ALogicalJourney

RepresentationandMind
HilaryPutnamandNedBlock,editors
RepresentationandRealityHilaryPutnam
ExplainingBehavior:ReasonsinaWorldofCausesFredDretske
TheMetaphysicsofMeaningJerroldJ.Katz
ATheoryofContentandOtherEssaysJerryA.Fodor
TheRealisticSpirit:Wittgenstein,Philosophy,andtheMindCoraDiamond
TheUnityoftheSelfStephenL.White
TheImageryDebateMichaelTye
AStudyofConceptsChristopherPeacocke
TheRediscoveryoftheMindJohnR.Searle
Past,Space,andSelfJohnCampbell
MentalRealityGalenStrawson
TenProblemsofConsciousness:ARepresentationalTheoryofthePhenomenalMindMichaelTye
Representations,Targets,andAttitudesRobertCummins
ALogicalJourney:FromGdeltoPhilosophyHaoWang

ALogicalJourney
FromGdeltoPhilosophy
HaoWang
TheMITPress
Cambridge,Massachusetts
London,England

1996MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproducedinanyformbyanyelectronicormechanicalmeans(includingphotocopying,recording,orinformation
storageandretrieval)withoutpermissioninwritingfromthepublisher.
ThisbookwassetinPalatinobyAscoTradeTypesettingLtd.,HongKong.
PrintedandboundintheUnitedStatesofAmerica.
LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData
Wang,Hao,1921
Alogicaljourney:fromGdeltophilosophy/HaoWang.
p.cm.(Representationandmind)
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0262231891(alk.paper)
1.Gdel,Kurt.2.LogiciansUnitedStatesBiography.3.LogiciansAustriaBiography.I.Title.II.Series.
QA29.G58W3571996
9632568
193dc20
CIP

Contents

Preface

xi

Introduction

0.1TheLogicianandHisTheorem

0.2Gdel'sPhilosophy:ProgramandExecution

0.3RelationofPhilosophytoMathematicsand
Logic

14

0.4FromGdeltoLogicandMetaphilosophy

20

Chapter1Gdel'sLife

25

1.1ASketch

26

1.2HealthandDailyLife

35

1.3SomeofHisGeneralObservations

42

1.4Marriage

46

1.5PoliticsandHisPersonalSituation

51

1.6CompanionofEinstin

54

Chapter2Gdel'sMentalDevelopment

61

2.1HisLifeinItsRelationtoHisWork

62

2.2ConsciousPreparation(19201929)

67

2.3TheFirstoftheThreeStagesofHisWork

70

2.4TheTwoLaterStages

76

2.5SomeFactsaboutGdelinHisOwnWords

81

2.6HisOwnSummaries

90

Chapter3ReligionandPhilosophyasGuidesto
Action

101

3.1GdelonanAfterlife

104

3.2ReligionandGdel'sOntologicalProof

111

3.3Worldviews:BetweenPhilosophyand
Ideology

121

Chapter4TheConversationsandTheirBackground

129

4.1ActualandImaginaryConversations

130

Pagevi

4.2MyContactswithGdelandHisWork

132

4.3ChronologyandMiscellany:1971to1972

137

4.4Continuation:1975to1976

147

Chapter5PhilosophiesandPhilosophers

153

5.1HowGdelRelatesPhilosophytotheFoundations
ofMathematics

155

5.2SomeGeneralComments

162

5.3ForHusserlWithDigressionsonKant

164

5.4Against(Logical)Positivism

172

5.5GdelandWittgenstein

177

Chapter6MindsandMachines:OnComputabilism

183

6.1MentalComputabilismGdel'sTheoremand
OtherSuggestions

184

6.2MindandMatter:OnPhysicalismandParallelism

190

6.3TuringMachinesorGdelianMinds?

193

6.4FormalSystemsandComputablePartial
Functions

203

6.5NeuralandPhysicalComputabilism

205

Chapter7PlatonismorObjectivisminMathematics

209

7.1TheDialecticofIntuitionandIdealization

211

7.2DiscoveryandCreation:Expansionthrough
Idealization

221

7.3ThePerceptionofConcepts

232

7.4FactsorArgumentsforObjectivismin
Mathematics

237

7.5ConceptionsofObjectivismandtheAxiomatic
Method

242

Chapter8SetTheoryandLogicasConceptTheory

247

8.1Cantor'sContinuumProblemandHis
Hypothesis

248

8.2SetTheoryandtheConceptofSet

253

8.3TheCantorNeumannAxiom:TheSubjectiveand
theObjective

259

8.4TheFunctionandScopeofLogic

264

8.5TheParadoxesandtheTheoryofConcepts

269

8.6SetsandConcepts:TheQuestforConceptTheory

273

8.7PrinciplesfortheIntroductionofSets

280

Chapter9Gdel'sApproachtoPhilosophy

287

9.1HisPhilosophy:ProgramandExecution

289

9.2OnMethodology:HowtoStudyPhilosophy

297

9.3SomeGeneralObservationsonPhilosophy

305

9.4TheMeaningoftheWorld:Monadologyand
RationalisticOptimism

308

9.5Time:AsExperiencedandasRepresented

318

Pagevii

Chapter10Epilogue:AlternativePhilosophiesas
Complementary

323

10.1FactualismandHistoricalPhilosophy:Some
Choices

326

10.2SomeSuggestionsbyBernays

335

10.3SomeLessonsfromtheWorkofRawls

342

10.4ThePlaceofPhilosophyandSomeofItsTasks

353

10.5AlternativePhilosophiesandLogicas
Metaphilosophy

361

References

375

Index

381

Rentongcixin,xintongcili.TherearesagesfromtheEasttherearesagesfromtheWest:allofthemhavethesamekindofmindheartalltheirmindshavethesamekindof
intuition.
LuJiuyuang,11391193
Itisonlyafterprofounderacquaintancewiththeothersciencesthatlogicceasestobeforsubjectivespiritamerelyabstractuniversalandrevealsitselfastheuniversalwhich
embraceswithinitselfthewealthoftheparticular.
Hegel,GreaterLogic

Pagexi

Preface
InthisbookIproposetodiscussKurtGdel'sphilosophicalviewswithinthecontextofmyownconceptionofthemansionofphilosophyanditsmanyrooms.
BeginningwiththeactualdiscussionsbetweenGdelandme,Ihavebroadenedthemeaningofconversationstoincludetheinterplaybetweenmycontinual
reflectionsandtheavailablerelevantmaterialbyandaboutGdel.Inthisway,Ihopetoattainacoherentunderstandingofhislifeandthoughtwithintheframeworkof
myownevolvingperspective,reconstitutingandcompletingtheactualdiscussionsbetweenussoastobringouttheirimplications.Itisthereforeobviousthatthis
projecthasbecomeanintegralpartofmyownongoingpursuitofacomprehensiveviewofthings.
ThisbookisacontinuationofmyReflectionsonKurtGdel,whichIcompletedinJuneof1986andpublishedin1987.Amongotherthings,itattemptstopresenta
moretransparentsurveyofGdel'slifeandworkthanisgivenintheearlierbook.Myoriginalpurposewastobringoutinagenerallyunderstandableformmy
fragmentaryandchaoticrecordsofourwiderangingconversations.ThisturnedouttobeamuchmoreformidabletaskthanIhadanticipated.Astheeffortcontinued
andastimewenton,IfeltincreasinglythatIwastryingtoreconstituteanimmensepuzzlefromthedistortedimagesofafewscatteredpieces.Toborrowsomelight,I
consultedGdel'sownwritingsbutunfortunatelymuchoftheunpublishednoteshemaderemainconcealedbehindhisGabelsbergershorthand.Tounderstandhis
commentsonLeibniz,Kant,Hegel,Husserl,andEinstein,Ihavealsotriedtostudysomeoftheirrelevantwork.
Earlier,inmyFromMathematicstoPhilosophy,IhadmadeuseofdiscussionsIhadwithGdelbetween1967and1972IcompletedthatworkinJuneof1972
andpublisheditinJanuaryof1974.Inparticular,Iincludedthere,withoutcomments,abouttenpagesofGdel'sownsummaryofwhathewantedtoseepublished.
Thepresentbookcontainselaborationsofthesepagestoo.
AllalongIhavethoughtofmystudyofGdel'sideasasawaytoarriveatandcommunicatewhatItaketobethemostreasonableofhisviewsontheissueshe
studied,ratherthananattempttodepictfaithfully

Pagexii

thebodyofhisphilosophicalthought.Histotalthought,inevitably,likethatofeverygreatthinker,isdifficulttobringintofocus,iftakenasawhole,andcontainsparts
ofvaryingdegreesofclarity.Intheprocessoftryingtoresolvevariousambiguitiesinmynotes,Ihaveselected,interpreted,andextrapolatedfromsomeofhis
observationsalongpathsthatarecongenialtome.Moreover,Ihavetriedtofindaninclusiveframeworkwithinwhichthesalientfeaturesofalternativephilosophies
suchashisandWittgenstein'scanbeseenascomplementaryratherthanascontradictorytoeachother.Bydoingthesethings,Ihavebeenledbeyondthescopeof
theplannedbookandfindithardtolocateasuitableboundarybetweenwhatshouldbeincludedandwhatshouldbeexcludedhere.Thishasaddedanabstacletothe
completionoftheproject.
Worsestillforthislimitedgoal,Ibegantorealizemoreandmoremyownignoranceandprejudices,bothgenerallyandinregardtotheliteraturerelevanttothe
specificissuesconsideredbutthesedeficienciescanbecorrectedonlygradually.Atthesametime,Ibegantosensethattherearewaysoflookingatphilosophy
superiortowhatIhadbeenaccustomedto.Thisfeelingoffacingnewvistasisexhilarating,butitalsoaccentuatesthefamiliartensionbetweenadesiretoconcludea
pieceofworkandanaturalurgetoenterthepromisedlandofbetterviews.Forallthesereasons,Ihadtodecidemoreorlessarbitrarilywhereandwhenthisbook
wastostop.
SinceIamtryingtopreserveinthisbookafairlycompleterecordofwhatGdelsaidinourdiscussions,itwouldbeawkwardtoincludealsomyownextended
reflectionsonthecentraltopicsofPlatonisminmathematics,thenatureoflogic,andthecontrastofmindswithcomputers.Iam,therefore,planningtoputthatmaterial
inaseparatebook,tobeentitledTheFormalandtheIntuitive:FromComputationtoWisdom.
Anothercomplicationismybeliefthatmanyofthetopicsconsideredhereareintrinsicallyofmorethanisolatedinterest.Buttocommunicatethisbeliefsuccessfully
requiresagiftforpresentingthematerialinsuchawaythatthecommonreaderwillnotbeputoffbypreconceivedideasaboutwhatheorshecanunderstand.Even
thoughIhavespentmuchenergyinorganizingthematerialtomotivatethemorespecializedconsiderationssothatthereadercanseethemasanaturalrefinementof
oursharedconcerns,IamnotsurehowfarIhavesucceeded.
In1946Gdel'smotherMarianneheardthatGdelandEinsteinwereclosefriends.ShebegantoaskaboutEinsteininherlettersandwantedtoknowmoreabout
him.InDecemberof1950GdelrecommendedtoherPhilippFrank'sbiographyEinstein:HisLifeandTimes(1947,theoriginalGermanmanuscriptwaspublished
onlyin1950)MarianneobtainedtheGermanversionofthisbookandfounditdifficult.InJanuaryof1951Gdelwrotetoher:''IsthebookaboutEinsteinreallyso
hardtounderstand?

Pagexiii

Ithinkthatprejudiceagainstandfearofevery'abstraction'mayalsobeinvolvedhere,andifyouwouldattempttoreaditlikeanovel(withoutwantingtounderstand
rightawayeverythingatthefirstreading),perhapsitwouldnotseemsoincomprehensibletoyou."
Ihavemyselffoundthisadvicehelpfulinstudyingtrustworthyworks.Itmustbeafairlycommonexperiencetorealizethatwhatwethoughtwasdifficultturnsouttobe
quiteunderstandablewithabitofeffort.Theseeminglydifficultpartsofthisbookare,Ihope,ofthiskind.Inanyevent,theunderstandingofonepartofitdoesnot
dependuponfamiliaritywithprecedingparts,oreven,inmostinstances,withthechapterthatcontainsit.
ThewritingofthisbookhascontinuallyoccupiedmefornearlyadecadeintheprocessIhavewrittenmuchpreliminaryandrelatedmaterial,partsofwhichhavebeen
publishedelsewherewhileotherpartsremainunfinished.Ihavederivedbenefitsfromvarioussourcesinonewayoranother.
IamgratefultoMarieGrossiforherskillandpatiencethroughtheseyearsinexecutingtheinterminableworkofturningthenumerousfragmentsintoaccurate
typescripts,withsympatheticunderstandingandconstructivesuggestions.
TotheInstituteforAdvancedStudyIamgratefulforpermissiontousematerialfromGdel'sliteraryestate.TotheWienerStadtundLandesbibliothekIamgrateful
forpermissiontoquotefromGdel'sletterstohismother.
Inconnectionwithdifferentpartsofthebook,IhaveprofitedinvariouswaysfromcommentsbyPaulBernays,LeighCauman,JulietFloyd,ZhaowuHe,Hongkuei
Kang,RayMonk,SidneyMorgenbesser,CharlesParsons,G.H.vonWright,QingheWang,SianjunWang,YiMingWang,andReiyuanWu.
OnseveralspecifictopicsIhavehadthegoodfortuneofobtainingthehelpofexperts:fromHowardStein,ontheconceptoftimeinphysicsandinphilosophyfrom
RichardTieszenontheviewsofEdmundHusserlfromWayneC.MyrvoldonthealgorithmiccharacterofphysicallawsfromPalleYourgrau,ontheideasofGottlob
Frege,andfromSherminHsei,ontheworkofJohnRawls.DiscussionswithHanneTierneyandPalleYourgrauonmanyaspectsofthebookhavebeenextensive
andespeciallyhelpful.
Forthepasttwoyearsorso,AnthonyEveretthashelpedmebymakinganindexandanoutlineofthereconstructednotesofmydiscussionswithGdel.Hisacute
commentsonadraftofthebookhaveenabledmetoeliminatevariousrepetitionsandothererrors.Moreover,hehasconsentedtomakeanindexforthebook.
HW

Pagexiv

HaoWangdiedonMay13,1995,afterthisbookwassubmittedforpublicationbutbeforeitwasreadytogotopress.Thefinalcheckingthathewouldordinarily
havedonewasdoneinsteadbyhisfriendsPalleYourgrauofBrandeisUniversityandLeighCaumanoftheJournalofPhilosophy(retired),attherequestandwith
theapprovalofHao'swidow,HanneTierney.WeapologizetoHaoandtoyou,hisreaders,foranydeficienciesinourefforttorenderthemanuscriptasclearand
faithfultoHao'sintentionsaspossible.
Weshouldalsomentiononespecificproblem:ProfessorWangrealizedthatthebookisrepetitious,andhespoketoProf.Yourgrauaboutthisonanumberof
occasions.Someoftherepetitionisinevitable,becauseofthestructureofthebook,butsomehewouldhaveeliminatedifhehadlivedlongerorifhishealthinhislast
yearshadallowedhimtodomorework.Thisisadefectthatweinhisabsencearenotinapositiontoaddressaverysmalldefect,wefeel,inwhatseemstousa
beautifulandextraordinarilyusefulbook.
PYandLSC

Page1

Introduction
Philosophersshouldhavetheaudacitytogeneralizethingswithoutanyinhibition:goonalongthedirectiononthelowerlevel,andgeneralizealongdifferentdirectionsina
uniquelydeterminedmanner.
Gdel,13September1972
Hegelseemstometobealwayswantingtosaythatthingswhichlookdifferentarereallythesame.Whereasmyinterestisinshowingthatthingswhichlookthesamearereally
different.
Wittgenstein,Autumn1948

InordertoseeGdel'sworkasacontributiontophilosophyasweknowittoday,itishelpfultorelatebothhisphilosophicalassertionsandhisphilosophically
significantworkinlogictofamiliarphilosophicalconcerns.Inparticular,hismostfamousresultonthemechanicalinexhaustibilityofmathematicsisrelevanttothe
currentdebateoverthemind'ssuperioritytocomputers.Byhisownaccount,Gdel'sPlatonismwasimportanttohisworkinlogic.Inaddition,hespeculatedon
severaltraditionaltopicswhichhave,byasortofunspokenconsensus,beenlargelyabandonedincontemporaryphilosophy:topicssuchasthelikelihoodofan
afterlife,theexistenceofGod,andtheprojectofanexactmetaphysicspreferablyintheformofamonadology.
Consequently,inordertodiscussGdel'sviewsinsuchawayastobenefitone'sownstudyofphilosophy,itseemsnecessarytoreviewbrieflytheconceptualandthe
historicalmotivationsbehindbothcontemporaryphilosophyandGdel'ssomewhatdifferentphilosophicalinterests.Particularlyrelevantinthisconnectionarethe
relationsofphilosophytologicandtoscience,whichmaybeseenastwosubproblemsofthegeneralissueofthenatureofphilosophyanditsplaceinhumanlife.The
transitionfromlogictophilosophyinGdel'sownworkisaconvenientplacetobegin.

Page2

0.1TheLogicianandHisTheorem
ItisgenerallyacceptedthatKurt(Friedrich)Gdel(19061978)wasthegreatestlogicianofthetwentiethcentury.InFebruary1951,whenGdelwassickina
hospital,RobertOppenheimertoldtheattendingphysicianthat"YourpatientisthegreatestlogiciansinceAristotle."Atthememorialmeetingon3March1978,Andr
Weilobservedthatitwouldbebanaltoaffirmthatin2,500yearsGdelwastheonlypersonwhocouldspeakwithoutexaggerationof"Aristotleandme."Inthe
seventiesJohnWheelersaidthat"ifyoucalledhimthegreatestlogiciansinceAristotleyou'dbedowngradinghim"(quotedinBernstein1991:141).Gdelhimselffelt
hisgreatestkinshipwithLeibniz.Inanycase,noonedeniesthathispositionamonglogiciansiscomparabletoEinstein'samongphysicists.
Einsteinhimself,whohadareallywarmandverycloserelationshipwithGdelfrom1942untilhisdeathin1955,consideredGdel'sworkasimportantto
mathematicsashisownworkwastophysics:"NowthatI'vemetGdel,Iknowthatthesamethingdoesexistinmathematics"(quotedinWang1987a,hereafter
RG:3132).
Gdel'sworkhasrevolutionalizedmodernlogic,greatlyraisingitslevelofsignificancebothmathematicallyandphilosophically.Moreover,inhishandsmathematics
andphilosophyareexceptionallymeaningful,beautiful,andfreefromrancor.Thedeeprespectheenjoysamongdiversegroupsofthoughtfulpeopleisrareinthe
modernworld.Inaworldwherepeoplecompeteconstantlywithoneanother,heraisedhimselfabovecompetition.Forallcontemporarybranchesoflogic,hiswork
servesasafoundationandalifeforce.Inphilosophy,bycontrast,muchofhiswritingremainsunpublished,andopinionsofitaretentativeanddivided.
On17June1952HarvardUniversityawardedGdelanhonorarydoctorateas"thediscovererofthemostsignificantmathematicaltruthofthiscentury."Inaletterto
hismother(22July)Gdeldescribesthiscitation(whichwaswrittenbyWillardVanOrmanQuine)as"unquestionablythemostbeautiful.""Butthismatter,"he
continues,"hasnothingtodowithEinstein,whosediscoveriesarenotmathematicalbutphysical."Hepointsoutthatthecitationshouldnotbetakentosaythatheis
thegreatestmathematicianofthecentury,but,rather,thatthephrasemostsignificantmeans''ofthegreatestgeneralinterestoutsideofmathematics."
ThetruthsohonoredwasdiscoveredbyGdelin1930attheageof24.Itishisbestknownwork,usuallyreferredtosimplyasGdel'stheorem,eventhoughhe
discoveredanumberofotherfundamentaltheoremsaswell.Thetheoremcanbestatedinanyoneofthefollowingalternativeforms:

Page3

GTMathematicsisinexhaustible.
GT1Anyconsistentformaltheoryofmathematicsmustcontainundecidablepropositions.
GT2Notheoremprovingcomputer(orprogram)canproveallandonlythetruepropositionsofmathematics.
GT3Noformalsystemofmathematicscanbebothconsistentandcomplete.
GT4Mathematicsismechanically(oralgorithmically)inexhaustible(orincompletable).
Thesepropositionsremaintruewhenwereplace"mathematics"by"arithmetic"(i.e.,numbertheoryorthetheoryofnaturalnumbers,thesimplestandthemost
fundamentalpartofpuremathematics).Inbrief,Gdel'stheoremrevealsthealgorithmicinexhaustibility(orincompletability)ofmathematics(andevenofarithmetic).
Thisfactofalgorithmicinexhaustibilityshows,accordingtoGdel,thateitherthehumanmindsurpassesallcomputersorthatmathematicsisnotcreatedbythehuman
mind,orboth.Itisthereforeclearthatthetheoremisrelevanttoboththephilosophyofmindandthephilosophyofmathematics.
Intermsofphilosophicaldiscourse,thetheoremhelpstoclarifythedialecticoflogicandintuition,offormalismandcontent,ofthemechanicalandthemental,of
languageandthought,oftruthandprovability,andoftherealandtheknowable.
Gdel'stheoremhasbeencelebratedinpoetry("HomageGdel"byHansMagnusEnzenberger)andinmusic(thesecondviolinconcertoofHansWernerHenze).
IthasbeenquotedintheBroadwayplayBreakingtheCode(1988),aboutthelifeofTuring,andintherelatedbiography,AlanTuring:TheEnigma(Andrew
Hodges,1983).Turing'stheoryofcomputersbuiltonandstrengthenedGdel'stheorem.
Theoriginal1931articleinwhichGdelprovedthetheoremisavailableinseveralEnglishtranslationsthisarticleandGdel'slecturesonit(atPrincetonin1934)
werepublishedbothinTheUndecidable(a1965collectionofthebasicpaperscloselyrelatedtothetheorem,editedbyMartinDavis)andinthefirstvolumeof
Gdel'sCollectedWorks(CW11986).ExpositionsoftheproofofGdel'stheoremhaveproliferatedinarticlesandbooksaimedatsmallerandlargergroups.Of
thoseaimedatthecommonreader,themostnotableareErnestNagelandJ.R.Newman,Gdel'sProof(1958)DouglasHofstadter,Gdel,Escher,Bach:An
EternalGoldenBraid(1979)RudyRucker,InfinityandtheMind(1984)andRogerPenrose,TheEmperor'sNewMind(1990).
GdelinpersonnarrowlymissedthewidespreadfamehistheoremacquiredthroughHofstadter'sbestsellingbook,whichappearedtheyearafterGdel'sdeath.This
colorfulworklinksthetheoremwiththemusic

Page4

ofJ.S.Bach(16851750)andthedrawingsofM.C.Escher(19021972)allseenasdiversemanifestationsofselfreference,or"strangeloops."Hofstadtersees
strangeloopsor"tangledhierarchies"as''thecruxofconsciousness"andproposesa"metaphoricalfugueonmindsandmachines."TheconstructionsinGdel'sproof
buttresstheprojectofartificialintelligence(AI)byoffering"thenotionthatahighlevelviewofasystemmaycontaincertainexplanatorypowerwhichsimplyisabsent
onthelowlevels"(Hofstadter1979:707).Inasomewhatsimilarspirit,JudsonWebb(1980)arguesinMechanism,MentalismandMetamathematicsthatGdel's
theoremsuppliesevidencefor(ratherthanagainst)thefaithofmanyAIresearchers.
Anotherextremeview,representedbyRogerPenrose,isthat"fromconsiderationofGdel'stheoremwecanseethattheroleofconsciousnessisnonalgorithmic
whenformingmathematicaljudgments,wherecalculationandrigorousproofconstitutesuchanimportantfactor"(Penrose1990:416).Gdelhimself,likeamajority
ofthosewhohavethoughtaboutthequestion,lookedforadditionalinsightswhich,incombinationwithhistheorem,wouldleadtoaconclusiveproofofournatural
beliefthatthehumanminddoesindeedsurpassallcomputers,preferablyjustbydemonstratingthemind'ssuperiorcapacitytodecidespecificallymathematical
questions.
Gdel'stheoremoccupiesacentralpositioninthedevelopmentofrecursiontheory,prooftheory,andcomputerscience.Furthermore,ithasbeentakenup
enthusiasticallybyphilosophers,linguists,andpsychologists.Peoplehaveaskedwhetherananalogoustheoremcanbeprovedforphysics.(CompareRG:156.)In
responsetoaproposaltogeneralizehistheoremtohumanaffairs,Gdelonceproposedwhatheconsideredareasonableformulation(inthedraftofaletterIforget
towhomdated15March1961):
0.1.1Acompletelyunfreesociety(i.e.,oneproceedingineverythingbystrictrulesof"conformity")will,initsbehavior,beeitherinconsistentorincomplete,i.e.,unabletosolve
certainproblems,perhapsofvitalimportance.Bothofcourse,mayjeopardizeitssurvivalinadifficultsituation.Asimilarremarkwouldalsoapplytoindividualhumanbeings.

Thetheoremisfastbecomingoneofthoseseminalcontributionstotwentiethcenturythoughtwhicheveryonehasheardaboutandacknowledgestobeimportant,
althoughappreciationsofitssignificancedifferindepthandininterpretation.Inthisrespect,itislikeFreudianpsychology,Einstein'stheoryofrelativity,Bohr's
principleofcomplementarityandHeisenberg'suncertaintyprinciple,Keynesianeconomics,andthedoublehelixmodelofDNA.

Page5

Gdel'sothermajorcontributionstologic,althoughimportantinlogicandphilosophicallysignificant,havenotacquiredcomparablepublicattention.Hisphilosophical
workremainslargelyunpublished,exceptforafewarticlesandfragments.Onlyhissketchofhisphilosophyofmathematicsisfairlyfamiliar.Duringmyconversations
withhim,however,Irealizedthatthissketchishighlyinadequateandmisleading,likeonetipofaniceberg.Eventhepartoftheicebergthathasbeenexposedtome
revealsamuchgranderstructurethanissuggestedbythefamiliarpicture.
ThereismuchmoreinGdel'sphilosophyofmathematicsthaniscommonlybelieved.Forinstance,contrarytothegeneralimpression,Gdelaffirmsthefallibilityof
ourmathematicalintuitionandinvestigatesthedifferentdegreesofclarityandcertaintythatexistwithinmathematics.Also,herecognizestheepistemicpriorityof
naturalnumbersoverarbitrarysetsandofobjectivityoverobjects.
Andthereismoreinhisphilosophythanhisphilosophyofmathematics.Unlikemostphilosopherstoday,hehasdefiniteviewsonmanydifficultissueswhichappearto
besofarbeyondwhatweknowthatwearehardputtoformstrongconvictionsonewayortheother.Whatismore,hisviewsareusuallycontrarytothespiritofthe
time.Thisspeculativeboldnessisundoubtedlylinkedtohisbeliefthat"therearemanyrelationshipswhichtoday'sscienceandreceivedwisdomhaven'tanyinkling
of"(lettertohismother[hereafterLM]dated12.9.61,reproducedinChapter3).
In1975,inresponsetoarequestfromapopularmagazinetoreportonsomeofmydiscussionswithGdel,Iwroteapaperputtingtogethersomeofhisobservations
ontherelationsbetweenmind,matter,mathematics,andcomputingmachines.Incommentingonadraftofthispaper,Gdelaskedmetoaddthefollowingparagraph:
0.1.2Gdeltoldmethathehadcertaindeepconvictionsregardingmindandmatterwhichhebelievedarecontrarytothecommonlyacceptedviewstoday.Thereasonsforhis
convictionsareofaverygeneralphilosophicalnatureandtheargumentshepossessedarenotconvincingtopeoplewithdifferentconvictions.Hence,hehadchosentostate
onlythosepartsorconsequencesofhisconvictionswhicharedefiniteevenwithoutreferencetohisgeneralphilosophy(Wang1978).

ThedistinctionbetweenhisdeepconvictionsandhisreasonsforholdingthemindicatesthatGdelpossessednopersuasiveformulationofhisgeneralphilosophy.
Judgingfromourlimitedknowledgeofhisliteraryestate,itappearsthathedidnotworkoutandputintowritingmuchofhisgeneralphilosophy.Myimpressionisthat
hedidnotdevelophisgeneralphilosophynearlyasthoroughlyashedidsomepartsofhisphilosophyofmathematics.Itisevenpossiblethattheinformalandloosely
structuredconversationshehadwithmeandwhichIamusingfreelyin

Page6

thisbookwillturnouttobethefullestextantexpressionofthediversecomponentsofhisinadequatelyarticulatedgeneralphilosophy.Ifthisconjectureiscorrect,
therewillbeagreatdealofroomforalternativeinterpretationsofhisphilosophicalviews.
AlthoughIgiveanextendedaccountofGdel'smentaldevelopment,inChapter2,itmaybeusefulheretoprovideabriefsketchofsomeofthehighpoints.
Stimulatedbyanintroductorytextbookincalculus,Gdelbecameinterestedinmathematicsin1921.InthesummerofthatyearhereadabiographyofGoethewhich
ledhim,indirectly,toaninterestinNewton'sideasandphysicsingeneral.HebegantoreadtheworkofKantin1922.HeenteredtheUniversityofViennatostudy
physicsin1924buthisinterestinprecisionledhimawayfromphysicsintomathematicsin1926and,in1928,tomathematicallogic.Tworevealingpiecesof
informationaboutthisperiod,asgleanedfromhisletters,arehisearlyadherencetoPlatonismandhisimageofhimselfassomeonegoingagainstthecontemporary
intellectualclimate:
0.1.3Ihavebeenaconceptualandmathematicalrealistsinceabout1925(letterof19.8.75,QuotedinRG:20).
0.1.4Idon'tconsidermyworka"facetoftheintellectualatmosphereofearlytwentiethcentury,"butrathertheopposite(ibid.).

From1929to1933Gdeldidfundamentalworkonpredicatelogicandthefoundationsofarithmeticandbegantothinkaboutsettheory.Fromroughly1933tothe
beginningof1943,hewasmainlyoccupiedwithsettheoryandmadefundamentalcontributionstoit.Thisshiftofhisattentionrelatedtoaconsciousdecisionto
concentrateonlyonbasicproblems.Forinstance,inearly1937hetoldmycollegeteacher,WangSianjun,that
0.1.5Thenatureofnumbertheoryisbasicallyclearnowasaresultofmyownandrelatedwork.Thepresenttaskistounderstandsettheory(Jetzt,Mengenlehre).

Between1927and1939,themathematicianKarlMengerhadfrequentcontactswithGdel.In1981hedescribedGdel'sconductduringscientificdiscussions:
0.1.6Gdelwasgenerouswithopinionsandadviceinmathematicalandlogicquestions.Heconsistentlyperceivedproblematicpointsquicklyandthoroughly,andmadereplies
withgreatestprecisioninaminimumofwords,oftenopeningupnovelaspectsfortheinquirer.Heexpressedallthisasifitwerecompletelyamatterofcourse,butoftenwitha
certainshyness,thecharmofwhichawokewarmandpersonalfeelingsforhiminmanyalistener.(CompareMenger1994:201.)

Page7

GdelstudiedtheworkofLeibnizfrom1943to1946.AccordingtoMenger,"GdelhadalreadybeguntoconcentrateonLeibniz"around1932(1994:210).He
publishedhisRussellpaperin1944andthefirstversionofhisCantorpaperin1947.Between1946and1950hedevotedhimselfmainlytowhathecalleda
"digression"thestudyoftheproblemoftime,withspecialreferencetoKant'sphilosophyandEinstein'stheoryofrelativityproducingtwomathematicalandtwo
philosophicalpapersasaresult.
In1951hewroteanddeliveredhisGibbslecture,whichwasprimarilyanattempttoargueforPlatonisminmathematics.In1958hepublishedtheBernayspaper,
whichinterpretsintuitionisticnumbertheorybyaslightandnaturalextensionofHilbert'sfinitarymathematics.From1953tothebeginningof1959hespentagreat
dealofhiseffortontheCarnappaper,inwhichhetriestoprovethatmathematicsisnotsyntaxoflanguageandarguesinfavorofsomeformofPlatonism.Intheend
hedecidednottopublishthispaper.HewrotetoP.A.Schilpp,theeditor,on3February1959:
0.1.7Ihavecompletedseveraldifferentversions,butnoneofthemsatisfiesme.Itiseasytoallegeveryweightyandstrikingargumentsinfavorofmyviews,butacomplete
elucidationofthesituationturnedouttobemoredifficultthanIhadanticipated.Thesubjectmatteriscloselyrelatedto,andinpartidenticalwith,oneofthebasicproblemsof
philosophy,namelythequestionoftheobjectiverealityofconceptsandtheirrelations.Inviewofwidelyheldprejudices,itmaydomoreharmthangoodtopublishhalfdone
work.

In1959GdelbegantostudytheworkofEdmundHusserl.In1964hepublishedarevisedandexpandedversionofhisCantorpaperandfrom1966to1969he
expandedtheBernayspaperbyaddingthreenewnotes.InDecember1967andMarch1968hewrotetwoletterstomeexplainingtheimportanceofhisPlatonism
forhisworkinlogic.(Ilaterpublishedtheletters,withhisconsent,inFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(Wang1974a,hereafterMP:811).Afterexplainingthe
relationofPlatonismtohisworkonpredicatelogic,hecontinued:
0.1.8Imayaddthatmyobjectivisticconceptionofmathematicsandmetamathematicsingeneral,andoftransfinitereasoninginparticular,wasfundamentalalsotomyotherwork
inlogic.

During1971and1972GdelandIhadextensivephilosophicaldiscussions,andhecommentedonabookmanuscriptofmine.Asaresult,hedecidedtoformulate
andmakepublicsomeaspectsofhisownphilosophicaloutlookthroughthatbooktheseconcisestatementsofhisweredulypublishedinMP:913,8486,189
190,324326).WeresumedourdiscussionsinOctoberof1975andcontinuedthemuntilJune1976.Iamtryingtomakeafullreportoftheseconversationsinthe
presentbook.

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0.2Gdel'sPhilosophy:ProgramandExecution
Gdel'sprograminphilosophyistofindanexacttheoryofmetaphysics,presumablyintheformofamonadology.Hefelt,however,thathehimselfwasfarfrom
reachingthatgoal.Hedidnotevenknow,hesaid,whattherightprimitiveconceptsare.Whathehaddonewastodealcarefullywithcertainmoremanageable
subproblemsandtocommunicatehisgeneralattitudeandsomemethodologicalrecommendations.IdiscusstheseitemsatgreaterlengthinChapter9.Mypurpose
hereistoexplainthemotivationbehindthephilosophicaldiscussionsreportedtherebyviewingthem,quiteapartfromtheirdirectcontactwithcurrentphilosophy,as
partsofGdel'sgrandproject.
Gdelcharacterizedhisphilosophicaloutlookinthisway:
0.2.1Mytheoryisamonadologywithacentralmonad[namely,God].ItislikethemonadologybyLeibnizinitsgeneralstructure.
0.2.2Mytheoryisrationalistic,idealistic,optimistic,andtheological.

Tocarryouthisprogram,GdelhadtotakeintoaccountKant'scriticismsofLeibniz.HesawHusserl'smethodaspromisingawaytomeetKant'sobjections.Thisis
why,asreportedinChapter5,hecriticizedpositivismanddefendedHusserl.
TheidealisticcomponentofGdel'stheoryis,Ibelieve,tobeconstruedasaffirmingtheprimacyofmindanditspowers.Itisinthissensethatherejectedmaterialism.
Thisisimplicitintheveryconceptionofmonadology,forthemonadsareseenasspiritualbeingsandtheyconstitutethefundamentalsubstances.Giventheprevalence
oftheviewthatthereisnomindseparatefrommatter,Gdelhadtotrytodisprovethatview.Sincetherangeofwhatmattercandoisnotastransparentastherange
ofthecapabilitiesofcomputers,heassumedthatthebrainfunctionsbasicallylikeacomputer.Hethentriedtoprovethesuperiorityofmindovercomputersby
arguing,inthefirstplace,thatmindscandomoremathematicsthancomputerscan.ThistopiciscentraltotheobservationsconsideredinChapter6,on"Mindsand
Machines."
Inotherwords,inordertoargueforhisidealism,Gdeltriedtobringthedialecticoftheformalandtheintuitivetoalevelatwhichapreciseresolutionismorelikely
tobeattained.Thisisnotunlikehisworkonthefoundationsofmathematics,wherehispreciseresultsinlogicconstitutedaplausibleandpreciserefutationofa
positivisticallyorientedformalism.Alongalessdecisiveline,hissolutionsofEinstein'sfieldequationsweremotivatedbyandusedbyGdeltosupporthisbelief
thatourintuitiveconceptoftimeisnotobjective.
TherationalisticcomponentofGdel'stheoryarguesinsupportofbothPlatonismandthesuperiorpowerofthemind,becauserationalismat

Page9

leastasGdelunderstooditputsuniversalsatthecenterandviewsthemasstableandknowablebyus.Immediatelyrelevanttohisgrandprojectwouldbethe
independentexistenceandknowabilityofthesharpprimitiveconceptsofmetaphysicsormonadologysothatwecanfindthegoverningaxiomsandseethemastrue.
Butwedonotevenknowwhattheseprimitiveconceptsare.Inanycase,fromourexperienceinthehistoryofphilosophy,weareinclinedtobelievethatthefamiliar
candidatesfortheprimitiveconceptsofmetaphysicsarenotsufficientlysharpandknowableforustoseewithstableintersubjectiveagreementthattheiraxioms
aretrue.Typically,insteadoffacingthisproblemdirectly,Gdelconcentratedonarelatedmoredefinitesubproblem:thatofPlatonism(orobjectivism)in
mathematics,whichisthesubjectmatterofChapter7.Hethenseemedtoapplyimplicitlyhisprincipleofuninhibitedgeneralization(andanalogy)toinferthat,ifwe
thinkhardenoughandseethingsintherightway,metaphysicalconceptsbecomeassharpandcanbeseenasclearlyastheconceptsofmathematics.
Theoptimisticandthetheologicalcomponentsofhistheoryareintendedtoprovideuswithmoreammunition.Theprincipleofuninhibitedgeneralizationisamajor
applicationofoptimism.OtherspecificapplicationsofthesetwocomponentsarewellillustratedbyGdel'sargumentsforanafterlifeandfortheexistenceofGod.
TheseboldspeculationsarereportedanddiscussedinChapter3.Itseemsclearthathehimselfrealized,however,thatthesetwocomponentscouldnotconvince
thosewhodidnotalreadybelievetheproposedconclusions.Indeed,theycouldhaveonlyaheuristicvalueinphilosophy:onewhobelievesinthemcouldarriveat
certainconclusionsbyapplyingthemandsubsequentlylookfororfindmoreuniversallyconvincingargumentstosupporttheconclusions.
Chapter8isdevotedtosettheoryandlogicasconcepttheory.Inthisconnection,Gdeldiscussedextensivelyaconceptionoflogicwhichseemstometobea
naturalrefinementofFrege'sinconsistentconceptionoflogicasconcepttheory.Inbothcases,logicincludessettheoryasapart.ThedifferenceisthatGdelrejected
Frege'sassumptionthattherangeofeveryconceptisaset.Asaresult,eventhoughsettheoryenricheslogicgreatly,concepttheoryisnotparalleltoitandhasyetto
bedeveloped.Weareatpresentfarfromknowingwhatthemainaxiomsofconcepttheoryare.Apartfromtheintrinsicsignificanceofsettheory,Gdelwas
interestedincapturingtheessenceofmathematics,asanadditionalsupportforPlatonisminmathematicsandasasubstantivepartoflogicinhissense,whichisan
elementarypartofmonadology:
0.2.3Logicdealswithmoregeneralconceptsmonadology,whichcontainsgenerallawsofbiology,ismorespecific.

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IntheforegoingsectionIhavetriedtoseetheviewsofGdelconsideredinthisbookaspartsofhisgrandproject.Mostofustodaydonot,Iamsure,seeany
plausiblewayofapproachingthegrandgoalofhisprojectinitsfullsplendor:thatis,asanexacttheorythatdoesformetaphysicswhatNewtondidforphysics.
Nonetheless,itispossibletoenvisagefruitfulworkinthedirectionofthisgrandgoalwhichwould,say,captureinasatisfactorywaytheskeletonofamonadology.
Forinstance,ifweenrichthetheoryoftheworldinWittgenstein'sTractatusbydistinguishingbetweenconceptsandobjects(themonadsandallsetsofobjects),
takingperceptionandappetitionastheprimitivefacultiesofthemonads,andusingasaxiomssomeoftheLeibnizianprinciplesandsomeoftherudimentarylaws
governingtheoperationofperceptionandappetition,wemayhopetoarriveatareasonabletheorywhichagreeswithourcrudeintuitionsandtosee,inparticular,that
thetruepropositionsoflogicinGdel'ssensearealltrueineverypossibleworldaccordingtosuchatheory.Ifwethinkabouttherelevantideasdiscussedlaterin
Chapter9,itseemstomepossibletointerpretGdel'sprojectinthisapparentlyweakenedsense.
Intermsofthepresentstateofphilosophyandmyownconcernsinthestudyofphilosophy,IbelieveitpossibletodistinguishtwopartsinwhatIknowofGdel's
philosophicalviewsandtoevaluatethesetwopartsseparately.Ontheonehand,thespeculationsonGodandanafterlifeandtheinclusionofacentralmonadin
monadologyarebeyondmyinformedconcernsIamnotabletoseethereasonablenessoftheoptimisticandthetheologicalpartsofhisphilosophywellenoughto
deriveanybenefitfromthem.Ontheotherhand,Gdel'smethodologicalobservationsandhiscommentsonfamiliarphilosophersarehighlysuggestiveandhelpfulin
broadeningone'soutlookhisextendeddiscussionsoflogicandsettheory,mindsandmachines,andPlatonisminmathematicsarestimulatingcontributionstothe
continuingdialogueintheEuropeanphilosophicaltradition.
Indeed,itmayevenbesaidthatinthesecond(methodological)partofhisphilosophyGdelwasaddressingthebasicproblemsofthistradition,whichputsthe
philosophyofknowledgeatthecenteranddirectsitsattentionprimarilytotheuniversalandthetheoretical.Ithastodowiththedialecticoftheuniversalandthe
particular(arguablythecentralproblemofGreekphilosophy)andthatofthesubjectandtheobject(arguablythecentralproblemofmodernphilosophyfrom
DescartestoKantandonwards).Forinstance,Plato'stheoryofIdeasisanattempttosolvetheproblemofuniversals,andiscommonlytakentobethebackboneof
Plato'sphilosophy.Yetitisonlyonephilosopher'sphilosophyofknowledge,notadefinitionofthegeneraltask.

Page11

InadiscussionofPlato'sAcademy,HaroldF.Chernissformulatedthetaskofphilosophyasfollows(1962:83):
0.2.4Moreover,therearetwothingsinwhichPlatoismoreinterestedthaninthetheoryofideasitself,forthattheoryis,afterall,onlyhiswayofsatisfyingthesetwo
requirements:first,thereissuchathingasmindwhichcanapprehendreality,andsecond,thisrealitywhichistheobject[subjectmatter]ofknowledgehasabsoluteand
unqualifiedexistence.

Thesetworequirementscanbemetindifferentways.Infact,weallbelievethattheyareasamatteroffactsatisfied,asweknowfromexperience.Yetwhenwetry
toreflectonthem,wefinditdifficulttodeterminejustwhatrealityis,orwhatwemeanbyreality,aswellasthesenseandtheextenttowhichourmindcan
apprehendit.
Muchoftraditionalphilosophymaybeseenasattemptstocaptureournotionofthisunqualified,absoluterealityandtocharacterizethemind'scapacitytoapprehend
it.Wehaveagooddealofexperienceofthemind'sapprehensionofreality,itssuccessesanditsfailures.Weareconvincedthatthephysicalworldisreal,andlifeas
weknowit,includingthesurprisingsuccessofscienceandtechnology,showsusthatinsomesensethemindcanapprehendit.
Yet,evenforourmostrudimentaryknowledge,ourmindshavetouseconcepts,suchasred,chair,andsoon,whicharenotinthephysicalworldinthesamesense
asthatinwhichparticularredchairsare.Wearefacedwiththetaskofdeterminingthestatusofconcepts.ItisthereforenotsurprisingthatforfiftyyearsGdel
adheredtoandcontinuallytriedtofindconvincingreasonstosupportsomeformofPlatonism.
FollowingthesuggestionofCherniss(0.2.4),wemaysaythatthemainproblemsofthephilosophyofknowledgeare(1)therangeandthenatureofobjectivereality,
and(2)therangeandthenatureofthemind'scapacitytoknowobjectivereality.
Mostpeopleagreethatthephysicalworldispartofobjectivereality.Onebasicproblemofphilosophyiswhatisknownas(1a)theproblemofuniversals,which
asks,inthefirstplace,whetherandinwhatsenseconcepts,oruniversals,andtheirrelationsareobjectivelyreal.(Anotherpartofthatproblemistherelationbetween
universalsandparticulars.)Anotherbasicquestionis(1b)theproblemoftime,whichaskswhethertimeandchangeareobjectivelyreal.
Weknowfromexperiencethattheminddoesknowalotaboutthephysicalworld,asisevidentbothfromoureverydayknowledgeandfromphysicsasweknow
haveit,andaboutthemathematicalworld,totheextentthatwehavereliableandrichmathematics.Mostpeopleagreethatsenseexperienceplaysanimportantpart
inourknowledgebutitisbynomeansclearthatsenseexperiencealonecanaccountforourconceptual

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knowledge,whichplaysanimportantpartinphysicsand,evenmorestrikingly,inmathematics.
Anaturalproblemis(2a)therangeandthenatureofthemind'scapacitytohaveconceptualknowledgeinparticular,toknowmathematicsandbeabletoapplyit.
Becausewefeelwenowknowthephysicalworldwellandbecausewetendtothinkofourbrainsaspartofit,weareinterestedin(2b)therelationbetweenminds
andbrainsand,inparticular,thecomparisonbetweentheircapacities.Moreover,sincecomputersoperateinamoretransparentmannerthaneitherbrainsorminds,
anotherfamiliarquestionis(2c)whetherbrainsormindsfunctionlikecomputersandwhetherornottheycandomorethancomputerscan.
ThefivevaguelyformulatedproblemsIhavelistedarenotoriouslyelusiveandcontroversial.Indiscussingthemwetypicallytalkatcrosspurposes,andsoarerarely
abletodiscoverwhere,behindthevehementantagonisms,truedisagreementslie.Twointerrelatedstrategiesforreducingthefrustrationsinthissituationare,first,to
workoutfullyalltheramificationsofapositionsoastorevealmoredefinitespotsofitspeculiarityand,second,todivideuptheissueintolesscomplexpartsandplan
tobeginwiththepartsthatadmitofmoreprecisetreatment.ItseemstomethatmuchofGdel'sworkcanbeviewedasapursuitofphilosophybyusingthesecond
strategy.
Gdel'sphilosophicalobservationsandhismajormathematicaldiscoveriescanmostlybeseenasdirectedtothefivemajorproblemsjustlisted,usuallytorestrictedor
derivedpartsofthem.Herestricts1a,theproblemofuniversals,largelytomathematicalconceptsandtheirrelations,strivingtoestablishandfixthecontentofhis
conclusionthattheyareobjectivelyreal.Indeed,inhisphilosophicalwritingsandinhisconversationshehassaidmoreonthistopicthanonanyother.Withregardto
1b(tobediscussedinChapter9),hebelieveswithKant(andParmenidesandthe"modernidealists")thattimeandchangearemerelysubjective(notobjectivelyreal).
Inparticular,heuseshissolutionsofEinstein'sfieldequationsaprecisemathematicalresultassupportforthisbelief.
On2a,themind'scapacityforconceptualknowledge,Gdelagainconcentratesprimarilyonmathematicalandlogicalconcepts.Heurgesthatourintuitiongoes
beyondKantian(or,accordingtohim,concrete)intuitionandthat,indeed,wecanalsoperceiveconcepts.Kant'sAnschauungisrestrictedtospacetime(or
sensory)intuitionitaccountsmoreorlessforHilbert'sfinitarymathematics,whichcarriesusbeyondthefinitetoasimpleformofthepotentialinfinite.Hilberthimself
hadexpectedtousehisfinitarymathematicstosafeguardmoreadvancedmathematicsbyprovingittobeconsistent,butGdel'stheoremfrustratedthisexpectation.
AsIelaborateinChapter7,GdelimplicitlysuggestsandcontributestoanapproachalternativetoHilbert'soriginalprogram,whichaimstoreveal

Page13

howwecanextendHilbert'sfinitarymathematicsstepbystepbyaddingplausiblenewabstractconcepts,soastoobtainmoreandmoreadvancedmathematics.
Gdelisalsomuchinterestedinproblems2band2c,thatis,instudyingtherelationsbetweenminds,brains,andcomputers,and,especially,incomparingtheir
capacities.Hebelievesthat"thebrainfunctionsbasicallylikeadigitalcomputer."Withthisassumption,heoffersa"scientificallyprovable"conjecturethatthemindcan
performmoreoperationsthanthebrain(thusconstruedasacomputer).Inaddition,hesuggestsseveraldirectionsalongwhichwemayhopetoprovethatthemind
candomoremathematicsthananycomputercan.Specifically,heseeksadditionalplausiblepremisesthatcanbecombined,separatelyortogether,withhistheorem
thatmathematicsismechanicallyinexhaustible,toyieldthedesiredconclusionthatmindsaresuperiortocomputersinmathematics.
Conceptsareofcentralimportanceforthemind'scapacitytoapprehendreality.Thereisendlessdebateonthequestionofwhether,whenwecomeupwithanew
concept,wearediscovering,creating,orinventingthatconcepttheanswerbeingdependentonone'spositionregardingproblem1a,theproblemofuniversals.
However,regardlessofone'spositiononthisissue,theabilityofthehumanmindtolearnorcomeupwithnewconceptsisaremarkableandhardtocapture
attribute.Thisconstantdevelopment,Gdelandmanyofusfeel,isquitebeyondthecapacityofcomputers.Yetitishardtoseehowonecouldproveconvincingly
thatthisisso.Tome,thephenomenonofthemind'slearningorcomingupwithnewconceptsisthecentralmysterythatphilosophytriesbutfailstodealwithclearly
andadequately.Iaminclinedtothinkthatalotofphilosophicalcontroversiesareaconsequenceofthisfact.Problem1aisbutoneofthem.
Gdelapplieshisprincipleofuninhibitedgeneralizationnotonlytodrawsuchstrongconclusionsasreason'spowertoansweritsownquestions,butalsotoextendthe
rangeofcertainconceptsbyanalogy.Asaresult,someofhisterminologymaybemisleadingandmayevenconcealsomedifficulties.
Forexample,heasserts,inanalogytoourperceptionofphysicalobjects,ourabilitytoperceiveconceptstoo.Itisnecessarytoremindourselves,however,thatby
thishemeansprimarilyourcapacitytounderstandandseethatcertainassertionsabouttheconceptsaretrue.Healsoregardsperceivingconceptsorintuiting
essencesasakindofobservation.Hisconceptionoftheaxiomaticmethod,whichheregardsasnothingbutclearthinking,seemstobebroaderthantheusual
conceptionandtorequiresomeconjecturalinterpretation,whichIattempttoprovidelaterinthischapter.

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Contrarytothefamiliarconceptionofconceptassomethingoriginallyconceivedbythemind,Gdelconstruesconceptsasrealentitiesspecifically''asthe
propertiesandrelationsofthingsexistingindependentlyofourdefinitionsandconstructions"(Gdel1994:128).Thereisaproblemofdistinguishingsuchconcepts
fromnotionsintroducedbyusforthepurposeoforientationandunderstanding:clearlywedousesuchnotions,regardlessofwhetherwealsorecognizerealconcepts
inGdel'ssense.Hehimselfmentionsaspeciesofsuchnotionsinthejustquotedcontext.IdiscussthisissuefurtherintheEpilogue.
Gdeldistinguishescreation,inthesenseofmakingsomethingoutofnothing,fromconstructionorinvention,inthesenseofmakingsomethingoutofsomething
else.Hisstrictadherencetothisdistinctionhastheconsequenceofgivingcreationforhimanarrowerrangethanweareaccustomedto.Inparticular,heseesconcepts
andotherthingsconstructedbyusasdiscoveriesratherthancreations.Asaresult,forinstance,hedisagreeswithBrouwer,sayingthatweconstructratherthan
createthenaturalnumbersfromouroriginalintuitionoftwooneness.InChapter7Iconsidersomeoftheramificationsofthisinsistenceonhisfavoritesenseof
creation.
Inthepresentwork,Iusuallyconstrueintuitionandidealizationintheirbroadandcomparativelystablesenses,which,Ibelieve,agreewithGdel'sprimary
conception.Ialsothinkofallprimitiveconceptsasobtainedordiscovered(inhissense)byidealization.Iregardtherealmofintuitionasconsisting,inthefirstplace,of
whatRawlscallsour"consideredjudgmentsinreflectiveequilibrium"(aconceptIdiscussintheEpilogue).
0.3RelationofPhilosophytoMathematicsandLogic
ThesurprisingcentralityoflogicandmathematicswithinEuropeanphilosophyisafamiliarphenomenon,undoubtedlybecausethesesubjectsareexceptionallyprecise
and,atthesametime,concernedwithwhatismaximallyuniversal.ItisgenerallyagreedthatmathematicsplayedanimportantpartinPlato'sphilosophyandthat
Aristotlewasthefounderoflogic.TheworksofDescartesandLeibnizalsoareimportantinbothphilosophyandmathematics,andSpinozapresentedhisEthicsin
theorderofgeometricaldemonstrations.EventhoughKantrelegatesformallogictoaperipheralplace,histranscendentallogiciscentralinhisphilosophy.Hegel's
scienceoflogicishismetaphysics,orfirstphilosophy.
Whenwecometothetwentiethcentury,thephenomenonoftheinfluenceofmathematicsandlogiconphilosophyisespeciallystriking.Frege(18481925),Husserl
(18591938),Russell(18721970),andWittgenstein(18891951)allbeganwithastronginterestinthefoundationsofmathematics.Weareallfamiliarwiththe
importanceoftheirworkand

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theirinfluenceinrecentandcontemporaryphilosophy.Moreover,Dedekind(18311916),Cantor(18451918),Poincar(18541912),Hilbert(18621943),
Brouwer(18811965),andTuring(19121954),thoughknownprimarilyasmathematicians,haveexercisedconsiderableinfluenceinthephilosophyofmathematics.
Peirce(18391914),Whitehead(18611947),C.I.Lewis(18831964),Bernays(18881977),Carnap(18911970),Ramsey(19021930),Gdel(1906
1978),andQuine(1908)allworkedonbothlogicandphilosophytheirworkexhibitsseveraldifferentwaysofrelatinglogictophilosophy.
Thecharacteristicfeatureofeffectivethinkingisanappropriateblendingoftheformalandtheintuitive.Mathematicsandlogicareimportantbecausetheyprovideus
withamodelandaframeofreferencefortheinterplaybetweentheformalandtheintuitive.Ineverydaylifeandinscientificthinkingweimplicitlyorexplicitlyuselogic
andmathematics.Inphilosophyweareconcerned,inaddition,withtheirnatureandtheirrelationshiptoeachotherandtophilosophy.
Philosophyseesinmathematicsamodelofclearthinking,withsharpconceptsandindubitableconclusionsaswellasauniverseofdiscourseinwhichorderprevails
andthepowerofpurereasonismostimpressive.PlatoandGdelbothusedourexperiencewithmathematicsastheirprimaryevidencefortheindependentexistence
ofsharpconcepts.Spinoza,asnoted,formulatedandpresentedhissystemofphilosophyasanaxiomatictheoryinthemannerofgeometry.Frege'sattempttoattaina
precisefoundationformathematicsledtoageneralframeworkforthephilosophicalstudyofourconceptsofmeaningandtruthinallscientificdiscourse.Incontrasting
alternativephilosophiesasdifferentworldviews,Gdelperceivedmathematicsastheultimatestrongholdofhisownfavoritetypeofphilosophy,whichchoosestoview
theworldasanorderlyandpurposefulwhole.
Theinfluenceofphilosophyonmathematicsislessconspicuousandpervasive.Cantordidtrytoborrowsupportfromtheologyforhissettheory,andRussellturnedto
mathematicsasasourceofsecurityandconsolationafterhefailedtofindarationalgroundforreligiousfaith.G.H.Hardyandsomeothermathematiciansseemtofind
thephilosophyofPlatonismhelpfulinageneralwayfortheirmathematicalwork.Gdelwasexceptionalinassertingthatandexplainingspecificallyhowhis
adoptionofPlatonisminhisphilosophyofmathematicswasfundamentaltohismathematicalworkinlogic.
Therelationofphilosophytologicismoredirectandintimatethanitsrelationtomathematics.Logicistaughtasabranchofphilosophy,andinsomephilosophieslogic
inoneformoranotheroccupiesacentralplace.Asweknow,however,therearedifferentconceptionsnotonlyofthenatureoflogicbutalsoofitsrange.Weall
implicitlyapplylogicinour

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thinking,butnotmanypeoplestudylogicconsciouslyasasubjectinitself.
Logicasanactivitytheartofthinkingservestoadjudicatetheinterplayordialectic,asonethinks,betweenbeliefandaction,whichinvolvesandisoftenreplaced,
inourthinkingprocess,bythedialecticofthesubjectandtheobject,theknownandtheunknown,thesubjectiveandtheobjective,formandcontent,theuniversal
andtheparticular,theformalandtheintuitive.Thisadjudicativefunctionoflogicispresentinallsortsofthinking.Asanartoramethod,logicisneutralrelativetothe
subjectmatterofourthought.
Thevaguebutsuggestiveworddialecticiscommonlyusedtodescribetheinteractionsofcontradictoryoroppositeforcesthatleadtoahigherandmoreunifiedstage
insomeprocesses.Traditionally,dialecticiscloselyassociatedwithlogic.Indeed,throughouttheMiddleAgestheworddialecticadesignatedwhatwenowcall
logic.ForHegel,logicisthescienceofthedialecticalprocessthecontinualunificationofoppositesinthecomplexrelationofpartstoawholewhichispervasive
bothinhumanthoughtandinworldhistory.
Thefamiliarcharacterizationofthesubjectmatteroflogicbeginsbyagreeingthatlogicaltruthsconsistofallandonlythosepropositionswhicharevalidinthesenseof
beingtruenomatterwhattheconceptsandobjectsareintheactualworld.Theconceptsoflogicthelogicalconstantsarethentheconceptsthatappearessentially
orirreplaceablyinthesevalidpropositions.Examplesare:everythingisidenticalwithitselfeverypropositionimpliesitselfeitherapropositionoritsnegationistrue
butnotbothsomethingistrueofeverythingifitistrueofallthings.Thesearevalidpropositionsbecausetheyaretrue,whatevertheconceptsandtheobjectsare.
Andtheconceptsofidentity,implication,negation,universalization(all),andsoon,whichoccuressentiallyinthesepropositions,arelogicalconstants.
Moreover,allpropositionsarebuiltupfromsimplepropositionsofpredicationthatis,propositionsthatapplycertainconceptstocertainthingsbyusingthese
familiarlogicalconstants.Inordertodealeffectivelywithpropositionsinauniformway,logiciansfromAristotletoFregehavecontrivedincreasinglyadequate
structuresandnotationstocodifytheintuitiveprocessofbuildinguppropositions.Indeed,whatisgenerallyacceptedtodayasthesystemofpredicatelogic(or
elementaryorfirstorderlogic)is,initsgeneralform,thesystemarticulatedbyFregein1879.Practicallynobodydeniesthatpredicatelogicisdefinitelyapartoflogic.
Afamiliarcontroversyisovertheissueofwhetherpredicatelogicisthewholeoflogic.Itispossibletoreformulatepredicatelogicinsuchawaythatitcanbeseenas
concernedonlywiththerulesofinferencethat

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governitslogicalconstantsnamely,identity,thepropositionalconnectives,andthequantifiers.Forinstance,wecandesignacompletesystemofpredicatelogicby
usingselfidentityofthingsandselfimplicationofpropositionsastheonlyaxioms,leavingthesubstanceofthesystemtonaturaldeductiverulessuchastherulethat
authorizesinferencefromtwogiven(asserted)propositionstotheirconjunctionwhichcapturetheintuitivemeaningoftheselogicalconstants.Withsucha
reformulationofpredicatelogic,thosewhowishtorestrictlogictopredicatelogiccansupporttheirthesisbyappealingtothefamiliarconceptionoflogicasthe
scienceofvalidrulesofinference.
Todeterminetherangeofobjects,wemaybeginwiththefamiliarphysicalobjects.Whenwethinkaboutconcepts,weareledtoanaturalextensionoftherealmof
objects:withrespecttomostfamiliarconcepts,wehaveineachcaseacorrespondingsetwhichistheextensionoftheconcept,inthesenseofacollectionofallthe
thingstowhichtheconceptisapplicable.Itis,however,natural,asemphasizedbyFrege,tothinkofanextensionasanobject.Inthisway,weareledtotheviewthat
setsofobjectsareobjectstoo.
Sincelogicisconcernedwiththenecessaryinthesensethatthelogicallytruepropositionsaretrueinallpossibleempiricalworldsithasnothingtosayaboutthe
contingentfactthatthisorthatempiricalobjectorconceptexistsintheactualworld.Hence,itwouldappear,logichaslittlematerialtobeginwith.
However,evenwithoutrecognizinganyempiricalthing,werealizethattheremustbesomeemptyconceptwhichappliestonothingand,therewith,theemptyset
whichistheextensionofeveryemptyconcept.Therefore,thereisatleastsomeobjectnamelytheemptysetineverypossibleworld.Butgivenanyobjects,we
canformtheirsetsandthesetsoftheirsets,andsoon.Inthisway,weobtainthefamiliarhierarchyofpuresetswhicharethesubjectmatterofsettheory.Andwe
maysay,therefore,thatsettheoryisalsoapartoflogic.
Itisalsopossibletoenvisageananalogoustheoryofpureconceptsandargue,onthesamegrounds,thatitisapartoflogictoo.However,asweknow,thereare
certainconceptswhoserangesofapplicabilityarenotsets:forinstance,theconceptofconceptortheconceptofset.Consequently,pureconcepttheoryisnot
entirelyaduplicateofpuresettheory.Infact,eventhoughwehavebynowasatisfactoryandratherwelldevelopedsettheory,wearefarfrompossessingtodaya
comparablymatureconcepttheory.Inthissense,muchfundamentalworkremainstobedoneeveninsettingupthebasicframeworkoflogicifitisconstruedas
includingpureconcepttheoryasanessentialpart.AsIsaidbefore,thisconceptionoflogicagrees,Ibelieve,withFrege'sintentionandGdel'sdeclaration.

Page18

Therelationbetweenphilosophyandlogicinthissenseiscomparabletotherelationbetweenscienceandmathematics.Justasmathematicsstudiestheuniversaland
abstractaspectwhichbelongstotheintersectionoftheconcernsofallsciences,thesubjectmatteroflogicmaybeseenastheintersectionorthelimitofallour
philosophicalconcernsaswegofromthemoresubstantivetothemoreabstract.Wemayalsoseelogicasaformofontologywhichconstitutesafundamentalpartof
metaphysics.
Alessabstractapproachtotherelationbetweenlogicandphilosophyistoadopttheviewthatphilosophyasworldviewaimsatcapturingandformulatingtheuniversal
andcomprehensiveframeofourinnerresourcesbymeansofwhichwereceive,digest,andinterpretallourthoughtsabouttheworldandaboutourselves.Fromthis
perspective,logicmakesupamajorpartofphilosophyandmayevenbeidentifiedwithwhatmightbecalledpurephilosophy.Inmyopinion,Hegel'sconceptionof
logicandWittgenstein'sconceptionasdevelopedinhisOnCertaintytendtowardthisinterpretationoflogicanditsrelationtophilosophy(compareWang1994:
section1).
Eachofuslearnstobelieveanumberofthingsandgraduallyformsapictureoftheworldasasystemofbeliefs.Welearntoactaccordingtothesebeliefs,among
whichsometendtostandfast,liketheriverbed,andsomearemoreorlessliabletoshift,likethemovingwaters.Logicisconcernedwiththebeliefsthatstandfastin
allsystemsofbelief.Thebeliefincertainempiricalpropositionsbelongstoourframeofreferencetoo,eventhoughtheyarenotpartoflogic.Mathematicsisapartof
logic.Althoughthesamepropositionmaybetreatedbothasarulefortestingand,atothertimes,assomethingthatmustbetestedbyexperience,logicisnotan
empiricalscience.
GiventhisvaguecharacterizationoflogicbasedonaparaphraseandaninterpretationofWittgenstein'stext,thereremaindifferentpossibilitiesforexplicatingthis
ambiguousconception.Forinstance,HegelandWittgenstein,althoughbothofthemcanbesaidtobeapplyingthisconception,offerdifferentanswersundoubtedly
conditionedtoalargeextentbytheirdifferentattitudestowardsamenessanddifference,aswellastheirdifferentideasofwhatistakentobeknown.Inanycase,itis
clearthatlogicaccordingtothisconceptionformsanimportantpartofphilosophy.Ifweaddtherequirementofprecisiontothisconceptionoflogic,wecould,Ithink,
alsoviewtheFregeGdelconceptionasanexplicationofit.
OnewaytolinkthisconceptionoflogicasthecommonpartofdifferentsystemsofbeliefstoourfamiliarsharedconcernsistocompareittoJohnRawls'seffort
toreplacecomprehensivepoliticaltheorywithapoliticalconceptionofjusticeintendedtorepresenttheoverlappingconsensusinamoderndemocraticsociety
(Rawls1993:xvii).Ifweconsider

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theintersectionortheuniversallyoverlappingconsensusofconflictingphilosophicalworldviews,weseemtohaveacomparativelytangiblewayofgradually
determiningthevaguedomainoftheapriori,inthesenseofthoseconceptsandbeliefswhichwecould,potentially,allobtainandacceptindependentlyofourspecific
individualexperiences.Inotherwords,withoutrestrictingourselvestoonetypeofsociety,wemaytrytolookfortheconceptsandthebeliefsaboutthemwhichallthe
differentworldviewsshare.Ifweidentifytherangeoflogicwiththatoftheapriori,orperhapsthemaximallyuniversalpartofit,wehaveinlogicacommonbasison
whichwemayhopetoadjudicatebetweenconflictingcomprehensivephilosophies.
Mathematicallogicasitiscommonlyunderstoodtodayconsistsroughlyofrecursionorcomputationtheory,prooftheoryandconstructivemathematics,modeltheory,
andsettheory.Itisabranchofmathematicsandofscience.Ifwerestrictlogictomathematicallogicinthissense,thentherelationbetweenphilosophyandlogicisa
specialcaseofthegeneralrelationbetweenphilosophyandscience.Onthewhole,thedevelopmentofmathematicallogic,especiallyatitsearlystages,hasbeenmuch
influencedbyphilosophicalconcerns:conversely,ithashadagreatdealofimpactonthesubstanceofthephilosophyofmathematicsand,therefore,alsoon
severalbasicpartsofgeneralphilosophy.
Therearedifferentattitudestowardtherelationbetweenphilosophyandscience.Forinstance,Einsteinsaid:"Thereciprocalrelationshipofepistemologyandscience
isofnoteworthykind.Theyaredependentuponeachother.Epistemologywithoutcontactwithsciencebecomesanemptyscheme.Sciencewithoutepistemology
isinsofarasitisthinkableatallprimitiveandmuddled"(1949:68384).Yetmostpracticingphysiciststodaypaylittleattentiontoepistemology.Similarly,unlike
Gdel,mostpracticingmathematicallogicianstodayhaveatmostaperipheralinterestinphilosophy.Thesedifferencesinattitudeundoubtedlyrelatetothecurrent
stageofaparticularscienceandthespecificproblemsinvestigatedbyagivenscientist.
Analogously,differentphilosophersmayvalueordeploreapositiverelationbetweenphilosophyandscience,dependingontheirownconceptionsofthetwosubjects
andthepartsofphilosophytheyconsiderimportant.Gdelseestheinteractionbetweenscienceandphilosophyasfruitfulforboth.Wittgenstein,ontheotherhand,
findsscienceharmfulbecauseitstrengthens"ourcravingforgenerality,"whichisresponsibleforbadphilosophy(1975:18).Heseestruephilosophyasinsulatedfrom
mathematics(1953:124)despitehisoccasionaldeclarationthatphilosophymayhelpgetscienceontherighttrackofattendingtoourrealneed(1974:381and
1980:62).

Page20

Wedo,asamatteroffact,drawphilosophicalconsequencesfromscientificresultswhetherfruitfullyorconfusedly.Asweallknow,therehavebeenconflicts
betweenscienceandreligion,andourwholepictureoftheworldhasbeenchangedbythedevelopmentofscience.Professionalphilosophyhasbeenaffectedbysuch
majorscientificadvancesasNewtonianphysics,Darwinianbiology,relativitytheory,quantumphysics,andmoleculargenetics.Amongothers,Gdelhimselfhas
repeatedlyconsideredthephilosophicalimplicationsofhisownincompletenesstheorem.
Intheoppositedirection,theinfluenceofphilosophyonscience,weknowthatmanyscientificideashadtheirbeginningsinphilosophy.Itislikelythatthetheological
viewofGodaspromulgatingthelawsofnaturehadapositiveeffectonthepersistentquestfororderinnaturebyphysicistslikeNewton.Inthiscentury,bothEinstein
andGdelhavealludedtothebeneficialeffectphilosophyhadontheirscientificwork.
AstrikingexampleoftheinteractionofphilosophyandscienceisthesetoffruitfulmathematicalproblemsproposedinHilbert'sprogram,whichhadbeendistilledwith
imaginationandskillfromphilosophicaldebatesonthefoundationsofmathematics.Incaseslikethis,thesolutiontoscientificproblemscanservetoclarifytheoriginal
philosophicalproblemaswell.Gdelsawonefunctionofphilosophyasthesuggestionofseminalideasatomictheory,forexample,wassuggestedbyDemocritus
andanotherasthereductionofphilosophicaltoscientificproblems,whichwastheintentionofhisownproposal(consideredinChapter6)toclarifythephilosophical
issueofmindandmatterbylookingforascientificproofofmind'ssuperioritytomatter.Moreover,Gdel'sbeliefinthefeasibilityoffindinganexactmetaphysics
seemstohavebeenbasedonaboldthoughunconvincingextrapolationfromhisreflectionsonourexperiencewithmathematicsandphysics.
0.4FromGdeltoLogicasMetaphilosophy
Thisbookhastwopurposes:first,topresentGdel'slifeandworkascompletelyandcoherentlyasIcan,and,second,tousehisoutlookasanillustrationofhowone
mighttrytoarriveatacomprehensivephilosophyorsomesubstantivepartofonewithrecognitionofourlimitedknowledgeandwithawarenessthatnumerous
reasonablealternativepositionsexist.
ThepartsofGdel'soutlookareofdifferentdegreesofclarityandcertaintytheyarelinkedtogetherbycertainmoreorlessuninhibitedgeneralizationsofdifferent
degreesofpersuasiveness.Themathematicalpartofhisworkisdefinitive.Hisconceptionoflogicasconcepttheorydefinesafairlypreciseandattractivetask,
althoughwedonotknowatpresenthowproductiveitwouldbetoconcentrateondevelopingsuchasystem.

Page21

Gdel'sPlatonisminmathematicsisinstructiveandadmitsofaspectrumofweakerandstrongerinterpretations,fromtheeasilyacceptabletothepowerfullyideal.For
mostofushisimplicitanalogyofmetaphysicstomathematicsishardtoacceptatthesametime,itsuggestspossibilitieswhichareconsonantwithhisintent,butless
substantiveandmorefeasible.
UndoubtedlydifferentpeoplewillacceptdifferentpartsofGdel'soutlook,andderivedifferentlessonsfromit.Mostphilosopherswill,Ibelieve,agreemoreorless
withmydivisionandevaluationofthedifferentdegreesofconclusivenessandpersuasivenessoftheseveralpartsofhiswork.Somepeoplemaywishtoclarifyand
developfurtherthoseofhisideaswhichtheyfindattractiveandplausible.Othersmaychoosetodisregardmostofhisphilosophicalideasasunreasonable,contrasting
hisbadphilosophywithhisgoodworkinlogic.
OneaimofthisbookistoreportandinterpretGdel'sviewsinaunifiedmanner,providingitsreaderswithanopportunitytoreflectontheirownpositiveornegative
reactionstothedifferentpartsofGdel'sphilosophyonthebasisofadditionaldata.Anotheraimistousethematerialtoclarifyandformulatemyownphilosophical
beliefsinordertoaddressmyownprincipalphilosophicalconcerns.
AlthoughIgrewupinChina,IhaveconcentratedduringmyprofessionallifemainlyonWesternphilosophy,specializinginbothgeneralphilosophyandmathematical
logic.Thisbackgroundundoubtedlyhasmuchtodowithmypreoccupationwiththeprevalenceofdisagreementinphilosophy:insteadofconcentratingondifferent
partsofthesamesubject(asdomostspecialistsinmathematicallogic),philosophersarriveatconflictingconclusionswhiletryingtoanswerthesamequestion.
Asaresult,oneofmyprimaryconcernsinstudyingphilosophyhasbeentoconsolidateandapplytherangeofbeliefsonwhichreasonablepeopleagree,ratherthanto
engageindetaileddebatesorpresentboldviewsthatstimulateandprovokeresponses.Logic,atleastbyintention,stayswithinthedomainoftheoverlapping
consensusofphilosophers,andsoitisdesirabletoapplylogictoadjudicatebetweenalternativeviews.Ifwecanseethatcertainconflictinganswerstothesame
questionareinfactanswerstodifferentquestions,wecanbegintodecomposeourdisagreementsthroughspecializationanddivisionoflabor.
IfindintheworkofJohnRawlsanilluminatingexampleoftheuseofsharedbeliefs.Rawlsrecognizestheexistenceofdeepconflictsamongreasonable
comprehensivephilosophiesbutseesnoprospectofresolution.How,heasks,isajustandfreesocietypossibleundersuchconditions?Hisansweristoformulatea
politicaltheoryofjusticewhich,hebelievesfallswithintherangeofanoverlappingconsensus.

Page22

Rawlsseeshisownpoliticaltheory,likeKant'smoraltheory,asaformofconstructivismandcontrastsitwithrationalintuitionism,whichisaformofPlatonism.
Asweknow,theconflictbetweenconstructivismandPlatonism,whichIconsiderinChapter7,iswidelydebatedinthephilosophyofmathematics.Inordertoclarify
theperspective,which,Ibelieve,IsharewithRawls,itmaybehelpfultocomparethetwocontrasts.Thereare,indeed,severalinstructiveramificationsinthis
comparison,whichIdiscussintheEpilogue.
Astheyarecommonlyinterpreted,constructivismandPlatonisminmathematicscontradicteachotherinanumberofways.Roughlyspeaking,thecrucialstepina
decompositionofthisconflictistoreduceittoafamiliardifferenceinattitudes:differentcombinationsofattitudesdependonone'schoiceofwhethertorequireor
permitahigherorlowerdegreeofclarityandcertainty,orweakerorstrongeridealizations.Thischoice,inturn,dependsonotherfactors,suchastherelationofthe
chosenpositiontothedevelopmentandapplicationofmathematics,one'sknowledgeandjudgmentofthenaturalnessofthemajoridealizations,andsoon.Moreover,
asIshallelaborate,eachformofconstructivisminmathematicsalreadyadmits(oratleastiscompatiblewith)someformofPlatonismandwithineachmeaningful
formofconstructivismorPlatonismthereisroomforspecializedinvestigations.Thuswearriveatacomprehensiveperspectivewhichreplacesamajorpartofthe
conflictsofviewsaboutthesamesubjectmatterwithchoicestospecializeinfairlywelldefinedmathematicaldomainsofonedegreeofcertaintyandclarityoranother.
Thisroughsketchofadialecticalapproachtothephilosophyofmathematicsillustratesmyproposalofawaytorealizethefamiliaridealoffindinganappropriateway
toseealternativephilosophiesascomplementarypartsofacooperativeproject.Theideaistofindandapplyasharedcriterionofrationality,sothatwecanassign
differentprobabilitiesrelativetowhatweknownowtodifferentpartsofeachphilosophyandmakeexplicitthedistinctaimsofeachphilosophy.Inthisway,one
canchooseanddevelopaphilosophyaccordingtoone'saimsandlearntotoleratephilosophieswithotherreasonableaims.Toarriveatamostplausiblepositionfora
sharedaim,onecantrytoselectandorganizedifferentbeliefsdirectedtowardthataim,accordingtotheirseparateandconjoinedprobabilities.
Itisusualtoseethepurposeoflogicastheformationandapplicationofacriterionofrationalitythatisacceptabletoallreasonablepeopleandservestoadjudicate
betweenalternativeviews.Whenlogicisseeninitsroleastheadjudicatorbetweenalternativephilosophies,itbecomesakindofmetaphilosophywhichprovidesa
methodologyforfindingandorganizing,withduereflection,ourconsideredjudgmentsatalllevelsofgenerality.

Page23

Given,however,ourgrossignoranceofthetruthorfalsityofmanyassertionsinphilosophy,thereare,ofcourse,manydisagreementsovertheprobabilitiestobe
assignedtothem.Inordertoimproveone'scapacitytojudge,itisnecessarytoreflectontheinterconnectionofthepartsofsomeattractivesystemofbeliefsand
checkthemagainstone'sownconsideredconvictionsonalltherelevantlevelsofgeneralityandcertainty.Thiscautiousapproachtendstoleadtoaninitialrestriction
toareasthatpromisecontinuedstableagreementandtoassertionsofvagueorqualifiedgeneralitieswhicharereasonablebuthardlystriking.
Inthissense,logicasmetaphilosophyisaretrospectiveandpreparatoryapproachtophilosophywhichtriestoseealternativephilosophiesascomplementaryandto
compareaphilosophy(orsomepartofit)continuallywithourintuitionsorjudgmentsinreflectiveequilibrium.Inthebackgroundareourlargepracticalconcerns,
whichgivedirectionandultimatemotivationtoourphilosophicalspeculations.
Truthandobjectiverealityareidealizationswhichderivemeaningandareacceptabletousbywayofouranticipationofintersubjectiveagreement,eitheruniversally
orwithinasignificanttypeofsociety,ideallyifnotactually.Philosophyisimpoverishedbyaninappropriateresistancetoabstractionandidealization,which,however,
havetoberestrainedbyattentiontotherequirementofforeseeablepotentialagreement.Forinstance,theconflictbetweenconstructivismandPlatonismcanbe
decomposedbybreakingtherelevantcontestedbeliefsintopartsthathavefairlydirectcontactwithourintuitionsorconsideredjudgmentswecanthuslocalizethe
disagreementandchooseamongdifferentformsofconstructivismandPlatonismwithineachdomain,whethermathematicsormoraltheoryorpoliticaltheory.
IdiscusstheseideasmorefullyintheEpilogue.Evenso,IamundernoillusionthatIamdoingmorethangropingforanillustrationofaprogramwhichIfindattractive.
ThefirsttwochaptersofthisbookaredevotedtothelifeandmentaldevelopmentofGdel.Thethirdchapterillustratesthequestforfinalsolutionsandgrand
unificationsofknowledgeandactionbydiscussingGdel'swrittenspeculationsonGodandanafterlife.Chapter4suppliesthebackgroundandachronological
summaryofmyconversationswithGdelinthe1970s,togetherwithareportofhisisolatedgeneralandtechnicalobservations.
Chapter5considersGdel'scommentsonphilosophiesandphilosophers,includinghisschemaforclassifyingalternativeworldviews,hissupportofHusserl's
phenomenology,hiscriticismofpositivismandempiricism,andhisdigressionsonKantandWittgenstein.Chapter6concernshisattempttodemonstratethe
superiorityofmindsoverbrains

Page24

andcomputers,withspecialemphasisonthecontrastbetweenmindsandcomputers.
Thethreechaptersfrom7to9areintimatelyconnectedthroughGdel'sgoverningidealofphilosophyasanexacttheory.Heseemstoseemathematicsand
Newtonianphysicsasmodelsforphilosophyandmetaphysics.Thestrategyappearstobethis:reflectionsonthenatureofmathematicsandlogicsupportPlatonismin
mathematicsreasoningbyanalogy,heconjecturesthatPlatonisminmetaphysicsistrueaswellsoitispossibletodevelopmetaphysicsasanexacttheory.
HisargumentforPlatonisminmathematicsisthesubjectmatterofChapter7.Chapter8isdevotedtosettheoryandtologicasconcepttheory,whichGdelviewed
asasortofbridgebetweenmathematicsandmetaphysics.InChapter9Ipresentanorganizedreportandinterpretationofourconversations,supplementedwithmy
owncommentsandrelevantmaterialdrawnfromGdel'swritings.ItrytocombineGdel'sfragmentarymetaphysicalspeculationsandbriefstatementsonhis
conceptionofphilosophy.TheseprogrammaticobservationsprovideaframeworkwithinwhichtoplacethemoresubstantiveassertionsinChapters5to8,makingit
possibletodiscernthemotivatingforcebehindthem.Thesesubstantiveviewsare,ofcourse,alsoofinteresttothosewhodonotsharehisoptimisticbeliefinthe
feasibilityandfruitfulnessofhisambitiousprogramformetaphysics.
Finally,inthelastchapter,theEpilogue,Isketchmyownapproachtophilosophy,incontrasttowhatItaketobeGdel'soutlook.

Page25

Chapter1
Gdel'sLife
Todeveloptheskillofcorrectthinkingisinthefirstplacetolearnwhatyouhavetodisregard.Inordertogoon,youhavetoknowwhattoleaveout:thisistheessenceofeffective
thinking.
Gdel,15March1972

Roughlyspeaking,GdelspentthefirsthalfofhislifeinCentralEuropeandthesecondhalfinAmerica.HewasbornatBrnninMoraviain1906andlivedthereuntil
theautumnof1924,whenheleftfortheUniversityofVienna.SubsequentlyhelivedandworkedprimarilyinVienna,payingthreeextendedvisitstoAmericabetween
1933and1939.HeleftAustriainJanuary1940andfromMarch1940untilhisdeathinJanuary1978madehishomeinPrinceton,NewJersey.Therehewasa
distinguishedmemberoftheInstituteforAdvancedStudy.Thetimebetween1929andJanuary1940wasthemosteventfulanddramaticperiodofhislifeandwork.
Hewasastudentfrom1912to1929andengagedinacademicresearchfrom1929to1976.Hismostfamouswork,allinmathematicallogic,wasdoneinVienna
between1929and1938.Yet,byhisownaccount,hisprimaryinterestwasphilosophy,andhespentmoreeffortindoingphilosophyasheunderstooditthanon
anythingelse.From1943on,hesaid,hewaschieflyoccupiedwithphilosophy.Acentralfeatureofhislifeandwork,accordingly,washischoicetoconcentrateon
whatheconsideredtobefundamental,disregardingotherissues.
Atabouttheageoffour,GdelacquiredthenicknamederHerrWarum(Mr.Why)becausehepersistentlyaskedthereasonsforeverything.Hecamefromaquite
wealthyfamilyandgrewupinavillawithabeautifulgarden.Hedidexceptionallywellandwasmuchpraisedinschooland,especially,incollege.Bythetimehewas
twentyfiveyearsoldhehadalreadydonespectacularwork,andhereceivedwiderecognitionverysoonafterward.
WhenhewasabouteightyearsoldGdelhadasevereboutofrheumaticfever.Thereafterhewassomewhathypochondriacalandhis

Page26

constantpreoccupationwithhishealthwasaccentuatedbyhisexcessivedistrustofdoctors.In1976hesaidthathisgenerallypoorhealthhad,atcertainperiods,
preventedhimfromdoingseriouswork.Hewasaboutfivefeetsixinchestall,usuallyunderweight,and,inhislateryears,exceptionallysensitivetocoldandproneto
eatingproblems.
Gdelisrememberedasacheerfulbuttimidchildwhobecameacutelytroubledwheneverhismotherleftthehouse.Throughouthislifeheavoidedcontroversyand
confinedhispersonalcontactstoasmallcircleofpeople.Helikewomenandevenasaschoolboydevelopedromanticinterests.Around1928hemethisfuturewife,
Adele,andfromthenon,despitethedisapprovalofhisfamily,theyremainedtogether.
InGdel'slifetimelittlewasgenerallyknownofhispersonallife,althoughin1976hegavemeanaccountofhisintellectualdevelopment.Afterhisdeath,hispapers,
hisletterstohismother,andthereportsofotherssuchashisbrotherRudolf,KarlMenger,andGeorgKreiselrevealedmoredetailsabouthislife.InReflections
onKurtGdel(Wang1987a,hereafterreferredtoasRG)Ireportedontheavailablefactsabouthim,bringingtogether,inlooselyorganizedmanner,materialfrom
thesesources.
IntherestofthisChapterIpresentamorecoherentsketchofGdel'slife,digestingandstructuringaselectionfromthedatanowaccessible.Thesedatainclude,
apartfromthematerialusedinRG,ahistoryofthefamilybyhisbrotherRudolphGdel(1987)andinterviewswithotherpeoplewhoknewhim,conductedinMayof
1986byEckehartKhler,WernerSchimanovich,andPeterWeibelIalsomakeextensiveuseofGdel'sletterstohismother.Iconsiderthedetailsofhismental
developmentseparatelyinChapter2,eventhoughIrealizethat,inacaselikehis,lifeandworkareintimatelyintertwined.
Workandpersonalrelationshipsarethetwocentralconcernsformostpeople.ForGdel,healthoccupiedacomparableplaceasathirdconspicuouslydeterminative
factor.Fromhisbirthin1906until1928heenjoyedahappyandharmoniousperiodofpreparation.Duringthemostturbulentstretchofhislife,from1929tothe
beginningof1940,hedidoutstandingworkandachievedgreatfamehealsoexperiencedseveralmentalcrises,suffereddeeppersonalconflicts,andreluctantlymade
thedisruptivetransitionfromCentralEuropetoAmerica.FromMarch1940untilhisdeathinJanuary1978helivedanexternallyuneventfullifeinPrinceton,except
thatduringhislastfewyearshishealthproblemsandthoseofhiswifebecamehisdominantconcern.
1.1ASketch
Kurt(Friedrich)Gdelwasbornon28April1906atBrnn(inMoravia),whichwasknownthenastheManchesteroftheAustroHungarian

Page27

Empire.ThecitywasrenamedBrnowhenitbecameapartofCzechoslovakiaaftertheFirstWorldWar.HisGermanspeakingfamilycultivateditsGermannational
heritage.AccordingtoKreisel(1980:152),GdelwroteanessayattheageoffourteenextollingthesuperiorityoftheausterelivesofTeutonicwarriorsoverthe
decadenthabitsofcivilizedRomans.WhateversuchyouthfulopinionsmayhavemeantforGdelatthetime,hewas,asanadult,knowntobepeacelovingand
cosmopolitaninhisgeneraloutlook.
Gdel'spaternalgrandfatherwasbornin1848anddiedbeforetheturnofthecentury,apparentlybysuicide.Hisfather,Rudolf,whowasborninBrnnon28
February1874,didnotgrowupwithhisparentsbutlivedwithhisAuntAnna,asisterofhisfather.Hedidpoorlyingrammarschoolandwassenttoaweaver's
schoolatabouttheageoftwelve.HecompletedhisstudywithdistinctionandimmediatelyobtainedapositionatthethenfamoustextilefactoryofFriedrichRedlich.
Heworkedinthisfirmtillhisprematuredeathin1929,risingfirsttomanagerandlatertopartowner.
Gdel'smother,MarianneHandschuh(18971966),grewupinalargeandhappyfamilyatatimewhenEuropewasatpeace.Shehadabroadliteraryeducationand
forsometimeattendedaFrenchschoolinBrnn.Alivelyandcheerfulyoungwomanwithmanyfriends,shelovedmusic,theater,poetry,sports,andreading.Her
familyoccupiedanapartmentinthesamehouseastheGdels.
MarianneandRudolfGdelweremarriedon22April1901andmovedtotheirownapartmentsoonthereafter.Theirfirstson,alsochristenedRudolf(andcalled
Rudiinthefamily)wasborninFebruary1902.MariannewasbroughtupasaLutheran,andherhusbandwasonlyformallyOldCatholic.Theirsonsreceivedno
religioustraining.Gdel'sbrotherremainedindifferenttoreligion.Gdelhimself,however,hadalifelongdislikeoftheCatholicChurchanddevelopedquiteearly
theologicalinterests.In1975hegavehisreligionas''BaptizedLutheran"(butnotamemberofanyreligiouscongregation).Hewrote,"Mybeliefistheistic,not
pantheistic,followingLeibnizratherthanSpinoza."In1978AdelesaidthatGdelreadtheBibleinbedonSundaysalthoughhedidnotgotochurch.
AccordingtoGdel'sbrother,theunionoftheirparents,thoughnota"marriageoflove,"wassatisfactory.Mariannewasundoubtedlyimpressedbytheenergetic
efficiencyofherhusbandandappreciatedthematerialcomfortheprovidedforthefamily.Andhe,whowasdullerandmoresolemn,enjoyedhercheerfulfriendliness.
Bothsonswereincloserpersonalcontactwiththeirmotherthanwiththeirfather.Mariannealwaysregretted,however,thatneitherofherchildrensharedherinterest
inmusic.

Page28

LaterinlifeMariannerecalledmanydetailsfromGdel'schildhoodwhich,inheropinion,presagedhislaterdevelopmentintoaworldfamousintellect.Gdel's
maternalgrandmother,whooftenplayedwithhimbeforeherdeathin1911,hadprophesiedagreatfutureforhim.
In1913whenGdelwassevenandhisbrothereleven,thefamilymovedintoanewvillawithafinegarden.Theboyshadlotsoffunwiththeirtwodogs,aDoberman
andasmallratter.Theyplayedmostlywitheachotherandhadfewfriendstheyplayedwithbuildingblocks,trainsets,asandbox,eighthundredtinsoldiers,and
boardgames.
FromSeptember1912toJuly1916GdelattendedtheEvangelischeVolkschule,aLutheranschoolinBrnn.Hethenbeganhiseightyearsinthe
StaatsrealgymnasiummitdeutscherUnterrichssprache,agrammarschoolusingtheGermanlanguage.HereceivedprivatetutorialsinEnglishanddidnottakethe
electivecourseinCzech.Hechoseinsteadtostudy(from1919to1921)Gabelsbergershorthand,ofwhichhelatermadeextensiveuse.(Thisisthereasonwhyso
muchofhisunpublishedwritingremainsinaccessibletoday.)
ThroughouthistwelveschoolyearsGdelreceivedtopmarksineveryclassexceptforgymnasticsand,once,mathematics.Hewasmostoutstanding,atfirst,in
languages,theninhistory,andtheninmathematics.Totheastonishmentofhisteachersandclassmates,hehadalreadymasteredtheuniversitymaterialinmathematics
whenhewasaboutseventeen.Hewaslessattachedtothefamilyandlessinterestedintheirgardenthanhisbrotherwas.
GdelenteredtheUniversityofViennainautumn1924tostudytheoreticalphysics.Hisinterestinprecisionledhimfromphysicstomathematicsin1926andto
mathematicallogicin1928.Heconcludedhisstudentdaysinthesummerof1929bywritinghisimportantdoctoraldissertationwhichprovedthecompletenessof
predicatelogic.Asstudentsheandhisbrotherlivedtogether,eachoccupyinghisownroom.BothpreparedthemselvesforcareersinAustria,ratherthan
Czechoslovakia.
Gdel'sstudentdayswerelargelytroublefreeandenjoyable.Gifted,diligent,wellpreparedinallrelevantsubjects,andthesonofawelltodofamily,hepossessed
allthepreconditionstobenefitfromtheexcellentintellectualnourishmenttheUniversityofViennaofferedatthetime.Hewasliked,andhistalentwasgenerally
appreciated.Heundoubtedlylearnedanddigestedagreatdealintheseyears,principallyinmathematics,physics,andphilosophy.Accordingtotherecollectionof
OlgaTaussky,afellowstudent,"Hewaswelltrainedinallbranchesofmathematicsandyoucouldtalktohimaboutotherthingstoohisclearmindmadethisarare
pleasure"(quotedinRG:76).
Hewascomfortablewithhisbrother,andBrnowasnotfaraway,enablingthemtoenjoyfamilyvacationsandvisitstoandfromtheirparents.

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Eventhoughtheydidnotspendmuchtimetogetherbecauseoftheirdifferentschedules,thebrothersgotalongwitheachotherwellenough.
On23February1929Gdel'sfatherdiedunexpectedly.HismothermovedtoViennainNovember1929tolivewithhersonsinalargeapartment.Foranumberof
years,thethreeofthemoftenwenttothetheatertogetherandhadlongdiscussionsaboutwhattheyhadseen.InNovemberof1937Gdel'smothermovedbackto
Brno,andGdelandhisbrothereachacquiredhisowndomicileinVienna.GdelmarriedAdelePorkertinSeptember1938.Hisbrothernevermarriedandlived
withtheirmotherinViennafrom1944untilherdeathin1966.
AfterGdel'sdeath,hisbrotherrevealedthat:
1.1.1Thefamilywasunhappywithhischoice.Ofcourse,shewasnotamatchforhimintellectually,butthiswouldlieinthenatureofthings.Shecamefromaverysimple
background.HerparentsalsolivedinLangegasse.Herfatherwasaphotographer.(R.Gdel1987.)

AsIsaidbefore,theperiodfrom1929tothebeginningof1940wasthemostturbulentinGdel'slife.Hedidhismostfamousworkandreceivedwiderecognition.
HetraveledtotheUnitedStatesfourtimes,andthelasttimehecametostay.Hesufferedseveralmentalcrises.HelivedwithAdelebuthadtocontriveelaborate
arrangementstodealwiththedisapprovalofhisfamily.
Fromthespringof1929totheautumnof1930Gdelmadetrulyfundamentalcontributionstologicandwasquicklyrecognizedallovertheworld.Hebecamea
PrivatdozentinMarch1933.HereceivedsomethinglikeastandinginvitationfromthePrincetonInstituteforAdvancedStudy,andvisitedtherefromOctober1933to
May1934,fromOctobertoNovember1935,andfromOctober1938toJanuary1939.HealsotaughtattheUniversityofNotreDamefromJanuarytoMay1939.
EvenafterWorldWarIIbeganinSeptember1939,heapparentlystillwantedtoremaininVienna.InNovember1939heandAdeleboughtanapartmentthereand
spentagooddealofmoneyimprovingit.AftertheAnschluss,however,hehaddifficultyregainingevenhismodestpositionasDozentunderthenewNazi
requirements.And,tohissurprise,hewasfoundfitformilitaryservice.Heevenconsideredobtainingapositioninindustrialresearchintheautumnof1939.Atthelast
minuteheappealedtoOswaldVebleninPrincetonandhadtogothroughtheunpleasantprocessofgettingvisasandpermitstoenablehimandAdeletoleaveVienna
forAmericaon18January1940.
AccordingtoGdel'sbrotherRudolf,theirfatherhadlefteachofthemsomemoney,andGdelspenthissharewithAdeleoverthenextsevenoreightyears.Rudolf
believedthatwhentheywerestilllivingwiththeirmother,Gdelhadsecretlyrentedhisownapartmentandhadprobably

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useditwithAdele.FromNovember1937untilNovember1939,aftertheirmotherreturnedtoBrno,GdellivedundoubtedlywithAdeleatHimmelstrasse43in
Grinzing,thefamousViennesewinedistrict.
FormanyyearsGdelkepthisassociationwithAdelealmostentirelyseparatefromhisfamilyandprofessionallife.Theirofficialmarriagetookplaceon20
September1938ataregistryofficewithonlyfewpeopleincludingAdele'sparentsandGdel'smotherandbrotherpresent.ApparentlyGdelhadnever
introducedAdeletohisfamilybeforethisoccasion.Twoweeksafterthewedding,GdelagainleftforAmerica,alone,andstayedawayalmostninemonths.
ThemonthsbeforehisarrivalinPrincetonwithAdeleinMarch1940werehecticanddisturbingforGdel.WithoutapositioninAustriaandthreatenedwithmilitary
service,heneverthelessboughtanapartmentandmovedintoit.Then,afterthegruelingprocessofobtainingvisasandexitpermitsinthemidstofthehurriedexodusof
AustrianJewsandintellectuals,heandAdelefacedthelongjourneythroughSiberiaandJapantogettoPrinceton.
Thestrainoftheseexperiencesonapersonalityliabletoperiodicboutsofdepressioncouldhavebeenbutapparentlywasnotexcessive.Accordingtohisbrother,
aroundtheendof1931,notlongafterthepublicationofhismostfamouswork,Gdelsufferedfromwhat"onewouldnowcallanendogenousdepressionatthat
timeneitherthetermnorthediagnosiswasinexistenceyet."(R.Gdel1987:00).ThiswasGdel'sfirstseriousnervouscrisisandincludedsuicidaltendencies.Onthis
occasionhewassenttothePurkersdorfSanatoriumand,atanothertime,toRekawinkel.
GdelhadasimilardisturbanceafterhisreturnfromhisfirsttriptoAmericainJune1934.Intheautumnof1935hecutshortthevisit,pleadingdepressionand
overwork.WhenhereachedParishetalkedtohisbrotherbytelephoneforaboutanhour.RudolfthenwenttoParisandbroughthimbacktoViennabytrain.Gdel
hadanotherbreakdownaftertheassassinationofhisteacherandfriendMoritzSchlickon22June1936.DecadeslaterAdeletoldseveralpeoplethatGdelwas
oncesenttoasanatoriumagainsthiswillandthatshehadrescuedhimbycatchinghimashejumpedoutofawindow.Thiseventpresumablyoccurredin1936.
Gdel'spaperscontaina1936receiptforDr.andFrauGdelfromahotelatAflanzforatwoweekstay,whichmayhavebeenmadeintheaftermathoftherescue.
InSeptember1931RudolfCarnapreportedinhisdiarythatGdelhadreadLeninandTrotsky,wasinfavorofsocialismandaplannedsociety,andwasinterestedin
themechanismofsuchsocialinfluencesasthoseoffinancecapitalonpolitics.In1939,ontheotherhand,KarlMengercomplainedofGdel'sindifferencetopolitics
whenhewasatNotreDame.

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Around1935Gdelwasoftenseenreadingatthedepartmentlibrary,deeplysunkinthoughtandstudyingthesamepageoverandoveragain.Whenhelecturedat
theuniversity,healwaysfacedtheblackboard,andtheaudiencedwindledrapidlyasthecoursecontinued.Aplaqueinhishonornowhangsintheroomwherehe
taught.
Duringtheeventfulyearsfrom1929toearly1940,Gdelproducedthemajorpartoftheworkhepublishedinhislifetime,fromthemostfamouspaperstobriefnotes
andreviews.Healsodidalltheextendedteachinginhislife(threecoursesinVienna,twoinNotreDame,andtwofamousseriesoflecturesinPrinceton),gaveovera
dozensinglelecturesatcolloquiaandprofessionalmeetings,andmadehissevenintercontinentaltrips.
InMarch1940atranquilnewchapterofhislifebegan.InPrincetonGdelwasappointedtotheInstituteforAdvancedStudyannuallyfrom1940to1946.He
becameapermanentmemberin1946attheageoffortyandaprofessorin1953attheageoffortyseven.AtfirstheandAdelelivedinrentedapartments.InApril
1948theybecamecitizensoftheUnitedStates,andinAugust1949theyboughtthehouseonLindenLanewheretheyspenttherestoftheirlives.Adeletookseven
extendedtripstoEuropebetween1947and1966,butGdelconfinedhistravelstosummervacationsatplacesclosetoPrinceton.Heretiredfromtheinstitutein
1976attheageofseventy.
EventhoughGdelwroteagooddealduringhisdecadesatPrinceton,hepublishedlittleinthoseyearsmostlyinresponsetorequests.Ofthesevenarticles
publishedinthisperiod,threewerewrittentohonorBertrandRussell(1944),AlbertEinstein(1949),andPaulBernays(1958)twoforinvitedlectures,tothe
PrincetonUniversityBicentennialCelebration(1946,firstpublished1965)andtheInternationalCongressofMathematicians(1950)andoneinresponsetoan
invitationtowriteanexpositoryarticleonCantor'scontinuumproblem(1947).TheonlyunsolicitedpaperwastheonegivinghisnewsolutionstoEinstein'sfield
equations,whichwaspublishedintheReviewsofModernPhysicsin1949.Inthe1960shemadebriefadditionstofiveofhisearlierworks,meticulouslyprepared
forneweditions.
Between1940and1951Gdelgaveanumberoflectures,butnone,asfarasIknow,after1951.In1940hedeliveredfourlecturesonconstructiblesetsat
PrincetoninAprilandoneonhisconsistencyproofofCantor'scontinuumhypothesisatBrownUniversityon15November.In1941hegavesomelectureson
intuitionisminPrincetonandoneatYaleUniversityon15April,entitled"InWhatSenseIsIntuitionisticLogicConstructive?"Therewerealsothetwo(laterpublished)
lecturesof1946and1950mentionedintheprecedingparagraph.Finally,helecturedinPrincetononrotatinguniversesinMayof1949andgavehisGibbs

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lecture"SomeBasicTheoremsontheFoundationsofMathematicsandTheirPhilosophicalImplications"totheAmericanMathematicalSocietyinProvidencein
Decemberof1951.
Byhisownaccount,GdelworkedprincipallyonlogicduringhisfirstthreeyearsinPrincetonandthenturnedhisattentiontophilosophy.From1943toabout1958,
asIreportatlengthinChapter2,Gdelconcentratedonphilosophyasitrelatestomathematicsand,toalesserextent,tophysics.From1959onheturnedhis
attentiontogeneralphilosophy,totidyingupcertainlooseendsinhisearlierwork,andtoanunsuccessfulattempttosolveCantor'scontinuumproblem.
Fromautumn1944onGdeltriedperiodicallytogetintouchwithhismotherandhisbrotherinVienna.Inaletterdated7September1945,hewrotethathehad
receivedtheirlettersofJulyandAugust.MorethantwohundredofhisletterstohismotherMarianne,fromthenuntilherdeathon23July1966,havebeenpreserved
theselettersareavaluablesourceofinformationabouthisdailylifeandhisviewsonvariousmattersoverthisextendedperiod.
Onthewhole,thelettersdealwiththeordinaryconcernsofamiddleclasscouplewithoutchildren.Intheearlyyears,thereisagooddealaboutpackagesandmoney
orderssenttotheirfamiliesinVienna.Everyyeartherewereexchangesofgifts,andmessagesweresentforChristmas,Mother'sDay,Gdel'sbirthday,and
Marianne'sbirthday.Therewerereportsandcommentsonhealthanddiet,onsummervacations,onfriendsandrelatives,onMarianne'stravels,ontheirapartments
andtheirhouse,onmaidsandgardeners,onpets(dogsandparrots),onfilmsandoperas,onbooks,onradioandtelevision,andsoon.
Inaddition,thelettersrecordanumberofimportanteventsinGdel'slifeandworkbetween1946to1966.TheyincludehisstudyofEinstein'srelativitytheoryandits
relationtoKant'sphilosophy(from1947to1950)andhistwolecturesandthreepublishedpapersonthiswork.TheyalsomentionhisGibbslecturein1951andthe
invitation,inMay1953,towriteapaperonthephilosophyofRudolfCarnap.Overthenextfewyearshementionsthisworkinhislettersseveraltimes,buthedidnot
publishthepaperinhislifetime.In1956hewasinvitedtowriteapapertohonorPaulBernayshepublisheditin1958.
InaletterinAprilof1976,Gdelspeaksofthegrowthofhisownreputationsincethe1930s:anenormousdevelopmentoverthefirsttenorfifteenyears,but
afterwardskeptuponlyinpart.Healsomentionsanumberofeventsthatexemplifiedtherecognitionofhiswork:theinvitedlecturesof1950and1951,thehonorary
degreesfromYalein1951andfromHarvardin1952,theEinsteinPrizeandthepromotiontoprofessorin1953,andanarticleonhisworkinScientificAmericanin
June1956.

