Fundamental Breach under the CISG

Alexander Lorenz [*]

Dinslaken, Germany/Canterbury, England
I. Introduction
The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods was adopted on
April 11, 1980 in Vienna and came into force on January 1, 1988. It sets out rules that
govern international sales contracts and in particular determines the formation of
contract and the rights and obligations of buyers and seller to an international sales
contract.[1] Since its predecessors ULIS [2] and ULF [3] adopted at The Hague in
1964 did not gain widespread acceptance [4], the Vienna Convention 1980 was
intended to supersede these two Conventions.[5]
In Article 25 the Vienna Convention 1980 defines "fundamental" breach of contract
and is a prerequisite of powerful remedies like the avoidance of contract [6] or the
buyer's right to require delivery of substitute goods.[7] It sets out the conditions under
which the aggrieved party can make use of these remedies. Therefore, the concept of
"fundamental" breach is a "central concept in the Convention's system of
remedies."[8]
II. Importance of Distinguishing between "Fundamental" and "Nonfundamental" Breach
To illustrate the importance of distinguishing between "fundamental" and "nonfundamental" breach, I propose to consider first a breach of contract and its
consequences under the Convention in general.
While chapter II of Part III of the Convention deals with the obligation of the seller
and provides remedies for the buyer, chapter III is concerned with the obligations of
the buyer and provides remedies of the seller.
The seller is under the obligation to "deliver the goods, hand over any documents
relating to them and transfer the property in the goods."[9] He must do so "within a
reasonable time after the conclusion of the contract".[10] If a date or a period of time
is fixed the delivery must take place "on that date" [11] or "within that period."[12]
The seller is required to deliver goods "which are of the quantity, quality and
description required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the
manner required by the contract."[13] In particular the goods must be fit for the

ordinary or particular purpose known to the seller [14], possess the quality of a sample
or model held out to the buyer [15] and be contained in a usual manner or adequate to
protect and preserve the goods.[16]
If the seller does not comply with one of these requirements he is in breach of the
contract.[17]
Also the buyer has certain obligations; the most important are to "pay the price for the
goods and take delivery of them".[18] If the buyer fails to do so he is in breach of
contract.[19]
Several remedies are available for a breach of contract.[20] This is where the
distinction between a "fundamental" and a "non-fundamental" breach becomes
crucially important since certain remedies are only available in cases of a
"fundamental" breach. The most important remedies of the Convention are:
A. Damages
If one of the parties fails to perform his contractual obligations Article 45(1)(b) gives
the buyer and Article 61(1)(b) the seller the right to claim damages under Article 74.
The latter sets out the rules for the calculation of damages as well as further
conditions for liability. In addition to a "breach of contract", two further conditions
have to be satisfied: a foreseeable loss must be suffered by the injured party and there
must be a causal link between the "breach of contract" and the suffered loss.[21]
Damages can be claimed for any failure of buyer or seller to perform the contractual
obligations.[22] Accordingly, the aggrieved party can recover damages from the party
in breach even though the breach has not been "fundamental".
B. Reduction of price
In case of non-conformity of the goods, the buyer may also reduce the price under
Article 50 pursuant to Article 45(1)(a).
The remedy of price reduction can be applicable where the seller has delivered nonconforming goods and the buyer elects to accept them in spite of the non-conformity.
[23] The remedy of price reduction is not available in types of breach other than nonconformity of goods. Other types of breach contained in Articles 31-34 such as late
delivery, handing over documents, etc. do not fall within the range of Article 50, and
price reduction is not available.[24]

