EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-10016. February 28, 1957.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PROCESO S. ARAGON, DefendantAppellant.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for Appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis, for Defendant-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. MARRIAGE LAW NULL AND VOID MARRIAGES; JUDICIAL DECREE TO ESTABLISH INVALIDITY, NOT
NECESSARY. A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse is
illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity as dis
tinguished from mere annuable marriage. (People v. Mendoza, L-5877, September 28, 1954.)

DECISION

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The facts
are not disputed and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a
certain Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits "1" and "1-A). While his
marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a
canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita church in Iloilo City.
"The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the Office
of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomera, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A", and
testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria
Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between
Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea. Maria
Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorreas death, and seeing that the
coast was clear in Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a
teacher-nurse.
"It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that
in 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands
of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Ilioilo, allegedly for the purpose of
undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a
certain Jesusa C. Magsalang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F").
"The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Magsalang in Sibonga, Cebu, on October
3, 1953. Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court,
however, believes the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was fully established not only
by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of
the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A"
and "B" ; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954)."
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The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in he absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613
authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant
could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Magsalang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria
Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the

instance of the latter. Authorities given for his ruling are 5 iada, 5th edition, 651; 35 American
Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs, Bickford, 74 N.H. 466, A. 579.
Appellant in this court relies on the case of People v. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767). In
this case the majority of this Court declared:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law of Act 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity, as distinguished from mere annuable marriages. There is
here no pretense that appellants second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the first
spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as
to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent court."
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We are aware of the very weighty reasons expressed by Justice Alex Reyes in his dissent in the case abovequoted. But these weighty reasons notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of
penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the
above-cited case of People v. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule
enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been
within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been
inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the
appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into.
Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellants prosecution for contracting this marriage can not
prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendantappellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the
second bigamous marriage. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, A., J., dissenting:

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I dissent.
Dissenting in the case of People v. Mendoza, replied on by the majority, I there said"
"Article 349 of the Revised Code punishes with prision mayor any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.
"Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve,
still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to
the courts. As Viada says, La satidad e importancia del matrimonio no permite que los casados juzguen por
si mismos de su nulidad; esta ha de someterse precisamente al juico del Tribunal competente, y cuando este
declare la nulidad del matrimonio, y solo entonces, se tendra por nulo; mientras no existta esta declaracion,
la presuncion esta siempre a favor de la validez del matrimonio, y de consiguiente, el que contrae otro
segundo antes de este articulo. (3 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 275.)
"This is a sound opinion., says Mr. Justice Tuason in the case of People v. Jose Cotas, (CA), 40 Off. Gaz.,
3145, and is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of adultery, that until be competent
authority in a final judgment the marriage contract is set aside, the offense to the vows taken and the attack
in the family exists."
I may add that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy would frustrate the
legislative intent rather than give effect thereto.
Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy

143 SCRA 449
FACTS:
Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a
certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia
on the ground of latters former marriage. Having been allegedly force to enter
into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia
likewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.
HELD:
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with
force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her
marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on
the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage
are regarded void under the law.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of
Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church
Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and
defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was
null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter
said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status
of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior
marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the
respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted
on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for
resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her
favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been
made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl

Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of
are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994

JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea and Nolasco for petitioner.
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 1 Bigamy carries
with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime
prescribes in fifteen (15) years. 2 The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . 3
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted. 4 At least, it is not expressly
denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred,
which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from the time the offended party
actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the subsequent marriage
was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice.

The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged
with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma.
Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid
and subsisting. 5
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992,
he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. 6
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of
the Civil Registrar in 1975, 7such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus
constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive
notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the
marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have
been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous marriage" as declared
by the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity
Church in Marikina on
15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the moment of registration the marriage
contract was open to inspection by any interested person.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in
criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant, 8 we agree with the view expounded
by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its
being more favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly explains
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be applied
in the case at bar, principally citing in support of his stand, the cases of People
v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); andPeople v. Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be
applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from
the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is
generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married
person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.

In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right or
interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said property
is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the
transactions involving the said property can easily be made by any interested party.
In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended person or the
authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive
notice was applied, involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly,
marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is
not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed
liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of
bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders
thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be
said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is
not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the
existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is
still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is
not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under
which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite
difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for
the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of
registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense would almost
be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless
violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. 9
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census
Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or even
third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too
formidable a task to even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for constructive
notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for
the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the time of such registering, filing or
entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to

the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the documents
registered in the Civil Register.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his
marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and sundry
for inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate in the marriage
contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or for that
matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in Marikina so that
everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no priest or minister
would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment
under the Marriage Law. 10 Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to his first
spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any third party would ever go to the local civil
registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple expedience of having the second marriage
recorded in the local civil registry, he has set into motion the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period
against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be
playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage with
ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the stability of
marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of our
society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the
same is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., took no part.

Terre vs Terre
Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 6
FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin.
Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab
initio for the reason of public policy and that they are free to contract marriage.
They got married in 1977 where he wrote single under Dorothys status. After
getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently
contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was
charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is null and void.
HELD:
Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her
first cousin thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any
declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she contracted her marriage
with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the
absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent
Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained
subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5)

attempts to serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to
another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or
residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the
respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's
Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law
until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order.
In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977
upon her representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain
Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him
out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla
and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that

his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol,
Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that
Jason was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance
to respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a
dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the
fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been
abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital
bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a
Resolution dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for
hearing on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her
evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another

hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once
again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her
case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his
evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly
considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for
resolution. The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did
so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court.
The Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was
single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law
student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting
her, this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she
was married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she
and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having
secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite
her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they
were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn,
July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in
1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from
his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found
out later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp.
21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p.
23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case

No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against
respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where
a prima facie case was found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant
filed an administrative case against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was
employed, which case however was considered closed for being moot and academic when
respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having gone on absence
without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on
14 July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent
Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into,
respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of
nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of
respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled
complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy
and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the
respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran
counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will
follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the
result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted,
he convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally
single and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went
through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After
respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant
without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not
only his unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and
responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of

the Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as
claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had
made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects
(Article 216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he

made a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as

he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from
complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the
Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to
contract a second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and
supported him through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a
second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting,
constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place.
The Court will correct this error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll
of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar
Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall
be circularized to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR No. 08-2008

TO: ALL JUDGES
SUBJECT: GUIDELINES IN THE OBSERVANCE OF A RULE OF PREFERENCE IN THE
IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES IN LIBEL CASES.
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel, committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition,
or any similar means, with prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods or fine ranging
from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.
In the following cases, the Court opted to impose only a fine on the person convicted of the crime of
libel:
In Fernando Sazon v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, 1 the Court modified the
penalty imposed upon petitioner, an officer of a homeowners association, for the crime of libel from
imprisonment and fine in the amount of P200.00, to fine only of P3,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the reason that he wrote the libelous article merely to defend
his honor against the malicious messages that earlier circulated around the subdivision, which he
thought was the handiwork of the private complainant.
In Quirico Mari v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,2 where the crime involved is
slander by deed, the Court modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner, an ordinary government
employee, from imprisonment to fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, on the ground that the latter committed the offense in the heat of anger and in reaction to
a perceived provocation.

In Roberto Brillante v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,3 the Court deleted the penalty
of imprisonment imposed upon petitioner, a local politician, but maintained the penalty of fine of
P4,0000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each of the (5) cases of libel, on
the ground that the intensely feverish passions evoked during the election period in 1988 must have
agitated petitioner into writing his open letter; and that incomplete privileged communication should
be appreciated in favor of petitioner, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given to
defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of
official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them.
In Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. v. People of the Philippines and Atty. Jose Pieraz, 4 the Court opted to
impose upon petitioner, a lawyer, the penalty of fine only for the crime of libel considering that it was
his first offense and he was motivated purely by his belief that he was merely exercising a civic or
moral duty to his client when wrote the defamatory letter to private complainant.
The foregoing cases indicate an emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only rather
than imprisonment in libel cases under the circumstances therein specified.
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of preference set
by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in
mind the following principles:
1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty
for the crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense,
work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of
justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary
imprisonment.
The Court Administrator shall cause the immediate dissemination of this Administrative Circular to all
courts and judges concerned.
This Administrative Circular, approved by the Supreme Court En Banc in A.M. No. 08-1-17 SC at its
session of 22 January 2008 shall take effect upon its issuance.
Issued this 25th day of January 2008.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known
as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the
prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would
constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed
by the petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the
terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the
Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided
on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn,
August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request,
appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.
(Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the
telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the
following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.
(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased
to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other
demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for
Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault
against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco
Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don
Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed
against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's

affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed
later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the
mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983,
pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at
the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted
his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine
Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn,
March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault.
Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion
which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan
and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to
one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the
appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding
that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and,
therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without
the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by
the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered
in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the
following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and
accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the
term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had
authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200
is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record,
wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of
this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in
any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence.
The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a
third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening
to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the
extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused
Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and
another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only
one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with
the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine
bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have
his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's
Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that
affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone
line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It
would be the word of the caller against the listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra
heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often
encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone
and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that
he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the
private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such
mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase
"any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement
as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private
secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering
or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman.

Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that
matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration
of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill
No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension
telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known
communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor
of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in
the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or
walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere
oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete
set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus
consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which
can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be
plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the
other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed
for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of
Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of
a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to
agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations
of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in
paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory
and should not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent.

The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be

restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually the
minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the
generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are
used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered.
(Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to
that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar
nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party
or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended
unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to
place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is
calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a
third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with
another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause
the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a
telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension
telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes
place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain.
Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if
instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and
that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension
telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including
an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the
rationale behind the rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the
law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States
v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26
F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA
821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's
Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative
measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of

the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the
inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater
importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely
listening to a telephone conversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment
which is certainly objectionable. It is made possible by special
amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be
less possible with the amendment than without it, because with the
amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of
government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant.
With this amendment, they would have the right, and the government
officials and the person in fact would have the right to tape record
their conversation.
Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.
Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party
could record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying:
"Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In
these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with
the peace offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these
conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he could falsify the
testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to
record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then
the chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.
Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the
presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we
could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be
wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape
record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations
which later on will be used in court.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such
as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to
gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage
over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must

strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are
of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that
the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity
and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation
of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners MR, hence the instant
petition.

Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using

a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape

recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent courts
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to
share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private
communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and
communication were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

GANAAN V IAC

NOV

G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainants residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault
which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same
morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a
business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered Yes. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where to deliver the money.
Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the
then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the
Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself
should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was
arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainants consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No.
4200, which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present
petition for certiorari.
Issue:

W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term device or arrangement under Rep. Act No.
4200
Held:
No. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either
a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed
for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition
to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,

nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,
sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain
ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok.
Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo
na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko
up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito
sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo
na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic)
ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,
kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo.
Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang
utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka

kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamaganak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa
labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis
ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang
sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa
no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa
'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of
Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court,
the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized
by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording
to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M.
CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order
May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A.
4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a personother than a participant to the
communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division)
of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the
trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do
not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the
facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200
penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her
act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or
absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.

The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that
would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or
special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties
but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the
actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the
act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you
say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or
outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it
is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please
be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness
and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you
are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is
being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of
the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts
of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication"
to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to
share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions
are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative
body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the

terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his
Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have
some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Freeconversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by
our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that
part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and
free exchange of communication between individuals free from every unjustifiable
intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was
neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different
note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private
communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and
leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58681 May 31, 1982
ALFREDO P. MALIT, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HON. JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA, in his capacity
as the Presiding Judge of the City Court of Caloocan City, Branch IV, respondents.

RELOVA, J.:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of respondent Judge, dated February 20,
1981, denying petitioner's motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 126521, entitled: "People of the
Philippines vs. Atty. Alfredo Malit", as well as the order of same respondent, dated May 5, 1981,
which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
It appears on record that herein petitioner was counsel of Miss Ruth Fernandez in an administrative
case filed against her by Dr. Macaspac. At the hearing of the case on January 17, 1980, Dr.
Macaspac Identified certain exhibits on the witness stand. On cross-examination by herein petitioner,
Atty. Malit, if she knew the person who "made" a certain exhibit, Dr. Macaspac evaded the question
by saying she did not understand the word "made." Petitioner tried to explain by saying that it means
"prepared." Notwithstanding, Dr. Macaspac would not answer and, instead, asked petitioner for
clarification. This prompted Atty. Malit to say: "I doubt how did you become a Doctor." As a
consequence, Dr. Macaspac instituted a complaint for slander against herein petitioner with the
Fiscal's Office of Caloocan City.
On February 28, 1980, an information for unjust vexation docketed as Criminal Case No. 126521
was filed by Special Counsel Apolinario A. Exevea which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1980 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused without
any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously vex and
annoy one Corazon I. Macaspac, by then and there uttering the following remarks
directly addressed to the latter:
I DOUBT HOW DID YOU BECOME A DOCTOR to her great annoyance, vexation
and disgust.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
"
Respondent Judge denied the motion to quash, as well as the motion for reconsideration raising the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction because the facts charged in the information are privileged
communication.
It is the position of petitioner that the statement "I doubt how did you become a doctor" does not
constitute an offense as it was uttered at the time he was conducting the cross-examination of Dr.
Macaspac; that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of
pleadings and motions belong to the class of communication that are absolutely privileged.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that an order denying a motion to quash cannot be the
subject of certiorari which is a remedy to keep an inferior court within the limits of its jurisdiction; that
the delimitation of the correctness, if at all, should be brought on appeal, after the trial of the raise
and not in certiorari; that petitioner's contention that the act complained of does not constitute an
offense because it is protected by the mantle of privilege is strictly a matter of defense.
Petitioner's contention should be sustained. Well settled is the rule that parties, counsel and
witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander cases for words otherwise defamatory,
uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or
relevant to the case.

Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the course of judicial

proceedings are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to, the cause in
hand or subject of inquiry, the same may be considered privileged communication
and the counsel, parties, or witnesses therein are exempt from liability. (See 53
C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas vs. Parreo, et al. G.R. No. L-12545, April 30, 1959, and
authorities cited therein). (Tolentino vs. Baylosis, 110 Phil. 1010)
And, as to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matter
privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not extend
must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable
man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety. (People vs. Andres, 107 Phil. 1046).
In the case at bar, petitioner was prompted to say: "I doubt how did you become a doctor" when Dr.
Macaspac would not answer the question as to who prepared the document presented to her, and
when the witness repeatedly evaded the question by saying that she did not understand the word
"made."
Newel in his work on The Law of Slander and Libel, 4th ed., uses the following language:
Absolute Privilege.In this class of cases it is considered in the interest of public
welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments and speak
their minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects; and all actions for
words so spoken are absolutely forbidden, even if it be alleged and proved that the
words were spoken falsely, knowingly and with express malice. (Section 350, pp.
387-388).
It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings belong
to the class of communications that are absolutely privileged. Stated otherwise, the privilege is
granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice. As this Court observed in Sison
vs. David (Supra):
... The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the
public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of
the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of
courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise
their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages. (33 Am. Jur. 123-124)
Generally, certiorari does not lie to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial court.
Interlocutory orders ordinarily should be reviewed when an appeal is taken from the trial court's
judgment. Not every procedural error or erroneous legal or factual conclusion amounts to grave
abuse of discretion. However, as this Court ruled in Sanchez, et al vs. Hon. Mariano A. Zosa, et al.,
(L-27043, November 28, 1975), "when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the
lower court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari
proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a
case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. "
WHEREFORE, the trial court's orders of February 20, 1981 and May 5, 1981 are reversed and set
aside. Respondent is hereby ordered to desist and refrain from proceeding with the trial of Criminal
Case No. 126521.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38753 August 25, 1982
RAFAEL S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY and
VIRGINIA M. MERCADO, respondents.
Francisco R. Sotto for petitioner.
Clemente M. Soriano for respondents.
&
FERNANDO, C.J.:

1wph1.t

The relevant question in this suit is whether or not the landmark case of United States v.
Bustos, 1 enunciating the doctrine that the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution
constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a superior
complaining against the conduct of a subordinate, is impressed with significance. The information in this
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition proceeding to quash an information for libel quoted in full the alleged
offensive telegram. Thus: "[Secretary David Consunji Department of Public Works and [Communications]
Manila In line with President Marcos appeal to give information on undesirable employees in the
government service to achieve the objectives of the New Society request that investigation image of the
activities of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of Public Service Commission as we have reason to believe that she
has enriched herself thru corrupt practices considering that she has properties and spending above what
her salary can afford with the husband jobless stop If investigation confirms this we trust you take
necessary action stop In case you need further details wire me at 101 Mariano Cuenco Quezon City and I
will give further details stop Expecting prompt action on this matter. Rafael Mercado]" 2 It closed with the
assertion that Virginia Mercado, private respondent, "never enriched herself in office." There was first a
motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Ramon Mercado on the ground of the telegram being a privileged
communication. It was denied by the lower court. Thereafter, through another counsel, came a motion to
quash, alleging that the facts charged do not "constitute an offense." Again, it met with a denial. A motion
for reconsideration having proved futile, the present proceeding was instituted.
t@lF

This Court required comment from respondents. In the comment submitted, the stress was on the
absence of any privilege, there being malice and bad faith. As stated therein: "The communication in
issue was made by the petitioner with evident malice and bad faith, a matter explicitly stated in the
information filed with the respondent Court, and the pretense that it was made allegedly in line with
the President's appeal to give information on undesirable employees in the government service,
cannot cover up such fact. Malice in fact and bad faith on the part of the petitioner, and/or that he
was motivated by vengeance and ill-will in making the said communication, is shown by, and can be
established by the prosecution thru the testimony of the private respondent and the following
documentary evidence: a) On October 14, 1972, petitioner filed a letter-complaint with the Chairman
of the Board of Transportation, against the private respondent, for alleged grave violations of the
Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service rules [with a true copy of the said complaint attached]; b)
Fourteen (14) days after the filing of the aforementioned administrative complaint by petitioner

against the private respondent, the said petitioner sent the subject libelous telegram or
communication to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication, which was indorsed for
investigation to the said Board of Transportation on October 31, 1972, by first endorsement of the
said Department Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the Chairman of the Board of Transportation [with
a true copy of the said first indorsement attached]; c) On November 23, 1972, the petitioner filed an
amended administrative complaint against the private respondent with the same Board of
Transportation docketed therein as Adm. Case No. 72-1, charging the private respondent with
dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt practices, and misconduct or discourtesy [with a
true copy of the said amended compliant attached]; d) The private respondent, submitted her answer
to the said administrative charges, and after due hearing, the Board of Transportation rendered a
decision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private respondent as innocent of the charges, and
dismissing the complaint filed against her [with a true copy of the said decision attached]; e) On July
17, 1973 petitioner, as complainant therein, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Board of Transportation, but the said Board, in an order issued on August 29, 1973, denied said
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit [with a copy of said order attached]; f) While the
Administrative Case No. 72-1 was pending determination before the Board of Transportation,
petitioner, to further harass and malign the good character and reputation of the private respondent,
filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG), a complaint against the private
respondent and her husband Lorenzo M. Mercado accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine,
which was carnapped. The said office, however, after due hearing, issued a resolution on February
9, 1973, recommending that the said case be closed for lack of evidence [with a copy of the said
resolution attached]; g) Also during the pendency of the administrative complaint filed by petitioner
against the private respondent in the Board of Transportation, petitioner filed with the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, a complaint for corrupt practices against
the private respondent; and after due investigation the CIS, in answer to the letter of private
respondent's counsel, dated March 24, 1973 [with a true copy attached]. requesting information
about the result of the said investigation, sent a letter to said counsel, dated March 27, 1973,
advising him that the said case is considered closed for insufficiency of evidence [with a copy of the
said letter attached]." 3
The comment was considered as answer and the case was set for hearing. Prior to such hearing,
there was a motion by petitioner to file memorandum in lieu of oral argument. As the motion was not
acted upon before the date set for hearing, the parties appeared. Preliminary questions were asked.
They were then required to file simultaneously their memoranda. Instead of just filing a
memorandum, petitioner had a motion to admit amended petition enclosing with such motion the
amended petition. The memorandum filed by him was on the basis thereof. The amendments,
however, did not affect the fundamental question raised as to whether or not the telegram being
qualifiedly privileged should be the basis for the special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition. Respondents in due time, after seeking an extension, filed their memorandum.
Thereafter, petitioner even submitted a manifestation, in effect reiterating contentions previously
made.
In the light of the above pleadings, this Court after a careful study, holds that certiorari to annul the
order denying the motion to quash as well as the motion for reconsideration does not lie. Neither
should respondent court be ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. Q-2936, the criminal complaint for
libel against petitioner. Nor should the court be prohibited from hearing the aforesaid criminal action.
This petition lacks merit.
1. United States v. Bustos, 4 as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision. It is to the credit of the
Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by thirty-six years, a similar doctrine
announced by the United States Supreme Court, 5 to the effect that a libel prosecution must likewise
survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and
free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls for

such an approach. The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional
rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.
t@lF

2. Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege, and this is one such
instance, may be "lost by proof of malice." 6 His opinion continues: " 'A communication made bona
fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he
has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.' (Harrison vs. Bush, 5
E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25; 3 W.R., 474; 85 E.C.L., 344.)" 7 He then gave what was
referred to by him as a "pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege, " namely, "a complaint
made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when
addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements
are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in
good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be
made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not
necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public
affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this
person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The
privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further
element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is
that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective
functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege." 8 What
casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is a summary of his conduct, viz a viz private respondent: a
letter complaint for grave violation of Republic Act No. 2260 and civil service rules was filed by him with
the Chairman of the Board of Transportation on October 14, 1972. Fourteen days later, on October 28,
1972, the telegram subject of this litigation, was sent to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. Then on November 23, 1972, there was an amended complaint with the Board of
Transportation to include such charges as dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt practices and
misconduct. The Board of Transportation found private respondent innocent, in an order of June 26, 1973.
There was a motion for reconsideration on July 17, 1973 filed by petitioner. It was denied on August 29,
1973 and during the pendency of such administrative case, petitioner not content, filed with the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group a complaint against private respondent and her husband, a relation,
accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped. After due hearing, a resolution was
issued recommending that said case be closed for lack of evidence. Again, during the pendency of such
administrative complaint, petitioner filed with the Criminal Investigation Service, a complaint for corrupt
practices against private respondent, likewise found without support in the evidence submitted. The
tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a
doubt could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of petitioner. The prosecution should be given
the opportunity then of proving malice.
t@lF

3. Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their stand. In People v.
Monton, 9 the question of whether or not a motion to quash based on a qualified privilege should be
upheld was decided adversely against the claim of those accused of libel, This Court made clear that
malice can be shown. It "simply puts the burden of doing so on the prosecution." 10 The ponencia of then
Justice, later Chief Justice, Makalintal distinguished the Bustos decision, thus: "That case is not here
applicable, because the acquittal of the accused therein on the ground that the defamatory imputation
was qualifiedly privileged was adjudged only after trial, wherein the prosecution tried to establish,
although unsuccessfully, the element of malice." 11 Further, the opinion stated: " It need only be added that
in the instant case the information alleges that the defendants, appellees here, wrote and sent the subject
letter to the President 'with malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and impeaching the
character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of one Jose J. Monteclaro ... and with malicious intent
of exposing (him) to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable
motive.' Under the foregoing allegation, the prosecution is entitled to go to trial and present the necessary
evidence to prove malice; and the denial, to it of the opportunity to do so, upon the defendants' motion to
quash, constitutes reversible error." 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

Concepcion, Jr., Aquino, Abad Santos and Escolin, JJ., concur.