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On14.12.58,inreplytohismother'sconcernabouthishealth,hewrote:"YetIwasonlyreallysicktwiceinthenineteenyearssinceIhavebeenhere.Thatmeans
thenonceintenyears.Butthatisreallynotmuch."Thetwoinstancesherefersto,apparently,wereableedingulcerinFebruary1951andapsychicdisturbancein
1954,whichwasaccompaniedbythefeelingthathewasabouttodie.Thelettersalsoindicatethathewasnotwellduringtheearlypartof1961.
Foralmosttenyears,GdelperiodicallyplannedvisitstohismotherinViennabuteachtimechangedhismind.Finallyin1957heinvitedhismothertovisithim
instead.HismotherandhisbrothervisitedPrincetoninthespringof1958,thespringof1960,theautumnof1962,andthespringof1964.In1966hismotherwanted
tocomeforhissixtiethbirthdaybutwastooilltomakethetrip.
Intheletterstohismotherand,occasionallyandbriefly,tohisbrother,GdelwritesagooddealaboutAdele,aboutEinstein,aboutpolitics,andabouthisownhealth
anddailylife.Everynowandthenhemakessomegeneralobservationsonhislifeandoutlook,whichseembetterdealtwithinaseparatesectionlaterinthischapter.
Hesaidlittleaboutthesemattersinhisconversationswithme,excepttooffersomeremarksabouthishealth,whichIalsoincludeinthesectiononthissubject.
Gdel'smarriageandhisrelationshipwithEinsteinareespeciallywelldocumentedandinterestingaspectsofthehumanrelationsinhislife.Weknowconsiderablyless
abouthisrelationswithotherpeople.AccordingtoRudolf,neitherofthebrothershadanyclosefriendsathome.InhisViennadays,Gdelwasfriendlywithsomeof
hiscontemporaries,includingMarcelNatkin,HerbertFeigl,JohnvonNeumann,AlfredTarski,G.Nbeling,andAbrahamWald.Amonghisteachers,heseemsto
haveinteractedfairlyextensivelywithHansHahn,MoritzSchlick,RudolfCarnap,andKarlMenger.HisotherteachersincludedHansThirring,HeinrichGomperz,
andPhilippFurtwngler.AtPrincetonheisknowntohavebeenfriendlywithOskarMorgenstern,HermannBrochandEricKahler,andtohavehadsomemeasureof
contactwithOswaldVeblen,JohnvonNeumann,EmilArtin,AlonzoChurch,PaulOppenheim,PaulErdos,MarstonMorse,DeaneMontgomery,andHassler
Whitney.HefoundallthedirectorsoftheInstitutewelldisposedtowardhim.Hewas,atvarioustimes,comfortablewithanumberoflogicianswhosawhimastheir
master,amongthemWilliamBoone,PaulJ.Cohen,StephenKleene,GeorgKreisel,AbrahamRobinson,DanaScott,CliffordSpector,GaisiTakeuti,Stanley
Tennenbaum,andme.HecorrespondedwithPaulBernaysovermanyyearsandinvitedhimtotheInstituteseveraltimes.
IknowofnosourceofinformationaboutGdel'slifeafterJuly1966comparableindetailtohisletterstohismotherfortheearlierperiod.We

Page34

knowthatheresumedworkonCantor'scontinuumproblemmorethantwodecadesafterhisoriginalstudy(1943)andspenttimeexpandinghis1958paperon
aninterpretationofintuitionisticlogic.In1967and1968hewrotemetwocarefulletterstoexplaintherelationbetweenhisphilosophicalviewsandhismathematical
workinlogic.
Inearly1970Gdelwassufferingfrompoorhealthandthoughthewasabouttodie.Afterhisrecoveryhehadextensivediscussionswithmebetweentheautumnof
1971andthespringof1976.
In1974Gdelwashospitalizedforaurinarytractproblembutdeclinedtohaveanoperation,andfromthenonhehadtowearacatheter.Forthelastfewyearsofhis
lifehishealthproblemsandthoseofAdelebecamehiscentralconcern,especiallyafterthespringof1976.
GdelarrangedtohavemevisittheInstitutefor1975and1976,buthemostlystayedathomeandtalkedwithmebytelephone.Wehadmanyextended
conversationsbetweenOctoberof1975andMarchof1976.AfterhewasbrieflyhospitalizedaroundtheendofMarchtheoreticaldiscussionsvirtuallyceased.In
Juneof1976,however,hespoketomeatsomelengthabouthisintellectualdevelopment.
NeartheendofMay1977,urgedbyWilliamBoone,ItriedtopersuadeGdeltogototheGraduateHospitalattheUniversityofPennsylvania,wheresome
excellentdoctorswerepreparedtodealwithhishealthproblemsasaspecialpatient.Heaskedforandtookdownalltherelevantinformation,but,intheend,would
notgivehispermissiontobetakenthere.
InJulyof1977Adelehadanoperationandsubsequentlystayedawayfromhomeforaboutfivemonths.ImyselfwasoutofthecountryfrommidSeptembertomid
Novemberofthatyear.WhenIreturned,IfoundGdelverydepressedandfullofselfdoubt.Oncehecomplainedthattherewasnoonetohelphimathome.I
askedHasslerWhitney,whohadtakenituponhimselftolookafterGdel'sneeds,aboutthisWhitneytoldmehehadsentseveralnursestothehouse,butGdelhad
refusedtoletthemin.
On17December1977IvisitedGdelandbrought,athisrequest,aroastedchickenandsomebiscuits.Heaskedmetobreakupthechickenintopieces,butdidnot
eatanywhileIwasthere.Onthisoccasion,hesaidtome:"Ihavelostthepowertomakepositivedecisions.Icanonlymakenegativedecisions."Afewdayslater
Adelereturnedhome,andon29DecemberWhitneyarrangedtohaveGdeltakentothePrincetonHospital.HediedthereonSaturday14January1978.According
tothedeathcertificate,hediedof"malnutritionandinanition,causedbypersonalitydisturbance."Asmallprivatefuneralservicewasheldon19Januaryanda
memorialmeetingtookplaceattheInstituteon3March.

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1.2HealthandDailyLife
Inaletterof29April1985,Gdel'sbrotherwrotetome:
1.2.1Mybrotherwasacheerfulchild.Hehad,itistrue,alightanxietyneurosisatabouttheageoffive,whichlatercompletelydisappeared.
1.2.2Atabouttheageofeightmybrotherhadaseverejointrheumatismwithhighfeverandthereafterwassomewhathypochondriacalandfanciedhimselftohaveaheart
problem,aclaimthatwas,however,neverestablishedmedically.

Inhislateryears,Gdel'spreoccupationwithhishealthwaswellknown.Itislikelythatthispreoccupationbeganquiteearly,perhapsnotlongafterhisrheumatic
fever.Itappears,however,thatheenjoyedgoodhealthonthewholeforthefirsttwentyfiveyearsofhislife.AsfarasIknow,noone,includinghimselfandhis
brother,hasmentionedanyotherillnessduringthisperiod,andwehavenodirectinformationaboutthestateofhishealthbefore1931.Wedoknow,however,that
heperformedextraordinarilywellinschool,incollege,andinhisearlyresearchwithoutanyapparentinterruptionsforhealthorforotherreasons.Indeedhispowersof
concentratedandsustainedworkwereclearlyevidentfromtheseearlyachievements.AccordingtoKreisel,thesepowers"continuedintothesixtieswhenhiswifestill
spokeofhim,affectionately,asastrammerBursche[vigorousyouth]"(Kreisel1980:153).
ThereareseveralstoriesofGdel'searlyromanticinterests.WhenhismotherwasvisitingLuganoin1957,hewroteher(9.8.57),"IstillremembertheZillertaland
alsothatIexperiencedmyfirstlovethere.IbelievehernamewasMarie."Thereisnoindicationofwhenthistookplace,anditprobablycametonothing.Whilehe
wasstillinschool,hisbrotherrecalled,hefellinloveandconversedeasilywiththedaughterofsomefamilyfriendswhovisitedfrequently.Theyoungwomanwas
morethantenyearsolderthanhewas,andhisfamilyobjectedstrongly,andsuccessfully.
Rudolfoncetoldmethat,inhisstudentdaysinViennawhilethebrotherswerelivingtogether,theyoftenateatanearbyrestaurantontheSchlesingerplatzbecause
Gdelwasinterestedinawaitressthere.Itwasafamilybusiness:thefatherwasthecashier,themothercooked,andtheirattractiveyoungdaughterwaitedonthe
customers.
Ataboutthistime,accordingtoOlgaTausskyTodd,afellowstudentattheuniversity,Gdelwasseenwithagoodlookingyounggirlwho"woreabeautiful,quite
unusualsummerdress."Thisgirl"complainedaboutKurtbeingsospoiled,havingtosleeplonginthemorningandsimilaritems.Apparentlyshewasinterestedinhim,
andwantedhimtogiveuphisprimadonnahabits"(Taussky,''RemembrancesofKurt

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Gdel",inP.WeingartnerandL.Schmetterer,eds.,GdelRemembered,1987,Bibliopolis,NapolihereafterTaussky1987seep.32).
Duringuniversityvacations,Gdeloftenaccompaniedhisfamilytoresortareas.Eventhoughheapparentlyneverdrovelaterinlife,inthosedayshesometimesdrove
thefamilycar,aChrysler,andwas,accordingtohisbrother,afastdriver.
IhavementionedearliertheturbulentdecadeofGdel'slifebetween1929(whenhewastwentyfour)and1939(whenhewasthirtyfour).Duringtheseyearshe
mademostofhisfamousdiscoveries,beganhislifelongintimacywithAdele,didallhisintercontinentaltravels,and,accordingtoAdeleandhisbrother,wasmentallyill
severaltimes.Inhisconversationswithme,however,hesaidnothingabouthisvariousmentalcrises,althoughhedidmentionaseveretoothproblemin1934anda
periodofpoorhealthin1936.From1940to1943,hetoldme,hishealthwasgood,anditwasexceptionallypoorin1961andin1970.
HisletterstohismotherafterhemovedtoPrincetonandwasabletoreestablishcontactwithherneartheendofthewar,providemoreinformationabouthishealth
andhisdailylife.Myquotationsfromtheselettersareprefixedbytheirdates.
6.4.46IamgladthatyouhaveinViennaatleastgoodplaysforadiversion.Wenevergotothetheaterherebutoftentothecinema,whichisagoodsubstituteforit,sincethere
arereallymanygoodpieces.Whatisalsoincomparablybetterhereisthemusicontheradio(i.e.,lightmusic,Icannotjudgetheothers).

Probablyin1942,OswaldVeblenorPaulOppenheimintroducedGdeltoEinstein,andtheybecameclosefriendsforthedozenyearsorsobeforeEinstein'sdeath
inAprilof1955.AlmosteverydaytheywalkedtogethertoandfromtheInstitute.AtthistimeEinsteinandGdeleachhadalargeofficeonthegroundfloorofFuld
Hall.AccordingtoDeaneMontgomery,whoseofficewas(from1948)nexttoEinstein's,GdelordinarilystoppedatEinstein'shouseabouttenoreleveninthe
morning,andtheywalkedtogethertoFuldHall.Theyworkeduntiloneortwointheafternoon,andthenwalkedhometogether.TheyusuallyapproachedFuldHall
fromthesidenearOldenLaneandusedthesideentrance.Gdel'smothermusthaveheardaboutherson'sfriendshipwithEinsteinandaskedhimaboutit.Inhisletter
of27.7.46,GdelmentionedEinsteinforthefirsttimefromthenon,Einsteinwasafrequenttopicoftheircorrespondence.
19.9.46MostlyIamsodeeplyabsorbedinmywork,thatIfindithardtoconcentratesomuchonsomethingelse,asisnecessaryforwritingaletter.
19.1.47WealwaysspendSundaysinverymuchthesameway.WegetuptowardnoonandaftereatingIdotheweeklyaccountandreadthenewspaper.

Page37
GenerallyIonlysubscribetothenewspaper(theNewYorkTimes)forSundayandfindthisalonestilltoomuch.[GdelusuallywrotehisletterstohismotheronSundaystoo,
mostlyintheevening.]
19.1.47Ihavealsoenoughexercise,sinceIwalkdailytoandfromtheInstitute,thatiseasilyhalfanhoureachway.Moreover,intheafternoonIoftengototheuniversityorthe
towncenter,whichtakesagainatleasthalfanhourtogetthereandcomeback.

On2May1947AdelesailedforEuropeandstayedawayforaboutsevenmonths.
12.5.47NaturallyIamnowverylonely,especiallytheSundaysareevenmorelonesomethantheotherdays.ButIhaveanyhowalwayssomuchtodowithmywork,notmuch
timeisleftformetobroodoverit.MakingthebedisahealthygymnasticexerciseandanyhowIhaveotherwisenothingtodo.

OnedayinDecemberof1947OskarMorgensterndroveGdelandEinsteintoTrentonforGdel'scitizenshipexamination.Einsteincalledit"thenexttolast
examination,"evidentlyhavinginminddeathasthelastone.On2April1948GandAdeletooktheircitizenshipoathtogether.
17.2.48Althoughmyhairisalreadyturninggreyandgreyer,myyouthfulelasticityhasnotdiminishedatall.WhenIfall,Ispringbackonmyfeetagainlikearubberball.Thatis
probablyaremnantofmygymnasticsuppleness.

In1949theGdelsboughttheirhouseonLindenLane.TheymovedinatthebeginningofSeptemberandlivedtherefortherestoftheirlives.
InFebruaryof1951,Gdelwashospitalizedfordelayedtreatmentofableedingduodenalulcerrequiringmassivebloodtransfusions.Theunduedelaywasapparently
causedbyhisdistrustofdoctors.InFebruary1978,shortlyafterGdel'sdeath,hisbrotherwrotethat"Mybrotherhadaveryindividualandfixedopinionabout
everything.Unfortunatelyhebelievedallhislifethathewasalwaysrightnotonlyinmathematicsbutalsoinmedicine,sohewasaverydifficultpatientforhis
doctors"(1987:26).
Dr.JosephM.RamponawasformanyyearsGdel'sphysicianinPrinceton,probablyfrom1935to1969.InaninterviewinMay1986(seeSchimanovichetal.
1995?),hesaidthatGdelhadrefusedtogotothehospitaltobetreatedfortheulcerandthattheyhadtoaskEinsteintopersuadehim.Therelationshipbetween
GdelandEinsteinwas,accordingtoRampona,"veryveryclose.IfeltthatEinsteininhispresencewaslikeablanketforhim.Hefeltconfidentthen.Hecouldreally
speaktotheworldatthatmoment.Einsteinwasforhimakindofprotection."TheverymorningwhenDr.RamponaputGdelinthehospital,J.Robert
Oppenheimer,directoroftheinstitute,telephonedhimandsaid,"Believe

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itornot,doctor,butthereisthegreatestlogiciansincethedaysofAristotle!"
Inautumn1935,whilehewasstilllivinginVienna,GdelcutshortavisittoPrincetonbecauseofdepressionandoverwork.Beforeleavingheapparentlywenttosee
RamponaabouthisdepressionandcontinuedtoconsulthimwhenhemovedpermanentlytoPrinceton.Dr.RamponarecountedthathesawGdelaboutoncea
weekuntil,probably,notlongbeforeFebruary1970."Someonetoldhimtotakedigitalis,"Ramponarecalled."Hehadnoreasonfortakingit,noshortnessofbreath,
noswellingoftheankles.SoIrefusedtogiveit.AndIkeptonrefusingandrefusing.Finallyhewenttoanotherdoctor!Thatwasthefirsttimehewenttoanother
doctor."
HisfriendsknewthatinhislateryearsGdelateverylittleasarule.Asearlyasaletterof19January1947,hearguedthatitisbettertoeatlessthantoeatmore.
Laterthetraumaticexperienceofthebleedingulcerledhimtoadoptastringentdiet,oneapparentlydesignedlargelybyhimself.Hisbrotherbelievesthatnoteating
enoughwasthecentralproblemofhishealth,atleastafteraround1950.Dr.Rampona,commentinggenerallyonGdel'shealthseemstoconcur:
1.2.3Hehadnodiseases,hewasjustaweaklybuiltman.Idonotthinkheevertookexercisesinhislifeandheneverbuilthimselfupasayoungman.Hegrewup,probablywith
goodhealth,andgrewtotheagehedid.
1.2.4Whenyoudonoteatanythingandyournutritionisbad,thingsinyourminddonotworkthewaytheydowhenyouarenormal.Hewasneverreallysick,justdidnoteat.He
livedonthetissuesofhisownbody.[Thatwasalsoonereasonwhy]hehadthefeelingthatsomeonewasgoingtopoisonhim.Hewasveryfearfulofstrangersgivinghim
somethingtoeat.

IhavefoundnoexactinformationaboutthedateofGdel's1951hospitalstay.Hisletterof8January1951givesnoindicationoftheforthcomingcrisis,andhisnext
letter,dated17March,saysheissufficientlyrecoveredtowrite.Twotelegramstohisbrotheron5Marchand23Marchsaythathewasallright.Judgingbythese
indications,itisplausibletoconcludethatthehospitalizationtookplaceinFebruary.
31.10.52MyacquaintancestellmethatIhadnotlookedsowellforalongtimealready.
1.6.54Istillalwaysdogymnasticexercisesregularlyinthemorning,i.e.,Ibegantodoitagainafewyearsagoanditdoesmemuchgood.

Intheautumnof1954,however,accordingtohislettersof4Octoberand10December,Gdelwasagaininpoorhealth.(Therewerealsotwotelegramstohis
brotheron1Decemberand10December.)Intheletterof14Decemberquotedbelow,herecallsbeingsickonlytwiceinthelast

Page39

nineteenyearsundoubtedlythebleedingulcerwasthefirsttimeandthisoccasionin1954wasthesecond.
10.12.54Amajorpartofmytroublewasundoubtedlypsychicallyconditioned.Forsometime[zeitlang]Iwasinaveryremarkablepsychicstate.Ihadtheirrepressiblefeeling
thatIhaveonlystillashorttimetolive,andthatthefamiliarthingsaroundme,thehouse,thebooks,etc.,arenothingtome.ThisparalyzedmeinsuchawaythatIcouldrouse
myselftoattendtononeofmyordinarytasks[Ttigkeiten].Thishasnowalsoabated,butnaturallyIhavebeensomewhatreducedinmypowersthroughthewholething.My
wholestateissimilartothetoothbusinessin1934.Thecausesmayevenbesimilar.[Ineachcasehesufferedfromaminorinfection.]
5.1.55Iamalsonotatallsolonesomeasyouthink.IoftenvisitEinsteinandalsogetvisitsfromMorgensternandothers.Inowlive[by]myselfmorethannecessaryinthepast.
5.1.55Ihaveinanycasenotimeforahobby,butitisalsonotnecessaryatall:sinceIhavevariousinterestsoutsideofmyvocation,e.g.,inpolitics,alsooftenviewplaysand
varietyprogramsontelevision,sothatIhavesufficientdiversionfrommathematicsandphilosophy.
14.3.55MyhealthisnowagainquitenormalIhavealsoreachedagainmyformerweight.Onlymysleepisnotquitesogoodasbefore.Ioftenwakeupearlyaboutsixandcannot
sleepagain.Thisthennaturallyhastheeffectthatoneislessfreshalldaylongandworksmoreslowly.

Einsteindiedon18April1955,notlongafterhisseventysixthbirthday.Gdelwassurprisedandshaken.
25.4.55ThedeathofEinsteinwasofcourseagreatshocktome,sinceIhadnotexpecteditatall.ExactlyinthelastweeksEinsteingavetheimpressionofbeingcompletely
robust.WhenhewalkedwithmeforhalfanhourtotheInstitutewhileconversingatthesametime,heshowednosignsoffatigue,ashadbeenthecaseonmanyearlier
occasions.CertainlyIhavepurelypersonallylostverymuchthroughhisdeath,especiallysinceinhislastdayshebecameevennicertomethanhehadalreadybeenearlierall
along,andIhadthefeelingthathewishedtobemoreoutgoingthanbefore.Hehadadmittedlykeptprettymuchtohimselfwithrespecttopersonalquestions.Naturallymystate
ofhealthturnedworseagainduringlastweek,especiallyinregardtosleepandappetite.ButItookastrongsleepingremedyacoupleoftimesandamnowsomewhatunder
controlagain.
21.6.55ThatpeoplenevermentionmeinconnectionwithEinsteinisverysatisfactorytome(andwouldcertainlybetohim,too,sincehewasoftheopinionthatevenafamous
manisentitledtoaprivatelife).AfterhisdeathIhavealreadybeeninvitedtwicetosaysomethingabouthim,butnaturallyIdeclined.Myhealthnowisgood.Ihavedefinitely
regainedmystrengthduringthelasttwomonths.

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18.12.55TherewasyesterdayasymphonyconcerthereinremembranceofEinstein.ItwasthefirsttimeIletBach,Haydn,etc.encirclemefortwohourslong.Nonetheless,the
pianistontheoccasionwasreallyfabulous.

InMarch1956AdelereturnedfromatriptoViennawithhereightyeightyearoldmother,wholivedwiththemuntilherdeathaboutthreeyearslater.
30.9.56Tomorrowthesemesterbeginsagainwithitsfacultymeetings,etc.Theverythoughtalreadymakesmenervous.Ioftenthinkofthenicedayswithnostalgia,whenIhad
notyetthehonortobeprofessorattheInstitute.Forthat,however,thepayisnowhigher!
23.3.57[Marcel]Natkin(fromtheSchlickCircle)[SeeChapter2]isnowinAmericaandIhaverecentlymetwithhimand[Herbert]FeiglinNewYork.TheSchlickEveningsarenow
thirtyyearsago,butbothofthemhavereallychangedverylittle.Idonotknowwhetherthisisalsothecasewithme.
27.8.57Iconstantlyhopethatmylifecomesforonceinacalmertrack,whichwouldalsoinclude,thatmyoversensitivitytofoodandcoldstops,andthatunexpectedthingsdo
notkeeponintruding.
12.12.57ItisindeedtruethattherearementalrecreationsinPrinceton.Buttheyaremostlyclassicalmusicandwittycomedies,neitherofwhichIlike.
10.5.58WherearethetimeswhenwediscussedintheMarienbadwoodsChamberlain'sbookonGoetheandhisrelationtothenaturalsciences?
14.12.58YetIwasonlyreallysicktwiceinthenineteenyearssinceIhavebeenhere.Thatmeansthenonceintenyears.Butthatisreallynotmuch.
30.7.59RecentlyIhaveonceagainverydeeplyinvolvedmyselfinwork,forwhichAdele'sbeingawayhasgiventheoccasion.
11.11.60Mylifestylehaschanged,totheextentthatIlieforacoupleofhoursinthegarden.

DuringthelonggapbetweenGdel'slettersof16December1960and18March1961,hehadanextendedstretchofillhealth.
18.3.61Ialwaysgotosleepveryearlynow,forthatIgetupratherearlyandgototheInstituteaboutonehourearlierthanbefore.Iamactuallymuchmoresatisfiedwiththislife
stylethanmypreviousone.Thatmyhealthisnowreallymuchbetter,yousurelyseesufficientlyfromAdele'sletter.
25.6.61Youcouldgivemeagreatjoy,ifyoucouldsendmeinautumnapricecatalogue(oratleastaprospectus)ofMhlhauserorNiennesortheirsuccessors.Itwouldinterest
meverymuchtoknowwhatprogressthetoyindustryhasmadeinthelastfortyfiveyears.Aretherenotalsoalreadysmallatombombsforchildren?[Thisrequestandtheonein
hisletterof12September1961wererepliestohismother'sinquiryaboutwhathewantedforChristmasgifts.]

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AdeleleftforItalyinJulyandstayedawayformorethantwomonths.DuringherabsenceGdelwroteseverallongletterstohismotherwhichincludedextended
considerationsabouttheafterlife.ThesepassageswillbereproducedinChapter3.
23.7.61IlivehereratherlonesomelyandhaveoccupiedmyselfwithreadingandworkalldaylongbutjustinthiswayIdofeelfine.Asfarasmy"normal"eatingisconcerned,I
ofcoursestillnevereatsomuchasbeforethiswholebusiness.
12.9.61Youcouldgivememostjoywithgoodbooksinphilosophy,alsowithclassicalworks.E.g.Iwouldbeverygladtohavethe"CritiqueofJudgment"byKantoralsothe
"CritiqueofPureReason"athome,inordertoreadinthemwheneverIhavethetime.
18.12.61TherightChristmasmoodonehasonlyinchildhood,ofwhichIhaveonceagainbeenvividlyremindedbytheprettytoycatalogue.[Thecataloguewasundoubtedly
sentinresponsetoGdel'srequestinJune,quotedabove.]
12.6.65Adeledoesnotplaythepianoveryoften,butstillmanytimesshedoesplayoldViennesemelodies.
13.5.66Wedonotsocializewithanybodyhere.

AsfarasIknow,Gdel'shealthwasmoderatelygoodfrom1962to1969.Inthebeginningof1970hewasagainunwellandthoughthewasgoingtodiesoon.In
February1970heconsultedDr.W.J.TateofthePrincetonMedicalGroup,probablyafterDr.Ramponahadrefusedtoprescribedigitalis.Laterthatmonthhecalled
and,aftersomedelaysonhispart,eventuallymetwithDr.HarveyRothberg.Thedisturbanceseemstohavebeenmorementalthanphysical.
In1974Gdelwashospitalizedforaurinarytractproblemrelatedtothestateofhisprostate.Dr.JamesVarneyandDr.CharlesPlace,twourologists,advisedhim
tohaveanoperation.Inaddition,MarstonMorserecommendedtohimDr.JohnLattimore,aurologistatthePresbyterianHospitalinNewYork.Apparentlyafter
consultingLattimore,Gdeldecidednottohavetheoperation.Instead,heworeacatheterinhislastyears.
Asmentionedbefore,bythespringof1976hisownhealthproblemsandAdele'shadbecomeGdel'schiefpreoccupation.Hisconditiondeterioratedrapidly
betweenJulyandDecember1977,afterAdelehadamajoroperationandhadtobeattendedtoelsewherewhilehelivedaloneathome.
Inthe1950sGdeloncewrotethatinrecentyearshisweightneverexceededfiftyfourkilograms.In1970heweighedeightysixpounds.Athisdeathin1978he
weighedonlysixtyeightpounds.ThesefiguresappeartosupportDr.Rampona'stheorythathehadformanyyearslivedoffthetissuesofhisownbody.

Page42

DuringourconversationsGdelsaidlittletomeabouthisownorAdele'shealthproblems.In1976,however,hementionedtheseproblemsseveraltimes.InApril,
afterhereturnedfromabriefstayinthehospital,hetoldmehehadacoldandspokeofathirtyyearlongkidneyinfection,ofbeingsensitivetocold,ofaprostate
blockage,andofusingincreaseddosagesofantibiotics.Headmittedhavingsentoutthewrongmanuscriptonthecontinuumproblematthebeginningof1970the
result,hesaid,oftakingcertainpillsthathaddamagedhismathematicalandphilosophicalabilities.
18.4.76IhadwrittenthepaperwhenIwasundertheillusionthatmyabilityhadreturned.Can'texpectwrongsayingsfromoneofthegreatestlogicians.Thepillshadalso
affectedmypracticalabilityinhowtobehave,andIdidthingswhichwerenotsobeautiful.
10.5.76Ihadnotbeenwelllastnight.
11.5.76Psychiatristsarepronetomakemistakesintheircomputationsandoverlookcertainconsequences.Antibioticsarebadfortheheart.[E.E.]Kummerwasbadinlarge
calculations.
1.6.76Myhealthproblemsincludemynothavingenoughredbloodcellsandmyindigestionfeelinglikearock.
3.6.76Ihavearthritiscausedbymycoldandreceivedsomeantibiotictreatmentinthehospital.
6.6.76Mrs.Gdelhadalightstrokelastautumn.Shesleepsinthedaytime.Herheadisheavyandshecan'tsitup.Sheisseventysixyearsoldandworriesaboutmanythings.A
nervousweaknessaffectsherlegs.ShewasoncedeliriousinVienna.Weemployanurse.Asecondstrokemayhaveoccurred.
6.6.76Idonotacceptthedoctors'words.Theyhavespecialdifficultieswithme.Thereisapsychologicalcomponentinthis.
22.6.76Mywifeisinthehospitalfortests.Icookonceeveryfewdays.
31.3.77Ineedanduseacatheterforurinatingbecauseofaprostateproblem.
17.12.77Ihavelostthepowerforpositivedecisions.Icanonlymakenegativedecisionsnow.

1.3SomeofHisGeneralObservations
AsImentionedinthefirstsectionofthischapter,Gdel'sletterstohismotherandbrothersometimesincludedgeneralobservationsembodyingaspectsofhisoutlook.
Theyaremostlybrief,writteninwidelyaccessiblelanguage,andcanbeunderstoodindependentlyoftheiroriginalcontexts.Ihaveincludedanumberofthem,without
comment,inthefollowingpages.

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17.2.48IwouldnotsaythatonecannotpolemicizeagainstNietzsche.Butitshouldofcoursealsobeawriter[Dichter]orapersonofthesametypetodothat.
18.10.49Marriageisofcoursealsoatimeconsuminginstitution.
28.10.49Thatoneisnotpleasedineveryrespectwiththevocationis,Ibelieve,unavoidable,evenifonehaschosenitpurelyoutofone'sloveforthesubject.
27.2.50Whatyousayaboutsadnessisright:iftherewereacompletelyhopelesssadness,therewouldbenothingbeautifulinit.ButIbelievetherecanrationallybenosuch
thing.Sinceweunderstandneitherwhythisworldexists,norwhyitisconstitutedexactlyasitis,norwhyweareinit,norwhywewerebornintoexactlytheseandnoother
externalrelations:whythenshouldwepresumetoknowexactlythistobeall[geradedaseineganzbestimmtzuwissen],thatthereisnootherworldandthatweshallneverbein
yetanotherone?
3.4.50Onecannotreallysaythatcompleteignoranceissufficientgroundforhopelessness.Ife.g.someonewilllandonanislandcompletelyunknowntohim,itisjustaslikely
thatitisinhabitedbyharmlesspeopleasthatitisbycannibals,andhisignorancegivesnoreasonforhopelessness,butratherforhope.Youraversionagainstoccultphenomena
isofcoursewelljustifiedtotheextentthatweareherefacingahardtodisentanglemixtureofdeception,credulousnessandstupidity,withgenuinephenomena.Buttheresult
(andthemeaning)ofthedeceptionis,inmyopinion,nottofakegenuinephenomenabuttoconcealthem.

InDecember1950GdelrecommendedtohismotherPhilippFrank'sbiographyEinstein:HisLifeandTimes(1947,theoriginalGermanmanuscriptwaspublished
onlyin1950).ApparentlyMarianneobtainedtheGermanversionandfounditdifficult.Inreply,Gdelwrote:
8.1.51IsthebookaboutEinsteinreallysohardtounderstand?Ithinkthatprejudiceagainstandfearofevery"abstraction"mayalsobeinvolvedhere,andifyouwouldattempt
toreaditlikeanovel(withoutwantingtounderstandrightawayeverythingatthefirstreading),perhapsitwouldnotseemsoincomprehensibletoyou.
12.4.52Butthedaysaremuchtooshort,eachdayshouldhaveatleastfortyeighthours.
25.3.53Theproblemofmoneyisnottheonlyconsiderationandalsoneverthemostimportant.
10.5.53Andisthereanyoneyouknowwholivesinaparadiseandhasnoconflictsonanything?
26.7.53Withtheaphorismsyouhavehituponmyfancy.Iloveeverythingbriefandfindthatingeneralthelongeraworkisthelessthereisinit.
21.9.53ItisinterestingthatinthecourseofhalfayearboththemainopponentsofEisenhower(Stalinforeignpolitical,Taftdomesticpolitical)havedied.

Page44
Moreover,thepresident[sic]oftheSupremeCourt(acreationofTruman's)hasnowalsodied.Somethingsopeculiar,Ibelieve,hasneverhappenedbefore.Theprobabilityfor
thisisoneintwothousand.
28.9.55IfyouwishtosendmetheEinsteinbiography,please,ifpossible,sendtheoriginaltext.OrisitneitherGermannorEnglish?InthatcasetheEnglishversionwouldbe
preferable,because,asIhavealreadyoftenremarked,translationsintoEnglisharemostlymuchbetterthantranslationsintoGerman.
24.2.56Ordinarilythereasonofunhappymarriagesis:jealousy(justifiedorunjustified),orneglectofthewifebythehusband,orpoliticalorreligiousdisagreements.
7.11.56Asyouknow,Iamindeedalsothoroughlyantinationalistic,butonecannot,Ibelieve,decidehastilyagainstthepossibilitythatpeoplelikeBismarckhavethehonorable
intentiontodosomethinggood.
23.3.57Abouttherelationofartandkitschwehave,Ibelieve,alreadydiscussedmanytimesbefore.Itissimilartothatbetweenlightandheavymusic.Onecould,however,
hardlyassertthatallgoodmusicmustbetragic?
7.6.58IbelievethathalfofthewealthofAmericarestsonthediligenceoftheAmericansandanotherhalfdependsontheorderedpoliticalrelations(incontrasttotheconstant
warsinEurope).
28.5.61RecentlyIhavereadanovelbyGogolandwasaltogethersurprisedhowgooditis.PreviouslyIhadoncebeguntoreadDostoevskibutfoundthathisartconsists
principallyinproducingdepressioninhisreadersbutonecanofcoursegladlyavoidthat.InanycaseIdonotbelievethatthebestinworldliteratureistheGermanliterature.
12.11.61Itisalwaysenjoyabletoseethattherearestillpeoplewhovalueacertainmeasureofidealism.
17.3.62Itissurelyratherextraordinaryforanybodytoentitleanautobiography"TheFairyTaleofMyLife,"sincelifeisindeedmostlynotsopretty.Itmayofcoursebethat
Slezaksimplyleavesoutallthenonpretty,sinceitisnotenjoyabletowriteaboutthem.
14.5.62TheSlezakbiographyis,asIseeit,chieflymeanthumorously.ButIdoubtthatanybodyhasexperiencedonlythehumorous.
17.3.62Youarecompletelyrightthatmankinddoesnotbecomebetterthroughthemoonflight.Thishastodowiththeoldstrugglebetweenthe"natural"andthe
"human"["Geistes"]sciences.Iftheprogressinhistory,legalandpoliticalscience[RechtsundStaatswissenschaft],philosophy,psychology,literature,art,etc.wereasgreatas
thatinphysics,therewouldnotbethedangerofanatomicwar.Butinsteadofthatoneseesinmanyofthehumansciencessignificantregress[ion].Thisproblemisveryactual
especiallyhere,inasmuchas,accordingtoAmericantradition,thehumanscienceswerefavoredinthemiddleschools,afactwhich

Page45
certainlyplayedaconsiderablepartintheascentofAmericaoverEurope.UnfortunatelytheEuropeaninfluence,withtheRussianconcurrence(seeSputnik),turnsthisrelation
around,asAmericaonthewhole,nottoitsadvantage,becomesmoreandmorelikeEurope.
4.7.62RecentlyIhavediscoveredamodernwriter[Dichter]''FranzKafka,"hithertounknowntome.Hewritesrathercrazily,buthasareallyvividwayofportrayingthings.For
instance,hisdescriptionofadreamhadtheeffectonme,thatIhadtwolivelydreamsthenextnightwhichIstillrememberexactlysomethingthatneverhappenedtome
otherwise.
24.3.63Ofallthatweexperience,thereeventuallyofcourseremainsonlyamemory,butjustinthiswayalllastingthingsretainsomeoftheiractuality.
20.10.63Ihaveyettoreadthearticlein"Entschluss"aboutmywork.Itwasinanycasetobeexpectedthatsoonerorlateruseofmyproofwouldbemadeforreligion,sinceitis
indeedjustifiedinacertainsense.
16.7.64An"editor"ofourletterswouldcertainlybesurprisedattherepetitions.
21.4.65Onlyfablespresenttheworldasitshouldbeandas[if]ithadameaning,whilstinthetragedytheheroisslaughteredandinthecomedythelaughable(hencealso
somethingbad)isstressed.
3.6.65Iatleasthavealwaysfoundthatonerestsbestathome.

OvertheyearsGdel'sviewsaboutAmericachangedwiththepoliticalsituation.ButheundoubtedlyfoundthathispositionattheInstituteforAdvancedStudysuited
him,andhealwaysexpressedtheviewthattheinstitutetreatedhimwell.Inthespringof1953,shortlyafterhewastoldofhispromotiontoaprofessorship,hewrote:
25.3.53TheInstitutepaysitsmemberswithoutrequiringanyperformanceinreturn,withthewholepurposethatinthiswaytheycanpursuetheirscientificinterestsundisturbed.
Ishallasprofessoralsohavenoobligationtoteach.Moreover,thepayshereareevenhigherthanthoseoftheuniversities.

GdelhadnowishtoreturntoEuropeandexpressedastrongaversionforAustrianacademicinstitutions:
28.4.46IfeelverywellinthiscountryandwouldalsonotreturntoViennaifsomeofferweremadetome.Leavingasideallpersonalconnections,Ifindthiscountryandthe
peopleheretentimesmorecongenialthanourown.

LaterherefusedhonorarymembershipintheAcademyofSciencesinVienna,aswellastheAustriannationalmedalforartsandsciences.
In1948heexplainedhisreluctancetovisitEuropethisway:
9.6.48IamsohappytohaveescapedfromthebeautifulEurope,thatIwouldonnoaccountliketoexposemyselftothedanger,forwhateverreason,ofmynot

Page46
beingabletoreturn[toPrinceton].Ibelievethatthisdangerreallyexistsunderthepresentconditions.

Threeyearslaterhewrote:
12.11.51ExceptforthefactthatyouliveinVienna,IamnotatalleagertogotoEurope,andespeciallytoAustria.

Tohismother'sobservationthatevilforceswereatworkinEurope,heresponded:
31.10.52Thisisofcoursetrueheretoo,thedifferenceisonlythattheyareinEuropeenduringatthehelm,hereonlytemporarilyandpartly.

1.4Marriage
AdelePorkertwasborn4November1899anddied4February1981.ShewassixandahalfyearsolderthanGdelandcamefromafamilymuchpoorerandless
culturedthanhis.Shehadlittleformaleducationorintellectualaspirationandwasslightlydisfiguredbyafacialbirthmark.Herfirst,briefmarriagetoaphotographer
namedNimburskywasapparentlyunhappy.AccordingtoGdel'sdescriptionin1953,
14.4.53Adeleisbynaturecertainlyharmlessandgoodnatured,butevidentlyhasanervousstreakthatwasaggravatedbyherexperience,especiallythestrictupbringingat
homeandherfirstmarriage.

WhenGdelfirstmetherin1928,AdelewaslivingwithherparentsneartheapartmentsharedbyGdelandhisbrother.Atthetime,AdelewasworkingatDer
Nachtfalter,anightspotlocatedatPetersplatz1whereGdeloftenwenttovisitheraftertheybecameacquainted.Later,inAmerica,Adelestillrecalledthose
venturesintoViennesenightlifevividlyandwithdelight.
Gdel'sparentsobjectedstronglytothisrelationship.Afterhisfather'sdeathinFebruaryof1929,hismother'sobjectionsseemtohavebeenthemainreasonwhy
GdelkepthisrelationshipwithAdeleseparatefromhisfamilylifeanddidnotmarryheruntil1938.Undoubtedlytheneedtoseparatethesetwocloserelationships
imposedagreatmentalburdenonGdelduringtheseyearsandmaywellhavecontributedtothecriseshesufferedin1931,1934,and1936.
Gdel'smothermovedfromBrnotoViennainNovemberof1929andlivedwithhersonsinalargeapartmentuntilNovemberof1937.GdelandAdelewere
marriedon20.9.39.(WhenIwroteupwhatGdelhadtoldmeabouthisintellectualdevelopmentin1976,Iadded,fromstandardreferences,thedateofhis
marriage.Heaskedmetodeletethesentence,onthegroundthathiswifehadnothingtodowithhiswork.)

Page47

LaterinlifeAdeleexpressedregretthattheyhadhadnochildren.TheybegantheirsettledmarriedlifeaftertheymovedtoPrincetoninMarch1940,andatfirstGdel
wasappointedtotheinstituteannually.Onlyinthebeginningof1946washeofferedapermanentposition.ItseemslikelythatGdeldidnotwantchildren,atleastnot
beforegettingasecureposition.By1946,however,Adelewasalreadyfortysix,ratheroldtobearafirstchild.ForAdelelifeinPrincetonwasnotnearlyas
satisfactoryasitwasforGdelhimself,eventhoughheundoubtedlysharedhersenseoflossathavingmovedawayfromthefamiliarplacesoftheiryouth.Thereare
severalreferencestoherstateofmindinhisletters:
16.4.46UnfortunatelyAdeledoesnotsharemyenthusiasmforthiscountryatall.
16.3.47Adeledoesnotliketheapartmentbutwouldliketoliveinafairlynewhouse.Shedoesnotlikelivinginasmalltown.Butthemainreasonforbeingdissatisfiedistobe
separatedfromherfolks.Andshehasgreatdifficultyinrelatingherselftothepeoplehere.
11.9.49[Thefirstproblemwasresolvedaftertheymovedintotheirownhouseat129LindenLane.]Adeleisveryhappyandworksfrommorningtillnightinthehouse.

InMay1986Alice(Lily)vonKahler,whoalsocamefromViennaandwasformanyyearsaclosefriendoftheGdelsinPrinceton,spokeaboutAdele'slifethere
andhermarriagewithGdel(quotedinSchimanovichetal.1995):
1.4.1Forherthematter[ofadaptingtolifeinPrinceton]wasnotsosimple[asforme],becauseshecouldnotevenmanagewithEnglishsowell,havingcomefromanothersocial
circle.Eventhoughshewasveryintelligent,therewasperhapssomedifficultyinherbeingacceptedhere.
1.4.2Shewasnotabeauty,butshewasanextraordinarilyintelligentpersonandhadanextremelyimportantrole[inhislife],becauseshewasactuallywhatonecallsthelifeline.
Sheconnectedhimtotheearth.Withouther,hecouldnotexistatall.
1.4.3Acomplicatedmarriage,butneithercouldexistwithouttheother.Andtheideathatsheshoulddiebeforehimwasunthinkableforhim.Itisfortunatethathediedbeforeher.
Hewasabsolutelydespondentwhenshewassick.Hesaid,"Pleasecometovisitmywife."
1.4.4Sheoncetoldme,"Ihavetoholdhimlikeababy."

GeorgKreisel,whooftenvisitedtheGdelsfromthemid1950stothelate1960s,madesimilarobservationsaboutAdeleandthemarriage(Kreisel1980:151,154
155):

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1.4.5Gdelhimselfwasequallyreticentabouthispersonalhistory,buthiswifetalkedmorefreelyaboutit,usuallyinhispresence.
1.4.6Itwasarevelationtoseehimrelaxinhercompany.Shehadlittleformaleducation,butarealflairforthemotjuste,whichhersomewhatcriticalmotherinlaweventually
noticedtoo,andaknackforamusingandapparentlyquitespontaneoustwistsonafamiliarploy:toinventatleast,atthetimefarfetchedgroundsforjealousy.Onone
occasionshepaintedtheI.A.S.,whichsheusuallycalledAltersversorgungsheim(homeforoldagepensioners),asteemingwithprettygirlstudentswhoqueuedupattheoffice
doorsofthepermanentprofessors.Gdelwasverymuchateasewithherstyle.Shewouldmakefunofhisreadingmaterial,forexample,onghostsordemons.

Gdel'smotherwascriticalofAdele,andsonaturallyAdelewasuncomfortableinherpresence.ThisconflictcreatedmanydifficultiesforGdel,ashisletterstohis
mothershowquiteclearly.Friendsnoticedtheproblemtoo.AsDorothyMorgensternobserved,"IamnotsurethatMrs.Gdelreallyapprovedofherdaughterin
law,soIalwayshavethefeelingthat,whenshecame,theywerebothsortofsuffering."
GivenAdele'sdiscomfortinPrinceton,itisnotsurprisingthatshewantedtotravelandvisitherownfamily.BecauseGdelwasnotwillingtotravel,especiallyto
Europe,Adelemadeanumberofextendedtripsbyherself,leavingGdelaloneinPrinceton.ThiswasamajorsourceofresentmentforGdel'smother,bothbecause
oftheexpenseandbecauseshebelievedAdelewasnottakingpropercareofherhusband.GdelhadtomakemanyexplanationsindefenseofAdele,andonseveral
occasionshenotedthatheworkedexceptionallyhardwhenAdelewasaway.
In1947AdelewentbacktoViennatospendaboutsevenmonthswithherfamily.Aftermorethansevenyears,thiswasherfirstopportunitytogobecauseofthe
waranditsaftermath.ForthenextfewyearsshestayedinAmerica,vacationingwithGdelattheseashorenearPrincetoninthesummers,enjoyingtheirhouse,and
avoidingtheexpenseofatriptoEurope.InMarchof1953,afterGdelreceivedtheEinsteinPrize(twothousanddollars)andwaspromotedtoprofessor,Adele
tookhersecondtriptoEuropewhenshelearnedhersisterwasdangerouslyill.
JudgingfromGdel'sletters,hismotherwasveryangryaboutthistrip,andforthenextfewyearssheandAdelewereestrangedfromeachother.Inhisletterof25
March1953,GdeldefendedAdele'stripandher"sudden"arrivalinViennabyair.HehadsenthisbrotherRudiatelegraminadvance,but,forsomereason,their
motherhadnotseenit.Thefareforatouristclassflightwasnotmuchmoreexpensivethantravelbyboat.
25.3.53ThereiscertainlynogroundtosaythatAdelekeepsmeisolated.Asyouwellknow,Ilikebesttobealoneandtoseenobodyexceptacoupleofintimatefriends.

Page49
25.3.53Inanycaseonecannotsayatallthatshepreventsmefromcomingonthecontrary,shesteadilyurgesmetotravel.
25.3.53ForyoutocomehereinAdele'sabsenceisofcoursehardlypossiblenowjustwhenyouareafflictedwithher.

InthenextletterGdelagainpleadedforAdele,thistimeinconnectionwithmoneymatters.
14.4.53ThereisalsonogroundforyoutobebitterovermywritingthatIspendformyselfonlywhatisnecessary,sincethe"necessary"includesyearlysummervacationsand
arbitrarilymanytaxis.Inotherwords,IdonotspareanythingformyselfandcanspendnomoreonmyselfevenifIhadthemostfrugalwifeintheworld.Asyouknow,Ihaveno
needtotravel,andtobuybookswouldhavelittlesense,sinceIcangetallthatinterestsmemoresimplyandmorequicklythroughlibraries.Whenyouwritethat,younowsee,
youhave"alwaysjudgedAdeleright"andthatAdeleplayscomedyandtheater,itisdefinitelyfalse.
14.4.53Itisadifficultmatterheretorestrictawifeinherspending,sinceitisthegeneralcustomthatmanandwifehaveajointaccountandthewifecanusetheaccountasshe
will.

InFebruaryof1956AdelewenttoViennaforthethirdtimeandvisitedGdel'smother.On24February1956Gdelwrote,"IamveryhappytohearthatAdele
visitedyouandeverythinghasagainbecomeallright."ThatMarch,AdelebroughtwithhertoPrincetonherownmother,wholivedintheirhouseanddiedaboutthree
yearslater.
ForabouteightyearsGdelmadeplanstogotoEuropetoseehismother(inViennaorLeipzigorHanover),buteachtimehechangedhismind.Finally,on11
November1957hewroteinvitinghertoPrinceton.SheandhisbrothercameinMayof1958,andsherepeatedthevisitin1960,1962,and1964.In1966his
motherwantedverymuchtobewithhimonhissixtiethbirthdayinAprilbutwastooweaktotravel.ShediedinJuly.
Adeledidnottravelwhilehermotherwaslivingwiththem.Afterhermother'sdeathinMarchof1959,AdeletookasummervacationintheWhiteMountainsofNew
Hampshire,thenwenttoViennafromOctobertoDecember.Gdel'smotheragainobjectedtotheEuropeantripandGdelwroteinreply:
6.12.59ThereisreallynothingspecialatallaboutAdele'stravel,whenonereflectsthatmanyofmycolleaguestraveltherealmosteveryyearandbringtheirwiveswiththem.Itis
truethatinthesecasestheyusuallyreducethetravelcoststhroughlecturesoverthere.ButjustbecauseIdonotdothis,IwillnonethelessnotletAdelesufferforit,especially
thisyearwhensheneedsafteralladiversionafterthedeathofhermother.

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AdeleagainwenttoViennaintheautumnof1960andagainGdelfearedaclashbetweenhismotherandAdele.
18.11.60Thatmylastletterwaswritteninanirritatedtoneisunquestionablyafalseimpression,becauseIwasnotatalltesty.AsIwroteit,Iwasonlyafraidthatanother
disharmonybetweenyouandAdelemightariseasituationwhichwouldofcoursehaveveryunfavorableconsequencesforourlifehere.

In1961AdelewasinItalyfromJulytoSeptember.Gdelwrotetohismotheron23Julytoexpressthehopethatshewasnotupsetbythis.On12Septemberhe
said:"Youwrotethateveryonecondemnshergoingawayforsolong.ButsinceIhavenothingagainstitandamwelltakencareof,Idonotknowwhatthereisto
objectto."Thenextyear,on27August1962,Gdelwrotethat"ThisyearAdeleis,forthefirsttimeinalongwhile,spendingthewholesummerhere,andhasgladly
spentthemoneythussavedinbeautifyingourhome."
InearlierpassagesIextensivelydocumentedGdel'shealthsituationandhispreoccupationwithit.GivenAdele'simportancetohim,itiseasytounderstandwhyhe
wasalsoverymuchconcernedwithAdele'shealth.Indicationsofhisconcernbegantoappearinthemid1960sonthewholeAdele'shealthseemstohavebeen
gooduptothattime.
OnherfirsttriptoItalyinthesummerof1961,sheenjoyedastayinIschiathat,accordingtoaletterGdelwrotetohismotherin1965,enabledhertocureher
maladies:
3.6.65Adeleisnowinthemiddleofpreparingforhertrip.ShewillinJunetravelagaintoIschiaforcure,becauseherrheumatismandothermaladies,whichwerecompletelycured
inIschia,havereturned.
3.6.65[Tohisbrother.]AdelewenttoseeDr.RamponaandhesaidtomethatIschiaisunquestionablytherightplaceforherpainsinthelimbs.

Inhisletterof19August1965GdelsaidhehadrecentlybeenverymuchworriedoverAdele'sstateofhealth.Ontheonehand,shefeltwonderfulaftertakingthe
baths.Ontheotherhand,thebathswerebadforherhighbloodpressureandshehadtogetinjections:
1.4.7Thatthereissomethingwrongwithherhealth,onecanalsoseefromthefactthatshehaslostallherzestforadventureandwouldhavelikedbesttocomehomealreadyat
thebeginningofAugust,buthadobeyedthedoctortocontinuethecure.IhavenowbookedforheradirectflightfromNaplestoNewYorkonthe24th,andhopethatthetravel
willdohernoharm.

Inhisletterof23September1965heapologizedthat,forthefirsttimeintwentyyears,hehadcompletelyforgottenhismother'sbirthday(on31August):"This
probablyhastodowithmy(unnecessary)worryonaccountofAdeleinAugust."

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MyimpressionisthatAdele'shealthreallybecameamatterforseriousconcernonlyinthe1970s.AsImentionedearlier,Gdeltoldmeaboutvariousproblemsin
1976,and,subsequently,aboutthemajoroperationsheunderwentinJulyof1977.Shealsohadtwostrokesbeforethen,probablysometimeafter1974or1975.It
wascleartomebythespringof1976thatGdel'schiefconcerninlifewaswithhisownhealthandAdele's.
ImetAdeleonlyafewtimes.InJune1952whensheandGdelcametoCambridgetoreceivethehonorarydegreefromHarvard,Imetthematthedinnerandthe
receptionatthehomeofW.V.Quine.OnthisoccasionAdelehadpreparedsomespecialfoodforGdel,andsheurgedhimtomovetoHarvardbecausepeople
thereweresonicetothem.IalsovisitedthemattheguesthousenextdoortotheFacultyClub,bringingforAdelethenewspapersreportingonthehonorarydegree
ceremony,asshehadrequested.
InSeptember1956GeorgKreiseltookmetotheirhouseforafternoontea.Adelewaspresentbutdidnotsaymuch.IrememberthatwediscussedTuring'ssuicide
andthatGdelaskedwhetherTuringwasmarried.Onbeingtoldthathewasnot,hesaid,"Perhapshewantedtogetmarriedbutcouldnot."Thisobservation
indicatedtometheimportanceGdelattributedtomarriageforaman's,andperhapsalsoforawoman's,lifeanddeath.
TwodaysafterGdel'sdeathon14January1978IwenttoseeAdele,havinglearnedthenewsfromHasslerWhitneythatmorning.OnthisoccasionAdeletoldme
thatGdel,althoughhedidnotgotochurch,wasreligiousandreadtheBibleinbedeverySundaymorning.Shealsogavemepermissiontocomeon19Januaryto
theprivatefuneralservice,where,ofcourse,Isawheragain.
1.5PoliticsandHisPersonalSituation
Gdelwasacautiousmaninpracticalmatters.AsfarIknow,henevertookanypoliticalstandinpublic.Itisgenerallyassumedthathehadlittleinterestinpolitics.As
Imentionedbefore,KarlMengercomplainedthatGdelappearedindifferenttopoliticsevenin1939,whenthesituationinEuropesomuchaffectedhisownlife.On
theotherhand,apartfromhisreportedinterestinsocialismin1931,theonlyindicationsofpoliticalopinionsareinthelettershewrotebetween1946andabout1963.
Perhapsthiswastheonlyperiodinhislifewhenhetookastronginterestinpolitics,asthefollowingselectionfromhisletterssuggests.
GdeladmiredRooseveltandEisenhower,dislikedTruman,detestedJosephMcCarthy,andlikedHenryWallaceandAdlaiStevenson.On31October1951,
towardtheendofEisenhower'sfirstpresidentialcampaign,

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hewrote"IhaveoccupiedmyselfsomuchwithpoliticsinthelasttwomonthsthatIhadtimefornothingelse."(EinsteinfoundhispreferenceforEisenhowerover
Stevensonverystrange.)On5January1955,inreplytoaquestionfromhisbrotherabouthis"hobby,"hewrote"Icouldatmostnamepoliticsasmyhobbyitisin
anycasenotsocompletelyunpleasantinthiscountryasinEurope."By7August1963hisinterestinpoliticshadgraduallyreachedalowpoint:"Ihavemoreorless
lostcontactwithpolitics,nowadaysIveryrarelylookatthenewspaper."
AfterthevictoryoftheRepublicanPartyinthemidtermcongressionalelectionsin1946,Gdelwrotetohismother:
22.11.46Youhaveprobablyalreadyreadaboutthe"landslide"resultoftheelectionherefourteendaysago.SotheRepublicans(i.e.,thereactionaries)arenowagaininpower
(forthefirsttimesince1933).ThedevelopmenthasindeedalreadygoneinthisdirectionsinceRoosevelt'sdeath[on12April1945]andIhavethefeelingthatthis,incredibleasit
maysound,hasalsoalreadyshownitselfineverydaylifeinvariousways.E.g.,thefilmshavedecidedlybecomeworseinthecourseofthelastyear.PrincetonUniversityisnow,
throughoutmanymonths,celebratingthetwohundredthyearjubileeofitsfounding.Remarkablythisislinkedtoagreatsecretmongering:I.e.,thescientificlecturesand
discussionsareinpartonlyopentoinvitedguests,andevenwhensomethingispublic,onespeaks,asmuchaspossible,onlyaboutbanalities,oralecturerisselectedwho
speakssounclearlythatnobodyunderstandshim.Itisdownrightlaughable.Sciencehasnow(chieflybecauseoftheatombomb)onthewholethetendencyofturningitselfinto
secretsciencehere.

GdeloftenexpressedhisadmirationforRooseveltandforRoosevelt'sAmerica:
5.1.47WhenyousayitisgoodthattheAmericanshavethepowerinhand,IwouldunconditionallysubscribetoitonlyfortheRooseveltianAmerica.ThatRooseveltcouldno
longerexertinfluenceontheconclusionofthepeacetreatiesandtheestablishmentofthenewLeagueofNations[sic]iscertainlyoneofthemostdeplorablefactsofourcentury.
29.9.50True,IhavealreadyoftencritizedAmerica:butonlyjustinthelastfewyearsformerlyIwasstillthoroughlyenchanted.

AccordingtoabookonEinsteininAmerica,"EinsteinwassodisgustedwithTruman'srecklesshandlingofforeignpolicythathevigorouslysupportedthequixotic,
thirdpartycandidacyofHenryWallacein1948."GdelapparentlysharedEinstein'sviewsonTrumanandWallace.
9.6.48Thepoliticalhorizonherealsoappearstobebrighteningupsomewhat.YouhaveperhapsheardaboutthegreatsuccessthatHenryWallace,aclosecolleagueof
Roosevelt's,hadonhiscampaigntour.Thisseemstoproveyetatleastthatthecountryisnotasreactionaryasthepresentregime.Itremains,however,veryquestionable
whetherhecanreceiveenoughvotestobecomethepresident.

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26.2.49Whatdoyouthinkofthebeautifulexpression,whichPresidentTrumaninflictsonhispoliticalopponentsinhispublicspeeches?Inanycasehesaid,accordingtothe
localhabit,onlytheinitiallettersS.O.B.(sonofabitch).

WithregardtotheKoreanWar,Gdelwroteon1November1950:"ButatanyrateitisclearthatAmerica,underthemagicword'Democracy,'carriesonawarfor
acompletelyunpopularregimeanddoesthingsinthenameof'policing'fortheUN,withwhichtheUNitselfisnotinagreement."
SeveralofhisletterscontaincommentsinfavorofEisenhower:
10.3.52ItwouldbeniceifEisenhowerwouldgetelectedinautumn.
6.1.54Youquestionmyopinionaboutthepoliticaldevelopment.ButIfindthatgoodthingshavehappenedunderEisenhower.1.TheceasefireinKorea,whichhas,inmy
opinion,savedusfromathirdWorldWar.2.Thereductionofthemilitarybudgetbyaboutthreebilliondollars.3.thecessationoftheinflation,whichhaslastedsixyears.I
believe,however,thatisjustthebeginning,sinceanewpresidentcertainlycannotgetintoanewcourseinoneday.
16.1.56ItisagrossexaggerationtosaythattodaythepoliticalclimateinAmericaissymbolizedby[Joseph]McCarthy(whoisundoubtedlytheAmericanHitler).Theinfluence
ofMcCarthyhassunkenalmosttozerosinceEisenhowerbecamepresident.[Inhisletterof5May1954GdelcreditedtheEisenhowerregimewith"theunmaskingofMcCarthy."]
16.12.60IbelievethatpeoplegenerallyunderestimatewhatEisenhowerhasdoneinthelasteightyearsformankind.Whenheleaves,muchwillturntotheworse,especiallyalso
withregardtothepeaceoftheworld.

AlthoughGdelpreferredEisenhoweroverStevensonforthepresidency,healsothoughtwellofStevenson:
26.7.65Stevensonisdead.Hewasoneofthefewsympatheticpoliticians.Heisdifficulttoreplace:theU.S.foreignpolicywillprobablybecomeevenmoreunreasonablethrough
hisdeath.

Gdel'sopinionofKennedychangedbetween1961and1963:
30.4.61Withregardtothenewpresident,oneseesquiteclearlyalreadywherehispoliticsisleading:warinVietnam,warinCuba,thebelligerentNazisorfascists(intheformof
"anticommunist"organizations)beginningtobloom,morerearmament,lesspressfreedom,nonegotiationswithKhrushchev,etc.
28.5.61InotheraspectsKennedynowlooksmorecongenialthanbeforetheelectionandIbelievethatAdeleisrightthatheoftenhasaninsidiousexpressionintheeyes.
24.3.63Intherealmofpoliticsitappearedforalongtimethatanatomicwarcouldbreakoutanyday.ButfortunatelyKhrushchevandKennedyarebothrationalinthisregard.

Page54
20.10.63WithregardtothepoliticsandthegoldreserveinAmerica,Ihadlittletimeinrecentmonthstodevotemyselftosuchmatters.Butingeneraltheinternationalsituation
hascertainlyimprovedsubstantiallyandKennedyhasprovenhimselftobeabetterpresidentthanwastobeexpectedoriginallyandbytheCubanadventure.

GdelwasunambiguouslyagainsttheAmericaninvolvementinthewarinVietnam:
21.10.65HaveyouheardaboutthebelligerentdemonstrationsagainstthewarinVietnam?Theyareright.IttookEisenhowertoendthewarinKorea.Butscarcelyhadhe
returned,exactlythesamethingbeganinVietnam.
20.1.66ThepeaceoffensiveinVietnamisverywelcome,butJohnsonhaswaitedsolonginthismatter,tillpeopleherehavealreadynearlythrownrotteneggsathim(ifnotalso
literally).

1.6CompanionofEinstein
Fromabout1942toAprilof1955EinsteinandGdelfrequentlywalkedtogetherwhileconversing.TheywereafamiliarsightintheneighborhoodoftheInstitutefor
AdvancedStudy.Althoughothershaveoccasionallynotedtheirclosefriendship,fewdetailsareknown,foritwasprimarilyaprivatematter,andthereisscarcelyany
recordoftheirdiscussions,whichwerealmostcertainlyundertakenentirelyfortheirownenjoyment.AccordingtoErnstG.Straus,whowaswiththemagooddealin
the1940s,
1.6.1Theonemanwhowas,duringthelastyears,certainlybyfarEinstein'sbestfriend,andinsomewaysstrangelyresembledhimmost,wasKurtGdel,thegreatlogician.They
wereverydifferentinalmosteverypersonalwayEinsteingregarious,happy,fulloflaughterandcommonsense,andGdelextremelysolemn,veryserious,quitesolitary,and
distrustfulofcommonsenseasameansofarrivingatthetruth.Buttheysharedafundamentalquality:bothwentdirectlyandwholeheartedlytothequestionsattheverycenter
ofthings(inHoltonandElkena1982:422).

Theywerebothgreatphilosopherscientistsaveryrarebreedindeed,whichappearstohavebecomeextinctasaresultofintensespecialization,acutecompetition,
obsessionwithquickeffects,distrustofreason,prevalenceofdistractions,andcondemnationofideals.Thevaluesthatgovernedthesephilosopherscientistsaretoa
largeextentnowconsideredoutofdate,oratleastnolongerpracticableintheirplenitude.Admirationforthemtakestheformofnostalgiaforabygoneera,orthey
areregardedasfortunatebutstrangeandmysteriouscharacters.Theirlivesandworkalsosuggestquestionsforsomewhatidlespeculation:Whatwouldtheybedoing
iftheywereyoungtoday?Whattypesofcultural,

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social,andhistoricalconditions(includingthestateofthediscipline)arelikelytoproducetheirsortofmindsandachievementsliketheirs?
Thereisanaturalcuriosityaboutthelifeandworkofpeoplelikethem.MuchhasbeensaidaboutEinstein,andtherearesignsindicatingthatagooddealwillbesaid
aboutGdelaswell.Theirexceptionaldevotiontowhatmightbecalled''eternaltruth"servestogiveamagnifiedviewofthevalueofourtheoreticalinstinctand
intellect.Reflectionsontheirprimaryvaluemayalsoprovideanantidotetoallthebusyworknowgoingontheymaysupplyabreathoffreshair,andevenpointtothe
availabilityofmorespaciousregionsinwhichonecouldchoosetoliveandwork.
BothEinsteinandGdelgrewupanddidtheirbestworkinCentralEurope,usingGermanastheirfirstlanguage.Inthe"miraculous"yearof1905,whenhewasabout
26,EinsteinpublishedarticlesonSpecialRelativity,onthelightquantum,andonBrownianmotion.Gdelhaddonehisworkonthecompletenessofpredicatelogic
andontheinexhaustibilityofmathematicsbeforereachingthesameage.EinsteinwentontodevelopGeneralRelativity,andGdelmovedtosettheory,wherehe
introducedanorderlysubuniverseofsets(the"constructible"sets),whichyieldedtheconsistencyofthecontinuumhypothesisandwhichhasbeentodatethesingle
mostfruitfulstepinbringingorderintothechaosofarbitrarysets.(HisworkonEinstein'sequationsfollowed,asadigressionandabyproductofhisstudyofthe
philosophicalproblemoftimeandchange.HeoncetoldmethatitwasnotstimulatedbyhiscloseassociationwithEinstein.)Duringthelastfewdecadesoftheirlives,
bothofthemconcentratedonwhatarecommonlythoughttobeunfashionablepursuits:EinsteinontheunifiedtheoryandGdelon"oldfashioned"philosophy.
Thecombinationoffundamentalscientificwork,seriousconcernwithphilosophy,andindependenceofspiritreachesinthesetwomenaheightthatisrarelyfoundand
isprobablyuniqueinthiscentury.Thesupremeleveloftheirintellectualworkremindsoneoftheseventeenthcentury,sometimescalledthe"centuryofgenius,"when
importantworkwasgiventotheworldbysuchgeniusesasKepler,Harvey,Galileo,Descartes,Pascal,Huygens,Newton,Locke,Spinoza,andLeibniz.
Oneindulgenceleadstoanother.IfwepairEinsteinwithGdel,whynotextendthefamiliarassociationofEinsteinwithNewtonbyanalogy?Theriddleis,then,to
lookforanxsuchthatEinsteinistoGdelasNewtonistox.TheobviouscandidatesareDescartesandLeibniz.Gdel'sownheroisLeibniz,anothergreatlogician.
Moreover,GdelconsidersLeibniz'smonadologyclosetohisownphilosophy.Atthesametime,thecleanandconclusivecharacterofGdel'smathematical
innovationsmaybemoresimilartoDescartes'sinventionofanalyticgeometry,andhissympathywithHusserlappearstobeclosertoDescartes'spredominant

Page56

concernwithmethod,withanewwayofthinkingandthebeginningofanewtypeofphilosophy.AnotherlikelycandidateisPascal,who,likeGdel,oftenwent
againstthespiritofhistime.
DuringhislifetimeGdelwasmuchlesswellknowntothegeneralpublicthanhisfriend.Ina1953lettertohismother,undoubtedlyinresponsetoaquestionfrom
her,Gdelcommentsontheburdenoffame:
9.12.53Ihavesofarnotfoundmy"fame"burdensomeinanyway.Thatbeginsonlywhenonebecomessofamousthatoneisknowntoeverychildinthestreet,asisthecaseof
Einstein.Inthatcase,crackpotsturnupnowandthen,whodesiretoexpoundtheirnuttyideas,orwhowanttocomplainaboutthesituationoftheworld.Butasyousee,the
dangerisalsonotsogreatafterall,Einsteinhasalreadymanagedtoreachthevenerableageof74years.

Gdel'sfamehasspreadmorewidelysincehisdeathin1978.Thegrowingattentiontohimandhisworkisundoubtedlyrelatedtotheincreasinglywidespread
applicationofcomputers.Forexample,onesymposiumheldasamemorialtohimannounceditsthemeas"DigitalIntelligence:FromPhilosophytoTechnology."
Indeed,itmaybethattheconnectionbetweenGdel'sworkandcomputersiscloserthanthatbetweenEinstein'sworkandtheatombomb,aboutwhichGdelsays
ina1950lettertohismother:
11.5.50ThatjustEinstein'sdiscoveriesinthefirstplacemadetheatombombpossible,isanerroneouscomprehension.Ofcoursehealsoindirectlycontributedtoit,butthe
essenceofhisworkliesinanentirelyotherdirection.

IbelieveGdelwouldsaythesamethingabouttheconnectionbetweenhisownworkandcomputers.The"entirelyotherdirection"isfundamentaltheory,which
constitutedthe(central)purposeoflifeforbothGdelandEinstein.Thiscommondedication,theirgreatsuccesswithit(indistinctbutmutuallyappreciatedways),
andtheirdrivetopenetratedeeperintothesecretsofnaturethecombinationofthesefactorsundoubtedlyprovidedthesolidfoundationfortheirfriendshipandtheir
frequentinteractions.Eachofthemfoundintheotherhisintellectualequalwho,moreover,sharedthesameculturaltradition.Byhappycoincidence,theyhappenedto
havebeen,sinceabout1933,throwntogetherinthesame"club,"theInstituteforAdvancedStudy.
Gdelwasgenerallyreluctanttoinitiatehumancontactsandwascomfortablewithonlyasmallnumberofindividuals,especiallyduringhisPrincetonyears.Therewere
undoubtedlyanumberofotherpeoplewhowouldhaveenjoyedsocialinteractionwithhimbutfewhadtheconfidenceortheopportunity.InthecaseofEinstein,of
course,therewasnoproblemofconfidence,andtherewasplentyofopportunity.Moreover,bothofthemhadthoughtexceptionallydeeplyandarticulatelyabout

Page57

scienceandphilosophyonthebasisofawealthofsharedknowledge.Thereiseveryindicationthatbothofthemgreatlyenjoyedeachother'scompanyand
conversation.Indeed,theirrelationshipmusthavebeenoneofthemostpreciousexperiencesofitskind.
OskarMorgenstern,whoknewGdelwellandwasalsoacquaintedwithEinstein(probablythroughGdel),wrotetotheAustriangovernmenttowardtheendof
1965torecommendhonoringGdelonhissixtiethbirthday:
1.6.2EinsteinhasoftentoldmethatinthelateyearsofhislifehehascontinuallysoughtGdel'scompany,inordertohavediscussionswithhim.Oncehesaidtomethathisown
worknolongermeantmuch,thathecametotheInstitutemerely'tohavetheprivilegetowalkhomewithGdel.'[The"lateyears"probablybeganin1951,whenEinsteinstopped
workingontheunifiedtheory.]

TheletterstohismothermakeitclearthatGdelvaluedEinstein'scompanyjustashighlyasEinsteinvaluedhis.Whatwasinvolvedis,Ithink,afascinatingexampleof
humanvalueswhichmayperhapsbehelpfulintestingethicaltheoriesinparticular,suchtheoriesas,JohnStuartMill's"principleofpreference,"whichproposesto
guidetherankingofpleasures.Morethanaquestfordefiniteresultsorevenanairingofpersonaltroubles,theirtalksmayappropriatelybeconsideredtohaveserved
a"purposelesspurpose"basedona"disinterestedinterest."Fromacommonandordinaryperspective,theymightbethoughttohaveengagedina"useless''activity.
Yettheirgenuineenjoymentstrikinglyrevealsatypeofvaluemanyofuscanonlydimlyseeorhaveexperiencedonlyinalimiteddegree.Couldwe,perhaps,callthis
underlyingvaluethatofpureandfreeinquirywhichisusuallyasolitaryaffairasanendinitself?Surely,thedevotionofGdelandEinsteintothisvaluehad
muchtodowiththeirextraordinarylevelofintellectualachievement.
AfterEinstein'sdeath,GdelrespondedtoaninquiryfromCarlSeeligbysayingthatheandEinsteinhadtalkedparticularlyaboutphilosophy,physics,politics,and,
often,aboutEinstein'sunifiedfieldtheory(although,orperhapsbecause,EinsteinknewthatGdelwasveryskepticallyopposedtoit).Whatispresupposedin
Gdel'sstatementis,Iamsure,alargeareaofagreementintheirtastesandinthevalueandimportancetheyplacedonparticularquestionsandideas.Theyshared
alsoagooddealofknowledge(includingjudgmentsonwhatisknownandwhatisnot),aswellasagreattalentforexpressingtheirthoughtsclearly.Intherestofthis
chapterIcontrasttheiroutlooksbylookingatsomeoftheiragreementsanddisagreements.
BothEinsteinandGdelwereconcernedprimarily,andalmostexclusivelyintheirlateryears,withwhatisfundamental.Forexample,Einstein(Schilpp1949:15
Woolf1980:485)oftenexplainedhischoiceofphysics

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overmathematicspartlyintermsofhisfeelingthatmathematicswassplitupintotoomanyspecialties,whileinphysicshecouldseewhattheimportantproblemswere.
HesaidtoStraus,however,that"NowthatI'vemetGdel,Iknowthatthesamethingdoesexistinmathematics."Inotherwords,Einsteinwasinterestedinproblems
fundamentaltothewholeofmathematicsorthewholeofphysics,butcouldinitiallydiscernthemonlyinthecaseofphysics.Gdeloncetoldme,almostapologetically
(probablytoexplainwhyhehadsolittleofwhatheconsideredsuccessinhislaterdecades),thathetoowasalwaysafterwhatisfundamental.
NeitherEinsteinnorGdel(contrarytoprevailingopinioninthephysicscommunityoftheirtime)consideredquantumtheorytobepartoftheultimatefurnitureof
physics.Einsteinseemstohavebeenlookingforacompletetheorywithinwhichquantumtheorywouldbeseenasaderivativeensembledescription.Inphysics,
accordingtoGdel,thepresent"twolevel"theory(withits"quantization"ofa"classicalsystem,"anditsdivergentseries)wasadmittedlyveryunsatisfactory(Wang
1974:13).
Intheletterstohismother,GdeloftenexplainsEinstein'sattitudewithsympathy.In1950hecommentedonanarticlecallingEinstein'stheory"thekeytothe
universe,"anddeclaredthatsuchsensationalreportswere"verymuchagainstEinstein'sownwill."Headded,"Thepresentpositionofhisworkdoesnot(inmy
opinion)justifysuchreportsatall,evenifresultsobtainedinthefutureonthebasisofhisideasmightperhapsconceivablyjustifythem.Butsofareverythingis
unfinishedanduncertain."Thisopinion,Ithink,agreed,essentially,withEinstein'sown.
TheseandotherexamplesofagreementbetweenEinsteinandGdelrevealasharedperspectivewhichwascontrarytocommonpracticeandthe"spiritofthetime"
andwhichconstitutedasolidfoundationfortheirmutualappreciation.Againstthisbackground,theirdisagreementsanddifferencesweresecondary.Indeed,inother
aspectsaswell,theoppositionoftheirviewscanusuallybeseenasbranchingsoutfromacommonattitude.
Bothofthemvaluedphilosophy,buttheydisagreedonitsnatureandfunction.Theywerebothpeacelovingandcosmopolitaninoutlook,but,unlikeEinstein,Gdel
tooknopublicpoliticalpositions.Theywerebothsympathetictotheidealofsocialism,butGdel'sskepticismtowardprevalentproposalsonhowtoattainit
contrastswiththelessrestrainedviewexpressedinEinstein's1949essay"WhySocialism?"(reprintedin1954).Thereisasenseinwhichbothmencouldbeseenas
religious,butEinsteinspokeofacceptingSpinoza'spantheism,whileGdelcalledhimselfatheist,followingLeibniz.(In1951GdelsaidofEinstein,"Heis
undoubtedlyinsomesensereligious,butcertainlynotinthesenseofthechurch.")

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TheybothreadKantinschoolanddevelopedastrongtasteforphilosophywhenyoung.EinsteinturnedagainstitbecauseofitsvaguenessandarbitrarinessGdel
wentontodevoteagreatdealofenergytoitspursuit,aimingat"philosophyasarigorousscience."AccordingtoEinstein,"Epistemologywithoutcontactwithscience
becomesanemptyscheme.Sciencewithoutepistemologyisinsofarasitisthinkableatallprimitiveandmuddled"(Schilpp1949:684).Gdel,bycontrast,shows
lessinterestinepistemologyandbelievesthatthecorrectwaytodophilosophyistoknowoneself.ForGdel,scienceonlyusesconcepts,whereasphilosophy
analyzesourprimitiveconceptsonthebasisofoureverydayexperience.
Inthe1950sEinstein,likemostintellectuals,preferredStevensontoEisenhower,butGdelstronglyfavoredEisenhower.(Ontheotherhand,Gdelsharedhis
colleagues'greatadmirationforFranklinD.Roosevelt.)Einstein'sloveofclassicalmusiciswellknownmusicseemstohavebeenoflittleinteresttoGdel.Onthe
otherhand,Gdel'sreportedlikingformodernabstractartwaspresumablynotsharedbyEinstein.Einsteinmarriedtwice,hadtwosonsandtwostepdaughters,and
wasawidowerforalmosttwodecades.Gdelmarriedonlyonceandrelativelylate,hadnochildren,andwassurvivedbyhiswife.
InGdel'sletterstohismotherhefrequentlymentionsseeingEinsteinalmostdailyandcommentsonEinstein'shealth,usuallyinoptimisticterms.Healsoexplained
Einstein'spublicactivitiesandmadeobservationsonbooksandarticlesaboutEinstein.
In1949therewasmutualgiftgivingontheoccasionsofEinstein'sseventiethbirthdayandtheGdels'housewarming.Inthesummerof1947,Gdelreportedtohis
motherthatEinsteinwastakingarestcure:"SoIamnowquitelonesomeandspeakscarcelywithanybodyinprivate."InJanuaryof1955,hewrote:"Iamalsonotat
allsolonelyasyouthink.IoftenvisitEinsteinandgetalsovisitsfromMorgensternandothers."
AweekafterEinstein'sdeathon18April1955,GdelwrotethatthedeathofEinsteinhadbeenagreatshocktohim,forhehadnotexpecteditatall,andthat,
naturally,hisstateofhealthhadworsenedagainduringthelastweek,especiallyinregardtosleepandappetite.Twomonthslater,however,hesaid,"Myhealthnow
isgood.Ihavedefinitelyregainedmystrengthduringthelasttwomonths."
Intermsofthecontrastbetweenparticipatinginhistoryandunderstandingtheworld,bothEinsteinandGdelwereprimarilyengagedinthetaskofunderstanding.In
theprocess,theycontributeddecisivelytotheirownspecialsubjects.But,unlikeGdel,Einsteinparticipatedinhistoryinotherwaysandwasmuchmoreofapublic
figure.Gdelkeptagreaterdistancefromthespiritofthetime,speculatingandofferingnovel

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ideasonanumberofperennialissuesthatinterestsomespecialistsbutare,shunnedbymostofthem.Forexample:Ismindmorethanamachine?Howexhaustiveand
conclusiveisourknowledgeinmathematics?Howrealaretimeandchange?CanDarwinismprovideanadequateaccountoftheoriginsoflifeandmind?Istherea
separatephysicalorganforhandlingabstractimpressions?Howprecisecanphysicsbecome?Isthereanextworld?Einstein,Ibelieve,paidmuchlessattentionto
suchquestions.
WhileEinsteinconcentratedonphysicsthroughouthislife,Gdelatfirstshiftedhisinterestfromtheoreticalphysicstomathematicsand,later,tologicthen,afterhis
greatsuccessinlogic,heinvolvedhimselfdeeplyinseveralphilosophicalprojects.ItistruethatEinsteintoolefthislastwork,theunifiedfieldtheory,unfinished.Yet
Gdelwasmoreliabletoembarkonnewvoyages,apparentlypursuingseveralimportantlinesofworkwithoutbringingthemtocompletion.OnemightsaythatGdel
didnotplanhislifeaswellasEinsteindid,andthatEinsteinhadasoundersenseofwhatwasfeasible.Butthennoneofusisequippedtoforetellwithanyassurance
whatfruitsourunfinishedworkwillbearinfuture.Moreover,asGdelsays,eventhoughthepresentisnotagoodtimeforphilosophy,thissituationmaychange.We
haveatendencytoexpectthedominanttrendtocontinueinthesamedirection,buthistoryisfullofswingsofthependulum.Thereisnosolidevidencethatwould
precludetheappearanceofmanyotherpowerfullyeffectiveintellectsofthetyperepresentedbyEinsteinandGdelperhapseveninthenottoodistantfuture.

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Chapter2
Gdel'sMentalDevelopment
Theworldandeverythinginithasmeaningandsense,andinparticularagoodandunambiguousmeaning.
Gdel,6.October1961

AtanearlyageGdel'squestforsecurityandcertaintyledhimtoapreoccupationwithmeaningandprecision.Asummer'sreadingattheageoffifteenseemstohave
ledhimtoadecisiontoconcentrate,asastartingpoint,ontheoreticalphysics,whichpromisedtoprovidepreciseanswerstohiswhyquestionsonaglobalscale.
Fromeighteentotwentytwo,hisinterestinprecisionledhimfromphysicstomathematicsand,then,to(mathematical)logic.
Withhisexceptionaltalentandthoroughnessofpreparation,Gdelquicklygainedcommandofcontemporarylogic.Hewentontodorevolutionaryworkinlogic
from1929to1943beforehereachedtheageofthirtyseven.Duringthisperiodhealsostudiedagooddealofphilosophy.When,in1943,hedecidedtoabandon
activeworkinlogic,heturnedhisprincipalattentiontophilosophy.
From1943to1958Gdelapproachedphilosophybywayofitsrelationtologicandmathematicswithadigression,from1947to1950,tostudytheproblemof
timeandchange,linkingEinstein'srelativitytheorytotheworkofKant.By1959hehadconcludedthatthisapproachrevealeditsowninadequacyandthat
philosophyrequiredamethoddifferentfromthatofscience.
In1959GdelbegantostudytheworkofHusserlandsubsequentlysuggested,withsomehesitation,thatphenomenologymightbetherightmethodforphilosophy.
EventhoughtherearetracesofHusserl'sinfluenceinsomeofGdel'sverylimitednumberofavailablewritingsafter1959,itisnotclearthathisworkactuallyderived
muchbenefitfromhisstudyofHusserl.In1972,hestatedthathadnotfoundwhathewaslookingforinhispursuitofphilosophy.

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2.1HisLifeinItsRelationtoHisWork
Afamiliarideal,bothforeachpersonandforsocietyatlarge,istheenjoymentofone'swork.Formostofus,however,workisanecessarycomponentofourlives,
governedmainlybythedemandsofsociety.Ifworkcouldbecomegenerallyenjoyableaneedratherthananecessaryevilnotonlywouldeveryonehaveabetter
lifebutwewouldalsohaveabettersociety.Asitis,asKarlMarxpointedout,workingpeoplearecommonly"alienated"fromtheirworkandsothey"liveonlywhen
theyarenotworking."Foramajorityofpeople,workisnomorethantheunavoidablemeansofmakingaliving,apreconditionforrealizingalifeofonekindor
another.
Inthecaseofthose,likeGdel,whohavedoneoutstandingwork,therestofusareprimarilyinterestedintheendproductofthatwork.Atthesametime,wemay
alsobecuriousabouttheprocessoftheworkanditsplaceinthelifeoftheperson.Onthewhole,thisrelationshiptendstobemorerevealinginthecaseofartists,
writers,andphilosophersthanitisinthatofscientists.Gdeldividedhisattentionbetweenscienceandphilosophy.Hisscientificworkbordersonphilosophyandis
avowedlylinkedintimatelytohisphilosophicalviews.IhavecometobelievethatitisrewardingtospeculateontherelationofGdel'sworktohislifeasaninstructive
exampleforstudyingtheinterconnectionsbetweenvariousphilosophiesanddifferentwaysoflifeanddifferenttypesofwork.
Afundamentaldeterminantofhumanbehaviorisourdesireforsecurityandorder.Sincecompletesecurityisrare,itisnaturalforustotrytoseetheworldas
fundamentallyorderly.Alternativeworldviewsproposealternativewaysofreconcilingtheapparentdisorderwefindwithourdesireforordertheyeithercultivatean
abilitytolivewithuncertaintyorcontrivesomewaytoperceiveorderbeneaththephenomenonofcontingency.Gdelisofspecialinterestfromthisperspective
becausehestroveespeciallyhardandwithgreatpowertofindandarticulateaconsistentandcomprehensiveviewofanorderlyandrationalworld.Hislifeandwork
wereconspicuouslygovernedbyhisdominantwishtoseeorderandattainsecurity.
OnetaskofphilosophyistoreconcilethephenomenonoftimeandchangewithourdesireforSicherheit(securityandcertainty).Wecannotdenythatweexperience
change,andthatchangebringsaboutnewsituationswhichmaythreatenoursenseofsecurityunlesswecananticipateandprepareforthem.(Incidentally,asawayof
givingusacertaingeneralsenseofsecurity,Gdelproposedadoctrine[consideredinChapter9]accordingtowhichtimeandchangearenotobjectivelyreal.)Our
desireforsecurityleadsinthiswaytoacravingforgenerality,forlawsthattelluswhatchangestoexpect.Typicallythisquesttakestheformofawhyquestion,

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whichasksforthecauseorthereasonAthatproducesoraccountsforagivensituationB.ThesituationB,whetherencounteredorimagined,maybeeitherdesirable
orelsesomethingwewishtoavoidorneedtopreparefor.Ineithercase,wefeelmoresecureifwecanfind,amongthecomplexfactorssurroundingB,someAthat
isthewhyofB.
Thequestforreasonshasatendencytoexpandbeyondthepracticallyrelevantandtobecomeanendinitself,eitherfromcuriosityorfromhabit.Indeed,weare
inclinedtoformulate,bothasanempiricalgeneralizationandasaheuristicprinciple,asweepinguniversalpropositiontotheeffectthateverythinghasareason.This
maybeviewedasaformofwhatLeibnizcallsthe"principleofsufficientreason."AndGdelseemstobelievestronglyinthisprinciple,eventhoughitis,mostofus
wouldthink,neitherprovablenorrefutable.LikeLeibniz,Gdeltakesthisprincipletobeagivenfundamentaltruth.Moreexplicitly,heattributestoLeibniz(inaletter
tohismotherreproducedinthenextchapter)theidea,whichheshares,thateverythingintheworldhasameaningthisidea,hesays,"is,bytheway,exactly
analogoustotheprinciplethateverythinghasacause,whichisthebasisofthewholeofscience"(Gdel19451966,hereafterLM).
WhenGdelwasaboutfour,hewasnicknamedMr.Whybyfamilyandfriendsbecausehealwayswantedtogettothebottomofthingswithhisintensivequestioning.
Thisearlydispositionmaybeviewedasthebeginningofhispersistentquestforreasons,carriedouteventheninamorecarefulmannerthanthatofmostchildren.
Conditionswere,asIhavementionedinChapterI,favorableforhimtocontinuethispursuit.
InChina,sometreesarefamousfortheirshape,age,size,location,orhistoricalassociation,andsooneitherlocallyormorewidely.Ifweconsiderthegrowthfrom
aseedtoalargetreethatlendsshadetopassersbyandprovidesahometootherlivingbeings,weareinclinedtothinkintermsofthecontinuinginteractionofheredity
(asinitiallycontainedintheseed)andenvironment(suchasthesoilandtheclimate)throughthedifferentstagesofthelifeofthetree.InhisErewhon(or"nowhere,"
1872)SamuelButlerenvisagesmachinesthatmetabolize,reproduce,evolve,maintainthemselves,andseemtohaveanaiminlife.Likepeople,thesetreesand
machinesadaptthemselvestotheenvironment.Theyareall,touseacurrentlypopularterm,"complexadaptivesystems"acomprehensivecategorythatis
challengingbutdifficulttostudysystematically.Forinstance,thephenomenonof(ourfelt)freedomisanessentialingredientofhumanbeings,whichmayormaynotbe
construableaspartoftheconnotationoftheconceptofanadaptivesystem.
IfwecompareGdeltoafamoustree(orperhapsthebigtreebetweenhimandEinsteininthephotographof1950)(Wang1987a:142,hereafterRG),wefindinhim
aseedwithpotentiallystrongintellectualpower

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(unmistakablyrevealedquiteearly)plantedinhealthysoil(awealthyandenlightenedfamily)andgrowingupunderpropercare(anormalgoodeducation)ina
congenialclimate(withstableintellectualstandards,appreciativeteachers,andincreasinglywelldefinedtasksforhimtoaccomplish).
Gdel'sabilitywas,asImentionedbefore,demonstratedquiteearly.Hismaternalgrandmother,whooftenplayedwithhimasachild,prophesiedagreatfuturefor
him.Inlateryearshismothertoldmanystoriesabouthimasachild,whichinherviewsuggestedeventhenthathewouldbecomeaworldfamousintellect.These
anecdotessuggeststronglythatGdelasachildhadalreadyacquiredconfidenceinhisowncapabilities,astateofmindusuallynecessaryforgreatworklateron.
Moreover,thisconfidencewasabundantlyconfirmedinschoolandatuniversity,wherehewaswidelyrecognizedasanexceptionallyablestudent.Hewasknownto
possessgreatcapacitiesformethodicalconcentration,accuracy,andthoroughness,forseparatingtheessentialfromtheinessential,andforgettingquicklytotheheart
ofthematter.
Atthesametime,therewereearlysignsthatGdel'smentalandphysicalhealthwasnotrobust.Ataboutfive,heoftenexhibitedstatesofanxietywhenhismotherleft
thehousehesufferedataboutthistimefromalightanxietyneurosis.Fromabouttheageoftenheenjoyedplayingchessbutbecameveryupsetwhenhelost,which
happenedrarely.
TheseincidentsindicatethatGdelwasmoreeasilyupsetthanmostpeoplewhenhisexpectationswerefrustrated.Clearly,beingupsetisastateonewouldliketo
avoid,andsowelearntodistinguishimportant(includinglongrange)expectationsfromunimportantones,toadaptourexpectationstoourability,toregulate
circumstancestoreduceuncertainty,andtocultivateourcapacitytoanticipateandtoleratedisappointment.AconspicuousfeatureofGdel'slifeisthechoicehe
madetoconcentrateonreducinguncertainties.HisentirelifeandworkmakeclearthathewasgreatlyconcernedwithSicherheit.Undoubtedlyhealsohadgreat
expectationsforhimselfheseemedtobedisappointedinhimselfinhislastyears.
GdelmusthaveworkedhardtofindwaystoassurehimselfofSicherheitand,atthesametime,dogoodwork.Hislaterbehaviorgivessomeindicationofhis
solutiontothisproblem.Hetendedtoentereverysituationbeithumancontact,publication,orcompetitionthoroughlyprepared.Hegenerallyavoided
controversy,knowingitwouldupsethim.Hetriedtomakehisworkdefinitiveandacceptabletoallsides.Inparticular,heprocrastinatedoverhisdecisionstosee
people,topublishhiswork,torespondtoquestionsorrequests,andsoon.Onthewhole,headheredtotheprincipleof"fewer,butbetter."(Wittgenstein'sattitude
towardpublishinghisworkwasquitesimilartoGdel's.)

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Withregardtohiswork,Gdeloftenchosetodo(andespeciallytopublishwhatwasmoredefinitiveratherthanthingsthatwerelessconclusive,evenwhenthelatter
seemedmoreimportanttohim.Thisappearstoaccountforhispreferenceforseekingphilosophicallyrelevant(andthereforeimportantforhim)scientific(and
thereforepreciseanddefinitive)results.Thesuccessheachievedbyfollowingthisstrategyinlogicisconspicuous,buthissolutionsofEinstein'sfieldequationsarealso
illustrative.Moreover,hespentmuchtimeandeffort(especiallybetween1960and1970)inconsolidatingandextendinghisoldwork.Since,however,definitiveand
preciseworkitselfishardlypossibleinphilosophy,itisnotsurprisingthathefelthehadnotfoundwhathelookedforinphilosophy.
ThesortofanxietyhehaddisplayedwhenhewaslosingatchessmayexplaininpartwhyGdelpublishedsolittleinphilosophy.Itmayalsoexplainhislatersuccess
incultivatingotherwaysofdealingwithcompetition.Byopeningupnewdirectionsandthinkingthroughtheirimplications,hegenerallyenteredintocompetitive
situationsonlywhenhewassureofsuccess.Whentherewasanydangerofbeinginvolvedinacontroversyoverpriority,herefrainedfromcontentionforexample,
hedidnotstressthefactthathewasfirsttoprovethattruthinalanguageisnotdefinableinthatlanguage.Healsotriedtominimizeinpublictheextenttowhichhehad
pursuedtheindependenceproblemsinsettheoryinhisunpublishedwork.
In1972IassertedthatGdelwas"abovecompetition."Hesmilinglyexpressedskepticismoverthephrasebutdidnotdenytheassertion.Hewas,Ithink,awareof
hisconcernovercompetitionbutmanagedtodealwithitmagnanimously.In1976hecheckedmyreport"SomeFactsaboutKurtGdel"(RG:4146)andthentold
meIcouldpublishitafterhisdeath.Ibelievehewould,likewise,havenoobjectiontomypublishinghisothersayingsafterhisdeath,sinceheisnolongerinany
dangerofbeingupsetbycriticismstowhichhehasnoconclusivereplies.
WedonotknowenoughaboutGdel'schildhoodtounderstandwhyhissenseofsecuritywassovulnerable.Onefamiliarapproachinsuchcasesistolookatthe
person'ssiblingrelations.InGdel'scasetheonlysiblingwashisbrotherRudolf,whowasacapableandpleasantboyfouryearsolderthanhe.Rudolfwasapparently
closertotheirparentsthanhewas.Kurtmayhavefeltinsecurebecausehethought,rightlyorwrongly,thatRudolfwasthemorefavoredchild.(Inthisregardtoo,
WittgensteinwassimilartoGdelhewasayoungestchildwithabrother,Paul,alsofouryearsolder.)Howeverthatmaybe,itseemsbettersimplytoacceptasa
giventhatGdelwas,fromchildhoodon,exceptionallypreoccupiedwithSicherheit.

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CloselyrelatedtothisconcernisthematterofGdel'sphysicalhealth.Atabouteightornine,hehadaseverecaseofrheumaticfever.Hewassomewhat
hypochondriacalthereafterandfanciedthathehadaheartproblem.Hemayhavedevelopedhisexceptionaldistrustofphysiciansatthisearlyperiod.Sincemedicine
isfarfromarigorousscience,hisdemandforprecisionandcertaintymaywellhavecontributedtothisdistrust.Inanycase,hisrefusaltofollowtheadviceof
physicianshadseriousadverseeffectsonhislaterhealth.Inparticular,inearly1951,asmentionedinChapter1,hedelayedtreatmentofableedingduodenalulcer
and,apparently,designedastrangedietforhimself,whichhecontinuedtofollow,tothedetrimentofhisgeneralhealth.
Judgingfromtheavailabledata,however,itappearsthatGdelwasingenerallygoodhealthduringthe1920sand1940s.Inthe1930shesufferedseveralperiodsof
mentaldisturbance:attheendof1931,inmid1934,inlate1935,andin1936.Betweenthespringof1929andthesummerof1938hewasdoingmostofhis
importantworkinlogic,andtheintenseconcentrationmayhaveweakenedhisresistance.Healsotooktwolongtripsduringthisperiod,unaccompaniedbyhisfuture
wifeAdele.InlateryearsheoccasionallymentionedhislonelinessduringhisvisitstoAmericain1933and1934and,briefly,in1935.
AccordingtoGdelhimself,hishealthwas,asmentionedbefore,exceptionallypoorin1936,1961,and1970.Fromthespringof1976untilhisdeathinJanuaryof
1978,hishealthproblemsandthoseofhiswifeAdelewerehisprincipalconcerns.Accordingtohisphysician,hehadbecomedepressiveandwasattimestroubled
byfeelingsofinferiority.Hisdeathcertificatesaysthathediedof"malnutritionandinanition"causedby"personalitydisturbance."
MostofthetimeGdelwasabletoprotecthisdelicatehealthandsensitivitybyjudiciouslyrestrictingtherangeofhisactivities,commitments,andhumancontacts.In
hislateryears,however,hewasnotabletoprotecthimselfsimilarlyfromdisappointment.Hisearlysuccessinlogicseemstohaveledtoexpectationsofsimilarly
definitiveworkinphilosophytheseexpectationswerenotrealized,andsohisselfconfidenceandhisfeelingsofsecurityweredamaged.Itispossiblethathewould
havedonemoreeffectivephilosophicalworkifhehadrequiredlessprecisionandlessdefiniteconclusionsinphilosophythaninscience.Itisalsopossiblethathe
wouldhavedevelopedhisphilosophyfurtherifEuropehadbeenatpeaceandhehadcontinuedhisworkthere.Butofcoursethesearemerespeculations,especially
sinceourknowledgeofhisunpublishedworkandoftheprobablelongrangeeffectofhisphilosophicalideasremainslimited.
Gdel'sexceptionallystrongdesireforsecurityandcertaintycausedhimtobegenerallycautiousandsomewhatlegalistic.Hewasreluctant

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topublicizethoseaspectsofhisviewswhichhethoughtwereunpopular.Inpracticalmattershewaswillingtoacceptestablishedauthoritybutinsistedondoingand
requiringwhathesawaslegallycorrect.Asaresult,someofhisbehaviorappearedunreasonable.Forinstance,inthespringof1939whenGdelwasinAmerica,he
insistedonreturningtoAustria,againsttheadviceoffriends.Mengerthoughthismajorreasonforgoingwastodefendhisrights:''Hehadcomplainedearlieraboutthe
withdrawalofhisDozentpositionattheUniversityofViennabytheNaziregime,andhespokewithgreatprecisionabouthisviolatedrights"(Menger1994).
Mengeralsorecalledin1981thatGdel,whilelivingonthecampusoftheUniversityofNotreDameinthespringof1939,sometimesmadeanissueofveryminor
matters:
2.1.1Hehadquarrelswiththeprefectofhisbuildingforallsortsoftrivialreasons(becauseofkeys,etc.).Ialwayshadtosettlethem,whichwasnoteasy,becausetheprefectwas
anoldpriest,verysetinhisways,andwithGdelmaintaininghisrights.LaterVeblentoldmethat[inPrinceton]Gdelhadsimilarbutmoreserioushouseholddifficulties(in
particularbecauseofasupposedlydangerousrefrigerator),whichVeblenonlyalleviatedwithgreatdifficulty(Menger1994).

MorgensterntoldMengerastoryaboutGdel'slegalisticbentfromhislastyears,whenhewasadmittedtoahospitalbutinsistedthathehadnorighttooneofthe
benefitsproffered:"AndinhisjudicialprecisionGdelunshakablymaintainedhisground,eventhoughthehospitalroutinewasdisturbed,inconveniencearoseonall
sides,and,ofcourse,whatwasthemostgrievous,hehimselfwasdeprivedofurgentlyneededmedicalhelp"(Menger1994).
2.2ConsciousPreparation(19201929)
Curiouschildrenarelikelytoask"Why?"whensurprisedbysomethingunusual,suchasanexceptionallylongnose.Then,atsomestagewebegintoaskforreasons
forordinarythingsaswell,which,bydefinition,fallintogroups,andweareonourwaytoaskingmoreandmoreuniversalquestions.Moreover,weoftenhavethe
urgetoask"Why?"againinresponsetotheanswertoapreviousquestion.Whenthisurgearisesfromgenuinecuriosity,wemaycometoaskmoreandmore
fundamentalquestions.
Inthisway,thequestforreasonsistransformedintoanideal:wesearchforwhatismoreuniversalormorefundamental,andthenforwhatismostuniversalormost
fundamental.Thereare,ofcourse,alternativeapproachestothisformidabletaskonemaychoosephilosophyorpoetry

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orreligionorhistory,and,withineachapproach,anyofavarietyofwaysofselectingandarrangingthepreparatorysteps.
Fromthebeginning,Gdel'spursuitofreasonswastemperedbyandcombinedwithhisquestforsecurityandcertainty,withprecisionasacriterion.Giventhiscentral
concern,itisnotsurprisingthathechoseacoursethatbeginswithwhatiscertainandprecise.Itisthenalsonaturalthathedecidedtoapproachtheidealofseeingall
reasonsthroughphilosophy,specificallyphilosophybywayofphysicsandmathematics.
AttheGymnasium(secondaryschool)inBrunnwhichheattendedfrom1916to1924,Gdelwasanoutstandingstudent,excelling,atfirst,inlanguages,thenin
history,andfinallyinmathematics.In1920(attheageoffourteen)hebegantotakeastronginterestinmathematics(onreadinganintroductiontothecalculus),andat
sixteenorseventeenhehadalreadymasteredtheuniversitymaterialinmathematics.ThisachievementmustbeseenastheresultofaninteractionbetweenGdel's
nativetalentandhisquestforcertainty,precision,theuniversal,andthefundamental.Eventhen,hewasundoubtedlyawarethatthestudyofmathematicsisgood
preparationforawiderangeofintellectualpursuits.
In1985Icameuponapassageina1946letterGdelwrotetohismother,whichappearedtoofferacluetoGdel'schoiceofvocation.
26.8.46Thebook"Goethe"byChamberlain,mentionedinyourletter,broughttomymindmanymemoriesfrommyyouth.Ireadit(strangelyexactlytwentyfiveyears[ago]now)
inMarienbadandseetodaystilltheremarkablelilaccoloredflowersbeforeme,whichthenpervadedeverything.Itisincrediblehowsomethingcanbesovivid.IbelieveIhave
writtenyoualreadyin1941fromtheMountainAshInn,thatIfoundthereagainthesameflowersandhowpeculiarlythistouchedme.ThisGoethebookalsobecamethe
beginningofmyoccupationwithGoethe'sFarbenlehreandhisStreitmitNewton,andtherebyalsoindirectlycontributedtomychoiceofvocation.Thisisthewayremarkable
threadsspinthroughone'slife,whichonediscoversonlywhenonegetsolder.

AtthetimeIfoundtheletterIwasatalossforacluetowhatitmeant.LaterIhadanopportunitytoaskhisbrotherwhathadhappenedinthesummerof1921in
connectionwiththebiographyofGoethe.RudolftoldmethatthetwoboyshadhadextendeddiscussionsofGoethe'sviewsaboutthenaturalsciencesandthat
afterwardsGdelhadconcludedthathefavoredNewtonoverGoethe.Thisexperienceundoubtedlytouchedoffhisinterestintheoreticalphysics,andso,whenhe
enteredtheUniversityofViennain1924heatfirstspecializedinphysics.
Meanwhile,in1922,Gdel'sfirstreadingof(someof)theworkofKantwas,ashetoldmein1975,importantforthedevelopmentofhisintellectualinterests.In
Januaryof1925,shortlyafterbeginninghisuniversitystudies,herequestedfromthelibraryKant'sMetaphysicalFoundationsof

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NaturalScience,whichstudiesthephilosophical(partlyapriori)foundationsofNewtonianphysics.ThisfactsuggeststomethatGdel'sinterestwaslessinphysics
itselfthaninitsphilosophicalfoundationsandsignificance.
Judgingfromhislaterdevelopment,itseemslikelythatGdelwasdissatisfiedwithKant'ssubjectiveviewpointandwiththelackofprecisioninhiswork.Gdel
apparentlysawevenphysicsasinsufficientlyprecise,ascanbeseenfromhisobservationthathisinterestinprecisionhadledhimfromphysicstomathematics.
Moreover,in1975hesaidthathehadbeenasortofPlatonist(a"conceptualrealist"ora"conceptualandmathematicalrealist")sinceabout1925thisPlatonist
stanceisclearlyanobjectivistposition,incontrasttoKant'ssubjectivepointofview.
From1925to1926,whilestillspecializinginphysics,GdelalsostudiedthehistoryofEuropeanphilosophywithHeinrichGomperz,thephilosophyofmathematics
withMoritzSchlick,andnumbertheorywithP.Furtwngler.Wesee,then,thathewasbecomingmoreinvolvedwithphilosophy,mathematics(inparticularnumber
theory),andthephilosophyofmathematics.Thisimpressionisconfirmedbythefactthatin1926hetransferredfromphysicstomathematicsand,coincidentally,
becameamemberoftheSchlickCircle(commonlyknownastheViennaCircle).
ForashortperiodGdelwasmuchinterestedinnumbertheory,whichisexceptionally"clean"(pure)and,inageneralway,philosophicallysignificantinthatitoffersa
strongsupportingexampleforPlatonisminmathematics.Yetspecificresultsinthisareaareofnophilosophicalsignificance.Moreover,definiteadvancesinnumber
theorydependmoreheavilyontechnicalskillsthanonconceptualclarification,andbyhisownaccountGdelwasbetteratthelatter.Atanyrate,thepulltowardlogic
soonbecameverystrong,bothforitsapparentoverallphilosophicalimportanceandforitspromiseofpreciseconceptualresultsofphilosophicalsignificance.
From1926to1928GdelattendedthemeetingsoftheSchlickCircleregularly,andthegrouparousedhisinterestinthefoundationsofmathematics.Undoubtedly
thiswastheperiodwhen,inGdel'sownwords,hisinterestinprecisionledhimfrommathematicstologic.Thiswasatimewhenmathematicallogicwaswidely
believed(certainlybytheCircle)tobe(1)thekeytounderstandingthefoundationsofmathematics(2)themaintoolforphilosophicalanalysisand(3)theskeleton
andcrucialinstrumentforerectingandfortifyinganew(logical)empiricism(orpositivism).Underlying(3)wastheideathatthemaindrawbackofempiricismhadbeen
itsfailuretogiveasatisfactoryaccountofmathematicsmathematicallogicpromisedtoremedythatdefectbyshowingthatmathematicaltruthsare"analytic"or
"tautologous"or"withoutcontent,"likesuchsentencesas"therearethreefeetinayard"touseRussell'sexample.

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Gdelhimselfrejectedthisideaeventhen.Indeed,hesawtheworkinlogichewassoontoundertakeasarefutationofpoint(3)anditsunderlyingidea.Atthesame
time,hefoundpoints(1)and(2)congenial.Hence,hehadanegativereason(torefuteempiricism)aswellaspositivereasonsforstudyingmathematicallogic,evenif
hisbasicgoalwasrestrictedtothepursuitofphilosophy.AnadditionalimpetuswasprovidedwhenhebecamefamiliarwithHilbert'sprogram,whichproposedto
settlecrucialphilosophicalissuesbysolvingprecisemathematicalproblems.
GdelagreedtohavehisnameincludedinthelistofmembersoftheSchlick(orVienna)Circleinitsmanifestoof1929.Nonetheless,hewaseager,overtheyears,to
dissociatehimselffromthemaintenetsoftheCircle,ashedid,forinstance,inlettershewrotetohismotherin1946andtoBurkeD.Grandjeanin1975:
15.8.46ThearticleonSchlickarrivedandhasinterestedmeverymuch.YouneednotwonderthatIamnotconsideredinit.Iwasindeednotaspeciallyactivememberofthe
SchlickCircleandinmanyrespectsevenindirectoppositiontoitsprincipalviews(Anschauungen).
19.8.75(draft)Itistruethatmyinterestinthefoundationsofmathematicswasarousedbythe"ViennaCircle,"butthephilosophicalconsequencesofmyresults,aswellasthe
heuristicprinciplesleadingtothem,areanythingbutpositivisticorempiricistic.

ApparentlyGdelstartedtoconcentrateonmathematicallogicbytheautumnof1928,whenhealsobegantoattendRudolfCarnap'slectureson"thephilosophical
foundationsofarithmetic."In1929hebeganhisresearchforthedissertationandsoonprovedthecompletenessofpredicatelogic.Withthecompletionofthiswork,
heleftthestageofpreparationandenteredthestageofhismostproductiveworkinlogic.
ThethoroughnessofGdel'spreparationsandtheacutenessofhisyouthfulmindwereobservedandreportedbyOlgaTausskyandKarlMenger,amongothers.
AccordingtoTaussky,Gdel"waswelltrainedinallbranchesofmathematicsandyoucouldtalktohimaboutanyproblemandreceiveanexcellentresponse."
Mengerdescribedhow"healwaysgraspedproblematicpointsquicklyandhisrepliesoftenopenednewperspectivesfortheenquirer"(Menger1994:205).
2.3TheFirstoftheThreeStagesofHisWork
Gdel'spreparationsupto1928includedathoroughmasteryofagreatdealofmathematics,agoodknowledgeoftheoreticalphysics,anddevelopmentofa
philosophicalviewpointofobjectivismwhichwentwellwithhisworkintheoreticalscience.From1929to1942herevolutionizedlogicbydoingphilosophically
importantmathematics.Until1939hewas

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spectacularlysuccessful,andhewassatisfiedwithhiswork.Butbythebeginningof1943hewasfrustratedbyhisunsuccessfulattempttofurtherclarifyCantor's
continuumproblemandturnedhismaineffortstophilosophy.
From1943to1958Gdelwasengagedinseekingwaystorepeat,insuitablyselectedpartsofphilosophy,hissuccessinlogic.From1943to1946hestudiedthe
workofLeibnizand,atthesametime,tookstockofhisownworkinlogicfromaphilosophicalperspective.From1947to1950heenjoyedadigressionintothe
problemoftime,linkingphilosophytophysics.In1958,orshortlybefore,hewasabletowriteandpublishapaperontheproblemofevidenceinthecontextofhis
owninterpretationofintuitionisticarithmeticatechnicalresulthehadobtainedin1941.Yethisprincipalconcernfrom1951to1958seemstohavebeentheattempt
toapplyandextendhisworkinlogicsoastodrawdefinitephilosophicalconclusionsinfavorofhisownobjectivisticorPlatonisticposition.Hewasnotsatisfiedwith
hiseffortsandfounditdifficulttoattain"acompleteelucidation"ofhisphilosophicalbeliefsconcerningconceptualrealism.
Byabout1959hebegantolookforanewwayofdoingphilosophyand,byhisownaccount,initiatedhisstudyofHusserlin1959.Stillhewasunabletosettleon,
develop,andapplyanewmethodfarenoughtosatisfyhimself.In1972hetoldmehehadnotdevelopedhisphilosophicalviewsfarenoughtogiveasystematic
accountofthembutcouldonlyapplytheminmakingcommentsonwhatotherphilosophershadtosay.
ThethreestagesinGdel'sworkmaybeseenasaspecialcaseoftheefforttoapproachthephilosophicalidealofunderstandingthemeaningoftheworldand
everythinginit,bydoingthebestworkwithinone'spowerasacontributiontowardtheideal.TheinfluenceoftheViennaschoolputthenatureofmathematicsatthe
centerofphilosophyandsuggestedthatmathematicallogicwasthebestpathforadvancingunderstandingofthenatureofmathematics.Itwas,therefore,naturalfor
Gdeltocontractornarrowhisphilosophicalidealandtobeginhisquestbydoingworkinlogic.Laterhecontinuedthispursuitbyexpandinghisworktolarger
issues,firstwithoutalteringhismethod,and,finally,bysearchingforanewmethodofdealingdirectlywithgeneralphilosophy.
DuringhisassociationwiththeViennaCirclefrom1926to1928Gdelhadfrequentdiscussionswithsomeyoungermembersofthegroupandattendedtheseminars.
Asnotedearlier,thisassociationarousedhisinterestinthefoundationsofmathematics,andin1928hebegantoconcentratehisattentiononmathematicallogic.Inthe
autumnof1928hislibraryrequestsaremostlyforworksinlogicandhewasattendingCarnap'scourseonthefoundationsofarithmetic.

