ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima

G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status
2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only
in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation
of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional.
In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it
has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power
itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional
per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of
powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it

prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond
the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related
constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its
members with either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its
legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined
to the following:
(1)
scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask
heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation and
(2)

investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to

the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such,
a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form
of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other
than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999]

FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque,
while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the
Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a
member of its SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang
Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB
Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President
Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of
the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as
member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his
appointment. When Red finally received his appointment papers, President Aquino
was already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative
in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to
receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment
papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the
date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the
Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the
position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa
through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1)
information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a
decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with
respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The Sandiganbayan acquitted
Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for reconsideration,
the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is

appointed or chosen or has qualified.

Held: YES.
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of
KB youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents.
Section 7 of BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide -

Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall
commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of
barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their
terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure is president of their respective
association and federation .
xxxx
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office
until the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers
shall have qualified and assumed office in accordance with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative
to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers;
neither did he take a valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie
Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a holdover capacity since his
term had already expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate
declaring that the holdover provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to
positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7
of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with respect to positions in the SB.
The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover
when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the
incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that
officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that
term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this
provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the
term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present
incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it
be beyond the term fixed by law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member
can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor
fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent
an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer
is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has
qualified.The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or
at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume
that the law-making body favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts generally indulge in
the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition
which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period
of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its
functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the
principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from

suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of

government functions

A.M. No. 3135 April 15, 1988

MIGUEL CUENCO, complainant,
vs.
HON. MARCELO B. FERNAN, petitioner.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
Complainant Miguel Cuenco has filed an untitled pleading dated 27 March 1988 which,
considering the melange confus of allegations therein, the Court treats as a consolidated:
(1) Second Motion for Reconsideration of the decision dated 23 July 1987 rendered by the Third
Division of the Court in the Consolidated Petitions in G.R. No. L-41171 (entitled "Intestate Estate
of the Late Vito Borromeo. Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera v. Fortunate Borromeo, et al."), G.R.
No. 55000 (entitled "In the Matter of the Estate of Vito Borromeo, Deceased. Pilar N. Borromeo,
et al. v. Fortunato Borromeo"), G.R. No. 62895 (entitled "Jose Cuenco Borromeo v. Court of

Appeals, et al."), G.R. No. 63818 (entitled "Domingo Antigua, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al."),
and G.R. No. 65995 (entitled "Petra Borromeo, et al. v. Francisco P. Burgos, etc., et al.");
(2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's En Banc Resolution of 17 February 1988 in this
case; and
(3) Compliance with the directive in aforesaid Resolution of 17 February 1988 requiring
complainant Cuenco "to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for having
made unfounded and serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan."
A. On the Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in the Consolidated Petitions
The record of the Vito Borromeo estate proceedings discloses that the 23 July 1987 decision of
the Court in the five (5) Consolidated Petitions mentioned became final and executory on 19
October 1987 and that Entry of Judgment was made on 24 March 1988. There is thus no need
to discuss here the arguments made by complainant Cuenco in respect of the Court's decision
therein on the matter of attomey's fees of Mr. Cuenco and all the other lawyers concerned.
B. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court in Administrative Case No.
3135
The present administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Cuenco against Mr. Justice
Fernan was previously dismissed by the Court "for utter lack of merit" in a Per
Curiam Resolution issued on 17 February 1988 on, inter alia, the ground that complainant had
failed altogether to substantiate his charges against Mr. Justice Fernan. The Court also held
that, under the Constitution, removal from office of a Member of the Supreme Court can be
effected only through impeachment, and not indirectly through disbarment proceedings. To the
extent that the Court can understand complainant Cuenco's untitled pleading, complainant
would now seek reconsider consideration of the Court's Resolution on the following grounds:
1. That in the estate proceedings of the late Vito Borromeo, Mr. Justice Fernan
"made up his mind that some persons have to be declared heirs of Vito
Borromeo" and that the several petitions for declaration of heirs were heard
jointly at the law office of Atty. now Justice Fernan in Cebu City;
2. That it is unlikely that Mr. Justice Fernan "had a stony face, was motionless,
expression less, without uttering words, views, opinions, so that he did not assert
any influence [during] long deliberations [of the Consolidated Petitional], hence,
"it is impossible to deny Justice Fernan's participation in the preparations of the
32-page decision of the Third Division of the Supreme Court [in the Consolidated
Petitional];" consequently, Mr. Justice Fernan not only "voted for his exoneration
which is naturally seriously anomalous," but he also acted as respondent, his
own counsel for himself and judge of himself three conflicting positions rolled
into one;"

3. That "[t]he decision of the Third Division in the five cases is open to the
suspicion that Justice Fernan is protecting Judge Burgos, and Attys. Antigua and
Estenzo for violating the provisions of the Civil Code;" and
4. That "[t]he theory that Mr. Justice Fernan is not accountable for any grave
misconduct except by impeachment proceeding, is not absolute.
In its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in this case, the Court found complainant Cuenco's
charges against Mr. Justice Fernan to be "completely unsupported by the facts and evidence of
record." We find in the present instance that complainant Cuenco, in his untitled pleading, has
once more failed to submit any proof whatsoever to substantiate the statements made by him
therein which are so extravagant as to be preposterous.
1. As pointed out in the Court's 17 February 1988 Resolution of this case, Special Proceedings
No. 916-R for probate of the will of the late Vito Borromeo was instituted in 1952, while it was
in 1954 that the "heirs" referred to by complainant Cuenco in his pleading claimed rights of
ownership over thirteen (13) parcel of land which they sought to be excluded from the estate of
the decedent. Upon the other hand, Mr. Justice Fernan's involvement in the Vito Borromeo
estate proceedings began only on 7 August 1965 and ended on 19 February 1968, long after
said "heirs" had surfaced and asserted their respective claims against the decedent's estate.
There is, therefore, no rational basis for the assertion of complainant Cuenco that Mr. Justice
Fernan "made up his mind that some persons have to be declared heirs of Vito Borromeo."
Complainant Cuenco further asserts that the several petitions for declaration of heirs filed by the
different claimants to the estate of the late Vito Borromeo "were heard jointly at the law office of
Atty. now Justice Fernan in Cebu City." It will be noted from the 23 July 1987 decision of the
Court in the Consolidated Petitions that said petitions for declaration of heirship were heard
jointly by the trial judge not by Mr. Justice Fernan sometime during or after the month
of December 1968, after probate of the will had been disallowed by the probate court, and after
Mr. Justice Fernan had already withdrawn as counsel for two (2) of the instituted heirs in the
Vito Borromeo estate proceedings.
2. The record explicitly shows that Mr. Justice Fernan inhibited himself from participating in the
deliberations on the Vito Borromeo estate cases and, in fact, did not take part in the resolution
thereof. This fact of non-participation is manifested in the annotation appearing beside Mr.
Justice Fernan's signature: "No part I appeared as counsel for one of the parties."
Complainant Cuenco, however, continues simply to ignore this express statement on the record
and, instead, presents his own personal notions of the "true" facts and circumstances of this
case. The record, however, is entirely bereft of any suggestion that Mr. Justice Fernan had in
any way influenced any Member of the Third Division of the Court or participated in the
deliberations and resolution of the estate cases.
3. We are unable to understand Cuenco's assertion that the Decision of the Courts' Third
Division in the Consolidated Petitions "is open to the suspicion that Justice Fernan is protecting
Judge Burgos, and Attys. Antigua and Estenzo for violating the provisions of the Civil Code."

