IRAN-KSA STAND OFF: PREPARING FO IMPENDING FALLOUTS

ABSTRACT
1.

The latest escalation in tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia has set off alarm

bells across the globe. There is a real fear that failure to repair the rupture in this
relationship could lead to a worsening of the already dire humanitarian crisis in Syria,
further destabilize a perilously volatile region, and even impede the battle against ISIS.
2.

The zero sum dynamics of Saudi-Iran relations impinge on their ties with the third

country in the areas. Pakistan, on a number of subjects concerning Iran and Saudi
Arabia, struggles to manage the balance in its ties with both Riyadh and Tehran.
Anybody studying the architecture of the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East should not
be surprised at Saudi Arabia announcing the severing of diplomatic relations with Iran in
the aftermath of the burning of the Saudi embassy in Tehran by violent protestors, who
were demonstrating against the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. In a domino effect,
Gulf countries and Saudi allies broke off or downgraded their relations with Tehran,
including Kuwait, the UAE and even Sudan.
3.

Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia have their roots both in geography and

history, but the present discord has more recent dimensions. Saudi Arabia, together with
its Arab partners, has been explicit in its suspicion of Iran and accuses it of meddling in
the internal affairs of Arab states right from the time of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
Many Arab states are furious at Tehrans direct military, political and financial support to
Assads regime in Syria. They have taken exception to the manner in which Iran gained
strength in Iraq through its proxies after Saddam Husseins fall from power.
4.

Iran, on the other hand, blames Saudi Arabia for promoting sectarian divide in

Muslim states, specifically in the Middle East where the latter wields great leverage.
Irans Supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has roundly condemned the execution of
Sheikh Nimr. President Hassan Rouhani ordered the arrest of protestors responsible for
the attack on the Saudi mission in Tehran, but also condemned the execution of the
religious scholar.

AIM
5.

The aim of this article is to identify the Saudi-Iran standoff and its future

prospects.
THE LOCAL LEVEL: EFFECTS OF THE IRAN-SAUDI ROW
6.

Increased hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia will further the nightmare in

Syria, the epicenter of the current regional instability. Iran will likely redouble its efforts to
fortify the Assad regime and the Saudis will ramp up support for rebel groups, in an
attempt by each side to gain the upper hand. Moreover, if a rupture in Iran-Saudi
relations leads to a collapse of the diplomatic track, military action on the ground in
Syria once again becomes unhinged from the political process. Efforts by Jordan to vet
rebel groups and create a moderate front with which to negotiate with the Assad regime
will likely end abruptly, potentially fracturing rebel groups. Fighting, thus, will take on a
new intensity, with more Syrian towns experiencing the same horrific fate of starvation
as Madaya.
6. ISIS could become the largest beneficiary of the hostility between Iran and Saudi
Arabia, as it operates outside the proxy war zone in Syria. ISIS will escape the spotlight
as Iran and Saudi Arabia pour their energy to fight their proxy war in Syria.
THE REGIONAL LEVEL: EFFECTS OF THE IRAN-SAUDI ROW
7. Continued hostility between Iran and Saudi Arabia will increase the levels of regional
polarization along sectarian and political lines. This has already begun. Almost all Arab
League ministerswith the exception of Lebanonin a recent communiqu backed
Saudi Arabia in its spat with Iran over Sheikh Nimr al-Nimrs execution and the
subsequent sacking of the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Such politically charged gestures
are difficult to rescind, making it hard to move towards regional rapprochement and
almost impossible to settle the regions current conflicts. Added to this is the danger that
Turkey will further tilt toward Riyadh in this conflict, undermining the potential that it
could serve an invaluable role as balancer and mediator. A convergence of the Arab and