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WhenGdelbegantodoresearchin1929,hewaswellequippedwithpowerfulmathematicaltools,afruitfulguidingphilosophicalviewpoint,aclearunderstandingof
thefundamentalissuesinthefoundationsofmathematics,andacommandofnearlyalltheimportantresultsinmathematicallogicwhichwerenotmuchatallatthat
time.InMarch1928heattendedtwostimulatinglecturesbyL.E.J.Brouwer,giveninVienna.Carnap'scoursehadundoubtedlyintroducedhimtotherelevantwork
ofFregeGottlob,DavidHilbert,andBrouwer.Inshort,by1929Gdelhadaclearpictureofwhatwasknownandwhatremainedtobediscoveredatthetime,
withinthewholefieldofmathematicallogicandinthefoundationsofmathematics.
Earlyin1929,heobtainedandstudiedthenewlypublishedGrundzgedertheoretischeLogik(1928)byHilbertandW.Ackermann,inwhichthecompletenessof
predicatelogicwasformulatedandpresentedasanopenproblem.Gdelsoonsettledthisproblembyprovingthecompleteness,andwroteuptheresultashis
doctoraldissertation,whichhesubmittedon15.10.29.Thedissertation,whichhasbeenpublishedinthefirstvolumeofhisCollectedWorks(1986,hereafterCW1)
revealsnotonlyhisthoroughfamiliaritywithmuchoftheliteraturebutalsohisclearunderstandingoftherelevantphilosophicalissues,suchasthedistinctionbetween
provabilityassuchandprovabilitybycertainpreciselystatedformalmeansandhisobservationthatthereisnoneedtorestrictthemeansofproofinthiscase.
AllGdel'sfamousdefiniteresultsinmathematicallogicwereobtainedduringtheperiodfrom1929to1942.Theseinclude(1)hisproofofthecompletenessof
predicatelogic(1929)(2)hismethodofconstructing,foranyformalsystemofmathematics,anumbertheoreticalquestionundecidableinthesystem(1920)(3)his
proofthattheconsistencyofanyoftheformalsystemsforclassicalmathematicscannotbeprovedinthesamesystem(1930)(4)histranslationofclassicalarithmetic
intointuitionisticarithmetic(1932)(5)hisintroductionofadefinitionofgeneralrecursivefunctions(1934)(6)hissketchofaproofthatthelengthofaproofina
strongerlogiccanbemuchshorterthananyproofofthesametheoreminaweakerlogic(lectureof19.6.35)(7)hisintroductionofconstructiblesetsandhis
immediateapplicationofthemtoprovetheconsistencyoftheaxiomofchoice(1935)(8)hisfurtherapplicationofconstructiblesetstoprovetheconsistencyofthe
(generalized)continuumhypothesis(1938)(9)hisinterpretationofintuitionisticarithmeticintermsofaslightextensionoffinitaryarithmetic(1941)and(10)his
preliminaryproofoftheindependenceoftheaxiomofchoice(1942).
Gdelobtainedmanyoftheseresultswiththehelpofhisobjectivisticphilosophicalviewpointafactthat,inturn,supportshisviewpointbydemonstratingits
fruitfulness.In1967hewrotetometoexplainthe

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importanceofthisviewpointfordiscoveringhisproofofthecompletenessofpredicatelogic(1above)hethenadded:"Myobjectivisticconceptionofmathematics
andmetamathematicsingeneral,andoftransfinitereasoninginparticular,wasfundamentalalsotomyotherworkinlogic."Hewentontoelaboratethisassertionby
consideringthecrucialimportanceoftheviewpointtohisdiscoveryof(2),(3),(7),and(8)above.
Thecompletenesstheorem(1)maybeseenasthesuccessfulconclusionofourquestforasatisfactoryformulationofwhatGdelcalls"thelogicforthefinitemind."
Thistheoremalsosupplementstheincompletenesstheorems(2)and(3)soastodemonstrateboththepowersandthelimitationsofmechanizationandconcrete
intuition.Theimplicationsof(2),(7),and(9)provideuswithinstructiveexamplesofourcapacitytofindnewaxiomsandnewconcepts.Inparticular,theproofof(2)
givesusageneralwayofseeingnewaxioms,byexhibiting,foreachsubstantiveconsistentformalsystem,certainnewaxiomsnotprovablewithinit.Theconnections
establishedby(9)and(4)aresignificantasakindofladdertoraiseusfromthepotentialinfinite(basedmoredirectlyonourconcreteintuition)totheactualinfinite.
Observation(6)offersanearlyexampleinthestudyofthecomplexityofproofsandcomputationsanareaoflivelyinvestigationforthelastfewdecades.
WhenGdelbeganhisresearchin1929,therewereatleastthreechallengingareasconcernedwiththerelationbetweenlogicandthefoundationsofmathematics.In
thefirstplace,formalsystemsforseveralpartsofmathematicshadbecomeavailable,andHilberthadproposed,andarguedforcefullyfortheimportanceof,the
problemsofconsistency,completeness,anddecidabilityofthesesystems.In(1),(2),and(3)Gdelsettledthequestionsofcompletenessand(finitaryproofsof)
consistencyforallthesesystems.Hisproposal(5)offeredonewayofsettlingthequestionsofdecidability,whichwereshortlyafterwardsanswerednegativelyby
AlonzoChurchand,inamoreconvincingmanner,byAlanTuring.
Inthesecondplace,therewastheproblemofevidenceinmathematics,whichreceivedsharperformulationsfromHilbert'sfinitaryviewpointandBrouwer's
intuitionism.TheconnectionsdiscoveredbyGdelin(9)and(4)madeanimportantcontributiontothisproblembyrevealingexplicitlywhatisinvolvedessentiallyin
expandingfinitaryarithmetictointuitionisticarithmeticandthentoclassicalarithmetic.
Thethirdchallengingareawassettheory.In1976GdelsaidhefirstcameacrossHilbert'soutlineofaproposed"proof"ofCantor'scontinuumhypothesisin1930
andbegantothinkaboutthecontinuumproblem.HereadtheproofsheetsofHansHahn'sbookonrealfunctionsin1932andlearnedthesubject.Aroundthistime
heattendedHahn'sseminaronsettheory,aswell.

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Thecontinuumproblemis,inGdel'swords,"aquestionfromthe'multiplicationtable'ofcardinalnumbers."ThefactthatitwassointractableindicatedtoGdelthe
needtoclarifytheveryconceptofset.ThatGdelsawtheneedforsuchclarificationisalsoclearfromMenger's1981recollectionthat"in1933healreadyrepeatedly
stressedthattheright[dierichtigen]axiomsofsettheoryhadnotyetbeenfound"(Menger1994:210).
Earlyin1937myteacherWangSianjuntraveledtoVienna,intendingtostudywithGdel.WhenhevisitedGdel,Gdeltoldhimthatthesituationwitharithmetic
wasessentiallyclearasaresultofhisownworkanditsfurtherdevelopmentbyothersthenextmajorareatoclarify,hesaid,wassettheoryjetzt,Mengenlehre.
Gdelundoubtedlysawthecontinuumproblemnotonlyasintrinsicallyimportantbutalsoasacatalyticfocusandaconvincingtestinggroundforhisreflectionsonthe
conceptofset.InalettertoMengerin1937,hewrote
15.12.37IhavecontinuedmyworkonthecontinuumproblemlastsummerandIfinallysucceededinprovingtheconsistencyofthecontinuumhypothesis(eventhegeneralized
form)withrespecttogeneralsettheory.Butforthetimebeingpleasedonottellanyoneofthis.Sofar,Ihavecommunicatedthis,besidestoyourself,onlytovonNeumann,for
whomIsketchedtheproofduringhislateststayinVienna.RightnowIamtryingtoprovealsotheindependenceofthecontinuumhypothesis,butdonotyetknowwhetherI
shallsucceedwithit.

SettheorywasclearlyoneofGdel'smaininterests,andthecontinuumproblemoccupiedhimformanyyears.Itseemslikelythatfrom1935(orperhapseven1932)
to1942,itwastheprincipalconcernofhiswork.Byhisownaccount,thefrustrationscausedbyhisfailuretoapplyhismethodtoprovetheindependenceofthe
continuumhypothesisplayedamajorpartinhisdecision,inearly1943,toabandonresearchinlogic.Morethantwodecadeslater,aftertheindependenceofthe
continuumhypothesiswasprovedbyPau1J.Cohenin1963,Gdelattemptedtogobeyondcompatibilityresultsandsettlethecontinuumproblemcompletelyby
introducingplausiblenewaxioms.Hecontinuedworkonthis(unsuccessful)projectforseveralyears,probablyupto1973or1974.
From1930to1940Gdelpublishedalargenumberofpapersandshortnotes,whicharenowgenerallyavailableinhisCollectedWorks.Healsoattendedseveral
coursesandseminars.In1976hesaidhehadcontinuedhisstudyoflogicandmathematics,includingthefoundationsofgeometryandthebeautifulsubjectoffunctions
ofcomplexvariables,between1930and1933.Mengerrecalled:thathealsocontinuedhisstudyofphilosophy:
2.3.1Inaddition,Gdelstudiedmuchphilosophyinthoseyears,amongothertopicspostKantianGermanidealistmetaphysics.Onedayhecametomewitha

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bookbyHegel(unfortunatelyIforgetwhichone)andshowedmeapassagewhichappearedtocompletelyanticipategeneralrelativitytheory.ButGdelalreadythenbeganto
concentrateonLeibniz,forwhomheentertainedaboundlessadmiration.(Menger1994:209210).

Intheautumnof1927GdelattendedMenger'scourseondimensiontheory.Mengerrecalledhimasa"slim,unusuallyquietman.Idonotrecallhavingspokenwith
himthen.LaterIsawhimagainintheSchlickCirclehowever,IneverheardhimtakethefloororparticipateinadiscussionintheCircle."Afteronesessioninwhich
Schlick,Hahn,OttoNeurath,andFriedrichWaismannhadtalkedaboutlanguage,Gdelsaid,"ThemoreIthinkaboutlanguage,themoreitamazesmethatpeople
everunderstandeachotheratall."Incontrast,tohisreticenceintheCirclehewasveryactiveinMenger'smathematicalcolloquium,whichhebegantoattendon
24.10.29atMenger'sinvitation:
2.3.2FromthenonhewasaregularparticipantwhodidnotmissasinglemeetingsolongashewasinViennaandingoodhealth.Inthesegatheringsheappearedfromthe
beginningtofeelquitewellandspokeevenoutsideofthemwithparticipants,particularlyG.Nblingandafewforeignvisitors,andlateronfrequentlywithA.Wald.Hetookpart
enthusiasticallyindiversediscussions.Hisexpression(oralaswellaswritten)wasalwaysofthegreatestprecisionandatthesametimeofexceedingbrevity.Innonmathematical
conversationshewasverywithdrawn.(Ibid.:201)

ThereareindicationsthatGdelwasalsointerestedineconomics.(ImentionedearlierCarnap's1931reportthatGdelwasinterestedintheinfluenceoffinance
capitalonpolitics.)WhileGdelwasinPrincetonfrom1933to1934,GeorgeWaldobtainedresultsoncertainequationsabouteconomicproductionandreportedon
theminMenger'scolloquium.AfterhisreturntoViennainthesummerof1934,Mengerreports,hewantedtoknowthem:"Gdelwasveryinterestedinthese
investigationsandaskedWaldtobringhimuptodate,sincethefirstsessionoftheyear1934/35wastobeginwithanotherreportbyWaldonthese
equations"(Ibid.:212).
Atthesessionof6November1934,GdelsuggestedageneralizationofWald'sstudiestosystemswiththepriceofthefactorsincluded:"Actually,foreachindividual
entrepreneurthedemandalsodependsonthepricesofthefactorsofproduction.Onecanformulateanappropriatesystemofequationsandinvestigatewhetheritis
solvable."Inhisintroductorynotetothisremark,JohnDawsonreports(CW1:392)thatGdelalsodiscussedthefoundationsofeconomicswithOskarMorgenstern
inthosedaysandthatMorgenstern,shortlybeforehisdeath,namedGdelasoneofthecolleagueswhohadmostinfluencedhiswork.

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2.4TheTwoLaterStages
From1943to1958,Gdelwaschieflyconcernedwithdevelopingaphilosophyofmathematics,bothasaprolegomenontometaphysicsandasarelativelyprecise
partofgeneralphilosophy.Inparticular,hedrewconsequencesfromhismathematicalresultsofthepreviousperiod.Intheprocessoftryingtofindaselfcontained
definitiveaccountofthenatureofmathematics,heconcludedthat(a)thetaskrequiresanunderstandingofknowledgeingeneral,and(b)philosophyrequiresa
methoddifferentfromthatofscience.
GdelalsostudiedLeibnizintensivelyfrom1943to1946andmade,inhisownwords,"adigression"(probablyfrom1947to1950)ontheproblemoftime.Hefound
agroupofnovelsolutionsofEinstein'sfieldequationsandusedthemtosupporttheKantianthesisthattimeandchangearepurelysubjective,orinsomesense
"illusions."HepublishedthreearticlesonKantandEinsteininconnectionwiththisdigression.Amongtheunpublishedmaterialtherearealsoseveralversionsofalong
philosophicalessayentitled"SomeObservationsabouttheRelationshipbetweenTheoryofRelativityandKantianPhilosophy."
Gdel'smainconcernfrom1943to1958wasthenatureofmathematicsanditsrelationtodefiniteresults,ontheonehand,andphilosophicalissues,ontheother.
Overthisperiodhewrotefivearticlesonthissubject,ofwhichthreewerepublished:theRussellpaper(1944),Cantorpaper(1947),andBernayspaper(1958).
Theseessaysonthewholeadherecloselytothegoalofdemonstratingadirectinterplaybetweenhisphilosophicalperspectiveanddefinitemathematicalresultsand
problems.Theymaybesaidtobeapplications,ratherthandirectexpositions,ofhisphilosophicalperspective,whichiseithershowninthemimplicitlyorsuggested
onlybrieflyandtentatively.Incontrast,thetwoessayshedidnotpublishweredevotedtoprovinghisphilosophicalpositionofPlatonismorconceptualrealism.These
arehislivelyGibbslecture(writtenanddeliveredin1951)andthesixlaboriousversionsofhisCarnappaperwhichhepreparedbetween1953andabout1958.In
replytomyquestionabouthis"philosophicalleanings,"Gdelwrotein1975:"Iwas[havebeen]aconceptualandmathematicalrealistsinceabout1925.Ineverheld
theviewthatmathematicsissyntaxoflanguage.Ratherthisview,understoodinanyreasonablesense,canbedisprovedbymyresults."
TheGibbslecture,whichwasapreliminaryattempttoprovePlatonisminmathematics,concludedwithanexplicitformulationofthatpositionandanexpressionof
faith:
2.4.1Iamundertheimpressionthataftersufficientclarificationoftheconclusioninquestionitwillbepossibletoconductthesediscussionswithmathematicalrigorandtheresult
willbethat(undercertainassumptionswhichcanhardlybedeniedinparticulartheassumptionthatthereexistsatallsomethinglikemathematical

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knowledge)thePlatonisticviewistheonlyonetenable.TherebyImeantheviewthatmathematicsdescribesanonsensualreality,whichexistsindependentlybothoftheacts
andthedispositionsofthehumanmindandisonlyperceived,andprobablyperceivedveryincompletely,bythehumanmind.(CW3:323)

AnilluminatingaspectoftheGibbslectureisthesystematicapproachtoaproofofPlatonism(inmathematics)envisagedbyGdelin1951.Hesawthetaskasthatof
disprovingeachofthreetheoriesalternativetoPlatonismandshowingthattheyexhaustallthepossibilities.Thesethreealternativeviewsarewhathecalled:(1)the
creationview,(2)psychologism,and(3)Aristotelianrealism.Whathecalled''nominalism"hesawasanextremeformof(1).ThemajorpartoftheGibbslecturewas
devotedtoadisproofofthisspecialcaseofoneofthethreealternativestoPlatonism:"ThemostIcouldassertwouldbetohavedisprovedthenominalisticview,
whichconsidersmathematicstoconsistsolelyinsyntacticalconventionsandtheirconsequences"(CW3:322).
AsfarasIknow,GdelnevermadeanyseriousefforttorevisetheGibbslectureforpublicationortopursuethesystematicprogramofrefutingallthreealternatives
toPlatonism.HedidnotincludetheGibbslectureinhislistofmajorunpublishedarticles,eventhoughhetoldmeonceortwiceinthe1970sthat"itproved
Platonism."Instead,inhisnextproject,oneofthemostextendedinhiswork,heconcentratedonrefutingmorethoroughlytheextremepositionof"nominalism",that
is,thesyntacticalconceptionofmathematics.
On15May1953P.A.SchilppinvitedGdeltocontributeapaper,tobeentitled"CarnapandtheOntologyofMathematics"toaprojectedvolumeinwhichvarious
philosopherswoulddiscussCarnap'swork(withCarnaphimself).Themanuscriptsweretobedueon2April1954.Gdelrepliedon2July1953,agreeingtowritea
shortpaperon"SomeObservationsontheNominalisticViewoftheNatureofMathematics."ForthenextfiveyearsorsoGdelspentagreatdealoftimeand
energyonthispaper,writingsixdifferentversionsofitundertherevisedtitle"Ismathematicssyntaxoflanguage?"Finally,on2February1959,hewrotetoSchilppto
saythathewasnotgoingtosubmithispaperafterall.
TheCarnappaperisofspecialinterestfortheinsightsitgivesintobothGdel'sworkandhislife.ItwasundoubtedlyhismostsustainedefforttodefendPlatonismin
writing,anditillustrateshistendencytoconcentrateonaspecialcaseandthengeneralizewithoutinhibition.IhaveoftenbeenstruckbyGdel'sreadinesstoinfer
PlatonismingeneralfromPlatonisminmathematics,apparentlyseeingnoneedforofferingadditionalreasonsthishedoesintheCarnappaper.Notablyinthefifth
andsixthversions,herefutesthesyntacticalviewofmathematicsbyarguingthat(1)mathematicalintuitioncannotbereplacedbyconventionsabouttheuseofsymbols
andtheirapplications(2)mathematicalpropositionsarenotdevoidofcontentand(3)thevalidityofmathematicsisnot

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compatiblewithstrictempiricism.Thus,byrefutinganextremepositionopposedtoPlatonisminmathematicshewasatthesametimeshowingtheplausibilityofhis
ownposition.
ThevariousmanuscriptsoftheCarnappaperalsoillustratethethoroughnessofGdel'sworkinghabits,hispreferenceforbrevity,andhisappreciationofthevalueof
seriousviewsalternativetohisown.Theearlierversionsincludemanyreferencesandfootnotes,whereasthelasttwoversionsaremuchshorterandincludeno
footnotes.Byappreciatingthevalueofanalternativeview,wecanbetterunderstanditsappealand,atthesametime,seethatitservesausefulpurposeeventhoughit
isnottrue.ThefinaltwosectionsofthesecondversionoftheCarnappaperaregoodexamplesofGdel'sattentiontothispoint.
48.Idonotwanttoconcludethispaperwithoutmentioningtheparadoxicalfactthat,althoughanykindofnominalismorconventionalisminmathematicsturnsouttobe
fundamentallywrong,neverthelessthesyntacticalconceptionperhapshascontributedmoretotheclarificationofthissituationthananyotherofthephilosophicalviews
proposed:ontheonehandbythenegativeresultstowhichtheattemptstocarryitthroughlead,ontheotherhandbytheemphasisitputsonadifferenceoffundamental
importance,namelythedifferencebetweenconceptualandempiricaltruth,uponwhichitreflectsabrightlightbyidentifyingitwiththedifferencebetweenempiricaland
conventionaltruth.
49.Ibelievethatthetruemeaningoftheoppositionbetweenthingsandconceptsorbetweenfactualandconceptualtruthisnotyetcompletelyunderstoodincontemporary
philosophy,butsomuchatleastisclear:thatinbothcasesoneisfacedwith"solidfacts,"whichareentirelyoutsidethereachofourarbitrarydecisions.

InmyopinionthenegativeresultsGdelhadinmindincludehisownresultsonthemechanicalinexhaustibilityofmathematicsandontheimpossibilityofproving
consistencybyfinitarymeans,whichshowalsotheinadequacyoftheconventionalistviewofmathematics,sincetheconsistencyoftheconventionsgoesbeyondthe
conventionsthemselves.InthissensetheHilbertprogram,byleadingtothesenegativeresults,maybeviewedasacontribution,indeedamajorone,ofthesyntactical
conceptiontotheclarificationofthesituation.Fromthisperspective,itissurprisingthatCarnapcontinuedtoadheretothesyntacticalconceptionevenafterGdel's
negativeresultshadbeenobtainedandwereknowntohim.
Hilbert'scontribution,ontheotherhand,liesnotinhissuggestionofthesyntacticalconceptionbutinhisformulationofpreciseproblemsasawaytotestit,even
thoughhehimselfexpectedittobeconfirmedratherthanrefuted.Thesyntacticalconceptionisatypicalexampleofwhatiscommonlycalledreductionism.Other
examplesincludethephysicalandthecomputationalconceptionsofmentalphenomena.Thesereductionistviewsaresimilarlyusefulatleastpotentiallyinhelping
ustoclarifythesituationwithrespecttoourthoughtprocesses,thatis,tounderstand

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whatalternativeviewsofmindareavailabletousatpresentandwhattheissuesarethatdividethem.Itseemstome,however,thatnoonehassofarsucceededin
formulatingfruitfulproblemstotestthesealternativeconceptionsofthemindproblemsthatareaspreciseandasclosetoresolutionasHilbert'sproblemswerewhen
heproposedthem.
WhenGdelworkedontheCarnappaperinthe1950s,theinadequacyofthesyntacticalconceptionhadbeenrecognizednotonlybyhimbutalsobyothers,among
themLudwigWittgensteinandPaulBernays.Itisthereforesomewhatsurprisingthathechosetospendsomuchefforttryingtorefuteit.Onereasonseemstohave
hadtodowithhispersonalhistory,specificallyhisyouthfulassociationwiththeViennaCircleand,inparticular,withhisteachersHahn,Schlick,andCarnap,who
wereallproponentsofthesyntacticalconceptioninoneformoranother.EvenafterthepublicationofGdel'sdecisiveresultsin1931,theconceptionremained
popularandinfluentialamongphilosophersformanyyears.Hemusthavebeenmuchstruckandbotheredbythestrangephenomenonofphilosopherswhoputlogic
andmathematicsatthecenteroftheirphilosophy,upholdanerroneousconceptionofmathematicsbasedonaninadequateunderstandingofthenatureofthesubject,
andyetcontinuetoexertagreatdealofinfluence.Anditwassurelynaturalforhimtowishtosettleonceandforallafundamentaldisagreementwithhisteachers
whichhadlastedoverthreedecades.
AnotherreasonwasprobablyGdel'sinitialbeliefthat,byconclusivelyrefutingthesyntacticalconception,anextremeoppositeofhisownPlatonisminmathematics,
hewouldbestrengtheninghisownposition,andthewholesituationwouldbeclarified.By1959heseemstohaveconcludedthatthisexpectationhadnotbeenand
wouldnotbefulfilled.In1971hetoldmeheregrettedgettinginvolvedintheprojectandhadfinallydecidednottopublishthepaper,because,eventhoughhehad
provedthatmathematicsisnotsyntaxoflanguage,hehadnotmadeclearwhatmathematicsis.
ThesustainedstrugglewiththeprojectofhisCarnappaperseemstohaveladGdeltotheconclusionthatphilosophywasharderandmoredifferentfromscience
thanhehadexpectedandthathisapproachtophilosophyuntilthenhadnotbeenontherighttrack.HisFebruary1959lettertoSchilppexplainingthathehaddecided
nottosubmithispaper,gavethreereasons:(1)hewasstillnotsatisfiedwiththeresult(2)hismanuscriptwasquitecriticalofCarnap'spositionand(3)sinceitwas
toolateforCarnaptoreply,hefeltitwouldbeunfairtopublishit.Schilpptriedtopersuadehimtochangehismindbuthadnosuccess.Amongotherthings,Gdel
saidinthisletter:
2.2.59Itiseasytoallegeveryweightyandstrikingargumentsinfavorofmyviews,butacompleteelucidationofthesituationturnedouttobemoredifficult

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thanIhadanticipated,doubtlessinconsequenceofthefactthatthesubjectmatteriscloselyrelatedto,andinpartidenticalwith,oneofthebasicproblemsofphilosophy,namely
thequestionoftheobjectiverealityofconceptsandtheirrelations.

In1972GdeltoldmehehadbeguntostudyHusserl'sworkin1959.Itseemslikelythathesawinitthepromiseof"acompleteelucidationofthesituation"that
wouldsettle"thequestionoftheobjectiverealityofconceptsandtheirrelations."ThatquestionisthequestionofPlatonism,orconceptualrealism:Howdowe
determinethesenseinwhichconceptsandtheirrelationsareobjectivelyrealandfindconvincingreasonsforbelievingthatthepropositionsointerpretedistrue?
Overthelastperiodofhisactivelife,from1959to1976,Gdelseemstohavedevotedhiseffortspartlytotidyinguphispreviousworkandpartlytosketchinghis
broaderphilosophicalviews.Inthefirsteffort,heexpandedandcommentedonseveralofhispreviouslypublishedarticle.Healsotried,unsuccessfully,tofind
reasonablenewaxiomstosettlethecontinuumhypothesis.Inthesecondeffort,heseemstohaveattempted,againunsuccessfully,toarticulatehisownphilosophical
viewsintoa"theory."Yet,becauseoftheinaccessibilityofmuchofhislaterwork,ourknowledgeofhisthoughtsandwritingsoverthisperiodislimitedtothefew
piecesnotedinthefollowingparagraphs.
Thereisabundleofundatedloosesheets,possiblyfromaround1960,whichincludesastatementofa"philosophicalviewpoint"andwhichconsistsoffourteenstrong
theses.(IreproducethislistanddiscussitinChapter9.)Around1962hewroteabriefessayontheclassification,thepast,andthefutureofphilosophy,withspecial
emphasisonitsrelationtomathematics.ThisessaygivessomeindicationofwhathehopedtoseedevelopedfromsomethinglikeHusserl'sapproach.Itiscontainedin
anenvelopefromtheAmericanPhilosophicalSociety,towhichhewaselectedin1961.Probablytheessay(whichIdiscussinChapter5)wasthedraftofalecture
intendedforthesociety.
In1963,Gdelcompleted"asupplementtothesecondedition"(1947)ofhisCantorpaper,whichwaspublishedin1946,togetherwitharevisedversionofthe
originalpaper.ThissupplementoffersamoreextendedandcategoricalexpositionofhisPlatonismthanisfoundinhispreviouslypublishedwritings,andcontainsbrief
butdecisiveobservationsonmathematicalintuition,creation,andhisagreementsanddisagreementswithKant.Thesefewpageshavebeenmuchdiscussedinthe
literatureandareconsideredinsomedetailinChapter7.AhistoricalquestionistheirrelationtoGdel'sstudyofHusserl,eventhoughtheymakenoexplicitreference
toHusserl.Ithasbeenreported,however,thatinthe1960sGdelrecommendedtoseverallogiciansHusserl'streatmentof"categorialintuition"inthelastpartofhis
LogicalInvestigations.Inourdiscussions

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inthe1970shesuggestedtomethatIdeasandCartesianMeditationsarethebestofHusserl'sbooks.
In1967and1968Gdelwrotetwoletterstomeexplainingtherelationbetweenhisobjectivisticviewpointandhismajormathematicalresultsinlogic.Aroundthis
timehealsoaddedanumberofphilosophicalnotestotheBernayspaperof1958.Inbothcaseshewasexpoundinghisphilosophicalviewpointprimarilyinthe
contextofdefiniteresultsandproblemsofascientificcharacter.
FromOctoberof1971toDecemberof1972andfromOctoberof1975toMarchof1976,Gdelfreelyexpressedmanyofhisphilosophicalideasduringextended
discussionswithme.Earlyin1972hedecidedtoeditandexpandmynotesonwhatheconsideredtobetheimportantpartsofwhathehadtoldme.ByJuneof1972
hewassatisfiedwithacondensedformulationofthismaterialinseveralfragments,andheauthorizedtheirinclusionforpublicationinmybookFromMathematicsto
Philosophy(1974a,hereafterMP),whichappearedinJanuaryof1974.
From1975to1976GdelandIalsoexperimentedwiththeideaofwritingupforpublicationsomeofhisdiscussionswithme,butnothingmuchcameoftheideaat
thetime,exceptforoneortwoobservationsinmyarticle"LargeSets"(completedin1975andpublishedin1977)andinthebiographicalarticle"SomeFactsabout
KurtGdel"(1981b).
TherecordsofGdel'sextensiveconversationswithmeincludeinformalformulationsofmanyfacetsofhisphilosophicalposition,whichare,unfortunately,hardto
reproduceorparaphraseororganizeorevaluate.Thepurposeofmuchofthisbookis,asIsaidintheIntroduction,toreportandevaluatewhathesaidtomewithin
anappropriateorganizationalframework.
2.5SomeFactsaboutGdelinHisOwnWords
Beforehisretirementintheautumnof1976,GdelarrangedformetovisittheInstituteforAdvancedStudy,andfromJulyof1975toAugustof1976Iwasgivena
houseonEinsteinDrive.Duringmystayhealmostneverwenttohisoffice,andwemetthereonlyonce,bypreviousagreement,on9December1975.Wehad,
however,frequentandextendedconversationsbytelephone.BetweenOctoberof1975andMarchof1976,wediscussedmostlytheoreticalmatters.Aroundtheend
ofMarchhewasbrieflyhospitalized,andthereafterheavoidedtopicsthatrequiredconcentration.
On28May1976hementionedasmallconferenceheldatKnigsbergintheautumnof1929.Thisgavemetheideaofaskinghimabouthisintellectualdevelopment,
andIpreparedalistofquestionsforhimonIJune.HeagreedtoanswerthemandsuggestedIcouldwriteuphis

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responsesandkeeparecordforpublicationafterhisdeath.Theresultwastheaforementioned"SomeFactsaboutKurtGdel"atitlehesuggested.Hereadand
approvedthetext,whichwasfirstpublishedintheJournalofSymbolicLogic(1981b)itisreproducedinmyReflectionsonKurtGdel(1987a),hereafter
RG:4146.
Recentlyitoccurredtomethatapresentationofthebasisofthepublishedtextthatis,ofwhathetoldmeinmoreorlesshisownwordsmaybeofinterestasan
informativecomplementthatretainsmuchofthesubtlepersonalflavorofhisownaccount.Forthisreason,Ireproduceintherestofthissection,asfarasfeasible,his
ownaccountofhismentaldevelopment,rearrangedaccordingtothechronologyoftheevents,togetherwithsomeofmyownexplanatorycommentsandreferences
(enclosedinsquarebrackets).
Igraduatedfromhighschoolin1924,studiedphysicsfrom1924to1926,andmathematicsfrom1926to1929.IattendedphilosophicallecturesbyHeinrichGomperzwhosefather
[Theodore]wasfamousinGreekphilosophy.IbecameamemberoftheSchlickKreisin1926,throughHansHahn.Mydissertationwasfinishedandapprovedinautumn1929,and
Ireceivedmydoctor'sdegreein1930.
WhenIenteredthefieldoflogic,therewere50percentphilosophyand50percentmathematics.Therearenow99percentmathematicsandonly1percentphilosophyeventhe1
percentisbadphilosophy.Idoubtwhetherthereisreallyanyclearphilosophyinthemodelsformodallogic.
ShortlyafterIhadreadHilbertAckermann,Ifoundtheproof[ofthecompletenessofpredicatelogic].AtthattimeIwasnotfamiliarwithSkolem's1922paper[thepaperreprinted
inSkolem1970:137152therelevantpartisremark3,pp.139142].IdidnotknowKnig'slemmaeitherbythesamemanwhohadtheresultonthepowerofthecontinuum.[For
somedetailsrelevanttotheseobservations,compareRG:270271.]
Insummer1930Ibegantostudytheconsistencyproblemofclassicalanalysis.ItismysteriouswhyHilbertwantedtoprovedirectlytheconsistencyofanalysisbyfinitary
methods.Isawtwodistinguishableproblems:toprovetheconsistencyofnumbertheorybyfinitarynumbertheoryandtoprovetheconsistencyofanalysisbynumbertheory.
Bydividingthedifficulties,eachpartcanbeovercomemoreeasily.Sincethedomainoffinitarynumbertheorywasnotwelldefined,Ibeganbytacklingthesecondhalf:toprove
theconsistencyofanalysisrelativetofullnumbertheory.Itiseasiertoprovetherelativeconsistencyofanalysis.Thenoneonlyhastoprovebyfinitarymethodsthe
consistencyofnumbertheory.Butfortheformeronehastoassumenumbertheorytobetrue(notjusttheconsistencyofaformalsystemforit).
Irepresentedrealnumbersbypredicatesinnumbertheory[whichexpresspropertiesofnaturalnumbers]andfoundthatIhadtousetheconceptoftruth[fornumbertheory]to
verifytheaxiomsofanalysis.Byanenumerationofsymbols,sentences,andproofsofthegivensystem,Iquicklydiscoveredthattheconceptofarithmetictruthcannotbe
definedinarithmetic.Ifitwerepossibletodefinetruthinthesystemitself,wewouldhavesomethingliketheliarparadox,showingthe

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systemtobeinconsistent.[CompareGdel'sletterof12.10.31toErnstZermelo,inwhichtheeasyproofofthisisgiven,inRG:9091.]Thisaspectofthesituationisexplicitly
discussedinmyPrincetonlecturesof1934,wheretheliarparadoxismentionedasaheuristicprinciple,aftertheproofoftheincompletenessresultshasbeengiven.Theliar
paradoxitselfreferstoanempiricalsituationwhichisnotformalizableinmathematics.Inmyoriginalpaper[publishedin1931]thereis[inaddition]anallusiontoRichard's
paradox,whichispurelylinguisticandreferstonoempiricalfact.
Notethatthisargument[abouttruthnotbeingdefinableinthesystemitself]canbeformalizedtoshowtheexistenceofundecidablepropositionswithoutgivinganyindividual
instances.[Iftherewerenoundecidablepropositions,all(andonly)truepropositionswouldbeprovableinthesystem.Butthenwewouldhaveacontradiction.]Incontrastto
truth,provabilityinagivenformalsystemisanexplicitcombinatorialpropertyofcertainsentencesofthesystem,whichisformallyspecifiablebysuitableelementarymeans.In
summer1930Ireachedtheconclusionthatinanyreasonableformalsysteminwhichprovabilityinitcanbeexpressedasapropertyofcertainsentences,theremustbe
propositionswhichareundecidableinit.[Thispreliminaryresultwas,accordingtoCarnap'sdiary,announcedtoCarnap,Feigl,andWaismannatCafeReichsraton26.8.30.Fora
moreformalexplicationofthelastthreeparagraphscompareWang1981b:2123.]
ItwastheantiPlatonicprejudicewhichpreventedpeoplefromgettingmyresults.Thisfactisaclearproofthattheprejudiceisamistake.
ItookpartinalittleconferenceatKnigsberginautumn1930.Carnapand[John]vonNeumannwerethere.Themeetinghadno"discussion."Ijustmadearemarkandmentioned
my[incompleteness]result.[ThemeetingwasthesecondTagungfrErkenntnislehrederexaktenWissenschaften,atwhichGdelpresentedhisproofofthecompletenessof
predicatelogic,obtainedin1929,on6September,andmentionedincidentallyhisnewresultduringthediscussionsessionthenextday.]
Atthattime,Ihadonlyanincompletenesstheoremforcombinatorialquestions(notfornumbertheory),intheformasdescribedlaterintheintroductionofmy[famous]paper.
[SeeCW1:147,149,wherethemainideaoftheproofissketchedintermsofintegers(fortheprimitivesigns),sequencesofintegers(forsentences),andsequencesofthese(for
proofs).]Ididnotyethavethesurprisingresultgivingundecidablepropositionsaboutpolynomials[byusingtheChineseremaindertheorem].
Ihadjustanundecidablecombinatorialproposition.Ionlyrepresentedprimitivesymbolsbyintegersandproofsbysequencesofsequencesofintegers.Theundecidable
propositioncanbegiveninfragmentsoftypetheory(andofcourseinstrongersystems),thoughnotdirectlyinnumbertheory.
IhadaprivatetalkwithvonNeumann,whocalleditamostinterestingresultandwasenthusiastic.TovonNeumann'squestionwhetherthepropositioncouldbeexpressedin
numbertheoryIreplied:ofcoursetheycanbemappedintointegersbuttherewouldbenewrelations[differentfromthefamiliaronesinnumbertheory].Hebelievedthatitcould
betransformedintoapropositionaboutintegers.Thissuggestedasimplification,buthecontributednothingtotheproof

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becausetheideathatitcanbetransformedintointegersistrivial.Ishould,however,havementionedthesuggestionotherwisetoomuchcreditwouldhavegoneintoit.Iftoday,
Iwouldhavementionedit.Theresultthatthepropositioncanbetransformedintooneaboutpolynomialswasveryunexpectedanddoneentirelybymyself.Thisisrelatedtomy
earlyinterestinnumbertheory,stimulatedbyFurtwngler'slectures.
Onthematterofanundecidablenumbertheoreticproblem,vonNeumanndidn'texpecttobequoted.Itwastogetinformationratherthantostimulatediscussion:vonNeumann
meantsobutIdidn'texpectso.HeexpectedthatIhadthoughtouteverythingverythoroughly.[Stanislaw]UlamreportedthatvonNeumannwasupsetthathedidn'tgetthe
result.ItissurprisingthatHilbertdidn'tgetit,maybebecausehelookedforabsoluteconsistency.
Ulamwroteabook[AdventuresofaMathematician,1976]andIwasmentionedinitatseveralplaces.UlamsaysthatperhapsIwasneversurewhetherIhadmerelydetected
anotherparadoxlikeBuraliForti's.Thisisabsolutelyfalse.Ulamdoesn'tunderstandmyresult,whichisprovedbyusingonlyfinitaryarithmetic.Asamatteroffactitismuch
more.[Itakethissentencetomeanthattheproofisnotonlyprecisebutperfectlyclear.]HowcanWittgensteinconsiderit[Gdel'sresult]asaparadoxifhehadunderstoodit?
ShortlyaftertheKnigsbergmeeting,Idiscoveredtheimprovedundecidablepropositionandthesecondtheorem[aboutconsistencyproofs].ThenIreceivedaletterfromvon
Neumannnothingindependentlytheindemonstrabilityofconsistencyasaconsequenceofmyfirsttheorem.HilbertandvonNeumannhadpreviouslyconjecturedthe
decidabilityofnumbertheory.Towritedowntheresultstookalongtime.[Thisundoubtedlyreferstohisfamouspaper.The"longtime"certainlyincludedtheperiodbetween7
September(whentheinitialresultwasannounced)and17November1930(whenthepaperwasreceivedforpublication).Itisalsopossiblethathehadspentalongtimewritingan
earlyversionbeforetheSeptembermeeting.]
Theproofofthe(first)incompletenesstheoreminmyoriginalpaperisawkwardbecauseIwantedtomakeitcompletelyformalized.Thebasicideaisgivenmoreclearlyinmy
Princetonlectures[of1934].
IwroteHerbrandtwoletters,thesecondofwhichhedidnotreceive.Hehadagoodbriefpresentationofmytheorems.
IvisitedGttingenin1932andtalkedaboutmywork.[C.]Siegaland[Emmy]Noethertalkedwithmeafterwards.Isaw[Gerhard]Gentzenonlyonce.Ihadapublicdiscussionwith
Zermeloin1931[atthemathematicalmeetingon15SeptemberatBadElster].IhadmorecontactwithChurchandKleenethanwithRosserinPrinceton.
In193033IhadnopositionintheUniversityofVienna.IcontinuedmystudiesofPrincipiaMathematicaandofpuremathematics,includingthefoundationsofgeometryand
functionsofcomplexvariables(abeautifultheory).Hahnwrotehisbook[onrealfunctions]Ireadtheproofsheetsandgotacquaintedwiththefield[probablyin1932].Itisan
interestingbook.IwasactiveinMenger'scolloquiumandHahn'sseminaronsettheory.IalsotookpartintheViennaAcademy.
Also,Iwasthinkingaboutthecontinuumproblem.IheardaboutHilbert'spaper["OntheInfinite,"1925]about1930.Oneshouldnotbuildupthehierarchyinthe

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constructivewayitisnotnecessarytodosoforaproofof[relative]consistency.Theramifiedhierarchycametomymind.Onedoesn'thavetoconstructordinals.Hereagainthe
antiPlatonisticviewwashamperingmathematics.Hilbertdidn'tbelievethatthecontinuumhypothesis(CH)couldbedecidedin[thefamiliarsystem]ZFforexample,headded
definitions.Inaddition,Hilbertgave[claimedtogive]aconsistencyproofofsettheory.
WhenIcamebacktoViennafromAmericain1934,Ibecameillwithaninfectionofmybadteeth.Icontinuedmyworkonsettheoryfromsummer1934to1935.(Hahndiedin1934).
AtfirstIdidnothaveCH,onlytheaxiomofchoice.Itmusthavebeenin1935.Iwassickin1936(veryweak).In1937IstudiedconsequencesofCH.Ifoundtheconsistencyproof
ofCHinsummer1938.[Sometimesthedatehasbeengivenassummer1937possiblyGdelwasnotsatisfiedwithhisearlierproof.]In194043IwasintheU.S.andmyhealthwas
relativelygood.Iworkedmostlyinlogic.Ididn'taccomplishwhatIwasafter.IwasdisturbedbyreviewsinVienna.[Ihavenoideawhatthissentencemightbereferringto.]
Iwasillin1936andhadotherthingstodoin1937.IobtainedtheconsistencyproofoftheCHinspring1938andextendedittothegeneralizedGCHshortlyafterwards.Icameto
Americaintheautumnandgavelectures[onmyresults].
Theconjecture,ratherthantheproof,oftheconsistencyofCH[byusingtheconstructiblesets]wasthemaincontribution.Nobodyelsewouldhavecomeuponsuchaproof
[suchanapproach].

TheobservationsintheprecedingfourparagraphsweremadebyGdelonseveraldifferentoccasions.Theysuggestthathehadprobablyalreadybeguntothink
aboutCHaround1931or1932,andthathisconsistencyproofmaybeseenasamodificationofHibert'sapproachalongthreedirections:(1)nottoproveCH
outrightbuttoproveonlyitsconsistency,(2)touse"firstorderdefinable"propertiesratherthanjustrecursivefunctions,and,mostremarkably,(3)toassumeall
ordinalnumbersasgivenratherthantrytoconstructthemfromthebottom.Theideaof(3)dependsstronglyonGdel'sPlatonisticconceptionofmathematics.Igive
amoreformalexplicationoftheseideasinWang1981b:128132.
MyoriginalproofoftheconsistencyofCHisthesimplest,butIhaveneverpublishedit.Itusesasubmodeloftheconstructiblesets,countableinthelowestcase.This
constructionisabsolute.Iswitchedtothealternativeinmy1939paper[reprintedinCW2:2832]toassureabsolutenessmoredirectly.Theinvolvedpresentationinmy1940
monographwastoassuremetamathematicalexplicitness.[ReprintedinCW2:33101,thiswasGdel'slongestsinglepublishedwork.]

TheobservationssofarprincipallyconcernGdel'sworkfrom1929to1939:thecompletenessofpredicatelogic,theincompletenesstheorems,andtheconstructible
setswiththeirapplications.InApril1977,hestressedthat
Ihavediscussedextensivelytheconceptualframeworkofmymajorcontributionsinlogicinthelettersandpersonalcommunicationspublishedinyourbook[MP:713].Mywork
istechnicallynothard.Onecanseewhymyproofswork.

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IwasattheInstitute[forAdvancedStudy]in[theacademicyear]1933to1934,for[partof]thefirsttermof1935,andappointedannuallyfrom1938to1946.Ibecameapermanent
memberin1946.
In1940orsoIobtainedametamathematicalconsistencyproofoftheaxiomofchoice.Itismoregeneralthantheproofusingconstructiblesets.Itusesfiniteapproximations.Only
theinitialsegmentisknown.Askwhether,say,2willoccur:yesorno.Everypropositionistransformedintoweakerpropositions.Ishouldthinkitwouldgothroughinsystems
withstrongaxiomsofinfinitywhichgivenonconstructiblesets.Certainlargecardinalaxiomswouldbeweakerintheabsenceoftheaxiomofchoice.[Gdelmentionedthisproof
onseveraloccasions.Iurgedhimtowriteitup.Heprobablylookeduphisnotesasaresultofmysuggestion,becauseinMay1977hetoldme:]Myunpublishednewproofofthe
consistencyoftheaxiomofchoiceisnotclearandthenotesareconfused.
IobtainedmyinterpretationofintuitionisticarithmeticandlecturedonitatPrincetonandYalein1942orso[shouldbe1941].[Emil]ArtinwaspresentattheYalelecture.Nobody
wasinterested.Theconsistencyproofof[classical]arithmeticthroughthisinterpretationismoreevidentthanGentzen's.[Theinterpretationwaseventuallypublishedinthe
Bernays(orDialectica)paperin1958.TheYalelectureon15.4.41,wasentitled"Inwhatsenseistheintuitionisticlogicconstructive?"Gdelalsogaveacourseoflectureson
intuitionism,includingthisinterpretation,atPrincetoninthespringof1941.]

InthelatefortiesareporthadalreadybeguntocirculateamonglogiciansthatGdelhadaproofoftheindependenceoftheaxiomofchoiceinfinitetypetheory.After
PaulJ.Cohenhadusedhismethodof"forcing,"in1963,toprovetheindependenceoftheaxiomofchoiceandCHfromtheaxiomsofZFGdelconvincedhimself
thathisownmethodcouldalsobeappliedtogettheseindependenceresults.Hemadeanumberofobservationsonthismatterinhisconversationswithme.
Accordingtohisnotebooks,heobtainedthecrucialstepinhisproofinthesummerof1942,whenhewasvacationingatBlueHillHouseinHancockCounty,Maine.
ForthenexthalfyearorsoheworkedintensivelyontryingtousehismethodtoprovetheindependenceofCHaswell,buthadnosuccess.Heseemstohave
droppedtheprojectintheearlypartof1943.
In1942Ialreadyhadtheindependenceoftheaxiomofchoice.SomepassageinBrouwer'swork,Idon'trememberwhich,wastheinitialstimulus.Independentsetsofintegersare
used.Manyirregularthingsareintroduced.Thereisnochoicesetasrequiredbytheaxiom,becausethingsareirregular.Detailsoftheproofareverydifferentfromthoseinthe
proofthatusesforcing.TheyhavemoresimilaritywithBooleanmodelsthanintensionalmodelsinwhichthesamesetmightberepresentedbydifferentproperties.[Iamnotsure
thatIhavecorrectlyreconstructedthissentencefrommyconfusingnotes.]Iworkedonlywithfinitetypetheory.Theindependenceoftheaxiomofconstructibilityiseasierto
prove.IfitwereprovableinZFC,itwouldalsobeprovableinZF.
Exactlythesamemethod,whichwouldn'tbemathematicallysoelegant,cangivetheindependenceofCH.ItissurprisingthatifCHisindependentofZF,then

Page87
itiseasytoproveitsindependencefromZFC.Forthespecialmethodofproof,anegativeformulationworks:thereexistsnosequenceofalephtwoincreasingfunctions.Itshould
beeasiertoprovethestronger[positive]formulation[ofCH],butitisnotso.
InsubstancemyownindependenceproofsuseBooleanmodels.ItisasurprisingfactthattheaxiomofchoiceholdsintheBooleanmodels.Onewouldhaveexpectedthe
opposite.Wedon'ttakecareoftheaxiomofchoice:itismagicthatitworksforBooleanmodels.Thetopologyisjustthesimplestthatonehas.Myproofsusetopologicallogic.
Theproblemwastofindtherighttopology.Ihavetodesignitspecially.[ThisparagraphappearstobeconcernedwithaproofoftheindependenceofCHbyusingGdel'sown
methods.]
Myproofiseasytosee.Itshowsthewayonearrivesatit.ThisislikemyresultsonundecidablepropositionsandontheconsistencyofCH.Oneseestheideabehindit.
Cohen'smodelsarerelatedtointuitionisticlogicanddoublenegation.
ItriedtousemymethodtoprovetheindependenceofCH[in1942to1943]butcouldnotdoit.Themethodlookedpromising.Ialwayshadnoelegantformulationatthe
beginning.AtthetimeIdevelopedadistasteforthewholething:Icoulddoeverythingintwentydifferentways,anditwasn'tvisiblewhichwasbetter.Moreover,Iwasthenmore
interestedinphilosophy,moreinterestedintherelationofKant'sphilosophytorelativitytheoryandintheuniversalcharacteristicofLeibniz.
Iamsorrynow.IfIhadpersisted,theindependenceofCHwouldhavebeenprovedby1950andthatwouldhavespeededupthedevelopmentofsettheorybymanyyears.
Thereshouldbeanewmodeltheorythatdealswithintensionality.Theshapeoftheintensionalwouldcorrespondtothestructureoftheextensional.

TheprecedingobservationslargelyconcernGdel'sworkinlogicfrom1940untilthebeginningof1943,when,asmentionedearlier,heturnedhisattentionto
philosophicalmatters,includingacarefulstudyoftheworkofLeibniz(whichhepursuedfrom1943to1946).
IhaveneverobtainedanythingdefiniteonthebasisofreadingLeibniz.Sometheologicalandphilosophicalresultshavejustbeensuggested[byhiswork].Oneexampleismy
ontologicalproof[oftheexistenceofGod].DanaScotthas[acopyof]theproof.Itusesthedivisionbetweenpositiveandnegativeproerties[proposedbyLeibniz].ButIhave
insertedchangesinthesequotations.Mymathematicalresults(suchasthe''squareaxioms"[proposedbymefordecidingCH])havenothingtodowithmystudyofLeibniz.

PaulErdossaidthat,thoughbothofthemstudiedLeibnizagooddeal,hehadalwaysarguedwithGdelandtoldhim:"Youbecameamathematiciansothatpeople
shouldstudyyou,notthatyoushouldstudyLeibniz."Hedidn'tsayhowGdelresponded.GdeldidtellmethathisgeneralphilosophicaltheoryisaLeibnizian
monadologywiththecentralmonad(namelyGod),although,healsostressed,Leibnizhadnotworkedoutthetheory.

Page88
IwenthomewithEinsteinalmosteverydayandtalkedaboutphilosophy,politics,andtheconditionsofAmerica.Einsteinwasdemocraticallyinclined.Hisreligionismuchmore
abstract,likethatofSpinozaandIndianphilosophy.Mineismoresimilartochurchreligion.Spinoza'sGodislessthanaperson.Mineismorethanaperson,becauseGodcan'tbe
lessthanaperson.Hecanplaytheroleofaperson.
Theremayexistspiritswhichhavenobodybutcancommunicatewithusandinfluencetheworld.Theystayinthebackgroundandarenotknown[tous].Itwasdifferentin
antiquityandintheMiddleAgeswhenthereweremiracles.Wedonotunderstandthephenomenaofdjvuandthoughttransference.Thenuclearprocesses,unlikethe
chemicalones,areirrelevanttothebrain.
MyworkonrotatinguniverseswasnotstimulatedbymycloseassociationwithEinstein.ItcamefrommyinterestinKant'sviews.InwhatwassaidaboutKantandrelativity
theory,oneonlysawthedifference,nobodysawtheagreementofthetwo.Whatismoreimportantisthenatureoftime.Inrelativitythereisnopassageoftime,itiscoordinated
withspace.Thereisnosuchanalogyinordinarythinking.Kantsaidthattheordinarynotionwaswrongandthatrealtimeissomethingquitedifferent.Thisisverified[by
relativitytheory],butinawaycontrarytoKant'sintentions.[BywhatisverifiedGdelmeant,Ibelieve,theviewthattimeisonlysubjective.]Onehalfisdifferent.Theotherhalf,
beingnotknowable,isnotfalsified.[Ithinkthatbythe"differenthalf"GdelmeanstheissueofwhetherspaceisEuclideanandthatbythe"otherhalf"hemeansthestatusof
spaceandtimeintheworldofthingsinthemselves,whichwasunknowableforKant.]
Thiswork[aboutrotatinguniverses]wasdoneinthelateforties[probablyfrom1946or1947to1950].Itwasonlyadigression.IthenspentoneyearontheGibbslecture[1951].
TheCarnappapercausedmetremendoustrouble.Iwrotemanyversionsinthefifties[probablyfrom1953to1957or1958].
InlateryearsImerelyfollowedupwithworkinlogic.In1959IstartedtoreadHusserl.Myhealthis[generally]poor:ulcerallthetimeandsometimesverysick.Myhearthasbeen
sicksinceIwaseightornineyearsoldwhenIhadrheumaticfever.AsmydutyattheInstitute,Ireadpapersoftheapplicants.Iammuchmoretalentedindoingworkofmyown
[thanevaluatingtheworkoftheapplicants].
Iamalwaysoutforimportantresults.Itisbetter[moreenjoyable?]tothinkthantowriteforpublication.Ihaveneglectedtopublishthings.IshouldpublishmypaperonKantand
Einstein,myGibbslecture,andmyCarnappaper.OfmathematicalresultsIshouldpublishmy"generalmethodofprovingtheconsistencyoftheaxiomofchoice"andseveral
thingsonrecursivefunctions.[ThisobservationwasmadeinJune1976inMay1977,asImentionedbefore,hesaidhisnotesforthe"generalmethod"werenotclear.]The
footnoteinHeijenoorttowardtheendofthepapercouldbemadeintoaveryelegantpaper.[Thereferenceis,Ibelieve,tothenotedated18.20.66invanHeijenoort1967:616617,
reprintedasfootnote1inCW1:235.]

InJuneof1976GdeltalkedabouttheexpandedEnglishversionofhisBernayspaperof1958,whichhasnowbeenpublishedinCW2:271280,305306.
Apparentlyheworkedonthisexpandedversionfrom1967

Page89

to1969.ItseemstohavebeenaresponsetoaninvitationbyBernaystocontributeapapertoasymposiumonthefoundationsofmathematicstobepublishedinthe
journalDialectica.
Myinterpretationofintuitionisticnumbertheorygivesaproofofitsconsistency.Thereisanobjectiontotheproofthat,asaconsistencyproofofintuitionisticnumbertheory,it
iscircular,onthegroundthat,inordertodefineprimitiverecursivefunctionals,intuitionisticlogicisusedtosomeextent.Ifoundawaytoavoidthisobjection.Averymuch
narrowerconceptofproofissufficienttocarryouttheproof.Itiscomplicatedtoshowthiscompletely.Ionlygivetheideaandhavenotgivenalltherelevantdetailsalsoitis
toocondensed.Itspendsalotoftimediscussingfoundations.Thenegativeinterpretationstaysinlowertypes:thisisstimulating.Thereissomethinggoodintheideaoffinitism.
[ThereismuchinthisparagraphwhichIdon'tunderstand.Forothercommentsontheexpandedversion,compareRG:288291.]
TheexpandedEnglishversionwasmeantfor"thesecondBernaysvolume"inDialectica.Itwasalreadyinproofsheets.Ihadexpectedtomakesomechangesandadditions,but
wasprevented[fromdoingso]bymyillnessin1970.Inowthinkthatnomajorrevisionisnecessary.

AsInowrecall,atsomestageGdelaskedmetowritealettertoBernaystoaskhimtosimplycorrecttheproofsheetsandpublishit.Andthenhewantedtomake
someminorchangesandtoldmethathehadtwosetsoftheproofsheets.IaskedhimtoletmehaveonesetwiththechangessothatIcouldpassitalongtoBernays.
Heneverdidsendmethesetand,asaresult,Ididn'twritetoBernaysaboutthematter.
ApparentlyGdelwasstimulatedbyCohen'sindependenceproofofCHin1963toresumehissearchfornewaxiomstodecideCH.Thereisareportonsomeofhis
attemptsinthisdirectionbetweenJanuaryof1964and1970(oralittlelater)inCW2:173175,compiledbyGregoryH.Moore.In1972OskarMorgensterntoldme
thatGdelwaswritingamajorpaperonthecontinuumproblem.IaskedGdelaboutthisin1976.InAprilandJune1976hemadethefollowingtwooverlapping
observations:
Thecontinuumhypothesismaybetrue,oratleastthepowerofthecontinuummaybenogreaterthanalephtwo,butthegeneralizedcontinuumhypothesisisdefinitelywrong.
Ihavewrittenup[somematerialon]thecontinuumhypothesisandsomeotherpropositions.OriginallyIthought[Ihadproved]thatthepowerofthecontinuumisnogreaterthan
alephtwo,butthereisalacuna[intheproof].Istillbelievethepropositiontobetrueeventhecontinuumhypothesismaybetrue.
[Iwroteadraftof"SomeFactsaboutKurtGdel"around20June1976.On29Junehecommented,]"Idoubtwhetheranybodywouldbeinterestedinthesedetails."
[InApril1976Gdelspokeabouthisownreputation:]Anenormousdevelopmentovertenorfifteenyearsafterwardsithasonlykeptupinpart.Ifeelthatmyreputationhas
declined:thedoctorsdonottreatmeassospecialanymore.

Page90
[On22.11.77hecalledmetosay]IdidnotdoenoughfortheInstituteconsideringthesalary.

2.6HisOwnSummaries
Duringhislifetime,Gdelpublishedaltogetherfewerthan300pages,mostlybetween1930and1950abouthalfaretakenupbyhisincompletenessresultsandthe
workrelatedtoconstructiblesets.Giventheimportanceandwiderangeofhiswork,thetotalofhispublishedworkissurprisinglysmall.Thereasonforthis
disproportionispartlythathewrotesoconciselyandpartlythatagreatdealofhisworkremainedunpublished.ThefirsttwovolumesofhisCollectedWorksreprint
nearlyallhispreviouslypublishedworktwoadditionalvolumes,devotedtoaselectionofhisunpublishedwritings,areunderpreparation.Thepresentvolume,which
includessomeofhisoralcommunications,maybeviewedasasupplementtothesevolumes.
Around1968Gdelpreparedabibliographyofhisownpublishedworkfortheproceedingsofaconferencewhichhadcelebratedhissixtiethbirthdayin1966.The
bibliographywaspublishedintheresultingFoundationsofMathematics(Buloff,Holyoke,andHahn1969:xixii).Anaccompanyingsheetfoundinhispapersgives
anoverviewandbriefevaluationoftheitemsinthisbibliography.Ireproduceboththebibliographyandhisnotationsonitsitemsbelow,withaviewtocapturing,to
someextent,Gdel'sattitudetowardhisownpublishedworkatthatperiod.
Inaddition,in1984JohnDawsondiscoveredamongGdel'spapersandsenttomeasheetheaded"MyNotes,194070."Thissheet,writtenbyGdelin1970or
1971,summarizeshisunpublishedwritingsandprovidesuswithsomeindicationofhisownevaluationofhislaterwork.Itseemsdesirabletotrytoexplainthislistas
well.Thefactthatitbeginsin1940isnotsurprising,sincehepublishedwhathetooktobehisimportantworkbeforethatyear.
BibliographyofGdelPreparedbyHimselfaround1968

1.

DieVollstndigkeitderAxiomedeslogischenFunktionenkalkls.MonatsheftefrMathematikundPhysik37
(1930):34360.Seeitem28.

2.

EinigemetamathematischeResultateberEntscheidungsdefinitheitundWiderspruchsfreiheit.AnzeigerderAkademie
derWissenschafteninWien67(1930):214215.Seeitem28.

3.

DiskussionzurGrundlegungderMathematik.Erdenntnis2(1931/32):147151.

4.

berformalunentscheidbareStzederPrincipiaMathematicaundverwandterSystemeI.MonatsheftefrMathematik
undPhysik38(1931):173198.ItaliantranslationinIntroduzioneaiproblemidell'assiomatica,byEvandroAgazzi,
Milano1961.Seealsoitems27,28.

5.

ZumintuitionistischenAussagenkalkl.AnzeigerderAkademiederWissenschafteninWien69(1932):6566.

6.

EinSpezialfalldesEntscheidungsproblemsdertheoretischenLogik.InErgebnisseeinesmathematischenKolloquiums
ed.byKarlMenger,vol,2(1929/30):2728.

Page91
7.

berVollstndigkeitundWiderspruchsfreiheit.Inibid.,vol.3(1930/31):1213.Seeitem28.

8.

EineEigenschaftderRealisierungendesAussagenkalkls.Inibid.:2021.

9.

EineInterpretationdesintuitionistischenAussagenkalkls.Inibid.4(1931/32):3940.

10.

berUnabhngigkeitsbeweiseimAussagenkalkl.Inibid.:910.

11.

ZurintuitionistischenArithmetikundZahlentheorie.Inibid.:3438.Seeitem27.

12.

BemerkungberprojektiveAbbildungen.Inibid.5(1932/33):1.

13.

berdieLngevonbeweisen.Inibid.,vol.7(1934/35):2324.Seeitem27.

14.

ZumEntscheidungsproblemdeslogischenFunktionenkalkls.MonatsheftefrMathematikundPhysik40(1933):433
443.

15.

OnUndecidablePropositionsofFormalMathematicalSystems(Mimeographednotesoflecturesgivenin1934).

16.

TheConsistencyoftheAxiomofChoiceandoftheGeneralizedContinuumHypothesis.Proc.Nat.Acad.Sci.USA24
(1938):556557.

17.

TheConsistencyoftheContinuumHypothesis.InAnnalsofMathematicsStudies,vol.3,PrincetonUniversityPress,
19402ndprinting,revisedandwithsomenotesadded,19517thprinting,withsomenotesadded,1966.

19.

Russell'sMathematicalLogic.InThePhilosophyofBertrandRussell,ed.byP.A.Schilpp,pp.123153.Evanstonand
Chicago,1944.Seeitem26.

20.

WhatIsCantor'sContinuumProblem?Amer.Math.Monthly54(1947):515525.Seeitem26.

21.

AnExampleofaNewTypeofCosmologicalSolutionofEinstein'sFieldEquationsofGravitation.Rev.ModernPhysics
21(1949):447450.

22.

ARemarkabouttheRelationshipbetweenRelativityTheoryandIdealisticPhilosophy.InAlbertEinstein,
PhilosopherScientist,ed.byP.Schilpp,pp.555562.Evanston,Ill.,1949.Germantranslation,withsomeadditionsto
thefootnotesinAlbertEinsteinalsPhilosophundNaturforscher,pp.406412.Kohlhammer,1955.

23.

RotatingUniversesinGeneralRelativityTheory.InProceedingsoftheInternationalCongressofMathematiciansin
Cambridge,Mass.,1950,vol.1,pp.174181.

24.

bereinebishernochnichtbentzteErweiterungdesfinitenStandpunktes.Dialectica12(1958):280287.Revised
EnglisheditiontoappearinDialectica.

25.

RemarksbeforethePrincetonBicentennialConferenceonProblemsofMathematics.InTheUndecidable,ed.byMartin
Davis,pp.8486.NewYork,1965.

26.

Areprintofitem19andarevisedandenlargededitionofitem20werepublishedinPhilosophyofMathematics,ed.by
P.BenacerrafandH.Putnam,pp.211232,258273.EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:PrenticeHall,1964.

27.

Englishtranslationsofitems4,11,13andarevisedandenlargededitionofitem15werepublishedinTheUndecidable,
ed.byMartinDavis,pp.438,7581,8283,3975.NewYork,1965.

28.

Englishtranslationsofitems1,2,4,7,withsomenotesbytheauthor,werepublishedinFromFregetoGdel,ed.by
JeanvanHeijenoort,pp.583591,595596,596616,616617.Cambridge,Mass.,HarvardUniversityPress,1967.

ThiscompletesmyreproductionofthebibliographypreparedbyGdelaround1968.TherearesomepeculiarfeaturesinGdel'sorderingofthisbibliography.He
evidentlyviolatednormalchronologicalorderinordertolistallhissignificantcontributionstoKarlMenger'scolloquiuminoneblock(itemsfrom6through13).The
placementofitem25(thePrincetonLectureof1946)isdeterminedbythedateofitsfirstpublicationitwould,Ithink,bemoreaccuratetoputitbetweenitems19
and20.

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Idiscoveredamarkedcopyofthisbibliographywhichaddsdatestoanumberoftheitemsinthelist,linkingittothesheetmentionedearlierwhichsummarizesand
evaluatestheitemsinthebibliography.Addingthesedatesandothermarkings(insquarebrackets),Ireproducethesheetbelow:
Jahresz.[year]

MeinePublikat.

30WCompl.

[1]

30

[6]

31WUndecid.

[4]

31

[7]

{32

[5]

{32

[9]

{32

[11]

33

[14]

34

[15]

35

[13]

5
40WCont.
4

[18]

44

[19]

46

[25]

47

[20]

49

[21]

49WRotating

[22]

50

[23]

8
58WDialectica
4____________

[24]

64Putnam

[26]

65Davis

[27]

67Heijenoort

[28]

69Dialectica12

[mypublications]

Wwichtig[important]

17papers

Reedited:Putnam2,Russell,ContDavis,Vol.,int.,leng.,Bicen.,Und.Heijenoort,comp1.,MengerNote,Ac.note,undec.,Hilbert.
Alotofinformationispackedintothissheet.Disentanglingitsdifferentcomponentsisanamusingpuzzle.Inthefirstplace,sevenofthe28itemsintheoriginallist2,
3,8,10,12,16and17areleftout.ThemotiveforthisdeletionisundoubtedlythatinGdel'smindthesevenpapersareeitherunimportant(8and12)ordonot
addmuchtorelated

Page93

itemsthatareincluded(4for2and3,5for10,and18for16and17).Moreover,thedoublelinebetween58and64indicatesthattheitemsbelowitarenotnew
publicationsbutratherrevisionsandexpansionsofpreviouspapers.Inthisway,wearriveatacountofeighteenratherthanhiscountofseventeenpapers.One
waytoeliminatethediscrepancymightbetotreat[4]and[7]asonepaper.
Theparagraphunder"Reedited"ismoreorlessselfexplanatory.Putnamreferstoitem26,whichincludesversionsoftheRussellpaper(19)andtheCantorpaper
(20).Davisreferstoitem27,whichincludesversionsofthe1934lectures(15)aswellasitems11,13,25,and4.Heijenoortrefersto28,whichincludesversionsof
1,7,2,4,andaquotationfromGdel'sletterof8.7.65(p.369),commentingontherelationbetweenHilbert'sandhisownworkonthecontinuumhypothesis.
Thelastentry,[19]69Dialectica12,indicatesthatatthetimeofwritingthelistGdelexpectedtheexpandedEnglishversionofhis1958paper(publishedinGerman
involume12ofDialectica)toappearin1969(involume23).Sincethepaperdidnotappearin1969,andsinceheincludedinformationonhispublicationsuptoand
including1967(namely,item28),thetwodocumentsmusthavebeenpreparedaround1968.
ThemarkW(forwichtig)ofcourseindicatesthepublishedworkGdeltooktobehismostimportant.Fivecategories,eschrepresentedbyone(ortwo)
publications,aremarkedwiththisletter:(1)thecompletenessofpredicatelogic[1](2)undecidablepropositions(onincompletability)[4](3)thecontinuum
hypothesis[18](4)rotatinguniverses[21,itsmathematicalaspect,and22,itsphilosophicalaspect],and(5)interpretationofintuitionisticarithmetic[24,togetherwith
itsexpandedEnglishversion].
TheeighteenpublicationsselectedbyGdelcanalsobegroupedasfollows:(a)predicatelogic,[1],[6],and[14](b)undecidablepropositions,[4],[7],[15],and
[13](c)intuitionism,[5],[9],[11],and[24](d)settheory(withthecontinuumproblemasitsfocalpoint),[18](possiblywith[20])(e)rotatinguniverses,[21],[22],
and[23](f)philosophyoflogicandmathematics,[19],[25],and[20](withitsexpandedrevision,asindicatedunder[26]).
Therelationoftheitemsunder(f)totheitemsunder(a),(b),and(d)maybeseenasananalogueoftherelationbetweenthetwopartsof[24]orthatbetween[22]
andthetwomathematicalpapersunder(e)orthatbetween[20]and[18].Ineachcase,thereisaninterplaybetweenphilosophyandmathematics.Wemayalsosay
that(a)isconcernedwithpredicatelogic,(b)witharithmetic,(c)withintuitionismandconcreteintuition,and(d)withsettheory.Theisolatedgroup(e)isconcerned
withtimeandphysics.
Thenumbers(markedwiththesymbol)betweensomeoftheyearsevidentlypointtothelapseofyearsbetweenpublicationstheyindicate

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fourstretchesofmorethantwoyearsbetween1930and1969.Theyare,however,somewhatmisleading.Thenumber5between1935and1940givesonlyarough
ideaofthecomparativelylongperiodofpreparationfortheworkinsettheory.Thenumber4between1940and1944isassociatedwithGdel'stransitionfromlogic
toothermatters.Thenumber8between1950and1958covers,implicitly,hisextendedeffortsonhisGibbslectureand,especially,onhisCarnappaper,whichhe
decidednottopublish.Thenumber4between1958and1964coincideswithanotherperiodoftransitionbutshowsonthesurfaceanarithmeticalerror.One
interpretationisthatalreadyin1962hehadessentiallycompletedsomeofhisrevisionsandadditions,eventhoughtheywerenotpublisheduntil1964oralittlelater.
After1967Gdelpublishednothingunderhisownname.Yetfromaletterhewrotein1975andhisrelatedreplytoarequestfor"aparticularlyaptstatement"ofhis
philosophicalpointofview(RG:20andanswertoquestion9,p.18),itisclearthatheconsideredhisstatementsquotedinWang1974ashisownpublication:"See
whatIsayinHaoWang'srecentbook'FromMathematicstoPhilosophy'inthepassagescitedinthePreface."Infact,inourconversationshemadeitclearthathe
valuedhighlytheideashehadexpressedinthesestatementsandthathewasratherdisappointedbytheindifferencewithwhichtheywerereceived.Onepurposeof
thepresentworkistoconsiderthesestatementsextensivelyinthehopeofcallingpeople'sattentiontothem.
Gdel'sStatementin"MyNotes,194070"
AsImentionedatthebeginningofthissection,IproposetoprovideanexplicationofGdel'sstatment,inhis"MyNotes,194070,"inwhichhesummarizesand
evaluateshisownunpublishedwork.
Inordertodiscussthisstatement,itisnecessarytosaysomethingaboutthecurrentstateofGdel'sunpublishedpapers.Hiswillbequeathedhisentireestatetohis
wifeAdele,whothenpresentedallhispapersandbooks,withminorexceptions,totheInstituteforAdvancedStudy.Later,herwillgavetheInstituteliteraryrightsas
well.BetweenJune1982andJuly1984,JohnW.Dawson,withtheassistanceofhiswife,CherylDawson,classifiedandarrangedthepapersandissuedatypescript
catalogueofthecollection,"ThePapersofKurtGdel:AnInventory."ThepapershavesincebeendonatedtotheFirestoneLibraryofPrincetonUniversity,where
theyhavebeenavailabletoscholarssince1.4.85.TheInstituteretainspublicationrights.
Thecollectionconsistsofaboutninethousanditems,initiallyoccupying15Paigeboxesandoneoversizecontaineraltogetherabout14.5cubicfeet.Theyare
dividedintotwelvecategories.Thefollowingfourcategoriesarerelevanttoourconsiderations:

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Series03Topicalnotebooks.Boxes5,6,and7.About150items125folders(andoneoversizefolder).MostlyinGabelsbergershorthand.
Series04Draftsandoffprints(oflecturesandarticles).Boxes7,8and9.About500items154folders(and15oversizefolders).
Series05Readingnotesandexcerptsbibliographicnotesandmemorands.Boxes9,10,11.About250numberedgroups78folders(andoneoversize).Largelyin
Gabelsbergershorthand.
Series06Otherloosemanuscriptnotes.Boxes11and12.About800items52folders(and7oversizefolders).
MostoftheitemswerefoundinenvelopeslabeledbyGdelhimself.Onthewhole,hisoriginalorderhasbeenretainedorrestored.Foldersarenumberedsequentially
withineachseries,thefirsttwodigitsservingasseriesdesignation.Eachdocumentisalsogivenitsownnumber.
Thestatementlabeled"Mynotes194070"isinfolder04/108.Itconsistsofsixentriesnumbered1to6,writtenmostlyinEnglish,withfootnotesandparenthetical
remarksinamixtureofshorthand,English,andabbreviations.Alinedrawnbetweenentries3and4evidentlyindicatesthatentries1to3pertaintophilosophy,
whereasentries4to6aremorescientificinnature.Apairoflargesquarebracketssurroundsentry5,probablybecauseitdealswithresultsinmathematicallogic
whichbearacomplexrelationtorecentdevelopmentsandmay,therefore,involvequestionsofprioritythatGdelwasgenerallyeagertoavoid.
Letmetrytoreproduce,thesummaryasbestIcan,usingtheheadingsS1toS6(Sforsummary)inplaceoftheoriginal1to6forconvenienceinfuturereference.
S1About1,000stenographicpages(68inches)ofclearlywrittenphilosophicalnotes[afootnotehere:alsophilological,psychological](=philosophical
assertions).
S2Twophilos.[philosophical]papersalmostreadyforprint.[Acomplicatedfootnoteisattachedtotheendofthisline.Thefootnotebeginswith"OnKantand
SyntaxofLang."(Thewordsonandandinshorthand),sothatitisclearwhichtwopapersGdelhadinmind.Whatiscomplicatediswhatheseemstohaveadded
asafterthoughts:first,thereisaninsertionreferringtohisontologicalproofnext,inparentheses,isamixtureofitemsthatseemstobeginwithfiveminormathematical
piecesandtocontinuewithtwoparalleladditions,oneofthemevidentlyreferringto(hisnoteson?)hisnewconsistencyproofoftheaxiomofchoice,whiletheother
appearstorefertothecollectionofhis"Notes."]
S3Severalthousandsofpagesofphilosophicalexcerptsandliterature.
S4Theclearlywrittenproofsofmycosmologicalresults.

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S5About600clearlywrittenpagesofsettheoreticalandlogicalresults,questions,andconjectures(tosomeextentoutstrippedbyrecentdevelopments.)[Hefteis
writtenbetweenthesecondandthirdlinesofthisentry,evidentlyreferringtohisArbeitshefte,whicharecontainedinfolders03/12to03/28.]
S6Manynotesonintuit.[intuitionism]&otherfound.[foundational]questions,auchLiterat.[alsoliterature.][Inparenthesesafterthewordquestionsisaninsertion
largelyinshorthandwhichappearstosay:"thewholeEv.onMainqu.andanother(pertainingtotheDial.workandanotherwork)."PresumablyEv.standsfor
EvidenzorEvidence.Here,aswiththefootnotetoS2,itisnoteasytodetermineexactlywhatGdelisreferringto.Amongotherthings,hecertainlyhasinmindallthe
materialrelatedtohis1958Bernays(Dialectica)paperanditsexpandedEnglishversion(togetherwiththethreeaddednotes.)Maybethisisalltheparenthetical
insertionissaying.Itisreasonabletosaythatthemainorcentralquestionoffoundationsis,bothgenerallyandaccordingtoGdel'sview,theproblemofevidence.
Hisinterestinintuitionismisundoubtedlyaresultoftheimportanceheattachestothisproblem.AndhecertainlyviewedhisworkontheBernayspaperasadefinite
contributiontotheproblemofevidenceinmathematics.]
MuchofthematerialmentionedinthisstatementiswritteninGabelsbergershorthand,andawaitstranscription.Gdeloncetoldmethathiswritingsinshorthandwere
intendedmerelyforhisownuseundoubtedlybecausetheywerenotinasufficientlyfinishedstatetocommunicateeffectivelytootherswhathehadinmind.Even
thoughthestatementgivesanindicationofwhathetooktobeofvalueamonghisunpublishedwritings,itishardtoidentifyexactlywhichpieceshehadinmind.
Moreover,wehavenoreliableestimateofhowreasonablehisevaluationis.
TheorderingofitemsinGdel'sstatementsuggeststhathevaluedmosttheonethousandpagesofphilosophicalassertions(S1).Therearefifteenphilosophical
notebookslabeled"Max"(in03/63to03/72)andtwotheologicalnotebooks(in03/107and03/108).Thebulkofthephilosophicalnotebookscontainsmaterial
writtenintheperiodfrom24.8.37toJune1945orDecember1946.Folder06/43includesphilosophicalmaterialfrom1961orlater,andfolder06/42contains
philosophicalremarkswrittenbetweenearly1965andabout20.8.67.Folder06/31containsGdel'snotesonHusserl'sCartesianMeditationen,Krisis(andits
Englishtranslation),andLogischeUntersuchungen.Notesongeneralobservationsfoundin06/115includetheselonghandmarkings:(1)Aufsatzim"Entschluss"
Sept.toDec.1963(2)AxiomWahrheitsbegr.u.intens.funktionen[theconceptoftruthandintensionalfunctions](3)Bem.Phil.

Page97

Math.(Allg.)[Remarksonthephilosophyofmathematics(general).ThisbundlehasrecentlybeentranscribedbyCherylDawson]somethingonP.J.FitzPatrick's
''ToGdelviaBabel,"Mind75(1966):332350.
The"twophilosophicalpapersalmostreadyforprint"(S2)areeasytoidentify.Thefirst,S2.1,"SomeObservationsabouttheRelationshipbetween[the]Theoryof
RelativityandKantianPhilosophy,"wasprobablywritteninthelateforties.Therearevariousversions(markedA,B,C,butwithvariants).Folder04/132,marked
"Einstein&Kant(lngereForm),"containsmanuscriptsAandB.TypescriptversionAconsistsof28pages(including43footnotes),whileBisarevisionofA,with
52footnotes.Folder04/133containsahandwrittenmanuscriptC,whichconsistsof30pagesoftextand19pagesoffootnotes(about66ofthem).Atypedversion
ofCwithonly14pagesoftext(withreferencestohandwrittenfootnotes)iscontainedin04/134.
Gdelworkedonthesecondpaper(S2.2),"IsMathematicsSyntaxofLanguage?,"from1953to1957or1958.Itexistsinsixdifferentdrafts,ofwhichthelasttwo
versionsaretheshortestandquitesimilartoeachother.
Theontologicalproofmentionedinthestatementseemstoexistonlyinapreliminaryform.S2.3,anontologicalproofoftheexistenceofGodinFolder06/41is
identifiedas"ontologischerBeweis."Anaccompanyingdate(10.2.70)apparentlyreferstothetimewhenGdelfirstallowedittocirculate.Italsoismarked"ca.
1941,"presumablythedateofitsinitialconception.
Surprisingly,anothermanuscript,whichGdelhadmentionedtomeseveraltimesintheseventieswasnotincludedunderS2.ItisS2.4,thetextfortheGibbsLecture,
"SomeBasicTheoremsontheFoundationsofMathematicsandTheirPhilosophicalImplications."Thistext,handwritteninEnglish,wascomposedin1951and
deliveredinDecemberofthatyear.Heapparentlyleftitunaltered.ItscontentoverlapswithS2.2.Folder04/92containsadraftinshorthand04/93containsa40
pagetextthemanuscriptin04/94adds18pagesof52insertionsand,finally,theversionin04/95has25pagesoffootnotes.
TheotheritemsinthefootnotetoS2aremoredifficulttoidentify.AsIhavementionedbefore,in1977Gdelfoundthathisnotesforhisnewconsistencyproofofthe
axiomofchoicewereconfusingandunclear.Althoughtheideawasprobablyconceivedin1940,Icouldfindonlyafewnotesonpp.811ofvolume15ofhis
Arbeitsheftinfolder03/27.The"fiveminormathematicalpieces"werepresumablywrittenbefore1943.Thereareseveralpossiblecandidates:(1)"SimplifiedProof,
aTheoremofSteinitz"(inGerman)infolder04/124,(2)"TheoremonContinuousRealFunctions"in04/128(3)"DecisionProcedureforPositivePropositional

Page98

Calculus"(inGerman)in06/09(4)"LectureonPolynomialsandUndecidablePropositions"(undelivered)in04/124.5.
TheseveralthousandsofpagesofphilosophicalreadingnotesandexcerptsfromliteratureunderS3areprobablymostlytobefoundamongthepapersinSeries05,
althoughsomeareincludedinSeries06,folders06/06,06/11,and06/15,andalargepartofthefoldersfrom06/24to06/44.Gdelretainedmanyofhislibrary
requestslips.Thesearestoredinfolders05/54to05/63,givingussomeindicationofthebooksandarticleshestudiedorintendedtostudy.Folders05/07and05/08
appeartocontainthe"programs"ofwhatheplannedtoreadfrom,roughly,1959to1975.
Amongtheseventyeightfoldersinseries05,Inoticedthefollowingitems:Leibniz,05/24to05/38Husserl,05/22HegelandSchelling,05/18phenomenologyand
existentialism,05/41C.Wronski,05/53theology,05/47to05/50philosophy,05/05,05/09,05/42,05/43,05/44,05/60,and05/62contemporaryauthors
(includingS.K.LangerandN.Chomsky),05/44history,05/19to05/21women,05/51,05/52psychology,neurophysiology,psychiatry,05/06.Folder05/39
includesnotesonBrouwer'sdoctoraldissertation(1907,inDutch),onHilbert'spaper,"OntheInfinite"(1925),andonHilbert's1928Bolognaaddress,whichpulled
togethertheopenproblemsofthefoundationsofmathematicsatthattime.
InS4Gdelspeaksofthe"clearlywrittenproofs"ofhiscosmologicalproofs,suggestingthattheyarefortheresultsinhis1950addresson"rotatinguniverses,"which
hadbeenpublishedin1952withlessthancompleteproof.Therelevantfoldersprobablyinclude06/13,06/14,and06/45to06/50.
EntriesS5andS6inGdel'sstatementareconcernedwithlogicandthefoundationsofmathematics.The"about600clearlywrittenpagesofsettheoreticaland
logicalresults,questions,andconjectures"ofS5areofamathematicalcharacter.Itseemslikelythatthechiefsourcesforthese600pagesarethethreesetsof
notebookslabeledbyGdel:(1)Arbeitshefte(sixteenvolumesplusoneindexvolume,totalingmorethanathousandpages,foundin03/12to03/28)(2)"Logicand
Foundations"(sixvolumeswithpagesnumberedconsecutivelyfrom1to440,plusoneindexvolume,in03/44to03/50)and(3)"ResultsonFoundations"(four
volumeswithpagesnumberedconsecutivelyfrom1to368,plusoneindexvolume,in03/82to03/86).Probably(1)isthemoreimportant,sincethelattertwosets
appeartoincludeagoodmanyreadingnotes(ratherthannotesonhisownresearch).(Iconjecturethatthemajorportionofthesethreesetsofnotebookswaswritten
between1940and1943,when,byhisownaccount,hishealthwasrelativelygoodandheworkedprimarilyonlogic.)

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The"ManyNotesonIntuitionismandOtherFoundationalQuestions"ofS6aremorephilosophicalincharacterthanthematerialclassifiedunderS5.Atypical
exampleisthematerialrelatedtohisBernayspaper.WhatGdelincludedinhisconceptionof"foundationalquestions"isalittleambiguous.Itisnot,forinstance,
clearwhethersomethematerialinthethreesetsofnotebooksmightfallunderS6too,andifso,howmuch.Inanycase,Idonotknowenoughabouttheunpublished
paperstospeculateaboutwhatGdelmeanttoincludeunderS6.

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Chapter3
ReligionandPhilosophyasGuidestoAction
Thephilosophershaveonlyinterpretedtheworld,invariouswaysthepoint,however,istochangeit.
Marx,ThesesonFeverbach,1845

Philosophyasanattempttofindthekeytolifeandtheuniversehasbeensufferingincreasinglyfromthedifficultchoicebetweenplausibleirrelevanceandexcitingbut
unconvincingspeculation.Thequestforuniversalitygetsfrustratedbyourgrowingrealizationoftheintimateconnectionsbetweencontingencyandrelevanceandofthe
strongdependenceoftruthonboththecontextoftheobservedandthepositionoftheobserver.Individualsituationsvaryfrompersontoperson,andthecumulative
humanexperiencechangesfromoneyeartothenext.Asaresult,one'sconceptionofwhatconstitutesanappropriatecombinationofrelevanceandplausibilityis
neitherinvariantacrosssubjectsnorstableovertime.
Formostpeople,academicphilosophytodayislargelyirrelevanttotheirdeepconcerns.Thoseindividualswhoaskformorethanwhatbusiness,science,technology,
andordinarypoliticshavetoofferlookelsewhereforsatisfaction:tothetraditionalreligionsortopopularpsychology,combined,perhaps,withZen,Taoism,orbody
mysticism,orwithsuchgrandphilosophiesandideologiesasMarxism,liberalism,conservatism,orneoConfucianism.
Philosophytodayfacessharperdemandsthandootherdisciplines,sharperalsothanthedemandsfacedbyphilosophyitselfatothertimes:toilluminateitsownnature
andplace,andtoanswernotonlyquestionsinphilosophybutalsoquestionsaboutit.Forthoseofuswhoareinterestedinphilosophyasavocation,itisnaturaland
helpful,bothinordertosatisfyourselvesandtojustifyourchoicetoothers,toaskastringofquestions:Whyphilosophy?Whatistheplaceofphilosophyinlife?
Whatisthemotivatingforceinthepursuitofphilosophy?Whataretheoriginalaimsandproblemsofphilosophy?Howandwhyhavetheybeentransformedinto
seeminglypointlessandfruitlessquestions?Wouldthework

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ofbringingtolighttheprocessofthistransformationrevitalizephilosophyandrestoreourfaithinthepossibilityoffindingappropriatephilosophicalcombinationsof
relevanceandplausibility?
Anumberoffamiliartraditionalphilosophicalidealsareeasytoappreciate,fortheyareobviouslyimportantifattainable.Canwe,forinstance,provetheexistenceof
Godandanafterlife?Canweofferaplanforbringingaboutanidealsociety?Canwelearnhowtoliveasatisfactorylife?Clearly,believingthatsuchidealsare
attainablethroughphilosophywouldprovidestrongmotivationforstudyingphilosophy.Yetveryfewcontemporaryphilosophersholdthisbelief.Gdelisan
exception.Henotonlyoffers,inprivate,argumentsinfavorofbeliefintheexistenceofGodandanafterlifehealsosuggeststhatphilosophicalinvestigationshold
promiseofyieldingdefinitivereasonsforsuchbeliefs,clearerandmoreconvincingthanhisowntentativeunpublishedarguments.
BecauseGdel'sthoughtsarebothakintofamiliartraditionalideasand,atthesametime,contemporaryincharacter,theyarewellsuitedformypurposeofbeginning
thediscussionofphilosophywithfamiliarandobviouslyimportantissues.Ontheonehand,wecanseeatoncehowGdel'sphilosophyisdirectedtoourcentral
commonconcernsand,asweshallsee,someofGdel's,uninhibitedgeneralizations,centeredonhisrationalisticoptimism,maybeviewedasanouterlimittothe
inclinationofphilosopherstospeculateboldlyabouttheplenitudeoftheuniverse.Ontheotherhand,Gdelconnectstheseaudaciousviewswithhismorefinishedand
articulatework,whichisverymuchapartofwhatisactivelyinvestigatedincontemporaryprofessionalphilosophy.Histhoughtsthusprovideuswithalivingexample
ofhowtolinkupcurrentandtraditionalconcernsinphilosophy.
Anaturalstartingpointinlookingforthemotivationtostudyphilosophyanddetermineitsnatureanditsplaceinourlivesistheuniversalconcernwithbridgingthegap
betweenourwishesandtheirconsummation.Weareconstantlyawareofthisseparationbetweenourdesiresandtheirfulfillment,betweenwhatwewishforandwhat
wefind,betweenwhatisandwhatoughttobe.Often,however,wedonotknoweitherwhatisorwhatoughttobe.Weworkonlywithourbeliefs,testingthem
whenwecan,directlyorindirectly,rigidlyorflexibly.Thereis,accordingly,muchroomformodifyingourbeliefsanddesires,soastogiveushopethat,bybehavingin
anappropriatemanner,wemaybeabletomaximizethesatisfactionofourdesires.
Wishesproduceforcesthatdriveustowardtheirconsummation.Abeliefinnewpossibilitiesbroadenstherangeofwishesandthepossiblewaysofsatisfyingthem.
Valuesservetomodifyandrearrangeexistingwishes.Wehaveanaturalinclinationtolookforahighestvaluethe

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goodortheonethingtowillthatcouldserveasaguideinselectingfromamongourdifferentwishesandasasteptowardunifyingthem.
Furthermore,theuniversalexperienceofpassingthroughchildhoodyieldsatendencytoappealtosomeonewhopossessespower,withone'smotherandfatherasthe
prototypes.Aswegrowup,wetransferourappealtomoreremoteauthoritiesthetribalchief,theprince,theemperor,God,orhistory.Thereis,however,a
dilemma:ontheonehand,familiaritybreedscontemptontheotherhand,ignoranceleavesusinthedarkastothecommandsoftheauthority.
Itisreasonabletoconcludethatthegapbetweenourwishesandtheirconsummationcanbereducedeitherbyincreasingone'spowerorbydecreasingone'swishes.
BuddhismandTaoismputahighvalueontheidealofdecreasingwishes,especiallywhenourwishesdependfortheirconsummationonfactorsbeyondourown
control.Ontheotherhand,awiderrangeofwisheshastheadvantageofprovidingmorepossibleselectionsandcombinations,aricherreservoirofchoicesfrom
whichtoworkoutasatisfactorylife.
Beliefinanafterlifeoffersthepromiseofanopportunitytocompletetasksleftunfinishedinthislife.Ifthisbeliefiscombinedwithfaithintheexistenceofasuitable
God,theafterlifecanalsobeseenasastageatwhichanothergapwillbebridgedthegapbetweenfactandourwishforjustrewardsandpunishments.Thereare,
asweallknow,manydifferentconceptionsofGod.AdesirableconceptionmustendowGodwithaselectionofdesiredpropertiesinsuchawaythat,givenwhatwe
believeweknow,itisnotonlypossiblebutalsoprobablethatthesepropertiescoexist.ThevariousattemptstoprovetheexistenceofGodallaimatestablishingthis
possibility,andalsoatresolvingtheissueofcommunicationbetweenGodandhumanbeings.
ForthosewhodonotbelievewecanpossiblysettleinareasonablyconvincingmannerthequestionwhetheraconsequentialGodexists,thereremainsthechallengeof
findingawebofbeliefstoserveasaframeworkfororganizingourdesires,beliefs,andactivities.Thischallengeoffindinganarticulateworldviewseemstomethe
naturalcentralconcernthatmostpeopleassociatewithphilosophyasavocation.
Giventheambiguityofthisambition,itsformidablerange,anditsremotenessfromwhatwereallyknow,thischallengeishardtomeet.Inthehistoryofmankind,
exceptionalpeoplehaveoccasionallycomeupwithinfluentialvaluesystemswhichsummarizehumanexperienceinmoreorlessnovelandconvincingways.Onesetof
suchphilosophersmightincludeConfucius,Plato,Aristotle,Kant,andMarx.Philosophytoday,however,seemstohavelosttouchwithsuchunifyingsystems.
Philosophyhastakenmanyshapesithasbeensplitintomanyspecialized

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parts,andwedetectnoclearpatterninanaccumulationofitsfruits.Nonetheless,itseemstomedesirabletolinkthemajorpartsofcontemporaryphilosophytothe
centralchallenge,bothdirectlyandwiththehelpoftraditionalconcerns.0
InhisPoetics(1451)Aristotlesaysthat"poetryissomethingmorephilosophicandofgraverimportthanhistory,sinceitsstatementsareofthenatureratherof
universals."Iseeinthisobservationthebroadsuggestionthatitismosteffectivetodealwithageneralsituationbywayofappropriateexamples.Focusingon
examplesoftenprovidesuswithabetterwayofclarifyingandcommunicatingourthoughtsthandirectlyconfrontingthecomplexsubjectmatteritself.Inparticular,it
seemstome,certainphilosophicalissuescanbetreatedeffectivelybyconcentratingontheviewsofafewsuitablyselectedrepresentativephilosophers.ThatiswhyI
havetriedtocombinemyownstudyofphilosophywithastudyoftheviewsofGdelandafewothers.
TherestofthischapterisdevotedtosomeillustrativediscussionsofGdel'sformulationsofhisthoughtsontheexistenceofGodandanafterlife,togetherwithsome
thoughtsofmyownderivedfrommytentativegropingforagrandphilosophy.SomeofGdel'srelatedobservationsonhismonadology,rationalisticoptimism,andhis
generalphilosophicalviewpointwillbeconsideredinChapter9.
3.1GdelonanAfterlife
BetweenJulyandOctoberof1961Gdelwrotefourlongletterstohismotherinwhichheoffered,amongotherthings,adiscussionofthepossibilityofanafterlife.
Thisdiscussionisofinterestbecauseitlinksafamiliarandfundamentalhumanconcernwithmoreorlessabstractphilosophicaldeliberations.Justastherelationofhis
philosophytoGdel'smathematicalresultsprovidesuswithafirmreferencepointforcertainindefinitephilosophicalissues,sofromadifferentdirectionthis
connectionwithasharedandlivelywishhelpsustogiveconcretemeaningtotherelevantabstractspeculations.
Becausesomeatheistsbelieveinanafterlife(SchopenhauerisanexamplementionedinGdel'sletters),Gdelfeelsfreetoconsiderthatissueapartfromtheproblem
oftheexistenceofGodandofGod'sinterventioninbringingaboutjustrewardsorpunishments.
Atonestageinhisargument,Gdelciteshisawarenessthatwearegrosslyignorantinmanyways:"Ofcoursethissupposesthattherearemanyrelationshipswhich
today'sscienceandreceivedwisdomhaven'tanyinklingof.ButIamconvincedofthis[theafterlife],independentlyofanytheology."Iseeinthispassageanimportant
recognitionthatplaysasignificantpartinGdel'sthinking.However,thoughIagreewithhim

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thatweshouldalwaysrememberthefactofourignorance,Iamoftennotconvincedoftheconsequencesheseemstodrawfromit.
3.1.1ASummaryofGdel'sArgument
Scienceshowsthatorderpervadestheworld.Thisorderprovidessomedegreeofevidenceforthebeliefthattheworldhasmeaning.Grantedthattheworldhas
meaning,theremustbeanafterlife.Thisfollowsbecause,giventhathumanbeingsinthisworldrealizeonlyaverysmallpartoftheirpotentialities,thesepotentialities
wouldbeameaninglesswasteiftherewerenoafterlife.
Moreover,sciencesupportsthebeliefthatthisworldofourshadabeginningandwillhaveanend,therebyopeningupthepossibilityoftherebeinganotherworld.On
theotherhand,wecan,throughlearning,attainbetterlives,andwelearnprincipallythroughmakingmistakes.Thisishowweare.Aswegrowolder,wegetbetterat
learningyetbeforewecanrealizeasignificantportionofourpossibilities,deathcomes.Therefore,sincethereoughtnotbesuchmeaninglesswaste,wemustenvision
thegreaterpartoflearningasoccurringinthenextworld.
Gdelrejectstheidea,putforthbyhismother,thattheintellectisnottheappropriatefacultyforstudyingthisissue.(Bytheway,thisideaofhismother'swaswidely
sharedandwasendorsed,forinstance,byWittgenstein.)GdelcomparesthestatusofhisownviewwiththatofatomictheoryatthetimeofDemocritus,whenitwas
introduced"onpurelyphilosophicalgrounds."Gdelsuggeststhathisbeliefinanafterlifemayprevailinthefuture,justastheatomictheoryprevailstoday.Headmits
thatwearealongwayfromjustifyingthisviewscientifically,buthebelievesitis"possibletodaytoperceive,bypurereasoning,"thatit"isentirelyconsistentwithall
knownfacts."
Toperceivethisconsistency,Gdelsays,waswhatLeibnizattemptedtodo250yearsago,andwhathealsoistryingtodoinhisletters.Theunderlyingworldviewis
thattheworldandeverythinginithasmeaning,orreasonsthisviewisanalogoustothe"principlethateverythinghasacause,whichisatthebasisofthewholeof
science."
3.1.2TheTextoftheLetters
Ineachofthefourletters,Gdelpresentedthediscussioninonecontinuousparagraph.Ihavebrokenthemupintosmallersegments.TheEnglishtranslationisbyYi
MingWang.
23.7.61Inyourlastletteryouaskedtheweightyquestion,whetherIbelievethatweshallmeetagaininanafterlife[obichineinWiedersehenglaube].Aboutthis,Icanonlysay
thefollowing:Iftheworld[Welt]isrationallyconstructedandhasmeaning,thentheremustbesuchathing[asanafterlife].Forwhatsensewouldtherebeincreatingabeing
(man),whichhassuchawiderealmofpossibilitiesfor

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itsowndevelopmentandforrelationshipstoothers,andthennotallowingittorealizeevenathousandthofthose[possibilities]?Thatwouldbealmostlikesomeonelaying,with
thegreatesteffortandexpense,thefoundationsforahouse,andthenlettingitallgotoseedagain.
Butdoesonehavereasontosupposethattheworldisrationallyconstructed?Ibelieveso.Foritisbynomeanschaoticorrandom,but,asscienceshows,everythingispervaded
bythegreatestregularityandorder.Order,however,isaformofrationality[Vernnftigkeit].
Howwouldoneenvisionasecond[another]life?Aboutthattherearenaturallyonlyguesses.However,itisinterestingthatitispreciselymodernsciencethatprovidessupport
forsuchathing.Foritshowsthatthisworldofours,withallthestarsandplanetsinit,hadabeginningandmostprobablywillalsohaveanend(thatis,itwillliterallycometo
"nothing").Butwhy,then,shouldthereexistonlythisoneworldforjustasweonedayfoundourselvesinthisworld,withoutknowingwhyandwherefrom,socanthesame
thingberepeatedinthesamewayinanotherworldtoo.
Inanycase,scienceconfirmstheapocalypse[Weltuntergang]prophesiedinthelastbookoftheBibleandallowsforwhatthenfollows:"AndGodcreatedanewHeavenanda
newEarth."Onemayofcourseask:Whythisdoubling[Verdopplung],iftheworldisrationallyconstructed?Buttothisquestiontoothereareverygoodanswers.SonowI've
givenyouaphilosophicallectureandhopeyou'vefounditcomprehensible.
14.8.61WhenyouwritethatyouworshiptheCreation[dieSchpfung],youprobablymeanthattheworldiseverywherebeautifulwherehumanbeingsarenotpresent,etc.Butit
ispreciselythiswhichcouldcontainthesolutionoftheriddlewhytherearetwoworlds.Animalsandplants,incontrasttohumanbeings,haveonlyalimitedcapacitytolearn,
whilelifelessthingshavenoneatall.Manalonecan,throughlearning,attainabetterexistencethatis,givemoremeaning[Sinn]tohislife.Butone,andoftentheonly,method
oflearningconsistsinfirstmakingmistakes.Andindeed,thatactuallyhappensinthisworldinsufficientmeasure.
Nowonemayofcourseask:Whydidn'tGodcreatemansothathewoulddoeverythingcorrectlyfromtheverystart?Buttheonlyreasonthatthisquestionappearsjustifiedto
uscouldverywellbetheincrediblestateofignoranceaboutourselvesinwhichwestillfindourselvestoday.Indeed,notonlydowenotknowwherewe'refromandwhywe're
here,wedon'tevenknowwhatweare(thatis,inessence[imWesen]andasseenfromtheinside).
Butwereweonceabletolookdeeplyenoughintoourselvesusingscientificmethodsofselfobservationinordertoanswerthisquestion,itwouldprobablyturnoutthateachof
usisasomethingwithveryspecificproperties.Thatis,eachpersoncouldthensayofhimself:Amongallpossiblebeings[Wesen],"I"ampreciselythiscombinationofproperties
whosenatureissuchandsuch.Butifitispartandparcelofthesepropertiesthatwedonotdoeverythingcorrectlyfromthestart,butinmanycasesonlyfirstbasedon
experience,itthenfollowsthat,hadGodcreatedinourplacebeingswhodidnotneedtolearn,thesebeingswouldjustnotbewe.Itisnaturaltoassumethatsuch(orquite
similar)beings,alsoin

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someway,existorwillexist.Thatis,wewouldthennotexistatall.Accordingtotheusualview,theanswertothequestion"WhatamI?"wouldthenbe,thatIamasomething
whichofitselfhasnopropertiesatall,ratherlikeaclotheshangeronwhichonemayhanganygarmentsonewishes.Onecouldnaturallysayalotmoreaboutallthesethings.
Ibelievethereisalotmoresenseinreligionthoughnotinthechurchesthanoneusuallythinks,butfromearliestyouthwe(thatis,themiddlelayerofmankind,towhichwe
belong,oratleastmostpeopleinthislayer)arebroughtupprejudicedagainstit[religion]fromschool,frompoorreligiousinstruction,frombooksandexperiences.
12.9.61Thatyouhadtroubleunderstandingthe"theological"partofmylastletterisindeedquitenaturalandhasnothingtodowithyourage.Indeed,Iexpressedmyselfvery
brieflyandtouchedonmanyratherdeepphilosophicalquestions.Atfirstsight,thiswholesetofviews[Anschauung]thatIexpoundedtoyouindeedseemshighlyimplausible.
ButIbelievethatifonereflectsonitmorecarefully,itwillshowitselftobeentirelyplausibleandreasonable.
Aboveall,onemustenvisionthegreaterpartof"learning"asfirstoccurringonlyinthenextworld,namelyinthefollowingway:thatweshallrecallourexperiencesinthisworld
andonlythenreallyunderstandthemsothatourpresentexperiencesare,sotospeak,onlytherawmaterialfor[thisreal]learning.Forwhatcouldacancerpatient(forexample)
learnfromhispainhere?Ontheotherhand,itisentirelyconceivablethatitwillbecomecleartohiminthenextworldwhatfailingsonhispart(notasregardshisbodilycare,but
perhapsinsomecompletelydifferentrespect)causedthisillness,andthathewilltherebylearntounderstandnotonlythisrelationship[Zusammenhang]withhisillness,but
othersimilarrelationshipsatthesametime.
Ofcourse,thissupposesthattherearemanyrelationshipswhichtoday'sscienceandreceivedwisdom[Schulweisheit]haven'tanyinklingof.ButIamconvincedofthis,
independentlyofanytheology.Infact,eventheatheistSchopenhauerwroteanarticleaboutthe"apparentpurposeinthefateoftheindividual."
Ifoneobjectsthatitwouldbeimpossibletorecallinanotherworldtheexperiencesinthisone,this[objection]wouldbequiteunjustified,forwecouldinfactbebornintheother
worldwiththesememorieslatentwithinus.Besides,onemust,ofcourse,assumethatourunderstanding[Verstand]willbeconsiderablybettertherethanhere,sothatwewill
graspeverythingofimportancewiththesameabsolutecertaintyas22=4,whereamistakeisobjectivelyexcluded.(Otherwise,forexample,wewouldn'thaveanyideaifweare
alsogoingtodieintheotherworld.)Thuswecanalsobeabsolutelysureofhavingreallyexperiencedeverythingthatweremember.
ButI'mafraidthatIamagaingoingtoofarintophilosophy.Idon'tknowifonecanunderstandthelasttenlinesatallwithouthavingstudiedphilosophy.N.B.Today'sphilosophy
curriculumwouldalsonothelpmuchinunderstandingsuchquestions,sinceinfact90percentoftoday'sphilosophersseetheirmaintask[as]gettingreligionoutofpeople's
heads,sothattheireffectissimilartothatofthebadchurches.

