the denial of a
petition for relief from judgment is subject only
to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65.
o
In seeking to reverse the appellate courts
decision denying their petition for relief from
judgment by a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, petitioners have availed of the
wrong remedy twice.
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to delve into the
merits of this petition, the same must still be denied.
What petitioners counsel did in this case was to attach
an improper Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to
their petition for review with the appellate court. While
this omission can plausibly qualify as simple
negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to
justify the annulment of the proceedings below.

For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper,

nothing short of clear abandonment of the clients
cause must be shown. The negligence of counsel must
be so gross that the client is deprived of his day in
court, the result of which is that he is deprived of his
property without due process of law. Thus, where a
party was given the opportunity to defend his interests
in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied
due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is
the very essence of due process.
o
Here, the case underwent a full-blown trial.
Both parties were adequately heard, and all
issues were ventilated before the decision was
promulgated.

It should be pointed out that in petitions for relief from

judgment, meritorious defenses must be accompanied
by the ground relied upon, whether it is fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence, extrinsic fraud or lack
of jurisdiction.
o
In the instant case, there being neither
excusable nor gross negligence amounting to
a denial of due process, meritorious defenses
cannot alone be considered.

While it is true that rules of procedure are not cast in

stone, it is equally true that strict compliance with the
Rules is indispensable for the prevention of needless
delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of
judicial business. Utter disregard of the rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.
ANTONIO CABADOR, Petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 186001 | October 2, 2009 (2D)
Facts:

PEOPLE

OF

THE

On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused

petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC of
murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N.
Valerio.
On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five
witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC
declared at an end the prosecutions presentation of
evidence and required the prosecution to make a
written or formal offer of its documentary evidence
within 15 days from notice. But the public prosecutor
asked for three extensions of time, the last of which
was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did
not make the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to
dismiss the case, complaining of a turtle-paced

proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in

2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial.
o
Further, he claimed that in the circumstances,
the trial court could not consider any evidence
against him that had not been formally
offered. He also pointed out that the
prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge
of his alleged part in the crime charged.
Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days
earlier or on July 28, 2006 the prosecution asked the
RTC for another extension of the period for its formal
offer, which offer it eventually made on August 1, 2006,
the day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss.
RTC then issued an Order treating petitioner Cabadors
August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer to
evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave
of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right
to present evidence in his defense.
The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision
insofar as he was concerned. Cabador filed a motion for
reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it on
February 19, 2007.
Cabador questioned the RTCs actions before the CA
but the latter denied his petition and affirmed the lower
courts actions. With the CAs denial of his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner came to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners motion to dismiss before the

trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave
of court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to
present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for
decision insofar as he was concerned
Held: No

The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two

stages: first, the prosecutions presentation of evidence
against the accused and, second, the accuseds
presentation of evidence in his defense.
o
If, after the prosecution has presented its
evidence, the same appears insufficient to
support a conviction, the trial court may at its
own initiative or on motion of the accused
dispense with the second stage and dismiss
the criminal action. There is no point for the
trial court to hear the evidence of the accused
in such a case since the prosecution bears the
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an
acquittal.

But because some have in the past used the demurrer

in order to delay the proceedings in the case, the
remedy now carries a caveat.
o
When the accused files a demurrer
without leave of court, he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence and the case shall be
considered submitted for judgment.
o
On occasions, this presents a problem such as
when, like the situation in this case, the
accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the
RTC, had the appearance of a demurrer to
evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one but
the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.

This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections

that, to determine whether the pleading filed is a
demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court
must consider:
o
the allegations in it made in good faith;
o
the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed;
and
o
the primary objective of the party filing it.

In this case, he gaps between proceedings were long,

with hearings often postponed because of the
prosecutors absence. This was further compounded,

20

Cabador said, by the prosecutions repeated motions

for extension of time to file its formal offer and its
failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked
in paragraph 13 above his right to speedy trial. But the
RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore these extensive
averments and altogether treated Cabadors motion as
a demurrer to evidence because of a few observations
he made regarding the inadequacy of the evidence
against him.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what
is so fundamental in any demurrer.
o
He did not state what evidence the
prosecution had presented against him to
show in what respects such evidence failed to
meet the elements of the crime charged.
o
His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any
particular testimony of even one witness. He
cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he
could not because, he did not know that the
prosecution finally made its formal offer of
exhibits on the same date he filed his motion
to dismiss.
o
To say that Cabador filed a demurrer to
evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind
man, touching the side of an elephant, and
exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the
prosecution has already rested its case. Section
23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, reads:
Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its
case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or
(2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of
exhibits on August 1, 2006, the same day Cabador filed
his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give
him an opportunity to object to the admission of those
exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And
only after such a ruling could the prosecution be
deemed to have rested its case.
o
Since Cabador filed his motion to dismiss
before he could object to the prosecutions
formal offer, before the trial court could act on
the offer, and before the prosecution could
rest its case, it could not be said that he had
intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a
demurrer to evidence.
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas,
the Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy
trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot be
declared to have waived his right to present evidence
in his defense.
On a final note, a demurrer to evidence shortens the
proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must, however,
be exercised in view of its pernicious consequence on
the right of the accused to present evidence in his
defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the
gravity of the penalty involved.

GREGORIO SINGIAN, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

(3RD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Respondents.
G.R. Nos.195011-19 | September 30, 2013 (2D)
Facts:

Singian was charged with nine counts of violation of

Section 3(e),7 and another nine counts of violation of
Section 3(g),8 of Republic Act No.3019 (RA 3019), or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The cases
involved the purported granting of behest loans by the

governments Philippine National Bank (PNB) to

Integrated Shoes, Inc. (ISI), in various amounts and on
different dates as above-enumerated.
Trial ensued after Singian (and other co-accuse)
pleaded not guilty
Singian then filed a Demurrer on the following Grounds:
o
lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB
official;
o
the contracts with PNB contained provisions
that are beneficial, and not manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous, to the government;
o
the loans could not be characterized as behest
loans because they were secured by sufficient
collaterals and ISI increased its capitalization;
and
o
assuming the loans are behest loans,
petitioner could not be held liable for lack of
any participation.
Prosecution filed an Opposition insisting that conspiracy
may be inferred from the following pattern of events:
o
The frequency of the loans or closeness of the
dates at which they were granted;
o
The quantity of the loans granted;
o
The failure of PNB to verify and to take any
action on ISIs failure to put up additional
capitalization and additional collaterals; and d.
The eventual absence of any action by PNB to
collect full payment from ISI.
Prosecution noted that petitioners arguments in his
Demurrer to Evidence constitute matters of defense
which should be passed upon only after trial on the
merits.
SB denied the Demurrer; denied ensuing MR. Singian
then elevated to SC via Rule 65

Issue: Whether or not the denial of the demurrer to evidence is

proper
Held: Yes

A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of

the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is in sufficient in point of
law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict.
The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt."

"Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a

demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight
or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official
action demanded according to the circumstances. To be
considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must
prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the
precise degree of participation therein by the accused."

For one to be successfully prosecuted under Section

3(g) of RA 3019, the following elements must be
proven: 1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public
officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf
of the government; and 3) the contract or transaction
was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
o
However, private persons may likewise be
charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA
3019 if they conspired with the public officer.
Thus, "if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a
private person may be held liable together
with the public officer, in consonance with the
avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act which is to repress certain acts
of public officers and private persons alike
which may constitute graft or corrupt practices
or which may lead thereto."

21

The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution

presented sufficient or competent evidence to establish
the three material elements of Section 3(g) of RA3019.
First, although petitioner is a private person, he was
shown to have connived with his co-accused. Second,
ISI and PNB entered into several loan transactions and
credit accommodations. Finally, the loan transactions
proved disadvantageous to the government.
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan in denying petitioners Demurrer to
Evidence
o
At the outset, we emphasize that "the
resolution of a demurrer to evidence
should be left to the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. A lower courts order of
denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the
appellate
courts
will
not
review
the
prosecutions evidence and precipitately
decide whether such evidence has established
the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt, unless accused has established that
such judicial discretion has been gravely
abused, there by amounting to a lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such
abuse will not suffice."

Grave abuse of discretion is the

capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment on the part of the public
officer concerned which is equivalent
to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or
hostility."
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an
iota of evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan
abused, much more, gravely abused, its discretion in
denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.
o
We agree with the PCGGs observation that
the Sandiganbayan arrived at its conclusion
after a careful and deliberate examination and
assessment of all the evidence submitted. A
closer scrutiny of the assailed Resolutions
would indeed show that the Sandiganbayan
meticulously discussed both testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution. It was only after a careful analysis
of the facts and evidence presented did the
respondent court lay down its findings and
conclusions.
o
Based on the evidence presented, the
Sandiganbayan was convinced that all three
elements of Section 3(g), RA 3019 were
satisfactorily established. It found that PNB
and ISI entered into several contracts or loan
transactions.
When there is no showing of such grave abuse,
certiorari is not the proper remedy. Rather, the
appropriate recourse from an order denying a demurrer
to evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial,
after which the accused may file an appeal from the
judgment of the lower court rendered after such trial.
o
In the present case, we are not prepared to
rule that the Sandiganbayan has gravely
abused its discretion when it denied
petitioners demurrer to evidence. Public
respondent found that the prosecutions
evidence
satisfactorily
established
the
elements
of
the
crime
charged.
Correspondingly, there is nothing in the

records of this case nor in the pleadings of

petitioner that would show otherwise.
In fine, we hold that "the presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense that may be passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits," and "the validity and merits
of a party's defense or accusation, as well as
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper."
o
Petitioner's claims and defenses in his
Demurrer to Evidence can best be tackled
during trial. In the presentation of his defense,
he shall have the opportunity to explain or
show why he should not be made liable. For
example, if there is any truth to the allegation
in his Demurrer of Evidence that the Deed of
Undertaking was altered, or that the signature
therein affixed is not his own, such that there
arise serious doubts as to his participation in
the execution of said document, this can be
resolved only upon proof presented during
trial. Petitioner must present evidence
regarding such claim, the truth of which he
can demonstrate during trial. Since this Court
is not a trier of facts, there is no way that this
issue can be resolved by this Court at this
stage of he proceedings.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
SALVINO SUMINGWA, Appellant.
G.R. No. 183619

October 13, 2009

FACTS: In twelve Informations, the prosecution charged

appellant with two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, four (4)
counts of Rape, three (3) counts of Unjust Vexation, one (1)
count of Other Light Threats, one (1) count of Maltreatment, and
one (1) count of Attempted Rape for acts committed against his
minor daughter AAA from 1999-2001.

Appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all the charges. On September

24, 2004, the RTC dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 1647 for Rape;
1648 for Unjust Vexation; 1650 for Other Light Threats; 1652 for
Unjust Vexation; and 1653 for Maltreatment, on the basis of the
Demurrer to Evidence filed by appellant.

AAA decided to report the sexual abuses to her grandmother

who forthwith brought her to the National Bureau of
Investigation where she was examined by the medico-legal
officer. It was found during the examination that there were no
extragenital physical injuries on AAAs body but there were old,
healed, and incomplete hymenal lacerations.

On November 24, 2004, AAA executed an Affidavit of

Recantation claiming that while appellant indeed committed
lascivious acts against her, she exaggerated her accusations

22

against him. She explained that appellant did not actually rape
her, as there was no penetration. She added that she charged
appellant with such crimes only upon the prodding of her
mother and maternal grandmother.

On February 14, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision convicting

appellant of six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness, one (1)
count of attempted rape and one (1) count of unjust vexation
giving credence to AAAs testimonies on the alleged lascivious
acts committed against her. In view of the withdrawal of her
earlier claim of the fact of penetration, the court sustained the
innocence of appellant on the rape charges and concluded that
the crime committed was only Acts of Lasciviousness.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of appellant, except

that in Criminal Case No. 1646; it convicted him of Qualified
Rape instead of Acts of Lasciviousness.

siblings. It does not go against reason or logic to conclude

that a daughter, in hopes of bringing back the harmony in
her family tormented by the trauma of rape, would
eventually cover for the dastardly acts committed by her
own father. Verily, the Victims subsequent retraction does
not negate her previous testimonies accounting her ordeal
in the hands for (sic) her rapist.

The CA correctly convicted appellant of Qualified Rape in

Criminal Case No. 1646, and of Acts of Lasciviousness in
Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654.

In her direct testimony, AAA stated that appellant removed her

short pants and panty, went on top of her and rubbed his penis
against her vaginal orifice. She resisted by crossing her legs but
her effort was not enough to prevent appellant from pulling her
leg and eventually inserting his penis into her vagina. Clearly,
there was penetration.

ISSUE: WON appellant is guilty of Qualified Rape?

HELD: Yes. In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal

of the accused most often depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainants testimony. By the very nature of
this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is
left to testify for herself. When a rape victims testimony is
straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling
examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be
discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to
establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may
be based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere
retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate
her original testimony.

A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by

the courts. It is exceedingly unreliable for there is always
the probability that such recantation may later on be
repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses
through intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any
other testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility
based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on
the demeanor of the witness on the stand.