Turkish positions in this dispute could increase anxieties in Tehran, perhaps resulting in
a strengthening of the hardliners in the February parliamentary and Assembly of Experts
elections. This could produce a more adventurous Iran at a time when the Saudis
themselves have become more openly aggressive. While these possible trends toward
further regional polarization do not necessarily portend direct armed conflict between
them, it will certainly reduce their capacity and will to tackle the problems that are
currently feeding regional dysfunction.
THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: EFFECTS OF THE IRAN-SAUDI ROW
8. The days of the Great Game in the Middle East are over. Whereas there was a time
when actions by global actors were able to shape relationships and events in the Middle
East, today the dynamic can go both directions, with regional actors having the capacity
to influence relationships at the global level. A case in point is the potential for hostility
between Saudi Arabia and Iran to increase tensions between the United States and
Russia. While the U.S.-Russian relationship has been continuously fraught with tension
over Syria, with each backing opposing sides in the conflict, they seem to agree on the
principle that there is no pure military solution to the war. Evidence of this was the
opening up of a diplomatic track shortly after the Russians entered Syria, despite U.S.
objections.
9. U.S.-Russian cooperation could end if the Iranian-Saudi relationship leads to a failure
of diplomacy in the Syrian civil war. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and Saudi
Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir have thus far committed their countries to be
represented at the next round of diplomatic talks. If Iran and Saudi Arabia come only
grudgingly to the talks to promote their competing regional agendas, or instead use this
forum to close the diplomatic window, then this leaves both the Washington and
Moscow holding the bag. If the diplomatic process collapses, the most robust
opportunities for cooperation between the United States and Russia could vaporize,
given they have differing military priorities, with Russia focused on fortifying the Assad
regime and the United States focused on dislodging ISIS. The result could be further
military entrenchment by both global powers and a hardening of positions. Moreover, if

Iran and Saudi Arabia add fuel to their proxy war in Syria, the U.S. and Russian forces
on the ground might find it hard to avoid being drawn further into the fight, in effect
trapping the two global powers in an unwinnable and intractable situation. Russia, in a
desperate but vain attempt to show gains before getting out of Syria, could ramp up its
efforts to support Assad militarily. The risk of a direct clash, with the margins for error
narrowing, between the United States and Russia is thus elevated.
THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY NEEDS TO RALLY
10. So what can be done to avoid the dire scenario of the Iran-Saudi dispute poisoning
the local, regional and international tiers of the three-tiered game? First, the United
States and Russia need to get on the same page on Syria and acknowledge the danger
signs posed by the sudden downward turn of the Iranian-Saudi relationship. This is not
as farfetched as it sounds. Both countries understand that a military track without a
parallel diplomatic track is a dead-end for resolving a conflict that is quickly becoming a
global security threat. Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin understands that a
diplomatic process is the only graceful and face-saving exit for Russia from Syria. The
United States and Russia need to present a united front and send a clear message to
Riyadh and Tehran that they will be resolute in efforts to find a political solution in Syria,
regardless of the state of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Neither Washington
nor Moscow can afford to have their relationship mirror the often-toxic ties between
Riyadh and Tehran. Instead, they need to close ranks and present the best of what the
international system can offer in terms of conflict mitigation.
11. Second, while the United States and Russia are the main actors in the Middle East
today, a broader P5+1-like initiative that worked so well during the Iranian nuclear
negotiations needs to be resurrected. The current International Syria Support Group
(ISSG) consisting of the major international and regional powers is a positive step in this
regard. But as Iran-Saudi ties deteriorate, a group consisting only of global powers will
be necessary to augment the efforts of the ISSG. A renewed P5+1 initiative could in
effect establish a firewall that helps international powers avoid being drawn into the
sectarian and political turmoil in the region. Only by insulating themselves this way can