As with the remedy of damages, the remedy of price reduction does not require a
"fundamental" breach but is available in any case of non-conformity of goods.
C. Contract Avoidance
Under Article 49 [25] the buyer may declare the contract avoided if the seller fails to
perform his obligations. The same applies to the seller under Article 64.[26] Pursuant
to Article 81 "avoidance of the contract releases both parties from their obligations
under it, subject to any damages which may be due". Accordingly, once a contract has
been declared avoided, the contract is terminated and the parties are released from
their obligations for the future. The buyer loses the right to claim the delivery of
goods and the seller cannot claim payment of the price anymore. However, the injured
party does not lose the right to claim damages he suffered as a consequence of the
breach.[27] For the past, the parties may claim restitution and be required to return the
supplied goods or the paid price.[28]
Contract avoidance is a drastic remedy [29] since world-wide commercial trade
normally involves large quantities of goods and therefore involves expensive transport
and storage. Consequently, the remedy of contract avoidance is not available for just
any breach of contract; at this point the distinction between "non-fundamental" and
"fundamental" breach, as defined in Article 25, becomes of major importance. The
avoidance of contract may only be declared if the failure of the seller "to perform any
of his obligations . . . amounts to a fundamental breach" [30] or if the seller does not
deliver the goods "within the additional period of time fixed" in accordance with
the Nachfrist-type rule in Article 47.[31] The same applies to the buyer if he does not
perform his obligation to pay the price or take delivery of the goods.[32]
Other than in the limited "Nachfrist" situation, a "non-fundamental" breach of contract
does not give the parties the right to avoid the contract.
The prerequisite of a "fundamental" breach is meant to save the contract and
consequently to avoid expensive and wasteful reshipment where either the defect of
goods is immaterial or the deprivations from the contract are insubstantial.[33] This
makes it clear that one has to carefully analyze whether a breach is "fundamental" or
not and what exactly amounts to a "fundamental" breach within the meaning of Article
25.
D. Repair and delivery of substitute goods
In case goods "do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require the seller" to
repair the goods [34] or to deliver substitute goods.[35]

The buyer's right to repair is subject to the condition that the repair is not
"unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances".[36] The unreasonableness
depends on the nature of the goods and other circumstances such as the distance of the
respective countries of the parties or the extent of the defect of the goods, but does not
depend on the character of the breach.[37]
However, the right to require delivery of substitute goods depends very much on the
character of the breach; substitute goods may only be requested in case of a
"fundamental" breach. The prerequisite of a "fundamental" breach was introduced in
this provision to avoid expensive transports of substitute goods in cases in which the
defect of the goods is trivial and the deprivation of contract is unsubstantial.
This, again, stresses the importance of the distinction between a "fundamental" and a
"non-fundamental" breach. While in the former case the buyer may require substitute
goods the buyer, in the latter case, has to content himself with a request for repair or
with claiming damages or price reduction.
E. Passing of risk
Apart from different available remedies, the distinction between "fundamental" and
"non-fundamental" breach becomes equally important in chapter IV of the Convention
dealing with the "passing of risk". Pursuant to Article 70, "articles 67, 68 and 69 do
not impair the remedies available to the buyer on account of the breach", if "the seller
has committed a fundamental breach of contract."
Articles 67-69 are concerned with the time when the risk of loss or damage to the
goods passes to the buyer. Once the risk passes to the buyer the seller is entitled to
payment regardless of any damage or loss to the goods.[38]
Article 67 deals with the "passing of risk" in sales that involve the carriage of goods.
In that case "the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are handed over to the first
carrier."
Pursuant to Article 68 "the risk in respect of goods sold in transit passes to the buyer
from the time of the conclusion of the contract."
Article 69 is concerned with the buyer's failing to take delivery. If the buyer does not
take over the goods in due time, the risk of damage or loss passes to him.
Article 70 deals with "passing of risk" in the case of a breach of contract of the seller
and situations in which such a breach may prevent the risk from passing to the buyer.
[39] In cases of non-conformity of goods that constitute a "fundamental" breach, the

