PASTOR vs.

CAGO
FACTS: Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were
survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr.
(Pastor Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child,
Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate
and allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with
the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition: a
legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s
42% share in the operation by ATLAS.
Thereafter, the probate court appointed Quemada as special
administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not
covered or affected by the holographic will. Consequently,
Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action
for reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which
included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the
names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to
be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance.
The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate.
The order was affirmed by CA and on petition for review, the
SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the
probate court after denying reconsideration.
For two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all
pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long
after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity
of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on the
ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was
held.
Instead, the probate court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was
still pending in another court, the probate court issued Order of

Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of

ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in
effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was directed to remit directly to
Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate, of which
Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee.
Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was
ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of
Quemada. Being immediately executory, Quemada
succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment.
The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the
meantime, the probate court ordered suspension of payment
of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after
resolution of oppositors motion for reconsideration. Pending
motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the writ of execution and garnishment
issued by the probate court.
However, said petition was denied as well as their motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality
the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.
RULING: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the
issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the
will. As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not

conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a

separate action to resolve title.
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of
execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the question
of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However,
nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of
ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is
manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it
confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will,
and the need for and propriety of appointing a special
administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic
will with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been
duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. It declared that the intestate estate
administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of
the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real
and personal properties.
The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of
the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that
the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in
the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was, therefore,
error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the
Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership
of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on
this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate
Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in
dispute.
Alvarado vs. Gaviola
FACTS: On November 5, 1977, 79 yr old Brigado Alvarado
executed a notarial will entitled Huling Habilin wherein he
disinherited an illegitimate son, Cesar Alvarado, herein

petitioner, and expressly revoked a previously executed

holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC
Laguna. According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he
was present when the said notarial will was executed, together
with three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where
the testator did not read the will himself, suffering from
glaucoma. Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight page document
and read the same aloud before the testator, the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the latter four
following the reading with their own respective copies
previously furnished them. Thereafter, a codicil Kasulatan ng
Pagbabago ng ilang pagpapasiya na nasasaad sa huling
habilin na may petsa nobiembre 5 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado
was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to
generate case for the testators eye operation. Said codicil was
likewise not read by brigido Alvarado and was read in the
same manner as with the previously executed will. When the
notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, cesar
Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not
exected and attested as required by law; that the testator was
insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age;
that the will was executed inder duress, or influence of fear or
threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of the
testator was procured by fraud or trick.
ISSUE: WON notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be
admitted to probate despite allegations of defects in the
execution and attestation thereof as testator was allegedly
blind at the time of execution and the double reading
requirement under art 808 of the NCC was not complied with
HELD: YES, the spirit behind the law was served though the
letter was not.

RATIO: Although there should be strict compliance with the

substantial requirements of law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which,
when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.
Cesar Alvarado was correct in asserting that his father was not
totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, but he
can be so considered for purposes of Art 808. That art 808
was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. However, in the case
at bar, there was substantial compliance where the purpose of
the law has been satisfied: that of making provisions known to
the testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will himself
and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his
wishes. Private respondent read the testator's will and codicil
aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental
witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent
thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the
contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then
did the signing and acknowledgement take place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and codicil
were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the
testator. With 4 persons, mostly known to the testator,
following the reading word for word with their own copies, it
can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably
assured that what was read to him were the terms actually
appearing on the typewritten documents
Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be

brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which,
when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will.
Nepomuceno
vs.
CA
FACTS: Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last
Will and Testament before he died. Petitioner was named as
sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally
married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful
wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were
married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator
devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On August
21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13,
1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition
alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the
petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the
testator was already very sick and that petitioner having
admitted her living in concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground
that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the
petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the
respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal denying theprobate of the will. The
respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the
devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.
ISSUE: W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when
after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased
Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provision.
HELD: No.

RATIO: The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when

after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in
favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that
in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is limited to
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the
Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless
to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)

decedent's holographic will and alleged that at the time of its

execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting
under duress, fraud or undue influence. Private respondent
opposed the petition on the grounds that the will contained
alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose
Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and
lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that
said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The Court of Appeals
found that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and
814of the New Civil Code. It alluded to certain dispositions in
the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but
not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by
decedent.

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations

shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions.

Issues: 1. Whether or not said will was executed in

accordance with formalities prescribed in law.

There is no question from the records about the fact of

aprior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will.
The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because
the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

Ruling: 1. Yes. The will was executed in accordance with the

formalities prescribed in law. In the case of holographic wills,
what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be
totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as
provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code.