the global powers apply the kind of diplomatic leverage needed to limit the damage
inflicted on the Syrian talks and the region by the split between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
While the international community might struggle to ameliorate relations between the
two regional powers, it can ensure thefocus of these two adversaries remains on
common regional threats and the persistent presence of ISIS.
12. Third, other regional powers like Turkey need to be convinced not to take sides in
the growing conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Egypt has already, to some degree,
closed ranks with Saudi Arabia, which is somewhat understandable given that its
financial lifeline flows from Riyadh. But Cairo needs to be persuaded not to pursue
additional actions that might further escalate an already fraught situation. Turkey should
be the real target of international diplomacy aimed at keeping the Iran-Saudi dispute
contained. It has more political and economic independence than Egypt, and while it
has been aligned with Saudi Arabia on Syria, it has strong energy ties to Iran.
Therefore, it has the capacity and the interests to remain neutral in this dispute. It
should be persuaded to try to work with both countries with the aim to reduce tensions,
perhaps acting as a bridge towards regional cooperation. Turkey falling completely into
the Saudi camp will only further stoke sectarian and regional tensions, which could also
exacerbate its already tense relationship with Russia. While a cooling off period is
probably required before Turkey can play this role, it should be encouraged to ultimately
move in this direction.
THE ROOTS OF SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN
13. The sectarian violence in Pakistan which has marred the final years of the last
century continues in the present and has cost thousands of lives. Shia-Sunni tensions
were largely

concealed through layers of governance and prevented from

degenerating into confrontation during the British Raj. Soon after the emergence of
Pakistan, the uneasy relationship between Shias and Sunnis gradually degenerated into
open violence by the mid-1980s. The Iranian revolution with the treat of export as well
as the decade-long struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and its
aftermath also stoked the sectarian flame in Pakistan which is home to largest

concentration of Shias after Iran. Though apostatisation of Shias has not been allowed,
successive governments have, at best, been indifferent to the sectarian fatwas issued
by extremist organizations such as the

Sipah Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Tayba, Jaish-e-

Mudhammad, Al Ikhwan and Harkutul Mujahideen. The violence these have ignited has
resulted in a tit-for-tat Shia response.

SAUDI POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE IN PAKISTAN

14. Over the course of their bilateral engagement with Pakistan the Saudis have
developed and extended close links with the Pakistani military establishment and large
sections of the countrys political and religious elites to a level where they (the Saudis)
consider themselves to be movers and shakers in Pakistans internal affairs The
Saudis have at times also played a mediatory role in resolving problems around the
civil-military relationship and other political crises in Pakistan. According to a WikiLeaks
cable the Saudi embassador to the U.S., Adel al-Jubeir, asserted in 2009 that the
Saudis were not observers but participants in Pakistan (Walsh, 2010).
Muslims in Pakistan, most of whom subscribe to the Sunni sect of Islam, generally hold
favourable views of SaudiArabia due to its being the birthplace of Islam and the
custodian of the two holiest sites of the faith (Harmain Sharifain). The Soviet-Afghan
war had provided the Saudis with the opportunity to extend their religious-ideological
influence in Pakistans public sphere by supporting Sunni religious organisations and
madrasas.
15. Saudis have been using their influence in Pakistans public sphere as a means to
seek and justify political and military support from Pakistan, as well as to counter Iranian
influence in Pakistan and the wider region. Political and military support for the nucleararmed Pakistan has also remained vital for Saudi Arabia in its strategic pursuit of a
dominant position in the Middle East and the Muslim world. At the same time, Pakistans
political and religious-ideological landscape is very complex and diverse and does not
by design validate support for the Saudi government and its policies. Recent
developments in the country, including the responses of the Pakistani people and
leaders on the issue of support for Saudi Arabias intervention in the Yemeni crisis, have

