Legal Writing 2 Trial Memorandum, Legal Opinion, Short Essay

University of Cebu
Cebu College of Law

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LEGAL WRITING
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Legal Writing
University of Cebu College of Law
LEGAL WRITING
PART TWO:
TRIAL MEMORANDUM, LEGAL

OPINION, AND SHORT ESSAY
QUESTIONS
PREPARATION OF A TRIAL MEMORANDUM AND LEGAL OPINION
BY: PROF. JAIME BILAN MONTEALEGRE
I.
A.
TRIAL MEMORANDUM
Concept
Generally, a trial memorandum outlines the legal arguments supporting or opposing the positions of a party to a case. It
includes the explanation of the parties understanding of the facts of the matter, the law or laws they believe shall determine
the outcome of the trial, and the conclusion they believe the judges should reach. Is purpose is to persuade the court that a
party is entitled to a judgment in its favor. The Trial Memorandum should explain why a particular law applies and how each
fact relates to the law.
A trial memorandum may be likened to or probably equivalent to the oral summary of the cases by the counsels in trials by
jury. In this jury system of hearing and deciding cases, trials are usually followed by oral arguments from both sides.
Counsels orally sum up their cases and try to persuade the jury with the evidence and arguments to accept their clients
point of view. In the Philippines, since there is no trial by jury but rather cases are decided by a single person, the judge,
counsels do not have the chance to orally sum up their cases and try to persuade the judge with the evidence and
arguments to accept their clients point of view. Thus, at the end of the trial, the counsels sum up their cases, not by oral
arguments, but by what is called the trial memorandum.
B.
Parts of a Trial Memorandum
In NO particular order, a Trial Memorandum should contain the following parts:

1.
The heading or Case Caption
(in our courts or quasi-judicial agencies, there is already a structure for the heading or the caption)

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2.
The Statement of the Nature of the Action of Case and the proceedings that the court had done in the
case.
2.1 The statement of the nature of the action of case is simply a statement of what the case is
all about. It is the statement of the legal disu]pute between the parties to a case.
-In Civil cases, there is a legal dispute when a party to a case complains that his right protected by law, or which violation
the law punishes, is violation by the other party who denies such violation.
-In Criminal cases, there is a legal dispute when the State claims that the accused violated its right to enforce the laws and
the accused would deny it during the arraignment.
2.2 To some lawyers, they include in this section the question of law or fact that the parties
present for resolution and which the judge should decide or what is referred to as the
issues. To the others, of course, the question of law or fact that the parties present for
resolution and which the judge should decide (issues) is treated as separate part of the trial
memorandum. In any case, the question or issue should include a few of the essential facts
of the case, but should be very brief and concise.
3.
The Brief Answer to the question or issues posed.

This part serves as the thesis of the Memorandum and should briefly analyze the reasons why you
believe the judges rule in your favor. It summarizes the law that should be used to analyze the case.
4.
The Statement of Facts. This part details all of the facts that are material to the case. Here are
some guides in the facts of the case:
a.
The facts should be outlined briefly. Opinions and/or conclusions of the lawyer preparing the trial
memorandum should not be included. Stated otherwise, the lawyer should avoid editorializing in
the statement of facts. Instead, the facts should be presented in a neutral way similar to how a
report might describe an event.
b.
The Statement of Facts is normally prepared by first writing out a rather complete statement
of facts. At the start, the statement of facts should be over-inclusive, rather than under inclusive.
Moreover, the facts should be written chronologically. This will enable the lawyer to see some
relationships that were not imagined and to see clearly how or why the parties acted as they did.
c.
Thereafter, the lawyer preparing the trial memorandum can now cut down on the facts, so as to
eliminate those that are not material or do not provide helpful background. The factual
presentation can also be reorganized so as to make it easier to understand.
5.
The Discussion of the Arguments.

Each legal argument outlines the issue of the law, or fact the judge must decide, the rule that should
be used to determine the issue of law or fact, a decision about how the rule should be applied to the

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facts of the case, and the conclusion summarizing the argument. In other words, the discussion for
each legal argument should contain the Issue, Rule, Application and Conclusion. The issue is the brief
statement of the dispute; the Rule is the section that contains any elements or the statutory
requirements that must be proven; the application is how the facts supported or oppose the
particular rule, which usually starts with the word In the instant case or Here; the conclusion is
the brief sentence summing up what was said.
6.
The Summary of the Trial Memorandum.

This part contains the conclusion that reiterates the major legal arguments, and
case that supports your point of view.

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II.
A.
LEGAL OPINION
Concept/Purpose
The purpose of a legal opinion is to analyze a legal problem and give an objective legal opinion on that problem. Usually, a
legal opinion is not an advocacy paper. Although the purpose is to reach a legal conclusion, the arguments presented must
be objective. In preparing a legal opinion, it must be explained why certain laws apply but the legal opinion must not
attempt to convince the client of the absolute correctness of the conclusion. Instead, it should acknowledge the weakness of
the argument.
B.
Steps in Preparing a Legal Opinion
In actual practice, the following are necessary steps in the preparation of a legal opinion:
1.
Make sure that the records of the case are complete.
2.
Write down the facts
3.
Research the law. The law should include those that are favorable to the clients position and
those that are unfavorable. Stated otherwise, the legal opinion must address the law that is
helpful and harmful to the clients case.
4.
Chart the law against the facts. This means that you have to list each essential fact or event
and identify the main legal element that pertains to the event.
5.
Identify the issues.
6.
Prepare the outline which should provide an explanation of how each element will be applied
to each fact.
7.
C.
Write the legal opinion. This should, of course, include editing of the legal opinion.
Parts of a Legal Opinion
A legal opinion is made up of:

1.
Heading. This simply includes the date and the person for whom the legal opinion is
intended. For purposes of the Bar Examinations, however, this should not be your concern
because the instruction for the essay examinations specifically directs you to omit the case
caption.
2.
The Question or Issues Presented. These encompass both the legal and factual elements
that must be analyzed. Legal and factual components should be incorporated.
3.
Answers.
4.
Statement of Facts. This should tell the story that gave rise to the legal question, but
should include only those facts that are necessary for the legal analysis. Moreover, legal
terms or legal conclusions should not be incorporated in the facts. If these are disputed facts,
they should be clearly identified with modifying terms such as alleged, stated, or
testified. Bias or distortion should be avoided and thus, facts that are both favorable and
unfavorable should be mentioned.

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5.
The Discussion. This must provide objectives yet convincing support for the conclusion.
Every section of the Discussion must contain five elements: Answer, Issue, Rule, Analysis,
and Conclusion.
6.
Conclusion. This should provide a brief summary of the facts and law required in the
Discussion.

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TRIAL MEMORANDUM
SKELETAL FRAMEWORK: TRIAL MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff, by counsel and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this action, the plaintiff seeks to _______________________ (Discuss briefly the nature of the cause/action).
This case concerns the _________________________. (Present the salient and relevant facts in a narrative that
supports your position without adding or distorting facts or making unreasonable inferences)
ISSUES
This memorandum will discuss the following issues:
I.
First, whether or not ___________________. (Spot and formulate the issue based on the conflicting legal claims
of the parties. Issues are the disputed points of law as set out in the problem that are alleged by one party and denied by
the other. Resolving these issues is necessary to decide the case)
xxxx
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

(Use the T-R-A-C formula for every issue: Thesis/Contention-Rule-Application-Conclusion)
I.
The plaintiff is entitled to ________________ because _______________. (This is the contention/thesis. You must
make it known at the very beginning of your discussion)

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Article _______ of the __________, which states that _______________ clearly applies in this case. The case of
___________ likewise applies. As held in that case, ______________. (Determine and state what the applicable rule is.
The applicable rule is the law, jurisprudence, legal principle or doctrine that is necessary to resolve the issue or to answer
the question that the issue raises)
In this instant case, ____________. (Here, interweave the elements of the applicable rule with the key facts. Show
your reasoning and analysis based on the applicable rule and its application to the facts. Show which facts support or
prevent the application of the rule step by step, element by element)
Therefore, __________. (State your conclusion)
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, plaintiff earnestly prays that ___________________. (State and enumerate the reliefs being sought)
Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and remedies that are just and equitable under the premises.
xxxx

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SAMPLE NO. 1
Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION
JUANA DELA CRUZ

Represented by her attorney-in-fact
Atty. Jeffrey A. Archer
Petitioner,
-versusC.A. G.R. SP No.__
For: Ejectment
JANE DOE
Respondent,
X-------------------------------------------------------X
MEMORANDUM
COMES NOW PETITIONER, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfully
submits this Memorandum in the above-entitled case and aver that:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
This is a Petition for Review pursuant to Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court assailing the decision rendered by the
Hon. Judge Lorenzo Menzon of the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 of Pasay City dated June 29,2009 where the dispositive
portion of which reads and quotes:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court Branch 1 of Pasay City is hereby affirmed in toto
So ordered.

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and an order made in August 6, 2009 denying the Motion for Reconsideration made by the petitioner where the dispositive
portion reads of which reads and quotes:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit-defendant-appellants
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied
The plaintiff, now the respondent, files against the defendant, now the petitioner, an action of Unlawful Detainer.
The respondent wherein claims that she is the titled owner of the said parcel of land being leased by the petitioner and
prays that the petitioner be ejected from the said property of the respondent.
The petitioner, in answering the complaint, maintained that she cant be ejected invoking P.D.1517, P.D. 2016, APD
1-12 Pasay City and other related laws which grants statutory rights to bona fide tenants to acquire the said property
through purchase of the said property in question. The petitioner is willing and able to buy the said property.
The Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City has decided the case in favor of the ownership of the property
which was evidently unprocedural considering that in an action of unlawful detainer, only issue of possession de facto can be
raised and ignoring the said Presidential Decrees, Proclamations and Issuances which take part of the law of the land. This
decision a quo made by the Metropolitan Trial Court and affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in toto which ought to be
reversed or modified
THE PARTIES
1.
The Petitioner Juana Dela Cruz (herein referred to as the Petitioner), is of legal age, widow and with residence and
postal address at 123 Binibini St., Pasay City where she can be served with legal processes and notices issued by this
Honorable Court;
2.
The Respondent Jane Doe (herein referred to as the Respondent), is of legal age, single and with postal address at
1010 Ginoo Blvd., Pasay City;
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
The petitioner entered into an oral contract of lease with the original owners of the said parcel of land, the late
spouses Marcela and Marcelo Del Pilar (herein referred to as the SPS. Del Pilar and/or spouses), the size of which is a 65
square meters and located at 123 Binibini St., Pasay City;
2.
In line with the lease agreement, the petitioner constructed their house and continued to reside therein up to the
present;

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3.
From the day they started to lease the said land, the petitioner never defaulted in the payment of the agreed
monthly rentals;
4.
On February 18, 1995, unknown from the petitioner the respondent has bought to the said property from the
spouses and the respondent has titled it on her own name;

5.
Thereafter, the respondent has taken her own steps to eject the petitioners from the said property until finally, she
filed an action of unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City;
STATEMENT OF THE CASES
1.
On February 12, 2008, the respondent filed a Complaint for Ejectment against the Appellee at the Metropolitan Trial
Court Branch 1 of Pasay City;

2.
On December 22, 2008, the petitioner filed a Position Paper;
3.
On February 2, 2009, the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City decided in favor of the respondent;
4.
On February 20, 2009 , the petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court
Branch 10 of Pasay City

5.
On June 29, 2009, the Hon. Judge Lorenzo Menzon of the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 of Pasay City affirmed in
toto the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court;

6.
On July 5, 2009, a Motion for Reconsideration is filed by the petitioner thru his counsel praying that the decision
rendered on June 29,2009 be set aside and another rendered for the Appellee;
7.
On August 6, 2009, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City has denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
petitioner; thus, prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review;

8.
On September 4, 2009, the petitioner file a Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals;
9.
On May 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals order both parties to submit their memoranda within 15 days
Hence, the filing of this memorandum

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ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HAD RAISED
IN DEFENSE THE LESSEES RIGHT UNDER P.D.1517, P.D.2016 AND APD 1-12 PASAY CITY
WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THE BONAFIDE LESSEES RIGHT TO AVAIL
OF THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P.D. 1517
WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE COVERAGE OF AREAS FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT (APD),
REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THE LIST OF STREETS SUBJECT TO ZONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NOT TO THE
AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION
ITSELF.
WHETHER OR NOT SUCH ACT OF THE PETITIONER OF INSTITUTING A COMPLAINT TO THE HOUSE AND
LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
ARGUMENTS
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HAD RAISED
IN DEFENSE THE LESSEES RIGHT UNDER P.D.1517, P.D.2016 AND APD 1-12 PASAY CITY
Under the Rule 70 of Rules of Court, an action for Unlawful Detention resolves only the issue of possession de facto
even if the evidence of ownership may be referred to or considered only to determine its possession. This is, if the
defendant, now the petitioner, is unlawfully withholding possession of the said property or the refusal of the petitioner is
unlawful as held by the Supreme Court in Huibonhoa v. Court of Appeals, GR. 95897, Dec. 14, 1997. In our present case,
the possession of the petitioner is lawful and even her refusal to vacate the said property is also lawful.
Since the petitioner has been lawfully leasing the said property to the original owners, the Sps. Del Pilar, it clearly
presents us a situation wherein the petitioner is lawfully in possession of the said property and justifies her refusal to vacate
the same property. Furthermore, although the contract between the original owners and the petitioners, the respondent
were not able to overthrow the counterclaim of the petitioner which was overlooked by the Honorable Metropolitan Trial
Court when she resolved the case in favor of the respondents. In her disquisition, the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court
said and quotes:
After the thorough evaluation of the evidence on record,
the court believes that the defendants can be lawfully ejected
from the subject premises.
Clearly, the plaintiff is the registered owner of the property