1wph1.t

Barredo, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., took no par

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47880 April 30, 1979
WILSON AGBAYANI, CARMELO BAUTISTA, PABLO PASCUAL and RENATO ROMEO
DUGAY, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SOFRONIO G. SAYO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya, Branch I, the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES And CONRADO B.
MAHINAN, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the venue of a criminal action for written defamation. Conrado B. Mahinan, a
lawyer, was the manager since September 24, 1973 of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) stationed at Cauayan, Isabela. Among his
subordinates in that branch office were Wilson Agbayani, chief of the investment unit; Carmelo N.
Bautista, chief of the production and premium unit; Pablo R. Pascual, officer-in-charge of the legal
and claims unit, and Renato Romeo P. Dugay, an employee of the claims unit.
On March 8, 1976, Mahinan filed with the fiscal's office at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a complaint
for written defamation against Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay.
Two days later, or on March 10, 1976, the Board of Trustees of the GSIS in its Resolution No. 373
considered Mahinan as resigned from the service as of the close of business hours on that date.
Mahinan appealed to the Civil Service Commission which later directed the GSIS Board of Trustees
to reinstate him "to his former position, or at the discretion of the proper official and in the interest of
the service, he may be assigned to another station or branch without demotion in rank, salary and
privileges". So, Mahinan is back in the service (pp. 2-3, Memorandum of Mahinan, pp. 200-1, Rollo).
On July 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed in the Court of First Instance of that
province an information for libel charging Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay with having
maliciously made defamatory imputations against Mahinan on or about February 17, 1976 in
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya (Criminal Case No. 509).
Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan, Isabela on
October 6, 1975; Bautista's undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and Agbayani's "unusual
incident report" of October 3, 1975 subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary and enclosing

documentary evidence to support his charges of malversation and falsification against Mahinan and
praying for the latter's separation from the service.
According to the information, all those documents allegedly depicated Mahinan "as an incorrigible
managerial misfit, despoiler of public office, spendthrift of GSIS funds, inveterate gambler, chronic
falsifier', and an unreformed ex-convict".
The four accused filed a motion to quash. They contended that the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a public officer holding
office at Cauayan, Isabela when the alleged libel was committed and, under Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offense charged comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Isabela. They argued that the provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija had no authority to conduct the
preliminary investigation and to file the information.
That motion was opposed by the fiscal. It was denied by the trial court in its order of April 25, 1977
on the ground that Mahinan was not a public officer within the meaning of article 203 of the Revised
Penal Code since the insurance business of the GSIS is not an inherently governmental function.
The court, reasoned out that since Mahinan was not a public officer, his residence, which was
allegedly in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, and not Cauayan, Isabela, where he had his office, would be
the criterion for determining the venue of the criminal action for libel.
On March 2, 1978, or after petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied, they
filed in this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the prosecution of the libel
case on the ground of improper venue.
The issue is whether the venue of the criminal action for written defamation filed by Mahinan is
Nueva Vizcaya or Isabela. There is no issue as to whether Mahinan is a public officer. As GSIS
branch manager, he is unquestionably a public officer. (See Sec. 1[1][B], Art. XII and Sec. 5, Art. XIII,
Constitution and sec. 2[a] and [b], Republic Act No. 3019.)
Mahinan in his memorandum does not support the trial court's theory that he was not a public officer
at the time of the commission of the alleged libel. Instead, he relies on the rule that the trial court's
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the information and since it was alleged that the libel
was committed in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, he argues that the trial court, prima facie, has
jurisdiction over the case. This contention is devoid of merit and shows unawareness of the
provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Article 360, which lays down the rules on venue in cases of written defamation and which specifies
the officer or court that should conduct the preliminary investigation, reads as follows:
ART. 360. Persons responsible. - x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided
for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense:

Provided however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or
province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such
public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published
and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first
published:
Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the
criminal action is filed and vice versa:
Provided furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:
And provided finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written
defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the
time of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in
the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city,
or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may
be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.
xxx xxx xxx
(As amended by Republic Act Nos. 1289 and 4363 which were approved on June 15,
1955 and June 19, 1965, respectively.)
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written
defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the
place where the same was written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the
public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any
jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written
or printed (People vs. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the
injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel
case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio
Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace
court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec vs. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to
the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from

inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote
municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional
Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303,
311).
The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense.
As a corollary and in view of the legislative intent to prevent the harassment of the accused by
means of criminal complaints in remote municipal courts, the preliminary investigation of the criminal
action for written defamation shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city,
or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such action may be instituted.
The Court of First Instance of the province or city where the criminal action may be filed may also
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case pursuant to section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court (Escribano vs. Avila, L-30375, September 12, 1978).
Applying the foregoing rules to this case, we hold that the proper venue of Mahinan's criminal action
for written defamation against the petitioners is the Court of First Instance of Isabela, since as a
GSIS branch manager, he was a public official stationed at Cauayan, Isabela and the alleged libel
was committed when he was (as he still) in the public service. The preliminary investigation of the
complaint should have been conducted by the provincial fiscal of Isabela, or by the municipal judge
of ILAGAN, the provincial capital, or by the Court of First Instance of the same province.
The criminal action could have been filed also in the Court of First Instance of the province or in the
city court of the city where the libel was printed and first published.
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the
complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was
committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually
residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and
first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the
circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue
of the action.
In the instant case, the venue was laid in Nueva Vizcaya. It was alleged in the information that the
libel was committed in Bambang, a town located in that province. It was not alleged that at the time

the libel was committed Bambang was the actual residence of complainant Mahinan or that it was
the place where the libel was printed and first published or where Mahinan held his office.
The alleged defamatory documents quoted in the information do not justify the filing of the
information in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya. Thus, as already noted, the affidavits of
the accused, Bautista and Pascual, both dated October 6, 1975, were subscribed and sworn to at
Cagayan Isabela before the municipal judge thereof. The "Unusual Incident Report" submitted by the
accused, Agbayani, also quoted in the information and likewise alleged to be defamatory, was
subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary on October 3, 1975. That report indicates Cauayan,
Isabela as the place where Mahinan held office. Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya was not mentioned at all
in those alleged defamatory documents.
We hold that the information in this case is defective or deficient because it does not show that the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, where it was filed, has jurisdiction to entertain the criminal
action for written defamation initiated by Mahinan against the petitioners and that the provincial fiscal
of that province had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Consequently, the trial court erred in not sustaining petitioners' motion to quash on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority to file the information (Sec. 2[b] and [c], Rule 117, Rules of
Court).
The allegation in the information that the libel was committed in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya is not
sufficient to show that the Court of First Instance of that province has jurisdiction over the case. The
alleged libelous documents quoted in the information show that Nueva Vizcaya is not the proper
venue of the criminal action.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616; U. S. vs. Pagdayuman, 5 Phil. 265; U. S. vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 249;
Ragpala vs. J. P. of Tubod, Lanao, 109 Phil. 373, 378).
The trial court in its questioned order admits that if Mahinan was a public officer at the time the
written defamation was committed, it would have no jurisdiction to try the case since the venue of the
action should be Isabela where Mahinan held office at the time of the commission of the offense. In
this memorandum, Mahinan has not questioned Ms status as a public officer and he admits that
Cauayan, Isabela was his official station.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of April 25, 1977, denying petitioners' motion to quash is set
aside. It is directed to dismiss Criminal Case No. 509, the libel case against the petitioners, without
prejudice to the filing of another criminal action for written defamation in the Court of First Instance of
Isabela within the remainder of the prescriptive period, if warranted according to the result of a
proper and duly conducted preliminary investigation. Costs against respondent Mahinan.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., took no par
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63559 May 30, 1986
NEWSWEEK, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
PLANTERS INC., BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ASOCIACION DE
AGRICULTORES DE LA CARLOTA, LA CASTELLANA y PONTEVEDRA, INC., DONEDCO
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION INC., ARMANDO GUSTILO, ENRIQUE ROJAS, ALFREDO
MONTELIBANO, JR., PABLO SOLA, JOSE MONTALVO, VICENTE GUSTILO, JOSEPH
MARANON, ROBERTO CUENCA, JOSE SICANGCO, FLORENCIO ALONSO, MIGUEL
GATUSLAO, PEDRO YULO, MARINO RUBIN and BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin Law Offices for private respondents.

FERIA, J.:
Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, in this
special action for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated December 17, 1982 sustaining the Order of the then Court of
First Instance of Bacolod City which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the complaint for libel filed
by private respondents (Civil Case No. 15812), and the Resolution dated March 10, 1983 which
denied its Motion for Reconsideration.
It appears that on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane
planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar
planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all
sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners'
non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The complaint alleged that
petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the publication of the article "An
Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. The
article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big
landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid
sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them with imprunity. Complainants therein
alleged that said article, taken as a whole, showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood,
slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put them (sugarcane planters) in
bad light, expose them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation here in the Philippines and abroad,
and make them objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and of the
public in general. They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and
compensatory damages, and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the
court may determine, plus expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of
the article was attached to the complaint.
On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article
sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state,
much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and,
consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Private respondents filed an
Opposition to the motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a reply.

On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which
the motion to dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid
cause of action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is
a matter of evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982.
On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court (CA-G. R. No.
14406) seeking the annulment of the aforecited trial court's Orders for having been issued with such
a grave abuse of discretion as amounting to lack of jurisdiction and praying for the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
As earlier stated, respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders in a Decision dated December
17, 1982 and ordered the case to be tried on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint
contains allegations of fact which called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari under
Rule 65 cannot be made to substitute for an appeal where an appeal would lie at a proper time.
Subsequently, on March 10, 1983, the respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, hence this petition.
The proper remedy which petitioner should have taken from the decision of respondent Court is an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the special civil action of certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of said Rules. However, since the petition was filed on time within
fifteen days from notice of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, we shall treat the
same as a petition for review on certiorari. The two (2) issues raised in the petition are: (1) whether
or not the private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action; and (2) whether or not the
petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action.
First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because
the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding
sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be
committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been
directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the
mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
We agree with petitioner.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to maintain a
libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772, November 30,
1962), although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an earlier case, this Court
declared that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the
imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could
have Identified the personality of the individual defamed." (Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and
Lyons 42 Phil. 760).
This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class of
persons, as in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the
collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks
apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384).
In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen , 32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows:
Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language
only, are not actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the

statements are sweeping; and it is very probable that even then no action would lie
where the body is composed of so large a number of persons that common sense
would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons
connected with the body to pursue an upright and law abiding course and that it
would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the actions of a part.
(supra p. 628).
It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a
group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to
every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or
group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane
planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable
basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar
planters.
We find petitioner's contention meritorious.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all
(Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the representation of
class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class
an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs
has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be libelous
never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that the victim had
been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the mayor of
Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act performed by an elective public
official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and press.
The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit were arrested. The
Court takes judicial notice of this fact. (People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.)
The second issue to be resolved here is whether or not the special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition is available to petitioner whose motion to dismiss the complaint and subsequent motion
for reconsideration were denied.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject
of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to
quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment
of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then
certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused
to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or

offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to
quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In
such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few
examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus vs. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez vs. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior
judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss
the case.
In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended
complaint.
In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to
quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from
further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People vs. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription
was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.
Respondent Court correctly stated the general rule and its exceptions. However, it ruled that none of
the exceptions is present in the case at bar and that the case appears complex and complicated,
necessitating a full-blown trial to get to the bottom of the controversy.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
against it by pointing out the non-libelous nature of the article sued upon. There is no need of a trial
in view of the conclusion of this Court that the article in question is not libelous. The specific
allegation in the complaint, to the effect that the article attributed to the sugarcane planters the
deaths and brutalization of sugarcane workers, is not borne out by a perusal of the actual text.
The complaint contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural workers in the
sugar industry and the various foundations and programs supported by planters' associations for the
benefit of their workers. Undoubtedly, the statements in the article in question are sweeping and
exaggerated; but, paraphrasing the ruling in the Uy Tioco case above quoted, it would be
unreasonable and absurd to condemn the majority of the sugarcane planters, who have at heart the
welfare of their workers, because of the actions of a part. Nonetheless, articles such as the one in
question may also serve to prick the consciences of those who have but are not doing anything or
enough for those who do not have.

On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media that
they should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth. Freedom of
the press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in
Civil Case No. 15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74907 May 23, 1988
PEDRO S. LACSA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
San Jose, Enriquez, Lacsa, Santos & Borje for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
Convicted on July 9, 1982 by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of libel and sentenced
to pay a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, 1 the accused-petitioner, Pedro S. Lacsa, appealed
to the former Intermediate Appellate Court. The respondent appellate court, however, in its decision 2 claw
March 12,1986, affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. Still unsatisfied, the petitioner is now
before us through a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
respondent court's decision and his acquittal from the crime charged.
We deny the petition. The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:
The petitioner is a Certified Public Accountant by profession. Being a representative of an
institutional member of the Philippine Columbian Association and as a former member of the latter's
Board of Directors, the petitioner volunteered to act as auditor and offered his services free in
connection with the association's move to offer pre-emptive rights to its members. In his capacity as
auditor, the petitioner had access to the records of the association's members including the personal
folder of the private complainant, Ponciano C. Marquez, who was then the President. According to
the petitioner, he discovered in the course of his work that Marquez was a mere associate member
of the association. As such, the petitioner questioned the qualification of Marquez to hold the

presidency of the association inasmuch as only proprietary members thereof can be voted to the
said position. Thus, purporting to espouse the interest and welfare of the association and its
members, the petitioner, on December 21, 1978, wrote a letter to the Board of Directors impugning
the status of Marquez as a proprietary member and as president of the association. In that letter, the
petitioner contended that the issuance of Certificate No. D-44 (for proprietary membership) to
Marquez, without the prior knowledge and authority of the association's Board of Directors, was
erroneous. On January 2, 1979, the petitioner likewise sent a letter to the private complainant asking
the latter to yield the presidency for having failed to show that he was entitled to a proprietary
certificate membership which is one of the qualifications for the position. The petitioner, through his
letter, likewise branded the private complainant as a "de facto president." The letter, which the
petitioner eventually caused to be published and circulated among the members of the association,
reads:
Januar
y 2,
1979
Mr. Ponciano C. Marquez
Philippine Columbian Association
350 Taft Avenue, Manila
Subject: Erroneous issuance of Membership
Certificate No. D-44 in
your name.
Dear Sir:
In connection with my 21 December 1978 letter to the PCA Board of Directors, I
strongly urge you to yield the Presidency. This has become necessary in view of the
following: (1) your as associate membership status has been definitely established,
(2) with more than enough time, you failed to show that you are entitled to a
proprietary certificate, (3) only propriety member can hold and occupy the position
you have been holding and occupying for three years (as de facto president), and (4)
to afford the Board a chance to decide the manner of rectifying the unauthorized and
erroneous issuance of Membership Certificate No. D-44 in your name.
Your cooperation on this matter will go a long way towards the attairmenthe of true
camaraderie and understanding among members of the Club.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) PEDRO S.
LACSA
PSL/egl
cc: Dr. Jose N. Villanueva,

Jr. Atty. Antonio de las Alas, Jr.

Atty. Alfonso C. Roldan
Justice Claudio Teehankee
Director Victor Buencamino, Jr.
Director Oscar J. Hilado
Dr. Vicente D. Limoso
Director Angel Dayao
Don Carlos T. Fernandez
Mr. Baldomero T. Olivero
Mr. Ramon Ordoveza
Mr. Jorge Vargas
Atty. Lino Patajo
Dr. Jose M. Barcelona Prof. Renato Constantino.

Not content with what he had already done, the petitioner, on January 9, 1978, again caused the
publication in a newsletter circulated to the association's members, of an item entitled "Doubt As To
the Legitimacy Of The Incumbent President."
Due to these imputations of the petitioner, the private complainant, Ponciano C. Marquez, instituted
separate criminal complaint and civil action against the former, Marquez claimed that he was
maligned, defamed, and exposed to public ridicule by the petitionees actions.
The basic question to be answered is whether or not, under the instances related, the petitioner is
guilty of the crime of libel.
The petitioner insists that the term "de facto president," which he used to describe the private
complainant, is not libelous per se. The petitioner asserts that even assuming that the said term is
indeed libelous, the letter and newsletter in which it appeared nevertheless constitute privileged
communication and cannot give rise to a libel conviction. Besides, he claims that the letter and
newsletter which caused the present discord were written by him pursuant to his moral, social, and
legal responsibility as a member of the Philippine Columbian Association. These being so, the
petitioner argues, he should be exonerated from the criminal charge.
We disagree.
Six decades ago, in the case of U.S. vs. O' Connell, the Court laid down the test for libelous
meaning:

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant has imputed nothing wrong to the complainants in certain and express
terms. But this is not necessary. Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes
more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and
metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient if the
words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the
person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or
are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or
persons up to public ridicule. Said Chief Justice Shaw of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts:"The rule is a sound one that the law cannot shut its eyes to what all
the rest of the world can see; and let the slanderer his language, and wrap up his
meaning in ambiguous givings out, as he will, and it shall not avail him, because
courts will understand language, in whatever form it is used, as all mandkind
understands it." (Carter vs. Andrews [1834], 16 Pick. [Mass.], 1.)
Said another court much more recently:
The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component
phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, but the import
conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader." (Mller vs. O'
Connell, City Ct., 57 L. J., 1768, Sept. 12, 1917.) 4
xxx xxx xxx

The rule was further elucidated in U.S. vs. Sotto where we stated:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of Jimenez vs. Reyes (27 Phil. Rep., 52), at Page 59, Justice Trent,
writing the opinion of the court, laid down the rule that for the purpose of determining
the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous "that construction must be
adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the
plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was
uttered. The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole. In
applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any
subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on being called to account.
The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the minds of the
readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the
article, it comes too late to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from
the word used in the publication. 5
xxx xxx xxx

1. Considering that there are two classes of membership in the Philippine Columbian Association
associate and proprietary and it is only those of the latter who are qualified to be voted as
president of the association, the act of the petitioner in branding complainant Marquez as a mere de
facto president and insinuating imperfection in the latter's status as a proprietary member, most
certainly exposed Marquez to public contempt and ridicule. No amount of subtlety designed to
camouflage the ill-effect of the petitioner's misdeed would erase the impression already created in
the minds of the readers of the libelous materials. The Solicitor General is correct in stating that
calling Marquez a de facto president "is equivalent to saying that he is a pretender, a fraud, and

impostor and he is arrogating unto himself certain powers, rights, and privileges to which he is not
entitled. 6
2. We cannot likewise subscribe to the assertion of the petitioner that the letter and newsletter article
complained of partake of privileged communication. To be classified as a privileged communication,
the disputed letter and article must be absolutely free from any taint of malice which, unfortunately, is
not the case here.
xxx xxx xxx
... Granting that, under Section 9, private communication is made and published, in
good faith, with sole purpose of the protection mentioned in said section, but is false
and malicious, is it entitled to the privilege mentioned in said section, and is the party
relieved from liability when the communication was made "with good motives" and
'for justifiable ends" or "with justifiable motives?" Malicious motives are inconsistent
with "good motives" for "justifiable ends" and "with justifiable motives." It was not the
intention of the Legislature to make the "privileged communication" in Section 9,
absolutely privileged. Such communication must also be free from malice. 7
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, even before he embarked on his crusade against Marquez, knew that the latter was
already a proprietary member of the association. He (the petitioner) had personal knowledge of the
issuance and existence of Certificate of Membership, Series B, No. 44, for proprietary membership
in the name of Marquez. This fact finds support in the respondent court's decision:
xxx xxx xxx
... And to show further that the accused had knowledge of the conversion of the
associate membership of Ponciano Marquez into proprietary as contained in the
minutes of April 22, 1968, Exh. A-16, the prosecution called attention to the fact that
the accused placed his initials "PSL" and dated "9/28/78" on the left hand bottom
comer of said Exhibit "A-1 6" and marked the Pages on which the Id document may
be found with encircled number "63." The accused admits that the initials and dates
and the paging were made by him when he examined said document, but claims that
said document is not an authentic document, because it is unsigned and he did not
bother to inquire from Atty. Reynoso about it because it was unsigned. However, Atty.
Reynoso, who had been the secretary of the club from 1941 to 1942 and from 1951
to 1971, testified that the minutes were prepared under his instruction and
supervision at the club office, the original was contained in book form but was lost at
the office sometime in 1975-76. The accused, therefore, should have inquired from
Mr. Reynoso as to the authenticity of said copy of the minutes before making his
claim that there is doubt as to the legitimacy of the presidency. Apparently, Justice
Lino Patajo, in stating that the minutes were still in the club custody until April 10,
1980, was referring to the copy of the minutes and not the original minutes which
were lost sometime in 1975 or 1976. There was, therefore, no sufficient ground to
claim that there was no basis for the conversion of the associate membership of
Ponciano Marquez into proprietary membership. 8
xxx xxx xxx

In any case, even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that the petitioner's letter dated January 2, 1979 is
privileged communication, it lost its character as such when the matter was published in the
newsletter and circulated among the general membership of the Philippine Columbian Association.
When he undertook to be the auditor of the association, the petitioner was under the obligation to
keep his findings in strict confidence between him and the association's Board of Directors. The fact
that the petitioner rendered his services gratis can not justify the violation of that confidence. His
contention that he reviewed the records of the association exercising his right as a member thereof
and thus not bound by any confidentiality is untenable. He stated in his petition that he undertook the
job as a service to the association. For this reason, he was duty bound to report his discoveries first
to the Board of Directors which represents the association and is the only body that can make the
necessary correction in case there was really a mistake in the membership records. The petitioner's
precipitate act of immediately going public with his alleged findings is unpardonable.
The petitioner further contests the authenticity and propriety of the unsigned minutes of the meeting
of the association's Board of Directors which showed the approval of the private complainant's
application for conversion of membership status from associate to proprietary. Upon review of the
records of this case, we however find the said minutes to be proper evidence. Their authenticity has
been sufficiently established by the testimony 9 of the association's former secretary, Atty. Jose
Reynoso.
Another circumstance which militates against the petitioner's pretensions of good faith and
performance of a moral and social duty was his irresponsible act of letter writing to expose his
alleged discovery of what he perceived to be an anomaly. When he saw the unsigned minutes of the
association's Board of Directors, he immediately sent out the assailed letters eventually culminating
in the publication of the subject newsletter sans the verification which ordinary prudence demands.
Finally, the petitioner maintains that the actions against him are pure harassment. This accusation
finds no support in the records of this case. On the other hand, we accept the finding of the
respondent court that the motive of the petitioner in maligning the reputation of the Marquez has
been amply established. Said that court:
xxx xxx xxx
... .It is apparent from the circumstances brought out in the case that because the
accused was not extended appointment to his position as member of the steering
committee of the club, which committee is very important because it was created to
implement the terms and conditions of their memorandum of agreement with
Permaline, Inc. for the construction of the Philippine Columbian Sports Complex,
which, at that time, is worth P30,000,000.00 but merely to the chairmanship of the
finance committee which Mr. Lacsa rejected and which rejection Mr. Marquez
accepted, the accused felt aggrieved and then began taking steps to find cause
criticizing Marquez' actuations as president of the association. 10
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED; and the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
is hereby AFFIRMED Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72383 November 9, 1988
MARCELO SORIANO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, HON. AUXENCIO DACUYCUY, and HON. FRANCISCO
TANTUICO, JR.respondents.
R. D. Bagatsing & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Where is the proper venue of a libel case for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on a trial court
when the complainant is a public officer?
On complaint of private respondent Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. the then Chairman of the Commission
on Audit (COA), an information for libel was filed against petitioner Marcelo Soriano and six (6)
others in connection with press releases and articles imputing to Tantuico the tampering by COA
personnel of election returns in the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections at his residence in Tacloban City
and in the COA Regional Office in Palo, Leyte. This election offense was allegedly committed at
Tantuico's behest to assure the victory of certain candidates in the said Batasan elections. The
information which was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte states:
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Marcelo B. Soriano,
Bobby de la Cruz, Cesar Villegas Cirilo "Roy" Montojo, Emmanuel "Butch" Veloso,
Valenta U. Quintero and John "Doe", of the crime of Libel, committed as follows:
That during the period from May 26, 1984 to June 1, 1984, in the City of Tacloban,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive and
with malicious intent of impeaching the reputation, honesty and virtue of Commission
on Audit Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr., and with the malicious intent of injuring
and exposing the latter to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, published/republished
in the "THE GUARDIAN" dated May 26-June 1, 1984, a weekly newspaper/
magazine circulated in Tacloban City and nationwide, of which accused Marcelo B.
Soriano and Bobby de la Cruz are the Editor Publisher and Associate Editor,
respectively, the press release of accused Cesar G. Villegas written/printed and first
circulated/published in Tacloban City dated May 19, 1984, copy of which is hereto
attached as part of this Information, publicly imputing the crime of falsification of
public documents and/or violation of election laws to said Chairman Francisco S.

