1AC

The contention is cybersecurity-Cyber attacks are empirical and increasing now encryption
backdoors uniquely increases likelihood of success. Every attack
increases the risk of existential catastrophe.

Nolan 15 Andrew Nolan, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, former
Trial Attorney at the United States Department of Justice, holds a J.D. from George Washington
University, 2015 (Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions, CRS
Report to Congress, March 16th, Available Online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf,
Accessed 07-05-2015, p. 1-3)

Over the course of the last year, a host of cyberattacks have been perpetrated on a number of
high profile American companies. In January 2014, Target announced that hackers,
using malware, had digitally impersonated one of the retail giants contractors, stealing
vast amounts of dataincluding the names, mailing addresses, phone numbers or email addresses for up to 70 million
individuals and the credit card information of 40 million shoppers. Cyberattacks in February and March of 2014
potentially exposed contact and log-in information of eBays customers , prompting the online
retailer to ask its more than 200 million users to change their passwords. In September, it was revealed that over
the course of five months cyber-criminals tried to steal the credit card information of
more than fifty million shoppers of the worlds largest home improvement retailer, Home Depot. One
month later, J.P. Morgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank by assets, disclosed that contact
information for about 76 million households was captured in a cyberattack earlier in the year.
In perhaps the most infamous cyberattack of 2014, in late November, Sony Pictures
Entertainment suffered a significant system disruption as a result of a brazen cyber attack
that resulted in the leaking of the personal details of thousands of Sony employees . And
in February of 2015, the health care provider Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield [end page 1]
disclosed that a very sophisticated attack obtained personal information relating to the
companys customers and employees. The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early
2015 appear to be indicative of a broader trend: the frequency and ferocity of
cyberattacks are increasing, posing grave threats to the national interests of the
United States. Indeed, the attacks on Target, eBay, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan-Chase, Sony
Pictures, and Anthem were only a few of the many publicly disclosed cyberattacks
perpetrated in 2014 and 2105. Experts suggest that hundreds of thousands of other entities may
have suffered similar incidents during the same period, with one survey indicating that
43% of firms in the United States had experienced a data breach in the past year.14 Moreover,
just as the cyberattacks of 2013which included incidents involving companies like the
New York Times, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, and Microsoft were eclipsed by those that
occurred in 2014, the consensus view is that 2015 and beyond will witness more
frequent and more sophisticated cyber incidents. To the extent that its expected
rise outpaces any corresponding rise in the ability to defend against such attacks, the
result could be troubling news for countless businesses that rely more and more on
computers in all aspects of their operations, as the economic losses resulting from a
single cyberattack can be extremely costly. And the resulting effects of a cyberattack
can have effects beyond a single companys bottom line. As nations are becoming ever
more dependent on information and information technology, the threat posed by any
one cyberattack [end page 2] can have devastating collateral and cascading effects
across a wide range of physical, economic and social systems. With reports
that foreign nationssuch as Russia, China, Iran, and North Koreamay be using
cyberspace as a new front to wage war, fears abound that a cyberattack could be
used to shut down the nations electrical grid, hijack a commercial airliner,
1

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or even launch a nuclear weapon with a single keystroke.24 In short, the potential
exists that the United States could suffer a cyber Pearl Harbor, an attack that would
cause physical destruction and loss of life and exposein the words of one prominent
cybersecurity expertvulnerabilities of staggering proportions .
25

26

Encryption backdoors directly collapse the US tech industry and

economy - causes investor pullout and financial attacks
Clark, economic scholar, 14 (Thomas G. Clark, economics scholar, blogger on
economics, politics, and philosophy, university level English tutor, former administrator
in public and private industries, How NSA overreach has done more damage to the US
economy that Osama Bin Laden could ever have dreamed of, Thomas G. Clark, Another
Angry Voice Blog, http://anotherangryvoice.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsa-overreachworse-than-terrorism.html)//chiragjain
Ever since the Edward Snowden leaks started it has become more and more obvious that the NSA and their Five Eyes partners (the
spooks in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) have been making a concerted effort to monitor and control the entire Internet.
They've engaged in vast data stealing exercises designed to sweep up and store the private communications data of virtually everyone; the
NSA have employed a team of some 850,000 NSA staff and private security contractors to trawl this ocean of stolen data for whatever they

can find; they've damaged international relations by snooping on dozens of heads of state ;
they've used their snooping powers to spy on companies like the Brazilian oil company Petrobras (surely motivated by industrial espionage,
rather than their stated justification of "fighting terrorism"); they've undermined

encryption technology endangering the security of financial transactions; and they've compelled
countless US based technology companies to violate the privacy of their own customers and to
build backdoors into their products to enable NSA snooping. In order to compress what they've been
doing into a single paragraph, I've obviously left out a lot of the nefarious activities orchestrated by the NSA and carried out by their
mercenary army of hundreds of thousands of private sector spooks and their Five Eyes collaborators. But even so, the above paragraph is
more than enough to demonstrate that the

security services in the US, and the other Five Eyes collaborator states, are
running dangerously out of control. The fact that the NSA and their Five Eyes collaborators feel entitled to trawl the

Internet for whatever they can find, which is then stored in vast data centres and subjected to algorithmic analysis without the need for any
kind of judicial warrant, demonstrates that something fundamental has changed in the relationship between the state and the citizen. Due
process has been abandoned, and as far as the security services are concerned, we are all assumed to be guilty. They don't have to be able to

with no
democratic oversight at all over many of their data stealing operations . The fact that the US state
show probable cause, they don't have to apply for a warrant from a judge, they just steal our data and use it as they see fit,

employs a staggering 850,000 NSA staff and private sector contractors to trawl this ocean of stolen data should be alarming to anyone with
the brains to think through the logical implications of such a vast mercenary army. You would have to be a hopeless idealist to imagine that
there are no "bad apples" at all amongst all these hundreds of thousands. If we assume that just 4% of them (one in every 25) are the kind of
people that would use their access to enormous surveillance powers to do things like steal commercially confidential information to order,
blackmail people, cyber stalk people, wage petty vendettas against old adversaries ... that would mean a rogue army of some 34,000 thieves,
stalkers and blackmailers with access to the NSA's vast caches of stolen data and their extraordinary surveillance capabilities. The fact that
the NSA have been using their powers to engage in industrial espionage against various countries such as Germany, Russia, China and
Brazil illustrates that "the few bad apples" narrative, although useful from an illustrative point of view, isn't actually the main concern. The
main concern is that the NSA itself is corrupt to the core. Instead of using their powers to maintain the rule of law and to "fight terrorism"
they're actually intent on using their unprecedented espionage capabilities in order to undermine global competition for the benefit of US
based corporations. One of the most worrying revelations is that the spy

agencies have deliberately compromised

the encryption technology used to keep our financial transactions safe, and that they
have awarded themselves the power to hack into bank accounts anywhere in the world
and simply erase money out of existence, or invent fictional transactions. They have
undermined the integrity of the financial system in order to build themselves snooping capabilities
that would have blown the minds of the East German Stasi or the Soviet KGB. Perhaps the most damning element of all (from an
American perspective) is the extraordinary amount of damage the NSA have done to the
reputation of US technology companies, by compelling them to breech the privacy
of their own customers and infecting their products with spyware. This trashing of the
reputation of countless US based technology companies comes with an enormous price
tag. It has been estimated that the reputational damage inflicted on US technology
companies by their own government could amount to $180 billion, as millions of
customers are turned off the idea of investing in buggy, insecure and spyware laden
products from US companies. If you add the estimated $180 billion in reputational damage to American companies to the
staggering cost of running the NSA and employing an army of 850,000 spooks, the cost of this folly is absolutely enormous. One of

the worst things about having trashed the reputation of their own technology sector, is
the fact that the technology sector is one of the few parts of the US economy that
is healthy and productive. The US financial sector is a gigantic, virtually
unregulated and desperately unstable hotbed of corruption and reckless gambling and
US manufacturing power has been in decline since the neoliberals came to power in the 1980s and
allowed short-term profiteers to asset strip US productivity. The US economy is in
decline, but that decline has been offset by a remarkable period of exponential
growth in the US technology sector. Any American with a reasonably comprehensive view of how their economy
is structured must be absolutely aghast at the damage inflicted on the technology sector by the power crazed spooks that considered their

Not
only does it look like the NSA's overreach is going to cost the US economy vastly more
than any terrorist attack ever has, it also looks set to crush US ambition of
controlling the Internet, as ever more people realise that the Americans can no
longer be trusted to control the fundamental infrastructure of the Internet.
Any non-US corporation with the slightest regard for data security is going to move
away from reliance upon the US technology sector as soon as possible, and any
nation that values its own industries is surely going to approve of efforts to wrest
control of the Internet away from the US. The sheer scale of NSA data theft is
driving the development of new highly encrypted technology. It is only a matter of
time before spook proof browsers and encrypted communications become
commonplace, because there is an undeniable market demand for such things. The
most terrible thing from a US perspective is that US technology companies will be
completely cut off from entry into this new market because everyone is now aware
of how the US intelligence agencies have forced US technology companies to infect their
own products with spyware and invade the privacy of their own customers. Nobody is
ever going to believe US technology companies when they give assurances about privacy,
meaning that the next wave of secure communications technology is going to arise
outside the US. The NSA have been using their surveillance powers to engage in industrial espionage in order to benefit US
mission to infect everything they could with spyware as far more important than the long term success of the US technology sector.

corporations. This is a clear demonstration that they see it as their mission to help US corporations by fair means or foul. Given that this is
one of their core objectives, the fact that they

have inflicted such an extraordinary amount of damage on

the most vibrant sector of the US economy must go down as one of the most spectacular own goals in history. They
built a vast data stealing operation in order to help US corporations, but in doing so inflicted more damage on the US economy than Osama
Bin Laden could ever have dreamed of. The NSA have used their scaremongering narratives about the threat of terrorism to justify the
slaughter of their own golden goose, yet they would have us believe that they are not responsible. They would have everyone believe that
Edward Snowden is the guilty party; that he alone is responsible for the damage to the US technology sector. But their case is a ludicrous
one. There is clearly something dreadfully wrong with the way things are set up if just one man (out of some 850,000 spooks) can single
handedly wipe an estimated $180 billion off the value of the US technology sector simply by telling the truth.