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on question as evidenced by the Transfer Certificate of the

Title Number 12345. Such being the case and as an exercise
of ownership the plaintiff can lawfully take possession of the
property (pars. 1 & 2 pp.2 Decision 2-3-09)
the pronouncement made by the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court humbly submits that it is not in conformity with the
rules governing ejectment cases which concerns itself solely with the issue of possession . In fact, ownership was never
raised as an issue in this case.
In refusing to vacate the property, petitioner invokes her statutory rights found under the Section 6 of P.D. 1517
which provides the property in question to be purchased by a qualified lessee. The petitioners lease period and in fact that
her oral contract with the original owners of the land makes her the legal tenant thereof. Also, under P.D. 2016, prevents
her eviction when the entire Barangay San Roque where Binibini Street is located an area of priority development.
Furthermore, the issuance of the decree is used to prevent urban landowners from ejecting the tenants in violation of P.D.
1517 and other related laws which are intended to develop such slum areas in the Metro Manila
Since such decree and issuances became part of the land, the petitioners claim and evidence relating to such
decrees and issuances should have been appropriate and laudible for the trial judge to consider it and not hastily decide the
case because the respondent is the titled owner of the said property.
WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THE BONAFIDE LESSEES RIGHT TO AVAIL
OF THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P.D. 1517
When the Honorable Judge Lorenzo Menzon, affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, he invoked the
doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Five Star Marketing, Co., Inc. v. Booc (535 SCRA 28) which reads
and quotes:
The avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, which have been made summary in
nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious
means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of the
property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long
time, otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession
might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a
measureof self-protection to take the law into his hands and
seize the same by force and violence. (par. 2 pp 2.
Decision 6-29-09)
In the present case, the evil sought to be prevented in the said Five Star case is not present. First of all, the
petitioner is no illegally in possession of the said property as indicated in the previous agreement made by the petitioner for
she was the lessee of the original owners of the said land, the Sps. Del Pilar. Furthermore, her resistance to vacate the
premises is that she availed her right granted under PD1517 on which the avowed policies are laid down under its preamble
to wit:

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WHEREAS, it is declared objective of the New Society to effect social, economic and political reforms
attuned to the establishment of a secure national community and to an improved quality of life for all
citizens and for all others who may sojourn our shores;
WHEREAS, the quality of human life in our times is inescapably determined by the relationship among
population, resources, the environment, and intelligent policies;
WHEREAS, human settlement is an integrative concept embracing the interdependence of man's
environment, human shelters and structures, and the design and organization of human communities
consistent with a national framework plan, all for the people's security and well-being.
WHEREAS, land is the ultimate platform of all man's activities, and the crucial factor in determining the
shape of human settlements;
WHEREAS, the basic law of the land explicitly provides for the regulation of the acquisition, ownership,
use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and for the equitable diffusion of property ownership
and profits which includes land and land resources;
WHEREAS, the traditional concept of landownership has aggravated the problem arising from urbanization
such as the proliferation of blighted areas and the worsening of the plight of the urban poor and has
spawned valid and legitimate grievances in urban centers giving rise to social tension and violent conflicts;
WHEREAS, a social reform objective of the New Society is to renew blighted areas, improve the conditions
of the urban poor and resolve and redress legitimate grievances arising therefrom, while at the same
providing incentives to progressive landowners and developers who wish to develop their lands in
accordance with government plans and programs responsive to community welfare;
The then late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation 1967 as amended by Proclamation No. 2284 to
ensure a meaningful realization of the said policies therein in PD 1517. Furthermore, PD 2016 was also issued to prevent
the Circumvention of the Urban Reform Law by the heartless landowners.
From the avowed principles of the said laws, courts should not render these laws nugatory but instead to decide to
effectively implement these laws for the benefit of the slum dwellers.
In PD 2016, the equitable diffusion of property ownership of land and land resources is the primary reason why in
such Presidential Decree prohibits the ejectment of the qualified tenants residing in areas for priority development.
Furthermore, such reason is one of the paramount objectives of the Urban Reform Law which in turn, cannot be rendered
nugatory by the avowed objective of the action for Unlawful Detainer which had been made summary in character
REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THE LIST OF STREETS SUBJECT TO ZONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NOT TO THE
AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION
ITSELF.
The property in question where the petitioner built her house more than 60 years ago is located at Binibini Street
Barangay San Roque, Pasay City. APD 1-12 covers a large portion of Pasay City bounded on the North by the Manila-Pasay
boundary; on the East, by Tripa de Gallena somewhere near M. dela Cruz; on the South by EDSA and on the West by
Zamora-Burgos Streets.

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The following Barangays are included in the APD 1-12 are the following: San Isidiro, San Roque and Sta. Clara.
Some streets are also listed within the whole area proclaimed as subject to zonal development. Binibini Street wherein the
property is located is located at Barangay San Roque. Although the said street is not included in the list as an area for
priority development but considering that the entire Barangay San Roque is covered by the proclamation as blighted area
and subject to priority zonal development Binibini Street is necessarily included. It would be absurd that not to include a
street and the whole Barangay is put as a part of the areas for priority development.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing, the petitioner respectfully prays that the Honorable Court of
Appeals reverse or modify the decision of the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City dated June 29, 2009
and the order of the Honorable Regional Trial Court Branch 10 of Pasay City dated August 6, 2009.Furthermore, a new order
be rendered declaring the areas in Binibini Street be subject to APD 1-12 Pasay City as areas of priority development and
petitioner be entitled to the benefits and privileges provided under Sec 6 of P.D. 1517
It is further prayed that the alleged sale of the said parcel of land of the Spouses Marcela and Marcelo Del Pilar to
the respondent, Jane Doe, on February 18, 1991 be declared null and void due to the violation of the Urban Reform Law
Finally, other reliefs that are just and equitable under the present circumstances are likewise prayed for.
Respectfully submitted
Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of May 2010
DE GUZMAN TUGELIDA DE CASTRO AND ASSOCIATES
Counsel for Petitioner
Address: Unit 1200, Tall Building Condominium, Espana, Manila
By:
Atty. Jeffrey A. Archer
IBP Lifetime No. 12345; 5/10/2005
PTR No. 777654; 1/10/2011
Roll of Attorney No. 2005-006341
MCLE Compliance No. III 000897

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SAMPLE NO. 2
MEMORANDUM
(On the Issue of Jurisdiction)
Private Respondent, through counsel, respectfully states:
1.
During the hearing last November 24, 2010, this Honorable Court noted that there is a threshold issue to be
resolved in this proceeding, i.e., if it has jurisdiction in light of the question of whether or not petitioner X is doing business
in the Philippines without the requisite license.
2.
Petitioner itself alleges in its Petition that it is a foreign corporation, thus:
13.
Petitioner X is an organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the British Virgin Islands, with business
address at 1301 Bank of America Tower, 12 Harcourt Road, Central, Hong Kong. x x x
3.
During the hearing last November 24, 2010, petitioner, through its counsel, reiterated its assertion in its Reply
dated ___, 2010 that it is not doing business in the Philippines. Evidently, therefore, the petitioner has no license to do
business in the Philippines. (To further support such fact, attached to the original copy of this Memorandum is the original
Certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission that petitioner X has no registration of any kind with its
office [Annex 1].)
4.
The law in this regard is clear a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the requisite license
from the Securities and Exchange Commission, cannot sue. (cite statutory provisions here)
5.
Thus, the only question now is, whether the petitioner X is doing business in the Philippines?
6.
The fact that X is doing business in the Philippines is shown in the Petition itself and in its corresponding annexed
document. Thus, the Petition alleges:

21.
The
NN
Axa
has
then
an
(sic)
existing
Bareboat
Charter
Agreements
[COPY
REST
OF
SENTENCE/PARAGRAPH].
7.
In support of such allegation, petitioner has attached its Bareboat Charter with Y Corp. as Annex G to the Petition
filed with this Honorable Court. For easy reference, attached as Annex 2 hereof is a copy of such Bareboat Charter. Such
Charter consists of eleven (1) pages.
8.
The Bareboat Charter has the following features:

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(a)
on the first page, in box no. 2, the place of execution is Manila, Philippines;
(b)
on the last page, i.e., the eleventh page, the notarization of the Charter and its acknowledgment by the
contracting parties were accomplished in Pasig City;

(c)
on the first page, in box no. 4, the bareboat charterer, i.e., Y Corp., is shown to be based Unit 3204B, East
Tower, PSE Bldg., Exchange Road, Ortigas, Pasig City;

(d)
on the first page, in box no. 13, the port of delivery is at a safe port in the Philippines;
(e)
on the first page, in box no. 20, the trading limits is within Philippine ports only;
(f)
on the first page, in box no. 16, the port of redelivery is Bataan, Philippines;
(g)
on the first page, in box no. 21. the charter period is from August 2, 2010 to February 1, 2013;
(h)
on the first page, in box no. 22, the charter hire is US$3,800 per calendar day;
(i)
on the second page, in box no. 35, dispute resolution is pursuant to Philippine law and the place of
arbitration will be in Manila;

(j)
on the second page, in box no. 44, the flag and country of the Bareboat Charter Registry is the
Philippines.
9.
Evidently, therefore, petitioner X came to the Philippines, through its representative, and executed the Bareboat
Charter with Y, a corporation based in the Philippines, over X's alleged vessel, the NN Axa, which is under Philippine
registry for purposes of the charter. The said vessel was delivered by X to Y in the Philippines and said vessel is restricted
to navigate only within the Philippines. When the Bareboat Charter is terminated, Y will then redeliver the vessel to X in
Bataan, Philippines. The fee for the Charter is US$3,800 per day and the Charter period is two and a half (2 ) years [or at
least nine hundred (900) days]. Any dispute will be resolved pursuant to Philippine law through arbitration in Manila.
10.
With its vessel being chartered or in civil law terms, leased to Y upon the foregoing terms and conditions, is X
doing business in the Philippines?

Without doubt, X is doing business in the Philippines.
11.
In any event, just to forestall any uncertainty on this issue, cited hereunder are pertinent rulings in decided cases:
A.
[CITE EXCERPTS OF JURISPRUDENCE]
B.

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C.
D.
12.
To reiterate, it is submitted that the only finding that can be made is that X is doing business in the Philippines.
Since it is a foreign corporation and has no SEC license to do business, petitioner X cannot sue, and in particular, cannot file
this Petition. Consequently, this petition must, as it should, be dismissed.
Prayer
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court consider the foregoing Memorandum in its resolution
of the above-discussed threshold issue in this case and thereby DISMISS the petition. Other pertinent reliefs are likewise
prayed for.
November 7, 2010. Cebu City, Philippines.
XXX

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SAMPLE NO. 3

SUPREME COURT
Manila City
JUANA DELA CRUZ,

Defendant-Petitioner,
-versus-
CIVIL CASE NO. L-12345

For: Ejectment
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------x
MEMORANDUM
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Supreme Court
most respectfully submits and presents this Memorandum in the above-titled case and avers that:
THE PARTIES
1.
Plaintiff-Respondent Jane Doe is of legal age, single, and residing on 1010 Ginoo Boulevard, Pasay City, where she
may be served with legal processes and notices issued by this Honorable Court;
2.
Defendant-Petitioner Juana Dela Cruz is of legal age and residing on 123 Binibini Street, Quezon City, and may be
served with legal processes and other judicial notices thereto.
I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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1.
On February 11, 2008, herein Plaintiff-Respondent filed a Complaint for Ejectment dated February 7, 2008 against
Defendant-Petitioner;
2.
On December 22, 2008, an Answer dated December 15, 2008 was filed by the Defendant-Petitioner;
3.
On February 3, 2009, a Decision was rendered by Branch 1 of Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City in favor of the
Plaintiff-Respondent;
4.
On August 6, 2009, a Motion for Reconsideration filed July 5, 2009 by Defendant-Petitioner through legal counsel
was denied by Judge Lorenzo Menzon of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court Pasay City;
5.
On September 14, 2009, a Petition for Review dated September 9, 2009 was filed to the Court of Appeals by
6.
On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff-Respondent through legal counsel filed a Comment dated April 19, 2010;
7.
On May 13, 2010, as per Verification and Report from the Judicial Records Division (JRD) no Reply was filed by the
8.
On May 21, 2010, a Resolution was rendered by the Court of Appeals denying Defendant-Petitioners Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO);