It is noteworthy that appellant pulled AAAs leg, so that he could

insert his penis into her vagina. This adequately shows that
appellant employed force in order to accomplish his purpose.
Moreover, in rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the formers moral ascendancy and influence
over the latter may substitute for actual physical
violence and intimidation. The moral and physical dominion
of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his
beastly desires, and no further proof need be shown to prove
lack of the victims consent to her own defilement.

While appellants conviction was primarily based on the

prosecutions testimonial evidence, the same was corroborated
by physical evidence consisting of the medical findings of the
medico-legal officer that there were hymenal lacerations. When
a rape victims account is straightforward and candid, and is
corroborated by the medical findings of the examining
physician, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for rape.

Aside from the fact of commission of rape, the prosecution

likewise established that appellant is the biological father of AAA
and that the latter was then fifteen (15) years old. Thus, the CA
aptly convicted him of qualified rape, defined and penalized by
Article 266-B of the RPC.

As correctly held by the CA, AAAs testimony is credible

notwithstanding her subsequent retraction. We quote with
approval its ratiocination in this wise:
ISSUE2: WON accused-appellant is guilty
Lasciviousness committed against a child?
Clearly, the retraction made by the Victim is heavily
unreliable. The primordial factor that impelled the Victim to
retract the rape charges against her father was her fear and
concern for the welfare of her family especially her four (4)

of

Acts

of

HELD: Yes. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, reads:

23

sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation,

prostitution, or incest with children;
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children,
whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.

(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching,

either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
public area of a person.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period

to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act
No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the
penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; x x x. (Italics supplied.)

The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as

follows:
1. The accused commits
or lascivious conduct.

the

act

of

sexual

intercourse

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution

or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

AAA testified that in November 2000, while she and appellant

were inside the bedroom, he went on top of her and rubbed his
penis against her vaginal orifice until he ejaculated. She likewise
stated in open court that on May 27, 2001, while inside their
comfort room, appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina
while they were in a standing position. In both instances, there
was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert his penis into
her vagina.

Following the "variance doctrine" embodied in Section 4, in

relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness committed against a child. The pertinent
provisions read:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and

proof. When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.

Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An

offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.

As the crime was committed by the father of the offended party,

the alternative circumstance of relationship should be
appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts of
Lasciviousness, relationship is always aggravating.

ISSUE3: WON appellant is guilty of 2 counts of Acts of

Lasciviousness committed against AAA on the second week of
August 1999 and on the first week of September 1999?
The aforesaid acts of the appellant are covered by the
definitions of "sexual abuse" and "lascivious conduct" under
Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated
to implement the provisions of R.A. 7610:
(g) "Sexual
abuse" includes
the
employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child
to engage in, or assist another person to engage in,

HELD: Yes. AAA testified that in August, appellant, with lewd

design, inserted his hands inside her shirt then fondled her
breasts; and in September, he forced her to hold his penis until
he ejaculated.

24

The trial and the appellate courts were correct in giving

credence to the victims testimony, in dismissing appellants
defense of denial and alibi, and in disbelieving that AAA initiated
the criminal cases only upon the prodding of the latters
grandmother. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere
denial of ones involvement in a crime cannot take
precedence over the positive testimony of the offended
party.

We are not unmindful of the fact that appellant was specifically

charged in an Information for Acts of Lasciviousness defined and
penalized by Article 336 of the RPC. However, the failure to
designate the offense by statute, or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. The character of the
crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by
the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information.

In the present case, the body of the information contains an

averment of the acts alleged to have been committed by
appellant which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under
Section 5(b), Article III, R.A. 7610.

On September 24, 2004, the RTC dismissed Criminal Case Nos.

1650, 1652 and 1653 for insufficiency of evidence. Criminal
Case No. 1651, among others, proceeded, however. Eventually,
appellant was convicted of Attempted Rape, which the CA
affirmed.

A careful review of the records reveals, though, that the

evidence is insufficient to support appellants conviction of
Attempted Rape.

The attempt that the RPC punishes is that which has a logical
connection to a particular, concrete offense; and that which is
the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of
the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. In the instant case, the primary question that
comes to the fore is whether or not appellants act of removing
AAAs pants constituted an overt act of Rape.

We answer in the negative.

Overt or external act has been defined as some physical

activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.

Appellant should, therefore, be meted the same penalties and

be made to answer for damages as in Criminal Case Nos. 1649
and 1654.

ISSUE4: WON appellant is guilty of attempted rape considering

that there was an earlier demurrer granted?

HELD: No. AAA testified that on November 24, 2000, while AAA
and her brothers were sleeping inside their parents bedroom,
appellant entered and asked AAA to have sex with him. When
AAA refused, appellant forcibly removed her clothes and boxed
her right buttock. As she still resisted, he took a bolo, which he
poked at her. Appellant desisted from committing further acts
because of the timely arrival of AAAs grandmother. With these,
appellant was charged with Other Light Threats in Criminal Case
No. 1650; Attempted Rape in Criminal Case No. 1651; Unjust
Vexation in Criminal Case No. 1652; and Maltreatment in
Criminal Case No. 1653.

The detailed acts of execution showing an attempt to rape are

simply lacking. It would be too strained to construe appellants
act of removing AAAs pants as an overt act that will logically
and necessarily ripen into rape. Hence, appellant must be
acquitted of Attempted Rape.

Neither can we hold appellant liable for Other Light Threats for
threatening AAA with a bolo; for Unjust Vexation for undressing
her without her consent, causing disturbance, torment, distress,
and vexation; nor for Maltreatment for boxing the right side of
AAAs buttocks. Although all of the above acts were alleged in
the Information for Attempted Rape in the Order dated
September 24, 2004, Criminal Case Nos. 1650, 1652 and 1653
involving the above crimes were dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence based on the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant.

The order granting appellants demurrer to evidence was

a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounted
to an acquittal. Any further prosecution of the accused

25

after an acquittal would violate the proscription on

double jeopardy. Accordingly, appellants conviction of any of
the above crimes, even under Criminal Case No. 1651, would
trench in his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE5: WON appellant is guilty of unjust vexation?

HELD: Yes. Appellant was charged with Unjust Vexation, defined

and penalized by Article 287 of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 287. Light coercions. Any person who, by means of

violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the
purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a
fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than
75 pesos.

Any other coercion or unjust vexation shall be punished by

arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.

The second paragraph of this provision is broad enough

to include any human conduct that, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, could
unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. The
paramount question to be considered is whether the
offenders act caused annoyance, irritation, torment,
distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to
whom it was directed.

Appellants acts of embracing, dragging and kissing AAA in front

of her friend annoyed AAA. The filing of the case against
appellant proved that AAA was disturbed, if not distressed by
the acts of appellant.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES JOSE C. GO and ELVY T. GO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 175514
February 14, 2011
FACTS: On September 30, 1999, respondent Jose C. Go (Go)
obtained two loans from PBCom, evidenced by two promissory
notes. To secure the two loans, Go executed two (2) pledge
agreements, covering shares of stock in Ever Gotesco Resources
and Holdings, Inc.
Two years later, however, the market value of the said shares of
stock plunged to less than P0.04 per share. Thus, PBCom, as
pledgee, notified Go in writing on June 15, 2001, that it was
renouncing the pledge agreements.

Later, PBCom filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money
against Go and his wife, Elvy T. Go (Spouses Go), alleging that
Spouses Go defaulted on the two (2) promissory notes, having
paid only three (3) installments on interest paymentscovering
the months of September, November and December 1999.
Consequently, the entire balance of the obligations of Go
became immediately due and demandable. PBCom made
repeated demands upon Spouses Go for the payment of said
obligations, but the couple imposed conditions on the payment,
such as the lifting of garnishment effected by the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on Gos accounts.
Spouses Go filed their Answer with Counterclaim denying the
material allegations in the complaint and stating, among other
matters, that:
8. The promissory note referred to in the complaint
expressly state that the loan obligation is payable within the
period of ten (10) years. Thus, from the execution date of
September 30, 1999, its due date falls on September 30,
2009 (and not 2001 as erroneously stated in the complaint).
Thus, prior to September 30, 2009, the loan obligations
cannot be deemed due and demandable.
9. Contrary to the plaintiffs proferrence, defendant Jose C.
Go had made substantial payments in terms of his monthly
payments. There is, therefore, a need to do some
accounting works (sic) to reconcile the records of both
parties.
10. While demand is a necessary requirement to consider
the defendant to be in delay/default, such has not been
complied with by the plaintiff since the former is not aware
of any demand made to him by the latter for the settlement
of the whole obligation.
11. Undeniably, at the time the pledge of the shares of
stock were executed, their total value is more than the
amount of the loan or at the very least, equal to it. Thus,
plaintiff was fully secured insofar as its exposure is
concerned.
12. And even assuming without conceding, that the present
value of said shares x x x went down, it cannot be
considered as something permanent since the prices of
stocks in the market either increases (sic) or decreases (sic)
depending on the market forces. Thus, it is highly
speculative for the plaintiff to consider said shares to have
suffered tremendous decrease in its value. More so, it is
unfair for the plaintiff to renounce or abandon the pledge
agreements.
On September 28, 2001, PBCom filed a verified motion for
summary judgment, which was opposed by the Spouses Go. The
RTC granted the motion and a decision was rendered for the
plaintiff.
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court finding that the
supposed admission are insufficient to justify a rendition of
summary judgment in the case for sum of money, since there
were other allegations and defenses put up by Spouses Go in
their Answer which raised genuine issues on the material facts
in the action.
ISSUE: WON Summary Judgment was proper?
HELD: No. The Court agrees with the CA that "[t]he supposed
admission of defendants-appellants on the x x x allegations in
the complaint is clearly not sufficient to justify the rendition of
summary judgment in the case for sum of money, considering
that there are other allegations embodied and defenses raised
by the defendants-appellants in their answer which raise a
genuine issue as to the material facts in the action."
The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine issues as to
three material facts, which have to be addressed during
trial: first, the fact of default; second, the amount of the
outstanding obligation, and third, the existence of prior
demand.

26

Under the Rules, following the filing of pleadings, if, on motion of

a party and after hearing, the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions and admissions on file show that, "except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law," summary judgment may be
rendered. This rule was expounded in Asian Construction and
Development Corporation v. Philippine Commercial International
Bank, where it was written:
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended,
except as to the amount of damages, when there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be
allowed. Summary
or
accelerated
judgment
is
a
procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims
or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby
avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when
there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the
presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on
their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are
not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules
must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor,
therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as
pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real
or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary
judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence
of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to
render summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the
facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot
take the place of trial. (Underscoring supplied.)
Juxtaposing the Complaint and the Answer discloses that the
material facts here are not undisputed so as to call for the
rendition of a summary judgment. While the denials of Spouses
Go could have been phrased more strongly or more
emphatically, and the Answer more coherently and logically
structured in order to overthrow any shadow of doubt that such
denials were indeed made, the pleadings show that they did in
fact raise material issues that have to be addressed and
threshed out in a full-blown trial.
PBCom anchors its arguments on the alleged implied admission
by Spouses Go resulting from their failure to specifically deny
the material allegations in the Complaint, citing as
precedent Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of
Appeals, and Morales v. Court of Appeals. Spouses Go, on the
other hand, argue that although admissions were made in the
Answer, the special and affirmative defenses contained therein
tendered genuine issues.
Under the Rules, every pleading must contain, in a methodical
and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts.
To specifically deny a material allegation, a defendant must
specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he
does not admit, and whenever practicable, shall set forth the
substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his
denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material
and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so
state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates
three (3) modes of specific denial, namely: 1) by specifying each
material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of
which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable,
setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely
upon to support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an
averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying
only the remainder; (3) by stating that the defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the
effect of a denial.45
The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial
is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint
which he succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together
with the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The
parties are compelled to lay their cards on the table.
Again, in drafting pleadings, members of the bar are
enjoined to be clear and concise in their language, and to
be organized and logical in their composition and
structure in order to set forth their statements of fact
and
arguments
of
law
in
the
most
readily
comprehensible manner possible. Failing such standard,
allegations made in pleadings are not to be taken as
stand-alone catchphrases in the interest of accuracy.
They must be contextualized and interpreted in relation
to the rest of the statements in the pleading.
In this case, the admissions made by Spouses Go are to be read
and taken together with the rest of the allegations made in the
Answer, including the special and affirmative defenses.
For instance, on the fact of default, PBCom alleges in paragraph
8 of the Complaint that Go defaulted in the payment for both
promissory notes, having paid only three interest installments
covering the months of September, November, and December
1999.
In paragraph 6 of the Answer, Spouses Go denied the said
allegation, and further alleged in paragraphs 8 to 13 that Go
made substantial payments on his monthly loan amortizations.
The portions of the pleadings referred to are juxtaposed below:
Complaint
8. The defendant defaulted in
the payment of the obligations
on the two (2) promissory
notes (Annexes "A" and "B"
hereof) as he has paid only
three (3) installments on
interests
(sic)
payments
covering
the
months
of
September, November and
December, 1999, on both
promissory notes, respectively.
As a consequence of the
default, the entire balance due
on the obligations of the
defendant to plaintiff on both
promissory notes immediately
became due and demandable
pursuant to the terms and
conditions embodied in the
two (2) promissory notes;48