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6.10.61ThereligiousviewsIwrotetoyouabouthavenothingtodowithoccultism.ReligiousoccultismconsistsofsummoningthespiritoftheApostlePaulortheArchangel
Michael,etc.inspiritualisticmeetings,andgettinginformationfromthemaboutreligiousquestions.WhatIwrotetoyouwasinfactnomorethanavividrepresentation,and
adaptationtoourpresentwayofthinkingofcertaintheologicaldoctrines,thathavebeenpreachedfor2000yearsthoughmixedwithalotofnonsense,tobesure.
Whenonereadsthekindsofthingsthatinthecourseoftimehavebeen(andstillare)claimedasdogmainthevariouschurches,onemustindeedwonder.Forexample,according
toCatholicdogma,theallbenevolentGodcreatedmostofmankindexclusivelyforthepurposeofsendingthemtoHellforalleternity,thatisallexceptthegoodCatholics,who
constituteonlyafractionoftheCatholicsthemselves.
Idon'tthinkitisunhealthytoapplytheintellect[Verstand]toanyarea[whatsoever](asyousuggest).Itwouldalsobequiteunjustifiedtosaythatinjustthisveryareanothing
canbeaccomplishedwiththeintellect.Forwhowouldhavebelieved,3000yearsago,thatonewould[now]beabletodeterminehowbig,howmassive,howhotandhowfaraway
themostdistantstarsare,andthatmanyofthemare100timesbiggerthanthesun?Orwhowouldhavethoughtthatonewouldbuildtelevisionsets?
When,2500yearsago,thedoctrinethatbodiesconsistofatomswasfirstputforward,thismusthaveseemedjustasfantasticandunfoundedthenasthereligiousdoctrines
appeartomanypeopletoday.Foratthattimeliterallynotasingleobservationalfactwasknown,whichcouldhaveinstigatedthedevelopmentoftheatomictheorybutthis
occurredonpurelyphilosophicalgrounds.Neverthelessthistheoryhastodaybrilliantlyconfirmeditselfandhasbecomethefoundationforaverylargepartofmodernscience.
Ofcourse,oneistodayalongwayfrombeingabletojustifythetheologicalviewoftheworld[dastheologischeWeltbild]scientifically,butIbelievethatitmayalsobepossible
todaytoperceive,bypurereasoning(withoutdependingonanyparticularreligiousbelief),thatthetheologicalviewoftheworldisentirelyconsistentwithallknownfacts
(includingtheconditionspresentonourEarth).
ThefamedphilosopherandmathematicianLeibnizattemptedtodothisaslongas250yearsago,andthisisalsowhatItriedtodoinmylastletter.ThethingthatIcallthe
theologicalworldviewistheconceptthattheworldandeverythinginithasmeaningandsense[SinnundVernunft],andinparticularagoodandunambiguous[zweifellosen]
meaning.FromthisitfollowsdirectlythatourpresenceonEarth,becauseithasofitselfatmostaveryuncertainmeaning,canonlybethemeanstotheend[MittelzumZweck]for
anotherexistence.Theideathateverythingintheworldhasameaningis,bytheway,exactlyanalogoustotheprinciplethateverythinghasacause,whichisthebasisofthe
wholeofscience.

3.1.3.CommentsontheLetters
Anattractive,plausible,andstableideaintheselettersis,asGdeloncesaidtomemoreexplicitly,that,aswegrowolder,wegenerallygettoknowbetterhowto
learnbutthat,unfortunately,wenolongerhavesufficient

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vigor,stamina,andtimetomakefulluseofthisgraduallyacquiredknowledgeandcapability.Itwould,therefore,bedesirabletohaveanafterlifetocontinuethe
processoflearningandtobringtofruitionwhatourendeavorsinthislifehavepreparedusfor.Since,however,thehypothesisofanafterlife,thoughnotconclusively
refutable,ishardlyconvincing,amorereasonableandfamiliarcourseistoconcentrateonthisonelife,seeingitastheonlyonewehavetoworkwith.
Iamundertheimpressionthat,intheEuropean(oratleasttheChristian)tradition,youhavetohaveanafterlifetobeimmortal.Thisisnotsoaccordingtothe
prevalentconceptionofimmortalityinChina.Accordingtothisconception,therearethreeformsofimmortality:(1)settingagoodexamplebyyourconduct(2)doing
gooddeedsand(3)sayingsignificantthingsofonekindoranother.Theideaisthattheseachievementswillremainafterwedie,fortheywillbepreservedinthe
memoryofourcommunityandwillcontinuetoaffectothers.Sincetheyareours,thismeansthatpartsofuswillcontinuetoliveafterusandwewillhavegained
immortalitybyachieving(1)or(2)or(3).
IoncementionedthisconceptiontoGdel.Heseemednottoviewsuchachievementsasformsofimmortality,apparentlyonthegroundthatyouyourselfwillno
longerbetheretoenjoytherewardsofyourgooddeedsbyseeingtheirpositiveeffectsonothers.WhetherornotoneagreeswithGdelonthispoint,atleastfor
thoseofuswhohavelittlefaithinanafterlife,theChineseconceptionofimmortalityhastheadvantageofcapturingsomeofthefamiliarandaccessiblecentralgoalsof
ourlives.Regardlessofbeliefinanafterlife,mostofusdoplacegreatvalueonthesegoalsandbelieveweshoulddoourbesttoachievethem(orother''good"goals).
Icanseethat,asweapproachourdeath,beliefinanafterlifecanbecomforting,sincemostofusdohavecertainunfinishedprojects.Idonotsee,however,thatthe
assumptionofanafterlife,justasanopportunityforfurtherlearning,shouldmakeanydifferenceinhowweplanandliveourlivesinthisworld.
TheChineseconceptionofimmortalitymayresemblethatoftheEnlightenment.In1765Diderot,forexample,wroteinaletter"Posterity,tothephilosopher,iswhat
theworldbeyondis,tothereligiousman."IntheEncyclopedia,hedefinedasenseofimmortalitybysaying"Itisthekindoflifethatweacquireinthememoryof
men"and"Ifimmortalityconsideredfromthisaspectisachimera,itisthechimeraofgreatsouls."
Spinoza'sideaofaneternallifehassomeaffinitywiththeviewsofTaoism,especiallythoseofZhuangZi,whowouldhaveendorsedthethoughtexpressedbySpinoza
inthenexttothelastparagraphofEthics:"Whereasthewisemanisscarcelyatalldisturbedinspirit,but,beingconsciousofhimself,andofGod[Nature],andof
things,byacertaineternalnecessity,neverceasestobe,butalwayspossessestrueacquiescenceof

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hisspirit."Eternallife,however,isnotanafterlife:"Menareindeedconsciousoftheeternityoftheirmind,buttheyconfuseeternitywithduration,andascribeittothe
imaginationormemorywhichtheybelievetoremainafterdeath"(notetoProposition34ofPart5ofEthics).LikeConfucius,Spinozathoughtaboutliferatherthan
death:"Afreemanthinksofdeathleastofallthingsandhiswisdomisameditationnotofdeathbutoflife''(Proposition67ofPart4).
Valueshavemuchtodowiththefulfillmentofwishes.Ifyouthinkofyourselfaspartofacommunity,smallorlarge,thenyourrangeofwishesincludesthoseofothers
inthecommunity,andwhatisofvaluetothembecomespartofyourownwishes.Inthiswayyourrangeofvaluesisbroadenedandbecomeslessdependentonan
afterlife.
Inanycase,itisofinteresttoconsider,underthereasonableassumptionthatwehaveonlythislife,Gdel'sobservationthatwelearnbetteraswegrowolder.This
ideapresentsuswiththepracticalquestionofhowtoplanourlivesinsuchawayastotakeadvantageofthisimprovedcapacityinoldage.Acrudeanalogymightbe
thewishtotravelasfarasyoucaninyourlife,withtheunderstandingthatasyouapproachtheendofyourjourneythesameamountofphysicalstrengthwillenable
youtocoveralongerdistancethanbeforebecauseofyouracquiredabilitytouseyourstrengthmoreeffectively.Theanalogyis,ofcourse,defective.
Atthebeginningoflifewehavelittleideaofwhatphysicalandmentalresourceswehavebeengiven.Theenvironmentintowhichwearebornisanothergiven
element,independentofourownefforts.Graduallyweacquirebetterknowledgeandunderstandingofthesegivenelementsandtheirevolvingstates,whichmakeup
whatwehaveateachstage.Foreachsegmentofourliveswemakechoicesonthebasisofwhatweseeasourcurrentsituation.Awholelifeplanwillincludesome
obviousconsiderations:attentiontophysicalandmentalhealthbalancingimmediategratificationversuspreparationsforthefuture(byacquiringgoodhabits,meeting
basicneeds,andimprovingneededphysicalandmentalresources)and,ofcourse,achievingwhatwecanateachstagewithoutundulyexhaustingtheresources
neededtosustainusinthefuture.
Inpractice,alifeplanmaybeseenasacontinuingpreparationfordeath(withreferencetoyourevolvinganticipationofdeath).Inafundamentalway,wemustwork
withprobabilitiesanduncertainties,formuchdependsonwhatactuallyhappenstousandoursurroundingsinthefuture,andwecanonlytrytomakeinformed
guesses.
Comprehensivecommongoalsincludebeingtruetoourselvesandbeingautonomous,goalstoalargeextentembodiedinfindingoutwhatwewantandwhatweare
abletodo,andthenattemptingtocombinethesedesiresandcapacitiesinaroughprojectwhichismodifiedfromtimetotime.Formostpeople,wantsareconcerned,
first,withhuman

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relationsand,secondly,withwork.Bothdependagooddealonotherpeople,butthereareafewkindsofworkthatdependmainlyononeself.Inaccordancewith
theidealofautonomyitisdesirabletoreducetheextenttowhichwedependonothersandoncircumstances.Wemay,forinstance,try,toeliminate"falseneeds"and
toconfineourdependenceonotherstoasmallnumberofpersonswhomwecantrust.
ItispossibletoviewGdel'slifeintermsofthesehomelyobservations.IshallpresentwhatItaketobeaplausibleaccountofhisintellectualdevelopment,thestoryof
alifedevotedtothepursuitofphilosophy,inthetraditionalEuropeansense.Tobegin,IsingleoutthequestforaworldviewasGdel'scentralgoal.
Becauseofhisconcernwithphilosophy,heundoubtedlydevelopedanespeciallyarticulateawarenessofhisownworldview,whichtiedtogetherhisworkandhislife.
Wemaytakeitthathisaiminlifewastomakethegreatestpossiblecontributionthathecouldtotheidealoffindingandjustifyingthecorrectortrueworldview.Even
thoughitishard,andperhapsuninformative,tobeexplicitabouthowthemanyaspectsofGdel'sthoughtrelatetohisaiminlifeasIhavecharacterizedit,Iseethis
ideaasahelpfulguideinmyattempttoplacehiswiderangeofthoughtswithinasinglebroadframework.
AsfarasIknow,thefourletterstohismotherquotedabovecontainGdel'smostextendedstatementonhisviewsaboutanafterlife.Inaddition,Ihavecomeacross
somerelatedbutscatteredobservationsinothercontextsforexample,thecommentsonhopeandoccultphenomenaintheletterstohismotherquotedinChapter1
(pp.43,44).
Duringhisconversationswithme,Gdelalsomadeseveralrelatedstatements,sometimeswithexplicitreferencetohis"rationalisticoptimism,"(whichIconsiderin
Chapter9,p.317).
InthenearlytwoyearspriortohisdeathinJanuaryof1978,Gdelwasalmostexclusivelyoccupiedwithhishealthproblemsandthoseofhiswife.Wehavenoway
ofknowingwhetherorhowhethoughtaboutthequestionofanafterlifeduringthisperiodasfarasIknow,hemadenoattempttowork.Wittgenstein,bycontrast,
afteradiagnosisofcanceroftheprostateglandintheautumnof1949,continuedtowritephilosophywhenhewasstrongenough.ShortlybeforehisdeathinApril
1951,hetoldMauriceDrury:"Isn'titcuriousthat,althoughIknowIhavenotlongtolive,Ineverfindmyselfthinkingabouta'futurelife.'Allmyinterestisstillonthis
lifeandthewritingIamstillabletodo"(Rhees1984:169).
3.2ReligionandGdel'sOntologicalProof
Religionsareassociatedwithreverenceandpiety.Inthestrictsense,beingreligiousincludesbelievinginandworshipingatranscendentdivine

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realitythatcreatesandcontrolsallthingswithoutdeviationfromitswill.Inanextendedsense,areligionisanysystemofidealsandvaluessuchthat(1)theyconstitute
anultimatecourtofappeal,(2)onecanenthusiasticallystrivetowardthem,and(3)onecanregulateone'sconductaccordingtoone'sinterpretationofthem.Areligion
embodiesavalueheldtobeofsupremeimportanceacause,principle,orsystemofbeliefsheldwithardor,devotion,conscientiousness,andfaith.Inthissense,
somepeoplearesaidtomakeMarxismordemocracy,orevenpleasure,theirreligion.
MaxWeberincludedConfucianismandTaoisminhisstudyofthemajorworldreligions.(Indeed,anEnglishtranslationofthispartofhisstudyisentitledTheReligion
ofChinaConfucianismandTaoism.)Incontrast,FungYulandeniesthatConfucianismisareligionandbelievesthat:
3.2.1TheplacewhichphilosophyhasoccupiedinChinesecivilizationhasbeencomparabletothatofreligioninothercivilizations.Intheworldofthefuture,manwillhave
philosophyintheplaceofreligion.ThisisconsistentwiththeChinesetradition.Itisnotnecessarythatmanshouldbereligious,butitisnecessarythatheshouldbe
philosophical.Whenheisphilosophical,hehastheverybestoftheblessingsofreligion.(Fung1948:1,6).

Ifweidentifyone'sphilosophywithone'sworldview,thenreligionsconstituteaspecialtypeofphilosophywhichisdistinguishedfromothertypesbyaheavierreliance
onfaith,agreatertendencytowardreverenceanddevotion,and,ideally,abetterunifiedsystemofvaluesasaguidetoconduct.Religionshavetakenonvarious
differentformsinthehistoryofmankind.ForinstanceEinsteindistinguishedbetweenacosmicreligiousfeelingandareligionoffearblendedvariouslywithmoralor
socialreligions,eachofwhichappealstosomeanthropomorphicconceptionofGod(Einstein1954:3638).
GdeldescribedEinsteinascertainlyreligiousinsomesense,althoughnotinthatofthechurches,andsawhisconceptionasclosetotheideasofSpinozaandEastern
religions.In1975Gdelgavehisownreligionas"baptized"Lutheran(thoughnotamemberofanyreligiouscongregation)andnotedthathisbeliefwastheistic,not
pantheistic,followingLeibnizratherthanSpinoza.
ForSpinoza,Godandnature,properlyunderstood,areoneandthesamething.Sincewehavenodoubtthatnature,ortheworld,exists,themajorproblemisnotto
provetheexistenceofGodbuttounderstandnatureproperly.LikeGdel,Spinozabelievesthathumanreasoniscapableofdiscoveringfirstprinciplesandproviding
uswithafixedpointintheuniverse.Indeed,Gdel'srecommendationofanaxiomatictheoryformetaphysicsbearsastrikingresemblancetothecoursetakenby
SpinozainhisEthics:DemonstratedintheGeometricalOrder.Gdelwasnotsatisfied,however,withSpinoza'simpersonalGod.

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OnemaybelievethatGodexistswithoutalsobelievingitpossibletofindanarticulateandconvincingargumenttoprovetheexistenceofGod.ForPascal,forinstance,
religionissupportedbyfaithinatranscendentandhiddenprinciple.Gdel'smotherapparentlythoughtthatthequestionofanafterlifecouldnotbesettledbythe
intellectalone.
LikeGdel,Wittgensteinthoughtagooddealaboutreligion,buthisviewsonreligiousmattersweremoretentativeandchangedovertheyears.Inthesummerof
1938Wittgensteindeliveredseverallecturesonreligiousbeliefsomeofhisstudents'notesontheselectureswerepublishedin1966.Amongotherthings,withrespect
toreligionhesaid:"Wedon'ttalkabouthypothesis,orabouthighprobability.Noraboutknowing"(1966:57).Once,neartheendofhislife,Druryremindedhimthat
inoneoftheirfirstconversationshehadsaidtherewasnosuchsubjectastheology.Hereplied,"ThatisjustthesortofstupidremarkIwouldhavemadeinthose
days[around1930]"(Rhees1984:98).OnthematterofprovingGod'sexistence,hewrotein1950:
3.2.2AproofofGod'sexistenceoughtreallytobesomethingbymeansofwhichonecouldconvinceoneselfthatGodexists.ButIthinkthatwhatbelieverswhohavefurnished
suchproofshavewantedtodoistogivetheir'belief'anintellectualanalysisandfoundation,althoughtheythemselveswouldneverhavecometobelieveasaresultofsuch
proofs.Perhapsonecould'convincesomeonethatGodexists'bymeansofacertainkindofupbringing,byshapinghislifeinsuchandsuchaway.(Wittgenstein1980:85)

In1972GdeltoldmethathisstudyofLeibnizhadhadnoinfluenceonhisownworkexceptinthecaseofhisontologicalproof,ofwhichDanaScotthadacopy.
WenowknowthattherearetwopagesofnotesinGdel'spapers,dated10February1970,andthathediscussedhisproofwithScottthatmonth.Thefollowing
academicyearScottpresentedhisownnotestoaseminaronentailmentatPrincetonUniversity.
Thesenotes,whichbegantocirculateintheearly1970s,aresomewhatdifferentfromGdel'sown,bothintheorderingofthematerialandinreplacingGdel's
Axiom1bythespecialcase:BeingGodlikeisapositiveproperty.InReflectionsonGdel(RG:195)IreproducedaversionofScott'snotesbutmadeamistakein
copyingScott'sAxiom5(Gdel'sAxiom1):Iwrote"BeingNEisGodlike"insteadof"BeingGodlikeisapositiveproperty."BothGdel'sandScott'snotesare
reproducedfaithfullyanddiscussedinSobel1987andAnderson1990.IreproduceGdel'snoteshere,inalesstechnicalnotation,toindicatehislineofthought.
Gdelusesthenotionofapositivepropertyasprimitive.Hesaysthatpositivemeanspositiveinthemoralaestheticsense,independentoftheaccidentalstructureof
theworld,andthatitmayalsomeanpureattributionthatis,thedisjunctivenormalformintermsofelementary

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propositions(orproperties)containsamemberwithoutnegationasopposedtoprivation(orcontainingprivation).
Axiom1Theconjunctionofanynumber(collection)ofpositivepropertiesisapositiveproperty.Forinstance,ifAandBarepositiveproperties,havingbothofthem
istohaveapositivepropertytoo.
Axiom2Apropertyispositiveifandonlyifitsnegationisnotpositive:everypropertyor(exclusive)itsnegationispositive.
Definition1G(x)oranobjectxisGodlikeifandonlyifxpossessesallpositiveproperties:foreverypropertyA,ifP(A)thenA(x).
Definition2ApropertyAisanessenceofanobjectxifandonlyif(1)A(x)and(2)foreverypropertyBofx,necessarilyeveryobjectywhichhasthepropertyA
hasthepropertyBtoo.Anytwoessencesofxarenecessarilyequivalent.
[Thedefinitionsays:(1)A(x)and(2),foreveryB,ifB(x),then,necessarily,foreveryy,A(y)impliesB(y).Hence,ifAisanessenceofx,thenanyobjectwhichhas
propertyAnecessarilyhasalltheotherpropertiesofxtoo.Inotherwords,xis,inasense,entirelydeterminedbyA.]
Axiom3Ifapropertyispositive(ornegative),itisnecessarilypositive(ornegative).Itfollowsfromthenatureofapropertywhetheritispositiveornegative.
Theorem1IfxisGodlike,thenthepropertyofbeingGodlikeisanessenceofx:ifG(x),thenGisanessenceofx.
[Byhypothesis,G(x).Hence,byDefinition2,wehavetoproveonly:(a)foreverypropertyBofx,necessarilyforeveryobjecty,ifG(y),thenB(y).ByDefinition1,
sinceG(x),xpossessesallpositiveproperties.Therefore,byAxiom2,allpropertiesofxarepositive.Hence,ifB(x),thenBispositive.ByAxiom3,wehave:(b)ifB
(x),thennecessarilyP(B).ByDefinition1,necessarilyG(y)impliesthatP(B)impliesB(y).Therefore,necessarilyP(B)impliesthatG(y)impliesB(y).Bymodallogic,if
necessarilyP(B),thennecessarilyforally,G(y)impliesB(y).By(b),ifB(x),thennecessarilyforally,G(y)impliesB(y).Butthisisthedesiredconclusion(a).
Hence,Gisanessenceofx.]
Definition3Necessaryexistence.E(x)ifandonlyif,foreveryessenceAofx,thereexistsnecessarilysomeobjectwhichhasthepropertyA.[Anobjectnecessarily
existsifandonlyifeveryessenceofitisnecessarilyexemplified.]
Axiom4P(E).Thepropertyofnecessaryexistenceisapositiveproperty.
Theorem2IfG(x),thennecessarilythereissomeobjecty,G(y).
[ByAxiom4,Eisapositiveproperty.ByDefinition1,itisapropertyofx,sinceG(x).Hence,ifG(x),thenE(x).ByTheorem1,ifG(x),thenGisanessenceofx,
and,therefore,byE(x)andDefinition3,thereisnecessarilysomeobjecty,G(y).]

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FromTheorem2,itfollows[byfamiliarlogic]that,ifthereissomex,G(x),thenthereisnecessarilysomeobjecty,G(y).[Butafamiliarruleofmodallogicsays:ifp
necessarilyimpliesqandpispossible,thenqispossible.]Hence,ifpossiblythereissomex,G(x),thenpossiblythereisnecessarilysomeobjecty,G(y).[Butthereis
anotherruleofmodallogic:ifitispossiblethatpisnecessary,thenpisnecessary.]Therefore:
Theorem3IfitispossiblethatthereissomeGodlikeobject,thenitisnecessarythatthereissomeGodlikeobject.
TheremainingtaskistoprovethatpossiblythereissomeGodlikeobject.Thismeansthatthesystemofallpositiveproperties(ortheircorrespondingpropositions)is
compatible[orconsistent].Thisistruebecauseof:
Axiom5IfAisapositivepropertyand[if]necessarilyforallx,A(x)necessarilyimpliesB(x),thenBisapositiveproperty.
Thisaxiomimpliesthatselfidentity(x=x)ispositiveandselfnonidentity(thenegationofx=x)isnegative.[Sinceeveryobjectisnecessarilyselfidentical,self
identityisnecessarilyimpliedbyeveryproperty.Hence,sincetheremustbesomepositiveproperty(evenjustforthewholeenterprisetomakesense),selfidentityis
apositiveproperty.ByAxiom1,itsnegationisnotpositive(andthereforenegative).]
Butifasystemofpositivepropertieswereincompatible,itwouldmeanthatitssumproperty[theconjunctionofallthepropertiesinthesystem],whichispositive[by
Axiom1],wouldbeselfnonidentity,whichis,however,negative.[Therefore,thereispossiblesomeGodlikeobject.ByTheorem3,thereisnecessarilysomeGod
likeobject.Hence,Godnecessarilyexists.Inthisargument,God'spossibleexistenceisidentifiedwiththecompatibilityofthesystemofallpositiveproperties,which
isidentifiedwiththeconsistencyofthesystemoftheircorrespondingpropositions.Attheendofhisnotes,Gdeloffersanalternativeproofoftheconclusion,which
replacesthisparagraphbyadifferentlineofthought.]
Giventhefactthatselfnonidentityisanegativeproperty,itfollowsthat,ifapropertyAispositive,thenthefollowingisnotthecase:everyobjectnecessarilydoesnot
havethepropertyA.OtherwiseA(x)wouldnecessarilyimplythenegationofx=x.[Byassumption,thenegationofA(x)isnecessarilytrueforallx.Hence,A(x),
beingfalse,necessarilyimplieseverything,includingthenegationofx=x.]ByAxiom5,selfnonidentitywouldbepositive,contrarytothejustprovedconclusionthat
itisnegative.[ByDefinition1andAxiom1,Gisapositiveproperty.Therefore,itisnotthecasethateveryobjectnecessarilydoesnothavethepropertyG.Hence,
usingthefamiliarrelationbetweenpossibilityandnecessity,wehave:Theorem4.Itispossiblethatthereissomeobjectx,G(x).Indeed,theargumentprovesthat,
foranypositivepropertyA,possiblythereissomex,A(x).CombiningthiswithTheorem3,we

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have:Theorem5.Itisnecessarythatthereissomeobjectx,G(x).ByDefinition2andTheorem1,thisobjectxisuniquelydeterminedbyitspropertyG.
Consequently,Godnecessarilyexists.]
ThisconcludesmyexpositionofGdel'snotesof10February1970.(Imaywellhavemissedsomepointsandmisrepresentedsomeothers.)Hisgenerallineof
thoughtisfamiliarfromthehistoryofphilosophy.Descartes,forexample,spokeofperfectionsinsteadofpositiveproperties,butthecrucialstepsofhisargumentin
theFifthMeditationaresimilartoGdel's:(a)Godisthesubjectofallperfections,bydefinitionandinaccordancewithourclearanddistinctideaand(b)existenceis
aperfection.
In1676LeibnizwrotesomenotesinconnectionwithhisvisitsanddiscussionswithSpinozainTheHague,andobservedthatDescarteshadassumedthe
conceivabilityorpossibilityofamostperfectbeing,buthadfailedtoshowawayinwhichotherscouldarriveforthemselvesataclearanddistinctexperienceofthat
concept.LeibnizthenproducedanargumentforthesameconclusionandshowedittoSpinoza:"Hethoughtitsound,forwhenhecontradicteditatfirst,Iputitin
writingandgavehimthispaper,"whichcontainedthefollowingthreesteps:
L1ByaperfectionImeaneverysimplequalitywhichispositiveandabsoluteorwhichexpresseswhateveritexpresseswithoutanylimits.Butbecauseaqualityof
thiskindissimple,itisunanalyzableorindefinable,forotherwiseeitheritwillnotbeonesimplequalitybutanaggregateofmanyor,ifitisone,itwillbecontained
withinitslimitsandhencewillbeunderstoodthroughnegationofwhatisbeyondtheselimitswhichiscontrarytohypothesis,sinceitisassumedtobepurelypositive.
L2Fromthisitisnotdifficulttoshowthatallperfectionsarecompatiblewitheachother,orcanoccurinthesamesubject.[ForasummaryofLeibniz'sargument,
seebelow.]
L3Thereforethereis,orcanbeconceived,asubjectofallperfectionsoramostperfectbeing.Henceitisclearthatthisbeingexists,sinceexistenceiscontainedin
thenumberofperfections(Leibniz1969:167168).
TodemonstrateL2,Leibnizillustratedthegeneralsituationofthesystemofallperfectionsbyconsideringthespecialcaseofonlytwoperfections,thatis,the
proposition:(H)AandBareincompatible.AccordingtoLeibniz,(H)cannotbeprovedwithoutanalyzingAorBorbothbut,sincetheyare,byhypothesis,
unanalyzable(simple),(H)isnotprovable.Hencetheproposition(H)isnotnecessarilytrue.Therefore,itispossiblethat(H)isfalse:thatAandBcanoccurinthe
samesubject.
ThisargumentandsimilarlyGdel'sobviouslyinvolvesthedifficulttasksofconceivingandenvisagingasufficientlyrich(andyetpure)

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collectionofperfectionsorpositivepropertiestosatisfytheconditions:(a)theyareallcompatible,(b)theyareallactuallyexemplifiedsimultaneouslyinsomeone
object,and(c)theyincludeenoughofthequalitiescommonlyassociatedwithasignificantportionofthefamiliarconceptionsofGod.Forinstance,evenifweassume
Gdel'sthesisthatallconceptsaresharp(eventhoughwedonotperceivethemclearly),thereremainstheproblemofsinglingout,programmaticallyatleast,those
conceptswhichdetermineperfectionsorpositiveproperties.
Asweknow,Kantobjectstotheontologicalargumentsonthegroundthatexistenceisnotapredicateoraproperty.Wemayfeelthatitisasomewhatarbitrary
mattertodecidewhetherexistenceisaproperty.However,oneisinclinedtodoubtthat,merelybyselectingacollectionofproperties,onecouldpossiblybeassured
thattheremustactuallyexistsomeobjectthatpossessesallthepropertiesinthecollection.InKant'swords,Imayhavetheconceptofathalerwithoutactually
owningathaler.
Gdel'sAxiom1statesexplicitlythatanyconjunctionofpositivepropertiesisapositiveproperty.UnlikeLeibniz,hedoesnotexplicitlyappealtotheconceptof
simpleproperties.However,atleastintermsofexpressingproperties,hisconceptionalsopointstocertainpositivepropertieswhicharesimpleinthesensethatthey
arenotcombinationsofotherproperties.Whateverthesesimplepositivepropertiesmightbe,wecanenvisageatleastallBooleancombinationsofthemby
conjunction,disjunction,andnegation.Asanillustration,supposethatthesesimplepositivepropertiesandtheirBooleancombinationsarealltheproperties.
ByGdel'sAxiom2,thesepropertiesaredividedintotwoclasses:thepositiveonesandthenegativeones,thelatterbeingnegationsoftheformer.Gdelseemsto
suggestthatapropertyispositiveifandonlyifitsdisjunctivenormalformscontainssomememberwithoutnegation,thatis,somedisjunctwhichiseitherasimple
positivepropertyoraconjunctionofsimplepositiveproperties.Forinstance,beingselfidenticalorselfnonidenticalisapositiveproperty,anditsnegationthatis,
beingselfnonidenticalandselfidenticalisanegativeproperty.ThisdivisiondoessatisfyAxiom2,sinceeverymemberofthedisjunctivenormalformofthe
negationofonewithsomememberwithoutnegationisalwaysaconjunctionwithsomenegativeterm.
IfthisisthecorrectinterpretationofGdel'snotes,thenGodpossessesnotonlyallthesimplepositivepropertiesbutalsoalltheirBooleancombinationsthatare
positiveinthejustspecifiedsense.Nonetheless,allthesimplepositivepropertiesarecompatibleifandonlyifallthepositivepropertiesarecompatible.Thisisso
becausetheconjunctionofallthepositivepropertiesincludestheconjunctionofallsimplepositivepropertiesasapartandyetitisequivalenttoadisjunctionwhich
includestheconjunctionofallsimplepositivepropertiesasonemember.LetSbethe

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conjunctionofallsimplepositiveproperties,Tbetheconjunctionofalltheotherpositiveproperties.ClearlyifSandT,thenS.Butthedisjunctivenormalformofthe
conjunctionofSandTisoftheformSorU.ClearlyifS,thenSorU.
ItisnotclearthatthepropertiescommonlyattributedtoGod,suchasbeingomnipotent,omniscient,andomnibenevolent,aresimpleproperties,eventhoughweare
inclinedtoseethemaspositiveproperties.Thereductionofallpositivepropertiestothesimpleonespromisestolightenthetaskofprovingtheircompatibility,since
weareinclinedtothinkthatsimple(positive)propertiesaremutuallyindependentand,consequently,mutuallycompatible.
Thetaskoffindingallthemutuallyindependentsimplepositivepropertiesseemstobeessentiallyofthesametypeasthemuchdiscussedidealorassumptioninthe
theoryofWittgenstein'sTractatus(1922)thattheremustbeacompletecollectionofmutuallyindependentelementarypropositions,whichmaybehiddenfromusbut
whichcaninprincipleberevealedbytherightsortof"ultimateanalysis."
Whentwoormorepropertiesexcludeoneanother,theycannotallbepositivepropertiesoralloccurinelementarypropositions.Insuchcasesthereistheproblemof
selectingoneofthepropertiestobethepositiveorelementaryone.Forinstance,anobjectmayhaveanyoneofagroupofparallelproperties,suchasdifferent
colors,shapes,sizes,tastes,odors,weights,andsoonitseemsarbitrarytochooseoneproperty(sayblue)ratherthananother(sayyellow)asthepositiveor
elementaryone.Thisfamiliarexampleillustratesthedifficultyinvolvedinfindingmutuallycompatibleproperties.Ofcourse,therestrictiontonecessarilypositive
propertiescontractstherangeofcandidatesfromwhichselectionscanbemade.
Asweknow,Wittgenstein,lateinlife,abandonedtheelementarypropositionsofhisTractatus.Allthesame,sincetheTractatuscapturessomesignificantfeaturesof
ourpictureoftheworld,itcontinuestogetanddeserveourattention.Analogously,itislikelythatGdel'sontologicalproof,thoughitfailstoprovideaconvincing
proofoftheexistenceofGodastraditionallyconceived,willsurelystimulatemeaningfulreflection.
ThetextofGdel'sontologicalproofof10February1970isincludedinthethirdvolumeofhisCollectedWorks,togetherwithanappendixofselected"Texts
relatingtotheontologicalproof."Thesetextsincludetwoloosesheetsinlonghand(oneofwhichisdated"ca.1941")andthreeexcerptsfromGdel'sphilosophical
notebooks(writteninGabelsbergershorthand):twoshortonesfrom1944,andalongonefrom1954.ThetextsinshorthandhavebeentranscribedbyCheryl
DawsonandthentranslatedfromGermanintoEnglishbyRobertM.Adams,whoalsowroteanintroductorynotetoboththemaintextandtheappendix.(CW3,
388402)

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Ofspecialinterestisthelongexcerptfrom1954(pp.103108ofvol.14ofGdel'sphilosophicalnotebooksCW3,433437).Inthisexcerpt,Gdelmakesa
numberofobservationsontheontologicalproof:
(1)Theproofmustbegroundedontheconceptofvalueandontheaxiomsforvalue(itcanbegroundedonlyonaxiomsandnotonadefinitionof"positive").(2)Thepositive
andthetrueassertionsarethesame,fordifferentreasons.(3)Itispossibletointerpretthepositiveas"perfective"or"purelygood"(butnotas"good").(4)Thatthenecessityof
apositivepropertyisitselfapositivepropertyistheessentialpresuppositionfortheontologicalproof.And(5)thepositivepropertiesarepreciselythosewhichcanbeformed
outoftheelementaryonesthroughapplicationsofconjunction,disjunction,andimplication.

Thelongexcerptalsocontainssomehighlysuggestivegeneralobservations.Oneofthemrecommendsthestudyofphilosophy:
Engaginginphilosophyissalutary[wohlttig(wohltuend?)]inanycase,evenwhennopositiveresultsemergefromit(andIremainperplexed[ratlos]).Ithastheeffect
[Wirkung]that"thecolor[is]brighter,"thatis,thatrealityappearsmoreclearly[deutlicher]assuch.

Thisobservationrevealsthat,accordingtoGdel'sconception,thestudyofphilosophyhelpsustoseerealitymoredistinctly,eventhoughitmayhappenthatno
(communicable)positiveresultscomeoutofittohelpothers.
Gdel'sothergeneralobservationsarepackedintotwoconsecutiveparagraphs,whichprovideaconcentratedillustrationofwhatiscentraltohisconceptionof
philosophy.Itseemstomethattheassertionsinthesetwoparagraphscanbedividedintosixpartsforpurposesofdiscussion.
1.

Thefundamentalphilosophicalconceptiscause.Itinvolves:will,force,enjoyment,God,time,space.Willand
enjoyment:Hencelifeandaffirmationandnegation.Timeandspace:Beingnear=possibilityofinfluence.

2.

Theaffirmationofbeingisthecauseoftheworld.Thefirstcreature:tobeingisaddedtheaffirmationofbeing.From
thisitfollowsfurtherthatasmanybeingsaspossiblewillbeproducedandthisistheultimategroundofdiversity
(varietydelights).

3.

Harmonyimpliesmorebeingthandisharmony,fortheoppositionofpartscancelstheirbeing.

4.

Regularityconsistsinagreementforexample:atthesameangle,thereisthesamecolor.

5.

Property=causeofthedifferenceofthings.

6.

PerhapstheotherKantiancategories(i.e.,thelogical,includingnecessity)canbedefinedintermsofcausality,andthe
logical(settheoretical)axiomscanbederivedfromtheaxiomsforcausality.Moreoveritshouldbeexpectedthat
analyticalmechanicswouldfollowfromsuchanaxiom.

TheinclusionofGodunderassertion1isrelatedtotheidentificationofthecauseoftheworldwiththeaffirmationofbeinginassertion2.Inone

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ofthetwoexcerptsfrom1944,Gdelexplicitlylinksthecauseoftheworldwitha''proofoftheexistenceofanaprioriproofoftheexistenceofGod":"Accordingto
thePrincipleofSufficientReasontheworldmusthaveacause.Thismustbenecessaryinitself(otherwiseitwouldrequireafurthercause)."
Implicitinassertions2and3istheideathattheaffirmationofbeingisapositivevalue,orperhapstheonlyultimate(positive)value.Gdelseemstoidentifythetrue
withthegood(andthebeautiful).Theaffirmationofbeingisboththecauseandthepurposeoftheworld.LikeGod,wewilltheaffirmationofbeingandenjoyit.The
productionofasmanypossiblebeingsaspossibleisanexplicationoftheLeibnizianideaofthebestpossibleworld.
Inhisdiscussionswithmeintheseventies,Gdelsaidonseveraloccasionsthathewasnotabletodecidewhattheprimitiveconceptsofphilosophyare.Assertion1
maybeinterpretedasanattempttodosobyreflectingonwhatisinvolvedinthefundamentalconceptofcause.Thelineofthoughthereisrelatedtohisobservation,
tobeconsideredinChapter9,thatthemeaningoftheworldistheseparationofforceandfact.Inthecaseofconsciousbeings,forceworkstogetherwithwilland
enjoymenttoincreasetheaffirmationofbeing.
Observations4and5onregularityandproperty,respectively,presumablyhavetodowiththepositivevalueofthoseitems:regularitygivesorderandcontributesto
harmonypropertycausesdiversity,whichisapositivevalue.
Conjecture6maydependonGdel'sassociationofpositivevaluewithbothassertionsandtheaffirmationofbeing.Heoncesaidtomethatthereisasenseofcause
accordingtowhichaxiomscausetheorems.ItseemslikelythatGdelhasinmindsomethinglikeAristotle'sconceptionofcauseoraitia,whichincludesbothcauses
andreasons.Inanycase,ifthelogicalcategoriesandaxiomsaredefinableandderivablefromthecategoryofcauseanditsaxioms,theconceptofcauseisnolonger
restrictedtocausalityinspaceandtime.
ForthosewhofindSpinoza'sconceptionofGodplausibleandattractive,anaturalquestioniswhyLeibnizorGdelchoosesnottoadoptit.Thefamiliarreplyon
behalfofLeibnizisthatSpinozadoesnotallowforthenotionofindividuality.ForSpinoza,GodorNatureistheonesubstanceoftheuniverse,possessingthetwo
knownattributes:thoughtandmatter.Withinthisunity,particularexistences,whetherthingsorpoems,arenotsubstancesbutmodesofextensionandthought.
Itseemstome,however,thattheidentificationofGodwithNatureisavaluablesimplification,whichhelpsustofocusourattentiononlifeandtheworldasweknow
them.AccordingtoSpinoza'sphilosophy,thehigheststateofjoy,thestateofcontentmentinoneselfor"theintellectual

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loveofGod",isattainableinourpresentlife:Aswelearntoseetheworldfromthenaturalperspectiveofrationalthinking,wecomemoreandmoretoseeit"under
theaspectofeternity."ByofferinganactualaxiomaticpresentationinhisEthics,Spinozaenablesustocomparewhathebelieveswithwhatwebelieveatmany
points,notjusttoaskwhetherhisaxiomsareplausible,butalsotoquestionhis"propositions"(ortheorems).
Gdel'sboldspeculationsonGodandanafterlifeareanintegralpartoftheEuropeanphilosophicaltradition.Theybearmoredirectlyonfamiliarcommonconcerns
thandohisreflectionsonthenatureoflogicandmathematics.Atthesametime,forpeoplelikemewhocomefromadifferentculturalbackground,itiseasierto
appreciatehisthoughtsonmoreuniversalsubjects,likemathematicsandnaturalscience,thanhisideasonreligionandmetaphysics,whicharemorecloselyboundtoa
particularculturaltradition.
However,mydifficultywithGdel'sspeculationsmayhavemoretodowithhisdistinctivepositionthanwiththeEuropeantradition.Hehimselfsaysthathisviewsare
contrarytothespiritofthetime.Ifinditeasier,forinstance,toappreciatethegeneraloutlooksofEuropeanslikeRussellandEinsteinthanGdel'sviewsonGodand
theafterlife.
3.3Worldviews:BetweenPhilosophyandIdeology
Atanymomentweareexplicitlyorimplicitlyinterestedinreachingonekindofdesirablestate:tohavesingledoutawishandtoknowhowtoconsummateit.Inorder
toarriveatsuchastate,Iselectoneofmyownwishestoattendto,takeitsfulfillmentasagoal,andlookforfeasiblewaystoreachthatgoal.Anoverarchingidealfor
meistofindaunifyingwishorgoaltoserveasbackboneforthestructureofmyvariouswishesandasacentralguideformyaction.Asamemberofvariousgroups,I
amalsoinvolvedinthegoalsofthesegroups.Andeachgrouphasitsownidealoffindingaunifyinggoal.
Onecentralaimofphilosophyistofindsuchunifyinggoalsandespeciallytoenvisionadesirablestateofthewholehumanspeciesthatcouldserveasagoalforallof
usbothindividuallyandtogether.Ideallywewouldliketofindeither(1)aunifyinggoalforeachindividualthatagreeswiththecollectiveunifyinggoalor(2)a
collectiveunifyinggoalthatdeterminestheindividual'sunifyinggoalsinsuchawaythatthecollectivegoalbecomesbothjustandattainable.
Thisabstractcharacterizationofacentralidealofphilosophyisintendedtocapturesomebasicfeaturesofwidelyinfluentialreligions,philosophies,andideologies.The
Christianreligion,forexample,proposesforeverypersonthesharedunifyinggoaloflovingGodthisgoal,ifadoptedby

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everyone,promisestobenefitnotonlyeachindividualbutmankindaswell.Marxismproposesmeasurestoattainthecollectivegoalofaclasslessidealsociety,which
iswidelydesired.ThosewhofindMarxismconvincingtendtosubordinatetheirindividualunifyinggoalstothecollectivegoal.Confucianismtriestocombinethe
collectivegoalofastableandcontentedsocietywiththeindividualgoal,fortheselectfew,ofneishengweiwangtobeasage(internally)andtobeabletogovern
justly(asanexternalapplicationofone'swisdom).
Thereareseveralcomponentsofanyunifyinggoalthatformspartofanarticulateworldviewasaguidetoaction.Thegoal'seffectivenessisafunctionofthese
components.Oneofthemisthequestionofwhetherthegoalisfeasibleanddesirableinitself.Thefeasibilityofacollectivegoaldependsontheeffortsofthemembers
ofthecollective,whichareinturndeterminedbythegoal'sdesirabilityforthemembers.Thequestioniswhetherasufficientnumberofmembersdesirethecollective
goalstronglyenoughtobeinspiredtopursueit,eventhoughtheymayhavetosacrificesomeoftheirprivateinterests.
Thefeasibilityofaprogramofactiontoproduceadesiredresultdepends,then,onourknowledgeofcausalconnections:whetheractionAwillproduceeffectB.In
practice,ourbeliefsaboutfeasibilitydependmoreonpersuasionthanonknowledgepersuasionissufficienttoproduceaction.Butifthebeliefisnotknowledge,the
actionusuallydoesnotproducethepromisedresult.Weare,therefore,facedwiththetaskofbridgingthegapbetweenbeliefandknowledge.
Inthisconnectionapejorativesenseofthewordideology,whichhadbeenproposedin1796asanameforthephilosophyofmindorthescienceofideas,was
introducedin1802byNapoleonBonaparte.Accordingtothisnewusage,whichiscommontoday,sensiblepeoplerelyonexperience,orhaveaphilosophy
irresponsiblepeoplerelyonideology.NapoleonattackedtheprinciplesoftheEnlightenmentasan"ideology"andattributed"allthemisfortuneswhichhavebefallen
ourbeautifulFrance[since1792]tothisdiffusemetaphysics,whichinacontrivedmannerseekstofindtheprimarycausesandonthisfoundationwoulderectthe
legislationofpeoples,insteadofadaptingthelawstoaknowledgeofthehumanheartandofthelessonsofhistory"(inWilliams1983:154).
Anideologyinthissenseisalsosaidtobea"theory,which,restinginnorespectuponthebasisofselfinterest,couldprevailwithnonesavehotheadedboysand
crazedenthusiasts"(SirWalterScott,1827).MarxandEngelscriticizedtheideologyoftheirradicalGermancontemporariesonthegroundthattheirthoughtwasan
abstractionfromtherealprocessesofhistoryandnotbasedonknowledgeofactualmaterialconditionsandrelationships.Morebroadly,anideologyisanabstract,
impracticalorfanaticaltheory.

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Thesecriticismsofwhatiscalledanideologyaremotivatedbytherationalrequirementthataprogramofactionbebasedonappropriateknowledgeofthecrucial
relevantfactors.Itiseasytoagreethatthemostimportantfactorsarethefactsaboutthehumanheartandthelessonsofhistory.Butopinionsdifferastowhatthese
factsandlessonsareforinstance,itisdifficulttodeterminethenatureandtheplaceofselfinterestinthehumanheartorthepartthatmaterialconditionshaveplayed
andwillplayinhistory.
Wehavedifferentinterpretationsoftheworldbecausetherearemanythingsabouttheworldofwhichwehavenorealknowledge.Weextrapolatefromwhatwe
knowindifferentwaysaccordingtoourowndifferentsituationsandperspectives.Inthissense,aprogramtochangetheworldcertainlydependsonsomeviewofthe
worldwhichisverymuchaninterpretationoftheworld,sinceithastomakeboldextrapolationsfromwhatwereallyknow.Atthesametime,acarefullyarguedgrand
programofchangecanhaveaspecialattractionforusandcanfocusourattentiononimportantaspectsoftheworldtheappealofsuchaprogramisespeciallystrong
ifitoffersaplausiblewayofunifyingthoughtandaction.
Historicalexperiencetellsusthattherearesomeroughcorrelationsbetweentypesofprogramsandtypesoffollowers.Accordingtoonegeneralization,radical
programstendtoprevailwith"hotheadedboysandcrazedenthusiasts."Butthecorrelationisoftenmuchmorecomplexthansuchroughgeneralizationswould
suggest.Asweknow,participantsandsympathizersofamovementaredrawntoitfromdiversegroupsandfordifferentreasons.(Forthesourcesofthequotationsin
theprecedingparagraphs,seetheentryon"Ideology"inWilliams1983.)
Totakeapersonalexample,fromthesummerof1972andforseveralyearsthereafter,IwasstronglyinterestedinMarxism,andImadeseriouseffortstoconvince
myselfthatMarxismcontainsthekerneloftherightworldview.Therewasastrongwilltobelieveatwork:tobelievethatChinawasdoingwellandwasopeningupa
neweraintheworld.LinkedtothisbeliefwastheinclinationtoaccepttheofficialChineseversionofMarxismandofwhatwashappeninginChina,accordingto
whichChinawasindeedatthestageoftransitiontocommunism.
From1977to1979,alessdistortedpictureoftheactualsituationinChinawasgraduallyrevealedtomethroughpersonalconversationsandpublishedaccountsof
whathadhappened.SlowlyIbegantorealizethatmybeliefaboutwhatwashappeningwasfundamentallyincorrectandthatmyextrapolationfromthisbelieftomy
beliefinthestrengthofwhatIvaguelytooktobeMarxismwaswithoutrealfoundation.
Marxismcontainsdifferentcomponentsandhasbeengivendiverseinterpretations.Someofitscomponentsaremoreplausiblethanothers.Its

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impliedprogramofactionasappliedtoanygivensituationfacesspecialproblemsineachcase.Therehavebeenmanyattemptstodistinguishthephilosophy(the
theory)ofMarxismfromtheideologyofMarxismasaguidetopractice,whichdependsmoreonwhatwewishtobelieve.Sincedoingtherightthingusuallyrequires
knowledgethatwehave,itiscommontoappealtowhatwewishtobelieveandtomakemistakesasaresult.
InChinatherewas,fromthe1950son,largelythroughtheinfluenceofMaoTseTung,aneagernesstoenterquicklythestageof"socialism"construedprimarilyin
termsoftheformalaspectofincreasingpublicownership(ofatleastthemeansofproduction).Oneconsequenceofthispreoccupationwithspeedandappearance
wasthattheeffectsoftraditionalChinesevaluesandtheweightofChinesehistoryonthecourseofeventswerelargelyinterpretedinacrudeandonesidedmanner,
especiallyfrom1949to1979.Theauthenticforcesoftraditionandhistorywereoftenmisrepresentedandexploitedforthebenefitofthepowerfulandtheprivileged.
Itiswidelyacceptedtoday,atleastinChina,that,conspicuouslyfrom1957to1976,MaoviolatedthefundamentalprincipleofMarxism:"existencedetermines
consciousness,"whichimpliestheprimaryimportanceofthemeansofproduction.Aremarkablehistoricalfactwasthat,despiteobjectionsfrommostofhisimportant
colleagues,MaowasabletodivertChinesehistoryintoastrangelyunrealisticcoursefrom1957to1976fromtheantirightistmovementandtheGreatLeap
Forward,totheCulturalRevolution.
Onefactorwas,ofcourse,Mao'sextraordinaryprestigeandpower.Inaddition,hishabitofemphasizingsuccessanddownplayingfailureappealedstronglytothe
impatience,sharedbythepopulationatlarge,forChinatocatchupandovertaketheadvancedcountriesinonewayoranother.BythetimeofMao'sdeathin1976,
itwasclearthatmakebelievewaspredominantandthattheChineseeconomywasonthevergeofcollapse.
In1979thepresentcourseofreformandmaterialincentive,inplaceofrevolutionandclassstruggle,haditstentativebeginning.Theconsensusthathadbeen
reachedtocombinesocialismwithamarketeconomy,announceddramaticallyin1992,reflectedadecisiontoputeconomicreformatthecenter,therebyobeyingthe
fundamentalMarxianempiricalgeneralizationthatthematerialbaseultimatelydeterminesthesuperstructure.
ThegoverninggoalofChina'scontinuingeffortshas,atleastsincetheearly1970s,beensummarizedbytheambiguouswordmodernization,whichincludes
industrializationandthequestsforwealthandstrength,ahighstandardofliving,efficiency,andadvancedscienceandtechnologyin

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short,thetransformationofChinafromadevelopingcountryintoadevelopedone.
Inviewofthecentralplacecurrentlyoccupiedbythepracticeof"lookingtowardmoney,"whathasbeenadoptedinChinaappearstobemoreinthespiritof
capitalismthaninthatofsocialism.However,thedistinctionisbynomeanssharptherearedifferentshadesofprivateandpublicownershipinalltypesofsociety.The
Chineseexperienceinparticularrevealsthefutility,andindeedtheharmfulness,ofarguingoverthelabelssocialistandcapitalistratherthantryingtofindoutdirectly
whatthepopulationatlargewants.
MyexperienceasIhavereporteditmayperhapsbeviewedasapieceofevidenceagainstPlatonismifPlatonismistakentoimplythatweshould,inthefirstplace,
focusonconceptsthoseofcapitalismandsocialisminthiscase.Itseemstome,however,thatPlatonismisrarelydiscussedexplicitlyintermsofitsconnectionto
suchpracticalconsiderations.Forinstance,whenGdelarguedforPlatonisminmathematics,hedidnotdiscusstherelationofPlatonismtopoliticalissues.Inany
case,weshould,Ibelieve,becarefulintryingtogeneralizePlatonismfrommathematicstootherareas.
Marxismoffersaworldviewthaturgesustochangetheworldinarevolutionarymanner.Mostpeople,however,tendtoacceptthesocietyinwhichtheyliveandlook
forguidanceabouthowtoliveinsocietyasitis.Morepeopleseekthisguidancefromreligionorliteratureorpopularpsychologythanfromphilosophy.Inthisregard,
theChinesetraditionhasbeendifferentfromtheEuropeantradition.
InChina,philosophyistraditionallyconcernedprimarilywiththeproblemsoflife.Inmyfinalexaminationin1945foradegreewithadissertationonepistemology
ProfessorShenYutingaskedmewhyIwantedtostudyphilosophy.IsaiditwasbecauseIwasinterestedintheproblemsoflife.HethentoldmethatintheWest
suchproblemswereaddressedbyliteraturemorethanbyphilosophyindeed,muchofWesternphilosophyisorientedtowardscienceandhaslittledirectrelevanceto
theproblemsoflife.
Chinesephilosophy,incontrast,haslittletodowithscienceandisratherlikeliteratureinitsspirititiscloselyconnectedwithliterature,historyandeverydaylife,
whereasWesternphilosophytends,moreoftenthannot,toseescience,inonesenseoranother,asitsideal.Relatedtothisdifferenceisthegreaterinclinationinthe
Westerntraditiontowardsystem,explicitness,andseparationsbetweensubjectandobject,appearanceandreality,abstractandconcrete,knowledgeandaction,
natureandhumanbeings,meansandends,factandvalue,formalandintuitive,andsoon.
ThispreferenceforscienceintheEuropeantraditionhasplayedalargepartingeneratingmuchthatisuniqueinworldhistory:theelaborate

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subtletiesofPlatoandAristotle,thedetachedsystemofEuclid'sgeometry,thesystematictheologyofAquinas,thecumulativedevelopmentofscienceandtechnology,
theperfectionofinstrumentalreason,therefinementofspecializationandthedivisionoflabor,andsoon.Atthesametime,thebifurcationsinvolvedhaveledto
certainformsoffragmentationandrigidity,toatendencytowardreplacingendsbymeansandgeneratingmeaninglesswishesjusttoconsumeavailablemeans,and
generallytoaconcentrationonwhatcanbeeffectivelyandefficientlydoneevenifithaslittletodowithourfundamental,thoughoftenilldefined,emotionalneeds.
Wemaybeginwiththefundamentalsharedinterestinlivingabetterlife.Formostofus,scienceandtechnologyarenotimmediatelyrelevanttothisinterestexceptin
thesecondarysensethatwemakeuseoftheproductsoftechnology.Literatureismoredirectlyrelevanttoitforitteachesusaboutwaysoflifethroughexamples.In
literaturetheabstractandtheconcretearemoreorganicallyintegratedthantheyareinscience,andambiguityismorenaturallyhandled.Atthesametime,scienceis
moreobjectiveandsystematicthanliterature.Philosophydiffersfromscienceinthatitscentralconceptsarelessprecise,andfromliteratureinthatitsdiscourseisless
concrete.Foreachofitspartsphilosophyfacesachoicebetweendifferentwaysofcombiningthevirtuesofscienceandliterature.Forthatpartwhichrelatestoour
centralinterestinabetterlife,themoreattractivechoice,itseemstome,liesonthesideofaffinitytoliterature,asinChinesephilosophy.
Tomeetthecentralneedoflivingabetterlife,weface,apartfromparticularproblemsspecialtoonegrouporanother,certainmoreorlessuniversalproblemsshared
byeveryone.Forexample,althoughtherearedistinctrequirementsfordifferentwaysofearningaliving,diligenceandeffectiveuseofone'sresourcesaregenerally
desirable.Thescienceofthephysicalworldhaslittletosayaboutsuchimportantcommontasksaslearningmoreaboutourselves,ourdesires,andourcapabilities
improvingourhabitsandourwaysofthinkingavoidingormasteringanger,greed,despair,envy,andvanitycultivatingtheabilitytoestablishandenjoyclosepersonal
relationshipsfindingandpursuingrealizablepositiveidealsaimingatwisdomratherthanknowledgeandpayingattentiontooursubjectiveworld,bothmentaland
moral.
Onthewhole,philosophyintheChinesetraditionconcentratesmoreonsuchproblemsoflifethandoesthewesterntraditionlikeliterature,itislessspecialized,more
widelyaccessible,andbearsmoredirectlyonoureverydayconcerns.Probablywiththesepositivecharacteristicsinmind,ProfessorFungYulanoncetoldmethat
thosewhoknowbothwesternandChinesemusicprefertheformer,butthosewhoknowbothwesternandChinesephilosophypreferthelatter.Atthesametime,
Chinesephilosophy

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ismoreambiguous,lessprecise,andlesssystematicitsteachings,tobeeffective,havetobecomplementedbycertainexternalforces.
Therelationbetweenphilosophyanditspracticalrelevanceiscomplex.Thesourceofthefundamentaltensionbetweenrelevanceandplausibility,betweenideology
andphilosophy,istheneedtojudgeanddecideinthefaceofinsufficientknowledge.Itishardenoughtochooseamongalternativebeliefsforuseinlocaldecision
making.Tojudgeobjectivelythevalueofatheoryasaglobalguidetoactionisbeyondthepowerofmostofus.Andhistoryhastaughtustobeskepticalaboutgrand
theories.
Theinfluenceofadoctrineworksatthelevelofintersubjectiveagreementinwishandbelief.Ifagroupsharescertainbeliefsandwishesoveracertainhistorical
periodandiftheprogramofactionofadoctrinethatendorsesthesebeliefsaddressesthesewishes,thedoctrinecanserveasadynamicforceforthegroup.Butthe
idealofanytheoreticalpursuitalsoincludesthequestfortruth,tobetestedbyfact.Inparticular,itincludesacomponentofuniversalitywhichcallsforintersubjective
agreementbeyondaparticulargroupandhistoricalperiod.Thisdistinctionbetweenlimitedanduniversalapplicabilitymaybeseenasoneoftheobservableeffectsof
thedifferencebetweenideologyandphilosophy,betweeninfluenceandknowledge.If,however,adoctrinemakesexplicititsrestrictiontotheconcernsofacertain
kindofsocietyatacertainhistoricalperiod,itcancombineknowledgewithinfluenceinanattractiveway.Forexample,thetheoryofjustice,asithasbeendeveloped
byJohnRawls,seemstobeagoodexampleofchoosingafundamental,ifrestricted,problemandstudyingitimpartially.
Agoodwaytodealwithaproblemthatwefindtoohardtosolveistobreakitintopartsanddealwitheachpartseparately.Inphilosophy,therearemanydifferent
waysofdoingthis,resultinginanumberofpartswhicharecommonlycalled"philosophicalproblems."Giventhecentralconcernofphilosophywiththewholeoflife
andtheworldandtherestrictionofitsactivitytothoughtratherthanactionintheordinarysense,theseproblemstendtoberemotefromoureverydaypractical
interests.Thisremotenessmakesithardertofindtherightquestionstoaskandsotheformulationofphilosophicalproblemsandtheexplanationoftheirrelevanceto
practicalconcerns,whichmotivatesoureffortstosolvethem,hasbecomeasubstantive,integralpartofthestudyofphilosophydistinguishingitfromother
disciplines.

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Chapter4
TheConversationsandTheirBackground
Inpresentingtheseconversations,youshouldpayattentiontothreeprinciples:(1)dealonlywithcertainpoints(2)separateouttheimportantandthenewand(3)payattention
toconnections.
Gdel,5February1976
Knowthenthyself,presumenotGodtoscan:TheproperstudyofmankindisMan.
AlexanderPope,"TheRapeoftheLock"

TheconversationsbetweenGdelandmetouchedonmanyaspectsofphilosophy.Givenourdifferentworldviews,basedonourdifferencesinknowledgeand
experience,Iwasnotalwaysabletoappreciatethegroundsoreventhecontent,ofsomeofhisstrongconvictions.Wedid,however,shareaninterestinanda
familiaritywithissuesinthefoundationsofmathematics.Itisthereforenotsurprisingthatourdiscussionsinthisareaweremostextensiveandsocanserveasapointof
referenceforinterpretingandunderstandinghisotherobservations,whichIoftenfindcrypticandabrupt.
InthischapterIsummarizemycontactswithGdelandpresentsomeofhismoreorlessscatteredobservationsonavarietyofissues.Inordertoprepareamoreor
lesscoherentreportofwhatGdelsaidtome,Ihavesplitupouractualconversationsintoaboutfivehundredsegments,someofwhichcontaindisparateparts.These
fragmentsformthebasisofmyreconstructioninthisbook.SinceIdonothaveaverbatimrecordofGdel'sownwords,thereareboundtobemisrepresentations.I
haveleftoutsomesegmentsthatareoverlytechnicalorhardtointerpretandinsertedtheremainingsegmentsindifferentchaptersaccordingtotheirsubjectmatter.

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4.1ActualandImaginaryConversations
InNovemberof1971GdeltalkedabouthisCarnappaperandexplainedwhyhehaddecidednottohaveitpublished.Ashesawit,hehadshowninthispaperthat
mathematicsisnotsyntaxoflanguage,buthehadnotbeenabletogiveanaccountofwhatmathematicsis:"Theissueisnotsomuchmathematics.Youcannot
understandwhatmathematicsiswithoutunderstandingknowledgeingeneralyoucannotunderstandwhatknowledgeiswithoutunderstandingtheworldingeneral."
HestatedthemattermorespecificallyinalettertoSchilpp,writtenatthebeginningof1959:hehaddecidednottopublishhisCarnappaperbecausehehadfailedto
attainacompleteelucidationof"thequestionoftheobjectiverealityofconceptsandtheirrelations."
IhaveencounteredananalogousobstacleafeelingofconceptualincompletenessinworkingoverandreflectingonmyconversationswithGdelinthe1970s.I
havereconstructedtheseconversationsinseveralversions,basedonveryincompletenotes,inaneffort(onlypartiallysuccessful)tointerpretthemandplacethemin
perspective.
ToconveysomegraspofGdel'sgeneraloutlookandtoindicatewhyIagreewithhimonsomepointsbutnotonothers,itseemsnecessarytoarticulatesomethingof
myowngeneraloutlook.Becausetherearemajordifferencesbetweenouroutlooks,myattempttopresenttheconversationsinapubliccontextinvolvesmeina
continualquestioningabouthoweitheroutlookwouldlookfromthestandpointoftheother.ThismeansthatIhavebeencontrivingimaginaryconversationsbetween
Gdelandme.Althoughmuchofone'sphilosophicalthinkingingeneralconsistsofsilentorimplicitdiscussionswithotherphilosopherswhoseviewsonehas
absorbed,thetalenttocommunicatesuchdiscussionsasintelligibledialoguesisrare.
Plato'sdialoguesarethestandardmodelforimaginaryphilosophicalconversations.TherearealsoimaginaryexchangesinmanyofWittgenstein'slaterwritings
betweenaproponentofsomefamiliarphilosophicalviewandaninterlocutor.AndLeibnizadoptsthedialogueforminhisNewEssaytocontrastLocke'sviewswith
hisown.Thesefamousexamplesrevealthegreaterflexibilityofdialoguesovermonologuesinenablingthereadertoweightthecomparativemeritsofalternativeviews
andtoseemoredirectlythevariousinterlinkedcomponentstypicallyinvolvedinaphilosophicaldisagreement.
Actualconversationsareusuallylesswellstructuredthaninventeddialoguesandarehardtoreproduceforthebenefitofothers.Theyarehappazardanddepend
stronglyontheircontingentcontexts(suchasthesharedbackgroundoftheparticipants),whicharehardtocounterbalancebymakingexplicitalltheimplicit
assumptions.Accordingly,inorderto

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reconstructmyextensiveconversationswithGdel,Ihavehadtodescribemuchoftheircontext,includingnotonlyknowledgepresupposedbythembutalsocertain
writtentexts.Anindicationofthespecificcircumstancessurroundingtheconversationsshouldclarifythispoint.
MostofmyactualconversationswithGdeltookplacebetweenOctoberof1971andDecemberof1972,inregularsessionsinhisofficeandfromOctoberof1975
toJuneof1976,usuallyonthetelephone.TheyconsistedprimarilyofmyeffortstolearnGdel'sviewsonvariousissuesandofhiscommentsonmaterialwrittenby
me.EvenwhenIdidnotunderstandwhathesaid,ordisagreedwithit,Ididmybesttoformulatedefiniteresponsestoit,soastogetthepointsclear.
ForthelastdecadeorsoIhavethoughtagreatdealaboutwhathesaidtome,aswellasabouthisrelevantwritings,publishedandunpublished.IntheprocessIhave
comeupwithnewquestionsandcommentsonwhatItaketobehisthoughts.Thesenewobservationsconstituteasortofimaginaryconversationwithhim.Hiswritten
andoralresponsestovariousofmyownwritingsareyetotherkindsofconversations,asarehistwolettersof1967and1968(seeWang1974a:811),which
respondedtoadraftofmySkolempaper.From1971to1972hecommentedextensivelyondraftsofmyFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(hereafterMP).From
1975to1976hediscussedwithmeseveraldraftsofmypaper''LargeSets."Followingeachofthese"conversations,"Iwroteuphisideasinmyownwords,andwe
discussedthefragmentsIhadthusproduced.
Inviewofthiscomplexbackgroundofinteractionsandpreparations,IhaveconcludedthatthemostpromisingwaytoclarifywhatGdelsaidtomeistodiscussitin
thecontextofhisworkandwhatItaketobehisgeneraloutlook.Thisisaformidabletask.Hetoldmehehadnotdevelopedhisownoutlookfarenoughtopresentit
systematically,butthathecouldapplyitincommentingonmywork.Forthesamereasonheoftenchosetoconsidertheviewsofotherphilosophersasawayof
puttingforwardhisownthoughts.Iliketothinkofmyextensiveeffortstoconsiderhisworkandhisviewsasanattemptonmyparttodothesamesortofthing.
NowandthenGdelmentionedthingsofinteresttomewhichseemedrelatedtowhatwehaddiscussedonsomepreviousoccasion.WhenIaskedhimwhyhehad
notsaidthesethingsbefore,hewouldreply,"Butyoudidnotaskme."Iinterpretthisresponsetoimplythat,sincehehadsomanyideasonsomanythings,he
preferredtolimithisremarkstowhatwasstrictlyrelevanttotheimmediatecontext.Oneconsequenceofthiswasthatheavoidedtopicsandviewsonwhichhedid
notbelievetherewasasharedinterest,orevensomeempathy.InthisrespecthewasnotunlikeWittgenstein,whooncesaidtoSchickthathecouldtalkonlywith
someonewho,sotospeak,"heldhishand."

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IhadbeentoldthatGdelhaddeclinedHarvard'sinvitationtogivetheWilliamJamesLectures.WhenIaskedhimwhy,hegavemetworeasons:(1)hewasnot
willingtolecturetoahostileaudience(2)hisideasdeservedfurthercarefuldevelopmentbuthehadnotdevelopedthemsufficientlytobeabletoanswerobjections.
MorethanoncehespokeofmyMPasthe"mostunprejudiced"workinrecentphilosophyIoftenwonderwhetherthisjudgmentofhiswasunprejudicedandnotjust
aresultofhisfindingmyviewscongenial,oratleastunobjectionable.Weprobablydidshareatentativenessinourviewsandastrongdesiretounderstandand
toleratealternativepositions,perhapsbecauseweboth,fordifferentreasons,feltlikeoutsidersincurrentphilosophy.Ontheotherhand,thisattempttobe
unprejudicedmayalsobeareasonwhyMPisnotamoreeffectivework.
Gdel'sdesiretoshunconflictalsoaffectedhispublishedwork.Hewouldmakegreateffortstopresenthisideasinsuchaformthatpeoplewithdifferentperspectives
couldallappreciatethem(indifferentways).Whenhefeltthathisviewswouldreceivealargelyunsympatheticresponse,heusuallyrefrainedfrompublishingthem.
Morethanoncehesaidthatthepresentagewasnotagoodoneforphilosophy.Thismayexplain,inpart,whyeventhoughhehadbyhisownadmissionexpended
moreeffortonphilosophythanonmathematicallogicortheoreticalphysics,hehadpublishedlessinphilosophy.
Inseveralofourdiscussionshestressedtheimportanceoftheologyforphilosophyand,onceortwice,offeredtotalkaboutFreud,sayingthatthereisawayto
presentFreud'sideasmorepersuasivelysothattheycanbeseentoconstitutea"theory."AsIwasnotinterestedineithertheologyorFreudatthetime,hedidnot
expandonthesesubjects.(WhenIbecameinterestedinFreudin1982,IregrettedthatIhadnotmadeuseofmyearlieropportunitytolearnaboutGdel'sideason
Freud.)Similarly,hewouldhavebeenwilling,hadItakentheinitiative,todiscussmoreextensivelyhistheologicalviewsandhisideasontimeandchange.These
circumstancesareevidenceofthefactthatGdel'sconversationswithmebynomeanscoveredthewholerangeofhisphilosophicalinterests.
4.2MyContactswithGdelandHisWork
In1939,asacollegefreshmaninChina,IauditedProfessorWangSianjun'scourseonsymboliclogicandmetGdel'snameforthefirsttime,inconnectionwithhis
completenessproofforpredicatelogic.In1941,IcameacrossapopulararticleinEnglishinwhichGdel'sworkwaspraised,andtranslateditintoChinese.Butit
wasonlyinthespringof1949,whenIhadanopportunitytoteachMathematics281atHarvard,thatIdecidedtomasterGdel'sincompletenesstheoremsby
teachingthem.

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AtsomestageIwasstruckbytheapparentlyparadoxicalsituationconnectedwiththerelationbetweenasystemS(dealingwithintegersandsetsofintegers)andits
(weak)secondorderextensionT.TheconsistencyofScanbeprovedinT.Moreover,ifSisconsistent,ithas,bytheLwenheimSkolemtheorem,acountable
modeland,therefore,amodeldealingwithintegersonly.Hence,sinceSalsoincludessetsofintegers,weseemtoobtainamodelofTinS,undertheassumptionthat
Sisconsistent.Inotherwords,wegettheconclusionthatTisconsistentifSis.Consequently,weseemtoobtaininTaproofofitsownconsistency,contradicting
Gdel'ssecondtheorem(unlessTisinconsistent).Therefore,classicalanalysiswouldbeinconsistent.
Primarilyinordertoseekclarificationofthispuzzlingsituation,IwrotetoGdelon7July1949askingtoseehim.Imetwithhimforthefirsttimeafewdayslaterin
hislarge,ratherbareofficeonthegroundfloorofFuldHallatPrinceton.(IhadspokenwithhimbytelephoneinFebruaryofthatyear.)
AtthismeetingIexplainedmylineofthoughttoGdel.Hepointedoutthatthereisanambiguityinthenotionofmodelintheaboveargument.ButIdidnotgrasphis
ideaandcontinuedtotrytoformalizethestepsinvolved.InJanuaryof1950IcompletedamanuscriptonthesubjectandsentittoPaulBernaysandtoBarkley
Rosserforscrutiny.Bernayswasconvincedbytheargument,buteventuallyRossernoticedthattheintegersinSandTaredefineddifferently.OnlythendidIrealize
thatthedifficultywasasGdelhadsuggested.Sincethecomponentsoftheargumentareofsomeinterest,theywerelaterpublished(Wang1951a,1951b,and
1952).
Ontheeveningof26December1951,IattendedGdel'sGibbsLecturetotheAmericanMathematicalSocietyatBrownUniversity.Onthisoccasionhereadhis
manuscriptsorapidlythatIcouldnotcapturemuchofwhathewassaying.HeconcludedthelecturebyreadingafairlylongquotationinFrenchfromHermite.
InJune1952,whenGdelcametoHarvardwithhiswifeAdeletoacceptanhonorarydegree,IwaspresentatW.V.Quine'sdinnerpartyforthem.Onthis
occasion,AdelewasimpressedbythefriendlinessofthecolleaguesgatheredthereandurgedGdeltomovetoHarvard.Shealsoexpressedaninterestincollecting
newspaperreportsoftheawardceremony,whichIafterwardsobtainedanddeliveredtoher.
Inthe1950sIoccasionallyspokewithGdelbytelephoneandsawhimonceortwiceathissmallofficeinFuldHallnexttothelibrary.ItwasprobablyinAugustof
1956thatKreiseltookmetotheGdels'homeonLindenLanefortea.IrememberthatwetalkedaboutAlanTuring'ssuicide.Gdel'sfirstquestionwas:"Was
Turingmarried?"Afterreceivinganegativeanswertothequestion,hesaid,"MaybeTuringwantedbutfailedtogetmarried."ThenexttimeIsawGdelwas,I
believe,more

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thanfifteenyearslater,on13October1971,whenwebeganourregulardiscussionsessions.
MyclosecontactwithGdelbeganmoreorlessaccidentally.Around1965IwasinvitedtowriteanintroductiontoThoralfSkolem'scollectedpapersinlogic,andI
decidedtomakeacarefulsurveyofallhisworkinlogic.On14September1967IsentGdeladraftofthisessayandaskedforhiscomments.Thepartofthepaper
thatdirectlyconcernsGdel'sownworkdealswiththeroleofSkolem'sworkinarrivingattheproofofthecompletenessofpredicatelogic,oneofGdel'smajor
results.
Sinceabout1950IhadbeenstruckbythefactthatallthepiecesinGdel'sproofhadapparentlybeenavailableearlierintheworkofSkolem.InmydraftIexplained
thisfactandsaidthatGdelhaddiscoveredthetheoremindependentlyandgivenitanattractivetreatment.
On7December1967Gdelreplied,statingthathislateresponsewasduetohisdifficultyinfindingtheappropriateperspectiveformakingclearthenoveltyofhis
owncontribution.Hewasunhappywithmyinterpretation:"Yousay,ineffect,thatthecompletenesstheoremisattributedtomeonlybecauseofmyattractive
treatment.Perhapsitlooksthisway,ifthesituationisviewedfromthepresentstateoflogic."Hewentontodistinguishbetweenthemathematicalandthe
philosophicalsidesofthematterandtospeakmoregenerallyabouttherolehisphilosophicalviewsplayedinhisworkinmathematicallogic.
Gdel'spointwasthattheresultwasrightlyattributedtohimbecausehewastheonewhohadthe"requiredepistemologicalattitude"todrawtheconclusion,even
thoughthestepwas,mathematically,"almosttrivial."Iwasconvincedbyhisexplanationandrevisedmydraftinthelightofit.Therevisedversionwaslaterpublished
inSkolem'sSelectedLogicalWorks(1970).Inhisletter,GdelalsocontrastedhisownandSkolem'sepistemologicalviews,withspecialreferencetoSkolem's
1929monograph(reprintedinSkolem1970:227273).
4.2.1Skolem'sepistemologicalviewswere,insomesense,diametricallyopposedtomyown.Forexample,onp.253,evidentlybecauseofthetransfinitecharacterofthe
completenessquestion,hetriedtoeliminateit,insteadofansweringit,usingtothisendanewdefinitionoflogicalconsequence,whoseideaexactlywastoavoidtheconceptof
mathematicaltruth.Moreoverhewasafirmbelieverinsettheoreticalrelativismandinthesterilityoftransfinitereasoningforfinitaryquestions(seep.273).

On19December1967IwrotetoGdeltoaskmorequestions,someofthemphilosophicalquestionsofamoregeneralcharacter.Hemarkedthisletter
"wissenschaftlichinteressant,"indicatingthathewasinterestedindiscussingthequestionsitraised.
On7March1968Gdelsentmeanotherletterbothtoelaborateandqualifysomeaspectsofhispreviousletterandtoreplytosomequestions

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directlyrelevanttoit.Theletterconcludeswithapromise:"UnfortunatelyIwasverybusythepastfewweekswithrewritingoneofmypreviouspapers.ButIhopeto
beablesoontoanswertheotherquestionsraisedinyourletterofDecember19."TherewritinghereferredtowasevidentlyhispaperonfinitarymathematicsinGdel
1990:271280,305306,hereafterCW2).
InJanuaryof1970IplannedtovisitGdelinPrincetonbut,throughsomeconfusion,themeetingdidnotmaterialize.On25May1971Iwrotetoaskpermissionto
quoteaportionofhisletterof7December1967inwhatwastobecomemybookFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(MP).Soonafterward,hehadStanley
Tennenbaumgivemehisfavorableresponse.On9July,hewrotetomedirectly:"AsyouprobablyhaveheardfromProfessorTennenbaumalready,Ihaveno
objectionwhatsoevertoyourpublishingmyletterofDecember7,1967.Infact,Iamverymuchinfavorofthesethingsbecominggenerallyknown.Ionlyhaveto
requirethatyoualsopublishmyletterofMarch7,1968."Thiswasfollowedbyalistofdetailedinstructionsonhowthequotationsweretobepresented.(Themain
portionsofthetwolettersareinMP:811,inaccordancewithhisinstructions.)Towardtheendoftheletter,hesaid:"Iamsorrythat,inconsequenceofmyillness,
ourmeeting,proposedforJanuary1970,nevermaterialized.Ishallbeverygladtoseeyousometimethisyearatyourconvenience."
IthenproposedthathecommentonadraftofMP.Afterreceivingit,hesentmearequest"tomentiontomethepassageswheremynameoccurs."Ipointedtothree
partswhichwereextensivelyconcernedwithhispublishedwork:(1)ChapterVI,theconceptofset(2)ChapterII,section3,mechanicalproceduresand(3)
ChapterX,section6,mathematicalarguments(onmindsandmachines).
Hemusthavereadthesepartsveryclosely.Wedidnotbegintomeetimmediately,butoncewestartedourregularsessions,hecommented(forseveralmonths)
extensivelyonthesesectionsandcontributedhisownviewsto"enrich"(hisword)them.Hecontributed(1)analternativeaccountoftheaxiomofreplacement(p.
186)andfiveprinciplesforsettingupaxiomsofsettheory(pp.189190)(2)anewsection3.1(pp.8486)and(3)anewsection7(pp.324326).Inaddition,
becausehistwolettersareincludedintheIntroduction,hecommentedonthatandcontributedsomeadditionalobservations(pp.813).
Gdelpreferredtopresenthiscontributionsintheformofindirectquotations,althoughthisdidnotpreventhimfromgoingthroughseveralstagesofrevisionand
deletion.Manyofthealternativeformulations,discussions,andlongerexplanationsheprovidedweredeletedinthepublishedversion.Irestoresomeofthemin
severalchaptersofthisbook.Inthefollowingaccount,Iorganizemychronologicalreviewofthediscussionsaroundmynotesofthevariousconversations.

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BecauseIspentthesummerof1971intheBostonarea,myfirstmeetingwithGdeldidnottakeplaceuntiltheautumn,on13October.Herecalledthatwehadlast
metathishousemorethantenyearsearlier.BetweenOctoberof1971andDecemberof1972wemetquiteregularlyinhisofficenexttothenewlibrary,usuallyon
Wednesdaysfrom11:00A.M.tobetween1:00and1:30P.M.Accordingtomyrecords,wehadtwentysuchsessions(fivein1971andfifteenin1972).Gdelgaveme
permissiontotakenotes.Forthefirstsession,becauseIhadneglectedtobringapenorapencil,hesharpenedapencilformetouse.FriendshadsuggestedthatI
shouldbringataperecorder,butatthattimeIdidnotfindtheideacongenialanddidnotproposeit.
Usuallybothofusarrivedearly.WhileIstayeddownstairsinthelibraryGdelwenttogetwatertotakehismedicine.Heusuallybroughtslipsofpapertoremind
himselfofthethingshewishedtotalkabout,andItookdownasmuchofthesubstanceofhisobservationsasIcould.OftenIattemptedtoreorganizethenotes
shortlyafterwardandpreparedquestionsforthenextsession.Nonetheless,mynotesremaininaveryunsatisfactorystate,andthebestwaytoputthemintouseful
formisnotentirelyclear.
Inordertopreserveascompletearecordaspossible,IhavereconstructedasmanyofGdel'sobservationsasIcouldfromeachsession.Evenso,therearemany
observationsthatIamnotabletoacceptorevenunderstandweundoubtedlygavedifferentmeaningstosomeofthecrucialwords,andsomeofhisstatementsmay
bemetaphoricalortentativeincharacter.Unreliableastheserecordsare,asympatheticreaderwill,Ibelieve,findthemstimulating.Theymayalsobeusefultofuture
scholars.
Afterafewmeetings,OskarMorgensterncalledmetosaythatGdelenjoyedthesesessionsverymuchOskaralsoaskedmetotrytolearnmoreaboutthecontent
ofthelargemassofGdel'snoteswritteninGabelsbergershorthand(inGerman).WhenIaskedGdelaboutthesenotes,hesaidwithasmilethattheywereonlyfor
hisownuse.Onseveraloccasionsheproposedtoletmeseesomeofhisunpublishedmanuscripts,butineachcasehetoldmeatthenextsessionthathehad
examinedthemanuscriptandfounditnotyetinaformfittobeshown.(Incidentally,atthebeginningofoneofthesessions,onabeautifulspringdayin1972,
MorgensterncamewithmetoGdel'sofficeandtookseveralphotosofGdelandmetogether.)
ForthesessionsuptoJuneof1972,thetimewasdividedintothreeparts:generalphilosophicaldiscussions,considerationsofmymanuscript,andGdel's
contributions(withrepeatedrevisions).AfterthebookmanuscriptwassentawayinJune,thelasttwopartswerelargelydropped.IthensuggestedtoGdelthathe
simplytellmeabouthisphilosophicalviewsinasystematicmanner.Hereplied,however,thathehadnot

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yetdevelopedhisphilosophytothepointofbeingabletolectureonit.Hecouldonlyapplyitinmorespecificcontexts,forinstance,tomakecommentsonviews
offeredbyothers.Ihavebeenstruckbythisdistinctionthathedrewandbelieveitisimportant.Itmayalso,inpart,explainwhyheneverasfarasIknowprepareda
systematicexpositionofhisphilosophy.
Afterthesummerof1972IspentseveralyearstryingtolearnaboutMarxism.(Atonepoint,mycollegeteacherYutingShenurgedmetodropthiseffortand
concentrateonlearningphilosophyfromGdel.ButIdidnot,atthattime,followhisadvice.)Ialsodidsomeworkrelatedtocomputersin19731974.
Inthesummerof1975Ibecameavisitor(foraboutfifteenmonths)attheInstituteforAdvancedStudyandresumedextensivecontactwithGdel.Mostofour
conversationswerebytelephonebecausehehadbasicallystoppedgoingtohisoffice.Isenthimwrittenversionsofsomepartsofourdiscussionssothathecould
commentontheminournexttelephonecall.Someofmyreportsofhissayingsinthisbookare,thereforeinaformthatheapprovedofotherpartshereadbutwas
notsatisfiedwith,eventhoughherecognizedthemashisownstatements.(Inthesecasesheseemedtoexpect,orhope,thatIwouldcomeupwithaclearer
expositionthanhisown.)Stillotherpartswereneverseenbyhim.Therefore,heprobablywouldnothavewishedtopublishmuchofthematerialintheformI"quote,"
anditisquitepossiblethatthereareplaceswhereIammistakenaboutwhatheactuallysaid.
IhavemadenoseriousattempttolookintoGdel'sNachlass,which,onmanypoints,maycontainbetterpresentationsthanmineorprovidemoreextendedcontexts
whichmayevenprovesomeofmyreports,cuminterpretation,tobemistaken.Inaddition,comparedwithmostpeople,Gdelseemstohavemadeamuchgreater
separationbetweenwhathewaswillingtosayinconversationandwhathewaswillingtopublishthinkingintermsofboththequalityofthecontentandthe
necessaryqualificationsandreceptivityofhisreaders.SowhatIreportinthisbookmustbeunderstoodcumgranosalis.WhileIfindGdel'sstrongpreferencefor
brevityadmirable,Idonotthinkitadvisableforotherstoimitatehisstyleinthisrespect.Particularlyinthisattempttoreporthisviewsfully,Idonotstriveforbrevity,
andoftenincludeseveralofGdel'sslightlydifferentformulationsofonepoint,inhopesofreducingthedangerofgrossmisrepresentation.
4.3ChronologyandMiscellany:1971to1972
Gdel'sdiscussionswithmeincludedbothscatteredobservationsandcontinuedelaborationsofseveralaspectsofhisbasicphilosophical

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viewpoint.Itis,notsurprisingly,difficulttodrawasharpboundarybetweenthetwocategories.Ipresentinthissectionboththesomewhatisolatedobservationsand
anoutlineofthechronologicalevolutionofthemoreintricateconsiderationselaboratedinseparateotherchapters.
AsIsaidbefore,theearlydiscussionswerebasedonseveralpartsofabookmanuscriptIlaterpublishedasFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(MP).Clearly,itis
moreconvenienttorefertothepublishedtextthantotheoriginalmanuscript,andIhavefollowedthispractice.
13.10.71Gdelbeganthediscussionsbyconsideringmyexaminationoftheformalizationoranalysisorexplicationorunderstandingorperceptionoftheintuitiveconceptof
mechanicalprocedureorofwhatwemeanbythewordmechanicalorcomputable(compareMP:81102).TheexaminationwascenteredonTuring'sdefinitionofmechanical
procedures.GdelwantedtousethisexampletosupporthisPlatonism(inmathematics),thatis,hisbeliefthatconceptsaresharpandthatwearecapableofperceivingthemmore
andmoreclearly.Inaddition,hebegantoargueforhisthesisthatmindorspiritisnot(equivalentto)matterandissuperiortocomputers.

Thesearetwoofthemaintopicsofourcontinueddiscussions.WhatGdelsaidaboutthemwillbereportedindetailinChapters6and7.HereIpresentonlythe
incidentalobservations.
Withregardtomyremarksonspeedfunctionsandordinalrecursions(MP:98),Gdelcommented:
4.3.1Thespeedandtheordinalapproachesshouldcomeoutthesame.Fasterandfasterincreasingfunctionshelptodefinedistinguishedordinalnotations.Selfreferenceand
"catchingpoints"arerelevanthere.

Gdelwasinfavorofmetaphysicsandopposedtopositivism.WhenIaskedhimabouttheworkofSaulKripke,hesaid:
4.3.2Kripkeis,thoughnotapositivist,stilldoinglinguisticphilosophy.
27.10.71InthissessionGdeldiscussedmyquestionsaboutthedistinctionbetweenmechanicalandmaterialandabouthisstatementthatphysicsisfinitary.heapprovedand
extendedmycriticismsofpositivism(compareMP:7),distinguishedsemanticfromintensionalparadoxes,talkedabouttheaxiomofreplacement,anddefendedtheappealto
intuition.Healsomadeanumberofincidentalobservations,mostlyinanswertomyquestions.
4.3.3CharlesHartshorneisanexampleofacontemporarymetaphysician.

WhenIaskedwhetherwecancomparetheevolutionofmathematicalconceptswiththedevelopmentoffictionalcharactersinthemindofanovelist,Gdelobserved:
4.3.4Fictionalcharactersareempirical.Incontrast,theconceptofset,forinstance,isnotobtainedbyabstractionfromexperience.Kantwasright:ourexperience

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presupposescertainconcepts,whichdonotcomefromexperience.Wearriveatsuchconceptscauseandeffect,forinstanceonlyontheoccasionofexperience.Theparallel
betweenthisandcomingfromexperienceoftenleadstoawronginference.
4.3.5Categorytheoryisbuiltupforthepurposeofprovingsettheoryinadequate.Itismoreinterestedinfeasibleformulationsofcertainmathematicalargumentswhichapparently
useselfreference.Settheoryapproachescontradictionstogetitsstrength.

AcolleagueofminehadsuggestedthatIaskGdelabouthisreactiontothe"PolyaWeylwager."Thiswagerwassetin1918(seeMP:248)inMorrisSchreiber's
Englishtranslation,itgoesasfollows:
BetweenG.PolyaandH.Weylabetisherebymade,accordingtothespecificationsbelow.Concerningboththefollowingtheoremsofcontemporarymathematics
(1)

Everyboundedsetofnumbershasaleastupperbound.

(2)

Everyinfinitesetofnumbershasacountablesubset.
Weylprophesies:
A.Within20years(thatis,bytheendof1937),Polyahimself,oramajorityoftheleadingmathematicians,willadmitthattheconceptsofnumber,set,andcountability,whichare
involvedinthesetheoremsanduponwhichwetodaycommonlydepend,arecompletelyvagueandthatthereisnomoreuseinaskingafterthetruthorfalsityoftheretheorems
intheircurrentlyacceptedsensethanthereisinconsideringthetruthofthemainassertionsofHegel'sphysics.
B.ItwillberecognizedbyPolyahimself,orbyamajorityoftheleadingmathematicians,that,inanywording,theorems(1)and(2)arefalse,accordingtoanyrationallypossible
clearinterpretation(eitherdistinctsuchinterpretationswillbeunderdiscussion,oragreementwillalreadyhavebeenreached)orthatifitcomestopasswithintheallottedtime
thanaclearinterpretationofthesetheoremsinfoundsuchthatatleastoneofthemistrue,thentherewillhavebeenacreativeachievementthroughwhichthefoundationof
mathematicswillhavetakenanewandoriginalturn,andtheconceptsofnumberandsetwillhaveacquiredmeaningswhichwetodaycannotimagine.
Weylwinsiftheprophecyisfulfilledotherwise,Polyawins.Ifattheendoftheallottedtimetheycannotagreewhohaswon,thentheprofessorsofmathematics(excludingthe
bettors)attheE.T.H.andattheUniversitiesofZurich,Gttingen,andBerlin,willbecalledtositinjudgementwhichjudgmentistobereachedbymajorityandincaseofatie,
thebetistoberegardedasundecided.
Thelosingpartytakesituponhimselftopublish,intheJahresberichtenderDeutschenMathematikerVereinigung,athisownexpense,theconditionsofthebet,andthefact
thathelost.

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Zurich,February9,1918.
[H.Weyl][G.Polya]
Theconsummationofthebetisherebyattested:
Zurich,February9,1918.
(Witnesses)

Whenthebetwascalledin1940,everyone,withGdelasthesoleexception,declaredPolyathewinner.Weyl'sprophesywasnotfulfilled.Gdelexplainedhis
dissentingvote,withthequalificationthatWeylhadoverstatedtheimpliedposition:
4.3.6Itaketheissuetobe:Whetherin1938aleadingmathematicianwouldthinkthattheconceptofsetcanbemadesufficientlyclear,not[whetherheorshewouldthink]thatthe
conceptofsetisanadequatefoundationofmathematics.Ibelievethatmathematiciansarewaveringbetweenthetwopointsofviewontheissueand,therefore,veryfewofthem
haveastrongopiniononewayortheother.
10.11.71Gdelcontinuedthediscussiononmindsandmachines,ontheperceptionofconcepts,andontheepistemologyofsettheory.Healsobegantotalkabout
phenomenology.
24.11.71GdelcontinuedwithcommentsonthedraftoftheintroductiontoMP.HesaidmoreaboutHusserlandtalkedaboutthenatureoflogic,theparadoxesintrospection,
andtherelationoflanguagetophilosophy.
GdeltoldmethatOskarMorgensternwantedacopyofmydraftofFromMathematicstoPhilosophy.IlatersentMorgensternacopy,andhecalledmeon6Decemberand13
Decembertotellmeseveralthings:GdelenjoyedhisdiscussionswithmeGdelandhewereoldfriendsfromViennawhosaweachotheroftenGdelhadagreatdealof
philosophicalwritingsinaGermanshorthandandGdelhadanEnglishtranslationofhisBernayspaperwithalongnewfootnote.
6.12.71Inreplytoaquestionofmine,Gdeltalkedabouthisviewsonthenatureoflogic.HediscussedKantandHusserl,hisownrationalisticoptimism,andsomedifferences
betweenmindsandmachines.

Inreplytomyquestionabouthisshorthandnotes,Gdelsaid:
4.3.7TheyareformyownuseonlyandnotforcirculationtheyarelikeWittgenstein'sZettel.

Attheendofthesessionweagreedtomeetagainon20December.Ontheeveningof19December,however,Gdeltelephonedmetopostponethemeetingto5
January.
5.1.72GdeltalkedaboutHusserl,settheory,positivismandobjectivism,theconceptofcreation,andthephilosophicalimplicationsofhisinexhaustibilitytheorems.Inaddition,
hecommentedonmyincidentalquestion:whethermodeltheoryhassomebroaderphilosophicalinterest:

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4.3.8Wehavetoconsiderforthispurposeageneraltheoryofrepresentationsinmathematics,acompleterepresentationofsomecategory,suchasfinitegroupsbymatrices,or
Booleanalgebras.Representationsareveryimportantmathematicallyfromthepointof[viewof]solvingproblems.Forexample,whetheratheoremfollowsfromtheaxiomsin
numbertheoryoranalysisisaquestionoftherepresentationofallmodelsoftheaxioms.Ifwegettherepresentationofalltheirmodels,wecandecidederivabilitybymodels.
Beginningwithagivenaxiomsystem,wecanalsoaddnewaxioms.Moresystematicmethods[ofaddingaxioms]thanthoseavailablesofarwillbefoundinthisway[byfinding
therepresentationofallmodels?].Fromthestandpointofidealisticphilosophy,suchrepresentationsareveryimportant.Forinstance,Hegelbeganwiththeoppositionof
somethingandnothing.[IwonderwhetherGdelhadinmindtheideaofbeginningwithsomethingandnothingastheextremecasesofrepresentationsofatautologyanda
contradiction,fromwhichwegetothersystemsbyaddingandtakingawayaxioms.]
4.3.9Theaxiomscorrespondtotheconcepts,andthemodelswhichsatisfythemcorrespondtotheobjects.Therepresentationsgivetherelationbetweenconceptsandobjects.
ForSpinozatheconnectionofthingsaretheconnectionsofideas.Tworepresentationsofthesamethingareconformal.Forexample,wehaveacorrelationinthegeometryof3
spacebetweenpointsandplanes.Theyaresorelatedthatwecantakepointsasobjectsandplanesasconcepts,ortheotherwayround.Wehavehereageneralproportionality
ofthemembershiprelation(theconcept)andthesets(theobjects).Theoriginaldifferenceisthatconceptsareabstractandobjectsareconcrete.Inthecaseofsettheory,both
themembershiprelationandthesetsareabstract,butsetsaremoreconcrete.Numbersappearlessconcretethansets.Theyhavedifferentrepresentations[bysets]andarewhat
iscommontoallrepresentations.Butweoperatewithnumbersinconcreteways:[forexample,weaddormultiplybythinkingof]acollectionoftwoindeterminatethings.With
largenumbersweuseidealizationandextrapolation.
19.1.72GdelmainlycommentedonthedraftoftheintroductiontoMP.Thetwosubstantivequestionsheraised(tobediscussedinChapters5and8)havetodowith
positivism:itsrelationtothespecialtheoryofrelativityandtoHilbert'sproposedproofofthecontinuumhypothesis.Healsocommentedon''Wittgenstein'stwo
philosophies"(MP:13discussedinChapter5).

IaskedGdeltonamesomerecentphilosopherswhomhefoundcongenial.Inreply,hesaid:
4.3.10WilliamHenrySheldonatYale,whowasstillaliveafewyearsback,C.Hartshorne,andJosiahRoyce.ButthefollowersofSheldonarenotsogoodtheytendtobemore
positivistic.Sheldonwantedtoreviveidealisticphilosophy.HartshorneisinthetraditionofthescholasticshemustaddwhathasbeendonebythefollowersofLeibniz.

IthenaskedhimaboutBrandBlanshardandA.N.Whitehead,andhesaid:

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4.3.11BlanshardisnotasgoodasSheldon,beingmorepositivisticWhitehead'stheoriesarefarfetchedandtoocomplicated.

Gdelcommentedonmydiscussionofthe"bigbook"idea(MP:357358).(ThisideahadbeensuggestedbyWittgensteininhislectureonethics.)Inconnectionwith
myphrase"thepeculiarplaceofethicsrelativetoourpossibleknowledge,"Gdelstressedthatsomethinghasvalueforsomebody.Hesaidthat"Thelinebetween
valueandfactisnotsharp"doesnotfollowform"Determiningbasicaspirationswouldseemtorelatefactstovalues.''
GdelhadrecommendedHusserl'sIdeastome,andItriedtoreadit.Notbeingsufficientlymotivated,Ifoundittoolongwinded.Gdelthoughtthatthedifficultstyle
wasdeliberateinordertopreventthereaderfromgettingtheillusionofunderstandingthetext.
2.2.72Thissessionwasdevotedtosettheory,JacquesHerbrand'sdefinitionsofcomputablefunctions,andHilbert'sideasonthecontinuumhypothesis.Attheendofthe
sessionGdelsaidwewouldmeetagaininthree,ratherthantwoweeks.

IaskedaboutGdel'sopenquestiononHerbrand'sseconddefinitionofrecursiveness(seeGdel1986:368,n.34andMP:8788).Inreplyhesaid:
4.3.12Weshoulddistinguishintuitionisticgeneralrecursiveness(R),intuitionisticcomputability(C),andintuitionisticcomputabilityfromsomefinitesetofequations(F).Ris
includedinF,andFisincludedinC.TheopenquestioniswhetherRisidenticalwithF.AslightlymoregeneralquestioniswhetherRisidenticalwithC.

AboutthistimeGdelreceivedaninvitationfromtheRockefellerUniversitytoacceptanhonorarydoctorateinJune.Heaskedmetosendhimsomeinformation
abouttheuniversity.Iproposedtosendhim,inaddition,somematerialaboutWittgenstein'slaterwork.TheletterIsenthimon9Februaryillustratesthepatternof
ourcommunicationbetweensessions:
AfterourmeetingonFebruary2,IhavesentyousomepublishedinformationaboutthisuniversityandalsoacopyofMoore'sreportonWittgenstein'slecturesof19301933.
Ihavefurtherrevisedthechapteronsetsandthesectiononmechanicalprocedures.Iencloseherewithasetoftheserevisions.Ifeelparticularlyuncertainabouttherevisions
madeonthematerialaboutsets.Theymayeasilycontaininaccuraciesandmistakes.Ihavetriedtoindicateonthecoveringsheettheplaceswhichcontainreferencestoyou,as
wellastheplaceswhereIfeelinsecure.
Withinthenextfewdays,Ihopetoreturntotherevisionoftheintroduction.
LookingforwardtothemeetingonFebruary23.
23.2.72GdeltalkedabouttheaxiomsofsettheoryandthecoincidenceofformalsystemswithmanyvaluedTuringmachines.Muchofthesessionwasdevotedtoreligion,his
rationalisticoptimism,andsomepersonalitemsabouthimself.

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HebeganthesessionbyaskingmeaboutreligioninChinaafter1949.Thereisnorecordofmyrepliesinmynotes.(Lookingbackwithhindsighttotheyearsfrom1949to1972,I
nowthinkthat,forthemajorityoftheChinesepopulationinthosedays,Maoismwasverymuchlikeafundamentalistreligion.)Gdelthenwentontoexpresssomeofhisideas
abouttheafterlifeandrationalisticoptimism.
Gdelalsomentionedvariousfactsabouthispersonallife.Hiswifewasmucholderthanhe.Theyhadmadesomeextensionstotheirhouse.Hisbrotherwasaradiologist.Einstein
andMorgensternservedaswitnessesforhisapplicationforAmericancitizenship,forwhichhehadstudiedhowtheIndianscametoAmerica.
Thenextsessioncamethreeratherthantwoweekslater.
15.3.72GdeltalkedmainlyaboutHusserlandhisrelationtoKant.Inadditionhemadesomegeneralobservations.
4.3.13See6.3.16.

TomyobservationthatMarxistphilosophyisthoughttorevealcertaingrossfactsabouthumannature(MP:2),Gdelsaidthatithasinfluencedhumannature
[presumablyratherthandescribeditfaithfully].
InmydraftIhadobjectedtoHusserlonthegroundthatphilosophyasasuperscienceisnotfeasibleintheforeseeablefuture.Gdel,however,demurred:
4.3.14Itisnotappropriatetosaythatphilosophyasrigorousscienceisnotrealizableintheforeseeablefuture.Timeisnotthemainfact[factor]itcanhappenanytimewhenthe
rightideaappears.

Thenextsessionwasscheduledfor29March,buton28MarchGdeltelephonedtopostponeitforoneweek.
5.4.72GdelandIagreedthatheprefersHusserlandIpreferKant.HethenexpressedsomeatypicallyvehementobjectionstoWittgenstein'sviews.(SeeChapter5below.)(Inow
realizethathisunrestrainedcriticismwasoccasionedbyaletterof17January1972fromMengeraskingGdeltoevaluateWittgenstein'sremarksonhisfamoustheorem.)He
continuedwithsomeobservationsonthenatureofphilosophicalthinking(see9.2.4).

Gdeltelephonedmeon7Apriltosuggestanumberofchangestomymanuscript,chieflyrevisionsintheversionsIhadworkedoutforsomeoftheparagraphs
attributedtohim.
19.4.72Gdeloffereddetailedcommentsonthesectiononmechanicalprocedures(MP:8199).Inaddition,hemadeseveralfragmentaryremarksrelatedtoEinstein'stheoryof
relativityandquotedJosiahRoyceassayingthatreasonmeanscommunicationwiththedivinemind.
3.5.72Thissessionwaslargelydevotedtodetailedcommentsonthechapterabouttheconceptofset(MP:187209).
BythistimeGdelhaddecidedtoacceptthehonorarydoctoratefromRockefeller,inaceremonyscheduledfor1June.Hebeganthesessionbyaskingmeto

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getexactdetailsabouttheconvocation.HethenraisedthequestionofcopyrightinreferencetohisexplicitcontributionstoMP.Theideawasthathewouldhavetherightto
republishthemalthough,headded,hehadnopresentintentionofdoingso.(Thisrequestwasafterwardsacceptedbythepublisher.)
Gdelcommentedonthequestionofdeterminingarbitrarysets(MP:197).Forhim,completenessmeansthateveryconsistentsetexists.Forhim,arbitrarysetsaredetermined:itis
notaquestionofdetermination.Themostgeneralconceptofarbitrarysetisalsoadeterminationforhim."Arbitrary"inthiscasecangotogetherwith"precise".
InmydraftIhadspokenof"errorscomingfromapproximatingtheintuitiveconceptoflargeness."Gdelsaidthat(1)onlyapproximatingisnotaserioussourceoferror,andthat
(2)apresettheoreticalconceptmaybewrong,anexamplebeingthebeliefthatapropersubsetisalwayssmaller.Hecomparedtheconstructiblesetswithnonstandardmodelsin
whichwecanhavetheaxiom"Allsetsarefinite"eventhoughinfinitesetsoccur.Thequestionofwhethermeasurablecardinalsoccurintheuniverseofconstructiblesetshas
moretodowithnonstandardmodelsthanwiththequestionofmerelargeness.
Gdeltalkedmoreabouttherelationbetweenaxiomsofinfinityandtheconstructibleuniverse(MP:204).Whatisjustifiedinthisis:ifyoucallallordinalsconstructible,itisreally
artificial.Lateronitturnedoutthatonlyacountablesectionofordinalsmattersinwhatcountsintheconstructible.Hethenoutlinedaproofofthisresultandobservedthatevery
subset[ofthecountablemodel]isdefinable.Preliminaryconceptssuchasthatofconstructiblesetsarenecessarytoarriveatthenaturalconcept,suchasthatofset.
Inregardtocounterintuitive,unlikely,implausible,orunreasonableconsequencesofthecontinuumhypothesis,Gdelreferredtotheconsequencehehadlistedaspoint3(Gdel
1990:264)orpoint4(ibid.:186)asthemostunreasonable.Hementionedtheexampleofsquaringthecirclebyrulerandcompassinconnectionwithmysuggestionthatmaybeno
plausibleaxiomscandecidethecontinuumhypothesis(ibid.:198).

Gdelsaidthattwomoresessionswouldbedevotedtomymanuscriptandthathewouldcompletehisrevisionswithinfourweeks.Thenextmeetingwasscheduled
for17May,buton16MayGdelcalledtopostponeituntil24May.
24.5.72GdelmadeseveralcommentsontheprefaceandintroductionofMP.(OriginallythebookwastobeentitledKnowledgeandLogic.Ihaddecidedbeforethissessionto
renameitFromMathematicstoPhilosophy.)
Gdelaskedsomequestionsabouttheforthcomingceremonyforhishonorarydegree.Wouldhesitorstandwhilethecitationwasread?[Sit.]Wouldhehavetomakeaspeech?
[No.]Wouldhebethefirstorthesecondofthetworecipients?[Second.]Hepreferredtobethesecond.
InmydraftIhadusedthetermstructuralfactualism.Gdelsuggestedthat,inviewoftheemphasisonsubstantialfacts,itwasmoreappropriatetosaysubstantialfactualism.
InmydraftIhadurgedpayingattentionalsoto"factsofintention"and"intentionalobjects."Gdelcommentedthatonehastocultivatethecapacityforintrospection,

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Empfindung(asfeelingorperception),andconceptualthinking.Hedistinguishedthesyntactical(orformalistic)fromtheconstructivebypointingoutthatneitherKroneckernor
Brouwer(norKarlMenger)wasinterestedinthesyntactical.

On1JuneGdeltraveledfromPrincetontotheRockefellerUniversitytoreceivehishonorarydoctorate.Iofferedtofetchhimatthetrainstation,butheprotested
thatheknewperfectlywellhowtogetaboutinNewYorkCity.
14.6.72Gdelmadesomeadditionalobservationsontheintroduction.Hedescribedthehonorarydegreeceremonyandnotedthattherehadbeennoreligiousserviceandno
publicityrelatedtoit.
Onmyideaof"Newtonianworlds"(MP:26),hesaidthatitistoomuchtoclaimthatNewtonianphysicsisforcedonuslikearithmetic.Heagreedthattheattitudeintraditional
mathematicswasmoreinclinedtotheconstructive(ibid.:27).Hestressedthatlogicisnotonthesameplaneasotherknowledge(asacommentonp.28).Inreferencetomypleato
"correctthealltoohumantendencytoassimilatedifferences"inphilosophy(ibid.:6),hesaidthathefavoredassimilation.

On20JuneItalkedwithGdelbytelephone,andashorttimelaterIwentawayforaboutsevenweeks.WhenIreturnedtoNewYork,weagreedtoresumethe
sessionson9August.On7Augusthetriedunsuccessfullytoreachmetopostponethemeeting.
9.8.72Thiswasanabbreviatedsession.GdelremarkedontheelegantprintingofthepostcardIhadsenthimfromChina.WediscussedhisquestiononreligionsinChinaand
therelationbetweenChinaandRussia.Itooknonotes,butrememberthatwedisagreedbothonwhatwetooktobethefactsandontheconclusionswedrewfromthem.
13.9.72Gdeltalkedaboutvariousthings,includingtheconceptofconceptandtheconceptofabsoluteproof,evidence,Ideas(intheKantiansense),fallibility,andhis
rationalisticoptimism.HemadeanumberofscatteredobservationsabouttheVietnamwar,theAmericanbombing,China,Russia,Thieu,Hanoi,fascism,theprotests,communism,
andsoon.Amongotherthings,hesaidthatRussiahaddeliveredalotofoiltoChinaandthatHanoihadsecretlyhelpedtheThieugovernment.
GdelalsomentionedhisGibbslectureandhispaperonKantandrelativitytheory.Theformerisalivelypresentation:abouthalfofitconsidersPlatonismand"actuallyproves
thatPlatonismiscorrect,"mentioningonlyinpassingthedisjunctionthateithermindissuperiortoallcomputersortherearenumbertheoreticalquestionsundecidablebythe
mind.ThelatterarticledealswithKant'stranscendentalaesthetic.Hepromisedtoshowmeoneofthetwopaperssoon.
Gdelasked:"Isn'titstrangethatthegreatphilosophersoftwentyyearsagoDucasse,Sheldon,Blanshard,Hartshornehavenosuccessors?"[Herecommended,inthese
philosophersandinphilosophersgenerally,theaudacityto]"generalizethingswithoutanyinhibition."