Tantuico, Jr., publication in the said newspaper is captioned "IMPEACH TANTUICO

CASE LOOMS", quoted verbatim to wit:
Unido lawyers are studying the filing of impeachment proceedings against
Commission on Audit regional head Francisco Tantuico, Jr. because election returns
were reportedly talled at his COA Regional Office and at his residence.
The tamper hunt trail started when a "sympathetic" COA employee informed ConCon delegate Roy Montejo of the 'new' tally sites.
If you want to raid or to know where the election returns are being changed, proceed
immediately to the Tantuico residence of the Commission on Audit, said a telephone
tip received by Montejo.
Tente U. Quintero former Leyte vice-mayor reported that, with fellow candidates, Atty.
Cesar Villegas and Emmanuel Veloso, all Unido bets for the five-slot Batasan race in
Leyte, Montejo and their supporters went to the Tantuico residence some 2.5 kms.,
from the city proper. Having no warrant of arrest (sic) barred their entry.
At the regional COA office at Candahug Palo, Leyte, around 11 kms., from Tacloban,
they were able to enter and were told to wait for the regional director.
People coming in and out of the conference room attracted their attention. The open
door revealed election returns being opened by persons inside, Identified later as
COA personnel who were "shocked" to see the candidates query that they were
"merely tallying the votes for the five KBL candidates", the personnel later added that
they "did not know" who instructed them to do so.
When the photographer called by one of Mr. Veloso's assistants came, the COA
personnel drifted off one by one; leaving only the conference room, the election
returns and the envelopes ready to be photographed. It was assumed that the
personnel were wary of being photographed with the election returns.
Lack of sufficient basis for comparison led to the uncertainty of the returns being
declared as tampered or not. However, Montejo said that the returns were supposed
to have been with the Provincial Comelec supervisor, Filomeno Azeta, as the
provincial canvassing at the Leyte Provincial Capitol was still in progress at the time
of the raid.
COA Regional Director Sofronio Flores, Jr., upon seeing the three candidates, tried
to explain things. But, Unido supporters said, he failed to answer certain questions.
The Unido lawyers, meanwhile, started preparing legal charges against the parties
seen guilty wherein said Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr., is portrayed in the
aforequoted newspaper/magazine publication as directing and/or orchestrating on or
about May 17, 1984 the tampering of the election returns for the May 14, 1984
elections in Leyte to assure the victory of certain candidates in said elections, when
in truth and in fact he has no knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing imputed to him as
at said time he was in Quezon City holding office as such Chairman of the
Commission on Audit.

Contrary to law. (pp. 24-26, Rollo)

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6136 of the Leyte court. The petitioner filed a motion
to quash the information on the ground of improper venue. The petitioner contended that the court
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
the libel case should have been filed at Quezon City where Tantuico holds office and where the
publication house of the "Guardian" is located.
The trial court denied the motion in a resolution dated May 16, 1985, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, considering that the libelous article complained contained in a press
release was printed and first published in the City of Tacloban and venue for this
case has been Properly laid in accordance with Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, the motion to quash the information herein filed by defendant Marcelo Soriano
is hereby denied. (p. 6, Rollo)
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction with the then Intermediate Appellate Court raising the same question of jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court of Leyte to hear and decide the libel case on the merits.
The appellate court dismissed the petition in a decision dated September 12, 1985. It held that the
Regional Trial Court of Leyte had jurisdiction over the libel case. The appellate court also denied a
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
The only issue to be threshed out in the instant petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of
Leyte may try the libel case or whether or not it should be tried elsewhere.
The applicable law is Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1289
and Republic Act No. 4363. It provides:
Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish exhibit or cause the publication
or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means shall be responsible for
the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a
daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court
of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission on of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended
parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila or of the city, or province where the libelous article is printed and
first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of
Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is

a private individual, the action shad be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published: ...
This Court in Agbayani v. Sayo (89 SCRA 699, [1979]) recapitulated the law as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office
at the time of the commission of the offense. (at P. 705)
Both the trial court and the appellate court applied the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try an
offense is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information (People v. Delfin, 2 SCRA
911, [1961]) and since the information alleged that the libelous article was printed and first published
in Tacloban City, the offense should be tried in Leyte. The petition is impressed with merit.
We follow the "multiple publication" rule in the Philippines. Thus, in the cases of Montinola v.
Montalvo (34 Phil. 662, [1916]) and United States v. Sotto (36 Phil. 389 9171), this Court ruled that
each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a distinct offense. Stated more succinctly for
purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, every
time the same written matter is communicated such communication is considered a distinct and
separate publication of the libel.
We explained this as follows:
The common law as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single publication was
to the effect that each communication of a written or printed matter was a distinct and
separate publication of a libel contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of
action. This rule ("multiple publication" rule) is still followed in several American
jurisdictions, and seems to be favored by the American Law Institute. Other
jurisdictions have adopted the "single publication" rule which originated in New York,
under which any single integrated publication, such as one edition of a newspaper,
book, or magazine, or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one- of
action, regardless of the number of times it is exposed to different people... (50 Am.
Jur. 2d 659 cited in Time, Inc. v. Reyes) (39 SCRA 301,:313 [1971]).
<re||an1w>

Petitioner Marcelo B. Soriano was included as one of the accused in the libel case in his capacity as
editor-publisher of the "Guardian." Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine ... shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof." Soriano's criminal liability,

thereof, was based on a press release prepared in Tacloban City and mailed or delivered to various
newspapers. The press release was the basis of the alleged libelous article contained in the
"GUARDIAN." Thus, as far as Soriano is concerned, his criminal liability, if any, allegedly stemmed
from the publication in the May 26-June 1, 1984 issue of the GUARDIAN of an article captioned
"IMPEACH TANTUICO CASE LOOMS" wherein the full text of the press release prepared by
accused Cesar G. Villegas in Tacloban was reproduced. Obviously, as far as petitioner Marcelo B.
Soriano is concerned, the requirement as regards the place where the libelous article was printed
and first published must be construed as referring to the publication of the press release of accused
Cesar Villegas in Soriano's newpaper "THE GUARDIAN."
The error of the trial court lies in its confusing the publication, whether mimeographed or otherwise,
of a press release by Villegas in Tacloban City with the publication by a Metro Manila newspaper of
that same press release together with various press releases or dispatches from other parts of the
country. For purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirements of Art. 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, the liability of a Manila or Quezon City editor must be deemed as commencing with the
publication of the allegedly libelous material in his newspaper and not with the typing or
mimeographing of press releases by interested persons in different municipalities or cities, copies of
which are sent to metropolitan newspapers for national publication. The amendments to Art. 360
were intended to free media persons from the intimidating harassment of libel suits filed in any place
where a newspaper happens to be sold or circulated. The purpose behind the law would be negated
or violated if the interpretation made by the trial court and appellate court is followed.
The May 26-June 1, 1984 issue of THE GUARDIAN shows that the newspaper is published every
Wednesday and Saturday with editorial and business offices located at Room 201, Llames Building,
694 E. de los Santos Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City. The intended circulation is nationwide. There is
no indication from the records before us, apart from the petitioner's receiving the press release and
publishing it in the GUARDIAN, that he had a hand in its preparation and distribution from Tacloban
City.
As the respondent COA Chairman held office in Quezon City and the offending newspaper is
published in Quezon City, the case should be filed with a Quezon City court.
The Solicitor General, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Solicitor
Aurora Cortes-Jorge, disagree with the prosecution in this case. He states:
A more circumspect reading of the information, insofar as petitioner Soriano and coaccused Bobby de la Cruz, Editor Publisher and Associate Editor, respectively, of
The Guardian are concerned, shows that the criminal charges does not at all state
that the libelous article against Tantuico was printed and first published in Tacloban
City. Indeed, what the information merely recites is that said accused
"published/republished in "The Guardian" dated May 26-June 1, 1984, a weekly
newspaper/magazine circulated in Tacloban City and nationwide, of which accused
Marcelo B. Soriano and Bobby de la Cruz are the Editor Publisher and Associate
Editor, respectively, ... publicly imputing the crime of falsification of public documents
and/ or violation of election laws to said Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr., which
publication in the said newspaper is captioned "IMPEACH TANTUICO CASE
LOOMS", quoted verbatim to wit: ...
As a matter of fact, what the crime information does clearly asserts as having been
written / printed and first circulated/published in Tacloban City dated May 19, 1984
was the press release of accused Cesar G. Villegas which the city fiscal to have
likewise contained the malicious imputation against Tantuico. Apparently, this was

made the basis, albeit mistakenly, by the dent trial court in vesting jurisdiction upon
itself over the libel mm against petitioner whose only involvement in the imputed
offense refers to the publication of the Guardian and not to the press release of the
accused Villegas. The error is made more apparent even from a reading of the
information itself which shows that the Villegas press release was issued on May 19,
1984 which was earlier than the questioned publication of The Guardian which is
dated May 26-June 1, 1984.
Even a recall of a copy of said issue of The Guardian (May 26-June 1, 1984) will
easily yield the fact that said newspaper was printed and first published in Quezon
City where its publishing house is located. As such, the publication in The Guardian
constituted a separate case of action for libel which should have been filed in
Quezon City. It is a settled jurisprudence that each separate publication of a libel
constitutes a distinct crime of libel, although two libelous publications arose out of the
same controversy and even if one was a partial reiteration of the first. (People v.
Vicente Sotto, 36 Phil. 389; Montinola v. Montalvo, 34 Phil. 662)
The foregoing having failed to evince any finding that the alleged libelous statements
were printed and first published in Tacloban City, but were in fact printed and first
published in Quezon City, and considering the admitted fact that Tantuico, at the time
of the commission of the offense, was a public official whose office is located in
Quezon City, the application of the provisions of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code constrain a conclusion that the venue and jurisdiction over subject criminal
case for libel should be lodged not in Tacloban City but in Quezon City. (pp. 75-77,
Rollo)
This decision, in helping or making it easier for media people to meet their occupational hazard of
libel suits, should by no means be viewed as encouraging irresponsible or licentious publications.
Public officers and private individuals who are wronged through an inordinate exercise by
newspapermen or media of freedom of speech and of the press have every right to avail themselves
of the legal remedies for libel. Media cannot hide behind the constitutional guarantee of a free press
to maliciously and recklessly malign the persons and reputations of public or private figures through
the publication of falsehoods or fabrications, the sordid distortion of half- truths, or the playing up of
human frailties for no justifiable end but to malign and titillate.
At the same time, the Court should be vigilant against all attempts to harass or persecute an
independent press or to restrain and chill the free expression of opinions. In this case, the intent of
the amendment is to avoid the harassment of media persons through libel suits instituted in distant
or out-of the-way towns by public officers who could more conveniently file cases in their places of
work.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision and resolution of
the appellate court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch 7,
Palo, Leyte is DIRECTED TO DISMISS Criminal Case No. 6136 in so far its petitioner Marcelo
Soriano is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45031 October 21, 1991
NANERICO D. SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices for petitioner.

FERNAN, C.J.:p
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeal promulgated on August 25, 1976 which
affirmed the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII (Pasig) convicting
Nanerico D. Santos of the crime of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the private offended parties Carlos
Moran Sison and Luis F. Sison in the amount of P50,000.00 by way of actual, consequential and
exemplary damages and costs. 1
The instant petition raises the ultimate issue of whether or not the publication of a complaint filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission before any judicial action is taken thereon is
privileged as a report of a judicial proceeding.
On February 23, 1970, petitioner Nanerico D. Santos as a columnist of the then Manila Daily
Bulletin wrote and published in his weekly column an article entitled "Charges Against CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc." which article was quoted verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on February 13,1970 by Rosario Sison Sandejas and her
daughters charging CMS Stock Brokerage Inc., particularly its board chairman and controlling
stockholder Carlos Moran Sison and its president-general manager Luis F. Sison, of engaging in
fraudulent practices in the stock market.
On the very day that the news item appeared, Carlos Moran Sison sought a meeting with petitioner
Santos so that he could submit to the columnist his reply which he wanted published "the very next
day" and in the same column. They met at about 6:15 in the evening at the Andres-Soriano
Executive Center in Makati, Rizal where petitioner promised Sison that he would have the reply
published, not on the next day, but in the February 25, 1970 issue of the Manila Daily
Bulletin because " it was already past the deadline for the next day's issue."
The reply was not published on February 25, 1970 as petitioner had promised and so Carlos Moran
Sison called petitioner by phone to tell him not to publish the reply anymore as it would only rekindle
the talks. Sison also informed petitioner that he would be sued for libel, to which statement petitioner
retorted: "Well, sue me for libel."2
About a week later when Carlos Moran Sison chanced upon petitioner at the Hotel Intercontinental
lobby, the latter asked Sison: "When will you sue me?" Petitioner received his answer on March

4,1970 when the appropriate complaint for libel was lodged against him by Carlos Moran Sison and
Luis F. Sison before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. Charge together with petitioner were
Mariano B. Quimson, Jr., Hans M. Menzi, M.M. de los Reyes, Felix G. Gonzales and Ben Rodriguez,
also of the Manila Daily Bulletin. Subsequently, the corresponding information was filed before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) on November 16, 1970. 3 It is interesting to note that a few weeks following
the publication of the complaint, Santos' weekly column was stopped, ostensibly to cut down on overhead expenses brought about by the
adoption of the floating rate in foreign exchange .4

On January 26, 1971, upon motion of the trial fiscal and with the conformity of the offended parties,
the lower court dismissed the case against all the accused, with the exception of petitioner Nanerico
D. Santos.
In due time, the trial court rendered its judgment of conviction. In affirming the decision, respondent
Appellate Court declared:
The article in question is not a privileged communication. At the time the complaint
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission was published in the column of
the accused there was as yet no proceeding at which both parties had an opportunity
to be present and to be heard. (Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 30 Phil. 88).
Publishing an article based upon a complaint filed in a Court of First Instance before
any judicial action is taken thereon is not privileged as a report of a judicial
proceeding. (Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 34 Phil, 447).
The article in question is libelous. It imputes a crime to the private offended parties,
that of 'willful violation of the provisions of the Securities Act and the implementing
Rules and Regulations issued by the commission'which is penalized by
imprisonment or fine or both and said published article of the accused imputes to the
private offended parties, as stockbrokers, fraudulent acts and illegal purchases/sales
and manipulations of securities to the prejudice of their customers and the general
investing public, which acts actually caused the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the
private offended parties. (Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 6-7).
The case is now before us for resolution.
The applicable provision of law is Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Generally, malice is presumed (malice in law) in every defamatory imputation. This presumption,
however, does not arise if the communication is privileged under Article 354.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 354 refer to qualifiedly privileged communications.

5 The character of the

privilege is a matter of defense which may be lost by positive proof of express malice. In other words, the onus of proving actual malice is
placed on the plaintiff who must then convince the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill will. Once this is accomplished, the
defense of privilege is unavailing. Thus, under Article 362 of the Revised Penal Code, it is provided that:

Art. 362. Libelous remarks. Libelous remarks or comments connected with the
matter privileged under the provisions of article 354, if made with malice, shall not
exempt the author nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal
liability. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner now insists that the published article is privileged, being a fair and true report of a judicial
proceeding, without comments or remarks, and therefore not punishable. He maintains that the
alleged libelous news report which came out in the Manila Daily Bulletin was merely lifted from a
complaint word for word, except for the last innocuous paragraph which he added to the effect that
"(i)nvestors and Sison's fellow brokers are eagerly awaiting developments on these charges".
Moreover, he contends that the cited rulings in the cases of Barreto vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 30
Phil. 88 and Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co., 34 Phil. 447, are no longer valid.
Petitioner's arguments are well-taken.
It must be recalled that in holding petitioner liable for libel, both the trial court and the Appellate Court
applied the doctrine established in the aforementioned 1915-1916 cases. Briefly:
An answer to a complaint filed in court, containing libelous matter, is not privileged so
as to exempt a newspaper from prosecution under the Libel Act for a publication
thereof, no action having been taken by the court thereon. (Barretto vs. Philippine
Publishing Co., supra).
Publishing an article based upon a complaint filed in a Court of First Instance before
any judicial action. is taken thereon is not privileged as a report of a judicial
proceeding. (Choa Tek Hee vs. Philippine Publishing Co., supra).
The Court, through Justice Moreland, gave the rationale:
The foundation of the right of the public to know what is going on in the courts is not
the fact that the public, or a portion of it, is curious, or that what goes on in the court
is news, or would be interesting, or would furnish topics of conversation; but is simply
that it has a right to know whether a public officer is properly performing his duty. In
other words, the right of the public to be informed of the proceedings in court is not
founded in the desire or necessity of people to know about the doings of others, but
in the necessity of knowing whether its servant, the judge, is properly performing his
duty. Only clear provisions of law can justify a newspaper, or an individual, in
spreading baseless charges of fraud or corruption made by one man against another,
wherever such charges may be found. The fact that such charges are contained in a
paper filed in court gives no inherent right to an individual to peddle its contents from
door to door or spread them broadcast; and a newspaper has no more privileges
than an individual. Between the newspaper and the individual there is no difference
of right. The real difference between them lies in the ability of the one to spread the
publication more quickly, more extensively, and more thoroughly than the other.
Unless, therefore, the statute plainly confers that right, the publication of such
charges is actionable unless justified. . . .
It is generally agreed that the privilege, the right to publish without liability for
damages, does not extend to mere pleadings filed in court, as, for example, bills in

equity, upon which there has been no action. (Cited cases). The reason for this rule
is thus stated in Park v Detroit Free Press Co.: There is no rule of law which
authorizes any but the parties interested to handle the files or publish the contents of
their matters in litigation. The parties, and none but the parties, control them. One of
the reasons why parties are privileged from suit for accusations made in their
pleadings is that the pleadings are addressed to courts where the facts can be fairly
tried, and to no other readers. If pleadings and the documents can be published to
the world by any one who gets access to them, no more effectual way of doing
malicious mischief with impunity could be devised than filling papers containing false
and scurrilous charges, and getting these printed news. . . . (Barreto vs. Philippine
Publishing Co., supra, pp. 92-93, 105-106).
However, it would seem that the passage of time has worked to petitioner's great advantage. In
1976, the doctrine so fervently and eloquently espoused by Justice Moreland in the Barreto case
was overturned by this Court through Justice Esguerra in Cuenco vs, Cuenco, No. L-29560, March
31, 1976 70 SCRA 212, 234-235. Thus:
The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered
privileged is not only because said pleadings have become part of public record open
to the public to scrutinize, but also due to the undeniable fact that said pleadings are
presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and legal in nature,
appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before the courts for the proper
administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern. Moreover,
pleadings are presumed to contain allegations substantially true because they can be
supported by evidence presented in good faith, the contents of which would be under
the scrutiny of courts, and therefore, subject to be purged of all improprieties and
illegal statements contained therein.
We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should be that a fair and
true report of a complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments even before an
answer is filed or a decision promulgated should be covered by the privilege.
In Manuel vs. Pano, supra, the Court, speaking through Justice Cruz, categorically stated that the
publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith
and without comments or remarks, is privileged and comes under Item 2 of Article 354. It is no
longer correct to state that Article 354 is not applicable because the published complaint as filed
would not by itself constitute a judicial proceeding, as the issues have not as yet been joined. That
doctrine established in the Barretto and Choa Tek Hee cases is no longer controlling and has been
superseded by the Cuenco case. Moreover, it could also be argued that the complaint, by itself, is a
public record and may be published as such under Rule 135, Section 2 of the Rules of Court unless
the court directs otherwise in the interest of morality or decency.
We now come to the all-important consideration of whether the prosecution, in an effort to remove
the protection of privilege, was able to establish that the columnist charged with libel was in fact
motivated by malice.
It is plainly evident from a reading of the published article itself that it is but a faithful reproduction of
a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. There are no embellishments, wild imputations,
distortions or defamatory comments calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and
expose them to public contempt. What petitioner has done was to simply furnish the readers with the
information that a complaint has been filed against a brokerage firm. Then he proceeded to
reproduce that pleading verbatim in his column. Now this is decidely part and parcel of petitioner's

job as a columnist whose "beat" happens to be the stock market. He is obligated to keep the public
abreast of the current news in that particular field. On this crucial point, the Court is inclined to
resolve all doubts in favor of petitioner and declare that there is no libel. It may be well for us to keep
in mind that the rule on privileged communications in defamation cases developed because "public
policy, the welfare of society and the orderly administration of justice" have demanded protection for
public opinion. Therefore, they should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover
grounds of malice and falsehood. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law
throws over privileged communications. 6
The controversial publication being a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and made without
malice, we find the author entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters
under Article 354 (2). It follows that he cannot be held criminally liable for libel.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of petitioner Nanerico D. Santos is SET ASIDE and he is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of libel. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 76565 November 9, 1988
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, represented by its President, MARTIN ISIDRO and
its Publisher, APOLONIO BATALLA, BEN F. RODRIGUEZ, FRED J. REYES, JAMIL MAIDAN
FLORES and JOHN DOES,petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE EDILBERTO NOEL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of the
Regional Trial Court, 12th Judicial Region with station in Marawi City, ATTY. DIMATIMPOS
MINDALANO, ATTY. MANGORSI A. MINDALANO, SHIEK EDRES MINDALANO, SULTAN
GUINAR MINDALANO, FAROUK CALIPA MINDALANO, SULTAN MAHADI MINDALANO,
SULTAN KHALID MINDALANO, SULTAN MA-AMOR MINDALANO, DR. TAHER MINDALANO,
DATU MAGUIDALA MINDALANO, SOBAIDA MAGUMPARA VDA. DE MINDALANO, RAISHA
MINDALANO MANDANGAN, ATTY. KIMAL M. SALACOP, DATU KAMAR M. MINDALANO,
MAYOR RASLANI MINDALANO, VICE-MAYOR ALIDADI A. MINDALANO, ENG. RASHDI A.
MINDALANO, MRS. PAISHA MINDALANO AGUAM, DATU AZIS MINDALANO AGUAM, MRS.
MOOMINA MINDALANO OMAR, DATU AMINOLA MINDALANO OMAR, in behalf of the
Mindalano Clan, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako for petitioners.
Kimal M. Salacop, Mahadi Pimping, Dimatimpos Mindalano, Mangorsi Mindalano, Linang
Mandangan, Abdul S. Aguam and Dagoroan Q. Macarambon for private respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
On 3 July 1986 the twenty-one (21) private respondents (plaintiffs below), claiming to be the nearest
relatives of the late Amir Mindalano, suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the entire Mindalano
clan of Mindanao, filed a Complaint 1 for damages (docketed as Civil Case No. 81-86) before Branch 8
of the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City charging petitioners with libel. Private respondents' action was
anchored on a feature article written by Jamil Maidan Flores entitled "A Changing of the Guard," which
appeared in the 22 June 1986 issue of Philippine Panorama, a publication of petitioner Bulletin Publishing
Corporation. In particular, exception was taken to the following excerpt:
The division of Lanao into Sur and Norte in 1959 only emphasized the feudal nature
of Maranaw politics. Talk of Lanao politics and you find yourself confined to a small
circle of the Alonto, Dimaporo, Dimakuta, Dianalan, Lucman families and a few more.
These are big, royal families. If you are a Maranaw with aspirations for political
leadership, you better be a certified bona fide member of one or several of these
clans.
xxx xxx xxx
About the only time that one who was not of any royal house became a leader of
consequence in the province was during the American era when the late Amir
Mindalano held some sway. That was because Mindalano had the advantage of
having lived with an American family and was therefore fluent and literate in English.
But as soon as the datus woke up to the blessings of the transplanted American
public school system, as soon as they could speak and read and write in English,
political leadership again became virtually their exclusive domain. There must be
some irony in that. 2(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents alleged in their complaint that, contrary to the above portion of the article, the
Mindalanos "belong to no less than four (4) of the 16 Royal Houses of Lanao del Sur." Private
respondents likewise objected to the statement that the late Amir Mindalano, grand patriarch of the
Mindalano clan, had lived with an American family, a statement which, they alleged, apart from being
absolutely false, "has a distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society." Contending finally that
petitioners had with malice inflicted "so much damage upon the social standing of the plaintiffs" as to
"irreparably injure" the Mindalano name and reputation, private respondents interposed a claim for
the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, all in the
aggregate amount of P2,350,000.00.
Reacting to the complaint, petitioners filed on 6 August 1986 a Motion to Dismiss 3 urging that (a)
venue had been improperly laid, (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and (c) the
complainants lacked the capacity to bring the suit. In an Order 4 dated 30 October 1986, however,
respondent Judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed petitioners (defendants below) to file their
answer to the complaint.
In the present Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assail the 30 October 1986 order of
respondent Judge, reiterating basically the arguments raised in their Motion to Dismiss filed with the
trial court.
On 4 December 1986, the court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent Judge
from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 81-86. 5 Petitioners and private respondents
have since then filed responsive pleadings.