9.
Accordingly, the Honorable Court of Appeals ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda fifteen (15)
days from notice, otherwise regardless whether or not Memoranda were filed, the petition shall be submitted for decision;
Hence, the filing of the instant Memorandum.
I.
1.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks that a parcel of land located at 123 Binibini Street, Pasay be returned to her possession,
but due to Defendant-Petitioners occupancy thereat, the former cannot claim possession which left her with the option of
residing at 1010 Ginoo Boulevard, Pasay City. It is noteworthy to stress that Plaintiff-Respondent is the registered owner of
the land subject under TCT No. 12345 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. The property was sold to them by the now
deceased original owners, Spouses Marcelo and Marcela del Pilar;
2.
Defendant-Petitioner, on the other hand, is an alleged lessee of the original owners of the land since September
1955. They had repeatedly assailed the verbal contract of lease for more than 50 years;
3.
Plaintiff-Respondent was not able to claim immediately the land for it was previously subject to a pending legal
proceeding and that there was still no urgent necessity of using and occupying it. When the event came that PlaintiffRespondent was able to enforce her right over the land, Defendant-Petitioner, despite earnest and peaceful efforts of the

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Plaintiff-Respondent still refused to vacate the land. This led her to seek help from the Barangay officials for mediation
and/or conciliation in accordance with law. However, the Defendant-Petitioner still persistently occupied the land without
heed to the serious and constant demand of the Plaintiff-Respondent which rendered it unattainable to reach an agreement;
4.
Due to the foregoing failure to claim the parcel of land attributed to the obstinate refusal of the Defendant-
Petitioner, Plaintiff-Respondent was compelled to hire the services of a legal counsel to commence the enforcement of
ejection under the wings of the courts of law.
I.
A.)
ISSUES OF THE CASE
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS UNLAWFUL
DETAINER ACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HAD RAISED IN
DEFENSE THE LESSEES RIGHTS UNDER P.D. 1517, P.D. 2016, APD 1-12 PASAY CITY;
B.)
WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THE BONA FIDE LESSEES RIGHT TO AVAIL
THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P.D. 1517;

C.)
REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THE LIST OF THE STREETS SUBJECT TO THE ZONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NOT TO
THE AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION
ITSELF.
I.
A.)
ARGUMENTS
The court committed no error in deciding that an unlawful detainer action be enforced upon herein
Defendant-Petitioner despite the assailed contention of the former under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016.
B.)
There is no bar in this instant case for an unlawful detainer to avail the benefits and privileges provided
by Section 6 P.D. 1517 provided it is applicable.

C.)
The determination of the scope and limitation of Areas for Priority Development shall be based on the
list of specific areas prescribed by the proclamation.
II.
A.)
DISCUSSION
It is necessary to emphasize that the Plaintiff-Respondent is the bona fide owner of the parcel of land located at
123 Binibini Street, Pasay City under TCT No, 12345 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. In the Philippines, the

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presentation of a valid certificate of title of the real property is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the person whose
name the certificate of title is entitled to.
Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, it provides that the original certificates in the
registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of the register of deeds of the province
or city where the land is situated, and the seal of the court, and also the owners duplicate certificate, shall be received as
evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except so far
as otherwise provided in this Act.
Recognized jurisprudence also uphold the significance of a certificate of title in proving valid ownership of a land. In
the decision of the case of Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel, the ponente cited two cases which highlight the significance
of a valid certificate of title in claiming ownership over a land. It was held that in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado,
the Court declared that the trial court did not err in giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis
vis the contested unregistered Deed of Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered owner is
preferred to possess the property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a
Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
The ruling of Dizon v. Court of Appeals was also used as basis for this argument. It was stated that a certificate of
title is conclusive evidence of ownership and the questionability of the title is immaterial in an ejectment suit. Futhermore,
Article 428 of the New Civil Code enumerates the rights of an owner. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations other than those established by law. The owner has right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
It is indubitable that the certificate of title of 123 Binibini Street, Pasay City under TCT No. 12345 which is
registered in the Register of Deeds of Pasay City entitles Petitioner-Respondent the right to exercise the aforementioned
rights, specifically, in this instant case, the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover
the land.
The contention of the Defendant-Petitioner that the verbal lease agreement they had made with the now deceased
original owners Marcelo and Marcela Del Pilar for over 50 years shall entitle them to the privileges under P.D. 1517 and P.D.
2016 (Annex A and B, respectively) is untenable. It is expressly stated that Section 6 of P.D. 1517 grants lessees the
right of first refusal before they may be ejected from a land, but this is only feasible under certain conditions. It is an
indispensable qualification that the land is included in the list of Areas for Priority Development (APD) before an owner can
be granted of the right of first refusal. The land subject of this case is clearly not included in the specific areas enumerated
in the list of APD. To reiterate the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. No. CV 12345: Insofar as the property in litigation,
appellant Jane Doe is, consequently, correct in objecting to appellees exercise of the right of first refusal granted under
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517. The fact that it is not included in the areas for priority development specifically
identified under Proclamation No. 1967 indicates that appellee have no cause of action for annulment of sale, reconveyance,
and preliminary injunction against appellants.
B.)
The Plaintiff-Respondents argument in this issue is intimately connected with the preceding argument. Defendant-
Petitioner vigorously assails that there is no bar to the availability of the privileges and benefits conferred to bona fide lessee
whenever there is an unlawful detainer action. It is however true. But this is subject to circumstances that may qualify a

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lessee to the privileges and benefits under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1516 such as the right of first refusal. Unfortunately, the
land possessed by the Defendant-Petitioner does not fall under the ambit of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517. Therefore, the
Defendant-Petitioner has no cause of action in this issue.
C.)
The third issue questions the coverage of the APD prescribed by the proclamation, whether or not it refers to the
list of streets subject to the Zonal Development or to the areas included in the delineation of the metes and bounds
indicated.
Reiteration is therefore necessary to lay emphasis on the decision of the Court of Appeals that in the List of Areas
for Priority Development (APDs), labeled as the South Sector of Pasay City, the area for priority development was defined
as Tramo Lines along Barangays San Isidro, San Roque, and Santa Clara. It was thereafter specifically enumerated the list
of covered sub-areas (please refer to Annex C for diagram) which are the following: 1) F. Victor, 2) Ventanilla Street, c)
Juan Luna Street, d) D. Jorge Street, e) Viscarra Street, f) Conchita Street, g) Dolores Street, h) Leonardo Street, i) Alvarez
Street, j) Basilio Street, k) Rodriguez Street, and i) Villa Barbara. There is consequently no gainsaying the fact that with its
Binibini Street location, the property in litigation is not included among the sites identified as Areas for Priority Development
in Pasay City.The mere fact that the list does not include Binibini Street necessarily implies that it is deemed excluded from
it.
Citing Solanada Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, it made a profound analysis of Section 6 of P.D. 1517 (as found in
Annex A of this Memorandum) based on statutory construction:
We agree. A close reading of Proclamation No. 1967 reveals that, before a preemptive right can be exercised, the
disputed land should be situated in an area declared to be both an APD and a ULRZ.
An urban tenant's right of first refusal is set forth in Section 6, PD 1517, as follows:
Sec. 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban Zones[,] legitimate tenants who have
resided on the land for ten years or more [,] who have built their homes on the land[,] and residents who
have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed
of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time
and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation
and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree.
Proclamation No. 1967 further delimited the areas or zones wherein this preemptive right could be availed of viz.:
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued on 11 September 1979, pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No.
1517, declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban Land Reform Zone.
WHEREAS, It is now necessary and appropriate to identify specific sites covered by urban land reform in
Metropolitan Manila for purposes of making specific the applicability of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and
of LOI No. 935.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution and existing laws, and in relation to Proclamation No. 1893 declaring the entire
Metropolitan Manila area as an Urban Land Reform Zone, and LOI 935, hereby amend Proclamation No.
1893 by declaring 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land
Reform Zones as described in the attached annex.

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The provisions of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and of LOI No. 935 shall apply only to the
above[-]mentioned Areas of Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. xxx xxx xxx
The aforesaid whereas clauses express a clear intent to limit the operation of PD 1517 to specific areas declared to
be located in both an APD and a ULRZ. The conjunctive and in the last sentence of the quoted provision confirms this
intention. And in statutory construction implies conjunction, joinder or union. As understood from the common and usual
meaning of the conjunction and, the provisions of PD 1517 apply only to areas declared to be located within both an APD
and a ULRZ.
With the foregoing recognized jurisprudence said, the Defendant-Petitioners action would necessarily lead to futility
for no cause of action.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premise considered, it respectfully prayed for that this Honorable Supreme Court that DefendantPetitioners prayer for writ of injunction be DENIED for having no cause of action and the petition DISMISSED for being
clearly unmeritorious.
Other just and equitable relief under the foregoing are likewise being prayed for.
Respectfully submitted.
Makati City for Manila City, Philippines. April 8, 2011.
AZURIN BUHAIN BONTUYAN AND ARICAYOS LAW OFFICES
Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent
10th Floor, New Building,
Makati Avenue, Makati City
By:
ATTY. PAOLO COELHO
IBP Lifetime No. 67891; 5/10/2005
PTR No. 44568; 1/10/2011
Roll of Attorney No. 2005-001023
MCLE Compliance No. III 000899
Copy Furnished:
ATTY. JEFFREY A. ARCHER
Counsel for Petitioner
Unit 1200, Tall Building Condominium,

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Espana, Manila

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SAMPLE NO. 4
PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff, through counsel, most respectfully alleges:
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
In order that this honorable court may be enlightened and guided in the judicious disposition of the above-entitled
case, cited hereunder the material, relevant and pertinent facts of the case, to wit:
1.
Plaintiff is Luz Diaz, sixty five (65) years old, widow and a resident of Mountain View Subdivision, Antipolo, Rizal
while defendant is Emma Crisostomo, forty two (42) years old, housewife married and also a resident of Mountain View
Subdivision, Antipolo, Rizal;
2.
Plaintiff and defendant have been neighbors for at least three (3) years. Plaintiff alleges that in the afternoon of
October 25, 2010, a truck owned by the defendant's carpenter, Gregorio Timbol, was parked in front of the defendant's on a
street that was sloping. Mr. Timbol has been working on the renovation of defendant's house. He has been a carpenter for at
least thirty five (35) years;
3.
Just before the incident, plaintiff was taking a nap in her house when she noticed that her dog, Trix was missing.
She then looked around the house until she heard a crashing bang and a dog crying out;
4.
When the plaintiff went outside her gate, she saw Trix pinned under the wheel of the truck. The truck was backed
up against a tree by the sidewalk and Trix was thrashing and squealing underneath the truck with blood coming out his
mouth;
5.
Plaintiff cried and screamed to Nilda, her helper, and shouted for the guards who roamed the subdivision, but no
one came. She could not save him even if she wanted to because there was no one in the truck's driver seat and she does
not know how to drive. She could only cry and scream while Trix kept on howling until it stopped moving and making any
sound. He died soon after;
6.
According to the plaintiff, Trix had been with her since her husband passed away eight years ago.
7.
Plaintiff observed that the truck had always been parked in front of the defendants house since the time
defendant's house was being renovated;

8.
When the incident happened, defendant did not do anything except to call Mr. Timbol. Defendant insisted that the
truck was properly parked and what happened to Trix was an accident and Mr. Timbol could not be faulted. On the other
hand, Mr. Timbol admitted that his truck was of an old model. He bought it second hand and had it overhauled and
repainted. He also admitted that, when he parked it on the day the incident happened, he put two (2) large rocks against
the back wheels to make sure the truck does not roll back down the street;

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9.
Mr. Timbol finally admitted that when he looked at the scene after the incident happened, the rocks were no longer
there. He concluded that someone must have removed them;

10.
Plaintiff demanded that the defendant should give her another dog, but the latter refused and insisted that what
happened to Trix was plaintiff's fault because Trix should have not been loose on the streets.
11.
Defendant testified that Trix was a pesky dog and had complained about it many times. In fact, it was because of
Trix that the defendant met plaintiff for the first time three (3) years ago. Defendant went to plaintiff's house to complain
that Trix pulled out the plants in the yard;
12.
Defendant also mentioned that Trix would dig holes in her lawn. It would frequently deposit its wastes on her
driveway and also pee in front of her house, leaving a foul smell. One time, Trix even chased her little girl along the road;
13.
Defendant went to the extent of complaining the activities of Trix before the Homeowner's Association, so that the
latter issued a Board Resolution stating that wandering dogs will be caught and brought to the municipal dog pound.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.
Whether or not the plaintiff committed a nuisance when she allowed her dog to roam the streets of the subdivision.
2.
Whether or not the defendant validly abated the nuisance when she lodged a complaint before the Homeowner's
Association
3.
Whether or not the carpenter was negligent when he parked his car in front of the house of the defendant
4.
Whether or not the defendant may be held liable when the truck of her carpenter ran over the plaintiff's dog
ARGUMENTS
1.
Plaintiff committed a nuisance when she allowed her dog to roam the streets of the subdivision because the dog
endangered the safety of a resident of the subdivision. The dog also caused annoyance and offended the senses of a
resident inside the subdivision.
Our laws on property states that: "A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health and safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with free passage of any public highway
or street or any body of water; (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property." (Article 694, New Civil Code of the Philippines).
Here the plaintiff allowed her dog to roam the streets of the subdivision because it was ran over by a truck while on the
street. Plaintiff's dog was not kept inside any cage or in a leash because it could sleep in plaintiff's room, lie on the floor or
be found on defendant's yard. Plaintiff's dog was therefore free to move around freely. When plaintiff's dog was roaming the
streets of the subdivision, it endangered the defendant's girl because it chased her on the street. Plaintiff's dog also caused
annoyance and offended the senses of defendant because it dug holes on defendant's lawn, pulled out the plants in her yard
and deposited wastes on her driveway or peed in front of her house that left a very foul smell.
Therefore plaintiff committed a nuisance when she allowed her dog to roam on the streets and yard of her neighbor because
it endangered the defendant's girl . It also caused annoyance and offended the senses of the defendant.