4. On the statements made by complainant Cuenco concerning the rule referred to in the per
curiam Resolution of 17 February 1988 that a Member of the Supreme Court may be removed
from office only through impeachment, not by a disbarment proceeding, it suffices to furnish
Mr.Cuenco a copy of the extended Resolution of this Court dated 15 April 1988 on this same
topic.
C. On Compliance with the Resolution of l7 February 1988 in Administrative Case No. 3135.
The Court finds the explanation given by complainant Cuenco to be totally unsatisfactory.
Complainant Cuenco vehemently denies acting in bad faith in filing the present administrative
complaint against Mr. Justice Fernan and suggests that his acts have been "misunderstood" by
the Court. Complainant, however, has failed to present a shred of evidence to support the very
serious charges he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan. In his untitled pleading, complainant
Cuenco has not only declined to prove the accusations he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan
but has also chosen to make additional statements and charges so extravagant and so clearly
uninformed as to require no discussion. Because the Court cannot assume that complainant
Cuenco is totally unaware of the nature and gravity of the charges he has made against Mr.
Justice Fernan and which he has completely failed to support with anything but his own bare
assertion, the Court is compelled to conclude that those accusations were made in bad faith.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved:
a) to DENY Mr. Cuenco's Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of
the Court dated 23 July 1987 in G.R. Nos. L-41171, 55000, 62895, 63818 and
65995, said decision having become final and executory;
b) to DENY, with finality, complainant Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of this Court dated 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No.
3135; and
c) to FIND Mr. Cuenco guilty of misconduct as a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.
Complainant Cuenco is hereby severely REPRIMANDED and WARNED that the same or
similar misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely by the Court. Were it not for
complainant Cuenco's advanced age, frail health and prior service to the country, the Court
would have imposed a more severe penalty in this case
A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988
REQUESTING HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN
ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint,
dated 14 December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court,"
together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."
Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the Court en banc in view of
the important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous letter by "Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez referring to charges for
disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan and asking Mr.
Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr.
Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he
apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. 3135,
which, in the opinion of Mr. Cuenco, made improper any "intervention" by Mr. Raul Gonzalez. Mr.
Cuenco, nonetheless, encourages Mr. Gonzalez "to file responsive pleading Supreme Court en banc
to comply with Petition Concerned Employees Supreme Court asking Tanodbayan's intervention.
The Court DIRECTED the Clerk of Court to FURNISH Mr. Raul M Gonzales a copy of the per curiam
Resolution, dated 17 February 1988 of the Court in Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel
Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the
charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same
Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be
administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan.
Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr.
Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading relating to, inter alia,
Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned, the Court
treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April
1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.
It is important to underscore the rule of constitution law here involved. This principle may be
succinctly formulated in the following terms. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to
be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the
incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence which carries with
it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from
office.
The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in Administrative Case No.
3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaining for disbarment here must be
dismissed. Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the
Constitution, be members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only
by impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a
Member of the Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to
circumbent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional mandate theat Members of
the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for and conviction of

certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution. Precisely the same
situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his deputies (Article XI [8] in
relation to Article XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the Commission on
Elections (Article IX [C] [1] [1] in relation to Article XI [2], Id. and the members of the
Commission on Audit who are not certified public accountants (Article XI [D] [1]
[1], Id.), all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar.
(Emphasis supplied)
This is not the first time the Court has had occasion to rule on this matter. In Lecaroz v.
Sandiganbayan, 1 the Court said:
The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction
over "public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations." There are exceptions, however, like constitutional officers,
particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1973 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2 The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from
office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and
corruption."
Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned
constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who
may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his
office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New
Constitution, states that "judgement in cases of impeachment shall be limited to
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit
under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The
above provision is a reproduction of what was found in the 1935 Constitution. It is
quite apparent from the explicit character of the above provision that the effect of
impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of
honor, trust or profit under the Republic. It is equally manifest that the party this
convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance
with law. There can be no clearer expression of the constitutional intent as to the
scope of the impeachment process (The Constitution f the Philippines, pp. 465-466)."
The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall
nevertheless be liable and subject of prosecution, trial and punishment according to
law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not thereby
removed, the filing of a criminal action "in accordance with law" may not prosper. 2
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution we referred to above in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan are
substantially reproduced in Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of

public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Sec. 3 xxx xxx xxx
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or the other
constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal
acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What
the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed
before such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be
removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment
proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate
proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of
powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is important. Without the protection of
this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or
their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of
judicial authority by the Court.
It follows from the foregoing that a fiscal or other prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu
proprio dismiss any charges brought against a Member of this Court. The remedy of a person with a
legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Resolution upon Hon. Raul M.
Gonzales and Mr Miguel Cuenco.

In Re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988)

Fast facts
Raul Gonzales forwarded an anonymous letter by Concerned Employees of the Supreme
Court to Justice Fernan. The letter was addressed to Gonzales referring to charges for
disbarment brought by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan and asking to do something
about this. The action against Fernan was filed in the Tanodbayan. Tanodbayan special
prosecutor like a fiscal; ombudsman.

Administrative Case No. 3135

Resolution dated February 1988 entitled Miguel Cuenco v Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan in
which Resolution, the Court resolved to dismiss the charges made by Cuenco against Fernan
for utter lack of merit. The Court resolved to require Cuenco to show cause why he should
not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Fernan.

Important principles of AC 3135

Article 8, Section 7 (1987 Constitution). A public officer who under the Constitution is
required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him
and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with
disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.

Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan. Proscribes the removal from office of the aforementioned

constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be
removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an
offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear
mandate of the fundamental law.

Impeachment first, before criminal and other actions. There is fundamental procedural
requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced.
The Court is not saying that a Member of the SC is absolutely immune from disbarment and
criminal actions against him. It is just that, this member must first be removed from office
via impeachment proceedings before other actions will
prosper against him. Should the tenure of the SC Justice be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by
disbarment proceedings) for any misbehavior that may be proven against him.

Reason for ruling. Without the rule, Members of the SC would be vulnerable to all manner of
charges
which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other
parties who,

for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the
Court. Can judges be disbarred during their term? Yes. The only ones who could be
disbarred are the impeachable officers.

