University of Illinois at Springfield

Norris L Brookens Library

Archives/Special Collections

John P. Longan Memoir

L855J. Longan, John P. b. 1914

Memoir
2 vols., 58 pp.
INSTITUTE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS COLLECTION
John P. Longan, worked for the International Cooperation Administration (a
successor agency to the IIAA) from 1957-73, discusses working in Guatemala,
Brazil, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Thailand: responsibilities,
political climate, cultures and customs, public safety and law practices,
implementing public safety programs, religions, terrorism, and travel. He also
recalls early life, marriage, work with the U.S. government, public safety career,
retirement, and post-retirement consultation work, specifically the William
Niehouse and Richard Starr kidnappings.
Interview by James D. Williams, 1984
Donated by the Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, New York
RESTRICTED: May be read but not quoted, cited, or reproduced.

Archives/Special Collections LIB 144

University of Illinois at Springfield
One University Plaza, MS BRK 140
Springfield IL 62703-5407
1984, University of Illinois Board of Trustees

John P . Longan Memoir

Volume I

The John P . Lon gan Memoir was donated to the Oral History Office
January, 1986, by James D. Williams .

ORAL HISTORY OFFICE

SANGAMON STATE UNIVERSITY
1986

S.:n~: rntin St~tE: !Jni ver;i\ y Archives

Brooker.$ library, Ro~m 144

(21 7) 786-6520

Preface
The John P . Loni;an r:iemoir is part of an oral history series on
foreign a1a in Latin America called the Institute of I ~ te ~
Arnerican Affairs Collection .
The Insti tut.e of :::;iter- h:1er:..can
Affairs was initiated under the Good ~eichbor Policy of President
Fr anklin D. Roosevelt with r:elson A. Rockefeller as Coordinator .
The IIAA , started in 1942, preceded the Marshall Plan in Europe
by some five years and probably influenced the decision to
implement that historic action .
The country programs initiated unde r the IIAA were innovative .
In the health field , for example , special public health services
(SESP in Brazil and SCISP in other countries) were organized .
These organizations had considerable freedom in respect to policy
and use of funds .
The United States and host country personnel ,
following the pattern of joint decisions by pror,ran direc~ors ,
worked together in a process that "rubbed " tv:o cul tu ~eE toether
in a very personal way .
The results can be seen in the lives o~
those who participated , in the institutions that have r esulted
such as the KHO ~orld Wide Rala ria Eradication Prograr:i , and in
many professional and personal r elationships .
?r o~ra~ s
i~
agriculture and education were also started under the I:kA .
Other program categories , including public adriini s tration and
public safety , were started later when the Unit ed States acency
carried a differ ent name .
Arnone those naMes were Point Four and
the International Cooperation Administration .
The focus of the collection is twofold ; firs t , to record the
"feel" of the expe rience of participatint; in the foreign aid
program in Latin hmerica , and second , to r ecor d the ac~ual
experiences and observations of participants , the latter wi th an
emphasi s on tl'mse i terns that night be importa nt for policy r.ic.kers
and historians .
This emphasis attempts t o identify inportant
elements in societal and instituti onal deve l o:?me nt; eler.ents tha t
are important in soc ial change without violence .
The collection
and its focus lends itself to an oral history approach .
Each
narrator makes an important and very personal contribution which ,
combined with other memoirs , is much more than the sum of the
several parts .
To provide coverage in depth , each narrator
r efer e nces
professional and technical articles _and
other
documents that help complete the memoir .
The value of this collection to researchers , pol icy make r s and
historians is felt to be greater than can now be predicted .
7he
focus on personal experiences and observations res ulting from
"rubbing" two cultures together in a very personal way in a
working
environment
provides
many
unexpected
insights .
Researchers are expected to identify these insights and evaluate
them .
Even in the first few memoirs , policy formation and
conflict resolution patterns start to come into focus and
patterns of societal change as well as the reasons , policies , and
methods begin to take shape .
John

P.

Longan ,

the

narrator ,

was

born and

brought

up

in

Oklahoma .
He attended the O}:lahoma Ci t.v fchool of La; and had a
veriety of law enforcement rositions be~ore corninc to work with
the International Coo;erati on Acir.inistration in 1?57 .
ICh was a
successor at;ency to the IIAA .
1-iis assignnents took hir: to
Guatemala , Erazil , Yene:::.uel<!. , Tile Doninican Hep-..iblic , Thaila::d ,
and to Kashincton , D. C. In 1963 in Vene:::.uela he helped stabilize
the government in the face of a terrorist offe :1sive , leaciins to a
freely elected coverl1r.lent and to continuity under a der.ocratic
system .
In The Domi~ican Republic te helped with the retu=n o~
that government to civil Dominican authority after the Ir.~er
American Forces involvement in the 106o ' s .
His me~oir provides
insights
pertinent to an unde=standin5 of terrori sm as a
political device .
He retired from foreign se rvice in 1973 after
which he helped free American citizens held by terrorists in
Venezuela and Columbia .
James D. Williams , the interviewer , was born an~ br oucht U? in
Illinois . He graduated with a Civil Encineerinr de~ree fron Iowa
State Collece in 1939 and worked with the Illinois Jepart~ent o~
Public Health until he went into the Arny and the IIhA in 19u3 ,
He worked on the Ama~on ProGrarn in Bra~il fror. 19LJ to 1946 , when
he returned to the Illinois Department of Public 1-ieal th .
F'ror.
1956 to 1061 he worked in successor agencies to the I~AA in
~exico ,
Guatemala , and Bra:::.il .
?rom 1961 ~o 197) , ~hen he
retired , he rerforr.ed tech~ical assistance ~orf. i1: air pollution
control and health plannin~ with the U. S . Public Health ServiceDHEW .
Readers of thi s oral hi story should remember that it is a
transcript of the spoken word with only sli5ht editorial chan[es .
Both the r ecordinbs and t~i s transcript should be regarded as a
primary historical source since no effort Kas ~ade to correct o~
challenge the narrator .
~he factual accuracy of the ce~oir
and
the observations made are those of the narrator .
Patricia Tompkins- f;cGill transcribed. and edited this raemoir .
i s a daughter of John and Dorothy LonGan .

She

This oral history may be read , quoted , and cited freely . It may
not be reproduced in whole or i n part by any means without
written permission from the Oral History Research Office of
Columbia Uni ve~ity in the City of New York , New York 10027 .

John P. Longa n Memoirs

Table of Contents
Background . ... .. .. . .. . .... . ............... .. . . ....... . . .. ... . . .. .

1- 4

Early Li fe -School -Marri age - U.S. Border Patrol -Military ServicePublic Safety- Reti rement and Consultation
Pos t- Re tirement Cons ultation . ......... . ..... ............ . ..........

4-1 0

Willi am Niehouse ki dnapp ing-- Rich ard Starr kidnapp i ng

Public Safety Career ... . . . . ....... ............ ............. .. ..... . .

11 - 14

Preparat i on for - Philosophy- Entry Into For eign Service

Gu a t em a l a - 1 95 7- 1 9 5 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ~ - 23
Tasks - Title-Responsibilities - Political Climate - Training- Establish~ e!
of the Police Academy- Status of Public Safety in Guatemala at the Ti meAssessment of Success of Program- Personal - Family-T raveling to Gu atemala Leisure Activities-Culture and Customt s- The Guatemalan People - Subversion
an d Terrorism-Military v.s. Foreign Aid
Braz i 1- 1960-1 962 .... ... . . .... . . . ...... .. ... . .......................... 24 -32
Politi ca l Cli mate-Leone B1 i zola - Cultura l Climate - Family- Li fe in Rio de
Janeiro-Police Practices-Roma n System of Law- Philosophy of Foreign Policy
Venezue la - 1962

33 -38

Beginning the Public Safety Program- The F. A.L .N . and Urban Terrorism- Free
Elections- Description of the Public Safety Program in Venezuela and its
Success- Top Level Inter- Governmental Cooperation- Career Systems and Personnel
Reta inment- Pol i tica l Considerations--Success in Venez uela
The Dominican Republic - 1966

................. .. . .. ...... . ... . ........ 38- 41

Gett ing Milita ry Forces Out- Comparison to Vietnam

Religions in Other Countries

~~"---~~~~~~~~~~~~

... ... .. . . .. . .. .. .... . .. .. ..... . ........41 -4 2

Catholocism-Macumba - Voodoo - Buddhism-The influence of Religion in Different

Cultures -L iberation Theology- Terrorist Va lues
Thailand 1969-1 971

42- 45

Thail an d du ri ng the Vietnam War - Public Safety in Thailand - Rural TerrorismThe Cultu re and the People- Political Mistakes and Vietnam- Personal Reactions Climate and Living Condi t i ons -T ra vel in the Interior

page 2

John P. Longan Meinoirs

Table of Lo11le:nts

'Culture Shock" and Adapting to Foreign Living . . . .. .. ..... ... . . . . ... . . .. 46- 47
~e turn

to Venezuela - 1971 - 1973 ..... . ..... . ....... . ... . ......... . ...... .... 47- 48

)umma ry and Phi losophy .. ... . .. . ... .. ............... .. ...... . ....... . .... 48- 54
:ontacts in Othe r Countries - American Bu r eaucracy- Th e Has hi ngton Assi gnment -

rhe

C. I. A.

John P.
Lonf:an ,
l ovenber
Bentonville , Arkansas , 72712 .

24 ,

1984 ,

801

11th

ti . \.' .

St . ,

James D. Williams , Inter vieKer .

Tape 1
Q:
This is November 24 , 1984 .
I ar;, interviewint; John Lonb"an ,
known as "Jake",
I must explain Jake ' s entry into thi s pror,ram
to make i t t i e into t he Instit ute of Inter- Anerican Affair~ .
Jake worked in the Publi c Safety Pro6ram in Latin America as well
as other places .
!he Public Safety Probram came into beint; m~ch

later than the Institute o: Inter- Arier:.can A:fairs .

Eo w e,~e:' ,

it

followed on the sane s""-e1. and i: o:;e thinks in ter1.s o: the

or161n of the program and pro6rans o: various cate6ori es , then
they are part and parcel of the sa~e thing . ~ake , :ets start ou~
wi th a relatively short statement fron you concer ning your
background ; where you were born , where you were broug~t up , an~ a
few things like that . Go ahead .

A:
OK .
I was born Sept . 20 , 19i l; I in r-:t . \'ie;.; Cr:laho.-.a-Western Oklahoma , 1-:here I stayed until I Graduated :ror. :'.i,sr.
School . I spent my f r eshman year at the University o: m:.laho;-,:;. ,
1

Q:

Par don me , Jake .

or were your folks-- ?

We r e you brouGht up on a ranch or in town ,

A:
I moved-- rr:.v :olks moved fror.i a farm into t.Oi:r, ;;~en I ;.;::_s
about three years old , so I ;.;as really raised in t o't'n--a Yery
small town .

Q:

And your folks--your Dad did what i n town?

A: Well , he was--mostly he did a little contracting and building

and that type of thinb .
He was basical ly a farmer .
ne came to
Okl ahoma before statehood.
He was mor e or less the cowboy type .
I r emember he used to br eak horses and a fe w thin&s like that
back in the early days .
Q:
So you f inished high school the r e and t hen you went
college?

on

to

A:
I went to the University of Oklahoma .
I jus~ finished ~y
freshman year-- and- - because I went into--I was out about three
years--and I got married in J4 at the age of 19 .
~nd frow
an
education point of view, I went to night school at the Oklahoma
Ci t y School of Law fo r about J 1/2 year s .

Q:

Did t hat l ead t o a degr ee in Law?

A:
No , it didn ' t .
I was pr obably two semester s from an LL5
Degree when I went into the Border Patr ol and later the se rvice .
I ha ve no degrees .

Q:
Lets
U. S. ?

see ,

A:
Thats
Justice ,

the

And that
Border Patrol?

Q:

is
U. S.
would

that the Texas Bor de r Patr ol or nart o:

Bor der Patr ol ,

under

Departr.ent

have been in what year you went

with

o:
the

went with the Border Patrol in Feb . 194 1.

A:

Q:

Your wife also came fro m that same area?

A:

Same town , yes .

Q:
Her
marr ied?

A:

the

the

name

We gr aduated from the s;,,r;ie high school.

is Dorothy .

What Kas her nane

before

she

Kas

Reynolds .

Q: Ok , so that brines you up to going into the Se rvice , which i s

probably a good place to-- (tape stopped) .
O~ , Jake , lets go on ,
we seem to be getting our recording ok .
A: Well , we might back up and , for the r ecor d , during the ti~ c I
was in Law School , at least part of the time I \.-:as in .=,a;: School ,
I was on the Oklahoma City Police Depart~ent , fror. Septenber 1936
until the time I went into the Border Patr ol in Feb . of ' til .
Ok , why don ' t you just go r ight on and fill in the gaps up
till the time --

Q:

A:
And fron June of ' b2 until Oct . of ' 45 I served in the U. S.
Coastguard both in the U. S. and overseas , after which I came back
to the Border Patrol , from where I had a leave of absence . I was
discharged from the Service in Oct . of ' 45 but I took some
terminal leave and went back to the Bor der Patrol i n ' 46 .

Q:

Your time overseas with the Coastgua r d was whe r e?

A: It was in the Sout h Pacific--well , all of the Pacific . I was

in what was called an Army Manning Detachment .
We we re involved
in small craft- - landing craft and that type of thinb- - on some of
the i s l ands .

Q:
I see .
OK . I r eally didn ' t mean t o cut into what you ~ere
saying ther e , Jake .
You were talking about when you came back ,
then , from the Ser vice . What year? Forty-- ?
A:
I was dis~harged in Oct . of 45 but my wife and daughter we re
living in Oklahoma Ci ty and I had what was called Ter minal Leave
2

1ol1J1

1/

.. .

i1

and needed a per iod of r eadjuctment so I stuyed there and just

sort of--actually r>ent 'back to Lai' School for a :~e ;.; r.:onths and.
found out it was kinda ' hard to pick ur , but ~t was close to a
year before I asserte~ my employment ri&hts in the Border Patrol .
I went back there in 1946 .

Q: And that took you where to live then?

A: \foll , durine; ny time in the Border Patrol I lived in El Paso ;
Alamogordo , J:ew Viexico ; Ft . Hancock , Texas ; Cleveland , Ohio ; and
the Fast Bay Area out of San Francisco--Fleasanton and Li ven-.ore ,
California , That ' s about it in the Border Patr ol ,
Well , dic.i you do primarily adninistrati ve thir.e;s or
work i nvestigations or what?

Q:

field

A:
Primarily , a:ter I GOt out of the Service--before ! ;;en ~ in
the Service , it was :pr irr.arily border duty , but- I ha.d about a 7
month detail with Axis diflornats right after Pearl Ea.rbor , Kh 0 re
Ke were rou:1din5 tr.en up fror: all over the ~:esterr. Eer:is;i:ere a.:-.i
exchanGing them with-Q:

\i.'i th what kind of diplomats?

A:

The Axis diplomats .

Q:

Oh , you mean from the Axi s countries?

A:
Italian , Japanese , and German , a.ne ~e had so=e--oh , like the
Gre{briar Hotel in \:hi te Sulphur Spri n5s , \:est \"irc~nia , and t:-.e
Homestead in ~ot ~p rin5s and others .
~e h~~ the~ interned t~ere
until such time as r>e started exchancir.G the~ ;.;ith our dip~o~a~s
in Lisbon , Portugal and Portubliese East Africa .

Q:

Hm , that ' s interestinc .

That ' s what

A:
Servi ce in ' 42 .

Q:

I was doing until the time I enlisted

in

the

I see .

After comin; back from the Servi ce I did what we call line
A:
duty and then I was--in the Clevel a nd a nd the Buffalo district I
:as an Investicator . Later on , I 1-:as Sector Intellit;ence Officer
in the El Faso area and was Assistant Chief Ins~ector in the San
Francisco District at the t ime I went with Publi c Safety for my
overseas assiGnment .

Ok , now lets just jump to your overseas assiGnment in Public

Safety , which would have bee n what year s?

Q:

A:

I went with Public Safety on July the first , 1957 ,

Q:

And you stayed there until what year , more or less?

John l . i.onc,an
A:
I stayed with Public Safety until I retired July the f irs t. ,
1973 ,
As i t worked 0Ut , I had 32 years of GoYe r nment servi ce
just r eally equally diYided -- 16 years with each a gency .
I

Q:
That s interestinG, because I had 16 years with the State of
Il linois and 16 years with the Federal Government.
A:

You had thirty t wo years?

Q:
Yeah , tha t ' s r eally somethint; , isn t it? I r etir ed i n 73
~.~hen you came back
fr or,
Well , we ' ll jump that period .
too .
and
r
et
ired
,
you
came
here
to
forei gn duty , then in
73 ,
Arkansas , right?
I

A:

Yes .

Q: Where you now live at 801 N. W. 11th?

A:

Right .

Q: Ok .
And then , since you ' ve been r etired ,
things have you de l ved into?

what sorts

of

A:
I ' ve got--I ' ve dabbl ed , more or less , in the real estate
business , a nd I ' ve done some consult in5 work in vari ous parts of
Latin America .
For example , I think in ' 75 , I did so~e
consulting work for Public Systems Incorporat ed .
Thats a - - o~ , a
manufacturer and so forth of Public Safety mater ials and they
have done an awful lot of sur veys of--both in- country an1
overseas--of security a~encies .
I bel ieve I vis~ted Venezuela
and Curacao , Kica rat;ua , Panama ,--t wo or three countri es wi~ h
them .

Q:

This would be --

A:

In nineteern seventy fiv e .

Q:

For equipment--s urveys of equipment?

A:
We ll , not onl y surveys of equipment but fo r surveys for
upgrading t heir organi zational set- ups and that type of thing .

Q:

Per sonnel s ystems?

A:
Per sonnel systems , communication syst ems and that t ype of
thing .
What I was doing with the m mostly was--they had thei r
specialists that went with me , and I knew the contacts a nd I knew
the countries .
Q:

Oh , I see .

A:
Then in February of 1976 , there was a gentl eman by the name
of William Niehouse who was the Director in Venezuela for the
Owen Illinois Glass Company , who se headquarte rs a r e i n Toledo ,
Ohio.
He was kidnapped , and I was called a nd went down
4

John

r.

Lone.an

ostensibly f or J or b ~ee~s t o help them out .

I staye~ o~ it
until we had a release for him in la'\.e ,lunP of 1979 , so I ,.;as
really a consultant with O~Pn Illi.ois in ~ene~ue:a a~~ othe=
trips I made to Mexico and othe rs f or contacts : or a ~er:.oi o:
about--a little over U-.ree ~; ears .
At the sar.e t.:..r.e , : dici co:-.e
bacY. for period::> of tine ar.d tat;e U; r.y r c;al estate business a :1::.
work thr ouch telephone co~tacts and so forth unt:..l : had ~o [O
out again on a lot of different trips for various t~in;s .
don ' t --maybe thi ,.. is a rood tir:1e f or you to desc =ibe
u:ifolded , but
briefly what you did on the I~iehou se case as it
briefly , because I know that i s a book in itse lf .
\-:hy

Q:

A: Yeah . ~ell , it i s . I have--in f act , ~onna and Bill ~i ehou se

have sold their movie ri cht s and book right s and so on and so
forth and I ' ve cot t Ko or three boxes of ~ate=:..als and i t i s very
drawn out and cor.plicated , but basical2.y , du=ic.[. February o:
1976 , a grm.:r of nas}:ed nen we:-it tv h:.s house :..r. C;:.:-c:.cas a. ..hdna:pped him ;;. t gu:::poi nt. .
And they--i t :a::> c. ?c.::.. -r,:.. cc:.l t::-i:~. r.s .
It \:as a s;li nte: g r ot:.j f r om the o:i ? /-.:.,:; Co:-.r..l:. :.. s-:. t;=ou~
Venezuela.
And their de~ands were conpletely ~o::..tica: to ber:.~
with .
':'hey \:anted a il.anifesto publis!.ed. in \'er;e::.uelc:. , _ne ::e.:
York Tines , ~ht.? Lor.don I1ai l y r:e~s , a :id the French ?ape:::-- - :1 thi:,~:
its called Le 1-:onde , c:.n:1 it i,.;as so po2.itical t,'.-13.t t'.".e \'er. e::.uela.n
c;overnment wouldn ' t let it be putlished in \'e:-ie::.uel 2.
J,:.d- - I
don ' t want to get into too ~uch d.e~ail , but as a natt r o:
record , the t hen Pre s ide nt of Vene:uela , Car los hn~res ?ere::. ,
happened t o be l';i nister of Inte rior i:licn I '\-: c~s the :-e i:-1 the 60 ' s
durinc; the turbulent year s , and I h<.ci. a Good r elatio:-1sr,i p ,,:_ t l.
him , but he :asn ' t goi nc t.o chance l i s mi nd , a:-ic: 1-:e ~:e?t n.:.\i:. contacts ;;ith the terrorists .
~c had a sort o~ a little
headqua rter s at the Tar.a na ca hotel i-:he re I rar, the o-;e =a tio:. . J..-:.0
we ' d nake the contacts ,
etc .,
we ha~ to war~ ;;ith t~
authorities . But they told us that that couldn ' t be putlished in
Venezuela , even if we tried ~e couldn ' t , and that was riGht . Eu~
they would l ook at it most unfavorably if ;;e pablished it
overseas . \'.'ell Owen Illinois published it in the ;;e;; York ~ir;cs ,
the French paper , and the London Daily l\ei.:s .
And. as a s i deli:rn
the Venezuelan government confiscated the multi- million dolla r
Owen Illinois industri es in Venezuela .
0

Q:

Oh , my gosh .

A:
And--but to make a lone story s hort , the Pr esident calle~
back some of his older people tha t had r et ired and ~e set up-afte r we made contact afte r that , I s t ayed there . I i,.;as the
representative for Owen Illinois , and we used a fr i e:-id of the
Niehouses that worked with the Chemical Bank as what ;;e called
the "ball carrier" . He was the contact with the ;.:iC.na;iper s .

Q:

The rebel group?

A:
The rebel group , and he was bringing the messa5es bac~ and
f orth , and they had , about , at one time , about twelve pla :.n
clothes cars wired for sound and so on , and had him wired for

John

r.

i.,011ca11

sound , tryin1; to-- co finilll.v they s:rr unG a t :::-ar anci cot the
people that Kerc r eally the contacts .
Eut that didn't lead to
the people that were holdinG hiffi . 7his turned out to be a worldwide type of thine .

Q:

No kidciin1; !

A:
And then , we broke off--they just broke of~ contact with us
after that .
And for a number of years we had all ~inds o~ false
leads--people cominc forward su:;;iposed to kno"' i:here he v;as ,
others claimed that he was dead and so on and so forth .
And
finally I prevailed upon Mrs . Niehouce and we went to columni st
Jack Anderson , who published a thing in his colunn t'.lat he :ot.:ld
be the contact that would meet with them any place worldwide .
And the first message came out of Geneva , Sid t::.e:::-lanci .
It i-:as
dropped in an Owen Illinois drop box like they have there , and :.t
was delayed and we i.;eren' t able to try to f ollow up on their
demands .
And about a year later we got the second one out o:
somewhere in Si:ecien .
P.:id 1,-e could not really f;et--ani I
understand it--we couldn ' t Ct the co~?any to agree to--at that
time I believe it was a five million dollar r ansom ce~and and a
few other things .
But just be:o:-e r.e i-:as freec I ;.;e :ere get t:.:i:::;
contacts right out of New York City sent to Jae~ ~nderson in
l.'ashington , and the l ast one 1,as , if 1-:e were i-.-illing to pay a
seven million dollar ransom , to publish an ad in the J;ew Yori-~
Times that a villa was ~or rent --~anted to re nt--and put at least
seven r ooms--all that coded .
And a.gain , Owen Illnois wouldn ' t
Ke published that the nur1ber o: roows ~as
a6ree to it .
negotiable . (Lau5hs) .

Q:

(Laughs)

That ' s neat !

A:
They broke off negotiations again for a fei-.- nonths and then
came back again .
And each time they were sendinG 1-:hat i.;e call
"bonafides".
They had pictures of r:i ehouse readir.g the ua"Je r or
somethin6 like that , and--no question v;e were dealing with the
riGht people .
But in the meantime there were soi71e other people
ripping off the company that were trying to negotiate down in
Venezuela , but they finally got too careless and the police got
them , and we paid no r ansom , which was quite a wild story by
itself.

Q: Well , is this--thc fact that you ' d cet these nessages fron
different places--is that the indication that they ' re a world\{ide
.,group?
A: Yes , and I don ' t think we ' ll ever know--now , I ' ve cot to bac~
up a little .
As a result of the nessages etc . we p:.c %ed u; in
Caracas , there was overwhelming evidence on some other people .
They put a Vene~uelan Senator and a Venezuelan Congressman in
jail and went before the Supreme Court and revoked their
immunity .
They stayed in jail for several years .
But it may
have started out that way- - and then--from the time we published
the Manifesto that they we r e willing to negotiate for ransom .

John P. Longan
Q:

You say " it may have started out th.:::.t i.:ay "-- ?

A: With a local group--

Q: And then it

sno~balled

into--?

It snowballed in or-- I ' m not sure and I don ' t oelieve anyone
A:
else is really sure--

Q: Well , I guess the question that comes up is whether or not

there was a linkage ;;ith the Communist world movement or nussian
input in some way?
A: Well , I think it was a splinter group to the overall movement
and , on other cases that I ' ,.e known about and one othe r that T
was involved in , the~ use that to further thei r Oi:n :;iropagancia in
the various countries and then the ransom part o: it they use to
finance their operatior.s .

Q: So that! s the way they make it run?

ma~e

A:

Thats the way they

it r un , amonc other thinGS

Q:

Well then they --they dici--he was--i;iehouse :as released?

A:

Yes .

Q:

And you say no ransom Kas--

A:
I\o r ansom 1-:as paia .
Ee ~:as rescued ,
long--almost a dramatic story within itself .

Q: Maybe

we~d

Khich :..s

~:ind

o:

better save that for the book and the movi e , huh?

A: (Laughs) . ~ell , you know , I doubt if either one of then Kill

ever be published because at that time--! knoK I went to 7oledo
and I was there in their house answering the phone , etc ., and
everybody wanted to talk to them and they were interviewe~ on
camera by 20/20 and all the networks , but it has a way , Kith
time--with all the other subsequent events overshadowing them , I
(Laughs) But it was an
doubt if it will ever be published .
inter esting story .
But to f i nish up my consultant work , I GOt
acquainted with Jack Vii tchell , one of the employees :i th Jack
Anderson , the columnist , who was really our principal contact in
the Niehouse case , and we had a Peace Corpsman kidnapped down in
Colombia.
Of course as you know , the Government doesn ' t pay any
ransoms .
And as an aside , Diet;o Asencio , :ho was the De:;;uty
Chief of Kission in Vene~uela during the Niehouse case who K Or~ed
with me very closely , was Anbassador to Colombia a:ter he (Starr ,
the Peace Corpsman) was kidnapped .
And I was asked to come do~~
and help him out on that , but I was tied up with the Niehouse
case and couldn t .
And if you remember your history , later on
Diego Asencio himself was kidnapped .

Q:

No , I

hadn ~ t--

John F. Lone_;an
A: But
Niehouse

anyhow , so as not to ranble--lets jus~ kind of--when

was r eleased , I ~us w n r~1ng very closely also with
~ashington from the Office for Combating Ter roris~ .
Ke were also
t r ying to work with Richard Starr , the Feace Corps~an ' s , fa~ily ,
especi ally his "1other , 1.-ho was very--she had r;,a.de a nL<..-.ber of
t r ips and she was just decperate .
And after J:ie'..ouse 1.;as out
they called me and wanted to know if he could be interviewed by-they call ed in a couple of behavioral scientists- - in order to
allay the fears of the Peace Corpsman '.s mother .
And I -- ~nowinG
Bil l --I ' d never seen him befor e hi s rel ease , but I thought he ' d
do better , which he did--

Q: This is Bill Niehouse?