buyer does not lose his remedies although the risk of damage or loss has passed to
him. Therefore the buyer may declare the contract avoided if the non-conformity of
goods already amounted to a fundamental breach at the time the risk passed to the
buyer but the goods suffered further damage after the "passing of risk".[40] If the nonconformity of goods did not amount to a "fundamental" breach before the risk has
passed, contract avoidance is not available to the buyer since he has to bear the risk.
F. Miscellaneous
Furthermore the distinction between "fundamental" and "non-fundamental" breach
becomes important where a contract avoidance may be declared for the reason of an
anticipatory breach of contract.[41]
Finally, the parties may declare an instalment contract avoided in case of a
"fundamental" breach.[42]
G. Conclusion
As seen above, the distinction between "fundamental" and "non-fundamental" breach
is crucial to determine the different remedies available to the aggrieved party. In case
of a "fundamental" breach, the injured party cannot only claim damages, price
reduction or the repair of non-conforming goods but may also declare the contract
avoided or request the delivery of substitute goods. Also the question whether
remedies are still available in case the risk passed to the buyer depends on the nature
of the breach of contract.
The distinction between "fundamental" and "non-fundamental" breach may lead to
different legal consequences and is therefore of major importance in the Convention.
Having illustrated the importance to distinguish between "fundamental" and "nonfundamental" breach, I will now focus on the definition of a "fundamental" breach in
detail and raise the question whether the definition of a "fundamental" breach
provided in Article 25 is the best that can be devised.
Article 25 defines a "fundamental" breach as a breach of contract that "results in such
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to
expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable
person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a
result."
The concept of "fundamental" breach is already to be found in Article 10 ULIS but
was criticised for being too subjective.[43] The definition in Article 25 introduced

more objective criteria and can be seen as a compromise between a strict subjective
test and a strict objective test.[44] The hypothetical will in Article 10 ULIS was
eliminated and instead a material test was adopted in Article 25 of the 1980 Vienna
Convention.[45]
However, a "fundamental" breach had to be drafted in general terms since such a
concept cannot specify all possible circumstances.[46] Therefore, the present
definition in Article 25 has generated much controversy and difficulties in interpreting
it.
It is even asserted that it is impossible to define a fundamental breach at all and that
only practice in the form of case law is capable to shape such a general concept.
[47] At the 1977 UNCITRAL conference it was proposed to delete any definition of
fundamental breach but these suggestions were met with opposition.[48]
The definition in Article 25 can be divided in two elements: first, a detriment such as
substantially to deprive the other party of what he is entitled to expect under the
contract -- the detriment/expectation component -- and second, the foreseeability of
the detriment -- the foreseeability component.[49]
A. Detriment/expectation component
The word detriment is not defined in the Convention. However, a definition of
"detriment" cannot be confined to an actual material loss or damage but has to be
interpreted in a broader sense including also immaterial detriments such as losing a
customer, losing resale possibilities or being brought into disrepute etc.
[50] "Detriment . . . (just) . . . fills the modest function of filtering out certain cases, as
for example where breach of a fundamental obligation has occurred but not caused
injury."[51]
The major emphasis is laid upon the contractual expectation of the injured party: "of
what he is entitled to expect under the contract".[52] The expectation of a party under
a contract is a central criterion to the determination whether a breach of contract is
detrimental.[53] The expectation interest adds an objective criterion to the definition
since it is the contract that determines the party's obligations and it is also the contract
that determines the importance of these duties.[54] Consequently, it is not the personal
and subjective interest of the injured party that matters but the expectation that can be
assessed by looking at the contract itself.[55]
Furthermore, detriment must "substantially" deprive the injured part of what he is
entitled to expect under the contract.[56] Determining "substantiality" causes major
problems because it is open to various interpretations.[57] It was even argued that to

define "fundamental" by "substantial" is an idem per idem definition and therefore