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4.10.72GdeltalkedaboutHegel'slogicandabout"bions"(seeChapter9).HesaidthathewasnotyetreadytoshowmeeitherhisKantpaperorhisGibbslecture.Hedivided
thepopulationintotwoclasses,workersandintellectuals:
4.3.15Therulersfindithardtomanipulatethepopulation:sotheyusematerialismtomanipulatetheintellectualsandusereligiontomanipulatetheworkers.Beforethe
communistscanconquertheworld,theywillhavetohavesomerationalreligion.Thepresentidealisnotasufficientlystrongmotive.Can'treformtheworldwithawrong
philosophy.Thefoundersofsciencewerenotatheistsormaterialists.Materialistsbegantoappearonlyinthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthcentury.

IbroughtuptheChineseteachingofthreekindsofimmortalitybasedonmoralorpracticalorintellectualachievements.Gdelsaidthatthesecanprovideonlymuch
weakermotivesthanreligion.HethenmentionedthereligionofSpinozaandEinstein,whichpositsadesirablestateofunitywithnatureasGodandmakesone
unafraidofdeath.HealsomentionedNirvanaandnonexistence.
18.10.72Gdelmadeobservations(tobeconsideredlater)onWittgenstein,therelationbetweenlogicandphilosophy,withspecialreferencetoHusserlandHegel,andthe
intensional(incontrasttothesemantic)paradoxes.AttheendofthissessionGdelandIagreedthatatthenextsessionwewoulddiscussHusserl's1910essay"Philosophyas
RigorousScience."
8.11.72ApartfrommakinganumberofcommentsontheEnglishtranslationofHusserl'sessay,Gdeldevotedthissessiontoexpoundinghisownphilosophicalviews(tobe
discussedinChapter9.)
ThetextfordiscussionwastheEnglishtranslationofHusserl'sessayinPhenomenologyandtheCrisisofPhilosophy(Lauer1965).Gdelbeganbyobservingthatthetranslation
is,onthewhole,good.
29.11.72Gdeldiscussedexplicitnessandtheaxiomaticmethod,CarnapandWittgenstein,hisownworkinghypothesis,strictethics,andtheinfinitudeofintegers.
4.3.16Hartshornehasnoideaofmathematicallogic,andhisontologicalargumentiswrong.Thisisanexampleofthenegativeeffectofnotknowinglogic.Ninetypercentofthe
intellectualsthinkthatreligionisterriblyharmfulmetaphysiciansalsowanttoconcealreligioustruth.Thediscoveryofmetaphysicaltruthwillbenefitmankind.
15.12.72Apartfromsomegeneralremarksatthebeginningofthesession,Gdeldevotedthetimetohintingatsomeofhisbasicphilosophicalideas:onabsoluteknowledgeand
theNewtonianscheme,Husserlandtheconceptoftime,monadology,thetheoryofconcepts,andPlatonism.
Healsotalkedaboutthecontractforthebook[MP]andsuggestedthatIconsultalawyeraboutit.[Ididnotdoso.]Hefounditinexplicablethat,withoutadeclarationofwar,
HaiphongcityandharborhadbeendestroyedbyU.S.bombing.

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HebelievedthatHanoisupportedThieuratherthanMing.HefounditdifficulttobelievethatLinBiaohadtriedtokillMao.HewishedtodeterminewhetherChinaorRussiawas
morerationalandaskedmetofindabookinEnglishontheRussianconditionthattookaneutralposition.
Gdelsaid:"Russiahascometotheconclusionthatoneshouldmakeuseofthebadcapitalistmodeofcompetitionanditsmotivestoo,suchasemployingmaterialrewards
legally."HebelievedthattherearetwophilosophiesinRussia,oneexotericandoneesoteric.Theesotericphilosophyisauniquesystemfromwhichalltrueconsequencesare
derived.KarlMichelethad,hesaid,attemptedthiswithanimprovedversionofHegel'sphilosophy.

Thesessionon15December1972wasthelastoftheregularlyscheduledsessionsbetweenGdelandme.ForthenexttwoandahalfyearsIwasoccupiedwith
otherthingsandspokewithGdelonlyoccasionallybytelephone.Ihavenorecordoftheseconversationsandcannowrememberonlyafewscatteredoccasions.
AftermyvisittoChinainthesummerof1972,IhadbecomeinterestedinMarxismand,derivatively,inHegel'sphilosophy.InSeptember1972Iwasinvitedto
presentapaperataconferenceonwesternandeasternlogic,totakeplaceinJuneof1973attheUniversityofHawaii.Idecidedtowriteanessay"Concerningthe
MaterialistDialectic,"withtheintentionofforcingmyselftobeexplicitaboutsomeofmyvagueandsuperficialimpressionsofthesubject.Iworkedontheessayfrom
theautumnof1972onandpresentediton29June1973.Aftersomefurtherrevisions,thepaperwaspublishedinPhilosophyEastandWestin1974.
StartinginJulyof1973IworkedforayearoncomputerrelatedtopicsattheIBMResearchLaboratories.On3November1973GdelaskedmewhatIwas
workingonandIsaid"characterrecognition."Hethensaidthathetoowasinterestedinthatproblem.IfeltsurethattherewasamisunderstandingandexplainedthatI
wasmerelytryingtoseehowcomputerscanbemadetorecognizethecharactersoftheChinesewrittenlanguage.Hethendroppedthetopic.
OnthesameoccasionGdelobservedthatimperialismbenefitsonlyasmallprivilegedclassinanimperialistcountry.Napoleon,hesaid,stoodforanidea,whereas
Hitlerwasdefensive.Inaddition,hemadesomeobservationsonknowledge,China,andRussia,thecontentofwhichIunfortunatelynolongerremember.
4.4Continuation:1975to1977
In1975IwasaskedtospeakontheconceptofsetattheInternationalCongressonLogicandtheMethodologyofScience,heldinLondon,Ontario,thatsummer.I
readapaperon"LargeSets,"whichwaspublished,afterrevision,in1977.Meanwhile,Gdelhadarrangedformeto

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beavisitorattheInstituteforAdvancedStudyfortheyearbeginninginJulyof1975andtooccupyahouseonEinsteinDrive.ThatautumnIresumedmydiscussions
withGde,usingtherevisionofmytalkonlargesetsastheinitialframeofreference.UptoJanuaryof1976,thediscussionscenteredlargelyonobjectivismwith
regardtosetsandconcepts(mostlyreportedinChapter8).
BythistimeGdelhadlargelyceasedtogotohisstudyattheInstitute,soourdiscussionswereheldsporadicallyandbytelephone.Ialsokeptlesscarefulrecords
thanIhadforourregularsessions.IincludeinthischapteronlythoseofGdel'sobservationswhichIfindhardtoclassifyunderthemaintopicsconsideredelsewhere
inthisbook.
19.10.75Gdelspokeaboutsecrettheories.Asanexample,heconjecturedthatthereisasecretphilosophyinRussiawhichisfruitfulfordoingscienceandmathematics,butthat
thegeneralprinciplesofthisphilosophyarekeptsecret.
25.10.75Gdelsaidthathedislikedthewholefieldofsettheoryinitspresentstate:thetaskwastocreateacertainplausibility.(Itakehimtomeanthattherewastoomuch
technicalmathematicalwork,notenoughphilosophicalorconceptualthinking.)Hewasnotinfavorofthetemporalorthefluid.Hefoundthetalkaboutpossiblesets
objectionableonlybecauseoftheirfluidityhewouldnotmindiftheywerefixed.
9.11.75GdeltoldmehevaluedformalanalogiesandgaveasanexampletheanalogybetweenEuclideanspaceandanelectriccircuit.Hesaidthatfallinginloveatfirstsightis
notattractivebecauseitisfarfetchedandunclear.

IreproducebelowsomeofthegeneralobservationsGdelmadebetween16Novemberand7December1975.
4.4.1Setsarethelimitingcaseofobjects.Allobjectsareinspaceorrelatedtospace.Setsplayformathematicsthesameroleasphysicalobjectsforphysics.Thelawsofnature
areindependentofnature.Itisanalyticthattheydonotchange.Ifnaturechanges,theydeterminethechange.
4.4.2[Onacommonfriend:]Heistheonlypersonwhoisagoodmathematician,hasbroadinterests,and[is]acriminalpowerormoneywillstraightenouthisdifficulties.
4.4.3IlikeIslam:itisaconsistent[orconsequential]ideaofreligionandopenminded.
4.4.4See7.3.11.
4.4.5Idistrustthe"historyofhistorians."Historyisthegreatestlie.Onlythebarefactsaretrue,theinteractionsareusuallywrong[wronglyreported].Iamalsonotinterestedin
historythatdiscussesideas.Manythingsarewrong[wronglyreported].Forinstance,forLeibnizmonadsdidnotinteract,but[Christian]Wolffandothersattributetohimthe
viewthattheyinteract.

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4.4.6Mathematicalobjectsarenotsodirectlygiven[asphysicalobjects].Theyaresomethingbetweentheidealworldandtheempiricalworld,alimitingcaseandabstract.
4.4.7Conceptsaretherebutnotinanydefiniteplace.Theyarerelatedeachintheotherandformthe"conceptualspace."Conceptsarenotthemovingforceoftheworldbutmay
actonthemindinsomeway.
4.4.8Wehavenowayofknowingwhatthetranscendentalandtheaprioriare.
4.4.9Wehavemeansofknowingsomethingaboutthespiritualworld.Themeaningoftheworldwouldbepartofwhatisgivenoutsideofsensations.Hegeliansynthesisis
concernedalsowithhigherlevelsandhigherformsofwishwhicharedirectlygivenoutsideofsensations.
4.4.10ForKant,themindisthetranscendentalegowhichissubjectiveandseparatefromtheoutsideworld.[The]outerworldisunknowableforKant.Buttheunconscious
accompaniessenseperceptions:theideasweformofsensationsrefertotheobjectitself.
4.4.11Inborn[eingeboren]ideasarefinished[astheyare]buttheremaybesomethingmoregeneralwhichcomesfrom[the]outsidepsychologicallybutnotphysically.Thisthird
thingbesidesthinkingandsenseperceptionsuggestssomethinglikeanobjectivemind.Thissomethingdoesrepresentanaspectof,andmaybeaplanof,objectivereality.

FromearlyNovembertothemiddleofDecember1975,IwrotefourfragmentsreportinganddiscussingGdel'sideasonsetsandconcepts.On18NovemberIsent
himthirteenpagesentitled"SetsandConcepts"(fragmentM)hecommentedcarefullyonthisdocumentfrom24Novemberon.Thiswassoonfollowedbyfragments
N(eightpages,seebelow)andC(sixpages),reportingonwhathesaidaboutconcepts.LaterIusedfragmentCasthebasisformylecturetotheAssociationfor
SymbolicLogicinMarchof1979.Themostambitiousfragment,Q,consistedofeighteenpagesandwasentitled"QuotationsfromGdelonObjectivismofSetsand
Concepts,"whichIsenttohimon15December1975.GdellikedMbetterthanQ,onwhichhecommentedextensivelyon4January1976.
AsIsaidbefore,bytheautumnof1975GdelhadlargelyceasedgoingtohisstudyattheInstitute.AtthebeginningofDecember,however,hesuggestedthatImeet
himthereatfouro'clockonTuesdaythe9th.Sincewebotharrivedearlyinthemidstofaheavyrain,thesessionbeganatquarteroffour.Itwaslargelydevotedto
thefragmentsMandCaboutsetsandconceptswhichIhadrecentlysenthim.Healsomadeanumberofmoregeneralobservations,probablyindirectcommentson
anotherfragment,markedN,inwhichItriedtocombinesomeofGdel'sideaswithmyowncurrentinterestinMarxism.

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4.4.12Thenotionofexistenceisoneoftheprimitiveconceptswithwhichwemustbeginasgiven.Itistheclearestconceptwehave.Even"all,"asstudiedinpredicatelogic,is
lessclear,sincewedon'thaveanoverviewofthewholeworld.Weareherethinkingoftheweakestandthebroadestsenseofexistence.Forexample,thingswhichactaredifferent
fromthingswhichdon't.Theyallhaveexistencepropertothem.
4.4.13Existence:weknowallaboutit,thereisnothingconcealed.Theconceptofexistencehelpsustoformagoodpictureofreality.Itisimportantforsupportingastrong
philosophicalviewandforbeingopenmindedinreachingit.

InfragmentN,IhadtriedtorelatetheconsiderationsaboutsetsandconceptstoGdel'ssuggestionthatwecoulddiscernthemeaningoftheworldinthegap
betweenwishandfact.Apparentlyasacommentonthisattempt,Gdelbroughtupwhathecalled"thesociological"andsaidthatconcernwiththesociologicalleads
toreligionandtopower:
4.4.14Powerisaqualitythatenablesonetoreachone'sgoals.Generalitiescontainthelawswhichenableyoutoreachyourgoals.Yetapreoccupationwithpowerdistractsus
frompayingattentiontowhatisatthefoundationoftheworld,anditfightsagainstthebasisofrationality.
4.4.15Theworldtendstodeteriorate:theprincipleofentropy.Goodthingsappearfromtimetotimeinsinglepersonsandevents.Butthegeneraldevelopmenttendstobe
negative.Newextraordinarycharactersemergetopreventthedownwardmovement.Christianitywasbestatthebeginning.Saintsslowdownthedownwardmovement.In
science,youmaysay,itisdifferent.Butprogressoccursnotinthesenseofunderstandingtheworld,onlyinthesenseofdominatingtheworld,forwhichthemeansremains,
onceitisthere.Alsogeneralknowledge,thoughnotinthedeepersenseoffirstprinciples,hasmovedupwards.Specifically,philosophytendstogodown.
4.4.16Theviewthatexistenceisusefulbutnottrueiswidelyheld,notonlyinmathematicsbutalsoinphysics,whereittakestheformofregardingonlythedirectlyobservable
[bysenseperception]aswhatexists.Thisisaprejudiceofthetime.Thepsychologybehinditisnottheimplicitassociationofexistencewithtime,action,andsoon.Ratherthe
associationiswiththephenomenonthatconsistentbutwrongassumptionsareusefulsometimes.Falsityisinitselfsomethingevilbutoftenservesasatoolforfindingtruth.
Unlikeobjectivism,however,thefalseassumptionsareusefulonlytemporarilyandintermediately.

GdelwasinthePrincetonHospitalforseveraldaysinthebeginningofAprilof1976.Fromthenonextendedtheoreticaldiscussionsvirtuallystopped.InJuneof
1976hebegantotalkabouthispersonalproblemsandtoldmeagooddealabouthisintellectualdevelopment.(IreporttheseobservationsinChapters1and2).
On19April1976hetalkedaboutthecircumstancessurroundinghiscommunicationtoseveralindividuals,inearly1970,ofamanuscriptentitled

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"SomeConsiderationsLeadingtotheProbableConclusionthattheTruePoweroftheContinuumisAlephtwo."Thispapercontainedseriousmistakes(seeGdel
1990:173175andGdel1995):
4.4.17Takingcertainpillsforthreemonthshaddamagedmymathematicalandphilosophicalabilities.WhenIwrotethepaperIwasundertheillusionthatmyabilityhadbeen
restored.Can'texpectwrongsayingsfromoneofthegreatestlogicians.Thepillshadalsoaffectedmypracticalabilityineverydaybehaviorsand,foraperiod,Ihaddone"things
whichwerenotsobeautiful."

On23April1976GdeltoldmehewasgoingtoPhiladelphiaforacheckuponMonday[the26th].
10.5.76Hementionedthathehadnotbeenwellthenightbefore.Psychiatrists,hesaid,arepronetomakemistakesintheircalculationsandoverlookcertainconsequences.
Antibioticsarebadfortheheart.E.E.Kummerwasbadinlargecalculations.
28.5.76GdelaskedmewhetherWittgensteinhadlosthisreason(whenhewaswritinghisremarksonthefoundationsofmathematics).
1.6.76Inreplytomyquestionabouthiscurrentworkonthecontinuumproblem,Gdelsaidthathehadwrittenupsomematerialabouttherelationbetweentheproblemandsome
otherpropositions.Originally,hehadthoughthehadsettledtheproblem,buttherewasalacunaintheproof.Hestillbelievedtheproposition[hisnewaxiom]tobetrueeventhe
continuumhypothesismaybetrue.
4.4.18Inprinciple,wecanknowallofmathematics.ItisgiventousinitsentiretyanddoesnotchangeunliketheMilkyWay.Thatpartofitofwhichwehaveaperfectview
seemsbeautiful,suggestingharmonythatis,thatallthepartsfittogetheralthoughweseefragmentsofthemonly.Inductiveinferenceisnotlikemathematicalreasoning:itis
basedonequalityoruniformity.Butmathematicsisappliedtotherealworldandhasprovedfruitful.Thissuggeststhatthemathematicalandtheempiricalpartsareinharmony
andtherealworldisalsobeautiful.Otherwisemathematicswouldbejustanornamentandtherealworldwouldbelikeanuglybodyinbeautifulclothing.
4.4.19Inmylateryears[apparentlyafter1943]Ihadmerely"followedupwithworkinlogic."

On5June1976Gdelspoketomeabout"aninterestingtheologicaltheoryofhistory,analogoustoantihistory":
4.4.20Thereisapairofsequencesoffourstages:(1)Judaic,(2)Babylonian,(3)Persian,(4)Greek(a)earlyChristianity(Roman),(b)MiddleAges,(c)capitalism,(d)communism.
Thereisasurprisinganalogybetweenthetwosequences,evenindates,andsoon.Theagesinthesecondsequencearethreetimeslongerthanthoseinthefirst.Inaddition,we
cancompareEnglandandFrancewithPersia,GermanywithGreece.Theoriginoftheideaistheological.Butthesimilarityismuchcloserthancanbeexpected.Therearestructural
lawsintheworldwhich

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can'tbeexplainedcausally.Theyhavesomethingtodowiththeinitialconditionoftheworld.Ihadnotspentmuchtimeontheseideasabouthistory.

Gdelsaidthathehadneglectedtopublishthingsandwentontolistsomeofhisunpublishedwork:
4.4.21Iwasalwaysoutforimportantresultsandfounditbettertothinkthantopublish.
4.4.22Thereisanintuitivepictureofthewholethingaboutintuitionisticdemonstrability.Takenonmathematicalsequences(galaxies,etc.)andconsiderthemonlyuptofinite
limits,onlycountable.Therealworldisthemodel.Itisessentialthatnonewordinalsarise.Adoubleconstruction:(1)useempiricalsequencesandaddindependentnewsetsto
continuethem(2)thenconstructacountable(orevennonstandard)model.
4.4.23Einstein'sreligionismoreabstract,likethatofSpinozaandIndianphilosophy.Myownreligionismoresimilartothereligionofthechurches.Spinoza'sGodislessthana
person.Mineismorethanaperson,becauseGodcan'tbelessthanaperson.Hecanplaytheroleofaperson.Therearespiritswhichhavenobodybutcancommunicatewith
andinfluencetheworld.Theykeep[themselves]inthebackgroundtodayandarenotknown.ItwasdifferentinantiquityandintheMiddleAges,whenthereweremiracles.Think
aboutdjvuandthoughttransference.Thenuclearprocesses,unlikethechemical,areirrelevanttothebrain.

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Chapter5
PhilosophiesandPhilosophers
Thepossibleworldviews[canbedivided]intotwogroups[conceptions]:skepticism,materialismandpositivismstandonone[theleft]sidespiritualism,idealismandtheologyon
theother[theright].Thetruthliesinthemiddle,orconsistsinacombinationofthesetwoconceptions.
Gdel,ca.1962

Therearetwofundamentaldifficultiesindoingphilosophy.Inthefirstplace,whatweknowisinadequatetothetaskofansweringthequestionswenaturallyand
reasonableask.Itishardtofindtheboundarybetweenwhatweknowandwhatwedonotknow,totakeintoconsiderationourpartialknowledgeintherelevant
areasinanappropriatemanner,andtofitallthedifferentpartstogetherintoanorganicwhole.Itisnoteveneasytofindagoodstartingpoint.Wecan,however,view
thistaskasacooperativegoaltowhichwecan,perhaps,makeanoteworthycontribution,whetherbyadheringonlytowhatisclearorbyofferingatentativebroad
surveyoftheworld.
Inthesecondplace,philosophyaimstoinvolveone'swholeperson.Forexample,WittgensteinsaidtoDruryin1949:''Itisimpossibleformetosayinmybook
[PhilosophicalInvestigations]onewordaboutallthatmusichasmeantinmylife.HowthencanIhopetobeunderstood?"Again,inthesameconversation,
Wittgensteinsaid:"IamnotareligiousmanbutIcannothelpseeingeveryproblemfromareligiouspointofview"(inRhees1984:160,79).One'stemperament,
upbringing,andexperienceconditionone'sstyleofthinkingandone'sattitudetowardmanyissuesinphilosophy.Forexample,theattitudesofGdelandof
Wittgensteintowardtheconcreteandtheabstract,therelationbetweenscienceandphilosophy,theplaceofscienceandeverydayexperienceinphilosophy,the
natureandthevalueofmetaphysics,andtheimportanceoflanguageforphilosophyareallquitedifferent.Thisexamplesuggestssomeofthereasonswhythereareso
manydifferentphilosophies.
Eachofushasvariousemotionalneedsandisexposedtomanydifferentoutlooks,piecesofknowledgeandinformation,communitiesofideas,

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humanrelations,andsoon.Toarticulateaphilosophythatdoesjusticetoallthesefactorsisobviouslyatremendouslydifficulttask.Mostofusdonotsucceedin
attainingthisimpossiblegoal,nordoweevenattemptit.Instead,weselectoneaspectorafewaspectsofphilosophywhichwehaveencounteredandabsorbed,and
weconcentrateondoingjusticetothem.
Asweknow,therearemanydifferentphilosophiesandschoolsofphilosophy.Indeed,therearedifferentconceptionsofwhatphilosophyisanddifferentthingsthat
peoplewantandbelievethatitispossibletogetfromphilosophy.Theseconceptionsvaryfromculturetoculture.Theyalsochangewithtimeandwith
experiencebothhistoricallyandpersonally.
Around1933Wittgensteincameuponaconceptionormethodofphilosophywhichaimstocounteract"themisleadingeffectofcertainanalogies."Althoughmost
peoplewouldviewthistaskasnomorethanasubsidiarypartofphilosophy,Wittgensteinobserved:"If,forexample,wecallourinvestigations'philosophy,'thistitle,
ontheonehand,seemsappropriate,ontheotherhanditcertainlyhasmisledpeople.(Onemightsaythatthesubjectwearedealingwithisoneoftheheirsofthe
subjectwhichusedtobecalled'philosophy.')"(Wittgenstein1975:28).Thoseofuswhoarenotsatisfiedwithsuchaconceptionmaystillseethistypeofphilosophy
asakinddifferentfromtheordinarykindofspecializationwithinphilosophywhichisusefulasanantidoteandaremindertodisciplineourspeculation.
Themorefamiliarkindofspecializationdividesasubjectintodifferentpartsaccordingtotheirsubjectmatter.Withinphilosophywetypicallyhavemetaphysics,logic,
moralphilosophy,epistemology,politicalphilosophy,philosophyoflanguage,philosophyofmind,philosophyofscience,philosophyofmathematics,philosophyof
law,andsoon.Inaddition,wehavethehistoryofphilosophywhichcanbesubdividedaccordingtoperiods,typesofphilosophy,individualphilosophers,andso
on.Specialistsinonebranchmayeitherregardthatbranchascentraltoallofphilosophyorchooseitbecauseitiswellsuitedtotheirindividualinterestsandabilities.
Wittgenstein,forexample,viewsthephilosophyoflanguageascentral,andGdelseesthephilosophyofmathematicsasthesurepathtofundamentalphilosophy.In
contrast,Rawlsconfineshisattentiontopoliticalphilosophybutdoesnottakeittobecentraltophilosophyasawhole.
Inhisdiscussionswithme,Gdelfrequentlycommented,ontheonehand,onthephilosophiesofKantandHusserl,and,ontheotherhand,onpositivismand
empiricism,withspecialattentiontotheviewsofCarnap.HealsomadeoccasionalobservationsontheviewsofWittgenstein.Itiscleartomethathissympathies
werewithHusserlandthatheopposed

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thelogicalpositivists,theleadersofwhomhadbeenhisteachersinVienna.HisattitudetowardKant'sphilosophyisambivalent:hestudieditcarefullyandlikedsome
ofitsideas,buthedislikeditsoverallperspective,forhesawitasopeningthedoortomuchbadphilosophy.
MymainpurposeinthischapteristoreportanddiscussGdel'sobservationsonKant,Husserl,Carnap,andWittgenstein.Since,however,Gdel'soralremarks
werefragmentaryandsinceImay,insomecases,haverecordedthemincorrectly,Ibeginwithawrittentext,apparentlythetextforalectureheplannedtogive
around1963.Thistextprovidesaschemaforclassifyingalternativephilosophiesandillustrateshisdistinctiveapproachandhissympathiesinphilosophy.One
remarkablefeatureofGdel'sownworkishisabilitytoachievephilosophicallysignificant,preciseresults,combinedwithatendencytobeginwithsomesolidfacts
suchashisownfamoustheoremandthesuccessofphysicsormathematicallogicandthentomakeuninhibitedgeneralizationsandanalogies.Atthesametime,this
forcefullyaffirmativeattitudeismoderatedbyanopenmindedtoleranceandawillingnesstotakeintoconsiderationthestrengthofviewsopposedtohisown.
5.1HowGdelRelatesPhilosophytotheFoundationsofMathematics
Around1962GdelwroteinGabelsbergershorthandamanuscriptentitled"TheModernDevelopmentoftheFoundationsofMathematicsintheLightofPhilosophy."
ItwasfoundinhispaperswithaletterandanenvelopefromtheAmericanPhilosophicalSocietydated13.12.61.Gdelhadmarkedit"Vortrag"(lecture).Theletter
fromthesocietystatesthatGdelmaywish,asanewlyelectedmember(inApril1961),tofollowthecustomofgivingatalkonatopicofhisownchoosingineither
AprilorNovemberof1963.Gdelprobablywrotethemanuscriptwithsuchalectureinmindbutdecidednottodeliverit.
In1986thetextwastranscribedbyCherylDawsonanddistributedtoafewcolleagues.ShortlyafterwardImade,formyownuse,acrudeEnglishtranslation,which
hassincebeencorrectedbyEckehartKhler,JohnDawson,andCharlesParsons.BoththetranscribedtextandtheEnglishtranslationarepublishedinGdel's
CollectedWorks(CW3).
ThiswiderangingtextisofspecialinterestbecauseitillustrateshowGdelviewedtheinteractionbetweenthephilosophyofmathematicsandphilosophyasawhole.
Itputsatthecenterofphilosophicalconflictstheattitudeofthephilosophereitheroptimismandapriorismontheonehandorpessimismandempiricismonthe
othertowardthepowerofreasontoascertainthatthereis,indeed,orderintheuniverse.Since"mathematics,byitsnatureasanaprioriscience,alwayshas,inand
of

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itself,aninclinationtoward"orderanduniversality,itis,Gdelbelieves,thestrongholdofouroptimismtowardreason.
GdelseeshisowninexhaustibilitytheoremandtherelatedquestfornewaxiomsasevidenceinfavorofHusserl'sbeliefinourcapacityforcategorialintuitions.He
concludesbyrecommendingHusserl'sphenomenologyseenasadevelopmentofthecoreofKantianphilosophyasthebestapproachtophilosophy,tobe
combinedwithanewscienceofconceptswhichGdelproposedinanalogytothespectacularlysuccessfulscienceofthemodernworld.Accordingly,weareled
fromthestudyofthefoundationsofmathematics,toanewfruitfuloutlookonphilosophy,whichpromisestochangeourknowledgeandtherewithourworldview
inafundamentalway.Letmenowgiveamoreextendedsummaryofthetext.
Thetextbeginswithaschemaofalternativephilosophicalworldviews,usingthe"distance"fromtheologyasasortofcoordinatesystem.Inthisschema,skepticism,
materialism,andpositivismstandonthe"left"sidespiritualism,idealism,andtheologystandonthe"right"side.Roughlyspeaking,faith,order,andoptimismincrease
aswemovefromtheleft(the"negative")totheright(the"positive'')."ThedevelopmentofphilosophysincetheRenaissancehas,byandlarge,gonefromrighttoleft."
Inphysicsinparticular,thisleftwardswingreacheditspeakwiththenowprevalentinterpretationofquantumtheory.
Mathematicshasalwayshadaninclinationtowardtheright.Forinstance,"theempiricaltheoryofmathematics,suchastheonesetupbyMill,hasnotbeenwell
received."Indeed,mathematicshasevolvedintoeverhigherabstractionsandevergreaterclarityinitsfoundations.Sincearoundtheturnofthecentury,however,the
antinomiesofsettheoryhavebeenseizeduponasthepretextforaleftwardupheavalasthespiritofthetimeextendsitsdominancetomathematics.Yettheresulting
skepticalviewofmathematicsgoesagainstthenatureofmathematics,whichHilberttriedtoreconcilewiththespiritofthetimebytheremarkableandrogyne
(Zwitterding)ofhisformalistprogram.
Itturnsout,however,thatitisimpossibletoreconcilethesetwothingsinthismanner.Gdel'sowntheoremshowsthat"itisimpossibletocarryoutaproofof
consistencymerelybyreflectingontheconcretecombinationofsymbols,withoutintroducingmoreabstractelements."Onemust,therefore,"eithergiveuptheold
rightwardaspectsofmathematicsorattempttoupholdthemincontradictiontothespiritofthetime."
Itcannotbedeniedthatinourowntimegreatadvancesinmanyrespectsoweagreatdealtopreciselythisleftwardshiftinphilosophyandworldview.ButGdel
believesthatthecorrectattitudeistocombinetheleftwardandtherightwarddirections.Inmathematics,herecommendsthe

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pathofcultivating(deepening)ourknowledgeoftheabstractconceptsthemselves.
Thewaytodothis,Gdelasserts,isthroughHusserl'sphenomenologya"techniquethatshouldbringforthinusanewstateofconsciousnessinwhichwesee
distinctlythebasicconcepts."Thisapproachtakesourexperience(includingintrospection)seriouslysoitshouldbeseenaspartofaliberalempiricism.
Insupportofthisapproach,Gdelconsiderstheintellectualdevelopmentofachild,whichheseesasbeingextendedinadulthoodintwodirections.Theextensionof
achild'sexperimentationwithexternalobjectsanditsownsensoryandmotororgansleadstoscienceasweknowit.Ananalogousextensionofachild'sincreasing
understandingoflanguageandconceptsis,inGdel'sview,thetaskofHusserl'sphenomenologyandmayleadtosomethinglikeanewscienceorphilosophy(ofthe
mind).Moreover,"evenwithoutapplyingasystematicandconsciousprocedure,"newaxiomsbecomeevidentaswelookfortheaxiomsofmathematics,andour
capacitytoaxiomatizemaybeseenasanexampleofmovementinthisdirection.
ThisintuitivegraspingofeverneweraxiomsagreeswiththeKantianconceptionofmathematics.Indeed,thewholephenomenologicalmethodis,accordingtoGdel,
apreciseformulationofthecoreofKantianthought.Theideaofphenomenologythough"innotanentirelyclearway"isforGdelthereallyimportantnewthingin
Kant'sphilosophy.Itavoids"boththefatalleapofidealismintoanewmetaphysicsaswellasthepositivisticrejectionofeverymetaphysics.Butnow,ifthe
misunderstoodKanthasalreadyledtosomuchthatisinteresting,howmuchmorecanweexpectfromthecorrectlyunderstoodKant?"
BeforeturningtoageneraldiscussionofGdel'sdivisionofphilosophyintotheleftandtheright,Iselectafewpassagesfromhistextforcomment.
5.1.1Thusonewouldforexample,saythatapriorismbelongsinprincipleontherightandempiricismontheleftside.Furthermore,oneseesalsothatoptimismbelongsinprinciple
towardtherightandpessimismtowardtheleft.Moreover,materialismisinclinedtoregardtheworldasanunorderedandthereforemeaninglessheapofatoms.Inaddition,death
appearstoit[materialism]tobefinalandcompleteannihilation,while,ontheotherhand,theologyandidealismseesense,purpose,andreasonineverything.Anotherexampleof
atheoryevidentlyontherightisthatofobjectivelawandobjectiveestheticvalueswhereastheinterpretationofethicsandestheticsonthebasisofcustom,upbringing,andso
onbelongstowardtheleft.

Comment.TheseobservationshelptoclarifyGdel'sdistinctionbetweenviewsontherightandontheleft.Theproblemis,ofcourse,tolookforreasonable
combinationsofthemasGdelhimselfassertslaterinthetext.

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5.1.2Nowonecanofcoursebynomeanscloseone'seyestothegreatadvanceswhichourtimeexhibitsinmanyrespects,andonecanwithacertainjusticemakeplausiblethat
theseadvancesareduejusttothisleftwardspiritinphilosophyandworldview.But,ontheotherhand,ifoneconsidersthematterinproperhistoricalperspective,onemustsay
thatthefruitfulnessofmaterialismisbasedinpartonlyontheexcessesandthewrongdirectionoftheprecedingrightwardphilosophy.Asfarastherightnessandwrongness,or,
respectively,truthandfalsity,ofthesetwodirectionsisconcerned,thecorrectattitudeappearstometobethat(the)truthliesinthemiddleorinacombinationofthetwo
conceptions.Now,inthecaseofmathematics,Hilberthadofcourseattemptedjustsuchacombination,butoneobviouslytooprimitiveandtendingtoostronglyinonedirection.

Comment.Gdeldoesnotdenythatthemechanicalsystemsofcombinationsofsymbolsaremoretransparentthan(say)settheory.Buthesuggeststhatthisis
becausethesesystemsaresetupusingrelativelysimpleabstractconcepts,andthatthetaskistotrytoseelesssimpleabstractconceptsmoreclearlyaswell.The
combinationhehasinmindappearstobearecognitionofdifferentdegreesofcertaintyandclaritywitharecommendationtolookmorecloselyattheevidencefor
differentlevelsofidealizationintheirdistinctnessandinterrelations.Hisownsympathyisclearlywiththerightinacceptingthehighlevelsofidealization.Hisideaisa
combinationonlyinthesenseofadmitting,infavoroftheleft,thatwedohaveafirmergraspofthoseabstractconceptswhichareinvolvedinthemoreconcreteand
mechanicalsituations.Hedenies,however,thatwecangiveanaccountofanyreasonablyadequatepartofsciencein"materialterms."Wearefree,hesaystostopat
differentlevelsofidealizationyethebelievesthatthereisnogoodreasonforstoppingatorbeforeanyoneofthefamiliarlevels,fromsmallintegersuptofullset
theory(ofcourseshortofcontradictions,whichwouldinfacthelptorevealhiddendistinctions).
5.1.3Inwhatmanner,however,isitpossibletoextendourknowledgeofthoseabstractconcepts,thatis,tomaketheseconceptsthemselvespreciseandtogaincomprehensive
andsecureinsightaboutthefundamentalrelationsthatarepresentamongthem,thatis,theaxiomsthatholdforthem?Theproceduremustthusconsist,atleasttoalargeextent,
inaclarificationofmeaningthatdoesnotconsistindefining.Nowinfact,thereexiststodaythebeginningsofasciencewhichclaimstopossessasystematicmethodforsucha
clarificationofmeaning,andthatisthephenomenologyfoundedbyHusserl.Hereclarificationofmeaningconsistsinconcentratingmoreintenselyontheconceptsinquestion
bydirectingourattentioninacertainway,namely,ontoourownactsintheuseofthoseconcepts,ontoourpowersincarryingoutthoseacts,andsoon.Insodoing,onemust
keepclearlyinmindthatthisphenomenologyisnotascienceinthesamesenseastheothersciences.Ratheritis(orinanycaseshouldbe)aprocedureortechniquethatshould
bringforthinusanewstateofconsciousnessinwhichweseedistinctlythebasicconceptsweuseinourthought,orgraspotherbasicconcepts,hitherto

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unknowntous.Ibelievethereisnoreasonatalltorejectsuchaprocedureashopelessattheoutset.Empiricists,ofcourse,havetheleastreasonofalltodoso,forthatwould
meanthattheirempiricismis,intruth,anapriorismwithitssignreversed.

Comment.Gdelseemstosuggest(asanideal)thatweshouldaimtousethephenomenologicalmethodtodiscovertheaxiomsfortheprimitiveconceptsof
philosophy(andofmorerestrictedfields).ButIamnotawareofanyconspicuoussuccessfulexamplesofdefiniteaxiomsarrivedatinthismanner.Neithertheaxiom
ofchoice,theaxiomofreplacement,the"axiom"ofconstructibility,the"axiom"ofdeterminacy,norevenDedekind'saxiomsforarithmeticwereobtainedbygoing
backtotheultimateactsandcontentsofourconsciousnessinthemannerrecommendedbyphenomenology(seeWang1987a,section7.3,hereafterRG).Norisit
cleartomehowcompleteaHusserlianjustificationof(say)Dedekind'saxiomscanbefoundalthoughIregardthisexampleasafruitfultestcasefor
phenomenology.Gdel'sbelief(andperhapsHusserl'salso)isprobablythatsuchradicalintrospectionsarepossibleandthatonlysuchintrospectionscanrenderour
questsystematicandourresultsecure.Ihaveseennopersuasiveargument,empiricalorotherwise,forthispossibility.
Icanonlyguesswhatismeantbythesentenceaboutempiricism.Husserlandothershavespokenofphenomenologyasathoroughgoingempiricism.Empiricism
wouldbeanapriorismifitdeniedthatadditionalattentiontotheactsandthecontentsofourconsciousnesswouldmakeadifference.Ifthemindwereentirelyblank,
therewouldhavetobeapowerfulmechanismassociatedwiththemindtogiveusallweknowonthebasisofthedataofexperience.Themind,asweseefromits
observableoperations,isbothmoreandlessthanacameraoramirror.Inparticular,toexpectthatneurophysiologywillfullyexplainourknowledgewouldseemto
requireahighlycompetentinternalmechanism.Maybethe"invertedsign(ordirection)"referstothecontrastbetweenthemind'scontributingeverythingandits
contributingnothing.Inthelattercase,wemayspeakofan"invertedapriorism"inthesenseoftakingitforgrantedthatalltheinformationcomesfromoutside.Inany
case,sincetheconceptofexperiencecanandhasbeenunderstoodinsomayways,itseemsnecessarytolookcloselyatwhataspecificformofempiricism
understandsbyexperienceandhowitdealswithit.Inparticular,phenomenologymaybesaidtobepayingmoreratherthanlessattentiontoexperiencethanother
doctrinesthatgomorefamiliarlybythename"empiricism."
5.1.4Butnotonlyistherenoobjectivereasonfortherejection[ofphenomenology],onecanonthecontraryevenpresentreasonsinitsfavor.Ifoneconsiders

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thedevelopmentofachild,onenoticesthatitproceedsintwodirections:ontheonehand,itconsistsinexperimentingwiththeobjectsoftheexternalworldandwithits[own]
sensoryandmotororgansontheotherhand,incomingtoabetterandbetterunderstandingoflanguage,andthatmeans,assoonasthechildhasgottenbeyondthemost
primitiveformofdesignation,ofthebasicconceptsonwhichit[language]rests.Withrespecttothedevelopmentinthisseconddirection,onecanjustifiablysaythatthechild
passesthroughstatesofconsciousnessofvariousheightsforexample,onecansaythatahigherstateofconsciousnessisattainedwhenthechildfirstlearnstheuseofwords,
andsimilarlyatthemomentwhenitforthefirsttimeunderstandsalogicalinference.Indeed,onemaynowviewthewholedevelopmentofempiricalscienceasasystematicand
consciousextensionofwhatthechilddoeswhenitdevelopsinthefirstdirection.Thesuccessofthisprocedureis,however,anastonishingthing,andisfargreaterthanone
wouldexpectapriori:itleadsafteralltothegreattechnologicaldevelopmentofrecenttimes.Thatmakesitthusappearquitepossiblethatasystematicandconsciousadvancein
theseconddirectionwillalso[leadtoresultsthat]farexceedtheexpectationsonemayhaveapriori.

Comment.Gdelseesaparallelbetweenthetwodirectionsinchilddevelopmentandtheirextensions.Thesuggestionseemstobethatphenomenologyistothe
seconddirection(the"mental"world)asempiricalscienceistothefirst(thematerialworld).Thefirstdirectionisnotselfcontained,sincelanguageandconceptsare
crucialtoitssystematicextension.Theprimarydataoftheseconddirectionaretheactsandcontentsofourconsciousness,whichareprivateandunstable.Moreover,
theyhaveacquired"hiddenmeanings"throughchildhoodexperiencesandhistoricalheritage,whichare,toalargeextent,nolongeraccessible.
Gdelspeaksofsystematicandconsciousextensions.Heimpliesthatwehaveacquired,andappliedinthedevelopmentofempiricalscience,asystematic(and
conscious)extensioninthefirstdirection,andheseemstoassertthatphenomenologypromisesasimilarsystematicprocedureforextensionintheseconddirection.
Butthe"systematic"procedureofempiricalsciencehasevolvedandispassedonmorethroughpraxisthanthroughtalkorabstractthinking.Thedevelopmentof
phenomenologyhasbeenquitedifferent:Husserlhassaidagooddealabouthismethod,buttherearefewsuccessful,relativelyconclusive,andunambiguous
applicationsofthemethod.
Thephrase"systematicandconscious"hasquitedifferentmeaningsandfunctionsasappliedtothetwodirections.Husserlcharacterizedthemethodusedintheactual
practiceofempiricalscienceas"naive"andrecommendedadifferent("trulyscientific")attitude.Fromthisperspective,itisquestionablewhethertheprocedureof
extensionsalongthefirstdirectioniseithersystematicorconscious.Indeed,Ibelievethatmuchofthestrengthofscientificprocedureisderivedfromits"impurity,"that
is,its

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inclusionofunconsciousandunsystematiccomponents.(Amajorobstacletothedevelopmentofartificialintelligenceispreciselytheproblemofmakingthese
unconsciouscomponentsexplicit.)
ItispossibletoextractfromHusserl'swritingaplausiblesenseinwhichheisindeedstrivingforasystematicandconsciousprocedureintheseconddirection.Butthe
distancebetweenmethodandapplicationismuchgreaterinphilosophythanitisintechnology.Themethodbecomesclear(orclearer)onlywhenitisdemonstratedin
operation.ItseemstomethatneitherHusserlnorGdelhasproducedanyconvincingexamples.Inmyopinion,theroleoftheunconsciouspresentsamore
fundamentalobstaclethantheoccasionalfailuretofullycommunicateourconsciousthoughts.GrahamWallas(1925)andJacquesHadamard(1945)considersome
aspectsofthisproblem.Wallasinparticularspeaksofaperiodof"incubation"beforereaching"illumination",inhisconsiderationofHenriPoincar'saccountofhis
discoveryofanewtheorem(p.80).Theunconsciousorsubconscious,itissupposed,wasdoingtheworkduringtheperiodofincubation,whenmentalactsand
contentsarosewhichwere,almostbydefinition,largelyunrecoverable.Eventhoughthe"illumination"reachedinsuchcasescansometimesbe"verified,"thereasonis,
Ibelieve,thattheverificationdoesnotrequirethesortofradicalrootednessthatHusserlseemstodemand.
Itis,however,possible,andreasonable,todissociateGdel'ssuggestionsfromthemoreradicalrequirementsandmorecomprehensiveclaimsmadebyHusserlfor
hisapproach.Insteadofquestioningwhethertheactualimpureproceduresinempiricalsciencecanbesaidtobesystematicandconscious,wemay,onthecontrary,
acceptthemasasortofmodelforsystematicandconsciousprocedures.Inotherwords,evenwhileborrowingsomeofHusserl'sideas,wecanleaveroomfor
addingmoremixedandlesspureconsiderationstotakecareof,forexample,intersubjectivityandtheexternalworld.Inaddition,Iseenoreasonwhyoneshould
concentrate,asGdelseemstosuggest,onprimitiveconceptsandtheaxiomsforthem.Inthecaseofaxioms,Dedekind'sworkonthenaturalnumbersoffers,inmy
opinion,aclearermodelofconceptualanalysisandareliablestartingpointforfurtherrefinements.
Gdel'sthoughtsaboutchilddevelopmentareattractivequiteapartfromanystrictadherencetoHusserl'sphenomenology.Theycanandshould,Ithink,beseenas
ideasdirectedatthetaskoffoundinga"scienceofthemind."Seeninthislight,theideasdonotcommitustoanexclusivelyphenomenologicalapproach.Nordothey
excludeappropriateattentiontotheroleofthebiological,historical,genetic,andsocialfactorsinourdevelopmentandcognitiveactivity.Indeed,studieslookingin
suchdirectionsarenotunfamiliarintheliterature.

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5.2SomeGeneralComments
Gdel'sgeneralschemaofdividingworldviewsintotherightandtheleftisreminiscentofafamiliarcontrastintroducedbyWilliamJamesatthebeginningofhis
Pragmatism(1907:913).Jamesidentifiesaperson'sphilosophywithhisorher"viewoftheuniverse"(orworldview)."Thehistoryofphilosophy,"hesays,"istoa
greatextentthatofacertainclashofhumantemperaments[betweenthe]tenderminded[rationalist]andthetoughminded[empiricist]."Sincetemperamentisnota
recognizedaspectofreason,aprofessionalphilosopherwillurgeonlyimpersonalreasonsforthe(desired)conclusions.(F.H.Bradleyoncedefinedmetaphysicsasan
attempttogivebadreasonsforone'sprejudices.)Jamescharacterizesthetendermindedpersonasrationalistic(goingbyprinciples),intellectualistic,idealistic,
optimistic,religious,monistic,dogmatical,andabelieverinfreewillthetoughmindedpersonasempiricist(goingbyfacts),sensationalistic,materialistic,pessimistic,
irreligious,pluralistic,skeptical,andfatalistic.
AccordingtoJames,neithertypeofphilosophyfullysatisfiestheneedsofournature,eventhoughhehimselffavorsempiricism.Hisownsolutionispragmatism,ashe
understoodit,aviewwhich"canremainreligiousliketherationalisms,butatthesametime,liketheempiricisms,itcanpreservetherichestintimacywith
facts"(1907:23).The"religion"Jamesrecommendsisa"meliorism"thattreatsthe"salvationoftheworld"asapossibility,whichbecomesmoreandmoreaprobability
asmoreagentsdotheir"levelbest''(pp.137,139).Thisisaplausibleandattractivebelief,butitisnotreligioninthetheologicalsenseas,say,Gdelunderstandsit.
ThereisalsoaproblemwiththerangeofwhatJamestakestobefacts.Afamiliardebateconcernswhethertorecognize,beyondempiricalfacts,alsoconceptual,and,
inparticular,mathematicalfacts.Terminologyaside,itseemspossibletomodifythefamiliarcriticismsofempiricismsoastoshowthatpragmatismsimilarlyfailstogive
anadequateaccountofmathematicsasweknowit,especiallyofits"uselessparts,"itsautonomy,anditsinternalcohesiveness.
LikeJames,Gdelalsoassertsthat"truthliesinthemiddleorinacombinationofthetwoconceptions."HisproposedsolutionappearstobeHusserl's
phenomenology,andhesaysnothingexplicitlyaboutitsrelationtoreligiousconcepts.UnlikeJames,whospellsouthispragmatism,Gdelleaveshisproposalinthe
stateofabriefobservationwithinthecontextofhisessay.ElsewherehesuggeststhatHusserl'smethodmaybeapplicabletometaphysicalorreligiousconceptsas
well.
Acloseassociationofmetaphysicswithreligion,bywayoftheology,hasalongtradition.ItbeganwiththeintroductionoftheworldmetaphysicstolabelAristotle's
workonFirstPhilosophy,whichmaybeseen

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asamixtureoftheologyandthephilosophyoflogic.Theologyoffersapathfromthephilosophyofknowledgetothephilosophyofvalue.Thisisclearintheworkof
Aquinas.Ifitispossibletoarriveatfundamentaltheologicalknowledge,includingtheexistenceofGod,thenthefirstprinciplesofthephilosophyofvalueare
accessibletorationalthinking.Gdelseemstometobelievethatthisispossible.HeseemstobelievethatbyusingHusserl'smethodtheprogramcanbeexecuted
moreconvincinglythansimilarattemptsbyPlatoandLeibniz.
InChapter3IconsidersomeofGdel'stentativethoughtsaboutreligiousmetaphysics,whichdidnot,Iamsure,makemuchuseofHusserl'smethod.Hisdiscussions
withmewereprimarilyconcernedwithPlatonismorobjectivisminmathematics,mindsandmachines,theconceptsofsetandconcept,andthenatureoflogicallof
whichIdealwithinseparatechapters.Inaddition,hemadescatteredobservationsontheviewsofanumberofphilosophers,notablyKant,Husserl,Wittgenstein,and
Carnap.
From1924to1939GdelwasstudyingattheUniversityofViennaand,formuchofthattime,wascloselyassociatedwiththeprincipalmembersoftheVienna
Circle,thenthecenteroftheschooloflogicalpositivism(RG:4852).Gdelwasfamiliarwiththeirviews,butdidnotfindthemcongenial.Heparticipatedinthe
Circle'sintensivestudyofWittgenstein'sTractatusfromtheautumnof1926untiltheearlymonthsof1928butsaidafterwardsthathehadneverstudied
Wittgenstein'sworkthoroughly"onlyverysuperficially,"andhadnotbeeninfluencedbyit(RG:17,19,20).
InhiscorrespondenceandconversationswithCarnapbetween1931and1935(RG:5152),GdelimplicitlycriticizedCarnap'sgeneralphilosophicalviewpointby
pointingouttheinadequacyofCarnap'sdefinitionofanalytictruth.Notuntilthe1950s,however,didGdelwriteanelaboratecriticismofthephilosophyof
mathematicsofCarnap,Hahn,andSchlickinthesixversionsofhisCarnappaper,"IsMathematicsSyntaxofLanguage?"Thespiritofthisessayissimilartothatof
myown1985paper,"TwoCommandmentsofAnalyticEmpiricism"(aslightlydifferentversionappearsinWang1985a).
InFebruaryof1959GdelwrotealettertoSchilpp,theeditorofthevolumethatwastoincludetheCarnapessay,tosaythathewasnotsatisfiedwithitandhad,
therefore,decidednottopublishit.Accordingtohisownaccount,hebeganhisstudyofHusserlin1959.Itseemstomethatthetwodecisionsmayhavebeen
related.Hehad,hetoldmeonce,provedconclusivelyinthisessaythatmathematicsisnotsyntaxoflanguagebutsaidlittleaboutwhatmathematicsis.Atthetimehe
probablyfeltthatHusserl'sworkpromisedtoyieldconvincingreasonsforhisownbeliefsaboutwhatmathematicsis.

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Itis,therefore,notsurprisingthat,whenhecommentedonvariousphilosophersduringhisdiscussionswithme,hehadmoretosayabouttheviewsofHusserlthan
aboutthepositivistsorempiricists.Indeed,hisowncriticismsoftheempiriciststendtobesimilartoHusserl's.Imyselfagreewiththesecriticisms,asfarasIamable
tounderstandthem.Iamnot,however,abletoaccept,orevenevaluate,thestrongpositivethesesonthepowerofreasonfavoredbyGdelsuchasHusserl's
projectof"philosophyasarigorousscience"andGdel'sownbeliefthat"PhilosophyasanexacttheoryshoulddoformetaphysicsasmuchasNewtondidfor
physics"(inWang1974a,hereafterMP:85).
5.3ForHusserlWithDigressionsonKant
Availableevidenceindicatesthatfrom1959onGdelstudiedHusserl'sworkcarefullyforanumberofyears.HislibraryincludesallofHusserl'smajorwritings,many
markedwithunderliningsandmarginalcomments,andaccompaniedbyinsertedpageswrittenmostlyinGabelsbergershorthand.Thesecommentsarenowbeing
transcribed,andaselectionofthemwillbepublishedinafuturevolumeofGdel'sCollectedWorks.Inthe1960sherecommendedtosomelogiciansthatthey
shouldstudythesixthinvestigationinLogicalInvestigationsforitstreatmentofcategorialintuition.Inhisdiscussionswithmeinthe1970sherepeatedlyurgedme
tostudyHusserl'slaterwork.
GdeltoldmethatthemostimportantofHusserl'spublishedworksareIdeasandCartesianMeditations(theParislectures):"Thelatterisclosesttoreal
phenomenologyinvestigatinghowwearriveattheideaofself."AccordingtoGdel,HusserljustprovidesaprogramtobecarriedouthisLogicalInvestigations
isabetterexampleoftheexecutionofthisprogramthanishislaterwork,butithasnocorrecttechniquebecauseitstilladoptsthe"natural"attitude.
IonceaskedGdelaboutHusserl'sFormalandTranscendentalLogic,becauseIthoughtitmightbemoreaccessibletomethansomeoftheotherbooks.Gdel
saidthat"itisonlyprogrammatic:itissuggestedthatformallogicisobjectiveandtranscendentallogicissubjective,butthetranscendentalpartwhichismeanttogive
justificationsisrudimentary."Gdeldidnot,Ibelieve,muchlikeTheCrisisofEuropeanScience.
Before1959GdelhadstudiedPlato,Leibniz,andKantwithcarehissympathieswerewithPlatoandLeibniz.YethefeltheneededtotakeKant'scritiqueof
LeibnizseriouslyandfindawaytomeetKant'sobjectionstorationalism.HewasnotsatisfiedwithKant'sdualismorwithhisrestrictionofintuitiontosenseintuition,
whichruledoutthepossibilityofintellectualorcategorialintuition.Itseemslikelythat,intheprocessofworkingonhisCarnappaperinthe1950s,Gdelhadrealized
thathis

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realismabouttheconceptualworldcalledforamoresolidfoundationthanhethenpossessed.AtthisjunctureitwasnotsurprisingforhimtoturntoHusserl's
phenomenology,whichpromisesageneralframeworkforjustifyingcertainfundamentalbeliefsthatGdelshared:realismabouttheconceptualworld,theanalogyof
conceptsandmathematicalobjectstophysicalobjects,thepossibilityandimportanceofcategoricalintuitionorimmediateconceptualknowledge,andtheone
sidednessofwhatHusserlcalls"thenaiveornaturalstandpoint."
Gdelmentionedphenomenologyforthefirsttimeinourdiscussionson10November1971inthecontextofpointingoutthelimitationsofmyproposedfactualism,
whichurgesphilosopherstodojusticetowhatweknow,forinstance,inmathematics.Onanotheroccasionhesaidthathehadformerlybeenafactualistbuthadat
somestagerealizedthatphilosophyrequiresanewmethod.Itistemptingtobelievethatthisrealizationoccurredinthe1950sandthathefoundinphenomenologythe
newmethodhehadbeenlookingfor.
Inanycase,Gdelwassympathetictofactualismasanantidoteandalimitedmethod,eventhoughnotasthewholeorbasicmethod.Inmyopinion,twoofthe
componentsinKant'sphilosophyare:thetranscendentalmethod,whichtriestocapturethatpartofourthoughtwhichispotentiallysharedbyallminds,anda
factualismwhichtakesexistingknowledgeinmathematicsandphysicsasagivendatumandaskshowitispossible.ForGdel,theappealofHusserlian
phenomenologywas,Ithink,thatitdevelopedthetranscendentalmethodinawaythataccommodatedhisownbeliefsinintellectualintuitionandtherealityof
concepts.
Intherestofthissection,IquoteandorganizeGdel'sscatteredobservationsonHusserl(andKant)inwhatIseeasareasonableorder.Becausesomuchofthe
discussionoverlapsthegeneralconsiderationsofChapter9,Imakenumerouscrossreferences,toavoidrepetitions.(Thereaderwillgainthemostcomplete
understandingofGdel'sview'sonthesephilosophers,therefore,byswitchingbackandforthbetweenthissectionandtherelevantquotesinChapter9.)AsIsaid,he
introducedthetopicofphenomenologyinconnectionwiththelimitationsoftheideaofdoingjusticetowhatweknow.
5.3.1See9.3.23.
5.3.2See9.3.24.

ForGdel,factualismforeverydayknowledgewasmoreimportantthanfactualismforexactscience.Eventhoughwhatweknowofhisphilosophicalworkis
intimatelylinkedtoscience,especiallymathematics,hehimselfsuggeststhatscienceorthestudyofscientificthinking,incontrasttoeverydaythinking,haslittletooffer
tofundamentalphilosophy:

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5.3.3Husserlisafactualistnotfortheexactsciencesbutforeverydayknowledge.Everydayknowledgeisprescientificandmuchmorehiddenthanscience.Wedonotsaywhy
webelieveit,howwearriveatit,orwhatwemeanbyit.Butitisascientifictasktoexamineandtalkabouteverydayknowledge,tostudythesequestionsofwhy,howandwhat.
Todenythatwecandothisisanirrationalattitude:itmeansthattherearemeaningfulscientificproblemsthatwecanneversolve.WhetherHusserlgottherightmethodis
anotherquestion.
5.3.4Studyingscientificthinkingwouldnotgettoasmuchdepthasstudyingeverydaythinking.Scienceisnotdeeper.Thereisnothingnewinscientificdiscoveriestheyareall
explainedineverydaythinking.Onemustnotexpectmuchfromscience[indoingphilosophy]forinstance,itwillnothelp[inlearning]howtoperceiveconcepts.
5.3.5InprincipleKantalsostartedfromeverydayknowledge,andheprivatelyarrivedatsuperscience.Everydayknowledge,whenanalyzedintoitscomponents,ismorerelevant
ingivingdataforphilosophy.Sciencealonewon'tgivephilosophyitisnoncommittalregardingwhatreallyisthere.Alittlebitofscienceisnecessaryforphilosophy.For
instance,Platostipulatesthatnooneunacquaintedwithgeometryistoentertheacademy.Tothatextenttherequirementiscertainlyjustified.
5.3.6Husserl'sisaveryimportantmethodasanentranceintophilosophy,soasfinallytoarriveatsomemetaphysics.Transcendentalphenomenologywithepochasits
methodologyistheinvestigation(withoutknowledgeofscientificfacts)ofthecognitiveprocess,soastofindoutwhatreallyappearstobetofindtheobjectiveconcepts.No
brightmindwouldsaythatmaterialobjectsarenothingelsebutwhatweimaginethemtobe.

[Thislastobservationprobablyreferstothecomplexcontentinvolvedin(say)seeingatree,aselaboratedbyHusserl,forwhomthisregion(ofseeingaphysical
object)istoserveas"aguidingclueinphenomenologicalinquiries"(Ideas,Section150).]
Gdel'sownmainaiminphilosophywastodevelopmetaphysicsspecifically,somethinglikethemonadologyofLeibniztransformedintoanexacttheorywiththe
helpofphenomenology.
5.3.7Phenomenologyisnottheonlyapproach.Anotherapproachistofindalistofthemaincategories(e.g.,causation,substance,action)andtheirinterrelations,which,
however,aretobearrivedatphenomenologically.Thetaskmustbedoneintherightmanner.
5.3.8HusserlusedKant'sterminologytoreach,fornow,thefoundationsand,afterwards,usedLeibniztogettheworldpicture.Husserlreachedtheend,arrivedatthescienceof
metaphysics.[ThisisdifferentfromwhatGdelsaidonotheroccasions.]Husserlhadtoconcealhisgreatdiscovery.Philosophyisapersecutedscience.Withoutconcealment,
thestructureoftheworldmighthavekilledhim.

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5.3.9Husserldevelopedageneralmethodandappliedittometaphysicsaswellastothefoundationsofeverydayknowledge(e.g.,thephenomenologyoftime)beforeapplyingit
toothersciences.Thesearetherightsubjects.Epochcannotbeappliedanywhereelse.HeideggerpublishedHusserl'slectures[ThePhenomenologyofInternalTime
Consciousness,1928],buttheyarefarfromwhatHusserlhadsaid.Heideggerappliedthemethodtoourwill(emotions,etc.)sohedidnotreallyapplyHusserl'smethod.

Gdelusuallydidnotsaythatphenomenologyincludesametaphysicsasatheory,eventhoughhemighthavethoughtthatHusserldidgoontoobtain,privately,a
metaphysics.Heformulatedhisownidealthus:"PhilosophyasexacttheoryshoulddoformetaphysicsasmuchasNewtondidforphysics"(MP:85).
5.3.10See9.3.10.
5.3.11ThebeginningofphysicswasNewton'sworkof1687,whichneedsonlyverysimpleprimitives:force,mass,law.Ilookforasimilartheoryforphilosophyormetaphysics.
Metaphysiciansbelieveitpossibletofindoutwhattheobjectiverealityisthereareonlyafewprimitiveentitiescausingtheexistenceofotherentities.Form(SoSein)shouldbe
distinguishedfromexistence(DaSein):theformsthoughnottheexistenceoftheobjectswere,inthemiddleages,thoughttobewithinus.

OndifferentoccasionsGdelmadescatteredobservationsonphenomenologyandHusserl'swork.
5.3.12Generalphilosophyisaconceptualstudy,forwhichthemethodisimportant.(Phenomenologyisaconceptualstudy,forwhichthemethodisimportant.)Phenomenology
strivestounderstandwhatisgoingoninourmind.Relationshipsmustbeseen.Plato'sstudyofthedefinitionofconceptswasthebeginningofphilosophy.
5.3.13Byusinghisphenomenologicalviewpoint,Husserlseesmanythingsmoreclearlyinadifferentlight.Thisisdifferentfromdoingscientificwork.Itinvolvesachangeof
personality.
5.3.14BothHusserlandFreudconsideredindifferentwayssubconsciousthinking.
5.3.15Somereductionismisright:reducetoconceptsandtruths,butnottosenseperceptions.Reallyitshouldbetheotherwayaround:Platonicideas[whatHusserlcalls
"essences"andGdelcalls"concepts"]arewhatthingsaretobereducedto.Phenomenologymakesthem[theideas]clear.
5.3.16Phenomenologygoesbacktothefoundationsofourknowledge,totheprocessofhowweformtheknowledge,andtouncoveringwhatisgiventousfrominside.Itwants
exactlytotranscend[whatistakenas]knowledgeandgetsuperknowledge.Ithasabasicbeliefthatotherswillagreeinwardly:theywouldcometothesameconclusions.

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5.3.17Thebasisofeverythingismeaningfulpredication,suchasPx,xbelongstoA,xRy,andsoon.Husserlhadthis.Hegeldidnothavethisthatiswhyhisphilosophylacks
clarity.Idealisticphilosophersarenotabletomakegoodideaspreciseandintoascience.
5.3.18Husserlintroducedamethod:clearlyeverymathematicianhadthatinhisheadbeforemathematicallogicwasformulated.Itisjusttheaxiomaticmethod.
5.3.19Leibnizbelievedintheidealofseeingtheprimitiveconceptsclearlyanddistinctly.WhenHusserlaffirmedourabilityto"intuitessences,"hehadinmindsomethinglike
whatLeibnizbelieved.EvenSchellingadheredtothisideal,butHegelmovedawayfromthis.Truemetaphysicsisconstantlygoingaway.Kantwasaskeptic,oratleastbelieved
thatskepticismisnecessaryforthetransitiontotruephilosophy.
5.3.20Idon'tparticularlylikeHusserl'swaylonganddifficult.Hetellsusnodetailedwayabouthowtodoit.Hisworkontimeislostfromthemanuscripts.

GdelmadethisstatementlastinMarchof1976inreplytomyrequestforsomesuccessfulcasesofapplyingthemethodofphenomenologywhichwouldteachmeby
examples.ThereferencetoHusserl'sworkontimesuggeststhatGdelbelievedHusserltohavedoneinstructiveworkonourideaoftimebutthat,unfortunately,it
hadbeenlost(compare9.5.11).ItiscleartomethatGdelregardeditasverydifficult,andofcentralimportancetophilosophy,tounderstandourideaoftime.For
instance,hemade,ondifferentoccasions,thefollowingobservationsontheimportanceanddifficultyofthistopic,whichIdiscussinChapter9.
5.3.21See9.5.4.
5.3.22See9.5.1.
5.3.23Aswepresenttimetoourselves,itsimplydoesnotagreewithfact.Tocalltimesubjectiveisjustaeuphemism.Problemsremain.Oneproblemistodescribehowwearriveat
time.Anotherproblemistherelationofourconceptoftimetorealtime.Therealideabehindtimeiscausation.
5.3.24See9.5.8.

Thereiswidespreadskepticismaboutanappealtointuitionandintrospection(orselfobservation).EventhoughHusserldidnothesitatetotalkaboutintuitions,hedid
discussthedifficultiesofselfobservationandtrytodistancephenomenologyfromintrospectionist(empirical)psychology(Ideas,Section79).Gdelhadno
hesitation,however,inusingtheconceptofintrospectionundoubtedlyhavinginmindsomethingdifferentfromtheformsofintrospectionassociatedwithempirical
psychology.Aftercontrastinglanguageandsymbolswithconceptsandsayingthatwehavenoprimitiveintuitionsaboutlanguage,heproceededtomakeseveral
observationsonintrospection,phenomenology,andpsychology.

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5.3.25Phenomenologyisnecessaryinordertodistinguishbetweenknowingapropositiontobetruebyunderstandingit[byattaininganintuitivegraspofaproofofit]andby
rememberingthatyouhaveprovedit.[Apropositionoraproofis]anetofsymbolsassociatedwithanetofconcepts.Tounderstandsomethingrequiresintrospectionfor
instance,theabstractideaofaproofmustbeseen[theidea"behind"aproofcanonlybeunderstood]byintrospecti
5.3.26Longbeforemathematicallogicwasdiscovered,onehadbeenapplying[ineverydaylife]therulesoflogic(e.g.,thedistributivelawandmoregenerallytherulesof
computation)withunderstandingnowitisnolongernecessary.[Itakethistomeanthatwecannowapplytheserulesmechanically,orblindly,therebyachievinganeconomyof
thought.]Mechanicalrulesofcomputationhadalsobeenappliedinmathematicsforexample,Euclidappliedthedistributivelawinmakinginferences.
5.3.27Introspectionisanimportantcomponentofthinkingtodayithasabadreputation.Introspectivepsychologyiscompletelyoverlookedtoday.Epochconcernshow
introspectionshouldbeused,forexample,todetachoneselffrominfluencesofexternalstimuli(suchasthefashionsoftheday).Eventhescientists(fashionsoftheday).Even
thescientists[sometimes]donotagreebecausetheyarenot[detachedtrue]subjects[inthissense].
5.3.28Onefundamentaldiscoveryofintrospectionmarksthetruebeginningofpsychology.Thisdiscoveryisthatthebasicformofconsciousnessdistinguishesbetweenan
intentionalobjectandourbeingpointed(gerichtet)towarditinsomeway(feeling,willing,cognizing).Therearevariouskindsofintentionalobject.Thereisnothinganalogousin
physics.Thisdiscoverymarksthefirstdivisionofphenomenabetweenthepsychologicalandthephysical.Introspectioncallsforlearninghowtodirectattentioninanunnatural
way.Toapplyitineverydaylifewouldonlybeharmful.
5.3.29Whenweunderstandorfindthecorrectanalysisofaconcept,thebeliefisthatpsychologicalstudycomestothesameconclusion.Thisscienceofintuitionisnotyet
precise,andpeoplecannotlearnityet.Atpresent,mathematiciansareprejudicedagainstintuition.Settheoryisalongthelineofcorrectanalysis.

OneofGdel'srecurrentthemeswastheimportanceofexperiencingasuddenilluminationlikeareligiousconversioninphilosophy.(Thistheme,bytheway,
remindsmeoftheteachingsofHuiNeng's"suddenschool"ofZen(Chan)BuddhisminChina.)Inparticular,GdelbelievedthatHusserlhadsuchanexperienceat
somepointduringthetransitionbetweenhisearlyandlaterphilosophy(compare9.1.13to9.1.15).
5.3.30Atsometimebetween1906and1910Husserlhadapsychologicalcrisis.Hedoubtedwhetherhehadaccomplishedanything,andhiswifewasverysick.Atsomepointin
thisperiod,everythingsuddenlybecamecleartoHusserl,andhedidarriveatsomeabsoluteknowledge.Butonecannottransferabsoluteknowledgetosomebodyelsetherefore,
onecannotpublishit.Alectureonthenatureof

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timealsocamefromthisperiod,whenHusserl'sexperienceofseeingabsoluteknowledgetookplace.Imyselfhaveneverhadsuchanexperience.Formethereisnoabsolute
knowledge:everythinggoesonlybyprobability.BothDescartesandSchellingexplicitlyreportedanexperienceofsuddenilluminationwhentheybegantoseeeverythingina
differentlight.
5.3.31Husserlcouldnotcommunicatehisideas.Heknewmuchmore.Thisisnotsurprising:generallyinpsychoanalysisandotherfields,manythingsdrives,will,decisions,and
soonarehidden.Butwecanonlyjudgeonthebasisofwhathasbeencommunicated.
5.3.32Around1910Husserlmadeachangeinhisphilosophyascanbeseenfromhisarticle"PhilosophyasaRigorousScience."Intentionallyhisstylealsochangedaround
thistimeinconformitywithhischangedmethod.Anexampleishisuseoflongsentencesafterthechange.Itwasawaytomakethereaderpayattentiontothesubtletiesofhis
thoughts.
5.3.33MetaphysicsintheformofsomethingliketheLeibnizianmonadologycameatonetimeclosesttoHusserl'sideal.Baumgarten[17141762]isbetterthanWolff[16791754],
andalsobetterthanFichteandHegel.

WithregardtoHusserl's"transcendentalturn,"RichardTieszentoldme,incorrespondence,thatHusserllecturedonKant'sphilosophyeverydayoftheweekexcept
Sundayduringthewintersemesterof19051906.Subsequently,inhisfivelecturesin1907laterpublishedasTheIdeaofPhenomenologyhefirstmadepublic
hischangeofapproachtophilosophy.InTieszen'sopinion,Husserl'sradicalshiftatthistimecamefromacombinationoftwofactors:(a)hehadbecomeawareof
apparentlyinsurmountableproblemsinhisnaturalisticframeworkand(b)hethenbegantostudyKantandthoughtthatthoseproblemscouldberesolvedbya
thoroughgoingtranscendentalapproach.Perhapsonecouldsaythatthe"suddenillumination"occurredwhenHusserlsaworatleastthoughthesawthatthenew
approachwasallpowerful.
Gdel'sobservation5.3.30seemstosuggestthatasIalsousedtobelieveHusserlwasanabsolutist(or"foundationalist"initsstrongestsense).However,even
thoughhedidspeakinanabsolutistwayfromtimetotime,therearevariouspassagesinhiswritingswhichdenythatwecanattainanyinfallible,absolutelycertain
insights.(ExamplesofbothtypesaregiveninFollesdal1988forHusserl'sowncriticismofwhathecalls"absolutist"theoriesoftruth,compareTieszen1989:181
182.)
InmydraftofMP,Iwrote:"AccordingtoHusserl,idealobjectssuchasemotions,values,pricesandRiemannmanifoldshaveasmuchrealityasphysicalobjectsand
areasmuchsuitablesubjectsforthedevelopmentofautonomousconceptualsciences."Gdelcommented:
5.3.34Thisstatementisnottobetakenseriouslyoneisnottomakeametaphysicsofit.Emotionsareoccurrencesinspacetimetheyarenotidealobjects.

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Rather,oneshouldsay,theconceptsofemotionssuchasanger.Thevalueofsomethingmaymeaneitherthatitisavalueorthatithasvalue.It'sbettertosaythatemotions
haveratherthanarevalue(s).

AdigressiononKant.IndiscussingHusserl,GdeloftencomparedhisworkwithKant's.HeknewKant'sworkverywellandspokehighlyofhisideaselsewhere
(see5.1above).ButintheseconversationshespokemoreoftenofwhatheregardedasthenegativeaspectsofKant'sphilosophy.Inthe1970sIfoundKant's
philosophymoreattractivethanHusserl's,andGdeltriedtochangemypreference.
Forinstance,whenIexpressedmyadmirationforKant'sarchitectonic,Gdelreplied:"Athoroughandsystematicbeginningisbetterthanasloppyarchitectonic."
WhenIobservedthatKantwentbeyondthepurelyintellectual,hementionedMaxScheler'sdevelopmentofaphenomenologyofthewill.Ithoughtthatthiscomment
contradictedhisobservation,quotedin5.3.9,againstHeidegger.WhenIremarkedthat,contrarytoHusserl'sclaimthathisphenomenologywasascience,therehad
beennoconspicuouscooperativeprogressinitsdevelopment,Gdelreplied:
5.3.35Husserlonlyshowedthewayheneverpublishedwhathehadarrivedatduringthirtyyearsofwork,butonlypublishedthemethodheused.Herequiresverygifted
followers:asgoodasheorbetter.
5.3.36KantandHusserlarecloseinterminologyforexample,bothspeakof"transcendentalism."HusserldoeswhatKantdid,onlymoresystematically.KantandLeibnizwere
alsoabsolutistsofthethree,onlyHusserladmitsthisexplicitly.BothHusserlandKantbeginwitheverydayknowledge.Husserlsetsdownthebeginningsofasystematic
philosophy.Kantrecognizesthatallcategoriesshouldbereducedtosomethingmorefundamental.Husserltriestofindthatmorefundamentalideawhichisbehindallthese
categories.Kant'saxiomsaboutthecategoriessayverylittle.Thetrueaxiomsshouldimplyallaprioriscience.
5.3.37ItisnotmeanttobeacriticismofwhatHusserlhasdonetopointoutthathewantstoteachnotsomekindofpropositionalknowledge,butanattitudeofmindwhich
enablesonetodirectone'sattentionrightly,tostrainone'sattentioninacertaindirection.Kant'sphilosophyofarithmeticandgeometrycomprisesassertionswithoutproof.For
Husserl,thegeneralideaofspaceisaprioritosomeextent:thingsareastheyappear(notalwaysobjects,alsootheraspects).
5.3.38AccordingtoKant,wearemorallyobligedtoassumesomethingeventhoughitmaybemeaningless.Whatissubjective,evenwithagreement,isdifferentfromwhatis
objective,inthesensethatthereisanoutsiderealitycorrespondingtoit.Oneshoulddistinguishquestionsofprinciplefromquestionsofpractice:fortheformer,agreementisof
noimportance.
5.3.39Kantalsomakesselfobservationofeverydaylife.Kantisinconsistent.HisepistemologyprovesthatGod,andsoon,havenoobjectivemeaningtheyarepurely
subjective,andtointerpretthemasobjectiveiswrong.Yethesaysthat

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weareobligedtoassumethembecausetheyinduceustodoourdutytoourfellowhumanbeings.Itis,however,alsoone'sdutynottoassumethingsthatarepurelysubjective.
5.3.40Kantnoticesonlyanambiguousanduncertainpsychologicalfactwhichisnotnecessary.Hisinsightsaredifferentfromthoseinthebook[presumablythefirstCritique].

5.4Against(Logical)Positivism
Positivism,includinglogicalpositivism,iscloselyrelatedtocertainformsofempiricism,naturalism,andscientism.Gdeldevelopedintellectuallyinthemidstofthe
leadinglogicalpositivistsHahn,Schlick,andCarnap.Buthefoundtheirphilosophicaloutlookunsatisfactory,bothgenerallyand,especially,inconnectionwiththeir
accountofmathematics,whichfailstodojusticetowhatweknowandmakesithardtodocertainmathematicalworkrelatedtothephilosophyofmathematics.
AccordingtoGdel'sownaccount,hehadbeenaPlatonistorobjectivistorrealistinmathematicssinceabout1925(RG:20).Buthebegantomakehisviewspublic
onlyinthe1940ssomeofthethingshesaidinthe1930ssuggestamoreambivalentattitude.Forexample,heexpressedskepticismtowardsettheoryinhislecture
''ThePresentSituationintheFoundationsofMathematics,"deliveredtotheAmericanMathematicalSocietyon30December1933(tobepublishedinCW3).Later,
throughhisstudyofHusserl'sworkfrom1959on,heseemstohavecometobelievethathehadfoundanepistemologicalfoundationforhisobjectivisticposition.
Inthesection"AgainstPositivism"(MP:713),IsummarizepartsofwhatGdelsaidtomeaboutpositivismincorrespondenceandinconversation.Thatdiscussion
consistsoffourparts:(1)generalobservations(2)twoletterstomeexplainingtheimportanceofhisobjectivisticconceptionforhisownworkinlogic(3)a
comparisonbetweenHilbert'sapproachandhisownapproachtoCantor'scontinuumhypothesis,illustratingthenegativeeffectofapositivisticconceptionand(4)the
relationofpositivismtophysics.Itishardtodrawalinebetweenhisobservationsnegatingthevalueofpositivismandthosefavoringobjectivism.Inthischapter,I
confinemyattentionto(1)and(4)andleavetheideasrelatedto(2)and(3)tochapters7and8.
Gdel'snegativefeelingtowardpositivismresultstosomeextentfromhisbeliefthatthepositivisticattitudehashadnegativeeffectsonthepursuitofphilosophyand
science.Ontheonehand,hebelievesitdirectstheattentionofphilosophersawayfrommorefruitfultypesofworkinphilosophy.Ontheotherhand,hebelievesit
preventsusfromeffectivelypursuingcertainareasoffundamentalphysicsandmathematics.Ingeneral,

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hebelievesthatthepositivisticattitudeimposesanarbitraryrestrictiononthepossibilitiesoffullyexercisingourmentalpowertounderstandand,thereby,improvethe
worldinafundamentalway.
Gdelmadeanumberofoverlappingremarksondifferentoccasionsaboutthegeneraloutlookofpositivism.
5.4.1Thepurposeofphilosophyisnottoproveeverythingfromnothing,buttoassumeasgivenallincludingconceptualrelationsthatweseeasclearlyasshapesandcolors,
whichcomefromsensationsbutcannotbederivedfromsensations.Thepositivistsattempttoproveeverythingfromnothing.Peopleclaimthatpositivismfollowsfromscience.
Thisisinsomesensetrue.Asaresult,observationsplayadisproportionallylargepart.[Compare9.3.6]
5.4.2Exactlyasinlearningthe[experiential]primitiveslikethesensationsaboutcolorandshape,onecannotprove[theprimitiveconceptsofphilosophy].Ifinphilosophyone
cannotassumewhatcanonlybeseen,thenoneis,likethepositivists,leftonlywiththesensations.[Compare9.2.]
5.4.3Evenifweadoptpositivism,itseemstomethattheassumptionofsuchentitiesasconceptsisquite[as]legitimateastheassumptionofphysicalobjectsandthatthereis
quiteasmuchreasontobelieveintheirexistence.Theyarenecessaryforobtainingasatisfactorysystemofmathematicsinthesamesenseasphysicalobjectsarenecessaryfora
satisfactorytheoryofouractuallyoccurringsenseperceptions.[Forrelatedobservations,see7.2.18and7.4.6.]
5.4.4Positivists(1)declinetoacknowledgeourhavingaprioriknowledge(2)reduceeverythingtosenseperceptions,oratleast,whileassumingphysicalobjects,connect
everythingtosenseperceptions(3)contradictthemselveswhenitcomestointrospection,whichtheydonotrecognizeasexperience.Theyhavetoonarrowanotionof
experience,andthefoundationsoftheirphilosophyarearbitrary.Russellmakesevenmoredrasticmistakes:asifsenseexperienceweretheonlyexperiencewecanfindby
introspection.
5.4.5Positivistsdeclinetoacknowledgeanyaprioriknowledge.Theywishtoreduceeverythingtosenseperceptions.Generallytheycontradictthemselvesinthattheydeny
introspectionasexperience,referringtohighermentalphenomenaas"judgments."Theyusetoonarrowanotionofexperienceandintroduceanarbitraryboundonwhat
experienceis,excludingphenomenologicalexperience.Russell(inhis1940[InquiryintoMeaningandTruth])madeamoredrasticmistakeinspeakingasifsenseexperiencewere
theonlyexperiencewecanfindbyintrospection.
5.4.6Thespiritoftimealwaysgoestopositivismandmaterialismforinstance,PlatowasfollowedbyAristotle.Positivismandmaterialismhavesimilarconsequences.
5.4.7Onebadeffectoflogicalpositivismisitsclaimofbeingintimatelyassociatedwithmathematicallogic.Asaresult,otherphilosopherstendtodistancethemselvesfrom
mathematicallogicandtherewithdeprivethemselvesof

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thebenefitsofawayofprecisethinking.Mathematicallogicmakesiteasiertoavoidmistakesevenforonewhoisnotagenius.
5.4.8Mathematicallogicshouldbeusedmorebynonpositivisticphilosophers.Thepositivistshaveatendencytorepresenttheirphilosophyasaconsequenceoflogictogive
itscientificdignity.Otherphilosophersthinkthatpositivismisidenticalwithmathematicallogic,whichtheyconsequentlyavoid.
5.4.9Thosephilosopherswhoarenotpositivistsaresurprisinglyignorantofmathematicallogic.Becausethepositivistsidentifyitwithpositivism,naturallyotherphilosophers
objecttotheclaimedsupportforaphilosophytheydislike,and,consequently,paylittleattentiontoit.Thepointisnotsomuchexplicituseoflogic,butratherthewayofthinking
andalsosotothinkthatthefruitscanbeputintothetermsoflogic.

RemarksRelatedtoCarnap
5.4.10Wittgenstein'snegativeattitudetowardsymboliclanguageisastepbackward.Thosewho,likeCarnap,misusesymboliclanguagewanttodiscreditmathematicallogicthey
wanttopreventtheappearanceofphilosophy.Thewholemovementofthepositivistswantstodestroyphilosophyforthispurposetheyneedtodestroymathematicallogicasa
tool.Thereisaninnerlogicinthis,whichmayevenbeaconsciousoneinsomeofthepositivists.Thebeliefisthattruthincludingwhatistrueinreligionisharmful.Another
ideaatworkinCarnapisthis:theconcealmentoftruthinpositivismwillonlyworkforthelowerintelligenceforthemoreintelligent,positivismencouragesthemtothinkthe
opposite.Carnapbelievesthatforthepresentstagealsoespeciallyforsciencepositivismismoreuseful[thanotherphilosophicalpositions].Carnapbelievesthatatpresent
philosophyisbeyondthereachofknowledge.[Forthecontextofthisobservation,seethepassagethatintroduces5.5.6inthenextsection.]
5.4.11IagreethatasEinsteinsaidtoCarnap[quotedinMP:381]thereisatendencytowaterdownpositivismtotheextentofnolongermeaninganythingdistinctive.
5.4.12Carnapassumesinfinitelymanyexpressions,whichareidealizedphysicalobjects.Finitaryresultsaregivenaphysicalinterpretation,whichistakentofollowasan
empiricalfact.ThisisclosetoMill'spointofview.
5.4.13Carnaptakesmathematicsaslinguisticconventions.Butobjectivityandperceptibilityareconnected:Wecansee[thecorrectnessof]thecorrectdefinitionsforinstance,
thedefinitionofmeasurablesets[ofrealnumbers]istrue.[Myworkon]theCarnappapercausedmetremendoustrouble.
5.4.14MyCarnappaperprovedthatmathematicsisnotsyntaxoflanguage.Butitfailedtoprovethepositivestatementofwhatmathematicsis.
5.4.15Carnap'sworkonthenatureofmathematicswasremotefromactualmathematicshelatercameclosertoactualscienceinhisbookonprobability.

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CarnaphadabookonLeibnizaround1947[IwonderwhetherthisremarkbyGdelisbasedonreliableinformation].

PositivismandPhysics
ItisawellknownfactthatthesuccessofEinstein'sspecialtheoryofrelativitywasamajorinspirationforthecentralthesisoflogicalpositivismthatthecriterionfora
statementtobemeaningfulisitsverifiabilityultimatelybysenseexperience.Indeed,inconnectionwiththediscoveryofhisspecialtheory,Einsteinhimselfmentions
thedecisiveinfluenceofHumeandMach:"Thetypeofcriticalreasoningwhichwasrequiredforthediscoverywasdecisivelyfurnished,inmycase,especiallyby
thereadingofDavidHume'sandErnstMach'sphilosophicalwritings"(inSchilpp1949:53).
Atthesametime,Einstein'sattitudetowardquantumtheoryis,inhisownwords,opposedto"thepositivisticallyinclinedmodernphysicist"(ibid.:667).Asascientist,
"thefactsofexperiencedonotpermithimtolethimselfbetoomuchrestrictedintheconstructionofhisconceptualworldbytheadherencetoanepistemological
system.Hethereforemustappeartothesystematicepistemologistasatypeofunscrupulousopportunist"(ibid.:684).GdelcontrastedEinstein'spositionwiththatof
Bohr(compareMP:7):
5.4.16TheheuristicsofEinsteinandBohrarestatedintheircorrespondence.CantormightalsobeclassifiedtogetherwithEinsteinandme.HeisenbergandBohrareontheother
side.Bohr[even]drewmetaphysicalconclusionsfromtheuncertaintyprinciple.

Inhisdiscussionswithme,Gdelmadeanumberofcommentsontherelationbetweenpositivismandphysics,withspecialemphasisonthespecialtheoryofrelativity.
InMay1972hewroteapassagetosummarizetheseviews,whichIreproducedinFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(MP:1213).
5.4.17Itmustbeadmittedthatthepositivisticpositionalsohasturnedouttobefruitfuloncertainoccasions.Anexampleoftenmentionedisthespecialtheoryofrelativity.The
fruitfulnessofthepositivisticpointofviewinthiscaseisduetoaveryexceptionalcircumstance,namelythefactthatthebasicconcepttobeclarified,i.e.,simultaneity,isdirectly
observable,whilegenerallybasicentities(suchaselementaryparticles,theforcesbetweenthem,etc.)arenot.Hence,thepositivisticrequirementthateverythinghastobe
reducedtoobservationsisjustifiedinthissense.That,generallyspeaking,positivismisnotfruitfuleveninphysicsseemstofollowfromthefactthat,sinceithasbeenadoptedin
quantumphysics(i.e.,about40yearsago)nosubstantialprogresshasbeenachievedinthebasiclawsofphysics,eventhoughthe"twolevel"theory(withits"quantization"of
a"classicalsystem,"anditsdivergentseries)isadmittedlyunsatisfactory.Perhaps,whatoughttobedoneistoseparatethesubjectiveandobjectiveelementsin

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Schrdinger'swavefunction,whichsofarhasbynomeansbeenprovedimpossible.Butexactlythisquestionis"meaningless"fromthepositivisticpointofview.

Gdelmadeseveralrelatedobservationsonpositivismmoreinformallyinthecourseofthediscussions.
5.4.18Underexceptionalcircumstances,positivismisfruitful.Forexample,simultaneityisdirectlyobservable,andsoreducingeverythingtoobservationsisjustified.Generally
speaking,quantummechanicsispositivistic.Thetwoleveltheoryisnotsatisfactory.Weshouldperhapsdistinguishthesubjectiveandtheobjectiveelements.Butexactlythis
questionispositivisticallymeaningless.
5.4.19Positivismisgenerallynotfruitfulinscientificresearch,althoughitmayhavebeenvaluableinthediscoveryofthespecialtheoryofrelativity.Generallyspeaking,theright
ideasarefruitful.Positivismispedagogicallybetterforthespecialtheoryofrelativity.

Asfirst,Gdelwishedtopointoutthat,evenforthediscoveryofthespecialtheoryofrelativity,thepositivisticoutlookisunnecessary.Buthethendecidedtoleave
outthefollowingpassage:
5.4.20Thepositivisticattitudeisnotnecessaryforarrivingatthespecialtheoryofrelativity.ItisamathematicalfactthattheMaxwellequationsareinvariantunderLorentz
transformations.InviewofthewideapplicabilityoftheMaxwellequations,onemaybeinclinedtoassumethatallphysicalphenomenacanbeexplainedbytheMaxwell
equations,oratleastthatadditionalphysicallawsareliketheMaxwellequationsinthesinglerespectofbeinginvariantunderLorentztransformations.Fromeitherassumptionit
followsthataphysicalbody(inparticular,aclockand,therewith,time)proceedingonamovingbodywillslowdown.

Thispassage,writtenoutbyGdel,wasareformulationofwhathehadsaidearlierinthediscussions:
5.4.21Considerthespecialtheoryofrelativityfromtheabsolutistview.ItisamathematicalfactthattheMaxwellequationsareinvariantwithrespecttotheLorentz
transformations.Further,assumethatallphenomenacanbeexplainedbytheMaxwellequations.Itfollowsthataphysicalbodyproceedingonamovingbodywillslowdown,
alsoaclock,alsotime.Thepositivistattitudeisnotnecessaryatall.TheassumptionthateverythingisexplainedbytheMaxwellequationsistoostrong.Replaceitbyaweaker
assumption:Itistobeexpectedthatwhatistobeadded[totheMaxwellequations]isalsocompatiblewiththeinvariance.Therefore,wehavethestatement:Everyphysicallawis
invariantundertheLorentztransformations.Intermsoftheconceptionofabsolutetimeandspace,wemaysaythatthetimemeasurementisdistortedwhenmoving.Physically
[thisalternativeformulationmakes]nodifference,butitisnotacceptabletothepositivists.Nonpositivisticallyonewoulddrawtheconclusionthatitisphysicallyindeterminable,
whichistherealthing.Einstein'sgeniussuggeststhequestionwhetheritisnecessarynottobeacompletepositivist.

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ThefollowingobservationseemstoberelatedtoGdel'sownrotatinguniversesassolutionstoEinstein'sfieldequationsofgravitation(compareSection9.5):
5.4.22Lorentzspaceisnotrealizedintheworld.Whatisrealizedisseenfromcosmology:Riemannspaceandevenabsolutespace[are]lessrelativistic.Iftheuniverserotates,
thenthewholeworldmoveswithuniformmotion.Thatwouldbethemoststrikingconfirmationoftheabsolutistviewonecanthinkof.

AsImentionedatthebeginningofthissection,thediscussionsagainstpositivismincludedacomparisonbetweenHilbert'sandGdel'sworksonthecontinuum
hypothesis(summarizedinMP:1112).TheideaisthatHilberthadanattractiveapproachtotheproblem,but,becauseofhis"quasipositivisticattitude,"hemadean
unjustifiablystrongclaimforitandfailedtoappreciatewhatcouldhavebeenachievedfromhisapproachwiththerightattitude.Therefore,wehavehereastriking
exampleofhowapositivisticleaningmayhamperone'sresearchinmathematics.IturntodetailedobservationsonthispointinChapter8.
5.5GdelandWittgenstein
Likemanyphilosophersofmygeneration,IhadperiodicallystruggledwiththephilosophicalwritingsofWittgenstein.GivenmydeepinvolvementinGdel'sviews,it
wasnaturalformetotrytocometotermswiththeapparentincompatibilitybetweentheiroutlooks.AfterapreliminaryattemptinRG(pp.5867),Icontinuedthe
effortinseveralessays:alecture(1987b)inAugust1986attheWittgensteinSymposiumanarticleinSynthese(1991)andalecturetotheGdelSocietyinAugust
1991(1992).SincemymainpurposeinthepresentcontextistoconsiderGdel'sobservations,Iincludehereonlyabriefsummaryofmyownimpressions,derived
fromanattempttocomparethetwophilosophers.
WhereasGdelemphasizestheabstractandtheuniversal,Wittgensteinpaysmoreattentiontotheconcreteandtheparticular.Gdelisparticularlyinterestedinthe
relationbetweenphilosophyandscience.ForWittgenstein,"thedifficultyinphilosophyistosaynomorethanweknow"heisforshowingourviewsbyourwork
ratherthansayingwhatwewishtoaccomplishthroughaphilosophicalprogramsuchasHusserl'sofphilosophyasrigorousscienceorGdel'sofdoingfor
philosophywhatNewtondidforphysics.IncontrasttoWittgenstein,Gdelconsiderslanguageunimportantforthestudyofseriousphilosophicalissues.Bothofthem
believethateverydaythinkingisofmorefundamentalrelevancetophilosophy,butinpracticeGdelhasappealedmoretoscience.Bothconsiderphilosophyto
compriseconceptualinvestigations,buttheir

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conceptionsofconceptareradicallydifferent.Bothoccupiedmuchoftheirtimewiththephilosophyofmathematics,buttheirperspectivesandconclusionsoftenrun
incontrarydirections.Finally,whiletheybothfindthatscienceasitiscommonlydoneadoptsaonesidedperspective,Gdelwishestoimprovesciencewhile
Wittgensteintriestodemystifyit.
AsastudentintheUniversityofVienna,Gdelstudiedwithseveralteachers(notablySchlick,Hahn,andCarnap)whoweregreatlyinfluencedbyWittgenstein.From
1926to1927,attheageof20,heattendedanextended,continuousdiscussionoftheTractatusintheViennaCircle.Onewould,therefore,expecthimtohavea
strongresponse,positiveornegative,toWittgenstein'swork.AsfarasIknow,however,thereisnorecordofGdel'sresponseatthattime.
In1975,Gdeldraftedseveralrepliestoaninquiry,whichgavesomerelevantinformation:hefirststudiedWittgenstein'sworkaround1927,but,hesaid"never
thoroughly"(RG:17)or"onlyverysuperficially'(RG:19):"Wittgenstein'sviewsonthephilosophyofmathematicshadnoinfluenceonmywork,nordidtheinterestof
theViennaCircleinthatsubjectstartwithWittgenstein(butratherwentbacktoProfessorHansHahn)"(RG:20).
ItislikelythatGdelfoundWittgenstein'sworktooimprecisetodiscuss.Inhisconversationswithmein1972,however,hedidcommentonWittgenstein'swork
severaltimes.InJanuary,GdelmadesomeobservationsinconnectionwithmybriefdiscussionsofWittgenstein's"twophilosophies"(MP:1314):
5.5.1TheTractatusgivesawellroundedpicture.Thefirstphilosophyisasystem,thesecondamethod.Itishardtospeakofthesecondphilosophy.Theonlythingincommonis
therejectionofmetaphysics.InastrongersenseWittgensteinrefutedmetaphysics.Themainpointsaretherefutationofmetaphysicsandthecentralityoflanguage.

InOctober,GdelmadeanotherobservationontheTractatusandalsocommentedonWittgenstein'sdefenseofSchopenhaueragainstSchlick'scriticism(quotedin
MP:380):
5.5.2IstheTractatuscompatiblewithbasicstuffoftheconceptualsort?Probablynot.Ifso,wemusttakeitasamatterofcounterproofofthesystem.[In1930or1931
Wittgensteindidsaythattheobjects(entities,things,etc.)intheTractatusincludebothparticularsanduniversals(Lee1980:120).However,itisnotsoeasytoaccommodatethe
universalsinhissystem.(CompareWang1985a:76.)]
5.5.3MaybeSchopenhauer'sphilosophywashelpfultoWittgensteininthesenseofaladder.IntheTractatusperiod,thatwouldbetheonlyreasonableinterpretation.

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Gdel'smaincommentsonWittgensteinweremadeon5April1972.KarlMengerhadwrittentoGdelinJanuaryaskinghimtocommentonWittgenstein's
discussionofhis(Gdel's)theoreminRemarksontheFoundationsofMathematics(1967hereafterRFM).Atthetime,Itoowasinterestedindiscussing
Wittgenstein'sworkwithGdelandsenthimsomematerialinearlyFebruary.Inparticular,IcalledGdel'sattentiontoWittgenstein'slater(around1932)criticismof
theunderlyingprinciplesofatomicityandfinitenessusedinhisownearlywork(reportedbyG.E.Moore1955:14andconsideredatlengthinWang1985a:95
99).WhenImethiminhisofficeon5April,Gdelaskedme:WhatwasWittgensteindoingalltheseyears?Undoubtedlyhehadinmindthelonglapsebetweenthe
completionoftheTractatusin1918andthecorrectionofhismistakesin1932.
BetweenreceivingMenger'sletterinJanuaryandmeetingwithmeinApril,GdelhadevidentlylookedatRFMandthematerialIhadsent.Hewasquitereadyto
expresshisimpressionsonthisoccasion.Hishabitualcalmnesswasabsentinhiscomments:
5.5.4HasWittgensteinlosthismind?Doeshemeanitseriously?Heintentionallyutterstriviallynonsensicalstatements.Whathesaysaboutthesetofallcardinalnumbers
revealsaperfectlynaiveview.[PossiblythereferenceistoRFM:132andthesurroundingobservations.]Hehastotakeapositionwhenhehasnobusinesstodoso.Forexample,
"youcan'tderiveeverythingfromacontradiction."Heshouldtrytodevelopasystemoflogicinwhichthatistrue.It'samazingthatTuringcouldgetanythingoutofdiscussions
withsomebodylikeWittgenstein.
5.5.5aHehasgivenuptheobjectivegoalofmakingconceptsandproofsprecise.Itisonethingtosaythatwecan'tmakeprecisephilosophicalconcepts(suchasapriority,
causality,substance,thegeneralconceptofproof,etc.).Buttogofurtherandsaywecan'tevenmakemathematicalconceptspreciseismuchmore.IntheTractatusitissaidthat
philosophycan'tbemadeintoascience.Hislaterphilosophyistoeliminatealsoscience.Itisanaturaldevelopment.Todeclinephilosophyisanirrationalisticattitude.Thenhe
declinesallrationalitydecliningevenscience.

On20April1972GdelwrotehisreplytoMenger'sJanuaryletter,commentingonsomeofWittgenstein'sdiscussionsofhisownfamoustheorem(compareRG:49):
5.5.5bItisindeedclearfromthepassagesyoucite[RFM:117123,385389]thatWittgensteindidnotunderstandit(orpretendednottounderstandit).Heinterpreteditasakindof
logicalparadox,whileinfactitisjusttheopposite,namelyamathematicaltheoremwithinanabsolutelyuncontroversialpartofmathematics(finitarynumbertheoryor
combinatorics).Incidentally,thewholepassageyouciteseemsnonsensetome.See,forexample,the"superstitiousfearofmathematiciansofcontradictions."

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WittgensteinhadmadevariouscommentsonGdel'stheorembetween1935and1944,includingextensivediscussionsin1937and1944.Fromtheseobservations
mostlypublishedbynowitisclearthathehadgivenmuchthoughttothematterandconsideredGdel'sproofphilosophicallyimportant.However,eventhough
manyphilosophershavepuzzledoverthem,westillhavenosatisfactoryunderstandingofseveralpartsofhiscommentsonGdel'stheorem.
On29November1972GdelcommentedonthefollowingquotationfromCarnapinmytypescript(MP:380):"WhenwefoundinWittgenstein'sbook[the
Tractatus]statementsabout`thelanguage',weinterpretedthemasreferringtoanideallanguageandthismeansforusaformalizedsymboliclanguage.Later
Wittgensteinexplicitlyrejectedthisview.Hehadaskepticalandsometimesevenanegativeviewoftheimportanceofsymboliclanguagefor[philosophy]."Iquote
Gdel'scommentonthispassagein5.4.10above.Onanotheroccasion,inthecontextofhisobservation5.5.1,Gdelmadearelatedremarkwhichalsoseems
appropriateasacommentonthisquotation:
5.5.6TousetheTractatusthewayCarnapdoeshassomevalue.Thereis,however,noideallanguage.Inwhatwaycouldoneevenconceiveofanideallanguage?

EarlierinthissectionIquotedGdel'sobservation(5.5.1)whichmentionsthe"centralityoflanguage"inbothofWittgenstein's"twophilosophies."Ingeneral,Gdel
deploredtheoverestimationoftheimportanceoflanguageforphilosophy.Specifically,heblamedthisoverestimationforthewidespreadfailuretodistinguishthe
intensionalfromthesemanticparadoxes(atopictobediscussedlaterinChapter8).Inthecontextofemphasizingtheimportanceofthisdistinction,Gdelstatedat
somelengthhisnegativeattitudetowardanexcessiverelianceonlanguage:
5.5.7Wedonothaveanyprimitiveintuitionsaboutlanguage.Languageisnothingbutaoneonecorrespondencebetweenabstractobjectsandconcreteobjects[namelythe
linguisticsymbols].Everythinghastobeproved[whenwearedealingwithlanguage].Theoverestimationoflanguageisdeplorable.
5.5.8Languageisusefulandevennecessaryforfixingourideas.Butthisisapurelypracticalaffair.Ourmindismoreinclinedtosensualobjects,whichhelptofixourattentionon
abstractobjects.Thisistheonlyimportanceoflanguage.Itisridiculous[toexpect]thatweshouldhaveanyprimitiveintuitionsaboutlanguage,whichisjustanassociationof
symbolswithconceptsandotherentities.
5.5.9Ifyouuselanguagetodefinecombinationsofconceptsreplacedbycombinationsofsymbols,thelatterarecompletelyunimportant.Symbolsonlyhelpustofixand
rememberabstractthings:inordertoidentifyconcepts,weassociatethemwithcertainsymbols.Allprimitiveevidenceoflogicis,whenyouinvestigateit,alwaysofconcepts
symbolshavenothingtodowithit.Seeingcomplicated

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symbolsiseasiertheyareeasiertohandle.Onecanoverviewmoresymbols.Werememberacomplicatedconceptbymeansofasymboldenotingit.Ifitisanaturalconcept,then
wecanunderstandit.

UndoubtedlyWittgensteinandGdeldifferintheirconceptionsoflanguageandtheirexperiencewithit.Inanycase,therelationofmathematicstolanguageseemsto
exhibitcertainstrikingpeculiarities.Ontheonehand,language(includingsymbolsanddiagrams)isofgreatpracticalimportancetoamathematician,packingmuch
informationintoaneconomicalreminder.Ontheotherhand,incomparisonwithotherhumanenterprises,mathematicsislesslikelytobedistortedorconfusedby
language.Instudyingmathematics,a(foreign)studentislesshandicappedbydeficienciesinthenaturallanguageofthetextortheteacher.Communicationof
mathematicalideasdependslessonfacilityinwritingorspeakinganaturallanguage.Itisoftenpossible,forexample,tofindanaccuratelongprooffromvery
fragmentaryhints,suchasadiagramorafewcrucialwords.OneofmycollegeteachersoncetoldmethathehadbeenadvisedtostudyEnglishbutdecidedinsteadto
study"theuniversallanguage"meaningmathematics.SomethingofthissortmaybepartofwhatBrouwerhasinmindwhenhespeaks(somewhatmisleadingly
perhaps)ofmathematicsaslanguageindependent,or"anessentiallylanguagelessactivityofthemind."
TheeffectsofthedifferentattitudesofGdelandWittgensteintowardlanguageanditsrelationtophilosophyaremoststrikingintheirphilosophiesofmathematics
especiallyofsettheory.WhereasGdelmadesignificantcontributionstosettheoryandsawthequestfornewaxiomsinsettheoryasagoodillustrationofourmind's
powers,Wittgensteinpersistentlyattemptedto"showhowverymisleadingtheexpressionsofCantorare."Indeed,Wittgensteinwrotein1929:"Thereisnoreligious
denominationinwhichtheuseofmetaphorical[notmetaphysical]expressionshasbeenresponsibleforsomuchsinasithasinmathematics"(Wittgenstein1980:1).
[Inaletterof19September1991G.H.vonWrightinformedmethatthewordmetaphysischerintheprintedtexthadbeenamisreadingoftheoriginalmanuscript.]
Weencounterherearemarkableconflictofviewswhichmayserveasastimulatingdatumforthestudyofthenatureofphilosophicaldisagreementsandofplausible
waystodecomposethemsothat,perhaps,constructivedialoguemaybecomepossiblebetweenproponentsoftwophilosophicalpositions.
Intermsofthedivisionofphilosophicalworldviewsmentionedatthebeginningofthischapter,wecouldsaythatGdelleanstowardtherightandthetenderminded
andWittgensteintowardtheleftandthetoughminded.Wittgensteinoncemadearelatedcontrast:"No,Idon'tthinkIwouldgetonwithHegel.Hegelseemstometo
bealwayswantingtosay

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[that]thingswhichlookdifferentarereallythesame.Whereasmyinterestisinshowingthatthingswhichlookthesamearereallydifferent''(inRhees1984:157).Kant
alsospeaksofthedifferentmanifestationsofreason's"twofold,selfconflictinginterest"inuniversalityanddeterminateness:somepeoplearealmost"hostileto
heterogeneity"somealmost"extinguishthehopeofeverbeingabletodetermine"thingsinuniversalterms(Kant19:540).