On the question of venue raised by petitioners, paragraph 2 of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides in part:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this Chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court
of first instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city where the libelous
article was printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense ... (Emphasis supplied)
The law specifically designates as proper venue in criminal and civil actions for libel the Regional
Trial Court of the province or city "where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense;" upon the other hand, the record of this case shows that at the time
the allegedly libelous Panorama article was published, nine (9) of the twenty-one (21) complainants
(private respondents) were then residents of Marawi City. Filing of the complaint (Civil Case No. 8186) with the Marawi Regional Trial Court thus did not result in any procedural infirmity as would
vitiate the proceedings undertaken there. Petitioners' argument that venue was improperly laid
simply because the twelve (12) other complainants were non-residents of Marawi at the time of
publication is, therefore, without merit. It is to the benefit of petitioners that the twelve (12) nonresidents of Marawi chose to go along with the suit in Marawi instead of commencing a separate suit
elsewhere. The Court is not, however, to be understood as saying that the 21 complainants, if
residents in 21 different places, could have sued in 21 differing courts and still claim that venue had
been properly laid in each instance. Such a situation may well indicate a pattern of harassment of
the defendant newspaper which could justify intervention on the part of this Court to avoid a potential
paralysing effect upon the exercise of press freedom.
Coming now to the principal issue of whether or not the complaint states a valid cause of action, the
Court finds that libel has not here been committed; the civil suit for damages must fail.
It is axiomatic in actions for damages for libel that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole. 6 We have accordingly examined in its entirety the
subject article "A Changing of the Guard" which is in essence a popular essay on the general nature and
character of Mindanao politics and the recent emergence of a new political leader in the province of
Lanao del Sur. We note firstly that the essay is not focused on the late Amir Mindalano nor his family.
Save in the excerpts complained about and quoted above, the name of the Mindalano family or clan is not
mentioned or alluded to in the essay. The Identification of Amir Mindalano is thus merely illustrative or
incidental in the course of the development of the theme of the article. The language utilized by the article
in general and the above excerpts in particular appears simply declaratory or expository in character,
matter-of-fact and unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory or derisive implications or nuances
appear detectable at all, however closely one may scrutinize the above excerpts. We find in the quoted
excerpts no evidence of malevolent intent either on the part of the author or the publisher of the article
here involved.
Private respondents, however, argue that petitioners had in the article falsely and maliciously
ascribed to the late Amir Mindalano, and to the rest of the extended Mindalano family, an inferior
status or conditioni.e., that of not belonging to any of the royal Muslim houses of the Lanao
provinces which respondents assert substantially injured their good family name and reputation. In
their complaint before the trial court, private respondents asserted their affiliations with at least five
(5) royal houses:
11. The late Amir Mindalano, as well as plaintiffs from their heritage from the
Mindalano genealogy, belong to no less than four (4) of the 16 royal Houses of
Lanao del Sur, namely; (1) the Sultanate of Ramain; (2) the Sultanate of Butig, (3)
the Sultanate of Masiu and (4) the Sultanate of Bayang. They also are distinctly

favored for being scions of the Royal House of Noron of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Noron was the sister of Pagayawan and Diwan of the Royal Houses of Pagayawan
and Bayang respectively;
12. Intermarrying with the Mindalano clan, who are also represented in this suit, are
scions of the other royal families of the two Lanao provinces, all of whom, together
with the nominal plaintiffs and the others represented in this suit, have been
provoked to wrath, exposed to public contempt and ridicule, and their social standing
and reputation besmirched and humiliated by the defamation subject matter of this
suit that blackened and vilified the memory of their departed patriarch, the late Amir
Mindalano;
xxx xxx xxx 7
It is also claimed by private respondents that the excerpts objected to falsely asserted that
the late Amir Mindalano has acquired his fluency and literacy by living with an
American family [which] has a distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society in
that during the American time the royal families of Lanao hid their children from the
public school system and the Americans. Only the lowliest commoners were sent to
school or allowed to live with any American family. Amir Manalao Mindalano has
received his education at the Lumbatan High School, was a student leader thereat,
and has not lived with an American family. 8
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that titles of royalty or nobility have been maintained and
appear to be accorded some value among some members of certain cultural groups in our society.
At the same time, such titles of royalty or nobility are not generally recognized or acknowledged
socially in the national community. No legal rights or privileges are contingent upon grant or
possession of a title of nobility or royalty and the Constitution expressly forbids the enactment of any
law conferring such a title. 9 Thus, the status of a commoner carries with it no legal disability. Assuming
for present purposes only the falsity (in the sense of being inaccurate or non-factual) of the description in
the Panorama article of Amir Mindalano as not belonging to a royal house, we believe that such a
description cannot in this day and age be regarded as defamatory, as an imputation of "a vice or defect,"
or as tending to cause "dishonor, discredit or contempt," or to "blacken the memory of one who is
dead" 10 in the eyes of an average person in our community. The above excerpts complained of do not
disparage or deprecate Maranao titles of royalty or nobility, neither do they hold up to scorn and
disrespect those who, Maranao or not, are commoners. There is here no visible effort on the part of
petitioners to cast contempt and ridicule upon an institution or tradition of members of a cultural or ethnic
minority group, an "indigenous cultural community" in the language of the Constitution, whose traditions
and institutions the State is required to respect and protect. 11 What private respondents assert is
defamatory is the simple failure to ascribe to the late Amir membership in a Maranao royal house, the
ascription, in other words, to him of a factual condition shared by the overwhelming majority of the
population of this country, both Maranao and non-Maranao, Muslim and non-Muslim. In a community like
ours which is by constitutional principle both republican in character 12 and egalitarian in
inspiration, 13 such an ascription, whether correct or not, cannot be defamatory.
The Court is similarly unable to see anything defamatory in a statement (even if inaccurate) that
private respondents' patriarch once lived with an American family. Since the early decades of this
century a great many young Filipinos (including Muslim Filipinos) have been going abroad for study
and many of them share the experience of staying with a foreign family, improving their language
skills and learning something about the culture and mores of the people. Once more, from the
viewpoint of the average person in our present day community, the statement complained of is not
defamatory.

Private respondents' feelings and sensibilities have obviously been hurt and offended by the
reference to Amir Mindalano as a commoner and as having lived for a time with an American family.
Personal hurt or embarassment or offense, even if real, is not, however, automatically equivalent to
defamation. The law against defamation protects one's interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a
reputation "as good as one's character and conduct warrant," 14 in the community and it is to
community standards-not personal or family standards-that a court must refer in evaluating a publication
claimed to be defamatory.
The term "community" may of course be drawn as narrowly or as broadly as the user of the term and
his purposes may require. The reason why for purposes of the law on libel the more general
meaning of community must be adopted in the ascertainment of relevant standards, is rooted deep
in our constitutional law. That reason relates to the fundamental public interest in the protection and
promotion of free speech and expression, an interest shared by all members of the body politic and
territorial community. A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to
report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest, wherever they may
take place within the nation and as well in the outside world, with minimum fear of being hauled to
court by one group or another (however defined in scope) on criminal or civil charges for libel, so
long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing
within the general community. Any other rule on defamation, in a national community like ours with
many, diverse cultural, social, religious and other groupings, is likely to produce an unwholesome
"chilling effect" upon the constitutionally protected operations of the press and other instruments of
information and education. 15
Applying the foregoing to the facts of the present Petition, we note that the subject matter of the
article "A Changing of the Guard" is clearly one of legitimate public interest. As pointed out earlier,
petitioners in the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press have kept well within the generally
accepted moral and civil standards of the community as to what may be characterized as
defamatory. The complaint in the court below failed to state a cause of action and should have been
dismissed by respondent Judge. We hold that such dismissal, in the circumstances of this case,
including in particular the nature of the basic issue here at stake, may be compelled by certiorari and
prohibition. 16 This conclusion renders the third and last issue raised by petitioners quite moot.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. The Order of respondent
Judge dated 30 October 1986 in Civil Case No. 81-86 denying the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
SET ASIDE, and respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to dismiss Case No. 81-86 forthwith upon
notice hereof. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 4 December 1986 is made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., took no part.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135306. January 28, 2003]

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA

and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., petitioners, vs. ISLAMIC
DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDUL-RAHMAN
R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE
GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A.
JUNIO, respondents.
DECISION

I may utterly detest what you write, but I shall fight

to the death to make it possible for you to
continue writing it. - Voltaire
BELLOSILLO, J.:

VOLTAIRE'S PONTIFICAL VERSE bestirs once again the basic liberties to free
speech and free press - liberties that belong as well, if not more, to those who question,
who do not conform, who differ. For the ultimate good which we all strive to achieve for
ourselves and our posterity can better be reached by a free exchange of ideas, where
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the free market - not just the ideas we desire, but including those thoughts we
despise.
[1]

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of

more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims
ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE
GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf
of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C.
LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article
published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid. The article reads:

"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng
mga Muslim?

Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang
kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain.
Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang
pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang Ramadan."
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the
Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only
published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and
disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public
policy, good morals and human relations; that on account of these libelous
words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim
world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense,
contended that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and
therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression
of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage,
prejudice or injury to Muslims.
[2]

On 30 June 1995 the trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs
failed to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the
article were not specifically identified -

It must be noted that the persons allegedly defamed, the herein plaintiffs, were not
identified with specificity. The subject article was directed at the Muslims without
mentioning or identifying the herein plaintiffs x x x x It is thus apparent that the
alleged libelous article refers to the larger collectivity of Muslims for which the
readers of the libel could not readily identify the personalities of the persons
defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an individual Muslim member to prove that the
defamatory remarks apply to him. The evidence presented in this case failed to
convince this court that, indeed, the defamatory remarks really applied to the herein
plaintiffs.
[3]

On 27 August 1998 the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It
opined that it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all
adherents of the Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as god by
members of the Muslim religion. This libelous imputation undeniably applied to the
plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the same religious beliefs." It added that
the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the

requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.
[4]

Hence, the instant petition for review assailing the findings of the appellate court (a)
on the existence of the elements of libel, (b) the right of respondents to institute the
class suit, and, (c) the liability of petitioners for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a
person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that
which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or
confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.
It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of
another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational
interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to
have, of the plaintiff.
[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel
or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or
vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
[9]

[10]

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to

an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or
alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of
action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and
expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights. Thus, in Newsweek, Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we dismissed a complaint for libel against Newsweek,
Inc., on the ground that private respondents failed to state a cause of action since they
made no allegation in the complaint that anything contained in the article complained of
specifically referred to any of them. Private respondents, incorporated associations of
sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several
individual members, filed a class action suit for damages in behalf of all sugarcane
planters in Negros Occidental. The complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bacolod City alleged that Newsweek, Inc., committed libel against them by the
publication of the article "Island of Fear" in its weekly newsmagazine allegedly depicting
Negros Province as a place dominated by wealthy landowners and sugar planters who
not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers but also
brutalized and killed them with impunity. Private respondents alleged that the article
showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or
[11]

[12]

[13]

misrepresentation of facts intended to put the sugarcane planters in a bad light, expose
them to public ridicule, discredit and humiliation in the Philippines and abroad, and
make them the objects of hatred, contempt and hostility of their agricultural workers and
of the public in general. We ratiocinated -

x x x where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is

essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every
individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the
class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so
that he can bring the action separately, if need be x x x x The case at bar is not a class
suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all, or where the
representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to
make each member of the class an actual party. We have here a case where each of
the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not
have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly
injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be
identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot
sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action
in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.
An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the
community. Each Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of
over five (5) million people, belongs to a different trade and profession; each has a
varying interest and a divergent political and religious view -some may be conservative,
others liberal. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others
may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and
the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who
constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation
is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single
common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject
matter of the controversy.
In Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company, the United States Court of
Appeals held that one guiding principle of group libel is that defamation of a large group
does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual unless it can be
shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.
[14]

The rule on libel has been restrictive. In an American case, a person had allegedly
committed libel against all persons of the Jewish religion. The Court held that there
could be no libel against an extensive community in common law. In an English case,
where libel consisted of allegations of immorality in a Catholic nunnery, the Court
considered that if the libel were on the whole Roman Catholic Church generally, then
the defendant must be absolved. With regard to the largest sectors in society,
including religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no criminal action at the
behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of the individual, will lie.
[15]

[16]

In another case, the plaintiffs claimed that all Muslims, numbering more than 600
million, were defamed by the airing of a national television broadcast of a film depicting
the public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess accused of adultery, and alleging that
such film was "insulting and defamatory" to the Islamic religion. The United States
District Court of the Northern District of California concluded that the plaintiffs' prayer for
$20 Billion in damages arising from "an international conspiracy to insult, ridicule,
discredit and abuse followers of Islam throughout the world, Arabs and the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia" bordered on the "frivolous," ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate an actionable claim for defamation. The California Court stressed that the
aim of the law on defamation was to protect individuals; a group may be sufficiently
large that a statement concerning it could not defame individual group members.
[17]

[18]

Philip Wittenberg, in his book "Dangerous Words: A Guide to the Law of

Libel," discusses the inappropriateness of any action for tortious libel involving large
groups, and provides a succinct illustration:
[19]

There are groupings which may be finite enough so that a description of the body is a
description of the members. Here the problem is merely one of evaluation. Is the
description of the member implicit in the description of the body, or is there a
possibility that a description of the body may consist of a variety of persons, those
included within the charge, and those excluded from it?
A general charge that the lawyers in the city are shysters would obviously not be a
charge that all of the lawyers were shysters. A charge that the lawyers in a local point
in a great city, such as Times Square in New York City, were shysters would obviously
not include all of the lawyers who practiced in that district; but a statement that all of
the lawyers who practiced in a particular building in that district were shysters would
be a specific charge, so that any lawyer having an office within that building could
sue.

If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to
have no application to anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all
mankind. Not only does the group as such have no action; the plaintiff does not
establish any personal reference to himself. At present, modern societal groups are
both numerous and complex. The same principle follows with these groups: as the size
of these groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recover
damages on tortious libel become elusive. This principle is said to embrace two (2)
important public policies: first, where the group referred to is large, the courts presume
that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally applying to each
individual member; and second, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard
freedom of speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a sound
compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel cases.
[20]

[21]

In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who
among the Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the
reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants,
Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who are
believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the
Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and theological
distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which describes only a general segment of the
Philippine population, comprising a heterogeneous body whose construction is not so
well defined as to render it impossible for any representative identification.
The Christian religion in the Philippines is likewise divided into different sects:
Catholic, Baptist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other groups the essence
of which may lie in an inspired charlatan, whose temple may be a corner house in the
fringes of the countryside. As with the Christian religion, so it is with other religions that
represent the nation's culturally diverse people and minister to each one's spiritual
needs. The Muslim population may be divided into smaller groups with varying agenda,
from the prayerful conservative to the passionately radical. These divisions in the
Muslim population may still be too large and ambiguous to provide a reasonable
inference to any personality who can bring a case in an action for libel.
The foregoing are in essence the same view scholarly expressed by Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in the course of the deliberations in this case. We extensively
reproduce hereunder his comprehensive and penetrating discussion on group libel -

Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander the one being, in general,
written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of
the interest in reputation and good name. This is a relational interest since it involves
the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff.

The law of defamation protects the interest in reputation the interest in acquiring,
retaining and enjoying ones reputation as good as ones character and conduct
warrant. The mere fact that the plaintiffs feelings and sensibilities have been offended
is not enough to create a cause of action for defamation. Defamation requires that
something be communicated to a third person that may affect the opinion others may
have of the plaintiff. The unprivileged communication must be shown of a statement
that would tend to hurt plaintiffs reputation, to impair plaintiffs standing in the
community.
Although the gist of an action for defamation is an injury to reputation, the focus of a
defamation action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement itself and its
predictable effect upon third persons. A statement is ordinarily considered defamatory
if it tend[s] to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium,
contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace The Restatementof
Torts defines a defamatory statement as one that tends to so harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons
from associating or dealing with him.
Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as
part of his prima facie case that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2)
defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.
The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the
defamatory charge has been made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a
third person for damages suffered by reason of defamation of another person, even
though the plaintiff suffers some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases,
it is necessary that the publication be of and concerning the plaintiff. Even when a
publication may be clearly defamatory as to somebody, if the words have no personal
application to the plaintiff, they are not actionable by him. If no one is identified,
there can be no libel because no ones reputation has been injured x x x x
In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it
must appear that the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was
made. This principle is of vital importance in cases where a group or class is defamed
since, usually, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an individual
member to show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed.

If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons,

they applied to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain
an action for defamation. When the defamatory language was used toward a small
group or class, including every member, it has been held that the defamatory
language referred to each member so that each could maintain an action. This small
group or class may be a jury, persons engaged in certain businesses, professions or
employments, a restricted subdivision of a particular class, a society, a football team,
a family, small groups of union officials, a board of public officers, or engineers of a
particular company.
In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group
of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can
be made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a
right of action for libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special,
personal application and was so general that no individual damages could be
presumed, and where the class referred to was so numerous that great vexation and
oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of suits, no private action could be
maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory publications concerning groups
or classes of persons engaged in a particular business, profession or employment,
directed at associations or groups of association officials, and to those directed at
miscellaneous groups or classes of persons.
Distinguishing a small group-which if defamed entitles all its members to sue from a
large group which if defamed entitles no one to sue is not always so simple. Some
authorities have noted that in cases permitting recovery, the group generally has
twenty five (25) or fewer members. However, there is usually no articulated limit on
size. Suits have been permitted by members of fairly large groups when some
distinguishing characteristic of the individual or group increases the likelihood that
the statement could be interpreted to apply individually. For example, a single player
on the 60 to 70 man Oklahoma University football team was permitted to sue when a
writer accused the entire team of taking amphetamines to hop up its performance; the
individual was a fullback, i.e., a significant position on the team and had played in all
but two of the teams games.
A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception of the size of the group and
whether a statement will be interpreted to refer to every member. The more organized
and cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all its members with the same brush and

the more likely a court will permit a suit from an individual even if the group includes
more than twenty five (25) members. At some point, however, increasing size may be
seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury will fall beneath the
threshold for a viable lawsuit.
x x x x There are many other groupings of men than those that are contained within
the foregoing group classifications. There are all the religions of the world, there are
all the political and ideological beliefs; there are the many colors of the human race.
Group defamation has been a fertile and dangerous weapon of attack on various
racial, religious and political minorities. Some states, therefore, have passed statutes
to prevent concerted efforts to harass minority groups in the United States by making
it a crime to circulate insidious rumors against racial and religious groups. Thus far,
any civil remedy for such broadside defamation has been lacking.
There have been numerous attempts by individual members to seek redress in the
courts for libel on these groups, but very few have succeeded because it felt that the
groups are too large and poorly defined to support a finding that the plaintiff was
singled out for personal attack x x x x (citations omitted).
Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the
instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were
purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely
claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages.
A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the present case is an
intentional tortious act causing mental distress and not an action for libel. That opinion
invokes Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire where the U.S. Supreme Court held that words
heaping extreme profanity, intended merely to incite hostility, hatred or violence, have
no social value and do not enjoy constitutional protection; and Beauharnais v.
Illinois where it was also ruled that hate speech which denigrates a group of persons
identified by their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and the law may
validly prohibit such speech on the same ground as defamation of an individual.
[22]

[23]

We do not agree to the contrary view articulated in the immediately preceeding

paragraph. Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a
civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due
to personal attacks on his character. It has no application in the instant case since no
particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported
damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle
[24]

of relational harm - which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the
form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm - which includes
injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional
distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the
standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their
faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus
beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application of the relational
harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on
which the concept of emotional distress properly belongs.
[25]

Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the
defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was
extreme and severe.
[26]

"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The
defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or
frighten the plaintiff. Generally, conduct will be found to be actionable where the
recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him or her to exclaim, "Outrageous!" as his or
her reaction.
[27]

[28]

"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme
grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea,
mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. "Severe emotional
distress," in some jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or
mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals
trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic
depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or
she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not
simply a matter of damages.
[29]

[30]

[31]

Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry,
anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults,
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining
whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and

required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to

occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact
that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his
feelings hurt, is not enough.
[32]

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell illustrates the test case of a civil action for damages
on intentional infliction of emotional distress. A parody appeared in Hustler magazine
featuring the American fundamentalist preacher and evangelist Reverend Jerry Falwell
depicting him in an inebriated state having an incestuous sexual liaison with his mother
in an outhouse. Falwell sued Hustler and its publisher Larry Flynt for damages. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled that the parody was
not libelous, because no reasonable reader would have understood it as a factual
assertion that Falwell engaged in the act described. The jury, however, awarded
$200,000 in damages on a separate count of "intentional infliction of emotional
distress," a cause of action that did not require a false statement of fact to be made. The
United States Supreme Court in a unanimous decision overturned the jury verdict of the
Virginia Court and held that Reverend Falwell may not recover for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. It was argued that the material might be deemed outrageous and
may have been intended to cause severe emotional distress, but these circumstances
were not sufficient to overcome the free speech rights guaranteed under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Simply stated, an intentional tort causing
emotional distress must necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free speech.
[33]

It must be observed that although Falwell was regarded by the U.S. High Court as a
"public figure," he was an individual particularly singled out or identified in the parody
appearing on Hustler magazine. Also, the emotional distress allegedly suffered by
Reverend Falwell involved a reactive interest - an emotional response to the parody
which supposedly injured his psychological well-being.
Verily, our position is clear that the conduct of petitioners was not extreme or
outrageous. Neither was the emotional distress allegedly suffered by respondents so
severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. There is no evidence
on record that points to that result.
Professor William Prosser, views tort actions on intentional infliction of emotional
distress in this manner [34]

There is virtually unanimous agreement that such ordinary defendants are not liable
for mere insult, indignity, annoyance, or even threats, where the case is lacking in
other circumstances of aggravation. The reasons are not far to seek. Our manners,
and with them our law, have not yet progressed to the point where we are able to

afford a remedy in the form of tort damages for all intended mental disturbance.
Liability of course cannot be extended to every trivial indignity x x x x The plaintiff
must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of
rough language, and to acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind x x x The
plaintiff cannot recover merely because of hurt feelings.
Professor Calvert Magruder reinforces Prosser with this succinct observation, viz:

[35]

There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case where someones feelings
are hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some
safety valve must be left through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively
harmless steam.
Thus, it is evident that even American courts are reluctant to adopt a rule of
recovery for emotional harm that would "open up a wide vista of litigation in the field of
bad manners," an area in which a "toughening of the mental hide" was thought to be a
more appropriate remedy. Perhaps of greater concern were the questions of
causation, proof, and the ability to accurately assess damages for emotional harm, each
of which continues to concern courts today.
[36]

[37]

In this connection, the doctrines in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely been
superseded by subsequent First Amendment doctrines. Back in simpler times in the
history of free expression the Supreme Court appeared to espouse a theory, known as
the Two-Class Theory, that treated certain types of expression as taboo forms of
speech, beneath the dignity of the First Amendment. The most celebrated statement of
this view was expressed in Chaplinsky:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or fighting words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Today, however, the theory is no longer viable; modern First Amendment principles
have passed it by. American courts no longer accept the view that speech may be
proscribed merely because it is "lewd," "profane," "insulting" or otherwise vulgar

or offensive. Cohen v. California is illustrative: Paul Robert Cohen wore a jacket

bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles courthouse in April 1968, which
caused his eventual arrest. Cohen was convicted for violating a California statute
prohibiting any person from "disturb[ing] the peace x x x by offensive conduct." The U.S.
Supreme Court conceded that Cohen's expletive contained in his jacket was "vulgar,"
but it concluded that his speech was nonetheless protected by the right to free
speech. It was neither considered an "incitement" to illegal action nor "obscenity." It did
not constitute insulting or "fighting" words for it had not been directed at a person who
was likely to retaliate or at someone who could not avoid the message. In other words,
no one was present in the Los Angeles courthouse who would have regarded Cohen's
speech as a direct personal insult, nor was there any danger of reactive violence
against him.
[38]

[39]

No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly defamatory words printed on

Cohen's jacket. The conviction could only be justified by Californias desire to exercise
the broad power in preserving the cleanliness of discourse in the public sphere, which
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant to the State, holding that no objective
distinctions can be made between vulgar and nonvulgar speech, and that the emotive
elements of speech are just as essential in the exercise of this right as the purely
cognitive. As Mr. Justice Harlan so eloquently wrote: "[O]ne mans vulgarity is another
mans lyric x x x words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force." With Cohen, the U.S. Supreme Court finally laid the constitutional foundation
for judicial protection of provocative and potentially offensive speech.
[40]

Similarly, libelous speech is no longer outside the First Amendment

protection. Only one small piece of the Two-Class Theory in Chaplinsky survives U.S. courts continue to treat "obscene" speech as not within the protection of the
First Amendment at all. With respect to the "fighting words" doctrine, while it
remains alive it was modified by the current rigorous clear and present danger
test. Thus, in Cohen the U.S. Supreme Court in applying the test held that there was
no showing that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" had threatened to
provoke imminent violence; and that protecting the sensibilities of onlookers was not
sufficiently compelling interest to restrain Cohen's speech.
[41]

Beauharnais, which closely followed the Chaplinsky doctrine, suffered the same fate
as Chaplinsky. Indeed, when Beauharnais was decided in 1952, the Two-Class
Theory was still flourishing. While concededly the U.S. High Tribunal did not formally
abandon Beauharnais, the seminal shifts in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence
substantially undercut Beauharnais and seriously undermined what is left of its vitality
as a precedent. Among the cases that dealt a crushing impact on Beauharnais and
rendered it almost certainly a dead letter case law areBrandenburg v. Ohio, and,
[42]

again, Cohen v. California. These decisions recognize a much narrower set of

permissible grounds for restricting speech than did Beauharnais.
[43]