mere tautology.[58] Thus, determining "substantiality" in terms of quantity -- how big
may a deficit of the delivered goods be not to be substantial? Does late delivery
"substantially" deprive the injured party of what he is entitled to expect under the
contract? Do other criteria such as a reasonable offer to cure or the reasonable
possibility to resell or use the non-conforming goods elsewhere have to be taken into
account? Article 25 does not given an explicit answer to these questions. The question
for instance whether a breach amounts to "substantial detriment" even if an offer to
cure is made and a repair of the deficient goods is possible and does not cause
unreasonable inconvenience can be dealt with in different ways. This becomes
important where a contract is declared avoided and the seller has made an offer to cure
pursuant to Article 48.
It is suggested that this question "must be answered in the light of the effect of a
rightful offer to cure, for otherwise seller's exercise of this right would be
futile."[59] It implies that "substantiality" of the detriment depends on whether the
breach can be cured without causing unreasonable inconvenience and delay.
[60] Otherwise, the seller's right to cure stipulated in Article 48 consequently ceases to
exist by the time the contract is declared avoided which would render Article 48
meaningless.
On the other hand, Article 48 expressly states that the right of the seller to cure is
subject to Article 49; this can suggest that contract avoidance has priority over an
offer to cure. If an offer to cure would prevent a "fundamental" breach, Article 49
would be subject to Article 48 and Article 48 would have priority over Article 49. This
would twist the provisions to mean just the opposite. Moreover, the injured buyer
finds himself in a position of uncertainty. Will the seller make an offer to cure and
when? The change of the nature of the breach would just depend on the seller making
an offer to cure. All this would result in a weakening of Article 25.
Furthermore, in cases of contract avoidance national courts [61] have even held that
non-conformity of goods does not result in "substantial" detriment if the goods
reasonably can be used for another purpose or can be resold elsewhere. In this case,
the buyer may claim damages or use other remedies but may not declare the contract
avoided for the reason that the Convention aims at saving contracts. This
interpretation leaves the buyer and the seller in uncertainty. In case an action is
brought before a court concerning a fundamental breach, the buyer faces a dilemma:
on the one hand, he has to keep the non-conforming goods in order not to lose the
right to avoid the contract;[62] on the other hand, the buyer might have to resell the
goods or make other use of them in order to mitigate the loss.[63]

All this goes to show that the term "substantial" detriment is open to various
interpretations and that each interpretation may conflict with certain provisions in the
Convention or render them meaningless. Accordingly, there is no interpretation that
can be claimed to be the right one. The term "substantial" detriment therefore is not
sufficiently clear and eventually it is for the courts to develop rules in their case law
that can be relied on by the parties.
B. Foreseeability
As far as foreseeability of a substantial detriment is concerned, a breach is not
fundamental "unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the
same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result."[64] This
second part of Article 25 is composed of a subjective and an objective test of
foreseeability; it is meant to eliminate a "fundamental" breach where the substantial
detriment occurs unexpectedly.[65]
The party in breach may claim that he was not able to foresee such a detriment with
the consequence that the breach of contract does not amount to a fundamental one
within the meaning of Article 25. Accordingly unforeseeability may depend on the
party's knowledge and evaluation of the relevant facts, his experience, his perception
of the circumstances, etc.[66]
However, as parties in breach are not likely to admit that they foresaw the detrimental
result, the objective criterion of a "reasonable person standard" was introduced.
[67] Here the question has to be asked whether a "reasonable person of the same kind
in the same circumstances would not have foreseen the result."[68] Although this test
is meant to add objectivity to the definition, it remains rather vague since numerous
characteristic features have to be taken into account to determine a person of the same
kind and it is suggested that the whole socio-economic background including religion,
language, etc. must be taken into consideration.[69] Courts therefore face the difficult
task to assess what exactly is a person of the same kind. The parties to the contract in
question may be unable to predict the outcome of the litigation.
The same applies to the term "in the same circumstances". The whole range of facts
such as conditions on world and regional markets, national legislation, prior trade
usage between the parties, etc. must be taken into account to determine whether a
reasonable person would have foreseen a detrimental result.[70]
Moreover, it is important to mention that the burden to prove unforeseeability lies
with the breaching party.[71]

However, the main problem of foreseeability rests with the time at which the
detrimental result must be foreseen. Article 25 does not answer this question and it
remains uncertain whether the time of the contract conclusion is crucial to assess
foreseeability or whether foreseeability of a detrimental result occurring after the
conclusion of contract also has to be taken into consideration.[72]
Again, Article 25 is open for interpretation on this point and has generated much
controversy.
It has been suggested that if a detrimental result was not foreseeable at the time of the
conclusion of contract, and becomes foreseeable after that, the party in breach cannot
claim that the detrimental result was unforeseeable. According to this view any
foreseeability of a substantial detriment before the time of breach but after the time of
conclusion is to be taken into consideration.[73] Others suggest that foreseeability of
detrimental results after the conclusion of contract can only be taken into
consideration in exceptional cases and only up to the time when the preparations for
performance of the contract performance started.[74]
These views consider the overall situation of the contract and leave room for a more
individual evaluation of the circumstances. The relevant information often might be
passed on to the party in breach after the conclusion of the contract and it is argued
that the drafters of the Convention meant to provide courts with a rather flexible
provision.[75] On the other hand, it is suggested that foreseeability can only be taken
into account if the substantial detriment was foreseeable at the time the contract was
concluded.[76] It is argued that it is the contract that determines the importance of
buyer's and seller's duties and obligations. Therefore the time of the contract
formation must be the crucial time for foreseeability; otherwise one party could make
substantial a certain interest that was not mentioned by the time of the contract
formation interest and change a "non-fundamental" breach into a "fundamental"
breach simply by providing the other party with further information.
There are good reasons for both solutions. Which solution is the one the court will
apply? Seller and buyer are left in uncertainty until further reliable case law has
developed.
IV. Conclusion
What conclusion can be drawn from all this? As seen in the first part of the essay, the
distinction between "fundamental" and "non-fundamental" breach is of major
importance since different remedies are available.