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Our laws on Property further states that "[n]uisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects the
community or neighborhood or any considerable amount of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or
damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition."(Article
695, New Civil Code) Here, the nuisance maybe regarded as a private nuisance because it only affects an identifiable
number of persons. Specifically, the defendant, her family and her surroundings.
2. Defendant failed to abate the nuisance because he did not obtain the approval of the City Health Officer to authorize him
to abate the nuisance.
{Write your discussion here pointing out relevant laws and jurisprudence tying it up with the case at hand.}
3. The carpenter was negligent when he parked his car in front of the house of the defendant because he failed to use that
care and diligence expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances.
4. The defendant may be held liable when the truck ran over the plaintiff's dog because he was the employer of the
carpenter that committed negligent acts and which resulted to damages against the plaintiff.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant to pay the value for the plaintiff's dog.
Plaintiff likewise prays for costs and for such other and further relief as this honorable court may deem just and
equitable in the premises.
Manila, Philippines, November 27, 2011.

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SAMPLE NO. 5
Regional Trial Court
_____ Judicial Region
Branch ____, _______
LUZ DIAZ,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. ___________
- versus For: Damages
EMMA CRISOSTOMO,
Defendant.
X -------------------------------/
MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENDANT
Defendant, through the undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully submits this Memorandum,
as follows:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff filed the instant case for damages arising from quasi-delict against defendant pursuant to Article 2176 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
After the presentation of evidence, this Honorable Court required the parties to
submit their respective Memorandum. Hence, this Memorandum for the defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is a 65-year old widow who has been a resident of Mountain View Subdivision, Antipolo, Rizal for thirty (30)
years. She had a dog named Trix. On the other hand, defendant is a 42-year old housewife, and a neighbor of plaintiff in
Mountain View Subdivision for the last three (3) years.
In the afternoon of October 25, 2010, while plaintiff was taking her siesta in her living room, she noticed that her
dog Trix was no longer by her feet. Thus, she got up to look for the dog in the kitchen and also in the garden but it was not
there. Suddenly, she heard a loud crashing bang and also the cries of the dog from outside her house. So she ran towards
the gate and when she opened it, she saw the dog thrashing and squealing under the wheel of a truck, with blood coming
out of its mouth. The truck was owned by Gregorio Timbol, one of the carpenters who were working on the renovation of

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defendants house at that time. Plaintiff cried and shouted for the guards who roamed the subdivision but no one came.
She could not save the dog even if she wanted to because there was no one in the trucks driver seat, and she did not know
how to drive. The dog kept on howling until it stopped moving and making any sound, and it died soon after.
Since plaintiff knew that the truck belonged to one of defendants carpenters, she complained to defendant after
the incident. Plaintiff demanded that defendant should get her another dog because Trix was plaintiffs only companion in
her house. However, defendant refused all of the plaintiffs demands, and insisted that the whole incident was the fault of
plaintiff. Defendant contended that the owner of the truck should not be blamed because the dog was not supposed to be
out on the streets in the first place.
Hence, plaintiff filed the instant action for damages against the defendant as a result of the death of the formers
dog.
ISSUES
The issues to be resolved in the instant case are as follows:
1.
Whether or not Timbol, the owner of the truck, was negligent in parking his truck in front of defendants
house;
2.
Whether or not plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the death of her dog; and
3.
Whether or not defendant should be liable for the death of plaintiffs dog.
DISCUSSION
First Issue: Whether or not the owner of the truck was negligent in parking his truck in front of defendants
house
It is defendants position that the owner of the truck was not negligent in parking his truck in front of defendants
house.
Plaintiff argued that Timbol did not properly park the truck, and that is the reason why it suddenly moved
backwards, ran over the dog, and killed it. On the other hand, Timbol alleged that he followed subdivision rules when he
parked his truck in front of defendants house, and he even put two large rocks against the back wheels of his truck to make
sure that the truck would not roll back down the street.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury. All that the law
requires is for a person to use that care and diligence expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances.
(Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 147, 154)

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By following the subdivision rules and by putting two large rocks against the back wheels of his truck when he
parked it in the sloping part of the street, Timbol clearly observed that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand.
Therefore, there was no negligence on his part when he parked his truck in front of
defendants house. Plaintiffs argument that Timbol was negligent in parking his truck because it led to the death of her dog
is untenable and very speculative. She failed to adduce evidence showing that Timbol did not follow the subdivision rules,
nor did she present evidence to rebut Timbols contention that he observed the proper degree of care and precaution under
the given circumstances. In other words, plaintiff failed to prove that Timbol was negligent in parking his truck in front of
defendants house.
Second Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the death
of her dog
It is defendants position that plaintiffs own negligence was the proximate cause of the death of her dog.
Plaintiff alleged that her dog was killed when the truck of Timbol suddenly moved backwards and ran over the said
dog. On the other hand, it is defendants position that plaintiff should be faulted that the dog was run over by the truck
because the dog should not have been out there roaming the streets in the first place because of a prior warning from the
homeowners association of the subdivision.
In order to resolve the issue on whether or not plaintiffs negligence was the proximate cause of the death of her
dog, it may be proper to know first the definition or meaning of the term probable cause.
In the case of Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation (G.R. No. 184905, August 28, 2009, 597 SCRA 526, 535-536),
the Supreme Court defined proximate cause in the following manner:
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively,
the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
The homeowners association of the subdivision previously warned plaintiff about her dog, and it even issued a
board resolution banning wandering dogs in the subdivision. With the issuance of the said resolution, plaintiff should have
done something to ensure that her dog would not be able to go out of the gate of her house. She could have put the dog
inside a cage or tie it up to a certain area in her house while she is taking her siesta in her living room. Instead, she just
allowed the dog to stay or sleep by her feet. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that plaintiff failed to properly close the
gate of her house, and this is the reason why the dog was able to escape from her house and roam around the streets.

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Based on the foregoing circumstances, plaintiff clearly failed to observe, for the protection of the interests of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Hence, plaintiff was
negligent in complying with the resolution issued by the homeowners association of the subdivision banning wandering
dogs. Such negligence eventually led to the death of her dog. Plaintiff has only herself to blame for letting her dog roam
the streets freely because if the dog was not out on its own, it would not have been killed. In effect, the proximate cause of
the dogs death was not because it was run over by the truck, but it was because plaintiff failed to observe the proper
degree of care and precaution required under the circumstances. The death of the dog would not have occurred if not for
plaintiffs own negligence considering that the dog was not supposed to be out on the streets in the first place.
Therefore, plaintiffs own negligence was the proximate cause of the death of her dog.
Third Issue: Whether or not defendant should be held liable for the death of plaintiffs dog
It is defendants position that she should not be held liable for the death of plaintiffs dog.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Moreover, Article 2179 of the Civil Code states as follows:
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
As previously discussed, plaintiffs own negligence was the proximate cause of the death of her dog. She failed to
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.
Thus, pursuant to the
aforementioned Article 2179 of the Civil Code, plaintiff cannot recover any damages from the defendant.
Therefore, defendant should not be held liable for the death of plaintiffs dog.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing considerations, it is defendants position that since plaintiffs own negligence is the
proximate cause of the death of her dog, defendant should not be held liable for any damages arising from such death.

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PRAYER
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, defendant respectfully prays as follows:

1.
That all reliefs set forth in the Answer be granted; and
2.
Such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.
________________, Philippines, October 24, 2011.
(Sgd.) Name of Counsel

Counsel for the Defendant
(Address of Counsel)
Roll No. _____________
IBP No. _________; Date/Place Issued
PTR No. _________; Date/Place Issued
MCLE Compliance No. ____________

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SAMPLE NO. 6
Based on the Ponencia of Justice Roberto A. Abad in People of the Philippines vs. Romy Fallones (G.R. No. 190341, March
16, 2011)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PROSECUTION
The Prosecution, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves the admissibility of the deceased rape victims spontaneous utterances during the time she was
being sexually abused and immediately afterwards.
The prosecution charged the accused Romy Fallones with rape in an information dated September 14, 2004 before
a Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The complainant in this case, Alice, was a retardate. She died while trial was ongoing, hence, was unable to testify.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented Allan (Alices father), Amalia (her
sister), PO3 Lilibeth Aguilar (a police
investigator), Eduardo Marcelo and Arturo Reyes (the apprehending officers), Dr. Ortiz (a medico- legal officer), and Eden
Terol (a psychologist).
Amalia testified that at about 9:45 a.m. on June 29, 2004, her mother told her older sister, Alice, to look for their
brother Andoy. Since Andoy arrived without Alice, her mother asked Amalia to look for her. Amalia looked in places where
Andoy often played and this led her near accuseds house. As she approached the house, Amalia heard someone crying out
from within, Tama na, tama na! Recognizing Alices voice, Amalia repeatedly knocked on the door until the accused
opened it. Amalia saw her sister standing behind him. As Amalia went in to take her sister out, Alice held out a sanitary
napkin and, crying, said that the accused had given her the napkin. Alices shorts were wet and blood-stained. Frightened
and troubled, the two girls went home.
On their way home, Alice recounted to her sister that the accused brought her to his bathroom, pulled down her
shorts, and ravished her. She said that the accused wet her shorts to make it appear that she tripped and had her monthly
period. Along the way, they met an uncle and told him what happened. On their arrival, their father brought Alice to the
barangay while Amalia returned to the accuseds house where she saw her uncle, some relatives, and neighbors accosting
and beating the accused. Shortly after, some barangay officials arrived and intervened.

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ISSUES
This memorandum will discuss the following issues:
First, whether or not Amalias testimony was hearsay, and therefore doubtful, and unreliable;
Second, whether or not the deceased rape victims utterances are res gestae and therefore admissible in evidence.
Third, whether or not accuseds claim that the members of Alices family pressured her into pointing to him
as her abuser can be given credence.
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

I.
Although what Alice told Amalia may have been hearsay, the rest of the latters testimony, which established both
concomitant (Alices voice from within the accuseds house, pleading that she was hurting) and subsequent circumstance
(Alice coming from behind the accused as the latter opened the door, her shorts bloodied), are admissible in evidence
having been given from personal knowledge.
Although Alice died before she could testify, the evidence shows that she positively identified the accused
as her abuser before the barangay officials and the police. Amalia, her sister, testified of her own personal knowledge that
she had been out looking for Alice that midmorning; that
she heard the latters voice from within the accuseds house
imploring her attacker to stop what he was doing to her; and that upon repeatedly knocking at the accuseds door, he
opened it, revealing the presence of her sister, her shorts bloodied.
II.
Amalias recital of what she heard Alice utter when she came and rescued her is part of the res
gestae. In
Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006, res gestae was defined as referring to
statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after
its commission. This is based on Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which states:
Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior
or
subsequent
evidence as part of the
res
thereto with
respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
Alices statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion,
without any opportunity for her to fabricate a false statement.