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Chapter6
MindsandMachines:OnComputabilism
Itisconceivable(althoughfaroutsidethelimitsofpresentdayscience)thatbrainphysiologywouldadvancesofarthatitwouldbeknownwithempiricalcertainty(1)thatthe
brainsufficesfortheexplanationofallmentalphenomenaandisamachineinthesenseofTuring(2)thatsuchandsuchistheprecisematerialstructureandphysiological
functioningofthepartofthebrainwhichperformsmathematicalthinking.
Gdel,GibbsLecture,1951note17

Computabilismisthethesisthatthebrainandthemindfunctionbasicallylikeacomputerneuralismisthethesisthatthebrainsufficesfortheexplanationofmental
phenomena.Duringhisdiscussionswithmeinthe1970s,Gdelarguedforhisstrongconvictionthatneithercomputabilismnorneuralismistrueapositionwhich
excludesthepossibilitythatadditionalknowledgewillyieldtheoutcomeenvisagedinpoint(1)above.
Ifwedonotassumeneuralism,thentheissueofcomputabilismissplitintotwosubproblems:onedealingwithneuralphenomenaandtheotherwithmental
phenomena.Inaddition,sincewepossessawelldevelopedphysics,itiscommontoidentifytherelationbetweenmindandbodywiththatbetweenmindandmatter,
andsoneuralismisreplacedbyphysicalism.If,however,wetrytomaketheassumptionsexplicit,wemaydistinguish,inanobviousmanner,(a)ontheonehand,
physicalismwithrespecttobiological,neural,andmentalphenomenaand(b)ontheotherhand,computabilismwithrespecttophysical,biological,neural,andmental
phenomena.
Ofthesesevendistinctproblems,thecentralonethatGdeldiscussedwithmewascomputabilismasanexplanationofmentalprocesses,thatis,theissueofwhether
allthinkingiscomputationalwithspecialemphasisonmathematicalthinking.Gdel'smainconcernwastodemonstratethatnotallmathematicalthinkingis
computational.
Theactualdiscussionsbeganwithmyconsiderationofmechanicalprocedureasanexampleofafairlysuccessfulcharacterizationofgeneral

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mathematicalconcepts.Specifically,Gdelcommented(1)onmyobservationthatTuringcomputabilityisnotanentirelysharpconcept(Wang1974a,hereafter
MP:8183)and(2)onmyformulationoftheargumentfortheadequacyofTuring'sdefinitionofmechanicalprocedure(ibid.:9095).Theseformulationsledto
Gdel'sresponses(ibid.:8485,102n.30,326),whichincluded,asanafterthought:(3)aconjectureddisproofofthecommonbeliefthatthereisnomindseparate
frommatter.Gdelalsocommented(4)onmyreviewofattemptstoemployhisincompletenesstheoremtodisprovecomputerismformentalphenomena(ibid.:315
320).ThesecommentsledtothetwoparagraphsinMPthatbeginatthemiddleofp.324.Inthischapter,inordertobeginwiththemorefamiliarmaterial,Iconsider
(4)and(3)first,andthenturnto(2)and(1).
Apartfromanumberofincidentalobservations,IexaminesuccessivelyGdel'sideasonthefollowingtopics:(a)therelationbetweenmentalcomputabilismand
Gdel'sincompletenesstheoremonthecomputationalinexhaustibilityofmathematics(b)thelackofsolidevidenceforthewidespreadbeliefinphysicalism(or
parallelismbetweenthephysicalandthemental)(c)thestrengthandweaknessofTuring'sformulationandjustificationofhisdefinitionofcomputerand
computationand(d)physicalandneuralcomputabilism.Gdel'sconsiderationoftopic(a),inparticular,continuesthethoughtsheexpressedinhisGibbslecture,
whichwaswrittenanddeliveredin1951(inGdel1995,hereafterCW3).
6.1MentalComputabilismGdel'sTheoremandOtherSuggestions
OnelineofthoughtmuchpursuedintryingtorefutementalcomputabilismusesGdel'sinexhaustibilitytheorem.Thetheoremimpliesthat,foreverycomputerthat
generatestheorems,thereissometruthwhichwecanseetobetruebutwhichcannotbegeneratedbythecomputer.Itappears,therefore,thatourmentalpower
surpassesanycomputerinprovingtheorems.Whenwetrytomakethisargumentprecise,however,itturnsoutthattherearesubtleloopholesinit.
OneformofGdel'stheoremsaysthat,ifareasonablystrongtheoremprovingcomputerorprogramissoundorconsistent,thenitcannotprovethetruththat
expressesitsownconsistency.InhisGibbsLecture,Gdelusesthisformtodrawseveralconsequences.In1972hewroteuptwooftheseconsequencesasfollows:
6.1.1Thehumanmindisincapableofformulating(ormechanizing)allitsmathematicalintuitions.Thatis,ifithassucceededinformulatingsomeofthem,thisveryfactyieldsnew
intuitiveknowledge,forexampletheconsistencyofthisformalism.Thisfactmaybecalledthe"incompletability"ofmathematics.Ontheotherhand,onthebasisofwhathasbeen
provedsofar,itremainspossiblethattheremayexist(andevenbeempiricallydiscoverable)atheoremprovingmachine

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whichinfactisequivalenttomathematicalintuition,butcannotbeprovedtobeso,norevenbeprovedtoyieldonlycorrecttheoremsoffinitarynumbertheory.[SeeMP:324.]
6.1.2Eitherthehumanmindsurpassesallmachines(tobemoreprecise:itcandecidemorenumbertheoreticalquestionsthananymachine),orelsethereexistnumbertheoretical
questionsundecidableforthehumanmind.[Itisnotexcludedthatbothalternativesmaybetrue.]

Inthetextwrittenin1972,GdelwentongoingbeyondhisGibbslecturetorejectthesecondalternativebyarguingfora"rationalisticoptimism"(MP:324325).
(Seesection9.4,togetherwithrelatedobservationsonthisargument.)Clearlyhehimselfrealizedthatsucharefutationofmentalcomputabilismisnotconvincing,as
wecaninferfromhiscontinuedeffortstofindotherwaystoachievethedesiredrefutation.
IntheGibbslecture,Gdelcontinuedwithadifferentlineofthought.Inonedirection,heelaboratedonthepossibility,assertedin6.1.1above,thattheremightexista
theoremprovingcomputerinfactequivalenttomathematicalintuition.
6.1.3Itisnotprecludedthatthereshouldexistafiniterule[acomputer]producingallitsevidentaxioms.However,ifsucharuleexists,wewithourhumanunderstandingcould
certainlyneverknowittobesuchthatis,wecouldneverknowwithmathematicalcertaintythatallpropositionsitproducesarecorrector,inotherterms,wecouldperceivetobe
trueonlyonepropositionaftertheother,foranyfinitenumberofthem.Theassertion,however,thattheyarealltruecouldatmostbeknownwithempiricalcertainty,onthebasis
ofasufficientnumberofinstancesorbyotherinductivereferences.[Gdelappendedtotheendofthisstatementthenotequotedatthebeginningofthischapter.]

Sinceevery"finiterule"ischaracterizedbyafinitesetofaxiomsandrulesofinference,itis,asfarasweknow,possibleforustoknowofanyfiniterulethatitis
correct.Inthatcase,nofiniterulecouldfullycaptureourmathematicalintuitionbecause,ifitdid,wewouldknowitsconsistencyaswell,whichgoesbeyondthe
rule.Thepointof6.1.3is:iftherewereafiniteruleequivalenttoourmathematicalintuition,thenwewouldneverknowittobesuchotherwisewewouldalsoknow
theconsistencyofthefiniterule,andsoitwouldnotbeequivalenttoourmathematicalintuition.
Ifwereflectonthecharacteranddevelopmentofmathematicalintuitionasrevealedbythepracticeofthecommunityofmathematicians,wemaybeabletoexamine
morecloselythelikelihoodofthepossibilitythatmathematicalintuitionis(orisnot)infactequivalentinpowertosomecomputer.Therelevantphenomenaare,
however,socomplexandindefinitethatI,forone,amreluctanttofacethisformidabletask.

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IntheGibbslectureGdelalsointroducedadistinctionbetweenmathematicsinthesubjectivesenseasthesystemofalldemonstrablepropositionsand
mathematicsintheobjectivesenseasthesystemofalltruemathematicalpropositions.Usingthisdistinction,hecouldreformulate6.1.2asfollows:
6.1.4Eithersubjectivemathematicssurpassesthecapabilityofallcomputers,orelseobjectivemathematicssurpassessubjectivemathematics,orbothalternativesmaybetrue.

Gdelthendrewsometentative,anddebatable,conclusions:
6.1.5Ifthefirstalternativeholds,thisseemstoimplythattheworkingofthehumanmindcannotbereducedtotheworkingofthebrain,whichtoallappearanceisafinitemachine
withafinitenumberofparts,namely,theneuronsandtheirconnections.
6.1.6[Thesecondalternative]seemstodisprovetheviewthatmathematicsisonlyourowncreationforthecreatornecessarilyknowsallpropertiesofhiscreatures,becausethey
can'thaveanyothersexceptthosehehasgiventothem.Sothisalternativeseemstoimplythatmathematicalobjectsandfacts(oratleastsomethinginthem)existobjectivelyand
independentlyofourmentalactsanddecisions,thatistosay,someformorotherofPlatonismor"realism"astothemathematicalobjects[holds].

Ifweaccepttheinferencesandassertionsinthesetwoparagraphs,wealsohaveavariantof6.1.5:eitherphysicalismisfalseorelsePlatonisminmathematicsistrue,
orboth.Infact,therestofGdel'sGibbslecturewasdevotedtoanattempttoargueinfavorofPlatonisminmathematicsatopicwhichhealsodiscussed
extensivelyinhisconversationswithmeandwhichwillbethesubjectmatterofChapter7.
Gdel'sthoughtsaboutthenatureanddefinitionofcreationandaboutthepropositionthatthebrainislikeacomputerareamonghisfavoriteideas.Heelaboratedon
theminourdiscussions,andIconsiderthemlater,intheappropriatecontexts.Forthepresent,IlimitmyselftothoseofGdel'sobservationswhicharedirectly
relevanttotheimplicationsofhistheorem.Notsurprisingly,someoftheseobservationsaresimilartothoseinhisGibbslecture:
6.1.7Theincompletenessresultsdonotruleoutthepossibilitythatthereisatheoremprovingcomputerwhichisinfactequivalenttomathematicalintuition.Buttheyimplythat,
insuchahighlyunlikelyforotherreasonscase,eitherwedonotknowtheexactspecificationofthecomputerorwedonotknowthatitworkscorrectly.
6.1.8Myincompletenesstheoremmakesitlikelythatmindisnotmechanical,orelsemindcannotunderstanditsownmechanism.Ifmyresultistakentogetherwiththerationalistic
attitudewhichHilberthadandwhichwasnotrefutedbymy

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results,then[wecaninfer]thesharpresultthatmindisnotmechanical.Thisisso,because,ifthemindwereamachine,therewould,contrarytothisrationalisticattitude,exist
numbertheoreticquestionsundecidableforthehumanmind.
6.1.9Thereisavagueideathatwecanfindasetofaxiomssuchthat(1)alltheseaxiomsareevidenttous(2)thesetyieldsallofmathematics.Itfollowsfrommyincompleteness
theoremthatitisimpossibletosetupanaxiomsystemsatisfying(1)and(2),because,by(1),thestatementexpressingtheconsistencyofthesystemshouldalsobeevidentto
me.AllthisisexplicitlyinmyGibbslecture.
6.1.10Anotherconsequenceofmytheoremisadisjunctionoftwopropositions:(a)Mathematicsisincompletableinthesensethatitsevidentaxiomscannotbeembodiedina
finiteruleand,therefore,thehumanmindsurpassesfinitemachines,orelse(b)thereexistabsolutelyundecidableDiophantineproblemsforthehumanmind.Thisconsequenceof
mytheorem,liketheprecedingone,issharp.Eitheralternativeisopposedtothematerialistphilosophy.Alternative(a)isagainsttheidentificationofthebrainwithmind.
Alternative(b)disprovestheviewthatmathematicalobjectsareourcreation.

GivenGdel'sresultthataformalsystemoratheoremprovingcomputercannotproveitsownconsistency,anobviousideaforrefutingcomputabilismistotryto
arguethatmindcanproveitsownconsistency.InMPIconsideredthisattemptatlength(MP:317321).Inthecourseofdiscussingmymanuscript,Gdelmade
severalobservationsonthislineofthought.Laterhewroteaonesentencesummaryofthem(MP:328n.14):
6.1.11Becauseoftheunsolvedintensionalpardoxesforconceptslikeconcept,proposition,proof,andsoon,intheirmostgeneralsense,noproofusingtheselfreflexivityof
theseconceptscanberegardedasconclusiveinthepresentstageofdevelopmentoflogic,although,afterasatisfactorysolutionoftheseparadoxes,such[an]argumentmayturn
outtobeconclusive.

Theintensionalparadoxescertainlyincludethatoftheconcept:beingaconceptthatdoesnotapply(meaningfully)toitself.IamnotsurewhatotherexamplesGdel
hadinmind.Anexampleaboutthegeneral[orabsolute]conceptofproofmightbe:thispropositionisnotprovable.ButIammerelyconjecturing:IwishIhadasked
him.AsIsaidbefore,Gdelfindstheintensionalparadoxesanimportantopenproblemanddistinguishesthemfromthesemanticparadoxeswhich,hesays,aretrivial
andhavebeensolved.
6.1.12Ifonecouldclearuptheintensionalparadoxessomehow,onewouldgetaclearproofthatmindisnot[a]machine.Thesituationofthegeneralconceptofproofissimilarto
thatwiththegeneralconceptofconcept.Bothbelongtothefieldofbankruptcy[animplicitreferencetothediscussioninMP:190],becausewehavenotclearedupthe
contradictionssurroundingthesegeneralconcepts.Otherwiseaproof:onceweunderstandthegeneralconceptofproof,wehavealsoaproofby

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themindofitsownconsistency.Asitis,wecanactuallyderivecontradictionsfromthegeneralconceptofproof,includingtheselfapplicationofproof.Onthebasisofour
defectiveunderstandingofthegeneralconceptofproof,wecanpotentiallyarriveattheconclusionthatevidenceissimplyinconsistent.Thisshowsthatsomethingiswrongwith
ourlogicalideas,whichshouldbecompletelyevident.
6.1.13Theconceptofconceptandtheconceptofabsoluteproof[briefly,AP]maybemutuallydefinable.WhatisevidentaboutAPleadstocontradictionswhicharenotmuch
differentfromRussell'sparadox.IntuitionismisinconsistentifoneaddsAPtoit.APmaybeanidea[intheKantiansense]:butassoonasonecanstateandprovethingsina
systematicway,wenolongerhaveanidea[buthavethenaconcept].Itisnotsatisfactorytoconcede[beforefurtherinvestigation]thatAPorthegeneralconceptofconceptis
anidea.TheparadoxesinvolvingAPareintensionalnotsemanticparadoxes.IhavediscussedAPinmyPrincetonbicentenniallecture[reprintedinGdel1990,hereafter
CW2:150153].
6.1.14ItispossiblethataclarificationofAPcouldbefoundsothat,byapplyingit,mathematicalintuitionwouldbeabletoproveitsownconsistency,therebyshowingthatit
differsfromamachine.Since,however,wearenotclearaboutAP,itremainspossiblethateithertheconsistencyofmathematicalintuitionisnotapropositionoratleastitisnot
evident.Theargument[againstcomputabilism,byprovingtheconsistencyofourmathematicalintuition]maybecorrect,ifwefindthesolutiontotheparadoxesinvolvingAP,
becausetheproof[ofconsistency]mightbelongtothedomainthatisretained.
6.1.15Brouwerobjectstospeakingofallproofsorallconstructibleobjects.Hencetheextensionalandtheintensionalparadoxesdonotappearinintuitionismaccordingtohis
interpretation.ButIthinkthatthisexclusionofall,liketheappealtotypetheoryinthetheoryofconcepts,isarbitrary[fromtheintuitionisticstandpoint].
6.1.16ItisimmediatelyevidentthatIamconsistent,ifyouacceptAPasaconcept.Thereisanapparentcontradictioninmyownuseofthehumanmindalsoasaconcept.What
istobeavoidedistousethisconceptinaselfreferentialmanner.Wedon'tknowhowtodoit.ButImakenoselfreferentialuseoftheconceptofhumanmind.

ThemainpointofGdel'sobservations6.1.11to6.1.16forthepresentcontextis,asIseeit,theideathatifwecometoabetterunderstandingofthegeneralconcept
ofproof,wemaybeabletoseeinadirectmannerthatthewholerangeofwhatweareabletoprovemathematicallyisindeedconsistent.Ifso,mathematicalintuition
is,unlikeacomputer,capableofseeingandprovingitsownconsistency.Gdel'sadaptationoftheKantiandistinctionbetweenideasandconceptsseemstosuggest
that,eventhoughabsoluteprooflookslikeanideatousinourpresentstateofignorance,itmayturnouttobeaconceptuponfurtherinvestigation.Ifwecansee
absoluteproofasaconcept,weshallbeabletostateand

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provethingsaboutitinasystematicway.Inparticular,itispossiblethatweshallbeabletoapplyourimprovedmathematicalintuitiontoproveitsownconsistency.
SomeofGdel'sbriefobservationsonrelatedpointsfollow.
6.1.17Whenonespeaksofmindonedoesnotmeanamachine(inanygeneralsense)butamachinethatrecognizesitselfasright.

InJune1972,atameetingtohonorJohnvonNeumann,Gdelaskedthefollowingquestion:
6.1.18Isthereanythingparadoxicalintheideaofamachinethatknowsitsownprogramcompletely?
6.1.19Thebrainisacomputingmachineconnectedwithaspirit.[Compare6.2.14.]
6.1.20Themachinealwaysknowsthereasons.Wecanknoworstronglyconjectureastatementwithoutbeingabletoofferaproof.Intermsofselfanalysis,wearenotawareof
everythinginusofmuchinourmindswearesimplyunconscious.Weareimpreciseandoftenwaverbetweendifferentalternatives.Consciousnessisthemaindifference.
6.1.21Consciousnessisconnectedwithoneunity.Amachineiscomposedofparts.[Compare9.4.13.]
6.1.22Theactiveintellectworksonthepassiveintellectwhichsomehowshadowswhattheformerisdoingandhelpsusasamedium.[Compare7.3.14.]

ThereisaterminologicalcomplicationinGdel'suseofthetermshumanmindandmathematicalintuition.Itendtothinkintermsofthecollectiveexperienceofthe
humanspecies,andsoIaskedhimonceabouthisusage.Hisreplysuggeststomeasimplifyingidealization:
6.1.23BymindImeananindividualmindofunlimitedlifespan.Thisisstilldifferentfromthecollectivemindofthespecies.Imagineapersonengagedinsolvingawholesetof
problems:thisisclosetorealitypeopleconstantlyintroducenewaxioms.

On5.6.76Gdeltoldmeaboutaconjecturewhichhebelievedwould,iftrue,provemind'ssuperiorityovercomputers(misstatedinRG:197):
6.1.24Itwouldbearesultofgreatinteresttoprovethattheshortestdecisionprocedurerequiresalongtimetodecidecomparativelyshortpropositions.Morespecifically,itmay
bepossibletoprove:Foreverydecidablesystemandeverydecisionprocedureforit,thereexistssomepropositionoflengthlessthan200whoseshortestproofislongerthan
1020.Sucharesultwouldactuallymeanthatcomputerscannotreplacethehumanmind,whichcangiveshortproofsbygivinganewidea.

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6.2MindandMatter:OnPhysicalismandParallelism
Theproblemofmindandmatterisnotoriouslyelusive.Oncewedistinguishmindfrommatter,weseemtobecommittedtoafundamentaldualism.Yetitisthenhard
tocomeupwithanyreasonableaccountofhowtheinteractionbetweenmindandmatterworks.Atthesametime,wearealsoaccustomedtosuchadistinctioninour
everydaythinking.
Onefamiliarformulationofthecentralquestionabouttherelationbetweenmindandmatteristoaskwhether,asGdelputsit,"thebrainsufficesfortheexplanationof
allmentalphenomena."Onesimpletestfortheexistenceofanysuchexplanationistoaskwhetherthereareasufficientnumberofbrainoperationstorepresentthe
mentaloperationssothateverymentaloperationcorrespondstooneormoreneuraloperations.Inotherwords,regardlessofhowmindandmatterinteract,wemay
askthelesselusiveonemightsayquantitativequestionwhetherthereexistssomeonetooneormanytoonecorrelationbetweenneuralandmentalphenomena.
Aconvenienttermforthebeliefthatthereindeedexistssomesuchcorrelationispsychoneuralparallelism.Ifweassumethatallneuraloperationsarephysical
operationsofaspecialtype,wemayalsoidentifythispositionaspsychophysicalparallelism,whichmaybeviewedasadefinitecomponentorevenaprecise
formulationofthesomewhatvaguepositionofphysicalism.Inthiscontext,Iidentifyphysicalismwithparallelism,and,forthemoment,donotdistinguishbetween
thedifferentformsofparallelism,whichcorrelatethephysicalwiththebiological,thentheneural,andthenthemental.
Insteadofpsychoneuralorpsychophysicalparallelism,Gdelusestheformulation:(1)Thereisnomindseparatefrommatter.Sincehisconjecturedrefutationof(1)
alsorefutesparallelism,Ishall,forthemomentinsteadoftryingtofindafaithfulinterpretationof(1)simplyidentifyitwithparallelism.Usingthissimplification,two
ofGdel'sassertions(MP:326)canbereformulatedthus:
6.2.1Parallelismisaprejudiceofourtime.
6.2.2Parallelismwillbedisprovedscientifically(perhapsbythefactthattherearen'tenoughnervecellstoperformtheobservableoperationsofthemind).

Aprejudiceisnotnecessarilyfalse.Ratheritisjustastronglyheldbeliefnotwarrantedbytheavailableevidenceitsintensitybeingdisproportionatetothesolidityof
evidenceforit.Thewidespreadbeliefinparallelismtodayisoneaspectoftheprevalenceofscientism,which,asweknow,islargelyaconsequenceofthespectacular
successand,therewith,thedominantpositionofscienceandtechnologyinourtime.

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Bytheway,WittgensteinmakessimilarobservationsinhisZettel(notablyintheparagraphs605to612).Forinstance:"Theprejudiceinfavorofpsychophysical
parallelismisafruitofprimitiveinterpretationofourconcepts."Heimaginessomeonewhomakesroughjottingsasatextisrecitedthataresufficienttoenablethe
persontoreproducethetextlater,andthensays:"Thetextwouldnotbestoredupinthejottings.Whyshoulditbestoredupinournervoussystem?"(Wittgenstein
1981).
RegardlessofwhetherGdel'sconjecture6.2.2couldbeconfirmed,itisremarkableasanillustrationofthesignificantideathatthephilosophicalissueofparallelismis
(also)ascientificandempiricalproblem.ThisisapointGdelemphasizedseveraltimesinhisdiscussionswithme.
6.2.3Itisalogicalpossibilitythattheexistenceofmind[separatefrommatter]isanempiricallydecidablequestion.Thispossibilityisnotaconjecture.Theydon'tevenrealizethat
thereisanempiricalquestionbehindit.Theybeginwithanassumptionthatno[separate]mindexists.Itisareasonableassumptionthatinsomesenseonecanrecallevery
experienceinone'slifeineverydetail:ifthisassumptionistrue,theexistenceofmindmayalreadybeprovablefromit.
6.2.4Logicdealswithmoregeneralconceptsmonadology,whichcontainsgenerallawsofbiology,ismorespecific.Thelimitsofscience:isitpossiblethatallmindactivities
infinite,forexample,alwayschanging,andsoonarebrainactivities?Therecanbeafactualanswertothisquestion.Sayingnotothinkingasapropertyofaspecificnaturecalls
forsayingnoalsotoelementaryparticles.Matterandmindaretwodifferentthings.
6.2.5Themerepossibilitythattheremaynotbeenoughnervecellstoperformthefunctionofthemindintroducesanempiricalcomponentintotheproblemofmindandmatter.For
example,accordingtosomepsychologists,themindiscapableofrecallingalldetailsiteverexperienced.Itseemsplausiblethattherearenotenoughnervecellstoaccomplishthis
iftheempiricalstoragemechanismwould,asseemslikely,befarfromusingthefullstoragecapacity.Ofcourseotherpossibilitiesofanempiricaldisproofareconceivable,while
thewholequestionisusuallydisregardedinphilosophicaldiscussionsaboutmindandmatter.

Inconnectionwiththebroadissueofthenatureofphilosophyanditsrelationtoscience,Gdelused,whencommentingonmydiscussionof"thedivorceof
philosophyfromscienceandlife"(MP:376),theissueofmindandmatterasanexample:
6.2.6Manysocalledphilosophicalproblemsarescientificproblems,onlynotyettreatedbyscientists.Oneexampleiswhethermindisseparatefrommatter.Suchproblemsshould
bediscussedbyphilosophersbeforescientistsarereadytodiscussthem,sothatphilosophyhasasoneofitsfunctionstoguidescientificresearch.Anotherfunctionof
philosophyistostudywhatthemeaningoftheworldis.[CompareSection9.4below.]

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Atdifferenttimes,Gdelmadescatteredobservationsrelevanttoparallelismandthecontrastbetweenmindandmatter.
6.2.7Itisaweakerpresuppositiontosaythatthemindandthebrainarenotthesamethan[tosay]thatthemindandthebrainarethesame.
6.2.8Thefundamentaldiscoveryofintrospectionmarksthebeginningofpsychology.[Forfurtherelaboration,see5.3.28.]
6.2.9Mindisseparatefrommatter:itisaseparateobject.Inthecaseofmatter,forsomethingtobewhole,ithastohaveanadditionalobject.[Compare9.4.12.]

InJune1972,Gdelaskedatapublicmeeting:
6.2.10Isthereenoughspecificityintheenzymestoallowforamechanicalinterpretationofallfunctionsofthemind?

Itiscommontodistinguishtheemergenceoflifefromtheemergenceofmind.Inthissense,thedistinctionbetweenmindandmatterassimilatesbiologicalandneural
phenomenatophysicalphenomena.Ifwedonotassumethisassimilation,thenpsychophysicalparallelismincludesascomponentsbiophysical,neurobiological,and
psychoneuralparallelisms.Forinstance,somebiologistsaffirmthat,whetherornotcomputabilismholdsforthephysical,itdoesnotholdforthebiologicalin
particular,becauseoftheimportanceofthehistoricaldimensioninlife.
Inhissummary,preparedin1972,oftheearlydiscussions,Gdeladds,aftergivinghisconjectureaboutascientificrefutationofpsychoneuralparallelism,someofhis
otheropinions:
6.2.11Moregenerally,Ibelievethatmechanisminbiologyisaprejudiceofourtimewhichwillbedisproved.Inthiscase,onedisproof,inmyopinion,willconsistinamathematical
theoremtotheeffectthattheformationwithingeologicaltimesofahumanbodybythelawsofphysics(oranyotherlawsofasimilarnature),startingfromarandomdistribution
oftheelementaryparticlesandthefield,isasunlikelyastheseparationbychanceoftheatmosphereintoitscomponents.

Thiscomplexstatementcallsforsomeinterpretativecomment.FromGdel'sotherobservations(seebelow),itseemsclearthatbymechanisminthiscontext,he
means,Darwinism,whichheapparentlyseesasasetofalgorithmiclaws(ofevolution).Eventhoughheseemstobelievethatthebrainandpresumablyalsothe
humanbodyfunctionslikeacomputer(seebelow),heappearstobesayingherethatthehumanbodyissocomplexthatthelawsofphysicsandofevolutionare
insufficienttoaccountforitsformationwithinthecommonlyestimatedperiodoftime.
Inhisdiscussionswithme,Gdelmadesomerelatedremarks.
6.2.12Idon'tthinkthebraincameintheDarwinianmanner.Infact,itisdisprovable.Simplemechanismcan'tyieldthebrain.Ithinkthebasicelementsofthe

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universearesimple.Lifeforceisaprimitiveelementoftheuniverseanditobeyscertainlawsofaction.Theselawsarenotsimple,andtheyarenotmechanical.
6.2.13Darwinismdoesnotenvisageholisticlawsbutproceedsintermsofsimplemachineswithfewparticles.Thecomplexityoflivingbodieshastobepresenteitherinthe
materialorinthelaws.Thematerialswhichformtheorgans,iftheyaregovernedbymechanicallaws,havetobeofthesameorderofcomplexityasthelivingbody.

Gdelseemstobelieveboththatthemindismorecomplexthanthebrainandthatthebrainandthehumanbodycouldnothavebeenformedasamatteroffact
entirelybytheactionoftheforcesstipulatedbysuchlawsasthoseofphysicsandevolution.Ofcoure,thedesiretofind''holisticlaws"hasbeenrepeatedlyexpressed
bymanypeople.Asweknow,however,nodefiniteadvancehasbeenachievedsofarinthisquest.
Ifthebrainisjustanordinaryphysicalobject,thenneuralcomputabilismisaconsequenceofphysicalcomputabilism.ButGdelseemstomakeasurprisingturn,
whichImissedforalongtime.Itdependsonhisbeliefthatthereismind(orspirit)separatefrommatter.Heseemstosaythatthebrainisinitselfjustaphysical
object,exceptforthefactthatitisconnectedtoamind.
6.2.14Evenifthefinitebraincannotstoreaninfiniteamountofinformation,thespiritmaybeableto.Thebrainisacomputingmachineconnectedwithaspirit.Ifthebrainistaken
tobephysicalandas[tobe]adigitalcomputer,fromquantummechanics[itfollowsthat]therearethenonlyafinitenumberofstates.Onlybyconnectingit[thebrain]toaspirit
mightitworkinsomeotherway.

Itseemstofollowfromthisremarkthatthebrainisaspecialandexceptionalcomputerandphysicalobject,becausewehavenowaytoconnectanordinary
computerorphysicalobjecttoaspiritinsuchanintimatemanner.Thecomplexityofthehumanbodyassertedin6.2.11may,therefore,havetodowithGdel'sbelief
thatitis,throughthebrain,connectedtoamind.Accordingto6.2.12,lifeforceisaprimitiveelementoftheuniverse.Indeed,Gdel'sinclinationtowardmonadology
seemstosuggestthatthelifeforceismorebasicthantheaccompanyingphysicalembodimentthatdevelopswithit.
6.3TuringMachinesorGdelianMinds?
AsImentionedbefore,inthesummerof1971Gdelagreedtoholdregularsessionswithmetodiscussamanuscriptofmine,whichwassubsequentlypublishedin
1974asFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(MP).Intheveryfirstsession,on13October1971,hemadeextensivecommentsonthesectiononmechanical
procedures(especiallyMP:8183,9095).

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Specifically,heconcentratedonmydiscussionoftheprecisionandjustificationofTuring'sdefinitionofmechanicalprocedures.
ThemainpointsGdelintroducedinthissession,andcontinuedtoelaborateoninlatersessions,arethree:(1)Turingmachinesfullycapturetheintuitiveconceptof
mechanical(orcomputational)proceduresand,equivalentlythatofformalsysteminaprecisedefinition,therebyrevealingthefullgeneralityofGdel'sown
incompletenesstheorems(2)TuringmachinesareanimportantpieceofevidenceforGdel'sbeliefthatsharpconceptsexistandthatwearecapableofperceiving
themclearly(3)Turing'sargumentfortheadequacyofhisdefinitionincludesanerroneousproofofthestrongerconclusionthatmindsandmachinesareequivalent.
Asanissuerelevanttoboth(1)and(2),GdelintroducedandthenrepeatedlyreconsideredatechnicalpointaboutTuring'sdefinition.IhadconstruedTuring's
definitionasdealingwithtotalfunctionsandhadarguedthatthedefinition"isactuallynotassharpasitappearsatfirstsight"becauseitincludestheconditionthatthe
computationalwaysterminates:"Itisonlyrequiredthatthisconditionbetrue,themethodtobeusedinestablishingitstruthisleftopen"(MP:83).Bothforthepurpose
ofsupportinghisbeliefinsharpconceptsandinordertolinkupmechanicalprocedureswithformalsystems,GdelchosetoconstrueTuring'sdefinitionasdealing
withpartialfunctions.Therewererepeateddiscussionsonthispoint,towhichIreturninSection6.4(below).
Inconnectionwithpoint(2),GdelimmediatelybegantoelaboratehisownPlatonisminmathematicsandtogiveotherexamplesofourabilitytoperceivesharp
conceptsclearly.Ileavethisaspectofthediscussionforthenextchapter,andconcentratehereprimarilyonPoint(3),whichisconcernedwithoneofGdel's
attemptstoprovemind'ssuperiorityovercomputers.
Inconnectionwith(1),GdeloftenemphasizedtheimportanceofTuring'sdefinition.InhisPrincetonlectureof1946,heattributedtheimportanceoftheconceptof
generalrecursiveness(orTuringcomputability)tothefactthatitsucceeds"ingivinganabsolutedefinitionofaninterestingepistemologicalnotion"(Gdel1990,
hereafterCW2:150).Inthe1960sthesingledoutTuring'sworkasthedecisiveadvanceinthisregardandaddedtwonotestohisownearlierworktosayso(Gdel
1986,hereafterCW1:195,369).Inthesecondnote,writtenin1964,headdedsomeobservationsinthedirectionofPoint(3):
6.3.1Notethatthequestionofwhetherthereexistfinitenonmechanicalprocedures(suchasthoseinvolvingtheuseofabstracttermsonthebasisoftheirmeaning),not
equivalentwithanyalgorithm,hasnothingwhatsoevertodowiththeadequacyofthedefinitionof"formalsystem"andof"mechanicalprocedure."Notethattheresults
mentionedinthispostscriptdonotestablishanybounds

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forthepowersofhumanreason,butratherforthepotentialityofpureformalisminmathematics[CW1:370].

Around1970Gdelwroteaparagraphentitled"APhilosophicalErrorinTuring'sWork"CW2:306),intendedasafootnoteafterthewordmathematicsintheabove
quotation.TheversioninMP(pp.325326),whichisunderdiscussioninthischapter,isarevision,writtenin1972,ofthe"error"paragraph.Beforediscussing
Gdel'scomplexcommentsonthis"error,"letmedigresslongenoughtogivesomeindicationofTuring'sideas.
Turingpassesfromtheabstractuseofthewordmechanical("performedwithouttheexerciseofthoughtorvolition")toaconcreteuse("performablebyamachine")
andconsiderstheactionsofa"computer"(i.e.,anabstracthumanbeingwhoismakingacalculation).Thecomputerispicturedasworkingonsquaredpaperasin"a
child'sarithmeticbook.''Turingthenproceedstointroduceseveralsimplifications,arguingineachcasethatnothingessentialislostthereby.Forinstance,wemay
supposethatthecomputationiscarriedoutonapotentiallyinfinitetapedividedintosquaresorcells,thetwodimensionalcharacterofpaperbeingnonessential.The
mainideaisthatcomputationproceedsbydiscretestepsandthateachstepislocalandlocallydetermined,accordingtoafinitetableofinstructions.
Ordinarilywestoretheinstructionsinourmindas"statesofmind"which,togetherwiththesymbolsunderobservation,determinewhatwearetodoateachstage,
suchaschangingthecontentofsomecells,movingsomedistancetoobserveothercells,andchangingthestateofmind.Withoutlossofgenerality,Turingassumes
thatthecomputerobservesonlyonecellatatime,inwhichonlyonesymbol(including"blank")iswritten.Moreover,heassumesonlythreebasicacts:changingthe
contentofthecellunderobservationshiftingattentiontothenextcell(totheleftortotheright)andchangingthe"stateofmind."
InmydraftofMP,ItriedtojustifytheadequacyofTuring'sdefinitionofmechanicalprocedurebyspeakingofthemindandthebraininterchangeablythereby
implicitlyassumingneuralparallelism(seeMP:9195).Inparticular,Istatedandformulateda"principleoffiniteness":"Themindisonlycapableofstoringand
perceivingafinitenumberofitemsateachmomentinfact,thereissomefixedfiniteupperboundonthenumberofsuchitems"(p.92).Amongtheapplicationsofthis
principle,Imentionedtheissueofstorage:
[FSM][thatis,FinitelymanyStatesofMind]Moreover,thenumberofstatesofmindwhichneedbetakenintoaccountisalsofinite,becausethesestatesmustbesomehow
storedinthemind,inorderthattheycanallbereadytobeenteredupon.Analternativewayofdefendingthisapplicationoftheprincipleoffiniteness

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istoremarkthatsincethebrainasaphysicalobjectisfinite,tostoreinfinitelymanydifferentstates,someofthephysicalphenomenawhichrepresentthemmustbe"arbitrarily"
closetoeachotherandsimilartoeachotherinstructure.Theseitemswouldrequireaninfinitediscerningpower,contrarytothefundamentalphysicalprinciplesoftoday.A
closelyrelatedfactisthatthereisalimittotheamountofinformationthatcanberecoveredfromanyphysicalsystemoffinitesize(MP:9293).

ItwasincommentingonthisparagraphthatGdelfirststated,on13October1971,hisideathatthebrainisacomputerconnectedtoamind(see62.14above).He
wentontosay:
6.3.2Itisbynomeansobviousthatafinitemindiscapableofonlyafinitenumberofdistinguishablestates.Thisthesispresupposes:(1)spiritismatter(2)eitherphysicsis
finitaryorthebrainisacomputingmachinewithneurons.IhaveatypedpagerelevanttothisthesiswhichisforthcominginDialectica[undoubtedlyareferencetothenotelater
publishedinGdel1990:306].

On10November1971Gdelgaveanimprovedformulationofthetwopresuppositions:
6.3.3Thethesisoffinitelymanystatespresupposes:(a)nomindseparatefrommatter(b)thebrainfunctionsaccordingtoquantummechanicsorlikeacomputerwithneurons.A
weakerconditionis:physicsremainsofthesamekindastoday,thatis,oflimitedprecision.Thelimitedprecisionmaybemagnified,butitwillnotbedifferentinkind.

Itwasonlymuchlater,probablyinMayof1972,thatGdelgavemeseveraltypedpagesforinclusioninMP,whichincluded(a)areformulationofhisnoteof
Turing'sphilosophicalerror(b)areformulationof6.3.3asfootnote30attachedtomy[FSM]paragraphand(c)afurtherelaborationof6.3.3.Item(b)readsas
follows:
6.3.4[Gdelpointsoutthat]theargumentinthisparagraph,liketherelatedargumentsofTuring,dependsoncertainassumptionswhichbeardirectlyonthebroaderquestionas
towhethermindscandomorethanmachines.Theassumptionsare:(1)thereisnomindorspiritseparatefrommatter(2)physicswillalwaysremainofthesamekindinthatitwill
alwaysbeoneoflimitedprecision(MP:102).

Thetypedpagesfor(a)and(c)arehighlycomplex(printedinMP:325326).Insteadofreproducingthepassageinfull,Iproposetobreakitintoseveralpartsand
commentonthemasIcontinue.Roughlyspeaking,(a)isdevotedtoproposingapossiblelineofapproachtoprovethesuperiorityofmindovercomputers,and(c)is
devotedtoanadditionalanalysis,possiblystimulatedbymyformulationof[FSM],toconsidertheconditionsunderwhichwhatGdelcalls"Turing'sargument"
becomesvalid.Thecomplexityof(c)stemsfromboththeinferencefromtheconditionsand

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Gdel'spositiveandnegativecommentsontheplausibilityofeachoftheseveralconditions.
6.3.5Attemptedproofsfortheequivalenceofmindsandmachinesarefallacious.OneexampleisTuring'sallegedproofthateverymentalprocedureforproducinganinfiniteseries
ofintegersisequivalenttoamechanicalprocedure.
6.3.6Turing,inhis1937,p.250[Davis1965:136],givesanargumentwhichissupposedtoshowthatmentalprocedurescannotcarryfartherthanmechanicalprocedures.However,
thisargumentisinconclusive,becauseitdependsonthesuppositionthatafinitemindiscapableofonlyafinitenumberofdistinguishablestates.

Interpretation.Oneproblemistoidentifyfrom6.3.6theTuringargumentbeingconsidered.Beforedoingthat,however,onehastointerpretthephrase"proofsfor
theequivalenceofmindandmachines."ForalongtimeIassumedthatitreferstoproofsforthefullthesisofequivalence:thethesisofmentalcomputabilism,thethesis
thatmindscandonomorethancomputers.Asaresultofthisassumption,Ipuzzledoverthematterandwrotethefollowingtwoparagraphs:
IhavecertainlyneverinterpretedthisparticularreasoningbyTuringinsuchamanner.NordoIbelievethatTuringhimselfintendedtodrawsuchastrongconsequencefromit.
Eventhoughheoftentriedtoargueinfavorofmentalcomputabilism,Iamnotawarethathehadeverclaimedtoappealtothisparticularargumentofhisasaproofofthe
conclusionattributedtohimbyGdel.
Moreover,GdelimpliesthatwhatTuringallegedlyprovedissufficienttoestablishcomputabilismforthemental.Inotherwords,hesuggeststhat,inordertorefutemental
computabilism,itisnecessarythattherearementalprocedureswhicharesystematicbutcannotbecarriedoutbyanycomputer.Itseemstomesufficienttorefutemental
computabilismbyfindingcertaintaskswhichmindscandobutcomputerscannotwithoutnecessarilyresortingtoasystematicmentalprocedure.Inanycase,itseemstome
desirabletodistinguishthethesisofmind'ssuperiorityfromthespecificrequirementoftherebeingsomenoncomputationalsystematicmentalprocedure.Ifonebelievesthatthe
twothesesareequivalent,thenanexplicitargumenttoshowtheequivalenceseemstometobeneeded.

Recently,however,Ihavedecidedthatmypreviousinterpretationofthephrase"proofsfortheequivalence"hadbeentooliteralandhadnotcapturedGdel's
intention.Mypresentinterpretationofthephraseistotake"proofsfortheequivalence"tomean,inthiscontext,justproofsaimedinthegeneraldirectionof,or
toward,establishingtheequivalenceofmindandmachines.Underthisinterpretation,Gdel'schoiceoftheTuringargumentashistargetofattackwasmotivatedby
hisdesiretofindsomesharpissuetoconsiderwithinthemurkyareaoftryingtoproveordisprovetheequivalenceofmindsandcomputers.Furthermore,under
Gdel'sinterpretationoftheTuringargument,althoughthat

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argument,evenifitissound,failstoprovementalcomputabilismfully,nonetheless,arefutationofitalongthelineofGdel'sproposalwouldsucceedinrefutingmental
computabilismfully.
Atthesametime,Gdelexpressesstrongviewsonseveralfamiliarbeliefswhichareofindependentinterest,quiteapartfromtheirrelationtotheTuringargumentand
Gdel'sproposedlineofrefutation.Indeed,ImyselffindtheseviewsmorestimulatingandlesselusivethantheirconnectiontotheTuringargument.Thefirstfull
paragraphofp.326inMPcanbesummarizedinfourassertions:
6.3.7Itisaprejudiceofourtimetobelievethat(1)thereisnomindseparatefrommatterindeed,(1)willbedisprovedscientifically.
6.3.8Itisverylikelythat(2)thebrainfunctionsbasicallylikeadigitalcomputer.
6.3.9Itispracticallycertainthat(2')thephysicallaws,intheirobservableconsequences,haveafinitelimitofprecision.
6.3.10Ifweaccept(1),togetherwitheither(2)or(2'),thenTuring'sargumentbecomesvalid.

Iconsider6.3.7atlengthinSection6.2aboveanddiscuss6.3.8and6.3.9insection6.5below.Thedifficulttaskistheinterpretationandevaluationof6.3.10.Since,
asIexplaininsection6.5,itisreasonabletoaccept6.3.9,thecontentof6.3.10is,essentially,thatifweaccepteither(1)orparallelism,thenTuring'sargumentis
valid,which,accordingtoGdel,showsthatmentalprocedurescannotaccomplishmorethanmechanicalprocedures.
Mostofustodayareaccustomedtothinkingofthefunctionsofthebrainandthemindinterchangeably.Forinstance,inmyformulationof[FSM],quotedabove,the
appealtothecorrelationisquiteexplicit.InTuring'sownformulationofhisargument,thesituationisnotsoobvious.Inanycase,itseemsnecessaryfirsttounderstand
whatGdelmeansbyTuring'sargument.
From6.3.6,itseemspossibletoseeGdelasmakingthefollowingassertions:
6.3.11If(i)afinitemindiscapableonlyofafinitenumberofdistinguishablestates,then(ii)mentalprocedurescannotcarryanyfartherthanmechanicalprocedures.
6.3.12Turing'sargument(iii)forthecondition(i)ishisideawhichcentersonthefollowingsentences:"Wewillalsosupposethatthenumberofstatesofmindwhichneedbe
takenintoaccountisfinite.Thereasonsforthisareofthesamecharacterasthosewhichrestrictedthenumberofsymbols.Ifweadmitaninfinityofstatesofmind,someofthem
willbe'arbitrarilyclose'andwillbeconfused"[Davis1965:136].

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Gdeldoesnotquestiontheinferencefrom(i)to(ii).But,inordertoinfer(i)from(iii),hebelievesitnecessarytousesomeadditionalassumptionswhichhecannot
accept.Indeed,Gdel'sownproposalistofindawaytodisproveboth(i)and(ii).Atthesametime,heobservesin6.3.10thatifweassume(1)and(2)or(2'),then
wecaninfer(i)fromTuring'sargument(iii).Fromthisperspective,myformulationof[FSM],quotedabove,maybeseenasasketchofsuchanargument.
Alternatively,wemaytrytoproveGdel's6.3.10asfollows.By(1),thereisnomindseparatefromthebrain.Therefore,inordertoprove(i),itissufficienttoprove
thatthebrainiscapableofonlyfinitelymanydistinguishablestates.Thefinitelimitofprecisionrecognizedin(2')impliesthatwithinafinitevolumewecandistinguish
onlyfinitelymanypoints.Therefore,sincethebrainisfinite,whenweobserveitasaphysicalobject,wecandistinguishonlyfinitelymanystatesofit.Sincethestates
havetoberepresentedbyobservablydistinguishablebrainstates,thebrain,observingitself"frominside,"canhavenospecialadvantage.Otherwisethebrainwould
beabletodistinguishmorestatesthanareallowedbythefinitelimitofprecision.
ThereremainsthequestionwhetheritisnecessaryforTuringtoappealtosuchadditionalassumptionsinordertocompletehisargument(iii)fortheconclusion(i).At
thebeginningofhisessay,Turingsummarizesinadvancehisjustificationofhisdefinitionof"calculablebyfinitemeans"therewithof(i)asapartofthedefinitionin
onesentence:"ForthepresentIshallonlysaythatthejustificationliesinthefactthatthehumanmemoryisnecessarilylimited"(Davis1965:117).Onewouldbe
inclinedtoacknowledgesuchalimitation,however,whetheroneisthinkingofthebrain'smemoryorthemind's.
Intryingtoindicatetheadequacyofhis"atomicoperations,"Turingdoesbringinthenotionofphysicalsystem."Everysuchoperationconsistsofsomechangeofthe
physicalsystemconsistingofthe[human]computerandhistape.Weknowthestateofthesystemifweknowthesequenceofsymbolsonthetape,whichoftheseare
observedbythecomputer(possiblywithaspecialorder),andthestateofmindofthecomputer"(Davis1965:136).Ifwebelievethatthereismindseparatefrom
matter,wemayfeelalsothattherearedistinguishablestatesofmindwhicharenotadequatelyrepresentedinthephysicalsystem.Inotherwords,theremaybe
distinguishablestatesofmindwhicharenotdistinguishableintheirphysicalrepresentationinthebrain.
Gdel'sownattempttorefutementalcomputerismincludesthefollowingstatements(MP:325):
6.3.13Mind,initsuse,isnotstatic,butconstantlydeveloping.

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6.3.14Althoughateachstageofthemind'sdevelopmentthenumberofitspossiblestatesisfinite,thereisnoreasonwhythisnumbershouldnotconvergetoinfinityinthe
courseofitsdevelopment.
6.3.15Nowtheremayexistsystematicmethodsofaccelerating,specializing,anduniquelydeterminingthisdevelopment,forexample,byaskingtherightquestionsonthebasisof
amechanicalprocedure.Butitmustbeadmittedthattheprecisedefinitionofaprocedureofthiskindwouldrequireasubstantialdeepeningofourunderstandingofthebasic
operationsofthemind.Vaguelydefinedproceduresofthiskind,however,areknown,forexample,theprocessofdefiningrecursivewellorderingsofintegersrepresentinglarger
andlargerordinalsortheprocessofformingstrongerandstrongeraxiomsofinfinity.

Theexampleaboutdefininglargerandlargerordinalsis,bytheway,animplicitreferencetoTuring's1939Princetondoctoraldissertation,inwhichhetriedtofinda
sequenceofordinallogicsbycontinuallyaddingateachstagenewtruepropositionsofthetypewhichare,byGdel'stheorem,undecidablewithinthepreceding
ordinallogicsinthesequence.Turing'sideawastoconfinethenonmechanicalintuitivestepsentirelytotheverificationthatcertainrelationsbetweenintegersdo
definelargerandlargerordinals.
Assertion6.3.13seemstobeconfirmedbyourexperiencewiththeworkingsourownminds.Incontrast,6.3.14and6.3.15areconjectures,anditisnotclearwhat
wouldconstituteaconfirmationordisproofofeitherofthem.
Whenwethinkaboutourmentalstates,wearestruckbythefeelingthattheyandthesuccessionofthemfromonestatetothenextarenotsopreciseasthoseof
Turingmachinesorcomputersgenerally.Moreover,wedevelopovertime,bothindividuallyandcollectivelyandso,forinstance,whatappearedtobecomplex
becomessimple,andweunderstandthingswedidnotunderstandbefore.Hereagain,wefeelthattheprocessofdevelopmentissomewhatindefiniteandnot
mechanical.Yetwedonotseehowwecancapturethesevaguelyfeltdifferencesinformulationsthataresufficientlyexplicittosecurearigorousproofthatwecan
indeeddomorethancomputerscanincertainspecificways.Gdel'schoiceofconjecture(6.3.14)givestheimpressionofprovidinguswithanexactperspectivefor
clarifyingthedifferences,sincethedistinctionbetweenthefiniteandtheinfiniteisoneoftheclearestdifferencesweknow,especiallyfromourexperiencein
mathematics.
Buttherelationbetweenthecontrastofthefiniteversustheinfiniteandthatofthemechanicalversusthenonmechanicalisnotsimple.Typicallycomputers,whicheach
haveonlyafixed(finite)numberofmachinestates,caninprincipleaddandmultiplyanyoftheinfinitelymanynumbers.Amindoracomputerneednotbeindistinct
statesinorderdealwithdistinctnumbers.Gdel'snotionof"thenumberofmind'sstatesconverging

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toinfinity"is,Ithink,acomplicatedrequirement,sincetherearestatesofdifferentdegreesofcomplexity.Weseemtoneedacriteriontodeterminewhatsortofthing
constitutesastate,inordertobeabletocountthenumberofstatesinanysituation.Forinstance,wemaytrytospecifyameasureofsimplicitysuchthatwhatwe
thinkofaspossiblestatesofcomputersareexactlythesimpleonesaccordingtothemeasure.Itisnotcleartomewhatanaturalandadequatemeasuremightbe,
except,perhaps,thatitmustimplytheconditionthatthesimplestatesbephysicallyrealizable.
Assumeforthemomentthatsomesuchcriterionisgiven.Howdowegoaboutdeterminingwhetherornotthenumberofthestatesofthemindconvergestoinfinity?
Itwouldbehardtobreakupallmentalstatesintosuchsimplestates.Aneasierapproachmightbethis:selectcertainthingsthatmindscandoandshowthatthey
requiremoreandmoresimplestatesintheagreedsense.Ideally,ofcourse,wewouldhaveaproofofmind'ssuperiorityovercomputersifwecouldfindsomething
whichmindscandobutwhichcannotbedonebyusingnomatterhowmanysimplestates.If,however,wedonothavesuchastrongresult,buthaveonlyproved
6.3.14intermsofsimplestates(intheagreedsense),itdoesnotfollowthatwewouldhaveattainedaproofofmind'ssuperiority.
Supposewehavefoundaproofof6.3.14.Convergingtoinfinityinthiscasemeansjustthat,foreveryn,thereissomestageinthedevelopmentofamindsuchthat
thenumberofthemind'sstatesisgreaterthann.Sincethestatesare,byhypothesis,ofthekindthatisappropriatetocomputers,thereis,foreachstageinthemind's
development,somecomputerthathasthesamestatesthemindhasatthatstage.Itremainspossiblethatthedifferentstagesofthemind'sdevelopmentarerelatedina
computablemanner,sothatthereisasortofsupercomputerwhichmodifiesitselfinsuchawaythat,ateachstageofthemind'sdevelopment,thesupercomputer
functionslikethecomputerthathasthesamestatesthemindhasatthatstage.Hence,itseemstomethatthecrucialissueisnotwhetherthenumberofmind'sstates
convergestoinfinity,butratherwhetheritdevelopsinacomputablemanner.
Gdel'sownstatement,6.3.15,seemstoindicatetheambiguityoftheconjecturethattheremaybesomementalprocedurethatcangobeyondanymechanical
procedure.Forinstance,Gdel'sowndefinitionofconstructiblesetsgivesasystematicprocedurebywhich,givenanyordinalnumbera,wecandefineall
constructiblesetsoforderaorless.Theprocedureisnotmechanical,sinceitisdemonstrablethatwecannotgiveallordinalnumbersbyamechanicalprocedure.At
thesametime,weourselvescannot,atanystageofourdevelopment,giveallordinalnumberseither.
Gdel'squestfornonmechanicalsystematicproceduresseemstobearsomeresemblancetotheLeibnizianideaofauniversalcharacteristic.In

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fact,whatGdelsaidontwooccasionsabouttheLeibnizianideagivessomeindicationofthegoalofhisownquest:
6.3.16[Conversationon15.3.72.]In1678Leibnizmadeaclaimoftheuniversalcharacteristic.Inessenceitdoesnotexist:anysystematicprocedureforsolvingproblemsofall
kindsmustbenonmechanical.
6.3.17Butthereisnoneedtogiveuphope.Leibnizdidnot,inhiswritingsabouttheCharacteristicauniversalis,speakofautopianproject.Ifwearetobelievehiswords,hehad
developedthiscalculusofreasoningtoalargeextent,butwaswaitingwithitspublicationtilltheseedcouldfallonfertileground.[SeeRussellpaper,CW2:140].

Withrespecttothecentralissueofmind'ssuperiorityovercomputers,Gdel'snoteonTuring'sphilosophicalerror,wemayobserve,singlesoutthreepropertiesfor
comparingmindswithcomputers:(a)mind'sconstantdevelopmentincontrastwiththepredeterminedcharacterofacomputer(6.3.13)(b)thepossibleconvergence
toinfinityofthestatesofthemind,incontrastwiththefinitenessofthestatesofeverycomputer(6.3.14)and(c)thepossibilitythattherearenonmechanicalmental
procedures(6.3.15).Ofthesethreecontrasts,(a)isafundamentalfactthatopensupdifferentdirectionsforfurtherexploration.Conjectures(b)and(c)aretwo
examplesofsuchdirections.
Inparticular,direction(c)looksforanextensionoftheconceptofmechanicalproceduretosomesuitableconceptofsystematicprocedurewiththefollowing
property:thatitispreciseenoughanddefinedpreciselyenoughtoenableustoprovethatitcanaccomplishmorethancanbeaccomplishedbyanymechanical
procedure.Inorder,however,todefinesuchaconceptorsuchaprocedure,wehavetofindsomecriterionofprecisionthatisbroaderthanthatofbeingmechanical.
Seenfromthisperspective,whatGdelisafterhereresembleshisquestforageneraldefinitionofprovabilityordefinability(discussedinhis1946Princetonlecture,
CW2:150153).Inbothcases,heislookingfor"anabsolutedefinitionofaninterestingepistemologicalnotion."
Therearevarioussystematicprocedureswhichimproveourmentalpowersbutwhicheitherarenotmechanicaloratleastwerenotinitiallyintroducedasmechanical:
thedecimalnotation,logarithms,algebraandanalyticgeometryastheyaretaughtinsecondaryschools,andsoon.Alongadifferentdirection,wecanalsoview
certainresearchprogramsassystematicprocedures.Withregardtomanyofthesefruitsofthemind'spower,wemayaskwhethercomputersarecapableof
producingsuchprocedures.Indeed,insomecases,wecanshowthatthevaguelydefinedprocedurescanbereplacedbymechanicalproceduresinothercaseswe
donothavepreciseenoughformulationstodeterminewhethertheyareorarenotsoreplaceable.

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6.4FormalSystemsandComputablePartialFunctions
OneofthepointsthatGdelandIdiscussedrepeatedlywasthequestionwhethermechanicalproceduresareembodiedintotalorpartialfunctionscomputableby
Turingmachines.
Indefiningacomputabletotalfunctionf,byamachineF,itisrequiredthatforeveryinputm,thereexistsanumbernsuchthatadefiniterelationRholdsbetweenm
andn.TherelationRembodiesthecomputationofthemachineFtoarriveatnasthevalueoff(m),bybeginningwithmasinput.Theconditionisoftheform:for
eachm,thereisann,R(m,n).Itrequiresthatthecomputationterminate(successfully)foreachinputm.Thereisanopenquestionastohowthisconditionofgeneral
successisproved.(Foranextendedconsiderationofthisquestion,seeWang1990a,Chapter2.)
OnthispointGdelobserved:
6.4.1Thepreciseconceptofmechanicalproceduresdoesnotrequirethisconditionofuniversalsuccess.Amechanicalproceduremayormaynotterminate.Turing'ssolution
(analysis)iscorrectandunique.Forthissharpconceptthereisnotaproblemofproof(oftheconditionofuniversalsuccess).Theunqualifiedconceptisthesameforthe
intuitionistsandtheclassicists.

LaterGdelwroteanelaborationofthisremark:
6.4.2TheprecisenotionofmechanicalproceduresisbroughtoutclearlybyTuringmachinesproducingpartialratherthangeneralrecursivefunctions.Inotherwords,theintuitive
notiondoesnotrequirethatamechanicalprocedureshouldalwaysterminateorsucceed.Asometimesunsuccessfulprocedure,ifsharplydefined,stillisaprocedure,thatis,a
welldeterminedmannerofproceeding.Hencewehaveanexcellentexamplehereofaconceptwhichdidnotappearsharptousbuthasbecomesoasaresultofacareful
reflection.Theresultingdefinitionoftheconceptofmechanicalbythesharpconceptof"performablebyaTuringmachine"isbothcorrectandunique.Unlikethemorecomplex
conceptofalwaysterminatingmechanicalprocedures,theunqualifiedconcept,seenclearlynow,hasthesamemeaningfortheintuitionistsasfortheclassicists.Moreoveritis
absolutelyimpossiblethatanybodywhounderstandsthequestionandknowsTuring'sdefinitionshoulddecideforadifferentconcept(MP:84).

Tomysuggestionthatthesepartialproceduresmaybethoughttobeartificialandnotmathematicallyinteresting,Gdelresponded:
6.4.3Atleastoneinterestingconcept,viz.,thatofaformalsystem,ismadeperfectlyclearinauniquelydeterminedmanner.Thereisnorequirementofbeingsuccessful[intrying
toproveastatement]inaformalsystem.Theconceptwasnotcleartomein1930(orevenin1934)otherwiseIwouldhaveprovedmyincompletenessresultsinthegeneralform
forallformalsystems.

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6.4.4FormalsystemscoincidewithmanyvaluedTuringmachines.TheonewhoworkstheTuringmachinecansetalevelateachtimebyhischoice.Thisisexactlywhatonedoes
inapplyingaformalsystem.

GdellaterwroteupthesetwoobservationsforFromMathematicstoPhilosophy:
6.4.5Itmaybearguedthattheproceduresnotrequiringgeneralsuccessaremathematicallyuninterestingandthereforeartificial.Thereis,Iwouldliketoemphasize,atleastone
highlyinterestingconceptwhichismadeprecisebytheunqualifiednotionofaTuringmachine.Namely,aformalsystemisnothingbutamechanicalprocedureforproducing
theorems.Theconceptofformalsystemrequiresthatreasoningbecompletelyreplacedby"mechanicaloperations"onformulasinjustthesensemadeclearbyTuringmachines.
Moreexactly,aformalsystemisnothingbutamanyvaluedTuringmachinewhichpermitsapredeterminedrangeofchoicesatcertainsteps.TheonewhoworkstheTuring
machinecan,byhischoice,setaleveratcertainstages.Thisispreciselywhatonedoesinprovingtheoremswithinaformalsystem.Infact,theconceptofformalsystemswasnot
clearatallin1930.OtherwiseIwouldhavethenprovedmyincompletenessresultsinamoregeneralform.NotethattheintroductionofmanyvaluedTuringmachinesisnecessary
onlyforestablishingagreementwithwhatmathematiciansinfactdo.SinglevaluedTuringmachinesyieldanexactlyequivalentconceptofformalsystem(MP:84).

Interpretation.IfonewishestoproveqinaformalsystemF,wecanthinkofqastheinput.Ifqisanaxiom,itcanberecognizedassuchandtheproofiscomplete.
Otherwisethenextstageconsistsofallthealternativepremisesfromwhichqfollowsbysomeruleofinference.Forinstance,iftheonlyruleismodusponens,thenext
stageconsistsofpand"qifp,"foreverypropositionpinF.If,forsomep,bothpand"qifp"areaxioms,thenwehaveaproofqinF.Otherwise,werepeatthe
processforthepropositionsthatarenotaxioms.Inthiswaywehaveatreestructure.Theonewhoworksthemachinemakeschoicesor''setsalevel"atcertain
stages.Inthissense,aformalsystemisrepresentablebya"manyvaluedTuringmachine."Wemayalsointroducealinearorderofallalternativepremisesatdifferent
stages(saybythelengthofp)byanenumerationofallthenodesofthetree.InthiswaywegetbacktosinglevaluedTuringmachines.
WithregardtoTuring'sdefinitionofsuccessfulcomputational(orgeneralrecursive)procedures,Gdelmadetwoobservations:
6.4.6Itisimpreciseinoneandonlyoneway,whileoriginallytheconceptwasnotatallprecise.Theimprecisionrelatestothequestionwhethertheprocedureisabsolutelyor
demonstrablycomputableinotherwords,whethertheconditionofuniversalsuccessismerelytrueordemonstrable(say,intuitionistically).
6.4.7Thedefinitionoftotalcomputablefunctions(intermsofTuringmachines)isalsoprecisefromtheobjectivisticviewpoint,sincetheconditioniseithertrueor

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false,andthemethodofprovingitisaseparateissuenotaffectingtheprecisionoftheconcept.

IusedtheconceptofmechanicalprocedureinMPasanexampletodiscusstentativelythegeneralquestion,"Ifwebeginwithavagueintuitiveconcept,howcanwe
findasharperconcepttocorrespondtoitfaithfully?"(MP:81).Gdelreplacedtheword"sharper"by''sharp"andansweredthequestioncategoricallybyasserting
that
Thesharpconceptisthereallalong,onlywedidnotperceiveitclearlyatfirst.Thisissimilartoourperceptionofananimalfarawayandthennearby.Wehadnotperceivedthe
sharpconceptofmechanicalproceduressharplybeforeTuring,whobroughtustotherightperspective.Andthenwedoperceiveclearlythesharpconcept(MP:8485).

Hewentontosaymoreabouttheperceptionofconcepts,linkingitto"philosophyasanexacttheory"andofferingseveralexamplesofoursuccessfulperceptionof
sharpconcepts.AsthispartofthediscussionhasmoretodowithPlatonism,Idealwithitinthenextchapter.
6.5NeuralandPhysicalComputabilism
Thethesisofphysicalcomputabilismintendstoassertthatthephysicalworldislikeacomputerorthatphysicalprocessesareallalgorithmic.Given,however,the
limitationsofourcapacitytoobservetheworldasitis,wehavetoapproachthethesisbyaskingonlyinitiallyatleastwhetherphysicallawsbasedonour
observationsandourreflectionsonthemare,andwillcontinuetobe,algorithmic.Similarly,insteadofaskingwhetherthebrainisacomputer,itismoresuitableinour
presentstateofknowledgetoaskwhetherthebrainfunctionsbasicallylikeacomputer.
Ontheissueofneuralcomputabilism,Gdelseemstogiveanaffirmativeanswer(quotedaboveas6.3.8):
6.5.1Itisverylikelythat(a)thebrainfunctionsbasicallylikeadigitalcomputer(MP:326).

Thisconjectureisstatedinacontextinwhich(a)isacompanionofassumption(b):thatthereisnomindseparatefrommatter.Since,however,Gdelbelieves(b)to
befalseandsees,asquotedabovein6.2.14,thebrainasacomputerconnectedtoamind,thereistheproblemofwhetherheisasserting6.5.1undertheassumption
(b)ornot.Giventhefactthatheevidentlybelievesthattheminddoesnotfunctionlikeacomputer,hemaybemerelysayingthat,forthosewhobelieve(b),6.5.1is
true.
Inrelationtophysicalcomputabilism,Gdelgivesexplicitlyonlyapartialanswer(quotedaboveas6.3.9):

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6.5.2Itispracticallycertainthat(c)thephysicallaws,intheirobservableconsequences,haveafinitelimitofprecision[MP:326].

Acomparisonofstatements6.3.2and6.3.3,quotedabove,indicatesthatGdelconsiders(c)tobeweakerthantheassertion(d)thatphysicsisfinitary.
Sinceourobservationofsuchphysicalpropertiesaslength,weight,temperature,andsooncannotyieldcompletelyaccuratenumericalvalues,incomparingthe
preciseconsequencesofphysicallawswithourobservations,wehavetomakeallowanceforcertainminordifferences,say,withrespecttowhatwecall"insignificant
digits."Ifwetakethisfamiliarobservationastheinterpretationof(c),thenwecan,Ibelieve,agreewithGdelthat6.5.2istrue.Itfollowsthatthenumericalvalueswe
obtainbymeasurementanddirectobservationareallrationalorfinitenumbers.
Theformulationandtestingofphysicallawsareultimatelybasedonacomparisonoftheirconsequenceswiththeresultsoflimitedprecisionofourobservations.
Thereisasenseinwhichevery(real)numberandeveryfunctioncanbecloselyapproximated,arbitrarily,bycomputableones.Therelationsdeterminedbyphysical
lawswhichareonlybetweenresultsofobservationscan,therefore,allbeseenascomputablerelations.Fromthisperspective,wemayseetheuseofnoncomputable
realnumbersandfunctionsasjustaconvenientwayofsummarizingandgeneralizingtheobserveddataaboutphysicalpropertiesandrelations.
However,asweknow,eventhoughphysicallawshavetoagreewithdatafromobservations,theyareobtainedthroughagreatdealofreflectionandconstructionon
thebasisofsuchdata.Itdoesnot,therefore,followfrom(c)thatphysicallawsmustbefinitaryoralgorithmic.Thatis,Ithink,whyGdelsaidthat(c)isaweaker
conditionthanassertion(d).
Inourdiscussions,IwaspuzzledbyGodel'stendencytoidentifymaterialismwithmechanism(inthesenseofcomputabilism),because,forallweknow,physical
theorymayormaynotbeandremainalgorithmic.Heseemstosuggestthat(c)willcontinuetoholdandthat,ifthereisnomindseparatefrommatter,thereisno
differenceintheobservableconsequencesofmaterialismandmechanism.
SinceIoftenfailedtounderstandwhatGdelsaid,sometimesIcouldnotevenformulatemyquestionswellenoughtocommunicatetohimwhatIwantedtoknow.As
aresult,Iwas,onsomeoccasions,notevenabletoseewhetherhewasansweringmyquestions.Letme,however,trytoreconstructsomeoftheexchangesas
clearlyasIcan.
WhenIaskedhimthereasonforhisbeliefthatthebrainasaphysicalobjectiscapableonlyoffinitelymanydistinguishablestates,hereplied:

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6.5.3Quantummechanicsisonlyfinitary:thisiscertainlythecasewithchemicalprocesseswedonotknowthenuclearprocesseswhichprobablyarenotessentialtoneural
activities.

IaskedGdelwhetheritispossiblefortheretobeaphysicalboxwhoseoutputsarenotacomputablefunctionofitsinputs.Ialsoaskedwhether,evenifthephysical
worldproceedsinacomputablemanner,itispossiblethatwedonotknowtheinitialconditionsbecausetherehasbeen,insomesense,aninfinitepast.Earthquakes
aboveafixedlowerbound,forexample,maybeginatinstantsthatformanoncomputablesequence.Tobothquestions,Gdelansweredthatwecanfindoutthat
suchapropositionistrueonlyifwegetadifferentkindofphysics.Presumably,hemeantbythat:onlyifwedevelopsomephysicaltheoryforwhich(c)isnolonger
true.
Iaskedaboutthepossibilitythatinthefuturephysicsmayusemoremathematics,sothat,inparticular,mechanicallyunsolvableproblemsmaybecomesolvableinthe
physicalworldandphysicalcomputabilismmaybedisproved.Gdel'sreplyseemstoshiftthequestiontooneaboutourmentalpowers:
6.5.4Inphysics,wearenotlikelytogobeyondrealnumbers,evenlesstogobeyondsettheory.Rationalisticoptimismincludesalsotheexpectationthatwecansolveinteresting
problemsinallareasofmathematics.Itisnotplausiblethatphysicswilluseallofmathematicsinitsfullintendedrichness.Moreover,ateachstage,physics,ifitistobetrueonce
andforall,istobepresentedonagivenlevel,andthereforecannotuseallofmathematics.[Gdelseemstoconsideritpossiblethatwewillatsomestagearriveatdefinitive
physicallaws,andtocontrastthiswiththeopenendednessofmathematics.Elsewhere,hesaid:]Nuclearforcesmightrequireallofmathematicsthereconditepartsof
mathematicswouldthenbebroughtbacktothemainstreamofscientificstudies.

InconnectionwithGdel'sidealizationofmindasoneindividual'smind(6.1.23),Iobservedthatitiseasiertothinkofthehumanspeciescontinuingforeverthanofa
singlehumanminddoingso,andthatwecanalsothinkofbiggerandbiggermachinesbeingmadeitthenappearspossiblethatthewholemachineracecoulddomore
thananysinglemachine.Gdelcommented:
6.5.5Suchastateofaffairswouldshowthatthereissomethingnonmechanicalinthesensethattheoverallplanforthehistoricaldevelopmentofmachinesisnotmechanical.If
thegeneralplanismechanical,thenthewholeracecanbesummarizedinonemachine.

Ialsoaskedthefamiliarquestionwhetherrobotsmaybeabletooperateinanoncomputablewayasaresultofgrowththroughinteractionswithoneanotherandwith
theenvironment.Inreply,Gdelsaid:

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6.5.6Aphysicalmachineoflimitedsizecanneverdoanythingnoncomputableitisnotevenexcludedthatitcangrowbiggerandbigger.Thisisbecauseamachineissomething
webuildandfullyunderstandincludingitsmannerofgrowth.

ItseemstomethatthisanswerdependsonGdel'sbeliefin(c)of6.5.2,orperhapsevenontheassumptionthatphysicsisandwillremainalgorithmic.Otherwise,a
robotmayoperatenoncomputablythroughitsinteractionwithitsphysicalenvironment,andwemaybeabletoknowthiswiththehelpofsuitablenonalgorithmic
physicallaws.Inviewoftheseobservations,andGdel'sassertionaboutthebrainfunctioninglikeacomputer,Iwasandremainpuzzledbythefollowingstatement:
6.5.7TodisturbTuring'sconclusionweneednoseparatemindifweallowthattheindividualbraingrowsbiggerandbigger.

Oneinterpretationdependsontheambiguityofthephrase"separatemind."AsIhavequotedbefore,thebrain,forGdel,isacomputerconnectedtoamind.Ifthe
combinationissuchthatthemindisnotseparateinsomesuitablesense,then,asthebraingrowsbigger,itmayderivepowersthroughitsconnectiontoamindsothat,
unlikeagrowingphysicalmachine,itmayoperatenoncomputably.Ontheotherhand,itislikelythatby"Turing'sconclusion"Gdelmeansthepropositionthatamind
orbraincanonlyhavefinitelymanydistinguishablestates.Ifthisisthecase,itseemsthatifabrainoranyphysicalobjectgrowsbiggerindefinitely,thenthereisroom
foracontinuedincreaseofthenumberofitsdistinguishablestatesbeyondanyfiniteupperbound.
Themajorpartofthischapterisconcernedwiththeissueofmentalcomputabilismespeciallyattemptstoprovethemind'ssuperiorityovercomputers.Most
discussionsintheliterature,becausetheyimplicitlyassumepsychoneuralparallelism,makenodistinctionbetweenmentalandneuralcomputabilism,sothatonecan
switchbackandforthbetweenthem.
IhavegivenmoredetailsonmanyofthepointstouchedoninthischapterinWang1993.

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Chapter7
PlatonismorObjectivisminMathematics
Itisbyviewingtogetheranumberofrelevantfactsthatwecometobelieveinobjectivism[inmathematics].Philosophyconsistsofpointingthingsoutratherthanarguments.
Gdel,25November1975

Inhisdiscussionswithmeinthe1970s,GdelusedthewordsPlatonismandobjectivisminterchangeably.Thetwotermsusuallyevokedifferentassociations.
Platonismimpliesthebeliefinaknowableobjectiverealityofmathematicalobjectsandconcepts,whileobjectivismemphasizesthethesisthatpropositionsaboutthem
areeithertrueorfalse.Thereis,however,nodoubtthatourintuitionof(theobjectivityof)thetruthorfalsityofpropositionsexplicatesthecontentofourbeliefthatthe
thingstheyareaboutareobjectivelyreal.Forthisreasonthecrucialpointis,asIbelieveandasGdelagrees,thefactthatwedohaveobjectivityinmathematics.
ManypeopleareputoffbyGdel'sseeminglymysticallanguageofperceivingconceptsandmathematicalobjects.Butifwerecallhisderivationofthismannerof
speakingfromtherecognizedfactofmathematicalobjectivity,thenwehaveacommonstartingpoint.Forexample,intheCantorpaper(Gdel1990,hereafter
CW2:268)hesays:
7.0.1Wedohavesomethinglikeaperceptionalsooftheobjectsofsettheory,asisseenfromthefactthattheaxiomsforcethemselvesuponusasbeingtrue.

AmongtherelevantfactsmentionedbyGdelinsupportofobjectivismarethefollowing.(1)Factsareindependentofarbitraryconventions.(2)Correctnumber
theoreticaltheoremsrevealobjectivefactsaboutintegers.(3)Thesefactsmusthaveacontent,becausetheconsistencyofnumbertheoryisnottrivialbutisderived
fromhigherfacts.(4)Wecan'tassumesetsarbitrarilybecauseifwedidwewouldgetcontradictions.(5)ObjectivismisfruitfulitwasfundamentaltoGdel'sown
workinlogic(Wang1974a,hereafterMP:9)andthegenericsetsinPaulCohen'sworkalwaysrequirearealismaboutrealnumbers.

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PlatonisminmathematicsoccupiesacentralplaceinGdel'sphilosophyandinhisconversationswithme.Asaresult,thischapteriscloselyrelatedtothenexttwo
chapters,anditwasoftendifficulttodecidehowbesttodistributethematerialamongthem.Ihavetriedtoavoidduplicationand,whereIcan,tousecrossreference.
MygeneralideaistoputthematerialonsetsandpureconceptsinChapter8andtorelegategeneralmethodologicalconsiderationstoChapter9.
WhatGdelsaidduringourconversationsrevealsamoreflexibleandaccommodatingoutlookthantheviewcommonlyattributedtohimonthebasisofhispublished
statements.Specifically,heemphasizes(1)thefallibilityofourknowledge(2)theepistemologicalpriorityofobjectivityoverobjects(3)theprimaryimportanceof
numbertheoryratherthansettheoryforthepositionofobjectivismand(4)ourrelativefreedomtochoosebetweenconstructiveandclassicalmathematics,with
theirdifferentdegreesofclarityandcertainty.
Thedegreesofclarityandcertaintyofdifferentpartsofmathematicstendtodecreaseaswemovefromsimplenumericalcomputationstoconstructiveandclassical
numbertheory,thentoclassicalanalysisandfullsettheory.Atthesametime,thismovementinthedirectionofdecreasedcertaintyandclarityaccompaniesthe
historicalandconceptualprocessofenlargingtherealmofobjectivityinmathematics.Themaintaskoffoundationalstudiesistoreflectonthisprocessbystudying
whatIwouldliketocallthedialecticofintuitionandidealization,whichisakindofdialecticoftheintuitiveandtheformal,thesubjectiveandtheobjective.Idiscuss
thisdialecticinthefirstsectionofthischapter.
Insection7.2,IgiveanaccountofGdel'scontrastbetweencreationanddiscovery,aswellashisproposedargumentsforextendingtherangeofthediscoveredin
mathematicsfromaminimumtosomemaximum.Theremarkableextentoftheintersubjectiveagreementofourmathematicalintuitionisthefundamentalempirical
datumfortheformulationandtheevaluationofeveryaccountofthenatureofmathematics.Thecontinuedextensionoftherangeofourintersubjectiveagreement
tendstofavorthediscoveryviewofmathematicsoverthecreationview,andthebeliefinanobjectivemathematicalrealityhelpstoexplainthelackofarbitrarinessand
therestrictionsonourfreedominmathematicalthinking.
OneideacentraltothedistinctlyoptimisticcomponentofGdel'sobjectivismishisbeliefthatweareabletoperceiveconceptsmoreandmoreclearly,notonlyin
mathematicsbutalsoinfundamentalphilosophy.(Forabriefsummaryofthisposition,seeMP:8486.)Whereasitiscomparativelyeasytosharethisbeliefinthecase
ofmathematicalconcepts,Gdel'sextrapolationfrombasicsciencetoexactphilosophyinthisregardiscontrarytoourexperiencewiththehistoryofphilosophy.In
particular,asphilosophersofthiscenturyhaveoftenemphasized,theessentialimmunity

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ofmathematicstothecontingentvicissitudesoflanguagecannotbesharedbyphilosophy.Section7.3isdevotedtoareportandadiscussionofGdel'sobservations
onourcapacitytoperceiveconcepts.
Insection7.4IsummarizewhatGdeltakestobetherelevantfactsinsupportofobjectivisminmathematics,someofwhichwillbeelaboratedinthenextchapter.
Finally,inthelastsection,IconsidersomeapparentambiguitiesinGdel'sposition.
NeartheendofhisGibbslectureof1951,GdeldistinguishesPlatonismfromabroaderconceptionofobjectivism:
7.0.2[BythePlatonisticviewImeantheviewthat]mathematicsdescribesanonsensualreality,whichexistsindependentlybothoftheactsandthedispositionsofthehuman
mindandisonlyperceived,andprobablyperceivedveryincompletely,bythehumanmind(Gdel1995,hereafterCW3).
7.0.3Mathematicalobjectsandfacts(oratleastsomethinginthem)existobjectivelyandindependentlyofourmentalactsanddecisions[originalmanuscript,p.16].

EventhoughGdelmadeanadmittedlyinconclusiveattempttoprovethethesisof7.0.2inhisGibbslecture,hisdiscussionswithmeemphasizedinsteadthethesisof
7.0.3.Ontheonehand,itiseasiertoestablish7.0.3than7.0.2.Ontheotherhand,onceweaccept7.0.3,wemaylookto7.0.2foradditionalreasonstostrengthen
it.
7.1TheDialecticofIntuitionandIdealization
Naturalnumbersarecentraltoobjectivism.Gdel'spublishedpapershavemoretodowithsetsandconceptsthanwithnumbers.(CompareWang1987a,hereafter
RG:283319.)Incontrast,inhisconversationswithmeonobjectivisminmathematicsGdelstressedthecentralplaceofnumbertheoryanareathathasthe
advantageofbeingcomparativelysimpleandstable,relativetotheincreaseofourknowledge.
7.1.1Justforthejustificationofthegeneralpositionofobjectivism,itissufficienttoconfineone'sattentiontonaturalnumbers[withoutbringinginsetsandconcepts,atleast
initially].ObjectivismagreeswithPlato.
7.1.2Therealargumentforobjectivismisthefollowing.Weknowmanygeneralpropositionsaboutnaturalnumberstobetrue(2plus2is4,thereareinfinitelymanyprime
numbers,etc.)and,forexample,webelievethatGoldbach'sconjecturemakessense,mustbeeithertrueorfalse,withouttherebeinganyroomforarbitraryconvention.Hence,
theremustbeobjectivefactsaboutnaturalnumbers.Buttheseobjectivefactsmustrefertoobjectsthataredifferentfromphysicalobjectsbecause,amongotherthings,theyare
unchangeableintime.
7.1.3Logicandmathematicslikephysicsarebuiltuponaxiomswitharealcontentandcannotbeexplainedaway.Thepresenceofthisrealcontentisseenby

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studyingnumbertheory.Weencounterfactswhichareindependentofarbitraryconventions.Thesefactsmusthaveacontentbecausetheconsistencyofnumbertheorycannot
bebasedontrivialfacts,sinceitisnotevenknowninthestrongsenseofknowing.
7.1.4Asfarassetsareconcerned,settheoryisnotgenerallyacceptedasnumbertheoryis.Therealargumenthastobemodified:Forthosemathematicianswhobelieveinthe
truthofthefamiliaraxiomsofsettheoryorforthemajorityofthosewhothinkaboutsettheory,theremustbeobjectivefactsaboutsets.
7.1.5ThereisaweakkindofPlatonismwhichcannotbedeniedbyanybody.EvenforonewhoacceptsthegeneralpositionofPlatonism,conceptsmaybe[asunacceptableasa]
squarecircle.Therearefourhundredpossibilities:e.g.,Platonismforintegersonly,alsoforthecontinuum,alsoforsets,andalsoforconcepts.IfwecompareGoldbach's
conjecturewiththecontinuumhypothesis,wearemorecertainthattheformermustbeeithertrueorfalse.

Statement7.1.5isoneexampleofGdel'sideathatwehaveachoiceindecidinghowstronganobjectivismwearewillingtoacceptinmathematics.Hisstrategyis,I
believe,tobeginwithsomeweakformofobjectivismwhichnobodycandeny,andthentrytoindicatehowwearenaturallyledtostrongerandstrongerforms.
Whatisthisweakkindofundeniableobjectivism?SometimesGdelseemstomeanbythissimplytherecognitionthatthereissomethinggeneralintheworldand
whateverinevitablyfollowsfromthisrecognition.OnepossibilityisthestatementattributedbyhimtoBernays:Itisjustasmuchanobjectivefactthattheflowerhas
fivepetalsasthatitscolorisred.Sincetheideaisnottodeterminefullyauniqueweakobjectivismbuttoindicateaweakkind,anynatural,simpleexamplecanbe
chosenasanillustration.
AccordingtoGdel,itmightbethatthereareonlyfinitelymanyintegersand:If1010isalreadyinconsistent,thenthereisnotheoreticalscience.Elsewherehesaid:
7.1.6Nothingremainsifonedrivestotheultimateintuitionortowhatiscompletelyevident.Buttodestroysciencealtogether,servesnopositivepurpose.Ourrealintuitionis
finite,and,infact,limitedtosomethingsmall.Thephysicalworld,theintegersandthecontinuumallhaveobjectiveexistence.Therearedegreesofcertainty.Thecontinuumisnot
seenasclearly[asthephysicalworldandtheintegers].

Theseobservationssuggestboththatwemaystartwithnumericalcomputationsoversmallnumbersandthatthereareforcefulreasonswhywedonotchoosetostop
withthem.Sincesmallisanambiguousword,itishardtodetermineauniquecollectionofsuchcorrectassertionsandtheirnegations.Butwemayimaginesome
reasonablecollectionofthiskind,suchthateachassertioninitiseithertrueorfalseandwecanfind

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outwhich.Tothisextent,wemaysaythatweallbelieveinaformofPlatonism:somethinglikethisvagueandneutralformulationcouldbesaidtodefinean"inevitable"
or"universal"Platonism.Weareinclinedtosay,inaddition,thateverycorrectassertioninthiscollectionisanunconditionalmathematicaltruth.Andthatthislimited
collectionofobjectivetruthscanserveasanaturalstartingpointtoreviewhowitleadstofamiliarenlargements.
Onewhowouldadmittobetrueonlythemembersofthisrestrictedrangemightbecalleda"strictfinitist."Oneapparentreasonforthisradicalpositionisadherence
towhatisreallyintuitiveorperspicuous.Forinstance,weknow,orexpect,thatwebecomefatiguedandconfusedbeforewegetdefiniteresultsincomplex
computationswithlargenumbers.GeorgeMiller'smagicnumber7saysthatweareabletograspatthesametime7items,plusorminus1or2.(Compare8.2.9
below.)
Wehave,however,noavailablewayofdistinguishinginauniformmanner,betweensmall(orfeasible)andlargenumbers.Wefindithardtolocateanystablestopping
place,eitherconceptuallyorrelativetoourexperience.Historically,wehavecontinuallyincreasedtherangeoffeasiblenumbers,byimprovednotation,bytheabacus,
bycomputers,andsoon.Conceptually,itisimpossibletofindannsuchthatnissmallbutnplus1islarge.Todenythisleadstothefamiliarparadoxofsmall
numbers:1issmall,nplus1issmallifnistherefore,all(theinfinitelymanypositive)integersaresmall.Indeed,theveryactofsinglingouttheoperationofadding1
asaclearbasisforgettinglargerandlargernumbersisitselfanactofabstraction,togiveformtoarangeofnebulousrelationsoforder.
Inotherwords,ifwebeginwithsmallnumbers,wearenotabletofindanaturalstoppingplaceuntilallthe(finite)numbersareexhausted.Ifwetrytofindthetotality
ofallfeasiblenumbers,ourfailureinevitablyleadsustotheinfinitetotalityofall(finite)numbers.Thisseemstobethefirsttotalitythatsatisfiesbothoftwoattractive
requirements:(1)itincludesallfeasiblenumbers,and(2)wecanworkwithit(asastablelimitorunit).Bothhistoricallyandconceptually,theseconsiderationsare
apparentlyinescapable.ButtoacceptthemistomakewhatGdelcalledthe"bigjump."However,mostdiscussionsonthefoundationsofmathematicsareconcerned
withissuesthatariseonlyafterwehavemadethisbigjump.
Itiswellknown,forinstance,thatbothHilbert'sfinitismandBrouwer'sintuitionismtakethisbigjumpforgranted.Indeed,itisonlyafterthebigjumphasbeenmade
thatfamiliarissuesoverpotentialandactualinfinity,constructionanddescription,predicativeandimpredicativedefinitions,countableanduncountablesets,strong
axiomsofinfinity,andsoonariseintheircurrentform.

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Oncewemakethebigjumpandrecognizeinfinitelymanynumbers,wefaceimmediatelytheessentialpartofthedebatesbetweenHilbert'sfinitism(thehalfofitthat
stipulateswhathasa"realcontent,"disregardingthedisprovedotherhalfthatwastojustifyclassicismonthebasisofit),Brouwer'sintuitionism(asrestrictedtonatural
numbers),andclassicalnumbertheory.Thenextenlargementistoseehowmuchcanbedonebyhandlingsetslikenumbers(semiintuitionismorpredicativism).To
envisagearbitrary(uncountablymany)setsofnumbersgetsustoclassicalanalysis.Toconsideralsosetsofthesesets,theirsets,andsoon,leadstoarbitrarysets.
Thisquicksummarymaybeseenasanaccountofthemainfeaturesoftheexistingfamiliardistinctionsofthevaryingranges.
Inthe1950sIwasstruckbytheimpressionthatwhatthedifferentschoolsonthephilosophyofmathematicstaketobetherangeofmathematicaltruthsforma
spectrum,orderedmoreorlessbyalinearrelationofcontainmentthatexhibitsastepbystepexpansion.Insteadofviewingtheschoolsascontendingandconflicting
nonoverlappingpaths,itispossibletotakeamoredetachedpositionandexaminemorecloselythestepbystepexpansionfromonestagetothenext.Indeed,Ifound
thatmuchofwhathadgone(fornearlyeightyyears)underthenameof"foundationalstudies"couldbeseenfromaneutralviewpointasproductiveworkdirectedto
themoreexactdeterminationoftherangesandtheirinterrelations.
Atthattime,Igaveanextendeddescriptionofthisimpressionandpresentedthefamiliaralternativeviews(onthefoundationsofmathematics)underthefollowing
headings:(ii)anthropologism(iii)finitism(iv)intuitionism(v)predicativism(numberasbeing)(vi)extendedpredicativism(predicativeanalysisandbeyond)(vii)
Platonism(Wang1958).Ialsoconsidered(i)logicinthenarrowersense(primarilypredicatelogic).[Strictlyspeaking,noteveryheadingiscontainedineverylater
one.Inparticular,(ii)and(iv)bothhavespecialfeaturesthatsomewhatdisruptthelinearorder.Buttheserefinementsneednotbeconsideredinthepresentcontext.]
IfounditreassuringwhenGdelexpressedsimilarideasonseveraloccasionsinthe1970s.Itturnsoutthatsomethinglikethisoutlookhadbeenafavoriteofhissince
around1930,eventhoughhedidnotmentionitinhispublishedwork.Allowmetoquotehisformulationofitinfootnote30ofthethirdversion(writteninthe1950s)
ofhisCarnappaper(CW3):
7.1.7Somebodyofunconditionalmathematicaltruthmustbeacknowledged,because,evenifmathematicsisinterpretedtobeahypotheticodeductivesystem[i.e.,ifthemost
restrictedstandpoint(implicationism)istaken],stillthepropositionswhichstatethattheaxiomsimplythetheoremsmustbeunconditionallytrue.Thefieldofunconditional
mathematicaltruthisdelimitedverydifferentlyby

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differentmathematicians.Atleasteightstandpointscanbedistinguished.Theymaybecharacterizedbythefollowingcatchwords:1.Classicalmathematicsinthebroadsense
(i.e.,settheoryincluded),2.Classicalmathematicsinthestrictsense,3.Semiintuitionism,4.Intuitionism,5.Constructivism,6.Finitism,7.RestrictedFinitism,8.Implicationism.

Roughlyspeaking,1and2correspondtomy(vii)3to(iv)and(v)4and5(differing,Ibelieve,inthat4addsto5freechoiceorlawlesssequencestodealwiththe
continuum)correspondto(iv)6to(iii)7to(ii)(thoughwithdifferences)with8correspondingtotaking(i)asthebodyofunconditionedtruths.
Forthepurposeofsortingoutalternativephilosophies,itissufficienttoconfineourattentiontotheessentials.Hence,wemayappropriatelyoverlooksomeofthefine
pointsandconsiderasimplifiedlist,limitingourattentiontonaturalnumbersandsets:(a)strict(orrestricted)finitismasappliedtonumbers,(b)finitism(asappliedto
numbers),(c)intuitionistnumbertheory,(d)classicalnumbertheory,(e)predicativeanalysis,(f)classicalanalysis,and(g)settheory.
Speakingloosely,wemovefromsmallnumbers(ina)to(arbitrary)largenumbersandtherebyslipintothepotentiallyinfinite(inbandc).Thenextstage(d)is
concernedwiththeactualinfinitetotalityofnumbers,whereas(e),asortof''countabilism,"beginstointroducesets,butonlytotheextentthattheycanbehandled
moreorlesslikenumbers.Arbitrarysetsofnumberscomeinwith(f),whichmaybetakentobeconcernedonlywithsmallsets,andwemovefromthemtolargesets,
in(g).
Conceptuallyanddevelopmentally,thetransitionfromeachstagetothenextseemsquitenatural.Inthefirstplace,itseemsarbitrarytotakeanynumberasthelargest.
Next,whenwedealwithinfinitelymanynumbers,weareledtotheprincipleofmathematicalinduction,whichcallsforsomewayofdealingwithsetsofnumbers.
Onceweenvisagesuchsets,weareled,byidealization,totheideaofarbitrarysetsofnaturalnumbers.Butthensetsofsets,andsoonalsocometomind.
Ourhistoricalexperienceshowsthatsuchextensionshavenotproducedirresolvablecontradictionsorevenlesserdifficulties.Onthecontrary,onthewholeandinthe
longrun,strongagreementtendstoprevailamongpractisingmathematicians,ifnotalwaysovertheissueofimportance,atleastoverthatofcorrectness.Amajor
concernofthephilosophyofmathematicsisevidentlytostudythejustificationofthisagreementandtodeterminewhatitisthatisagreedupon.Theseparationofthe
orderedstagesisonewaytoreducethedifficultyofthistask.
Itisafamiliarideathatinfinityisattheheartofmathematics.Moreover,onefeelsthatoncethe"jump"toinfinityismade(fromatoborcord),theadditional
extensionsarenotasremotefromeachotherorfrom

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the"simplest"infinityastheinfiniteisfromthefinite.Indeed,Gdelonceconjectured:
7.1.8Ifsettheoryisinconsistent,thenelementarynumbertheoryisalreadyinconsistent.

Thisconjecturesaysthatifthelatterisconsistent,soistheformer.Suchaconclusioncertainlycannotbeprovedinsettheoryifsettheoryisconsistent,sinceifit
could,settheorywouldproveitsownconsistencyand,therefore,byGdel'sincompletenesstheorem,wouldbeinconsistent.
Probablytheideabehindtheconjectureisourfeelingthattheextensionsbeyondthe"simplest"infinityaresocloselylinkedfromonestagetothenextthataserious
weaknessatonepointwouldbringdownthewholeedifice.Itisnotexcluded,althoughitisnotlikely,givenouraccumulatedexperience,thatsomenewparadoxes
willbefoundinsettheoryoreveninclassicalanalysis.Ifthatshouldhappen,therewouldbealternativepossibilities:wemighteitherfindsomeconvincinglocal
explanationortracethetroublebacktotheinitialbigjumptotheinfinite.
OncethewidedisagreementbetweenstrictfinitismandPlatonismisdecomposedalongthisline,wehaveGdelobservedmorechoices:
7.1.9Thereisachoiceofhowmuchclarityandcertaintyyouwantindecidingwhichpartofclassicalmathematicsisregardedassatisfactory:thischoiceisconnectedtoone's
generalphilosophy.

ThedecompositionischaracterizedbywhatIproposetocalladialecticofintuitionandidealization.Ontheonehand,Gdelemphasizesthatourrealintuitionis
limitedtosmallsetsandnumbers.Ontheotherhand,hefinds,forinstance,theKantiannotionofintuitiontoorestrictiveandhasfaithinthepowerofourintellectual
orcategorialorconceptualoressentialintuitiontoaccomplishsuchdifficulttasksasfindingtherightaxiomsofsettheoryandgenerallyclarifyingbasicconcepts.The
bridgewhichIdetectedfromhisobservationsbetweenthesetwocontrarycomponentsofhisviewis,tospeakvaguelybutsuggestively,asortofdialectic.By
thisImeantopointtoourexperienceofthewayourmathematicalknowledgeisincreasedandconsolidatedthroughtheinterplayoftheenlargementsofourintuition
andouridealization.
Idealizationisaconstrainedandtestablewayofextendingorgeneralizingourbeliefsbyanalogyorextrapolationorprojection.Itaimsatextendingboththerangeof
thesubjectmatterandthepowerofintuitionofthesubjectoragent.Withrespecttomathematicalknowledge,weseemtobejustified,onempiricalgrounds,in
believingthatidealizationhasbeensuccessfulsofarandwillcontinuetobeso.Ofcourse,wehavesometimesrunintodifficultiesandevenontowrongtracksandshall
undoubtedlycontinuetodoso.Butthisphenomenonisalsofamiliarin

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(say)physicsandbiologyindeedtoagreaterextentthaninthepursuitofmathematics.
IconsiderGdel'sgeneralobservationsontheconceptsofidealizationandintuitioninChapter9hereImentiononlythosewhicharedirectlyrelevant.
7.1.10Strictlyspeakingweonlyhaveclearpropositionsaboutphysicallygivensetsandthenonlyaboutsimpleexamplesofthem.Ifyougiveupidealization,thenmathematics
disappears.Consequentlyitisasubjectivematterwhereyouwanttostopontheladderofidealization.
7.1.11Withoutidealizationsnothingremains:therewouldbenomathematicsatall,exceptthepartaboutsmallnumbers.Itisarbitrarytostopanywherealongthepathofmoreand
moreidealizations.Wemovefromintuitionistictoclassicalmathematicsandthentosettheory,withdecreasingcertainty.Theincreasingdegreeofuncertaintybegins[atthe
region]betweenclassicalmathematicsandsettheory.Onlyasmathematicsisdevelopedmoreandmore,theoverallcertaintygoesup.Therelativedegreesremainthesame.

Ihavementionedthenaturalinclinationthatleadsustotakethebigjumpfromthefinitetotheinfinite.Thisbigjump,likethelawofexcludedmiddle,isanidealization.
Oncewearewillingtotakethisjump,itbecomesdifficulttoargueagainsttakingotherjumpsormakingotheridealizations.Inordertojustifyacceptingthebigjump
butrejectingotherjumps,itisnecessarytofindanotionoftheintuitivethatappliestothefruitofthebigjumpbutnottoadditionaljumps.
Kant'sconceptofintuitionseemstosatisfythisrequirementtosomeextent.Thereare,however,asGdelpointsout,difficultiesinapplyingtheconceptinawaythat
doesjusticetoourarithmeticalintuition.
7.1.12AgoodEnglishrenderingofKant'stermAnschauungisKantianintuitionorconcreteintuition.Kant'sconsiderationsofpureintuitionfailtoproduceawellgroundedbelief
intheconsistencyofarithmetic.ThisisagroundforrejectingKant.Ourintuitiontellsusthetruthofnotonly7plus5being12butalso[that]thereareinfinitelymanyprime
numbersand[that]arithmeticisconsistent.HowcouldtheKantianintuitionbeall?Thereareobjectivefactsaboutintuition.
7.1.13Ourrealintuitionisfinite,and,infact,limitedtosomethingsmall.Kantianintuitionistooweakaconceptofidealizationofourrealintuition.Ipreferastrongconceptof
idealizationofit.Numbertheoryneedsconcreteintuition,butelementarylogicdoesnotneedit.Nonelementarylogicinvolvestheconceptofset,whichalsoneedsconcrete
intuition.Understandingaprimitiveconceptisbyabstractintuition.

ItiswellknownthatHilbertseesKantianintuitionasabasisofhisbeliefthattherealcontentofmathematicsliesinhisfinitarymathematics.Gdelhimselfpointsout
thisrelationintheBernayspaper(CW2:272,n.b)

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7.1.14WhatHilbertmeansbyAnschauungissubstantiallyKant'sspacetimeintuitionconfined,however,toconfigurationsofafinitenumberofdiscreteobjects.Notethatitis
Hilbert'sinsistenceonconcreteknowledgethatmakesfinitarymathematicssosurprisinglyweakandexclude[s]manythingsthatarejustasincontrovertiblyevidentasfinitary
numbertheory.

EventhoughGdelbelievesthattherealcontentofmathematicsgoesfarbeyonditsfinitarypart,hestillfindssignificanttherestrictedconceptofintuitionofafinitary
mathematician.Inthisconnection,SueToledohasreportedsomeobservationsbyGdel:
7.1.15Inthiscontext,Gdelnoted,itwouldbeimportanttodistinguishbetweentheconceptsofevidenceintuitiveforusandidealizedintuitiveevidence,thelatterbeingthe
evidencewhichwouldbeintuitivetoanidealizedfinitarymathematician,whocouldsurveycompletelyfinitaryprocessesofarbitrarycomplexity.Ourneedforanabstractconcept
mightbeduetoourinabilitytounderstandsubjectmatterthatistoocomplicatedcombinatorily.Byignoringthis,wemightbeabletoobtainanadequatecharacterizationof
idealizedintuitiveevidence.ThiswouldnothelpwithHilbert'sprogram,ofcourse,wherewehavetousethemeansatourdisposal,butwouldneverthelessbeextremely
interestingbothmathematicallyandphilosophically.(Toledo1975:10).

InthisconnectionGdelispointingoutthat,eveninthelimiteddomainoffinitarymathematics,wedonotyetpossessanadequatecharacterizationofidealized
intuition.Inpractice,ofcourse,thisfacthasnotpreventedusfromidealizingbeyondthisrealmandacquiringintuitionsaboutbroaderidealizedstructures.Wehave
hereoneexampleoftheadvantagesofaliberalpositionofobjectivism:itfindswithinitselfsuitableplacesforrestrictedperspectives,suchasthefinitaryone,and
leavesroomfordoingjusticetotheirspecialconcernsaswell.
Theextensionsoffinitarynumbertheorytotheintuitionisticandthentotheclassicalaregoodexamplesofthedialecticbetweenintuitionandidealization.
Roughlyspeaking,finitarynumbertheoryrestrictsitsattentiontodecidableorcomputableproperties.Onenaturalideaistoincludeallandonlypropertiesthatinvolve
addition,multiplication,andoperationslikethem.Thefamiliarideaofpotentialinfinitysuggeststhatwerefrainfromtalkingdirectlyaboutthetotalityofnumbersand
limitourselvestopointingtoitbyusingonly"freevariables."Inthisway,wearriveattheformalsystemFsometimescalledquantifierfreeprimitiverecursive
arithmeticwhichcodifies,asisnowgenerallyagreed,Hilbert'sfinitarynumbertheory.
ThecommonlyacceptedformalsystemHforintuitionisticnumbertheorygoesbeyondthesystemFinpermittingcertainusesofquantifiersoverallnumbers(including
iteratedmentionsofthetotalityofallnumbers),butrestrictsitselftoemployingthemonlyincombinationwith

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intuitionisticlogic.ThefamiliarformalsystemNforclassicalnumbertheoryresultsfromthesystemHbysubstitutingclassicallogicforintuitionisticlogic.
TheprocessbywhichwearriveattheformalsystemsF,H,andNfromourintuitiveunderstandingoffinitary,intuitionisticandclassicalnumbertheoryobviously
involvesthedialecticoftheintuitiveandtheformal,ofintuitionandidealization.Whatismoreremarkableisthat,oncewehavetheformalsystems,weareabletosee
preciserelationsbetweenthemwhichenableustogainaclearintuitivegraspofsomeoftherelationsbetweentheoriginalconcepts.Itsohappensthatthemost
informativeresultsalongthisdirectionoriginatedwithGdel:hisinterpretationofthesystemHbywayofanaturalextensionofthesystemF(intheBernayspaper)
helpstoclarifythecontentofbothsystems,aswellastheirinterrelationshiphistranslationofthesystemNintothesystemH(Gdel1933)provestherelative
consistencyoftheformertothelatter,andlocalizestheirdifferencesattheirdifferentinterpretationsofexistenceanddisjunction.
TheinvestigationsofpredicativeanalysisandalsopredicativesettheorymaybeseenasanaturalextensionoftheformalsystemNforclassicalnumbertheory.By
restrictingourattentiontosetsthatare,likethesetofnaturalnumbers,countable,itispossibletoobtainfromthislineofworkcomparativelytransparentanaloguesof
manyconceptsandtheoremsinclassicalanalysisandclassicalsettheory.
ThemostsurprisingresultinthisdirectionalsocamefromGdel,who,bychoosingasuitablemixtureofconstructiveandclassicalnotions,wasabletoarriveatan
informativemodelofclassicalsettheorywhichpossessesanumberofattractiveproperties(Gdel1939).Inthiscase,thedialecticoftheintuitiveandtheformal,and
oftheconstructiveandthenonconstructive,isstriking:theintuitiveconceptsofpredicativityandclassicalordinalnumbersarecodifiedwithinaformalsystemofset
theorytoproducebothanintuitivemodelofthesystemitselfandapreciseformalresultoftherelativeconsistencyofthecontinuumhypothesis.Indeed,Gdelhimself
seestheworkasaremarkableillustrationofthefruitfulnessofhisobjectivism(MP:10).
7.1.16However,asfaras,inparticular,thecontinuumhypothesisisconcerned,therewasaspecialobstaclewhichreallymadeitpracticallyimpossibleforconstructiviststo
discovermyconsistencyproof.Itisthefactthattheramified[predicative]hierarchy,whichhadbeeninventedexpresslyforconstructivisticpurposes,hasbeenusedinan
entirelynonconstructiveway.

ThemostseriousandextensiveapplicationsofthedialecticofintuitionandidealizationinGdel'sdiscussionswithmewereinconnectionwithmyattempttojustifythe
axiomsofsettheory(seeMP:181190).Gdel

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foundmyattemptcongenialand,althoughIdonotrememberclearly,probablysuggested,asawaytocharacterizemyapproach,theterm"intuitiverangeof
variability".(Seethefirsttwolinesoftheparagraphbeginningatthemiddleofp.182ofMP.Bytheway,asCharlesParsonsfirstpointedout,theword'only'inthe
firstlineshouldbedeleted.)Inotherwords,Gdelsawmywayofjustifyingthefamiliaraxiomsofsettheoryasoneofshowingineachcasethatthemultitudes
introducedbyeachaxiomdoconstituteintuitiverangesofvariabilitywhichwecanoverview.Healsocontraststhisprinciplewithotherprinciplesthathavebeenused
forsettingupaxioms(MP:189190).
IleavemostofthedetaileddiscussionsofthissubjectforthesectiononsettheoryinChapter8,andconfinemyselfheretosomeofGdel'sgeneralobservations.For
example,immediatelyaftersayingthathepreferredastrongerconceptofintuitionthanKant's(7.1.13),Gdelsaid:
7.1.17Itisastrongidealizationoftheconceptofourrealintuitiontospeakofsetsasgivenbyanoverview.Theidealizedtimeconceptintheconceptofoverviewhassomething
todowithKantianintuition.Impredicativedefinitionshavenothingtodowithwhetherasetisgivenbyanoverview[whichdealswithextensions].Anintuitiverangeis
contrastedwithsetsgivenbyconcepts[only]andmoregenerallywithsomethingofwhichwehavenooverview:forexample,thetotalityofallsetsobtainablebytheiterative
conceptofset.Thereisahugedifferencebetweenitandthepowersetofthesetoffiniteordinalnumbers.

AsImentionedbefore,Gdelconsidersthestepfromourexperiencewithindividualnaturalnumberstotheacknowledgmentofallofthemthebigjump.Heseesthe
recognitionofthepowersetofagivensetasthesecondjumpintheformationofsets:
7.1.18Toarriveatthetotalityofintegersinvolvesajump.Overviewingitpresupposesan[idealized]infiniteintuition.Inthesecondjumpweconsidernotonlytheintegersas
givenbutalsotheprocessofselectingintegersasgiveninintuition."Giveninintuition"heremeans[anidealizationof]concreteintuition.Eachselectiongivesasubsetasan
object.Takingallpossiblewaysofleavingelementsout[ofthetotalityofintegers]maybethoughtofasamethodforproducingtheseobjects.Whatisgivenisapsychological
analysis,thepointiswhetheritproducesobjectiveconviction.Thisisthebeginningofanalysis[oftheconceptofset].
7.1.19Weidealizetheintegers(a)tothepossibilityofaninfinitetotality,and(b)withomissions.Inthiswaywegetanewconcretelyintuitiveidea,andthenonegoeson.Thereis
nodoubtinthemindthatthisidealizationtoanyextentwhatsoeverisatthebottomofclassicalmathematics.ThisiseventrueofBrouwer.FregeandRusselltriedtoreplace
thisidealizationbysimpler(logical)idealizations,which,however,aredestroyedbytheparadoxes.Whatthisidealizationrealizationofapossibilitymeansisthatweconceive
andrealizethepossibilityofamindwhichcandoit.Werecognizepossibilitiesinourmindsinthesamewayasweseeobjectswithoursenses.

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7.2DiscoveryandCreation:ExpansionthroughIdealization
Inconnectionwiththepositionofobjectivism,Gdelmakesvariousobservationsaboutthecontrastbetweencreationanddiscovery,aswellasbetweenthe
subjectiveandtheobjective.Byadheringtotheconceptofcreationasthemakingofsomethingoutofnothing,heseesseverelimitationsonthehumancapacityto
create.Forthepurposeofsecuringasolidgroundforourmathematicalknowledge,hejudgesthefamiliarstrategyoftakingintersubjectiveagreementastheultimate
criterionoftruthtobeaninconsistenthalfmeasure.Inparticular,hisbeliefinourcapacitytoknowobjectiverealityasitisisatthecenterofhisdissatisfactionwith
Kant'sphilosophy.
FromtheGibbsLecturetotheConversationsinthe1970s
Inthewritingspublishedduringhislifetime,Gdelrarelydiscussesexplicitlythefamiliarandelusiveissueofwhethermathematicsisdiscovered(found)orcreated
(made)byus.Hedid,however,considerthisissueduringhisconversationswithme,and,asInowknow,inpreparinghisGibbslecturein1951.Givenhisconception
ofcreation,itiseasytoconcludethatmathematicsmustdependonsomethingnotcreatedbyus.Sometimeshetracesthissomethingbacktoratherintangible
beginnings.Itthenseemshardtoshowhowwecanmakesomuchoutofsolittle.Fromhisvariousinterconnectedobservations,Idetectatrendinhisthoughts:once
wegrantthatsomethingisgivenobjectively,itisrelativelyeasytoseethatthecontinuedenrichmentofmathematicsdemands,forthesamereason,thatwealsogrant
acertainrichnesstowhatisobjectivelygiven.
InhisGibbslecture,GdelattemptstoprovePlatonismbyarguingagainst"theviewthatmathematicsisonlyourowncreation."Inaddition,hemakessome
suggestionstoexcludeotherpositionswhichrecognizetheobjectivityofmathematicsinthesenseof7.0.3butfallshortofPlatonismasdefinedby7.0.2.Oncehesaid
tome:
7.2.1MyGibbslecturegivesalivelypresentation.ItprovesPlatonism.