Unfortunately, the definition in Article 25 is not sufficiently clear and open to various
interpretations. In particular the interpretation of a "substantial" detriment and the
crucial time of "foreseeability" leave the buyer and seller in uncertainty.
At the end of the day the definition in Article 25 at least provides rough guidelines for
merchants, lawyers and courts; it stipulates that it is not the subjective interest of the
aggrieved party that matters but the expectation under the contract that specifies the
detriment. It adds more objectivity to the definition. Furthermore, the question of
foreseeability is addressed and Article 25 sets out that the detriment has to be
foreseeable which provides further important guidelines.
Unfortunately, the time of foreseeability of the detriment is left out and, as seen
above, can generate many difficulties. On this point, the drafters of the Conventions
could have made the definition clearer by specifying the time of foreseeability.
Eventually there remains the question of "substantiality". The definition of
"fundamental" breach is meant to define a very serious breach; to achieve this the
word "substantial" is used. As also seen above, this is said to be mere tautology since
it is an idem per idem definition. But how can one make "substantiality" more
specific? Of course, one can add more description or examples to the definition but
they will hardly be capable of covering all possible situations that might occur and
probably generate even more problems to interpret a definition of fundamental breach
-- more words call for more interpretation.
In my view, it is not possible to draft a more specific definition of a fundamental
breach since it is simply meant to describe a very serious breach and has to be drafted
in general terms. However, it is for the courts to develop criteria and guidelines in
their case law. But there remains the problem that courts in different countries might
have different views on these problems with the consequence that no uniform
interpretation of Article 25 will be established.
The parties to an international sales contract are therefore well advised to include
specific provisions concerning a reasonable offer to cure or the crucial time of
foreseeability, etc. into their contract. The more specific these provisions are, the
narrower becomes the scope of possible interpretations.
All in all, it seems that the notion of a fundamental breach itself is very important and
necessary to satisfy the needs of international trade. On the other hand, the notion of a
fundamental breach is very difficult to determine in detail and, until a uniform case
law has been established, may cause uncertainties to the parties to an international
sales contract. But, by including specific provisions in their contracts, parties to
international sales contracts can easily avoid many of these uncertainties.

FOOTNOTES
* Pace essay submission, June 1998.
1. LEE, Robert "The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: OK for the UK?" (1993) Journal of Business Law, p. 131, at p. 133.
2. Uniform Law on International Sales (1964).
3. Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(1964).
4. Only Belgium, Gambia, West Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
San Marino and the UK were parties.
5. NICOLAS, Barry "The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law" (1989), p.
201.
6. Article 49(1)(a), 51(2), 64(1)(c), 72 (1), 73(1).
7. Article 46(2).
8. NICOLAS, supra Note 5, at p. 218; see also HONSELL, Heinrich "Kommentar
zum UN-Kaufrecht: Uebereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen Ueber Vertraege ueber
den internationalen Warenkauf" (1997) Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, at Article 25 - 1.
9. Article 30.
10. Article 33(c).
11. Article 33(a).
12. Article 33(b).
13. Article 35(1).
14. Article 35(2)(a)(b).
15. Article 35(2)(c).
16. Article 35(2)(d).