Francisco vs. House of Representatives GR 160261

10 November 2003
Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August
2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003,
the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives,
et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of
the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law
or in fact, adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue
was presented before it.
Held: The courts power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the

earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of
the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide is concerned. The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction
or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here
is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly
and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation
of powers under our system of government.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time
bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none,
nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions.
Because it not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the
other two great branches of the government.

Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner:

The powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches:
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice courts
of justice determine the limits of powers of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. The judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of the political law
doctrine.

The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political

question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of
the government properly acted within such limits.

The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of
the second impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would
require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.

G.R. No. 193459 : February 15, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, Petitioner
v.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN
PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG
ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, COCHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES LAWYERS
(NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents, FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., RespondentIntervenor.

FACTS:
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents known as
the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the
endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.

A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to House
Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on Rules to include
it in the Order of Business.
Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed another
impeachment complaint against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by
Party-List Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, et al.
The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker
Belmonte who also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution, found the two complaints, which
both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
sufficient in substance.
Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive
reliefs. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo
ante order and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition.
They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints
as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its
function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.
Petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special
civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication.
Whether or not the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar
rule.
HELD: The petition lacks mert.

First issue:

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two

impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power.
Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took
the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding
should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Second issue:
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year. However, the term initiate means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint
which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking
initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the
complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

Petition is DISMISSED.

Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of Sept. 1 and 7,
2010 finding two impeachment complaints against the petitioner, simultaneously
referred to the House Committee on Justice, sufficient in form and substance on
grounds that she was denied due process and that the said resolutions violated the
one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers.
Court dismissed the petition.
Facts:

22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private
respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestao (Baraquel
group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement of
Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao

27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker

Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in
the Order of Business


3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John
Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes
group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by
Representatives Colmenares, Casio, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment

Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to
House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules
to include it in the Order of Business

11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House

Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both

complaints sufficient in form

2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the

th
15 Congress was published

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two

complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance

Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions

of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these
violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings

Issue/s:
1. Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy
2. Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment
Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due process to the Petitioner
3. Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the
Constitution

Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.

Ratio:
1.

NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary
the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to
initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner
of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the
same official.

-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,
judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review
2.
DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of promulgation the
Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?

(P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment
complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJs, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending
case with her at the Sandiganbayan

Presumption of regularity

The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant of rule-making
power in the HOR

the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements

and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the
substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee

The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating the Rules.

impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the
punishment of the offender

3.

THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

(P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against
her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She
posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent.

INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action
of said complaint (referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice)

IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

Rationale of the one-year bar: that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: 1)to
prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task
[of] legislation,
that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle
starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. (Gutierrez vs. HOR,
2011)

CJ Corona vs. Senate

GR No. 200242
July 17, 2012
Facts:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary
restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court,
Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of
Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.
The present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed
by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable
cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a
hodge-podge of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all
premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the
ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under Par.
2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief,
bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged
corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioners right to due process because first, Art. II does
not mention graft and corruption or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second,
it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that graft and corruption is a separate and distinct
ground from culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust; and (4) issued the
subpoena for the production of petitioners alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite
the same being the result of an illegal act (fruit of the poisonous tree) considering that those documents
submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No.
6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.
Issue:
Had the constitutional issues raised in this case been mooted out?
Ruling:
The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required
majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest
vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and
nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the
prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts. An
issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal
of the petition.
People of the Philippines vs Sandiganbayan and Bienvenido Tan, Jr.

In July 1987, Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) Bienvenido Tan, Jr. issued an
assessment against San Miguel Corporation (SMC) demanding payment of P342 million in
taxes. SMC filed a request for reinvestigation. Tan granted the request and eventually he
reduced the tax liability to P302 million. But in October 1987, without any word from SMC,
Tan referred the case to the Legal Service Division of the BIR. Various BIR officials
reviewed the case and they recommended that SMCs tax liability be reduced to P22 million
(a significant reduction from the original P342 million). The reduction was justified by the
BIR officials on the ground that the tax examiners had made some errors in computing
SMCs tax liability.
So SMC was demanded to pay P22 million but then SMC asked for a compromise of P10
million. Again, the matter was referred to various BIR officials who agreed and
recommended to Tan that he should accept the compromise offer. Tan accepted the P10
million compromise offer. This resulted to a criminal case against Tan for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, his act of accepting the P10 million
compromise offer caused undue injury to the government and it gave SMC unwarranted
benefits due to the significantly reduced tax liability. The Sandiganbayan originally convicted
Tan but it reversed its own decision upon motion of Tan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tan should have been convicted of the crime charged.
HELD: No. It was found by the Sandiganbayan that there was an improper computation in
the tax liability of SMC. The error basically imposed tax on top of another tax which if
allowed would be unfair to the taxpayer. It was therefore proper to have the tax be reduced
from P302 million to P22 million.
But is it proper for Tan to accept the P10 million compromise by SMC?
Tan is well within his power to accept the P10 million compromise offer. This is actually
abatement (not compromise as termed by SMC). Tan is actually prudent to accept the P10
million offer so as to avoid a protracted and costly litigation. Abatement is the diminution or
decrease in the amount of tax imposed. It refers to the act of eliminating or nullifying; of
lessening or moderating. To abate is to nullify or reduce in value or amount. The CIR has
the power to abate or cancel the whole or any unpaid portion of a tax liability, inclusive of
increments, if its assessment is excessive or erroneous, or if the administration costs
involved do not justify the collection of the amount due. No mutual concessions need be
made, because an excessive or erroneous tax is not compromised; it is abated or canceled.
Only correct taxes should be paid. Further, Tan cannot be said to have acted in bad faith.
He acted upon concurrence and recommendation of the various BIR officials.

Ombudsman vs CSC Case Digest G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007
FACTS:
The qualification standards set for Director II positions in the Central Administrative Service and
Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman pursuant to Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 1 dated January 24, 1997 are as follows:
Education:
Bachelorsdegree
Experience:
3
years
of
supervisory
experience
Training:
None
required.
Eligibility : Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE)/Career Executive Service (CES)
However, in the case of Khem N. Inok vs. Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 148782, July 2,
2002 ), the Supreme Court held that the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, the Office of
the Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights are not covered by the CES governed by
the Career Executive Service Board. Said Decision effectively granted the petition of Mr. Inok for
security of tenure as Director III of the Commission on Audit despite the absence of a CES
eligibility.
Thus, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo wrote a letter dated July 28, 2003 to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), requesting the approval of the amendment of qualification standards for
Director II positions in the Central Administrative Service and Finance and Management Service of
the Office of the Ombudsman, as follows:
Education
:
Bachelors
Experience
:
3
years
of
supervisory
Training
:
None
Eligibility : Career Service Professional/Relevant Eligibility for Second Level Position

degree
experience
required.