Nonetheless,althoughheproposedmorethanoncetoshowmethetextofhislecture,hedecidedintheendthatitwasnotinasufficientlyfinishedformtobeshown
tome.When,eventually,Ihadtheopportunitytoreadthetextofthelecture,Inoticedthat,contrarytotheimpressionconveyedby7.2.1,hewasquitetentativeinhis
conclusions.
Inanycase,itisreasonabletoseethemainpurposeoftheGibbslectureasapreliminaryattempttoprovePlatonisminmathematics.Eventhoughheintroducesthe
issueofPlatonismundertheassumptionthat"thereexistabsolutelyundecidablemathematicalpropositions"ahypothesishelaterclaimedtoberefutablebyhis
rationalisticoptimism

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(MP:324325)heannouncesthathewilldiscusstheissueindependentlyofthatassumption(originalmanuscript,p.21).
Inarguingagainstthecreationviewofmathematics,Gdelmakesseveralassertionswhichwerelatermoreorlessrepeatedinhisconversationswithme:
7.2.2Thecreatornecessarilyknowsallpropertiesofhiscreatures,becausetheycan'thaveanyothersexceptthosehehasgiventothem(p.16).
7.2.3Onemightobjectthattheconstructorneednotnecessarilyknoweverypropertyofwhatheconstructs.Forexample,webuildmachinesandstillcannotpredicttheirbehavior
ineverydetail.Butthisobjectionisverypoor.Forwedon'tcreatethemachinesoutofnothing,butbuildthemoutofsomegivenmaterial.Ifthesituationweresimilarin
mathematics,thenthismaterialorbasisforourconstructionswouldbesomethingobjectiveandwouldforcesomerealisticviewpointuponusevenifcertainotheringredientsof
mathematicswereourowncreation.Thesamewouldbetrueifinourcreationsweweretousesomeinstrumentinusdifferentfromourego(suchas"reason"interpretedas
somethinglikeathinkingmachine).Formathematicalfactswouldthen(atleastinpart)expresspropertiesofthisinstrument,whichwouldhaveanobjectiveexistence[ibid.:18].
7.2.4Firstofall,ifmathematicswereourfreecreation,ignoranceastotheobjectswecreated,itistrue,mightstilloccur,butonlythroughlackofaclearrealizationastowhatwe
reallyhavecreated(or,perhaps,duetothepracticaldifficultyoftoocomplicatedcomputations).Therefore,itwouldhavetodisappear(atleastinprinciple,althoughperhapsnot
inpractice)assoonasweattainperfectclearness.However,moderndevelopmentsinthefoundationsofmathematicshaveaccomplishedaninsurmountable[unsurpassable?]
degreeofexactness,butthishashelpedpracticallynothingforthesolutionofmathematicalproblems[ibid.:2122].
7.2.5Secondly,theactivityofthemathematiciansshowsverylittleofthefreedomacreatorshouldenjoy.Evenif,forexample,theaxiomsofintegerswereafreeinvention,stillit
mustbeadmittedthatthemathematician,afterhehasimaginedthefirstfewpropertiesofhisobjects,isattheendofhiscreativeactivity,andheisnotinapositionalsotocreate
thevalidityofthetheoremsathiswill.Ifanythinglikecreationexistsatallinmathematics,thenwhatanytheoremdoesisexactlytorestrictthefreedomofcreation.That,however,
whichrestrictsitmustevidentlyexistindependentlyofthecreation[ibid.:22].
7.2.6Thirdly:Ifmathematicalobjectsareourcreations,thenevidentlyintegersandsetsofintegerswillhavetobetwodifferentcreations,thefirstofwhichdoesnotnecessitate
thesecond.However,inordertoprovecertainpropositionsaboutintegers,theconceptofsetofintegersisnecessary.Sohere,inordertofindoutwhatpropertieswehavegiven
tocertainobjectsofourimagination,[we]mustfirstcreatecertainotherobjectsaverystrangesituationindeed!

Atthispoint,Gdelpointsoutthathehadformulatedhiscritiqueintermsoftherathervagueconceptoffreecreationorfreeinventionevidently

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implyingthat,asaresult,neitherthepositionnorhisproposedrefutationofitcouldbepreciseandconclusive.Hegoesontosaythattherewereattemptstoprovidea
moreprecisemeaningoftheconceptofcreation,whichwouldhavetheeffectofmakingitsdisproofmorepreciseandcogentalso(ibid.:23).
7.2.7Iwouldliketoshowthisindetailforthemostprecise,andatthesametimethemostradicalformulationthathasbeengivensofar.Itisthatwhichassertsmathematical
propositionstobetruesolelyduetocertainarbitraryrulesabouttheuseofsymbols.Itisthatwhichinterpretsmathematicalpropositionsasexpressingsolelycertainaspectsof
syntactical(orlinguistic)conventions,thatis,theysimplyrepeatpartsoftheseconventions.Accordingtothisview,mathematicalpropositions,dulyanalyzed,mustturnoutto
beasvoidofcontentas,forexample,thestatement"Allstallionsaremalehorses."Everybodywillagreethatthispropositiondoesnotexpressanyzoologicalorotherobjective
fact,butitstruthisduesolelytothecircumstancethatwechoosetousethetermstallionasanabbreviationformalehorse.

Gdelcontinueswithmanypagesofargumentsagainstthissyntacticalorverbalorabbreviationalornotationalconventionalism.Hethenconcludesthelecturewith
sometentativeobservationsinoppositiontowhathecalled"psychologism"and"Aristotelianrealism,"whichheregardsasthemainalternativestothecreationview
andtohisownPlatonistposition(asdefinedabovein7.0.2).Hedeclareshisfaiththat"aftersufficientclarificationoftheconceptsinquestion"itwouldbepossibleto
provePlatonism"withmathematicalrigor.''
Inthe1950s,Gdelspentmanyyears,probablyfrom1953to1959,workingonhisCarnappaper,"IsMathematicsSyntaxofLanguage?"forthepurposeofrefuting
thepositionofsyntacticalconventionalisminmathematics,whichhadbeenheldbyhisViennateachersCarnap,Schlick,andHahn.Historically,thisconventionalismis
ofgreatsignificance.Becauseofitsstrikingsimplicityandapparenttransparencyitconstitutesthemainnovelattractionofthepowerfulmovementoflogicalpositivism.
It"completes"thesketchofaphilosophyinWittgenstein'sTractatusbyaneagerextrapolationbasedonanequivocation(seeCarnap1936:47,discussedinWang
1985a:15).TheawarenessofitsinadequacyhadledWittgensteinandQuinetolookformodificationsofitthatwouldpreserveitspreferenceforadherencetothe
concrete.GiventhefactthatGdelhaddevelopedhisownopposingoutlookwhilehewasinViennaatthecenterofthelogicalpositivistmovement,itisnotsurprising
thathefeltitimportanttorefuteconventionalism.Nonetheless,heeventuallydecidednottopublishhisCarnappaper.Heoncegavemeashisreasonforthatdecision
hisjudgmentthat,eventhoughthepaperhaddemonstratedthatmathematicsisnotsyntaxoflanguage,ithadnotmadeclearwhatmathematicsis.

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Duringoneofourdiscussions,Gdelmadethefollowingobservationonconventionalism:
7.2.8Conventionalismconfusestwodifferentsensesofconvention:arbitraryoneswhichhavenocontentandseriousoneswithanobjectivebase.Wearenotcreating
mathematicalobjectsbyintroducingconventions.Inordertointroduceconventions,wehavetoknowtheconcepts.Inordertoworkwiththeconventions,oneneedsallof
mathematicsalready,forinstance,toprovethattheyareconsistent,thatis,thattheyareadmissibleconventions.

AsIsaidbefore,inourdiscussionsGdelwasemphaticinhisadherencetoatraditionalconceptofcreation:
7.2.9Tocreateistomakesomethingoutofnothingandwegivewhatwecreatealltheirproperties.Thisisdifferentfrommakingsomethingoutofsomethingelse.Forexample,we
makeautomobilesbutdonotknowalltheirproperties.

Originallythewordcreatewasusedmainlyintheprecisecontextoftheoriginaldivinecreationoftheworld.Augustine,forinstance,insistedthatcreaturescannot
create.AccordingtoDr.Johnson'sdictionary,tocreate(assaidofGod)is"toformoutofnothing."Ifwefollowthistradition,we(humanbeings)cancreateonlyina
deviantextendedsense,asinthequotationfromH.L.MansencitedintheOxfordEnglishDictionary:"Wecanthinkofcreationonlyasachangeoftheconditionof
thatwhichalreadyexists."
Atthesametime,evenifwebeginwithabroadnontraditionalconceptionofcreation,theexperienceoftherichstabilityofmathematicsmayleadustothediscovery
view.Einstein,analogously,saidabouttheoreticalphysics:"Tohimwhoisadiscovererinthisfield,theproductsofhisimaginationappearsonecessaryandnatural
thatheregardsthem,andwouldliketohavethemregardedbyothers,notascreationsofthoughtbutasgivenrealities"(Einstein1954:270).
Inourdiscussions,IcalledGdel'sattentiontothefactthatRiemannandBrouwersometimesspeakofcreationsinmathematics.Inparticular,Imentionedtwoof
Brouwer'sstatements:(1)"Manalwaysandeverywherecreatesorderinnature"(2)"Thisintuitionoftwooneness,thebasalintuition[Urintuition]ofmathematics,
createsnotonlythenumbersoneandtwo,butalsoallfinitenumbers"(Brouwer1975:123,126).WhenIaskedGdelwhetherwecanspeakofacontinuous
creation,hereplied:
7.2.10WhenRiemannandBrouwerspeakofcreatingobjectsinourmind,theymeandoingthisaccordingtocertainprinciples,whichdependonourintuition.Inthecaseof
Brouwer,thelackofarbitrarinessmeansthathedoesnotcreatearbitrarilyoutofthatwhichisshowninourintuition.ForBrouwer,mathematicsexpressestheessenceofthe
humanmind.Ifweusecreateinplaceofmakeforautomobilesanddososimilarlyintheconceptualworld,thenBrouwer'sconcept

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ofcreationisofthiskind.Usingthisconcept,wemayspeakofafacultyofwhatwecancreate.Wehavenotdeterminedordecidedwhattocreate.Thenotionofcontinuous
creationcanapplytosettheory,butnottonumbertheory.BycreatingtheintegerswehavedeterminedGoldbach'sconjecturethatis,werecognizethepropositionsabout
numbersasmeaningful.Insettheory,everypropositionneednotbemeaningful.Itisindefinitetosaythatwehavecreatedsets.Creatingmathematicalobjectsinthissensedoes
notmeanthattherearenoobjectsnotcreatedbyus.CreationinthissensedoesnotexcludePlatonism.Itisnotimportantwhichmathematicalobjectsexistbutthatsomeofthem
doexist.Objectsandconcepts,oratleastsomethinginthem,existobjectivelyandindependentlyoftheactsofhumanmind.
7.2.11Brouwerisnottalkingaboutcreationinhisassertion(2),hewasmerelysayingthatwegetnumbersoutoftheUrintuition.Itisagoodexampleofconstructingsomething
outofsomethinggiven.Thewordconstructhereisanalogoustophysicalconstruction.Thetwoonenesscontainsthematerialfromwhichwecombineanditeratetogetnumbers.
ThisUrintuitionisquiteintangible.Butthisisallright,becausesomethingwhichisverysimplealwaysappearsasalmostnothing.Forexample,Hegelidentifiesthemere
somethingwithnothing.

"DataoftheSecondKind"
InowbelievethatBrouwer'sUrintuitionoftwoonenessor"twoity"illustratesthesortofthingthatpointsquitedirectlytowhatGdel,intheCantorpaper,takesto
be"thegivenunderlyingmathematics"(CW2:268).
7.2.12Thatsomethingbesidesthesensationsactuallyisimmediatelygivenfollows(independentlyofmathematics)fromthefactthatevenourideasreferringtophysicalobjects
containconstituentsqualitativelydifferentfromsensationsormerecombinationsofsensations,forexample,theideaof[physical]objectitselfwhereas,ontheotherhand,byour
thinkingwecannotcreateanyqualitativelynewelements,butonlyreproduceandcombinethosethataregiven.Evidentlythe"given"underlyingmathematicsiscloselyrelatedto
theabstractelementscontainedinourempiricalideas.40[See7.2.14forfootnote.]
7.2.13Itbynomeansfollows,however,thatthedataofthissecondkind,becausetheycannotbeassociatedwithactionsofcartainthingsuponoursenseorgans,aresomething
purelysubjective,asKantasserted.Ratherthey,too,mayrepresentanaspectofobjectivereality,but,asopposedtothesensations,theirpresenceinusmaybeduetoanother
kindofrelationshipbetweenourselvesandreality.
7.2.14[Footnote40]NotethatthereisacloserelationshipbetweentheconceptofsetandthecategoriesofpureunderstandinginKant'ssense.Namely,thefunctionofbothis
"synthesis,"thatis,thegeneratingofunitiesoutofmanifolds(e.g.,inKantoftheideaofoneobjectoutofitsvariousaspects).

ClearlytherestrictionofthepowerofourthinkingtoreproducingandcombininggivenelementsisinconformitywithGdel'sconceptionof

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creation.Mind'spowerofsynthesismustbeacomponentofitsabilitytocombine.Combining,presumably,alsoincludesselecting,anditincludesaswellthe
interactionbetweenconsciousthinkingandunconsciousthinking,whichisafamiliarexperience.Forexample,manyofusareawareofthebenefitsderivablefrom
periodsofincubationinundertakingacomplexpieceofintellectualwork.Whenwearefatiguedorstuck,anight'srestoranextendedabstentionfromconscious
engagementwiththetaskathandoftenresultsinunexpectedadvances.
Whatisdoneintheunconsciousisalsothinking,inthesenseofcombiningandreproducinggivenelements.Mind'spowerliesinthemannerinwhichthegivenis
processedand,inparticular,analyzedandsynthesized.Sinceitisgenerallyagreedthatcomputersalsocancombineandreproduce,itfollowsthat,ifwearetoprove
mind'ssuperioritytocomputerswemustclarifyandsubstantiateourbeliefthatbythinkingamindcandomorethanacomputercan,byvirtueofthemind'sabilityto
dealmoreflexiblywithsubtlerdata.Givenourwelltestedbeliefthatobjectiverealityisrichlyandsubtlycomplex,itseemsreasonabletoconcludethatobjectivismin
mathematicsallowsmoreroomthandoesthecreationviewforourmindtocarryoutitsmathematicalthinkinginawaythatsurpassesthecapabilityofcomputers.
Inordertoexplicatethecomplexpassagein7.2.12,wemustfirstconsiderwhatGdelwroteimmediatelybeforeitintheCantorpaper:
7.2.15Butdespitetheirremotenessfromsenseexperience,wedohavesomethinglikeaperceptionalsooftheobjectsofsettheory,asisseenfromthefactthattheaxiomsforce
themselvesuponusasbeingtrue.Idon'tseeanyreasonwhyweshouldhavelessconfidenceinthiskindofperception,andmoregenerally,inmathematicalintuition[acorrection
proposedbyGdelhimselftoreplace"i.e.,inmathematicalintuition"]thaninsenseperception["takeninamoregeneralsense,including,forinstance,lookingatacityfroman
airplane"phraseaddedbyGdelNovember1975].
7.2.16Itshouldbenotedthatmathematicalintuitionneednotbeconceivedofasafacultygivinganimmediateknowledgeoftheobjectsconcerned.Ratheritseemsthat,asinthe
caseofphysicalexperience,weformourideasalsoofthoseobjectsonthebasisofsomethingelsewhichisimmediatelygiven.Onlythissomethingelseisnot,ornotprimarily,
thesensations(CW2:268).

Atleastinhisdiscussionswithme,Gdeldidnotidentifymathematicalintuitionwithsomethingliketheperceptionofsets.Thatmaybewhyhetoldmespecificallythat
itwasamistakeintheoriginaltexttosay"inthisperception,i.e.,inmathematicalintuition,"pointingoutthatsuchperceptionisbutaspecialtypeofmathematical
intuition.Infact,myimpressionisthatmathematicalintuitionforhimisprimarilyourintuitionthatcertainpropositionsaretruesuchasmodusponens,mathematical
induction,4

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isanevennumber,someoftheaxiomsofsettheory,andsoon.Onlyderivativelymaywealsospeakoftheperceptionofsetsandconceptsasmathematicalintuition.
Implicitin7.2.16isthefamiliartruththatthe"somethingelsewhichisimmediatelygiven"inthecaseofphysicalexperienceis,inthefirstplace,thesensations.The
continuationof7.2.16in7.2.12pointsoutthat,eveninphysicalexperience,somethingbesidesensationsisactuallyimmediatelygiven,asisseenfromthefactthat
qualitativelydifferentideaslikethatof(physical)objectitselfareinvolved.ThislineofthoughtisundoubtedlyrelatedtoKant'sobservationthatinphysical
experienceweapplythecategoriesofpureunderstanding,whicharequalitativelydifferentfromsensations.Consequently,ourphysicalknowledge,inparticularour
senseperception,isbasedon,besidessensations,someothertypeofdatumaswell,thatis,dataofthesecondkind(thetermintroducedin7.2.13).
Gdel'sdiscussionof"the'given'underlyingmathematics"islessexplicit.Sincemathematicsisobviously"qualitativelydifferentfrom"nothing(anditscombinations),it
mustbebasedonsomethingthatisimmediatelygiven:thisseemstomethebasicargumentthatishardesttoquestion.Ourmathematicalexperienceshowsthatwe
mayalsobesaidtohavesomethinglikeaperceptionofmathematicalobjectsandconcepts.Sincesenseperceptionis,asweallagree,based(primarily)onthe
sensations,whichareimmediatelygiven,themathematicalanalogueofperceptionmustalsobebasedonsomethingimmediatelygivenbecauseitcannotcomefrom
nothing(seeingthat"bythinkingwecannotcreateanyqualitativelynewelements").
AstrikinglysimilarpointismadebyFregeinaremarkablydifferentmanner.Fregewishestoargueforthepossibilityof"thepresentationofathoughtthatdoesnot
belongtotheinnerworld."Forthispurpose,hefirstobserves,"thevisualimpressionswehavearenotonlynotthesame,butmarkedlydifferentfromeachother.And
yetwemoveaboutinthesameexternalworld.Havingvisualimpressionsiscertainlynecessaryforseeingthings,butnotsufficient.Whatmuststillbeaddedisnot
anythingsensible.Andyetthisisjustwhatopensuptheexternalworldforusforwithoutthisnonsensiblesomethingeveryonewouldremainshutupinhisinner
world."Fregethenaddstentatively,"Soperhaps,sincethedecisivefactorliesinthenonsensible,somethingnonsensible,evenwithoutthecooperationofsense
impressions,couldalsoleadusoutoftheinnerworldandenableustograspthoughts"(Frege1918:2627).
Fregedoesnotpausetogivehisreasonforbelievingthatthereisormustbethisdesiredothertypeof"somethingnonsensible."Ratherhegoesontosay:"Outside
ourinnerworldweshouldhavetodistinguishtheexternalworldproperofsensible,perceptiblethingsandtherealmof

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whatisnonsensiblyperceptible.Weshouldneedsomethingnonsensiblefortherecognitionofbothrealms."
PresumablyFregebelievesthat,sincewedo"grasp"or"perceive"thoughts(nonsensibly),theremustbeanobjectiverealmofthoughts.ItseemsthatFrege's
"somethingnonsensible"correspondstoGdel's"dataofthesecondkind,"whichareelusiveandlikelytobemisleadingifwe''reify"them.Thatmaybewhyneither
FregenorGdelsaysmuchthatisspecificaboutthem.(SeeYourgrau1989,pp.339403,onthisandothersimilaritiesbetweentheviewsofFregeandGdel.)
ManyphilosophersareputoffbyGdel'slanguageofmathematical(orconceptual)perceptionandintuition.Butitseemstomethatwhatisatstakecanalsobe
expressedinotherterms.Ourelementarymathematicalexperienceshowsthatwearecertainofmanymathematicalpropositions:forexample,210times210is220,the
billionthdigitofthedecimalexpansionoftheirrationalnumbereiseither0orgreaterthan0.Whatisthegroundforsuchstrongbeliefsasthese?Ifitissaidthatthe
groundisnothingbesidesourtraining,thenonecouldaskhowtrainingalonecouldpossiblysecuresomuchforus.
Mostofuswouldagreethatempiricalpropositionssuchas"Ihavetwohands"or"theearthalreadyexistedtendaysago,"arebelievedatleastinpartbecausethere
havebeencertainsensations,certainimmediatelygivendataduetoourrelationtoreality.TheargumentsofGdelandFregepointstronglytothepresenceofanother
kindofexperienceaswell.Itcertainlyseemsplausibletoadmitthat,apartfromtraining,ourmathematicalbeliefsaresimilarlybasedatleastinpartoncertain
immediatelygivendatawhichare,however,"duetoanotherkindtorelationshipbetweenourselvesandreality."
Itseemstomehardtodeny,givenourmathematicalexperience,thattheremustbesomedataunderlyingourfaithincertainmathematicalpropositions.Gdel's(and
Frege'srelated)assertionsaboutideassuchastheideaofaphysicalobjectaremeanttoshowthatevenourphysicalideasrequirecertainimmediatelygivendatathat
arenotsensations.Thisisanadditionalargument,introducedforthepurposeofreducingthedoubtthattherecouldpossiblybyanydataotherthansensations.
Inshort,Gdelasksustoacknowledgetwokindsofdatum:(a)sensations,theprimarydataforourideasreferringtophysicalobjectsand(b)dataofthesecond
kind,whichinclude(b1)thoseimmediatelygivendata,otherthanthesensations,onthebasisofwhichweformourphysicalideas(whatGdelcalls"theabstract
elementscontainedinourempiricalideas"),and(b2)"the'given'underlyingmathematics."Gdelobservesthat(b2)"iscloselyrelatedto"(b1).Thedataofthesecond
kindinbothcasesenableus,asexplicatedinthefootnotecitedin7.2.14,toformconceptswhosefunctionissynthesis.

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Inotherwords,thedataofthesecondkindarethebasisonwhichweformbothKant'scategoriesofpureunderstandingandmathematicalconceptssuchasthoseof
setandnumber.Gdeloffersnodirectcharacterizationofthedataofthesecondkind.ButBrouwer'sUrintuitionoftwoonenessmay,Ithink,beseenasamore
directimageofthegivenunderlyingmathematicsthantheconceptsofsetandnumber.ThefactthatwehaveideasoftheseKantiancategoriesandalsomathematical
conceptspointstocertainfeaturesofrealitywhichintheirrelationtousenableustohavesuchideas,onthebasis,orthroughthemediation,ofthedataofthesecond
kind.Itisnaturaltopresumethatthesefeaturesofobjectiverealityarejusttheconceptsourideasaimatcapturing.
ConsidernowGdel'sfundamentaldisagreementwithKant,astentativelyassertedinpassage7.2.13:thedataofthesecondkind"mayrepresentanaspectof
objectivereality."Asweknow,accordingtoKant,eventhoughthecategoriesofpureunderstandingplayacentralroleindeterminingwhatisobjectiveinour
experience,theyarenotobjectiveinthesenseofrepresentinganaspectofthethingsinthemselves.Rathertheyare,inthissense,purelysubjective,thoughperhaps
conditionedinsomeimpenetrablewaybythethingsinthemselves.
Since,however,wecanbeginonlywithwhatwebelieveweknow,itismorenaturaltodispensewiththeadditional,andlargelyinaccessible,realmofthethingsin
themselvesandsay,forinstance,thatourideaofphysicalobjectisbasedonsomedataofthesecondkindwhichrepresentanaspectofreality.Asamatteroffact,
wedobelievethattherearephysicalobjectsintherealworld.ButinanycaseIdonotthinkthisissueaboutourideaofphysicalobjectisdirectlyrelevanttothe
questionofamathematicalworld.Thereforewemayconcentrateonthedataofthesecondkind"underlyingmathematics"briefly,"mathematicaldata."
AsIsaidbefore,itishardtodenythattherearesuchmathematicaldata.Butjustgrantingthisdoesnotseemtogetusveryfar.Forallweknow,itmightgiveusonly
somethinglike(say),1,2,andmany.Thereasoningthatleadstotheconclusionthattherearesomemathematicaldatais,however,quitegeneral.Overtheyears,the
domainofmathematicshasbeenextended,andintheprocessobscuritiesandcrises(theirrationalnumbers,theinfinitesimals,thecomplexnumbers,thedivergent
series,theparallelaxiom,theparadoxesofsettheory)havebeenclarifiedandovercome.Aswegainincreasingconfidenceinmoreandmoreofmathematics,oras
therangeofourmathematicalintuitionincreases,webelieveweknowmoreandmorenewthings.Since,however,"byourthinkingwecannotcreateanyqualitatively
newelements,"theremusthavebeen(orwemusthaveseen)moreandmorenewgivenelements,thatis,additionalmathematicaldata.

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Westartwiththeempiricalfactofourbelievingwhatweknowtobeso,andwegoontoexaminethevalidityofwhatwesupposeweknow.Thisexaminationofthe
foundationsofmathematicshasinthiscenturyproducedthefamiliarschoolsofstrictfinitism,formalism(orfinitism),intuitionism,semiintuitionism,andlogicism.From
alessengagedperspective,theseschoolsmaybeseenasalternativedelimitationsoftherangeofmathematicaltruth,roughlyintheorder,nothistoricallybut
conceptually,ofmovingfromthenarrowertothebroader.Ourinterestisthenshiftedtoastudyofwhatisinvolvedingoingfromonestagetothenext.
Abriefsketchofsomeofthemainfeaturesofsuchastudywasgiveninthelastsectionconstruedasadialecticofthecriterionofintuitionasawayof
characterizingourstrongandstablebeliefsandtheprocedureofidealizationtopurifyandextendourconceptions.Suchanapproachisthoughttobeinstructive,
becausetheinteractionofintuitionandidealization,vaguethoughtheyareasconcepts,hasworkedsowellsofar,andwehaveeveryreasontobelievethatitwill
continuetoworkwell.
ItismyimpressionthatGdelwouldassenttothebeliefalthoughhedoesnotseemtosaysoexplicitlythateachextensioncallsforsomequalitativelynew
elementsasadditionalmathematicaldata.Suchpostulateddataaremeanttolinkupourconceptionswithobjectivereality,orthemathematicalworld.Thepostulation
ofsuchdatais,Ithink,awayofexplicatingourbeliefthattheedificeofmathematics,surprisinglyrichandstable,musthavesomeobjectivebasis.Withorwithout
suchdata,themainpointisthatjustasthesuccessofphysicshasledustoacceptmoreandmoreelaboratetheoriesaboutthephysicalworld,theadvancesin
mathematicsshouldinduceustoacceptaricherandrichertheoryofthemathematicalworld.Buttheanalogycontainsvariousfacets.Forexample,relativetoour
presentknowledge,theconnectionsbetweenthedifferentpartsofmathematics(andthosebetweencertainpartsofthemsay,numbertheoryandsettheoryand
physics)arenotnearlyascloseasthosebetweendifferentpartsofphysics.
AccordingtoGdelintheCantorpaper:
7.2.17Thequestionoftheobjectiveexistenceofthemathematicalworldisanexactreplicaoftheobjectiveexistenceoftheouterworld(CW2:268).

Inthesamecontext(twoparagraphsback)hemakesstronguseofhisanalogyof"somethinglikeaperception"ofsetsto"senseperception,whichinducesustobuild
upphysicaltheoriesandtoexpectthatfuturesenseperceptionswillagreewiththem."Iwouldratherspeakintermsofacomparison,asastart,(say)betweenour
seeingourbeliefsaboutsmallintegersastrueandourseeingourbeliefsaboutmediumsizedphysicalobjectsastrue.Inotherwords,ifonewishestospeakinterms
ofperceiving

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mathematicalobjects,whatismeantis,inthefirstplace,thatweseeastruethestrongandstablebeliefswehavewhichareordinarilysaidtobeaboutsuchobjects.In
thisway,Ihopetoavoidorpostponethecomplexissueaboutthenatureofmathematicalobjectsandtheirdifferencesfromphysicalobjects.InviewofGdel's
observationsontheepistemologicalpriorityofobjectivityoverobjects,Iaminclinedtothinkthathewouldbesympathetictothis(tactical?)procedure.
ArelatedearlierdiscussionisGdel'sfamousanalogybetweenphysicsandmathematicsintheRussellpaper,which,accordingtowhathetoldmeaboutthepassage,
maybereformulatedslightlydifferently:
7.2.18Evenifweadoptpositivism,itseemstomethattheassumptionofsuchentities[setsandconceptsasexistingindependentlyofourdefinitionsandconstructions]isquite
aslegitimateastheassumptionofphysicalobjects,andthereisquiteasmuchreasontobelieveintheirexistence.Theyareinthesamesensenecessarytoobtainasatisfactory
systemofmathematicsasphysicalobjectsarenecessaryforasatisfactorytheoryofoursenseperceptions,andinbothcasesitisimpossibletointerpretthepropositionsone
wantstoassertabouttheseentitiesaspropositionsaboutthe"data,"thatis,inthelattercasetheactuallyoccurringsenseperceptions["andintheformercaseactualsimple
computationswithintegers."addedbyGdelin1975](CW2:128).

Bytheway,theadditionismorespecificthanthespecificationelsewhereintheRussellpaperofhismathematicalanalogueofsenseperceptions:"arithmetic,i.e.,
thedomainofthekindofelementaryindubitableevidencethatmustbemostfittinglycomparedwithsenseperception(ibid.:121).Inthe1970sGdelcharacterized
7.2.18asanadhominemargument,inthesensethatitresortstowhatthepositivists(also)believe,andusestheirlanguage(ofassumption,data,etc.).
Howthiscomparisonbetweenmathematicalandphysicalknowledgeistobeextendedseemstobeasecondaryissuewhichneitherisimportantinthepresentcontext
norpromisesanykindofuniquelysatisfactorysolution.PerhapswecancomparenumbertheorywithNewtonianphysics,sincetheseareprobablythemostdecisive
partsofmathematicsandphysicswithregardtothegenerationinusofastrongbeliefinanobjectivemathematicalworldandastrongbeliefinthefruitfulnessof
physicaltheory.Thereisalsosomesimilaritybetweentheunendingquestfornewaxiomsofsettheoryandthequestforaunifiedtheoryinphysics.Buttheplaceofset
theoryinthemindsofpuremathematiciansis,certainlyatpresent,lesscentralthanthatofthegoalofaunifiedtheoryinthemindsoftheoreticalphysicists.
Gdel'ssuggestedrefutationofsubjectivisminmathematicsappealstothefactthatwebelievewehavemathematicalknowledge.Onceweacceptcertainsimple
mathematics,wetendtogofromoneextensiontoanother,withsomedecreaseindegreeofcertaintyandwithoccasional

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setbacks(confusionsandcotradictions).Fromourexperience,however,wehaveacquiredthebeliefthatrobustexpansions,ingeneralandinthelongrun,become
morecertain,stable,anduseful.Suchconfidence,foundedonourgrossexperience,isundoubtedlytheultimatejustificationofourbeliefinamathematicalworld,
which,moreover,isfruitfulindoingsometypesofmathematicalwork(asillustratedbyGdel'sletters(MP:811),whichIconsiderinsection7.4below).
Inmyopinion,theobjectiveexistenceofaworldcanmeanforusonlyourexperienceofthesuccessfulaccumulationofconvergentlystablebeliefsaboutitssubject
matter,beliefsthatholdfastinthelightcreatedbyallourattemptstobeunprejudiced.Thereisnothinginourconceptofobjectiveexistencethatrequirescausal
effectsonoursenseorgans.Thefamiliarandnaturaldistinctionisexpressedbysayingthatthephysicalworldisnotonlyobjectivebutalsoactual.Actualexistenceis
anextradimensionaddedtoobjectiveexistence.Ifwedonotquestiontheobjectiveexistenceofthephysicalworld,itishardtofindreasonstodoubtthatofthe
mathematicalworld.Thatiswhyacomparisonofmathematicswithphysicsisofcrucialrelevance.
7.3ThePerceptionofConcepts
Inmydiscussionofmathematicalconcepts,Ispokeofsharpeningorformalizingavagueintuitiveconceptandaskedthequestion(MP:81):Ifwebeginwithavague
intuitiveconcept,howcanwefindasharperconcepttocorrespondtoitfaithfully?Gdelobjectedtothisformulationandsaidthatthetaskistotrytoseeor
understandaconceptmoreclearly.Inadditionheproposedtoreplacethewordsharperbysharp,becauseheevidentlywantedafixedtargetthatinitselfadmitsof
nodegrees.
IeventuallysummarizedGdel'sscatteredobservationsonourcapacitytoperceiveorunderstandconcepts,inhisownwords,inlessthantwoprintedpagesinFrom
MathematicstoPhilosophy(MP:8486).Forthepurposeofunderstandinghislineofthought,Ibeginthissectionbydiscussingthepartsofthissummary.
Inthefirstplace,thereareconcepts,andweareabletoperceivethemasweareabletoperceivephysicalobjects.
7.3.1Ifwebeginwithavagueintuitiveconcept,howcanwefindasharpconcepttocorrespondtoitfaithfully?Theansweristhatthesharpconceptisthereallalong,onlywedid
notperceiveitclearlyatfirst.Thisissimilartoourperceptionofananimalfirstfarawayandthennearby.Wehadnotperceivedthesharpconceptofmechanicalprocedures
beforeTuring,whobroughtustotherightperspective.Andthenwedoperceiveclearlythesharpconcept.
7.3.2Therearemoresimilaritiesthandifferencesbetweensenseperceptionsandtheperceptionsofconcepts.Infact,physicalobjectsareperceivedmoreindirectly

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thanconcepts.Theanalogofperceivingsenseobjectsfromdifferentanglesistheperceptionofdifferentlogicallyequivalentconcepts.
7.3.3Ifthereisnothingsharptobeginwith,itishardtounderstandhow,inmanycases,avagueconceptcanuniquelydetermineasharponewithouteventheslightestfreedom
ofchoice.
7.3.4"Tryingtosee(i.e.understand)aconceptmoreclearly"isthecorrectwayofexpressingthephenomenonvaguelydescribedas"examiningwhatwemeanbyaword."

Atthisjuncture,Gdelproposedaconjecturethatthereissomespecialphysicalorgantoenableustohandleabstractimpressionsaswellaswedo:
7.3.5Iconjecturethatsomephysicalorganisnecessarytomakethehandlingofabstractimpressions(asopposedtosenseimpressions)possible,becausewehavesome
weaknessinthehandlingofabstractimpressionswhichisremediedbyviewingthemincomparisonwithorontheoccasionofsenseimpressions.Suchasensoryorganmustbe
closelyrelatedtotheneuralcenterforlanguage.Butwesimplydonotknowenoughnow,andtheprimitivetheoryonsuchquestionsatthepresentstageislikelytobe
comparabletotheatomictheoryasformulatedbyDemocritus.

AnimportantreasonforGdel'sstronginterestinobjectivisminmathematicsandinourcapacitytoperceiveconceptsclearlyinmanycases,is,Ithink,his
extrapolatedbelieforuninhibitedgeneralizationthatwecanseethefundamentalconceptsasclearlyinphilosophyasinmathematicsandphysics.Otherwise,itwould
bedifficulttounderstandwhyheintroducesthefollowingremarkablerecommendationandpredictioninthiscontext:
7.3.6PhilosophyasanexacttheoryshoulddotophysicsasmuchasNewtondidtophysics.Ithinkitisperfectlypossiblethatthedevelopmentofsuchaphilosophicaltheory
willtakeplacewithinthenexthundredyearsorevensooner.

AsexamplesofourabilitytoperceiveconceptsclearlyGdelmentionstwocasesand,indescribingthem,linksthedefinitionofaconcepttotheaxiomsthatconcern
it:
7.3.7Thepreciseconceptmeantbytheintuitiveideaofvelocityclearlyisds/dt,andthepreciseconceptmeantby"size"(asopposedto"shape"),e.g.ofalot,clearlyisequivalent
withPeanomeasureinthecaseswhereeitherconceptisapplicable.Inthesecasesthesolutionsagainareunquestionablyunique,whichhereisduetothefactthatonlythey
satisfycertainaxiomswhich,oncloserinspection,wefindtobeundeniablyimpliedintheconceptwehad.Forexample,congruentfigureshavethesamearea,aparthasnolarger
sizethanthewhole,etc.

Gdelevidentlybelievesthat,formanyimportantfundamentalconcepts,wearecapableofseeingclearlytheaxiomsimpliedbyourintuitive

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ideasofthem.Anaturalquestionishowtodealwithambiguousconcepts,which,asweknow,includemostfundamentalphilosophicalconcepts.Presumablyinorder
toanticipatethisquestion,Gdelseemstosuggestthatwehaveambiguousconceptsonlywherewemixtwoormoreexactconceptsinoneintuitiveconcept.Our
experienceshows,however,thatambiguitiesinmanycentralconceptscannotberesolvedinthismanner.Inanycase,Gdeloffersaclarificationoftwoambiguous
concepts:continuityandpoint.EventhoughIdonotthinkthatthesetwoexamplesareusefulevidenceinfavorofhisstrongassertionin7.3.6,theyareofinterestin
themselves:
7.3.8Therearecaseswherewemixtwoormoreexactconceptsinoneintuitiveconceptandthenweseemtoarriveatparadoxicalresults.Oneexampleistheconceptofcontinuity.
Ourpriorintuitioncontainsanambiguitybetweensmoothcurvesandcontinuousmovements.Wearenotcommittedtotheoneortheotherinourpriorintuition.Inthesenseof
continuousmovementsacurveremainscontinuouswhenitincludesvibrationsineveryintervaloftime,howeversmall,providedonlythattheiramplitudestendtoward0ifthe
timeintervaldoes.Butsuchacurveisnolongersmooth.Theconceptofsmoothcurvesisseensharplythroughtheexactconceptofdifferentiability.Wefindtheexampleof
spacefillingcontinuouscurvesdisturbingbecausewefeelintuitivelythatacontinuouscurve,inthesenseofbeingasmoothone,cannotfillthespace.Whenwerealizethat
therearetwodifferentsharpconceptsmixedtogetherintheintuitiveconcept,theparadoxdisappears.Heretheanalogywithsenseperceptionisclose.Wecannotdistinguishtwo
neighboringstarsalongdistanceaway.Butbyusingatelescopewecanseethatthereareindeedtwostars.
7.3.9Anotherexamplealongthesamelineisourintuitiveconceptofpoints.Insettheorywethinkofpointsaspartsofthecontinuuminthesensethatthelineisthesetofthe
pointsonit(callthisthe"settheoreticalconcept").Inspaceintuitionwethinkofspaceasafinemattersothateachpointhaszeroweightandisnotpartofmatter(butonlyalimit
betweenparts).NotethatitisnotpossibletocutamateriallinesegmentorarodintwowaysatthesamepointorsurfaceP,oncewithPontheleftpart,onceontheright,
becausethereisnothinginbetweenthetwocompletelysymmetricalparts.Accordingtothisintuitiveconcept,summingupallthepoints,westilldonotgettheline,ratherthe
pointsformsomekindofscaffoldontheline,Wecaneasilythinkofintervalsaspartsofthelineandassignlengthstothem,and,bycombiningintervals,tomeasurablesets,
wherewehavetoconsidertwomeasurablesetswhichdifferonlybysetsofmeasurezeroasrepresentingthesamepartofthecontinuum.Butwhenweusethesettheoretical
conceptandtrytoassignalengthtoanyarbitrarysetofpointsontheline,welosetouchwiththeintuitiveconcept.Thisalsosolvestheparadoxthatsettheoreticallyonecan
decomposeaglobeintoafinitenumberofpartsandfitthemtogethertoformexactlyasmallerglobe.Inthelightofwhathasbeensaidthisonlymeansthatonecansplitthe
scaffoldconsistingofthepointsintoseveralpartsandthenshiftthesepartstogethersothattheywillallbewithinasmaller

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spacewithoutoverlapping.Theresultholdsonlyforthesettheoreticalconcept,whileitiscounterintuitiveonlyfortheintuitiveconcept.

TheabovenineentriesreproduceGdel'sowntext,aspublishedinFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(MP:8486)butbrokenintoappropriateparts.Inour
conversations,Gdelmadeseveralrelatedobservationswhichoccasionallyaddsomethingtohiswrittenformulations.
Inplaceof7.3.1,hesaid:
7.3.10IamforthePlatonicview.Ifthereisnothingprecisetobeginwith,itisunintelligibletosaythatwesomehowarriveatapreciseconcept.Ratherwebeginwithvague
perceptionsofaconcept,asweseeananimalfromfarawayortaketwostarsforonebeforeusingthetelescope.Forexample,wehadthepreciseconceptofmechanicalprocedure
inmind,buthadnotperceiveditclearlybeforeweknewofTuring'swork.
7.3.11Theegomaylosereasonjustasitmaylosesenseperception.Senseperceptionisalsonotimmediate.Inmathematicsthereissomethingobjective.[Aftersayingsomething
like7.3.2,Gdeladded:]ThePlatonicviewhelpsinunderstandingthingsthisfactillustratesthepossibilitiesofverifyingaphilosophicaltheory.

Inconnectionwithhislanguageofperceivingconcepts,hesaid,
7.3.12Setsareobjectsbutconceptsarenotobjects.Weperceiveobjectsandunderstandconcepts.Understandingisadifferentkindofperception:itisastepinthedirectionof
reductiontothelastcause.

Gdelmadeseveralremarksrelatedto7.3.5:
7.3.13Theperceptionofconceptsmayeitherbedonebysomeinternalorganorjustbyaninnerperceptionourownexperienceusingnospecialorgan.Iconjecturethatsome
physicalorganisnecessaryforthis.
7.3.14Ibelievethereisacausalconnectionintheperceptionofconcepts.ButatpresentthetheoryislikethetheoryofatomsatthetimeofDemocritus.AlreadynosinAristotle
isacausalaffair:theactiveintellectworksonthepassiveintellect.[Compare6.1.22.]Theactiveintellectis,Ibelieve,locatedinsomephysicalorgan.Itmightevenhaveimages.I
amcautiousandonlymakepublicthelesscontroversialpartsofmyphilosophy.
7.3.15Somephysicalorganisnecessarytomakethehandlingofabstractimpressionspossible.Nobodyisabletodealeffectivelywiththem,exceptincomparisonwithoronthe
occasionofsenseimpressions.Thissensoryorganmustbecloselyrelatedtothecenterforlanguage.

InthemanuscriptofmybookIstated:"Historically,manyinterestingquestionswereanswered,oratleastclarified,onlyafterthecrucialconceptssuchascontinuity,
area,constructionbyrulerandcompass,theorem,set,etc.hadbeenformalized.Forexample,therearecontinuous

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functionswhichhavenoderivative."(MP:82).Ascommentsonthisstatement,Gdelmadeseveralobservationssimilarto7.3.7and7.3.8:
7.3.16Thereisnodoubtatallthatds/dtistheonlywaytomakecleartheconceptofvelocity.Thisuniquedeterminationissurprising.Itisanotherverificationofrationalism.On
theconceptofarea,Lebesgue'sanalysisisundoubtedlycorrectinthecaseswhereboththeanalysisandtheconceptareapplicable:onlytheysatisfytheaxiomswewantfor
instance,apropersubsetmusthaveasmallerarea,congruentsurfaceshavethesamearea.
7.3.17Incontrast,continuitycannotbemadepreciseinauniqueway,becauseitinvolvestwodifferentconceptsnotdistinguishedintheordinaryperceptionastwostarsare
seenasonewithoutthetelescope.Whatisinvolvedhereisanambiguity,notanunavoidablevagueness.Inourpriorintuitionwearenotcommittedtotheoneortheother:
namely,continuousmovementorsmoothcurve.Acontinuousmovementremainscontinuousbutisnolongersmoothifitincludesinfinitevibrationsinitssmallestparts.A
smoothcurvemustbedifferentiableandcannolongerfillthespace.

Theobservationin7.3.9wasprobablyaresponsetothefollowingstatementsofmine:"Rigidityoftheformalizedconceptleadstodecisionsincaseswheremereuse
oftheintuitivenotionwasinsufficient.Forinstance,theexistenceofaspacefillingcurvecanonlybeestablishedaftertheexactdefinitionofcurveis
introduced"(MP:8182).
OthercommentsofGdel's,relatedto7.3.9are:
7.3.18Theexistenceofadecompositionofaspacemeans:onecansplitthescaffoldconsistingofthelimitsintoseveralpartsandthenshiftthesepartstogethersothattheywill
fillasmallerorbiggerspace.
7.3.19Inspaceintuition,apointisnotapartofthecontinuumbutalimitbetweentwoparts.Ifwethinkofspaceasfinematter,thenapointhasweightzeroandisnotapartof
matter.Accordingtothisconcept,allthepointsdonotadduptothelinebutonlymakeupascaffold(Gersst)oracollectionofpointsofview.Thenitisnotsurprisingthatone
canshiftthemaround.Whenweturntothemathematicalorsettheoreticalconceptofpoints,orratherwhenwelookatpartsofthecontinuumandassignalengthtoeachpart,
webeginwithintervalsandarriveatmeasurablesets.WecometoviewthecontinuumasasystemofpartsoraBooleanalgebrawithoutindivisibleelements.Insteadofthinking
ofthecontinuumasconsistingofpoints,wethinkofitasaunionofcertainmeasurablesetssuchthattwosetsdifferingbyazerosetaretakentobeequivalent.Itisthennot
surprisingthatwecansplitthescaffoldintoappropriatepartsandshiftthemtogetherinasuitablewaytofillasmallerorlargerspace.Intheprocesswenolongeradheretothe
intuitiveconceptofpointsaslimitsbutratherworkwithsumsoflimitsaspartsofthecontinuum.

AnotherfavoriteexampleofourabilitytoperceiveconceptsforGdelisTuring'sanalysisoftheconceptofmechanicalprocedure,whichIdiscuss

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inChapter6.Insteadoftheperceptionofconcepts,Gdelalsospeaksoftheanalysisofconcepts,whichheseesasthecentraltaskofphilosophy.Inthisconnection,
hedistinguishessciencefromphilosophyandenvisagesaneventualconvergenceofthetwo:
7.3.20Theanalysisofconceptsiscentraltophilosophy.Scienceonlycombinesconceptsanddoesnotanalyzeconcepts.Itcontributestotheanalysisofconceptsbybeing
stimulatingforrealanalysis.Einstein'stheoryisitselfnotananalysisofconcepts(anddoesnotpenetrateintothelastanalysis)itsmetaphysics(withitsfourdimensionalframe)
dealswithobservationswhicharethegivenforscience.Physicaltheorieschangequicklyorslowlytheyarestimulatingtoinvestigatebutarenotthecorrectmetaphysics.Exact
reasoning,positiveintegers,andrealnumbersalloccurinmetaphysics.(Itisnotsosurethattopologyalsodoes.)Forexample,naturalobjectsdiffermoreorless,andmetricspace
isconcernedwithhowmuchtheydiffer.Abstractstructuresarenaturallychosen.Analysisistoarriveatwhatthinkingisbasedon:theinbornintuitions.
7.3.21Theepistemologicalproblemistosettheprimitiveconceptsofourthinkingright.Forexample,eveniftheconceptofsetbecomesclear,evenaftersatisfactoryaxiomsof
infinityarefound,therewouldremainmoretechnical(i.e.,mathematical)questionsofdecidingthecontinuumhypothesisfromtheaxioms.Thisisbecauseepistemologyand
science(inparticular,mathematics)arefarapartatpresent.Itneednotnecessarilyremainso.TruescienceintheLeibniziansensewouldovercomethisapartness.Inotherwords,
theremaybeanotherwayofanalyzingconcepts(e.g.,likeHegel's)sothattrueanalysiswillleadtothesolutionoftheproblem.
7.3.22Atpresentwepossessonlysubjectiveanalysesofconcepts.Thefactthatsuchanalysesdonotyielddecisionsofscientificproblemsisaproofagainstthesubjectivist
viewofconceptsandmathematics.
7.3.23See9.4.15.

7.4FactsorArgumentsforObjectivisminMathematics
ItseemstomethatGdelbasedhisbeliefinobjectivisminmathematicsonaprocedureofviewingtogetherrelevantfactsonseveraldifferentlevels.Onthemost
fundamentallevel,aselaboratedin7.2,theremustbesomethingobjectiveinmathematics:theremustbesomedatumofthesecondkindwhichrepresentsanaspect
ofobjectivereality.Itspresenceinusisduetoanotherkindofrelationshipbetweenourselvesandreality,whichisdifferentfromthecorrespondingrelationship
underlyingthepresenceofthedataofthefirstkind.
Thedialecticofintuitionandidealization,consideredin7.1,indicatesthenaturalprocessbywhichtherealmoftheobjectiveinmathematicsisextendedstepbystep.
Atthesametime,withineachrealmofobjectivitywealsonoticecertainfactswhichsupportourbeliefinitsobjectivity.The

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examplesofourabilitytoperceiveconceptsdiscussedin7.3arefactsthatsupportourbeliefthatmathematicalconceptshaveanobjectivebasis.
Amongtherelevantfactswhichmaybeseenasdirectevidencefortheobjectivityofnumbersandsets,wemaymentionthefollowing.InconnectionwithGdel's''real
argument"forobjectivisminmathematics,hemakestwoobservationsrelatedtothosein7.1:
7.4.1Forexample,webelievethatFermat'sconjecturemakessense:itmustbeeithertrueorfalse.Hence,theremustbeobjectivefactsaboutnaturalnumbers.Buttheseobjective
factsmustrefertoobjectswhicharedifferentfromphysicalobjects,becausetheyare,amongotherthings,unchangeableintime.
7.4.2Numbertheorythefactthatitdoesn'tleadtocontradictionsissimplythere,thoughwecandecideonlysomeoftheproblemsinit.[Compare7.1.3.]

IconsideratlengthGdel'sviewsontheconceptsofpuresetandpureconceptinthenextchapter.Someofhisgeneralargumentsmay,however,bestatedhere.For
example,heelaborateshiscomparisonofparadoxeswithsensedeceptionsoriginallymentionedinpassinginhisCantorpaper(CW2:268).
7.4.3Thesettheoreticalparadoxesarehardlyanymoretroublesomefortheobjectivisticviewofconceptsthandeceptionsofthesensesarefortheobjectivisticviewofthe
physicalworld.Theiterativeconceptofset,whichisnothingbuttheclarificationofthenaiveorsimplythecorrectconceptofset,resolvestheseextensionalparadoxes
exactlyasphysicsresolvestheopticalparadoxesbythelawsofoptics.
7.4.4Theargumentthatconceptsareunrealbecauseoftheunresolvedlogical(intensional)paradoxesisliketheargumentthattheouterworlddoesnotexistbecausethereare
sensedeceptions.
7.4.5Withregardtotheunresolvedintensionalparadoxesabouttheconceptofconcept,thecomparisonwithdeceptionsofthesensesisanadequateargumentagainsttheweak
argumentforthestrongconclusionthat,sincetherearetheseparadoxes,conceptscannotexistsothatitisimpossibletoarriveataserioustheoryofconceptsbecauseexisting
thingscannothaveselfcontradictoryproperties.Theparadoxescanonlyshowtheinadequacyofourperceptionthatis,understandingoftheconcepts(suchastheconcept
ofconcept)ratherthanthrowdoubtonthesubjectmatter.Onthecontrary,theyrevealsomethingwhichisnotarbitraryandcan,therefore,alsosuggestthatweareindeeddealing
withsomethingreal.Subjectivemeansthatwecanformconceptsarbitrarilybycorrectprinciplesofformationsofthought.Sincetheprinciplesleadingtotheparadoxesseemtobe
quitecorrectinthissense,theparadoxesprovethatsubjectivismismistaken.

Inotherwords,realityoffersresistanceandconstraintstooursubjectiveinclinations.Theunresolvedparadoxesdonotprovetheimpossibility

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ofaserioustheoryofconcepts.Atthesametime,unlessweassumeGdel'srationalisticoptimism,itisalsonotexcludedthatunresolvedparadoxesmayturnoutto
beunresolvable.Itseemsdesirabletodistinguishthosebeliefswhichdependonsuchconvictionsfromotherswhichdonot.
Thefundamentalfactisthatwedounderstandmathematicalconceptsor,rather,thatweseethatcertainpropositionsaboutthemaretrue.Thisfactmusthavesome
objectivebasis,andsotheremustbesomemathematicaldataofthesecondkind,asdefinedin7.2.Wearenotabletospecifythesedataexactly,butwedoknow
that,forinstance,simplecomputationsaboutintegersareascertainasalmostanythingweknow.Fromthisstartingpoint,wearenaturallyled,asindicatedin7.1,to
arbitrarynaturalnumbersandsets.Moreover,Ihavejuststatedcertainfactswhichdirectlysupportourbeliefintheobjectivityofnumbers,puresets,andpure
concepts.
Inaddition,Gdelproposesanotherkindofargument,whichappealsimmediatelytobeliefsthatopponentsofobjectivismalsoshare.Positivismoranyformofanti
objectivismrestrictsthedatatosenseexperienceandwhatpeoplegenerallyagreeon,suchaswhatconstitutessuccess.Gdellabelsasadhominemthetypeof
argumentthatgoesdirectlybacktosuchfacts.Inparticular,heseeshisanalogybetweenmathematicsandphysicsquotedabovein7.2.18asanadhominem
argument.
Gdel'stwolettersconsideredbelowarewhathecallsanargumentfromsuccess.Hesawthisasanadhominemargumenttooandproposedon4January1976
toaddthefollowingpassagetotheletters:
7.4.6Itisanassumptionevenmadebythepositiviststhatifahypothesisleadstoverifiableconsequenceswhichcouldbereachedinanotherwayortotheoremsprovable
withoutthishypothesis,suchastateofaffairsmakesthetruthofthehypothesislikely.However,mathematiciansliketotaketheoppositeposition:itiscorrecttotakeobjectivism
tobefruitful,butitneednotbetrue.Thispositionisoppositetothenatureoftruthorevenscienceandthepositivists.

Regardingthislastposition,Gdelhadsaidearlier,inJanuary1972:
7.4.7Evenrecognizingthefruitfulnessofmyobjectivismformywork,peoplemightchoosenottoadopttheobjectivisticpositionbutmerelytodotheirworkasiftheposition
weretrueprovidedtheyareabletoproducesuchanattitude.Butthentheyonlytakethisasifpointofviewtowardthispositionafterithasbeenshowntobefruitful.
Moreover,itisdoubtfulwhetheronecanpretendsowellastoyieldthedesiredeffectofgettinggoodscientificresults.

InoneoftheseveralfragmentsIpreparedin1975forthepurposeofdiscussingthemwithGdel,Iwrote,"LookingmorecloselyattheplaceofGdel'sobjectivism
inhismathematicalpractice,weseethenthatitis,amongotherthings,ausefulheuristicpictureinfact,hismathematical

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workhasinfluencedsomepeopletoentertainthesamesortofpicture."Gdelcommented:
7.4.8AbrahamRobinsonisarepresentativeofanasifposition,accordingtowhichitisfruitfultobehaveasifthereweremathematicalobjectsandinthiswayyouachieve
successbyafalsepicture.Thisrequiresaspecialartofpretendingwell.Butsuchpretendingcanneverreachthesamedegreeeofimaginationasonewhobelievesobjectivismto
betrue.Thesuccessintheapplicationofabeliefintheexistenceofsomethingistheusualandmosteffectivewayofprovingexistence.

Theargumentfromsuccessinfavorofobjectivisminmathematicsdiffersfromtheargumentfromourmathematicalintuitioninthatitgoesthroughconspicuous
consequencesofathesiswhichareuniversallyacceptableinsteadoftryingtoprovethethesisbyadirectappealtooursharedintuition.Ontheonehand,itiseasierto
agreethattheresultsareimpressivethantoagreethatwedosee,bytheotherargument,thetruthofthethesisofobjectivism.Ontheotherhand,itisnotsoeasyto
determinewhethersomeweakerthesiscannotproducethesameeffect.
Gdel'scentralargumentfromsuccessinhislettertomeof7December1967issupplementedbytheletterof7March1968.Itwasstimulatedbyadraftofmy
Skolempaper,inwhichIsuggestedthat,sinceSkolemhadgiventhemathematicalcoreofGdel'sproofofthecompletenessofpredicatelogicin1922,Gdel's
proofdidnotaddmuchtoSkolem'swork.
Inhiscarefullypreparedreplytomyrequesttocommentonthedraft,Gdelpointedoutthatintheintellectualclimateofthe1920s,theapparentlyeasyinferencefrom
Skolem'sworktohisowntheoremofcompletenesswasconceptuallyorphilosophicallyaverydifficultstep.Healsoofferedanexplanationforthissurprising
blindnessorprejudice.
Atthattime,thedominanttrendinmathematicallogic,representedbyHilbert,Skolem,andHerbrand,wastoregardasreliableonlyfinitaryreasoning.Therefore
metamathematics,whichhadbeenintroducedbyHilbertforthedeclaredpurposeofprovidingthefoundationsformathematics,hadtorestrictitselftousingonly
finitaryreasoning.However,theeasyinferencefromSkolem'sworktothecompletenesstheoremisdefinitelynonfinitary.Thatwaswhynooneforsomanyyears,
beforeGdel'sworkin1929,hadbeenabletonoticetheeasyinference.
AsGdelhimselfputit(MP:89):
7.4.9Thisblindness(orprejudice,orwhateveryoumaycallit)oflogiciansisindeedsurprising.ButIthinktheexplanationisnothardtofind.Itliesinawidespreadlack,atthat
time,oftherequiredepistemologicalattitudetowardmetamathematicsandtowardnonfinitaryreasoning(MP:89).
7.4.10Nonfinitaryreasoninginmathematicswaswidelyconsideredtobemeaningfulonlytotheextenttowhichitcanbe"interpreted"or"justified"intermsof

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afinitarymetamathematics.(Notethatthis,forthemostpart,hasturnedouttobeimpossibleinconsequenceofmyresultsandsubsequentwork.)Thisview,almostunavoidably,
leadstoanexclusionofnonfinitaryreasoningfrommetamathematics.Forsuchreasoning,inordertobepermissible,wouldrequireafinitarymetamathematics.Butthisseemsto
beaconfusingandunnecessaryduplication.
7.4.11Moreover,admitting"meaningless"transfiniteelementsintometamathematicsisinconsistentwiththeveryideaofthisscienceprevalentatthattime.Foraccordingtothis
ideametamathematicsisthemeaningfulpartofmathematics,throughwhichthemathematicalsymbols(meaninglessinthemselves)acquiresomesubstituteofmeaning,namely
rulesofuse.Ofcourse,theessenceofthisviewpointisarejectionofallkindsofabstractorinfiniteobjects,ofwhichtheprimafaciemeaningsofmathematicalsymbolsare
instances.Thatis,meaningisattributedsolelytopropositionswhichspeakofconcreteandfiniteobjects,suchascombinationsofsymbols.
7.4.12ButnowtheaforementionedeasyinferencefromSkolem1922isdefinitelynonfinitary,andsoisanyothercompletenessproofforthepredicatecalculus.Thereforethese
thingsescapednoticeorweredisregarded.

Apparentlyinconsideringhowtoclarifytheimportanceofhiseasyinferencefromexistingwork,Gdelwasledtoreflectonthegeneralrelationbetweenhis
philosophicaloutlookandhismajorworkinlogic.Orperhapshewanted,ashesaidlaterinaletterin1971,tomaketheseideasofhisgenerallyknown.Inanycase,
hewentbeyondcommentingonmydrafttoexpoundonthissignificantbroadissue:
7.4.13Imayaddthatmyobjectivisticconceptionofmathematicsandmetamathematicsingeneral,andoftransfinitereasoninginparticular,wasfundamentalalsotomyotherwork
inlogic.

Amonghisotherworkinlogic,Gdelconcentratedontwoitems:hisproofoftheconsistencyofthecontinuumhypothesisbyhistransfinitemodelofconstructiblesets,
andhisincompletenesstheorems.Heobservedthat,inbothcases,heusedtransfiniteconceptswhichyieldedeitherafinitaryrelativeconsistencyprooforfinitarily
provableresultssuchastheexistenceofundecidablepropositions.IconsiderhisresultsinsettheoryinChapter8andconfinemyattentionheretotheincompleteness
work.
Inthefirstplace,Gdelremarkedthathisdeviceof"Gdelnumbering,"isunnaturalfromtheperspectiveoftheformalisticconceptionofmathematics.
7.4.14Howindeedcouldonethinkofexpressingmetamathematicsinthemathematicalsystemsthemselvesifthelatterareconsideredtoconsistofmeaninglesssymbolswhich
acquiresomesubstituteofmeaningonlythroughmetamathematics?

Inhissecondletter,Gdeladdedanotherobservation(MP:10):

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7.4.15Iwouldliketoaddthattherewasanotherreasonwhichhamperedlogiciansintheapplicationtometamathematics,notonlyoftransfinitereasoning,butofmathematical
reasoningingeneraland,mostofall,inexpressingmetamathematicsinmathematicsitself.Itconsistsinthefactthat,largely,metamathematicswasnotconsideredasascience
describingobjectivemathematicalstatesofaffairs,butratherasatheoryofthehumanactivityofhandlingsymbols.

Histwootherobservationsonthedependenceofhisdiscoveryoftheincompletenesstheoremonhisobjectivismfollowseveralsimilarremarksonhisconsistency
resultsinsettheory(MP:9,10):
7.4.16Finallyitshouldbenotedthattheheuristicprincipleofmyconstructionofundecidablenumbertheoreticalpropositionsintheformalsystemsofmathematicsisthehighly
transfiniteconceptof"objectivemathematicaltruth,"asopposedtothatof"demonstrability,"withwhichitwasgenerallyconfusedbeforemyownandTarski'swork.Again,the
useofthistransfiniteconcepteventuallyleadstofinitarilyprovableresults,forexample,thegeneraltheoremsabouttheexistenceofundecidablepropositionsinconsistentformal
systems.
7.4.17Asimilarremarkappliestotheconceptofmathematicaltruth,whereformalistsconsideredformaldemonstrabilitytobeananalysisoftheconceptofmathematicaltruthand,
therefore,wereofcoursenotinapositiontodistinguishthetwo.

7.5ConceptionsofObjectivismandtheAxiomaticMethod
ThereappeartobesomeambiguitiesinGdel'scharacterizationsofhisconceptionsofobjectivismandtheaxiomaticmethod.Imyselfaminfavorofconstruingthem
inaliberalmannerthatwouldallowustoimproveourknowledgebytakingadvantageofourintuitionsonalllevelsofgeneralityandcertainty.WhatImeanbythis
vaguestatementshouldbecomeclearattheendofthissection.
Tobegin,letusconsiderwhatGdelsaysinthelasttwoparagraphsofhisexpandedCantorpaper.Thereheappearstodistinguishthreedifferentcriteriaoftruth.
First,hecontraststruthbycorrespondencewithtruthbyourexpectationthatwecanseemoreandmoreaxioms(CW2:268):
7.5.1However,thequestionoftheobjectiveexistenceoftheobjectsofmathematicalintuition(which,incidentally,isanexactreplicaofthequestionoftheobjectiveexistenceof
theouterworld)isnotdecisivefortheproblemunderconsideration.
7.5.2Themerepsychologicalfactoftheexistenceofanintuitionwhichissufficientlycleartoproducetheaxiomsofsettheoryandanopenseriesofextensionsofthemsufficesto
givemeaningtothequestionofthetruthorfalsityofpropositionslikeCantor'scontinuumhypothesis.

Inaddition,hesays:

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7.5.3Besidesmathematicalintuition,thereexistsanother(thoughonlyprobable)criterionofthetruthofmathematicalaxioms,namelytheirfruitfulness[anotionexplainedbyhim
onp.261]inmathematicsand,onemayadd,possiblyalsoinphysics(CW2:269).

InNovemberof1975,Icharacterizedhisstatement75.2asassertingthepossibilityofrecognizingmeaningfulnesswithoutrealismGdelthenchangeditto:"He
himselfsuggestsanalternativetorealismasgroundforbelievingthatundecidedpropositionsinsettheoryareeithertrueorfalse."
Inconnectionwith7.5.1,itisclearthat,iftheobjectsofmathematicalintuitiondoexist,everypropositionaboutthemiseithertrueorfalse.However,asGdelhimself
emphasizedinhisconversations,objectivityisbetterdefinedforusthanobjects:"Outofobjectivitywedefineobjectsindifferentways"(compareChapter9).Inset
theory,oralsoinnumbertheory,wehavemanyundecidedpropositions.Theessenceofobjectivisminadomainisthebeliefthateverypropositioninitiseithertrueor
false.Onedifferencebetweensettheoryandnumbertheoryisthat,eventhoughwedonotknowalltheaxiomsineithercase,weknow,inthecaseofnumbertheory,
ageneralformofalltheaxiomsyettobefoundnamelyasnewcasesoftheprincipleofmathematicalinduction.
ItseemstomethatwhenGdelcalls7.5.2analternativetorealism,heisrestrictingrealismtothesenseofassertingtheobjectiveexistenceoftheobjectsof
mathematicalintuition.Inthecentralsenseasjustsuggestedofrealismorobjectivism,7.5.2illustratesthetypicalgroundforourbeliefinobjectivism.Asa
"criterionoftruthinsettheory"orelsewhere,thekindofpsychologicalfactdescribedin7.5.2istheprimaryonorindeedtheonlyoneavailabletous.Itisonthe
basisofsuchfactsthatwebelieveintheobjectiveexistenceoftheobjects.Inthissense,correspondencetorealityasthecriterionoftruthisderivedfromthis
criterion.
Whetherornotonebelievesinobjectivisminadomainisapsychologicalfactbasedonone'sexperience.Wemayconsiderfivepossiblecomponentsofthisbelief:(a)
theobjectsofthedomainhaveobjectiveexistence(b)allthepropositionsaboutitareeithertrueorfalse(c)weknowthateverysuchpropositioncanbedecided
(d)weexpecttobeabletodecideeventuallyevery(significant)propositionaboutitand(e)belief(c)willneverberefuted.
Belief(c)implies(b),(d)and(e).Neither(c)nor(b)necessarilyimplies(a).Forinstance,withregardtoadomainintroducedbyabbreviationalconventions,we
believe(b)and(c)butnot(a).Inthecaseofnumbertheoryandsettheory,whichareourmainconcernhere,weknowthatthereareundecidedpropositions,but
therecanbedisagreementsoverthefivebeliefs.

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Thebeliefinobjectivismcanbeandhasbeenconstruedindifferentways.Onepossibilityistorequirenotonly(b)butalso(a):Iaminfavorofequating(a)and(b).In
anycase,withregardtodomainswithundecidedpropositions,wedonotknoweither(a)or(b)inastrongsenseofknowing,buthavetoappealto(c)or(d)or(e).
Belief(c)implies(d)and(e).Iwouldliketoconstrueobjectivisminthebroadsenseofidentifying(e)withbeliefinobjectivism,sothat,ifoneaccepts(e),oneis
alreadyacceptingnotonly(b)butalso(a)intheweaksenseofitsnotbeingrefutableinfact.Itseemstomehardtorefute(b)or(a)inaconclusivemannerwithout
beingabletorefute(e)first.
Inmyopinion,thewidelyacceptedbeliefinthepriorityofobjectivityoverobjectsimpliesthebeliefthattheissueofobjectivisminmathematicsis,inthefirstplace,
belief(b)belief(a)isofimportanceprimarilybecauseofitsintimaterelationwith(b).Gdel'sstatement7.5.2is,Ithink,anexampleoftryingtoinfer(d)fromour
experienceofbeingabletofindandtoanticipatemoreofstableaxiomsofsettheory.
Statement7.5.3isanexampleofGdel'stendencytofocushisattentionontheaxioms,sinceheseemstoimplyin7.5.3thatmathematicalintuitionisconcernedonly
withtheaxiomsandiscontrastedwithsuccessorfruitfulness(CW2:261):"Successheremeansfruitfulinconsequences,inparticularin'verifiable'consequences,i.e.
consequencesdemonstrablewithoutthenewaxiom."Thetruthoftheseconsequences,however,hadalsobeenseenbymathematicalintuition,andweseecertain
mathematicalpropositions,suchasnumericalcomputations,tobetruedirectly,withoutgoingthroughtheaxioms.Indeed,weapplyourintuitionatalllevelsof
generality.
Inotherwords,eventhoughpositiviststendtodoubtthatwehavedirectaccesstopropositionsotherthanthe"verifiable"ones,Iseenoreasonwhyanobjectivisthas
todenythatwedoappealto,andhaveintuitionof,suchverifiablepropositions.
Inhisdiscussionswithme,Gdelstressedthecentralimportanceoftheaxiomaticmethodforphilosophy.Hedidnotelaboratehisconceptionofthemethod,except
thatheoftengavetheimpressionthatthetaskistofindtheprimitiveconceptsandthentrytoseethetrueaxiomsforthemdirectlybyourintuition.Inpractice,of
course,herecognizesthatconsiderationsonmanylevelsareinvolvedwhenwetrytofindtheaxiomsortheprinciplesofanarea.Nonetheless,heseemstohave,or
assume,anotionofintrinsicnecessityastheattainableideal.
Inconnectionwiththefruitfulnessofaxioms,Gdelsuggests,withoutgivingexamples,thefollowingpossibility:
7.5.4Theremightexistaxiomssoabundantintheirverifiableconsequences,sheddingsomuchlightonawholefield,andyieldingsuchpowerfulmethodsfor

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solvingproblems(andevensolvingthemconstructively,sofarasthatispossible)that,nomatterwhethertheyareintrinsicallynecessarytheywouldhavetobeacceptedatleast
inthesamesenseasanywellestablishedphysicaltheory(CW2:261).

Itisimplicitlyassumedherethatsuchaxiomsdonotcontradictanyofourfirmerbeliefs.ThestrikingexamplesofGdel'sownaxiomofconstructibilityandthe
currentlymuchstudiedaxiomofdeterminacyhaveconspicuouslyallthequalitiesspecifiedin7.5.4.However,wedonotacceptthemasamongthe(ultimate)axioms
ofsettheory,becausetheaxiomofdeterminacycontradictstheaxiomofchoiceandtheaxiomofconstructibilityiscontradictedbycertainplausibleaxiomsoflarge
cardinals,which,however,wedonotclearlyseetobeintrinsicallynecessaryeither.Itseems,therefore,thatintrinsicnecessityisanidealwhich,inpractice,wemayor
maynotattaininchoosingaxioms.
EventhoughGdelstrovetofindaxiomswithintrinsicnecessitydirectlybyintuition,hewaswillingtoendorsealternativeapproaches.Onestrikingexamplewashis
endorsementofRussell'sanalogybetweenlogicandzoology,whichwasfollowedbyanapprovingdescriptionofRussell's1906proposal.
7.5.5TheanalogybetweenmathematicsandanaturalscienceisenlargedbyRussellalsoinanotherrespect(inoneofhisearlierwritings).Hecomparestheaxiomsoflogicand
mathematicswiththelawsofnatureandlogicalevidencewithsenseperception,sothattheaxiomsneednotbeevidentinthemselves,butrathertheirjustificationlies(exactlyas
inphysics)inthefactthattheymakeitpossibleforthese"senseperceptions"tobededucedwhichofcoursewouldnotprecludethattheyalsohaveakindofintrinsic
plausibilitysimilartothatinphysics(CW2:121).

Thereferenceis,Ibelieve,tothefollowingparagraphinapaperbyRussellfirstpublishedin1906inFrench(seeWang1987a:314):
7.5.6Themethodoflogisticisfundamentallythesameasthatofeveryotherscience.Thereisthesamefallibility,thesameuncertainty,thesamemixtureofinductionand
deduction,andthesamenecessityofappealing,inconfirmationofprinciples,tothediffusedagreementofcalculatedresultswithobservation.Theobjectisnottobanish
"intuition,"buttotestandsystematiseitsemploymenttoeliminatetheerrorstowhichitsungovernedusegivesrise,andtodiscovergenerallawsfromwhich,bydeduction,we
canobtaintrueresultsnevercontradicted,andincrucialinstancesconfirmed,byintuition.Inallthis,logisticisexactlyonalevelwith(say)astronomy,exceptthat,inastronomy,
verificationiseffectednotbyintuitionbutbythesenses.The"primitivepropositions,"withwhichthedeductionsoflogisticbegin,should,ifpossible,beevidenttointuitionbut
thatisnotindispensable,norisit,inanycase,thewholereasonfortheiracceptance.Thisreasonisinductive,namelythat,amongtheirknownconsequences(including
themselves),manyappeartointuitiontobetrue,noneappeartointuitiontobe

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false,andthosethatappeartointuitiontobetruearenot,sofarascanbeseen,deduciblefromanysystemofindemonstrablepropositionsinconsistentwiththesystemin
question(quotedinWang1987a:314).

Inthisparagraph,the"methodoflogistic"isundoubtedlywhatiscommonlycalledthe"axiomaticmethod"today.Iaminfavorofadoptingthisliberalconceptionofthe
axiomaticmethodanddonotthinkthatGdelwouldrejectit.Hisapparentlyexclusiveconcernwithfindingaxiomsdirectlybyintuitionmaybejustaconsequenceof
hisbeliefthatsuchauseoftheaxiomaticmethodisthemostfruitfulchoice.Ifthisconjectureistrue,thendisagreementwithhispositioninthisconnectionwouldbe
overone'sestimationofthecomparativefruitfulnessofalternativeapproaches.
Inanycase,IaminfavorofconstruingtheaxiomaticmethodalongtheliberallineofRussell'sargumentin7.5.6.Indeed,itisnotcleartomewhytheaxiomatic
methodshouldoccupyascentralplaceinphilosophyasGdelseemstoassigntoit.Forinstance,Rawls'smethodof"reflectiveequilibrium,"whichisrelatedtobut
possiblybroaderthanthemethoddescribedin7.5.6,seemstobeappropriatetophilosophy.IconsiderRawls'smethodatlengthinsection10.3below.

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Chapter8
SetTheoryandLogicasConceptTheory
Logicisthetheoryoftheformal.Itconsistsofsettheoryandthetheoryofconcepts.Setisaformalconcept.Ifwereplacetheconceptofsetbytheconceptofconcept,wegetlogic.
Theconceptofconceptiscertainlyformaland,therefore,alogicalconcept.Aplausibleconjectureis:Everysetistheextensionofsomeconcept.Thesubjectmatteroflogicis
intensions(concepts)thatofmathematicsisextensions(sets).
Gdel,ca.1976
Forsomeonewhoconsidersmathematicalobjectstoexistindependentlyofourconstructionsandofourhavinganintuitionofthemindividually,andwhorequiresonlythatthe
generalmathematicalconceptsmustbesufficientlyclearforustobeabletorecognizetheirsoundnessandthetruthoftheaxiomsconcerningthem,thereexists,Ibelieve,a
satisfactoryfoundationofCantor'ssettheoryinitswholeoriginalextentandmeaning.
Gdel,TheCantorPaper,1964

ItisclearthatGdelsawconcepttheoryasthecentralpartoflogicandsettheoryasapartoflogic.Itisunclearwhetherhesawsettheoryasbelongingtologiconly
becauseitis,ashebelieved,partofconcepttheory,whichisyettobedeveloped.Forpresentpurposes,Itakeasagivenhiscategoricalstatementthatlogicconsists
ofsettheoryandconcepttheory.IhaveattemptedtoclarifythisconceptionoflogicinRecollectionsofKurtGdel(Wang1987a,hereafterRG:309310)this
chapterismainlyareportofGdel'sownfragmentaryobservationsonthisissue.
Inmyopinion,Gdel'sconceptionoflogicisanaturaldevelopmentofwhatFregewantedlogictobe.Idevelopedthisideaearlier(1990a,1994)inthecontextofa
frameworkforclassifyingalternativeconceptionsoflogic.Idonot,however,saymuchaboutthistopicinthepresentwork.
BetweenOctoberof1971andMayof1972,GdelandIdiscussedadraftofmychapterontheconceptofsetforFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(hereafter
MP:181223).Thesediscussionswere,hesaid,intendedto

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''enrich"thischapter.Onpointsonwhichweagreed,Imadenospecificattributionstohim,evenwherehissuggestionshadledtoreformulations.
Inconformitywithhiswishes,Iacknowledgedhiscontributionsinthefollowingcontexts:(1)hisjustificationoftheaxiomofreplacement(MP:186),incontrasttomy
own(2)hisfiveprinciplesbywhichaxiomsofsettheoryaresetup(189190)(3)hisdistinctionbetweenlogicandmathematicsintheirrelationtotheparadoxes
(187188)(4)oneofhisexplicationsofthephrase"givemeaningtothequestionofthetruthorfalsityofpropositionslikethecontinuumhypothesis"(199)and(5)a
comparisonoftheaxiomofmeasurablecardinalswithcertainphysicalhypotheses(25,208,223n.23).Ishallconsiderherethedetailsofthesecontributions.
WorkbyCharlesParsons(1983:268297)andMichaelHallett(1984)isofspecialrelevancetothediscussionsoftheiterativeconceptofsetinFromMathematics
toPhilosophyandshouldbecomparedwithGdel'sconceptasreportedhere.
From18October1975until4January1976,wehadextensivediscussionsonsettheoryandlogicasconcepttheory,firstinconnectionwithadraftofmyessay
"LargeSets"(Wang1977)andthenthroughtheinterplaybetweenhisobservationsandfourfragmentsIhadproducedforpurposesofdiscussion.Thismaterialhas
notbeenpublishedtodate,exceptforoneremarkthatIreportedin"LargeSets"(Wang1977:310,325,327).InthischapterIformulateandorganizehisremarksof
thisperiodincombinationwithrelevantobservationshemadebeforethen.
Thetopicswediscussedinclude:thescopeandthefunctionoflogicthenatureofsets,concepts,andclasseslogicasconcepttheorytheconceptofsetandthe
axiomsofsettheoryandCantor'scontinuumproblemandCantor'shypothesis.IshallfollowGdel'sstrategyofusingCantor'scontinuumproblemasafocalpointin
consideringthenatureofsettheory.
8.1Cantor'sContinuumProblemandHisHypothesis
ThemostfamousprobleminsettheoryisCantor'scontinuumproblem,whichaskswhatappearstobeanelementaryquestion:Howmanypointsarethereon(a
segmentof)theline?Howmanyrealnumbersorsetsofnaturalnumbers?Anaturalandobviousreplyisthatthereareinfinitelymanypointsorrealnumbersornumber
sets.Thisansweriscorrect,asfarasitgoes,butitceasedtobecompletelysatisfactoryafterCantorintroducedaprecisedistinction,withintheinfinite,betweenthe
countableandtheuncountable,andthenprovedthatthesetofrealnumbers,unlikethesetofintegerswhichiscountable,isuncountable.Moreover,Cantorwasable
todefinethesizes,orthecardinalitiesofinfinitesetsinsuchawaythattherearemanydistinctuncountablecardinalities.

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In1874Cantorannouncedforthefirsttimehisconjecturethatthecardinalityofthecontinuum,thatis,thesetofrealnumbers,isthesmallestuncountablecardinal
number(Cantor1932:132).Thisconjectureiswhatisknownintheliteratureasthecontinuumhypothesis.Itremainsunsettledtoday:wehaveneitheraproofnora
disproofofit.However,accordingtotheobjectivepictureofsets,itiseithertrueorfalse,howeverdifficultitmaybeforustoknowwhichisthecase.Ifandwhenthe
conjectureissettled,thissuccessthatis,thefactthatitissettledwouldbeacrucialpieceofevidenceinfavoroftheobjectivepictureofsets.
Themostimportantresultonthecontinuumhypothesissofaristhatitcanneitherbeprovednordisprovedonthebasisofthefamiliaraxiomsofsettheorycurrentlyin
use.Gdelseesthisconclusionasasignificantandlivelyincentivetosearchfornewaxioms.Moreover,heviewsthefactofourbeingabletoreachsucharemarkable
proofasstrongevidencefortheobjectivepicture:itis,hebelieves,onlybyaseriousapplicationoftheobjectivepicturethatwehavebeenabletoestablishthe
consistencyandindependenceofthehypothesisrelativetotheknownaxiomsofsettheory.
Itiswellknownthatthereisaoneonecorrelationbetweenrealnumbersandsetsofpositiveintegers.Thecontinuumhypothesissaysthatthereisalsoaoneone
correlationbetweenthesesetsandthecountableordinalnumbers,whichcorrespondtotheordinaltypesofthewellorderedsetsofpositiveintegers.Inorderto
proveordisprovethehypothesis,itisnecessarytofindsufficientlyexplicitcharacterizationsofthecountablesetsandthecountableordinals,sothatonecantryto
determinewhetherthereisaoneonecorrelationbetweenthem.
On4June1925inMnsterHilbertdeliveredanaddress"OntheInfinite,"inwhichheoutlinedanattemptedproofofthecontinuumhypothesisfromthefamiliar
axiomsofsettheory.Aswenowknow,theoutlinecannotleadtoacorrectproof,sincetheconclusiontobereachedisfalse.However,theunderlyingideais
plausibleandsuggestive.In1930GdelbecameacquaintedwithHilbert'soutlineandbegantoreflectonthecontinuumproblem.In1938hereachedaproofofthe
weakerconclusionthatthecontinuumhypothesis(CH)isconsistentwiththefamiliaraxiomsofsettheoryandwroteitup:CHisnot,heconcluded,refutablebythose
axioms.
In1939hepublishedhisproof(Gdel1990,hereafterCW2:2832).ShortlyafterwardBernayssaidinhisreview:"ThewholeGdelreasoningmayalsobe
consideredasawayofmodifyingtheHilbertprojectforaproofoftheCantorcontinuumhypothesis,asdescribedinHilbert1925,soastomakeitpracticableandat
thesametimegeneralizabletohigherpowers"(Bernays1940:118).

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InJanuary1972IaskedGdelaboutthisobservationinwhichBernayscomparedGdel'sproofwithHilbert'soutline.Gdelrepliedimmediately,and,ontwolater
occasions,returnedtothecomparison:
8.1.1ForHilberttheabsoluteconsistencyofCHisnotstrongerthanitsrelativeconsistency,becauseheclaimedtohaveprovedalsotheconsistencyoftheaxiomsofsettheory
[aspartofhisclaimedproofofCH].InouterstructuremyproofismoresimilartoHilbert'soutline:bothuseordinalsandfunctionalsofordinals,andnothingelsebothdefine,in
termsofordinalnumbers,asystemoffunctions(orsets)forwhichCHistrue.Indetails,however,therearetwodifferences.(1)WhileHilbertconsidersonlyrecursivelydefined
functionsorsets,Iadmitalsononconstructivedefinitions(byquantification).(2)WhileItaketheordinalsasgiven,Hilbertattemptstoconstructthem.Thiscaseisaclassical
exampleofusingthesameapproachbutattainingdifferentsuccesses.
8.1.2HilbertbelievedthatCHistrueinconstructivemathematicsandthatnothingtrueinconstructivemathematicscaneverbewronginclassicalmathematicssincethelatter,
duetoitsconsistency,isonlyasupplementandcompletiontotheformer.Moreover,Hilbertwasnotinterestedinconstructivemathematics[initself,beingjustaladdertoget
classicalmathematicsbyprovidingaconsistencyproofforit].Brouwerwascompletelydifferent.AccordingtoHilbert,arealcorrectconsistencyproofofsettheorycontainsCH.
8.1.3Hilbertthinksthatifoneprovestheconsistencyofsettheoryinthenaturalway,thentheconsistencyofCHisacorollaryoftheproofthoughnotofjustthetheorem.This
istrueandrealizedbymyownproof:theconsistencyofthepowersetaxiomrevealstheconsistencyofCH[andofthegeneralizedCHtoo].ItisstrangethatHilbertpresentsthe
ideainsuchawaythatonedoesnotseethispoint[immediately].

InrevisingmysummaryoftheseobservationsforFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(MP:1112),Gdeladdedsomeadditionalremarks:
8.1.4Hilbertwasnotaconstructivistinthesenseoftotallyrejectingnonconstructiveproofs.Hiserrorconsistsinhisviewthatnonconstructivemetamathematicsisofnouse.
Henceheexpectedthathisconstructivemetamathematicswouldleadtothesolutionoftheproblem.
8.1.5Hilbertbelievedthat(1)thecontinuumhypothesisistrue(andprovablebyhisoutline)inconstructivemathematics,(2)nothingtrueinconstructivemathematicscaneverbe
wronginclassicalmathematics,sincetheroleofthelatterissolelytosupplementtheformer(3)soastoobtainacompletesysteminwhicheverypropositionisdecided.Hilbert's
LemmaII(1925:391)wassupposedtoprove(1),andhisLemmaI(385)wassupposedtoprovemathematicallythepartof(2)relevanttoCHthatis,toprovethatanyrefutation
ofCHfromclassicalaxiomscouldbereplacedbyaconstructiverefutation.Theassertion(2)isanotherphilosophicalerror(stemmingfromthesamequasipositivisticattitude).
8.1.6IfthetermconstructiveisasHilberthadinmindidentifiedwithfinitary,Hilbert'sproofschemeisnotfeasible.Otherwiseitmightbe.Butitwouldatany

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ratebeanenormousdetourifoneonlyaimsataconsistencyproofforCH.Ontheotherhand,itwouldsolvethemuchdeeper,butentirelydifferentproblemofaconstructive
consistencyproofofZermelo'saxiomsofsettheory.

Gdelhadalreadystated,inhislettertomeof7March1968,thatitwouldbeimpossibleforaconstructivisttodiscoverhisproof(seeMP:10,quotedabovein
7.1.16).
InChapter7IconsideredtheargumentfromsuccesswhichGdelsetoutintheletterstome,regardinghiscompletenessandincompletenesstheorems.Partsofthose
lettersarealsorelevanttohisworkinsettheory,aswellastohisobservationsonPaulCohen'sforcingmethodforprovingindependentresultsinsettheory.
Inhisletterof7December1967,heexplainedthefundamentalplaceofobjectivisminthediscoveryofhismodelLofconstructiblesetsforsettheory:
8.1.7[H]owcouldonegiveaconsistencyproofforthecontinuumhypothesisbymeansofmytransfinitemodelLifconsistencyproofshavetobefinitary?(Nottomentionthat
fromthefinitarypointofviewaninterpretationofsettheoryintermsofLseemspreposterousfromthebeginning,becauseitisan"interpretation"intermsofsomethingwhich
itselfhasnomeaning.)Thefactthatsuchaninterpretation(aswellasanynonfinitaryconsistencyproof)yieldsafinitaryrelativeconsistencyproofapparentlyescapednotice
(MP:9).

On7March1968hewroteanotherletter,qualifyingandelaboratingontheaboveparagraph:
8.1.8OnrereadingmyletterofDecember7,Ifindthephrasingintheaboveparagraphisperhapsalittletoodrastic.Itmustbeunderstoodcumgranosalis.Ofcourse,the
formalisticpointofviewdidnotmakeimpossibleconsistencyproofsbymeansoftransfinitemodels.Itonlymadethemmuchhardertodiscover,becausetheyaresomehownot
congenialtothisattitudeofmind(ibid.:910).[Followedbythepassagequotedabovein7.1.16.]

Inmyletterof18November1975,attachedtofragmentM,IraisedthefollowingquestioninconnectionwithGdel'sargumentfromsuccess:"Whatcanwesay
aboutCohen'swork[1966]?Woulditberighttosaythatheneededarealisticviewofrealnumbersthecontinuumatleast?"GdelrepliedbydiscussingMand
alsocommentedlateronmyreconstructionofhisreply.Letmetrytoreproducewhathesaidonthesetwooccasions:
8.1.9Cohen'swork,ashedevelopedit,wasbasedonmyconstructiblesets,[anidea]whichisbasedonarealistposition.Thisisonlyonewayofcarryingoutindependence
proofs.Infact,IhadpreviouslydevelopedapartofarelatedmethodnotfromconstructiblesetsbutfromsomeideastimulatedbyreadingsomeworkofBrouwer'sandproved
theindependenceoftheaxiomofchoice.

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InCohen'sproofsonemakesgeneralityorimpossibilitystatementsaboutwhatonedoesnotknow.Nobodycanunderstandthis.Thiswouldbenonsenseifsetswerenot
physicallysotosayrealbutwereonlyasoneconstructsthemoneself.TheeasiestwaytounderstandCohen'sideaistoimaginesetstobephysicalsets.Thisisnottheonly
way.Asaheuristic,ifsetsarereal,youcanmakedefinitestatementsaboutthem,eventhoughyouonlyknowthemtoasmallextentsuchasnoprimenumbersoccurinthem.
Generalitybecomesequivalenttoimpossibility:apropertyistrueofallifthereisnopossibilityofexhibitingnotdemonstrable,reallyfromtherealworldacounterexample.The
followingfactisclearintheseproofs:Ifanarbitraryphysicalsetisenvisaged,empiricalknowledgecannotdefineadefinitelimitbutCohennonethelessteachesushowgeneric
statementscouldbemadeaboutit.Itisimpossibletounderstandwhatisbehindthis.Onedoesn'tseehowCohen'sproofsworkbutonecanseehowmyproofswork,iftheyare
carriedoutinlightofwhatweknowafterCohen'swork.

Onanotheroccasion,GdelsaidaboutCohen'sideaofforcing:
8.1.10Forcingisamethodtomaketruestatementsaboutsomethingofwhichweknownothing.

Giventhefactthatthecontinuumhypothesisisnotdecidableonthebasisofthefamiliaraxiomsofsettheory,itisnaturaltolookforotherplausibleaxiomsthatwould
settletheissue.Gdelhimselftriedforanumberofyears,after1963,tofindsuchaxioms.Itisknownthatin1970hewrotethreemanuscriptsonthisquest:(1)Some
considerationsleadingtotheprobableconclusionthatthetruepowerofthecontinuumisalephtwo(2)AproofofCantor'scontinuumhypothesisfromahigher
plausibleaxiomaboutordersofgrowthand(3)anunsentlettertoTarski.(AllthreepiecesareincludedinGdel'sCollectedWorks,volume3,withanintroductory
notebyRobertM.Solovay.)
In1972OskarMorgensterntoldmethatGdelwasworkingonabigpaperonthecontinuumproblem.InNovemberof1975,inthecontextofrelatingthe
introductionofnewaxiomstothetaskofmakingthemplausible,Gdelmentionedwhatisnowknownashissquareaxiom:ThereisasetS,ofcardinalityalephone,
offunctionsofpositiveintegers,suchthat,foreveryfunctionfofpositiveintegers,thereissomemajorizingfunctionginSthatis,thereissomem,suchthat,foralln
greaterthanm,g(n)isgreaterthanf(n).
Bythistime,Gdelhadbeenconvincedbyseverallogiciansthatthesquareaxiombyitselfsetsnoupperboundonthesizeofthecontinuum.Butheseemstofindthe
axiomplausibleandtothinkthatitmay,inconjunctionwithsomeothertrueorplausiblepropertyofthecontinuum,determinethesizeofthecontinuum.Inanycase,
hetoldmein1976thathebelievedthatthesizeofthecontinuumisnogreaterthanalephtwoandthateventhecontinuumhypothesismaybetrue,althoughthe
generalizedcontinuumhypothesisisdefinitelyfalse.

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EventhoughwestilldonotknowwhetherCantor'scontinuumhypothesisistrueorfalse,ithascertainlystimulatedagooddealofsignificantworkinsettheory,which
canjustifiablybesaidtosupporttheobjectiveviewofsets.Wedonotknow,inastrongsenseofknowing,thatsettheory,evenasrestrictedtoZermelo'ssystemZF,
isconsistent.Nonetheless,thereisasignificantbodyofworkinsettheorybynow,andamongthosewhostudythesubjectthereisunanimousagreementastowhich
proofsarecorrectandwhichproofsaremistaken.Eventhoughwedonothaveapreciseformulationoftheobjectivepictureofsets,itishardtoseehowanyother
picturecouldprovideassatisfactoryanaccountofourcumulativeexperienceasthatacquiredthroughthestudyofsettheoryfromCantortothepractitionersof
today.
ThesearchfornewaxiomsgoingfarbeyondthoseofthesystemZFisanactivecomponentofcurrentworkinsettheory.Thissearchhasaspecialcharmasawayof
broadeningourvistasbypureintellect.Atthesametime,werarelyneedthefullpowerofZFinmathematics.Weneverusealltheranks.Eventheneedforomega
one(thefirstuncountableordinalnumber)ranksinprovingBoreldeterminacyisexceptional.Roughlyspeaking,HarveyFriedman(1971)provedthatnoproofof
Boreldeterminacycanbecarriedoutwithfewerranksthanomegaone,andD.A.Martin(1975)gaveaproofofthetheorem,usingomegaoneranks.
Inconnectionwiththerelationofsettheorytothecommonpracticeofmathematicians,Gdelobserved:
8.1.11Eventhoughtherankhierarchyinsettheoryisrich,ordinarymathematicsstaysinmuchlowerthanmostofthepossiblestages,withreallyfeasibleiterationsofthe
formationofpowerset:toomegaoneortothelimitofsomesequencern(withomegaasr1,omegaxasrn+1ifxisrn).Ordinarymathematicsneverneedsunboundedquantifiers
(whichrangeoverallsets).
8.1.12MyCantorpaperwaswrittentodrivefrommathematiciansthefearofdoingsettheorybecauseoftheparadoxes.Itisfruitfulformathematicianstobeinterestedin
foundations:forexample,systematicmethodsforsolvingcertainproblemshavebeendeveloped.Mathematiciansareonlyinterestedinextensions:afterformingconceptstheydo
notinvestigategenerallyhowconceptsareformed.

8.2SetTheoryandtheConceptofSet
AtthebeginningofthischapterIquotedGdel'sdeclarationthatobjectivismprovidesasatisfactoryfoundationforCantor'ssettheory.Roughlyspeaking,itsaysthat,ifwe
acceptobjectivism,theconceptofsetissufficientlyclearforustorecognizethesoundnessandthetruthoftheaxiomsofsettheory.Themaintask,therefore,istoseethatthe
conceptofsetisindeedclearenoughforustoacceptitsaxiomsonthebasisofobjectivism.

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8.2.1Thedistinctionbetweenmanyandonecannotbefurtherreduced.Itisabasicfeatureofrealitythatithasmanythings.Itisaprimitiveideaofourthinkingtothinkofmany
objectsasoneobject.Wehavesuchonesinourmindandcombinethemtoformnewones.
8.2.2Asetisaunityofwhichitselementsaretheconstituents.Itisafundamentalpropertyofthemindtocomprehendmultitudesintounities.Setsaremultitudeswhicharealso
unities.Amultitudeistheoppositeofaunity.Howcananythingbebothamultitudeandunity?Yetasetisjustthat.Itisaseeminglycontradictoryfactthatsetsexist.Itis
surprisingthatthefactthatmultitudesarealsounitiesleadstonocontradictions:thisisthemainfactofmathematics.Thinking[aplurality]togetherseemslikeatriviality:andthis
appearstoexplainwhywehavenocontradiction.But"manythingsforone"isfarfromtrivial.
8.2.3This[fact]thatsetsexististhemainobjectivefactofmathematicswhichwehavenotmadeinsomesense:itisonlytheevolutionofmathematicswhichhasledustosee
thisimportantfact.Inthegeneralmatterofuniversalsandparticulars,wedonothavethemergerofthetwothings,manyandone,totheextentthatmultitudesarethemselves
unities.Thinking[aplurality]togethermayseemlikeatriviality.Yetsomepluralitiescanbethoughttogetherasunities,somecannot.Hence,theremustbesomethingobjectivein
theformingofunities.Otherwisewewouldbeabletothinktogetherinallcases.
8.2.4Mathematicalobjectsarenotsodirectlygivenasphysicalobjects.Theyaresomethingbetweentheidealworldandtheempiricalworld,alimitingcaseandabstract.Objects
areinspaceorclosetospace.Setsarethelimitcaseofspatiotemporalobjectseitherasananalogueofconstruingawholephysicalbodyasdeterminedentirelybyitsparts(so
thattheinterconnectionsofthepartsplaynorole)orasananalogueofsynthesizingvariousaspectstogetoneobject,withthedifferencethattheinterconnectionsoftheaspects
aredisregarded.Setsarequasispatial.Theyhaveananalogytooneandmany,aswellastoawholeanditsparts.

ThelastobservationisrelatedtothecomparisonwithKant'sideaofsynthesisquotedaboveinChapter7.
InthatchapterIdiscussedthedialecticofintuitionandidealization,beginningwithnaturalnumbersbecausetheyaregenerallyfamiliarandthereforealsosignificantfor
thosewhoarenotinterestedinsettheory.Asfarastheessentialtransitionfromsmalltolarge,finitetoinfiniteandbeyondisconcerned,wemayalsoconfineour
attentionjusttosets.Wemaygofromsmallsetstolargesetsbythedialecticofintuitionandidealization,intuitiveoverviewandthought,thesubjectiveandthe
objective,knowledgeandexistence.
Gdelcomparedsetsandnumbersinthesewords:
8.2.5Numbersappearlessconcretethansets.Theyhavedifferentrepresentationsandarewhatiscommontoallrepresentations.Forexample,weaddormultiplybydealingwitha
collectionoftwoindeterminatethings.

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Beforeturningtotheclarificationandapplicationofthesedifferentformsofdialectic,Iconsidersomefamiliarperipheralissuesabouttheobjectivisticconceptionof
axiomaticsettheory.
Sincetherearemathematicalandphysicalobjects,therearealsopuresetsandempiricalsets,suchasthesetofpeoplecurrentlyresidinginBeijing,andsoon.In
orderthattherebesets,theremustbenonsetsindividualswhicharetheconstituentsofsomeofthesetstheexistenceofsetspresupposestheirexistencetheyare
conceptuallytheoriginalobjectsorelements.Typically,inaphilosophicalconceptionofsettheory,thereareUrelements,whichcorrespondtotheindividualsor
nonsets.Usually,theemptysetisalsotakentobeasortofindividual,because,likeindividuals,it(hastheemptyextensionor)hasnomembers.
Asweknow,settheorywhenstudiedmathematicallyusuallyconfinesitsattentiontopuresetsandincludestheemptysetastheonlyUrelementortheinitial
objectfromwhich(other)setsareformed.Wecanformulatethisfamiliarideaasfollows:
8.2.6Individualisadifficultconceptinphilosophy.ButtheideaofUrelementisnotdifficultforsettheory,becauseweareinthiscontextnotinterestedinwhatanindividualis
butratherleavethequestionopen.WedonotattempttodeterminewhatthecorrectUrelementsare(MP:181182).

Theiterativeconceptofsetseessetsasdetermined,inthefirstplace,bytheirextensions.AccordingtoRussell(1919:183),wecannottakesets"inthepure
extensionalwayassimplyheapsorconglomerations":theemptysethasnomembersatallandcannotberegardedasa"heap"itisalsohardtounderstandhowit
comesaboutthatasetwithonlyonememberisnotidenticalwithitsonemember.Hence,iftherearesuchthingsasheaps,wecannotidentifythemwiththesets
composedoftheirconstituents.
Gdelseesthislineofthoughtasadducingreasonsagainsttheextensionalviewofsets,andreplies,intheRussellpaper:
8.2.7Butitseemstomethattheseargumentscould,ifanything,atmostprovethattheemptysetandtheunitsets(asdistinctfromtheironlyelement)arefictions(introducedto
simplifythecalculus,likethepointatinfinityingeometry),notthatallsetsarefictions(Gdel1944inCW2:131).

WhereasIagreewithGdel'sobservationasadefenseoftheextensionalviewofsets,Iaminclinedtothinkthattheiterativeconcept,althoughanextensionalview,
doesnottakesets"inthepureextensionalwayassimplyheaps."Itseemstomethatasetasaunityissomethingmorethanjustaheapofitems.ButIdonotknow
howtoexplicatethisvaguelyfeltsomethingmore.
Ingeneratingoneobjectoutofitsvariousaspects,ifweabstractfromtheinterrelationsorinterconnectionsoftheaspects,theoneobject

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generatedwouldbethesetofwhichtheaspectsareconstituents,providedwethinkoftheseaspectsasobjects.Wecanlikewisesynthesizeasmallnumberof
physicalobjectsintooneobject,aset,bydisregardingalltheinterrelationsamongtheseobjects.Aswecometolarge,thoughfinite,andinfinitemanifolds,
idealizationswhatHusserlcalls"constitutionsofmathematicalobjects"whichgobeyondtheimmediatelygivenareneeded.Gdelsaidinthisconnection:
8.2.8Husserlspeaksofconstitutingmathematicalobjectsbutwhatiscontainedinhispublishedworkonthismatterismerelyprogrammatic.Phenomenologicalinvestigationsof
theconstitutionofmathematicalobjectsisoffundamentalimportanceforthefoundationsofmathematics.

Conceptually,thefinitesetsbuiltupfromtheemptysetbehaveessentiallylikethenaturalnumbers.Forinstance,sometimesonetakesthenaturalnumbersinsteadof
theemptysetastheUrelements.Justaswegofromsmallnumberstolargeonesandthentotheirinfinitewhole,wedothesamewithfinitesets:
8.2.9Byournativeintuitionweonlyseeclearpropositionsaboutphysicallygivensetsandthenmerelysimpleexamplesofthem.Allweknowaboutsetsofintegersoroffinite
setsisonlywhatweknowaboutphysicallyexistingsetsweonlyknowsmallfinitesegments.Ifyougivenupidealization,thenmathematicsdisappears.(Compare7.1.10.)

AccordingtoGeorgeMiller(1956),wearepsychologicallycapableoftakinginwithoneglimpseonlyacollectionofaboutsevenitems.
8.2.10Coulditbethecasethatthereareonlyfinitelymanyintegers?Wecan'timaginesuchasituation.Ourprimitiveconceptswouldbewrong.Numberisbasedontheconcept
ofdifferentthings.Theconceptofdifferenceisprecise.Ifitisnotprecise,thenwecan'titerateindefinitely.Ifonedeniesdifference,onealsodeniesiteration.

AsIsaidbefore,goingfromthefinitetotheinfiniteinvolvesthebigjump.Inparticular,inordertooverview(orrunthrough)aninfiniteset,itisnecessarytoresortto
anextensionofintuitionintheKantiansensetosomesortofinfiniteintuition.
8.2.11Toarriveatthetotalityofintegersinvolvesajump.Overviewingitpresupposesaninfiniteintuition.Whatisgivenisapsychologicalanalysis.Thepointiswhetherit
producesobjectiveconviction.Thisisthebeginningofanalysis.(Compare7.1.18.)

IdiscussthemovefromintegerstothetotalityofintegersinChapter7.Oncewerecognizethatthereareinfinitesets,weseethattheaxiomofinfinityistrueforthe
conceptofsets:thereexistssomeinfiniteset.Theotherimportantstandardaxiomsofsettheoryare,forrestriction:extensionality

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andfoundationforgettingmoresets:subsetformation,powerset,andreplacement.
Theaxiomofextensionalitymaybeviewedasadefiningcharacteristicofsetsincontrasttoconceptsorproperties.Inordertoseethattheaxiomoffoundation
holds,werecallbrieflysomeelementaryfacts:
Cantor'ssettheorycallsourattentiontotherightperspectiveforperceivingfairlyclearlytheconceptofset.Accordingtothisperspective,whichhassofarstoodthe
testoftime,thereisarankortypehierarchyofsets,whichconsistsofwhatcanbeconceivedthroughiteratedapplicationoftheoperationofcollectinggivenobjects
intosets.
Ifwetrytovisualizetheuniverseofallsetsandchoosetoleaveouttheobjectsthatarenotsets,wehaveapeculiartree(orratheramessofmanytrees)withthe
emptysetastheroot,sothateachsetisanodeandtwosetsarejoinedbyabranchifonebelongstotheother.
Togetsomeorderoutofthischaos,oneusesthepowersetoperation.Clearly,theemptysetmustbeatthebottom.Ifweconsiderthepowersetoftheemptyset,
wegetallpossiblesubsetsoftheemptyset,andsoon.Intheoriginalmessoftreesrepresentingallsets,everynodeexcepttheroothassomebranchgoing
downwards.Hence,everynodemusteventuallyleadbacktotheemptyset.Butifweuseapowersetateachsuccessorstageandtakeunionateverylimitstage,we
shouldbeabletoexhaustallpossiblesetsonthewayup,sothateachnodewillbeincludedinthisonedimensionalhierarchy.
Itseemssurprisingthatarbitrarycollectionsofobjectsintowholesshouldformsuchaneatorder.Yetitisnoteasytothinkofanynonartificialsituationthatwould
defeatthisorder.
Theaxiomoffoundationisageneralizationofthecharacteristicofsetsthatnosetcanbelongtoitself.Itsaysthateverysetcanbeobtainedatsomestage,orthat
everycollectionofsetshasaminimalmemberintherankhierachyasjustdescribed.Giventhewaythehierarchyisconceived,itisclearthat,withineverynonempty
collectionofsets,theremustbesomesetthatisofnohigherrankthananysetinthecollection,sothatnosetinthecollectioncanbeamemberofit.
Theaxiomofsubsetformation(orof"comprehension")saysthatifacollection(ofobjectsorjustofsets)isincludedinaset,thenitisalsoaset:
8.2.12Originallyweunderstandsetsbydefiningproperties.Thenweextensionalizeandconceiveofasetasaunityofwhichtheelementsareitsconstituents.Certainlyifwecan
overvieworrunthroughthemembersofacollection,wecanoverviewanypartofthecollectionobtainedbyomittingcertainmembersofit.(CompareMP:184.)