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In Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines , supra, it was held that for spontaneous statements to be
admitted in evidence, the following must concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
Here, the accuseds act of forcing himself into Alice is a startling event. And Amalia happened to be just outside his
house when she heard Alice cry out tama na, tama na! When the accused opened the door upon Amalias incessant
knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o. The admissibility of Alices
spontaneous statements rests on the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no
chance to contrive. In Capila vs. People, G.R. No. 146161, July 17, 2006, it was held that it is difficult to lie in an excited
state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness.
III.
Accuseds claim that the members of Alices family pressured her into pointing to him as her abuser cannot be given
credence. Accused has been unable to establish any possible ill-motive that could prompt Alices family into charging him
falsely. In fact, the accused admitted in his testimony that there had been no animosity between Alices family and him.
In conclusion, the evidence sufficiently establish that the accused Fallones raped Alice. The accused offered no evidence of
his innocence other than his bare denial. In fine, the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution earnestly prays that the accused Romy Fallones be adjudged and
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for raping Alice.
The prosecution prays for such other reliefs and remedies that are just and equitable under the premises.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

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LEGAL OPINION
SKELETAL FRAMEWORK: LEGAL OPINION
_______________
_______________
Re: ___________________
Dear Mr. ________________

In response to your request, I have analyzed whether or not you can file an action for estafa against Mr. Santos.
My opinion is based on the following facts ____________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________. (Narrate the facts)
With regard to the first issue ____________________________________________. (Use the T-R-A-C Method)
As regards the second issue ____________________________________________. (Again use the T-R-A-C
Method)
If you pursue with the action, I believe you have an excellent chance of prevailing. Please call should you have
questions about this opinion.
Very truly yours,

_____________
(Lawyer's name)

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SAMPLE NO. 1
December 10, 2010

Mr. Peter Banag
16 Annapolis St.
Cubao, Quezon City
Dear Mr. Banag:
Here is the opinion you requested. The facts, gathered from you and your documents, are as follows:
Your daughter, Mary Banag, about six years old, went to Arthur Sisons house to buy ice-candy on September 12 at
about 3 PM. Mary knocked on the gate, but having gotten no response from Arthur who was napping then, she tested the
gate by pushing it. Upon doing so, the gate yielded and Arthurs dog jumped out, went after Mary and attacked her from
behind, biting her on the leg and arms as she fell to the ground. She was saved by Fred Puzon, a neighbor, who kicked the
dog away and protected her. Awakened by the commotion and having heard shouts that his dog had attacked a child, Arthur
went out, sent the dog back to his yard and bought Mary to a nearby clinic for treatment, paying the medical bill thereafter.
You asked Arthur to pay Mary P20,000 in damages for the ordeal but all you got was a letter saying that he cannot grant
your demand because he was not at fault. He based his stand on the following:
1.
That there was a sign at the gate warning about the presence of the dog, in effect implying that if Mary heeded
what the sign says, the attack wouldnt have happened
2.
That at the time of the attack she was not accompanied by an adult, impliedly putting the blame on you as her
parent for letting her roam outside unattended and therefore exposing her to danger; and
3.
That he already paid the bill for Marys medication.
The issue here is clear: its whether or not Arthur is liable to Mary for damages. In my opinion, Arthur is liable for
damages notwithstanding his defenses. First and foremost, what happened to Mary is classified as a quasi-delict, as defined
by Article 2176 of the Civil Code:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
As for the nature of Arthurs liability, the provision that governs is Article 2183 of the Civil Code. It provides that:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may
cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come
from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

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The Supreme Court explained said provision in the case of Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 74431, 179
SCRA 47), saying that:
According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on
the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
Now, Arthur may say that what happened was brought about by contributory negligence on Marys part as the
former implied in his letter, or he may claim that letting Mary roam the vicinity unaccompanied is negligence on your part
and constitutes the proximate cause of her injuries, notwithstanding his own negligence in leaving the gate unlocked before
napping. Both scenarios are governed by Article 2179 of the Civil Code that provides:
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In the first scenario, the Supreme Courts ruling in Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
129792, 321 SCRA 375) that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law covers Mary, hence throwing the notion of contributory negligence on her part out the
window. As for the second scenario, the ruling in Umali v. Bacani (G.R. No. L-40570, 69 SCRA 263) provides that parental
negligence in allowing a young child to go out of the house alone may at most qualify as contributory negligence and as
such would be covered by the second sentence of Article 2179.
Arthur, being the owner of the dog that attacked Mary, is liable for damages, with all possible defenses taken into
consideration. If Arthur didnt leave the gate unlocked before taking a nap an act showing a lack of due care there would
have been no way the dog could have attacked Mary. Mary could test the gate all day long and she wouldnt be attacked by
Arthurs dog had the gate been closed. Of course, he may say that paying Marys medical bill should be enough, but that
does not cover the moral damages that Mary is entitled to under Article 2219 (2) of the Civil Code, which specifically
pertains to quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. As mentioned earlier, the only reprieve due him would be a mitigation of
his liability.
One thing: my opinion is based on the laws and the jurisprudence applicable to your situation. If by any
circumstance you take your plight to court, I am confident that the case will be decided in your favor.
Very truly yours,

Emile Justin P. Cebrian

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SAMPLE NO. 2

CITY OF ILIGAN
Office of the City Legal Officer
September 7, 2009
Hon. Lawrence LL. Cruz
City Mayor
Iligan City
OFFICE OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD

Iligan City
Dear Sirs:
Referred to this office for comment is the legality or validity of the City Ordinance No. 1826, otherwise known as AN
ORDINANCE BANNING SMOKING INSIDE PUBLIC UTILITY PASSENGER VEHICLES OPERATING WITHIN THE CITY OF ILIGAN.
This office is of the opinion that the subject ordinance is not contrary to existing laws or the Constitution. It is well-settled
that pursuant to the general welfare clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), local
government units are empowered to enact ordinances in the exercise of police power. Every local government unit has the
sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order,
and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Thus, taking into consideration that smoking
especially in public endangers not only the health of the smoker but also that of the others, the City Government has a valid
reason for banning smoking in public utility jeepneys.
However, for its effectivity, the subject ordinance which contains penal sanctions, is required to be posted at prominent
places in the City of Iligan for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks and shall also be published in a newspaper
of general circulation within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Iligan.
For your honors' guidance.
Atty. Iggy Coroma
City Legal Officer

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Legal Writing
SAMPLE NO. 3
PADILLA LAW OFFICE

7/F Padilla-De Los Reyes Building
232 Juan Luna Street
Binondo, Manila
Attention: ATTY. SABINO PADILLA JR.
Gentlemen:
This refers to your letters dated May 23, 2003 and February 17, 2004 requesting for clarificatory ruling on the following
facts:
6. In the light of the foregoing background, several employees of GCHS since January 1, 1998 (when the 1997 NIRC took
effect) have been compulsorily retired after twenty (20) years of service, pursuant to Section 1, Article X of the GCHS
Retirement Plan quoted above. These retirees, however, have not reached aged fifty (50). The question sqarely raised is
whether their retirement benefits are subject to withholding.
It is our opinion that since R.A. 7641 provides that any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement
age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract, and the GCHS
Retirement Plan is part of the terms and conditions of employment of GCHS employees and therefore an
applicable employment contract, and a GCHS employee may be compulsorily retired after completing 20 years of
service, even if he is not yet fifty (50) years old at the time of retirement. Similarly, a GCHS employee may be
compulsorily retired upon reaching sixty (60) years, even if he has not served for at least ten (10) years.
And since both have met the two requirements of R.A. No. 7641 which give them a right to the retirement benefit,
namely: (a) that he is retired according to the CBA or other applicable employment contract; and (b) that he has
served at least five (5) years in the said establishment their retirement benefits are not subject to income tax
pursuant to Section 32(B)(6)(a) of the Tax Code. And this exemption applies, even if R.A. No. 4917, under which
the GCHS Retirement Plan was established, requires at least ten years of service and age fifty for the tax
exemption of retirement benefits.
We request a confirmation of the following opinion, because of the growing confusion among banks as to whether
it is the conditions of R.A. No. 7641 or R.A. 4917 that would apply to the two cases explained above.
In reply thereto, please be informed that Section 32 (B)(6)(a) of the Tax Code of 1997 provided as follows:
(6) Retirement Benefits, Pensions, Gratuities, etc.
(a) Retirement benefits received under R.A. No. 7641 and those received by officials and employees of private
firms, whether individual or corporate, in accordance with a reasonable private benefit plan maintained by the
employer: Provided, that the retiring official or employee has been in the service of the same employer for at least
ten (10) years and is not less than fifty (50) years of age at the time of his retirement: Provided, further, that the
benefits granted under this subparagraph shall be availed of by an official or employee only once. xxx.

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It will be observed that under the afore-quoted provisions, retirement benefits may be received either under R.A. No. 7641
and in accordance with a reasonable private benefits plan maintained by the employer under then R.A. No. 4917 (now
Section 32(B)(6)(a) of the Tax Code of 1997.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7641, otherwise known as an Act Amending Article 287 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as The Labor Code of the Philippines, by Providing for Retirement Pay to Qualified Private Sector
Employees in the Absence of any Retirement Plan in the Establishment provides, viz:
Section 1, Article 287 of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 287. Retirement Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned
under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, that an
employees retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those
provided herein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65)
years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said
establishment may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay quivalent to at least one half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Thus, R.A. No. 7641 providing for Retirement Pay to Qualified Private Sector Employees shall apply only in the absence of
any Retirement Plan, collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract in the establishment.
Accordingly, under R.A. 7641, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five
(65) years which is declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one half (1/2) month salary for every
year of service, a fraction of at least six(6) months being considered as one whole year.
Under R.A. No. 4917 (now Section 32(B)(6)(a) of the Tax Code of 1997), it is required that the following conditions must be
present in order that the employee benefits may be granted tax exemptions: (1) the employee had been in the service of
the same private firm for at least ten (10) years; and (2) he is at least fifty (50) years old at the time of retirement.
Thus, if there is a retirement plan duly approved by the BIR, collective bargaining agreement or other applicable
employment contract providing for retirement benefits, the same shall be followed and R.A. No. 7641 shall not apply.
In your letter dated February 17, 2004, you opined that the tax exemption under R.A. No. 7641 and the tax exemption
under R.A. No. 4917 must be reconciled and harmonized in a way that would not lead to such absurd results as:
1.
An employer who sets up a reasonable private benefit plan, but does not secure BIR approval, will have all
retirement benefits subject to tax, even if the retiree is 50 years old and has served 10 years. The retiree cannot
qualify under R.A. No. 4917 because his employers retirement plan is not approved by the BIR. Neither can he

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qualify under R.A. No. 7641 because it applies only in the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing
for retirement benefits; here there is a retirement plan, although not approved by the BIR, or
2.
An employer enters into a collective bargaining agreement providing retirement benefits to employees
who complete twenty years of service even if below age 50, or to employees who reach age 60, provided they have
served for at least five years; in this situation, these retirees qualify for the tax exemption under R.A. No. 7641;
but the momemt the employer obtains approval of the BIR for a retirement plan containing those provisions, the
retirement benefits for these employees become taxable.
And that you submit that the reasonable reconciliation of the tax exemption under R.A. No. 4917 and R.A. No. 7641 is to
hold:
1.
That any retiree who satisfies the requirements of R.A. No. 7641 (retirement under a CBA or other
applicable employment, and service for at least five years) is entitled to the tax exemption, even if he is a member
of a reasonable private benefit plan established by his employer and approved by the BIR, if the retirement benefit
he receives from the Plan is equal to or less than the minimum requirement benefit provided by R.A. No. 7641. This
would avoid the absurd situation where an employee who fails to meet the 50 years retirement age or 10 years
service requirements will be taxed if he receives the retirement benefit from a BIR approved retirement plan, but
not if his employer does not have such a retirement plan or if the retirement plan is not BIR approved.
2.
That if he receives from the BIR approved plan a retirement benefit in excess of the minimum retirement
benefit provided by R.A. 7641, he must satisfy the requirements or conditions of R.A. No. 4917, which means that
he must be at least 50 years old and must have served 10 years, in order to enjoy the tax exemption. This is but
fair since it is clear that the retirement benefit comes from the BIR approved voluntary plan and not from the
requirements of R.A. No. 7641.
3.
It is needless to add that the tax treatment of retirement benefits received by employees outside of a BIR
approved retirement plan will be governed by R.A. No. 7641.

This Office is amenable to your proposal that if the retirement benefit to be received by a member of a private benefit plan
established by the employer under R.A. No. 4917 and duly approved by the BIR is equal to or less than the minimum
retirement benefit provided by R.A. No. 7641, said benefits shall be exempt from income tax to prevent an absurd situation
where the retirement benefits will be exempt if an employer does not have such a retirement plan or if the retirement plan
is not approved by the BIR.
However, if the employee receives from the BIR approved plan a retirement benefit in excess of the minimum retirement
benefit provided by R.A. No. 7641, he must satisfy the requirements or conditions of R.A. No. 4917, which means that he
must be at least fifty (50) years old and must have served the company for at least ten (10) years in order that his
retirement benefits may be tax exempt. This is but fair since it is clear that the retirement benefit comes from the BIR
approved voluntary plan and not from the requirement of R.A. No. 7641.
Finally, retirement benefits received by employees not from a BIR approved retirement plan shall be governed by R.A. No.
7641.
Very truly yours,
(Signed) JOSE MARIO C. BUNAG
Deputy Commissioner (BIR)

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Legal & Inspection Group

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SAMPLE NO. 4
Hon. Matias V. Defensor, Jr.