revealed some fundamental problems regarding Saudi religious and political influence in
Pakistan.
16. Firstly, the Saudis sectarian orientation in dealing with Islamic groups, parties and
madrasas in Pakistan does not make them equally credible in the eyes of all Pakistani
religious groups and religious-political parties. Secondly, some analysts believe that
sectarian tendencies have not yet made inroads into Pakistans national political
discourse (Rana, 2015b). Therefore, with the exception of a few small sectarianoriented parties, mainstream political and religious-political parties in Pakistan hardly
consider that such tendencies steer Pakistans relations with Riyadh.
17. Thirdly, Saudi religious and political influence in Pakistan varies depending on the
Pakistani peoples sentiments and popular national narratives. For instance, the Saudis
failed to obtain Pakistans military support on Yemen in light of a national consensus in
Pakistan to remain neutral. Fourthly, while the Pakistani people and their leaders
acknowledge the holiness of the land of Saudi Arabia, criticism of the Saudi government
has been growing in Pakistan in recent months and years, particularly for that
governments alleged support to sectarian groups and madrasas that fuel religious
extremism and sectarian violence Despite its extensive diplomatic and public diplomacy
efforts, the Saudi government could not obtain the desired public and political support
from Pakistan on the issue of Yemen. Most of Pakistans political parties, media and civil
society had begun to oppose the sending of troops to Yemen in support of the Saudi-led
coalition fighting Shia Huthis there even before the joint parliamentary session held from
April 6th to 10th 2015 decided the matter.
18. Pakistani legislators condemned the overthrow of the government of President Abd
Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and pledged to provide all possible support if Saudi Arabia were
attacked or its security endangered, but decided against sending troops to Yemen.
There were two apparent reasons for this. Firstly, a consensus was emerging among
Pakistans political and military establishments and civil society organizations against
sending troops to Yemen, which in turn influenced the media and public opinion.
Pakistans fear of a sectarian backlash in the country; growing internal security
concerns and actions, particularly those taken after the December 16th 2014 attack on

an army public school in Peshawar; regional engagements, including those with China,
which called for the establishment of good relations with Pakistans immediate
neighbours including Iran; and the foreign policy commitment to maintain Pakistans
traditional policy of non-interference in the Middle East paved the way for this
consensus. Therefore, because they ran contrary to the larger national narrative on the
Yemeni crisis, the street protests organised by religious and sectarian groups in support
of sending troops to Yemen were unable to generate any impact.
19. Secondly, two main religious-political parties in Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-e-IslamFazlur Rehman (JUI-F) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), were reluctant to join pro-Saudi
protests and rallies. According to some analysts, JI has remained linked to the Muslim
Brotherhood movements of the Middle East, which have suffered at the hands of Arab
monarchists, particularly after the so-called Arab Spring. From this perspective, JI is
reluctant to become part of any movements which support the monarchists aggressive
adventures, noted one observer (Rana, 2015c). Similarly, although some of its local
leaders were unhappy, JUI-F supported the parliamentary resolution on Yemen,
apparently in an effort to enhance its credentials as a mainstream political party by
supporting widely held national and mainstream views.
20. Therefore, in the absence of some major religious-political parties, pro-Saudi
protests and demonstrations by small religious and sectarian groups and parties
including those financially supported by Saudi Arabia failed to attract the attention and
participation of the people and government. Most of these protests and rallies were held
by the alliance Tehreek-e-Difa-e-Harmain Sharifain (Movement for the Protection of the
Holy Sites), which was formed at the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad on April 2 nd 2015
(Ali, 2015a) with the aim of influencing the government to send troops to Yemen to
support Saudi Arabia. Some other groups, including Jamaatud Dawa, also held several
rallies and demonstrations in various cities.
The Iran factor
21. One of the main factors affecting Saudi Arabias efforts to strengthen its political and
religious-ideological foothold in Pakistan has been its desire to counter Iranian influence
in the region. However, Pakistan has always tried to maintain a balance in its relations