CSC issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 disapproving the request on the ground that Director II
position, being third level eligibility, is covered by the Career Executive Service. The Commission
argued that, as the central personnel agency of the government, it is mandated by the
Constitution to administer all levels in the civil service, including that of the third level.
The Office of the Ombudsman, thus, filed a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside and nullify
CSC Opinion No. 44, s. 2004. The Office of the Ombudsman asserts that its specific, exclusive and
discretionary constitutional and statutory power as an independent constitutional body to
administer and supervise its own officials and personnel, including the authority to administer

competitive examinations and prescribe reasonable qualification standards for its own officials,
cannot be curtailed by the general power of the CSC to administer the civil service system. Any
unwarranted and unreasonable restriction on its discretionary authority, such as what the CSC did
when it issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004, is constitutionally and legally infirm.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Director II positions in the Central Administrative Service and the Finance and
Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman are covered by the Career Executive
Service
HELD:
No. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Section 7 of EO 292, otherwise known as The
Administrative Code of 1987, provides:
SECTION 7. Career Service. The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on
merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on
highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and
(3) security of tenure.
The Career Service shall include:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the
faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical
positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit
systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;
x x x x x x x x x (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the CES covers presidential appointees only.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is the appointing authority for all officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except the Deputy Ombudsmen. Thus, a person
occupying the position of Director II in the Central Administrative Service or Finance and
Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman, not by

the President. As such, he is neither embraced in the CES nor does he need to possess CES
eligibility.
To classify the positions of Director II in the Central Administrative Service and the Finance and
Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman as covered by the CES and require
appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will lead to
unconstitutional and unlawful consequences. It will result either in (1) vesting the appointing
power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution or (2) including in the CES
a position not held by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code.
Section 6, Article XI of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies,
shall be appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.
This is complemented by Sec. 11 of RA 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of
1989.
Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent body. As a guaranty of
this independence, the Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials and employees of the
Office of the Ombudsman, except his deputies. This power necessarily includes the power of
setting, prescribing and administering the standards for the officials and personnel of the Office.
To further ensure its independence, the Ombudsman has been vested with the power of
administrative control and supervision of the Office. This includes the authority to organize such
directorates for administration and allied services as may be necessary for the effective
discharge of the functions of the Office, as well as to prescribe and approve its position structure
and staffing pattern. Necessarily, it also includes the authority to determine and establish the
qualifications, duties, functions and responsibilities of the various directorates and allied services
of the Office. This must be so if the constitutional intent to establish an independent Office of the
Ombudsman is to remain meaningful and significant.
Qualification standards are used as guides in appointment and other personnel actions, in
determining training needs and as aid in the inspection and audit of the personnel work
programs. They are intimately connected to the power to appoint as well as to the power of
administrative supervision. Thus, as a corollary to the Ombudsmans appointing and supervisory

powers, he possesses the authority to establish reasonable qualification standards for the
personnel of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Since the responsibility for the establishment, administration and maintenance of qualification
standards lies with the concerned department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to
assisting the department or agency with respect to these qualification standards and approving
them. The CSC cannot substitute its own standards for those of the department or agency,
specially in a case like this in which an independent constitutional body is involved.
Petition GRANTED and Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 SET ASIDE. (Ombudsman vs Civil Service
Commisison, G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007)

G.R. No. 196231

September 4, 2012

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting

through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR
G.R. No. 196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of issues relating to the
President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the
protective cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong
- the Office of the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as
unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats,
robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police
District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant,
Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said
cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police
Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was
lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was
dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not

been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the
offenses charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution
recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against the same
police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings
despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision
finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct
was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose
office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a
bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to
have himself reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight
HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the
creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to
determine accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious
and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9)
months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules
to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within
five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition
thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia,
Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder and
Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General
Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against
the grant of bail. However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor
Barreras-Sulit and sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement
("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding
the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off
the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's
apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the
House of Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the
PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice
passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President
the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate
government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to
culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are
violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal
from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise

administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.

HELD: YES. The Ombudsman's administrativedisciplinary power over a Deputy

Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's
authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For,
while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of
these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable
conclusion that Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise
concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both
provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the
least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check
and balance" intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the
Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutorypower to the President to removea Deputy
Ombudsman and aSpecial Prosecutor, Congressmerely filled an obvious gap inthe
law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2 of the same Article, there is,
however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a
Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of
R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in
the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy Ombudsmanand a Special
Prosecutor isImplied from his Power toAppoint. In giving the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express
terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to
appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and
effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into
abuses and irregularities that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is
certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the
President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and
other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy Ombudsmandoes not
Diminish theIndependence of the Office of theOmbudsman. he claim that Section

8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman
from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is vested
with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional
mandate to be a protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the
Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This means nothing more than that "the
terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office"
are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office where thequestioned acts,
falling short ofconstitutional standards, do notconstitute betrayal of public trust.
Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a
manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful
conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or
private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the Office of the
Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the case
was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that
administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even without the private
complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more
than nine months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the
case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business
affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did.
There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt
intention or questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative
accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty
of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct
in office do not amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be
vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there
being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of
public trust.
The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitionerBarreras-Sulit to determine theexistence of any
of the grounds forher removal from office as providedfor under the Constitution
and theOmbudsman Act.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case
No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered
REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension
effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the
investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We
AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the
Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.
George Uy, Petitioner, Vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, The Hon. Ombudsman And The Hon. Roger C.
Berbano, Sr., Special Prosecution Officer Iii, Office Of The Special Prosecutor, Respondents. [ G.R.
Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001 ]

FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy
Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership was
charged with estafa through falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner filed a
motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and that the
Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that :
1.
It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a
regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of War
mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the Integrated
National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines
2.
As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the rank requirement
stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in the
regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that In cases where none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for reconsideration
was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the Court's
ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of
regular courts.
RULING: No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute
all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The power to investigate and to
prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of
any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official"
is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public
officers and employees during their tenure of office.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public
officers and employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the
most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed
the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office.
Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of theOmbudsman then (to be known as the
Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the Office of
theOmbudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and criminal cases before
the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.