And, backdoors are inherently vulnerable allows for financial

attacks
Cerias 14 (Center for Education and Research Information Assurance and
Security Purdue University U.S. Bank of Cyber: An analysis of Cyber Attacks on the
U.S. Financial System 3/2014 Page 1, 53-54)\\mwang

An individual perpetuating a cyber attack on a financial institution or their client is likely

doing it for personal gain, out of retaliation, or simply to be a nuisance . While an individual
instance of identity theft may not seem financially significant to anyone external to the victim, identity theft cost consumers
over five billion dollars and cost financial institutions over 48 billion dollars over the
course of 2008. In addition to identity theft, other common cyber attacks on businesses, individuals and institutions include fraud
and espionage, both of which can also be financially devastating. A 2011 report from the Ponemon Institute, a privacy and information
management firm, the average data breach in the United States ends up costing 6.75 million dollars, ranging as high as 31 million dollars1 .
If the cyber

attack is led by a nation state or a group acting on their behalf, and the target is an
attack could be considered an act of war depending on the
intent and severity of resultant damage. A successful attack that originated from a group that considers the United
States to be an enemy country that disrupts the activity of any critical infrastructure entity, could be considered an act of war. The
external entity to that nation state, the

modern day economy of the United States is extremely dependent on information

technology systems and cyber. Critical infrastructure is a term that refers to any organization essential to the national
economy, including financial, energy, transportation, and telecommunication entities, as well as waste, water, public health, and similar
government services2 . A

successful, malicious cyber attack on any of these entities of the United

States critical infrastructure could potentially be devastating to the well being of citizens,
as well as financially devastating to the government. An attack wouldnt necessarily have to be targeted on a
financial institution to damage the economy; an attack on any critical infrastructure has the potential to
additionally damage the United States financially. A successful attack on the federal
banking industry could potentially bankrupt individuals, destroy businesses, devastate
the economy or prevent the federal government from being able to function as it needs
to. This paper looks into the history of the United States financial industry and the attacks taken against it by the use of cyber. By looking
at the attacks taken place and researching the attack types and originating known attacker we are able to look into the patterns used by
groups, individuals, and nation states in their attacks against the United States financial industry. For the ease of continuity the following
terms are defined as they are used in this paper. The

U.S. financial infrastructure is evolving along with the

cyber capabilities it utilizes. Analyzing the statistics of cyber attacks on the United States
financial industry and their origins gives insight into patterns of attack, sources and motivation of various
nationally significant attacks, and the possibility of continued, increasing cyber threat against the
nations financial sector of its critical infrastructure. Analyzing individual cases of financial cyber crime has allowed for
greater understanding of the history and continuing threat the US financial system faces from individuals, hackitivists, groups and nation
states. While the motivation for the attacks may vary, the trend of cyber crime is exponentially rising due to increased internet access and
usage by individuals, businesses, and government agencies alike. The

financial industry is a direct target for

individuals seeking to profit due to the potential for large financial gains. Cyber is a dynamic

environment that can easily facilitate these types of financial crimes remotely, quickly, and without leaving obvious signs or evidence of a
breach. A

significant cyber attack led by a nation state or its actors versus another nation
state could be considered an act of war, as defined in this paper. Protecting the framework of the
US financial system is essential to the health and survival of the national
and global economies. Identifying patterns of compromise and potential attackers is a crucial step in determining if the
financial industry is indeed under attack and if so, who the perpetrators may be. The U.S. financial infrastructure is
evolving along with the cyber capabilities it utilizes and travels through. Protecting this framework
is essential to the health and survival of the national and global economies. Identifying patterns of compromise and potential attackers is a
crucial step in determining if the financial industry is indeed under attack and if so, who the perpetrators may be. The previous work
analyzes past cyber attacks to determine if the U.S. financial industry is under attack by individuals, group and nation states. This paper
defined key terms and presented a theory and paradigm of cyber attacks. This paper examined case studies, both in summary and in depth,
to examine the aggressors and any origination or motivation. Additionally, this paper proposes a taxonomy created by the researchers
concerning types of cyber attacks seen in the financial sector. This paper also demonstrated a SWOT analysis on a case study. This paper
provided an overview and timeline of nationally and internationally significant cyber attacks that affected the US financial system. An

there is indeed an
upward trend in financial cyber crime; as the number of internet users has grown exponentially over the last decade,
analysis of attack types and case studies on unique types of breaches were presented. This paper found that

the number of reported cyber attacks has increased as well. As more individuals, businesses, institutions, and government agencies
continue to use cyber for more and more, the trend of cyber crime will also continue to increase.

That collapses the banking sector --- spurs hoarding --- that
devastates the economy

Casaretto 14 (John Casaretto, SiliconANGLE's CyberSecurity Editor cites an authority

in economic warfare and financial terrorism that has been commissioned by the
Pentagon and has consulted with the CIA, FBI, SEC, among others A colossal cybereconomic attack is coming Game Plan SiliconAngle
http://siliconangle.com/blog/2014/01/06/a-colossal-cyber-economic-attack-is-cominggame-plan Jan 6, 2014)\\mwang
The U.S. economy is in the cross-hairs of a major economic cyber attack. There is an
alarming amount of evidence that it has not only happened before, but that it will
be coming again. Thats the warning from author Kevin Freeman, in Game Plan: How to Protect Yourself
from the Coming Cyber-Economic Attack the follow-up book to his blockbuster New York Times bestseller, Secret
Weapon. Freeman is an authority in economic warfare and financial terrorism that has been

commissioned by the Pentagon and has consulted with the CIA, FBI, SEC, among others.
In the book, Freeman illustrates a variety of financial threats against our economy, including cyber attacks, EMPs,
espionage, collusion in coordinated short-sale attacks and much more. He also goes in to how individuals can protect

themselves from this threat and guard their assets, by showing how in times of disaster economics survival comes down
to preparing for a variety of possible economic meltdown scenarios. A Game Plan for the Next Attack America was

attacked in 2001 and again in 2008. We are still suffering from those attacks. Secret Weapon
explained in detail how the attack of 2008 happened, who was involved and what would come next. Many signs of the
next attack have already appeared. It appears that a third attack is imminent. Game Plan is
your companion to Secret Weapon, taking the research to the next level, personalizing it for individuals, and providing a
strategic path to respond. Freeman argues that arrogance has kept us from realizing the economic war that is

underway, while cyber-security is at the heart of it. The new frontier for war isnt really terrorism as
people know it, but financial attacks and thats exactly what is laid out in the book a history of attacks
and motives that he reported to the Pentagon and eventually in Secret Weapon. There is evidence that
either Chinese, Russian influences may have forced the bailouts of 2008. Evidence that
enemies are preparing for a catastrophic EMP attack with the potential of wiping out
the power grid over swaths of the country for months. Were unprepared to respond to that type of
event, and it could even come from natural events which are cyclically overdue. The report floated around the DOD but
was apparently suppressed because of political sensitivity. The law required that the report be released in late 2011,
allowing the voters to assess the information before the national elections in 2012. Unfortunately, the report was held up
for months. When I asked the reason for the unusual delay, I was told that there were fears that the findings might be used
as a political weapon. Now, there are many that dismiss all this because there is a perception that

China is a trade partner and an interdependent economy. Freeman explains how the Chinese
military is in it for the long game and that its basically a winner-take-all situation. Cyber
attacks that originate in China and other countries are continuous and are largely
expected to rise. Al-Qaeda has absolutely defined their ambitions to commit
financial cyber attacks. This may be the most critical issue we face today. This is Americas new
battle space. The doctrine of mutually assured destruction or the notion of taking on our
military even after years of prolonged challenges is not something that enemies are even
thinking of engaging in anymore. Its all about cyber attacks, attacking the financial and
national infrastructure thats the frontier. On December 15th 2013, General Keith Alexander, the
Commander of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and Director of the NSA was featured on 60
minutes, where he basically admitted that a foreign nation state could potentially crash the
U.S. economy. In a stunning reaction to this revelation, Wall St actually continued its rise to close out the
year, with the DJIA rising some 800 points meaning theyre not taking these threats seriously .
Freeman sees a way out, and a way for people to navigate their own way through this kind of crisis. It goes beyond buying
gold and hunkering down in the basement. Thats because the decline can take time, spiraling in the throes

of a domino effect with people hoarding assets, the economy stagnating and
the flaws in our current economic strategy exposed . Part of his prescription is a recipe of 8
steps for America to avoid this financial disaster. It is going to require a lot of leadership and investment.

Ill isolate multiple impacts --First, biotechs expanding now and will continue to in the squo
Smith 1/18 <Sarah Smith, research advisor at Reportbuyer, leading industry
intelligence solution that provides market research, 1/18/2016, Analyzing the Global
Biotechnology Industry in 2015, PR Newswire, http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/analyzing-the-global-biotechnology-industry-2015-300205576.html>//wx

LONDON, Jan. 18, 2016 /PRNewswire/ -- Biotechnology as an industry has been around for many years now. The manipulation of
biological processes is nothing new as the fermenting of grains and fruits to create alcoholic beverages to the discovery of penicillin has been
around since the 1920s. Advances in genomics, molecular biology and computing power has made it possible for the field of biotechnology
to advance and develop more targeted medicines, manufacture high nutrition crops, and even manufacture grow artificial organs and
tissues. Following

the economic recession of 2008-2009, the global biotechnology industry

has been growing at a strong rate, despite a slowdown in 2013. However, forecast for the global biotech industry is
expected to show strong growth till the year 2019. Emerging markets like China, Brazil and India are leading the sales in the global
biotechnology market. The

Americas and Europeregions hold the biggest share in the global

biotechnology industry - Americas had a share of nearly 45%, followed by Europeaccounting for nearly 30% of the global

biotechnology industry. The medical/healthcare segment is the leading segment of the biotechnology industry and in 2014 it consisted of
nearly 60% of the global biotech industry's total value. This was followed by the food and agriculture segment. Aruvian Research analyzes

the Global Biotechnology Industry in this comprehensive research report. Analyzing the Global Biotechnology Industry covers the biotech
market from the year 2010 till 2019. The

report analyzes a total of 23 biotech markets and over 40

biotech companies. The report begins with an analysis of the global biotechnology industry through industry statistics, industry

value analysis and an industry segmentation. We segment the global biotech industry into bioinformatics, genomics, pharmacogenomics
and proteomics. We also analyze industry financing and investments. Forecast for the global biotechnology industry is included till 2019. An
industry definition precedes this section. The Global Biotechnology Industry is analyzed through Porter's Five Forces Strategy Analysis. We
look at the biotech industry through buyer and supplier power, competitive rivalry in the industry, threat of new entrants and the threat of
substitutes. The blurring differences between biotech and pharma companies is analyzed in our report. Moving on, we analyze market
trends and challenges facing the global biotechnology industry such as the emergence of bioinformatics, biosensor technology, cloning
technology, and others. Challenges

facing the industry are analyzed such as industry

globalization, intellectual property issues, regulatory barriers, lack of investor confidence, financial issues, issues with genetic

manipulation, and lack of adequate water, amongst a host of other barriers are all analyzed. Moving to the analysis of the 23 key biotech
markets, we analyze each country through industry statistics, industry value analysis, industry segmentation and forecast till 2019.
Countries analyzed include Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom and United States.
Other markets we analyze briefly include Australia, Brazil, Cuba, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Romania, Singapore, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Switzerland and Tanzania. Major players in the global biotech industry are analyzed through a corporate profile, an analysis of the
business segments they operate through, a company strategy wherever available, financial analysis and a SWOT analysis. We analyze a total
of 44 companies in the report. The report Analyzing the Global Biotechnology Industry is ideal for investors, competitors within the
industry, as well as companies looking to enter the global biotech market will find this report to be meaningful in understanding the
workings of the industry.