[44]

In Brandenburg, appellant who was a leader of the Ku Klux Klan was convicted
under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute for advocating the necessity, duty and
propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reforms; and for voluntarily assembling with a group
formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. Appellant challenged
the statute and was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that the advocacy of
illegal action becomes punishable only if such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Except in unusual instances, Brandenburg protects the advocacy of lawlessness as
long as such speech is not translated into action.
[45]

The importance of the Brandenburg ruling cannot be overemphasized. Prof. Smolla

affirmed that "Brandenburg must be understood as overruling Beauharnais and
eliminating the possibility of treating group libel under the same First Amendment
standards as individual libel." It may well be considered as one of the lynchpins of
the modern doctrine of free speech, which seeks to give special protection to politically
relevant speech.
[46]

In any case, respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a
class suit. As correctly pointed out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during the
deliberations, "an element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In
determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the
court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the
interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made parties as it
so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor bearing on the
ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
[47]

The rules require that courts must make sure that the persons intervening should be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned. In the present
controversy, Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the
interests not only of the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as
well. Private respondents obviously lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a
global group; neither have they been able to demonstrate the identity of their interests
with those they seek to represent.Unless it can be shown that there can be a safe
guaranty that those absent will be adequately represented by those present, a class
suit, given its magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing."
[48]

Likewise on the matter of damages, we agree that "moral damages may be

recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual
basis for the damages and its causal connection with the acts complained of, and so it
must be, as moral damages although incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed
not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and actual damages
suffered. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is
able to establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these
damages would appear to have been adequately established by respondents."
[49]

[50]

[51]

In a pluralistic society like the Philippines where misinformation about another

individual's religion is as commonplace as self-appointed critics of government, it would
be more appropriate to respect the fair criticism of religious principles, including those
which may be outrageously appalling, immensely erroneous, or those couched as fairly
informative comments.The greater danger in our society is the possibility that it may
encourage the frequency of suits among religious fundamentalists, whether Christian,
Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or others. This would unnecessarily make the civil
courts a battleground to assert their spiritual ideas, and advance their respective
religious agenda.
It need not be stressed that this Court has no power to determine which is proper
religious conduct or belief; neither does it have the authority to rule on the merits of one
religion over another, nor declare which belief to uphold or cast asunder, for the validity
of religious beliefs or values are outside the sphere of the judiciary. Such matters are
better left for the religious authorities to address what is rightfully within their doctrine
and realm of influence. Courts must be viewpoint-neutral when it comes to religious
matters if only to affirm the neutrality principle of free speech rights under modern
jurisprudence where "[a]ll ideas are treated equal in the eyes of the First Amendment even those ideas that are universally condemned and run counter to constitutional
principles." Under the right to free speech, "there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas." Denying certiorari and affirming the appellate court decision would surely
create a chilling effect on the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press.
[52]

[53]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 27 August 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the
RTC-Br. 4, Manila, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., in the result.
Carpio, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., joins the dissent of J. Carpio.
Azcuna, J., joins the dissent of Justice Austria-Martinez.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120715. March 29, 1996]

FERNANDO SAZON y RAMOS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals (Special Third Division) in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 13777 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 161 of Pasig City, in Criminal Case No.
58939, convicting the petitioner of the crime of libel.
The relevant antecedents are not disputed.
Petitioner Fernando Sazon and private complainant Abdon Reyes were both
residents of the PML Homes in East Drive, Parang Marikina, Metro Manila. They were
likewise members of the PML-Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc.
(PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners of PML Homes. The association had a
monthly newsletter, the PML-Homemaker, of which the petitioner was the editor.
On December 11, 1983, the PML-BLCA held an election for the members of its
board of directors. Among those who ran in the election were the private complainant
and the petitioner. The petitioner was elected as a director. He was likewise elected by

the new board as president of the homeowners association. The private complainant
lost in said election.
Unable to accept defeat, the private complainant, on January 16, 1984, wrote a
letter to the Estate Management Office of the Home Financing Corporation (EMO-HFC)
protesting the election of the petitioner as a director and president of the homeowners
association. He alleged that the election was a nullity because of: (1) the lack of
authority of the petitioner to call for such an election; (2) the absence of a quorum; and
(3) lack of the required notice to the homeowners. On January 18, 1984, the private complainant wrote his co-homeowners explaining
to them his election protest and urging them not to recognize the petitioner and the
other members who won in the election.
Meanwhile, in response to the election protest, the EMO-HFC ordered the PMLBLCA to conduct a referendum to be supervised by the EMO-HFC. The private
complainant then notified his co-homeowners about this development and requested
them to attend a general meeting with the representatives of the EMO-HFC which was
to be held before the referendum.
Soon after the general meeting, several copies of a leaflet called the PML Scoop
were received by the homeowners. The leaflet was entitled Supalpal si Sazon,
obviously referring to the affirmative action taken by the EMO-HFC in connection with
the private respondents election protest. At about the same time, the phrase Sazon,
nasaan ang pondo ng simbahan? was seen boldly written on the walls near the
entrance gate of the subdivision. There was no proof, however, as to who was
responsible for these writings.
Thinking that only private complainant was capable of these acts, petitioner Sazon
started writing, publishing, and circulating newsletters to his co-homeowners,
culminating in the appearance in the February 10, 1984 issue of the PML-Homemakers
of the following article:

USAPAN NG BOARD v. ABDON NAG-COLLAPSE SA ESTATE MANAGEMENT

OFFICE
Dala ng mahigpit na pakiusap ng Estate Management Office (EMO) na gawin ang
lahat na nararapat upang magkaroon ng katahimikan at pagkakaisa ang mga tiga PML
Homes, ang Board Secretary, Mr. Pacis at President F.R. Sazon ay nagpaunlak na
pagbigyan ang kahilingan ng ating kasama na si Abdon Reyes.

Ang kahilingan: Anyayahan ang EMO-HFC na magconduct ng Plebiscite or

Referendum para sa possibility ng isa pang halalan ng Board of Directors.
Sa meeting na dinaluhan ni Abdon Reyes na nagdala ng isang cameraman at may
kasamang pagyayabang at kaunting panggolpe de gulat (na tila baga puro tanga yata
ang akala niya sa mga kausap), ipinipilit pa rin nitong ang Board sa PML Parang ay
binubuo pa rin nuong mga taong inilukluk ng developer na nag 1-2-3.
Halos pag-pupukpukin ng bag ng mga kababaihang nagsisama sa miting ang ating
pobreng super kulit na walang pakialam sa mga taga atin.
Ang mga nagsipagbigay suporta sa Pangulo at Board Secretary ay sina Gng.
Cavarosa, Gng. Triffie Ladisla, Gng. Nitz Rodriguez at Dra. Sazon.
Kung di dahil sa pakiusap nina Messrrs. ABNER PACAIGUE at HOMER AGNOTE,
kasama na ng Board Secretary at Pangulo, malamang ay nagulpi sana ang
mandurugas.
Dahil sa patuloy na kabulastugan ni Abdon, ang meeting na ginaganap sa EMO
kaninang umaga ay nag-collapse nang malaman na may ikinalat na liham ang
mandurugas, na nagsasabing di umano ay hindi tutoo ang ibinabalita ng Homemaker
na siya ay turned-down sa HFC.
Matagal na po tayong niloloko ng magkasamang Abdon at Evangeline Lopez. Dahil
sa tagal ay alam na tuloy natin kung papaanong maipapatigil ang kanilang
kabulastugan.
Sila rin ang mastermind sa paninirang pun sa Pangulo sa pamamagitan ng pag-susulat
ng panira sa mga pader natin. Diumanoy itinatanong daw nila kung saan dinala ang
pondo ng simbahan. Bakit hindi sila tumungo sa kinauukulan: Treasurer, Auditor, at
iba pang officials.
UPHELD PO ANG ATING BOARD, ITO AY MABUBUWAG LANG KUNG
INYONG NANAISIN.
Mag-iingat po tayo sa panlilinlang ng mga taong gaya ni Abdon at Vangie.
UNITED WE STAND DIVIDED WE FALL LETS UNITE AND FIGHT EVIL!!!

F. R. SAZON - Editor

Aggrieved by the aforequoted article, the private complainant initiated the necessary
complaint against the petitioner, and on May 25, 1984, an Information was filed before
the trial court charging the petitioner with libel.
On March 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision finding the petitioner guilty
of the crime charged, and accordingly sentenced him, thus:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FOUR
(4) months and ONE (1) day ofarresto mayor as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR
(4) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional as maximum, with the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of P200.00 in accordance with Art. 353, in
relation to Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.

The petitioner appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. On June 19, 1995,
the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, petitioner brought the present action, and in seeking a reversal of the
challenged decision, he claims that the Court of Appeals, erred:

1. x x x IN NOT HOLD1NG THAT THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE (EXHIBIT A) IS

IN THE NATURE OF A PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AND HENCE,
PROTECTED AND NOT ACTIONABLE.
2. x x x IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE WORDS IN CONTROVERSY ARE NOT
DEFAMATORY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AS THEY ARE NONACTIONABLE EPITHETS WRITTEN WITHOUT MALICE.
3. x x x IN NOT HOLD1NG THAT THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE DID NOT
CAUSE DAMAGE TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS REPUTATION.

4. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-PETITIONERS CONVICTION IS

WARRANTED, x x x IN NOT LIMITING THE PENALTY IMPOSED UPON HIM
TO FINE ALONE WITHOUT IMPRISONMENT x x x.
3

In fine, the principal issue posited in this petition is whether or not the questioned
article written by the petitioner is libelous.
We rule in the affirmative.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel in this wise:

ART. 353. Definition of libel. - A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, on to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:

(a) it must be defamatory;

(b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable.

Petitioner concedes the existence of the third and fourth requisites in the case at
bench. Accordingly, only the first and second elements need to be discussed herein.
Petitioner insists that the allegedly offensive words found in the subject article are
not actually defamatory. According to petitioner, the word mandurugas and other words
and phrases used in the questioned article do not impute to private complainant any
crime, vice or defect which would be injurious or damaging to his name and
reputation. As far as petitioner is concerned, the descriptive words and phrases used
should be considered as mere epithets which are a form of non-actionable opinion,
because while they may express petitioners strong emotional feelings of dislike, they do
not mean to reflect adversely on private complainants reputation.
We do not agree. In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged
libel means, but what the words used by him mean. Here, the defamatory character of
the words used by the petitioner are shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned
5

article. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. Petitioner used the following
words and phrases in describing the private complainant: mandurugas, mag-ingat sa
panlilinlang, matagal na tayong niloloko, may kasamang pagyayabang, ang ating
pobreng super kulit, patuloy na kabulastugan, mastermind sa paninirang puri,
etc. Jurisprudence has laid down a test to determine the defamatory character of words
used in the following manner, viz:
6

Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy

reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a
favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce
the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they
were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty,
virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule. x x x.
7

This test was satisfied in the case at bench. Branding private complainant Reyes
mandurugas, et al. most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule. No
amount of sophistical explanation on the part of petitioner can hide, much less erase,
the negative impression already created in the minds of the readers of the libelous
material towards private complainant. Respondent Court of Appeals is, thus, correct in
holding that these words and phrases (mandurugas, et al.) are indisputably defamatory
for they impute upon the private complainant a condition that is dishonorable and
shameful, since they tend to describe him as a swindler and/or a deceiver. (Italics
Ours).
8

Petitioner also maintains that there was no malice in this case. He argues that the
prosecution failed to present evidence demonstrating that the accused was prompted by
personal ill-will or spite or that he did not act in response to duty but acted merely to
cause harm to private complainant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving malice on the part of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.
We are not persuaded. The general rule laid down in Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that:

Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown. x x x Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is defamatory, as in this case,
the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for
the law already presumes that the defendants imputation is malicious (malice in

law). The burden is on the side of the defendant to show good intention and justifiable
motive in order to overcome the legal inference of malice. Unfortunately, petitioner
miserably failed to discharge this burden in the case before us.
Petitioner however submits that malice should not be presumed in the instant case,
but must be proved as a fact (malice in fact), since the questioned article is a privileged
communication covered under the two exceptions enumerated under Article 354, viz:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of

any legal, moral or social duty; and,
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Petitioner avers that he wrote the article not to malign the private complainant, but
merely to correct the misinformation being circulated by Reyes and some quarters
within the community about the petitioner and the association he heads. He did it
therefore, in response to some moral, social or civic duty as he was at that time the
President of their homeowners association and editor of its newsletter. Hence, the
article falls under the first exception of Article 354.
The argument has no basis. In Daez v. Court of Appeals we held that:
9

As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct
on the pant of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with
supervision over them. Such a communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author
is not guilty of libel. The rule on privilege, however, imposes an additional
requirement. Such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having
jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some
duty to perform or interest in connection therewith.
In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published
was vested with the power of supervision over the private complainant or the authority
to investigate the charges made against the latter. Moreover, a written letter containing
libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated
among the public, as what the petitioner did in this case.
10

In his final attempt to come under the protective mantle of privileged

communication, petitioner alleges that the subject article likewise constitutes a fair and
true report on the actuations of a public official falling under the second exception of
Article 354, since private complainant was a public relations consultant in the
Department of Trade and Industry at the time the allegedly libelous article was
published on February 10, 1984.
11

On this point, the rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or
acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not
constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation. But any attack upon
the private character of the public officer on matters which are not related to the
discharge of their official functions may constitute libel. This is clear by express
provision of Article 354, exception number two (2) which refers to any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
12

A perusal of the petitioners article reveals that it has no reference whatsoever to the
performance of private complainants position as a public relations consultant in the
Department of Trade and Industry. The article attacked solely the private character of
the complainant and delved on matters completely unrelated to his official functions. It
cannot therefore fall under the protective coverage of privileged communication.
However, even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that petitioners article qualifies under
the category of privileged communication, this does not still negate the presence of
malice in the instant case. It is well to note that the existence of malice in fact may be
shown by extrinsic evidence that the defendant bore a grudge against the offended
party, or that there was rivalry or ill-feeling between them which existed at the date of
the publication of the defamatory imputation or that the defendant had an intention to
injure the reputation of the offended party as shown by the words used and the
circumstances attending the publication of the defamatory imputation. The
circumstances under which the subject article was published by the petitioner serve to
buttress the inference that petitioner was animated solely by revenge towards the
private complainant on account of the leaflet entitled Supalpal si Sazon, earlier
circulated among the homeowners as well as the writings near the entrance gate of the
subdivision, all of which petitioner believes to be the handiwork of the private
complainant. Furthermore, the words used in the questioned article were mostly
uncalled for, strongly sending the message that petitioners objective was merely to
malign and injure the reputation of the private complainant.This is certainly indicative of
malice in fact on the part of the petitioner.
13

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that, in lieu of imprisonment and fine, the penalty to be imposed upon the

petitioner shall be a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) PESOS with subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 118971 September 15, 1999

RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 40, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
The question for determination in this case is the liability for libel of a citizen who denounces a
barangay official for misconduct in office. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, found
petitioner guilty and fined him P1,000.00 on the ground that petitioner failed to prove the truth of the
charges and that he was "motivated by vengeance in uttering the defamatory statement." On appeal,
the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 dated February 1, 1995, affirmed. Hence, this petition for review.
The decision appealed from should be reversed.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore
Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to see then National
Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint against their
Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo. After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials,
petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA
compound concerning their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, the following news
article 2 appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa:
Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang 38 mahihirap na
pamilya sa Tondo Foreshore Area na umano'y inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang
barangay chairman sa pakikipagsabwatan sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing
Authority sapul 1980.
Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo ng barangay 66,
Zone 6, Tondo Foreshore Area, sa mga project manager ng NHA upang makamkam
ang may 14 na lote ng lupa sa naturang lugar.

Binanggit ni Rodolfo R. Vasquez, 40, Tagapagsalita ng (mga) pamilyang apektado,

na umaabot lang sa 487.87 metro kuwadrado ang kabuuan ng mga lupa na
kinatitirikan ng mga barung-barung ng 38 pamilya.
"Naninirahan na kami sa mga lupang nabanggit sapul 1950 at pinatunayan sa mga
survey ng NHA noong nakalipas na taon na may karapatan kami sa mga lupang ito
ng pamahalaan," ani Vasquez.
"Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni
Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA,"
sabi ni Vasquez.
Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating pinuno ng city hall ng Maynila,
MHS Minister Conrado Benitez, at ilang pinuno ng pulisya ang barangay chairman
kaya "nakalusot" ang mga ginawa nitong katiwalian.
Bukod sa pagkamkam ng mga lupaing gobyerno, kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa
mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga nakawan ng manok.
1wphi1.nt

"Sapin-sapin na ang mga kaso na idinulog namin noong nakalipas na mga taon, pero
pinawalang saysay ang lahat ng iyon, kabilang na ang tangkang pagpatay sa akin
kaugnay ng pagrereklamo sa pangangamkam ng lupa noong 1984," sabi pa ni
Vasquez.
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging that the
latter's statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation. After conducting preliminary
investigation, the city prosecutor filed the following information in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 40:
The undersigned accuses RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ of the crime of libel committed
as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1986, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
with malicious intent of impeaching the reputation and character of one Jaime
Olmedo, chairman of Barangay 66, Zone 6 in Tondo, Manila, and with evident intent
of exposing him to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously caused the publication of an article entitled "38
Pamilya Inagawan ng Lupa" in Ang Tinig ng Masa, a daily newspaper sold to the
public and of general circulation in the Philippines in its April 22, 1986 issue, which
portion of the said article reads as follows:
Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon Aquino ang 38
mahihirap na pamilya sa Tondo Foreshore Area na umano'y
inagawan ng lupa ng kanilang barangay chairman sa
pakikipagsabwatan sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing Authority
sapul 1980.
Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo
ng barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo Foreshore Area sa mga project
manager ng NHA upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa sa
naturang lugar.

. . . "Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na

patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga
project manager at legal officers ng NHA," sabi ni Vasquez.
Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating pinuno ng city hall
ng Maynila, MHS Minister Conrado Benitez, at ilang pinuno ng
pulisya ang barangay chairman kaya "nakalusot" ang mga ginawa
nitong katiwalian.
Bukod sa pagkamkam ng mga lupaing gobyerno, kasangkot din
umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at
maging sa mga nakawan ng manok. . . .
with which statements, the said accused meant and intended to convey, as in fact he
did mean and convey false and malicious imputations that said Jaime Olmedo is
engaged in landgrabbing and involved in illegal gambling and stealing of chickens at
the Tondo Foreshore Area, Tondo, Manila, which statements, as he well knew, were
entirely false and malicious, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character
and reputation of said Jaime Olmedo, thereby tending to impeach besmirch and
destroy the honor, character and reputation of Jaime Olmedo, as in fact, the latter
was exposed to dishonor, discredit, public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Contrary to law.
Upon being arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, whereupon the case was tried. The
prosecution presented Barangay Chairman Olmedo and his neighbor, Florentina Calayag, as
witnesses. On the other hand, the defense presented Ciriaco Cabuhat, Nicasio Agustin, Estrelita
Felix, Fernando Rodriguez all residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area and petitioner as its
witnesses.
On May 28, 1992, the trail court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel and sentencing
him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition
for review. Petitioner contends that
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT PINPOINTING PETITIONER AS
THE SOURCE OF THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS ARTICLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER IMPUTED
THE QUESTIONED ACTS TO COMPLAINANT.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE ALLEGED
IMPUTATIONS WERE MADE MALICIOUSLY.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH FAILED TO
APPRECIATE PETITIONER'S DEFENSE OF TRUTH.

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF
LIBEL WERE PROVEN.
We will deal with these contentions in the order in which they are made.
First. Petitioner claims he was "unfairly singled out" as the source of the statements in the article
when any members of the 38 complainant-families could have been the source of the alleged
libelous statements. 3 The reference is to the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals:
. . . In his sworn statement; appellant admitted he was the source of the libelous
article (Exh. "B"). He affirmed this fact when he testified in open court as follows:
That his allegation on the act of landgrabbing by Olmedo was based on the alleged
report and pronouncements of the NHA representatives (p. 5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1998); the
said allegations were made by him before the local press people in the pursuit of
fairness and truthfulness and not in bad faith (pp. 8-9, id.); that the only inaccurate
account in the published article of "Ang Tinig ng Masa" is the reference to the 487.87
sq.m. lot, on which Olmendo's residence now stands, attributed by the reporter as
the lot currently occupied by the appellants and his fellow complainants (pp. 4-5, tsn,
Nov. 15, 1989; pp. 4-5, tsn, January 15, 1990); and that after the interview, he never
expected that his statements would be the cause of the much-publicized libelous
article (pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 15, 1989). 4
It is true petitioner did not directly admit that he was the source of the statements in the questioned
article. What he said in his own sworn statement 5 was that the contents of the article are true in almost
all respects, thus:
9. Tama and nakalathala sa pahayagang "Ang Masa" maliban na lang sa tinukoy na
ako at ang mga kasamahang maralitang taga-lungsod ay nakitira sa humugit
kumulang 487.87 square meters sapagkat ang nabanggit na 487.87 square meters
ay siyang kinatitirikan ng bahay ni Barangay Chairman Olmedo kung saan nakaloob
ang anim na lote isang paglabag sa batas o regulasyon ng NHA;
10. Ang ginawa kong pahayag na nailathala sa "Ang Masa" ay sanhi ng aking nais
na maging mabuting mamamayan at upang maituwid ang mga katiwaliang
nagaganap sa Tondo Foreshore Area kung saan ako at sampu ng aking mga
kasamang maralitang taga-lungsod ay apektado at naapi.
This was likewise what he stated in his testimony in court both on the direct 6 and on crossexamination. 7However, by claiming that what he had told the reporter was made by him in the
performance of a civic duty, petitioner in effect admitted authorship of the article and not only of
the statements attributed to him therein, to wit:
"Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at ilegal man na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni
Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at legal officers ng NHA,"
sabi ni Vasquez.
xxx xxx xxx
"Sapin-sapin na ang mga kaso na idinulog namin noong nakalipas na mga taon, pero
pinawalang saysay ang lahat ng iyon, kabilang na ang tangkang pagpatay sa akin

kaugnay ng pagrereklamo sa pangangamkam ng lupa noong 1984," sabi pa ni

Vasquez.
Petitioner cannot claim to have been the source of only a few statements in the article in question
and point to the other parties as the source of the rest, when he admits that he was correctly
identified as the spokesperson of the families during the interview.
Second. Petitioner points out that the information did not set out the entire news article as published.
In fact, the second statement attributed to petitioner was not included in the information. But, while
the general rule is that the information must set out the particular defamatory words verbatim and as
published and that a statement of their substance is insufficient, 8 a defect in this regard may be cured
by evidence. 9 In this case, the article was presented in evidence, but petitioner failed to object to its
introduction. Instead, he engaged in the trial of the entire article, not only of the portions quoted in the
information, and sought to prove it to be true. In doing so, he waived objection based on the defect in the
information. Consequently, he cannot raise this issue at this late stage. 10
Third. On the main issue whether petitioner is guilty of libel, petitioner contends that what he said
was true and was made with good motives and for justifiable ends.
To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must
be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of
the charge (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice. 11
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstances which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken
the memory of one who is dead. 12
There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. 13 It is not required that the
person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has
read or heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the estimate in which others hold him in,
not the good opinion which he has of himself." 14
On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third
person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement. 15
Finally, malice or ill will must be present. Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or security duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.