Answer
6.
Defendants
deny
the
allegations in paragraphs 8, 9,
10 and 11 of the Complaint;
xxx
8. The promissory notes
referred to in the complaint
expressly state that the loan
obligation is payable within
the period of ten (10) years.
Thus, from the execution date
of September 30, 1999, its
due date falls on September
3o, 2009 (and not 2001 as
erroneously stated in the
complaint). Thus, prior to
September 30, 2009, the loan
obligations cannot be deemed
due and demandable.
In conditional obligations, the
acquisition of rights, as well as
the extinguishment or loss of
those already acquired, shall
depend upon the happening of
the event which constitutes

27

the condition. (Article 1181,

New Civil Code)
9. Contrary to the plaintiffs
preference, defendant Jose C.
Go has made substantial
payments in terms of his
monthly payments. There is
therefore, a need to do some
accounting works (sic) just to
reconcile the records of both
parties.
10. While demand is a
necessary
requirement
to
consider the defendant to be
in delay/default, such has not
been complied with by the
plaintiff since the former is not
aware of any demand made to
him by the latter for the
settlement
of
the
whole
obligation.
11. Undeniably, at the time
the pledge of the shares of
stocks were executed, their
total value is more than the
amount of the loan, or at the
very least, equal to it. Thus,
plaintiff was fully secured
insofar as its exposure is
concerned.49
12.
And
even
assuming
without conceding, that the
present value of said shares
has went (sic) down, it cannot
be considered as something
permanent since, the prices of
stocks in the market either
increases
(sic)
or
(sic)
decreases depending on the
market forces. Thus, it is
highly speculative for the
plaintiff
to
consider
said
shares
to
have
suffered
tremendous decrease in its
value. Moreso (sic), it is unfair
for the plaintiff to renounce or
abandon
the
pledge
agreements.
13. As aptly stated, it is not
aware of any termination of
the pledge agreement initiated
by the plaintiff.
Moreover, in paragraph 10 of the Answer, Spouses Go also
denied the existence of prior demand alleged by PBCom in
paragraph 10 of the Complaint. They stated therein that they
were not aware of any demand made by PBCom for the
settlement of the whole obligation. Both sections are quoted
below:
Complaint
10. Plaintiff made repeated
demands from (sic) defendant
for the payment of the
obligations which the latter
acknowledged
to
have
incurred however, defendant
imposed conditions such as

Answer
10. While demand is a
necessary
requirement
to
consider the defendant to be
in delay/default, such has not
been complied with by the
plaintiff since the former is not
aware of any demand made to

[that] his [effecting] payments

shall depend upon the lifting
of garnishment effected by the
Bangko
Sentral
on
his
accounts.
Photocopies
of
defendants
communication
dated March 3, 2000 and April
7, 2000, with plaintiff are
hereto attached as Annexes
"F" and "G" hereof, as well as
its demand to pay dated April
18, 2000. Demand by plaintiff
is hereto attached as Annex
"H" hereof.50 [Emphases
supplied]

him by the latter for the

settlement
of
the
whole
obligation.

Finally, as to the amount of the outstanding obligation, PBCom

alleged in paragraph 9 of the Complaint that the outstanding
balance on the couples obligations as of May 31, 2001
was P21,576,668.64 for the first loan andP95,991,111.11, for
the second loan or a total of P117,567,779.75.
In paragraph 9 of the Answer, however, Spouses Go, without
stating any specific amount, averred that substantial monthly
payments had been made, and there was a need to reconcile
the accounting records of the parties.
Complaint
9. Defendants outstanding
obligations under the two (2)
promissory notes as of May
31, 2001 are: P21,576,668.64
(Annex
"A")
and
P95,991,111.11 (Annex "B"),
or a total of P117,567,779.75.
Copy of the Statement of
Account is hereto attached
as Annex "E"hereof.51

Answer
9. Contrary to the plaintiffs
preference, defendant Jose C.
Go has made substantial
payments in terms of his
monthly payments. There is
therefore, a need to do some
accounting works just to
reconcile the records of both
parties.52

Clearly then, when taken within the context of the entirety of the
pleading, it becomes apparent that there was no implied
admission and that there were indeed genuine issues to be
addressed.
As to the attached March 3, 2000 letter, the Court is in
accord with the CA when it wrote:
The letter dated March 3, 2000 is insufficient to support the
material averments in PBComs complaint for being equivocal
and capable of different interpretations. The contents of the
letter do not address all the issues material to the banks claim
and thus do not conclusively establish the cause of action of
PBCom against the spouses Go. As regards the letter dated April
7, 2000, the trial court itself ruled that such letter addressed to
PBCom could not be considered against the defendantsappellants simply because it was not signed by defendantappellant Jose Go.
In this case, Spouses Go are not disclaiming knowledge of the
transaction or the execution of the promissory notes or the
pledge agreements sued upon. The matters in contention are, as
the CA stated, whether or not respondents were in default,
whether there was prior demand, and the amount of the
outstanding loan. These are the matters that the parties
disagree on and by which reason they set forth vastly different
allegations in their pleadings which each will have to prove by
presenting relevant and admissible evidence during trial.
Furthermore, in stark contrast to the cited cases where one of
the parties disclaimed knowledge of something so patently
within his knowledge, in this case, respondents Spouses Go
categorically stated in the Answer that there was no prior
demand, that they were not in default, and that the amount of

28

the outstanding loan would have to be ascertained based on

official records.

ISSUE: WON Summary Judgment was proper?

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

HELD: No. Summary judgments are governed by Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of which state:
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ARSENIO ALDECOA, JOSE B. TORRE, CONRADO U. PUA,
GREGORIO
V.
MANSANO,
JERRY
CORPUZ
and
ESTELITAACOSTA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 166330

September 11, 2013

FACTS: On March 9, 2000, petitioner entered into a contract of

lease of a lot where petitioner constructed and installed a
cellular base station. Inside the cellular base station is a
communications tower, rising as high as150 feet, with antennas
and transmitters; as well as a power house open on three sides
containing a 25KVA diesel power generator. Around and close to
the cellular base station are houses, hospitals, clinics, and
establishments, including the properties of respondents Arsenio
Aldecoa, Jose B. Torre, Conrado U. Pua, Gregorio V. Mansano,
Jerry Corpuz, and Estelita Acosta.

Respondents filed a complaint for abatement of nuisance and

injunction. In its Answer/Motion to Oppose Temporary
Restraining Order with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner
raised special and affirmative defenses.

SEC. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party

against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be

served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the
hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. (Emphases supplied.)

In Rivera v. Solidbank Corporation, the Court

extensively when a summary judgment is proper:

discussed

For a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must

establish two requisites:
On September 11, 2000, petitioner filed its Pre-Trial Brief in
which it identified the issues. On even date, petitioner filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment.

(a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact,

except for the amount of damages; and
(b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment
must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

On January 16, 2001, the RTC issued its Order granting

petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing
respondents Complaint.

On appeal, the CA declared the cellular base station of petitioner

a nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the
residents because: (1) the locational clearance granted to
petitioner was a nullity due to the lack of approval by majority of
the actual residents of the barangay and a barangay resolution
endorsing the construction of the cellular base station; and (2)
the sound emission of the generator at the cellular base station
exceeded the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) standards.

Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party,

including documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a
material fact exists, the burden to produce a genuine issue
shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the
moving party is entitled to a summary judgment.

A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the

presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue
which is a sham, fictitious, contrived or a false claim.

29

The trial court can determine a genuine issue on the basis of the
pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits or counter
affidavits submitted by the parties. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or
genuine issue or question as to any fact and summary judgment
called for. On the other hand, where the facts pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary
judgment cannot take the place of a trial. The evidence on
record must be viewed in light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion who must be given the benefit of all
favorable inferences as can reasonably be drawn from the
evidence.

Courts must be critical of the papers presented by the moving

party and not of the papers/documents in opposition thereto.
Conclusory assertions are insufficient to raise an issue of
material fact. A party cannot create a genuine dispute of
material fact through mere speculations or compilation of
differences. He may not create an issue of fact through bald
assertions, unsupported contentions and conclusory statements.
He must do more than rely upon allegations but must come
forward with specific facts in support of a claim. Where the
factual context makes his claim implausible, he must come
forward with more persuasive evidence demonstrating a
genuine issue for trial.

Judging by the aforequoted standards, summary judgment

cannot be rendered in this case as there are clearly factual
issues disputed or contested by the parties. As respondents
correctly argued in their Opposition to petitioners Motion for
Summary Judgment:

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, there are several genuine

issues as to the cause of action and material facts related to the
complaint. For one there is an issue on the structural
integrity of the tower, the ultrahigh frequency (UHF)
radio wave emission radiated by the communications
tower affecting the life, health and well-being of
the[respondents] and the barangay residents, especially
their children. Also, the noxious/deleterious fumes and
the noise produce[d] by the standby generator and the
danger posted by the tower if it collapses in regard to
life and limb as well as the property of the [respondents]
particularly those whose houses abut, or are near/within
the periphery of the communications tower. x x x

Likewise constituting real or genuine issues for trial, which arose

from subsequent events, are the following: whether the
generator subject of respondents Complaint had been
removed; whether said generator had been replaced by
another that produces as much or even more noise and
fumes; and whether the generator is a nuisance that can
be abated separately from the rest of the cellular base
station.

A reading of the RTC Order dated January 16, 2001 readily shows
that the trial court did not take into account any of the
considerations or tests before summarily dismissing Civil Case
No. Br. 23-632-2000. The reasoning of the RTC that similar
cellular base stations are scattered in heavily populated areas
nationwide and are not declared nuisances is unacceptable. As
to whether or not this specific cellular base station of petitioner
is a nuisance to respondents is largely dependent on the
particular factual circumstances involved in the instant case,
which is exactly why a trial for threshing out disputed or
contested factual issues is indispensable. Evidently, it was the
RTC which engaged in speculations and unsubstantiated
conclusions.

For the same reasons cited above, without presentation by the

parties of evidence on the contested or disputed facts, there
was no factual basis for declaring petitioner's cellular base
station a nuisance and ordering petitioner to cease and desist
from operating the same.

Given the equally important interests of the parties in this case,

i.e., on one hand, respondents' health, safety, and property, and
on the other, petitioner's business interest and the public's need
for accessible and better cellular mobile telephone services, the
wise and prudent course to take is to remand the case to the
RTC for trial and give the parties the opportunity to prove their
respective factual claims.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is

PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 and
Resolution dated December 9, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71337 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records of the case be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, of Roxas, Isabela, which is DIRECTED to reinstate
Civil Case No. Br. 23-632-2000 to its docket and proceed with
the trial and adjudication thereof with appropriate dispatch in
accordance with this Decision.

ANDREW JAMES MCBURNIE, Petitioner,

vs.
EULALIO GANZON, EGI-MANAGERS, INC. and E. GANZON,
INC., Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117 G R. Nos. 186984-85
October 17, 2013
FACTS: On October 4, 2002, McBurnie, an Australian national,
instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary
claims against the respondents alleging that on May 11, 1999,
he signed a five-year employment agreement with the company
EGI as an Executive Vice-President who shall oversee the
management of the companys hotels and resorts within the
Philippines. He performed work for the company until sometime
in November 1999, when he figured in an accident that
compelled him to go back to Australia while recuperating from
his injuries. While in Australia, he was informed by respondent
Ganzon that his services were no longer needed because their
intended project would no longer push through.
The respondents opposed the complaint, contending that their
agreement with McBurnie was to jointly invest in and establish a

30

company for the management of hotels. They did not intend to

create an employer-employee relationship, and the execution of
the employment contract that was being invoked by McBurnie
was solely for the purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an
alien work permit in the Philippines. At the time McBurnie left for
Australia for his medical treatment, he had not yet obtained a
work permit.
The LA declared McBrnie as having been illegally dismissed. On
appeal, respondents filed for a motion to reduce bond which was
denied by the NLRC explaining that "in cases involving monetary
award, an employer seeking to appeal the [LAs] decision to the
Commission is unconditionally required by Art. 223, Labor Code
to post bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award x
x x." Thus, the NLRC required from the respondents the posting
of an additional bond in the amount of P54,083,910.00.
Their MR having been denied, respondents elevated the case to
the CA.
In the meantime, in view of the respondents failure to post the
required additional bond, the NLRC dismissed their appeal which
prompted the respondents to file with the CA the Petition for
Certiorari which was later consolidated with the earlier petition.
The application for writ of preliminary injunction having been
granted by the CA, petitioner filed before the SC a Petition for
Review on Certiorari docketed as G.R. Nos. 178034 and 178117,
assailing the CA Resolutions that granted the respondents
application for the injunctive writ. On July 4, 2007, the Court
denied the petition on the ground of McBurnies failure to
comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and to
sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error. A
motion for reconsideration was denied with finality in a
Resolution dated October 8, 2007.
Unyielding, McBurnie filed a Motion for Leave (1) To File
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and (2) To Admit the
Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, which was
treated by the Court as a second motion for reconsideration, a
prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 56 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, the motion for leave was denied by the Court in a
Resolution dated November 26, 2007. The Courts Resolution
dated July 4, 2007 then became final and executory on
November 13, 2007; accordingly, entry of judgment was made
in G.R. Nos. 178034 and 178117.
In the meantime, the CA ruled on the merits of CA-G.R. SP No.
90845 and CA-G.R. SP No. 95916 and rendered its
Decision dated October 27, 2008, allowing the respondents
motion to reduce appeal bond and directing the NLRC to give
due course to their appeal.
Undeterred, McBurnie filed a motion for reconsideration. At the
same time, the respondents moved that the appeal be resolved
on the merits by the CA. On March 3, 2009, the CA issued a
Resolution denying both motions. McBurnie then filed with the
Court the Petition for Review on Certiorari docketed as G.R. Nos.
186984-85.