with Iran and Saudi Arabia, which has at times proved very tricky (Syed, 2014a).
General Zias military takeover in Pakistan in 1977, the Iranian revolution of 1979, and
the Soviet-Afghan war in Afghanistan brought Pakistan and Saudi Arabia closer not only
in religious-ideological terms, but also in emerging regional strategic alliances.
22. In the 1980s and early 1990s Pakistan also witnessed the emergence of Sunni and
Shia sectarian groups, including violent ones, allegedly supported by Saudi Arabia and
Iran, respectively. While the Iranian revolution inspired the Shia groups, the SaudiPakistani alliance in Afghanistan and General Zias Islamisation policies, which were
oriented around Sunni Islam, did the same for Sunni groups. Iran was concerned about
Zias religious-ideological alignment with Saudi Arabia, both in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Since 2001 Pakistan has successfully maintained normal relations with
Iran; these relations became very warm when the PPP government was in power (200813). As discussed earlier, the Saudis were unhappy about this and sought to shift the
balance of relations in their favour immediately after their traditional ally, the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), came to power in 2013. A marked warming up of
Pakistani-Saudi relations in the first quarter of 2014, which entailed some high-level
bilateral visits and the provision of $1.5 billion in Saudi aid to Pakistan, was largely seen
as the result of Saudi efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Pakistan, which had grown
while the outgoing PPP government was in power.
23. During Saudi crown prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Sauds visit in February 2014
Pakistan fully supported the Saudi position on the Syrian conflict and asked Syrian
president Bashar al-Assad Irans main ally in the region to form a transitional
governing body. There were also reports that Saudi Arabia was in talks with Pakistan to
provide arms including anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles to Syrian rebels, a claim
that Pakistan denied. Pakistan also denied reports that it would send 100,000 of its
troops to Saudi Arabia.
24. Pakistans support for the Saudi position on Syria raised speculation that it was
changing its Middle East policy under Saudi pressure. Concerns were expressed that
Pakistan was not only changing its traditional position of staying neutral in Middle
Eastern affairs, but was also exhibit[ing] a stance that did not converge with those

being held by some of its important regional allies in China and Iran . Eventually, the
PML-N government took two steps. Firstly, it convened a conference2 of Pakistani
diplomats in the Middle East and the Gulf in Islamabad on May 6th 2014. Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif told participants that Pakistan would maintain its policy of neutrality and
non-interference in the Middle East.
25. Secondly, following this conference, the prime minister paid a visit to Iran. The
Iranian-backed Huthi takeover in Yemen in September 2014 added to the Saudis
regional insecurities in the Middle East and North Africa. The Saudi government badly
wanted Pakistan to join the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen against the Huthis,
but Pakistans political and military leadership decided not to send troops to Yemen. The
Saudis might have viewed the decision as reflecting a Pakistani tilt toward Iran, but it
was in fact designed to strengthen Pakistans policies of staying neutral in the affairs of
the Muslim world and maintaining balanced relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. During
the five-day joint parliamentary session held on Yemen in April 2015 some
parliamentarians expressed fears that sending troops to Yemen would annoy Pakistans
closer neighbour Iran, with which Pakistan shares a 780-km border and has great
prospects for bilateral engagement once international sanctions on Iran are lifted.
Others warned that Pakistans interference in the Yemeni conflict would not only create
a sectarian backlash in the country, but could also impact Pakistans ongoing military
operations against internal militants. It could both ease pressure on the militants and
also motivate them to start recruiting fighters for the war in Yemen. Yet it remains to be
seen how Pakistans refusal to send troops to Yemen to aid the Saudis will affect its
relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran in the long run. Despite deciding to stay neutral on
Yemen, Pakistan has repeatedly expressed complete solidarity with Saudi Arabia and
vowed to defend that countrys territorial integrity. In April 2015, after the Pakistani
Parliament decided against sending troops to Yemen, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif led a
high level delegation to Saudi Arabia comprising the army chief, the defence minister
and other high-ranking officials to explain the decision to the Saudis.
26. At the same time, apart from the situation in the Middle East and North Africa,
several other factors also affect Pakistans relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, such as
the world powers signing of a nuclear deal with Tehran, which, by easing economic

sanctions, could reintegrate Iran into the regional and international trading systems;
emerging regional dynamics and alliances in South and Central Asia; the new Saudi
leaderships strategic priorities and preferences vis--vis Pakistan; Pakistans relations
with India and/or Indias influence on Pakistans relations with Afghanistan, Iran and
Saudi Arabia; and the threat of Islamist militancy and terrorism.