A:
Bill J!iehouse .
lie called her up--he ca:'._led Ui' Richard ' s
mother and reassured her and so on and so forth , and v a got
Anderson interested in it.
So he ;.ublisheC. a cc::'.. c:.;-.n or. t!-,:::. t -that there was no money and so on and so forth t~t he would
personally pay a r easonable a~ount to--ani guara~t~e to be
str aightforward on it . hnd we had a contact fro~ ~exica C~ty an~
ultimately it boiled down to where we too~ $250 , 000 ~n s~all
bills to Colombia and checked in at the ~ecucia~~ ~otel ani
called a pho:-ie number , then we' d be told. ;;ha t to do .
S') I i;as
called by Mi tchell- -i t ;,as on a 'lirnrsciay nie_::ht--and. I :.~le;.; i!1to
~ashington and ;.;e picked up $250,0GO in s~all bills ,
and I ~ea ~
small bills--a lot of them were 20 "s and it turneC. out there ,;e:ce
a few 10 ' s and 5-'s-- i t i..;eighed over 70 pounds- - a t tl-.ree bac-J:s ::._n
Washington and put it in a vault over~icht and bo~;ht our tic~ets
to Bogota and meantime wed made arranceffients ~or the E~bassy
there to meet us at planeside a:-id take us throus h cust o~s a:-id so
forth .
But we had to get through security i:-i E~a~i a~d.
Washington , so--by then we had some pretty [Ood priori ty - - t he
Secr etary of State called the head of the ~AA and we were
escor ted onto the plane with our $250 , 000 which , incidentally , I
went t o a surpl us military store and bought one of those big old
canvas bags and that ' s what we had the money in .
And we put it
in the Deputy Chief of Hission~ s safe in Bogota and negotiated
with our contacts for three or four days and we ended up by--at
four o~ clock one morning they picked us up in a Gercedes--it
tur ned out to be a Doctor , and drove out to a small a irpo rt .
Jack Mitchell and I and the Doctor and one other guy cot in a
littl e single engine plane wi th our $250 , 000 and just a ~ew
little odds and ends- -we couldn't taJ.:e our cloth es--a;,d. fl e i: over
the Andes to a little place call ed Nieva down in-- r~ ght at the
edge of the jungle in Southern Colombia . And we made our contact
and t urned the money over to thorn di r ectly and--I guess in a ll
instances the r e ' s got to be a certain element of tru s t in that ,
and there is--even those type of people , if you--the re ' s a
certain element of trust .
At least they said thi s package will
have to go--fi rst they wouldn '.t take i t in the military bag .
\1'e
had to unpack it and they had a guy there to count i t , then they
put it i n t wo liquor cases and I saw it take off in a jeep down
towards the jungle .
They said "It will be about a two hour jeep
ride ; it! ll be about 9 hours by horseback and about six or seven
hours of walking to get the money there and your man will come

,iolrn J lonc,.... n

out the sa.i:e ''::..y , but he shoulci (:- "--they [.a\c :..:s the ciay he
should be back .
So -..;e stayed there in the to~el , a~i oici.:y
enou6h I got a few calls fr om Bo[ota fron the [il~ ~c co~tacteci
~:ho apparently had a ":'.:'ir.ca " or a ra.nch out there sc:-.e:r.ere ;.::.. tr-.
a radio on it , and he said " \foll , they ' \e s!E.vcd r.if: -..;r.isf:ers o--r
and he ' 11 be--and he ' s back c..t :;ioi1~t nurr,ber so e:.:-.:::. so e:.:1ci. he
should be ther e to;iorroi;". J.'hen he calleci b~6: c..:1G. said. ";:o , :.. ts
been delayed a ci.ay " . So i n the mcanti.nc ''C li&.d made arran[;er:-.cr.ts
through the Ei:bassy anci. the Peace Corps- - they ha~ fioKn a Lea r
Jet down to Bocota tha t was settinc do~ n waiti~; for us t o call
them . And I was supposed to get in touch with Gener al ~odri sue::. ,
who was in charGe of the Southe rn r:ili tar y Cor.,;;,;::.nd o: Coloi71oi a
a:ter we e;ot the man out , and ~us"\:. cal:,. J;im an::i sc..y '' El hom"bre
esta aqui ", or "the man 's here" . J..nd he h"as deli \ereC. t o us anci.
I got in touch id th Gene r al Rodri gue::. a:-d I :'i;c:rei ;.:s i:e:::-e t,ofr..s;
to have a little trouble rettins out--that they ~ou l~ l::..ke to
debrief and so forth--but absolutely no ?rotle~ .
:t t~rnei out
thc.t hi s daur,hi..e:- had ma:-:-ied a Peace Co:::-r::-:-:an c:.:-::: : t:-.:..:::i-: he 1:as
hnd o: sy;c:pa'vhetic to us ( lauchs) .
3:n, r:e ~u::.-t C.ec:-:..e :-e:::. :-::..:-; a
little bit ar:d i,e GOt the clearance b..:-: !":-=! sc.::.. C. "::o;. :i::..e a
fli ght plan :Or Cali " because of tJ-,e r.arcct::..c::s t~ ::..:-.[s a:-,:::. tr.a"':.
type of thinr .
But to ~ake a l one sto:-y short , i ~~ulC. be
prearranged ; Ke filed for a fli cht ;lan fo:- Cali , th~t ' s :..r: the
Northern part , and we Kent over Cali in the Lear Jet at J0 , 000
feet (laughs) and l a nded at t he Br ook Air Base in ?ar:a~a and too~
our man t o the Gorgas Hos;ital Khere he Kas checkei out
overnight . His Dother was there . I cot on a ~lane and ca~ e hc~e
and then Kitchell and people Kent on to ~ash in;ton ani had all
thei r ';', \' , anci-- ( l augr.s) tr.at i:as :.,. F"ecrua:-:; of ' 80 , so I
haven ' t done any consultins Ko r~ since the:-: .

Q:

Uh--the-- I know you

Corpsman ' s name?

A:

mentioned ,

but what

was

the

Peace

Richard Starr --S- T- A- R- R.

Q: And did he--did he come out with any books and--?

A:
Yeah . Anderson-- I think par t of the deal--he actually-- Jack
Anderson himself actually borrowed that $250 , 000 and he r ecoupei
part of it throu&h some of the book rights etc .

Q: Oh , I see .

Tha t s how the--

A:
And a~parently Richar d Starr has done quite well. He ' s with
the Government .
Jie GOt a - - I t hink it i.;as about a G. S. 12 or
something .
I ~ ve
heard from his reother a t i ~e o:::- t~o at Christ~~s
and--I haven ' t heard much from him , but he Kas in ve ry good
physical shape . He had this parr ot that he--I thin~ he named h~n
Gromyko or something (laughs) --but Ke had to get the parr ot out
of there ; he ' d lived with it all those years , and that Kas a
little--being overseas yourself you know what a chore that i s
getting him in from Panama . But--

(' : Kell tho:::c an: t i,o v e r y i nte r cst:..:-ic aid :.. r.?0 :- tc::~ ... asxe:-:1,;.::-r-' s .
Did the l atter shoi.: any Ko rl C:.~icie cor-,:iectior.s l i ::e t!-:e :e .e:.ue:i.ar.
one did?
A:

lio .

Q:

It :a s pur ely--:

A:
No , i t ...-i.s a r u r al Gr oup--I t!"linl: iti::; called the ? . .t. .r.-Fuerces Arnt:tda:::; F.ebe lcies--that--1 hey just ki nd of c o:-:trol the
Southern part of Colombi a --ha ve for ye2rs .
The -- ~:. c ~ard
Starr
was sent up ther e --h c KaG a spec i ali st i n t r opica.l insects ,
really , a nd he ' d tJeen i n t liiG li ttl e villace v:ay out t !,e ::.' e in tr:e
boondocks 01:ly about a Keel-: or t;io ;1he;1 he i-:u.s ki d:r-.&.:;:~:::d .
':'Le~
came i n and shot up the villa~e and so on and so ~o :-th a~i fou~d
this Grint;o \:ho didn ' t s:peaf;. rmch Spa:--.:. sh at tha. t ti:-:e , a.nd they
jus t took hi r..

Q:

So i t v:as kind
the f . A. R. ?

o~

a spur of

~ he

none t th:.. nc

c ~ t~e

7a=t

of

It l\aS a sru:- o: the rr.O~;e!1t thi ne , ur:j then --2~t ~e l:.ye.:.

A:
rii;ht up in tlie--rno:ed a r ound ;d th the:--. - t.~i(:ir ca:-.:- :~c:--- ;.:e::..:.. ,
J;iehouse h"aS held for t riree year s and four r.10:,tJ-.s a :-.G. ~ta:;:-:- ''"-3
just unde r tl1a t .

Q: A long dr a Kn - out thi nG, i s that

A:

r i5~t?

I guess so .

Takes alot of patie nce and pe r serverance to r.aJ:e tilese eYer.t::

have a suitable endi ng .

Q:

A:
Well , I d i dn ' t --oddly enouch , both of then ca~e out in [OOi
physical condition and neither haci the so- called " Stocf":r.o:..:--.
Syndr ome " i\her e the.Y could r e l ate to thei r ca;;to:::-s . I n f act "':.he::
both h"e r e --they despi s e then , p r etty much .
The toughest thi ne
Jim, r eally , i s on the fa nilies .
Q:

The

doesn~t

fSUY on t he spot ,
s ur vi v e , huh?

A:
Yes .
bea r d .

he e ithe r s urvi v es p -re tty well or

Nie house lo s t 40 pounds a nd had a thr ee yea r groh"th

he
o~

Q:
Hnn .
Yeah , those i.;ould be some e xperie nces no :::atter i.:hic!,
end of t hem that you ;er e i n on , even on your end. , I :ould biles:; .
Well , docs that pret ty v:ell wrap u~ v:hat you ciid e x cept the r eal
estate busine s s ba ck he re in Bentonville ?

A:

That ' s ris ht .

I ' ve just b e en s emi - active in rea l e state .

Q: Well , ok . So we ' ve cove r ed you r backgr ound a nd soffiev:hat your

foreground f r om t he e xpe r ie nce in overseas Puhli c Safet y ;:ark .
Woul d you s a y tha t there.'-s anything i n your backs r ound that

10

John F. LonGiln
forc:..c:-i
in -che

prepared you to co into l:or~:in[ Ki th

foreicn peo 1 le in their ow:-1 cour;"L:::-::.es
Publi c Safety field?
particularly

60ver~~ents

and

A: Well, I think at the tine I v:as ci ven the job they tho-...:.r,ht r.;y
backe;round fitted , but in retrospect I ' m not too sure it did .
Q:

Why did they think it did?

A: Well , because I had had experience in the

aspects and the military aspects--

civil

police

Q: In the Coastr,uard?
A:
In the Coast[:Uard , because I wa.s in a s:;:>eciali>:;ej ty::;:ie o:
thing .
In addition to the coffibat thinGG we co~bat - load.ed
explosi\ e~.
a1,ci petr oleur:-.--and the:-, the Eiorde r Pa-':-rc l.
I c~u st
kind of had a gene:-al bac~:rrouna a:1d. this ;;a.s so:ietr-1::.r.c ne,: , cut
you really--it Kasn ~ t--there were no rna:1uals--the:-e wa~ r;o"L~~~c-
you just kind of had to [O in and k~nd o: iearn it a~i
~~o~
that when I started I thouGjt that probably the u . ~ . wa; was the
only way , but you learn a3 you 50 alon5 its not e ve~ the best ~ay
to do thine;s .
Q:
And , lets see--,
going for you there?

la:<c;uac;e abili ty--did you have

anythinf;

A: Well , I thought tha.t I spoke pr etty cood Spa:-iish but i t

turned out I spoke Mex- Tex and when I sot into a ~ ider vocabular!
I found out that I was very liraited in la:1GUaGe .
You and ~ w9~t
to languaGe school together (la u6hs) .
Q:
Yeah ,
Guatemala .

(lauGhs)

I remember how we strugGled with S?anish i~

A:
I thou[;ht that I v:as pretty GOOd in Spar,is:t but I -- i t
:as
only in my little limited field , but I think that Spanish is very
important . I v:i sh that I had been more fluent- - or , any lanbilase .
Portuguese--I think you ' ve got better Portuguese .

Q:

Well , of course I started out with Portuguese , then I had to

convert to Spanish and the n convert back to Portu5uese .
But in
regard to living in different cultures or s tudyinc diffe r e~ t
countries or special interest s in history or sociolOGY or- -is
there anything in that r egard that would have been a plus for you
in getting into work with other countries?
A: Ho , I don '-t think so . I think I was just v.oe:ully inadequate
to what to expect in these countries when I went in .

Of

course , that's not necessarily your fault .

I guess it
comes down to what were the policies of the peopl e in the
or ganization that recruited you , or did they have policie s?
Q:

11

john P. Loncan
A:
They r eally didn '.t ,
\.'e--<.:.t the> t ine= :e:.:.---.:e had 'c.i:o
peopl e i n Guc..tenala a nd t...-c Jeo:;-iie ii. BoE\'i3. a :-.i tJ-.~t :a~ t:.e
Latin Ameri ca coul1'.. ries and :c 'l'e r " <~l.::. ,:ust st.::.:--::.:..r.~ o;.;t ;.,-:;., 7-h-Ke had no one except Nith u . c . exrcrie~ce to ro ~2Kn and try to
iriplernent "hat

o!:.t~ 1, ~ib ly l:ac

U. S .

rolic,r at

tL~ ..

did chanGe f:-o~ t i me to time ove r the 16 year s

it- - or I was i n i t .

:_. :_~ie ,

a:,d

t~at Ne

'l'e =e

.:

.L

:..n

Q: W
ell , lets cone Lael-: t o that r.ctter- - 1:hat ,.:c.:: :: . ::: . ! C-:.c~, c.:-:::
ho" has it chancei , ~ cause I th i n~ th~ts an i mrortc.:..nt ~atter , b t
right now I --you ment ioned t hin[S t hat wer e }:inU. o: gooi or b:d
or iffy in your backc:r ouni and e}:_,.eri12nce fo :- the :::- :-~: o\e r :o:ec.:..:. .
\!as ther e anythinc t hat -.:as par 1,ic;.i:'..c...:-ly baci or :;i~:-t:.c;.;.lar l:, coci
in your bt:.CkGrOUnd Khen JOU actually Ot i nto it--ttat p:-oved to
be good or pr oved to be bad?

A: Keli , i thin~ Khat ?roved to be b~d -- o:- ~~-:d h~vc bee~

really ins~ :-ro;.i~table :..f you hain ~ t ada?ted-- Ko~:~ -- ~0 ~e loc~el
in t o the Kc..y t!.a t yo11 had learr.eci to cio i 1, :.. ~-, t.'.':<.:: 0 . S .
?o:exampl e-Q:
So , freedol'i of--some C'O !~:.icierable free o:i ~-.:, _c:::.::t i ;-. those
ear ly year s i n r ec.:..rci to fOlic:i" :as a cood. :..ce.:.?

A: You -- t hat ~ s rirht . Your policy direct:..vez -- t~ey ~ :.c~t. v&:-y ,

J.'.d say , fror.i a1if11i ni str ation to a.dr~1 ini stra t ion or : r or. year to
year , but whatever t he policies were , you h~l z r~etty ~:..c.e
latit ude t o "ct sour _:,our o.:n otjccti ves a:1ci t:-:: -:o r:.i-':. the:-. c:-.
paper and r each then , bt:.t it i..-as a :ot easie:- 1,0 set. t:-.e:-. C.o ~:: . o-paper and define your objectives than i t i;as t.o reach the:-. :..r,
most i nstances .

Q: ~e ll now, of course , we hear a l ot about

i t t hey call t hem? HlLuan liberties?

hu~a~ -- the -- ~hat

is

Q: Was anybody t hinking about s uch ma t te r s in te r ms of pol icy

those year s when you we r e r ecr uited?

i~

A:

Huma n rights .

Q: Human r ights?
A:

Yes .

A:
Yes .
We wer e t hi nki ng about human rights , ani o~e of the
main thrust s 'l'as--you know, :her e you wer e havint; urban ter ror:..si7i
and riots and that type of thi ng--was to i nc r ease the ca~abi lities
of the security fo r ces e tc . to cont r ol i t i n a no:-e h:ir.a~itarian
way .
In ot he r wor ds , use tear gas and r ubber bullets and bounce
birdshot off the pavement or somethinG r a ther t han f i r i ng i n t he
Our policy was alwa ys t o upgr ade the ir
air or fir ing at them.
capabilities to maintain l a w and or der , pr ot e c t lives a nd
pr oper ty , a nd to do i t as hwnane ly--but t he r e were accusat ions , a
l ot of them from the extreme l eft that was pr etty we l l o rgani~ed ,
t hat --and the key thing , I guess , Jim--you didn.'.t control t he

12

John F. Loncan
country tint you ''ere -'"ryinc to u1cr<:v:ie t:,cir-- c&~'.::.1 i::!.i :,iP::: . You
really , control oi.i1er th<!.:i the in:lucr.cC' yo-.i could hnve
u1 on the ;:..uthor.:.. ties tha-t --L:. t --:ro:-: tLe 1.:orY..:..nc lE-Yel to tl.e :.c;
goYerrunci.t len:~l. And hur.:lr. rit;ht:: or az~:. oti.cr t'."'.i:.c t!.r.t--t'.1c
police and civil authori~ier -- toK rood or Lad they ~c=e *as
directly related to just i:hat that rovcrnnent v:as .
=: yo,1 hr,::! a
su;ipressive i;overnrr.ent like--no qi.;.e::;ticn aliou~. f.a.-:o:::.c.. a11d ::o::-.e c:
theM , they we r e coin; to reflect ~~e ~olicies o:--ace~cies ~e=e
going to reflect tl.e policie::; of OYE:rn.".ent 1-:r.ici1 1-:ere-hd no,

Q: So that ~ s Khat you could expect .

~oKever , th~t sort o: tS.:..~c

always occur .
I knoK it probably would occur le:::: in the
health field as com~ared to the public sa:ety field wti ch ::..s ~ore
sensiti vc politically , I s;;.::;1)ect . ~ut I cu,.,::~ you ' <e e:::-.<:.:l 2.i:::.e.3.
that , at least i11 the bet;inninG o: "'.,{1" ;irot;ra:". , ::::.e;.:::..oi:::.::.. ~:: policies , at l east hoK the policies are i~ple~ente~ , is r=e-.ty
fildn ~t

v.

inportar.t ,

and

you've

e::t.a.tlisr.ed too tha: the

c~ :.t e8..

:~a-:.es

policy has ali.;ays been on tl.e siG.e o: hu.ar: r.:..,-hts .

A: 7here~s no que:::-.ion abo'Jt the : . ~ . ~~licy alKa~s :e::..~c on t~e
side of hwna11 rich"v::> .
':'hi:re ha\'e been tines i:her. ,,.:e \-:ere :-.c=e
vocal about it than at otlier tirr.e:: ,
:;: tr.ir.k u:,d.er the Ca=te=
adninistration , probably , i:e v:erc r.ore: \oca2. but t.l-1::-e ' s ;-;~
quest.:..on in ~y ~.:..nd that K e ~ve alv:ay::; e;-;courarecl ~~~a~ =ichts a~~
deP1anded it to the e):tent ti.at :e r.z.C. an,y le,erace .
Q:
Yeah , the anount of leverar0 tr1at you k<Y: ir. i.:or~:i:-,::
denocra:.icallj v:i ", h ano:her co,ernr.e:1t an::. ::.. ts }"eo:;..l:.:: ::..s -:..:.:..ts
limited , Khich = cuess gets r.:..r:-it C.01:?, to the cru.:: c: tec:-.::.:..c:.::..
assistance and foreit;n aid .
no~-: ci.o yo'J ci.o q_;;.i L..e a tit ;.-:. t.:. :er;:
limited leverace?
But before i.;e cet into that , ~ v:a~t to as~
what your attitude v:as tov:arci. governnent--in this country-- v:as in
those years before you v:ent into the Foreign Service .
rid you
think of government as--as I did--r:-iaybc a neces:::ar~.- e,il but
nevertheless an evil , or did you thin~ about the role o:
government in society? \..'hat was your attitude tOl:arci govern..r..ent?

A:

You rr.ean our government?

Q:
Yes , the U. S.
local governments ,

Government including the Federal ,

State

a~~

A: Well , that is about all I could comment on because I had no

J..s :ar as our
knowledge of foreign governnent at the tine .
government i s concerned, in the Border ?atrol and so~e o: the
stations (I held ) I just felt like it was the best in the v:orld .
It was the most dedicated , and in working with State Police
agencies , most of them v:ere pretty good .
The local police and
sheriff ' s offices that v:e r e politically controlled and you had a
different ballgane . Some of them were good and some of them ~ere
par tisan , politically controlled .

Q: Jake , how did you happen to get into the foreign field work
in public safety? Any particular long rani;e goal or ci.id you just
happen to fall into it?
(

1J

.,,;.,. J,

lo~-- .

J.

/.. :
In my case it :;:0 :;..ist a h<'~r:;-e11:::;tance . ::: :.aC. oee:i sc:i:. :r'"':-.
the San F'ranci::;co district r: the Border Tt: t:-o::. :..nto i-.'a:::;~:ir:,...t.c:.
and wa.s doin.r- :;;or.e irn3<ructinr in o:-.e o: ti.e ::;choc::..s the~; :-.:.c.
fOini:; .
iie ho..d an o::icer by the :-.ar.e o: ::Jei.:i t t E:::..r~:.all ;;:-:o .:c..s
coinG do;m to Gu:rr.e:-,;;,,2.a to do a G r;o;~~.h stu~y o: t:-.e Gu::..:-i~ cc
tiacienda , sort o: li~:e a bor' er :;,:::..trol i!. Gt.:a:.e:-.a ::..a .
::0--I
talked with him and he cavE ffie a phone na~ber to call .
~ c~:leJ
and talked with ryr on Engle , filled out the :or~ 57 and 15 day~
later I wac 0:1e out to California anu r ollec UJ' :-.y tent so to
speak and was back in \: .::shinGton and entered on duty Hi th v:!-.:-.":.
was then called the International Coopcra ti on .L.C.ministra tio:-. ,
ostensibly with r eemployraent ri ghts and to serve JO months only .
But--

Q: Did your wife-- ~as she in on thi~ deci:ion or die this

pretty fa:::t-- so fast that she didr. '.t have r.uch tir.e to
about it and say " yes", " no ", or 1:hateve:::-?

ha~7e~

tr.:'..:-.;;

/.. : \.'ell , probarl,\' the l at:.er , Jim . She ::.id.r, ' t i..::.':e r:t.:c~. t:'..1.e to
think about it aEd fror. a personal stanC.?O:'..!,t , :Jo.:-ot'.-:v -.:a:::-, - :'..:.
too good of heal~h at that tine &nd Ke h~- a litt~e t.:-ouble -- ~hey
had to give a waiver to ge"~ the first ove::::-seas ;::eC.ical cle.::.:.rance .
Q:

Oh .

A: But I don ~ t thin~ she Kas orpoce1 to it , and after v: e rot

overseas , where you had the servants and a feK thir:;s li~ c t~1~ ,
I think she felt and :;: tr.ink she still feel:: t!.at ',;e f'.f;.ie -:.: .e
right decision .
But I doubt if she had too nuch i~;~t at t~~~
time because it moved so fast .
\.,'ell , I didn 't--uh-- I did kind of interru:;_1t you:- sto:-~: the:-e ,
I i;uess , so you cane bac~: to Califorr.ia ar. 4 'tr.er: ~'OU v:e;-it fro:-.
there to--Guatemala v:as your fir st assie;rJient?

Q:

A: Yes .

I went through an orientation period in a fe~ Keeks a~i

well , about two and a half months in \..'ashincton before I :ent to
Guatemala .
And the aGreement was fo r med with the Guatemalan covernmcnt
and the Americ<i.J. gove rnment , I suppose , mostly through the
Embassy in Guatemala or through a Washington office?
Q:

A: No . Our program was just like all the progra~s at that ti;::e .
Before we went into any country you had to have a --first - - a
formal reque ~t from that country for that tyre of assistance
which came through an Embassy .
Then you ah;ays had to ha\e a
and then
survey team that went in that made a little stuC.y
recommended the program . So , I think that I mentioned before , at
that time there were only tl;o proi;rams being r equested anC. they
were very new ; one I went to in Guatemala and one other in
Bolivia .

14

AnJ wh:it 1;er e your ta::;l:::- coinr to be in Gu::te ~.ala as .:ere

delineated unrir:r the policie ... and tlic procru.r:-; ti.at the su::-: e;r
team came up wi tr.?

0:

h:
Kell , my t.itle 1-:as ?i.;blic c-:-::.:et;; .~iYiso: , ':"r::..i:-:.:.:.;, at. t:.:.:.:.
pa r ticular tiir.e , and = :a:: i:. tLc "':,:ain:.r. 0 ac:;:: 0ct.s o: :.t , a: .::. -...:e
;;ere workins 1:ii.L : our di::'::'ere;-;t 7r ::.ice e:.ce1.cie::: ; t~. e ::c.. :.:.. c.c:.:.
:::'olice ; a:.d the Gua:::.dic. cie h.::.cir;.d&. ;-;:.icl 1:;;..s rea~ly so1. e:.:~:.:. _:
1

like our Bord~r T'a trol c..~ .~ Custci-.::: ;

a.n 1 ..Tud~cia:..

:F ol2-ce ,

1-:: .:. c:-!

is kind of a com1Jina ti on of our Del1~rtrient of Justice and ;::: ,

i ntellicence ar.J other1:Lc1? ; an l tlier, t!,c I eni tent:.ary 2yste:-. .
And I was the Traininr, Offic er for all of it , an:l each o:
t ~ en
required a ::;cpar a te sur vey- - tli!: onE.--t he :r-.ord er Patrol made by
DeWitt ~ar::;h~ll and then all of the~ had been su rv ~ y ed .
~e ~ade
the Judi cial Police s urvey anJ t.he T c..11.:.. tcntiar .v sur:e:f after I
Kas the r e .
Incidenti a lly , ~im Ecn~ett , hcaj of tte ~ . E . Bu:rea~
of Prisons , ma.de the :.r.i tial pei,i te1,tia:-y sur:e:: :o: u:: :.r:
Guatemala .
Q:

Oh , thats interestir.t:; .

J.. :
So ba:::.cc::.lly , ny r es;o:-1::.i():.:. i l.;: , c::- <.tt lea.:::: :-.~: -:,:_-;;,::_c. , -.::..:::
':'raininG Officer . Eut ;:e haci or:ly a Chis: a ;,:: ::::~,,::..:~ c::.:~-: ;.:(? ," ..;.::::.
really }:ind of 1-;orl:eci across the bo:..r d tocet:'le:-- - :.. t ,:as Sile:--, c..
small procram .
Q:

The Chief--you're speak.inc; of a 1.other /,me:ricar.?

Each country had -..:h:1t'::. cc.lle:l a cr::..e:

A:
Yeah--Da\c L:l.uc;hlin .
c:Advisor
anC. then you had vari ous -- li~e -- trc::.in:.. :-:.c--a :- ea
whatever--advisors .
\.' hat was the settinc; on the Guatenalan s i de tha.t
expected to work with?
Q:

~ou

;-:~re

A:
\:ell , it hadn.' t been too lone , a:: you :-eca::L::. , the Ar::e::i::;
l;Overnment
haci.
been--i t was a
Co:-::iu:.ist
gove:-:L1ent--;.:as
overthrown in 1954 , at that time by--the E;Uj' in the f o r efr ont-and its an open secret if it is a secret that we were pretty well
i nvol ved , I c;uess .
Q:

You 're speab nG of t he C. I. A. involveme nt?

A:
Yea h , the U. S. Govern:nent , C. I.A ., semi- covert . P.ut the ma:-,
that came in and was made President as a re::;ult of that coup was
President (Carlos) Castillo Armas , a nd we were trying t o urcra~e
the carabili tics of the Guate;.ialan rovc rnne :1t and so on a:id so
:orth to-- as we talked about before--the usual ~t:.:i;- - :-:a :.~ta:..~
law and order , protect lives and :;:-roperty , anri [Uar::. acai:-.s'..
future subver:::;ion .
And I haci. taY.e:i a little bit o: o:?::.enta "'..io:,
from the Secr et Service there at the White liouse i:. i:ashi ncton ,
and we had a little special tean that was goinG ciown to set up a
so- called body guard fo r Castillo Armas as part of the prog rar.-t hey were getting r eady for elections .
And of course he was

15

john P. Lont;a!1
assassinated before I got thrrc- - I 1 eli e ve y ou Ke r e there

a~

the

time .