17. von CAEMMERER, E. / SCHLECHTRIEM, Peter "Kommentar zum

Einheitlichen UN-Kaufrecht" (1995), 2nd edition, Munich, at Article 25 - 7.
18. Article 53.
19. LEE, supra note 1, at p. 140.
20. Article 45(1); 61(1).
21. BIANCA, C.M. / BONELL, M.J. "Commentary on the International Sales Law The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention" (1987) Milan, at Article 74, 2.2. (Knapp).
22. Ibid, at Article 45, 2.1.1 (Will) and at Article 61, 2.2. (Knapp).
23. Ibid, at Article 50, 2.1. (Will)
24. HONNOLD, John "Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United
Nations Convention" (1991) 2nd edition, Deventer-Boston , at 313.1.
25. See Article 45(1)(a).
26. See Article 61(1)(a).
27. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 81, 2.2. (Tallon).
28. Article 81(2).
29. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 49, 1.1.(Will).
30. Article 49(1)(a), 64(1)(a).
31. Article 49(1)(b).
32. Article.64 (1)(b).
33. HONNOLD, supra note 24, at 182.2; MICHIDA, Shinichiro "Cancellation of
Contract" (1979) The American Journal of Comparative Law, p. 279, at p. 281.
34. Article 46(3).
35. Article 46(2).
36. Article 46(3).

37. HONNOLD, supra note 24, at 284; BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article
46, 2.2.2.2. (Will).
38. Article 66.
39. HONNOLD, supra note 24, at 379.
40. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 70, 2.3. (Nicholas).
41. Article 72.
42. Article 73.
43. ZIEGLER, Ulrich "Leistungsstoerungsrecht nach dem UN-Kaufrecht" (1995)
Baden-Baden, at p. 40; ERSI, Guyla "A propos the 1980 Vienna Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" (1983) The American Journal of
Comparative Law, p. 333, at p. 337.
44. ZIEGLER, supra note 43, at p. 41.
45. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 25, 1.2. (Will).
46. HONNOLD, supra note 24, at 181.2.
47. ERSI, supra note 43, at p. 336-337.
48. Ibid, at p. 336 n.7.
49. BABIAK, Andrew "Defining "Fundamental Breach" under the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' (1992) Temple
International Law Journal, p. 113, at p. 118; HONNOLD, supra Note 24, at 183.
50. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 25, 2.1.1.2. (Will);
HONSELL, supra note 8, at Article 25 - 14.
51. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 25, 2.1.1.2. (Will).
52. Article 25.
53. BABIAK, supra note 49, at p. 120; von
CAEMMERER/SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 17, at Article 25 - 9.
54. von CAEMMERER/SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 17, at Article 25 - 9.

55. HONSELL, supra note 8, at Article 25 - 16.

56. Article 25.
57. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 25, 2. (Will).
58. Ibid, at Article 25, 2.1.2. (Will); EORSI, supra note 43, at p. 336-337.
59. HONNOLD, supra note 24, at 184.
60. Ibid, at 296; von CAEMMERER/SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 17, at Article 25
- 20; NICOLAS, supra note 5, at p. 224.
61. Appeal Court in Frankfurt a.M., Germany, 18 January 1994, RIW 1994 p. 240,
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940118g1.html>; Federal Court of Justice,
Germany, BGH-Urteil-VIII ZR 51/95 3 April
96, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960403g1.html>.
62. Pursuant to Article 82.
63. Pursuant to Article 77.
64. Article 25.
65. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 25, 2.2. (Will).
66. Ibid, at Article 25, 2.2.2.1. (Will).
67. Ibid, at Article 25, 2.2.2.1. and 2.2.1. (Will).
68. Article 25.
69. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 25, 2.2.2.2.1. (Will).
70. Ibid, at Article 25, 2.2.2.2.2. (Will).
71. BABIAK, supra note 49, at p. 121.
72. NICOLAS, supra note 5, at p. 219.
73. HONNOLD, supra note 24, at 213.
74. BIANCA/BONELL, supra note 21, at Article 25, 2.2.2.2.5. (Will).

75. BABIAK, supra note 49, at p. 123; ZIEGLER, supra note 43, at p. 43.
76. von CAEMMERER/SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 17, at Article 25 - 15.