But funding is key - sustained financing from the banking sector

is critical

Gerhardt, 5 (Don, CEO of Medical Alley / MNBIO, A Guide to Biotechnology

Finance, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, First
Edition, August 2005,
http://www.positivelyminnesota.com/Data_Publications/Publications/All_Other_DEE
D_Publications/Small_Business_Assistance_Office_Publications/A_Guide_to_Biotech
nology_Finance.pdf)
Biotechnology is on the forefront of a technological explosion. Indeed, this has already been
dubbed the "Century of Biology." In little more than a dozen years, the biotechnology industry has grown
from a handful of companies to a $40 billion worldwide industry that increasingly has an impact on a
broad spectrum of fields including, health care, agriculture and energy production.
Waves of new products, including those that help save lives, grow disease resistant foods and produce environmentally
friendly fuels, are coming to market. The expansion of the industry is being driven by three global demographic trends: a
growing population, longer life expectancies and an increasing percentage of elderly people in the total population.
Developing and manufacturing biotechnology medicines and products, however, is a complex

and costly process. Research and development, for example, now cost biotech companies up to
$100,000 per employee annually. To capitalize on the extraordinary opportunities
presented by the industry, biotechnology companies must be on the cutting edge of modern
financing. Success increasingly depends on knowledge of the specific issues that affect the industry and creative
strategies that develop from that understanding. Whether in early stages of growth or more mature phases of
development, companies are eager to attract grants, investment and corporate partners.

Massive decline in global yields are inevitable --- investment in

biotech now is key to prevent billions from starving to death

Noyes, 10 - *authors from report being referenced below [Katherine, Biotech Push
Needed to Avert Global Food Crisis, Scientists Warn Tech News World, 2-11-10,
http://www.technewsworld.com/rsstory/69321.html?wlc=1284092034]
World leaders must embrace agricultural biotechnology if they are to cope with the
severe food shortages likely to result from global warming in the coming decades, warns a
group of scientists. Yields from some of the most important crops for human consumption begin to
decline sharply when average temperatures exceed about 30 degrees Celsius, or 86 Fahrenheit, they explain in an
article that will appear Friday in the journal Science. As a result, "you're looking at a 20 percent to 30 percent decline in
production yields in the next 50 years for major crops between the latitudes of southern California or southern Europe to
South Africa," said David Battisti, a University of Washington atmospheric sciences professor and coauthor of the article.
Countries around the globe, then, need to "get beyond popular biases against the use of agricultural biotechnology,"

particularly crops genetically modified to produce greater yields in harsher conditions, the scientists said. 9 Billion by
2050 Even without climate change, feeding the world's population will be increasingly difficult as

that population increases -- likely by more than 30 percent to 9 billion people in 2050. That alone would require
doubling grain production in the tropics, Battisti said. A warmer climate, however, will reduce yields at a time when
they're needed most, because many temperatures will be too high to achieve the most efficient photosynthesis. For every
temperature increase of one degree Celsius, in fact, yields tend to go down by 10 percent, Battisti told TechNewsWorld.
"The projected changes in temperature due to global warming will put a lot of really basic stresses on plants," he said.
'Further Stress on Plants' In the tropics and subtropic s, in fact -- between roughly 30 degrees North and 30
degrees South -- the optimal temperatures for photosynthesis are already exceeded, explained
Battisti. "If you add global warming on top of that, you find that it puts further stress on plants," he pointed out. Even if
emissions were reduced dramatically in the coming years, it would still result in yield reductions of at least 20 percent by
midcentury, he asserted, with further reductions due to increasing pressure from pests and pathogens. 'Already Taking Its
Toll' "We are well aware through our emergency work responding to drought/famine/flood that climate change is already
taking its toll on agricultural yields in many parts of the developing world," Jennifer Parmelee, senior spokesperson with
the United Nations World Food Program (WFP), told TechNewsWorld. The WFP works to address the impact of climate
change through food-for-work programs "that include agricultural rehabilitation such as building of microdams, terraces
and other water catchments, and replanting of trees and shrubs to prevent further erosion and loss of precious topsoil,"
Parmelee explained. Places including Ethiopia and Haiti, for example, are both "massively deforested," she noted. A
'Major Starvation Catastrophe' So far, there hasn't been much attempt to breed crops resistant to heat stress, Battisti
noted. The result of all these increasing pressures could lead to a "major starvation catastrophe" by the end of this century
among the more than 3 billion people who live relatively close to the equator, along with a plethora of food shortages
elsewhere, the report's authors warn. "I grow increasingly concerned that we have not yet understood what it will take to
feed a growing population on a warming planet," said lead author Nina Federoff, who is science and technology adviser to
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and biology professor at Pennsylvania State University. What's needed are
systems that have the potential to decrease the land, energy and fresh water needed for agriculture while reducing the
pollution associated with agricultural chemicals and animal waste, the authors wrote. The Green Revolution The so-called
Green Revolution in agriculture produced a 2 percent increase in yields per year for 20 years, Battisti noted, primarily
through development of new grain varieties along with fertilizer and irrigation. "We're really asking for yield gains
comparable to those at the peak of the Green Revolution, but sustained for an unprecedented length of time -- 40 years -and at a time when climate change is acting against us," he said. Also complicating matters is that many of the institutions
involved do not work together closely enough to succeed, the authors charged. Then, too, there's the continued resistance
to crops such as corn and soybeans that have been genetically modified to be insect resistant and tolerant of herbicides. No
Silver Bullet "There has to be a lot of creative thinking, a greater blending of biotechnology and agriculture, and better
coordination between private and public research efforts throughout the world for us to keep pace with the increasing
demand for food," Battisti said. "We need to be thinking about the long-term demands for food and the environmental and
social ramifications of how we will produce it." There is no "silver bullet," Battisti added; rather, the solution will have to
involve a combination of things. Specifically, it will mean changing agronomy, or the way humans farm, and in some
cases, it will be a matter of changing varieties to more heat-tolerant versions. "That's a time-consuming process," Battisti
noted. "We'll have maybe three shots before mid-century to make current varieties more resilient to heat."

Biotech is key to boost food production and solve global famine

Reuters 8 (Alister Doyle, Environment Correspondent, Reuters, Biotechnology a key

to solving food crisis-US says, June 3,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03566931.htm, RG)
ROME, June 3 (Reuters) - Biotechnology can help solve the world's food crisis with benefits such as
flood-resistant rice in Bangladesh or higher cotton yields in Burkina Faso, a senior U.S. official said at a U.N.
food summit on Tuesday. "Biotechnology is one of the most promising tools for
improving the productivity of agriculture and increasing the incomes of the rural poor ,"
U.S. Agriculture Secretary Ed Schafer said. "We are convinced of the benefits it offers to developing
countries and small farmers," he told a U.S.-led briefing on the sidelines of the June 3-5 summit seeking ways
to combat high food prices when climate change may aggravate shortages. Some green groups say genetically-engineered
crops threaten biodiversity while many European consumers are wary of eating products dubbed by critics as
"Frankenfoods". Schafer said biotechnology, including genetically-modified organisms (GMOs),

could help produce more food by raising yields and producing crops in developing
nations that are resistant to disease and pests. "Genetic engineering offers long-term
solutions to some of our major crop production problems," said Philippine Agriculture Minister
Arthur Yap. But he said that it was not a panacea for all of his country's agricultural problems.

Food scarcity causes wars that go nuclear

Future Directions International (FDI), Australian research institute, International

Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points Resulting from Food and Water
Insecurity, WORKSHOP REPORT, Global Food and Water Crisis Research Programme,
52512, p. 8-9.
There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a
lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian
revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germanys World War Two
efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food.
Yet the general sense among those that attended FDIs recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the
future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation,
migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small
Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDIs March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict,
clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the gl-obe are starting to take note. . He writes (p.36), if people
are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.
Hunger feeds anarchy. This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if

large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then
wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow. He continues: An increasingly credible
scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering,
self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts. He also says: The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to
be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife,
insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources. As another workshop
participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources
for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because
people are going hungry. A study by the [IPRI] International Peace Research Institute indicates that where

food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur,
Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed
countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the [CSIS]
US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute [OPRI], all identify
famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

Finally, strong US growth is key to promoting an American

economic model --- the alternative is mercantilism, which
destroys economic cooperation

Atkinson 12 (ROBERT D. ATKINSON, President Information Technology and

Innovation Foundation a public policy think tank based in Washington, D.C, nonresident
senior fellow of the Brookings Institutions Metropolitan Policy Program. Enough is
Enough: Confronting Chinese Innovation Mercantilism FEBRUARY 2012 http://www2.itif.org/2012enough-enough-chinese-mercantilism.pdf)//kyan

Chinese officials are clearly aware of the damage their mercantilist policies have had on the
American economy (and other economies), but they portray China as a partner in the global economy, albeit
one that as a poor developing nation should be allowed to cut corners that more developed nations should not.17 They like to
paint the United States as a key trading partner. In fact, they dont really see the United
States as a trading partner. Rather America is an importing partner (with America doing most of
the importing) and a tech-transfer partner (with virtually all of the technology flowing from the United States to China).
In other words, Americas role is to serve as an import platform for producers in China (now
mostly multinationals, but increasingly domestic Chinese firms) and as a source of technology to help Chinese
firms move up the technology and value added scale so that they can displace U.S.
multinationals on the world stage. And this aggressive approach towards the implementation
of Chinas mercantilist policies suggests that there is a fundamental ideological difference
between how the Chinese state sees it role in bringing about state capitalism and the

traditional western model of capitalism supported by global organizations such as the WTO. But
the even larger threat is that the Beijing consensus will replace the Washington consensus as
the guiding star of other nations around the globe seeking to get rich. We already see this
in Brazil and India which are looking to emulate China in certain respects by ramping up mercantilism. 18
If this happens, it will be extremely difficult to maintain a global trading system that operates
along the lines most economists originally envisioned. What we need is neither the Washington consensuswhich is flawed in the
conceptual limitations it places on legitimate government roles to spur innovation and competitivenessnor the

Beijing
consensus, which is fundamentally a threat to globalization, but rather what might be termed a Helsinki consensus.

In other words, nations like Finland are fundamentally committed to a vision of global integration and free trade, but at the same time
recognize that good, non-mercantilist innovation policies (e.g., funding for research and technology transfer, support for STEM education,
R&D tax incentives, etc.) are critical to enable them to effectively compete in global markets. The World Bank, IMF, and other multilateral
organizations need to be advocating the Helsinki consensus around the world so that nations are not forced into an unproductive choice

between the Washington consensus and the Beijing consensus. If their choice is so limited, too many
will default to the latter, especially as they look at the respective economic
performances of the United States and China.

And, U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for

global war --- transition wars

Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008 [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princetons Woodrow Wilson School
and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, The
Dangers of a Diminished America, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]
Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial

architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The
worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget
deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be
possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and
Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while
Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos . Russia's new militancy and

China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from
the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing
commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could
all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance

ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive
powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster
exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become
ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.
The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic
competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has
demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil
prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic
growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be
constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political
legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if
the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails
with external adventures.