Q: Right .

So it Kas

p rira~rily trai~i~c

you were e xpected to--

A: Well , pr iMct.ril y tra.i1in[ Kar:; ~y title , but t~e s~eci~i c

activities we were aimin[ at 1-;e rc i1r.; rovir.t:; :;'Olice capabilities .
~:

I (jliess what I '.r1 g ettinc a t i s ":.ether or not there 1-:ere ans

schools--sct up ly the Guat emalans tha t you
could just pluc in and start. to do your .lvra ininc .
~hools-- trainine

A:
~o .
At that tine the r e wasn ' t ,
And ~e we r e involved i;i
police ort;ani :::,z,. "!..io!1 , acir:1ini str a tioi. , and or e :-a ti r.c _?:::-oce ::u:::-e:3 us
..-ell as traininc .
5ut Ki "'.:.h the J:a:. i o:ic..l ?oEcc 1-:e e::::.c..:;:::..i ;:l.c:i a
local Police Acadcny at the National Police afte:::- : [Ot t~e:::-c -- :
helped establish it ,
Q,:

Good .

J.. : Anci the sa::-1e way ~i th ti1e Gu<:..rd:'.a de H<:..cii:n:ia--:.:,e:: f:::;:i -.:.:.e::own little schoolinc pro;r a:": , but it w<~s :;:retty ;ri1.:'."'.:ive a :.:i a:.
that time 1-:e hc..ci no 1-:ay to trct.ir.. :;:ie0r::.e outsiC:c cf t:-1e cou:."';,::: .
We didn.'t ha ve an Internationu.l or ::;:,;':,er/,r.ed cun Felice /..ca'i.r:::-:i;i- .
We sent a fe: to Puerto Rico which i::. about t l e nea r e::ot we coul'1 .
And I recall so;i1c of t!1e ~raininc fi:'... ms tha. t I had. rut tocP hc:r-the 1-;a y we ~ 1 u~ the::i i~1 ~;2 r:isl1 t::.ci: thc!1 -- I hc..i an intc : : - "'.'rL ~,Pr
that we turned the ~ound o:::r on the :::~ilr. an:i ;:e li-.d a trc.r.:-c:r:'..; ~
and it -..:as on a tape r ecorder for ~a~e of our v:'_3~al aid::. a~~ a
lot of times you didn~t have lip sync or anythinc--it -..:a::o pret~ y
primitive to start with .
Q: ( Laut:;hs)

\fo ll , what else i s thcre-- if an;1thinc--i n r erar.:l to

the organi:;:;ation-- the settin.::;--in which you rnrkeci i:J Guate1.ala?

A: Well , they we r e ve ry linited in equipment of any kind ,

especially in the i nt e rior , and one of the big proble~s was - - the
U. S. Gover!"1'11cnt--that was a commodity p roc;r am where >;e did put
some money into equipment , which was differ ent fr om some of the
other countries li~e Venezuela where the y bou ~ht their own .
Put
we went in and upgraded the
communication
syst em ,
the
transportation system ; but the ti c probler;i , and it was ne ve r
solved , was--tl cy wa nted to kee:p most of the i::;ood cars in the
capital , the best equipment in the ca_?i tal , and i:'.:' you -..:e:::-e !. t
careful some of the best police equi:;>incnts 1-:ere pu~ en ru;::.rJ.i .. c;
some of the hic;he r govern.1cnt o:!:'ficials r a t her than out on the
street duty , so it Kas awfully ha rd to bring then around to our
idea of the best wa y to do it .
We were lookins at lone; ranee
problems .
\fo upg racied each director of a police agency or
President
or
a
Governor ;
they Ke re looking
at
their
administration or term in office .
So the political aspects of
it and the facts of life aspects of it and I guess you could just
say the plain old greed and self- interest that goes along with
the human r ace was very prominent , not only in Guatemala but in
other places ,

16

Q: So Kould you consider Guatemala a success or

ne~1u~

succc::::::?

A:
~;aq;i nal success ,
:::-ez..lly , ave:- the lone haul . -" :.y cni o:'!.our r eport I pointed out :::one o:- t.i.e successes anc :::or.e o: t:'le
!'ailures , but I would cor.;:;ider it node rate to r.ar!_;:.:1al .
':'!1:\:
were upcraded but you chance ad.minirtrc.tionc , you cha.r1f"e head.::. o:
organi zations , ai.d a lot of the equi?r,er.t and boo~:s c.r:ci tr.;..i:1in::;
materials and even some of tile surveys and so forth ;.;ould co
along with them , and the succeedinc aGencies --you kno~ they had a
number of military coups-- so I ~ould have t o say in a ll ho~e:::ty
it was no better than moO.erate , probc..ul:; a m~rcinal :::.ucce:::~ , :or
a permanent ty;.ie thint; .

Q:

Yeah .

Of course , you r:er e there :rc1.--

A:
I was 0111,v there :::- r OP't I 57 to I ~5' hut the rrocrc..:-. ;.;en"" o;.
:or--well , it >;;is stil2- c;oinr whPn : r~tire.l ir. ' 73 , c.n".i I ;;.:::.:::
back throurh ther~ i,.;Len = 1:~::: Chie: o: -ciJe La-:ir. .4--:'3r:_ce:...::. =::-c.:.c! .
on inspection tour and so f0rth ar.'3. :::-e\:.si teci a lot o: t'.-.e:-. a: . .: ,
I saw then :irl.ti1.c \:it'.':--t:.is KO"Jlci. r.aYC oner. 2:. ~::,~~-- I :::.:::.;:
them fightinc some of the sane prol.ler.s we 1-;cre :'if/.ti:1c i:.
5-;really.
Q:
So
the
ori;ani:;:;ational r..attcrs
of
the
po:!.:.cc--"Jh::
institutional structures--hadn t rtraii;htsned out that n ~ch?

A:

~o , t hey

hadn t .

Q: Ho: about any--oh , you r1icht say outst.an::..:n.::;

in~i \-:.~uc..ls

you mi&ht have noted duri nc the ti~e that you Kere ttere .
they make the grade or O.id they cive U? in ciiscourae~e~t?
A:
Well , alot of them [.aYe up ii. discoura(;e;::ent or ;..; ere just
eliminated
in changes of adr.linistrations or f o r political
reasons , and I really am not able to folloK it on an indivi~ual
basis . too close .
I can e;i ve you one instance .
: tr; in~~ it r:as
late '57 that the Deputy Chief of the J:ational Police ar1ci. I 1:e r e
on a field trip up in l!uehuetcnani:;o--you know where that is?-- a
little town out of Que:;:;al tena nco where the police are on foo-: ;
there wasn' t a vehi c l e at all . This particular younr: chi1.p was
barefooted , hardly clothed , had on his old rac;- ta.:; police uni for:-:
and was barefooted-- but he just kind of stood out , a:-1..l I too~: a
liking to hin a11d the Dep-..1ty Chief d.id , a:1d we broush-':. bin ir.to
Guatemala City and he worY.ed there in the Police Acacie:-:y , a :,;;.
that~s
r:here he was when I le~t there in ~ 50 .
I think it ~u:::t
have been 1965 or thereabouts , I went t o a craduation ceremony at
our International Police Acadern;1 1 and it so happened that he ;.;as
the valedictorian . And he had come up a lon5 way ; I think he had
the r ank of a Lieute nant .
And that was a success stor.Y if I h"as
t o leave it right there .
But then two years later --I was in
Venezuela at the time - I went to this graduation--t;.;o years
later , in late' 67 when I was back in GuatemaJa , he had left the
National Police and was working for the U. S. O. M. (U . S . Operation

17

Ir

l1lJ

~iGsion to Guaten~la , the U . ~ . OJcratio~ cf th0 S~~~~~y .

:o he ' ~
left , and I thini-: he proball:Y ::;t<tyeG. :ith our co;cc:-:-_-.-:: .. t c.::- a
local ett::t>loyce for 2., n ur;,hc r o: _Ye;).T C I
"t:ut f:C :,1~ -v
cot
disench<rnted , I cucss , or h e cou lo r:ic..J:c more , l i<: \' e a t ;::tcr li:-e
and better pa y .
~ : \!ell , that , I t;UC'~C , r:-etty :ell S'J.r.\S u:; th~ j ob o"ci::S::-V<:..tio:.s
c;,nd your fe e lings about them . \"l1at :;: rea.li::.eJ 1-:e or-.it-;-,ci to a::~:
about , t o talk about your a :1d :Jorothy' s reactio:1s t o GJ:::.te:-.2:.::.a
and the people and tne :problews a :1d the fun of no-.- ::.. r.[ 1,!"!~::-e a:-.1
getti ng into the Gua te;;ialan Ka y of l i vint; .
A:
Well , r eally it was quite a n ex~erience . Ea thy , cur you ::ce :daui;hter , was not q..ti te 6-- I thir,;: she Kan 5.
J..r-:C.. ;-:e G..:-oYe to
Guatemala .
\:e lournt
a ca:- in \:asr.in,st o:1 c.n:i. d.:-0: t: t!-!:::.ouc:1
Hexico , and bac~ at that t ::..me--you ~ay have done that-- Ke ha~ to
put the car o!, a flc.t ca r at Ton<:.la , '.:exi co a:i:i :-:..c:" ci:>-:n 1,hc..t
little old railroad fo r about 18 or 20 hour s ir..to Ta?c.chula .

Q:

Yes , in fact we did too .

!\ :
And that Wd..:J qui-1,:.e a1 1 CXJlc, rienc~ , lllt : h~. . d E.r~;t \<:. ::d a.i"".i::a-l
and when I crossed ?uer..te ':'alisr.ia n to dri \'e :.. r:t.o Guatc;-.::.la , the:::-e
was a J;c..tiona l Pol:..ce Ca?tc..in and a sq_uaC. oi' r,c: . t~.::.~" :,~.. 2...;te..:.
me the r e at the center o: the bri . -: re , an:i a::; soon a:> ~.'.':i::; [C-Z. t'. .e
tac nllf.lber , :hich I' d sent on c:..Le;;.C: , they r,a::c i'lO a :;:re =.:..c-: :.r:..:e:i i.to Guatemala City and. De\.'itt ::a r s hall had 17,c.::.c a :-:-a ;.,-e :-.e :.t:
with soneone on h orie lea.vc , and we d.rov e thr ouc!i a [:l".:.e ir:-: o c..
nice house already furni shed l:i tr, a:1 out::idc do; c..:.:: a !1 :..:-:c:..rie
dos and a~ Enclich sreakinc ~ai~ a1 .j dinner Ku:: rea::.~ .
(~=-~:~:)
So that was my first ha rdshi p post .

Yeah , thats pretty first class cor.rpar ed to i-:l1at ;-.o::;t :;:eo:;:::.e

went t hrough .

Q:

A:
Thats right--and wha t v:e went thr ouch on sone of our other
changes .
But it was a chanGe , you knoK, the custo~E and so on
and so forth , but I ~ ll have to say that both ny ciau~hter c..nd wife
adjusted to it very fast .
I was pretty frustrated tryinG to get
something done for my f i r st year , at least .
ThinGS didn ~ t move
as fast as you.'.d like for them to .

Q: Well tha t s for s ure .

I c a n remembe r the t wo of u s ctudy inc
Spani sh toccthc r , for one thing ; and the n another r ecollection
'rias the marimba band. a:id the party at your place on the 1.Jth o:July , was that?
A:

No , it was my birthday .

Q:

Oh , i t was your b irthday .

A:
Yeah .
That was a Guatemal an custom , I guess , for them to
come to your house on y our bi rthday or somethini; , and this Deputy
Chief of the National Police , he and I had got ten to be pretty
close , and somehow h e fou nd out about my birthday .
But wha t .'s

John l . Lonca:i
i ronic aiout th.-.. t , Jir-1- - ;e ;-:er" haYir{ a i i "'..:Uc t:. t o~' 1.:..:1-::'r
ter rori :::;;n bacl: then .
Oi..;tsicie the cate of \:1.c:-e 1:c ..:sr0 1 :.. y:_i.:; I
about 2 or ;. r.i[;h~ ~ oc:'.'orc , sN.cone h<:.:l :;-u~ :::o:-e C.~::-.:..:-.:. te a!t.l
blew UJ' a en:- <.. :.a ;-:or:e c:s u_;1 . } ut r..t I.. o clo6: :..1 :.:.c ;-.or :-.:..:ic c :.
1iy birthday , you k!1ol: hoi-: t!ie~: a:-c for ::::100~ :..:.~ o:: :- :.=.- ,;, ,:-:: r!-: ~ <:..:-.-:
:;:-yroteclinic:::;--I he::ir G. a bunc:i o: f:..re...:o:rl:s 2..:-.d so :-orth [-'.Y:.:.c
of: I ai1d I i.,hour-M, ":::: co::;i1 ' ;:ha.". ::: ro:.:.c 0:1 CUl.. -...:.ere :-.c-.:':- " ' ::..:-.i
I turned on the outsici.e licht into t iiis lit tl<> cou:t tr.:.nc a:i:i
went to the doo:r , and the ne xt u.i:1r I lwcw tlicJ l:er e -- tJ-:e~,- 1:c ::t
i nto "The f.tar Sp:wgled :t:;..nner" 1d th t!1eir b::wd z..:i:l t.h~:~ t:-.e
"Hymno !Jacion11l" of Guatemala , ar.d the n " Ha)1l\V Bi rU1da y t o Yo-...i ".
So Senor J'olon-c , our l andlorrl--co".., up a 1.c1 o~er1cd the [.C.te <:1nG.
they all came in with a narimba 1.Jaml , and i tr.:, cu:::;tor:ary to serv"
them drinko and 1reakfast , so we got the n.J.id up a nci. fixed what
1:e could fo r brea}:fa::t and i;ave them drink c at1".i the :-' played. the
marimba band out in the ca r po:-t , a;,r: they s~:'..d " ,: :!.'e cor.i:-ic oac~.
this afternOO!l ,
InviL.e all your ~:rienis ani we :: tav e a:1o:.he:outside party". J..nci = thi:-.k th.::.ts the one you ca:-.c to .
0

Q: Yes ,

tha~E

the one we carae t o .

So we inv:. ten e Ye r ybod.y an:l C.ruc; in 1;ha L. :ooC. ..:e c::: :..:: ' , a :.::
wi1at boo:::.e we could ar.d. they cane t.::.ci: id L.l~ t:-1'= ::-.c:.r:.:i::a -::.a:,..:. <:..!. ~
the party went o~ till a bout 10 o ~ c:ock that nicht, as I r eca:l
(Laughs) .
A:

Q:

(Laughs)

That i,;as quite an e x:,eriencc .

Yen.h .
f.ut they -v;e r e v er:: 1: a:-1r. 1 0uti;0:..nc; ;ieo:;:-le , a :1..: t"'n
were always C.oiiic so11ethinc ~i ~: c thn. t :or ;.rou o:- ci Yin:; :;ou ~o:-. s
kind of a ridiculous conplir.c? itary cE'rti:'.'ica.:.e Lec3.use ~ :. t:::
di dn't ha ve much else to g ive you ( lauc;hs) .
A:

(LauGhs) .
l:a,{ oe they didn't cet !'".uch done ,
lots of certificates?

Q:

out the~f

e;2.se

A: Yeah , they sure did . But the Guate~alans are v e ry c our teous ,
as you know , considerate people . And there ac;ain , it vari es fro~
country to country ; our p roblems and our r ecepti on and everythinc
else varies in each country , or ours did .
Yeah. \>:ell , and you say the Guaterr.:i.lans a r e very courteous1 ,
outGoinG people , and yet I ca n remcmlic r tha t when they didn t
like wha t showeci up in Time i~ac;az inc or lle1.;s 1:cd: , the:/ 1; oulci.11 't
ask any questions , they'd just co over and teat up the r epo:-tcr
that r eported for those masazincs .
Q:

A:

Q:

Well , that ....-as another probler:-1 that we hn.C. .

So

there~ s an underlyinG vein of viole~ce so~e~here i n

the

society?
A:
Well , their unde rlying vein of violence--I~n not sur e I can
expl ain it--its inbred in them , and they hate pretty deeply .

19

I thinJ.: I r..cnti oned last nic:ht one of the indance::. ;.;here

cauGht sone of the terroricts a~d actually killeci the~ .

they

Q:

Yes , you mentioned that ; anci. put them in bacs and tossed. thew
in the ocean , richt?

A:
Right , and they washed back in and they ~ere fou~ci. , ~ut
that S the s.a:ne type Of I'E'Oj)lC that JiaG_ 1Y~8!1 r:illi:1[ their })!::Ople
and kidnappinc and extorti nG a lot of ~eo;le , a~j ~hat-- t~at ~u::;t
happened .
1

Q: What year would that have been?

A:

That wou ld have been- - lets cee- - nust have been about 1S'C,_s . I
know--when wa~ the Dominican Republic thin~?-- where vc r-,aS. the
InterAmerican Forces in there--I th:..n~: that :as ' 66 .

0:

The Johnson aclJrlinistration?

Yeah , I i:no1; I 1-:ent to the Dorr.inica:1 :rwrub~ic O!l

tlie year after I was ci.own on--it would have been ' 65 ,
Jim--the year before .
A:

Q:

also

rc;,cr~ber

;hen

}:illed-- assassinate d - -a~1d

1:e

1: ere

:.!1

Guc:.ter.,ala ,

nobody pa:..i too r..uch

.q.. -

a nw.
ti::..r.}: ,

" . .;;.1. ,

a (9:1e:-al

at-'ver,t:..0~1

to

1:::.::;

it .

It was kind of lH:e it 1:as a11 acce?tecl 1:ay o: doir..::: b:.isi:1Cs::: ,

which kind of ru~~led me , but I --it wa:::n' t ny resp o~sibility to
think much o: anythinG about , so I didn ~t th:..nk that nuch about
i t until later .
A: Well , I don't remembe:::- that particular incicer:t , ::i-..1-;: a ::.at c:
them were rretty cruel and a lot of those COU?E w~ :-e bloo~!es~ .
I know th~t one-- I was talkinc to the Director o: the ::atio~a:
Police there one time--we were at sone ~1nci o: ba~;uet o:sornething and they were talkinc , and he was talkins about whe~
they were in the Nationa l Palace and he was on the :..nside and
somebody else was tryin6 to overthrow then and the other croups
were down there in the street and they had told hin eithe r to
surrender or else- - and he asked , .. .,.,' ell who' s ;Ot the r;.ost cuns
and whos E.;Ot tha t cannon?" and they said "The op:;:iosition ", and he
said "Vaya " , "Surrender ; what else?" (lauGhs) .
Q:
(Lauf;"hs) Well I can r emember one of the secretaries ir. our
office --she had cotten a bullet throuch her , wl1en she was a kid ,
in one of those revolutions- - she just happened to be in the 1-.-rons
place at the right time ,
so- -I had no r eal feelinc
or
understanding of what it 1_:-as all about .
I e;uess I'-:-, as~:inc
whether or not you had any feeling or observations concerni~
that underlyinc vein .

A:
Well , yes I did , a nd actually it was relatively ~uiet durinE.;
the time I was in Guatemala , you know fr om ' 57 to ' 59 M iE_;ue~l
Ydigor as Fuentes was elected President and there were a few
I
little violent incidents but we had minor trouble--they weren t
playi ng that r oue;h and it wasn ' t that violent , like we had in
20

Venc:::.uela in the 60: s '

bombed and--\\'hen you
Guate ma l a?
Q:

s n.y

whe r e the Embassy

" th ~y

11

can

you

;;.:i,s r .:t.Ci 1lr1e

i denti~y

cu:i!ied u.:.d

' ' ~he,y ''

A:

Well , "they " --" tr.ey " 1,ere--you mean the opT'osi ti on?

Q:

Was it a n opposition party or an opposition or j ust-- ?

Yeah , it was a --well fir::.t , you still had t!ie -- I don't eve:1
r emember the names , whet her it was the Ar;;1ed Force::. i:1 ~evoluti or;
or what --they Kere a n opposition party , and alsc so~e of thei r
hard line s:;:ilinter i;rouJ.Js wer e the ones that 1-:ere ah:;;,,ys tryinG
to subvert c:.nd overthro.-; th e government plus doi::[" sc:,e of the
J~i dnappincs ani t hat tyj)e of thine; .
And then you )-,ad the usual
thinB i n the Kay of cri~inal viol ence , because Guats ~ala had t~e
olicarchy and the extre;nely rich and the extrene ly poor that-- i e
a society thats conducive , I s uess , to reactinc Ki ~~ violence ,
because--it didn ~ t h~p~e n durinc my ti~e and I dcn ~ t think i ts
happened. fo r years--b ut SO~i!? Of t he old tir.1CrE- \:e:;:-e tc...l::i::c aC10i..l-.:.
under t he (Jacobo Cu~nan ) A =~en ~ -- that waE the Co~~~~i~t reci~e -
and sc~e of those other reci~es , where they cut o~~ t~e ha~d~ o~
thieves , so itG--it Kas tra~itionc...l , I [Ue3s , fro~ t~e ti~ e of
the Spanish conq:icst fo r sor.e of the~e cour. trie~ to react J_::._ r:e
that t o crirainals and vi olence--or overreact , I'd say .
A:

Q:

I
looked

wonder if your policy makers i~ t he Public ~a~ety field

at the politics of the sit uation and how c~tti11s o~r
people ~ s hands and thei r h~ads di dn ~ t l ead to the ~ost ;ro~uctive
society in the world , and a poli ce systen that had to rely o~
extremely
r epressive
measures didn~ t wor~ out
too
well
politica lly . I s there any-- ?
A:
Oh , it was obvious from our point of view that it was not
only wrong but it was c ounterproductive ; it was the very worst
way they could do it , beca use the b ottom li ne -- you~ re not going
to really ha ve a n effective security or civil police fo r ce
without the support and the help of the people .
If the people
a r e against the a uthority, youlre never going to be too successful .

Q:

Is that an attitude that you tried to in s till through

trainine;?

your

A:
It sure is , and its difficult to ins till . You don ~ t cha~ce
peopl e ' s way of thinking overni ght , a nd you could change t he
lowe r l eve l and the middle l evel a lot faster t han you could the
t op l evel and the old timer ~.
But it was--I suppose you could
ca ll it one of the basic things would be t o t r y to chance
attitudes to whe r e they;d be more cons tructive for their own
objectives as we ll as ours , and ours were --oh , they wer e vague ly
defined .
We didn't want an unfriendly government in any of the
Latin American countries..
We want ed cooperation a nd so forth

21

,lohn 1. Lo11c..i.n
:rori then anJ , in the 1=:-ocro.r-j ,: -.. ~ :.:lYolvc,..;-. :.n , you G.~dn ~ :"".::.::n
policy --you diC.n ' t. r ec:.lly 112 \'P r.1:i:::h--you c.lid:. t h<:.::e c.::st.'.1:'..nc t::
r.u.y aliout the political a:::ren::.
it .

o:

Q:
You r1can 1.h fl~'le::-ic.:..n~~. c:.t <...:.y lnvc:l rc~ll;,
anythinc to do \.;i th i1C-.bnc tiie cc u:.tr~ r1olicy .

c:'..:::r, '.-:,

!:~xe

A:
\-.'ell , the hne:ricaris ciidn'i. h~vi: a :.;;thinc to do , ct:-,e::- :.!-:::::.:-.
ini'luencc , wi ti1 nal:inc: the coui.":.ry 11olicy , but in r.:: ~art:'..ci.!::..c:..::
ca::.e , a:::. a technician , r:iy ;ic1 i:<:.::. to try '!:.o ir.-r.le:c1ent ti.c.
:rolicie::. of our r.overnment at thn t pr:.rticu}ar tir;-,e on t~wsc
particular thine::. .
If it v:u.c:. to u:;:1,r1ode this er u!:ra::ie th.:.."~ ,
1:hy I clidn 1t asl: why . If you hu.d <:. corru:;-it co':ernr.sJJt c:
sonetliinr; li(;e th.'.1 t , as lone a:: they 1:0 r .. our crooi-:c:.- - thi:-re
wasn.'d , anythinc I coulO. do about it .
C:
Yeu.ll , i:ell if it 1:u.2 a t;ove::-n.:-,n :-,t. in :;-10;.:er , .::.~: t'.-.2:: r.u..:i '-C
be worked with in some way or othe::-:
h. : It Ka::. a h::::.n.i: ca:; , tecc. 'J.Se i : ym;.'.:-: 0- ::. co:- :-::_;-<:. cc\<?:-:-_-.: :.i11 ;101:<-'r , :; eo1 le are r.cre ::i:-.:>;,r- -..c c:;:-c_:'2 c:::-:'..:-.e s a:,::. ";-n
vulnerai:.le to ::-ur'\'E::'.'S:'..Or. to o;e::rtli::-o.: -..!~.:-~t ?:~:ctic:.:::..=:.::- [C\c:-:-.:c.0::that , o.t that particu.lar ]lOint in -c.:'..r.e , i:c i:c.::"e~ tc !-:ec:> i:.
;ioKer .
Q:
Uh huh . So I cuess the.ts run--u.nc1 , Hell , is st:.. :i.l ::-ur:r.ir.c -but maybe has rone full course?

/, : Its cone i'ull CO'..lrsc richt !10\; , '..: .... lK~l -- o: cnurse , t~.~ cc::~;..:.
thine; i n '59 : i:e h;:.d the sar.,-:; 11ro1 lr::-.:. ir. t:-.r- ' Ci s t'.-,:..t ..:i:-'::c:runninc into no1: a :1:i , as far as ti-ir r . : :. . :;-n::..:'..cy , :.. ".:.:: ":. o ;:ec: ::.. -:
fron exportin[; re~..~01u:,ion to the other cou:-.t:-:e::. :.:: ~~e ~: e::-t e:-:-.
Hemisphere , \.'e licked. it in the' Go s a:-,l thi:: c~::-ly '70 s , ":::-...:.t i:::.
gone full cour-e ; Ke 1 ve got it acai :~ .
~e ~ ve EOt a -- ~o ~uestio~
about the $a:1di..nistas , ;:hat their rolicy i ::; :..n ;:::.caragua is to
export revolution , flowinc fron Ru~::.i& throurh Cuba ,
~icht noK
they: re conce:1tratinc on 21 Sc..lvador uni oti.ers .
So 1:e.'.ve cone
full circle , a11d ....-e ' re attackinc; it virtually the same l>ay ,
except there s no more aesistance c;iven to the civil authorities ;
its all thrcuc;h mili tar y .
The type of procram I was involved
in--i ts now illcf1.l to t;i v e i t ; Conc;resr abolished it after the
Vietnam settlement .

Q:

So even--Kell , Kould you say tl1at the::-e are Police Adv:..sor:: ,

Public S.:i.fety Advisors , in this country that coulO. p r ovide cood
services if they we r e civen the opportunity?
A:

Well , there are no more U. S . Public Safety Advisors .

No , I mean i: v:e ,.;ere to look into our o,,...n Police

Depar tments , state , local , federal , C. I . A. and Khateve r , ,,...oulci. ,,...e
find people and could we develop an ort;anization that v;ould oe
c apable of doi ng what you would be talkinc about?
Q:

22

John

P. Loncan

A:
I thin~ it ... ouic h~lr ;
thi nk ~c coul~ io it ~o:::-e
econonically an l 11or0 e:fecthely tli;in v:c co-.i2.: 1:i th the str <:..iGht
military aid , lika i\e a re do inc noi; in Cl Sc:..lY~ci.or .
Yes .
In r espect to ci Yi l acti\itie; in a society , it i-;o-..:ld
seem that the ~ilitary , i n a cenc r~l sense , " c-.i:tl ls :.~e lc~st
capable of proYidinc it?