In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are present. The statements that Olmedo,
through connivance with NHA officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the area and that he
was involved in a number of illegal activities (attempted murder, gambling and theft of fighting cocks)
were clearly defamatory. There is no merit in his contention that "landgrabbing," as charged in the
information, has a technical meaning in law. 16 Such act is so alleged and proven in this case in the
popular sense in which it is understood by ordinary people. As held in United States v. Sotto: 17
. . . [F]or the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be
libelous "that construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public
would naturally understand what was uttered. The published matter alleged to be
libelous must be construed as a whole. In applying these rules to the language of an
alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by
the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the
publication had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by
the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too he to have the effect of
removing the sting, if any there be, from the words used in the publication.
Nor is there any doubt that the defamatory remarks referred to complainant and were published.
Petitioner caused the publication of the defamatory remarks when he made the statements to the
reporters who interviewed him. 18
The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be presumed
so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under Art. 361 of the
Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statements is made against a public official with respect to
the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the accused
will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends. 19
In this case, contrary to the findings of the trial court, on which the Court of Appeals relied, petitioner
was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official. His allegation that, through
connivance with NHA officials, complainant was able to obtain title to several lots at the Tondo
Foreshore Area was based on the letter20 of NHA Inspector General Hermogenes Fernandez to
petitioner's counsel which reads:
09
August
1983
Atty. Rene V. Sarmiento
Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
55 Third Street
New Manila, Quezon City
Dear Atty. Sarmiento:
In connection with your request, that you be furnished with a copy of the results of
the investigation regarding the complaints of some Tondo residents against

Chairman Jaime Olmedo, we are providing you a summary of the findings based on
the investigation conducted by our Office which are as follows:
1. Based on the subdivision plan of Block 260, SB 8, Area III, Jaime Olmedo's
present structure is constructed on six lots which were awarded before by the
defunct Land Tenure Administration to different persons as follows:
Lot 4 Juana Buenaventura 79.76 sq. m.
Lot 6 Servando Simbulan 48.50 sq. m.
Lot 7 Alfredo Vasquez 78.07 sq. m.
Lot 8 Martin Gallardo 78.13 sq. m.
Lot 9 Daniel Bayan 70.87 sq. m.
Lot 1 Fortunato de Jesus 85.08 sq. m. (OIT No. 7800)
The above-mentioned lots were not yet titled, except for Lot 1. Fortunato de Jesus
sold the said lot to a certain Jovita Bercasi, a sister-in-law of Jaime Olmedo. The
other remaining lots were either sold to Mr. Olmedo and/or to his immediate relatives.
Lot 14 is also titled in the name of Mariano Bercasi, father-in-law of Jaime Olmedo,
with an area of 47.40 sq. m.
The lot assigned to Chairman Olmedo has a total area of 487.87 sq. m.
2. Block 261, SB 8, Area III
Lot No. 7 is titled in the name of Jaime Olmedo, consisting an area of 151.67 sq., m.
A four-door apartment owned by Mr. Olmedo is being rented to uncensused
residents.
3. Block 262, SB 8, Area III
Lot No. 13 is allocated to Delfin Olmedo, nephew of Jaime Olmedo, but this lot is not
yet titled.
4. Block 256, SB 5, Area III
Victoria Olmedo, uncensused, is a daughter of Jaime Olmedo. Her structure is
erected on a non-titled lot. The adjacent lot is titled in the name of Victoria. It was
issued OCT No. 10217 with an area of 202.23 sq. m. Inside this compound is
another structure owned and occupied by Amelia Dofredo, a censused houseowner.
The titled lot of Victoria now has an area of 338.20 sq. m.
For your information.

(s/t) HERMOGENES
C. FERNANDEZ
I
n
s
p
e
c
t
o
r
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
Public
Assistance &
Action Office
In addition, petitioner acted on the basis of two memoranda, 21 both dated November 29, 1983,
of then NHA General Manager Gaudencio Tobias recommending the filing of administrative
charges against the NHA officials "responsible for the alleged irregular consolidation of lots [in
Tondo to Jaime and Victoria Olmedo.]"
With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it must be noted that
what petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted murder against petitioner, gambling,
theft of fighting cocks) had been filed by the residents against their barangay chairman but these had
all been dismissed. Petitioner was able to show that Olmedo's involvement in the theft of fighting
cocks was the subject of an affidavit-complaint, 22 dated October 19, 1983, signed by Fernando
Rodriguez and Ben Lareza, former barangay tanods of Barangay 66, Zone 6, Tondo. Likewise, petitioner
presented a resolution, 23 dated March 10, 1988, of the Office of the Special Prosecutor in TBP-87-03694,
stating that charges of malversation and corrupt practices had been filed against Olmedo and nine (9)
other barangay officials but the same were dismissed. Indeed, the prosecution's own evidence bears out
petitioner's statements. The prosecution presented the resolution 24 in TBP Case No. 84-01854 dismissing
the charge of attempted murder filed by petitioner against Jaime Olmedo and his son-in-law, Jaime
Reyes. The allegation concerning this matter is thus true.
1wphi1.nt

It was error for the trial court to hold that petitioner "only tried to prove that the complainant
[barangay chairman] is guilty of the crimes alluded to; accused, however, has not proven that the
complainant committed the crimes." For that is not what petitioner said as reported in the Ang Tinig
ng Masa. The fact that charges had been filed against the barangay official, not the truth of such
charges, was the issue.
In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo
Foreshore Area were not only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the performance of a civic
duty to see to it that public duty is discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is
incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of every citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with

any requirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for
justifiable ends.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official
conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statements was made with actual
malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 25 which this
Court has cited with approval in several of its own decision. 26 This is the rule of "actual malice." In this
case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that
petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false
or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct
and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to
Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of
a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding
concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, "public discussion is a political
duty" and the "greatest menace to freedom is an inert people." 27
Complainant contends that petitioner was actuated by vengeful political motive rather than by his
firm conviction that he and his fellow residents had been deprived of a property right because of acts
attributable to their barangay chairman. The Court of Appeals, sustaining complainant's contention,
held:
That the said imputations were malicious may be inferred from the facts that
appellant and complainant are enemies, hence, accused was motivated by
vengeance in uttering said defamatory statements and that accused is a leader of
Ciriaco Cabuhat who was defeated by complainant when they ran for the position of
barangay captain. . . . 28
As already stated, however, in accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either
constitutes a crime or concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves
the truth of his charge, he should be acquitted. 29
Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making the charges against
complainant, it would appear that complainant filed this case to harass petitioner. Art. 360 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a
daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamation's contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. . .
.
Yet, in this case, neither the reporter, editor, nor the publisher of the newspaper was charged
in court. What was said in an analogous case 30 may be applied mutatis mutandis to the case at
bar:

It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the
allegedly offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff and the periodical itself,
were not at all impleaded. The charge was leveled against the petitioner and,
"curiouser" still, his clients who have nothing to do with the editorial policies of the
newspaper. There is here a manifest effort to persecute and intimidate the petitioner
for his temerity in accusing the ASAC agents who apparently enjoyed special
privileges and perhaps also immunities during those oppressive times. The
non-inclusion of the periodicals was a transparent hypocrisy, an ostensibly pious if
not at all convincing pretense of respect for freedom of expression that was in fact
one of the most desecrated liberties during the past despotism. 31
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
GMA NETWORK, INC. (formerly
known
as
REPUBLIC
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.)
and REY VIDAL,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 146848

Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA,

- versus -

Promulgated:
JESUS
G.
BUSTOS,
M.D.,
TEODORA R. OCAMPO, M.D.,
VICTOR V. BUENCAMINO, M.D.,
October 17, 2006
CESAR F. VILLAFUERTE, M.D.,
ARTEMIO T. ORDINARIO, M.D.,
and VIRGILIO C. BASILIO, M.D.,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review [1] under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is the decision[2] dated January 25, 2001 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) inCA-G.R. CV No. 52240 which reversed and set aside an earlier
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 64, in Civil
Case No. 88-1952, an action for damages thereat commenced by the herein
respondents Jesus G. Bustos, Teodora R. Ocampo, Victor V. Buencamino, Cesar F.
Villafuerte, Artemio T. Ordinario and Virgilio C. Basilio, all physicians by
profession and the former chairman and members, respectively, of the Board of
Medicine, against the herein petitioners GMA Network, Inc. (formerly Republic
Broadcasting System, Inc.) and Rey Vidal.
The facts:
In August 1987, the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) conducted the physicians licensure examinations. Out of the total two
thousand eight hundred thirty-five (2,835) examinees who took the examinations,
nine hundred forty-one (941) failed.
On February 10, 1988, a certain Abello and over two hundred other unsuccessful
examinees filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC of Manila to compel the
PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test
papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous
checking of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the examinations.
As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to gather
news from courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing
of the mandamus petition. After securing a copy of the petition, Vidal composed
and narrated the news coverage for the ten oclock evening news edition of GMAs
Channel 7 Headline News.
The text of the news report,[4] as drafted and narrated by Vidal and which
GMA Network, Inc. aired and televised on February 10, 1988, runs:

Some 227 examinees in the last August Physician Licensure

Examinations today asked the Manila [RTC] to compel the [PRC] and
the Medical Board of Examiners to recheck the August 1987 test
papers. The petitioners [examinees] today went to the Presiding Judge to
also ask for a special raffling of the case considering that the next
physicians examinations have been scheduled for February [1988] . They
said that the gross, massive, haphazard, whimsical and capricious
checking that must have been going on for years should now be stopped
once and for all.
The last examination was conducted last August at the PRC
central offices, the Far Eastern University and the Araullo High School,
the exams on multiple choice or matching type involve 12 subjects
including general medicine, biochemistry, surgery and obstetrics and
gynecology.
21 schools participated in the examination represented by some
2,835 medical student graduates, 1,894 passed and 141 failed.
The results of the exams were released December 9 and were
published the following day in metropolitan papers last years (sic).
A group of failing examinees enlisted the help of the Offices of
the President and the Vice President and as a result were allowed by PRC
to obtain the official set of test questions. The students then researched
and produced the key answers to the key questions.
The petitioners were also allowed to see their own test papers,
most of them copying the papers .
With these copies, they were able to match the scores and the
correct answers in the examinations. They found that the errors in
checking were so material that they actually lowered the scores that
formed the individual ratings of the examinees in the various subjects.
Examples of the discrepancies are to be found in identical answers
being rated as incorrect in one examinees paper but correct in
another. There is also the case of two different answers being rated as
correct. There are indications of wrong counting of total scores per
subject so that the totals are either short by two up to four points.

Finally, there are raw scores that have been transmuted incorrectly
so that a passing score was rendered a failure. The petitioners said that
the haphazard and whimsical and capricious checking should now be
stopped once and for all. They said that the nine years formal studies and
the one year internship not to mention the expenses and the blood, sweat,
and tears of the students and their families will have been rendered
nugatory. The petitioners also noted that Com. Francia had promised last
January 12 to rectify the errors in the checking and yet they have not
received the appropriate action promised whereas the next exams have
been set for Feb. 20, 21, 27 and 28. (Words in bracket added.)

Stung by what they claim to be a false, malicious and one-sided report filed
and narrated by a remorseless reporter, the herein respondents instituted on
September 21, 1988 with the RTC of Makati City a damage suit against Vidal and
GMA Network, Inc., then known as the Republic Broadcasting System, Inc. In
their complaint,[5] docketed as Civil Case No. 88-1952 and raffled to Branch 64 of
the court, the respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, alleged, among other things, that
then defendants Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard for the truth,
defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous visual presentation on GMA
Network, Inc.s Channel 7. They added that, as a measure to make a forceful impact
on their audience, the defendants made use of an unrelated and old footage
(showing physicians wearing black armbands) to make it appear that other doctors
were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees.
According to the plaintiffs, the video footage in question actually related to a 1982
demonstration staged by doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital management.
In their answer with counterclaim, the defendants denied any wrongdoing,
maintaining that their February 10, 1988 late evening telecast on the filing of the
mandamus petition was contextually a concise and objective narration of a matter
of public concern. They also alleged that the press freedom guarantee covered the
telecast in question, undertaken as it was to inform, without malice, the viewing
public on the conduct of public officials. And vis--vis the particular allegation on
the film footages of the PGH demonstration, defendants tagged such footages as
neutral. Pressing the point, defendants hastened to add that the footages were

accompanied, when shown, by an appropriate voiceover, thus negating the idea

conjured by the plaintiffs to create an effect beyond an obligation to report.
In the course of trial, the plaintiffs presented testimonial evidence to prove
their allegations about the Vidal report having exposed them, as professionals, to
hatred, contempt and ridicule. And in a bid to establish malice and bad faith on the
part of the defendants, the plaintiffs adduced evidence tending to show that the
former exerted no effort toward presenting their (plaintiffs) side in subsequent
telecasts.
In a decision[6] dated October 17, 1995, the trial court found for the herein
petitioners, as defendants a quo, on the postulate that the Vidal telecast report in
question is privileged. Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, plaintiffs
complaint for damages against defendants Republic Broadcasting
System Incorporated and Rey Vidal is hereby DISMISSED.
The defendants counterclaim for damages is likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration,[7] herein

respondents went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 52240. As stated at the
threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision [8] of January 25, 2001, reversed
and set aside that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 17, 1995 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and [petitioners] are hereby
ordered to pay, in solidum, the following:
a)
the amount of P100,000.00 for each of the [respondents]
as moral damages;
b)
the amount of P100,000.00 for each of the [respondents]
as exemplary damages;

c)

the amount of P20,000.00 as attorneys fee;

d)

and cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets added.)

Hence, petitioners present recourse, submitting for the Courts consideration the
following questions:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA, AFTER DECLARING THE NEWS
TELECAST
OF FEBRUARY 10,
1988 AS
QUALIFIEDLY
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN INJECTING ACTUAL
MALICE TO THE NEWS TELECAST OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988 JUST
SO THAT RESPONDENT BOARD OF MEDICINE COULD
RECOVER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN COMPLETELY REJECTING
PETITIONERS EVIDENCE THAT THE CHARACTER GENERATED
WORDS FILE VIDEO WERE INDICATED ON SCREEN TO
IDENTIFY THE SHOWING OF THE OLD FILM FOOTAGE IN THE
NEWS TELECAST OF FEBRUARY 10, 1988.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN IMPUTING MALICE UPON PETITIONERS FOR NOT
PRESENTING A TAPE COPY OF THE NEWS TELECAST OF
FEBRUARY 10, 1988 ON THE GRATUITOUS DECLARATION
THAT A TAPE COPY COULD BE EASILY SECURED FROM THE
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)
WHICH ALLEGEDLY KEEPS FILE COPIES OF ALL SHOWS FOR A
CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME.
D.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT BOARD OF MEDICINE

CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS THEREOF, WHO NEVER
QUESTIONED THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
DATEDJANUARY 25, 2001 IN A SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT
PETITION BEFORE THE HONORABLE COURT, CAN ASK FOR AN
INCREASED AWARD IN DAMAGES FROM THE HONORABLE
COURT UNDER THEIR COMMENT DATED 7 MAY 2001.

Summed up, the issues tendered in this petition boil down to the
following: (1) whether or not the televised news report in question on the filing of
the petition for mandamus against the respondents is libelous; and (2) whether or
not the insertion of the old film footage depicting the doctors and personnel of
PGH in their 1982 demonstrations constitutes malice to warrant the award of
damages to the respondents.
It bears to stress, at the outset, that the trial court found the disputed news
report not actionable under the law on libel, hence no damages may be recovered.
Wrote that court:
This Court finds the telecast of February 10, 1988 aired over
Channel 7 by [petitioner] Rey Vidal as a straight news report of the acts
and conduct of the members of the Medical Board of Examiners who are
public officers, devoid of comment or remarks, and thus privileged, and
recognized under the 1987 Constitution.
A comparative examination of the telecast of the disputed news
report with the Petition for Mandamus entitled Abello, et al., vs.
Professional Regulation Commission filed before the [RTC] by the
medical examinees reveals that the disputed news report is but a
narration of the allegations contained in and circumstances attending the
filing of the said Petition for Mandamus.In the case of Cuenco vs.
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-29560, March 31, 1976 , [it was] held that the
correct rule is that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in Court
without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a
decision promulgated should be covered by the privilege. xxx. This
Court adopts the ruling [in Cuenco] to support its finding of fact that the
disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in
the said Petition for Mandamus, filed by the medical examinees, thus the
same falls within the protected ambit of privileged communication.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, [petitioners], in consideration of the foregoing observations
cannot be held liable for damages claimed by [respondents] for simply
bringing to fore information on subjects of public concern. [9] (Words in
brackets supplied.)

The CA, too, regarded the text of the news telecast as not libelous and as a
qualifiedly privileged communication, [it having been] merely lifted or quoted
from the contents and allegations in the said petition [for mandamus].[10] But unlike
the trial court, the CA saw fit to award damages to the respondents, it being its
posture that the insertion to the news telecast of the unrelated 1982 PGH picket
film footage is evidence of malice. Without quite saying so, the CA viewed the
footage insertion as giving a televised news report otherwise privileged a libelous
dimension. In the precise words of the appellate court:
While it is the duty of the media to report to the public matters of
public concern and interest, the report should be a fair, accurate and true
report of the proceedings. The subject telecast failed in this aspect. The
insertion of the film footage showing the doctors demonstration at
the PGH several times during the news report on the petition filed
by the board flunkers undoubtedly created an impression that the
said demonstration was related to the filing of the case by the board
flunkers. The insertion of the film footage without the words file
video, and which had no connection whatsoever to the petition, was
done with the knowledge of the [petitioners], thus, in wanton and
reckless disregard of their duty to the public to render a fair, accurate and
true report of the same.
xxx xxx xxx
The findings of malice on the part of the [petitioners] should not
be construed as a censure to the freedom of the press since their right to
render a news on matters of public concern was not the issue but rather
the misrepresentation made when they inserted a film footage of the
doctors demonstration which created a wrong impression of the real
situation. Unquestionably, the news reporting, interview and the showing
of [the flunkers] filing the case were fair reporting. At this point, that
would have been sufficient to inform the public of what really

happened.However, for reasons only known to [petitioners], they

inserted the questioned film footage which had no relation to the
news being reported. There is no other conclusion that there was
motive to create an impression that the issue also affected the
doctors which forced them to demonstrate. xxx. (Words in brackets
supplied).

With the view we take of this case, given the parallel unchallenged determination
of the two courts below that what petitioner Vidal reported was privileged, the
award of damages is untenable as it is paradoxical.
An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act
amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes
malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable
act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person.[11] Liability for libel attaches present the following elements: (a)
an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
(b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.[12]
Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact) or may be taken for
granted in view of the grossness of the imputation (malice in law). Malice, as we
wrote inBrillante v. Court of Appeals,[13] is a term used to indicate the fact that the
offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to
duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that
the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
In the instant case, there can be no quibbling that what petitioner corporation
aired in its Channel 7 in the February 10, 1988 late evening newscast was basically
a narration of the contents of the aforementioned petition for mandamus. This is
borne by the records of the case and was likewise the finding of the trial court. And
the narration had for its subject nothing more than the purported mistakes in paper
checking and the errors in the counting and tallying of the scores in the August
1987 physicians licensure examinations attributable to the then chairman and
members of the Board of Medicine.

Conceding hypothetically that some failing specifically against the

respondents had been ascribed in that news telecast, it bears to stress that not
all imputations of some discreditable act or omission, if there be any, are
considered malicious thus supplying the ground for actionable libel. For, although
every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does
not exist in matters considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the
presumption.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified.[14] Absolutely privileged
matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In
absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no
moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of these
are speeches or debates made by Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in
any of its committees. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance
is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. The second kind
of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of
libel provided the prosecution established the presence of bad faith or malice in
fact. To this genre belongs private communications and fair and true report
without any comments or remarks falling under and described as exceptions in
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.[15]
To be sure, the enumeration under the aforecited Article 354 is not an
exclusive list of conditional privilege communications as the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to
include fair commentaries on matters of public interest.[16] .
In the case at bench, the news telecast in question clearly falls under the second
kind of privileged matter, the same being the product of a simple narration of the
allegations set forth in the mandamus petition of examinees Abello, et al., devoid
of any comment or remark. Both the CA and the trial court in fact found the
narration to be without accompanying distortive or defamatory comments or
remarks. What at bottom petitioners Vidal and GMA Network, Inc., then did was
simply to inform the public of the mandamus petition filed against the respondent
doctors who were admittedly the then chairman and members of the Board of
Medicine. It was clearly within petitioner Vidals job as news writer and reporter
assigned to cover government institutions to keep the public abreast of recent

developments therein. It must be reiterated that the courts a quo had determined
the news report in question to be qualifiedly privileged communication protected
under the 1987 Constitution.
This brings us to the more important question of whether or not the complaining
respondents, in their effort to remove the protection accorded by the privilege,
succeeded in establishing ill-will and malice on the part of the petitioners in their
televised presentation of the news report in dispute, thus committing libel.
The CA, adopting the respondents line on the matter of malice, resolved the
question in the affirmative. As the CA noted, the insertion of an old film footage
showing doctors wearing black armbands and demonstrating at the PGH, without
the accompanying character-generated words file video, created the impression that
other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the unsuccessful examinees.
The Court disagrees.
Contrary to the CAs findings, the identifying character-generated words file
video appeared to have been superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the
minds of televiewers of the idea that a particular footage is current. In the words of
the trial court, the phrase file video was indicated on screen purposely to prevent
misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public. [17] The trial court added
the observation that the use of file footage in TV news reporting is a standard
practice.[18] At any rate, the absence of the accompanying character-generated
words file video would not change the legal situation insofar as the privileged
nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. For, with the
view we take of the state of things, the video footage was not libel in disguise;
standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least,
conveyed nothing derogatory in nature.
And lest it be overlooked, personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real,
is not automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects
ones interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation as good as ones
character and conduct warrant in the community.[19] Clearly then, it is the
community, not personal standards, which shall be taken into account in evaluating
any allegations of libel and any claims for damages on account thereof.

So it is that in Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel,[20] we held:

The term community may of course be drawn as narrowly or as
broadly as the user of the term and his purposes may require. The reason
why for purposes of the law on libel the more general meaning of
community must be adopted in the ascertainment of relevant standards,
is rooted deep in our constitutional law. That reason relates to the
fundamental public interest in the protection and promotion of free
speech and expression, an interest shared by all members of the body
politic and territorial community. A newspaper should be free to report
on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest,
wherever they may take place within the nation and as well in the
outside world, with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group
or another (however defined in scope) on criminal or civil charges for
libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keep within the general
community. Any other rule on defamation, in a national community like
ours with many, diverse cultural, social, religious an other groupings, is
likely to produce an unwholesome chilling effect upon the
constitutionally protected operations of the press and other instruments
of information and education.

It cannot be over-emphasized furthermore that the showing of the 1982 film

footage, assuming for argument that it contained demeaning features, was actually
accompanied or simultaneously voiced over by the narration of the news report
lifted from the filing of the mandamus petition. As aptly put by the petitioners
without controversion from the respondents, there was nothing in the news report
to indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create another news story
beyond what was reported.[21]
To be sure, actual malice, as a concept in libel, cannot plausibly be deduced
from the fact of petitioners having dubbed in their February 10, 1988 telecast an
old unrelated video footage. As it were, nothing in the said footage, be it taken in
isolation or in relation to the narrated Vidal report, can be viewed as reputation
impeaching; it did not contain an attack, let alone a false one, on the honesty,
character or integrity or like personal qualities of any of the respondents, who were
not even named or specifically identified in the telecast. It has been said that if the
matter is not per se libelous, malice cannot be inferred from the mere fact of

publication.[22] And as records tend to indicate, the petitioners, particularly Vidal,

do not personally know or had dealings with any of the respondents. The Court
thus perceives no reason or motive on the part of either petitioner for malice. The
respondents too had failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioners
were animated by a desire to inflict them unjustifiable harm or at least to place
them in a discomforting light.
Surely, the petitioners failure, perhaps even their indisposition, to obtain and
telecast the respondents side is not an indicia of malice. Even the CA, by
remaining mum on this point, agrees with this proposition and with the petitioners
proffered defense on the matter. As petitioner Vidal said while on the witness box,
his business as a reporter is to report what the public has the right to know, not to
comment on news and events, obviously taking a cue from the pronouncement of
the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New York Times Co. v. Connor[23] that a
reporter may rely on statements made by a single source even though they reflect
only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution by a public official.
What is more, none of the herein respondents ever made a claim or pretence
that he or all of them collectively was or were among the demonstrating PGH
doctors in the 1982 video footage. It thus puzzles the mind how they could claim to
have been besmirched by the use of the same video in the subject news telecast.
Given the foregoing considerations, the propriety of the award by the CA of
moral and exemplary damages need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that moral
damages may be recovered only if the existence of the factual and legal bases for
the claim and their causal connection to the acts complained of are satisfactorily
proven.[24] Sadly, the required quantum of proof is miserably wanting in this case.
This is as it should be. For, moral damages, albeit incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are designed not to impose a penalty but to compensate one for injury
sustained and actual damages suffered.[25] Exemplary damages, on the other hand,
may only be awarded if the claimants, respondents in this case, were able to
establish their right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
[26]
Not being entitled to moral damages, neither may the respondents lay claim for
exemplary damages.