Room No. 303 Northwing
House of Representatives
Batasan Pambansa,
Quezon City
Sir :
This refers to your letter dated August 4, 2009 requesting legal opinion on whether or not the survey works to be
undertaken for a local housing project is exempt from value-added tax.
It is represented that on January 10, 1989, the National Housing Authority (NHA) approved the inclusion of Kaingin I and II
in Brgy. Pansol, Quezon City as Areas for Priority Development (APDs) under Zonal Improvement Program; that said
approval was on the condition that the development of the site shall be undertaken under Community Self-Help Program
with Community Mortgage and that the exact boundaries of the areas occupied by families residing thereat shall be
determined; that the NHA is responsible for the management of the Trust Fund per IRR of R.A. 7835, otherwise known as
the "Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter Financing Act (CISFA) of 1994" which was issued to govern the implementation
of local housing program; that a Memorandum of Agreement was executed on July 3, 2009 by the NHA, the 3rd
Congressional District of Quezon City ("District") represented by Congressman Matias V. Defensor, Jr. and Barangay Pansol,
Quezon City whereby NHA and the District agreed to allocate from the Trust Fund the amount of P274,000 as payment for
Boundary Survey Works for Kaingin I and II Housing (APD) Project, Brgy. Pansol, Quezon City; that Brgy. Pansol has
engaged the services of Adonis Surveying Office to conduct the perimeter boundary/relocation survey in determining the
territorial boundary of Kaingin I and II; and that a consideration of P274,000, excluding value-added tax (VAT), will be paid
to Adonis Surveying Office.
In reply, please be informed that pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7279, pertinent portion of which reads:
"Sec. 20. Incentives for Private Sector Participating in Socialized Housing. To encourage greater private sector
participation in socialized housing and further reduce the cost of housing units for the benefit of the underprivileged and
homeless, the following incentives shall be extended to the private sector:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(d) Exemption from the payment of the following:

(1) Project-related income taxes;
(2) Capital gains tax on raw lands used for the project;
(3) Value-added tax for the project contractor concerned;
xxx
xxx
xxx"

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the contractor of socialized housing units is exempt from the payment of value-added tax.
On the other hand, Section 25 of R.A. 7279 enumerates the benefits granted to the occupants of Areas for Priority
Development (APD), zonal improvement program sites and slum improvement and resettlement programs sites, to wit:
"SECTION 25.
Benefits. In addition to the benefits provided under existing laws and other related issuance to
occupants of areas for priority development, zonal improvement program sites and slum improvement and resettlement
program sites, such occupants shall be entitled to priority in all government projects initiated pursuant to this Act. They
shall also be entitled to the following support services:
(a) Land surveys and titling at minimal cost;" (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, surveying of land is merely a support service for the beneficiaries of socialized housing. It is a
preliminary activity to constructing or developing socialized housing sites.
Inasmuch as Adonis Surveying Office is only contracted as surveyor to determine boundaries of the subject land and is not
the contractor for the development of the housing projects and, considering further that the survey works and services to be
undertaken by Adonis Surveying office is separate from the construction of the socialized housing units which shall take
place after the metes and bounds of the individual areas of Kaingin I and II have been established, Adonis Surveying Office
cannot be considered as a private contractor participating in socialized housing entitled to tax exemption privileges under
Section 20 (d) of R.A. 7279. Thus, the amount charged by said surveyor is subject to value-added tax (VAT) 1 under Section
105, in relation to Sections 108 and 114 (C) of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended by R.A. 9337, which provides that:
"SEC. 105. Persons Liable. Any person who, in the course of trade or business, sells, barters, exchanges, leases goods or
properties, renders services, and any person who imports goods shall be subject to the value-added tax (VAT) imposed in
Sections 106 to 108 of this Code.
xxx
xxx
xxx
SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties.
"(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent
(10%) (now 12%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services, including the use or lease of properties.
The phrase 'sale or exchange of services' means the performance of all kinds of services in the Philippines for others for a
fee, remuneration or consideration, including those performed or rendered by construction and service contractors; . . ."
"SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. . . .
(C)
Withholding of Value-added Tax. The Government or any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or
agencies, including government-owned or -controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on
account of each purchase of goods and services which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106
and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold a final value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%) of the gross
payment thereof: Provided, That the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident

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owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For purposes of this Section,
the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the withholding agent.
"The value-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following the end of the month the
withholding was made."
Based on the foregoing, this Office is of the opinion that cost of survey works and services in the amount of P274,000 is
subject to value-added tax at the rate of 12% pursuant to Section 105 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended, and the income
payment made by Brgy. Pansol to Adonis Surveying Office shall be subject to 5% final withholding tax under Section 114
(C) of the same Tax Code.
This ruling is being issued on the basis of the foregoing facts as represented. However, if upon investigation, it will be
disclosed that the facts are different, then this ruling shall be considered as null and void.
Very truly yours,

Commissioner of Internal Revenue
By:
(SGD.) JOEL L. TAN-TORRES
Senior Deputy Commissioner
(Officer-In-Charge)

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SAMPLE NO. 5
March 31, 2011
Ms. Melanie P. Gamboa

35 Craig Street, Sampaloc, Manila
Dear Ms. Gamboa:

This refers to your query regarding the possibility of changing the surname of your 16-year old niece, Paula Perez
Cortes, who was placed under your care by your sister, Maricel Abrogar Perez, who is currently in the United States (US)
working as a nurse.
You mentioned that Paula Perez Cortes, who was born on November 15, 1994, is the daughter of your sister,
Maricel Abrogar Perez. Paula has been living with you ever since Maricel went to the US in year 2000 to work there as a
nurse.
You also mentioned that Paulas father is William Cortes, Maricels boyfriend back in college, and who got her
pregnant while they were in their third year of college.

It is my understanding that Paulas parents never got married and that Paula grew up not knowing her father
because after Paulas first birthday, her father William returned to his province in Zamboanga and since then, he has not
returned to Manila nor has he sent anything for Paulas support. Likewise, you also mentioned to me that in Paulas birth
certificate, she carries the surname of her father, and William Cortes is indicated therein as her father. In addition, in all of
Paulas official records, including school records, she carries her fathers surname and the name William Cortes is identified
as her father.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, you were asked by Maricel to seek legal assistance. She wants Paulas
surname to be changed from Cortes to Perez because she intends to petition Paula to the US and the change in name would
facilitate the process because Paula would be easily identified as her daughter. Also, Maricel does not want Paula to have
anything to do with William anymore since he abandoned his own child.
Hence, you are asking for my advice or opinion on the following queries:
1.
Is it possible to change the surname of Paula P. Cortes from Cortes to Perez?
2.
What are the requirements or procedures to be followed in case a person wants to change his or her surname?
With regard to your first query on whether it is possible to change the surname of your niece from Cortes to Perez,
it is worthwhile to note that under the law, no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. (Article

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376, Civil Code of the Philippines) Therefore, in the case of Paula P. Cortes, your sister must file the appropriate petition
before the court in behalf of her minor child.
In one case, the Supreme Court held that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either
in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may
justify such change. (In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005, 454 SCRA 155)
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which
have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. (Ibid.)
In the case of Paula, her mother wants to change her surname so that Paula would be easily identified as her
daughter, and she also does not want Paula to have anything to do with her father William anymore since he abandoned his
own child. On the other hand, it may be implied from your narration that William voluntarily recognized Paula as his own
child, thus, warranting the use of Williams surname in the registration of Paulas birth. It is a right bestowed upon Paula
who is an illegitimate daughter of William because she was conceived and born outside a valid marriage (Article 165, Family
Code of the Philippines).
Under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, an illegitimate child who has been
voluntarily recognized by his/her father may carry the latters surname. Hence, your sisters desire to change the surname
of her child Paula will be tantamount to depriving Paula of the rights accorded by law by virtue of such recognition. Proof of
recognition and filiation gives an illegitimate child the right to receive support from the father and likewise entitles the child
to a legitime which shall be one-half (1/2) of the legitime of a legitimate child, pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
Moreover, having voluntarily recognized Paula as his own child, William may then file his opposition/objection to the
petition which your sister wants to file in court. Therefore, there is that possibility that the court may deny your sisters
petition.
In relation to your second query on the requirements or procedures to be followed in case a person wants to
change his or her surname, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of
the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring
his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

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(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at
least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the name of the petitioners name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Rule 103, Section 3 of the Rules of Court further states that if the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance,
the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct
that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in some
newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall
not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice. In
addition, Section 4 of the same Rule states that any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition.
The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
It is hoped that the foregoing satisfactorily answers your queries and helps guide you in arriving at a proper course
of action. Please take note, however, that this opinion is solely based on the facts you have narrated and my appreciation of
the same. The opinion rendered may vary when the facts are changed or elaborated.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Stephanie Tamara

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SAMPLE NO. 6
27 November 2011
Mr. Adriano Enriquez Maria Orosa Street Manila
Dear Mr. Enriquez:

This legal opinion seeks to answer your question as to whether or not you can now remarry under Philippine law
after discovering that your wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley.
The Facts
Per our discussion and the documents you have shown me, the following are the pertinent facts:
On May 24, 1991, you married Myra Santos in the Philippines. Your marriage was blessed with a son Miguel
Enriquez.
In 1996, your wife left for the United States bringing along your son Miguel. A few years later, you discovered
that your wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2010, you learned from your son that your wife
had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
The Applicable Law

The applicable law is Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. It provides that:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to directly govern your situation. It seems to apply only to
cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
Your case, on the other hand, is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.

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The Legislative Intent behind Paragraph 2 of Article 26

However, an examination of the records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The Applicable Jurisprudence

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of VAN DORN v. ROMILLO, JR. (G.R. No.
L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139). The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Supreme Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Will this same principle apply to your case? The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of QUITA v.
COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 124862, 22 December 1998, 300 SCRA 406). In Quita, the parties were, as in your case,
Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The Supreme Court therein hinted, although by way of obiter dictum only, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Analysis and Conclusion

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Paragraph 2 of Article 26
would apply to your case because it should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
I am confident that said interpretation would prevail in court because to rule otherwise
absurdity and injustice.
would be to sanction
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent (LOPEZ & SONS, INC. v. COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850)
Recommendation

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To invoke Paragraph 2 of Article 26, it is required that you should submit competent evidence concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of your wife. This is based on the settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence (CORTES v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 121772, 13
January 2003, 395 SCRA 33).
Likewise, it is also a rule under Philippine law that before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws (GARCIA v. RECIO, G.R. No.
138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437).
Furthermore, you must also show that the divorce decree allows your ex-wife to remarry as specifically required in
Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that you are capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
For the said purpose, we recommend the filing of a Petition for Declaratory Relief based on Section 1 of Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court. The said provision states:
Section 1. Who may
file
petitionAny
person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive

governmental
regulation may,
before
breach
order
or violation thereof,
or
regulation,
ordinance,
or
other
bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
In the case of OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. IBAY, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281, it was
held that the requisites of a Petition for Declaratory Relief are:
1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
I am of the considered opinion that the said requisites are all present. First,
your
case
clearly
presents
justiciable controversy concerning the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. Second, the State,
which will be a party to the petition will necessarily assert its duty to protect the institution of marriage while you, a private
citizen, will insist on a declaration of your capacity to remarry; hence adverse interests will be involved. Third, you, as the
party who will be praying for relief, clearly have legal interest in the controversy. Lastly, the issue is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when you remarry, litigation will ensue and put into question the validity of your second
marriage.

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I appreciate the opportunity to advise you regarding this matter. Please let me know if you wish to discuss any of
these issues further. Thank you.
Yours faithfully,
(Sgd.) LEGAL COUNSEL

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UNIVERSITY OF CEBU
COLLEGE OF LAW
HOW TO EFFECTIVELY ANSWER
SHORT ESSAY QUESTIONS IN LAW & BAR SUBJECTS
Our ultimate challenge:
To be lawyers.
View of some Filipino law students:
Forms and grammar are hardly important. It is substance that really
matters.
Contrary view by some responsible law students:
What if the substance is awkwardly formatted,
ungrammatically written, erroneously structured, and inaccurately punctuated?

ATTRIBUTES LOOKED FOR BY BAR EXAMINERS IN THE ANSWERS OF FUTURE LAWYERS:
1. Correct appreciation of facts;
2. Ability to identify the issue/s;
3. Knowledge of the law and jurisprudence;
4. Logic and reasoning ability;
5. Responsiveness;
6. Clarity of ideas and handwriting;
7. Brevity;
8. Neatness of presentation;
9. Correct grammar and punctuation; and
10. Persuasion.
EXAMINATION TIPS
The only thing that stands between a man and what he wants from life is often merely the will to try it and the faith to
believe that it is possible.
- Richard M. Devos
1.
PRAY like you have never prayed before.
2.
RELAX. Entertaining pressures and tension will be of no help. Think that this is it and there is nothing more to do but to
try your best.

3.
Never ever think of cheating.
4.
Take a quick browse at your questionnaire to have an overview of the length of each question, the number of questions
and sub-questions but do not concentrate on the details as yet. (The proctor or watcher will instruct your group to count the
pages of the questionnaire -- this is the time for your quick browse.)
5.
Budget your time according to the number of questions and length of problems. Check the percentage allocation for
each question. This will not only help you to budget your time but also give you a cue on how difficult or intricate a problem
is, hence, warning you to be very careful with your answer.