Q:

A:
~ell ,
you know , thats morL o r lcs~ true .
7~e i ~eal w~
complete
coopr-r:d,iou ar,d c0o perL.ttion 1C'~i :ccn the
:-.il:'.. ta:-:;
o..cvisors a nd our advi sor s in the various countrie s . for e):c..:-.~ l ,
when
I
went into Venezuela duri 11c
th,.,
I oCJ : : '
:.'-re::iclP:.t
Bettencourt , who was v ery close to our A~bacsador r :,e~art , ~~~t
wac Wh3.t
he r:antcd ; he \:am,cci to Uf'[rG.de r.:.. S Ci Yi l
})0 li Ce
authori tic s to 1;Lere he ;.:;:;.:;: r.ot de:;--en:le::t u~o: . -...!.e ::ili "'va:::-~: ,
because he tho~cht they could do th~ best JOl , a~i t~at ~as a
proGra~ Khere I bElieve Ke ha~ 90 ~i:itary adYi~o ::- 3 ,
~~ i j-.i::t ~::
a11 aside , 1:hen tlv~y had th~i::- little head~-.i.:.r:.e:::-:: ouc. r.ear :.: ....
Country Clul , t!1e F . /.. L,;. ,, i?. Er.i_;lisL ::.0 1.::-:-.e:.. ? o::-cec o:
i!ational Lihrration , attac(:cd their h 0 .:.r:i~l.iar".,":;:: c:-.e G.<:<; C:.! ..:. r.-'-.:.them ta}:e off their :pa:1L.s , took rictures o:~ it . :::::. .:<..~ :;:.u~ ::. ::::.es.
all over the world .

Q:

The

QlYS

tLat had t o tai:e doKn 'their par.".,s -- ~~. e y c~loq;e:i :.o

who?
A:

The U. S .--thu.t was p<1rt of our U. S. l~il i tu.ry Ad.visory Tei.r;, ,

Q:

Oh really?

A:
AnC.--but tLc~' i:e :?:"e ':er.v \i:::;iC,l.- --'.1:;.d a r.:.....-:. :;:.::-o:i> , :.-~::.
their headquarters at the Country Cluo , a:-,::. r.;:.:. :-.o securi :.;: .
io.!
Ther e wasn't rr.uch securi ty in the E:-11.ass~: i:~. er1 I cot. the::-e .
had , of course , Enbacsy Security , but there h~dn ' t been too r~c!1
of a problerr, .
Later , a bonb ex?loded in the t::::bt:::::~y , t:ut t:.'2::
machine c;unncd the Er:ibass:,1 from acro~s the s:.Yce:t , bullets cci:-.c
through outside ~~lls a~d inride ~al2.s and- - you [O :..~ a~d look at
i t now , fror tlie :n.y it used to bc--the :ay the~: vr:: built Ui' all
the security an-.l so or. and co for:.IJ --i t look::; a little liY.e a
fortress . I thir.k I ' m get tine oi'f the subject r iGht nOi: .

Q:

Well , thats perfec tly permissable in a n oral hi story .

But to answer your question , if you could co bacr: and build

A:
up a propar:i liY.e ,,;e had , I think it helped , ar.1 I think it -..:a~
one way to c;et at the p r oblem , but it ;:as just or.e sr.all portio;,
of an overall country tean effort that you needed in each country
to get the job done . I think we contributed to it bette r for our
little aspect of it than could be done otherwise o r has been done
since .
But we started out small and inexperiencei , but I think
at the time it was abolished , about two years after I r eti r ed--it
was probably abolished in about ' 74 or ' 75--i:e had a pretty GOOd
nucleus worldwide of peopl e that we r e of the oad:ground and
experi ence to make a contrib ution . But we were still very snall .

23

1pf1 I

I ,

\'ie>tnarn

l (1i1911

ha:

t or.etht>r , u.;

fl

more
1;0

J'OC'}'lc tk1?1 <.i.ll t.l1c 0L1,cr

.,ere in soi'lc 57 countric:::. .

cou?.t:::ic:::

~ u"t.

r. :

Ic there a!~ythin.,... else th,,t we should

recard to Gu~tcr:ala tefor e we move on l.o--I
next acsirnr.ent?

:n

. -__ -.!:"ra.:.:.

A:

Yes , hra:.il v:as r.1y next as:::.i(;JL11ei.t .

Q:

Lets see , you i-:cnt l.:-1ere in--i t r.ust have 1:.een--

A:

I went t o Bra:.il in June of ' Go , I believe .

Q:

Yea h .

It ~a3 in 1960 .

Thats close enouch for the record .

A:
And my ob wac to be ;..rca .4.dvi:::.or do1:n i n :?c:-to A:lecre 1 L::.o
Grande do Sul , 1;hich i s !~ind of intere:::.tir1G , to sr.oi: you the
politics of it .
I be Le,e the Gover!10:::- o: ;:;io G::.-an:i~ do Sul 1-:a::
a GU.Y by the nar.e o: Fri:.ola (Leo:io ?ri:.o:a) ;.:ho t:l!T.S:i out l.O r
01,e of the leu.dir.c le:ti::-ts or Cor::-.unist:: --he d:'..C.:1 :, :.~:-:: out tc
be , I c;ueGf: he Kd..G tLen--l~r-tt , you ~~ay reca:.: , ~:..:-. , ;.;~.e~.. ;-:e ~: e:.~
d0w11 - - hc::.d c. !'ro,;ect /.p.-ee:-.0:-.t whicL o::ts?.::::'..-:.. l~.' hE: ;-_::;.::: c.;:-::e:i tc.
sicn a11i sc i'orth--l-:e :e!!t C.'J;.:n for tr.e :::.i[11i:.[ ce:::-e:-.c :.:'.. e:= <:.~ .i r."
had ti1e J'l"CSS --not only loc&l fYOS::; 1 :i: ["'J.CS3 i t i::..::; .:..r.LS:'.'!'"1E.."::'..c:-.:..::_
press- - he ru. . . licc.lly accused. the \J . ;- o:- c::c:-ir.c )-,.:..:-, a :-.::..::..::..::.. "'!:
dollarc to sic1. that p:::-oc:-a:-. becc.u::-c ;;e.'.j ha.-e acces;:; to r.:.::
security r ecords in nio G:-c.ndc de ~u1 , a1~0. r.is r ecord.s i:eye
ridiculous-- he couldn' t evc!1 find tlicr-; ( lauGh:::;) .
i,nd ~.-e n0'.er
did open up that proGram Khile I was there .
I endej up ~or~i? [
Guan;lauara (Hie) u.!ld doins some surveys in othor interior Etatcs .
0

0 : Before we c"t ai:a~, fro!'! Lri::;ola , I doii : t i:no;; :'..:- :.'oi.l've :::e:c:i
the recent--wi thir. the last _year-- Mn:::; re;,orts o: !-,:'..:-.?

A:

~o

haven~ t .

I ' ve kind o: lost track of

hi~ .

(' :
ile , to all a;ipearance:: , is 0!1e Of the [.Cnu2.nc S'..:.::-;}O:'.'te :-c o:the Uni tocl St;:..tes a:-1d hu.-1an ric;Lts and :.c the Governor , .!.
believe , of Guant abara .
A:

Brizola?

Yes , sir . He 1 s rie:;ht in the f orcfro?Jt of what you night call

our most helpful guys . How there s sor.1etliinc; strance-Q:

A:

Thats very stranc;e , because ....

Q:

He--wc worked with h i m in the Sanitary EnGinee:-::. nc :ield a~i

I've met hifTl and he' s very able ,
very ar-ciculate ,
vcr:;
knowlecl5eable about the technical as well as the political
natters , and ~eened to me to be very ~otivated , e ven at that
tine , ' 50 to 1 61 when I Kas there , to improvinG the l ot of the
people . So there= s some very very strance anomalies in here that
I would sure hope somebody would get into .

24

John P . Loncan
A:
'59 to
00.
Well this would ho.ve been in 1r1 CO
talk inc about --you r emember tl.c i1 c i den",, , do:i ' t you :

that

I .'i71

Q: Yeah . I r emember whe n there Ka~ an expro~riation and it ~ust

have been somewhere alone in t!1a t same , or :-:a.ybe a t :. t l ;;.. te:- ,
period. I c an ~ t pinpoint when it was , He Kas expro ~r:'..atinc -- or
c;etting r eady to expr opriate-- a tele~ltone cor-.par.y o:::- a : .o;-:0r
company or sonethi nc like that,.
::o.ut ar,ywc..y he -.;as defini tel:1
l abeled by people I l:new later on as a Co::-.nu;,i:::.t ar,d he h:ld. t o
escape durinc their 1964 r e v olution into Ur acuay or so~e~he re .
A:
Yeah , he Kar def:'..i i tcly l<-1.Jcled &- - : ca;c.'.t r cr.e:-.oe r --a:te :::John Quadros was elected Pr esident- - ! don t have any rr:enory of
any subsequent--but I do hc,,ve a d irect ne:riory o::.- the ,:ay he
turned on t he U. S. GoveYnment and made tho~e ~i ld acc usations
about a million dollars to microfi lm his po li ce r ecorcs .
?.ut I
haven~t thought of him since then.

Would you have an~ idea that the:::-e Kas a~;th:'..nc ~~a~ ~=-c~t
have happened that could l ead to his inte=?retatio~ o~ ro~e
comments as an offe r of ~ tic sur.1 of i710ney to r+. .:..crCt::.~r. thr:
stuff?

Q:

A: I don~ t have the vacuest i dea because I believe Joe l:'..nco t~~
gone down and surve yed it and after a r equest fro~ 3 :::-i=ola , an~
it was handled just:--:- I r.iacie a nw-:-1!)er of S'..l:'.'\'eys .o..~d. -::al!-:e:i -vo
Gover nors i n other states and it was al _ just rout :.~ e - - t~e;
would r equest it , you knoK , each individual stat e ths:-e , _:~e
~inas Ger ais--we weren ' t
in all the state~ --but we had t~e
request for assistance duly certified , a sur~ey , a ~rogra~ ~a1~
out with me as the Area /,dvi sor and I think 1:e -..; e :::-e i;o:.r.b to ha;e
a couple of assistants there in that particula:::- p rogra~ , a~d the~
go down with Joe Li ngo t o get t he agreement si~ned an , I
remember we 1': cre stalled 2. l ittle b i t about see inc; the Go,er .. or
and so on and so forth and we n ev er did see him that e ve ninG a nd
then you read the paper s the ne xt rr.orninc --it was a little bit
of a shock t o cet on a p l ane and come back and find out what
you 1 d been accused of --do inc; a survey was r outine--tha t happened
in all the othe r states , including Guanabara a nd :iinas Cera.is
and , oh , Sao Paulo--wc had s ev e ral other pr ocr ams already-pr oject a6reernents siGned .
But t hat was the prerequisite to ne
going down there , because we never went in till Ke had the
Project Agreement s signed .
~

Well , politi cs i s a str anGe field. I don~ t think I ~ ll ever

understa nd it.
It p r obably doesn't make any di:ferc~ce Khether
its here in thi s country or wheth e r its in Latin Ane rica .
So
that was-::--how about your cultural encounter in Bra;:;il ; ciid you
find it easy to 6et acclimated in Brazil and adjusted to the
area-:-and your family--how about t hat?
A: Yes~
We lived in Rio a ll the time a nd it was , I thought ,
relatively eas y to get adjusted after we found housing .
Our
daughter enjoyed it the r e ; we enjoyed it t here ; and I did travel
pretty ext ensiv ely in Br azil but it was an easy country to tra vel

25

...

John P. Longan

in and I enjoyed it , but I never will forget some of the top

officials that you would--some of the new programs--I was asked
directly what are some of the best methods the F.B.I. used for
torturing confessions out of prisoners. I had to tell them that
they don't; that it is counterproductive and so on and so forth.

Q:

They didn't believe it, huh?

A:
No, I don't think they were ever converted, because
apparently after I left there was some v iolence and there were
some death squads--I guess you read about those--that were
traceable back to the security agencies in Brazil in sometime in
the '60s--Ted Brown was our advisor--and we had a congressional
investigation. Ted went in and appeared before one of the U. S.
Congressional Commit t ees to show our participation, and we came
out alright on it after the fact, but we were accused of
teaching them how to do it, actually, how to torture--but
nothing could have been further from the truth.
Q:
Is that right?
So in the Congressional testimony, would he
have gone into the underlying reasons why they had torture as a
way of police work, or do you know much about it?

A:
No, I don't think he tried that and I think it would have
been a mistake i f he had, Jim .
I think what he did was simply
show what our objectives were and what we did and what we
encouraged them not to do and how we encouraged them to do it in
a more scientific and humane way and impressed the committee
that we had never seen any of that torturing, which I ' m sure we
haven't.
If I thought some of it was going to go on and I was
never confronted with it I would walk away before I 'd seen it,
but the bottom line is, you don ' t have any control over it.

Q:

Right.
I guess the reason I
in the back of my mind I had the
police practices were patterned
Italy, and most all their policies
traced to the Italian police .

asked the question--somewhere

impression that the Brazilian
after those of Mussolini in
and their operations could be

26

John

r.

Loncan

(.:
Tho oricin of police nol i cie!C. in Brazil and :hcthcr or not
they cane froi~ J;ussolini s It::.ly anG. 1,hothe~ you hc.d any
recollections of that , or hoK these policies ciici oricinate-policies in rcs?cct to -A:
I have no recollecti on or kno;decige either one to dispute it
or t o confirm it . I do know that 5rasil, amonc sorae of the other
Latin countries , their whole judicial syste:-n is based on f.or~an
law , which is a lot different than our system , Khere you!.ve got
the right to have your accusor face you and all that ty?e o~
stuff ; everythii1c is done accordinc to the old Roman system--a
long list o~ papers and so forth ~he re a person can be tried ,
convicted , and serve t ime ~~ well , not convicted--be tried and stay
in jail three or four or five years before they even get their
trial , in Brazi l and some of the other countries . If you noticed
then in their drilling and so forth in their para~ilitary and
their police school ing and so forth , ~hey marched goose- step like
the storm troopers and Italians , and for that natte r , I thin~ the
Russians do the same , so I have no ~ay to make a judGernent .

Q:

Thats an interesting possibility .

Do you ascribe some o~
th ei r difficulties to their basic laKs--the Ro~an syste~ where
you have to be r eady to prove yourself innocent at any ti~e , as
compared to our system , which i s --you have to be proved Guilty?
A:
Well , thats
basically true .

kind

of

a thumbnai l sketch

Q:
But do you t hink its important in what
Public Safety area?

you

ha~?ens ,

just -- t~ats

say in

the

A:
Its very important , and tha t s one reason we tried to improve
the conditions in some of the penitentiaries in the various
countries ; just about every country I was i n , we did a survey of
the prison systems and tried to--we couldn t change their Roman
law , but we could try to chanGe and influence and to speed it U? ,
Some of the people that didn ~ t have money or in~luence , the biG
problem was to --they would just stay there in those jails a~d
you couldn t eve~ get whats t a ntamount to a preliminary hearing
or anything else ; their papers were just logjarnmed .

Q:
It would seem to me that that would be a te m~tation in a
political sense to get your political opposition or your e nemies
in jail and never with a thouGht of actually provinG that they
did anything .
A:
I ~m sure that happened ,
and on the counter-producti ve side ,
it was certainly a fertile breeding ground for any type of
subversion or anyone who wanted to change the status-quo , even
though when they changed the status~quo , it may have been worse
t han i t was befor e .

27

John P . LonGan
Q:

It 'h"Ould le r..otivatior, for ch<:i.r.ce , thats :or sc::::-c .

A:

It certai nly Kas .

Ye::- , I c<.:.n Yerify that.

... car, rencl'l~1er a l':ayor i.. a;. u,; ri ver Ama::.on tOi:n v:ho had bee11 servinc tir.e i:i o:ie o: t:-.00e
jails ,
and he sc:.id " You Y.:io1.; uh;:t ", he sc..id , " they f reeci r::e ar.i
appointed me Vin.yo:::- of t hi :::. tmm ju::;t lJei'or e we were ready to h'.1\e
the Revolutio:1 ", ani he laci0hed about it . \foll , can you ir:a::;.:.l!e
that?
Wel l , what Vargas did at that ~ime was to take key people
t hat he saw in the pol iti c~l opposition , and he woul d assiGn them
as I:ayors of ai. u;:- ri ver tm:n , ur in the J.~~1.::.0:1 .
tell , tlmts
even better than havinc; therr: in j.::.il ; thc:i.ts co::-.plete iso::.atior.
Q:

A: Yeah . ~."ell , on a ::e :::-io~s anl a l:..rht sice , :.: ::o-u go bac!: :..:.
retrospect , lets take ti:o coun-::dc-::; ; let::; take :::..cc;.::a:::-ua and. l~-:.::;
ta;~e
Iran ; let::: ta.!-'.e Sa:--;oza- - there::: no c;_ue:::tio:-: .:..:::out h:.r;-. te:..r.c
corrupt , his far.ily and. so on an..: so fo:::-tl, .

Q:

You~ re

speakinc both of the Shah o: Iran

~nl Sa~o::.a?

/, :
Yeah , J.'.m coinc to take those ti\O cou .. tr::.e~ ; :~:.. :::-:::t , s~:-.o::.a .
And the Shah , to a ce r tain extent .
But lets loo~ at it ~OK ,
under thf' Sa.1iianistas .
Sor.e of the :yco:;-lc h.:-~:::. :ou[~t aga:..r:::t
overthro;-:in[. Samo::.a.- - the contras nov:--and th country i s i::-. i:'Jrse
sha:re than it. 1-:as uncler S.::..;no:;i:!. ,
They ve been rr.ore c::::-uel ar,-L
they ve r..urdered a nur,ber of Ini:..ans ar.,: a nu;j1:-::::r o: othe:::thin[G . And let:: co:-.:_::,a.re tJ1or.e:.i to t~r> ~!":.::.!-. o: :ra:. ?l;.is a __ o:
the--you cet into top secu::ity and 30 ~orth --of a~l o~ o~:::
apparatu~
for controllinc our o~~ vital ine::es~:: security - ~:..::0 ,
so lets just take the t~o count:::-ies . I do~~ -:, t~i~k e:. ~her o:ie o~
them are as well off as they \-:ere :i ~h the othe::::-s .
Tr.at doesn't
r:iake Sar:io:.a o r the Shah r i[ht , but--and o:~ the lichter side , I hea::C.
it described in one Kay in a little d.:.f:e:::-e~t sit~at:..on -- Khcn
you get r iGht dom to U. S . policy and so forth in a bind--I Kon~t
say :ho said it , but he says " You !:1101-; , t~i~y were corru:r.t ar:d
they were thie,es , but they :ere ours" (lauchs) "a:-id noi-: they' re
wor se and they ' r e against u s " (lau[;hs) .
0

(Lauchs) I don'-t know :hat the conclusion o: tr.at should. be

i n a policy sense , o r e ven a philosophi cal sense . Ko uld you have
a ny comments?
Q:

A:

What our policy should be?

Q:

Yeah , I nean , you describe a situation in ~hich it a:;-pears

that humankind has ve r y great shortcomint;s , J.. hether they a:::-e
under a Democratic system or Khether they ~ere under
an
Autocratic system , so , first of all , ~ou ld it be true that hunans
get about what they deserve , which isn t very much and t hey don~ t
deserve it , or does it hol d sor.e parti cular inplication fo r
fo r mulating policy , especially in the Public Safety fie l d-- ho ~
de s poti c you ha ve to be to ho l d a c ivilizat ion t ogethe r ?

28

John

r.

Loncan

Fran~:ly ,
,lir. ,
don ' t i-:no: ,
:;: do;;.'J., :!1i:.~: ~'..'?::- i:: ;:.;;y
A:
panacc;:i for doinc: it .
/1 ~ !1ilor-o:;-.h0r I <~i11 ' t (l<-.uct-.::: \ .
I .:. .
security mindetl .
I 1;culci natU!'<clly le t"c~i..1:::;,: o:- al} :-::
background an~ experience , but Kith all of thr ba~ a::rect~ o: l\,
and so on C1:1d so forth , I -.;oulrl--p!.ilo:::o:_::).:..c=..:..ly a:.::. pc::..ic::wi::.e-- I ~ould lean to~a.rcis le~ti~c sonecne like Sa~o~a alo~e -
not t::-y to r,o in <:.nd help overthro.: hin o! cut o::- c:.id to kee~
hin from be inc; not over~.hro;:n--:~ro:-. a securi t:: ::ta.n~-;-oin"t , .J.
think we American .... , and::: can under::tand it , I triir.~: :.hc.t a:;.c:.~.. h;:
and the lack of uncierstandinc of the threat is preva:ent by the
maJori ty of we A.mericc..n;:; .
But my 01:r. way of thinkin; you--ever
how you do it , and its coin5 to be done differently fron ti~e to
time--it ha::; to be S\,Opped .
He c2..r1.'.t let it ;:o f::-o:-. Cutia to
l~icar.J.[;Ua
to Sa 1vador to Gu:-.:.tenala to i'. exico , c:.:-i:i i:e' i:e [.Ot t,o
draw a line so::-.eplace . i:e O.on ~ t 1:c..nt to :ait, til: the :=:io Gra:-lcie
River or the East bank o: the l;issi::.si~pi (laucLs) .

Q:

And

you~ re

cpeakinG --

h :--fror. a security standpoint a:-id the ital i::tcre~t:: of ou=

country , because these coi.:::;:.ries, Cul>.:-. a:-id :~ic.:.rc:..c..:a , t:.e:i'rc not.
stoprinG .
They!rc expor~inc their revo:utio?., :ro~ iussia to
Cuba ,
and
it::;
spreaC.inc into--anC. ... tl.i n;:
t:-.e
?:c:a.ca::
ad.r.inistra t i on is ab:::;olutely richt in ci ti:-15 tl 1e ci.a:-_;er , and I
think that sor.e o: our Concressmcn a=e dead Kro~~ i~ the
criticisms we.'.re Given for what we're doinc; .

Q: You equate that or rel~te that to Cor.~uni::.r. or you relate

danger to international terrorisr. , or l_.ot:-i?

~~e

A:
it

Well , mostly to terrorism . I rate it--thc t0tto~ line--: ::;ce

as inimical to our oKn vital interests , our J . f ., our o~~
country ~ s vital interests security- wise .
~ut it ;ets
Co~~u~iat
influence canine fron Russia as the root cause . They ~ ve [Ot ::.ach
fertile areas to w or~ in : ~e talked about thcr. 1efore , to subve::-t
and so forth .
Eut once they ~ ve subverted , ~hey export it to t~e
next one , and there ~ s one thine about Co~~unists taking over a
country , you can take Bolivia or so~e of these others or even
Gua ter.ala that they cha.n-sed c;-overns'lents i:i th t-he chan[e of the
moon sometimes , but it 1 s still ffiore or less friendly to us . But
if the Government is under the Communist Block , they only have to
win once ; I ~ vc never known us to cct one back except i n ' 54 in
Guatemala and that was just the beginning of it .

Q:

Yeah , I see what you mean .

A:
I .'m taH:inG about combattinG the threat o: Co1.r;u!1isr. and.
subversion and their ~ay of life into the Western He~ispherc to
where its inimical to our own vital interests , and I thin~ it has
to be stopped , and you stop it with little procrams liKe Public
Safety and so forth by nippinc it in the bud be:ore it spreaci.s
r ather than getting into an escalated military s ituation to whe=e
you could have a confrontation with super- powers .

29

,l ohn I' .

Loncan

Q:
So you
Safety kind
really?

would be incli ned to put the dcvclO?~e nt o: T~l::.c

of in the inf r e:.structur e of econoi:i:..c develo?:-.ci.t ,

A:
Thats ri cht .
It5 a tool . Its o:ie s~~ll tool t o use i n
overall pro&rban t o keer our i n~luence a~i coo~eratio~ a:ii
forth Kith othQr cou:itri e3 to v;here they a r e at l east or,
friendly basis r a ther than on a colli5ion course with us .

E.. !~.t.

so
a

Q:
Hm: v;ould you defi ne "a friendly basis " ?
I mea1 , there are
differ ent kinds of f r :'..end:shi:ps ; the re ' s one base- 0 :-1 a riayoff ar:d
then the re ~ s one based on s imila r objectives and ~alue~ , so ~o::
would you--or v;ould you ~ut that into any kind of perspective as
to wha t you mean by frie n~ly nations to u~ , or are they ju~t
scared
to death and 1,:-1e r efore they--i s tr.at t!i:: kind o:
friendshi~ we--?

No , I don.', "., thi!1J.: tLat th3.ts the }:inci of fricnG. s :-1i;i that :e
should be stri vinf; :.'or .
I h;;x e to ad.I:::. t that Gorr.<:: o: ol!r socalled policies ec>.rly in .:..iatin Ar.crica i-ihere <-hey :oc ~: e".i at 20:-.e
of those little cm~:itri e s as - an01i.;;. r e::u-t'lics ;-:e:-e 1-:ro;.[ ,
think , Kher e ;-:e i..ou[;!1t :_ "t <:;.1~d ov er- i~:luencea -- : t!-1:.r.~: t:-i:. ts n0t
desir able , but more de~:.ratle tha~ havir.c the~ i~ cor;le~e
hostile situations.. :rmt ~c:ie;.;here , anci. I ha::e no i dea J,.: s t 1:h<?:-0
the h&ppy medium is--if you cculci. ci.raK & line and iffi~rove thei:societies , you kno;: , :::.-0:-! the cli c.::.rcr.;: to ,.;:1e:e . :e ha ,.e -r.r.,::
middle class , but t hat s --th1ts dre~rin[ , but I hai to lac:: a~ it
anci :;: st2.ll loo;: at :._ "':. i!1 a r.crc nc::.:-:-o: co:-.:;-ile::-: , _ cu.:=~ ; I ::.00;:
at it as t he vi t<:.l inte:re::-t to us r.:ecuri ty- 1:ise .
: ci.o!1.' t 1-:::.r.t
missles in the i:este:::-r; iier.i s~'here ; I ci.on.'t >:ant ou:: - ()o:-C.er i-:i t'.1 ;;.
Communi st country ; I ~ant it at least a par t i a~ 1erocr ac; .
: ~ ci.
rathe r see a corrupt De~ocracy than a
Connur.ist - do~i~ated
unf r iendly r eGime .
A:

Q:
l:ell, we.'.ve gotten a little bit f a r a1-:ay fro:-. Er a zil a.id
Public Safety 1-:orr: . \.'ell , I c;uess we pretty well covered the job
situation ; I guess we hadn ~ t covered all the job situatio~ in
Brazil .
But there s one thinG that occured to me which i s surely
job- rel ated .
Do you remember the time we thouGht our maici. had
stolen thincs f r om our house?

A:

Yes .

And you used tha t as an example to find hOi,

Janiero police system worked ?

Q:

A:

I remember that .

Q:

What a r e your recol lections of t ha t event?

A:
They'r e kind of vague , J i m, but as I recal2accusi ng your maid falsely , weren t they?

the

n:i.o

they

de

we re

Q: Yes , the way it turned out , and I always felt a little guilty
that ma ybe we were accusing the maid , because the circumsta ntial

JO

C'Yidence in.iicilted thc:.t o-he had. at lec:i.::i.. ta.;:c:: t: ..-- - :-.:: "L'il::..:oL
from the bedroom and t~k e n the money out o: ii.. a ni ~u~ped the
bill fold out in t he patio .
t. :
I don.'.t r c;;;e::ibcr hoi: that tu:neci out , f::-:.r.~:ly , Gut that .;as
one of the side line::; of Khat we ci.id over seas , if you had a : r iend
or Amer.i.ca n or :::oneone tl1c:.t. was--r obbed or 1:)1:i.tc:vc:r--a r.d i: you
called the police t o c ome out and intercede , I t~ink --its
hindsicht noK--they Kere prone to ov erreact , you know, just t o-maybe i mpr ess us--they i:a.nted to fi:-.C. so:r.eo:1e r,uil ty .
::ecause :
cauc ht a mai d ::-.tec.linf; from me in Ea:1ct:ok a:tc r that , and I r::;..nci
of r emember ed tha t , a nd I thought she was and I tra?ped he r~
I
was down at t h0 }1001 and. came bc:;,cJr. a l!d she Lu.i ny rions/ c..nd I
just fired her c..nd never r.;aid a i:or d to the police oecauce its -( l a ughs) --it Kas much simpler .

And probably much bette r for t he nai d .