RENATO A. TAPIADOR, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, respondents.
DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] dated January 22, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMBADM-0-94-0983 dismissing the petitioner from the government service for grave misconduct and the Order[2] dated April 7, 1997
denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The incipience of the case could be traced to the complaint-affidavit[3] dated July 4, 1994 lodged with the Resident Ombudsman
at the main office in Manila of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID for brevity) by Walter H. Beck, a U.S. citizen,
against the petitioner, Renato A. Tapiador, BID Special Investigator and assigned as Technical Assistant in the office of the then
Associate Commissioner Bayani M. Subido, Jr. The complaint alleged in substance that petitioner Tapiador demanded and
received from Walter Beck the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate
of registration (ACR for brevity) which was subsequently withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite repeated demands by
Beck, unless the latter pay an additional amount of Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00). Accompanying the complaint was the
affidavit[4] executed by a certain Purisima C. Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate the alleged payment of the amount
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by Walter Beck and his wife to the petitioner in consideration for the issuance of the
subject ACR.
The petitioner categorically denied in his counter-affidavit[5] dated July 11, 1994 that he demanded nor received any amount of
money from Walter Beck in consideration for the issuance of the latters ACR. In addition, the petitioner alleged that Beck and his
wife, Monica Beck, came to the BID office in Manila on June 29, 1994 to follow-up his visa application. On the said occasion,
when the petitioner advised the couple to accomplish first all the requirements for a visa application, Beck and his wife shouted
invectives at him and charged the petitioner with having demanded money from them. This incident prompted the petitioner to file
a criminal complaint for oral defamation before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Manila. The petitioners allegations were
corroborated by Rosanna C. Vigo, a BID employee and officemate of the petitioner, in her affidavit dated July 15, 1994.[6]
After investigation, BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma found the petitioner liable for violating existing civil service
rules and regulations as well as penal laws and thus, recommended that criminal and administrative charges be filed against the
petitioner.
Upon review of the case, the criminal charge was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence;[7] however, the
Ombudsman found the petitioner liable for grave misconduct in the administrative aspect of the case and imposed the penalty of
dismissal from the government service.[8] His subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied on April 7, 1997, the
petitioner filed the instant petition for review[9] which raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE
MISCONDUCT DESPITE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.
II
THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
ONLY AFTER ALMOST THREE YEARS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
III
THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
WITHOUT CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND ACTUAL HEARING IN VIOLATION OF ITS OWN RULES,
THUS CONSTITUTING A VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

IV
THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONTRADICTING ITS OWN FINDING RELATIVE
TO THE CRIMINAL ASPECT OF THIS CASE DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE.
V
THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DISMISSAL AGAINST PETITIONER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS HIS FIRST OFFENSE IN HIS THIRTY YEARS IN THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE.
In the Resolution dated July 7, 1997, we required the public respondent to file his comment to the instant petition. After several
extensions of time given by this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment[10]
on February 20, 1998 which essentially recommended that the petitioner be exonerated from the subject administrative charge
on the ground that the assailed resolution of the Ombudsman was rendered in violation of procedural due process and that it was
not supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, we directed the Office of the Ombudsman to file directly its own comment
which it did on May 12, 1998.[11] The petitioner filed a Reply[12] thereto on August 14, 1998. Thereafter, this case was submitted
for decision after the petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Solicitor General had filed their respective
memoranda.[13]
The Office of the Ombudsman maintains that the petitioner was accorded due process of law inasmuch as he was duly informed
and furnished a copy of the complaint against him as evidenced by his letters dated July 22 and 26, 1996 addressed to the
investigating officer requesting for a copy of the case records to enable him to prepare for his defense. Likewise, there was no
undue delay in the conduct of the administrative proceedings since the preliminary investigation was conducted immediately after
the complaint was filed in 1994; and that after the criminal aspect of the case was resolved, the administrative proceeding was
conducted shortly thereafter. That no preliminary conference had been conducted in the case was primarily due to the petitioners
manifestation to dispense thereof and submit the case for resolution inasmuch as he has already filed his memorandum of
evidence. Moreover, the Ombudsman opined that the petitioner was absolved of criminal liability during the preliminary
investigation of this case due to insufficiency of evidence constituting probable cause contrary to his claim that there was
absolutely no evidence against him. However, the Ombudsman asserts that the sworn statements of Walter Beck a and his
witness, Purisima Terencio, substantially established the administrative liability of the petitioner for grave misconduct by
demanding from complainant Beck a sum of money in exchange for the issuance of the latters ACR; and for that offense,
petitioner should be imposed the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the government service.[14]
By way of reply, the petitioner adverted to the minutes[15] of the preliminary hearing on July 18, 1998 and contended that it was
the hearing officer, Atty. Vitaliano M. Mendoza, who instructed him and his counsel to simply file a memorandum within fifteen
(15) days after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. The petitioner reiterated that the Office of the
Ombudsman found no evidence against him in its investigation of the criminal aspect of the case and thus, he argued that the
instant administrative charge should also have been dismissed.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint.[16] Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an ordinary civil
case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[17]
In dismissing the petitioner from the government service the Office of the Ombudsman reasoned out, as follows:
xxx [E]vidence for the complainant clearly established that respondent Tapiador unlawfully received the amount of P10,000.00
from spouses Walter and Monica Becker (sic), which act was personally witnessed by complainants witness, Purisima C.

Terencio, who in her affidavit dated July 01, 1994 positively identified the respondent as the person to whom spouses Becker
(sic) gave the money. In quoting, witness Terencio states That said spouses paid the full amount of P10,000.00 on February 23,
1992 to Mr. Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of Registration with the promise for the immediate release of the same
(p. 13, Record). To us, the said declaration of witness Terencio appears to be credible and worthy of belief since there is no
apparent reason for her to impute false statements against the respondent. It is also significant to observe that the said
declaration of Terencio was aptly corroborated by complainant Walter Becker (sic), a foreigner, who in his desire to stay
permanently in the Philippines became a victim of such irregularity. Moreover, there is no showing that respondent, in his
capacity as Technical Assistant, is authorized to receive payment for the processing of ACR. Worse, Mrs. Becker (sic) also
claimed that respondent demanded an additional amount of P7,000.00 from them for the release of the ACR.[18]
Notably, the instant administrative complaint was resolved by the Ombudsman merely on the basis of the evidence extant in the
record of OMB-ADM-0-94-0983. The preliminary conference required under Republic Act No. 6770[19] was dispensed with after
the nominal complainant, then BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma, manifested on July 29, 1996 that he was
submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the documents on record[20] while the petitioner agreed to simply file his
memorandum.[21] Consequently, the only basis for the questioned resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the petitioner from
the government service was the unverified complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that of his alleged witness, Purisima
Terencio.
A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were not even identified by
the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at the BID office in
Manila. Neither did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn statements despite prior
notice before the investigating officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge
against the petitioner was not supported by any evidence.[22] Hence, Becks affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
On this basis alone, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the
administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first instance.
Nonetheless, a perusal of the affidavit executed by Walter Beck does not categorically state that it was petitioner Tapiador who
personally demanded from Beck the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) in consideration for the issuance of the latters
ACR. On the other hand, it appears that Walter Beck and his wife sought the assistance of Purisima Terencio sometime in the
later part of 1992 in facilitating the issuance of his ACR and in the process, Terencio allegedly informed the couple that Beck
could be granted the same and would be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently with the help of the petitioner and a
certain Mr. Angeles who was also with the BID, for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Hence, Beck and his wife did not
appear to have any direct or personal knowledge of the alleged demand of the petitioner except through the information allegedly
relayed to them by Terencio. Likewise, although Beck claimed to have subsequently paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), his
affidavit is silent as to the identity of the person who actually received the said amount from him. The pertinent portion of his
affidavit reads, thus:
1. That during the months of Sept[ember] and Oct[ober] 1992 a certain Baby (Purisima)Terencio informed us that I could be
granted an ACR and will be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently thru Mr. Tapiador and Mr. Angeles, both from the
Bureau of Immigration, Manila and the fees was agreed at P10,000.00, official receipts inclussive (sic);
2. That after completing all the requirements and the amount of P10,000.00 was given I waited but no ACR was given to me;
3. That sometime in February 1993 my wife went to see Mr. Tapiador and was informed that he will hold my passport while I have
my ACR, which I refused;
4. That when we tranfered (sic) our residence to Negros Occ[idental] we arranged with Mr. Tapiador to pick up the ACR before
we will leave for that place, and when my wife went again to see Mr. Tapiador to pick up the ACR he was not in the office, and
that Baby Terencio promised to (sic) us that the ACR will be mailed to us, but it was never mailed;[23]