Even absent fill-in, economic decline causes war

Morey and Trantham 15 Political Science director of Undergrad Studies at University of Kentucky. Ph.D. in Political
Science from University of Iowa. Trantham Doctoral Canditate Visiting Lecture at Murray State University. M.A., University of Kentucky,
2015 Graduate Certificate in College Teaching and Learning, University of Kentucky, 2013 M.A., American University, 2010 B.A., Austin
College, 2008. (Talking But Not Doing: Congressional Opposition Cohesion and Presidential Foreign Policy Involvement, Daniel S. Morey
and Austin P. Trantham, April 3, 2015, WPSA 2015: http://216.59.24.78/2015browse.asp?sectionID=8&panelID=263#link8)//chiragjain

Presidents are also aware, as one Carter aide said, that no president whose popularity is as low as this Presidents has
much clout on the Hill (quote in Edwards 1980, 87). While high popularity provides presidents with prestige (Neustadt

1990) in Washington and the ability to get things done, the lack of popularity will destroy their capacity to lead on
domestic issues. When this is the case, presidents will turn to foreign affairs, where support in Congress is not necessary.
The idea of a linkage between popularity and foreign policy finds support in the diversionary

theory of international relations. In diversionary theory, presidents turn to foreign

policy, not because they lost power in domestic politics, but because they wish to shift the focus to
foreign issues in order to deflect blame at home. Most studies in this line of research theorize that
presidents are more likely to en gage in crisis activity with other states when their
popularity declines (see James and Hristoulas 1994). It is important to note that this line of research has not
developed an explanation for how low popularity affects the ability of a president to conduct foreign affairs. With low
popularity, it seems unlikely that other leaders would believe the president is able to credibly commit to agreements. Low
popularity may not force a president to foreign affairs as force them to the sidelines. Stated formally, low popularity
should reduce, not increase, foreign policy activity. Closely linked to approval is a loss of prestige due to a scandal.
Studying court nominations Kratz, Fleisher, and Bond (1998) speculate that credible evidence of wrong doing by a
nominee provides members of the Senate with a reason to oppose a nomination. A scandal, in other words, provides cover
to those that wish to oppose a nominee but might not be able to given other circumstances. While not direct evidence of
the effects of a presidential scandal, it does provide support for the common political wisdom that scandals can cause
presidents to lose control of the domestic agenda. Further, Wittkopt and McCormick (1998) speculate that a scandal
encourages partisanship in Congress, which would lead to a reduction in the amount of legislation passed. Edwards (1976,
113) states that political scandals will affect the prestige of a president. Since prestige is one of the presidents main tools
for influencing Congress, this hurts their ability to guide domestic politics. Some may object that scandals do not have any
direct link to Congress, instead feeling a scandal will just lower a presidents approval rating. While not generalizable to all
cases, Kagay (1999) found that President Clintons scandal did not lower his public approval rating but instead caused an
increase. This increase still did not cause Republicans to support Clinton and instead strengthened their resistance to his
policies. Thus, public opinion and scandal are not measures of the same concept or linked together in a simple cause and
effect manner. A third variable on presidential influence in Congress is the state of the

economy. Presidents are seen as the primary controller of the national economy, while
an erroneous view encouraged by Congressional delegations of authority, a failed
economy can quickly become equated with a failed administration. As the economic voting
literature demonstrates, negative evaluations of economic performance lead directly to voter support for the opposition
(Lewis-Beck 1990, Peffley 1984). This can embolden Congress to move out of the shadow of the

president and attempt to formulate their own domestic policy or at least block the current administrations efforts.
Studies in American use of force have directly linked economic conditions to
presidential decisions regarding the use of armed forces (Ostrom and Job 1986, James and Oneal
1991, Bruce and Hingkley 1992). While these studies usually argue that presidents use force to
deflect attention from economic misery and create a rally effect (Ostrom and Job 1986, 548) they
cannot rule out the alternative explanation that presidents are not deflecting attention as much as they are
engaging in foreign affairs when power is lost with Congress .6 This is especially
the case if military deployments are simply a measure of presidential involvement in
foreign affairs.

Plan
The United States federal government should substantially
curtail its domestic surveillance conducted through encryption
backdoors.

Next is solvency -Only the plan solves AND, its net better for law enforcement
consensus of experts and empirics
Bankston 15 (Kevin S. Bankston, Policy Director of the Open Technology Institute
and Co-Director of Cybersecurity Initiative, New America, Security Fellow with the
Truman National Security Project, serves on the board of the First Amendment
Coalition, former Senior Counsel and the Director of the Free Expression Project at the
Center for Democracy & Technology, former nonresidential fellow with the Stanford Law
Schools Center for Internet & Society, former Senior Staff Attorney and Equal Justice
Works/Bruce J. Ennis First Amendment Fellow at Electronic Frontier Foundation,
former Justice William Brennan First Amendment Fellow, litigated Internet-related free
speech cases at the American Civil Liberties Union, J.D. University of Southern
California Law School, B.A. University of Texas at Austin, statement before the U.S.
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Encryption Technology and Possible
U.S. Policy Responses, 4-29-2015, http://oversight.house.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/4-29-2015-IT-Subcommittee-Hearing-on-EncryptionBankston.pdf)KMM
the importance of strong encryption
technology to Americans continued security and prosperity
Chairman Hurd, Ranking Member Kelly and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today on

, and allowing me to articulate the arguments against recent suggestions that

Congress should legislate to limit the availability of strongly encrypted products and services. I represent New Americas Open Technology Institute (OTI), where I am Policy Director of the OTI program and also Co-Director of New Americas
cross-programmatic Cybersecurity Initiative. New America is a nonprofit civic enterprise dedicated to the renewal of American politics, prosperity, and purpose in the digital age through big ideas, technological innovation, next generation
politics, and creative engagement with broad audiences. OTI is New Americas program dedicated to technology policy and technology development in support of digital rights, social justice, and universal access to open and secure
communications networks. In September, Apple and Google enhanced the security of all smartphone users by modifying the operating system software of iPhones and Android smartphones, respectively, to ensure that the contents of those

a variety of
high-level law enforcement and intelligence officials instead quickly raised concerns that
such unbreakable encryptionwhether in the context of smartphones or in the context of
end-to-end encrypted Internet communicationsmay pose a challenge to law
enforcement and intelligence investigations
they seem
to be suggesting that companies build backdoors into their encrypted products and
services in order to allow surreptitious access by the government
Congress should reject any such proposal
It
was already rejected as a policy approach two decades ago, including by
Congress
in the 90s as part of
the Crypto Wars
phones are encrypted by default such that only the user can decrypt them.1 However, instead of praising those companies for taking a step that would help prevent countless crimes and data breaches,

.2 Several officials have even gone so far as to urge Congress to pass legislation to address the issue,3 presumably by

requiring companies to build their systems such that even when their users data is encrypted, the government can still obtain the plain text of that data when necessary to a lawful investigation. Put more colloquially,

. With all due respect for the many legitimate needs of our law

enforcement and intelligence agencies, I am here today to give you ten reasons why

. First and most obviously 1.

. American policymakers were faced with just this issue

a policy debate often referred to as

, where the Clinton

Administration battled against privacy advocates and the technology industry on a variety of fronts to limit the spread of strong encryption in order to address law enforcement and intelligence concerns. 4 One conflict was over the U.S.
governments attempts to promote so-called key escrow technologiessuch as the much-maligned Clipper Chip5 whereby the government or a trusted third party would hold master keys that could decode any encrypted communications.
The other conflict was over the U.S. governments attempts to restrict the proliferation of strong encryption products overseas by treating them as munitions subject to export controls. Ultimately, after many years of debate and widespread

the Administration withdrew its key escrow proposals and relaxed

export restrictions on encryption
in response to many of the same arguments
that strong encryption is vital to our information security, to our economic
security, and to our privacy and free speech, and that attempts to limit the
distribution or use of strong encryption that is free of government backdoors will not
only undermine those priorities but will be ineffective and ultimately unnecessary
[o]nly by allowing the use of strong
encryption, not only domestically but internationally as well, can we hope to make the
Internet a safe and secure environment
opposition from the public as well as from Congress,

. It did so

that I will make today:

. The

eventual consensus on these points was summed up at the time by Representative Bob Goodlatte, who concluded that

.6 That consensus was reflected by Congressman Goodlattes Security and Freedom Through Encryption or SAFE Act, a bill that

sought to reaffirm Americans right to distribute and use strong encryption, bar the government from mandating the use of key escrow technologies, and allow for the export of strong encryption.7 By 1999, that bill was cosponsored by a majority
of House members258 of them, including current members of this oversight committee, Ranking Member Elijah Cummings (D-MD), Rep. John Jimmy Duncan Jr. (RTN), Rep. John Mica (R-FL), and Del. Eleanor Norton (D-DC). 8 That bill

also in line with the recommendations of the National Academies, which after
extensive study issued a 700-plus page report on the policy challenges posed by
encryption. Its primary recommendation was
No law should bar the
manufacture, sale, or use of any form of encryption within the U S
was

: Recommendation 1

nited

tates. Specifically, a legislative ban on the use of

unescrowed encryption would raise both technical and legal or constitutional issues. Technically, many methods are available to circumvent such a ban; legally, constitutional issues, especially those related to free speech, would be almost certain
to arise, issues that are not trivial to resolve.9 As Professor Peter Swire, the White Houses privacy czar at the time that it announced its newly liberalized encryption export policies, recently summed up the conclusion of the Crypto Wars: If

there is modest harm and enormous gain to be derived from using

strong encryption
it was worth going at least
slightly dark in order to reap the many benefits of effective encryption
backdoors into
encrypted products and services It would seriously undermine our nations
cybersecurity, at a time when that security is already in crisis as demonstrated by
the endless string of high profile data breaches in the past year Every technical
expert
both experts from the generation that fought in the
original Crypto Wars as well as experts from the next generation has concluded that it
is impossible to devise a system that provides government access to data on encrypted
devices, or to end-to-end encrypted communications, while also ensuring that it remains
secure against other attackers, be they computer criminals, industrial spies, Chinese
intelligence, or anyone else Whether you want to call it a front door or a back door,
mandating guaranteed government access to encrypted data would open us up to a
variety of new cyber-threats In fact, it would be an open invitation for attackers to
focus on hacking into U.S. products and services because they would be easier targets
than products and services that are not subject to such mandated vulnerabilities
all of the best public
cryptographers in the world would agree that you cant really build [secure] backdoors in
crypto
when the White House cybersecurity coordinator was asked
last week if he could name a single respected technical expert who believed it was
possible, he had no answer Even the governments own top experts, the chief
cybersecurity adviser to the Commerce Departments N I
S
T
has publicly
concluded
t]heres no way to
do this where you dont have unintentional vulnerabilities
there is no way to build
a secure golden key that can only be used by the government
demonstrated in the 90s and equally true today
certain technology, societies should logically adopt that

technology. In 1999, the U.S. government concluded that

was precisely that type of valuable technology

.10 One of the most obvious benefits of

encryptionthen as nowis that it ensures the security of the private communications and data of Americans and American companies against all attackers. And if the government were to mandate
2.