CURRENT SCENARIO
27. Anybody studying the architecture of the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East should not be
surprised at Saudi Arabia announcing the severing of diplomatic relations with Iran in the
aftermath of the burning of the Saudi embassy in Tehran by violent protestors, who were
demonstrating against the execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. In a domino effect, Gulf countries
and Saudi allies broke off or downgraded their relations with Tehran, including Kuwait, the UAE
and even Sudan. The Muslim world can ill-afford any further escalation in a turbulent region
already riven with civil wars, terrorism and sectarian clashes. In Syria alone, over 250,000
people have been killed and over 10 million have turned refugees in civil strife since February
2011.

28. Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two main rivals for regional supremacy in the Middle
East. Both are oil-rich countries. Both have authoritarian systems of governance. They
also have a claim to the leadership of the two main Muslim sects. However, all these
similarities have not been able to steer them any closer; the last, in fact, resulting in
giving impetus to sectarian divide, which has now grown to such a proportion that it has
torn apart the entire Middle East.
29. Tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia have their roots both in geography and
history, but the present discord has more recent dimensions. Saudi Arabia, together with
its Arab partners, has been explicit in its suspicion of Iran and accuses it of meddling in
the internal affairs of Arab states right from the time of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
Many Arab states are furious at Tehrans direct military, political and financial support to
Assads regime in Syria. They have taken exception to the manner in which Iran gained
strength in Iraq through its proxies after Saddam Husseins fall from power.

30. Iran, on the other hand, blames Saudi Arabia for promoting sectarian divide in
Muslim states, specifically in the Middle East where the latter wields great leverage.
Irans Supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has roundly condemned the execution of
Sheikh Nimr. President Hassan Rouhani ordered the arrest of protestors responsible for
the attack on the Saudi mission in Tehran, but also condemned the execution of the
religious scholar.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN
31. Iran is Pakistans Western neighbor and sits on the periphery of Pakistans most
troubled province, Balochistan. Iran has a Balochistan of its own and figures in the
international conspiracies to carve out an Independent Balochistan comprising Pakistani
and Iranian Balochistan. Jundullah, an anti-Iran terrorist group operating from Pakistan
is sponsored and funded by the CIA. Pakistan has to collaborate with Iran to fight and
neutralize separatist elements in Balochistan.
32. Iran holds the key to regional peace; Afghanistan being center of gravity. Iran has its
stakes and influence in non-Pashtun Afghanistan. It has military ties with India and its
Chabahar port, very close to Gwadar, was built by India to encircle Pakistan, in line with
its strategic objectives. If Pakistan antagonizes Iran, it risks increased Indian influence
on its West and South-West. It will be a tough task with India all poised to assume
greater role in Afghanistan after NATO drawdown of troops. It may be kept in mind that
in order to develop Chabahar port, India has already built road infrastructure on IranAfghanistan border spending $750 million which will provide an access to Central Asia
from Iran and neutralize the positive outcome of Gwadar port for Pakistan.
33. It is for this reason that India and US are investing funds in Balochistan insurgency
to prevent Pakistan and China from taking advantage of Gwadar. Gwadar will only be
useful after Pakistan build roads and rail infrastructure in Balochistan which, given the
intensity of insurgency, is not possible for Pakistan anytime soon. Pakistans geostrategic location is very interesting. It is very close to the mouth of Strait of Hormuz and
every ship carrying all oil for East of Pakistan passes through North Arabian Sea i.e.
Pakistans territorial waters. Any tension in the region and an imminent clash of interest
of the world with Iran will direct impact Pakistans economic, political and strategic

stability. Pakistan is an energy deficient country. The natural answer to this problem is
import of gas from Iran for which IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project was
initiated.
34. Fearing incidental benefits of this project to China and also under US pressure,
India is already out of this project. Pakistan is also under immense US pressure to
abandon the project and concentrate on a very unfeasible TAPI (TurkmenistanAfghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project. Pakistan has yet not abandoned IP
project and is a target of fury of US and its allies. Though Pakistan is still a part of the
deal but its lukewarm response is already frustrating Iran. Any delay in launching the
pipeline project will cost Pakistan Irans goodwill Another difficult development is Irans
pursuit of its nuclear program. This also threatens the regional peace with India and
Pakistan already in possession of nuclear capabilities. Irans nuclear program threatens
Israel and the US-Israel nexus can go to any limit to deprive Iran of this capability.
35. This is where the Saudi strategic interests figure in. Saudi Arabia has been Irans
traditional adversary. These adversarial relationships were under wraps prior to 1979
when both the countries were Americas Cold War allies but the these adversarial
relationships intensified after Iran was ruled by religious clergy whose religious beliefs
are opposed to those of Saudi Arabia. Both the countries have not fought any war so far
but they are in proxy war since 1979 and the battle field, unfortunately, has been
Pakistan. Sectarian violence intensified in Pakistan causing deaths and bitterness and
polarizing Pakistani society. Saudi Arabia does not approve of Pakistans close relations
with Iran and tries to drive wedge between the two neighboring countries. Increased
attacks on Hazaras of Balochistan and other Shia pilgrims by pro-Saudi extremists
outfits is a clear indication that Saudi Arabia can go to any limit to teach Pakistan a
lesson for its Iran relations.
36. Irans nuclear program is viewed a direct threat, not only to Israel but also Saudi
Arabia and its allies. Recent troubles in Bahrain against the ruling regime supported by
Saudi Arabia triggered under Iranian influence played a great part in further worsening
Iran-Saudi Arabia relationships. It is generally assumed that any possible strike on Irans
nuclear installations will have a tacit approval and support of Saudi Arabia. There were

rumors in the recent past that Saudi Arabia had offered Israel to use its airspace for
aerial attacks on Iran. Pakistans economy depends on Saudi Arabia in more than one
ways. Nearly 60% of foreign remittances, a life blood for Pakistans economy, come for
Pakistani diaspora working in Saudi Arabia and its allied countries. These workers not
only bring petro-dollars, they also harbor close sympathy with these Arab countries.
37. This gives a great leverage to Saudi Arabia to meddle in Pakistans affairs directly
and also through right-wing clergy funded by Saudis. This clergy was strengthened in
Afghan jihad through massive donations which promoted Wahabi Islam and its violent
side in Pakistan. The extremists in Pakistan are still sympathetic to Saudi Arabia and
derive strength from its religious policies of intolerance. In addition to this, Pakistan has
to depend on Saudi oil to power its economy which is available on deferred payments.
Saudi Arabia is practically a US-satellite country.
38. Pakistan often uses Saudi influence to reach out to the US in difficult times. Like
other financial institutions, Saudis also extend economic cooperation to Pakistan when it
is approved of by the US. Saudis are suspicious of the current regime in Pakistan and
are apprehensive of its pro-Shia policies. They think that PPP government is playing a
dual role; trying to please both Iran and Saudi Arabia. The space created by this
suspicion is proactively being filled by India which worries Pakistan. Saudi Arabia was
visibly unhappy over the closure of NATO supplies for such a long period. The Saudi
decision to hand over Mumbai attack suspect to India was pressurize Pakistan to come
to terms with the US, and by implication with Saudi Arabia.
A WAY FORWARD
39.

Pakistans strategic compulsions, however, do not allows to abandon any one of

them. Pakistan has to act as a mediator between two countries to avoid the deadlock
among them. Diplomacy should be given a chance and officials on both sides should
exercise extreme restraint in engaging in informal means of communication to convey
messages. Both the countries need a bare minimum communication channel to avert
an accidental war. Then, an insubordinate hyper-nationalistic military officer, naval
commander or fighter pilot attacking the other wont be considered an attack by the rival
country.

CONCLUSION
40.

Without an eventual thawing of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, any

prospects for restoring stability, defeating ISIS and ending the civil wars in Syria and
Yemen will remain remote. Where relations between these two regional powers leads,
the

Middle

East

follows.. An

all-hands-on-deck

approach

should

be

taken

by international powers to at least attempt to repair relations. The Iran-Saudi

relationship is too big to fail, and failure is not an option for the Middle East primarily and
the global community at large.

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