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Analysis of available time as benchmark for answering each question:

*4-hour examination with
15 questions = 16 minutes each question
*3-hour examination with
6.
Read instructions carefully. Read each question carefully.
7.
While reading a question or case problem, analyze and start formulating your answers. If you do this, it be easier and
faster for you to write your answers since you are already guided by your earlier analysis. It will also minimize errors and
erasures.
8.
Be concise and responsive (brief but complete) in your answers. Try to contain your answer to a simple question or sub-
question in one page. Nevertheless, if you have more ideas that you believe will supplement your answer, do not hesitate to
add them but just see to it that whatever you write is worth reading. Otherwise, better stop. "Less write, less mistakes."
9.
An answer to one question in one problem requires a separate page. Answers to sub-questions may be presented
continuously in a page separated by space/s. It is suggested, however, that even answers sub-questions be presented on
separate pages, unless your answer is very short, so that in case you want to change any answer or if you have missed a
sub-question, you can still insert your answer in the remaining spaces of the page.
10. Begin answering on the page indicated.
11. When necessary (and if allowed), seek clarifications from the proctor watcher, never from your seatmates.
12. Answer neatly and legibly. Observe margins (do not far margins). Erase with one horizontal line no matter how long the
word, sentence or paragraph is. Do not obliterate or cross them out.
13. Do not tear or fold any page.
14. Do not put or write any unwarranted mark or name in your notebook as this will be considered as marking. Do not
underline or capitalize your writings for emphasis.
15. Maintain constantly a one-inch imaginary straight margin line in the left and right sides of your page. Be sure the size
of your letters can be easily read. Write for your examiner, not for yourself.
16.
Leave a space between the paragraphs of your answer for better presentation.
17.
Be careful with your numberings. Tick every question on the questionnaire which you have already answered. As much
as possible, try not to skip questions as you might forget or fail to go back to them. A good advice, however, is that you can

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skip first few batch of questions if you are not sure of your answers until you came across a sure answer to build up your
confidence. A caveat, on the other hand, is that you have to start within the first three questions. Otherwise, it would be
very difficult to estimate the pages of the notebook that you need to skip.
18.
Immediately after answering every question, make a quick review. Check the spelling, grammar and flow of
thoughts/ideas so you can immediately effect corrections, thus, prevent shortage of space.
19.
After finishing with the last question, review all your answers again. Check if you have covered all questions.
20.
Check if you have completely complied with all the instructions and requirements before submitting your notebook and
before leaving the examination room.

NOTE: Months or Years before the examination days, be sure you have practiced everyday how to answer various types of
law/bar questions in your practice notebooks. Practice makes perfect and is a confidence booster, just like an excellent
basketball player.
TIPS ON
HOW TO ANSWER DIFFERENT
TYPES OF ESSAY QUESTIONS
I. ENUMERATION
TIP:
Always introduce your enumeration. Use appropriate punctuation marks and conjunctions.
[ : ; , and
or ]
Example Question:
What are the limitations upon the power of Congress to enact penal laws?
SUGGESTED ANSWER FORMAT:
(Format 1 - if certain, give the specific source)
I
The limitations upon the power of
Congress to enact penal laws are the following:
1.
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted (Sec. 22, Art.. III, 1987 Constitution); and
2.
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law (Sec. 14(1), Art, III,
1987 Constitution).

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(Format 2 - if not certain, dont attempt to give the specific source)

I -A
The limitations upon the power of Congress to enact penal laws are the following:
1.
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted; and
2. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law .
(Format 3 -
when one is not sure of the total number of items, or could not give all that are required)
I-B
The
limitations
upon
the
power
of Congress to enact penal laws are the following: no ex post facto law or
bill of attainder shall be enacted and no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
II.
TIP:
DISTINCTIONS
Always introduce your distinctions. Use appropriate punctuation marks and conjunctions [ : ; , and
or ] . Be
careful with FORMER & LATTER.

Example Question:
Distinguish between justifying and exempting circumstances.
ANSWER FORMAT: (lifted from an actual answer)

II
Justifying circumstances may be distinguished from exempting circumstances as follows:
1. In the former,
there is neither a crime committed
nor a criminal
legally justified, while in the latter, there is a crime committed but there
because
the
is no criminal because
acts
therein
the law
are
excuses
the offender from liability therefor; and

2. There is no crime nor a criminal in the former, civil liability does not also attach to the offender, except in
case
of a
state of
necessity
although criminal liability
where
the
is excused, civil
party benefited should
indemnify
liability attaches to the offender
the person injured, while in the latter,

because
of the fact that a has been
committed.
III.
SIMPLE CASE PROBLEM ANSWERABLE BY CATEGORICAL YES OR NO.
This means that there is only sure answer without any qualification because all the facts are stated and they all fall squarely
to the applicable law.

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TIPS FOR YES OR NO ANSWER FORMAT - TRAC

1. Start with the topic or thesis paragraph stating your categorical answer to the question, i.e., Yes/No, completed by the
issue in question.
2. The second paragraph is a citation of the applicable Rule , law or jurisprudence or both
3. The third paragraph is the Application of the law on the facts.
4. The fourth paragraph may be your Conclusion. (optional or this may form part of the third paragraph)
NOTE:
If the instruction is to give only a one-sentence answer, you can still apply the TRAC format within that one sentence.
(Question No. Ill, 1998 Bar Examination in Labor and Social Legislation)
A lady worker was born with a physical deformity, specifically, hard of hearing, speech impaired and color
blind. These deficiencies do not impair her working ability.
Can the employer classify the lady worker as a
handicapped worker so that her daily wage will only be seventy-five percent (75%) of the applicable daily
minimum wage?
SUGGESTED ANSWER FORMAT: (lifted from an actual answer)
1.
Start with the first paragraph stating your categorical answer to the question, i.e., Yes/No/I distinguish/I qualify,
completed by the issue in question.

e.g.,
No. The employer cannot classify the lady worker as a handicapped worker in the case at bar.
2.
The second paragraph is a citation of the applicable law or jurisprudence or both. e.g.,
the Labor Code of the
It is provided for under
Philippines, that to be considered a handicapped worker, the physical deficiencies or deformities
of a worker must adversely affect or impair his working ability or capacity in relation to his assigned job. Here, the law
allows the payment of a wage of at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the applicable daily minimum wage.
3.
e.g.,
The third paragraph is the application of the law on the facts.

In the case at bar, the deficiency of the lady worker is unrelated to or does not impair her ability in the performance
of her assigned job.

4.
The fourth paragraph may be your conclusion. (optional or this may form part of the third paragraph).
e.g.,
Therefore, she should not be classified as handicapped worker and should be entitled to the full applicable daily
minimum wage.

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Legal Writing
(Format 1 -
with 3 to 4 paragraphs TRAC format)

III
No.
The employer cannot
It is provided for
under
classify
the
the lady worker as a handicapped worker in the case at bar.
Labor Code of the Philippines, that to be considered a handicapped worker, the
physical deficiencies or deformities of a worker must adversely affect or impair his working ability or capacity in relation to
his assigned job. In this case, the law allows the payment of a wage of at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the applicable
daily minimum wage.
In the case at bar,
the deficiency of the lady worker is unrelated to or does not impair her ability in the
performance of her assigned job.

minimum wage.
(Format 2 -
with 3 to 4 paragraphs TRAC format, with COMMA after YES/NO)

III-A
No, the employer cannot
classify
It is provided for
the
under
daily minimum wage.
In the case at bar,

minimum wage.
(Format 3 -
with 3 to 4 paragraphs TRAC format, with Affirmative/Negative
statement in lieu of YES/NO)

III-B
The employer cannot
classify

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Legal Writing
It is provided for
under
the
daily minimum wage.
In the case at bar,

minimum wage.
Format 4
-- One Sentence TRAC Format)

III-C
No, the employer cannot
classify
the lady worker as a handicapped worker because under the Labor Code
,for an employee to be considered a handicapped worker, his physical deficiencies or deformities must be such as to
adversely affect or impair his working ability or capacity in relation to his assigned job, for the purpose of allowing
the
payment of a wage of at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the applicable daily minimum wage; but in this case, the
workers deficiency is unrelated to or does not impair her ability to perform her assigned job.
Format 5
-- One Sentence TRAC Format, without YES/NO)

III-D
The employer cannot

an employee to be considered
classify
the lady worker as a handicapped worker because under the Labor Code ,for
a handicapped worker,
his physical deficiencies
or deformities
must be such as
adversely affect or impair his working ability or capacity in relation to his assigned job, for the purpose of allowing
to
the
payment of a wage of at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the applicable daily minimum wage; but in this case, the
workers deficiency is unrelated to or does not impair her ability to perform her assigned job.
Another Example for Categorical Yes/No Answer
QUESTION:
The American Consul accredited to the Philippines while driving his car
recklessly and imprudently along
Roxas Boulevard bumped a pedestrian who was crossing the street and the latter died as a consequence of his
injuries. Prosecuted in court for the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence, the Consul claimed diplomatic
immunity alleging that he is not subject to Philippine laws and regulations. Is his defense tenable? Why?
Format 1
-- using 3 - 4 paragraphs format)

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Legal Writing

IV
No. The American consuls defense of diplomatic immunity is not tenable.

Under the international law, those who enjoy the
ambassadors, ministers
plenipotentiary and
diplomatic
immunity are the sovereigns or heads of states,
ministers resident. Consuls , like the American consul in this case, are not
included in this group.

Hence, he cannot rightfully
Format 2
claim
diplomatic
immunity.
-- using 3 - 4 paragraphs format, with comma after YES/NO)

IV-A
No, the American consuls defense of diplomatic immunity is not tenable.

plenipotentiary and
diplomatic

Format 3
claim
diplomatic
immunity.
-- using 3 - 4 paragraphs format, with Affirmative/Negative statement in lieu of YES/NO)

IV-B
The American consuls defense of diplomatic immunity is not tenable.

plenipotentiary and
diplomatic

claim
diplomatic
immunity.
Format 4 -- One Sentence TRAC format , and if one is sure, with specific SC decision cited within the answer)
IV-C

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Legal Writing
No, the American consuls defense of diplomatic immunity is not tenable because, under the international law
and as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case of Schneckenburger vs. Moran, 63 Phil. 250, those who enjoy diplomatic
immunity are only the sovereigns or heads of states, ambassadors, ministers
plenipotentiary and
ministers resident,
but not the consuls.
Format
5 -- One Sentence TRAC format, and if one is sure, with specific SC decision cited at the end of the
answer)
IV-D
No, the American consuls defense of diplomatic immunity is not tenable because, under the international law ,
those who enjoy
plenipotentiary and
Format
diplomatic
immunity
are
only the sovereigns or heads of states, ambassadors, ministers
ministers resident, but not the consuls (Schneckenburger vs. Moran, 63 Phil. 250).
6 -- One Sentence TRAC format , without specific SC decision cited)

IV-E
No, the American consuls defense of diplomatic immunity is not tenable because, under the international law,
those who enjoy

plenipotentiary and
diplomatic
immunity
are
ministers resident, but not the consuls.
Format 5 -- One Sentence TRAC format , without specific SC decision cited, without YES /NO)
VI-F
The American consuls defense of diplomatic immunity is not tenable because, under
those who enjoy
plenipotentiary and
IV.
diplomatic
immunity
are
the international law,
ministers resident, but not the consuls.
CASE PROBLEM CALLING FOR A QUALIFIED ANSWER
This question calls for a YES or NO answer.
A little twist or change of fact, if so stated, would have called for a definite
answer; however, the facts of the problem lack that essential detail or details that could have called for only one definite
answer. For this reason, it is better for the examinee to give a qualified answer.
An + / -- statement with IF, HOWEVER
IF format is suggested, if appropriate. In some instances, the use of PROVIDED after the + / -- statement, or introducing
the answer with IT DEPENDS helps. A Yes /No with qualification format is also suggested.

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QUESTION
A, a convicted prisoner, learns that he is already overstaying in jail because his jail guard who happens to be
law student advised him that there is no more legal ground for his continued imprisonment, and the jail guard
told him that he can go. Is there a crime committed?
[Analysis: In this case, who is/are the target of having committed a crime, the prisoner, the guard or both? And what crime
or crimes? Has the prisoner already escaped as advised by the guard? Obviously these are not clearly given in the problem,
hence, the need of a qualified answer.]
QUESTION CALLING FOR QUALIFIED ANSWER
Format 1 --
using
+ / -- statement with IF / HOWEVER-IF format)

V
No crime is committed by A if he does not leave the jail.
However, if A gets out of jail, he commits a crime
known as evasion of sentence while the guard can be held liable for
Considering that
infidelity
in
the custody
A was sentenced to imprisonment after according him due process of law,
measure, be released, even assuming he indeed exceeded the period of his sentence,
of the
criminal.
he cannot, in the same
without going through a legal
process, either administratively or judicially.

Format 2
--
using It Depends / IF + HOWEVER IF format, 2 paragraphs)

V-A
It depends.
If A does not leave the jail,
no crime is committed. However, if A gets out of jail,
known as evasion of sentence while the guard can be held liable

Considering that A was sentenced
to
for
infidelity
in
the
custody
imprisonment after according him due process of law,
measure, be released, even assuming he indeed exceeded the period of his sentence,
he commits a crime
of
the criminal.
he cannot,
in the same
without going through a legal
process, either administratively or judicially.

(Format 3 -- using It Depends / IF + However-IF format , 1 paragraph)
V-B
It depends.
If
does not leave the
jail,
no crime is committed.
However, if A gets out of jail,
he
commits a crime known as evasion of sentence while the guard can be held liable for infidelity in the custody of the
criminal.
Considering that A was sentenced
to imprisonment after according him due process of law, he cannot, in
the same measure, be released, even assuming he indeed exceeded the period
through a legal process, either administratively or judicially.

64
of
his
sentence,
without going
Legal Writing
ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF A QUESTION CALLING FOR QUALIFIED ANSWER

QUESTION:
May a married woman engage in commerce without the consent of her husband?

(Format 1 -- using a Yes or No + Provided / If format)
VI
Yes,
a married woman may engage in commerce provided she has all the qualifications, even without the
consent of her husband
because Art. 73 of the Family Code expressly provides that
either spouse may exercise
any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other.
Under
the law,
a person
may engage in business if one is of legal age , has capacity to enter into contract and
is not suffering the penalty of civil interdiction, the nature of the business engaged in is not against the law, morals and
public policy,
and the object of the business is within the commerce of men.