October 27, 2008 and Resolution dated March 3, 2009 (allowing

the appeal of respondents and motion to reduce bond).
Meanwhile, on the basis of the Courts Decision, McBurnie filed
with the NLRC a motion for reconsideration with motion to recall
and expunge from the records the NLRC Decision dated
November 17, 2009. The motion was granted by the NLRC in its
Decision dated January 14, 2010.
Undaunted by the denial of their first motion for reconsideration
of the Decision dated September 18, 2009, the respondents filed
with the Court a Motion for Leave to Submit Attached Second
Motion
for
Reconsideration and
Second
Motion
for
Reconsideration, which motion for leave was granted in a
Resolution dated March 15, 2010. McBurnie was allowed to
submit his comment on the second motion, and the
respondents, their reply to the comment. On January 25, 2012,
however, the Court issued a Resolution denying the second
motion "for lack of merit," "considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading x x x."
The Courts Decision dated September 18, 2009 became final
and executory on March 14, 2012. Thus, entry of judgment was
made in due course.
On March 27, 2012, the respondents filed a Motion for Leave to
File Attached Third Motion for Reconsideration, with an attached
Motion for Reconsideration (on the Honorable Courts 25 January
2012 Resolution) with Motion to Refer These Cases to the
Honorable Court En Banc.
On September 4, 2012, the Court en banc issued a
Resolution accepting the case from the Third Division. It also
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the
implementation of the LAs Decision dated September 30, 2004.
This
prompted
McBurnies
filing
of
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration, where he invoked the fact that the Courts
Decision dated September 18, 2009 had become final and
executory, with an entry of judgment already made by the
Court.
ISSUE: WON the third motion for reconsideration should be
entertained?
HELD: Yes. At the outset, the Court emphasizes that second
and subsequent motions for reconsideration are, as a
general rule, prohibited. Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a
judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained." The rule rests on the basic tenet of immutability of
judgments. "At some point, a decision becomes final and
executory and, consequently, all litigations must come to an
end."
The general rule, however, against second and subsequent
motions for reconsideration admits of settled exceptions. For
one, the present Internal Rules of the Supreme Court,
particularly Section 3, Rule 15 thereof, provides:

In the meantime, the NLRC, acting on the CAs order of remand,

accepted the appeal from the LAs decision, and in its
Decision dated November 17, 2009, reversed and set aside the
Decision of the LA, and entered a new one dismissing
McBurnies complaint. It explained that based on records,
McBurnie was never an employee of any of the respondents, but
a potential investor in a project that included said respondents,
barring a claim of dismissal, much less, an illegal dismissal.
Granting that there was a contract of employment executed by
the parties, McBurnie failed to obtain a work permit which would
have allowed him to work for any of the respondents. In the
absence of such permit, the employment agreement was void
and thus, could not be the source of any right or obligation.

Sec. 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not

entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any
exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher
interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least
two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration
"in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed
decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise
patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the
parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered
becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)

On September 18, 2009, the Third Division of this Court

rendered its Decision which reversed the CA Decision dated

In a line of cases, the Court has then entertained and granted

second motions for reconsideration "in the higher interest of

31

substantial justice," as allowed under the Internal Rules when

the assailed decision is "legally erroneous," "patently
unjust" and "potentially capable of causing unwarranted
and irremediable injury or damage to the parties."
In Tirazona v. Philippine EDS Techno-Service, Inc. (PET, Inc.), we
also explained that a second motion for reconsideration may be
allowed in instances of "extraordinarily persuasive
reasons and only after an express leave shall have been
obtained."
In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines, we
allowed a second motion for reconsideration as the issue
involved therein was a matter of public interest, as it
pertained to the proper application of a basic
constitutionally-guaranteed right in the governments
implementation of its agrarian reform program.
In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, the Court set aside the
decisions of the LA and the NLRC that favored claimants-security
guards upon the Courts review of San Miguel Corporations
second motion for reconsideration. In Vir-Jen Shipping and
Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., the Court en banc reversed
on a third motion for reconsideration the ruling of the Courts
Division on therein private respondents claim for wages and
monetary benefits.
It is also recognized that in some instances, the prudent action
towards a just resolution of a case is for the Court to suspend
rules of procedure, for "the power of this Court to suspend
its own rules or to except a particular case from its
operations whenever the purposes of justice require it,
cannot be questioned." In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, the
Court, thus, explained:
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court
envision this liberality. This power to suspend or even
disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing
so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this
case. x x x.
xxxx
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set
forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind
and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts
will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering
real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights, and not the other way around. Truly then,
technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice
Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the
situation." x x x. (Citations omitted)
Consistent with the foregoing precepts, the Court has then
reconsidered even decisions that have attained finality, finding
it more appropriate to lift entries of judgments already
made in these cases. In Navarro v. Executive Secretary, we
reiterated the pronouncement in De Guzman that the power to
suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared final. The Court then recalled in
Navarro an entry of judgment after it had determined the
validity and constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9355,
explaining that:
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the
recall of entries of judgment in light of attendant
extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had

already declared final. In this case, the compelling concern

is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be
heard since they would be adversely affected by the
judgment in this case despite not being original parties
thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the
provisions of the [Local Government Code (LGC)] with
respect to the creation of local government units. x x x
In Munoz v. CA, the Court resolved to recall an entry of
judgment to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This
justification was likewise applied in Tan Tiac Chiong v. Hon.
Cosico, wherein the Court held that:
The recall of entries of judgments, albeit rare, is not a
novelty. In Muoz v. CA , where the case was elevated to
this Court and a first and second motion for reconsideration
had been denied with finality, the Court, in the interest of
substantial justice, recalled the Entry of Judgment as well as
the letter of transmittal of the records to the Court of
Appeals.
In Barnes v. Judge Padilla, we ruled:
A final and executory judgment can no longer be
attacked by any of the parties or be modified,
directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of
the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to
serve substantial justice considering
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules,
(e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and
(f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
As we shall explain, the instant case also qualifies as an
exception to, first, the proscription against second and
subsequent motions for reconsideration, and second, the rule on
immutability of judgments; a reconsideration of the Decision
dated September 18, 2009, along with the Resolutions dated
December 14, 2009 and January 25, 2012, is justified by the
higher interest of substantial justice.
To begin with, the Court agrees with the respondents that the
Courts prior resolve to grant , and not just merely note, in a
Resolution dated March 15, 2010 the respondents motion for
leave to submit their second motion for reconsideration already
warranted a resolution and discussion of the motion for
reconsideration on its merits. Instead of doing this, however, the
Court issued on January 25, 2012 a Resolution denying the
motion to reconsider for lack of merit, merely citing that it was a
"prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to
Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended." In League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v.
Commission on Elections, we reiterated a ruling that when a
motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for
reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court
therefore allows the filing of the second motion for
reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for
reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.
Similarly in this case, there was then no reason for the Court to
still consider the respondents second motion for reconsideration
as a prohibited pleading, and deny it plainly on such ground. The
Court intends to remedy such error through this resolution.
More importantly, the Court finds it appropriate to accept the
pending motion for reconsideration and resolve it on the merits
in order to rectify its prior disposition of the main issues in the
petition. Upon review, the Court is constrained to rule differently
on the petitions. We have determined the grave error in
affirming the NLRCs rulings, promoting results that are patently
unjust for the respondents, as we consider the facts of the case,

32

pertinent law, jurisprudence, and the degree of the injury and

damage to the respondents that will inevitably result from the
implementation of the Courts Decision dated September 18,
2009.
RULES 40 56
CECILIA B. ESTINOZO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
FORMER SIXTEENTH DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 150276 | February 12, 2008 (3D)
Facts:

Petitioner, representing herself to the private

complainants, was one of the owners of Golden
Overseas Employment and that she was recruiting
workers to be sent abroad, asked from them the
payment of placement and processing fees totaling
P15,000.00.
Viewing this as a golden opportunity for the
amelioration of their lives, the private complainants
paid the fees, went with petitioner to Manila, relying on
her promise that they would be deployed by July 1986.
On the promised date of their departure, however,
private complainants never left the country. They were
then informed by petitioner that there were no
available plane tickets and that they would leave by
September of that year.
Came November 1986 and still they were not deployed.
This prompted private complainants to suspect that
something was amiss, and they demanded the return
of their money. Petitioner assured them refund of the
fees and even executed promissory notes to several of
the complainants; but, as before, her assurances were
mere pretenses.
In the early months of 1987, complainants then
initiated formal charges for estafa against petitioner.
During the trial, in her defense, petitioner testified,
among others, that she was an employee of the
Commission on Audit who worked as a part-time
secretary at FCR Recruitment Agency owned by Fe
Corazon Ramirez; that she received the amounts
claimed by the complainants and remitted the same to
Ramirez; that complainants actually transacted with
Ramirez and not with her; and that she was only forced
to execute the promissory notes.
On November 9, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
charges of estafa
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the CA. The
appellate court, in the assailed April 30, 2001 Decision,
affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
On May 30, 2001, within the 15-day reglementary
period to file a motion for reconsideration or a petition
for review, petitioner filed with the appellate court a
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for
Reconsideration.
On June 28, 2001, the CA, in the challenged Resolution,
denied the said motion pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1
of the Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
June 28, 2001 Resolution of the CA. The appellate court
denied the same, on August 17, 2001, in the other
assailed Resolution.
Displeased with this series of denials, petitioner
instituted the instant Petition for Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the

proper remedy to question the denial of the motion for
extension to file MR with the CA
Held: No

Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly

provides that a party desiring to appeal by

certiorari from a judgment or final order or

resolution of the CA may file a verified petition for
review on certiorari.
o
Considering that, in this case, appeal by
certiorari was available to petitioner, she
effectively foreclosed her right to resort to a
special civil action for certiorari, a limited form
of review and a remedy of last recourse, which
lies only where there is no appeal or plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive remedies.
o
Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or
any other adequate remedy.
o
The nature of the questions of law intended to
be raised on appeal is of no consequence. It
may well be that those questions of law will
treat exclusively of whether or not the
judgment or final order was rendered without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion. This is immaterial. The
remedy is appeal, not certiorari as a special
civil action.
Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari
petition is an appropriate remedy, still this Court
cannot grant the writ prayed for because we find no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the
challenged issuances.
o
The rule, as it stands now without
exception,
is
that
the
15-day
reglementary period for appealing or
filing a motion for reconsideration or new
trial cannot be extended, except in cases
before this Court, as one of last resort, which
may, in its sound discretion grant the
extension requested. This rule also applies
even if the motion is filed before the expiration
of the period sought to be extended.
o
Thus, the appellate court correctly denied
petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to
File a Motion for Reconsideration.
It is well to point out that with petitioners erroneous
filing of a motion for extension of time and with her
non-filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition
for review from the CAs decision, the challenged
decision has already attained finality and may no
longer be reviewed by this Court.
o
The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even
substitute for the lost appealcertiorari is not
a procedural device to deprive the winning
party of the fruits of the judgment in his or her
favor.
o
When a decision becomes final and executory,
the court loses jurisdiction over the case and
not even an appellate court will have the
power to
review the said judgment.
Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation
and this will set to naught the main role of
courts of justice to assist in the enforcement
of the rule of law and the maintenance of
peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.
We reiterate what we stated in Amatorio v. People that
relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss
of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or
to a mistaken mode of procedure.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA

RETERTA, namely: EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M.
RETERTA, and AVELINA M. RETERTA, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159941 | August 17, 2011 (1D)

33

Facts:

On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action

for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC
On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants,
filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983
due to the land being friar land, and that the
petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil
Case No. TM-983.
On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the motion to
dismiss
The petitioners then timely filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion for
reconsideration on February 21, 2002.
On May 15, 2002, therefore, the petitioners assailed
the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA
dismissed the petition
On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.

Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for

new trial or reconsideration. An order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is not
appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the
judgment or final order.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for

certiorari
Held: Yes

The order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain

relief from was the order granting the respondents
motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the
motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby
completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more
for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an
appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy.

The fundamental distinction between a final judgment

or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory order, on
the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, viz:

The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from

one which has become final (or executory as of right
[final and executory]), is definite and settled. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case,
leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits
which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the
trial declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are and which party is in the
right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action
on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the
Court except to await the parties next move (which
among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal)
and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the
judgment once it becomes final or, to use the
established and more distinctive term, final and
executory. xxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of
the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but
obviously indicates that other things remain to be done
by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or
granting a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or
granting or denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things, etc.
Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable,
as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not
be questioned on appeal except only as part of an
appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case.

Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of

Court, cited by the petitioners, indicates that the proper
remedy against the denial of the petitioners motion for
reconsideration was an appeal from the final order
dismissing the action upon the respondents motion to
dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly:

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a

motion for reconsideration independently of a
judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A
motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new
issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the
theory of the case, but is only seeking a
reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on
the same issues, contentions, and evidence either
because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or
(b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or
final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary
to law.10 By denying a motion for reconsideration, or
by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds
no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or
final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to
stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the
denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or
final order itself.
The enumeration of the orders that were not
appealable made in the 1997 version of Section 1, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court the version in force at the
time when the CA rendered its assailed decision on May
15, 2002 included an order denying a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration, to wit:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. An appeal may be
taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or
reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar
motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment
by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more
of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main
case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal
therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In all the above instances where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n)

It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC,

effective December 27, 2007, has since amended
Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying
a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and
that such a revision of a procedural rule may be
retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on
that basis would not be right and proper, simply
because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure

34

in force at the time when it issued its assailed final

order.

of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new

procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file a
notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing or denying a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. This
would standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and do away with the confusion as to
when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted. Thus, the Court stated:

ERMELINDA
C.
MANALOTO,
AURORA
J.
CIFRA,
FLORDELIZA
J.
ARCILLA,
LOURDES
J.
CATALAN,
ETHELINDA J. HOLT, BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R.
JONGCO, JR. and JOEL JONGCO, Petitioners, vs. ISMAEL
VELOSO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171365 | October 6, 2010 (1D)
Facts:

This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case

filed by [herein petitioners] Ermelinda C. Manaloto,
Aurora J. Cifra, Flordeliza J. Arcilla, Lourdes J. Catalan,
Ethelinda J. Holt, Bienvenido R. Jongco, Artemio R.
Jongco, Jr. and Joel Jongco against [herein respondent
September 2, 2003: RTC-Branch 227 issued a
Resolution dismissing respondent's complaint
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227
decision in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September
26, 2003.
o
He filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
judgment on October 10, 2003, which RTCBranch 227 denied in an Order dated
December 30, 2003.
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227
order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on
February 20, 2004, and he filed his Notice of Appeal on
March 1, 2004.
o
However, the RTC-Branch 227, in an Order
dated March 23, 2004, dismissed respondent's
appeal for being filed out of time.
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 27 order
dismissing his appeal on April 30, 2004 and he filed a
Motion for Reconsideratio1 of the same on May 3,
2004. The RTC-Branch 227, in another Order dated May
31, 2004, granted respondent's latest motion because
it was "convinced that it is but appropriate and fair to
both parties that this matter of whether or not the
Appeal was filed on time, be resolved by the appellate
court rather than by this Court." The RTC-Branch 227
then ordered that the records of the case be forwarded
as soon as possible to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated February 8,
2005, resolved to give due course to respondent's
appeal.
Petitioners assert that respondent's appeal of the RTCBranch 227 Resolution dated September 2, 2003, which
dismissed the latter's complaint in Civil Case No. Q-0248341, was filed out of time.
o
Respondent received a copy of the said
resolution on September 26, 2003, and he
only had 15 days from such date to file his
appeal, or until October 11, 2003. Respondent,
instead, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the resolution on October 10, 2003, which left
him with only one more day to file his appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time

Held: No

Jurisprudence has settled the "fresh period rule,"

according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to
the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial
court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court
dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso, we
presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh
period rule:
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the power

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his

notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days
from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed
of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of
the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section
3.
The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in
Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, to wit:
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 14 September 2005 while the present
Petition was already pending before us. x x x.
With the advent of the "fresh period rule" parties who
availed themselves of the remedy of motion for
reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of
appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that
motion.
The "fresh period rule" is not inconsistent with
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states that the appeal shall be taken
"within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment
or final order appealed from." The use of the
disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a
rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within
15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the "final order," x x x.
The "fresh period rule" finally eradicates the confusion
as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted
- from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of
notice of "final order" appealed from.

Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban

Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal
which was purportedly filed five days late. With the
fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to file
the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the
denial of the therein petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
We followed suit in Elbia v. Ceniza, wherein we applied
the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of
the Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigant may
now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days
from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen
days from the receipt of the order denying the motion
for reconsideration.
In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the
same principle of "fresh period rule," expostulating that
procedural law refers to the adjective law which
prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that
courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural
laws do not come within the legal conception of a

35

retroactive law, or the general rule against the

retroactive operation of statutes. The "fresh period
rule" is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner
in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be
computed or determined and, therefore, can be made
applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, such
as the present case, without danger of violating anyone
else's rights. (Emphases supplied.)
Also in Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive
application of the fresh period rule to cases pending
and undetermined upon its effectivity:
The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the
period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of
promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was
clearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties,
Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus:
The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period"
rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in
cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to
14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated.
That question may be answered with the guidance of
the general rule that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage, there being no vested
rights in the rules of procedure. Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in
character as they do not create new or remove vested
rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.

In the case before us, respondent received a copy of

the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTCBranch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days
thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTCBranch
227
denied
respondent's
Motion
for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003,
which the respondent received on February 20, 2004.
On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of
the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly,
under the fresh period rule, respondent was able to file
his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15
days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due
course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 82610.

Issue: Whether or not the direct petition for review on certiorari

with the Supreme Court against the decision of the RTC is an
improper remedy
Held: Yes

In Murillo v. Consul, we laid down a doctrine that was

later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to
clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of
the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ
of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment
was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme
Court.
o
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41,
is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law.
o
The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule
42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
o
The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45,
is filed with the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as

to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Our ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo is instructive:

GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE, Petitioner, vs. LUIS ESTEBAN

LATORRE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183926 | March 29, 2010 (3D)
Facts:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari

under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, dated April 29,
2008.
In October 2000, petitioner Generosa Almeda Latorre
(petitioner) filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a
Complaint for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of
Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction
against her own son, herein respondent Luis Esteban
Latorre (respondent), and one Ifzal Ali (Ifzal).
Respondent immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the sole ground that the venue of the case was
improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint
was denominated as one for Collection and Declaration
of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for
Injunction, in truth the case was a real action affecting
title to and interest over the subject property.
Respondent insisted that all of petitioner's claims were
anchored on her claim of ownership over one-half ()
portion of the subject property

In its Order dated January 2, 2001, the RTC denied

respondent's motion to dismiss
On April 29, 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent
Aggrieved,
petitioner
filed
her
Motion
for
Reconsideration, which the RTC denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition, claiming that the RTC erred in
treating the venue as jurisdiction and in treating
petitioner's complaint as a real action.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what

the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth
or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, the same must not involve an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether
a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.
In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner
prayed that this Court decide the case on the merits. To
do so, however, would require the examination by this
Court of the probative value of the evidence presented,
taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to
adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This,
unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes
exceedingly clear that the filing of the case
directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine,
direct resort from the lower courts to the
Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the
appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained
in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of
last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to

36

it by the
tradition.

immemorial

decision in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08773-97. The

lead paragraph of said motion reads:

ARIEL A. TRES REYES, petitioner, vs. MAXIMS TEA HOUSE

and JOCELYN POON, respondents.
G.R. No. 140853 | February 27, 2003 (2D)

Complainant ARIEL A. TRES REYES, thru counsel, most

respectfully moves to reconsider the Decision dated
July 20, 1998 rendered by the Honorable Labor Arbiter
Ernesto S. Dinopol in the above-captioned case (copy of
which was received by the Complainant on September
28, 1998), and alleges as follows:

Facts:

Constitution

and

by

Respondent Maxims Tea House (hereinafter Maxims

for brevity) had employed Ariel Tres Reyes as a driver
In the wee hours of the morning of September 27,
1997, petitioner was driving a Mitsubishi L300 van and
was sent to fetch some employees of Savannah Moon,
a ballroom dancing establishment in Libis, Quezon City.
Petitioner complied and took his usual route along Julia
Vargas Street in Pasig City. He was headed towards
Meralco Avenue at a cruising speed of 50 to 60
kilometers per hour, when he noticed a ten-wheeler
truck coming his way at full speed despite the fact that
the latters lane had a red signal light on. Petitioner
maneuvered to avoid a collision, but nonetheless the
van he was driving struck the truck. As a result,
petitioner and seven of his passengers sustained
physical injuries and both vehicles were damaged.
On November 19, 1997, Maxims terminated petitioner
for cause.
Feeling that the vehicular accident was neither a just
nor a valid cause for the severance of his employment,
petitioner filed a complaint3 for illegal dismissal
On October 8, 1998, instead of filing the requisite
pleading for appeal, petitioner filed a "Motion for Partial
Reconsideration" with the NLRC. The NLRC opted to
treat petitioners motion as an appeal docketed as
NLRC CA No. 017339-98.
In his decision, the Labor Arbiter found that petitioner
was grossly negligent in failing to avoid the collision.
On March 11, 1999, the NLRC reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter on the ground that there was no
negligence on petitioners part.

Issue: Whether or not Motion for Partial Reconsideration can be

considered as an appeal to the NLRC
Held: Yes

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals grievously

erred in holding that the NLRC has gravely abused its
discretion in treating his "Motion for Partial
Reconsideration" as an appeal. Petitioner asserts that
when a motion for reconsideration of a decision of a
Labor Arbiter is filed, the Commission will properly treat
it as an appeal. He stresses that under labor law, rules
of procedure should be liberally construed to assist the
parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive
settlement of disputes. Hence, technicalities should not
prevail over substantial merits of the labor case.

This issue involves a question of substance versus

form. Strictly speaking, a motion for reconsideration of
a decision, order, or award of a Labor Arbiter is
prohibited by Section 19, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure.
o
But said rule likewise allows that a motion for
reconsideration shall be treated as an appeal
provided it meets all the requisites of an
appeal. Petitioner insists that his pleading was
in form a motion for reconsideration, but in
substance it was an appeal which complied
with
all
the
technical
requirements.
Respondents
counter
that
the
formal
requisites take precedence.

We have minutely scrutinized the records of this case,

particularly the questioned "Motion for Partial
Reconsideration," but we find no basis for the appellate
courts finding that said pleading did not contain a
statement as to when petitioner received a copy of the

Note that all that Section 3, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules

of Procedure requires with respect to material dates is
"a statement of the date when the appellant received
the appealed decision." We rule that petitioners
declaration in his motion that he received a copy of the
Labor Arbiters decision on September 28, 1998 is more
than sufficient compliance with said requirement
imposed by Section 3, Rule VI. We likewise find that the
motion in question was filed with the NLRC on October
8, 1998 or on the tenth (10th) day from the date of
receipt by petitioner of his copy of the Labor Arbiters
decision. Otherwise put, said pleading was filed within
the reglementary ten-day period, as provided for in
Section 1,12 Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.
The law13 on the timeliness of an appeal from the
decision, award, or order of the Labor Arbiters, states
clearly that the aggrieved party has ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof to appeal to the
Commission.14 Needless to say, an appeal filed at the
last minute of the last day of said period is, for all
intents and purposes, still seasonably filed.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 54110, the Court of Appeals accepted
respondents averment that petitioners "Motion for
Partial Reconsideration" was not verified. The records,
however, contradict their averments. We find that
petitioner verified his motion to reconsider the Labor
Arbiters decision on October 8, 1998, or on the same
day that it was filed.15 We must, perforce, rule that
petitioner has substantially complied with the
verification requirement as provided for in Section 3,
Rule VI of the Commissions Rules of Procedure.
Anent respondents claim that petitioner failed to pay
the requisite appeal fee in NLRC CA No. 0 17339-98,
the NLRC stated in its decision that:
o
A review of the record shows that October 8,
1998, complainant-appellant paid the amount
of P110.00 in cash as appeal fee. For this he
was issued, O.R. #0073761.
o
This finding refutes respondents claim. The
records clearly show the basis for the finding
of the Commission that the appeal fees were
paid.17 Thus, on this point respondents
averment, without any supporting evidence
and contradicted by the records, deserves
scant consideration.
How the Court of Appeals could have been misled by
respondents allegations of technical deficiencies with
respect to the questioned "Motion for Partial
Reconsideration" in NLRC CA No. 0 17339-98, is
surprising. Had the court a quo, to use its own words,
"carefully perused the case records," it would have
readily seen that said pleading had complied with the
technical requirements of an appeal. Hence, we are
constrained to conclude that the appellate court had no
basis for concluding that the NLRC had gravely abused
its discretion when the NLRC gave due course to the
motion and treated it as an appeal.
In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied
in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
and where their strict application would result in the
frustration rather than promotion of substantial justice,
technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should
not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the
parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be

37

better served, the application of technical rules of

procedure may be relaxed.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARLENE DE
LEON and BERNARDO DE LEON, respondents.
G.R. No. 143275 | March 20, 2003 (EB)
Facts:

Petitioner LBP, in its bid to maintain the legitimacy of

its appeal, contends that the proper mode of appeal
from a decision of the Special Agrarian Court is by way
of a notice of appeal due to the reference by Section 61
of RA 6657 to the Rules of Court as the governing
procedure for appeals to the Court of Appeals.
This being the case, the petitioner claims that the
procedure for ordinary appealed cases provided for in
Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure must be followed, that is, a notice of
appeal is required in order to perfect the appeal.
According to the petitioner, this is the proper mode of
appeal in the case at bar considering that the appealed
decision is that of the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction. Moreover, Section 1
of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
11 (pertaining to appeals by way of petitions for review
to the Court of Appeals of decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies and the Court of Tax Appeals), does not
include decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as
Special Agrarian Courts.