In all, the Court holds and so rules that the subject news report was clearly a fair
and true report, a simple narration of the allegations contained in and
circumstances surrounding the filing by the unsuccessful examinees of the petition
for mandamus before the court, and made without malice. Thus, we find the
petitioners entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters
under Article 354 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. It follows that they too cannot be
held liable for damages sought by the respondents, who, during the period material,
were holding public office.
We close this ponencia with the following oft-quoted excerpts from an old but still
very much applicable holding of the Court on how public men should deport
themselves in the face of criticism:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct
of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision
of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
by the balm of clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thinskinned with reference to comment upon his officials acts. Only thus can
the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. xxx. [27]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed

decision dated January 25, 2001 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No.
52240 is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE and that of the trial court
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to costs.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124245. February 15, 2000]

ANTONIO F. NAVARRETE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and

LEONILA E. GENEROSO, respondents. francis
DECISION

GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the Decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals dated March 14, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33838 insofar as it deleted
the award of moral damages and attorneys fees granted to him by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in its Decision dated September 27, 1990 in Civil Case No. 87-41856.
[1]

[2]

Petitioner is a lawyer and is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 87-41856 for
annulment of "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase and Damages", filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila entitled "Leonila E. Generoso, et. al. vs. Frederick S.
Pumaren, et. al.". Private respondent filed the civil case on September 2, 1987 originally
against Mr. Frederick S. Pumaren, Mr. Avelino Profeta and the Register of Deeds of
Metro Manila seeking to annul a deed of sale executed over her property on the ground
that her purported signature therein was forged. On December 21, 1987, the complaint
was amended to include petitioner and Atty. Rafael C. Dinglasan.
The Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase involved in the civil case was prepared and
notarized by petitioner. Petitioner claims that the statements made by private
respondent in her Amended Complaint and her testimonies in the course of the trial
falsely and maliciously slandered him. Hence, petitioner now assails the denial of his
right to recover moral damages and attorneys fees from private respondent.
The alleged malicious and false statements made by private respondent against
petitioner were uttered on December 14 and 21, 1987. On these dates, the lower court
conducted the hearings for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case
No. 87-41856. Petitioner claims that private respondent alluded to him when she said
the words "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers", and "plunderers" while testifying on the Deed
of Sale with Right of Repurchase. Quoted below are the pertinent portions of private
respondents testimonies:
"Q. Now, there are signatures here as witnesses appearing on page 2 of
the document, can you tell us, Ms. Witness, if you can recognize those
signatures?
"A. I do not know any of those bastards, none of them."

[3]

xxx
"Q. One of the defendants in this case is a certain Avelino Profeta, have
you met him before?
"A. I never met this swindler before. I never seen him. Never heard of
him."
[4]

xxxmarie

"Q. Before this proceedings commence as it appears that it was so

confirmed thru a petition be defendant Frederick S. Pumaren on October
13, 1986, did you receive from the Court or from the defendants that there
was such proceedings?
"A. No, sir. I did not receive any notice from the court or from
these stupid people."
[5]

xxx
"A. I do not know this document. I do not know about the selling. Those
people are really swindlers."
[6]

xxx
"A. I still could not understand how this certificate of title could be
recopied. There must be somebody who is responsible for it. How was it
possible that this was copied bythese swindlers."
[7]

xxx
"A. We came here precisely for this because I can not let these things go
ahead. My property is being stolen behind my back. I have to come here
10,000 miles away to defend my property so that justice may be given to
punish those plunderers."
[8]

xxx
"DRA. GENEROSO: Before we have the break, can I make a statement to
Atty. Villanueva? Are you defending Avelino Profeta, one of the
swindlers in this case? How can you, after examining all those papers,
protect and defend him after they plundered my property?"
[9]

(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner is also convinced that the following allegations of private respondent in her
Amended Complaint are actionable:
(a) Accused "private defendants" of "forging" Leonila Generosos signature
in the Deed of Absolute Sale with Right of Repurchase" (par. 51);
(b) Claimed that "the same conspiring defendants falsified the signatures
of Leonila E. Generoso" (par. 61);
(c) Pointed to private defendants wanton and malevolent acts to deceive
and defraud plaintiffs" (par. 91); and

(d) Charged the defendants of "blatant, malicious and fraudulent acts as

aforestated" (par. 10)
[10]

(Emphasis supplied) novero

On September 27,1990, the Regional Trial Court of Manila rendered its Decision in Civil
Case No. 87-41856, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring plaintiff Leonila E. Generoso as the absolute, exclusie and
paraphernal owner of the subject property covered by her already deemed
cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. 143351, now Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 154609, of the Register of Deeds of Manila;
(b) Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale with Right of Repurchase, Exhibit
A, and Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 143551 and 175354 issued to
Frederick S. Pumaren as null and void, concelled (sic) without force and
effect;
(c) Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. 154609 issued to plaintiff
Leonila E. Generoso as the lawful and valid title to the land in question;
(d) Dismissing the complaint with respect to defendant Antonio
Navarrete and, on his counterclaim, ordering plaintiffs to pay him the
amount of P 100,000.00 as moral damages and P 20,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
No pronouncement as to costs."

[11]

Both parties appealed, including petitioner who protested the minimal amount of
damages awarded to him.
On March 14, 1996, the Court of Appeals upheld the finding that the Deed of Sale with
Right of Repurchase and the Transfer of Certificate of Title issued to Pumaren were null
and void, but deleted the award of damages in favor of petitioner. It held:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modifications that: (a) the award of moral
damages and attorneys fees in favor of Navarrete are hereby
deleted; (b) Appellant Pumaren and Dinglasan are hereby ordered to pay
to Appellant Generoso and Elshawi jointly and severally, the amount of US
$ 2,650.00 or its peso equivalent by way of actual damages; to Appellant
Generoso, the amount of P 50,00.00 by way of exemplary damages; and

to Appellants Generoso and Elshawi, the amount of P 20,000.00 as

attorneys fees; and the costs of suit."
[12]

Petitioner believes that this Court should overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals
on the ground that: nigel
IN HOLDING THAT A PARTY TO A CASE HAS THE ABSOLUTE
PRIVILEGE OF FALSELY AND MALICIOUSLY MALIGNING A LAWYER,
EVEN WHILE THE LATTER IS NOT YET A PARTY TO THAT CASE, THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE, NOT HERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT, OR HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY CLEARLY NOT
IN ACCORD WITH LAW, WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, WITH FAIRNESS AND
EQUITY.
[13]

In questioning the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the statements made by
private respondent in the pleadings and in her testimony are considered absolutely
privileged, petitioner deplores the fact that only American cases were cited by the Court
to justify its conclusion. He insists that under Philippine law and jurisprudence, the
statements made by private respondent are not absolutely privileged. The petition
underscores the fact that petitioner is a lawyer whose reputation has been allegedly
besmirched by a "brown American". Petitioner now turns to this Court to vindicate his
honor.
[14]

In her Answer, private respondent cited decisions of the Supreme Court to the effect
that no action for libel or for damages may be founded on utterances made in the
course of judicial proceedings.
[15]

[16]

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in
revoking the award of moral damages and attorneys fees to petitioner.
It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of
the defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or
material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. Thus, the person making these
statements such as a judge, lawyer or witness does not thereby incur the risk of being
found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.
[17]

[18]

[19]

ella

The doctrine that statements made during the course of judicial proceedings enjoy the
shield of absolute privilege was first categorically established in the case of Sison vs.
David. In said case, the petition allegedly contained libelous allegations, implying that
the complainant was incompetent to manage the affairs of a corporation and that he
was converting his wifes paraphernal properties into conjugal properties. This Court
ruled in that case that the allegations in the pleadings were absolutely privileged and
went further by saying that:
[20]

[21]

[22]

"Also, sarcastic, pungent and harsh allegations in a pleading although

tending to detract from the dignity that should characterize proceedings in
courts of justice, are absolutely privileged, if relevant to the issues".
[23]

We have adopted the same ruling in several cases wherein statements made during
judicial proceedings were sued upon for libel or damages. The lone requirement
imposed to maintain the cloak of absolute privilege is the test of relevancy.
[24]

[25]

The doctrine of privileged communication has a practical purpose. As enunciated in the

case of Deles vs. Aragona, Jr. :
[26]

"The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged
in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, as for
the promotion of public welfare, the purpose being that members of the
legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers and witnesses may speak
their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring
the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for damages."
[27]

In determining the issue of relevancy of statements made in judicial proceedings, courts

have adopted a liberal attitude by resolving all doubts in favor of relevancy. In People
vs. Aquino , we emphasized that "it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should
be liberally considered to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with
microscopic intensity".
[28]

[29]

[30]

In this case, the allegations made by private respondent in her Amended Complaint
stand the test of relevancy. The words "forging", "malicious and fraudulent" and
"falsified" are clearly pertinent to the cause of action of private respondent, which is to
annul the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase wherein private respondents signature
was forged by an impostor, and to recover damages resulting from such forgery. marinella
With respect to the words "swindlers", "plunderers" "stupid" and "bastards" uttered by
private respondent in the course of her testimony, we are inclined to agree that such
language is too ignominious and degrading and is out of place in a courtroom.
Understandably, private respondent has no love lost for the people she accused of
illegally depriving her of her property, but her indignation does not give her the right to
use contumacious language with impunity in a courtroom. The judge and
commissioner then presiding at the time private respondent uttered the contemptuous
words should have restrained the latter because order and proper decorum should
always be maintained in the courtroom. Without question, the use of blatantly
defamatory language like "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers", and "plunderers" in
describing the adverse parties detract from the honor and dignity that befits a court
proceeding and should have been stricken out of the records.
[31]

[32]

[33]

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that the terms used by the private
respondent in her pleading and in her testimony cannot be the basis for an award of
moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of petitioner. As stated earlier, the words

"forging", "falsified", "malicious" and "fraudulent" in the Amended Complaint are

unmistakably relevant to private respondents cause of action which is to annul the Deed
of Sale where her signature was forged. The words "stupid", "bastards", "swindlers",
and "plunderers" uttered by private respondent did not specifically pertain to petitioner
to sufficiently identify him as the object of defamation, such identifiability being an
element of a libelous imputation. We believe that neither petitioners good name and
reputation nor his high standing in the profession have been damaged by these
utterances.
[34]

An examination of the transcript earlier quoted will show that private respondent did not
allude to petitioner in particular when she used the words "stupid" and "bastards". The
word "bastards" was in response to this question: "Now, there are signatures here as
witnesses appearing on page 2 of the document, can you tell us, Ms. Witness, if you
can recognize those signatures?" Clearly, private respondent was alluding to the
witnesses to the deed in question, who are not parties in the present action. Petitioner
was not a witness to the deed, he prepared and notarized it. Also, the word "swindler"
was used with particular reference to defendant Avelino Profeta who also is not a party
to the instant case. Used in the plural form in the other parts of her testimony, the words
"those swindlers", "those plunderers" and "those stupid people" referred to none of the
defendants in particular. alonzo
[35]

As regards the testimony of private respondent on December 14, 1987, the words
complained of were uttered before the complaint was amended to include petitioner. It
was on December 21, 1987 when private respondent amended her complaint to include
petitioner and Atty. Rafael Dinglasan as defendants. The petitioner was well aware that
the malicious imputations were made "while (he) is not yet a party to the case" and
could not have been the object thereof.
We accordingly affirm the ruling of the respondent court deleting the award of attorneys
fees in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., no part. Close association with counsel in law firm. brando
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529

March 28, 1969

ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Jose F. Maacop for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and
Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that a the municipal court of Cavite City, convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats
and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No. 2594), to four
(4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prison correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in
both cases.
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange,
Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of
June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the
main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing
statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common
funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin,
dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called
up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of
preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of
Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet
the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis
Buenaventura upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the naval station but
against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of
Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of
Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the station to know how they
felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence, as
"they just wanted to blow off steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the
demonstration he became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection.
The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the station,
using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to
accommodate the request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at
the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si
Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car
while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence
at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone
by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand
inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo.
Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the

motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the
other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.
lwphi1.et

On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with
grave threats and grave oral defamation, respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595,
Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows;
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the
crime of Grave Threats, as defined by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to kill, one Agustin
Hallare.
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 24, 1961.
DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal
BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel
The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with
law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and
penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any
justifiable motive but with the intention to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt to
the undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of several
persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the
undersigned complainant the following insulting and serious defamatory remarks, to
wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into English are as follows:
"Agustin, Your mother is a whore."
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 25, 1961.
(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE
Complainant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of
Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint
trial. On the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case
No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected to
the motion on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information
and that the amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the
amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.
From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a
verdict of affirmance. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this
appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court
allowing the substantial amendment of the information for grave threats after petitioner had been
arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of grave threats
without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting
petitioner of both offenses when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting
him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in convicting petitioner of grave
threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light
threats only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to
establish that of simple slander only.
On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be
amended as to all matters of form by leave and at the discretion of the court when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules of Court).
Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.
After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2
were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon
his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not
subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that
under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in which the threat is made not a
qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the
nature and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the
prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to
undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the
concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger
of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was
no allegation in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our view
the deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the information conformable to the
evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in no way
prejudiced petitioner's rights.
Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial
court committed a reversible error in proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him
to enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the amendment was not
substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.
The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the
appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats
and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, and in

convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court
indicates the commission of light threats only.
The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station;
the fact that placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their
persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted
in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only
one conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of
the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into effect." 2Indeed, Hallare became
so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him
home, wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats
were made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the
dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court
was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo".
This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but
rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer,
that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of
the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.
In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and
the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks
contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating
in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which
engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates
into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused.
Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the
offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements
therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for
which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be
considered as part of the more important offense of threats.
The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with
costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is
concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs
against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Santos, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Castro and Capistrano, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-32836-37 May 3, 1989

DANIEL VICTORIO and EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ellis F. Jacoba and Jose Ma. Abola for petitioners.
The Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision** of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1970
in Criminal Cases Nos. 09243 and 09244 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Exequiel Victorio and
Daniel Victoria", affirming the lower court's judgment of conviction of the petitioners for grave oral
defamation with modification of sentence and the appellate court's resolution dated October 28,
1970 denying herein petitioners' motion for rehearing and/or new trial as well as their urgent motion
for reconsideration filed on October 19, 1970. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads
as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, with the modification that appellants are sentenced to the
indeterminate penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor to one (1)
year and one (1) day of prision correccional, the judgment appealed from is affirmed
in all respects with costs." (as amended by the resolution dated August 7, 1970,
Rollo, p. 19).
The facts of the case taken from the decision of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practising lawyer since 1926, one time Justice of the Peace and member of the
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime president of the Nueva Ecija
Bar Association, has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain civil cases from 1953
until 1963 when petitioner decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty. L. Castillo in place of
Atty. Ruiz and his collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.
Exequiel Victorio and his wife afterwards filed an administrative charge against Judge Guiang which
was assigned to Judge Ramon Avancena, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, for investigation and disbarment proceedings against Atty. Ruiz, then pending in the Office of
the Solicitor General. Petitioner Daniel Victorio is the son of Exequiel Victoria.
During the hearing of the administrative case on that particular afternoon of January 9, 1964 in the
sala of Judge Avancea, Atty. Castillo, counsel of the Victorios, presented an urgent motion to
disqualify Judge Avancea to hear the administrative case, who apparently taken aback, called
down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture, while Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for respondent Judge Guiang
in the administrative case, moved that Atty. Castillo be cited for contempt of court.
After the said hearing and while the two accused were later walking down the corridor leading to the
stairs from the sala of Judge Avancea, the incident that gave rise to the criminal prosecution for oral
defamation took place. Petitioners were overheard by Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of
Cabanatuan City and one of the witnesses for the prosecution, to have uttered the following
defamatory words:

Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw

naman ang utak, suwapang at estapador."
Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador,
paltogak ta ukinana ta abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador."
(Translated in Tagalog as, Mayabang yang putang-inang abogado
Ruiz na iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at
estapador.")
On February 8, 1964, Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio were separately charged with the crime
of Serious Oral Defamation in the City Court of Cabanatuan City, in Identical informations (Original
Record, p. 1) indicting the accused as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of January, 1964, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused moved by resentment and hatred which he entertained against the person
of one Vivencio Ruiz, and in order to put him into public ridicule, discredit, and
contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and in the the
presence of many persons, uttered the following defamatory words, to wit:
LASTOG TA UKINANATA ABOGADO RUIZ, SWAPANG, ESTAPADOR, PALTOGAK
TA UKINNANATA.1
and other words of similar import to the great embarrassment of said Vivencio Ruiz.
Contrary to law.
Both accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment (Original Record, p. 10; p. 4) and the cases were
tried jointly.
After trial, both accused were convicted in a decision of the the City Court dated April 10,
1968,*** the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused, Exequiel Victoria is hereby found guilty of Grave Oral
Defamation and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS
& ONE (1) DAY, and the accused Daniel Victorio is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and to pay the costs proportionately.
SO ORDERED. (Original Record, p. 179).
Their motion for reconsideration and/or modification of judgment (Original Record, p. 181) filed on
the same date was denied in an order of the trial court dated September 25, 1968 (Original Record,
p. 189). On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on October 9, 1968 (Original Record, p. 201) affirmed the
decision of the trial court but modified the penalty to the indeterminate sentence of one (1) month
and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prisIon
correccional as maximum (Resolution of August 7, 1970; Rollo, p. 19). The motion for hearing and/or
reconsideration filed on October 15, 1970 as well as their urgent motion for reconsideration filed on
October 19, 1970 were denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated October 28, 1970.
Thus, this petition for review by certiorari filed with the Court on December 18, 1970 (Rollo, P. 9).

On February 11, 1971, the Court resolved to deny the petition for insufficient showing that findings of
facts are unsupported by substantial evidence and for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 43). However, in its
Resolution of April 15, 1971, the Court, considering the grounds of the motion of petitioners for
reconsideration of the resolution of February 11, 1971, resolved to: (a) reconsider said resolution;
and (b) to give due course to the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (Rollo, p. 56).
On October 15, 1974, counsel for petitioners-appellants filed a motion to dismiss G.R. No. L-32836
(Criminal Case No. 9469 of the City Court of Cabanatuan City and CA-G.R. No. 09243-44-CR),
manifesting that the petitioner-appellant Exequiel Victorio died on April 14, 1974 at Guimba, Nueva
Ecija where he was then residing (Rollo, p. 131). There being no objection interposed by the Solicitor
General in his comment filed with the Court on December 11, 1974, the death of petitioner-appellant
having occurred prior to the rendition of final judgment (Rollo,p. 154), the Court resolved on
December 18, 1974 to dismiss L-32836-37 only insofar as appellant Exequiel Victorio is concerned
(Rollo, p. 157).
The lone assignment of error (Brief for the Petitioners, p. 91), is as follows:
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
WORDS UTTERED BY THE PETITIONERS IN CONVERSATION WITH EACH
OTHER AND WHILE IN THE HEAT OF ANGER CONSTITUTE GRAVE ORAL
DEFAMATION INSTEAD OF MERELY LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION.
In effect, counsel for petitioners abandoned all the assignments of error in the Court of Appeals,
confined himself to only one, and practically admitted that the accused committed the crime charged
although of a lesser degree that of slight oral defamation only, instead of grave oral defamation.
There is no dispute regarding the main facts that had given rise to the present case. Appellantpetitioner in this instant appeal, does not deny that the accused, on the occasion in question, uttered
the defamatory words alleged in the information. Thus, the sole issue that the Court has to resolve is
whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral
defamation.
The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base
and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or
means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the demarcation
line, between serious and slight oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be punished
by arresto mayor in its maximum period toprision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a
serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall bearresto menor or a fine not exceeding
200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]).
To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court adopted
the following guidelines:
. . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words
will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, '...upon their sense
and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party
and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the
time: ... Balite v. People, Ibid., quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page
494).

Thus, in the same case cited where scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime of
estafa, the Court ruled:
The scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The language of
the indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim; He 'has sold the union; he
'has swindled the money of the vendees; he 'received bribe money in the amount of
P10,000.00 ... and another P6,000.00'; He 'is engaged in racketeering and enriching
himself with the capitalists'; He 'has spent the funds of the union for his personal
use.'
No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral
defamation. They are serious and insulting. No circumstances need to be shown to
upgrade the slander. . . .
In another case where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets including
words imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of
her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was grave slander:
The language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the
complainant. The words were uttered with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin
her reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who
will thus seek to impute vice or immorality to another, the consequences of which
might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance
apparently an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters, all
prominent in social circles, deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly, it is time for the
courts to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of vile and loud slander.
(U.S. v. Tolosa, 37 Phil. 166 [1917]).
In a case where the accused, a priest, called the offended party a gangster, in the middle of a
sermon, the court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander (People v. Arcand 68 Phil.
601 [1939]). There was no imputation of a crime nor a vice or immorality in said case.
In the instant case, appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered the defamatory words against Atty.
Vivencio Ruiz. Among others he called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime
of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated by the Court in Balite v. People, supra, "no
amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation . . . No
circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander."
Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are
libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held that "where statements
concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary
meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per
se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states cause of action."
Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade,
occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are slanderous per se(Kraushaar v. LaVin,
42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 [1943]; Mains v. Whiting 49 NW 559 [1891]; Greenburg v. De Salvo, 216 So. 2d
638 [1968]).
In Pollard v. Lyon (91 US 225 [1876]), the court there had occasion to divide oral slander, as a cause
of action, into several classes, as follows:

(1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of
some criminal offense involving moral turpitude for which the party, if the charge is
true, may be indicted and punished;
(2) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected with
some contagious disease, where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party
from society;
(3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party unfitness
to perform the duties of an office or employment, or the want of integrity in the
discharge of the duties of such office or employment;
(4) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or
her profession or trade; and
(5) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves
actionable, occasion the party special damage."
In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer onetime Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and
for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes
deep into the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory
words uttered to be considered grave oral defamationBalite v. People, supra. In addition, the fact
that the offended party is a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak",
"swapang at estapador", imputed against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or
improper practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se.
Petitioner argues that this Court in People v. Doronila (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 231 [1941])
and People v. Modesto (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 128 [1941]) ruled that defamatory words
uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation (Rono, p. 13).
We disagree.
An examination of the rulings relied upon by petitioner showed that said cases were decided not by
this Court but by the respondent court. Suffice it to say that said decisions do not bind this Court.
Nevertheless, the cases adverted to by petitioner would not in any manner help his cause. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, there was no reason for the petitioner to be angry at the
offended party who was merely performing his duties as a lawyer in defense of his client. Petitioner's
anger was not lawfully caused. (Brief for the Appellee, p. 7). The fact that the defamatory words were
uttered by the petitioner without provocation by private respondent and taken seriously by the latter,
renders inapplicable the cases relied upon by petitioner.
As a matter of fact, the scurrilous remarks were found by the respondent court to have been uttered
in a loud voice, in the presence of at least ten (10) persons, taken seriously by the offended party
and without provocation on his part.
WHEREFORE, the petition is Denied for lack of merit and the appealed decision Affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57103 January 30, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO A. ORCULLO, as Acting City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City, and VENIDA
PERALTA aliasEDAT PERALTA, respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro
City praying that the order of the respondent Judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, dismissing Criminal
Case No. 40117 be set aside and that said case be ordered reinstated and tried on the merits.
The petition alleges that on September 4, 1978, a special counsel in the Office of the City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro City filed an information with the City Court of Cagayan de Oro, Branch I, charging
the respondent Venida Peralta alias Edat Peralta with oral defamation committed as follows:
That on or about August 17, 1978, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Gumamela
Extension Street, Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent
to cast undue shame, public ridicule, discredit, disrepute and contempt against one
Lydia Flores, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and
shouted the following words towards the latter: "Hostess ug nangabit, bisan unsa
lang oten and nakapaslak "; which approximately means in English.- "A hostess and
has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina", or words of similar
import, directed to the said Lydia Flores, in the presence and with the hearing of
many people, well-knowing that what she uttered were not only defamatory but
downright false, causing the offended party by said utterance to suffer undue shame,
public ridicule, disrepute, discredit and contempt, to the great damage and prejudice
of the said Lydia Flores.
Contrary to Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
Cagayan de Oro City, September 1, 1978.
(SGD)
EFREN
L.
LAMPI
OS
Special

Couns
el 1
which information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 40117; that on November 3, 1978, Criminal
Case No. 40117 was set for arraignment and the accused- respondent pleaded not guilty; that on
February 2, 1981, the accused-respondent filed a motion to quash on the ground that the crime
alleged constituted an imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio; that on February
10, 1981, the respondent judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case
No. 40117 on the ground that the offense alleged in the information is a private crime which can be
instituted or filed only by the offended party; that on February 27, 1981, the City Fiscal filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117; and that on March 11, 1981,
the respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration. 2
In his comment filed on November 3, 1981, the private respondent contended that the wordings
"Hostess and has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina" are in unequivocal
terms and can be readily understood as imputing to the offended party the commission of the act of
adultery, she being a married woman, hence the crime charged consists in the imputation of an
offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and can be brought only upon complaint filed by the
offended party as provided in paragraph 5, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. 3
The Solicitor General was required to comment on the petition and on the opposition of the
accused. 4
The pertinent portion of the comment of the Solicitor General filed on December 18, 1981, reads:
The main issue to be resolved is whether the derogatory remarks "A hostess and
has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina" imputes adultery
or prostitution. Petitioner submits that the remarks impute prostitution rather than
adultery. The word "hostess" has acquired a notorious connotation. It has a peculiar
reference to one who works in nightclubs and "misters to the pleasures of men for
fee". The expression "any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina" definitely
describes and only refers to the work of a prostitute, and not that of a mere
adulteress.
It is alleged by accused-respondent that the remarks imputed adultery, because the
word "paramour" was mentioned, thereby implying complainant to be a married
woman who was carrying on an affair with a man not her husband. It must be pointed
out that since the information does not allege the civil status of complainant as
married, she should be presumed to be single, and therefore the remarks must be
understood as imputing prostitution, and not adultery. Assuming arguendo that
complainant is married and that the remarks, while imputing acts of prostitution to her
and in effect charged her with adultery, the information can still be filed without her
complaint. The case of People vs. Hong Din Chu, 33 SCRA 199, 202 is in point.
As thus alleged it is clear that, while the utterance in effect also
imputed on her the commission of adultery, the offended party being
a married woman, the disreputable conduct she was particularly
charged with was the crime of prostitution, not adultery. And it may be
pointed out that prostitution and adultery are not one and the same
thing, the first is a crime against public morals, committed by a
woman, whether married or not, who, for money or profit, habitually
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, whereas

adultery is in the nature of a private offense committed by a married

woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband. In short, the essential element in prostitution is not simply a
woman's entering into marital relations with a man other than her
husband, if she happens to be married, but the existence of
pecuniary or financial gain as inducement to, or consideration for, that
woman's engaging in sexual activities. Thus, to call a married woman
a prostitute is not merely to proclaim her an adulteress a violator of
her marital vows: it is to charge her of having committed an offense
against public morals, of moral degeneracy far exceeding that
involved in the maintenance of adulterous relations.
It appearing from the recital of the information that the alleged
defamatory remark by the accused specifically imputed upon the
offended party the commission of prostitution, which is a public crime
that can be prosecuted de oficio, the information filed under the
signature of the Assistant City Fiscal duly conferred jurisdiction upon
the lower court to try the case. (Emphasis supplied)
This ruling is a mere reiteration of previous pronouncements made by this Honorable
Court in People v. Santos, 98 Phil. 11 and Mangila v. Lantik, 30 SCRA 82. Still for
another reason, assuming arguendo that adultery which is a private crime, and
prostitution which is a public crime, are both imputed to complainant, criminal action
may still be instituted without her complaint because public interest, which is always
paramount to private interest, so requires (People v. Yu, 1 SCRA 199).
It must be noted that it is only when derogatory remarks clearly and categorically
reflect the elements constituting adultery would the complaint for libel by the offended
party be necessary to commence prosecution (People v. Padilla, 105 Phil. 45). In this
case, however, the derogatory remarks of accused-respondent, not only do not
clearly show the elements of adultery, but on the contrary, such remarks indubitably
impute the crime of prostitution. Therefore, the information for libel can be filed
without the complaint of the offended party. 5
The submission of the Solicitor General is well taken. Indeed, the words quoted in the information
are indubitably an imputation of the crime of prostitution which can be prosecuted de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, the order dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117 of the City
Court of Cagayan de Oro City is set aside, and the respondent judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, is
ordered to reinstate said criminal case and to try the same on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera and Plana JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

NOEL VILLANUEVA,

G.R. No. 160351

Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
PEOPLE
THE PHILIPPINESand
YOLANDA CASTRO,
Respondents.