Of co~::- se , in our
Ti 1e:-e had. bee r-_
case , i t turned Oltt t:-iat the I7i3.id didn't cio it .
five hou::;es in our bloc}~ that h&<i beer, t-ur cla.:::-i :;ei--:::i:::ccr:i :;.~:..o c :!:
jobs , just Kith a local ladder , all ~r: t~e :..ast - - ~~ a :e~ ~o~:.~s ,
so i t ;as not i n:-:..J.c , i ""- 1-:c:..::. ~a;--1e-coi~: l:ho cc.:-:e ::. -..:-.:-0-..:.::-:-. c:.:-. o:;e:-1
door up on t he balcony and pic~ed u~ ala::-~ cl oc ~ s a~ i jewe::..ry a~d
a few othe r ti incs , an~ ac~uall y l e:t a fc K fl o~0 r b~d:: :?r~r;~lei
on the floor as a kind o: a trade~a rk 0: the e~tr; J ~~~c~ =~ r~t
there , I su~pose , said soneth:..r;r about be :..~s a :;::-c~ezc~o~a :..
burgl ar .
In fact , at one of there hou:o;es that i ad bee:. bro~~er,
into in the l.ilod , they tool: a bi c safe .
/... :
Some o: them were really
standards--they were better--sone
those countries were fant ar.;tic .

ex:;.crt, 1:~: O\l::- 01.;r; 1::.irflc.r

the seco~J Et0=; :;0o;le -~

o~

The r e 1:er e two othe r thinc:s tha t came out of th&t--.1,. hat I
renember from that eve~t .
The first ~as that there we r e
somethin5 like 25 or JO ?reci ncts in ?.io de :ar;~e ro-- pol ~ ce
pre ci ncts , ana there Kas r;o inte rchance o: r ecords be~ween t hoee
and none to the State out side of Rio , so a ~erson could pull o:f
the se burs l ari es in each of those precinct s one at a time and he
wouldn~ t be looked at as a bi 6 operator bur5lar .
J...nd the seco~d
thing was that our maid was tortured ; I~ m not exactly sure how
she was tortured. , but she was by her 0 1..-n vehe:nent explanation :.o
us when r.;he came bn.c k , and she quit in a real huf f , v:hich I ca n't
blame he r for .
And the other thine was that the polic e we r e
absolutely off their rockers to e xpect us to keep her locked u~
at night , which is what they asked us to do ; you know) keep her
under surveillance . \..'ell , in my mind set , there ..-as absolutely no
way we could do that .
Q:

A:

No , tha ts true.

Q:

I don~ t know what else you might ha ve to add to --about the

local police situation that would be worthwhile for the record .
Well , youfre right about the va rious precincts , and thats
A:
been
a problem all ove r ;
their lack of cooper ation and

31

John

r..

Lonr.an

coordin~tion be tKce n p recincts even in one city ,

r.uch les~ ove r
the country .
/.nd I cion '. t. kn01..--- J: irnulcin.'. :, sc::.y t!-:'?y ciicin.'.t
torture your m:iicl , and -- I don't l:noi-: that they ci:'._ ci , ::.ut i:f c)-,e
said they did , they prob~bly
ciitl , Jim , but that~ kini o~ a-- ~ .' c
hacl some other experiences with the :prir.itive v:ay th2-t t'.ie ;:1ol:'._ ce
operate , eve:1 in l'e:1e::uela , which hc.s been a fairly recocn:'._::eJ
success ful proGram , but coinc back to ' 7G v;he n they Kere
debriefing the people in the Ni ehouse kidnappinc and so forth ,
some of their same pri mitive Kay of havins ther1 co~e dov;n to ":.he
office and , J.'.m talkinc about friendly v;:_ tncsse:::; , a:1ci ciragsin.:;
them out for days Kith depositions a~d that type of thi~; , that
hasn t chanscd and its not coinG to chanbe unt il Ke ca~ influence
them to chance their judicial syste~ .
Anci l ack of Eu~erviEion
has been a major problem . Tiley cet up into co::~1anci roles , not as
in our country , a comreanier is goi nc t o knoK what h~s ~eople are
doing ; there ~ s going t o te a chain of command anci fixing of
re sponsibili ty ; there probably wasn~ t ~uch superv~sion to the
people that were actually intervieKins your maid , Kh~tever they
were doin~ to her .

Q:
So you could sec whe r e they could. develop t he i ~ own
and if torture came to mind , well , thats Kha t they did 7
I can.'.t fathom too r,uch torture on
A:
F.it;ht ,
that , but apparently from all accusations made ,
They had some rret ty ;irirr:i ti ve v:ays
some truth .
Brazil .
Q:

~ethods

so~.etr1ins
the~e

li~:e

coulC. r-e

In Bradl?

A:
Electric Ghock and that t;r;.Je o:f thine , i s i:ric.t ;-:as a.::..les-eG. ,
but I ca n truthfully say I never saw any o:f it . If it happeneC. :
never saw any of the instrw1e nt s that they r: e~e c.llei;ei to use . I
was asked on a couple of occassions upon ~irst contact with
officials ," Khat does the F. E. I . use to torture co;1fe ssions out
of prisoner s?"

Q:

Well , that pretty well tips their hands .

A:
You don',t change attitudes overnight . I remenber somethi r.c
Keith HinebauGh s<:!.id in Guatemala ; I ne\'er ;.;ill forset tha t . v.'e
were talking about--I guess we were talkinG a1out rey end of tour ,
where I Kas pointing out alot of the failure s etc .; I reneraber
Keith said "Yeah", he said , " ~.'e -' ve had them", but saia " but vou
e;uys started at the bottom of a pretty steep hill". (L~uci1s) .
Q:

Yeah , tha ts v;ell put ,

A:

Yeah ,

Q:

Well , does that pretty we ll sum up t he Brazilian experience?

A:

I t hink so .

Q:

And your next assignment , then , was to--

i~::;n. ' . t

it?

J2

,l ohn

. Lonca.n

A:

Vcnr:.ucla .

c:;: :

To \' enez.ucla .

'lhnt
I went to
time the!
bur ninc a
f...:

J...~j

that woulci have

bce1~

in--?

would ha.ve been in the S:;>rinc of 1962 , c::.u:)ut l:~,y 1?62 .

Venezuela by nyscl~ to open u~ the procra~ .
At th&t
wer e killinc a policeman a ciz.y ; they were bo~binc a~ci
number of Venez.uelan institutions .

Q:

They , agai n , would

A:

The

Q:

The political orposition .

be -~

F . A . L . N~.
Alre~ ost

reb9ls or terr ori ::t::?

A:
~ e ll ,
they were urban terrorists .
~hey ~~ re haa~ei ~? t~
trained , url.a:. terrori sts , tr~ine:i ir, C:.fr;a , ti;c:;,:, ;;e::-e u::i:-.: t: ..::
Uni ver::i ty o:!:'

Ca.yacc..~

as a p:ri ": ile...:.ceC.

,..~.. c:::u::..:-j ;

:,~. i::~: ~-.-~ ~e [':l:_:-..

out anJ shooti1.c :rolice:ien c:.:~d. blo;:i:ic u7 Sec::.:;_-::; ~t o rez a:1..:. t:-_i?._::-::
like th<::.t 1 a;1d then [Oil1( bc,c}: into tr B lf J;i YerSi t:: 1;!-1'2'::'.'0 "."OliCC
could not enter .
The Co;:;Muni~t ; z.rty of \"e::e:.uck. <:.t t=-:w.t tir.e
controlled whats tantamount to our Ccn~res::; ~nd Se nate , really .
Q:

The::;e are thint;s that ha ve been ciocu.r,cnted?

Oh , yes .
A:
mi nute?

I can &i ve ,you--1:h.v don.'-t yoi; turn tii.:::.t o:-f

j~:-.:;".,

\foll , we don.'.t r eally need to GO l1c:.c;: and :>ic!-: \.!}) J..",.-r..

"'
1
references now , but as part of th'3 mer:oirs , l e t s ,.,.
v .. ..: """'
refere nce s in at the end to any r eports , an.Yth::.nc li~:e the:.t , O!'
di d you have speci:'ic c;,:.10tes in nind?
~:

J.. ~c.

its hard : or ne to articulate .

I had ::.~ ~ini a~
that was written u~ in Kiwanis maGa~ine ani a number of
mar,a~ines
and nei;spape r s --?:eader 's :Jiccst----'.i'ine :-:a,sa:.ine an:i a
nur.oer of other v;ell documented r eports after 1-:e had a :::.ucce::;s
Eany r c)ort s and ciocu.-:-.ent::; 1 Oi:
a nci. docur.ented it step by ste_p ,
available explain it better than I ca!l . But basically , Venezuela
was tryinc to have f ree elections on t l1c first Sunday of December
of 19GJ and this i;roup 1-:as trying to ove rthro1: tlie cove r J1J1.ent and
prevent election , because the Betancourt cover1~ent i s the sa~e
;Ove r runer.t th2.t had overthrown Per ez. Jer.enez. , the old dictator ,
But Betancourt was too middle of the roa~
a few years befor e .
for them ; he just wasn ~ t ready to let democra6y die . They wantel
to overthrow him and prevent elections , and that was t he l"iethod.
they were usin; .
They were killing a policeman a day and vo~ed
to have an uprisint; a month until the Gove rnnent fell.
'.i'he.Y had
a n upri sing in the mont h o~--I ~m not sure about t he month--!
think of May , at Carupino , and another one in Eastern Vene~uela .
Bands of t e rrorists just went in and attacked the whole city and
killed people,.
f... :

~ell ,

article

Q:

You say the--who did you say went in a nd killed people?

JJ

te to reader:

see addenda

John T' , Lon[.an

F , A. L . :: . - - in ~:po_r1~ ;,f 1 its Fuercec rr-:-.! j_::~ :_:_ ~:::;:.~:.o:.

'lrLl.n::;lation : /,rmcd i orcc::: o: tb"' r:;:~-tio:-.:..::.. ::.C:.lerc:..t.:..c: ..
':'hG::
lifter any attacl: the:.r 1:ei.t arounr: a.:,l paintei their s.:..c-:1 ::; ,
a l i ttle C}'. CUr ::;iOl train ther e the;, ", r <J.n fro;-. C~ :'.'?:C.:.::
<~mtush0d
ewer into the rriou:;t<.irn:: and nur6c:::-cG. a :Lot of -c.Lc ;eo:;-le ,
innocent pco} le , a.r,d t:1e!-1 t~1ey d l:::-i te t!1e ~ . A . 1 . :: . t:--ade:.--:--~: C'!.
thcir--on ~he side of the coachc::; and tha~ tyre of th.:..n; .
~i::
i:cll docunci.tc 1:~ 10 ti.eir le<::.l""r::: 1:cre . Fut , :i.r. : i6:i:-.c; th<:'cfi'ort to O\'erthrow the t;ove::.1u;ent , there ii:: a!1othe:;r po,;.,1_"., I.'.ve
cot to m;:~J.:e . l:hcci ;vou ret i nto a procrc;.n: lii:0 ?u1 1ic Safety -..:a.s ,
.YOU'Ye cot to h<: \'C Slll!'Or t fro:i the ;.;ori-:.:.. n[ lc;el to t~.e \'Cry to~)
f,OYe riu-;-,r>nt
leve:::.. in both the 1. . c .
ai~d
"!1e ho::t countr::
c0Y err1~-.er,t::
o:.. yo~ ca~_.', t [Ct r:ucL do~1e .
.!:e~;:t:c: .
; ro:: i::.t
3ettancou:-t
"-.!1::
AJ1ba.s[',CJ..dor
~ :,e1:a.:-l.t ,
t!,e=e
t:a.::
to:,::...:
COITlMli.!!icat ion . r: I r an into a roa:illod: , ::: .~'.l:Ol, sc..:..c. ":-:c ::.- ~ s t:.-:
pr oblen , one , t\-iO , tLrce " a!-1d r~e ~:a:-t ;:cull L:::r. t:--ez...:::~:""V .-:~tr.
the Presi dent , i:lio we;,t -:.o ti .e to; ~.o c"::-:0ct t.:-,-':, -r.:. "''."'2
p r oblems ,
bUt then the basic TTOb2.er:t cot dO>.T1 to so:ie re;,j_ to~
le,el decision::: . /,c"..,ua:i.ly tne C0:.sti tutio:1 o: 1erie:.;;e:..~ '"'chanseci t o where they reYol:e.i ~ 1ri v i leO.c:es c.:-ic ~Lr- .:..:-.:-;...;:.::. :.:: o: a
larre nur:ter o: Cor:r:ur:is"::- ir. t!ie u:;:;,c::- c:.:.:: :.. "'\~:'2::- !.0;.r:::s c: t:."'
Vene:z.ue lan Go;err.nenJ . .-',"lOUt Le: 2-: of the t:; ~ <.:: ::- C:. ! .:. ::..c ;;-:;::. hoi.lst.: o:~
Congrecs in \'cr;c::;u'"'l<! ''as :.n ;r:.soi ~:- :.or to ~:-1e e:r..ct::.c:~:: . ':'t. s~:
finally Kent into the Uni versity , ,.;i,ic!1 w.:;..: t.:.rl:1'::~:-:: o: , a~. . :.
cleaned out th~ u~i v e r sity ~~.
sanctuary . Becau:::.e they 1:ould co:..e ot:" of t~,(-:::e , &:,:. :::.'.;. tal;:.>.:about younG J.:id:: -- so;:e--hea:i"J 1;7 "t y ti 1-::: :rro7 le t::.c::.i:~ 0 :.: i:. CuL -" ,
and sone of ti."r: Ker~ :p:-ori r e:.t \'e:.e:.1:cla:. ~:i..::: , ::._ :=..;.:e t:.n o:.c.
younc t;irl that. \:aG sho.J"' ' She \;.;.:::- t,ht dau--:1.i~r:" o:- :,;~.-? ~ :.::._:.. ::..:. :.
of t he Presi dent .
Once we [O~ a l:.ttle b.:..t o~ a a~:'..:iei co~~~~..:
and sane nobility , i : they 1:m.::i.G. '."la\'e a L:'.. t c:..:.:. ::. u:1 t~;~ (; c:
shooti nc or bo~bing , the firct th i n~ y ou ~ d do :.s blcc~ o:r the
r oads into t he U;iiYersi t :ir--and--a lot of "v~1cn ;.:ere cau[/1"'... co:-.i:.,:
back afte r a str ike . Then do1,nto-.:n ir. Co::.raca::; , ..- ::..'Jr tall
buildincs to shield t~er: , ~hey Kould juct ::~~=-?choot ::-o~ u;~cr
le,els o:fi c i als a1.i police :-tan inc on tl1e corners or 1:h2. tever .
From the buildincs you couldn~ t cover--by the tine you cot t:7
ther e , you couldn~ t f i nd anyone . I r emember one ins"ance ; 1:hat
we did 1:as u::;e sor;,c wali:ic- talk i es and obscrYers in hi[h :; '.).:..:.t::
around and so for th ; later on , ;.;e had one incident ;.;he:-c th0y
fired do1-:n into a cro;.;d ai.<l police lookouts s7>otted. tr.er: c:.cro::::
f r on a hicher buildinc . E.v the t i ne the rio: :.ce cot U~' ti,nn I
there :ere three cuys 011 a sca:fold pai ntinf . ':': ,sy :.. oo~:el u:.:::"r <:..
tar polian a nd found thei r autoGatic Keapo~s a~~ ar:-e::t 0 i
the~ .
So thats the type of uri>an ter rori:::-:i that , as :-::..::- as ::: ~::. :), ; , o:
that magnitude and. in t hat point i n tine ; C::tracas :.c 1:i.e:::-e it
started i n 62 , and i t ha::; become more and nore sophisticate:
since i n othe r part s of t he wor ld .
And they had electi ons in
6J , a nd -- I ~ m r am1l i nG, I don~ t k now--naybe wc ~ d better get back
to--t hat s just some asi des that I r emenber .
O~e inst ance ,
t hey
machi ne gunned t he Ameri can Embassy on a l l d i f:e r ent f l oor s a nd
--it didn~ t quite nip his ear , but the Deputy Chief of ~i ss i on s
ca me right c lose to get ting ki lled- - a nd- bull ets Kent thr ouch our
office s and ot he r pa r t s of the Embas s y.. Thi s Kas a t hr ee pronged

A:

The

J;':l.cio n~l :

i"

J4

2tt .::i.ci: .
( 1)11 lar re nunler of ctudcn:s .:ere r.<-rch:..::.- U? to::-c:-..:::
th(' Cr:,b~.s!::y ; rolice --a !.:l. t he .:c:.tional Gt;.~rd -- ::"'.:.0? .::c-:1 t.'.-.0r. ,
( 2) l'i icn thE: re 1:C::.:::: a car ::.oa -1.c:i co:-..::,lete ly ;.;i "!:,h ..:.:::.:..:-:::.. ..~e ..J:'1:. t "'.: '.10::
'
L 1-.....
-r,...
\:ere CO..LnLr- .J...,o r.o,. ,'"'_ in
t-O -'-.., .i . c .ur.v
~~ .) cor.1 Ou .. -... .
, 1 .. .. - .LE:
o ...t.-'
~:-. s:.
[rourr we r e distract:'. _ nc ~E Kith the reac~ine [U~ ~:'.._ r~ ~=o~ ac =oc::
the road into the E~bass;~
5ut GO~eone tir?ed of~ t~e po::.ice ,
and they GOt the car befcre ii t rot into the L~~a3:: y co~.::ou~~ ; ~t.
was loaded with dy ~ami te ..
.!

Q:

.J.-

--i

........:

('":\
j

.-.-.:-

i:cll , i t was obviously a coor dinat ed- -

A:
Oh , it was that . A ca r just l ike that went acrosG fro~ the
American Embasc-y in C:::r a cas t o the Jfobile Oil Co:-.}:1a ;i.Y parr:inc
l ot - - t hey loa.cied a car i,.i t h dynami tE. . 'I:.y then th.:;:: cc.uldn't cet
it i nto our secur ity compound very easi ly . They Kc=e~ ~ t crashi~c
i t l i ke they a r e 1101{ Kith truc':s .
T'.,ey put tr.=:.t ca::. ::i..r. the
rarkinG lot ther e loa6ed Kith -- ~ot sone of the neKer ex?:o::ives-just plain old dynami te , and i t bleK up the r e a1 o~t ~ o~ clo~~ o~e
aft e r noon aid broke F:'.._r.do1:s .:.:ici lifi.t:: in tr.e I:::-:":J::..s:::y ari:::. L ::..e-.: 11:;
a bunch cf cc..n: around the are:.. ari:i :::'ortw.a :.e:. ,. G.:'. _ G.;_ '."'.:, ,::..:._
anyone , hut they k~lled--o~ , Jin--~housa:i~s 0~ ;ec~ : c . ~~ey xe=e
disbuised a::. Catholic :p:-:.. e:::.ts ir, :-obe~ a :id 1:ou::.C. cc ~:::- c..r:i ""cl!-.
down the police~e~ , a~d sane of the no:t c:-J~~ t~incs
rersona.lly sa1: r:..c~:t after the fact 1:a~ -- eut at 1;a::..o:~al G-..ia:-d.
Headquarters , they C.ressed in J:a tional Guard offi cer s .', u n~ :orn::;
and a couple of sent ri es we r e s tandi~c at attentio~ and salu~i~r
t hem because tl ie y thought t hey we r e their 01.;n of:ice:::-E., an::. t:-:e 2;
j ust cut the~ doKn Kith automat i c weapons . So , to :-e"'.:. ali ate w:'. _ "'.:.~
\'i olence ara:..~~t that t ; ?e of stuf: i s --its not r :'. _ [ht , but :.~
can be unde r stood .
Q:
Its c::. natural lar: of the juncle - - :hi ch , ::..ike ':ou sa~: , i::
s ure understandable .
\: ell , I cet the picture ' t:-.er. I t'.-ia t }Oil
came into Venesuela when thin~s were really in a bad ~tate in a
t e rrorist sense , and that you --y0ur proira~ -- Kas :.. ~~o rtant in
helping to get things-- ?

A: Viy procr ara--later on we had--ne\'er di d have 1w:e tha:1 about 8

or 9 rcople , but a~ ove r all effort from the ~eople thnt
backstopped us in v:ashinbt on , t he count ry team coo~ierat i on , you
know, with the va rious e l ement s of t he Embassy , pl us ha vi nc f ull
suppor t and cooperation clear up t o t he t op level i n Vene suel a ,
we we r e a1)le t o do it a nd i t 1:as r ococni zed a"" pr obably one of
t he rnoGt i f not t he most s uccessful pr ocr am wo had .
Because Ke
or ganized
to begin Kith--wel l ,
e ven after we
GOt
SOile
communication and so f orth , we actu.::.lly had one shoot- out tet1-:een
jur isdictional poli ce a~encies ove r a n armed ro-~ery . So we set
up a unified co:..-.and . There i..-as a co~llunica tior. s~:ste:-: , and. eacJ-:
acency had a representati ve at cornnand headquarters , and it
worked reasonably well .
In Caracas wore t wo police dcpar tment3 ;
one i n the State of Mir anda ; another in the Federal Distri ct . You
had two police depar traent s , t wo munici pal poli ce depar tne nts , in
t he Capi tal , and you had a different police agency in each state ,
each Gover nor in c ha r (Se , ki nd of like Br azil , and fou r Hati onal
agencies .
But it took a n awful l ot of cooperat ion a nd uni f i ed

35

,T ohn I' . Lonc<Ln

co:rinnnd to c;ct then all to i--l!C'::.0 they 1-:orkocl h~l: <:c.y rec:,::;on.:l ly
tocethcr .
~c h~d t~o U. S.
Army Colonels kicin~??C~ ciurin : ~h~~
time Ly the F .4 . L . !: .
Fir::.-J~ it ,.;as Col. Cher.:::.>..::::.t --:-.0 rela::..o:. -r,c
the otLer General .
:Cut -VJ;i:::. 1:-.:::: ,i:I~t ;-rio::- to cl-ctic:.:: , &::1
they r;aYe hi;-: U-,c:; ty71 ical Co;-::-:ci:.:. :::t t::.i<::.l a:~d - - a:tr r r.o::..:i:'..:-._- :.:'..:-.
~1bout 5 or 6 :eel:::: and cettinc ir.te!'national :;:iu"ulic:'.. ty 0 1~ it
and foun u him not cuil ty c..nd relE.:::.rnd hin .
rind tr.c.r, , ciet.r:'..e:::.:,.::
him , we could pinpoint fro~ a nunber o: facts an are~ o~ :10t ;-:ore
than 1 n ~qua.re bloci::: in Cc:trClc::..s i:here he r-.u::-t Lase 'be:::n Lel::. ,
because--thcre s c: lit tl , e airport--the soun:i of trie :;:.-l~ :. e::: , c.'."lc::.-e
i:as construction Hori: roi nt; on ci.01m u:1cier nec:..:c U:e:::e , c..:-::::. -... :.e:::e
was a :::tore uncler the::.c he coulci hec:.r voices a;i.i the::-e i:<:.::: a
playground 1:ith a little ~:iJ 1":: tl1E- na:-c.c of ~lulio , he cci~1lC. !.ea::his mother call hirr. . They newr could find it . '='i.e;. e:.. :e;.: 1:ee;.:::.
later , they kici~ar~eci Col , s~olin antl- - sa.me de~a~i:::: ~a~e anci.
same other thincs-~and we couldn~ t --the police ~e re cioinc
everythinc; , but we just could:1.'. t :-ie:..;:e the :::i[r1t contact . l.'e r.aci
a v;ali-;- ir, to t.he Embassy --'.1-? i:c:..::. c:.. f:,aniarci. that cc:.:-.e to
renesuela and h:.~ siste:?. , ::: c-.::::..:..c:e it 1:c:.s , 1-:c:.::; coricerc:.. '-' o: t:-.e
buildinc i:here Ch~naul t ha'.:! beer. ! !eld , o}:? J,i.i s~:e: i-..:..i ac,.. uc..11~:
seen ther:i ,.;hen they brouc,ht CLe:-,z,,u::..t in a.nci. they }:;,c:,..: thc..t :.:~ . <;:
had see!1 therr. anci. they ha:: put tl.e very foa::- o::.~ Gci i
:!,e
Kas afraiC:. to say anythin::- .
'.:'! .e:. c. ::.~t e:r the:; ~:icir1<c~~ si ::::-.ol:..:.,: ,
she juEt left and ~ent back to :?a:'..~ and t~i2 ~aE h~r ~::-c-r,~e::- .
So he cane to the E;:;ba~s~.- <-~r1ci z.::.i.l ":;-.'.ve:: [O'- so:-.et~-;:..r,[ I .-:::..:.t
-:_,.,
tell soneuody in the Er:i'bc:!.s::::~: lut :: -,.;or..'.t tc.lJ: to t~-"'" \"e;~e::J.ela:-i~ .
So he tolci u s --told r.r , c.,:1C:. ti1e:1 ::: c.::.lls..i. :.r. tl. :~.;:. t:.c:-. c:-.:..e: c :~
the C. I.h . and othe::-s c.nC. 1:e C'Jl.:;:'::..ete:::: de~rie:f::::. :r.:..;-. a:-i::. ; e
de::sc ri beci the quarter:::: ir1 t;-,e 1mi::..C:.inc c:..n.i everyth:.i.:- ~-J::::'- ::..:..~:e
Chenault clid--no quc::;tion acout it .
f.ut t!,e u; s:tot i;::..:: tl.e::
raided. that place about J o'cloc;: in the nornin[ a :;d pici-:e:i u::
two of the people that we re involved in the s~olinc ~=-d~a~;i~c
and I don t know , they nay have tortu::-ed the~ , : ~on ~t ~now , [~~
any ho;-:--I don't think so ; I thin!: ;.:e had sor.eone there ; ::: tr.:.:-,~:
that what they r eally did ~as told them that the; ~ould send ti:e~
back to Spain to that Governn.ent .
They Ke re political e):iles
from the Spanish i:;overnme nt and they were rr:ore a:raid of [Dine
back .
And they told us :here Snolinc wa::; be inc held
bef o::-c
the police got there , some Kay they got a tip off , because they
r eally had a system of Qlards and , recayipint; that , the n.o'1 u s
ope randi of the h:o were the sane ; they ho..d loo}:out~ at hi[li
p laces from the time the y were kidnapped till they char.r;ed to ti 1e
other cars and so on and so forth ; but by the tine they [Ot to
where they were holdinc Smolini:; , they had cotten hin ci.o~n i~to a
basement and out of there . hnd police found the toothtrush they ~ ~
bought for him . They took him down about three tlocks and turnei
him loo se and the police p i cked him up in ~inutes .
Unrela~ed ,
but as an afterthought , some of the same people that wo rked Kith
us on thi s case , some of them had gone into retire ~ent and the
President in 1976, Carlos Andres Perez , ( who Kas Einister o:
Interior in 1962 and 196J) called them back to Kork with ~e on
the Niehouse kidnapping ; Michael Orl ando Garcia and a fe K of the
others .
The point is you must have full cooperation between all
government levels , not just partial cooperation . You work at the
1

}-,::;::- ,

J6

J ohn P . Lonc;an
workinc level , and :..r they ca n he overruleri or a r c not ab: e to
use ;.:hat they've beci. t aucht by to~ coverT.r.er.t l e Yel I ~ou lo::::e
both ways .

Q:

I suppose t he rood peo~le quit and t he poor

crooked ones tal:c aci.vantace of a bad ci tua,ti on,.

0~9s

a~~

the

A:
The crooked ones take advantat::e of a bad ;::;ituc::.tion ancl th~
rood ones e;et disenchanteci or u::;ually , especially in so1,c o: the
countrie s where you havi:- a secL<r i ty :probl em l:i tJ,--:i1ich -v:e
encour aced private security peo;lc to take ave = the private
proper ty security to r eli eve the police co they could ?er:or~ the
r espons ibilities they hired to do -- so several lucrt:t i \" G sec-...::?'.':. ty
acencies sprunc ur a~i f or ot~er reasons , yoar 0ot on0s co~li
just make mor e mor.ey ~o~eKt e re else .
Q:

With pr obably l ee;:; :ructrati o:1--

A:

Much less frustration .

Q:
And they could ~aintain their
va lues--t o some e xt e n~.
A:

Yeah .

o~n

values-- the:..r

Tliats been one o::' the -cr-;:;ic rro"nle1:::; ,

better

- ,_, to at t r c:ct

and retain t;o~d reoplc . I: o~: the Lc:.tior:al Gut:..rd i n \'i:=nc;suela h~s
rot a career sjGte;;; anci the:i\',re .tro-oa.:..:y a""::out tr~s -::.sz-t . ':'f. e:-e.'~~
conti:-luity the:-e .
~Ut the O... ly ?Oli-Lics is ,
t~e~~ C~~ Cn'-1 U:t tc

be

Generals

r1ut thc y '.re not r,oi nc to e:;et to bs hec-.C:. o: 7,: ,e

orcani~ation Kithout the ~olitics ; thats true in our State ?olice
too , you know .