Format 2 -- using Yes or No / Provided format = 1 PARAGRAPH)
VI-A
Yes, a married woman may engage in commerce provided she has all the qualifications, even without the
consent of her husband.
Under
Art. 73
of
the Family Code,
"Either
spouse
may exercise
any
legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other.

Format
--
using
Affirmative/Negative statement
in lieu of Yes /No
Provided
format
PARAGRAPH)
VI-B
A married woman may engage
consent of her
profession,
husband.
Under
Art.
in commerce
73
of
provided
she
the Family Code,
has
all
the qualifications, even without the
Either spouse may exercise any
occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other.

Format
4 -- using It Depends / Provided / However format, 2 or 3 paragraphs)

65
legitimate
Legal Writing

IV-C
It depends.
A
has all the
married
woman
qualifications.
may
engage
in commerce and even without the consent of
her husband, provided she
However, she may not engage in commerce if she does not possess all the qualifications
prescribed by law or her husbands objection thereto is based on valid, serious and moral grounds.
Under Art. 73 of the Family Code, it is expressly stated that either
spouse
may
exercise
any
legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF A QUESTION CALLING FOR QUALIFIED ANSWER
NOTE: Civil Law question
May a husband validly object that his wife engage in business?
(Format 1 --
using a Yes or No / Provided format)

VII
Yes, the husband may object that his wife engage in business provided he has valid, serious and moral grounds.
Under
proper,
the
Family
and the benefit
Code ,
in case
of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not the objection is
has occurred prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection,
the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of spouse who has not obtained consent; but
the rights of the creditor who acted in good faith shall not be prejudiced.

(Format 2 --
using Affirmative/Negative statement in lieu of a Yes/No ,
with Provided format)
VII-A
The husband may object that his wife engage in business provided he has valid, serious and moral grounds.
Under
proper,
the
Family
and the benefit
Code ,
in case
of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not the objection is
has occurred prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection,
the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of spouse who has not obtained consent; but
the rights of the creditor who acted in good faith shall not be prejudiced.

(Format 3 -- using It Depends , followed by affirmative and then negative format)
VII-B
It depends.

66
Legal Writing
Under the Family Code, the husband may validly object that his wife engage in business provided he has valid,
serious and moral grounds. In the absence of any such ground, the husband s objection will not have any legal effect to
bar his wifes commercial engagement.
Moreover, in case of disagreement, the court shall decide
the benefit
whether
or
not the
objection
is
proper, and
has occurred prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting
obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of spouse who has not obtained consent; but the rights of the
creditor who acted in good faith shall not be prejudiced.
ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF A PROBLEM CALLING FOR QUALIFIED ANSWER:

QUESTION:
A building is owned by Y.
He stores some machineries inside the building.
He has used the building as a
collateral to a loan and is covered by a chattel mortgage. The machineries are likewise mortgaged and covered
by a chattel mortgage, which is duly registered. Y sells the land and the building and machineries therein to Z,
the latter not knowing the chattel mortgages.
(a) Is Z bound by the chattel mortgage on the building?

(Format 1 -- using a Yes or No / Qualification format)
VIII
No, the chattel mortgage on the building is not binding on Z.
mortgage is void from the very beginning. The reason is obvious.
As far as Z is concerned, the contract of chattel
Under the Chattel Mortgage Law, only chattels or
personalty may be the object of a contract of chattel mortgage. A building is certainly not a chattel or personalty. It is a
realty by incorporation; hence, it cannot be the proper object of a chattel mortgage.
In some cases decided by the Supreme Court, it has been held that the contract of chattel mortgage, applying
the principle of estoppel, is binding.
However, this rule can be applied only to a situation or controversy involving the
contracting parties only. It cannot be applied to Z, who is a third person, as far as the chattel mortgage is concerned.

Format 2 -- using Yes/No with Qualification -- with a slight modification)
VIII-A

67
Legal Writing
No, the chattel mortgage on the building is not binding on Z.


Although in some cases decided by the Supreme Court it has been held that the contract of chattel mortgage,
applying the principle of estoppel, is binding, this rule , however, can be applied only to a situation or controversy involving
the contracting parties only. It cannot be applied to Z, who is a third person, as far as the chattel mortgage contract is
concerned.

Format 3 -- using Affirmative/Negative statement in lieu of Yes/No, with Qualification -and with a slight
modification)
VIII-B
The chattel mortgage on the building is not binding on Z.

Although in some cases decided by the Supreme Court it has been held that the contract of chattel mortgage,
applying the principle of estoppel, is binding, this rule , however, can be applied only to a situation or controversy involving
the contracting parties only. It cannot be applied to Z, who is a third person, as far as the chattel mortgage contract is
concerned.
ANOTHER EXAMPLE:
(b) Is Z bound by the chattel mortgage on the machineries?
Suggested answer
(Format 1 -- using Yes or No / Qualification format):
IX
Yes, the chattel mortgage on the machineries is binding on Z. The contract of chattel mortgage is certainly valid
and binding not only as far as the contracting parties are concerned but even as far as third persons are concerned, more so
if the chattel mortgage is registered with the proper government office.
True, under the Civil Code machineries are classified as
real
property ,
but
this is so only
when
they are
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land,
and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or works.
Here, the machineries are
merely stored
by
in his building. Therefore, they are still classified as chattel or personalty for the purpose of the Chattel Mortgage Law.

68
Legal Writing
Suggested answer
(Format 2 -- using Affirmative/Negative statement in lieu of Yes/No , with Qualification format):
IX-A
The chattel mortgage on the machineries is binding on Z. The contract of chattel mortgage is certainly valid and
binding not only as far as the contracting parties are concerned but even as far as third persons are concerned, more so if
the chattel mortgage is registered with the proper government office.
True, under the Civil Code machineries are classified as real property , but this is so only when they are
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land,
and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or works.
Here, the machineries are
merely stored
by
in his building. Therefore, they are still classified as chattel or personalty for the purpose of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
HOW WILL YOU ANSWER IF THE QUESTION IS PHRASED LIKE THIS:

Are the chattel mortgages on the building and machineries binding on Z?
Suggested answer
X
It depends.
The chattel mortgage on the building is not binding on Z.
mortgage is void from the very beginning because , under the Chattel Mortgage Law, only chattels or personalty may be the
object of a contract of chattel mortgage. A building is certainly not a chattel or personalty. It is a realty by incorporation;
hence, it cannot be the proper object of a chattel mortgage. The only instance when said mortgage is binding on Z is when
he is a party to the said chattel mortgage.
It is different in the case of the chattel mortgage on the machineries. The contract of chattel mortgage is certainly
valid and binding not only as far as the contracting parties are concerned but even as far as third persons are concerned
even if they have no knowledge about it if the chattel mortgage is registered with the proper government office.
True, under the Civil Code machineries are classified as real property
but
only when they are intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of said industry or works.
Here, the
machineries are merely stored
by
building. Therefore, these are still classified as chattels or personalty for the purpose of the Chattel Mortgage Law.

69
in
his
Legal Writing
V.
PROBLEMS CALLING FOR ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS
This kind of question is actually answerable by YES or NO, but there is a need to present both sides in case there are
conflicting theories, opinions or schools of thought on the subject by some legal authorities, which by themselves may
appear to be correct.
FIRST METHOD OF ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
1.
The first paragraph contains the statement that there are different views applicable to the case.
2.
The second paragraph will present the first view.
3.
The third paragraph will present the other view, usually that which is most accepted or that with which you concur.
4.
The fourth paragraph will indicate to which view you subscribe. (Note: This may form part of the third paragraph.)
QUESTION
Manny killed his wife under exceptional circumstances and was sentenced by the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City to suffer the penalty of destierro during which he was not to enter the city.
Manny went to Dagupan City to visit his friends and his property.
Later, however,
Did Manny commit any crime?
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER FORMAT:

Format 1 ( lifted from actual answers)
1.
The first paragraph contains the statement that there are different views, applicable to the case.
e.g., There have been different views as regards the imposition of the penalty of destierro upon the offender who killed
his spouse under exceptional circumstances.

2.
The second paragraph will present the first view.

e.g., Firstly, the imposition of destierro under such a case should not be regarded as a penalty to the offender. It has
been submitted that the same is merely for the protection of the convicted offender against possible retaliatory acts of the
relatives of his victim. In this case, therefore, Manny cannot be said to have committed a crime.
3.
The third paragraph will present the other view, usually that which is most accepted or that with which you concur.
e.g., On the other hand, where it would be considered that the destierro imposed is a penalty, which is clearly provided
in the law without any qualification, Manny committed the crime of evasion of service of sentence since he entered within
the prescribed area of his banishment.
4.
The fourth paragraph will indicate to which view you subscribe. (this may form part of the third paragraph)
e.g., I subscribe to the second view.
(Format 1 -
following the preceding structure of the answer)

XI
There have been different views as regards the imposition of the penalty of destierro upon the offender
who killed his spouse under exceptional circumstances.

70
Legal Writing
On one hand, the imposition

offender. It has
been
submitted that
of destierro under such a case should not be regarded as a penalty to the
the same is
merely
for the protection
of
the convicted offender against
possible retaliatory acts of the relatives of his victim. In this case, therefore, Manny cannot be said to have committed a
crime.
On the other hand, where it would be considered that the destierro imposed is a penalty,
which is clearly
provided in the law without any qualification, Manny committed the crime of evasion of service of sentence since he
entered within the prescribed area of his banishment.
I subscribe to the second view.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
(Format 2 Yes/No with brief mention of the other view or theory)
XI-A
Yes, Manny committed the crime of evasion of service of sentence.
Despite the contrary view by some legal theorists, under the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, destierro is
a kind of penalty, which is expressly provided in the law without any qualification.
In this case, Manny entered the place from which he was
banished
by
the
court
without
any clearance
or authority from the same court. He is, therefore, liable for the crime of evasion of service of sentence .
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
(Format 3 Without Yes/No but only the Affirmative or Negative statement, with brief mention of the other
view or theory)
XI-B
Manny committed the crime of evasion of service of sentence.
Despite the contrary view by some legal theorists, under the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, destierro is
a kind of penalty, which is expressly provided in the law without any qualification.
In this case, Manny entered the place from which he was
banished
by
the
court
without
or authority from the same court. He is, therefore, liable for the crime of evasion of service of sentence .

71
any clearance
Legal Writing

WORKSHOP
Exercises in:
1. Answering questions
2. Analyzing questions
3. Critiquing answers
X is a general partner of XYZ Co.
T is a creditor to both X and XYC Co.
X, T paid him the sum of P100,000.
Upon learning of this development, partners Y and Z demanded from X that the entire
sum of P100,000 paid by T be remitted to the

him as payment of Ts
in the amount of P100,000 and upon demand by
partnership.
X refused, reasoning that the entire amount should go to
debt to him (X) since he was the one who
demanded for and collected the
payment.
Is Xs
contention correct? Why?

AA, a passenger in a vessel belonging to XX Co., and whose name in the passenger manifest on its
voyage,
January 1, 2003
was among those who died when the vessel capsized as a result of the alleged negligence of its crew.
The
complaint for damages was filed on April 30, 2009 by AAs heirs. It is now contended by XX Co. that the action is already
barred by the statute of limitations because it is one for recovery of damages which is not based on a written contract. Is
this contention correct? Reason.
PP took possession of a parcel of unregistered land belonging to MM in good faith and by virtue of a just title on June 15,
1989.
Exactly 9 years afterwards, on June 15, 1998, he became aware of certain facts which show that he was in
possession of the land wrongfully.

In a case filed by MM against PP on February 15, 2009, he contended that 30 years from June 15, 1989 was needed before
PP could be considered as the lawful owner of the property in question by prescription. Is MMs contention tenable? Reason.

72

Legal Writing 2 Trial Memorandum, Legal Opinion, Short Essay

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University of Cebu

Cebu College of Law

For Private and Personal Use Only

UCLASS Bar Operations

TRIAL MEMORANDUM, LEGAL

Parts of a Trial Memorandum

In NO particular order, a Trial Memorandum should contain the following parts:

The heading or Case Caption

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The Brief Answer to the question or issues posed.

The Discussion of the Arguments.

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The Summary of the Trial Memorandum.

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the facts of the

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Steps in Preparing a Legal Opinion

Make sure that the records of the case are complete.

Write down the facts

Identify the issues.

Parts of a Legal Opinion

A legal opinion is made up of:

Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

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Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

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SKELETAL FRAMEWORK: TRIAL MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PLAINTIFF

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

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Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

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Republic of the Philippines

JUANA DELA CRUZ

Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

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1010 Ginoo Blvd., Pasay City;

Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

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spouses and the respondent has titled it on her own name;

STATEMENT OF THE CASES

Court Branch 1 of Pasay City;

On December 22, 2008, the petitioner filed a Position Paper;

Branch 10 of Pasay City

toto the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court;

petitioner; thus, prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review;

Hence, the filing of this memorandum

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on question as evidenced by the Transfer Certificate of the

Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

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Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

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Bar Operations 2012: Ace the Bar, Race the Car!

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Private Respondent, through counsel, respectfully states: