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May 2016
This presentation is a research report and is for informational purposes only. Opinions expressed are solely those of Devonshire Research Group and this is not a recommendation to purchase securities discussed
herein. This presentation is confidential and may not be reproduced or distributed without the express consent of Devonshire Research Group. Please refer to the next slide for additional disclosures.
-Attorney Confidential-
Disclaimer
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-Attorney Confidential-
-Attorney Confidential-
Notice of non-affiliation
Part I of this analysis, released publicly in March 2016, was widely praised as effective and fact-driven. Critics of
the analysis allege that the work of the Devonshire Research Group is unfairly biased, due to affiliations with
industry players who seek to limit the market performance of Tesla. This is interesting, but untrue.
Devonshire Research Group hereby asserts that it does not have professional or business relationships with any of
the following organizations:
General Motors
Ford
Toyota
The City of Detroit
Koch Industries
ExxonMobil
Royal Dutch Shell
BP
CB Insights
The Illuminati
Marshall Mathers, aka Eminem
-Attorney Confidential-
-Attorney Confidential-
Executive Summary
How closely does TSLAs financing model mirror the features of common Ponzi, Pyramid, and Matrix schemes?
Numerous cautionary examples share features with TSLA, including hype driven by visionary leaders
TSLA has accepted capital from unsophisticated investors with bold claims on return and/or product value
If TSLA fails to deliver on these claims it has the potential to enter a death spiral
Most common death spirals do not require malicious intent, but rather excessive (even delusional) ambition
The profitability of the Model 3 depends on TSLAs ability to squeeze its supply chain; this is a tall order
Sophisticated suppliers (most notably Panasonic) will fight for their share of the profit
Panasonics rechargeable battery division is constrained in terms of investment capacity and profit demands
Current suppliers of numerous strategic, high-technology components have little IP and export to the US
Many Chinese suppliers are vulnerable to patent infringement accusations and could face ITC injunctions
TSLAs use of tax credits disproportionately benefits the wealthy at the expense of the average taxpayer
This inequality is a feature of the luxury-first market penetration strategy
The election year introduces significant risk for TSLAs continued reliance on taxpayer subsidies
-Attorney Confidential-
4
3
Originally
reported
0.9
0.8
0.6
0.5
0
-1
0.5
Originally
reported
0.7
-3
Non-GAAP
0.0
-0.5
Revised
Nov 2001
-1.0
0.4
-1.5
0.3
0.2
-2
Revised
Aug 2002
-2.0
GAAP
0.1
-2.5
0.0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
2012
2013
2014
2015
Tesla has escalated a dangerous habit of unorthodox future-earning-based financing in pursuit of the
questionably profitable and long-delayed Model 3. A misstep in the next two years risks entering a death spiral
Source: Devonshire Research Group considers Teslas decision to use non-GAAP accounting methods
to be inherently aggressive; unorthodox future earnings based financing defined on slide 11
-Attorney Confidential-
2008 - 2012
2013 - 2015
Early 2016
Late 2016
2017 - ?
Speculative upcoming innovations
Overprice
Roadster; use
profit to direct
Model S R&D
Collect $1k
deposits for Model
3 to finance SG&A
Pay interest on
deposits of future
models?
Distribute cost of
scale by locking in
multi-year contracts
Convince Nevada
to subsidize
creation of battery
factories, lithium
mines
Convince
Panasonic to invest
majority of spend
in Gigafactory
Secure Colorado
used car resale
credit to uphold
depreciation
Develop one-carper-neighborhood
leasing?
Guarantee 3-year
Model S resale
value to ease
nervous buyers
Present Model 3
prototype vehicle
loaded with costs
>>> $35K target
Implement pooled
fractional / shared
ownership models?
Allow a barter
system to convert
pre-order deposits
into coupons?
Abandon P&L,
Balance Sheet, and
cash flow as
outdated reporting
methods
Contributes to
growing GAAP
discrepancies
Fragile, unsustainable,
unpredictable approaching
US election year
Teslas financing model is fragile; it is attempting to manage multiple financial instrument models under the same
accounting umbrella to our knowledge, one of the last companies to attempt this level of financial innovation was Enron
-Attorney Confidential-
Model 3
Model S
Model S
RVG threshold
Model 3 reveal threatens to
tank Model S resale values, so
Tesla hoards used vehicles to
resell under Colorado used
EV credit incentive
Source: Edmunds.com, NADA used car guide 2015; Devonshire Research Group analysis suggests
traditional accounting strategies would be sufficient without promised resale guarantees and buy-back pricing
-Attorney Confidential-
30%
75%
40%
60%
25%
35%
20%
30%
10%
20%
10%
15%
5%
10%
5%
10%
5%
10%
2%
5%
2%
5%
60%
80%
Rationale
Tesla is operationally vulnerable to setbacks, and the deposit scheme amplifies this vulnerability.
Depositholders expect a $35k vehicle in 2017how many will vanish if this target is revised?
Highly Confidential
10
-Attorney Confidential-
Future-earning pyramidal financing (FEPF) is a business dynamic characterized by the act of raising
capital to finance future losses rather than future returns. The assumption in this dynamic is that
the future losses will be covered by a second capital raise (similarly pyramidal) which will allow
some investors to exit profitably, although many will reinvest and / or accept losses.
When properly recognized, managed, and regulated, FEPF can be a sustainable arrangement that
operates within both the spirit and letter of the law. Examples may be found in the realm of public
services, non-profits, and social service programs. However, when performed maliciously with
intent to defraud, FEPF forms the dynamic underlying illegal Ponzi, pyramid, and matrix schemes.
Aggressive cash-negative growth ventures that rely entirely on profitability at scale occupy a
dangerous middle ground where delusion often substitutes for malice.
Loss-Tolerant
Investors
(LTIs)
A category of investors that are capable of losing their investment in an enterprise, company, or
asset with or without their knowledge of this loss.
Financing Pyramid
Reporting
(FPR)
A form of financial reporting adopted from non-profit and venture capital investing that accurately
reflects businesses that are designed to lose money for long periods of time until subsequent
investors are secured, who must confront the needs to building a profitable business
If a business is operated as a FEPF, investors should not carry the expectation that such an enterprise will be run
for a profit; instead, this organization should be terminated, or regulated as a social service or non-profit
11
-Attorney Confidential-
Description
Strong presence
FEPF is not standard fundraising, and nonstandard fundraising tactics are commonly used
Malicious
Some presence
Delusional
Overambitious
No presence
Sustainable
12
-Attorney Confidential-
Description
Tesla
FEPF is not standard fundraising, and nonstandard fundraising tactics are commonly used
Source: Devonshire Research Group analysis and opinion; commentary from Elon Musk interviews and quarterly reports; limited
information about deposit vaulting available; https://www.teslamotors.com/blog/secret-tesla-motors-master-plan-just-between-you-and-me
13
-Attorney Confidential-
Massive fraud
Large-scale
Medium-scale
Aggressive-growth Unicorns
Everyday fraud
Small-scale
Targets unsophisticated /
vulnerable investors
Encourages investor
entrepreneurialism
Remains anonymous, then
vanishes
Unsustainable
Delusional / Overambitious
Source: Devonshire Research Group analysis and opinion; commentary from Elon
Musk interviews and quarterly reports
14
-Attorney Confidential-
Enron
Large-scale
Fractional
Reserve Banking
Madoff Ponzi
scheme
US Social
Security
WorldCom
Medium-scale
Bitcoin Savings
and Trust
Medicare
Ride Sharing
Large charities
Tesla Motors
(Today)
Multi-level
marketing
Shared Payment
Systems
Nigerian prince
email scams
Televangelism
Small-scale
Unsustainable
Startup seed
funding
Delusional / Overambitious
Sustainable
Source: Devonshire Research Group analysis and opinion; commentary from Elon
Musk interviews and quarterly reports
15
-Attorney Confidential-
Large-scale
Medium-scale
Tesla
Model Z
Supercharger
Network
Gigafactory
Tesla
Model 3
Tesla Motors
(Today)
Tesla
Model X
Tesla
Model S
Tesla
Roadster
Small-scale
Unsustainable
Delusional / Overambitious
Sustainable
Source: Devonshire Research Group analysis and opinion; commentary from Elon Musk interviews
and quarterly reports; Panasonic quarterly reports and press releases
16
Our
thesis
-Attorney
Confidential-
Historical precedent
Adjustment needed
High
Low
Low
Tesla escalates
pyramidal financing
but mismanages risk
Low
Growth outcome
Our thesis is twofold: (1) the likelihood of a successful Model 3 launch is low, and (2) Tesla will be forced
to seek residual value as a heavily-subsidized (and decidedly non-luxury) public good provider
17
-Attorney Confidential-
18
-Attorney Confidential-
Executive Summary
How closely does TSLAs financing model mirror the features of common Ponzi, Pyramid, and Matrix schemes?
Numerous cautionary examples share features with TSLA, including hype driven by visionary leaders
TSLA has accepted capital from unsophisticated investors with bold claims on return and/or product value
If TSLA fails to deliver on these claims it has the potential to enter a death spiral
Most common death spirals do not require malicious intent, but rather excessive (even delusional) ambition
The profitability of the Model 3 depends on TSLAs ability to squeeze its supply chain; this is a tall order
Sophisticated suppliers (most notably Panasonic) will fight for their share of the profit
Panasonics rechargeable battery division is constrained in terms of investment capacity and profit demands
Current suppliers of numerous strategic, high-technology components have little IP and export to the US
Many Chinese suppliers are vulnerable to patent infringement accusations and could face ITC injunctions
TSLAs use of tax credits disproportionately benefits the wealthy at the expense of the average taxpayer
This inequality is a feature of the luxury-first market penetration strategy
The election year introduces significant risk for TSLAs continued reliance on taxpayer subsidies
19
-Attorney Confidential-
Australia
USA
ITC injunction on
Chinese-imported
parts
Germany
China
UK
Shanghai
Price pressure by
Japanese and
Taiwanese suppliers
Belgium
Netherlands
Thailand
Singapore
Taiwan
S. Korea
Japan
Source
Destination
20
-Attorney Confidential-
Obstacles
Gross Profit
78%
Likely
Supercharger Allowance
0%
Likely
Manufacturing Overhead
46%
Maybe
Drivetrain
63%
Unlikely
Battery Pack
65%
Unlikely
Interior
43%
Unlikely
Systems
0%
Maybe
40%
Unlikely
3%
Maybe
21
-Attorney Confidential-
Tesla relies for the most part on a low-cost supply chain many of these
players lack protectable technology and have little give on margin
Tesla foreign imports by country: approximately half of suppliers hold no US IP
100%
70
60
Total # of suppliers
80%
50
40
60%
30
40%
20
20%
10
0
0%
China
Belgium
Hong Kong
Taiwan
Germany
UK
Japan
UK
1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
10,000,000
# of containers
Tesla has opted for a low-cost and low-IP approach, with close to half of all foreign parts
suppliers for the Models S and X holding exactly zero protective US patents
22
-Attorney Confidential-
1,000,000
Containers shipped to
Tesla since Q3 2009
Shipping company
Panasonic Corporation / Sanyo Electric
Luvata Oy
Fukuta Electric & Machinery Co., Ltd.
Ceramtec Gmbh
Ningbo Jinyi Automotive Parts
Fuji Polymer Industries Co., Ltd.
Hota Industrial Mfg. Co., Ltd.
Srems Zhongshan Cenity Electronic
Pektron Plc
Barum Continental Spol Sro
Nishikawa Rubber Co., Ltd.
Premo Group
Amtek Precision Engineering
Amtek Plastic Ltd
Wabco Fahrzeugsysteme Gmbh
Dura Automotive Systems Gmbh
Sixxon Precision Machinery Co., Ltd
Leopold Kostal Gmbh & Co
Rogers Technologies Co., Ltd
Flextronics International Kft
Transtek Magnetics Ltd.
Huf Huelsbeck & Fuerst Gmbh & Co
Isabellenhuette Heusler Gmbh & Co
Bizlink Technology Inc
US granted patents
56,392
11
1
250
0
22
0
0
0
0
141
0
0
0
1
128
0
27
350
576
0
171
6
4
Product Description
Lithium ion batteries
Copper rods & wiring
Induction motor
Performance ceramics
Charging plugs, integrated plates
Performance rubber & plastics
Gears, shafts, rotors, axles
Cooling tubes
Electronic components
Tires
Weatherstrips
Inductive elements
Bracket components
Plates, trays, pipes, etc.
Air suspension
Key areas of
exposure
Unspecified parts
Powertrain components
Steering column switches
Busbars (conductors)
Audio system
Transformers
Keys & starters
Battery monitoring
Cables / connectors
Tesla will need to realize significant cost savings across the board to make the Model 3 profitablebut
advanced components are already produced by low-cost suppliers with no patent holdings
Source: Devonshire Research Group IP databases
23
-Attorney Confidential-
The suppliers who do own IP are not loss-tolerant and will not
budge on margins for a relatively small purchaser such as Tesla
US patents granted
to supplier
100,000
Country of Origin
Panasonic Corporation
Germany
LG Electronics Inc
Australia
10,000
China
Hongfujin Precision
Italy
LG Chem Ltd.
Kobe Steel, Ltd.
1,000
Belgium
Foxconn Computer
South Korea
Taiwan
Ceramtec Gmbh
Nishikawa Rubber Co., Ltd.