.11

that has spoken publicly on this controversy since it began last September
,12

13

.14

. As the Chief

Information Security Officer of Yahoo put it when debating the issue with the Director of the NSA at New Americas cybersecurity conference in February,

That its like drilling a hole in the windshield.15 Indeed,

.16

one of

ational

nstitute of

tandards and

echnologies,

that when it comes to designing a secure key escrow system where the government has access to a master decryption key that cant be subverted by other attackers, [
.17 Put another way,

, like that which was suggested in a recent Washington Post editorial that

was immediately and roundly criticized by the Internet community.18 This fact was conclusively

,19

it is

.20

However, even assuming such a golden key system were feasible 3. It would cost the American economy untold billions of dollars. Experts estimated during the original Crypto Wars that building and operating the kind of key escrow
infrastructure desired by the government would have cost the government and industry many billions of dollars.21 Since then, the number of computer and Internet users, and computer and Internet devices, has grown exponentially; so too has
the complexity and cost of such a scheme to give the government the universal decryption capability it apparently desires.22 Thats not even counting the many more billions of dollars that would be lost as consumers worldwide lost confidence in
the security of American computing products and online services. American technology companies, which currently dominate the global market, have already been wrestling with diminished consumer trust in the wake of revelations about the
scope of the National Security Agencys programs, a loss of trust already predicted to cost our economy billions of dollars.23 Any new requirement that those companies guarantee that the U.S. government have the technical capability to decrypt
their users data would give foreign users including major institutional clients such as foreign corporations and governments that especially rely on the security of those products and serviceseven more incentive to avoid American products
and turn to foreign competitors. It would also likely diminish trust in the security of digital technology and the Internet overall, which would slow future growth of the Internet and Internet-enabled commerce and threaten the primary economic

foreign customers will not want to buy or use online services, hardware
products, software products or any other information systems that have been explicitly
designed to facilitate backdoor access for the FBI or the NSA Nor will many American
users
Instead, they will turn to more secure products that are available for
purchase or for free download from sources outside of the U S
It would
not succeed at keeping bad actors from using unbreakable encryption
already becoming widespread during the original Crypto Wars and at this
point is nearly ubiquitous
free and open source
engine of the 21st century. To put it bluntly,

.24

, for that matter.

nited

tates, which is a major reason why 4.

. Encryption technology and the

ability to create it was

,25

. And, as was true then, much of that technology is

. For example, there are the open source versions of PGP

encryption software that are still the most popular end-to-end email encryption solution, the OpenSSL software library that has long been used to encrypt vast amounts of every-day web traffic, open source disk encryption programs like
TrueCrypt, the open source Off-The-Record instant messaging encryption protocol used by a wide variety of IM clients, and the TOR onion routing software originally developed by the Naval Research Laboratory that is now widely used to

A government mandate prohibiting U.S. companies

from offering products or services with unbreakable encryption is of little use when
foreign companies can and will offer more secure products and services, and when an
independent coder anywhere on the planet has the resources to create and distribute free
tools for encrypting your communications or the data stored on your mobile devices
T]hat genie is not going back in the bottle
a U.S.
government-mandated backdoor into the encrypted products and services of U.S.
companies, while undermining the information security of millions
and the
economic security of the American tech industry, would do little to prevent bad actors
from taking advantage of strong encryption
likely to be ineffective but also Its unnecessary in order to keep us safe
from criminalsbut strong encryption is
opponents of strong device encryption have
circumvent oppressive governments censorship regimes and allow for anonymous online browsing.26

. As former

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff recently put it, [

.27 The result is that

of ordinary Americans

. Or, as PGPs inventor Phil Zimmerman famously said in the 90s: If privacy is outlawed, only outlaws will have privacy.28

Not only is such a mandate

5.

. So far, the

failed to offer any compelling examples where such encryption seriously hindered a
criminal investigation or prosecution
examples were quickly debunked by the press

. FBI Director Comey did offer, in his October speech on the subject, four examples of cases where cellphone-derived evidence was supposedly

critical to a solving a crime, but those

.29 During the same event, Director Comey came up empty when asked

for a real-world example where encryption actually stymied an investigation. 30 And in March he admitted to the House Appropriations Committee in March that he wasnt in a position to offer a percentage or number of cases affected by

where numbers are available via annual

reports by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
in 2014
strong encryption posed a problem in only nine of 3,500 wiretaps,
and that was a record high
rather than going dark, theres good reason to believe
that thanks to the growing role played by digital technology in nearly all aspects of our
livesand especially thanks to the prevalence of smartphoneslaw enforcement is in the
midst of a golden age of surveillance where they can access more data about what
we say, where we go, what we do, and with whom we associate and communicate than
ever before
metadata about private communications
can be just as revealing if not more revealing than the contents of those messages
themselves
promises to get even brighter for law enforcement with the rise
of the
Internet of Things where fine-grained data about everything from our
electricity consumption to the contents of our refrigerators to the behavior of our
medical implants will be available to prosecutors
much of the data stored on the
encrypted
cellphones that have caused so much concern are also backed up to
servers in the Internet cloud and available via legal process served on those
companies That which is not available via the cloud will in many cases be obtainable
simply by having a court compel the suspect to hand over the data or else face jail
time for contempt
encrypted data or communications that cannot
be obtained from the cloud might even be obtained by government investigators
secretly hacking into suspects devices from afar over the Internet, a law enforcement
technique that is worrisomely on the rise despite constitutional concerns With few
examples of encryption posing a serious challenge for law enforcement, and a wide
variety of other ways for law enforcement to obtain a wide variety of information from
or about suspects, the necessity of encryption backdoors to better combat crime is
unclear at best. What is absolutely clear, however, is
Strong
encryption prevents crime
allows people to protect their digital communications and computer systems against
criminal hackers and computer thieves
It is even more true now than it was nearly twenty years
ago: encryption makes us all safer and default encryption on smartphones especially so
encrypted devices.31 Meanwhile, in the realm of law enforcement wiretaps of phone and Internet communications,

, the number of cases where encryption has posed a problem is miniscule. Specifically,

according to the report issued

, of the over 3,576 wiretaps conducted by federal and state law enforcement in 2013, encryption was encountered in only 41 cases, and the police were able to obtain the plain text of the encrypted

communications in 32 of those 41 cases. 32 So,

. Indeed,

.33 Indeed, as a number of law enforcement and intelligence officials have acknowledged,

. 34 This golden age of surveillance

so-called

.35 Meanwhile,

Apple and Android

Apple and

Google

.36

.37 And for cases where notice to the suspect is not desirable,

. 38

a fact that Representative Bob Goodlatte attested to back in 1997:

. Just as dead-bolt locks and alarm systems help people protect their homes against intruders, thereby assisting law enforcement in preventing crime, strong

encryption

. The blue-ribbon National Research Council said it best, concluding that strong encryption supports both law enforcement efforts and our

national security, while protecting the proprietary information of U.S. businesses.39

,40

There is a growing epidemic of smartphone theft, with 3.1 million stolen in the U.S. in 2013, nearly double the number of smartphones stolen in 2012.41 The vast amount of personal information on those devices makes them especially attractive
targets for criminals aiming to commit identify theft or other crimes of fraud, or even to commit violent crimes or further acts of theft against the phones owner. Yet over a third of consumers fail to activate even the simplest security mechanisms

the FBI itself used to advise consumers with smartphones to turn their
encryption on until abruptly changing course and deleting that advice from its website
last month
on their mobile devices.42 That is why

.43 By taking this step for their customers and turning on encryption by default, mobile operating system vendors have completely eliminated the risk of those crimes occurring, significantly discouraged thieves from

bothering to steal smartphones in the first place, and ensured that those phones contents will remain secure even if they are stolen. A necessary consequence, of course, is that the contents will also remain secure if the phone is seized by law
enforcement. 6. It would undermine and turn on its head the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in our papers and effects. The Fourth Amendment gives individuals the right to be secure in their papers and effects, prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures and requiring that any warrant authorizing such a government invasion be issued by a court based on a showing of probable cause.44 As indicated by recent Supreme Court cases, the need for vigorous enforcement of that
right has become even more acute in the context of powerful digital technologies. Most recently, a unanimous Supreme Court in the case of Riley v. California decided to require warrants for the search of a cellphone in the possession of an
arrestee, based on the unprecedented amount of private data that may be stored on such devices even though such searches incident to arrest have traditionally been allowed without a warrant.45 As the Court explained, many cell phones are in
fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.46
These devices, with immense storage capacity, can hold every picture [their users] have taken, or every book or article they have read, and even the most basic phones that sell for less than $20 might hold photographs, picture messages, text
messages, Internet browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-entry phone book, and so on.47 Ultimately, as the Supreme Court explicitly held, the search of a modern electronic device such as a smartphone or a computer is more privacy invasive
than even the most exhaustive search of a house. 48 As the Court concluded in Riley, We cannot deny that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime. Cell phones have become important tools in
facilitating coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incriminating information about dangerous criminals. Privacy comes at a cost.49 The court did not pretend that requiring warrants
for searches of cellphones seized incident to arrest did not risk diminishing law enforcements effectivenessit simply recognized that allowing such warrantless searches posed an even greater risk to our Fourth Amendment rights considering
the scope of data available on those phones. The court made a similar calculus in the 2012 case of U.S. v. Jones when it decided that the comprehensive long-term tracking of a cars movements on public roads using GPS technology constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment, even though tracking that only reveals information that would have been visible from public space would not traditionally be considered to violate a suspects Fourth Amendment-based reasonable
expectation of privacy.50 Both the Jones and Riley cases can be viewed as the Courts attempt to compensate for the sharp increase in the governments surveillance capabilities thanks to digital technology by ratcheting up legal protections

The use of encryption on cellphones can be seen as a similar means of

compensating for the governments newfound technical powers during this golden age
of surveillance, using technology instead of the law to help restore the balance between
government power and individual power
against government searches.51

to something closer to what the Founding Fathers intended. Encryption opponents would push in the other direction and flip our