AJERO vs. CA
Facts: The instrument submitted for probate is the holographic
will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.
Petitioners instituted a special proceeding for allowance of

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in
the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to
sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these

2. Whether or not the decedent could validly dispose of the

house and lot locatedin Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its
entirety.

dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however,

does not render the whole testament void, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or
insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on
testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance
of such changes. Moreover, the list enumerated in Article 839
of the New Civil Code is exclusive; no other grounds can serve
to disallow a will.
2. No. Decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic
will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late
father, John H. Sand. Thus, as correctly held by respondent
court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which
she shares with her father's other heirs.
ACAIN vs. IAC
FACTS: Constantitno filed for probate of the will of his
decased brother Nemesio. The spouse and adopted child of
the decedent opposed the probate of will because of
preterition. RTC dismissed the petition of the wife. CA
reversed and the probate thus was dismissed
ISSUE: WON there was preterition of compulsory heirs in the
direct line thus their omission shall not annul the institution of
heirs.
RULING: Preterition consists in the omission of the forced
heirs because they are not mentioned there in, or trough
mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited. As for the widow there is no preterit ion
because she is not in the direct line. However, the same
cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has

not been questioned by the petitioner. Adoption gives to the

adopted person the same rights and duties as if he where a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person
a legal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition. The
universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and
sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution
of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in
the will amounts to a declaration that nothing was written. No
legacies and devisees having been provided in the will, the
whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title
to petitioner and his brothers and sisters
De Guzman vs. Angeles
On March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in Makati, Metro
Manila; (2) at the time of his death, the decedent was a resident
of Makati, Metro Manila; (3) decedent left personal and real
properties as part of his estate (4) the properties were acquired
after the marriage of the petitioner to the decedent and therefore
are included in their conjugal partnership; (5) the estate of -the
decedent has a probable net value which may be provisionally
assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less; (6) the possible
creditors of the estate, who have accounts payable. and existing
claims against the firm C. SANTOS Construction (7) the
compulsory heirs of the decedent are the as the surviving spouse
and their two (2) minor children namely: Charmane Rose de
Guzman 11 years and Peter Brian de Guzman, 9 years old; (8)
after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the
decedent left a last will and testament, none has been found and
according to the best knowledge information and belief of the
petitioner, Manolito de Guzman died intestate; and (9) the
petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of the decedent, is most
qualified and entitled to the grant of letters of administration.

On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of
possession over 5 vehicles registered under the name of
Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de
Guzman's but which are at present in the possession of the
private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro de
Guzman. The motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private
respondent must have the possession of said vehicles in order to
preserve the assets of her late husband. On the same day, the
lower court issued an order setting for hearing the motion on May
27, 1987 directing the deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de
Guzman at the expense of the private respondent.
Hearing was postponed on motion of petitioner's counsel, Atty.
Ricardo Fojas. The petitioner was also given three (3) days from
May 27, 1987 to give his comment on the motion for a writ of
possession. The hearing was reset to June 5, 1987 at 3:00 p.m.
Petitioner's counsel filed a notice of appearance and an "Urgent
Motion For Extension of Time to File an Opposition and for
Resetting of the Hearing."
The motion was granted and the petitioner was given five (5)
days from receipt of the order within which to file his opposition to
the motion for a writ of possession. The hearing was reset to
June 15, 1987 at 2:00 in the afternoon.
In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed
her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Petitioner as Special
Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman."
In an order dated May 28,1987, the aforesaid motion was set for
hearing on June 5, 1987. In this same order, the lower court
directed that all parties in the case be notified. However, no
notice of the order was given to the petitioner.

In an order dated June 5, 1987, the lower court granted the

private respondent's motion to be appointed as special
administratrix
The lower court issued another order, to wit:
Acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Assistance"
filed
by
Petitioner-Special
Administratrix Elaine de Guzman for appointment
of Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B.
Flora together with some military men and/or
policemen to assist her in preserving the estate of
Manolito de Guzman, the motion is granted and
the Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B.
Flora are hereby appointed for that purpose,
provided that the subject matter of the motion for
writ of possession pending before this Court shall
not be affected. (Rollo, p. 41)
Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the above
order. The petitioner resisted when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora
and Honorio Santos tried to take the subject vehicles on the
ground that they were his personal properties. According to the
petitioner, this resulted in a "near shoot-out between members of
the Makati Police, who were to maintain peace and order, and the
CAPCOM soldiers who were ostensibly aiding respondent sheriffs
and Elaine G. de Guzman" and that "the timely arrival of Mayor
Jejomar Binay of Makati defused the very volatile situation which
resulted in an agreement between the parties that the bulldozer,
sought to be taken, be temporarily placed in the custody of Mayor
Binay, while the parties seek clarification of the order from
respondent Judge Zosimo Angeles the next day, June 9, 1981 at
10:30 a.m."

In the conference held before the respondent court attended by

the counsels for both parties, the June 8, 1987 order was clarified
to the effect that the order "must be merely to take and preserve
assets admittedly belonging to the estate, but not properties, the
ownership of which is claimed by third persons."

the petitioner Pedro de Guzman, are eloquent proofs that all the
antecedent events were intended solely to deprive petitioner de
Guzman of his property without due process of law." He also
prays that the respondent Judge be disqualified from further
continuing the case.

The petitioner then filed a manifestation listing properties which

he claimed to be his own.

As stated earlier, the pivotal issue in the instant petition hinges on

whether or not a probate court may appoint a special
administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties
of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person
even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all
interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

Thereafter, the instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's
orders dated June 5, 1987 and June 8, 1987.
In a resolution dated June 10, 1987, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent court from enforcing
the two questioned orders. In another resolution dated October
28, 1987, we gave due course to the petition.
The petitioner contends that the June 5, 1987 order is a patent
nullity, the respondent court not having acquired jurisdiction to
appoint a special administratrix because the petition for the
settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman was not yet set
for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks, as
mandated by the Rules of Court. The petitioner also stresses that
the appointment of a special administratrix constitutes an abuse
of discretion for having been made without giving petitioner and
other parties an opportunity to oppose said appointment.
Anent the June 8, 1987 order, the petitioner alleges that the
immediate grant of the motion praying for the court's assistance in
the preservation of the estate of the deceased, "without notice to
the
petitioner
Pedro
de
Guzman,
and
its immediate implementation on the very same day by
respondent Elaine G. de Guzman with the assistance of
respondents deputy sheriffs, at no other place but at the home of

As early as March 18, 1937, in the case of Santos v. Castillo (64

Phil. 211) we ruled that before a court may acquire jurisdiction
over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of
the properties left by a deceased person, the application must
allege the residence of the deceased and other indispensable
facts or circumstances and that the applicant is the executor
named in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to
be probated.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court
acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon the filing of a
petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private
respondent since the petition had alleged all the jurisdictional
facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs
and creditors and the probable value of the estate of the
deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the
probate court over the proceedings for the administration of an

estate and its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in
the settlement of the estate of the deceased person. The court
may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased
person but the determination of the properties comprising that
estate must follow established rules.
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof.
When a petition for letters of administration is filed
in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix
a time and place for hearing the petition, and shall
cause notice thereof to be given to the known
heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any
other persons believed to have an interest in the
estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4
of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must
cause notice through publication of the petition after it receives
the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested
persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein
becomes binding on all the world. (Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil.
938; Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court Volume 3,1980
Edition) Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the
Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to have an
interest in the estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for
the settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. The
requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of the
proceeding in that no person may be deprived of his right to
property without due process of law. (Eusebio v. Valmores, 96
Phil. 163).
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence

of which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent

to the petition void and subject to annulment. (See Eusebio v.
Valmores, supra)
In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79
of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to be given by the
probate court before it acted on the motions of the private
respondent to be appointed as special administratrix, to issue a
writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in
the widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance to
preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
The "explanation" which we required of the respondent Judge for
his apparent haste in issuing the questioned orders, states:
xxx xxx xxx
10. In issuing the subject Orders, undersigned
acted in the honest conviction that it would be to
the best interest of the estate without unduly
prejudicing any interested party or third person.
Any delay in issuing the said Orders might have
prejudiced the estate for the properties may be
lost, wasted or dissipated in the meantime. (Rollo,
p. 86)
xxx xxx xxx
This explanation while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently
explain the disregard of the Rule. If indeed, the respondent court
had the welfare of both the estate and the person who have
interest in the estate, then it could have caused notice to be given
immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of Court. All
interested persons including herein petitioner who is the biggest