OF

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

April 10, 2006

x------------------------------------------------ -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is no ordinary word war story. Here, the Councilor and

Vice-Mayor of a town, both holders of exalted government
positions, became slaves to their human limitations and engaged
in a verbal scuffle at the municipal hall as if they were ordinary
men in the streets. A moment of unguarded emotional outburst
lead to the long-drawn out twists and turns of this case, which
should have been avoided if only they have imbedded in their
complex emotions, habits and convictions that consciousness to
regulate these deflecting forces and not to let them loose, either
to their own detriment or to that of the public they serve. This is
the high price they have to pay as occupants of their exalted
positions.[1]

At bar is a petition for review assailing the decision [2] dated

28 March 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22932
which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tarlac, likewise affirming with modification the joint
decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of CapasBamban-Concepcion, convicting petitioner of the crime of Grave
Oral Defamation in Criminal Case No. 139-94 and Slander by
Deed in Criminal Case No.140-94. Also assailed is the
resolution[3] dated 9 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals denying
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Petitioner Noel Villanueva was then a member of the

Municipal Council while private complainant Yolanda C. Castro was
then Municipal Vice Mayor, both of Concepcion, Tarlac. Upon
complaint of private complainant, two separate Criminal

Complaints were filed on 9 October 1994 against the petitioner in

the 2nd MCTC of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, to wit:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 139-94

For: Grave Oral Defamation

On September 12, 1994 on or about 10:00 in the morning at the SB

Office in the Municipal Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, in the presence of
several persons and again in the afternoon on or about four thirty (4:30
PM) at the Old Session Hall of the Municipal Building in my presence and
in the presence of several persons, defendant NOEL L. VILLANUEVA, in a
loud voice and within hearing distance of everyone present, unlawfully,
maliciously and feloniously uttered in a serious and insulting manner at
the undersigned complainant the following words: []Nagmamalinis ca,
ena ca man malinis, garapal ca[] and Balamu mansanas cang malutu,
pero queng quilib ularan ca, tictac carinat (You are pretending to be
clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt; you
are like a red apple, but inside you are worm infested and extremely
dirty), which utterances are serious and insulting in nature, tending to
cause dishonor, discredit and contempt of undersigned complainant and
causing her extreme mental anguish, wound (sic) feelings, besmirched
reputation and serious anxiety for which she is entitled to recover moral
and exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the
honorable court. Contrary to law.

CRIM.CASE NO. 140-94

For: Slander by Deed

On September 12, 1994 around four thirty (4:30 P.M.) in the afternoon,
more or less, at the Municipal Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, where
public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, and in
the presence of several persons, the accused Noel L. Villanueva while
in the process of hurling verbal insults at the complainant, then and
there unlawfully, feloniously and contemptuously gave the complainant
what is commonly known as dirty finger by poking his hand at
complainants face with the middle finger extended and the rest of his
fingers half-closed, an act tending to cause dishonor, discredit and

contempt on the complainant and causing her mental anguish,

wounded feelings and moral suffering for which she is entitled to moral
and exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the
honorable court. Contrary to law.[4]

Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on both counts and trial

ensued. The prosecution witnesses presented were the
complainant and her two witnesses.

The MCTC restated the facts as presented by the prosecution

evidence as follows:

On 12 September 1994, at 10:00 oclock in the morning, two

utility men came to complainants office, bringing with
them the application for monetized leave ofSangguniang
Bayan member Noel Villanueva, petitioner in this case.
The
application
for
monetized
leave
was
not
immediately attended to by complainant as she was then busy
dictating some important matters to her secretary. [5]

The accused at that time was standing in front of the Vice Mayors
Office and he allegedly said: E ano kung wala sa mood,
e ano kung galit sya.[6] These utterances of accused were
disregarded by complainant but accused then entered the
complainants office bringing with him his Application for
Monetized Leave. The accused addressed the complainants
secretary: Malou, pag atiu ne keng mood, papirma mu ne. The
alleged request of accused to the Secretary was made in a very
sarcastic manner.[7]

Complainant got the monetized leave and filed it in her in

and out files and while doing this, the paper accidentally fell on

the floor. When she was about to pick it up, the accused allegedly
got a yellow pad and swung it at complainants face, but she was
able to evade it. Accused then said: Ibuat daka ken, inabu daka
keng awang, e baling masukulnaku. (I will lift you from there and I
will throw you out of the window and I dont care if I will go to
jail). Then the accused went out of the office and before leaving,
he pointed a dirty finger at complainant, prompting the latter to
stand and get an empty bottle of coke to shield her face. Accused
proceeded towards the office of the municipal mayor.Because
accused was still frothing invectives, complainant purportedly
rolled the empty bottle of coke towards him. The incident was
witnessed by so many people numbering about 20 to 30 who
were then at the municipal hall.[8]

Prosecution evidence further showed that accused allegedly

mouthed the following disparaging remarks, Magmalinis ka, ena
ka man malinis, garapal ka. Balamumansanas kang malutu, pero
king kilub ularan ka, tiktak karinat (You are pretending to be clean
and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt. You
are like red apple, you are worm infested inside and extremely
dirty). While this was going on, the Municipal Attorney, Atty.
Pepito Torres, intervened to pacify the accused, but he was unable
to do so.[9]

Based on the account of the prosecution witnesses, from the

municipal session hall, the complainant was persuaded to enter
the office of the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary.Accused followed
her and inside said office, the accused again said, Ibuat daka,
inabu daka keng awang, e baling masukul ku (I will lift you from
there and I will throw you out of the window and I dont care if I
will
go
to
jail). I Tata mu tinagal yang kapitan pero masambut ya, pero ing k
aputul ku sinambut ne man (Your father ran for barangay captain
and lost but my brother won) [10] and again, the accused pointed a
dirty finger at complainant.[11]

The defense, on the other hand, presented six witnesses.

From their testimonies, the MCTC gathered that on 12 September
1994, accused requested Flora Calayag to prepare the application
for monetized leave and asked her to have it approved by the
complainant. Because the application remained unsigned by the
latter, it was Joel Cecilio who in the afternoon went to her office
for the approval of the monetized leave, but again, to no avail. [12]

Accused then personally carried his application to

complainants office. At that time, complainant was dictating
something to the Secretary and as he was about to give the copy
to the Secretary, complainant got up and grabbed the paper from
him and placed it on the right side of her table. [13]

This angered the accused and he said to complainant, [i]s

this the actuation of the high government official? The
complainant replied, Bolang (Insane). A verbal squabble ensued
and the complainant allegedly said, nung munta kayo keng
municipiyong
ayni
balamu
ninu
kayong
hari,
ala nakong depatan nung-e gawang pera, sira nako kareng tau.
(When you go to the municipal building as if you are a king, you
did nothing except to make money, the people no longer believe
in you.)[14]

Complainant, at that instant, hurled a bottle of coke at

petitioner and hit one of the Barangay Captains then present.[15]

After trial, the MCTC found petitioner guilty of Grave Oral

Defamation and Serious Slander by Deed in a joint decision
dated 26 February 1998. The MCTC held that the statements
uttered by petitioner and the act of making a dirty finger
constitute an affront on complainant who, as Vice Mayor and a
lady, deserves greater respect. The MCTC posited that the
defense interposed by the petitioner that complainant brought the

havoc upon herself when she refused to approve his application

for accrued leave credits monetization cannot be considered as
valid to obviate or obliterate the crime or damage done unto the
complainant. The MCTC then held:

With these, this Court finds overwhelming evidence against the

accused and as such this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a charged (sic) of Grave Oral Defamation punishable
under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code and Slander by Deed
punishable under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x The
complainant although she can estimate the value of the moral damages
is entitled to the sum of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees of P30,000.00
and P1,000.00 as appearance fee plus litigation expenses.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt

for the offenses or charges mentioned above, he is hereby sentenced to
an imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS and one (1) day to one (1) year in
each case which the accused shall served (at the same time), and to pay
by way of moral damages the sum of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and litigation expenses and
attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance fee.[16]

Both parties appealed to the RTC of Tarlac, which affirmed

petitioners conviction, but modified the penalty and the manner
of serving accuseds sentence, and with a substantial increase in
the award of damages. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal

Circuit Trial Court, insofar as it finds the accused guilty of grave oral
defamation in Criminal Case No. 139 and slander by deed in Criminal
Case No. 140 is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the accused
is to be sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from THREE (3) months as minimum to TWO (2) years and TWO (2)
months as maximum in each of the cases, the same to be served
SUCCESSIVELY.

Likewise, the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is

further modified and the accused is ordered to pay the amount
of P100,000.00 as moral damages and another amount ofP50,000.00
as exemplary damages, including the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees and P1,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee. [17]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the

trial court with the modification that the award of exemplary
damages was deleted because according to the Court of
Appeals it was shown from the records that the petitioner
himself was a victim of complainants indiscretion for
refusing, for no reason at all, to approve petitioners
application for monetization of his accrued leave credits.
The Court of Appeals disposed as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision is hereby

affirmed with the modification that the award of exemplary damages is
hereby deleted.[18]

As petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise met with

failure, petitioner, in a last stab at absolution, lodged the present
petition for review on the following arguments:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING ON

ONLY ONE (1) ISSUE RAISED BY PETITIONER IN HIS PETITION FOR
REVIEW AND IN NOT RULING SQUARELY ON THE OTHER FIVE (5)
ISSUES, THUS, DENYING PETITIONER OF HIS RIGHT TO BE HEARD AND
TO DUE PROCESS.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

REVERSING THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DESPITE THE FACT THAT AS PER THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS ITSELF, IT IS CLEAR, IT BEING SUSTAINED BY THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD, THAT IT WAS THE COMPLAINANT WHO GAVE THE
PROVOCATION TO THE WHOLE INCIDENT.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING

THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID
COURTS GAVE CREDENCE AND WEIGHT ONLY TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES, BUT FAILED TO GIVE PROBATIVE VALUE
TO AND ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
ACCUSED-PETITIONER AND THAT OF HIS WITNESSES.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND THAT HIS GUILT OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[19]

The issues are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in

sustaining the conviction of petitioner for grave oral defamation in
Criminal Case No. 139-94, and (2) whether the Court of Appeals
erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for serious slander
by deed in Criminal Case No. 140-94.

Anent the first issue, Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:

Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto

mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty
shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of

in writing. The term oral defamation or slander as now
understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. [20]

There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting

nature. The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1)
upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations
of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the case.[21] Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the
other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical
significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them
separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender
at the time.[22]

In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and

position of the offended party are also taken into account and

thus, it was held that the slander was grave, because the
offended party had held previously the Office of Congressman,
Governor, and Senator and was then a candidate for VicePresident,[23] for which no amount of sophistry would take the
statement out of the compass of grave oral defamation.
[24]
However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some
provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes
only a light felony.[25]

In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was

holding the position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be
an exemplar to society against the use of intemperate language
particularly because the offended party was a ViceMayor. However, we cannot keep a blind eye to the fact that such
scathing words were uttered by him in the heat of
anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of
Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid
justification to approve the monetization of accrued leave
credits of petitioner. In a manner of speaking, she sowed the
wind that reaped the storm.

In the words of the Court of Appeals:

The already existing animosity between them does not vest in

the complainant the prerogative to deny petitioner a right to
which he was legally entitled. Exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right. They are designed to permit the court
to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its
imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of
the offender. It cannot be invoked as a matter of right. x x x

[26]

The above findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported

by substantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties
and are not reviewable by this Court. [27]Considering this finding,
the Court of Appeals not only should have struck out the award of
exemplary damages but should have modified as well the offense
committed to be of simple nature punishable by arresto mayor or
a fine not exceeding P200.00 under the above-quoted Art. 358 of
the Revised Penal Code.

In Pader v. People,[28] complainant was conversing with his political leaders

at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan, when petitioner appeared at the gate
and shouted putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo! The latter was
dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for
Vice Mayor of Morong, Bataan in the elections of 8 May 1995. We held that the
offense committed was only slight slander. We explained why in this wise:
The issue is whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral
defamation. In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other,
depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and
accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the
special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between
the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the
intention of the offender at the time.
Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering,
however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation was only
slight. The trial court, in arriving at its decision, considered that the
defamation was deliberately done to destroy Atty. Escolangos reputation
since the parties were political opponents.
We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the
fact that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was drunk at the
time he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners
anger was instigated by what Atty. Escolango did when petitioners

father died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or
insulting nature.
In Reyes v. People [137 Phil. 112, 120 (1969)], we ruled that the
expression putang ina mo is a common enough utterance in the dialect
that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates
ones expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that
after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on
seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously,
the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily
to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional
gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not
uncommon.
In similar fashion, the trial court erred in awarding moral damages
without proof of suffering. Accordingly, petitioner may be convicted only
of slight oral defamation defined and penalized under Article 358, Revised
Penal Code, prescribing the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.[29] (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[30] petitioner and

complainant,
a
Municipal
Judge,
were
next
door
neighbors. Animosity grew between their two families because of
some disputes. Petitioner resented the practice of complainant of
throwing garbage and animal excrement into her premises. There
was also a boundary dispute between petitioner's mother and
complainant, which was the subject of a civil suit for "Recovery of
Possession, Ownership, Enforcement of Legal Easement and
Abatement of Nuisance" filed by the mother before the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo against complainant. Additionally,
petitioner's mother had previously instituted an administrative
complaint against the complainant before the Supreme Court, but
the same was dismissed. There was a pent-up feeling of being

aggrieved, resentment, anger, and vexation on petitioner's part,

culminating in her outburst against complainants. For having
called the complainant judge "land grabber," "shameless" and
"hypocrite," petitioner was charged and subsequently convicted
by the Court of First Instance of three separate offenses of Grave
Oral Defamation committed on 5, 6 and 8 August 1976. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdicts of
conviction. On review, however, we held that although the
abusive remarks may ordinarily be considered as serious
defamation, under the environmental circumstances of the case,
there having been provocation on complainant's part, and the
utterances complained of having been made in the heat of
unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for
the crime of Slight Oral Defamation. Petitioner was sentenced to
pay a fine of P200.00 in each of the criminal cases, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.

Guided by the foregoing precedents, we find petitioner guilty

only of slight oral defamation because of the attendant
circumstances in the case at bar.

Lest we be misconstrued, the Court does not condone the

vilification or use of scurrilous language on the part of petitioner,
but following the rule that all possible circumstances favorable to
the accused must be taken in his favor, it is our considered view
that the slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as
slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory
words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of
the offended party, constitutes only a light felony. [31]

In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of leave

without valid justification, but as an offshoot of a political
dissension may have been vexing for petitioner and may have
been perceived by him as provocation that triggered him to blow
his top and utter those disparaging words. In hindsight, to be

denied monetization of leave credits must have stirred upon the

petitioner a feeling akin to begging for money that he was legally
entitled to. This oppressive conduct on the part of complainant
must have scarred petitioners self-esteem, too, to appear as
begging for money. But again, this is not an excuse to resort to
intemperate language no matter how such embarrassment must
have wreaked havoc on his ego.

The next issue that faces this Court is whether or not petitioners act of
poking a dirty finger at complainant constitutes grave slander by deed.

Following the same principle as enunciated in our foregoing discussion of

the first issue, we find petitioner guilty only of slight slander by deed in Criminal
Case No. 140-94 inasmuch as we find complainants unjust refusal to sign
petitioners application for monetization and her act of throwing a coke bottle at
him constituted a perceived provocation that triggered the poking of finger
incident.

Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its

maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine
ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
shall perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall
cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. If said act is not
of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.

Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is

committed by performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit,
or contempt upon another person. The elements are (1) that the
offender performs any act not included in any other crime against
honor, (2) that such act is performed in the presence of other
person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor, discredit
or contempt upon the offended party. Whether a certain
slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or
not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the
circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion,
etc.[32] It is libel committed by actions rather than words. The most
common examples are slapping someone or spitting on his/her
face in front of the public market, in full view of a crowd, thus
casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon the person of
another.

In Mari v. Court of Appeals,[33] complainant and petitioner were coemployees in the Department of Agriculture, with office at Digos, Davao del Sur,
although complainant occupied a higher position. On 6 December 1991, petitioner
borrowed from complainant the records of his 201 file. However, when he returned
the same three days later, complainant noticed that several papers were missing
which included official communications from the Civil Service Commission and
Regional Office, Department of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint by the
Rural Bank of Digos against petitioner. Upon instruction of her superior officer,
complainant sent a memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain why his 201
file was returned with missing documents. Instead of acknowledging receipt of the
memorandum, petitioner confronted complainant and angrily shouted at her:
"Putang ina, bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair in front of complainant and choked
her. With the intervention of the security guard, petitioner was prevailed upon to
desist from further injuring complainant. We held:

Prescinding from the foregoing, it would serve the ends of justice

better if the petitioner were sentenced to pay a fine instead of
imprisonment. The offense while considered serious slander by deed

was done in the heat of anger and was in reaction to a perceived

provocation. The penalty for serious slander by deed may be either
imprisonment or a fine. We opt to impose a fine.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE the decision of

the Court of Appeals and in lieu thereof renders judgment finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious slander by deed
defined and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.[34](Emphasis supplied.)

In Mari, the Court found petitioner guilty of serious slander by deed defined
and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced him to
pay a fine ofP1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
deed involved was the banging of a chair in front of complainant and choking her.

In another case, Teodoro v. Court of Appeals,[35] the incident, which gave rise
to this case, is narrated as follows:

Petitioner Amado B. Teodoro was vice-president and corporate

secretary of the DBT-Marbay Construction, Inc., while complainant,
Carolina Tanco-Young, was treasurer of the same corporation. Petitioner
is the brother of the president of the corporation, Donato Teodoro, while
complainant is the daughter of the chairman of the board of the
corporation, Agustin Tanco. x xx

Records show that the incident complained of took place at the

Board Room of the D.B.T. Mar Bay Construction Incorporated in the
afternoon of August 17, 1984. Present at the meeting were Agustin Tanco,
Chairman of the Board; the President, Donato Teodoro; the accused,
Amado Teodoro, as Corporate Secretary; the complainant, Carolina TancoYoung who is the Treasurer; and one Oscar Benares.

xxxx

It appears that there was a controversial document being insisted

upon by the accused, as secretary, to be signed by the chairman. The
Board Treasurer, Carolina Tanco-Young questioned the propriety of
having the document signed as there was, according to her, no such
meeting that ever took place as to show a supposed resolution to have
been deliberated upon. A verbal exchange of words and tirades took
place between the accused Secretary and the Treasurer. One word led to
another up to the point where Carolina Tanco-Young, the treasurer,
either by implication or expressed domineering words, alluded to the
accused as a "falsifier" which blinded the accused-appellant to extreme
anger and rage, thus leading him to slap Tanco-Young the alleged name
caller.[36] (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court in Teodoro held that there was grave slander by deed.

In another case, the acts of pushing and slapping a woman in order to

ridicule and shame her before other people constitute the felony of slander by deed
defined and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.[37]

In the cases as above-cited, there was no provocation on the part of the

complainants unlike the present case. Moreover, the poking of the finger in the
case at bar was, palpably, of less serious magnitude compared to the banging of
chair, the choking in Mari and the slapping of a face in Teodoro. Thus, we find that
the poking of dirty finger in the case at bar, while it smacks of slander by deed, is
of a lesser magnitude than the acts committed in the foregoing cases.

Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the

phrase Fuck You, which
is
similar
to
the
expression Puta or Putang Ina mo, in
local
parlance. Such
expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People,
[38]
where the Court said that: This is a common enough
expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to
slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom,
if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a
reflection on the virtues of a mother. Following Reyes, and in
light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming
from complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger at
complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing
from the factual milieu of the case that the act complained of
was employed by petitioner "to express anger or displeasure"
at complainant for procrastinating the approval of his leave
monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature,
thus,
the
penalty
shall
bearresto
menor meaning,
imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not
exceeding P200.00. We opt to impose a fine following Mari.[39]

Yes, complainant was then a Vice-Mayor and a lady at that, which

circumstances ordinarily demanded respect from petitioner. But, it was, likewise,
her moral obligation springing from such position to act in a manner that is worthy
of respect. In the case at bar, complainants demeanor of refusing to sign the leave
monetization of petitioner, an otherwise valid claim, because of a political discord

smacks of a conduct unbecoming of a lady and a Vice-Mayor at that. Moreover, it

appears that she had, indeed, thrown a bottle of coke at petitioner, which actuation
reveals that she, too, had gone down to petitioners level.

Holding an esteemed position is never a license to act capriciously with

impunity. The fact that there was a squabble between petitioner and complainant,
both high-ranking local public officials, that a verbal brawl ostensibly took place,
speaks very poorly of their self-control and public relations. For this, they both
deserve to be censured and directed to conduct themselves in a more composed
manner and keep their pose as befits ranking officials who officially deal with the
public.[40]

To be worthy of respect, one must act respectably, remembering always that

courtesy begets courtesy.

Anent the award of damages, the Court of Appeals erred in

increasing the award of moral damages to P100,000.00 in light of
its own finding that petitioner himself was a victim of
complainants indiscretion for her refusal, for no reason at all, to
approve petitioners application for monetization of his accrued
leave credits.

In similar fashion, considering that petitioner and

complainant belong to warring political camps, occasional
gestures and words of disapproval or dislike are among the
hazards of the job.[41] Considering this political reality and the fact
that the Court of Appeals concluded, based on evidence on
records, that petitioner himself was a victim of complainants
indiscretion, her claim for damages and attorneys fees must,
likewise, fail. Akin to the principle that he who comes to court

must have clean hands, each of the parties, in the case at bar,
must bear his own loss.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CR No. 22932 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1) In Crim. Case No. 139-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight oral defamation only
for which we impose on him a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;

2) In Crim. Case No. 140-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of simple slander by deed for which we
impose a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;

3) The awards for moral damages and attorneys fees are DELETED.
Finally, the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it deleted the award
for exemplary damages is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.