100
Hong Kong
United Kingdom
Panama
Japan
Singapore
10
Luvata Pori Oy
Fukuta Electric & Machinery Co., Ltd
1
1
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
10,000,000
Containers shipped
to Tesla since Q3 09
24
-Attorney Confidential-
16%
Batteries
Devices
28%
17%
Chargers
Housing
17%
B2B
25%
Safety
$616 MM
Comfort
Consumer
electronics
23%
45%
26%
2015 automotive
capital investment
Capital pledged
to Gigafactory
25
-Attorney Confidential-
26
-Attorney Confidential-
1,000
800
400
200
Generally-accepted
critical pack price
150
114
100
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Zero-margin raw
material cost floor
Data fit gives 8% annual cost reduction by leading manufacturers, suggesting Tesla will not hit
$150 / kWh until 2020well past the promised end-of-2017 Model 3 delivery date
Source: Rapidly falling costs of battery packs for
electric vehicles, Nature Climate Change, 3/23/15
27
-Attorney Confidential-
Executive Summary
How closely does TSLAs financing model mirror the features of common Ponzi, Pyramid, and Matrix schemes?
Numerous cautionary examples share features with TSLA, including hype driven by visionary leaders
TSLA has accepted capital from unsophisticated investors with bold claims on return and/or product value
If TSLA fails to deliver on these claims it has the potential to enter a death spiral
Most common death spirals do not require malicious intent, but rather excessive (even delusional) ambition
The profitability of the Model 3 depends on TSLAs ability to squeeze its supply chain; this is a tall order
Sophisticated suppliers (most notably Panasonic) will fight for their share of the profit
Panasonics rechargeable battery division is constrained in terms of investment capacity and profit demands
Current suppliers of numerous strategic, high-technology components have little IP and export to the US
Many Chinese suppliers are vulnerable to patent infringement accusations and could face ITC injunctions
TSLAs use of tax credits disproportionately benefits the wealthy at the expense of the average taxpayer
This inequality is a feature of the luxury-first market penetration strategy
The election year introduces significant risk for TSLAs continued reliance on taxpayer subsidies
28
-Attorney Confidential-
Current impediments
Brand inconsistency:
inconsistency Tesla sells
luxury vehicles to the wealthy.
Government aid would require
benefits for all incomes
29
-Attorney Confidential-
1.0
Tax credits
6.5
6.0
0.8
5.5
0.7
5.0
0.9
0.6
0.5
0.4
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
0.3
2.0
0.2
1.5
1.0
0.1
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
<10
10-20
20-40
40-75
75-200
>200
Would any current US Presidential candidate risk extending nation-wide EV credits if this story
of inequality were to be shared with the average voter?
Source: The Distributional Effects of U.S. Clean Energy Tax
Credits, UC Berkeley, July 2015, data collected from 2009-2012
30
-Attorney Confidential-
Nissan Leaf
100,000
Tesla Model S
Chevrolet Volt
BMW i3
Fiat 500e
10,000
Smart Fortwo EV
Chevrolet Spark EV
Mitsubishi i-MiEV
1,000
Mercedes-Benz B-Class EV
Kia Soul EV
Tesla Model X
100
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
Base price
90,000
31
-Attorney Confidential-
In 2013, the average Tesla owner had twice the household income
of other EV owners
While the field of electric vehicles (EVs) has grown with the
Chevrolet Volt, Nissan Leaf and the Toyota Prius Plug-In, Tesla
buyers display unique differences. NVES shows that Tesla
owners have double the average household income of other EV
owners ($293,200).
($293,200) As a result, they are more likely to be adding
a Tesla to their household fleet (51%) rather than replacing a
vehicle with its purchase.
- Strategic Vision: New Vehicle Experience Survey (2013)
32
-Attorney Confidential-
Subsidy size
Source
Gigafactory incentives
$1,290 MM
Nevada taxpayers
Zero-emission credits
$518 MM
California taxpayers
$284 MM
Federal taxpayers
CA self-generation incentive
$126 MM
California taxpayers
$90 MM
California taxpayers
$45 MM
Federal taxpayers
$38 MM
California taxpayers
Tesla is built on loss-tolerant public money, but this will not be a solution in perpetuity. Eventually
Tesla will need to stand on its own or accept a role as a government-sponsored public good provider
33
-Attorney Confidential-
Luxury
Visionary
Green
Brand inconsistencies
High-performance vehicles
--
--
Quality engineering
--
Leading technology
Eventually affordable
To be determined
Developing EV infrastructure
--
Lowering emissions
Government endorsement
Supporters say Tesla is saving the world. We believe the reality is that Tesla helps rich people buy cars.
This brand inconsistency is a key vulnerability going into a contentious US presidential election year; is
inequality a core feature of the Tesla brand?
34
-Attorney Confidential-
35
-Attorney Confidential-
36
-Attorney Confidential-
Thank you
For more information, please contact Devonshire Research Group, LLC at surfhacker@bloomberg.net
37