Q:

Yeah , there ~as to , it secrns like , be an inter:ace into t~e

political system which has to be more , see~s like it ha= to be
more t enuous .
There alKa ys seemed to be peo?le Kil:inG to
voluntee r fo r those post s , though , so it rna~es you ~onder if its
all that bad , cioe sn't it?
A: Well , the r e'.s a lot of thincs I 1;onde r about , Jin . J .'.ve just
heard--some of our recent elections--one of our ConGressnen that
serveci a t Ko year term that spends a million or t~o dolla rs to
e,:et r eelected--anci wl1e n I :as in Ji e v: York , there were t;.: o of ther.
that acreed not to spend ~ore than $25 , 000 , Khi ch I thought ~as
very l a udi b l e .
Eut I can ~ t under s tand the eco r.o ~ics of cpe ndinc
t wo million do ll ar ~ to be e l ected to a pos t fo r tKo years that
pays--what? ~~ 75 or 80 thousand a year (lauchs) .
Q:

Doesn' t maY.:c sense , does it ?

A:

So I donl t have the ans wers .

i:o .

Q: No , I m sure we don~ t . Well , in l ooking back on your ~ark in

Venezuela , do you think t hat it contributed , or do you ha ve a ny
indicati on tha t it contributed to political stability?

37

John F. Lonci"l.n
l :
i 0ll , like I sa y , the ovPrall ~~fort o~ bet~ our fOer~~e~t~
contri butcd inmcn:::;cly , n.na its cho1:n , a i.d I thiLi: the pr ocrar :::
i.:as invol\cci in was one tool that ciid it , a:1 :: J:.'. ::..l i;.:.. Ye ;:ou a!.
example .
After all the terrori :::t re i ~n , you ~no ~ : ~ e~t to
Ve1~c::;u0la.
in t he S:;rinc o: .'.(2 and l:e Laci e l ect i o :~::: .:. r, tr.'2 :f:... :c. ::::
Sunday of Deceii.ber of .'. ~.) ; Leor.i 1;as electeci :!-" r es:..ue :!t , a:1i t'.:.:.:L
was the fir st time in their 15L year3 of history tha t they ~ad
elected a President , Bettancour t , who f i lleci out a full te r~ a~J
a duly elected Fr es ident had succeeded hiG .
h~d t~is
~a::
i~
1?(J .
Since then , ,.,hey r1aC: an orcierl_y electio:. ::.:-1
lE , c. .. ~
orderly elC'ctions in 73 , orcierly elect i ons :.n ,, 7E. ; t j,c r c:- ce e:l
orderly elections and t heres been c o~t inuit y ; there:: t ee~ n 0
j untas or anythi nc; .

Q: Well , thats a GOOd p r oof , it see~s to rnc , for the et re~cth o~

AnC.. one tf:at has r.ot te!1 it,'.s ~ta :-:, 1-:ith
the De~oc ratic systeffi~
our help .
A: Thats ric ht . lnd of course , you ca~~t attr ~bu~e it &11 to ou=
help , lieca.use v:e.'.ve ha'l liclr _ _, ~o ::.:.x.:..c. , i:e i:::.i ~1 e:'..-:- :l.:.
Guatenala , l:e.'.\e haci },el:;- i n Er c..::;il ; 1-:e La:i i t a
places ...-here tiiere l1ave been co:-,::-,ta.nt tu::::-no\e::.::so ...
Q:

True .

Lo .
h:
think .

So 1-:e don't knor: ;ill t: 1e an:::;.;crs 2;et, .

re ci.o; .'.t eve n have the st.:r:a.ce sc:::-c:. ~c; . e;:;,

\.,'hat other ex perienc es or 1-:hr;:. t ot:K~r jol s ci d. ::ou l 1::::: e

s hould r e1ort he r e i n recarG. to Latin ;._-,erica (..e::o:::e ;.:i:>
on to Tt1ailand or sonethinc?
Q:

t-:e

tn:.:.,
r.o':c

A:
\!ell , before 1 wc:-it to 'li 10.iland. I 1:c:.s ch:.ef of t: .e La t:.r.
American Br anch a n::l. before that I ci.id some :'DY (terr.;orary d.uty)
in South hlncrican place::; includ.ir,c Bolivia .
,:r.~t r.ir,ht
1: 8 o:r;eneral interest was v:hen we had t he Inter- Ame ricai, Forces in t he
7nat was a. sort o:
Dominican Republic , I believe in 1966 .
mi niature Vi etnam .
It turned out differ ently and I , at l east ,
attributed it to the v:a y it ~as handled early in the 6ar.e .
Rather than throwinc masses of military aid , --it i s pretty well
documented what happened r ather tha n- - Com1.unist force"' had pre-:t:;
well t aken over i n t he Dominican Republic under the Jonnso~
Administra tion and put the U. :: . l:ar ines and sor:e of the Greer:
Be r ets , had a Bra:.il forces (enci of 'i'a_;-ie i , siC.c 1) .
I think ~e were in the Dominican Republic a~ter the ?eace kecpi nc
forces had Gone in and re stored order .
A l ot of the r ebel
leaders , and so forth , were in custody .
'lhere were s t ill
spor adic acts of urban t error ism and that sor t of the thi ng . The
foremost objective of the U. S. Goverruner.t at that t i~e i'as to get
the mi l i tar y out and turn i t (the Domini can Republic) back over
to
the civil authorities and a duly
(elected)
central
goverrunent , because t ha t was t he par t t ha t had been di srupted .
But my part of i t --I was called from \'ene::;uela into 1.-.' ashi ngto!"l ,

J8

ini i..ir.l mC'cti nr , I can eYs 1~ rC'r.cr.hC'r nr.r.c-: o:-. t~.:::. t .

? i l:
Faucilcr--Lc w;:..:: rYcn later named .L....-1ln.ssatlor--Ka:: :..r. ~r.i=: \:'."::..to
iiou::" liai:-;on v.-i tL ti11? ~tatc Dc:ia::-tr.c i~t aw: Po1 Sa;;r-::- i:::.:: '-!"'.P
Deputy /,s::i:::tc:.i.t. ~ccretary o: St:~tc .
\; . . . h"'...cl a rr.c~.i.,:.. :.c ;.:~ -:.: . ~!1c.
the then -- /\:-.1:.~:::--(:~::- ~-tei-:art he:.d. 1.oYed :..nto --1:2...:: ::.. ::-e8..,,0::- c:
the Carril ra:1 /,:'.:'fc:.i::-:::--but anyno.: , there 1:v..::: a rea::o:-::::.'::::...- !"::..r:.
lc>Yel r;iec~iLC t!,;-t c~ve me diat 1.:>' t.c:..::: i:ould be ; a:.::. :::.::-:.. -:::1;; it
1:as t o ro ir: there and don,'.i., 1-:o::-ry a..:rout the va riou::. C...fe!1c:..e:: ,

'i'l 1i:-

the
any

v ariou~ bure&ucracies etc .,

cut across the
problc~ ,
v.-hy Get on the horn and see if we

39

boar 6 , :..: I ha1

could re solve it .

John P. Longan Memoir

Volume II

The John P . Longan Memoir was donated t o t he Oral His t ory Office
January , 1986, by James D. Williams .
ORAL HISTORY OFFICE
SANGAMON STATE UNIVERSITY
1986

P..ETURN TO:
$,mgamon Si~tc Univer:;ity t1ri:hives

Brookens Library, Room 144

(217) 786-6520

John F . Lont;an

Tape :::' , Side 2

hnd my job WaE to do WJ1ntever K~S 0 be do~e -- tO fe~ the ~i:itary

fo r ces out with a r easonatle assurance af~er i t ~~~ ~ce~
eva luat e d that t hey could ~.u.int::i.in l ar: and or der and so fort! J.
Q:
You ' r e speaki n5 of cuttinr across l ines ;
the --in t he American system--or

A:

you ' r e

of

spea~inr

In t he Ame rican sys ten - -

Q: And in the Dominican Re7ublic

~oo ?

A: Well , I had to cut across th~ l ines i n the AFle ric a~ systen in
order to move fast e;-,ouG:i to where the y could influe:-1ce the host
gover nment to do what v:as necessar y , i!1cluciing chancinc a
Mi ni ster of Interior anci a Director of the ::ationa.:. ?olice a:.i a.
fe w things l i ke that which are nore or less more o~ the cietai:s .
Q:

I see .

A:
And of course they ha1 sent Amba=sador Eu~~er :~ as a
troubl eshooter a~d I r ecall t hat they had sent a ~ r~ e~d cf - - ,.. c
Clark Anderson , ~rom the F . B. I . in to war~ with ~e , a~ci we ~ere
to --well --you know , A. I . I ., we had an h . I . D. Li r ec~or t~at was
--di dn ' t ~ant his ~ewer usurped- - he di dn ' t want ne ~oi~r to the
U. S. Ambassador dir ect and t~at type of thin[ ; you didn ' t ~o
through cha nnels ; you just went in a nd t r ied to put out the ~ire
as fast as you could .
hnd what ~ e di d- -we hai so~e trai~in[
pr ogr ams anC. ;orl:ed a nd advised and . . -orf:.eci. rehinC. th<:: sc :.c.::: ,
both Ki th A~bassasior Bennett in the Er.tasfv -- the ~ ~ave= r~=
headquarters f r on the A. I . D. over t~ere directly ~ i~~ --a!:ace~~
to his office , and then Ke Kere stayin; in the h~tassa~cr ~o~e: ,
the Erlbajador .
hnd i t 1,as a co;:ibination of a r:u;;-1he :;:- o: t~:..r.f~ ;
it was- - f irst and foremost ,
hnbassador Bunker and throuc~
di pl oma ti c cha nnels a nd so forth , he macie arrance~ents to r lea5e
most of t he rebel pri soner s a nd t hey went out on a ? l a ne to- - :
beli eve t o Cuba ; but t he re was s ti ll a n a wful lot of violence and
urban t error ism and so on and so fo r th that ~as goinG on .
Ani
they had killed a nu~ber of the National Police and so :'orth
dur ing this upr isinG , and it was just a matter of tryi~G to
restor e their capabi l i ties to wher e they could maintain law and
or der in or de r to cive the or der t o move t he Mili tar y f orces out .
And i t was a time s c hedule a nd things wor ked r eal . . - ell ; we
cha nged poli ce command a t the top and ~ot some ne ~ blood in
there ; and there we r e two factions in the r:a tional Police that
were- - I wouldn ' t say that the opposite factions we=e necessarily
rebe l suppor ted , but i t was just one of those thincs ti.at ..;01..11:
keep you from having a good effort .
But when ....-e put the - -:
r emember the morning t ha t they put t he new Di r ector of Police
in--he was supported mor e or less by the people i n the Ca?ital
a r ea whe r e the guy tha t was bei ng r epl a ced had t he s uppor t of the
Provincial Police .
Well there we r e seve r al t r uckl oads of ther.
came i n and t he r umors we r e going a r ound t hat they wasn ' t being
to let t hem- -the ne w ones--take ove r , a nd that type of thi nb , and
. . .... ,

40

typical Lei.tin-style , you kno\; , they h::i.d :.he i:>a:-.~~ :::.n:: all thz;.:
out ; and bcinc there as an ohserver , you didn ' t really knoK Kha:
i,.;as goinf: to happen a t tl,at particular time ,

but or1e t:rour

:ii~-:G.

up on one side of the l i ttle parade r r ound ,

or ~he little a rea
there by the National Police Capital , and the others on the other
side , and kind of glared back and fo r th , and the ninute ttey
played the Hynno ~acional , the ~atio~al Anthem , they a:l stood at
attention and the new guy Kent in- - not a thinc - - and then after
the cerelilonies , typical Latin , they had a few drinks and so forth
and the guys were givir.g each other the embrazo , \: hich i s an
inte r e s ting sideli ne , but after that- -and watching them f or a
couple of weeks--I made my report and Kent into ~ashington and I
said " I ' m reasonabl y sure , and Ambassador Bunker has been
convinced , that the civil authorities could ta~e over '' so it Kas
just a matter of pulling the Kilitary out .
And I r e ~e~ber I Kas
told "You ' d better be rii;h"., , or t:'lere ' 11 be sorr1e heaC.s ro:..1:.nf:
It was the best of our ju~[Crnent; but it did , it KOr~ei out ~e:l
and they ' ve still got a pretty Deraocratic forn o~ ~overnm e~t , ~ut
i f that had escalated into ~ilitary s t uf~ , lik e Vie~n~~ . and K~at
some people are afraid ~icar agua KOuld do , Khy-- I t~in~ thats a
success s t ory thats never been t0ld l i ke our f ailure :.n Vietna~ .
11

Q:
I think of another thin& before we ~ove on to ~ha:.land , an~
that is the role of religion :.n the Latin /..nerican cot::-:-:.r:.es ; the
Catholic Church , for example ; the l:acumbc.. ; and \'oodoo--do yo-.:.
have any observations on those?
/.. :

Yeah , I think they ' re a contributing factor .

Q:

Contributing to what?

A: Well , to the way people look at hoK they die and so ~orth and
what they re willing to risk once they ' re dedicated to a cause ;
like the Buddhists a nd the --whats the Iranian reli; ion? - - where t~ey
be l ieve t he- -after death that they ' r e really i;o in~ to ha ve
their --i f they die right , thats Khen they really start to live,
And I don ' t knoK hardly how to articulate it , JiD , but t~e
Buddhists- - of
course they cremate everyone ,
at least
:.n
Thailand , - - and I went to a few cremations of relatives of sone of
my contacts , and its a drinking , celebrating occasion . The first
t i me I t r i ed to give my condolances and one of the guys that knew
I wasn t familiar wi t h the culture sai d "Don ' t do t hat ", said
"t hi s i s a happy occassi on", But--

Q:
I don ' t know as I ever sensed that in respect to the Voodoo
practices or the ~acumba in Brazil , but you could sense that it
was qui te an important r eligion for many people .
A:
It was .
And of course , the Catholic relig ion , which i s
dominant in Latin America , I don ' t know my history that well , but
t here was probably as much brutality and violence i n t he name of
the Cat holic Chur ch when the Spaniar ds were settling some of our
Latin American countri es ; probably some of the greatest in
history , if you go back and--

41

Yes , very definitely . Corte~ a~d ?is~aro an: 7eo;:n o~ t~at

ilk.
And the other thin[ , :::r,ne ;.;~~c:t on relir:..o::, - oo , i s t110 s0calleci Lit P.ra ti0n Theo:;..ocy t!,;..:':, i-;e tear a1out no;.. -,.;;-,:: c:--. ::: a.:::..:. '--.
knm: an.vthinc about in the yc;;:.rbs \;hen ;.;e ;.;o:::ked. :.: . .:.,a;:,i :. .Lncrica .
Do you have any comments 0r, tliu.t?
0:

A:
J;o , I don ' t knov; r.uch aL out it .
::: do ~:n oi: -- yoa ta~:e , :-ro:-.
the \'iet Cone to the ':\J;..:.::arc...s ir. l'ruruay to the f . /.. , .:., , j; . i;-,
VenesuPla , and all of thoEr people ~hat &re trai~ed a~d rrie~~ei
i nto helievinc in the i r ca use ; re rar dlcss of their rcli c:.. o~ .
they ' re so dedicated that thPy don ' t think anything a~out the:..r
oKn life or human life other;.;ise ; to the~ , ite ;.;ar , a~d I do:. ' t
think it makee that ~uch difference t0 the~ about ~hat t~ 0 :..r
religious beliefs are , once they ret that indoctrination ani get
that deci.icated to that particular cause and are ~rained in :..t
and-1

Q:

Thats more importaP.t th:::.!. ar1ytr.inc

A:

I think so .

el~e?

Q: ~ell , I don ' t really kno;.; enou~h about Liberat:..o~ :he~lc~y to

even question you r:1ore fully , but it occu::.ei to r,P tl-:.at relir:..o:.s
are imrortant in many societies , obviously , a~d that you ~ic~t
have some specific observations .
If not , lets nove on ~o
Thailand , when you went t here in -- in wl.a t year?

A:
: went to ~hailan~ i~ a~0ut Fel . o: ' 69 , :irst : or a co~:le
of months T. D. Y. anci then c~:-:e tack an~ t=an~fer=ei ;:,hnre .
left there in June or Ju~y 71 ; I was there 2( ~o~t~s , ~0re or
less .
And of course that was in the heiGht of the V i et!1a~ war
and we had a nur-.ber of air tases in '7i&aila;,d. that ;,;e=.:: actua::::
for conbat bor-.iers and. fic;hter ;-:;.2~nes co ~r.s i!1to :.. etr:.a:-:
other places .
~e ha~ the traininc of not on:y t~e :~ai sec~ rity
forces for within Thailand , but some of the so- called irrecular
forces that were [Oing into Laos and fi5htin5 in a covert way .
And that was a huGe program ; we had--next to Vietnam , it was
probably the largcst--it was the largest we had ; : ve fcrcotten ;
at one time , at the time I was there , we had something under 100
advisors in various places in Thailand , and we were involved in a
number of thinGS
At one time we had t ;.;o C. B. tattalions
assigned to clearance and stuff of airstri?S and that type of
thing .
\-!e had several companies of Green Eerets
Lat erP
assistinG in some of the training that we were coord :.. natin~ ; :..t
was coordinated very closely \d th the Air Ju.erica an:i the C. : . ;.. .
operation .
And the Thai police--well , for exa~?le , the 3or~cr
Patrol Police o: Thailand had more STOL aircrafts , ~hort ~a~e o::
and Landin[ , like choppers and that type of th:..nc , than the :r.a:..
falitary and Army and AirForce .
And we had a lot of rural
terrorism in Thailand t o cope with in the various Prov ince s ; it
wasn t urban terrorism ; right opposite from Venezuela , plus you
had all the narcotics etc . up in the so- called Golden Trianr,le of
Burma , Thailand , and Laos . And the Thai police were responsible
for the outer security of all of our Air Bases ; I ' ve forgotten ;
G. .......

42

John P. Lonc;an
r.e had six er se';en in Tk.. ilc..nd , aiiJ t!.cy r..:ic -:.o ce rr:>.:..ly
capable , to \;here the,\' could11 ' t set u; ::;or.e I l?..ce ar.i lot. a
mortar or sometliinc in or i..ha"J type of thi11c lik" t~.sy ;.;ere co:.:-.,in Da Nanc; a11d places in \'ie".:.nar. . /.nd it :as a ::..arr.:: ~::-cy::.a-.; :. t
was- - I don ' t kno>-: the mc..c:-ii tude c: :. t ri[ht o:'f t;-;e to:t of . :
head , but there Kere millions o: dollars ~cnt in~o it ; tut it w~s
a political thillt; , anci i:e were cetti11[ thC' u~e o:~ ,:..:.r 2.ases a;.::
that was r eally about only the secure 7art o: that trianGle was
Thailand ; of course Carabodia and L~os were very insecure . A:.J so
26 months there; i t was diffferent- - entirely different than Latin
America .
The problem was dif~erent ; we still had to procram on
paper , kind of like we did be:orc , and co~pcte for funds and so
forth , but ne,er in the project r,roposal can I recc:..11 tr.at c.:.,:one
had the nerve to cor.e right ou1 and say "1oor: , th:.s is e:..
political dec:.sion ; we ' re :ust tryir.r i~rle~ent ;.;ha~ the
Government i.:ants done in thei:- vi t<tl interests . "
But- - do you h2ve any questions?
: dor, ' t i-::10-.: ex:..ctly ho.: -:.o :-J-:,
it in perspective , Jim .
Q. : Yes , well , I r,uess one o: the thiner V>::>uld be t~.~ :;)'~c:;-le ; ho-.:
did you find the people dif:erer.t TO i.:ort: v;:_ ".:.:~ as co:-::;::are:: to fr.e
Latin Americans , for exa::,:;'le?
i-.r.~: cu:.tur::.l t!!ir:cs
that ''ere
better or Korse?

A:
Well , ~ome better ,
opposite .
One instance ,
meetinG that I chaired
committee :

we had meetinc:s

sone worse , ~ut a:nost 180 decrees

one timE:: in a mectinr: that r.a~ a joint
, a meetinr th~t they calle; a ?A~
t~ice <:.. ,.; ee ~: '~i th /.r.~rica.r1s

a!"ld

'7i.-... i

people to work out details ,

rroble~s ,
n~c .
an~
Ke KCre
administerinc B1ch funds--thats their curre::c::- - a:-.::t :e :er
talking about something that had ~ee~ boucht th~~ ;.;as reall~ a
white elephant ; and I used the tern ";;hi-!..e elephant ", a:iC: 1.~
friend told me after the meeting ":;Jon ' t ever use t'.-,a t ; tha :: a
sacred thing in this area , is a white elcphant- - thats alnost
sacreligious to use " (lauchs) .
:Sut the Tha:. are very outcoin;:- ,
like I mentioned about the Guatenalans .
3ut the} ' r e more :or
ceremony than the Latins , if you can oelieve it , if you ve r:nve:served over there . For example , and I was pretty l oi' on the ran}:
scale , when I ' d come in from overseas , or Dorothy and Kathy cane
in , they had to go to the a irport with me , meet then at
planeside , had one of the V. I . P . rooms in the airport reserved
when Dorothy and Kathy came in ; they were riGht behind the Kine
and Queen of Thailand who had just vacated it ; and U,ey roll out
the r ed carpet when you come and go and you co up country for a~y
kind of trip or travel with them , they just can ' t do enouch :or
you .
And they ' re pretty professional , you knoK , and politically
I think they ' r e about as sharp as anybody that I know of , unless
it woul d be Switzerland .
You know , they ' ve never been in a war ,
and they were on the winning side every time , includinc the side
of the Japanese during World War II .
And they ' ve been very
flexible , and I ' ll have t o say that they were the staunchest ally
we had in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam crisis , and they ~ere
used more to our advantage than anything else ; we ffiade a lot o:
mistakes--a nd political mistakes--but I still think what we were
doing in Thailand was done pretty well , and I was only there fo r
I

4J

cl 0!111 ]

1011[,un

a sr.:ill time , bcca.uoe i:e hari. a j'r0crar.; in ~hailanci fo :- , ::: cue.-:, ,

15 years .
It Wil ~ o:.c o: thr' ec..rlirr rr0cra.JT.S ; it stc:.:cte...i about
the time I went to Gu~te11ala ; :t sta.r"leci. ir; t-he 50 ' s .
Q:
What Kas the natur e of
you referred to?

A:

so~c

o: the political

~istakes

~hat

Some of the political r.iistakes tlia.t--

Q:

Yes . I r;ather that the U. ,.. . Gov~rnmcnt rr1n.de ~ i :3t2.. ;:e3 , '~''ere
t hey in r espect to Thai land or i n resrect to the whole Soi..:.the~st
Asi a t hine;?
A:
~ell ,
there ac~in , Jim , its a r.:atter of judce~ent ; I ' ~ ~ust
t:i vinc. you m,v ,~uclfCi'.i'?:.t .
:!: tr.:..r.I: tiie biccest nista~:e ;:e r.ad.e i:-1
\'ietnan :us the nistc..~:e o;' overi-::::.::.. ard. escc:.l<:i.ti:10 be:'o:-e ;:e i-;:r:e:
Khat Ke were escalating .
I 5u~~~ i"t w~s kind of li~e " ryinc to
fO in and kill ou" :-.osqu:.. toes i:: tn a sle.lce ha:-:i7.e:c or so:-:ethinc
lii-:e that , liecatwe you i-.- ere fir.hti:-tc this hidden eneJT.y . \:e :e r.t
in and defo:.iat d t:-.e ~..ir.cle ; .;e co:--.t\ed ; :e wei.t :..:-;to v:::.:.c-""r-es
and so forth , a:1d the :-e were so:ie :;:iret'-." wel:::. ci.ocu:-,ei."e:i
re?ressive :::.stio;s ta;:e:-..
re:-.e;-: ~e:c
t!.e:-e :.:as ":.:E or.
lieutenant tri0d in cour a~d so ~orth .
?ut yo~ ~~ re~ t.0
rerneffi~e:- that some of terrorists t~a~ were kil:inr 0u:~=--~::~~
men 'r\ere ..,.omen anci r eal sriall chil~:-e:i ar;d that -._,v;ie o:~ -'...~.:..::: .
But 'r\ha.t the \'ietConc 1-;cre doinc; ...,-:..::: lriri:~i~,.- in t:ieir Pl!u:;-~-.i:?~.:.
and so fo r th dOh'n thr ough the lioChi l:inh trc:.. il , a :.:.:. they \.:oalS.
attack and the?; they ' ci just srire:..:: t::tc~: :.. :i ar.'i l.ler1:::. -~ 1:.:.::.
society , and tlie v:ay t o fi5!,t tL'lt :..s the s:.r.e ::c.._y that c.he:: :Cf'
doing it , v:i th snall e;:::ou;is hir,hly tra:..1.ei ; ::ou [O .::. a:.:. t.::: :c
1-iin the sur:rort of the countryside .
Eu"v the;:c <:.Gair: , JOU r.::. 'i a
very corrupt ree;ime i . \'ietna;-: an:: then c:..:~ter ti',e i:.i t:..c.::.
Presi dent was assassinateii and the nc;, Gu:: toot: ove::: , the one
that is in the United States no~- - has bee~ accused o~ be:..nG
i nvolved in narcotics et c .
0

Q:

Yes , I ' ve noticed t hat in recent ne"' items , its an extortion

r acket---

A:
Right . hnd a lot of the aid was coinG into the hands of the
ri ch Vietnamese and Going to out - of- the - country ba~~ s and - - I
only have ve r y much of a wor m' s eye view of i t - - but j ust i 1J ~y
j udcement , we escalated it too nuch and too f ast and ..,.e ju:::t
lost ; then after we got i nto the 'r\&r , Ke didn ' t call i t a war ; we
wer en ' t i n it to win .
Q:
Tr ue . Ho1-: much of a traumatic ex:;:>erience 1-;as it movinc fror.
a
Latin wor king climat e to a Thai land
working
cli~ate ,
culturally?

A:
I didn ' t find i t t r aumatic a t all ; I found it i nte r estinG ,
and I think f r om , you know, just enjoyinc not only the ..,.or~ but
t he li vin~ i n a country , that I enjoyed Thailand better than any
of the othe r s .
Oddly enouch , Brazil would have been second ,
because i t was a bi g country and we di dn ' t have the proole~s in

44

Brazil t hat we had i n Thailand , but we had a GOOd staf~ and a

l a r t;e staff and the y v;e re a lready in a head of me ; i t v;asn ' t like
when I went into Ve ncsuela ; it w~s r r etty we l l e=tabli shed ; t he
g uy I r eli eved. had excellen- r elations with the ':'hai i;ove:;,..r..me:1t ,
so it was just kind of a plush situation I walked into ; i t wa~
easy for me.
1

Q:
Well , how about such thincs as climate and living
and different customs?

con~itio~s

A: We ll , the clima te in BanGkok is e..bout like 2i o , and li vini; ir,

Ba ngkok , othe r than driving on t he wrong side - - left si de--of t~ e
roa d for your traffic and be i nc even more congested than ~io , t ~~
cli mate is much t he same .
Now yoilr travelinc i n the interior o~
Tha ila nd was very , very priffiitive compar ed. to Br a=il a~d other
places , See that little statue of t he guy on t he ':" . V, s it t int; 0:1
the wa t er buffalo?
The r eason I boucht that , just to give you a
comparison , when they had the ~irst man that walkei on the ~oon
--what was that ,
6? or 70? --in a little Thai v~llace that I
went into , they had one T. V. thinG elevated an~ had people
wa tching a ma n wa lk on the moon live , a~d I saw on~ kid layin; on
the back of a water buffalo and Ka tc~-iinc it on T , \' , i r: t he
interior of Thailand ,--a man wa lk on the moon live--and I thought
that was r eally quite a contrast and a sign of the t i mes .
Q:

Yes , about as much as you can ce t , wasn t it ?

And one time we rot stuck in a poli ce vehicle way out there
A:
and were pulled out with an elepha~ t , an~ - - it was r eally
primitive in some of the ?arts o~ the interior . ~~d so~e o~ i t
you went into with STOL ai r craft and --or choppers-- it Kas ~ust a
little cleared area that you went into to t a lk to so~e of the
peopl e tha t we r e trying t o se cure that area , and you had Code
Green or Code Red as to whet he r you l anded on it or not .
It was
different .