xxx xxx xxx

Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount directly to the petitioner if it were indeed the
latter who actually received the same, but he did not. This significant omission in his affidavit is fatal in establishing the alleged
administrative liability of the petitioner. It also appears that Beck and the petitioner would eventually meet personally for the first
time only later, more specifically on June 23, 1994, at the office of the latter. On the said occasion, so Becks affidavit went on to
state, petitioner even informed him that his ACR had been approved but that he still needed to submit his quarantine clearance
before the same could be issued to him. Before the said date however, it appears that Purisima Terencio had apparently been
doing most of the legwork for the Beck couple in facilitating the release of the subject ACR. Consequently, there is logical basis
to assume that it was to Terencio that the alleged payment was made by the Beck couple.
Anent the affidavit of Purisima Terencio, the Ombudsman gave full faith and credit to her statement that the spouses paid the full
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on February 23, 1992 to Mr. Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of
Registration with the promise for the immediate release of the same[24] on the mere assumption that there is no apparent
reason for her to impute false statements against the petitioner who is employed with the government for more than thirty (30)
years.[25] On the contrary, the rule that witnesses are presumed to tell the truth until proven otherwise[26] does not apply to the
case at bar for the reason that Terencio had the motive to impute falsities to avoid the inevitable wrath of the Beck spouses for
reneging on her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR. The Ombudsman should have been more prudent in according
credence to the allegations of Terencio coming as they do from a supposed fixer.
Besides, Purisima Terencio was adroit enough to make it appear in her affidavit that the Beck spouses had paid Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) in grease money to the petitioner on February 23, 1992 even without categorically stating that she had
personal knowledge or had actually witnessed the alleged pay off. A close scrutiny of the allegations in her affidavit show that the
alleged pay off had taken place as early as February 23, 1992. However, Beck claimed in his own affidavit that he was informed
by Terencio only between the period from September to October 1992 that the processing of his ACR could be facilitated through
the assistance of the petitioner and a certain Mr. Angeles. This glaring inconsistency more than sufficiently impeached Terencios
credibility thereby belying the assessment of the Ombudsman in the assailed resolution.
In view of the foregoing, it is not necessary anymore to pass upon the other grounds raised by the petitioner in his petition. The
complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to prove the charge in the subject administrative case, that
is, with substantial evidence.[27] Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has
no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under
Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,[28] the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the
public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman dated January 22, 1997 dismissing
the petitioner from the government service and the Order dated April 7, 1997 in OMB-ADM-0-94-0983 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED immediately to his position in the government service more particularly in
the Bureau of Investigation and Deportation, Manila, without loss nor diminution in his salaries and benefits.
SO ORDERED.

EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA, Petitioner, vs. EDWARD F. RANADA Respondent,

On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots
Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an

administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao, against petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City.
The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing
permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port, had been demanding money ranging
from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and P5000 as
monthly contribution from the DPAI. The complaint alleged that prior to August 6, 1998,
in order to stop the mulcting and extortion activities of Estarija, the association reported
Estarijas activities to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On August 6, 1998, the
NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked money used by the NBI to
entrap Estarija.
Consequently, the Ombudsman ordered petitioners preventive suspension and directed
him to answer the complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case against Estarija for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch No. 8.
In his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-affidavit, petitioner denied demanding
sums of money for the approval of berthing permits. He claimed that Adrian Cagata, an
employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the DPAI had payables to the PPA, and
although he went to the associations office, he was hesitant to get the P5,000 from
Cagata because the association had no pending transaction with the PPA. Estarija
claimed that Cagata made him believe that the money was a partial remittance to the
PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998 representing 10% of the monthly gross revenue of
their association. Nonetheless, he received the money but assured Cagata that he
would send an official receipt the following day. He claimed that the entrapment and the
subsequent filing of the complaint were part of a conspiracy to exact personal
vengeance against him on account of Ranadas business losses occasioned by the
cancellation of the latters sub-agency agreement with Asia Pacific Chartering Phil., Inc.,
which was eventually awarded to a shipping agency managed by Estarijas son.
On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case,
finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Estarija seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. Estarija claimed that dismissal
was unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to
remove government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not removable by
impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsmans
administrative authority is merely recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is unconstitutional because it gives
the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are not provided for in the
Constitution.
The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order 11 dated October 31,
2000. Thus, Estarija filed a Petition for Review with urgent prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction before the

Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition
and affirmed the Ombudsmans decision.
In his petition for review on certiorari, Estarija contends that he can not be liable for
grave misconduct because he did not commit extortion as he was merely prodded by
Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, to receive the money and that it makes no
sense why he would extort money in consideration of the issuance of berthing permits
since the signing of berthing permits is only ministerial on his part. He also maintains
that Rep. Act No. 6770 is unconstitutional because the Ombudsman has only the powers
enumerated under Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, which powers do not
include the power to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a government
official. According to him, the Ombudsmans power is merely to recommend the action
to the officer concerned. The Solicitor General maintains otherwise, arguing that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to spell out, restrictively, each act which
the Ombudsman may or may not do, since the purpose of the Constitution is to provide
simply a framework within which to build the institution.
Issue No.1: Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold Estarija liable for
dishonesty and grave misconduct
The petition is DENIED.
Estarija is liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct. Estarija did not deny that he went
to the DPAI office to collect, and that he actually received, the money which he
demanded from the DPAI as monthly contribution. Since there was no pending
transaction between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no reason to go to the latters office
to collect any money. Even if he was authorized to assist in the collection of money due
the agency, he should have issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he did not
do so. Patently, petitioner had been dishonest about accepting money from DPAI.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. And when the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of
established rule are manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.
Issue No.2: Whether or not the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure erring officials is constitutional
Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of
the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the
Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman
with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.
Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
They gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely
persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute
and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with
the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his
authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise given
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of Congress and the
Judiciary (Ledesma v. Court of Appeals)

The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article
XI of the 1987Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out
the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770,
specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to
sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The
powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth
to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold
that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official
other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

Maceda v. Vasquez
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
Nocon, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial
Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1)
the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court
filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorneys Office alleged that petitioner had
falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998, when in truth and in fact,
petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases
that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner
similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and
August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Supreme Court
an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Issue:

whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the
alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that
it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court
Held:
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Supreme Court
with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners certificates of service
to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of
his pending case load, as the Supreme Court has the necessary records to make such a
determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter,
as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.