Issue: Whether or not LBP avail of the correct mode of appeal

Held: Yes

A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the

proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian
Courts in cases involving the determination of just
compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60
of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said
mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room
for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and
categorical, there is no room for construction, but only
application.

First, there is no conflict between Section 60 and 61 of

RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court do not at all
prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the
proper mode of appeal for decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts.
o
Section 61 in fact makes no more than a
general reference to the Rules of Court and
does not even mention the procedure for
ordinary appeals in Section 2, Rule 41 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as the
appropriate method of elevating to the Court
of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian Courts
in eminent domain cases.

Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts

in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition
for review is not permissible for decisions of the said
special courts.
o
In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to
determine whether a petition for review is the
proper mode of appeal from decisions of
Regional Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is,
when they act as Special Agrarian Courts.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure merely mentions the Court
of Tax Appeals and the other different quasijudicial agencies without exclusivity in its
phraseology. Such omission cannot be
construed to justify the contention that a
petition for review is prohibited for decisions
on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the
category is for quasi-judicial agencies and tax
courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do

not properly belong. Although Supreme Court

Circular No. 1-91 13 (precursor to Rule 43 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) included
the decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in the
enumeration requiring petition for review, its
non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely
signifies that it was inappropriately classified
as a quasi-judicial agency.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review
dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any pleading
is submitted. A petition for review hastens the award of
fair recompense to deprived landowners for the
government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable
in an ordinary appeal. This is exemplified by the case at
bar in which the petition for review before the Special
Third (3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005) was
disposed of way ahead of the ordinary appeal filed
before the Fourth (4th) Division (CA-G.R. CV No. 60365)
in the Court of Appeals.

G.R. No. 144225. June 17, 2003

SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON
ALFREDO, SPOUSES ARNULFO SAVELLANO and EDITHA B.
SAVELLANO, DANTON D. MATAWARAN, SPOUSES DELFIN
F. ESPIRITU, JR. and ESTELA S. ESPIRITU and ELIZABETH
TUAZON, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO BORRAS
and ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS, Respondents.
Facts: A parcel of land in Hermosa, Bataan is the subject of
controversy in this case. The registered owners of the Subject
Land were petitioner spouses, Godofredo Alfredo (Godofredo)
and Carmen Limon Alfredo (Carmen). The Subject Land is
covered by OCT No. 284 issued to Godofredo and Carmen under
Homestead Patent.
Private respondents, spouses Armando Borras (Armando) and
Adelia Lobaton Borras (Adelia), filed a complaint for specific
performance against Godofredo and Carmen before RTC where
they alleged that Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged the Subject
Land with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) for
Php7000. To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold the
Subject Land to Armando and Adelia for Php15,000 and the
balance to be paid in cash to the sellers.
Armando and Adelia gave Godofredo and Carmen the money to
pay the loan to DBP which signed the release of mortgage.
Armando and Adelia subsequently paid the balance of the
purchase price of the Subject Land for which Carmen issued a
receipt.
Godofredo and Carmen then delivered to Adelia the owners
duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, with the document of
cancellation of mortgage, official receipts of realty tax
payments, and tax declaration in the name of Godofredo.
Godofredo and Carmen introduced Armando and Adelia, as the
new owners of the Subject Land, to the Natanawans, the old
tenants of the Subject Land. Armando and Adelia then took
possession of the Subject Land.
Subsequently, Armando and Adelia learned that hired persons
had entered the Subject Land and were cutting trees under
instructions of allegedly new owners of the Subject Land. They
discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of
the Subject Land to several persons.
Thus, Armando and Adelia filed an adverse claim with the
Register of Deeds of Bataan. The latter further discovered that
Godofredo and Carmen had secured an owner's duplicate copy
of OCT No. 284 after filing a petition in court for the issuance of

38

a new copy upon a claim that they lost their owners duplicate
copy. Armando and Adelia wrote Godofredo and Carmen
complaining about their acts, but the latter did not reply. Thus,
Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for specific performance.
Armando and Adelia amended their complaint to include the
following persons as additional defendants: the spouses Arnulfo
Savellano and Editha B. Savellano, Danton D. Matawaran, the
spouses Delfin F. Espiritu, Jr. and Estela S. Espiritu, and Elizabeth
Tuazon (Subsequent Buyers). The Subsequent Buyers, who are
also petitioners in this case, purchased from Godofredo and
Carmen the subdivided portions of the Subject Land. The
Register of Deeds of Bataan issued to the Subsequent Buyers
transfer certificates of title to the lots they purchased.
In their answer, Godofredo and Carmen and the Subsequent
Buyers (collectively petitioners) argued that the action is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Petitioners pointed
out that there is no written instrument evidencing the alleged
contract of sale over the Subject Land in favor of Armando and
Adelia. Petitioners objected to whatever parole evidence
Armando and Adelia introduced or offered on the alleged sale
unless the same was in writing and subscribed by Godofredo.
Petitioners asserted that the Subsequent Buyers were buyers in
good faith and for value.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of Armando and
Adelia.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, it
affirmed the findings of the RTC. Hence, this Petition for Review
under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether the alleged sale of the Subject Land in favor of
Armando and Adelia is valid and enforceable.
Held: The petition is without merit.
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court
reviews only errors of law and not errors of facts. The
factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on
this Court. This applies with greater force when both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on
their factual findings.
In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of
the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the trial and appellate
courts are borne out by the record. We agree with the
conclusions drawn by the lower courts from these facts.
The contract of sale between the spouses Godofredo and
Carmen and the spouses Armando and Adelia was a perfected
contract. A contract is perfected once there is consent of the
contracting parties on the object certain and on the cause of the
obligation [Article 1318, Civil Code]. In the instant case, the
object of the sale is the Subject Land, and the price certain is
P15,000.00. The trial and appellate courts found that there was
a meeting of the minds on the sale of the Subject Land and on
the purchase price of P15,000.00. This is a finding of fact that is
binding on this Court. We find no reason to disturb this finding
since it is supported by substantial evidence.
The contract of sale of the Subject Land has also been
consummated because the sellers and buyers have performed

their respective obligations under the contract. In a contract of

sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the
determinate thing sold, and to deliver the same, to the buyer
who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the seller. In the
instant case, Godofredo and Carmen delivered the Subject Land
to Armando and Adelia, placing the latter in actual physical
possession of the Subject Land. This physical delivery of the
Subject Land also constituted a transfer of ownership of the
Subject Land to Armando and Adelia. Ownership of the thing
sold is transferred to the vendee upon its actual or constructive
delivery. Godofredo and Carmen also turned over to Armando
and Adelia the documents of ownership to the Subject Land,
namely the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 284, the tax
declaration and the receipts of realty tax payments.
On the other hand, Armando and Adelia paid the full purchase
price as evidenced by the receipt dated 11 March 1970 issued
by Carmen. Armando and Adelia fulfilled their obligation to
provide the P7,000.00 to pay DBP. Petitioner never denied the
existence of the loan with DBP.
The trial and appellate courts correctly refused to apply the
Statute of Frauds to this case. The Statute of Frauds provides
that a contract for the sale of real property shall be
unenforceable unless the contract or some note or
memorandum of the sale is in writing and subscribed by the
party charged or his agent. The existence of the receipt, which
is a memorandum of the sale, removes the transaction from the
provisions of the Statute of Frauds.
The Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and
not to contracts either partially or totally performed. Thus,
where one party has performed ones obligation, oral evidence
will be admitted to prove the agreement. In the instant case, the
parties have consummated the sale of the Subject Land, with
both sellers and buyers performing their respective obligations
under the contract of sale. In addition, a contract that violates
the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits
under the contract. Godofredo and Carmen benefited from the
contract because they paid their DBP loan and secured the
cancellation of their mortgage using the money given by
Armando and Adelia. Godofredo and Carmen also accepted
payment of the balance of the purchase price.
Godofredo and Carmen cannot invoke the Statute of Frauds to
deny the existence of the verbal contract of sale because they
have performed their obligations, and have accepted benefits,
under the verbal contract [Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 1046 (1996)] Armando
and Adelia have also performed their obligations under the
verbal contract. Clearly, both the sellers and the buyers have
consummated the verbal contract of sale of the Subject Land.
The Statute of Frauds was enacted to prevent fraud. This law
cannot be used to advance the very evil the law seeks to
prevent.
[G.R. No. 148198 October 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. ELIZABETH
BETH CORPUZ, Appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision of RTC-Manila finding
appellant Elizabeth Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale constituting economic
sabotage under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of l995
Private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego,
Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to Alga-Moher

39

International Placement Services Corp. in Malate, Manila to

apply as factory workers in Taiwan. They were accompanied by a
certain Aling Josie who introduced them to the agencys
President Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes who later told them to
return with P10,000.00 each as processing fee.
When private complainants return to pay, appellant Corpuz was
the one who received the money and advised them to wait for
the contracts to arrive from the Taiwan employers since Mrs.
Reyes was not around.
Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus,
private complainants decided to ask for the refund of their
money from appellant who told them that the processing fees
they had paid were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. When they
talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money she received
from appellant was in payment of the latters debt. Thus,
complainants filed their complaint with the NBI which led to the
arrest and detention of Corpuz.
For her part, appellant resolutely denied having a hand in the
illegal recruitment and claimed that she merely received the
money on behalf of Mrs. Reyes of Alga-Moher International
Placement Services Corporation, where she had been working as
secretary and since the cashier was absent, she received the
processing fees of private complainants, which she thereafter
remitted to Mrs. Reyes. Nevertheless, the RTC found the
appellant guilty of the offense charged.
Issue: Whether the conviction of accused is improper and as
such, may be given due course on appeal despite the RTCs
findings of facts.
Held: It is axiomatic that findings of facts of the trial court, its
calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and
probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said
findings are accorded by this Court great respect, if not
conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial
court in observing and monitoring at close range, the conduct,
deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify
before the trial court. However, this principle does not
apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome
of the case. The exception obtains in this case.
The records of the case show that appellant was agencys
registered secretary while Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes is AlgaMoher
International
Placement
Services
Corp.s
President/General Manager. Part of its regular business activity
is to accept applicants who desire to work here or abroad and in
charge of the custody and documentation of the overseas
contracts.
When private complainants tendered the processing fees to
appellant, it was in compliance with the order of her employer,
Mrs. Reyes. In fact, she did not convince the applicants to give
her their money since they went to the agency precisely to pay
the processing fees upon the earlier advice of Mrs. Reyes.
As stated in the last sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the
persons who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical
persons, the officers having control, management or direction of
their business shall be liable.
In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the
case and found that the prosecution failed to establish that
appellant, as secretary, had control, management or direction of
the recruitment agency. She had no discretion over how the
business was managed. The trial court's finding that appellant,

being the secretary of the agency, had control over its business,
is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary basis.
An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal
recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with his
employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in illegal recruitment. Settled is the rule that the
existence of the corporate entity does not shield from
prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and
intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove appellants active participation in the illegal
recruitment activities of the agency.
While we strongly condemn the pervasive proliferation of illegal
job recruiters and syndicates preying on innocent people
anxious to obtain employment abroad, nevertheless, we find the
pieces of evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite moral
certainty, as they admit of the alternative inference that other
persons, not necessarily the appellant, may have perpetrated
the crime. Where the evidence admits of two interpretations,
one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with
innocence, the accused must be acquitted. Indeed, it would be
better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the
crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he
did not commit.
[G.R. No. 127473. December 8, 2003]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDY AMOR, JANE GAMIL, minors GIAN CARLO
AMOR represented by ATTY. OWEN AMOR, and CARLO
BENITEZ
represented
by
JOSEPHINE
BENITEZ,
respondents.
Absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any palpable
error in its findings, this Court will not question the probative
weight accorded by the lower courts to the various evidence
presented by the parties.
Facts: Private respondents filed with the RTC-Sorsogon, a
complaint for damages against PAl due to the latters failure to
honor their confirmed tickets.
It was alleged that private respondent Judy Amor purchased 3
confirmed plane tickets for her and her infant son, Gian Carlo
Amor; her sister Jane Gamil for the May 8, 1988, 7:10 a.m. flight,
PR 178, bound for Manila.
On May 8, 1988, Judy with Gian, Jane and another minor Carlo
Benitez, nephew, arrived at the Legaspi Airport at 6:20 a.m.
Carlo Benitez was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a
certain Dra. Emily Chua.
They were accompanied by Judys husband Atty. Owen Amor and
the latters cousin, Salvador Gonzales who fell in line at the
check-in counter with four persons ahead of him and three
persons behind him while plaintiff Judy went to the office of the
station manager to request that minor plaintiff Carlo Benitez be
allowed to use the ticket of Dra. Chua.
While waiting for his turn, Gonzales was asked by Lloyd Fojas,
PALs check-in clerk on duty and wrote: late check-in 7:05.
When Gonzales turn came, Fojas gave him the tickets of private
respondents Judy, Jane and Gian and told him to proceed to the
cashier to make arrangements.
Salvador then went to Atty. Amor and told him about the
situation. Atty. Amor pleaded with Fojas, pointing out that it is

40

only 6:45 a.m., but the latter did not even look at him or utter
any word. Atty. Amor then tried to plead with Delfin Canonizado
and George Carranza, employees of petitioner, but still to no
avail. Private respondents were not able to board said flight and
the plane left at 7:30 a.m., 20 minutes behind the original
schedule.
Private respondents went to the bus terminals hoping to catch a
ride for Manila. Finding none, they went back to the airport and
tried to catch an afternoon flight. Unfortunately, the 2:30 p.m.
flight, PR 278, was cancelled due to aircraft situation. Private
respondents were told to wait for the 5:30 p.m. flight, PR 180.
They checked-in their bags and were told to hand in their
tickets. Later, a PAL employee at the check-in counter called out
the name of private respondent minor Carlo Benitez. Plaintiff
Judy approached the counter and was told by the PAL personnel
that they cannot be accommodated.
Manuel Baltazar, a former Acting Manager of petitioner in
Legaspi City in May 1988, testified that based on his
investigation, the private respondents, although confirmed
passengers, were not able to board in the morning of May 8,
1988 because there were go-show or waitlisted and non-revenue
passengers who were accommodated in said flight. He also
noted that there was overbooking for PR 178.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment upholding the evidence
presented by private respondents.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Hence, the present petition of
PAL.
Issue: WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE LATE CHECKEDIN PASSENGERS AND WHETHER THE FAILURE OF AN AIRLINE TO
ACCOMMODATE A PASSENGER WHO CHECKED IN LATE IS
ACTIONABLE SO AS TO ENTITLE THEM TO DAMAGES.
Held: In support of the issue, petitioner argues that while
ordinarily, the findings of the CA are accepted as conclusive,
there are instances when the SC may make its own findings
such as when the appellate court based its findings on
speculation, surmises or conjectures.
It is inevitable and most crucial that we first determine the
question whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling
that private respondents were late in checking-in. Both issues
call for a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the general rule is that only questions of law may be
raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. Factual
findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us
especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial
court. This is because it is not our function to analyze or weigh
the evidence all over again.
However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to wit: (a)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding
is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of

Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the

case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are
mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where
the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the
respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted
by the evidence on record. Petitioner invokes exception (b).
The determination of this issue is necessary because it is
expressly stipulated in the airline tickets issued to private
respondents that PAL will consider the reserved seat cancelled if
the passenger fails to check-in at least 30 minutes before the
published departure time.
After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to
disturb the affirmance by the CA of the findings of the trial court
that the private respondents have checked-in on time; that they
reached the airport at 6:20 a.m., based on the testimonies of
private respondent Judy Amor, and witnesses Salvador Gonzales
and Atty. Owen Amor who were consistent in their declarations
on the witness stand and corroborated one anothers
statements; and that the testimony of petitioners lone witness,
Lloyd Fojas is not sufficient to overcome private respondents
evidence.
We have repeatedly held that the truth is established not by the
number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. In
the present case, it cannot be said that the quality of the
testimony of petitioners lone witness is greater than those of
the private respondents. PAL witness check-in clerk, Fojas,
testified that when respondents went to the check-in counter,
there were no more persons in that area since all the
passengers already boarded the plane. However, the
testimonies of Manuel Baltazar and Judy Amor together with the
manifest point to the fact that many passengers were not able
to board said flight, including confirmed passengers, because of
overbooking.
It is a well-entrenched principle that absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion or any palpable error in its findings,
this Court will not question the probative weight accorded by the
lower courts to the various evidence presented by the parties.
As we explained in Superlines Transportation Co. Inc., vs. ICC
Leasing & Financing Corporation:
The Court is not tasked to calibrate and assess the probative
weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over
again So long as the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
consistent with or are not palpably contrary to the evidence on
record, this Court shall decline to embark on a review on the
probative weight of the evidence of the parties.
It is also well established that findings of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal except on very strong and cogent
grounds. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the trial court
committed any error in upholding the testimonies of private
respondents witnesses. We find that the CA committed no
reversible error in sustaining the findings of facts of the trial
court.
[G.R. No. 131794. December 10, 2003]

41

RUBEN AUGUSTO and ATTY. NOEL D. ARCHIVAL,

petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE TEODORO K. RISOS,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, LapuLapu City, CLEOFE OMOLON, respondents.
Facts: Felisa Augusto and her siblings, Jose Augusto, Magdalena
Augusto and Alfonso Augusto, all married, were the co-owners of
a parcel of land located in Barrio Mactan, Opon, Cebu.
In 1961, the then Justice of the Peace and Ex-Officio Notary
Public notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale where Felisa, Jose,
Magdalena and Alfonso, all surnamed Augusto, sold the property
to Guillermo Omolon for P200.00. Guillermo Omolon and his
wife, Cleofe, caused the aforesaid document to be registered in
the Office of the City Assessor of Lapu-Lapu City. Tax Declaration
No. 02729 was issued thereafter.
At that moment, the property was still registered in the names
of Monico, Felisa, Jose, Filomeno, Teofilo and Sinfroso, all
surnamed Augusto, under the Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. RO-3560.
Guillermo Omolon died intestate and was survived by wife
Cleofe.
Sometime in July 1995, Cleofe filed a petition for the
reconstitution before the RTC Lapu-Lapu of the lot that she and
her husband purchased. Said court granted the reconstitution.
In the Register of Deeds, however, Cleofe was informed that the
owners copy of OCT had already been issued to Ruben Augusto,
and that based on record, the same was in the possession of
Atty. Noel Archival.
Hence, on May 14, 1997, Cleofe filed a petition before the RTC of
Lapu-Lapu City, docketed as Cadastral Case No. 21, alleging that
as lawful co-owner and possessor of Lot No. 4429, she had every
right to have and hold the owners duplicate of the said OCT. She
prayed that after due proceedings, the respondents Ruben
Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival be ordered to surrender the
owners copy of the said title.
Respondents Ruben Augusto and Atty. Noel Archival alleged,
inter alia, that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Felisa,
Magdalena, Alfonso and Jose, all surnamed Augusto, was
falsified and fictitious, and, thus, null and void. In the interim,
Cleofe moved that her adverse claim be annotated at the dorsal
portion of the title.
The RTC then issued an order directing Atty. Noel Archival to
produce the owners copy of OCT No. 3560 to allow the
annotation of Cleofes interest, upon which the owners duplicate
copy of the title may thereafter be returned.
The trial court further declared that, based on the pleadings of
the parties, the issue of ownership over the property had been
raised, a matter which the court, sitting as a cadastral court,
could not pass upon. The trial court further ruled that pending
resolution of the issue of ownership over the property in an
appropriate proceedings therefor, there was a need for the
annotation of Cleofes interest over the property.
The Atty. Noel Archival therein filed a Motion for a Partial
Reconsideration of the Order alleging that Cleofes interest over
the property had been sufficiently protected by the annotation

of her adverse claim and moved for its reconsideration in

ordering him to produce the owners copy of the OCT.
The RTC, sitting as a cadastral court, denied the motion, hence,
the Atty. Noel Archival filed a notice of appeal from the said
order to the CA. The RTC issued an order denying due course
therefor, on its perception that the orders subject thereof were
interlocutory; hence, not appealable. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed order of the RTC is
appealable?
Held: Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that an
appeal may be taken only from a final order, and not from an
interlocutory one. A final order is one which disposes of the
whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined. An order or judgment is deemed
final if it finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the
rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire
controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof,
and concludes them until it is reversed or set aside. Where no
issue is left for future consideration, except the fact of
compliance with the terms of the order, such order is final and
appealable. In contrast, an order is interlocutory if it does not
finally dispose of the case.
In this case, the order of the public respondent directing the
petitioners to produce the owners copy of OCT No. 3560 in the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the annotation of the private
respondents
interest
over
the
property
is
merely
interlocutory and not final; hence, not appealable by means
of a writ of error. The public respondent had not fully disposed of
the case as it had not yet ruled on whether to grant the private
respondents prayer for the surrender of the owners copy of OCT
No. 3560. As gleaned from the order of the respondent judge, he
believed that he had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the
issue of ownership over the property and was disposed to
dismiss the petition. Before so doing, he believed it was
necessary that the petitioners claim over the property be
annotated at the dorsal portion of the title before the institution
of an ordinary motion for the resolution of the conflicting claims
of ownership over the property:
Going over the pleadings of the parties, the court gathers that
ownership over the land in question is disputed by the parties,
which this court, sitting as a cadastral court, cannot pass upon.
However, since the petitioner has also shown enough basis for
claiming possession of the owners copy of OCT No. 3560, by
virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex A), and in view of the
willingness of Atty. Archival to have petitioners interest
annotated at the back of the title, the court feels that for the
protection of both parties, the owners copy of OCT No. 3560 in
the possession of Atty. Noel Archival must be produced, in order
that petitioners interest may be annotated therein pending
resolution of the issue on ownership in the proper proceedings.
In fine, the assailed order of the respondent judge partook of the
nature of an ad cautelam order. This is not to say that the
respondent court sitting as a cadastral court had no jurisdiction
to delve into and resolve the issue of ownership over the
property. Apropos is our ruling in Vda. de Arceo v. Court of
Appeals, et al., viz:

42

The first question must, however, be resolved against the

petitioners. We have held that under Section 2 of the Property
Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as a land
registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under
Act No. 496, the former land registration law. We said that the
Decree has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when
acting merely as a cadastral court. The amendment was [a]imed
at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial
courts the authority to act not only on applications for original
registration but also over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising from such applications or petitions.
At any rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction-rule
governing land registration courts is subject to recognized
exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or
have acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for
determination; (2) where they have been given full opportunity
to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has
considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that
the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such
controversial issues. By the same token, it has been held that
the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere
procedure, which may be waived.
It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of
ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of
registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming
jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both
parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one anothers
claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case,
registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged
unless the court first decided it.
[January 24, 2007 G.R. No. 137162]
CORAZON L. ESCUETA, assisted by her husband
EDGAR ESCUETA, IGNACIO E. RUBIO,
THE HEIRS OF LUZ R. BALOLOY, namely,
ALEJANDRINO R. BALOLOY and
BAYANI R. BALOLOY, Petitioners, vs.
RUFINA LIM, Respondent.
Facts: The action stemmed out when respondent Rufina Lim
bought the hereditary shares (consisting of 10 lots) of Ignacio
Rubio [and] the heirs of Luz Baloloy. Parties agreed that vendors
Rubio et al. would secure certificates of title covering their
respective hereditary shares.
Respondent Rufina Lim alleged that Ignacio Rubio et al.
subsequently, refused to receive the other half of the down
payment pursuant to a contract.
Meanwhile, the Baloloys failed to appear at the pre-trial. So
upon motion of respondent, the trial court declared they were
decalared in default. The Baloloy then filed a motion to lift such
order but was denied by the trial court on November 27, 1991.
Consequently, respondent was allowed to adduce evidence ex
parte. Thereafter, the trial court rendered a partial decision
dated July 23, 1993 against the Baloloys.
The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment and order
and supplemental petition. This was likewise denied by the trial
court, hence, they elevated the matter to the CA. The appellate
court affirmed the decision against the Baloloys.
Petitioner Baloloy argued and made an issue that the CA did not
consider the circumstances surrounding their failure to appear
at the pre-trial and to file the petition for relief on time.

As to the failure to appear at the pre-trial, there was fraud,

accident and/or excusable neglect, because petitioner Bayani
Baloloy was in the United States. There was no service of the
notice of pre-trial or order. Neither did the former counsel of
record inform him.
Furthermore, Bayani alleged that Alejandrino Baloloy was not
clothed with a power of attorney to appear on behalf of him at
the pre-trial conference.
Trial on the merits ensued against the other defendants,
however, the RTC decided by dismissing the complaint of the
buyer Rufina Lim. On appeal, the CA set aside and reversed.
Issue: Whether the contract of sale between petitioners and
respondent is valid and whether the order declaring petitioner
Bayani Baloloy in default is proper?
Held: Yes. The contract of sale between petitioners and
respondent is valid.
Bayani Baloloy was represented by his attorney-in-fact,
Alejandrino Baloloy. In the Baloloys answer to the complaint, the
allegations relating to the personal circumstances of the
Baloloys are clearly admitted.
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof
[RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 4.]. The factual admission in
the pleadings on record [dispenses] with the need x x x to
present evidence to prove the admitted fact [Luzon
Development Bank v. Conquilla , G.R. No. 163338, September 21,
2005].
It cannot, therefore, be controverted by the party making such
admission, and [is] conclusive as to them [Rimbunan Hijau Group
of Companies v. Oriental Wood Processing Corp ., G.R. No. 152228,
September 23, 2005].
All proofs submitted by them contrary thereto or inconsistent
therewith should be ignored whether objection is interposed by
a party or not [Republic v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 157847, August 25,
2005]. Besides, there is no showing that a palpable mistake has
been committed in their admission or that no admission has
been made by them.
Pre-trial is mandatory. The notices of pre-trial had been sent to
both the Baloloys and their former counsel of record. Being
served with notice, he is charged with the duty of notifying the
party represented by him. He must see to it that his client
receives such notice and attends the pre-trial. What the Baloloys
and their former counsel have alleged instead in their Motion to
Lift Order of As In Default is the belated receipt of Bayani
Baloloys special power of attorney in favor of their former
counsel, not that they have not received the notice or been
informed of the scheduled pre-trial.
Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of
attorney in their motion, they are now deemed to have waived
it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at this late stage of the
proceedings. For lack of representation, Bayani Baloloy was
properly declared in default.
Section 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. A
petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this
Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other
proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months
after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioners good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the
above-cited rule. The 60-day period is reckoned from the time

43

the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or

proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same.
As aptly put by the appellate court:
The evidence on record as far as this issue is concerned shows
that Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr., the former counsel of record of the
Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision dated June 23,
1993 on April 5, 1994. At that time, said former counsel is still
their counsel of record. The reckoning of the 60 day period
therefore is the date when the said counsel of record received a
copy of the partial decision which was on April 5, 1994. The
petition for relief was filed by the new counsel on July 4, 1994
which means that 90 days have already lapsed or 30 days
beyond the 60 day period. Moreover, the records further show
that the Baloloys received the partial decision on September 13,
1993 as evidenced by Registry return cards which bear the
numbers 02597 and 02598 signed by Mr. Alejandrino Baloloy.
Furthermore, no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence exists in order that the petition for relief may be
granted. There is no proof of extrinsic fraud that prevents a
party from having a trial x x x or from presenting all of his case
to the court or an accident x x x which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against, and by reason of which the party
applying has probably been impaired in his rights. There is also
no proof of either a mistake x x x of law or an excusable
negligence caused by failure to receive notice of x x x the trial x
x x that it would not be necessary for him to take an active part
in the case x x x by relying on another person to attend to the
case for him, when such other person x x x was chargeable with
that duty x x x, or by other circumstances not involving fault of
the moving party.
[G.R. NO. 142628, February 6, 2007]
SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and
HEIRS OF PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE
ORO
CITY,
DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN
REFORM
ADJUDICATION
BOARD
(DARAB),
DAR
REGION
X
DIRECTOR, ROSALIO GAMULO, FORTUNATO TELEN,
EMERITA OLANGO, THERESA MONTUERTO, DOMINGO H.
CLAPERO, JOEL U. LIM, JENEMAIR U. POLLEY, FIDELA U.
POLLEY, JESUS BATUTAY, NICANOR UCAB, EMERIA U. LIM,
EMILITO CLAPERO, ANTONINA RIAS, AURILLIO ROMULO,
ERWIN P. CLAPERO, EVELITO CULANGO, VILMA/CRUISINE
ALONG, EFREN EMATA, GREGORIO CABARIBAN, and
SABINA CANTORANA, Respondents.
RTC had the authority to annul final judgments, resolutions
rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal
ranking with such inferior courts.
Facts: Petra Capistrano Piit previously owned Lot No. 2291
located in Cagayan de Oro City. Springfield Development Corp.
(Springfield) bought Lot No. 2291-C and Lot No. 2291-D and
developed these properties into a subdivision project.
Consequently, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office issued a Notice of Coverage
which categorized the said property under the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and the case was
docketed as DARAB Case No. X-305. The Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) granted and gave due
course to the Notice of Coverage and directed the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office to proceed with the documentation,
acquisition, and distribution of the property to the true and
lawful beneficiaries.
Springfield and the heirs of Piit (petitioners) filed with the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for annulment of the DARAB
Decision but the RTC dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the CA likewise dismissed for lack of merit, ruling

that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB
Decision because it is a co-equal body. Petitioners argue that
under the Judiciary Reorganization Act or BP 129, there is no
provision that vests with the CA jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of DARAB judgments. Petitioners, however, contend
that the RTC may take cognizance of the annulment case since
Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 vests the RTC with general jurisdiction
and an action for annulment is covered under such general
jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to annul final judgment
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), a quasi-judicial body.
Held: B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any power of
the RTC to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies. However, in
BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, the Court ruled that the RTCs have jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of the decisions of the National
Water Resources Council, which is a quasi-judicial body ranked
with inferior courts, pursuant to its original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, under Sec. 21(1)
of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation to acts or omissions of an inferior
court.
This led to the conclusion that despite the absence of any
provision in B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC had the power to entertain
petitions for annulment of judgments of inferior courts and
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking.
This is also in harmony with the "pre-B.P. Blg. 129" rulings of the
Court recognizing the power of a trial court (court of first
instance) to annul final judgments. Hence, while it is true, as
petitioners contend, that the RTC had the authority to annul final
judgments, such authority pertained only to final judgments
rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal
ranking with such inferior courts.
The foregoing statements beg the next question, i.e., whether
the DARAB is a quasi-judicial body with the rank of an
inferior court such that the RTC may take cognizance of an
action for the annulments of its judgments. The answer is no.
The DARAB is a quasi-judicial body created by EO 229 and 129A. R.A. No. 6657 delineated its adjudicatory powers and
functions. The DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure specifically
provides for the manner of judicial review of its decisions,
orders, rulings, or awards. Rule XIV, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision,
order, award or ruling by the Board or its Adjudicators on any
agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement or interpretation of agrarian
reform laws or rules and regulations promulgated thereunder,
may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof, to the Court of Appeals by certiorari, except as provided
in the next succeeding section. Notwithstanding an appeal to
the Court of Appeals the decision of the Board or Adjudicator
appealed from, shall be immediately executory.
Further, the prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the DARAB
decisions to the CA.

44

The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from

decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means
that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and
stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the
inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body
with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's
control. The CA was therefore correct in sustaining the RTC's
dismissal of the petition for annulment of the DARAB Decision
dated October 5, 1995, as the RTC does not have any
jurisdiction to entertain the same.

[G.R. No. 173559

January 7, 2013]

LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact,

MARCELINA
DIONA,
Petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO
A. BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE, JR.,
Respondents.
A relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given
and not supported by the evidence presented violates the
opposing partys right to due process and may be declared void
ab initio in a proper proceeding.
FACTS: Respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from
petitioner payable in six months and secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage over their 202-square meter property in Marulas,
Valenzuela
When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay
notwithstanding demand, petitioner filed with the RTC a
Complaint. Respondents were served with summons thru
respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). On October 15, 1999,
with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the
Public Attorneys Office, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to
Answer. Despite the requested extension, however, respondents
failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of the
petitioner, the RTC declared them in default and allowed
petitioner to present her evidence ex parte.
The petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Execution but before
it could be resolved, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment claiming that not all of them were duly served with
summons. According to the other respondents, they had no
knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did
not inform them about it. They prayed that the RTCs Decision
be set aside and a new trial be conducted.
But on March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Execution to implement its Decision. However, since the writ
could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of
the mortgaged property, which the RTC granted.
Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment
and To Set Aside Execution Sale claiming that the parties did not
agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner
merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint.
Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per
annum) thus the monetary obligation ballooned from
P124,400.00 to P652,000.00.
The RTC granted respondents motion and accordingly modified
the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum.

Displeased with the RTCs Order, petitioner Diona elevated the

matter to the CA under Rule 65. The CA rendered a Decision
declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the
5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the
rate of interest to 12% per annum. In so ruling, the CA
ratiocinated:
Respondents filed with the same court a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment and Execution Sale. They contended that the
portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner 5% monthly
interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court and of their right to due process. According to
respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the
verbal agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioners
family can continue occupying respondents residential building
located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully
paid.
Following the mandate of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, the CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest is void
for being in excess of the relief sought in the Complaint.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied by the CA. In
SC, they contend that while conceding that the RTC patently
made a mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest, petitioner
nonetheless invokes the doctrine of immutability of final
judgment and contends that the RTC Decision can no longer be
corrected or modified since it had long become final and
executory.
Issue: W/N the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted petitioner 5% monthly interest rate in gross violation of
Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of respondents
right to due process.
HELD: The petition must fail.
We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly
interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the same
may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has
failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule
explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a
remedy which was lost due to the partys own neglect in
promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is
traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes
against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid
to rest."
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition
for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence
recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to
annul a judgment.

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In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final

and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere
inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having
been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum
interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due
process.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed
for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought
by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first
ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due
process considerations require that judgments must conform to
and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in
court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this
Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the
opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of
recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right
to due process of a defendant who was declared in default than
of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance,
amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is
allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible
when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d),
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief
that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for
in the Complaint. It provides:
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.
The raison dtre in limiting the extent of relief that may be
granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would
not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default
had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater
than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No
doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court is to safeguard defendants right to due process against
unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of
this Court, is akin to the very essence of due process. It
embodies "the sporting idea of fair play" and forbids the grant of
relief on matters where the defendant was not given the
opportunity to be heard thereon.
In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is
not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the
evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by the
parties does not include any provision on interest. When
petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that
respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum" and sought payment thereof. She did
not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither
did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTCs
award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and
disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement

because respondents were not informed of the possibility that

the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of
reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting
evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant
petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated in her
Complaint.
[G.R. No. 140945. May 16, 2005]
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
EVANGELISTA, respondent.

petitioner, vs. JOSE

A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be

bound by the decision rendered therein.
Facts: A certain real property located in V. Luna Road Quezon
City was awarded in 1968 by the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corp. (NHAs predecessor) to a certain Adela Salindon.
After the death of Salindon, the property was transferred by her
heirs to Arsenio Florendo, Jr., Milagros Florendo, Beatriz
Florendo, et al. However, the SC in a separate case G.R. No. L60544, such award in favor of Salindon was nullified and thus,
petitioner NHA was declared the owner of the property.
Despite said decision, the property was auctioned off by the
Quezon City Treasurers Office because of its unpaid real
property taxes by the Florendos. The highest bidder was Luisito
Sarte.
In 1991 NHA filed a case vs. Sarte; the City Treasurer of Quezon
City and the Quezon City Register of Deeds, as defendants.
While the case was pending, Sarte executed a Deed of
Assignment in favor of herein respondent Jose Evangelista.
NHA filed a motion for leave to file supplemental complaint to
include respondent Evangelista, among others which the trial
court denied.
In its decision, the RTC declared void ab initio the subsequent
issuance of TCT in the name of defendant Sarte and further held
in Paragraph No. 3 that: 3. Any transfers, assignment, sale
or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land
subject of this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or
his/her agents or assigns before or during the pendency
of the instant case are hereby declared null and void,
together with any transfer certificates of title issued in
connection with the aforesaid transactions by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is likewise ordered
to cancel or cause the cancellation of such TCTs.
The CA decided otherwise and said that respondent/assignee
Evangelista was not a party to civil case in RTC- QC and hence,
did not acquire any jurisdiction over his person.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in annulling paragraph 3 of
the trial courts decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
lack of due process of law.
Held: No. A person who was not impleaded in the complaint
cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,
and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by
the court.[Heirs of Antonio Pael vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
133547, February 10, 2000, 325 SCRA 341, 366; Arcelona vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA
20, 40]. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial courts decision
decreed otherwise.
Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as he was
the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from Sarte,
and title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of
inequity to allow respondents title to be nullified without being

46

given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his

ostensible ownership of the property. Much more, it is
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
Clearly, the trial courts judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3
of its dispositive portion is concerned.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character,
allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available
or other adequate remedy. Jurisprudence and Section 2, Rule 47
of the Rules of Court lay down the grounds upon which an action
for annulment of judgment may be brought, i.e., (1) extrinsic
fraud, and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process.
Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the

claim, and in either case, the judgment or final order and

resolution are void. A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in
court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons.
Petitioner argues that it should not bear the consequence of the
trial courts denial of its motion to include respondent as
defendant in Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. True, it was not
petitioners fault that respondent was not made a party to the
case. But likewise, it was not respondents fault that he was not
given the opportunity to present his side of the story. Whatever
prompted the trial court to deny petitioners motion to include
respondent as defendant is not for the Court to reason why.
Petitioner could have brought the trial courts denial to the CA on
certiorari but it did not.

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