Fourth Amendment rights on their head by instead casting the Fourth Amendment as a right of the governmenta right to dictate that the contours of the physical and digital worlds be redesigned to facilitate even easier surveillance.52 But there
is no precedent for such a reading of the Fourth Amendment. As former computer crime prosecutor Marc Zwillinger recently put it, I dont believe that law enforcement has an absolute right to gain access to every way in which two people may
choose to communicate And I dont think our Founding Fathers would think so, either. The fact that the Constitution offers a process for obtaining a search warrant where there is probable cause is not support for the notion that it should be
illegal to make an unbreakable lock. These are two distinct concepts.53 Zwillingers comments echoed those made by Senator John Ashcroft during the original Crypto Wars: There is a concern that the Internet could be used to commit crimes
and that advanced encryption could disguise such activity. However, we do not provide the government with phone jacks outside our homes for unlimited wiretaps. Why, then, should we grant government the Orwellian capability to listen at will
and in real time to our communications across the Web?54 Or, as a more recent commentator put it: This argument [that encryption foils the polices right to obtain evidence with a search warrant] misunderstands the role of the search warrant.
A search warrant allows police, with a judges approval, to do something theyre not normally allowed to do. Its an instrument of permission, not compulsion. If the cops get a warrant to search your house, youre obliged to do nothing except stay
out of their way. Youre not compelled to dump your underwear drawers onto your dining room table and slash open your mattress for them. And youre not placing yourself above the law if you have a steel-reinforced door that doesnt yield to a
battering ram.55 The law has never prohibited the creation of unbreakable locks, nor required us to hand our keys over to the government just in case it might need them for an investigation, whether those keys are physical or digital. Indeed, the
Founders themselves used ciphers to communicate with each other,56 and presumably would have viewed a demand that they hand over the key to their encryption scheme as abhorrent to their rightsnot only their Fourth Amendment right

against government intrusion but also their First Amendment right to speak and associate both freely and anonymously. 7. It would threaten First Amendment rights here and free expression around the world. Repeated court challenges to export
controls on encryption during the Crypto Wars illustrate how any attempt by the government to limit the distribution of encryption software code, which is itself speech, would raise serious First Amendment concerns. As one federal district court
held when considering a First Amendment challenge to 90s-era encryption export controls, This court can find no meaningful difference between computer languageand German or French. All participate in a complex system of understood
meanings within specific communities {in this case, that of programmers and mathematicians}.... Contrary to defendants' suggestion, the functionality of language does not make it any less like speech.... Instructions, do-it-yourself manuals,
recipes, even technical information about hydrogen bomb construction, are often purely functional; they are also speech.57 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the challenged encryption export regulations constituted a prior
restraint on speech that offends the First Amendment. 58 Therefore, not only would attempting to police the distribution of strong encryption code inside the United States require an endless and ineffective game of Internet whack-a-mole as old
and new encryption code proliferated across cyberspace, but the extensive censorship that would be necessary to fight that losing battle would also likely violate the freedom of speech. Similarly, a legal regime that forced individuals to cede their
private encryption keys to the government or to their communications providers for law enforcement purposes would also raise novel issues of compelled speech under the First Amendment. However, the free speech impact of a mandate against
unbreakable encryption and in favor of backdoors for government would reach far beyond just the communication of encryption code, and chill a wide variety of online expression. When individuals believe that they may be under surveillance,
there is a chilling effect that can curb free speech and the free flow of information online.59 If individuals must assume that their online communications are not secure but may instead be acquired by the U.S. government or by anyone else who
might exploit an encryption backdoor, they will be much less willing to communicate freely. By contrast, encouraging the availability of strong encryption free of surveillance backdoors can enable free expression both in the United States and
around the world, 60 including by stymieing the censorship and surveillance efforts of governments with less respect for human rights than our own. 8. It would encourage countries with poor human rights records to demand backdoor access of
their own. The governments of countries like China, 61 India, 62 and the United Arab Emirates63 have proposed a variety of measures that would require companies to implement key escrow systems or other forms of backdoors or stop doing
business in those countries, proposals that the United States government has criticized.64 Yet how can the United States credibly criticize, for example, the Chinese government for proposing an anti-terrorism bill that would require U.S.
companies to hand over their encryption keys, if we impose a similar requirement here at home? And how are U.S. companies to argue that they cannot implement such requirements and hand over the keys to foreign governmentseven those
with a history of human rights abusesif they have already had to do so for the U.S. government? As Marc Zwillinger has pointed out, if the U.S. mandates backdoor access to encrypted data, multinational companies will not be able to refuse
foreign governments that demand [the same] access. Governments could threaten financial sanctions, asset seizures, imprisonment of employees and prohibition against a companys services in their countries. Consider China, where U.S.
companies must comply with government demands in order to do business. 65 Such a result would be particularly ironic considering the U.S.s foreign policy goal of promoting Internet Freedom worldwide and in China especially, including the
promotion of encryption-based tools to protect privacy and evade censorship.66 Internet Freedom begins at home, and a failure by the United States to protect Americans ability to encrypt their data will undermine the right to encrypt and
therefore human rights around the world. 67 The U.S. government supports the use of strong encryption abroad as part of our foreign policy objectives, and it should support the same for Americans here in the United States. This is especially
true considering that 9. An overwhelming majority of the House of Representatives and the Presidents own hand-picked advisors have already rejected the idea. Echoing the Houses overwhelming support for the SAFE Act during the Crypto
Wars of the 90s, an overwhelming and bipartisan majority of the House of Representatives already rejected the idea of encryption backdoors just last year. 68 Thats when, by a vote of 293 to 123,69 the House approved the SensenbrennerMassie-Lofgren amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act, H.R. 4870. That amendment, responding to reports of that the NSA had worked to insert surveillance backdoors into a variety of hardware and software products, would have
prohibited the NSA or the CIA from using any funds to mandate or request that a personalter its product or service to permit the electronic surveillanceof any user of said product or service for said agencies.70 Although the amendment,
which was supported by a quickly organized activist campaign71 and a broad coalition of Internet companies and civil society organizations like Google and the American Civil Liberties Union,72 did not make it into the final CRomnibus
spending bill,73 it was still a potent indicator that Congress is skeptical of U.S. government efforts that would weaken the security of American hardware and software products. Equally skeptical of encryption backdoors were the five experts

the Presidents
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies included this strongly
worded recommendation
We
recommend that, regarding encryption, the US Government should fully support and
not undermine efforts to create encryption standards not in any way subvert,
undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally available commercial software; and
increase the use of encryption and urge US companies to do so
Therefore, not only the House of Representatives but a blue-ribbon panel of
experts including a former CIA Director and the White Houses former anti-terrorism
czar, have already concluded: mandating or even requesting the insertion of
encryption backdoors into U.S. companies products and services is a bad idea
hand-picked by the President to review the NSAs surveillance activities. Echoing the conclusions of the National Academies in their groundbreaking study from 1997, the final report of

prompted by its conclusion that strong encryption was necessary to the United States national and economic security: Recommendation 29
: (1)

; (2)

(3)

, in order to better protect data in transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in

other storage.74

. As demonstrated by their

support for the SensenbrennerMassie-Lofgren amendment, the Internet industry and the Internet activists agree, which is why 10. It would be vigorously opposed by a unified Internet community. Decades before the massive online advocacy
campaign that stopped the SOPA and PIPA copyright bills in 2012,75 The Crypto Warsand, in particular, the battle against the Clipper Chiprepresented the Internet communitys first major political engagement. And it was a rousing success.
An unprecedented alliance of Internet users, technologists, academics, the technology industry, and newly-emerging Internet rights advocacy organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and
the Electronic Privacy Information Center, flexed its muscles for the first time and made a huge difference in the political process. They organized experts to speak on panels, testified before Congress, and circulated electronic petitions, including
one that got over 50,000 signatures an extraordinary number in the early days of Internet activism.76 That Internet community, which won the first Crypto Wars two decades ago and more recently blocked SOPA and PIPA, has only grown
larger and more vocal in the intervening years, and will certainly make its voice heard if another round of Crypto Wars were to begin now. That conflict can be avoided, however. Especially considering all of the above arguments, many of which

Congress can and should leave the idea of encryption

backdoors in the dustbin of history where it belongs. Instead, policymakers should
heed the lessons of the past and the advice of the Presidents Review Group by
considering policies that will promote rather than undermine the widespread use of
strong encryption and thereby help guarantee a more secure and prosperous future
for America
are just as true if not moreso than they were twenty years ago,

. Thank you, and I welcome your questions on this important matter

End to end encryption solves people cant give government

data even if they wanted circumvention impossible
Seemann 15,

Michael Seemann studied Applied Cultural Studies in Lnebur, Now he blogs at

mspr0.de and writes for various media like Rolling Stone, TIME online, SPEX, Spiegel
Online, ct and the DU magazine Digital Tailspin Ten Rules for the Internet After
Snowden The Network Notebooks series March 2015 http://networkcultures.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/NN09_Digital_Tailspin_SP.pdf
ENCRYPTION AS HOSPITALITY
Encrypted communication also obeys end-to-end principles. Asymmetric encryption generally
means that the message you want to send will be encrypted while still on your computer (or mobile phone), and will be
decrypted only once it has reached its recipient. End-to-end encrypted data is impossible to decrypt

along the way, e.g. while on your service providers email servers . This distinguishes it
from so-called transport encryption, where a message is encrypted only on its way from
the source to the server, and then again between the server and the recipient on the email server itself,
the message will briefly be accessible in unencrypted form. In such a case, authorities can make server
operators divulge this unencrypted data with a corresponding court order. End-to-end
encryption will usually employ the public key method. A pair of keys is generated using sophisticated
mathematical algorithms. You keep the private key to yourself and make the other one public.
When you write someone an encrypted email, their approved public key is used to
encrypt it. But the recipient will need their own private key to decrypt the message. So

you need to provide your public key before someone can send you encrypted messages. A
pattern is recognizable here: providing a public key is an act of hospitality towards the
Other.

Companies wont comply with informal encryption backdoor

mandates empirics prove

Golumbic 7 (Charles Martin, University of Haifa, Professor of Computer Science ,

and Director of the Caesarea Rothschild Institute for Interdisciplinary Applications of
Computer Science, Fighting Terror Online: the Convergence of Security, Technology,
and the Law)//MP
Those involved in the private sector have a clear interest in developing their products in
line with the demands of the market, without any restrictions. Consequently, policy makers must consider the

potential consequences of encryption policy on research and development by the private sector: What economic influence would regulation have on incentives for

Governmental nonintervention is the desired approach from the point of view of industry concerning
regulating encryption and export of the means of encryption. During the period when
restrictions were more stringent, computer companies protested against them and called for
reform. Their call was supported by the fact that these restrictions had a serious economic effect on American companies. The CSPP (Computer
Systems Policy Project) called for a change in policy and an opening of borders, because export
restrictions were affecting the ability of American companies to compete effectively in world
markets
private companies? Would such consequences be desirable for private companies and for the market as a whole?

Finally, strong US growth is key to promoting an American

economic model --- the alternative is mercantilism, which
destroys economic cooperation
Atkinson 12 (ROBERT D. ATKINSON, President Information Technology and
Innovation Foundation a public policy think tank based in Washington, D.C, nonresident
senior fellow of the Brookings Institutions Metropolitan Policy Program. Enough is
Enough: Confronting Chinese Innovation Mercantilism FEBRUARY 2012 http://www2.itif.org/2012enough-enough-chinese-mercantilism.pdf)//kyan

Chinese officials are clearly aware of the damage their mercantilist policies have had on the
American economy (and other economies), but they portray China as a partner in the global economy, albeit
one that as a poor developing nation should be allowed to cut corners that more developed nations should not.17 They like to
paint the United States as a key trading partner. In fact, they dont really see the United
States as a trading partner. Rather America is an importing partner (with America doing most of
the importing) and a tech-transfer partner (with virtually all of the technology flowing from the United States to China).
In other words, Americas role is to serve as an import platform for producers in China (now
mostly multinationals, but increasingly domestic Chinese firms) and as a source of technology to help Chinese
firms move up the technology and value added scale so that they can displace U.S.
multinationals on the world stage. And this aggressive approach towards the implementation
of Chinas mercantilist policies suggests that there is a fundamental ideological difference
between how the Chinese state sees it role in bringing about state capitalism and the
traditional western model of capitalism supported by global organizations such as the WTO. But
the even larger threat is that the Beijing consensus will replace the Washington consensus as
the guiding star of other nations around the globe seeking to get rich. We already see this
in Brazil and India which are looking to emulate China in certain respects by ramping up mercantilism. 18
If this happens, it will be extremely difficult to maintain a global trading system that operates
along the lines most economists originally envisioned. What we need is neither the Washington consensuswhich is flawed in the
conceptual limitations it places on legitimate government roles to spur innovation and competitivenessnor the

Beijing

consensus, which is fundamentally a threat to globalization, but rather what might be termed a Helsinki consensus.
In other words, nations like Finland are fundamentally committed to a vision of global integration and free trade, but at the same time
recognize that good, non-mercantilist innovation policies (e.g., funding for research and technology transfer, support for STEM education,
R&D tax incentives, etc.) are critical to enable them to effectively compete in global markets. The World Bank, IMF, and other multilateral
organizations need to be advocating the Helsinki consensus around the world so that nations are not forced into an unproductive choice

between the Washington consensus and the Beijing consensus. If their choice is so limited, too many
will default to the latter, especially as they look at the respective economic
performances of the United States and China.