Q:
Do you think those peopl e a r e on their way to
of the modern world or do you think they ' re --- ?

beco ~inG

part

A:
I t hink Tha ila nd is ; I thi nk the rest of them would be
ready , but you know what happened in Cambodia after all of the
millions of people t hat wer e slaughtered ; and Laos , politi cally ,
the re ' s no indi cation to me t hat t hey ' r e going t o have an
opportunity to go more moder n .
Tha iland , yes , I t hink they ' r e
adapting very well .
In fact , they we r e adapti nG t oo we ll ,
because t ha t was a n R. &. R. (Rest a nd Rec r eati on ) center for all
of our peopl e cominG out of Vi etna m and it was a Saf e Haven f or
the dependents etc . and some of the stuff tha t sprunc up ; the
nightclubs and the P . X. s tuff that got into the economy etc . , and
around the airbases in Thai l and , and some of the people that came
r ight out fro m r agged clothes i nto b lue jeans or khakis and-( l a ughs )--they moderni zed pretty fas t , or they we r e America nized
pretty fast .

Q:

A l ittle faste r tha n they s hould ha ve , probably .

A:

Pr obably .

Q:
Throuch ei.11 this discu. :..01, ti1e:!.'C' hasn ' t LCP:i a :.y :..r,:!icatio:-i
o:- - in your discu~sion - -o:- a :r-heno:- ~110 :. ;Lie!. 1;a.c cal::.ei " cul tJre
shoct-: " ,

arid

:: ' ve J..o:..:ited co:-,e quef.'7..ior.s yol!r G.i:-ect:.. o:, a? . ..:. r.a\e

never found any indicati on th::.t you !:'u:ferei ar,y cu:::.tu::-e 1:'.-loc!: .
A:
I thinl: r..aybe I cici. an:l diC.ii t }:r,o,,.,. i.:i c; t it i-;as ,
wasn' t that distasteful . flaucLs : C, : l<:.ur,hs \ I reca::.l , a . ,J : ve
heard it from soneone else--1:her. I ::.c:t \'c:.e::;uela , Jir. , l0fore I
we IJt to Thail2.nd , I .....as Ciiief o: Latin /.;'lcrica i;1 i.'ashincton :-cr
about 1(i month::. , ;:uicl I w2. s asked th.:-.1.t same que::.tion , c:..:-id I told
people in the \:ashi115ton area thu. t ::. hud r1ore trou l :c , ani t!1a'" s
true , reacclim:itinr, to 'that
:ut as a:, exC!.:-.~:::.e , I
i::aici
"Overseas , I ca;'le ho:ie fro:-: i-;or~; , ~:: 1:ife or 'the caiC. . . -ou::..ci }"U't a
..l..

\,
"
..
narvll1l
in
my .i<.:.nc
au::... no;: l- cev c.. c _ -h"""
-., , .,o....-t::.l \ -"'-J::. . kJ o
~:::> 1. 't v:a. s
culture shock ir: reverse .
1

.J,.

.. .:

tt (

.... -

\:e::.=..

- .... - . \

:-:.,.L . 1:0;.; a~r-,u.L

you think they ha:i ai.y cul t.t:re :::hoc;: e>:j 8riec1ce::: ':'
Q:

(:c:.u_,,-hr,) ,

':':.~t ' E ?ret"':y

,...

'

- --:=- ,.
-- ..... ..: ' cio

A:
Some ,
I i..hir.k tlie Korst cul tu re shoe~: :1 0::-oth~; ha-:. :-~::: t !'!<>
night WP spent iii : 011ala
f.outherr, ::c;dco) l.cfo::e 'h' C ro"" on t'.-le
flat cEi.r ; 1.;e c-ta;.ed ii. aL old hovl i i i tiiir; o::..G. tc,;:-.--y0u b-:0;.:
J'onola--,vou rr.a:; have sta::c.i in the sam"' hotel--0u-t. 1-:e iiad. one
br eat bit; roo;ii " i th--you coulcin ' t loci-: tl.c cioor , ar.:: tr.ere: '':::.::; a
vera nda out ju!:'.t up one fli c ht 2~nd they we re has inc a ca.rr.i val or
fiesta with ferris \:hee l s a 11d that ~Y?C c:' thi :.c; a:::': =.-:..f":--:tc cir._:on

under uc ,

\\ e

\\:l"'e

stan:i:...n- or" L..!-.c tr:~rac,":l ,

a:-jd f~e:.-:.~.:' a .. :.

went Co\:ri to -vLe c:-:-!::..,~a1 a :1d : 0 ::.. . o~r.y \\:.r- ;:o:. .r.:..e:: ::..:.:: ;.;st::.~: . ' : ;-:
with us , and I rerr.er.ber wLcn KC went in to eat the:.~ 1.i r-L~ t:ie::
brour,ht out the rai; mPa.t anci so forti, to sho1: t:s tr.at ct;;:0re t::e:;;
cooked it , ani I thin~ she was be~inninc to ~ave culture Ehoc~
and rcsenations atout i t ther. , t'J1, then cy t'.ie t:..:-.e ;.:e cot :..:.-:o
Guatemala , why , you 'n'ere livinG ju~t very con:ortab::..e , as I tol~
you . And then 7hailand--Dor oth:, trave::..ei a ::-e i: t i r.es 'n'i th ;-;e
into the interior but it woulci be on special occas:..ons 1'ith a
poli ce 5roup or roinG to a Graduatio1 , where they stayed at the
best places ; even if it happened to
e b . O. Q. ~uarters or
somethinG like that , it was ve ry comfortable and no hardships .
1

Q:
I don ' t r eally remembe r , b ut whC'n we were in Bra:.il , we had
a n anthr opoloGi st by the name of Obc r c who wac de votinc hie ti~e
to the s tudy of culture shock amonc the American~ , a~ d ti .ere ~ e r e
a couple of very cood talks that he c..ave that 1o.C're p r il!ted ;
don ' t know if y 011 re rnenber these or not , or rC'r.".-:( e::. hi1. , b:'t
apparently it K::t.r. a much more comr.1on rhcnor.cr.on Lli<::.n ei t'. .o::>::. you
or I 'n'Ould think .
And later , towards the end of ~v stay i~
Brazil in
61 , we had sane people come who had been in Iran ,
and--well , the man was kind of a no- account type accountant , so
it didn ' t make much difference , but his wife was al'n'ays telling
you h ow g r eat it was i n Iran .
There wasn ' t anything that was
right in Br azil but everything was g r eat where she had been
before .
We ll , thats all right , except this went on , i t was just

46

c-:c you kind. o: st0rJ1ed li::tc:1:ir.c to :.t . !-.::~ lat~:.. o~.

1
r an acrC'GG ~.Qj:"1one 1'\ho kne1: he::_-- ir, :ra:4, C;..;iC sf,S: ~:.:...s :..::...-:~::::;
t<i.lldnr alOUt l.ni-: h0rril.le i t ;..-.:..s in Ira:-1 i:..:1C r.Oi\ 1,:_ cn "... .,c.;.._
e>):ces~ive

"'e

1'her e sl1c had 1eei. be: o r e .

i:ell 1 01.Je ri- ::;aid tr-.i::- i:as c:. o~ ~:-.e
cor.mon s::r.pto..-.s o:- culture i:-hocl: , a:1d : co:. ' ~ ~::.0;; a<: e:.:-.::o:--.e r.::.::
ever r eally unraYelled the matter of cul tu re shoe;: e ; en yet .
0

A:
~ell ,
he ' s the exrc=t , and ~ ' d have . o .,.,.ay --: ' ve o:te~
;.;onder ec.l at some of the people , and we hall sor.e o: ther. , t!.e
wives had drinkinz proble:-1s and the fU.Y:::; haci. di~fcn":-i 7- :;-rob:!..ei',:::;-I .iust wondered if they ciidr. ' t at tritutc that to cultu::-P s~oc:: o:maybe they would hav e had i t ~ier~ver they Kere , ~a~te they
br ought it with t hem . I thi nk that it doec require a ~e==o~ , the
type s:u:f 1:e i;ere in , to oe a11le "",C' a:;;.;-'., re;:.-c:-.-!.c1~.- ;.:e::..J. t o a
different lifestyle .
If you are roi:ic to ju:::;t 1;"'-r.t to live U .0
same tv~e of l i festyle you did be~orr a~d nnt aJa~~ at a __ ,
tl1ink you micht nm ir.to }- roblei'.::::; , but :.: you hc..:;e a:-.J C.s:::;:-ee o:
adaptability , ::;: don t -- I don ' t think ;;e c.:.d , and. ::: con ' t, have a:-.y
:ir st hand b10i:ledce o: too na.ny--1-:c::..1 , :: i::ie;: sor.e :;ie0;1:i.e i-:.:. th
rroblems , as you ciid , ~u~ ::: can ' ~ ~~t,:-ibi.lte :t, to cu ::.. t~=e shoe~ ,
honestly .
Q:

\?ell , after Th.:..iland , U .e:1 , ic

ti~::;, :~.ere

you

:ir.is~1eC.

u;?

A:
J;o , I wci.t back to Yenezucla fer 2:.:-.othe:- tour , ar.d t'.".:.t ;;~:::
i n the suml'ler of ' 71 , anci. le:t ir~ ; '::. . o~- ' -;-:; , ar.J t-'..e
capabilities c: the pol icn WP re ct: ll rr.i.lCL ir.; r o:r:i , ru, th":'e
had been some slippare .
I had some requeGts fo:- su r vey fer t~e
J~at i onal
Guar:i in co:.r.i.:.:1:.ca".:.io:1s ti-.:..- 1:': r. ~:. G.c-:-."" i:-.--::: -:.:-. :.:.~: ::.
--this would h:ive teen in 1972 , or ' 71 --;:c. ' d :::er."' t'.-1:.:: :::2.:-.e t:.::.c
and made a co;~.:;~ lete r epc-rt i:-1 ' GI. . /-.::: tr,ry ' c cr.:c:.,-e:i cc:-.:-.::..:-,.l 0 =:::
etc . and didn ' t have any recorl o: it .
..'..:,.:. a;;'arc:-.t::..y t:-.a~ ....-:-~:;
one thine; that never i:as iri}'le;;-,ente:i . ;:c cc-:. o:.:= ur.i:: e:i co:-.:-..:;.:.:i
going etc . in Caracas , but this :a::. a pretty \"ast pr ocra:-: ..... :1ere
they were goin~ to have to spend quite a it of money an:i tie i~
their Pr ovincial police systems over tne country , because the
Nati onal Guard was country- wide , but it was a little bit
di scour ac;ing , the success that I le:t in ' G? , to go bac~ , i t was
no lon5e r a hi[h prior i t y procram , there w~s n o loncer any real
security r isk , and t he probl em had just k i nd of bee n solved a1 1d
you do a lot better if you ' r e wo r kinG unde r a pr iority procr &r. .

Q: I Guess maybe tha t s a cha r act cri:::;t ic o~ a Denoc r atic sy sto~ ;

you put t he r esour ces where --maybe not the need. is , but 1':1ere
the wheel r eally squeak s or i-:here you really feel the ri Lch .
A:

That s where the p ri oriti es a r e at that time .

Q:
And
then when t hat s ov er , they drop back f r o;;, that
priori ty , which may not be ;.;rong ; I thi11k its mo r e apt to be
r i ght t han one that keeps on doi ng the same thing only oigge r and
bi gger c e ntury a ft e r c e ntury .

A:
Yes , a nd I do n ' t think t hats going to change , but my
persona l experie nc e f r om ' 62 through most of the t i me I

47

o wn
was

there , c:::-1~ccially until v;e secu.::ed th0 tr.inc , yoil r-0t e:er~;"LLir,c
you asb:'J for and they eYen tried to ci ve ,YOU nors t!.c.:. you
needed. , and .:hen you ' Ye cot <.h.:. t , you hae :10 e>:cu:::;e :or :a::.::.u:E ,
you r eally to.: the line .
'l;1eE-PC:1 you [0 bac:; Ki 7-'.-. a ::.0 ;.:
:;-:::.ori :,~;
procraM and can ' t ['.:t ::;:-.all -:l .ir. -s do:ic tr.c. t you r:.:.o,, are
essential , then it cets fr:.istratinc .
Q:

I don ' t knoi.; the ans: er to that 011e either , Ja.i-:e .

A:

No , I don ' t ei 1 her .

I don ' t thi:-J. anyo11e does .

So I tal~e it y our second tour in

s uccessful , i n a way , as j ' OUr fi r st orie 7

Q:

Venc:::uela

;.;a;::

not

as

We didn ' t have "Lne chal!e~gc ; diln ' t have the ;rot::.e~ ; it Kas
just a continuinc thi nt; , ani :. t -v:c..s routine c?~nd. ,.,-e ;:ere ba\inr
the OPEC c..nd the oi:!. p:::-oo::.er.... etc . i?. tLe En'...ias:::y , e:.r.i ?"t.:tlic
Safety used to 1.ie--the Country '::'ea!'"! !'.ec:ti:-:cs and eer~tl:i!ic-- "Lhat
1:as toi pric-:i ty .
Or:ce i n a-.::-.::.le. 7,:-,e ;...,-. :l::;:::;adcr i:o:.;:;.d as~: you
" I: ell , .:Lat ' s ['-.inc or.?
i;o;: ' s tl ,..,. ;eilicc do::. r:r , : a~:t:? " or
somcthinr- lit:e t.ha t .
It ;-;.:..::; ju:t 101: '.-: 0 y c::.:.j a l-:o- :-i-..:.:-. t.y:;- e o:~
assignment ; very eas,Y .
/.. lot o: r.y contac ...,::; ,,e re st:.. ::. ::. 7,Lc:::-e ;
they were still there du:::-i:i- the ::ie: ouse !:ici.:.a:;-:;,:..r.: -- c:.::.::.::.
there--but a lot of them ha.d cone 011 for 1: etter job:..
h:

Q:
Well , let~ hope ther e aren ' t any ~or e kidnappin[s and
won ' t have any more oc casi on s to loosen u:p those contactr .

yo~

There will be more kidnL...Jl1i ?lf:; , 2. . 1Hi the:::-e ha:: e oee!. , 2..!:..i
there Kill probably be more--: ho3 c not--lut I do:. ' t t~:..n~ i ... ' ll
happen to mC"' , Jim . Your contc::.cts h'1.vc a. ;.:ay of <:.cir:; ar:c". fe7,t,ir.'""
out of the ;;ay , too . I iou::..d be rro1 al.ily h<::.r; pressei to co::~(:;:
in there , in r.ost of the countr::.e:s , and. fi;. ... the co:-:tacts : ha.ci. ,
cause they just kind of drift a~ay from you .
I. :

Yeah , somebody ' s got to

situation exists .

Q:

~tar t

oYer acain , : suppose ,

that

A: I t r ust that there ' s someone that ' s cot the r icht contacts in
our various Embassie s that they can at least find out 1:hat ' s
r,oi nG on at a cri t i cal time . I remer11>er one time we had a cu.v by
t he name of J ack liee ly t hat was i n Panama .:he11 I .:as Chic: of the
Lati n Ameri can Br a nch , and Byro11 Ent;lC' , our hoss , ---.:e had
monthly reports and tha t t .y re of t hine; to coilc in--.::i.nci olci r:cely
neve r would rct his in , and one Saturday morninc Fyron c<:..re in
and he said " h'e h.::i.ve Jfoe l y ' s monthl.Y rcpo:rt yet.? " c::.nd I "aid " ;:o ,
it hasn ' t come in " .
ile said " CLtll I irr. Uj1 and. chc 1.; hir.1 out cooJ. "
and I said "Byr on , he just called the cour ;;here they overthre
the President , and Jack ' s ;:ired in " etc ., and he star t.ed out the
door , and he looked back at me and he said "Yeah . 3ark once and
then run back unde r t he house " (laubhs) .

48

,T ohn f . Lonc<tn

~:
(JJ:1u,. . . h~) ~h~~~ ;--rct.1.y c noG . Ii:Y~D-ucr~,..y a~.-! :~. e::- :.-c:.. ..... :.:::-.
the ::;i tu.:i. ti on , ~ .. :.Cl. yoa cc ricl~t G01'!1 (' i ... .
pretty ;;ell b:in;:; u::; U? to 1-:1,0:~ ;-:i: cou::.d c::.J..2. <.:.:-. ~~.:. - 0 t: .-:
foreic,n exyiericr,cc:::, , or cio ~ou La ;e-- ?

A:
I ti 1in;; so .
I Ye cot c.. re ~.::. cn0J It.Cr. . ., :y o :~ s.::-o r.e 0: - .,
experiences u.nd its real Ya["u" of ::.or.e of tLe ct~.cr~ ; = C'J.es:: ::cu
kind of remember what y0u want to .
: don ' t t~.:.~k o:'.' a~yt~i:JC
else that would be of inter est .
I

r~ :
\.'e) 1 , hopefully a pc:;:-son r cr..rnlierr what turns out to le ,cry
ir.1rorta nt I a::.; t i me c;ocs O l l I u.:.ci I I !:"1 horinr ti.&. ts >-;hat ce:.::
recorded ir. thc:-;c r-.Er.oi rs .
7-..:o -..!i.:..r.,r-::, occur to ne .
'::"i1e :i:-::t
one ; .rou have covered thf' \."asLincto!. ccC'r:r- k.:.n:.i of or. : i~uely ...-i ti.
your fir.din[ it nore ci:!:'.'icu2. t to ad .;ust to tr.e ~:.i -C'?i :-:.a c.es
than t o a fo:::cic:1 cu:;..ture a;i..:. t11a1, you '' e ::- e :~ t ;-a.:-:.::..cu::.;;.:-::.::
intcre::;ted i:1 tJ,,., :-e:i ta:;::e a:.:: -:~.:. t sc ::t o: x:.::: -:::-.:: . - r0::::: o:-. i: ~
K;:sLinrton . Ko.;.ld ~: . ere -re 2:-.:..~tL:..! ...... yoi...;. J. \-:c....;rt ~o z:..:..~ :..=-: :,:. ~ \.:::..::

o:

o'....~cr\a. + ionr-

er

:ee :.:..r!:.- s

~!...C\..:~

t~.-~

~:i:....s~. :.. ~--:

c:.

c..:-e.;.. -- :..::~

Kashington assi[;nr.e:,t,?
A:
\.'ell , .veal. , ir: a 'hc:..~: ; ju::t.
.-a::
= i-:r.o."
brie:feci when I too!: OYer Chi8f
"Jake , I 1-:ilnt you to travc;l and I v,c:nt you t c ;::1nK .,_. :-:at:: roir.- o:.
operationci.lly " and that. t.nic thinr; , 11u".. y ou c;ot so 1.ocGed J.o..:r!
with pa11erworl: , ansi.;erin;- Concres::;ional in,}uirie;.:. , ans.:e:::-i r..c- t:1:.s
i nquiry l that .VO\J We Y(' \.;Qr;.;iJ1f (1 Caye a \-;(' (?): lQ do th::,:': I ar1:: i,":,c :1
I was in \'cJ!Pc:;uelc. , if I neede.; to c"t il rr.0 :.;s~~c"' ir.t0 .-:.:~2:.:.:..-t.c:. ,
i f it 1o:as cl<t:::;sifieci , I ci [O to t:1" C. I . /.. . u.1 l s~11.:i i '!:. <ii:~c:. ar. t
send it across , if I didn ' t use the re.~ . . ~ I,.,.;~ rt~c;~t c~~~~e::..~ , =
had a direct line in my office in a:l.di tio:1 :here = co-..:.::..-:: :;. :.c~: \::>
the pho1 e and ciiCt.l a.n~: :;-lace I 1-:2.:.c.el to .
..'... :,:i :;: :-.:;.:::-: ' ~ : eer. i:.
l:ashin0ton too lone be:'.'orc they 1'.::.nte::i r.e t o c:::.eu:- ;;i -r,:-. <.!-.e c:-1.:.e:
of Operations and ~e~uty Chic:'.' a: ?u~:::.ic s~:ec.y ~e:c:-e i
co~!l
place an o-.erseas phcr.e call to r.y ;-ieor::.. t,; .a:. :e:-e cc;.1::_::._?:r r.
And I rer.er1bcr ;aldnc in to the bo::;:- ' s office aL,; telEr.c hir. he>
had double standard.s .
He \\anted to know v:hy and I used tint ilS
an exar.ple ; I said " I~oi-; I can ' t cve:i call 1-:ithout cettilJ~
per mission " and he changed that . And there was ah:ays so;-,ethinc
cominG up ; well , clear ances ; cee , if you cot an i nquiry and you
knew t he answer , sc:,d out a cable , you v,a nted to get i t back to
them . I had to clear it wi th t he Chief of Orcra tio:is , our De:;-:.:.ty
Chief , and t he n it would c;o to maybe the Desl: Officer , or i:~ it
was A. I . D. , maybe the p r o5ram , and to ancv:er a cab2.e that you
knei.; should co out in a fev: r.inutes , ~ometi~es fo~ cleara~cc~ a :.:
stuff you ' d c;et it out three or four day~ later ; .:.t v:as just
i nc r edible .
0

Q:

Thats

demorali~i ng .

49

i. :
Yeah . /,nd- - the bt:r"2.Ucrc..cy . I ,;u::.;t -..-c::::: ;;--:: ::-.i :1:: :;o:'..r. >'as
my :::urcr\'is0r , a1Jd we l..-cre rood f r ic1 ,G.:: , I t1.ii.;: :-ie )U'- ir. o:.c o:~

r;y ycrforna1icc c-.-<:!.lu<-.tion r'"10:-ts th~t Le l:..::: ,-.,,r:; cc:-.~ ..:_::._:-_

about my field E::':;1ericnce but s<:..ici. : h\::.. s h<~\ i:. - a tel.<_:-'.. t:'..r.c
adjur-tin.r- to \,'3slJin ton , c..nd to use r.y ;:er~::: , ",ia.c:: , t.r.i:: :'..s ,iw::-':.
not my cur of tea '' (:&ugh:::) . So I d:'..dn ' t re&:l! aiart very ~s : : .
0

;;:,:.:-::

\.'ell , r:-13.y"te it ta~;es a r;u;r,bcr of reo})2.e -..:-,::.t don ' t c..da:;-t to

the Kashincto;1 sce1.e to make it ...-ork at c:.11 , i::: r.y feclinc c.bou~
the thine I but then- - I I 11 put u,,..t in ny r.1e:';Oin: . '.:"ou r.ad qu:'.. te
a bit of contact l-:i th tr,e C.: . /, .
in a !-:...::-,i..e:- of i:o:rr::.:1.rsituations .
flo you licnc 2.11,V obs0r\'atio:1s ;:.":0l.:t :.he c. -: . . i.. ' s
operations arowiJ the world a1.d in L<::.ti:1 /1merica ir; 1a:ri.icul<...:-?
Q:

A:
Yeah . I wu.s very closely ascocia".,ed Ki th the.-. , a:.~ th"" oi.::,
procrar:i that I ci.ici.:. ' t furni~h C0\"er fo:.- c.: .h. c:;:eration::: i:. r.::
proGram was Vene~uelc:: in the ~irst courle of ye~r::: . : f:'..na:ly d:'..d
there . And in Thailand Ke nad a larre crOh? I ~ade perfor~anc~
eYaluation re;io:r-t~ :-o:;:: :,j_o rcco::_,:i OL C, : , J, , reo:;-::_e in :c;c.c:'._c.;_::_
branches ti. ~ t I ' Ye liPYc::r cee1 .
f.nl !:01.0 o: tr;e s-,uf:r t:-.a t v:c
\:ere coordinc:.ti:1.'.: o:; i:r,:..t ' :::: cc::.::..:e: :.rrr--~l::.: :c::.c:3 &:.:. s o o:-. ,
trainint; , ,,as all c.: .,; . fu:dc::i. .
i,n.l I r.e:.c t.o cocriir1a", e very
closely i:i th the ~L.:: ti or. Chit: :_;; i:::::.ch c: 1:,!;e :::l.L"c-:.:'..0:-.::; i-::. "':.r. '.
prof;rar..
J..nJ :;: k.no-: a lot 0: ti.er ; s0r,e o: tte:-. a:-e i:.:c - :o:-,r
friends a.nci SOIJC' of the others I -:o ,;u::::t diC::: It :ii t :. t or-~ to,..
i..-ell .
But T have to give the~ a ~ixeJ eva.::..~~~ia~ :il:t li~0
would 011 r.y ?rorrc:.. :"1 .
: thi rd: tht:.t t: .e.v c..r-= hi[h~J ~iJ.~;.:.:.:~e:i r "Jt
ha\'"
e,0r <:..l lC'i:P: t!.- C, : , .~. , ~,.. l r '.:O:-.C
thilt they siiouldn ' t
corr.;1lPtcly o:; r ::-t:. t=._o~,~2. .
:'hey 1: srr: cic::;:..-:-:e _
: i y C:o~.~-:!..~e..:2 :;.....,
intellicence [<cthcrcr , to accur.1uli1. t0 i-:. <u.i C'"'l2-.::. -:.I? i ", c.:.:.::
diss0minate it .
E-ut i..-e [Ot i1 to CO\er"'.. o:;-c:.::.tio:.s a:-. .]. <.:. ::1:-.":.e:of other thin0c ; i )ara- r.il:'.. tary thiri:-s ; i:: :c.:.c"" U-.e :ir::t ?ul.lic
Safety procr aJT. on record was r-1n by t!1e C. : , /, . i :~ l'ietr.a:-. t'.-.:-o._.,-:-.
a contract with ~ichisan SL.ate U~ive:.-:i~y .
co : ~hi ~~ ty a~i
large they had
v ery capalle p"orle , but their hands h~ve
certainly been tied --well--micht as ~ell co~e right o~t .
lnde:the Carter adninistra tio;, , the C. I. J.. . a;1d all o:~ our other
i ntellicence gather inc personnel Kere virtually ta~en apart .
1

Q:

So you ~ould conclude that the i ntelli gence cathcri nc

operation is really Khat they should do , and i..-hen it cane to
operations
tley --the
C. I . A.-- should not hc.:.\'e
been
doinc
oper a t ion s?
A:
Thats r icht .
J:ot di r ectly .
operationa , which they supervise ,
ground ; they should be behi nd the

Now we ' v e rot to have CO\'ert

but they ::,hould.1i ' t be on i..he
scene~ pu: linc the strincs and

Q:

Under those circumstances , i-. ho should make the :;>olicy?

A:

With C. I.A . ?

Q:

Yes ,

50

I. :
It should 1 c- :-.a~e l y the:> h~:ii of the -:: . : . ;, . h;t ::-::~ll:; , "'C:-'"'
c!JC'ck:: <1.?ld h::.:.ln.:.cc:: ty the Intcll:.re!.CE " :er :::..c-;.-;, C::-:-_-.:.-:_ "'...ers c-:~
the Concrc:s 0.11: t r.e .::c:.::.tc .
But. it.::: rot tc 1e \' E-::-y l:.r.i"'.:,"'i ,
bec<:..usc they t<.ili:r-J. <.1.bout our CC'Yert oper.:lt.ion ~n-1 . .. ( e:i:: o: J:"2.:;e
~) .

51

john P. Loncan
(, :

Lets ... ,.;itch over to a G.iffercnt tape ,

A:
I
thin!; WC were i:iniinc u_;:i i::,::i.t I tiioucht c.."t1cvt. :.~.( c.: .;..
and th~ir orerat:.or s ar.d i.:e :e1.v :.:.-to it :pret't-;: f>:KC. , :::.it yr,;.i ' ;e:
cot the K . G . ~ ., you 've [O't, -- ev~ry country--: ~~s re<..d:.n~ a~
article tl e othnr day .
ie ' vc r=0b~bly cot }5 , 0CO cove=t ace~~s

in our country a"'. . a r1inimur. 1

cou:-rtiIJG the

,r1ited

i:a""t::oL~

a.r.ul t:.:l

the 150 countries and the other thinGS , ani we ' ve got to have
covert o;;eration::; .
But , I cuess the best i-:u.y to put it , i:you ' re coinr to successful , its rot to be not o~ly :ow pro:il
and behinC. thP SCCll( s I
bi.i'l. you I VC rot to plar1 i ":. I t=2.=-!'J the:-. a!.ci
coach thel"l etc . , and i-:hen :. t car.es tiwc. to :;;ilay ".,he "';)::..::..l r;<..r.t ;;ol.l
don ' t e ven GO close to the stadiu~ .
:r you 6Ct 't-OO c::..ose to ~~ 0
stadillf.1 you ' re~ roir.c to t;ct ca;.ic!:t , r..r.d .; -- 2:0..: re in t!.P
headlines you ~ rc in t=ouLle , i: you ' re doinc th~ ~~~e c: ~o=~ t~e
C. I . A. is charred with the re~?onsi}ility o: doi~c .
~ou 're r .o~
only in troublr :ro:-1 a :;:-cli ti cal sta:.~;oint , tut yo_. ' =E: ::1
t:oull" of endancerinc sane of the :;-'eOJlc ' ::: :i \ e::: t! .a. t <..re
involve~ :.n it .
I re;-:enbcr ~y ~riend in Gu~tc~a:c:. , ~ue~~~
Gon::ale~ i..hat I traveled Kit:..
Ee told. l.lt:' one t:..1.e a.t c. ;-:e~":!.:; ,
he said " You km1w , you tal~: <it out ci.oi:1.c- 5.. t th:..:: ;:a;: c.:.C. C.0:..:1.- i ~
that way and not c;cttinc t.oo :ouch", tu":. hf" s..-... i-i ":f "vhcj ~:::.;:e
over , you people will leav . You h101: Kl1at i-.-:.11 hn.:;_-i:;e;. to :-.e?"
Ancl he gave the motion of cut",,inc his throat .
0

Sure . And no doubt it Kould , too . l.'c:i.l ,

you ha\e any fi11al stater.ell"...::: o: su:-.:-.:.ry sta":.e:-.c:-.ts i:1 rE-;::;c:.:-.: -:o
terrorier;-: and world terro:-:.::ri c..r,: 1:hat. r.,n::.i.::- ;i;i c:.~ eer.~ua :..:..~:
come into play to elim:..natc terror:.s;-: , if that ' E po:::s:..tle .
Q:

A:
I' ve eivcn it a lot o: thou1~ht , anJ. I don ' t t:r.:.:-i: there arc
any pat answers to totally eliminate tcrror:..c~ a::: lone a.e you ' ve
cot people that are willinc to die for a cause , they ':-e coinc t.o
But I thinJ.: i-:e ' re c;oinG to ha\e it , its t;oin.; to be
do it .
escalated , it has been escalated considerably in the last few
years ; look at the precautions it ta~es to pr otect our Embassies ,
the \,'hi te H'ouse , tl 1e State Department . And I thinr: its just the
beginninc; .
I think its roing to keep escalatinc and weapons arc
cettinc more so~histicated .
Sooner or later a snal l rroup o:
these people that have no fear of the conse quences a re GOinc to
get hold of sone nuclear device::- and start usin tho~ i11
terrorist activities .
I ' m nore concerned about t~at t~a.n : a~
the t'h'O superpowers beinG :oolis!1 enouch to pu~:. the c:..; l.ut".,0: ..
Because in the fin<:i.l anal_ysis its alnost im;o:::-.s i 1:.le to cor:'t.:::-ol
attacks on executives , assassinations , the type o: bo~c~ncs etc .
we ' re havini; in Beirut , that type of thine , a:::, lor,G a.s there ' s
people dedicated to do it and somebody will sell then explosives
or they can get it , its almost impossible to cor.~letely control
it , One of the better ways of doinG it is to infiltrate thew and
be able to know who they are and --they use the term " neutrali::e
them ". To me , neutralize them means to brine them to justice and
trying them right , not kill them , but i t doesn ' t always work that
way .

52

john

r.

L011[<1n

Q:
Do you tk.nk the r e ' :::, any v;ay that these i'eo::- ::.e could t:>e
inc or porated int o t l1e po litica l ::,ystem of the cou:.t::-:: , a :id
the r efore tl.cy 1rnuld ci.issipate the ir e:ier.r-ie'" ir, c. r ec..:. ~ :::. r
political sy stcr. r ather than out s i de of the s:: ste~, by \iol e r-,ce?

A:
We ll, not tlie peor le I ' m t aH:inc about .
'.Lhe :Jeo:;:ile I ' :,
taJ.kinc about , uEless they can control the society that tr,ey ' r e
incorpor a teJ i n , t hey ' r e not i nter ested i n i t .
hnd I ~ean
control it entirely , dominate i t .

Q:

So you say it star ts out with their basic mi:-iset to

with , and t~at ' s not going to change?

bec i~

A:
Well , if they ' r e di ed- in-the- wool party - li ~e Co~mu~ists , you
know--when v;as it?
1919? 1917?, 1-:lie ne..rer it K.:::.s :.he Com:-1u:-.i sts
took over , I ' ve forgotten ; their Korldwide objective has been
ve ry clear , a~i the se l i ttle vari ous coa~trie s etc . , whate ve r you
ca ll them ; the } . A. L. J: , or the p~o?le t~at a r e beinc s~~po rted ,
trai ned , and ori ented to their worl: ; n o~ , : don ' t t~ ink that
e:;roup of peo;-le c:::.1, ever i:ie mo::..ieG. into and :i tted i r:to a
societ y .
Eut I think the rnaj ori ty of the peo?l e ha -.-e . :!: thi:-J:
we ' ve done it in some of these count r~ es , w~ere you weed o~t t~e
bad apples before they cet [Oi nf , anJ I thin ~ t here ' E been a :e ~
in s tances where they ' ve [ i ven t ilerr. arr:riesty and sone o: the;-. ha Ye
come back and b l ended back in , but i f they Kc re r eally coG; le ~ely
converted , --

Q:

There ' s a hard core t hat i sn ' t [Oinc to

c~ance?

A:
I think t he re are a hard c or e tha t a r e Goi n tc t e
hard to change if t hey ' d eve r change at a ll .

Q:

I thi nk in this country , thouch , i f you l ook at ou r student

unrest , whatever it v;as 10 year s aeo , most of those people ha ve
come back into the mainstream of Ame rican life .

A:
We ll , most of them , including some of the most vocal ones ,
like Jane Fonda e tc ., I think they wer e just ve ry consci entious
t alented peopl e tha t were duped into doinG wha t othe r people
wa nted done .

Q:

So , tha t ' s the sort of t hinG tha t has a numbe r o~ l a yers to

it .
I think , when I v;as in Brazil the first time , it was my
unders t andinG that we had inhe rited a gr oup of Fascists in our
Health Croup , a nd I always wondered about this , be ca use e ve rybody
was so naive duri nc t hose v;a r year s , t hey didn ' t know one from
another , if we even do yet , but I wa tched these people the n , fro~
1943 through 196 1 , a nd they were good l oyal support e rs and
understanders of Democra tic principles of government, and they
knew how to pra ctice them .
So that gave me hope that a large
number of t hem , at leas t , we r e convertible .
A:
Well , I deplore the Nazis and the Facists about as much as I
do the Communists , but - -and I don ' t know tha t much about their

53

,1 ohn l'. Lonc:an

..
\', e '
don ' t kn0w '..,Int they :oc:lci ; but a lot o: "'.,he:-. h::..-.c:-. ' '-
Etill cot the Storn '::'rOO}Cr orcc::.1 i:.atio?.C ric,:-1t he::-e :.:1
country .

.,.~ E'

Q:
So cxtre~is~ either w~y ic ~eploral:0 1 but I den ' ' k:ioK
the ansi:er to :::'..,0)';1inG l '- , but I i-:1101-: w!-10:. t :.s:. ' t t~.e a:1::::c:;:- , a:. ;
thats 1;i10:.t they ' r" usin[ more a1,d !71ore o: it--its \..errorisr. rci~::
tryinr,
to cct throur:h terror v:hat they can ' t
accolilrlish
otherwise , or ti rough force or subversion .

1. :

You ' re spe~kinc: of our r0vcrn."iient :policier , or counte.:ir".::; t:.e

terrorists , or are you c; e~~:ir,[ of tLe te:::-o:-i::,-7,!: o:... o-::-.e:countries?

Q:

/, :
I ' r. speai:ii.c o: the -t.err0rist orr;c::.ni::.a tio: .s t:.c.. t c..re
COU!1try !10\.; ,
Q:

.. ,.
~-

Oh , you ' re s;iec:..kint; o:f the ones that a:::-e :.:. our co..::."':-r~: ?

A:
i:e1: , !lo'.. o:il.Y in ou.r cou:itr;, ,
they ' re concentratinc their ef:ortc .
So v:hu. t you ' re sa}"inc is tl.a t tlic.. ~ 17.0\'er.o; nt has
controlled if r.ot elili'. ina ted in so!71e .; .;.y or othe r , --

(1:

to

b~

A:
It has to Le controlld to '-~le e;:te:.t to i:h 0 re they c- :.:.o:.
dominate or at least con_;:iletely subYcrt 1-::.a.teYer coYe:::-1.:-.e:.:.
they ' r e Korkinc 0?1 .
Q: And I t;uess v:e decided th:i.t v:e ci.icin ' t i::.C" th0 c.:.E:v:er '-0
one , so v:e ' ve cone to our storp:.nc 1 oint acn.i11 1 haven ' "L 1-:e?

A: If anyone kno"s the ansKer to that one , they could ~o do~1. in

history , if they could make it Kor~ .

54

Addenda
to
John P. Longan Memo irs

i1-111e1~ica' s

global
lJeace

office1'ls

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'.
OCR
Frunn
ini; t o catch

we:-e
AF.Lt,. Airli nes
Flight 225 fr om Ecu2uor 's Qc;Jto Intern ati ona l Airport to Gu ay aquil.
Sudcenly a rn an dr essed as a t icket
ngent blocked th e ir p ath.
"Come qui e tly; you 'r e surrou:-icied,"
he s2id as oth er men in &round-crew
coveralls sprang forward with auto matic rifles le\'eled.
Th e would-be p asse ni;ers thr-ew up
th eir h ands. Frisk in& reve;il cd pistols,
tear gas grenades, and homemade
bombs hicden in their coats. Thus
Ecuado ri ; n po lice aborted a C astroite
p~ot to k
-i ap the airline r 's twenty four pa s~ 1gers and cre\\m en, circle
the c2pitai city of Quito while ordcrmg th e go\'ernment to d e liver fi\e
commun ist terrorists from th e prison
to the airport, land to exchange th eir
hostages, then fly th e t errorists to
Havana .
The detectives who sm ashed th e
plot h ad been trained by one of the
free world 's m ost powerful agencies
in the global struggle agains t communist terrorism and common crime,
the Office of Publi c Safety of the US
Agency for I n ternation a l Development In t his era of insurgency, wh e n
many of America 's friends are embattled by Red-inspired t errorists,
LA ~T -J\:r ~;l"T[ P/.~S[:\ G[ "S

22

\'! he1h Er

to iIi n" ins L' r gents in

Jce2 dc:--:\eC f~ o :-:1 oi.: :- D ec. 1c:-ct.ic:-i of

ln 8c;:>(' r1C~ :-: c~. l:J r.: ;~:JY pc. :- ~ o: t..'rie

South America or smashing

\:o:-k. f: r ::::-.;; i: c.ccc ;::,:e-c re c;J i:res c;

:r;,c ic al ch<o:-:fE' i:-, cc :-. ti.:.nc~ - old 2:ti,

sr.1uzcling rings in
Southeast

t~sia,

the men of the

US Of:ice of Public Safety

cor,1prise one of the
free world's most potent forces
in the int ernat ion al struggle
for law and order
OPS O\ersc2s ;;d \isers pro\'ide a w a y
of h elpint; w ithou t committini; th e
Unitl'C S ta tes military.
The OPS h 2s 4C10 police ad \'isers i:i
t hir ty- two n a t ions , mos t of th em in
Southeast Asia , L a tir, America, and
Africa . Th ese men are fluent in
foreign langu ages , h ave be en un iYersity- lra in e d , and h a\'e h ad long
experience in US law enforcem ent
age n cies. Says Byron Engle, th e form e r Ka n sas City police offic ia l \\ho
directs OPS , "From th e st.art, w e 've
preached that th e policeman is a public servant. This i.s a revolution ary

t UC!2S .

,.

Tr- ;;i:iirJt_:: cc :-;tl'r o: OPS is L'ie Intcrn;o ti o!12l Pol"ce 1-.cadc:-:iy, which
occcpic~ a fo:-r..er s:..-eetcc.r bcrn
O\" E- rlod:in& t he P otor.lc C Rl\er L"l
\': 2'.hin& t0:1. DC. I LS l ibr2 r-y offers
'':orks on sc ientific cri.:ne cie:tection as
w e-ll a> writin.<;s oy 11'. arx, Ll:ni.n. and
Sta lin ;rnd books on riot r.a!1ip:.ilation
and te rrorism. S ome 30Ci0 fri eses by
form e r st ude nts t re a t w ide-r 2r:ging
police problems, from p:-e\ention of
ma s> p <= nics at L 3t in .A:.-,eric<=n soccer
games to ne:rco : ics contro l in Africa.
In a full- scale- rn och :p cf a b igcity p olice opera t io ns co nt:-ol center,
train ees from many n a t ions 'warg2me " such problems c..o s ~u cie nt riots
or the pro tection of 2 v isi t i~f head of
st a te. Sitting in a i;lass - enclose-d control b oo th, the m en fa ce a giant
m ai; netic b oard d epic tin g a street map
of the mythi ca l city of Rio Brc;\os.
\~n en a game is in p rogress the room
clatte r s with tele ty pes , jangling telepho:-ies, and excited multiling ual
voices.
During one typicz l d ay recently,
an OPS adviser jus t r e turne d from

TH E

KITVAN I S

MAGAZJl\'E

Ey

ri_ ~ r:?;

T. CHEW

r - - - --- ------------- ---- ..

~--- -----~-------~--- -~.=_._ -?-:::- ~.-. "'-:::::.:-.?.~-- - - .

... - .. - - - - --

the Philippines lectu:-u1 o:-i efforts of

tne commu is : " HuJ.:" t uro :- ists t o
rekindle th eir guerrill;; insurrection
there; a soci2l scientist reported on
the t echniques of manipulated mass
movements, hate propaf:anda, and in&urrectionary oq;a niz.ation; and students watched a mo,ie on ri ot control.
To benefit from such imtruc t iona l
facilitie s , so far 3002 police exec u'..ins
from fifty-fi\e countries h c:\e com!'!
together to absorb t he le:test crime!ii:,hL.n.; a:-:d c c i.;r.ter-:r.~;;rt_:ency co:-iccpts, anci t ake th em ba ck to th eir
homelands a:1d adapt them t o conditions there. Such men as J\:e:jor General Vicen te HuErta Celis, director
i;rneral of the famed C;; ra bineros d e
Chil e; J,foh ammed Absci :- J\Jussa,
command an t of the S oma li police
force: and Brigadier G eneral Abdullah R afie, deputy chief of th e Jordanian J\ a t ional Police, have at tended
th e Academy's sessions.
"We try t o str e t ch the policeman's
vision of his role in the world today,
and to arm h im w ith both the dream
of pea cefu l democratic processes and
the skiUs n ecessary t o safeguard
them," says Mike McCann, a former
FBI agent and University of Indiana
professor of poli ce sciences who n ow
directs the police academy.

APRIL 1969

O?S".s

- :-- __:__ _~_- ~-=-- -..::--.....__:_. ---

i.nYe:~--:-.c

:-,t ;,b:-oaci p<.ys 0:1

in a Yc.ric ty o: \i..c:\.s.

T\\'O

ycCl:-s c.;o.

e~:anjJle. GcnC'ral Ja\c,l;t Tc,:-:.~h z,i

Thailancs R oyz, l 1,1aritITT1e Po ice
called on OPS public sc.fe :y aci\iser
J im Haringt on to ht:lp him lick t ne
age-old problem of pir;,cy o:-i the
Chc. o Phraya Ri\e:-, whi ch wines
t wcr.ty -fi\e miles fr o:-n B2:1gkok t o
the Gulf of Si am. V:iLl-i its t housands
o'. samp a ns a:-ici houseboats a:1d
dozens of t ribu t a ries for escape
rou t es, the r i\e!" had lcmg been a
paradisE for pirates and smugglers.
At nii::h t pirates in u :-iligh t ed , moto:-iz.ed sampans w ould t;licie silently up
t o a merch a ntman when most of the
cn:w \'-"< S a!'hore, S\'.2 rm up rope kdd ers and sli t the throa ts of the night
watch, loot the ship, and fice. Or
smugt;lers i.n speedy p owerboat.s
c arryin g contr<:b:md li quor or cit:arettcs would d a rt t o and fro m merch a nt ships st.anding at anchor in
int ern ational wa t ers-all the time
w aving d erisi ,ely at the sTower police
boats chugg ing after th em , which
we!"e unable to u se heavy weapons
becau se of the d ense p opu la tion of
the river.
Harrington suggested new t <ic tics
and placed a rush order in Fl orida for
high - speed cutters. He al.so arrar,ged

for
o~

fo r 'Y":--:;-.i J1;;,:-i:i..--:-.e
f:o:.TJ t o t!-.c l>-.; ~c C

Pol.c-E:~::-,

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Gu c; :-c t r;,inmg
One ni fh t ~hor ~ :y c. :.i:: :- t!-.t: r. ev;
cuttc:-.s he:c:i S(c re : i:, a:-:- 1-.ec. Colo:-iel
J ak L d:sa:lc;bu:-iso:-._;:; ga\e c}-ic:se tD a
s:nu ggle; craf: . v: r-,[n fr,e s::;.rt led
5mui; ~ l'?r-s r ealized tne po:ice boat
\\"3!' c;c.si ni; on tl-.c:r. fas:. fr,ey ccrted
bd1i:-id a b:g fre if;h : c-:-. But L;ha:-ia bunson[ whipped a:-o..i:-,c i" bow and
net L'ili r boat h1:- := d-0:1, bc:~.::ig it
with nowedu l Aooclich:s. Tr.e s:-:iu"glcr-s .dind O\e:-bo<::--d, 1'::2\i:-:;:: th;ir
contr c.band-l;,dcn crc.[ t to CJcle crazily \:bile police fished t~.er:; out.]:-. a
few weeks Tn<:i la \'::nc1 l-,ad :-o...::1ced
up tw en ty-e ight ri\er p'. :-atC' s c.mpans
and more th ;,n a ci oze:1 s:-r,uggler
-era fl
"\'."hilE- gi\i.ng assi.s:.a:-:ce '..o police
from t he Boli,ian j :.;:ct:ks t o lra:-i's
snowy m ountains, Public Sc.fe ty advisers ha\e been thr ea t eneci . a.m bushed, shot, and bombed. During
the course of the co:iflict i..ri Sou th
Vietnam, six h a ve di ed.
Besides giving emerge:icy help,
OPS strives to improve the qu a lity of
ba s ic police work, stressing the fundamentals of iden t i..'lcation, :-ecordk eeping, and communications, on
which efficient d ay -to -day law En-

23

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ra nks . In Lt n, 2 <>G\'L"Cr D em H <.rri rnn. a forn .c r US B o rder Patr(J] pil ot,
is hcl;, ini; tr;,in }: c-:1_\an~ to L i:c 0\cr
the Pol: ce A ;r Wint: from Er iii;.h
Aicrs. \': hFn E;,:-riso n disco\-crt d th <J t
1
foc t p2t:ohn~. : i Pa;_:] J\Lthc:-i[ c " ;-.5
,kipping mec.L<: t o finance pri\atc fly\ ing les5 ons f : or;, his mc<.fc' salary ,
~ Har ri .:on a ~r 2.:-i['!?d for the youn;: mu n
~ 1c/.~. cs c .: t l-'C: t iYE: i~\ e~:;_;-2 ~!r.[ p VliCt;
to attend a:-i o;; J2ho:n2 A;. in~ sd.o:;l
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~ ~ 1 ~.;1 ~ . dc:crz-:in. c .-j tu t vrj)lc the y oun g
~L:-C c :-~ &:.t o-...:: c/ l-.:~ cc.:- one rijgh~
To::l2:. thi :: :::'r' 01 a 11:T.:t:' c r: :ki.;:,-u
cit :-;; o crZ:tjc rc [i_J;e.
~:-; C: t :- 2 !:::- i:c :i 1t;:f-i : frc:-r, ~;E s~c.dov:s
trJ b('!:. man is fl::!J:f.' policC' a nd r escuctf i ; e~ t rr o :- is:ts c~i:-:-H: C: ::.:-c \ ~. - ;~; c'....:to mi sswns lll thl Afric "n w.ld;: , pu1 - J T!-ic Cdstrc1 ::.~ ./. . rrT1f':: F o r c~s o: T\ c .
.
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'umi; ca tt le ru :- J crs and c;,;-rymf out \ ,_.
"~: iii a p~}i:c:-r.L~ c Ge:: ." r::--iC. ti-il2y
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g-...:.:-. c.~Jc ~:-,~-. 1.- er-t-2 .-.-; :. :~:.~:5:-: u t TDe
' :-ic e:. ; 1;; r.. cde f C1ei 2 t!-. ::- boz.: .s :.. :-c. is.: :-~;
s_c. :-e.< c cp. 3. ~ -:: ~:- o :< s :.s. CJ.
u :- ba :i tc:-ror l t.1 e:. [.:-: :-~y or~ . 0;-,e
!Eotc E or ::R f. Tr::~c on a Luc;:et o:
Tr.e J: ..::il1c l:.,i:-;: c.:-: : o :0-. c-l ; . C'w '... '\\-ne:-i
on ! :~ 51 rr.ill ior1 bst >e;,or, OPS e>:Er ts
i. C' :-r o :-i:t. d !S:[ -...:2 ~ :C ~: c ;:: :-j('S'. . sJ: ;J p~~
out c pi.:tc.d c ~ia .s ~:o t 0:1 (: p.J:!cc:-:-.z.. :-1 ,' t -::. :- rL; :- i5- :_c. sf1c . Go-.::; L~t: br c ~Jc r of
~a globa l infiuenre Ya stly d:.c;iro po r~ t:oneitc t o its sm<:ll si..L c E\ hclpir:f.'
f'C1, :-. t bl~, ;-i~: - J-~ '. G st:..:di:.,, ~, f:-o:-:-. Cen - / Yc:-.c-:ucl 2 's fo:-c;;::-. :7.i". :.< :cr, m o re
-~other countries s et up fr,ci; O\\n pv - t r<::] UniYc-r~:~y. ~ j r l f:-E.- ri2~ c~ ti-le i:- i the.:-: t \ 1: c n ~y p::oplc ci1 c.!E: :: E<1 , -~t.:-J ciesc:- jp :i u:-is of 1:-i f r..ur2 2 :--c~- s c.:-::: the
lice aceidemics and b:> ort;Ll..."'li:in i;
: idl' s, v:ou JC Az..~~i 21 :in g c~:--2cc:.~
e5 c<ope c;,r'.s li cE:-.5'e r.u:n ber. Pc.lice
field tram i..ng t eams. Pub l ic Sdcty ~tr cc:~ in .sf-.ir.y .s:p :1 :-ts2 a :-s. s~io o !. irir;;
' -H~_n Q(h
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t'r.--JE:-:1 ~..-1-'(
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' c' , \,.( c - C-(' .C..,....("" r r..-1 - i n -nc'
~ ad\is ers l<:. s t year r e2~ht:d 11(1.(1 (1(1 fJ CJ 11
. Ct-'J1
.: J
Cl:~c- e r. ~~ \
, (J U:l ~
c ... b ' 2~ -1-
c:. _
policemen in thirty-one- c0un t rics . bo.ck to the s::.;-ic;J;,:-y of t ne w-u - , rc ur.c ~c u;: L'lt l cu:- ~:;l,e :- s . .t,.i;2in,
i>For ex a mple, i;ra duatcs of t!,c 1:-iterH s! ty . Bc\\\' C'l'n l~ Gl a n c l~ G ~ tcr - ~\. ht.-, ti:.r ror ist..5 s: ;,,;e c c \:,;:;:-:~; h olcup
rorists kilkc m o re tne: n t \:o hu ndred
a p :J :-t e:- c:s:::c.;:iec ti-. :- o ..:h c, \\in dow
nat io neil Police Acacemy t aui;h t law
enforc eme nt t actics io hundreds of p o lice-men . To finc.:ice ti-.c-i r 2c:i\ities,
<- n c ci:;,J c-d S0. Tne p::.l ice ca..:;ht the
Costa Rican p olic e and Yillaf,'e lc;;dwhi ch included dyncrr.it ini:; bridi;es,
de opcr<=coes - 211 \ \':c l-:e--in L'ie acl
ers in outdoor classes at junt;le air oil pipe-line , ;rnd r aciio s: 2: io ns and
A s:.:-:1ilcr t ipo ff :- i:-s;_;'.teci in L'ie rescue
::trips. Ethiopi a sent fourteen m en t o setting fire to hue \\'arch o u scs . they Jof tv: o /\_-:ieri c<= :J colo;-i els wl-:o had
c<.rried out op Ectacul<-r ci;,:;t i:n e bank i been kic nape d ir, a r2ns o:n <-t'.empL
~study in Washington, then made t},em
'\j the faculty of its new, thrce-ye2r Aba robberies.
\ \1,"h c1 the t icie bei:;an to turn Jake
D:na Police College.
\' encz ucla 's
President
F.omulo ,Longan and s o:-ne of his ad\isers
Aft er t he bloody 19G5 Dominic a n
B etanc ourt, him sc li a;-i old r e\olu- /q uietly slipped away fr o m Venezuela,
Republic insurrection, Pu olic S;:ifcty
Lon a ry aga inst the Jim enez tyranny ,
2s their fc.ll o ws h 2\e d or.e in fourt.een
cietcrminc-ci t o pro\e t o both 0-ie pubother countrie s i_-, t.he yc:st f:\e yec_rs.
aci\ise rs lcarn(' d that only three hunli e 2n d the army th;,t ci\'i l police / But th ei r work and th e w o rk o: OPS
dreci of the 8000-man police force h ad
C\'er h ad any basic training . Tr<Jining
cou ld m ain tai n law and order. He / i.s by no me2ns cor:iplete. r..s L'ie 12t.e
cadr es \\ere th e n rushed through the
a >ked Public S afet y for help. In May
Robert F. K enneciy t ol d the firs t
J9G:'. J ohn '',1a\.: e" Lon1= 2n, c slo\,. , graduatir,g cla ss of Publ ic Scfety's
Wash ini:;ton academ y , and in fifteen
t al kini;~o:nan,7 International Pol ice f.cc G( r!:Y five
~ montho the y h<.ci brouf,'ht th re e -we ek
cours es on police fundamentals to fll'w secretly to Caracas and set up an
y ea rs ai:;o: "Tr. is rr.;:;y b e the i:;e:-ic;-a'
a d \'JSory
group .
II tion o f risi:i i; expcct.ctio:i.s. w h en
\~ 2500 D ominican officers .
T h' Ccirac 2s ciii.:: c-nr y. Lonpn so9n
millions arc r elcc;s(d fro:n L'f:e chain.s
'
Durin i; Octobe r's onc-hundrcdnation i;ener;;l 2s s rmbly of Interpol,
di oc o\ercd , fr ('qucn tly fa iled to rtof ii:;no ran cc, po\crty, and di.sca.se
th e Int ernational Criminal Police Orport crimes in pr og r ess. Long~n
which hav e bound the:-:-i for centuries.
ganization, which was held in Tehr2n,
found out why. A citizen had to know
But it is also the age of the plastic
the Nepalese delegate sought advice
the correct six-di g it phone num~er
bomb, of arson, sabo12ge, kidnapings,
on getting foreign technical help.
of the nearest of five police agencies
murder for pol itical purpose; foe age
in the Caracas area . E-.en then, due to
of hit-run terrorist acti\'ities co-orDel egates of such countries as Pakistan, Kenya, and the Central African
poor police communications respori.se
dinated on a gl oba l scale. People
Republic immediately rose to praise
was horrendously slow. Following
cannot 2chie\'e peace and s>curity,
1
the American Public Safety ad\'isers.
even ensure their own personal
L onga n's advict, Bctancourt's gofGeneral Lui s L eyva, chief of the
ernment bought more than $1 milli n
safety, except under the rule of law."
Colombian delegation, declared that
worth of communications equipme t
THE arn
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