creditor of the estate listed in the Petition (P850,240.80) could

have participated in the proceedings especially so, because the
respondent immediately filed a motion to have herself appointed
as administratrix. A special administrator has been defined as the
"representative of decedent appointed by the probate court to
care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general
administrator is appointed." (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer R. Co.
1965 ed., at 106 cited in Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189).
The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the
preservation of the estate as the private respondent who happens
to be the widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the
necessity of notice as mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not
clear from the records exactly what emergency would have
ensued if the appointment of an administrator was deferred at
least until the most interested parties were given notice of the
proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a
regular administrator is apparent from the records.
As argued by the petitioner:
The position of special administrator, by the very
nature of the powers granted thereby, is one of
trust and confidence. It is a fiduciary position and,
therefore,
requires
a
comprehensive
determination of the suitability of the applicant to
such
position.
Hence,
under
Philippine
jurisprudence, it has been settled that the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the
choice of a regular administrator should be taken
in choosing the special administrator (Francisco,
Vol. VB, page 46 citing the cases of Ozaeta v.
Pecson, Ibid. and Roxas v. Pecson, Ibid.)
In order to fully and correctly ascertain the
suitability of the applicant to the trust, a hearing is

obviously necessary wherein the applicant can

prove his qualifications and at the same time
affording oppositors, given notice of such hearing
and application, the opportunity to oppose or
contest such application.
The requirement of a hearing and
the notification to all the known
heirs and other interested parties
as to the date thereof is essential
to the validity of the proceeding for
the
appointment
of
an
administrator "in order that no
person may be deprived of his
right or property without due
process of law" (Eusebio v.
Valmores, 97 Phil. 163). Moreover,
a hearing is necessary in order to
fully determine the suitability of the
applicant to the trust, by giving him
the opportunity to prove his
qualifications
and
affording
oppositors, if any, to contest the
said application. (Matute v. Court
of Appeals, 26 SCRA 770;
emphasis supplied).
Since the position of special administrator is a
very sensitive one which requires trust and
confidence, it is essential that the suitability of the
applicant be ascertained in a hearing with due
notice to all oppositors who may object precisely
to the applicant's suitability to the trust. (Rollo, pp.
103-104)

If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets

of an estate justify a court's immediately taking some kind of
temporary action even without the required notice, no such
emergency is shown in this case. The need for the proper notice
even for the appointment of a special administrator is apparent
from the circumstances of this case.
The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the
preservation of the estate was limited to properties not claimed
by third parties. If certain properties are already in the possession
of the applicant for special administratrix and are not claimed by
other persons, we see no need to hurry up and take special
action to preserve those properties. As it is, the sheriffs took
advantage of the questioned order to seize by force, properties
found in the residence of the petitioner which he vehemently
claims are owned by him and not by the estate of the deceased
person.
The petitioner also asks that the respondent Judge be disqualified
from continuing with the proceedings of the case on the ground
that he is partial to the private respondent.
In view of the fact that the respondent Judge in his "Explanation"
requests that he be inhibited from further active on the case, this
issue has now become academic. We accept Judge Angeles"
voluntary inhibition in line with our ruling in Pimentel v.
Salanga (21 SCRA 160).
... A judge may not be legally prohibited from
sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made
of record that he might be induced to act in favor
of one party or with bias or prejudice against a
litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should

exercise his discretion in a way that the people's

faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A
salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability
that a losing party might nurture at the back of his
mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against
him. That passion on the part of a judge may be
generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel,
is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to
the frailties of other men. He should, therefore,
exercise great care and caution before making up
his mind to act or withdraw from a suit Where that
party or counsel is involved. He could in good
grace inhibit himself where that case could be
heard by another judge and where no appreciable
prejudice would be occasioned to others involved
thereon. On the result of his decisions to sit or not
sit may depend to a great extent that all-important
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If
after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily
desist from sitting in a case where his motives or
fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is
to be interpreted as giving meaning and
substance to the second paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who
forestalls miscarriage of justice.
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to discuss the other
issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

VDA.DE PEREZ VS. TOLETE

FACTS: Subject of this case is the probate of the will of
Spouses Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan,
who became American citizens and practicing doctors in New
York, U.S.A. The spouses executed separate wills for the
benefit of each other. The spouses and their family perished
when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home.
Thereafter, their wills were admitted to probate with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. Then,
petitioner who is the mother of Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan filed
for the reprobate of the will with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malolos, Bulacan. The will was denied probate for the
reason that the documents did not establish the law of New
York on the procedure and allowance of wills. The petitioners
motion for reconsideration to be given sufficient time to prove
New York law was denied. On appeal, petitioner contend that
the evidence submitted to the RTC were already sufficient to
allow probate of will.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was necessary to prove the foreign
law.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: The evidence necessary for the reprobate or
allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his
domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3)
the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the
fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws
of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.

Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner

submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon
which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled
by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them
Petitioner must have perceived the omission of the fifth
requirement above as in fact she moved for more time to
submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York
laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over.
While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein
courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to
receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible
before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
Respondent Judge was ordered to give the petitioner a
reasonable time within which to submit evidence.