And, U.S. economic supremacy prevents several scenarios for

global war --- transition wars
Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 2008 [Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princetons Woodrow Wilson School
and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, The
Dangers of a Diminished America, 10-28, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html]
Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial

architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The

worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget
deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be
possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and
Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while
Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos . Russia's new militancy and

China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from

the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing
commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could
all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance

ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive
powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster
exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become
ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.
The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic
competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has
demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil
prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic
growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be
constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political
legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if
the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails
with external adventures.

Contention 2 is space -Cross-apply the biotech ev here -

Biotech key to nanotech

Henley, 00, The RMA After Next, Paramaters, Winter 99-00, pg. 46-57
Advances in molecularconventional mechanics.
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/articles/99winter/henley.htm)
Advances in molecular biology are not limited to genetic expression and immunology; some researchers are delving into
the physical, mechanical processes by which living cells function. How meter-long neurons move signal molecules from
one end to the other in a few milliseconds; how enzyme molecules rip apart the two halves of a DNA strand to permit cell
reproduction; how bacteria propel themselves using structures that are only a few molecules in size; these are essentially
mechanical questions, and Steven Block at Princeton is developing tools to measure and understand the processes
involved.[10] In the case of neurons, for instance, the answer turns out to be a rail-like structure running from one end of
the cell to the other, and another molecule that functions as a fast locomotive to haul the signal molecule along the rail at
high speed and deliver it to the other end. This field of molecular biomechanics points toward a

different approach to nanotechnology. The "traditional" approach, if one can use that
term in so futuristic a field, seeks to build molecular structures modeled on the wheels,
gears, levers, and electronics of the everyday world. Some refer to this as "dry"
nanotechnology, because it shuns the biological approach and the water-filled
environment in which biological molecules function. It remains to be seen whether the
dry approach will yield useful machines any time soon. The molecular-scale world is a
whole new environment for designers, with many novel problems including quantum
effects, thermal vibration, and chemical reactions with the surrounding environment.
But "wet" nano-devices are the very fabric of life, and it is likely that molecular biology
will be a fruitful source of proven successful designs , based on markedly different
principles than the gears-and-levers approach of conventional mechanics.

Nanotech is key to protect space assets, which are uniquely

essential to heg were at a tipping point now
Jenkins 9 Lieutenant Colonel Eva S. USAF, PhD in IR, has served on the Defense Intelligence Agency Directors

Special Projects staff, and as a National Security Agency Directors Fellow (Nanotechnology- Enabling Future Space
Viability, March 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA540174)

The U.S. is at a critical juncture in space and national security leaders should take heed.
While the U.S. has maintained space supremacy since the dawn of the space age, global
competitors have begun to rapidly erode that lead . These global competitors, to
include state and non-state actors, have the capability to exploit the space domains immense
vulnerabilities. Russia and China have clearly demonstrated a direct kinetic

kill
anti-satellite capability. In addition, several other nations and non-state actors
are working on active, effective anti-satellite offensive warfare capabilities .
Furthermore, the recent collision between a U.S. and Russian satellite highlights spaces increasing
vulnerabilities. It is not a secret that the employment of U.S. land, sea, air, and cyber

warfighting capabilities in the defense of the nation are critically dependent

on the availability, reliability, and viability of U.S. space assets and always
will be. Henceforth, space is vital to the national security of the U.S . today as it
will continue to be so tomorrow. There are no viable alternatives to space systems
and threats from global competitors are real. The U.S. is truly at a crossroads. The
nation must overcome its greatest challenges in space and capitalize on disruptive and emerging
technologies before it is too late. The greatest challenges the U.S. faces today in the acquisition and
launch of additional advanced, hardened, and secure space assets are their massive cost coupled with

their enormous weight, the ability to provide lift, to supply extended power, and to manage heat.
Fortunately, the potential solutions are many and varied. The U.S. can seek to: reduce the cost of launch;
improve spacecraft performance of spacecraft; decrease the cost of power consumption and increase
longevity; expand spacecraft functionality; decrease the cost of communications while expanding life
expectancies and currency; or reduce spacecraft cost in dollars per kilogram for the function and
performance it provides. Alternately, the U.S. can exponentially improve the spacecraft function and
performance so that the spacecraft capabilities far outweigh the cost. For this to occur , the U.S.

must renew its commitment to the advanced research and development of

new technologies and restore its commitment to space . This historic crossroads
requires innovation, thinking out-of-the-box, and focusing on the vast array of exponential technological
possibilities. Rapidly advancing technologies with the ability to transform and revolutionize virtually
every industry, to include space, are ripe for exploitation. Genetics, robotics, information technology,
and nanotechnology are truly transformative technologies with the potential to impact national security
both positively and negatively. The technological advances predicted in the coming years are expected to
exponentially surpass the advances seen during the past century. But of the four, nanotechnology,

the underlying technology that makes other things possible, is the key to
future space viability and dominance. Nanotechnology is the research and
technology development at the 1- to 100th nanometer scale , the creation and use of
structures that have novel properties because of their small size, and the ability to control or manipulate
at the atomic scale. Nanotechnology may very well be the driving force of the next

industrial revolution. The properties of nanotechnology-enabled materials are ideal for space. As
such, nanotechnology holds the key to transforming the space domain and the major driving force in the
expansion of space capabilities. Over 60 nations have established nanotechnology initiatives and over
4,000 companies and research institutes are working on nanotechnology developments worldwide. In
the near term, nanotechnology-enabled space systems will have significantly

enhanced flexibility, robustness, and performance capabilities and eventual

reductions in costs. The high payoffs include ultra small sensors,
communication and navigation, power sources, and propulsion;
dramatically reduced emissions, mass, volume, heat, and power and fuel
consumption; easily reconfigurable, autonomous systems ; and single chip
satellites with multiple capabilities . In the longer-term, the nanotechnology-enabled
systems will likely provide space systems with 1,000 times the performance of todays systems; weapon
systems at the warfighters fingertips enabled by nanotechnology; and carbon nanotube space elevators,
among others. There is no doubt that these revolutionary systems will be enabled by nanotechnology and
will be employed in space. Whether they will be routinely employed in space by the U.S. or by someone
else is yet to be seen. The U.S. must take decisive action before the nations

security posture is irrevocably weakened. The development of the future frontier2 has
only just begun.

Were falling behind in technology nanotech solves

Jenkins 9 Lieutenant Colonel Eva S. USAF, PhD in IR, has served on the Defense Intelligence Agency Directors
Special Projects staff, and as a National Security Agency Directors Fellow (Nanotechnology- Enabling Future Space
Viability, March 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA540174)
Addressing the Challenges. What will U.S. defense capabilities be in 20 to 25 years from now in this radically different
environment? What should the DoD, or more precisely the Air Force do now to address those potential challenges? One
answer is wargaming. The U.S. Air Force Future Capabilities Game 2007 is a wargame designed to shape military
capabilities to best respond to emerging future warfighting environments and national security challenges. These
wargames are used to explore new concepts and capabilities and help prevent technological, strategic, and/or operational
surprise. The report identified trends and shocks that are likely to erode traditional military advantages. The primary
drivers include the following predictions: a flattening technology gap will reduce U.S. military

advantagecomputing capability will greatly enhance cyberspace capabilities(and)

rising energy and U.S. manpower costs will force the U.S. military toward energyefficient and automated systems.102 The Wargame predicted that the following long-term challenges to
capabilities are likely: Deteriorating space securitygrowing anti-access (land, sea, and air) capabilitiesincreasing
number of weapons of mass destruction by more nationsa rapidly growing information-based global society(and) the
blurring of lines between major combat operations and irregular warfare103 Because the undertaking is so difficult, of
the five longterm challenges predicted by the Wargame, the U.S. has placed insufficient emphasis on

and action toward addressing the deterioration of space security and expanded capability.

Nanotechnology may hold the key to overcoming the challenges. The next step is to study
accelerating technologies, forecast their impact in the future on the military, and determine what leaders should do today
to address the encroaching challenges. The Air Forces Blue Horizons Program is a Headquarters sponsored long range
planning effort lead by exemplary faculty members and comprised of volunteer Air War College and Air Command and
Staff College line officers within the top 12 percent of their peer group. The research program is designed to mesh with the
Quadrennial Defense Cycle. The program focuses on how accelerating technological change interacts with a shifting
strategic landscape to produce massive dynamic change. This change then acts as a catalyst to create a very disturbing
disruptive threat to the U.S. and a serious challenge to the Air Forces future dominance. The 2007-08 Blue Horizons
Program studied nanotechnology, biotechnology, directed energy, and cyber through 2030 and rooted its findings in a
quantitative analysis methodology. Of the multiple 2007-08 Blue Horizons findings, the conclusions on nanotechnology
held that nanotechnology is the easily forgotten game changer . Furthermore, nanotechnology is now
being added to make systems better and it will become a stand-alone system in 2030. The team also came up with four
alternate futures for 2030 represented by a Peer China, a Resurgent Russia, a Failed State, and a Jihadist Insurgency
scenario. These alternate futures provide a plausible tool to understand future challenges and logical extrapolations based
on extensive research. The current 2008-09 program specific task is to develop a prioritized list of concepts and their key
enabling technologies that the U.S. Air Force will need to maintain the dominant air, space, and cyber forces in the
future. 39

The impact is global conflict escalation

Brooks et al 13 [Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment Stephen G. Brooks (bio), G. John
Ikenberry (bio) and William C. Wohlforth (bio), Stephen G. Brooks; G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth
STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G.
Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Emin
ence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at
Dartmouth College, International Security Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012, p. Project Muse]
Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement Even if deep engagement's costs are far less than
retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the
strategy's major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States' security role for its
interests in other realms, notably the global economyan interaction relatively unexplored by international relations
scholars. A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far

more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United
States' overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative
action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations
to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure,
reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten
others and thus stoke security dilemmas.The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens
the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory . Indeed,
arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the "American Pacifier" is provided in the
works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security

competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war

temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale
great power war.72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments
are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and
conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory
or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to
Eurasia's security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is
nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as
other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions.73
Defensive realists maintain that the high expected [End Page 34] costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies
and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia's major states could manage regional multipolarity
peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of
stabilizers that nonrealist theories point tosuch as democratic governance or dense institutional linkagesare either absent or weakly
present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is
regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are
optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt
European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military
outlays.74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region
and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might
want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where

the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding

the Middle East, the balance begins to

swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washingtonnotably
Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabiamight take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would

intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region's
prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern
expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear
capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing
reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and [End Page 35] Taiwan moved to obtain a
nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.75 The second body of scholarship
casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism's sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences.
Defensive realism's optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particularand
highly restrictiveassumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes.
Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state
preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption,
the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative

states have
preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they
engage in trade-offs among the various objectives.76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial
protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure
may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this
is indeed sometimes the case.77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major
to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption:

countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these
bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant

deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world's key regions. We

have already [End Page 36] mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that

the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional
multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear
proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the
capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely
competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment

advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the
world's core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity
and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic
externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security
ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment
experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place .

Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see
overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of
competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client statesall of which would be
concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States.
Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as
Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear
forces.78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they
would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many
retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79
Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate [End Page 37] over the stability of proliferation changes as
the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In
social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states
are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the
temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse.
Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from
nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by
analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation
including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not
have truly survivable forcesseem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers
grows.80 Moreover, the risk of "unforeseen crisis dynamics" that could spin out of control is
also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the
enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security
competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S.

interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves
peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of
retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is
separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and "pass the buck" to local
powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore
balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional
hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century. The problem is that
China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As
Mearsheimer notes, "The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are
not strong enough to do it by themselves."81 [End Page 38] Therefore, unless China's rise stalls, "the United States is
likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War."82 It follows that
the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It
will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene
there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asiajust what
the United States is doing.83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are

unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship , including highly influential realist
scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential
for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that
dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing
could well be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to
which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying

reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security
competition in the world's key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse
atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from
ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals . On
top of all this, the United States' formidable military machine may deter entry by potential
rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical
lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end
U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting
the "focused enmity" [End Page 39] of the United States.84 All of the world's most
modern militaries are U.S. allies (America's alliance system of more than sixty countries
now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the
U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking.85 In the end,
therefore, deep engagement reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United
States. This in turn makes it easier to sustain the policy over the long term. The Wider Benefits of Deep Engagement The case against deep
engagement overstates its costs and underestimates its security benefits. Perhaps its most important weakness, however, is that its
preoccupation with security issues diverts attention from some of deep engagement's most important benefits: sustaining the global
economy and fostering institutionalized cooperation in ways advantageous to U.S. national interests. Economic Benefits Deep engagement
is based on a premise central to realist scholarship from E.H. Carr to Robert Gilpin: economic orders do not just emerge spontaneously;
they are created and sustained by and for powerful states.86 To be sure, the sheer size of its economy would guarantee the United States a
significant role in the politics of the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the fact that it is the leading military power and
security provider also enables economic leadership. The security role figures in the creation, maintenance, and expansion of the system. In
part because other statesincluding all but one of the world's largest economieswere heavily dependent on U.S. security protection during
the Cold War, the United States was able not only to foster the economic order but also to prod other states to buy into it and to support

the security
commitments of deep engagement support the global economic order by reducing the
likelihood of security dilemmas, arms racing, instability, regional conflicts and, in
extremis, major power war. In so doing, the strategy helps to maintain a stable and
comparatively open world economya long-standing U.S. national interest. In addition to
ensuring the global economy against important sources of insecurity, the extensive set of U.S. military
commitments and deployments helps to protect the "global economic commons."One
key way is by helping to keep sea-lanes and other shipping corridors freely available for
commerce.88 A second key way is by helping to establish and protect property/sovereignty rights in the oceans.
Although it is not the only global actor relevant to protecting the global economic
commons, the United States has by far the most important role given its massive naval
superiority and the leadership role itplays in international economic institutions. If the
United States were to pull back from the world, protecting the global economic commons
would likely be much harder to accomplish for a number of reasons: cooperating with
other nations on these matters would be less likely to occur ; maintaining the relevant
institutional foundations for promoting this goal would be harder; and preserving access
plans for its progressive expansion.87 Today, as the discussion in the [End Page 40] previous section underscores,

to bases throughout the worldwhich is needed to accomplish this missionwould likely

be curtailed to some degree.

Heres a 2nd internal link to food scarcity - investment from

banking is key to jumpstart the commercial space industry - plan
creates a domino effect that sustains development
Fuller et al., 11 (Joseph, Jr., founder and President of Futron Corporation, Bachelor of
Science degree in physics from Texas Southern University and a Master of Business
Administration degree from the University of Houston, Jeffrey Foust, Program Manager
at the Futron Corporation, Ph.D. in planetary sciences from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, Chad Frappier, conducts research and analysis for the Futron
Corporation, Bachelor of Arts degree in political science and history from Purdue
University and a Master of Arts in Security Studies from Georgetown University, Dustin
Kaiser, Senior Analyst at the Futron Corporation, Bachelor of Science degree in
aeronautics and is currently completing a Master of Science degree in space studies from
the University of North Dakota, and David Vaccaro, Senior Analyst with the Futron
Corporation, Bachelor of Science degree in Science, Technology, and International
Affairs from Georgetown University, The Commercial Space Industry: A Critical
Spacepower Consideration, Toward a Theory of Spacepower, Chapter Six, NDU Press)
The Next Space Age: A Commercial Space Paradigm

The world may already be witnessing the arrival of the next space age . Increased
acceptance of high-risk commercial space business ventures as an element within an
investment portfolio is one beginning. Space adventures such as personal spaceflight and the launch of
private space habitats are another. The U.S. Government's commitment to purchase commercially produced space goods

Assuming success , these transformational changes will create new

services and capabilities and greater interdependence among users, and thereby enhanced spacepower.

and services is yet another.

If these are indicators of a transition into the next space age, what signs might confirm the existence of a new paradigm for
commercial space? How will the world know that its model of space commerce has permanently changed? Are such
changes now observable? While the future is difficult to predict, certain observations might confirm a new paradigm.
One of the first signs of the new space age may be the way that space-related goods and services have become seamlessly
integrated as a critical part of the human experience. Communications, navigation, weather, and satellite imagery are
current applications affecting how people live on a daily basis. As barriers to entry fall and new space applications
continue to increase our quality of life, the

acceptance of space commerce as an investment

opportunity , a business, and a career will become a natural ly occurring human experience.
In the next space age, the commercial space industry will be an integral component of defense and
civil space initiatives. Communications, GPS, weather, and remote sensing satellites are prominent examples of the
growing interdependence identified in this chapter. Governments and private operators will seek to leverage

commercially and strategically valuable space products and services. Whether private or government,
space developers will consider all users in systems design and operations.
Also in the next space age, space technology will be ubiquitous and produced by many nations. The global manufacturing
of satellite ground equipment is an example of what will exist more broadly in the next space age. Many of the current
space-capable nations view themselves as commercial suppliers of space goods and services. New foreign space powers
will utilize space in increasingly complex ways, creating competition for established space powers and for each other in a
global economy. This competition will drive technology development, reduce prices, improve capabilities, decrease risk,
and improve value for consumers.
Several actions must be sustained to continue to encourage and facilitate transition to a new
commercial space paradigm. Government research and development, as well as funding for
industry, serve as rich sources of technology and inspiration for entrepreneurs and must
continue . After the first few nonclassical commercial space ventures succeed financially,
transition to a new paradigm will accelerate , paving the way for new commercial
opportunities.

As for assurance of success, the numbers favor a breakthrough. A

large number of truly bold private business

ventures currently exist. Furthermore, this is a global, not just an American, phenomenon. Commercial space is a
largely unexplored and untapped frontier. However, the explorers and investors currently considering space ventures may
not be the first to succeed; they have been preceded by the industry's pioneers who have already committed to advance
into the next space age.

Cheap access to space solves resource wars

Collins and Autino, 9 (Patrick, Authority on Space Economics and Tourism, Life &
Environmental Science, Professor of economics at Azabu University, and Adriano, Space
Writer and Lecturer, Andromeda Inc., Italy, What the Growth of a Space Tourism
Industry Could Contribute to Employment, Economic Growth, Environmental
Protection, Education, Culture and World Peace,
http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/what_the_growth_of_a_space_tourism_industry
_could_contribute_to_employment_economic_growth_environmental_protection_ed
ucation_culture_and_world_peace.shtml)
The major source of social friction, including international friction, has surely always been unequal
access to resources . People fight to control the valuable resources on and under the land, and in and under the sea.
The natural resources of Earth are limited in quantity, and economically accessible resources even
more so. As the population grows, and demand grows for a higher material standard of living, industrial activity grows
exponentially. The threat of resources becoming scarce has led to the concept of "Resource

Wars". Having begun long ago with wars to control the gold and diamonds of Africa and South America, and oil in the
Middle East, the current phase is at centre stage of world events today [37]. A particular danger of "resource wars" is that,
if the general public can be persuaded to support them, they may become impossible to stop as resources become
increasingly scarce. Many commentators have noted the similarity of the language of US and UK government advocates of
"war on terror" to the language of the novel "1984" which describes a dystopian future of endless, fraudulent war in which
citizens are reduced to slaves. 7.1. Expansion into near-Earth space is the only alternative to endless "resource wars" As

an alternative to the "resource wars" already devastating many countries today, opening access to the
unlimited resources of near-Earth space could clearly facilitate world peace and security. The
US National Security Space Office, at the start of its report on the potential of space-based solar power ( SSP) published in
early 2007, stated: "Expanding human populations and declining natural resources are potential sources of local and
strategic conict in the 21st Century, and many see energy as the foremost threat to national security" [38]. The report
ended by encouraging urgent research on the feasibility of SSP: "Considering the timescales that are involved, and the
exponential growth of population and resource pressures within that same strategic period, it is imperative that this work
for "drilling up" vs. drilling down for energy security begins immediately" [38]. Although the use of extraterrestrial resources

on a substantial scale may still be some decades away, it is important to

recognise that simply acknowledging its feasibility using known technology is the surest way of
ending the threat of resource wars . That is, if it is assumed that the resources available for
human use are limited to those on Earth, then it can be argued that resource wars are
inescapable [22,37]. If, by contrast, it is assumed that the resources of space are economically
accessible, this not only eliminates the need for resource wars, it can also preserve the
benefits of civilisation which are being eroded today by "resource war-mongers ", most
notably the governments of the "Anglo-Saxon" countries and their "neo-con" advisers. It is also worth noting that the $1
trillion that these have already committed to wars in the Middle-East in the 21st century is orders of magnitude more than
the public investment needed to aid companies sufficiently to start the commercial use of space resources. Industrial and
financial groups which profit from monopolistic control of terrestrial supplies of various natural resources, like those
which profit from wars, have an economic interest in protecting their profitable situation. However, these groups'
continuing profits are justified neither by capitalism nor by democracy: they could be preserved only by maintaining the
pretence that use of space resources is not feasible, and by preventing the development of low-cost space travel. Once

the feasibility of low-cost space travel is understood, "resource wars" are clearly
foolish as well as tragic. A visiting extra-terrestrial would be pityingly amused at the foolish antics of homo sapiens
using longrange rockets to fight each other over dwindling terrestrial resourcesrather than using the same rockets to
travel in space and have the use of all the resources they need!