Caoibes vs. Ombudsman

Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. The Ombudsman
cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court
employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases
against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination
as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein.
Facts:
On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal
Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants
eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. Alumbres alleged that on May 20, 1997,
at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner
Judge Caoibes (Presiding Judge of RTC 253) to return the executive table he borrowed from
respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but before
he could finish talking, petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah," andboxed him at his right
eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was thrown away,
rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.

On June 13, 1997, Respondent Judge lodged an administrative case with the SC praying for
the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a judicial officer using the same facts as above.
On June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counteraffidavit within 10 days from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner
filed on an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the
Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case, and refer the same to the SC
which is already investigating the case. Petitioner contended that the SC, not the Office of
the Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective
culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are
under its exclusive supervision and control.
On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman denied the motion for referral to the SC
stating that under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, it is within its jurisdiction to
investigate

on

the

criminal

charges.

It

likewise

denied

petitioners

motion

for

reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on the case
pending resolution of the administrative case

Held:
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who were entangled
in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative
supervision

over all

courts and

its

personnel.

Prescinding

from

this

premise,

the

Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound
to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme
Court for determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This
rule should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject
of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from
the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he
should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court,
because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon
not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly
conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case before it
does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the

exercise

of

its

administrative

prerogatives

and

to

arrogate

unto

itself

power

not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on

judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision
over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is

hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino M.
Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action. (Caoibes vs.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, July 19, 2001)

LASTIMOSA V VASQUEZ
FACTS
Petitioner is First Asst. Provincial Prosecutor or Cebu. She and the Provincial
Prosecutor refused or failed to file a criminal charge of attempted rape
against Municipal Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Petitioner was filed with an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross
neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime and a
charge for indirect contempt. They were also placed under 6 mos preventive
suspension.
Prior to this, a complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who
found no prima facie evidence and recommended dismissal. However, the
Ombudsman Vasquex disapproved the recommendation and directed that
the Mayor be charged in the RTC. The Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas then
referred the matter to the Provincial Prosecutor and later to petitioner.
Petitioner found that only acts of lasciviousness have been committed and
filed a case under such.

ISSUES W/N the Ombudsman has authority to file an administrative case

against the petitioners and preventively suspend them.
RULING
YES.The Ombudsmans power to investigate and prosecute include the
investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official
regardless if such were related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty. The Ombudsman is authorized to call on
prosecutors for assistance under S31 fo RA 67701 . When a prosecutor is
deputized, he is subject to supervision and control of the Ombudsman. Such
supervision and control would mean that they can alter, repeal or modify
findings of their subordinates. The office also has the power to punish for
contempt under Rule 71, S3 of the Rules of Court.

Atty. Ismael G. Khan Jr. vs. Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo

Facts:
Simbillo advertised himself as an Annulment of Marriage Specialist. These
advertisements appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, and further research showed that similar advertisements were
published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and 6, 2000 and in the Philippine
Star in August 5, 2000.
In September 1, 2000, Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and
solicitation of legal services, filed by Assistant Court Administrator and Chief
of Public Information Office, Atty. Ismael G, Khan.

Simbillos advertisement undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage,

and violated rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court.
Simbillo professed repentance and beg for the Courts indulgence, this rings
hollow as he again advertised his services in an issue of Buy and Sell Free
Ads Newspaper in August 14, 2001, and again in October 5, 2001.
Rulings:
Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibilty, and Rule 138, section 27 of the Rules of Court,
and therefore, suspended from the practice of Law for One year. Repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

G.R. No. 118141 September 5, 1997

GARCIA-RUEDA vs. PASCASIO
FACTS:
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical
operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by
Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the
anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of complications of
"unknown cause," according to officials of the UST Hospital.
Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that

Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia.
Pursuant to its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda BalatbatReyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office of the City
Prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, what transpired was a confounding series of events
which we shall try to disentangle. The case was initially assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel,
who had to inhibit himself because he was related to the counsel of one of the doctors. As a result,
the case was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was, however, disqualified on motion
of the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and jurisprudence regarding preliminary
investigation. The case was then referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution
recommending that only Dr. Reyes be held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr.
Antonio be dismissed.
The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina Santos
Sioson, in the "interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties," recommended that the case be
re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was
transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where a volte face occurred again with the
endorsement that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a corresponding
information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning
the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba.
Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration regarding Prosecutor
Dimagiba's resolution, the investigative "pingpong" continued when the case was again assigned to
another prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the
criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of
Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio
A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution which was
approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 3 against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality
in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994,
Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence.

the

In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to
review the recommendations of the government prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the
same. Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find
that there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE:
Whether or not expert testimony is necessary to prove the negligent act of the respondent.

RULING:
In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and
skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such
training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at
least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert
testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the
causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the
conclusion as to causation.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any
expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good
standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of
Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only
testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter
of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.
The better and more logical remedy under the circumstances would have been to appeal the
resolution of the City Prosecutors dismissing the criminal complaint to the Secretary of Justice
under the Department of Justice's Order No. 223, otherwise known as the "1993 Revised Rules on
Appeals From Resolutions In Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations," as amended by
Department Order No. 359, Section 1 of which provides:
Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. Only resolutions of the Chief State
Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing a
criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice
except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.
What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of Order No. 223
states: "The Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution." On the
other hand, "He may motu proprio or on motion of the appellee, dismiss outright the appeal on
specified grounds."
In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted within his
power and authority in dismissing the complaint against the Prosecutors and this Court will not
interfere with the same.
Petition is dismissed.

MERCADO v. MANZANO

FACTS: On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati City, three
candidates competed for the post: Eduardo B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and
Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended
due to a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
alleging that Manzano was an American citizen (he was born September 4, 1955 in
San Francisco, California, USA to Filipino parents)

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under Section

40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as
disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those
with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of
Makati.

On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of
candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him
according to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. Manzano filed a motion
for reconsideration. Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.
Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion was unresolved. But on
August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed
the Second Divisions ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and
directing the proclamation of Manzano as winner, saying:

Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship by operation

of the US constitution and laws under principle of jus soli (basis is
place of birth).Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural
born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution
and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right of blood).

Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of

Immigration and holds and American passport, he has not lost his
Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken an
oath of allegiance to the USA. Manzano, after the age of majority,
registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998
Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US
citizenship.

Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City.

ISSUE: WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, WON he is disqualified
from being a candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City.

HELD: No

RATIO: The Court said that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage, where
a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a
result of a persons volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.

In Sec.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern was not with dual
citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their
countries of origin even after naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in
R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification.

It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual
citizenships have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual
citizenship. In private respondents certificate of candidacy, he made these
statements under oath on March 27, 1998: I am a Filipino citizenNaturalborn. I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to , a foreign
country. I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual-citizen.

Manzanos oath of allegiance, together with the fact he has spent his life here,
received his education here, and practiced his profession here, and has taken part in
past Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

MERCADO v. MANZANO

FACTS: On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice-mayoralty of Makati City, three
candidates competed for the post: Eduardo B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and
Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was suspended
due to a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril
alleging that Manzano was an American citizen (he was born September 4, 1955 in
San Francisco, California, USA to Filipino parents)

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under Section

40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as
disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those
with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of
Makati.

On May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of
candidacy of Manzano on the grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him
according to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. Manzano filed a motion
for reconsideration. Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.
Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion was unresolved. But on
August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) reversed
the Second Divisions ruling on the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and
directing the proclamation of Manzano as winner, saying:

Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US citizenship by operation

of the US constitution and laws under principle of jus soli (basis is
place of birth).Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural
born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution
and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the right of blood).

Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of

Immigration and holds and American passport, he has not lost his
Filipino citizenship since he has not renounced it and has not taken an
oath of allegiance to the USA. Manzano, after the age of majority,
registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998
Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US citizenship
under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US
citizenship.

Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati City.

ISSUE: WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if so, WON he is disqualified
from being a candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City.

HELD: No

RATIO: The Court said that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage, where
a person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a
result of a persons volition; it is a situation wherein a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.

In Sec.5 Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern was not with dual
citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain allegiance to their
countries of origin even after naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in
R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as
referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification.

It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual
citizenships have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual
citizenship. In private respondents certificate of candidacy, he made these
statements under oath on March 27, 1998: I am a Filipino citizenNaturalborn. I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to , a foreign
country. I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual-citizen.

Manzanos oath of allegiance, together with the fact he has spent his life here,
received his education here, and practiced his profession here, and has taken part in
past Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26,

1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such

renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Caasi v Ca
Merito Miguel was elected as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections of January
18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by Mateo Caasi on the ground that
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code Miguel was not qualified because he is a
green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the USA and not of Bolinao. Sec. 48
provides:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country
in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
Miguel admitted that he holds a green card, but he denied that he is a permanent resident
of the United States. He argued that he obtained the green card for convenience in order
that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit
his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and
that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2, 1987 for the
ratification of the1987 Constitution and the congressional elections on May 18, 1987.
After hearing, the Comelec dismissed the petition. It held that the possession of a green
card by the respondent Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his
residence in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether a green card is proof that the holder thereof is a permanent
resident of the United States such that it would disqualify him to run for any
elective local position.
Held: Yes. Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S.
and his possession of a green card attesting to such status areconclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the United States. In the"Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US
Embassy in Manila before hisdeparture for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to
Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state),"
Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently
issued by the US Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel
identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper

portion, the following information is printed: Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person
identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States.
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. He did not go
to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with
the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's
(not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.

Issue: Whether Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and

presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988
local elections, waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States
Held:

No. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that

the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green
card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified
to run for any elective office."
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of
such immigrant status should be as indubitable as hisapplication for it. Absent clear
evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green
card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local
elections on January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said
public office.

Issue: Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

Held:

Yes. Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent

resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of
proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of
Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become
a candidate for that office. Hence, his election was null and void.

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1)
year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy is one of thequalifications that
a candidate for elective public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification
because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a
period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in
November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or
immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of
excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess
dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have
cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The
assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such
entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public
duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign
country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito
Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected
to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (G.R. No.
88831 November 8, 1990)

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE vs DESIERTO, 528 SCRA 9 (G.R.

No. 130140. October 25, 1999)
FACTS:
On 8 October 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13,
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, with the
Chairman of the PCGG as Chairman; the Solicitor General as Vice Chairman; and one
representative each from the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of
Finance, Department of Justice, Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine
National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Government Corporate Counsel, and the
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. In its
FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July
1993, the COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine Seeds, Inc., (hereafter PSI) of
which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were the Directors, was one of the twentyone corporations which obtained behest loans. On 2 March 1996, the COMMITTEE
through Orlando O. Salvador, the PCGG consultant detailed with the COMMITTEE,
filed with the OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the Directors of PSI namely,
Jose Z. Osias, Pacifico E. Marcos, Eduardo V. Romualdez, Fernando C. Ordoveza, and
Juanito Ordoveza; and the Directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines who
approved the loans for violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.
ISSUE:
Does the imprescriptibility of the right of the State to recover ill-gotten wealth apply
to both civil and criminal cases?
RULING:
No. The so-called imprescriptibility as provided in Section 15 of Article XI of the
Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to
criminal cases, such as the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968.
This is clear from the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. Since
the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of
the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides,
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. In the
present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were
made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with
the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, the prescriptive period for the offenses with
which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from

the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
Art 12

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC V. DESIERTO (CONSTITUTIONAL,

ADMINISTRATIVE)
An EX POST FACTO law has been defined as one:
which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
done criminal, and punishes such action;
which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed;
which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when it was committed;
which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant;
which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when exercised was lawful; or
which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of
penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts ad establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide
for their punishment.
AO No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest loans. It merely
creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans and provides the
frame of reference in determining the existence of behest loans. Not being penal laws, AO
No 13 and Memo Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws.
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office
during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion,
whether probable cause exists and to charge the person believed to have committed the
crime as defined by law. As a rule, courts should not interfere with the Ombudsman's
investigatory power, exercised through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and the authority to
determine the presence or absence of probable cause, except when the finding is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
For one to have violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following elements must be
established:

the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions;
he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence;
and
he must have caused undue injury to any party, including the government or given any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference, in the discharge of his
functions.
Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be
held liable under the law. It is required that the act constitutive of bad faith or partiality
must, in the first place, be evident or manifest, while the negligent deed should be both
gross and inexcusable. Further, it is necessary to show that any or all of these modalities
resulted in undue injury to a specified party.
On the other hand, to be listed under Section 3(g), there must be a showing that private
respondents entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government.
Petitioner did not satisfy either criterion.