Theaxiomofpowersetsaysthatallsubsetsofasetcanbecollectedintoaset(CompareMP:184):

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8.2.13Thepowersetoperationinvolvesajump.Inthissecondjumpweconsidernotonlythemembersofasetasgivenbutalsotheprocessofselectingmembersfromtheset.
Takingallpossiblewaysofleavingoutmembersofthesetisakindof''method"forproducingallitssubsets.Wethenfeelthatwecanoverviewthecollectionofallthesesubsets
aswell.Weidealize,forinstance,theintegersorthefinitesets(a)tothepossibilityofaninfinitetotality,and(b)withomissions.Sowegetaconcretelyintuitiveideaandthenone
goeson.Thereisnodoubtinthemindthatthisidealizationtoanyextentwhatsoeverisatthebottomofclassicalmathematics.(Compare7.1.18and7.1.19.)

Inthejumpfromaninfinitesettoitspowerset,wehaveadialecticofthesubjectiveandtheobjective,ofknowledgeandexistence,muchmorethaninidealizingthe
integerstothepossibilityofaninfinitetotality.Unlikethetotalityofintegers,thetotalityofallsubsetsofaninfinitesetisnotevencountable.Itishardtoimaginehow
wecanknoworhaveanintuitiveacquaintancewitheveryoneofthesesubsets.If,therefore,knowingasetpresupposesknowingallitsmembers,itishardtobelieve
thatwecanknowthepowersetofaninfiniteset.
Inmyopinion,thisfamiliarobstaclecanbeovercomebyanappealtoobjectivisminsettheory.Accordingtotheobjectivisticconceptofset,Ibelieve,aset
presupposesforitsexistence(theexistenceof)allitselementsbutdoesnotpresupposeforitsknowability(theknowledgeof)allitselementsindividually.Thepointof
thisdistinctionis,Ithink,relatedtothatofGdel'ssimilardistinctioninconnectionwiththeviciouscircleprincipleintheformof:nototalitycancontainmembers
presupposingthistotality(theRussellpaper,CW2:128).Thestepfromtheexistenceofallsubsetsofaninfinitesettotheoverviewabilityofitspowersetclearly
involvesastrongidealizationofourintuition.Thismatterofpresupposition,sofarasexistenceisconcerned,isnotaquestionoftemporalpriority.Thepointis,rather,
that,conceptually,objectshavetoexistinorderforthesetofthemastheirunitytoexist.
Theaxiomofreplacementsaysthat,ifthereisaoneonecorrelationbetweenacollectionandaset,thenthecollectionisalsoaset.Forinstance,ifwebeginwithan
infinitesetandapplythepowersetoperationrepeatedly,thenwegetaninfinitecollectionconsistingoftheoriginalset,itspowerset,andsoon,uptoeveryfinite
iteration.Sincethereisaoneonecorrelationbetweenthiscollectionandthesetofnaturalnumbers,itis,bytheaxiomofreplacement,alsoaset.Thestrengthofthis
axiomliesinthefactthat,givenatotalityofsetsbuiltupfromtheemptysetorotherUrelements,wecanobtainnewsetsbycollectingtogethersetsfromthedifferent
levels,whicharenotincludedinanyoftheoriginallevels.
Ihadgivenanobviousjustificationofthisaxiombyapplyingtheidealizedsenseofoverviewingtogetherorrunningthroughallmembersofagivenset.Supposeweare
givenasetandaoneonecorrelationbetweenthemembersofthesetandcertainothergivensets.Ifweput,foreach

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elementoftheset,itscorrespondingsetinitsplace,weareabletorunthroughtheresultingcollectionaswell.Inthismanner,wearejustifiedinformingsetsby
arbitraryreplacements(MP:186).Gdel,however,chosetouseaseeminglymorecomplexapproachwhichrevealsmoreclearlytheplaceoftheaxiominthe
expansionofarangeofgivensets.(ComparetheparagraphattributedtohiminMP:186.)
8.2.14Theaxiomofreplacementisadeeperaxiom.Itdoesnothavethesamekindofimmediateevidenceprevioustoanycloseranalysisoftheiterativeconceptofsetwhich
theotherfamiliaraxiomshave.Itisnotquiteevidentatthebeginning.ThisisseenfromthefactthatitwasnotincludedinZermelo'soriginalsystemofaxiomsandFraenkel
initiallygaveawrongformulation.Heuristically,thebestwayofarrivingatitisthefollowing:
8.2.15Fromtheveryideaoftheiterativeconceptofsetitfollowsthat,ifanordinalnumberahasbeenobtained,theoperationPofpowersetiteratedatimesfromanysetyleads
toasetPa(y).But,forthesamereason,itwouldseemtofollowthat,ifinsteadofP,onetakessomelargerjumpinthehierarchyoftypes,forexample,thetransitionQfromxtothe
setobtainedfromxbyiteratingasmanytimesasthesmallestordinalaofthewellorderingsofx,Qa(y)likewiseisaset.Now,toassumethisforanyconceivablejumpoperation
evenforthosethataredefinedbyreferencetotheuniverseofallsetsorbyuseofthechoiceoperationisequivalenttotheaxiomofreplacement.
8.2.16Theiterationisalwaysbyordinalnumberswhichhavealreadybeenobtained:givenanyordinala,wecaninventanyjumpsfromsetstosetsanditeratethematimes.In
eachcasewegetanoperationwhichiteratesajumpanordinalnumberoftimes.Thenwegetauniverseclosedwithrespecttothisoperation.Inthiswaywejustifytheaxiomof
replacementandtherankortypehierarchyofsets.Youcanwellorderanyset,andthenanyjumpcanbeiteratedasmanytimesastheordinalnumberofitswellorderingtogo
fromanygivensettoanotherpossiblynewset.

HereisageneralobservationbyGdel:
8.2.17Theaxiomofsubsetformationcomesbeforetheaxiomofpowerset.Wecanformthepowersetofaset,becauseweunderstandtheselectionprocess(ofsinglingoutany
subsetfromthegivenset)intuitively,notblindly.Bytheaxiomofreplacementwereachhigherandhighertypesbydefiningfasterandfastergrowingfunctionstoproducetypes.
Wethenwantadomainclosedwithrespecttotheprocedureand,withthehelpofextensionalization,wearriveattheinaccessiblenumbers.Intuitionisticsettheorystayswiththe
intensional.

8.3TheCantorNeumannAxiom:TheSubjectiveandtheObjective
Apartfromthesefamiliaraxiomsofsettheory,Gdelrepeatedlyrelatesobjectivisminsettheorytotheaxiomthatacollectionofsetsisasetifandonlyifitisnotas
largeastheuniverseVofallsets.Beforeturningto

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aconsiderationofthisaxiom,however,IwouldliketodiscussGdel'scontrastbetweenthesubjectiveandtheobjective,whichIdonotclearlyunderstand.
Withinobjectivereality,certainmultitudesarealsounitieswebelievethistobeafactbecauseweareabletooverviewmanymultitudesandtherebyseethemas
unitiessets.Butalreadyinthecaseofoverviewingthepowersetofaninfiniteset,wehavetoprojecttotheobjectiverealmofexistencetheidealizedpossibilityof
formingbyomissionarbitrarysubsetsofthegivenset.Whatcanbethoughttogethercangobeyondwhatcanbeoverviewed,justas,generally,thoughtcango
beyondintuition.Idealizationisonewayofextendingtherangeofintuitionwiththehelpofthought.
8.3.1Thissignificantpropertyofcertainmultitudesthattheyareunitiesmustcomefromsomemoresolidfoundationthantheapparentlytrivialandarbitraryphenomenonthat
wecanoverviewtheobjectsineachofthesemultitudes.Withouttheobjectivepicture,wedonotseemabletoexcludecompletearbitrarinessindeterminingwhen[theelements
of]amultitudecanbethoughttogether(broaderthancanbeoverviewed)andwhennot.Indeed,withouttheobjectivepicture,nothingseemstopreventusfrombelievingthat
everymultitudecanbethoughttogether.Yet,asweknow,whenwedothis,wegetintocontradictions.Somepluralitiescanbethoughttogetherasunities,somecannot.Hence,
theremustbesomethingobjectiveintheformingofunities.
8.3.2Insomesense,thesubjectiveviewleadstotheobjectiveview.Subjectivelyasetissomethingwhichwecanoverviewinonethought.Ifweoverviewamultitudeofobjects
inonethoughtinourmind,thenthiswhole,theonethought,containsalsoasaparttheobjectiveunityofthemultitudeofobjects,aswellasitsrelationtoourthought.Different
personscan,webelieve,eachviewthesamemultitudeinonethought.Hence,itisnaturaltoassumeacommonnucleuswhichistheobjectiveunity.Itisindeedaunity,sinceitis
containedinanotherunity.Idealizationisdecisiveinbothcases[thesubjectiveandtheobjectiveunity].
8.3.3Eventhoughforourknowledgewedobringinconsiderationsofamoreorlesssubjectivenature,therangeofpossibleknowledgeiswiderthantherangeofexistencethat
canbejustifiedfromthesubjectiveviewpoint.Thepsychologicalactofthinkingtogetherallobjectsofamultitudeinonethoughtyieldsmoresetsfromtheobjectiveviewpoint
becausestrongeridealizationsareappropriate[thanfromthesubjectiveviewpoint].Fromtheidealizedsubjectiveview,wecangetthepowerset.Buttheindefinabilityofthe
universeVofallsetscan'tbegotbythesubjectiveviewatall.Thedifferenceinstrengthbecomesclearonlywhenyouintroducenewprincipleswhichmakenosenseatallinthe
subjectiveview.[ComparetheCantorNeumannaxiom,consideredbelow.]Foreverysetthereissomemindwhichcanoverviewitinthestrictestsense.
8.3.4Tosaythattheuniverseofallsetsisanunfinishabletotalitydoesnotmeanobjectiveindeterminedness,butmerelyasubjectiveinabilitytofinishit.

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8.3.5Thepropositionthatallsetsareconstructibleisanaturalcompletionofsubjectivesettheoryforhumanbeings.RonaldJensenhasshownthatitleadstounnatural
consequencessuchasSouslin'shypothesis.[(1972)compareCW2:17.]The"axiom"ofdeterminacyisanotherexample[whichinitsgeneralformcontradictstheaxiomofchoice].

Amultitudeofobjectshavingthepropertythattheunityoftheobjectsinthemultitudeexistsisaset.ThemultitudeVofallsetsdoesnothavethisproperty.The
conceptofsetcontainsthecomponentthatsetsareunitieseachwithitselementsasconstituents,anditthereforerulesoutthepossibilityofasetbelongingtoitself,
becauseifitdidbelongtoitselfitwouldbeitsownconstituent.ThishastheconsequencethatthemultitudeVofallsets,beingonahigherlevelthaneveryset,cannot
beaunity.Itpresupposesforitsexistence(theexistenceof)allsetsand,therefore,cannotitselfbeaset,becauseifitwereitwouldbeoneofitsownconstituents
(andbelongtoitself).
Ofcourse,itfollowsthatnomultitudecanbeasetifitsbeingasetwould,byjustifiableaxiomsofsettheory,compelVtobeasetalso.Onemightcomparethis
situationwiththenonexistenceofalargestfiniteordinaloralargestcountableordinal.Since,relyingonfamiliardefinitionsinsettheory,thesmallestinfiniteordinalis
thesetofallfiniteordinals,itcannotbeoneofthem,sincenosetcanbelongtoitself.Similarlyforthesmallestuncountableordinalandcountableordinals.Theydiffer
fromVinthattheyaresets.Theuniverseofallsetsistherangeoftheconceptofsetandisamultitude(many)andnotaunity(one).
Byappealingtogenerallyacceptedprinciplesofsettheory,wecanalsoprovideauxiliaryargumentstoshowthatVcannotbeaset.Forexample,themultitudeofall
subsetsofasetisagainasetandalargerset.IfVwereaset,themultitudeofallitssubsetswouldbealargerset,contradictingthefactthatnomultitudeofsetscould
belargerthanV.
InalettertoDedekinddatedHalle,28July1899,Cantorcalledmultitudes"like"Vinconsistentmultitudes,andintroducedageneralprincipletodistinguishthem
fromsets(Cantor1932:443):
8.3.6Ifwestartfromthenotionofadefinitemultitude[Vielheit](asystem,atotality)ofthings,itisnecessary,asIdiscovered,todistinguishtwokindsofmultitudes(bythisI
alwaysmeandefinitemultitudes).Forontheonehandamultitudecanbesuchthattheassumptionthatallofitselements"aretogether"leadstoacontradiction,sothatitis
impossibletoconceiveofthemultitudeasaunity,as"onefinishedthing."SuchmultitudesIcallabsolutelyinfiniteorinconsistentmultitudes.Whenontheotherhandthe
totalityoftheelementsofthemultitudecanbethoughtwithoutcontradictionas"beingtogether,"sothattheircollectioninto"onething"ispossible,Icallitaconsistent
multitudeora''set"[Menge].Twoequivalentmultitudeseitherareboth"sets"orbothinconsistent.

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Inthelaststatement,twomultitudesareequivalentifandonlyifthereisaonetoonecorrelationbetweentheirelements.Inparticular,amultitudeislikeVifandonly
ifitisequivalenttoV.Incontemporaryterminology,Cantorwasdistinguishingproperclassesofsetsfromthoseclasseswhicharethemselvessets.Wemayalso
restatehisassertionasanaxiom:AproperclassisasetifandonlyifitisnotequivalenttoV.
In1925vonNeumannrediscoveredthisaxiomandfullyexploreditsimplicationsinhisaxiomIV2(1961:41)soitbecameknownas"vonNeumann'saxiom."In
Novemberof1975,Gdelusedthisaxiomasevidencefortheobjectivecharacteroftheconceptofset:
8.3.7AshasbeenshownbyvonNeumann,amultitudeisasetifandonlyifitissmallerthantheuniverseofallsets.Thisisunderstandablefromtheobjectiveviewpoint,since
oneobjectinthewholeuniversemustbesmallcomparedwiththeuniverseandsmallmultitudesofobjectsshouldformunitiesbecausebeingsmallisanintrinsicpropertyofsuch
multitudes.Fromthesubjectiveviewpoint,thereisnoreasonwhyonlysmallmultitudesformunities:thereislittleconnectionbetweenthesizeofthemultitudeandthinking
togethertheobjectsofthemultitudeinonethought,sincetheelementsofalargebuthomogeneousmultitudemayhangtogetherinourthoughtmoreeasilythanthoseofasmall
butheterogeneousmultitude.Forexample,fromthesubjectiveviewpoint,itishardtofindagoodreasontocorrectFrege'smistakenbeliefthateveryconceptdeterminesaset.
[Subjectively,theRussellsetdoesnotappearcomplicated.]

Gdelisinterestedinthisaxiomforanotherreasonaswell:heconsidersitamaximumprinciple.Inthe1950shehadcommentedonitinalettertoStanislawUlam:
8.3.8Thegreatinterestwhichthisaxiomhasliesinthefactthatitisamaximumprinciple,somewhatsimilartoHilbert'saxiomofcompletenessingeometry.For,roughlyspeaking,it
saysthatanysetwhichdoesnot,inacertainwelldefinedway,implyaninconsistencyexists.Itsbeingamaximumprinciplealsoexplainsthefactthatthisaxiomimpliestheaxiom
ofchoice.Ibelievethatthebasicproblemsofsettheory,suchasCantor'scontinuumproblem,willbesolvedsatisfactorilyonlywiththehelpofstrongeraxiomsofthiskind,which
inasenseareoppositeorcomplementarytotheconstructivisticinterpretationofmathematics(quotedinUlam1958:13).

IndiscussingCantor'scontinuumproblem,Gdelconjecturesthattheproblem"maybesolvablewiththehelpofsomenewaxiomwhichwouldstateorimply
somethingaboutthedefinabilityofsets."Hementions,inthisregard,hisownconsistencyproofofthecontinuumhypothesisbythe"axiom"A,thateverysetis
constructible,asapartialconfirmationofthisconjecture(theCantorpaper,CW2:183184,262).Intheoriginal1947versionheaddedafootnote:''Ontheother
hand,fromanaxiominsomesensedirectlyoppositetothisonethenegationofCantor'sconjecture

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couldperhapsbederived"(CW2:184n.22).Intherevisedversion,writtenin1963,hefurtherelaboratesonthisobservation(CW2:262263n.23):
8.3.9Iamthinkingofanaxiomwhich(similartoHilbert'scompletenessaxiomingeometry)wouldstatesomemaximumpropertyofthesystemofallsets,whereasaxiomAstatesa
minimumproperty.Notethatonlyamaximumpropertywouldseemtoharmonizewiththeiterativeconceptofset[asweunderstandit,whichadmitsarbitrarysets"regardlessofif,
orhow,theycanbedefined"].

Intheprocessofcommentingonmymanuscriptin1972,Gdelproposedcertainrevisionsofmyremarksonmeasurablecardinals,whichIincorporatedinthetext
withoutmakingthechangesexplicit:
8.3.10Therelationoftheaxiomofmeasurablecardinalstotheusualaxiomsofsettheoryisonecomparabletothatbetweenthelawofgravitationandthelawsofclassicalphysics
inbothcasestheaxiomandthelawarenotderivablefromtheotherprinciplesbutextendthemwithoutcontradictingthem(MP:25).
8.3.11Thereusedtobeaconfusedbeliefthataxiomsofinfinitycannotrefutetheconstructibilityhypothesis(andthereforeevenlessthecontinuumhypothesis)sinceLcontains
bydefinitionallordinals.Forexample,iftherearemeasurablecardinals,theymustbeinL.However,inLtheydonotsatisfytheconditionofbeingmeasurable.Thisisnodefectof
thesecardinals,unlessonewereoftheopinionthatListhetrueuniverse.Asiswellknown,allkindsofstrangephenomenaappearinnonstandardmodels(MP:204).
8.3.12However,theredoesremainafeelingthatthepropertyofbeingameasurablecardinalsaysmorethanjustlargeness,althoughitimplieslargeness(MP:204).[Thisfeeling
hastodowiththefactthatitwasintroducedatfirstbytheprincipleofuniformityoftheuniverseofsets,whichisdifferentincharacterfromtheotherprinciples.]

InhisCantorpaper(CW2:261,269),Gdelhaddiscussedthecriterionoffruitfulnessinconsequences.Onceheelaboratedonasimilarpointinconnectionwith
measurablecardinals:
8.3.13Thehypothesisofmeasurablecardinalsmayimplymoreinteresting(positiveinsomeyettobeanalyzedsense)universalnumbertheoreticalstatementsbeyond
propositionssuchastheordinaryconsistencystatements:forinstance,theequalityofp n(thefunctionwhosevalueatnisthenthprimenumber)withsomeeasilycomputable
function.Suchconsequencescanberenderedprobablebyverifyinglargenumbersofnumericalinstances.Hence,thedifferencewiththehypothesisofexpandinguniverseisnot
asgreataswemaythinkatfirst(MP:223n.23).

Thereferenceto"thehypothesisofexpandinguniverse"wasrelatedtoasuggestioninmyoriginalmanuscriptlaterdeletedtocompareitwiththecontinuum
hypothesis.

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Inourdiscussions,Gdelalsoconsideredextensivelytheprinciplesbywhichweintroducetheaxiomsofsettheory.Since,however,manyofhisobservations
especiallythosepertainingtoAckermann'ssystemandtheprinciplethattheuniverseofallsetsisnotdefinablearequitetechnical,Ileavethatmaterialforthelast
sectionofthischapter.
8.4TheFunctionandScopeofLogic
ItishardtoclassifyordevelopmanyofGdel'soccasionalobservationsonlogic.Onedefinitepoint,however,isthatconcepttheoryisforhimthecenteroflogic.
Manyofhisotherremarksareratherfragmentary,andsometimesheseemstosaysomewhatdifferentthingsindifferentcontexts.BecauseIdidnotalwaysfully
understandhimandbecauseIhavenocompleterecordofwhathesaid,thereconstructionbelowmustbetakencumgranosalis.
Thefollowingeightparagraphsconcernthefunctionoflogicinmakingthingsexplicitandbrief:
8.4.1See5.3.26.
8.4.2Intheeighteenthcenturymathematicallogicwasstillasecretscience.AftertheCauchytypeofworkmathematicallogicemerged.Mathematicallogicmakesclearwhatclear
thinkingis,butonlyinthefoundations:thereareveryimportantthingsbeyond.Whatismadeexplicitisusuallymoreeffective.Wemakejumpsinthethoughtprocess.In
mathematicsinventionsplayalargepartinphilosophyanalysisplaysamajorrole.Mathematicallogicistrivialinmathematics,butnottrivialinphilosophy.Itservesto
abbreviatethings:onehundredpagescouldbereducedtofivepagesthingsaresaidmoreclearlyifsaidwithmorebrevity.Itmakesmuchclearerwhattheprimitivetermsare
whichonehasinmind,andhowtodefineotherthings.Positivistsdoapplythis,butnottosimplifymatters,rathertocomplicatethem.
8.4.3Onephilosophicalsignificanceofmathematicallogicisitsexplicitnessanditsexplicitaxiomaticmethod.
8.4.4Mathematicsoftenusesimplicitassumptions.Itisnecessarytohaveanexplicitformulation.TheaxiomsoforderonthelinearenotamongEuclid'saxiomsforgeometrybut
werefirstbroughtoutexplicitlyby[Moritz]Paschonlyinthenineteenthcentury.IfEuclidhadknownlogic,hewouldhaverealizedthatthereissimplynowaytocompletehis
proposedproofsbymakingexplicitthemissingsteps.Incontrast,itwouldbepossibleforPaschtoleaveoutstepsandstillhavecorrectproofs.

Inthisconnection,itisofinterestthatPaschexplicitlyrequiredtheremovabilityofgapsingenuinededuction(see84.5below).(Comparealsoananalogous
observationatthebeginningofFrege1884.)

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8.4.5Indeed,ifgeometryistobegenuinelydeductive,thentheprocessofinferringmustalwaysbeindependentofthemeaning[Sinn]ofgeometricalconcepts,justasitmustbe
independentofdiagrams.Onlytherelationsbetweenthegeometricalconceptsaretobetakenintoaccountinthepropositionsanddefinitionsunderconsideration.Itis,inthe
courseofthededuction,certainlylegitimateanduseful,thoughbynomeansnecessary,tothinkofthereference[Bedeutung]oftheconceptswhichareinvolved.Infact,ifitis
necessarytodoso,thentheinadequacyofthedeductioneventheinsufficiencyoftheproofmethodisrevealedifthegapscannotberemovedthroughamodificationofthe
deduction(Pasch1882:98).
8.4.6Mathematicallogicmakesexplicitthecentralplaceofpredicationinthephilosophicalfoundationofrationalthought.Theaxiomsoforderseparatelogicfromintuitionin
geometry.Thisisofcourseofphilosophicalimportance.Wehaveanintuitionoforderingwhichismuchclearerthanourmetricintuition,butitisconcealedinEuclidandmixedup
withlogicreasoning.Ourtopologicalintuitiongoesbeyondthemetricintuitionstatementsabouttopologicalorderingaremorestableandmoreoftentrue.
8.4.7Euclid'smistakeswouldoccuragainandagain,forexampleinphysicsandsociology.Ifweaxiomatizeintheseareas,weagainneedmathematicallogic.Themeaningofthe
wavefunctionwasfirstclarifiedbyvonNeumannbyusingtheaxiomaticmethod.Mathematicallogicmakesiteasiertoavoidmistakes,evenforonewhoisnotagenius.
8.4.8Husserlalsothinksthatmathematicallogicshouldnotbemadethebasisofphilosophicalthinking.Itisnotthechieftoolbutthebasictool:thefoundationofallconceptual
thinkingthatrevealsthefundamentalstructureofrationalspeech.Thebasisofeverythingismeaningfulpredication:somethinghassomeproperty,someobjectbelongstoaset
oraclass,somerelationholdsbetweentwothings,andsoon.HusserlhadthisHegeldidnothaveit.Mathematicallogicisimportantforcarryingoutideas,notforfindingthe
rightideas.[Thispassageisfollowedby5.3.18.]

Theaboveeightparagraphsrelatemathematicallogictotheaxiomaticmethod,whichwasimportantforGdel,notonlyinmathematics,butalsoinscienceand
philosophy,forthepurposeofdevelopingtheories.InthenextchapterIshallreturntohisemphasisontheimportanceoftheaxiomaticmethodandofhisidealof
axiomatictheoriesinphilosophy.Itshouldbenotedthathedidnotrestrictaxiomatictheoriestothoseembodiedexplicitlyinformalsystems:forinstance,heregarded
Newton'sphysicsasamodelofaxiomatictheories.
ItisclearfromthelastquotationthatGdelconsideredmathematicallogictobeimportantforphilosophymoreimportantthanitisformathematics,whereitis
usuallytrivial.Asidefromhisidealofanaxiomatictheory,hesawmathematicallogicashelpfulindoingphilosophybecauseitenablesustobeexplicitandbrief.His
contrastbetweenHusserl

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andHegelpointstothisbeliefintheimportanceoflogicforafundamentalclarityinthepursuitofphilosophy.Theideais,Ibelieve,roughlythis:Asignificant
applicationoflogicinphilosophyusesitnotexplicitlybutimplicitly,asawayofacquiringthehabitofprecisethinking.Inthissense,itislikelythatanintimatefamiliarity
withsomeprecisesubjectotherthanlogicwouldhavemoreorlessthesameeffect.
Gdelalsoconsideredtherelationoflogictoreasonandtorationalism:
8.4.9Reasonandunderstandingconcerntwolevelsofconcept.Dialecticsandfeelingsareinvolvedinreason.Wehavealsointuitionofhigherconcepts.ChristianWolff
confusesunderstandingwithreasonandusesonlylogicalinferences.
8.4.10Religionmayalsobedevelopedasaphilosophicalsystembuiltonaxioms.Inourtime,rationalismisusedinanabsurdlynarrowsense:sometimesevenconfinedtofirst
orderlogic!Rationalisminvolvesnotonlylogicalconcepts.Churchesdeviatedfromreligionwhichhadbeenfoundedbyrationalmen.Therationalprinciplebehindtheworldis
higherthanpeople.

Withregardtothescopeoflogic,thereiscontroversyoverwhethertoidentifylogicwithpredicate(orfirstorderorelementary)logicortoincludesettheoryinitas
well.Gdelcalledpredicatelogic"thelogicofthefinitemind."Forhim,logicincludesnotonlysettheorybutalsoindeedmorecentrallyconcepttheory.
On6June1971IaskedGdelaboutthescopeoflogicand,specifically,abouttheviewthatlogicshouldbeidentifiedwithpredicatelogic.Hehadtoldmeearlier
that,forhim,logicincludedsettheoryandconcepttheory.Onthisoccasion,however,heexpandedontherelationbetweenlogicandpredicatelogic:
8.4.11Thepropositionalcalculusisaboutlanguageordealswiththeoriginalnotionoflanguage:truth,falsity,inference.Weincludethequantifiersbecauselanguageisabout
somethingwetakepropositionsastalkingaboutobjects.Theywouldnotbenecessaryifwedidnottalkaboutobjectsbutwecannotimaginethis.Eventhoughpredicatelogic
is"distinguished,"therearealsoothernotions,suchasmany,most,some(inthesenseofplurality),andnecessity.
8.4.12Oneideaistosaythatthefunctionoflogicistoallowustodrawinferences.Ifwedefinelogicbyformalevidencedirectlyconcerninginferenceforthefinitemind,then
thereisonlyonenaturalchoiceanditisnotnaturaltotreattheinfiniteasapartoflogic.Thepartofformalinferenceorformaltheoryforthefinitemindincorporatesinferences.
Thecompletenessproofofpredicatelogicconfirmsitsadequacytothisconceptionoflogic.ForAristotle,tobevalidistohavederivationsandnottobevalidistohave
counterexamples.
8.4.13If,however,theconcerniswithinference,whynotlookforageneraltheoryofinferencewhichincludeseveryrulewhoseconsequencenecessarilyfollowsitspremise?
Sincewealsohaveintuitionsaboutprobabilityrelations,weshouldincluderulesgoverningprobabilityinferences.

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8.4.14Incontrasttosettheory,predicatelogicismainlyamatterofrulesofinference.Itisunnaturaltouseaxiomsinit.Fortheinfinitemind,theaxiomsofsettheoryarealsorules
ofinference.Thewholeofsettheoryiswithinthepurelyformaldomain.Wehaveadistinctionoftwokindsofhigherfunctionalcalculus[higherorderlogic]:intermsof
inferencesandintermsofconcepts.AccordingtoBernays,mathematicsismoreabstractinthesenseofhavingnoconceptswithcontentthanlogic.Abstractstructureslike
groupsandfieldsarepurelyformal.

Gdel'ssuggestiontoincludeinlogicrulesgoverningprobabilityinferencesseemstopointtowhatiscommonlycalledinductivelogic.Hesaidspecificallythatthe
calculusofprobability,asafamiliarbranchofmathematics,wasinadequateandnotwhathehadinmind.ThesuggestionremindsmeofthedistinctionF.P.Ramsey
drawsbetweenthelogicofconsistency"themostgenerallyacceptedpartsoflogic,namely,formallogic,mathematicsandthecalculusofprobabilities"andthe
logicoftruthinductiveorhumanlogic:"Itsbusinessistoconsidermethodsofthought,anddiscoverwhatdegreesofconfidenceshouldbeplacedinthem,i.e.in
whatproportionofcasestheyleadtotruth"(Ramsey1931:191,198).Thequestforsuchaninductiveorhumanlogiciscertainlyanimportantanddifficultenterprise.
Unfortunately,however,Gdeldidnotfurtherelaborateonhissuggestioninhisconversationswithme.
On22March1976Gdelmadesomeremarksthatoverlapwiththeseearlierobservations:
8.4.15Lowerfunctionalcalculus[predicatelogic]consistsofrulesofinference.Itisnotnaturaltouseaxioms.Itislogicforthefinitemind.Butwecanalsoaddlogicalconstants
suchasmany,most,some(inthesenseofplurality),necessarily,andsoon.Fortheinfinitemind,axiomsofsettheoryarealsorulesofinference.
8.4.16Fortheempiricist,thefunctionoflogicistoallowustodrawinferences.Itisnottostatepropositions,buttogooverfromsomepropositionstosomeotherpropositions.
Foratheoreticalthinker,thepropositionsembodyingsuchinferences(orimplications)arealsoofinterestinthemselves.

ForGdel,logicdealswithformalinthesenseofuniversallyapplicableconcepts.Fromthisperspective,theconceptsofnumber,setandconceptareallformal
concepts.Consequently,eventhoughhesometimesseemstoidentifylogicwithconcepttheory,Iassumethatthescopeoflogicconsists,forhim,ofconcepttheory,
settheory,andnumbertheory.Thefollowingismyreconstructionofsomeofhisobservationsontheseideas:
8.4.17Setisaformalconcept.Ifwereplacetheconceptofsetbytheconceptofconcept,wegetlogic.Theconceptofconceptiscertainlyformaland,therefore,alogicalconcept.
Butnointuitionofthisconcept,incontrasttothatofset,hasbeendeveloped.

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8.4.18Logicisthetheoryoftheformal.Itconsistsofsettheoryandthetheoryofconcepts.Thedistinctionbetweenelementary(orpredicate)logic,nonelementarylogic,andset
theoryisasubjectivedistinction.Subjectivedistinctionsaredependentonparticularformsofthemind.Whatisformalhasnothingtodowiththemind.Hence,whatlogicisisan
objectiveissue.Objectivelogicalimplicationiscategorical.Elementarylogicisthelogicforfiniteminds.Ifyouhaveaninfinitemind,youhavesettheory.Forexample,settheory
forafiniteuniverseoftenthousandelementsispartofelementarylogiccomparemyRussellpaper(probablyCW2:134).

AccordingtoGdel,hisRussellpaper,incontrasttohisCantorpaper(whichdealswithmathematicsandsettheory),dealswithlogicandconcepttheory.Wehavea
fairlywelldevelopedsettheoryweunderstandtheconceptofsetwellenoughtohaveasatisfactoryresolutionoftheextensionalparadoxes.Incontrast,wearefar
fromhavingasatisfactoryconcepttheoryasyetso,inparticular,westilldonotknowhowtoresolvetheintensionalparadoxes.Thefollowingobservationharksback
totheRussellpaper:
8.4.19Ifyouintroducetheconceptofconcept,theresultisstilllogic.Butgoing"higher"[thantheconceptofconcept]wouldbetooabstractandnolongerlogic.Theconceptof
conceptcallsforonlythelowestlevelofabstractintuition.Whethertheconceptofconceptisaformalconceptisnotinquestion.Theoldersearchforasatisfactorysettheory
giveswaytoasimilarsearchforasatisfactorytheoryofconceptsthatwill,amongotherthings,resolvetheintensionalparadoxes.Forthispurpose,Quine'sideaofstratificationis
arbitrary,andChurch'sideaalongthelineoflimitedrangesofsignificanceisinconsistentinitsoriginalformandhasnotbeenworkedout.[CompareCW2:125,137,138.]

SometimesGdelhintedatadistinctionbetweenconceptsandideasalongKantianlines.Ondifferentoccasionshespokeoftheconceptsofconcept,absolute
proof,andabsolutedefinabilityasideasratherthanconcepts:
8.4.20ThegeneralconceptofconceptisanIdea[intheKantiansense].TheintensionalparadoxesarerelatedtoquestionsaboutIdeas.Ideasaremorefundamentalthan
concepts.Thetheoryoftypesisonlynaturalbetweenthefirstandthesecondlevelitisnotnaturalathigherlevels.Layingthefoundationsdeepcannotbeextensive.

OnceIaskedGdelabouthisPrincetonlectureof1946,inwhichhehaddiscussedthetaskofextendingthesuccessofdefiningtheconceptofcomputability
independentlyofanygivenlanguageto"othercases(suchasdemonstrabilityanddefinability)"(CW2:150153).Hereplied:
8.4.21Absolutedemonstrabilityanddefinabilityarenotconceptsbutinexhaustible[Kantian]Ideas.WecanneverdescribeanIdeainwordsexhaustivelyorcompletelyclearly.
Butwealsoperceiveit,moreandmoreclearly.Thisprocessmaybeuniquelydeterminedrulingoutbranchings.TheIdeaofproofmaybe

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nonconstructivelyequivalenttotheconceptofset:axiomsofinfinityandabsoluteproofsaremoreorlessthesamething.
8.4.22Ideascannotbeusedinpreciseinferences:theyleadtothetheoryoftypes.Itisakindofdefeatismtothinkthatwehavethisvagueideawhichistheverybasisofour
preciseidea.Weunderstandthespecialconceptonlybecausewepreviouslyhadthegeneralidea.Werestrictthegeneralideatoindividualstogettheconceptofthefirsttype.
Thegeneralideaofconceptisjustgenerality.
8.4.23Kant'sdistinctionbetweenideasandconceptsisnotclear.Butitishelpfulintryingtodefinepreciseconcepts.

Gdelsaidmoreabouttheconceptorideaofabsoluteproofinconnectionwithmind'ssuperiorityovercomputers(see61.11to61.14above):ifthiscanbeclarified,
thenwecanresolvetheintensionalparadoxesand,thereby,provethesuperiorityofmind.
Gdelexpectedthatlogicwouldbemuchenrichedoncewehaveasatisfactorytheoryofconcepts.Forinstance,heoncemadethefollowingobservationabout
Skolem'sresultthateverytheoryofnaturalnumbersadmitssomenonstandardmodel:
8.4.24ItisawronginterpretationofSkolem'stheoremtosaythatitmakesthecharacterizationofintegersbylogicimpossible,becauseonecanusethetheoryofconcepts.

8.5TheParadoxesandtheTheoryofConcepts
Gdelwasemphaticthattheintensionalparadoxesshouldbedistinguishedfromthesemanticparadoxesandtheextensionalparadoxes.Forhim,unlikethesemantic
paradoxes,theextensionalandtheintensionalparadoxesarenotrelatedtoagivenlanguage.Thesharpdistinctionbetweensets(asextensions)andconcepts(as
intensions)makesitclearthatintensionalparadoxessuchasthatoftheconceptofallconceptsnotapplyingtothemselvesarenottrivialvariantsofextensional
paradoxessuchasthatofthesetofallsetsnotbelongingtothemselves.
InhisRussellpaperandhisCantorpaperGdelhadnotmadethesedistinctionsexplicit.Asaresult,ithadbeenpuzzlingtomanyreadersthathisattitudestowardthe
paradoxesinthetwopapersappeartobeincompatible.Specifically,thefollowingtwostatementsseeminconflict:
8.5.1ByanalyzingtheparadoxestowhichCantor'ssettheoryhadled,he[Russell]freedthemfromallmathematicaltechnicalities,thusbringingtolighttheamazingfactthatour
logicalintuitions(i.e.,intuitionsconcerningsuchnotionsas:truth,concept,being,class,etc.)areselfcontradictory(CW2:124).
8.5.2They[thesettheoreticalparadoxes]areaveryseriousproblem,butnotforCantor'ssettheory(CW2:180).

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InthesecondversionoftheCantorpaper,thisstatementwasrevisedtoread:
8.5.3Theyareaveryseriousproblem,notformathematics,however,butratherforlogicandepistemology(CW2:258).

IaskedGdelaboutthisapparentdiscrepancyin1971.InFromMathematicstoPhilosophy,Isummarizedhisreplyinaformrevisedandapprovedbyhim,as
follows:
8.5.4Thedifferenceinemphasisisduetoadifferenceinthesubjectmatter,becausethewholepaperonRussellisconcernedwithlogicratherthanmathematics.Thefullconcept
ofclass(truth,concept,being,etc.)isnotusedinmathematics,andtheiterativeconcept,whichissufficientformathematics,mayormaynotbethefullconceptofclass.
Therefore,thedifficultiesintheselogicalconceptsdonotcontradictthefactthatwehaveasatisfactoryfoundationofmathematicsintermsoftheiterativeconceptofset
(MP:187188,221).
8.5.5Inrelationtologicasopposedtomathematics,Ibelievethattheunsolveddifficultiesaremainlyinconnectionwiththeintensionalparadoxes(suchastheconceptofnot
applyingtoitself)ratherthanwitheithertheextensionalorthesemanticparadoxes.Intermsofthecontrastbetweenbankruptcyandmisunderstanding[MP:190193],myviewis
thattheparadoxesinmathematics,whichIidentifywithsettheory,areduetomisunderstanding,whilelogic,asfarasitstrueprinciplesareconcerned,isbankruptonaccountof
theintensionalparadoxes.Thisobservationbynomeansintendstodenythefactthatsomeoftheprinciplesoflogichavebeenformulatedquitesatisfactorily,inparticularall
thosewhichareusedintheapplicationoflogictothesciencesincludingmathematicsasithasjustbeendefined.
8.5.6Forsets,theparadoxesaremisunderstandings,eventhoughsetsasextensionsofconceptsareinlogicandepistemology.Setsarequasiphysical.Thatiswhythereisno
selfreference.Settheoryapproachescontradictiontogetitsstrength.
8.5.7Thebankruptcyviewonlyappliestogeneralconceptssuchasproofandconcept.Butitdoesnotapplytocertainapproximationswherewedohavesomethingtoleanback
on.Inparticular,theconceptofsetisanabsoluteconcept[thatisnotbankrupt],andprovableinsettheorybyaxiomsofinfinityisalimitedconceptofproof[whichisnot
bankrupt].

Ofcourse,ouractualconversationsincludedlessconcisestatementsandmoreramificationsthantheabove.
Gdelrepeatedlyemphasizesthathehimselfhadlongagoresolvedthesemanticparadoxesandthatitisimportanttodistinguishsemanticparadoxes,whichhavetodo
withlanguage,fromintensionalparadoxes,whichhavetodowithconcepts.Theconfusionbetweenconceptandlanguage,intensionalandsemantical,isprevalentand
harmful,andis,he

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believes,aresultofthewidespreadprejudiceinfavorofnominalismandpositivism.
Gdelobservedthatthegeneraltendencytoconfusesemanticwithintensionalparadoxesstemsfromapreoccupationwithlanguage.Weunderstandthesemantic
paradoxesbecause,foragivenlanguageinwhichtheycanbeformulated,weseethattheymeannothing.Forinstance,inGdel'sownworkontheincompletabilityof
numbertheory,hefirstsolvedthesemanticparadox"thisisnottrue"(relativetoagivenformallanguage)byconcludingthattruthisnotdefinableinthesamelanguage.
Hethenwentontosolvethesemanticparadox"thisisnotprovable(inthegivensystem)"byconcludingthatitisatruestatement,thoughnotprovableinthesystem.
Inadraftreplytoaletterof27May1970fromYossefBalas,thenastudentattheUniversityofNorthernIowa,Gdelspokeofhisincompletabilitytheoremas
showingthattruthcouldnotbeequatedwithprovability(intheformalsystem).Hecontinued:"Longbefore,Ihadfoundthecorrectsolutionofthesemantic
paradoxesinthefactthattruthinalanguagecannotbedefinedinitself."
Inadditiontotheparadoxoftheconceptofnotapplyingtoitself,Gdeloncementionedanotherparadoxthatoftheconceptofnotbeingmeaningfullyapplicable
toitself.
8.5.8Nolanguageisknownthatsemanticparadoxescomeinwithoutintensionalparadoxes.Meaningfulandpreciseconceptsmeanthis:sentencescomposedfromthemin
grammaticalformhavecontentandtruthvalue.Thereisalsoaparadoxoftheconceptofallconceptsnotmeaningfullyapplicabletothemselves.Meaningfulnessismuchclearer
forlogicalconceptsthanforempiricalconcepts.Butthismaybejustmypersonalhabit.
8.5.9Thesemanticparadoxeshavetodowithlanguageandareunderstood.Incontrast,theintensionalparadoxesremainaseriousproblemoflogic,ofwhichconcepttheoryis
themajorcomponent.ThetwokindsofparadoxareoftenmixedtogetherbecausewithoutPlatonismconceptsappearmorelikelanguage.
8.5.10Thedifferencebetweensemanticalandconceptualparadoxestendstobeobliteratedbynominalism.Withoutobjectivism,conceptsbecomecloselyrelatedtolanguage.
Thatiswhysemanticandintensionalparadoxesareoftenthoughttobethesame.Butconceptualparadoxescanbeformulatedwithoutreferencetolanguageatall.
8.5.11Languageplaysnopartintheintensionalparadoxes,sincetheyareconcernedwithconceptsaspropertiesandrelationsofthingswhichexistindependentlyofour
definitionsandconstructions.
8.5.12Theintensionalparadoxesinvolveonlylogicalconcepts,whilethesemanticparadoxesinvolveempiricalconceptstoo.Weseethesolutionofthesemanticparadoxesin
thattheysaynothing.Withtheintensionalparadoxes,

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however,wedon'tseethesolutionanditisnotclearthat''itsaysnothing"istherightdirectiontolookforit.Languageplaysnopartintheintensionalparadox.Eventhoughwe
usesymbolstostateit,thatstilldoesnotmakeitintoalinguisticparadox.Withsemanticparadoxes,wearealwaysinadefinitelanguage,whichalwayshascountablymany
symbols.Wecanneverhavetrueinthesamelanguage.OrdinaryEnglishisnotapreciselanguage,sothequestionofsemanticparadoxesdoesnotapplytoit.Thesemantic
paradoxeshavenocontent,becausetheyuseempiricalselfreference.Withlogicalselfreference,thelackofcontentdoesnotoccur.Forexample,notapplyingtoitselfisa
perfectlyreasonableconceptweseenoreasonwhyitshouldnotbe.Itcouldbeprovedthatapplyingtoitselfappliestoitself.
8.5.13Eventhoughwedonotunderstandtheintensionalparadoxesandhavenotyetfoundtherightaxiomsforthetheoryofconcepts,weknowwhattheprimitivesofthetheory
arewhichcannotbereducedtoanythingmoreprimitive.Thesemanticparadoxesaredifferent:wehavenoprimitiveintuitionsaboutlanguage.

OntheoccasionofthisdiscussionGdeltalkedextensivelyabouthisdissatisfactionwiththeexcessiveemphasisonlanguageinphilosophy(quotedinsection5.5see
especially5.5.7to5.5.9).Theprimitivesofconcepttheoryare,hebelieves,analogoustothoseofsettheory.AsIunderstandit,paragraph8.5.13saysthatthe
challengeofdevelopingconcepttheorycomespartlyfromthefactthatwedohavecertainintuitionsabouttheconceptofconcept,butthatwedonotyetperceivethat
importantconceptclearly.
Toclarifythecontrastbetweensemanticandintensionalparadoxes,on18October1972Gdelcitedthefollowingfamiliarexamples:
8.5.14Considerthesentence"Iamnotprovable"or
(1)(1)isnotprovable.
Languagecomesinhere.Butaboutwhatlanguageishespeaking?Itisimpossibletodefinealanguageforwhichyoucandrawthe[familiarcontradictory]conclusion.Theissue
onlybecomesproblematicifyouhavedevelopedalanguage.Buttherewouldalreadybesimplerintensionalparadoxessuchas:
(2)WhatIamsayingisnotprovable.
8.5.15Theselfreferencein(2)isbyapronoun,andpronounsareambiguous.Butthiscanbecorrected,followingAckermann'sdevice.Theeliminationofpronounsisan
importantstep:
(3)WhatMr.Asayson18October1972betweennoonandaminutelatercannotbeprovedthisbeingtheonlysentenceutteredbyMr.Awithinthatminute.
Onecanalsowriteasimilarsentenceonablackboardthatreferstoitselfbytimeandplace.Giventheserevisions[of(1)],youhaveintensionalparadoxesanyway:semantic
paradoxesareunimportant.

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ForGdel,theimportanceofthedistinctionbetweenextensionalandintensionalparadoxeshasmuchtodowiththefactthatwealreadyhaveafairlysatisfactoryset
theorywhichresolvestheextensionalparadoxes,whiletheunresolvedintensionalparadoxesprovideausefulfocustheyconstituteaconspicuousobstacletobe
overcomeinthemajortaskofdevelopingasatisfactoryconcepttheory.Moreover,heseestheparadoxesasevidenceforobjectivism,bothinthattheyreveala
constraintimposedbyobjectiverealityonourfreedomtoformsetsandconcepts,andinthat,byperceivingtheconceptofsetmoreclearly,wehaveresolvedthe
extensionalparadoxes.
Gdelwasinterestedinthedistinctionbetweenthebankruptcyandthemisunderstandingviewsabouttherelationbetweensettheoryandtheparadoxes(MP:190
193):
8.5.16Forconceptstheparadoxespointtobankruptcy,butforsetstheyaremisunderstandings.
8.5.17Istheword"misunderstanding"appropriateforthecharacterizationoftheextensionalparadoxes?Maybeweshouldcallthemoversightandmistakenapplication.
Oversightisamoredefiniteconcept,butitistoolight.Perhapsweshouldsaypersistentorseriousoversight.
8.5.18Therearenoconclusiveargumentsforthebankruptcyviewofsettheory.Touseconceptswhichhaveledtocontradictionsintheirmostprimitiveevidenceprovesnothing.
Itisnotonlyinsettheory[that]weuseidealizationsevenfinitenumbertheoryupto10100isalsoawildidealization.
8.5.19Theargumentthatconceptsareunrealbecauseofthelogicalintensionalparadoxesisliketheargumentthattheouterworlddoesnotexistbecausetherearesense
deceptions.
8.5.20Theintensionalparadoxescanbeusedtoprovethatconceptsexist.Theyprovethatwearenotfreetointroduceanyconcepts,because,bydefinition,ifwewerereally
completelyfree,they[thenewconcepts]wouldnotleadtocontradictions.Itisperfectlyallrighttoformconceptsinthefamiliarmanner:wehaveevidencethattheseare
meaningfulandcorrectwaysofformingconcepts.Whatiswrongisnottheparticularwaysofformation,buttheideathatwecanformconceptsarbitrarilybycorrectprinciples.
Theseprinciplesareunavoidable:notheoryofconceptscanavoidthem.Everyconceptispreciselydefined,exactlyanduniquelyeverywhere:true,false,ormeaningless.It
remainspreciselydefinedifwereplacemeaninglessbyfalse.Wedon'tmakeconcepts,theyarethere.Beingsubjectivemeansthatwecanformthemarbitrarilybycorrect
principlesofformation.

8.6SetsandConcepts:TheQuestforConceptTheory
Gdelassociatessetswithextensionandmathematics,conceptswithintensionandlogic.Setsareobjects.Indeed,heidentifiesmathematicalobjects

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withsetsandsuggeststhatobjectsarephysicalandmathematicalobjects.Heisnotexplicitonthequestionwhethernumbersarealso(mathematical)objects.Iprefer
toregardnumbersasobjectstoo,butformostofourconsiderationshere,itisconvenienttoleavenumbersout.Toavoidthefamiliarambiguityofthewordobject,I
shalltakebothobjectsandconceptstobeentitiesorthingsorbeings.
Classesareneitherconceptsnorobjects.Theyareananalogueandageneralizationofsets.Therangeofeveryconceptis,bydefinition,aclass.Iftherangehappens
tobeaset,thenthesetisalsotheextensionoftheconcept,becauseonlyanobjectcanbeanextension.
8.6.1Thesubjectmatteroflogicisintensions(concepts)thatofmathematicsisextensions(sets).Predicatelogiccanbetakeneitheraslogicorasmathematics:itisusuallytaken
aslogic.Thegeneralconceptsoflogicoccurineverysubject.Aformalscienceappliestoeveryconceptandeveryobject.Thereareextensionalandintensionalformaltheories.
8.6.2Mathematiciansareprimarilyinterestedinextensionsandwehaveasystematicstudyofextensionsinsettheory,whichremainsamathematicalsubjectexceptinits
foundations.Mathematiciansformanduseconcepts,buttheydonotinvestigategenerallyhowconceptsareformed,asistobedoneinlogic.Wedonothaveanequallywell
developedtheoryofconceptscomparabletosettheory.Atleastatthepresentstageofdevelopment,atheoryofconceptsdoesnotpromisetobeamathematicalsubjectasmuch
assettheoryisone.
8.6.3Setsandconceptsareintroduceddifferently:theirconnectionsareonlyoutward.(Ifwetakesetsastheonlyobjects,wegetthemathematicalsetsalimitingcaseofsetsin
generalwhicharereallytheworldofmathematicalobjects.)Forinstance,whilenosetcanbelongtoitself,someconceptscanapplytothemselves:theconceptofconcept,the
conceptofbeingapplicabletoonlyonething(oroneobject),theconceptofbeingdistinctfromthesetofallfinitemathematicalsets,theconceptofbeingaconceptwithan
infiniterange,andsoon.Itiserroneoustothinkthattoeachconcepttherecorrespondsaset.
8.6.4Itisnotintheideas(ofsetandconcept)themselvesthateverysetistheextensionofaconcept.Setsmightexistwhichcorrespondtonoconcepts.Theproposition"for
everyset,thereisa[defining]concept"requiresaproof.ButIconjecturethatitistrue.Ifso,everything(inlogicandmathematics)isaconcept:aset,ifextensionalandaconcept
(only)otherwise.
8.6.5Generallytherangeofapplicabilityofaconceptneednotformaset.Anobviousexampleistheconceptofset,whoserangeconsistsofallsets.Afamiliarandconvenient
practiceistotaketherangeofanyconceptasaclass.Whentherangeofaconceptisaset,thesetisitsextension.Since,strictlyspeaking,anextensionshouldbeoneobjectbut
aclasswhichisnotasetisnotoneobject,wecangenerallyspeakofthe"extension"ofaconceptonlyasafaondeparler.Bearingthisinmind,wecanalsothinkofclassesas
"extensions"ofconcepts.

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8.6.6Classesareintroducedbycontextualdefinitionsdefinitionsinuseconstruedinanobjectivesense.[Forinstance,somethingxbelongstoaclassKifthereisaconceptC
suchthatKistherangeofCandCappliestox.]Theyarenothinginthemselves,andwedonotunderstandwhatareintroducedonlybycontextualdefinitions,whichmerelytell
ushowtodealwiththemaccordingtocertainrules.Classesappearsomuchlikesetsthatwetendtoforgetthelineofthoughtwhichleadsfromconceptstoclasses.If,however,
weleaveoutsuchconsiderations,thetalkaboutclassesbecomesamatterofmakebelieve,arbitrarilytreatingclassesasiftheyweresetsagain.
8.6.7Classesareonlyaderivativehybridconvenience,introducedasawayofspeakingaboutsomeaspectsofconcepts.A(proper)classisanuneigentlichGegenstand,itis
nothinginitself.Inastrictsenseoneshouldnotspeakofaclass:itisonlyawayoftalkingaboutconceptswhichapplytothesamerangeofthings.Wetendtospeakofclasses
asiftheyweresingleobjectsbuttheyarelikefractionstakenaspairsofintegers.Allconceptsdefinedextensionallyareclasses.
8.6.8Leibnizdevelopedclassesonthelowestlevel.Butlogicallyonecannotstopwiththelowestclasses.Itisnaturaltoextendfurther,becausethegeneralconceptofconceptis
priortothelowestclasses.
8.6.9Ofcoursetheaxiomof"extensionality"holdsforclasses,becausethefaondeparlerhasbeenintroducedforthispurpose.[Inotherwords,twoclasseswiththesame
membersareidentical.]Incontrast,twoconceptswhichapplytothesamethingsareoftendifferent.Onlyconceptshavingthesamemeaning[intension]wouldbeidentical.
8.6.10ThefollowingsentenceshouldbedeletedfrommyRussellpaper:"Itmightevenbetruethattheaxiomofextensionality(i.e.,thatnotwodifferentpropertiesbelongto
exactlythesamethings,which,inasense,isacounterparttoLeibniz'sPrincipiumidentitatisindiscernibilium,whichsaysnotwodifferentthingshaveexactlythesame
properties)oratleastsomethingneartoitholdsforconcepts."Thisstatementistheassertionofaveryunlikelypossibilityofthestructureoftheworldwhichincludesconcepts.
Suchprinciplescanonlybetrueifdifferenceisdefinedproperly.Idonot[nolonger]believethatgenerallysamenessofrangeissufficienttoexcludethedistinctnessoftwo
concepts.

ThisstatementisoneillustrationofthefactthatGdelmodifiedsomeofhisviewsaboutclassesbetweenthe1940sandthe1970s.Onthewhole,heseemstohave
assignedclassesamorefundamentalpositionintheRussellpaperascomparedwithhislaterviewthat"classesarenothinginthemselves."Forinstance,heseemsto
haveviewedclassesandconceptsasequallyfundamental,whenheassertedthat,likeconceptsaspropertiesandrelationsofthings,classesarereal(CW2:128):
8.6.11Classesmay,however,alsobeconceivedasrealbeings,namelyas"pluralitiesofthings"orasstructuresconsistingofapluralityofthingsexistingindependentlyofour
definitionsandconstructions.

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Indeed,eveninhis1972formulation(8.5.4above),Gdelputsspecialemphasisonthe"fullconceptofclass(truth,concept,being,etc.)"andsaysthattheiterative
conceptofset"mayormaynotbethefullconceptofclass."Indiscussionsbetween1975and1976,however,henotonlypushedclassestoanauxiliarypositionbut
obviouslyimpliedthattheconceptofsetcannotbethefullconceptofclass.
Inthecontextof8.6.6,Gdelequatesclasseswith"extensional"concepts:
8.6.12Alternatively,wemaydealwith'extensional"concepts("mathematical"concepts)bylimiting[them]toconceptssuchthatifAappliestoB,thenAappliestoallconcepts
withthesame"extension"asB.
8.6.13Asusual,classeswhicharenotsetsareconvenientlyreferredtoasproperclasses.Anaturalextensionofthisterminologyistospeakofanextremelygeneralconcept
whenits"extension"isnotaset(orstrictlyspeaking,ithasnoextension).Sinceconceptscansometimesapplytothemselves,theirextensions(theircorrespondingclasses)can
belongtothemselvesthatis,aclasscanbelongtoitself.Fregedidnotdistinguishsetsfromproperclasses,butCantordidthisfirst.

Eventhoughitisclearthatgenerallytherangeofaconceptneednotbeaset,itisanopenquestionwhethereverysetistheextensionofsomeconcept.Indeed,Gdel
conjecturesthatthisisthecase.(Compare8.6.4.)
8.6.14Itisnotevidentthateverysetistheextensionofsomeconcept.Butsuchaconclusionmaybeprovableoncewehaveadevelopedtheoryofconceptsandamorecomplete
settheory.Whileitisanincorrectassumptiontotakeitasapropertyoftheconceptofconcepttosaythateveryconceptdefinesaset,itisnotaconfusiontosaythatsetscan
onlybedefinedbyconceptsorthatsetisacertainwayofspeakingaboutconcept.

Foreachseta,wemayconsideracorrespondingconceptCsuchthatCappliestoallandonlytheobjectswhichbelongtoa.Itmightbefeltthat,inthisway,every
setisseentobetheextensionofsomeconcept.Since,however,setsareextensional,itmaynotbeobviousthatthereisindeedsuchacorrespondingconceptfor
everyset.Idonothaveasufficientlyclearunderstandingoftheconceptofconcepttogiveanyconvincingreasonwhytheremaybecertainsetsforwhichsuch
representativeconceptsdonotexist.Indeed,Iaminclinedtoassumethattheyexistforallsets.AsfarasIcansee,suchanassumptioncannotberefutedandisa
reasonablecomponentoftheconceptofconcept.
ForGdel,oncewerecognizethedistinctionbetweensetsandconcepts,theabsenceanddesirabilityofasatisfactoryconcepttheory,whichisnotparasiticuponset
theory,becomesclear.Eventhoughheisnotabletooffermorethanpreliminarysuggestions,heconsidersitanimportantsteptohaveclarifiedsomewhatthenatureof
thequest.Intherestofthis

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sectionIpresentagroupofhisdisparateobservationsonthissearch,asreformulatedandeditedbyme.
8.6.15Foralongtimetherehasbeenconfusionbetweenlogicandmathematics.Oncewemakeanduseasharpdistinctionbetweensetsandconcepts,wehavemadeseveral
advances.Wehaveareasonablyconvincingfoundationforordinarymathematicsaccordingtotheiterativeconceptofset.Goingbeyondsetsbecomesanunderstandableand,in
fact,anecessarystepforacomprehensiveconceptionoflogic.Wecomebacktotheprogramofdevelopingagrandlogic,exceptthatwearenolongertroubledbythe
consequencesoftheconfusionbetweensetsandconcepts.Forexample,wearenolongerfrustratedbywantingtosaycontradictorythingsaboutclasses,andcannowsayboth
thatnosetcanbelongtoitselfandthataconceptandtherewithaclasscanapply(orbelong)toitself.
8.6.16Inthiswayweacquirenotonlyafairlyrichandunderstandablesettheorybutalsoclearerguidanceforoursearchforaxiomsthatdealwithconceptsgenerally.Wecan
examinewhetherfamiliaraxiomsforsetshavecounterpartsforconceptsandalsoinvestigatewhetherearlierattempts(e.g.,intermsofthelambdacalculusandofstratification,
etc.),whichdealwithsetsandconceptsindiscriminately,maysuggestaxiomsthataretrueofconceptsgenerally.Ofcourse,weshouldalsolookfornewcandidatesforaxioms
concernedwithconcepts.Atthepresentstage,theprogramoffindingaxiomsforconceptsseemstobewideopen.

Theprimitiveconceptsofthetheoryofconceptsareanalogoustothoseofsettheory.
8.6.17Aconceptisawholecomposedofprimitiveconceptssuchasnegation,conjunction,existence,universality,object,theconceptofconcept,therelationofsomethingfalling
undersomeconcept(orofsomeconceptapplyingtosomething),andsoon.(Compare9.1.26.)
8.6.18Justassettheoryisformulatedinthepredicatecalculusbyaddingthemembershiprelation,concepttheorycansimilarlybeformulatedbyaddingtherelationofapplication:
aconceptAappliestosomethingB(whichmayalsobeaconcept),orBparticipatesintheidea[withthePlatonicsense]A.Logicstudiesonlywhataconceptappliesto.
Applicationistheonlyprimitiveconceptapartfromthefamiliarconceptsofpredicatelogicwithwhichwedefineotherconcepts.

Ifweconfineourattentiontothoseobjectswhicharethe"pure"sets(mathematicalobjects)andmakethesimplifyingassumptionthateverysetistheextensionof
someconcept,wemaytakeconceptsastheuniverseofdiscourseanddefinesetsandthemembershiprelationbetweenthem(compareRG:310).Amorecomplex
andnaturalformulationwouldviewtheuniverseofdiscourseasconsistingofbothconceptsandobjects,wherebothconceptsandobjectsconsistofbothpureones
andempiricalones.
Gdelbelievesthat,howeverwesetupaformalsystemofconcepttheory,wealreadyknowtheprimitiveconceptsandthegeneralprinciples

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offormingnewconceptsbynegation,conjunction,existence,andsoon.Theproblemisthatwedonotknowtheaxiomsorthenecessaryrestrictionsonapplying
thesecorrectgeneralprinciples.
Inconnectionwiththedeterminationofaxiomsofconcepttheoryortherestrictionsonthecorrectprinciplesofformingconcepts,Gdelmakesseveralcommentson
existingideas.(ComparetheRussellpaper,CW2:137138.)
8.6.19Oncewedistinguishconceptsfromsets,theoldersearchforasatisfactorysettheorygiveswaytoasimilarsearchforasatisfactoryconcepttheory.Forthispurpose,
however,Quine'sideaofstratification[1937]isarbitrary,andChurch'sidea[19321933]aboutlimitedrangesofsignificanceisinconsistentinitsoriginalformulation.(Compare
8.4.19.)
8.6.20Eventhoughwedonothaveadevelopedtheoryofconcepts,weknowenoughaboutconceptstoknowthatwecanhavealsosomethinglikeahierarchyofconcepts(or
alsoofclasses)whichresemblesthehierarchyofsetsandcontainsitasasegment.Butsuchahierarchyisderivativefromandperipheraltothetheoryofconceptsitalso
occupiesaquitedifferentpositionforexample,itcannotsatisfytheconditionofincludingtheconceptofconceptwhichappliestoitselfortheuniverseofallclassesthatbelong
tothemselves.Totakesuchahierarchyasthetheoryofconceptsisanexampleoftryingtoeliminatetheintensionalparadoxesinanarbitrarymanner.
8.6.21Atransfinitetheoryofconceptsisanexampleoftryingtoeliminatetheparadoxesinanarbitraryway:bytreatingconceptsasiftheyweresets.Considerallconceptswhose
rangesareincludedintheuniversalsetV,andmergeallconceptshavingthesamerangeintoaclass.AlltheseclassesmakeupthepowerclassofV.Repeattheprocess:inthis
waytheaxiomofregularityholdsforclassestoo.Butwecanobtainnouniversalconceptorclassinthismanner.
8.6.22Asethavingapropertyisaclearlydefinedrelationbetweenthesetandtheproperty.Acompletefoundationofsettheorycallsforastudyofpropertiesandconcepts.And
wegetmoreinvolvedintheparadoxes.CompareafootnoteinmyCantorpaper[CW2:181n.17,260n.118].
8.6.23Whenweformulatetheparadoxesintermsofconceptsclearlydefinedforeverything,wedon'tseewhatiswrong.Hence,theconceptofclearlydefinedconceptisnota
clearlydefinedconcept.Aconcept,unlikeaset,canapplytoitself.Certainlytheconceptofconceptisaconcept.Doestheconceptoftransitiverelationapplytoitself?[Itried
hardtomakesenseofthisquestionbutwasnotabletocomeupwithasatisfactoryinterpretationofit.]Conceptsareunderstandablebythemind.Pureconceptsaretheonlykind
thatweunderstandwithoutthehelpofempiricalobservations.

Theobviousobstacletothequestforconcepttheoryistheintensionalparadoxes,ofwhichthemostimportantisthatoftheconceptofnotapplyingtoitself.On18
October1972Gdelintroducedandexplained

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indetailasimpleformofthisparadox.Hesuggestedthatitwouldbehelpful,forthepurposeofdevelopingconcepttheory,toreflectonit.Wemaylegitimatelycallit
Gdel'sparadox,eventhoughhegaveitadifferentname:
8.6.24Thereisasimplerversionofthefamiliarparadoxoftheconceptofnotapplyingtoitself.ItmaybecalledChurch'sparadoxbecauseitismosteasilysetupinChurch's
system[19321933].Itisparticularlystrikingthatthisparadoxisnotwellknown.Itmakesclearthattheintensionalparadoxeshavenosimplesolution.Aninterestingproblemisto
findatheoryinwhichtheclassicalparadoxesarenotderivablebutthisoneis.
8.6.25Afunctionissaidtoberegularifitcanbeappliedtoeveryentity[whichmaybeanobjectorafunction(aconcept)].Considernowthefollowingregularfunctionoftwo
arguments:

[Gdelusedadotbetweenthetwoarguments,insteadoftheletterd.Ifinditclearertosacrificetheeleganceofhisnotation.]
Introducenowanotherregularfunction:

Weseeimmediately:

LetH(x)beE(d(x,x)],whichisregular.BY(1),wehave:

SubstitutingHforx,weget:

ThiscompletesthederivationofChurch'sparadox.
8.6.26Thederivationabovehasnoneedevenofthepropositionalcalculus.DefinitionbycasesisavailableinChurch'ssystem.Itiseasytofindfunctionswhichareeverywhere
defined.Unliketheclassicalparadox,thereisnoneedtoassumeinitiallythatthecrucialconcept(orfunction)ofnotapplyingtoitselfiseverywheredefined.Theparadoxisbrief,
andbrevitymakesthingsmoreprecise.Byaslightmodification,itcanbemadeintoanintuitionisticparadox,usingprovability.

Atthispoint,IaskedGdel:Isthereanyparadoxthatusesnothingelsesuchasdefinitionbycasesbesidesprovability?Herepliedthat

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theanswerwas,hethought,yes.InNovemberof1975Gdel,recallingthisparadox,added:
8.6.27Itappliesalsototheconceptofallintuitionisticconcepts.A.Heytingpresupposesthegeneralconceptof(intuitionistic)proofinhisinterpretationofimplication:Aimplies
Bifandonlyif,foreveryproofofA,youcanconstructaproofofB.Incontrast,myinterpretationusesanarrowerconceptofproof.(CompareCW2:275276noteh.)

8.7PrinciplesfortheIntroductionofSets
Inthe1970sGdelofferedanswerssomewhatdifferentonesatdifferentstagestothequestion:Whataretheprinciplesbywhichweintroducetheaxiomsofset
theory?Thisisdifferentfromtherelatedquestion,Whatistheprecisemeaningoftheprinciples,andwhydoweacceptthem?Hedidnotsaymuchaboutthesecond
question,butheseemedtosuggestthatitshouldbeansweredbyphenomenologicalinvestigationsinthemannerofHusserl.
InFebruary1972Gdelformulatedasummaryofthefiveprinciplesactuallyusedforsettingupaxiomsofsettheory:(1)intuitiveranges(2)closureprinciple(3)
reflectionprinciple(4)extensionalizationand(5)uniformity.Heemphasizedthatthesameaxiomcanbejustifiedbydifferentprinciples,whicharenonethelessdistinct
becausetheyarebasedondifferentideasforexample,inaccessiblenumbersarejustifiedbyeither(2)or(3).
InMayof1972hereformulatedthefiveprinciples,andIquotedtheminfullinFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(MP:180190).Insteadofreproducingthese
quotationsexactly,Icombinethemherewithmynotesfromlessformaldiscussions.
8.7.1Intuitiverange.Foranyintuitiverangesofvariabilitythatis,multitudesthatcan,insomesense,be"overviewed"thereexistsetsthatrepresenttheranges.Thebasic
ideaofsetformationisthatofintuitivegeneration.
8.7.2Closureprinciple.Iftheuniverseofsetsisclosedwithrespecttocertainoperations,thereexistsasetthatissimilarlyclosed.Thisimplies,forexample,theexistenceof
inaccessiblecardinalsandofinaccessiblecardinalsequaltotheirindexasinaccessiblecardinals.Givenanyprimitiveoperationsofformingsets,[wecan]applythemasmuchas
possibleandtreatthetotalityasaset.ThisishowwearriveattheinaccessibleandtheMahlocardinals.
8.7.3Reflectionprinciple.Theuniverseofallsetsisstructurallyindefinable.Onepossiblewaytomakethisstatementpreciseisthefollowing:Theuniverseofsetscannotbe
uniquelycharacterized(i.e.,distinguishedfromallitsinitialsegments)byanyinternalstructuralpropertyofthemembershiprelationinitwhichisexpressibleinanylogicoffinite
ortransfinitetype,includinginfinitarylogicsofany

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cardinalnumber.Thisprinciplemaybeconsideredageneralizationoftheclosureprinciple.Furthergeneralizationsandrefinementsareinthemakinginrecentliterature.The
totalityofallsetsis,insomesense,indescribable.Whenyouhaveanystructuralpropertythatissupposedtoapplytoallsets,youknowyouhavenotgotallsets.Theremustbe
somesetsthatcontainasmembersallsetsthathavethatproperty.
8.7.4Extensionalization.Axiomssuchascomprehension[subsetformation]andreplacementarefirstformulatedintermsofdefiningpropertiesorrelations.Theyare
extensionalizedasapplyingtoarbitrarycollectionsorextensionalcorrelations.Forexample,wegettheinaccessiblenumbersbytheclosureprincipleonlyifweconstruetheaxiom
ofreplacementextensionally.Firstformulateaprinciplefordefinablepropertiesonlyandthenextendittoanything.
8.7.5Uniformityoftheuniverseofsets(analogoustotheuniformityofnature).Theuniverseofsetsdoesnotchangeitscharactersubstantiallyasonegoesfromsmallertolarger
setsorcardinalsthatis,thesameoranalogousstatesofaffairsreappearagainandagain(perhapsinmorecomplicatedversions).Insomecases,itmaybedifficulttoseewhatthe
analogoussituationsorpropertiesare.Butincasesofsimpleand,insomesense,"meaningful"propertiesitisprettyclearthatthereisnoanalogueexceptthepropertyitself.This
principle,forexample,makestheexistenceofstronglycompactcardinalsveryplausible,inviewofthefactthatthereshouldexistgeneralizationsofStone'srepresentationtheorem
forordinaryBooleanalgebrastoBooleanalgebraswithinfinitesumsandproducts.Foraxiomsofinfinitythisprincipleisconstruedinabroadersense.Itmayalsobecalledthe
"principleofproportionalityoftheuniverse":analoguesofpropertiesofsmallcardinalsbychanceleadtolargecardinals.Forexample,measurablecardinalswereintroducedin
thisway.Peopledidnotexpectthemtobelarge.
Inthecourseofstatingtheseprinciples,Gdelmadeseveralincidentalobservationsaboutthem:
8.7.6Thesearenotmutuallyexclusiveprinciples.Forinstance,theBernayssettheory[presumablythesysteminBernays1961]couldbefoundedonthereflectionprincipleoron
thecombinationofextensionalizationwiththeclosureprinciple.ThekeyissimilartotheMahloprinciples.
8.7.7Theintendedmodelofsettheoryincludesarbitrarilylargecardinals.Butinsomecasesitmayhappennottobecompatiblewiththestatementthatsuchandsuchlarge
cardinalsexist,becausethegeneralconceptneededcannotbeexpressedintheprimitivenotationofthemodel.

Intheearlyautumnof1975,Iwasrevisinganearlierdraftofmypaperonlargesets(Wang1977),inwhichIconsideredseveralformsofthereflectionprinciplequite
extensivelyandinafairlytechnicalmanner.ItwasnaturalformetoaskGdeltocommentonthemanuscript,andhewasquitewillingtodoso.Intheprocess,he
madevariousobservations.Amongotherthings,wediscussedthesystemofAckermann(1956),

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whichseemstohaveledGdeltoadrasticreformulationofhisfiveprinciplesfortheformationofsets(1972).
Ackermann'ssystemcanbeviewedasusingalanguageobtainedfromalanguageoftheZermelotypebyaddingaconstantV,takentostandfortheuniverseofall
sets.Asaresult,theuniverseofdiscoursecontainsthingsotherthansets,whichare,infamiliarterminology,thesubclassesofV.Thecentralaxiomofthesystemsays
thateverypropertyexpressibleinthelanguagewithoutusingVdeterminesamemberofV(aset),provideditappliesonlytomembersofV.(Formoredetails,see
Wang1977:330.)
(A)Ackermann'saxiom.LetyandzbeinVandF(x,y,z)beanopensentencenotcontainingV,suchthat,forallx,ifF(x,y,z),thenxisinV.Thereisthensome
uinV,suchthat,forallx,F(x,y,z)ifandonlyifxbelongstou.
Inthisformulation,yandzaretheparameters.Themainideaisthat,ifyandzaregivensetsandalltheentitiesxthatsatisfyF(x,y,z)aresets,wecancollectthem
intoanewsetu.Inthisway,fromanygivensetsyandz,wecanfindanewsetuofallxsuchthatF(x,y,z).
AccordingtoAckermann,(A)istocodifyCantor's1895definitionofthetermset(Cantor1932:282):ByasetweshallunderstandanycollectionintoawholeSof
definite,welldistinguishedobjects(whichwewillcalltheelementsofS)ofourintuitionorourthought.
Clearly,inordertocollectcertainobjectsintoawhole,theobjectshavetobegivenfirstinsomesense.AnaturalinterpretationofCantor'sdefinitionistosaythat,
fromamongthegivensetsateachstage,thosewithacommonpropertycanbecollectedtoformanewset.In(A)theobjectstobecollectedarethosexwhichhave
thepropertyofsatisfyingF(x,y,z)forgivenFandgivensetsyandz,providedonlythatonlysetsxcansatisfyF(x,y,z).Theobjectstobecollectedareineachcase
determinedbysuitabley,z,andF.
TherequirementthatVdoesnotoccurinFisneeded.Withoutit,unlesswerestrictFinsomesuitableway,wecouldeasilyprovethatVitselfisasetandreacha
contradiction:forinstance,take''xbelongstoV"asF(x):ImplicitintherequirementthatVdoesnotoccurinF(x,y,z)istheprinciplethatVcannotbecapturedby
suchexpressions.IfthereweresomeexpressionF(x,y,z)notcontainingV,suchthat,forcertainsetsyandz,F(x,y,z)ifandonlyifxbelongstoV,thenthe
requirementwouldbesuperfluous.Moreover,Vwouldbeasetandwearrivequicklyatacontradiction.
AccordingtoGdel,
8.7.8Ackermann'ssystemisbasedontheideaoftheindefinabilityofV,ortheAbsolute.Itisinterestingbecausethesystemitselfisweakinitsconsequencesbut

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somethingweakermaysometimesserveasabetterbasisfornaturalstrongextensionsthanastrongerinitialsystem.

Indeed,GdeltriedtofindajustificationformeasurablecardinalsbyconsideringanaturalextensionofAckermann'ssystem(seebelow).Atthisstageheseemedto
viewtheunknowabilityoftheuniverseofallsetsasareflectionprinciplewhichunifiesallprinciplesbywhichwesetupaxiomsofsettheory.
8.7.9AlltheprinciplesforsettinguptheaxiomsofsettheoryshouldbereducibletoaformofAckermann'sprinciple:TheAbsoluteisunknowable.Thestrengthofthisprinciple
increasesaswegetstrongerandstrongersystemsofsettheory.Theotherprinciplesareonlyheuristicprinciples.Hence,thecentralprincipleisthereflectionprinciple,which
presumablywillbeunderstoodbetterasourexperienceincreases.Meanwhile,ithelpstoseparateoutmorespecificprincipleswhicheithergivesomeadditionalinformationorare
notyetseenclearlytobederivablefromthereflectionprincipleasweunderstanditnow.
8.7.10Forthepresent,letusconsiderthefollowingthreeprinciples:
(G1)Theprincipleofintuitiverangesofvariability
(G2)Ackermann'sprinciple,orthereflectionprincipleinamorerestrictedsense:VcannotbedefinedbyastructuralpropertynotcontainingVnopropertydefinablefromthe
elementsofVcandetermineV
(G3)Astructuralproperty,possiblyinvolvingV,whichappliesonlytoelementsofV,determinesasetor,asubclassofVthusdefinableisaset.

AsIunderstandit,GdelisassertingthattheabovethreeprinciplesareamongthespecialconsequencesofthegeneralprincipleoftheunknowabilityofV:aswe
understanditbetter,weshallbeabletoformulateotherandmorepreciseconsequencesofit.Theprinciple(G1)istheprincipleweusedabovetojustifythefamiliar
axiomsofsettheory.Itisaconsequenceofthecentralprinciple,because(1)tobeabletooverviewamultitudeistoknowitinastrongsense,and(2)aknowable
multitudeisasetaccordingtohisintendedinterpretationofthecentralprinciple.Theothertwoprinciplesarealsoconsequencesofit,becausewhatisdefinablebya
structuralpropertyisknowable.
Thedifficultnotionisofcoursethatofastructuralproperty.Gdel'sassociationofAckermann'sideawiththeinclusiveprinciplesuggeststhat,forhim,theproperties
inAckermann'saxiom(A)areexamplesofstructuralproperties.Heseemstodetectcertaindistinctivefeaturesinthepropertiesusedin(A),apartfromtheexplicit
conditionthattheydonotcontainV.Heseemstosaythatanypropertythatsharesthesefeaturesisastructuralproperty.Theproblemistogiveamoderatelyprecise
accountofthesefeatureswhichlendssomecredibilitytothebeliefthatpropertieswithsuchfeaturesdefinesets.

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Gdelmadetwoobservationsabout(G2):
8.7.11Thepositiveapplicationof(G2)saysthatastructuralpropertynotcontainingVmustdefineaset,becausethesmallestrangedeterminedbyitcannotgototheendofV.By
envisagingalargeruniverseofentities(say,includingalsoconceptsandclasses,inadditiontosets),wecanalsohavenegativeapplicationsof(G2):apropertyorconceptnot
involvingVthatholdsforallsetsmusthaveabroaderrangethanV.
8.7.12(G2)goesbeyond(G1)inthatwhatisobtainedby(G2)neednotbeanintuitiverangeofvariability.Disregardingthebeginningsteps[offormingsimplefamiliarsets],(G2)is
theonlyreallyevidentprinciple.Thebuildingupofthehierarchyofsetsdependsonthisprinciple:assumeyouhaveaclearidea[andhavedeterminedtherebyastageorarankin
thehierarchyofsets],youcangoonfurther.Hence,Vcannotbedefined[orknowninsuchastrongsense].Thisistheveryideaofthehierarchy.Reflectionisamoreabstract
principlethantheprincipleofintuitiverange.Toarriveatanintuitiverangeofvariabilityisonlyasufficientconditionforfindingaset.

Ontheprinciple(G3),Gdelmadethefollowingcomments.
8.7.13Toillustratetheintensionof(G3),considerapropertyP(V,x),whichinvolvesV.If,aswebelieve,Visextremelylarge,thenxmustappearinanearlysegmentofVand
cannothaveanyrelationtomuchlatersegmentsofV.Hence,withinP(V,x),Vcanbereplacedbysomesetineverycontext.Inshort,ifPdoesnotinvolveV,thereisnoproblem
ifitdoes,thenclosenesstoeachxhelpstoeliminateV,providedchaosdoesnotprevail.
8.7.14Thereisalsoatheologicalapproach,accordingtowhichVcorrespondstothewholephysicalworld,andtheclosenessaspecttowhatlieswithinthemonadandinbetween
themonads.Accordingtotheprinciplesofrationality,sufficientreason,andpreestablishedharmony,thepropertyP(V,x)ofamonadxisequivalenttosomeintrinsicpropertyof
x,inwhichtheworlddoesnotoccur.Inotherwords,whenwemovefrommonadstosets,thereissomesetytowhichxbearsintrinsicallythesamerelationasitdoestoV.Hence,
thereisapropertyQ(x),notinvolvingV,whichisequivalenttoP(V,x).Accordingtomedievalideas,propertiescontainingVortheworldwouldnotbeintheessenceofanyset
ormonad.
8.7.15Incontrastto(G1)and(G2),(G3)isaprinciplethatgoesfromeachtoall.ConsiderapropertyP(V,x)suchthat,foreachx,ifP(V,x),thenxisasetand,therefore,belongsto
somestageorrankinthehierarchyofsets.By(G3),Pthendefinesaset.But,unlikesetsobtainedby(G1),theimplication(foreachx)[oftherepresentabilityofVbysomesetin
thecontextofP]doesnotyieldanoverviewoftherangeofP,exceptfortheempiricalfactthataproofoftheimplication(forallx)maysometimesyieldasurveyoftherangeof
thesetthusobtained.

Oftheseobservations,8.7.13givesthebestindicationofGdel'sconceptofstructuralproperties.AsIunderstandtheparagraph,itbeginswithsomethinglikethe
frameofAckermann'ssystemandtriestoextendthe

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axiom(A)byaddingcertainexpressionsthatcontainV,yetstillrepresentstructuralproperties.
LetF(x,y,z)beanopensentenceinthesystemsuchthat,forgivensetsyandz,allentitiesxthatsatisfyF(x,y,z)aresets.IfFdoesnotcontainV,itisastructural
property.IfitcontainsV,letusrewriteitasP(V,x).Thetaskistofindanotionofstructuralpropertyforsuchexpressionssuchthat:ifP(V,x)isastructural
property,thenallthesetsxthatsatisfyP(V,x)canbecollectedtogetherintoanewsetu.
Gdelseemstosaythat,forPtosatisfythiscondition,itissufficientforthepartsofPtobeorganicallyconnectedinasuitablesensesothat,sincex,y,zallaresets
and,therefore,smallcomparedwithV,onlycertaininitialsegmentsofVarereallyinvolved.Consequently,everyoccurrenceofVinPcanpotentiallybereplacedby
somesufficientlylargeset.Thismaybeseenasanotherapplicationofthereflectionprinciple:forgivenx,y,z,ifP(a,x)istruewhenaisV,thereissomesetv,such
thatP(v,x)istrue.Ifweextendaxiom(A)byrequiringthateitherFdoesnotcontainVoritisorganicinthissomewhatvaguesense,wegetastrongersystem
becausewewouldexpectthatinmanycasesVcannotbeexplicitlyreplacedbysetsinthesystem.
IamnotsurewhetherthiselaborationagreeswithGdel'sintention.Inanycase,thereremains,Ithink,theproblemofapplyingthisvaguecharacterizationtoarriveat
precisecharacterizationsofsomerichclassesofstructuralpropertiesofthedesiredkind.
W.C.Powell(in1972)andW.Reinhardt(in1974)presentedtwoequivalentformulationsofasysteminwhichalotofmeasurablecardinalscanbeprovedtoexist.
Astheyobserved,theirsystemscaneachbereformulatedbyaddinganewaxiomtoAckermann'ssystem.Inparticular,thenewaxiomneededforReinhardt'ssystem,
ishisaxiom(S3.3)(Reinhardt1974:15).
Onthebasisofthistechnicalresult,Gdelsaid,thereformulatedsystemand,withit,theexistenceofmeasurablecardinals,canbemadeplausibleonthebasisof
(G3).Indeed,GdelformulatedtheexactwordingofthisobservationandsuggestedthatIincludeitinmypaper:
8.7.16Thecombinationof(S3.3)withAckermann'ssystemisthereasonableformulation.Theadditionalaxiom(S3.3)saysessentiallythatallsubclassesofVobtainableinthe
systemcanbedefinedwithoutreferencetoVi.e.,Vcanbeeliminatedfromsuchdefinitions.Ithinkthatitisthisformulationwhichgivesacertaindegreeofplausibilitytothis
system.GenerallyIbelievethat,inthelastanalysis,everyaxiomofinfinityshouldbederivedfromthe(extremelyplausible)principlethatVisindefinable,wheredefinabilityisto
betakenin[a]moreandmoregeneralizedandidealizedsense(Wang1977:325).

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Chapter9
Gdel'sApproachtoPhilosophy
Generalphilosophyisaconceptualstudy,forwhichmethodisallimportant.
Gdel,23January1976
Forapproachingthecentralpartofphilosophy,thereisgoodreasontoconfineone'sattentiontoreflectionsonmathematics.Physicsisperhapslesswellsuitedforthispurpose
Newtonianphysicswouldbebetter.
Gdel,24May1972
Themeaningoftheworldistheseparationofwishandfact.
Gdel,November1975
Forthephysicalworld,thefourdimensionsarenatural.Butforthemind,thereisnosuchnaturalcoordinatesystemtimeistheonlynaturalframeofinference.
Gdel,15March1972

DuringhisdiscussionswithmeGdelmademanyscatteredobservationsonthenatureandthemethodofphilosophy.Itisnoteasytograspandorganizethismaterial
soastogiveafaithfulandcoherentexpositionofhisviewsdifferentemphasesindifferentcontextshavetobeinterpretedandreconciled.Ifindhisultimateidealin
philosophyoverlyoptimistic,andhisargumentsforhisbeliefinitsattainabilityquiteunconvincing.Thereisabiggapbetweenwhathesaidandanexplicitoutlineof
feasiblestepsthatwouldleadtocompletionofhisseeminglyimpossiblequest.Nonetheless,mostofhissayingsare,Ibelieve,ofinterestfortheirphilosophical
significance,eventothoseofuswhodonotsharehisrationalisticoptimism.
InordertoavoidaconfusingjuxtapositionofGdel'sviewsandmyown,Irestrictmyselfinthischaptertoamoderatelystructuredexpositionandinterpretationofhis
viewswithonlyoccasionalinterpolatedcomments.IntheEpilogueIcomparehisconceptionofphilosophywithafewothersandproposealooseframeworkfor
revealingthecomplementarycharacterofvariousseriousalternativeapproaches.

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Ultimately,one'sconceptionofsomethingconsistsofallone'sbeliefsaboutit,includingone'sattitudetowardit.Effectivelycommunicatingsomeoneelse'sconception
ofsomethingascomplexasphilosophy,requiresagooddealofselection,interpretation,organization,andarticulation.Inordertoprovideanapproximationof
Gdel'sviews,Ishalltrytodescribehisconceptionsofthesubjectmatterandmethodofphilosophy.Atbottom,anindividual'sconceptionofphilosophyis
determinedbywhatheorshewantsandbelievesitpossibletoobtainfromitspursuit.Hence,boththesubjectmatterandthemethodareintimatelyconnectedto
one'saims.
AsIunderstandit,Gdelaimedatarationalandoptimisticworldviewwhichputsmindorspiritatthecenterand,preferably,includesGod.Gdelsawmetaphysicsas
themostfundamentalpartofphilosophyheoftenidentifiedtheologywithmetaphysics,butsometimesdistinguishedthem,asIprefertodo.Themaintaskof
philosophyashesawitwas(1)todetermineitsprimitiveconcepts,and(2)toanalyzeorperceiveorunderstandtheseconceptswellenoughtodiscoverthe
principalaxiomsaboutthem,soasto"doformetaphysicsasmuchasNewtondidforphysics."Onseveraloccasionshesaidthathehadnosatisfactorysolutioneven
ofproblem(1).Healsosaid,however,thathisownphilosophy,initsgeneralstructure,islikethemonadologyofLeibniz.
Gdel'sstronginterestinobjectivisminmathematics,ontheonehand,andthesuperiorityofmindovermatter,ontheother,arecloselyconnectedtohismainaimin
philosophy.Thesuperiorityofmindisundoubtedlyimportantforhisontologicalidealism,whichseesmindaspriortomatter.Amajorapplicationofhis
recommendationtogeneralizewithoutinhibitionishisowngeneralizationfromobjectivisminmathematicstoobjectivisminmetaphysics.Thatmustbe,Ithink,the
reasonwhyheattachedsomuchimportancetothephilosophyofmathematicsforthedevelopmentofphilosophy.Likemostphilosopherstoday,however,Iam
unabletoappreciatetheplausibilityofthisextrapolation.
Gdel'senthusiasmforHusserl'smethodwasundoubtedlybasedtosomeextentonhiswishtobelievethatthismethodcouldenableustoperceiveclearlythe
primitiveconceptsofmetaphysics,andheprobablysawhisownobservationsonphilosophicalmethodasexplicatingandcomplementingHusserl'sideas.Justas
Husserl'sworkisvaluableeventothosewhodonotsharehisaiminphilosophy,sotooareGdel'sphilosophicaldiscussions,thoughfordifferentreasons.
InhisphilosophyGdeltriedtocombineandgobeyondthemaincontributionsbyhisthreeheroes:Plato,Leibniz,andHusserl.Leibnizhaddefinedtheidealbygiving
apreliminaryformulationofmonadology.Husserlhadsuppliedthemethodforattainingthisideal.Platohadproposed,inhisrudimentaryobjectivisminmathematics,
anapproachthat

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couldserveasfoundationforHusserl'smethodand,atthesametime,makeplausibleforGdelthecrucialbeliefthatweareindeedcapableofperceivingtheprimitive
conceptsofmetaphysicsclearlyenoughtosetuptheaxioms.
InthisfirstsectionIoutlineGdel'sphilosophicalprogramandthestepshetooktoachieveit.Inthisconnection,itisimportanttorememberthatGdelsawtheviews
consideredinChapters6to8asimportantpartsofhisprogrameventhoughthesignificanceofthismaterialis,inmyopinion,toaconsiderableextentindependent
oftheprogram.
Gdel'smethodologicalobservations,arediscussedinsection9.2theyarerelatedtoHusserl'sviewsbutcontainmanydistinctiverecommendations.Insection9.3I
presentsomeofhisgeneralobservationsonphilosophy.Hisidealofphilosophyasmonadologyiscloselyrelatedtohisrationalisticoptimismandwhathetooktobe
"themeaningoftheworld,"atopicItakeupinsection9.4.
BothHusserlandGdelregardedcontemporaryscienceasmistakingthepartforthewhole.Theysawthisasaconsequenceofitsdogmaticadherencetowhat
Husserl(1954,1970)calledthe"naturalpointofview,"whichwasderivedfromanunjustifiedgeneralizationfromthespectacularsuccessofthe"mathematizationof
nature."Inparticular,Gdelpointsout,thisapproachdoesnotbegintoprovideafulltreatmentofourallimportantintuitiveconceptoftime.Gdelemphasizesthe
greatdifficultyoftheproblemoftimenonetheless,heofferssomenewandstimulatinginsightsonit,inconsideringtherelationbetweenKant'sphilosophyand
Einstein'sphysics.Wehavehereastrikingexampleofhistalentforinnovationwithinthebroadrangeoflogicasthedialecticoftheformalandtheintuitive.Ashe
doesinhisdiscussionoftheinterplaybetweenmathematicallogicandphilosophy,indiscussingtheproblemoftime,herestrictsthedialectictothatbetweenscience
andphilosophy,whichheseesasaspecialpartoflogic,broadlyunderstood.Igiveabriefdiscussionofthisworkinsection9.5.
9.1HisPhilosophy:ProgramandExecution
Inhismanuscriptwrittenaround1962on"thefoundationsofmathematicsinthelightofphilosophy",whichIdiscussedinsection5.1,Gdelidentifiedphilosophies
withworldviewsandproposed"ageneralschemaofpossiblephilosophicalworldviews":
9.1.1Ibelievethatthemostfruitfulprincipleforgaininganoverallviewofthepossibleworldviewswillbetodividethemupaccordingtothedegreeandthemanneroftheir
affinityto,orrenunciationof,metaphysics(orreligion).Inthiswayweimmediatelyobtainadivisionintotwogroups:skepticism,materialism,andpositivismstandononeside
spiritualism,idealism,andtheologyontheother.

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Gdelcharacterizedhisownphilosophyinageneralway:
9.1.2Mytheoryisamonadologywithacentralmonad[namely,God].
9.1.3Myphilosophyisrationalistic,idealistic,optimistic,andtheological.
9.1.4Asfarastheappropriatemethodofphilosophyisconcerned,metaphysics,ethics,law,andtheologyallaredifferent.

Accordingtomyinterpretationofthislaststatement,metaphysicsisthefundamentalpartofphilosophytheotherthreeimportantpartspresupposemetaphysicsand
requiremoreempiricalandlesscertainconsiderations.Theologyorreligioninparticular,contrarytowhatthethreeprecedingstatementsseemtoimply,goesbeyond
metaphysicsoneshouldtrytodevelopfirstamonadologywithoutacentralmonad.Inanycase,Iprefertodistinguishmetaphysicsfromtheology.Iconsidered
Gdel'sattemptattheologyinChapter3.HereIconfinemyattentiontometaphysicsinthisrestrictedsense,thatis,separatefromtheology,focusingonGdel'sideal
ofamonadology,but,forthepresent,withoutthecentralmonad.
AtsomestageIaskedGdeltogivemeasystematicexpositionofhisphilosophy,andherepliedthathehadnotdevelopeditfarenoughtobeabletoexpoundit
systematically,althoughhewassufficientlyclearaboutittoapplyitincommentingonthephilosophicalviewsofothers.AsIsaidbefore,thiswasundoubtedlywhyhe
chosetodiscussphilosophybycommentingonwhatIhadwrittenandontheideasofotherrelevantphilosopherssuchasKant,Husserl,andthe(logical)positivists.
InNovemberof1972GdelusedtheoccasionofdiscussingHusserl's"PhilosophyasRigorousScience"(inLauer1965)togivewhatappearstobeasummaryof
thepillarsofhisownphilosophicaloutlook:thatis,(A)torecognizethatwehaveonlyprobableknowledge,buttodeclineskepticism(B)monadology(C)to
appreciatetheuniversalityofobservations(D)tostriveforasuddenilluminationand(E)toachieveexplicitnessbyapplyingtheaxiomaticmethod.
Thefundamentalideasseemtobethese:Byobservationwecandiscovertheprimitiveconceptsofmetaphysicsandtheaxiomsgoverningtheseconcepts.Bythe
axiomaticmethod,wecanarriveatanexacttheoryofmetaphysics,whichforGdelisbestseenasakindofmonadology.Inordertopursuethisidealeffectively,we
mustrealizethatwearecapableofonlyprobableknowledge.Weshouldlearntoselectandconcentrateonwhatisfundamentalandessential.Therefore,inorderto
secureagoverningfocustoguideourcontinuousattention,weshouldstriveforasuddenillumination.
Gdelhad,onvariousoccasions,maderelatedobservationsonthesefivetopics,whicharereportedelsewhereinthisbook.Moreover,thefive

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pillarsaresubjecttodifferentinterpretations,andtheirimplicationshavetobeconsidered.Neverthelessthesefivetopicscanserveasguidepostsfororganizingand
communicatingwhatItaketobeGdel'sconceptionofphilosophy,andIreconstructherethestatementshemadeaboutthematthattime.Thesestatementsare
exceptionalinthat,unlikemostofhisremarksinourdiscussions,theywerepresentedinacontinuousmannerononeoccasion.
(A)Wehaveonlyprobableknowledge,butskepticismisnotatenableposition:
9.1.5Thereisnoabsoluteknowledgeeverythinggoesonlybyprobability.Husserlaimedatabsoluteknowledge,butsofarthishasnotbeenattained.Eveniftherewereabsolute
knowledge,itcouldnotbetransferredtosomebodyelse,orallyorthroughwrittenmaterial.Skepticismistemporary[orprovisional].
9.1.6Oneconjecturesonlythatthereissomeprobableintuitionandthishastodowithbeingunprejudiced.Inthelastanalysis,everyerrorisduetoextraneousfactorsreason
itselfdoesnotcommitmistakes.

Therearetwocomponentsinthesetwoobservations.Oneisthethemethatweareneverinfallible,sincetheempiricalcomponentalwayscomesin.Theotheristhe
beliefthatwehavewaysofcorrectingourmistakes,asisconfirmedbyourcumulativeexperience.(Otherideasrelatedtothispointarereportedin9.2.)Onegeneral
pointisthattherearedegreesofevidence,clarity,andcertainty.Wehavealsoawayofdealingwithskepticism,because"toacknowledgewhatiscorrectin
skepticismservestotakethestingoutofskepticalobjections."
GdelthenconsideredHusserl's"genuinelyscientificideal"inphilosophyandhisassertion:"Norwilliteverberealizedbyasingleindividualitwouldnotbesciencein
themodernsenseifitcouldbesorealized"(Lauer1965:15).Gdelsaid:
9.1.7Theidealcouldmeanfindingtheaxiomsorattainingthewholeofknowledge.[Hehimselfwasapparentlymoreconcernedwiththeformer.]Itdoesnotfollowfromthe
conceptofsciencethatitcannotberealizedbyasingleindividual.

(B)Monadology.Gdel'sownfavoriteversionofthescientificidealofphilosophyismonadologyinthesenseofLeibniz.InthisconnectionGdelonceusedaword
thatsoundedlikebions.Iconjecturethatbionisformedfrombioasneonisformedfromneoandmeanssomethinglike"elementarylifeparticle."Accordingto
Webster'sDictionary,bionsisthephysiologicalindividual,characterizedbydefinitenessandindependenceoffunction,indistinctionfromthemorphologicalindividual,
ormorphon.
9.1.8ItisanideaofLeibnizthatmonadsarespiritualinthesensethattheyhaveconsciousness,experience,anddriveontheactiveside,andcontainrepresentations

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(Vorstellungen)onthepassiveside.Matterisalsocomposedofsuchmonads.Wehavetheemotionalideathatweshouldavoidinflictingpainonlivingthings,butanelectronor
apieceofrockalsohasexperiences.Weexperiencedrives,pains,andsoonourselves.Thetaskistodiscoveruniversallawsoftheinteractionsofmonads,includingpeople,
electrons,andsoforth.Forexample,attractionandrepulsionarethedrivesofelectrons,andtheycontainrepresentationsofotherelementaryparticles.
9.1.9Monads(bions,etc.)arenotanotherkindofmaterialparticletheyarenotinfixedpartsofspace,theyarenowhereand,therefore,notmaterialobjects.Matterwillbe
spiritualizedwhenthetruetheoryofphysicsisfound.Monadsonlyactintospacetheyarenotinspace.Theyhaveaninnerlifeorconsciousnessinadditiontorelationsto
otherparticles(clearinNewtonianphysics,whereweknowtherelationshipsbetweentheparticles),theyalsohavesomethinginside.Inquantumphysicstheelectronsare
objectivelydistributedinspace,notatafixedplaceatafixedmoment,butataring.Hence,itisimpossibleforelectronstohavedifferentinnerstates,onlydifferentdistributions.
9.1.10Tobematerialistohaveaspatialposition.(Thenumber2,forexample,hasnospatialposition.)Spatiallycontiguousobjectsrepresentoneanother.Wedonotknowwhat
theobjectsareifweknowmerelythattheyareinspace.Weunderstandspaceonlythroughthedriveoftheobjectsinspaceotherwisewehavenoideawhatspaceis.[Butif
materialobjectsandspacearedefinedbyeachother,materialisminthis"spatial"senseisuntenable.]Forthisveryreason,materialismwasgivenupatthebeginningofthe
century,and"thestudyofstructure"hastakenitsplace.But"thestudyofstructure''isaconfessionthatwedon'tknowwhatthethingsare.Realmaterialismisnonsense.
9.1.11Thereisanoldideathatdescriptionwilltakeonaveryconcreteformtomakeascienceoutofthis.Thetaskistodescribemonadsontheirdifferentlevels.Monadology
alsoexplainswhyintrospection[selfobservation]issoimportant.Whatisessentialfortheunderstandingofthemonadsistoobserveyourself:Thisisamonadthatisgivento
you.

IconsiderGdel'sotherobservationsrelatedtohismonadologyin9.4.
(C)Observationespeciallyselfobservation[is]theuniversalbasis.
9.1.12Everythinghastobebasedonobservation[watchingtowards],providedob[towards]isunderstoodcorrectly.ObservationincludesWesenschau(essentialintuition,
graspofessence,categorialintuition,perceptionofconcepts),whichissimplyleftoutofwhatiscalledexperiencemostofthetimeinparticular,bytheempiricists.

ThisstatementiscloselyrelatedtoGdel'sbeliefinourabilitytoperceiveconcepts(discussedinsection7.3)andhisobjectiontotherestrictivenotionsofexperience
andobservationheldbythepositivistsandtheempiricists(discussedinsection5.3).Hisextendedobservationsonselfobservationwillbeconsiderinthenextsection.

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(D)Suddenillumination.Onthisoccasion,GdelarguedthatHusserlhadattainedasuddenilluminationsometimebetween1905and1910.Elsewherehesaidthat
hehimselfhadneverhadsuchanexperienceandthatphilosophywaslikereligiousconversion.Inaddition,hesaid:
9.1.13SchellingexplicitlyreportedanexperienceofsuddenilluminationDescartesbegan,afterhisfamousdream,toseeeverythinginadifferentlight.
9.1.14Later,HusserlwasmorelikePlatoandDescartes.Itispossibletoattainastateofmindtoseetheworlddifferently.Onefundamentalideaisthis:truephilosophyis[arrived
atby]somethinglikeareligiousconversion.
9.1.15Husserlseesmanythingsmoreclearlyinadifferentlight.Thisisdifferentfromdoingscientificwork[itinvolves]achangeofpersonality.

IhaveatbestonlyavagueguessaboutwhatGdelwassuggestingintheseobservations.PerhapsHusserlwasable,afterpersistenteffortsovermanyyears,to
understandwhatistrulyfundamentalinphilosophicalinvestigations,therebyreachingaclearerperspectivefromwhichtoseethings.Inanycase,Ihavelittletosayon
thisideaofGdel's.(Compare5.3.30to5.3.33.)
(E)Theimportanceofexplicitnessandtheaxiomaticmethod:
9.1.16Thesignificanceofmathematicallogicforphilosophyliesinitspowertomakethoughtsexplicitbyillustratingandprovidingaframefortheaxiomaticmethod.Mathematical
logicmakesexplicitthecentralplaceofpredicationinthephilosophicalfoundationofrationalthought.[IconsiderGdel'srelatedobservationsinthenextsection.]

FromtimetotimeIexpressedskepticismovertherealizabilityofGdel'sprojectofmetaphysicsasanexactaxiomatictheoryandmentionedthefamiliarobjectionthat
suchattemptshaverepeatedlyfailedinthehistoryofphilosophy.Onthisoccasion,Gdelofferedthefollowingreply:
9.1.17OneneedssomeArbeitshypotheseorworkinghypothesisinconsideringthequestionwhetheroneshouldpursuecertainmetaphysicalprojectsnow.Myworking
hypothesisisthattheprojectunderconsiderationhasnotyetbeenstudiedfromtherightperspective.Specifically,previousattemptshavebeenhamperedbyonecombinationor
anotherofthreefactors:(1)lackofanexactdevelopmentofscience,(2)theologicalprejudices,and(3)amaterialisticbias.Thepursuit,unhamperedbyanyoneofthesethree
negativefactors,hasn'tbeentriedbefore.

Iagreethat,bygettingridofthethreenegativefactors,wemayhopetodobetterphilosophy.YetIamnotabletoseethatGdel'sworkinghypothesisprovidesus
withasufficientbasisforbelievingthathisprojectisfeasible.Idonotdenythat,bypursuingtheprojectenergetically,eventhoughwithoutsubstantivesuccess,one
mayarriveatsignificantnew

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insights.Itis,however,uncleartomehowfarorwithwhatresultsGdelhimselfpursuedthisprojectexceptthathedidsaythathehadnevergotwhathelookedfor
inphilosophy.
Gdeldidnotthinkthathehimselfhadcomeclosetoattainingtheidealofanaxiomatictheoryofmetaphysics.Hesaidseveraltimesthathedidnotevenknowwhat
theprimitiveconceptsare.Nonethelesshefeltthathehaddevelopedhisphilosophyfarenoughtoapplyitinmakingcommentsonotherviews.Moreover,althoughhe
discussedextensivelyvariousissueswhichwereundoubtedlyrelevanttohisultimateideal,herarelymadeentirelyexplicithowthedifferentpartsofwhathesaidwere
relatedtohisoverallproject.
OnegeneralguideishisdeclarationthathistheoryisakindofLeibnizianmonadology.Yethedoesnotdiscusstheproblemofidentifyingtheprimitiveconceptsof
metaphysicsbyreflectingon,say,themonadologyalreadyformulatedbyLeibniz.Nonetheless,insomeoftheshorthandnotesquotedtowardtheendofsection3.2,
hedoesgivewhatappearstobeatentativelist:
9.1.18Thefundamentalphilosophicalconceptiscause.Itinvolves:will,force,enjoyment,God,time,space.Willandenjoyment:hencelifeandaffirmationandnegation.Timeand
space:beingnearisequivalenttothepossibilityofinfluence.

ThislistisrelatedtoanothercluetoGdel'sleadingidea,thesloganthat"themeaningoftheworldistheseparationofwishandfact."Hedoesnotexplicitlyrelatethis
slogantohisprojectofmonadology,buthehintsatsomelinkbetweenitandHegel'ssystemoflogic,whichhesawasanalternativetomonadology.Insection9.4.I
consideralltheseitemstogetherthelistin9.1.18,theslogan,monadology,andHegel'slogicsinceItakethemtobecloselyrelated.
AsIsaidbefore,Gdel'sconcernwiththesuperiorityofmindovermatterisundoubtedlyaimedatsupportingthefundamentalplaceofmindinmonadology.His
interestinPlatonismhastodowithjustifyingthebeliefthathumanbeings,asadvancedmonads,arecapableofrepresentingtheworldmoreandmoreclearly.Yet
anotherproblemimportantforGdelistheconceptoftime.
Inanotherdirection,Gdelseeshisconceptionoflogicasthetheoryofconcepts,includingandgoingbeyondmathematics,ascoheringwithhismonadology.Hesaid
ononeoccasion:
9.1.19Logicdealswithmoregeneralconceptsmonadology,whichcontainsgenerallawsofbiology,ismorespecific.

InthecourseofadiscussionofsettheoryandconcepttheoryGdelelaboratedonhisontologyofthetwofundamentalcategoriesofbeing:objectsandconcepts.
Eventhoughhesometimesseemstosaythatobjects

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consistofphysicalobjectsandsets.Inowbelievethatheintendstosay,moreprecisely,thatobjectsconsistofmonadsandsets:thatis,(1)monadsareobjects(2)
setsofobjectsareobjects.
9.1.20Weshoulddescribetheworldbyapplyingthesefundamentalideas:theworldasconsistingofmonads,theproperties(activities)ofthemonads,thelawsgoverningthem,
andtherepresentations(oftheworldinthemonads).
9.1.21Thesimplestsubstancesoftheworldarethemonads.
9.1.22Natureisbroaderthanthephysicalworld,whichisinanimate.Italsocontainsanimalfeelings,aswellashumanbeingsandconsciousness.
9.1.23BeingintimeistoospecialandshouldnotappearsoearlyasinHegel'sscheme,whichintroducesbecomingimmediatelyafterbeingandnonbeing.

Gdeltalksaboutwholeandunity,aswellaswholeandpart,inrelationtothecontrastbetweenconceptsandobjectsandthedistinctionbetweenprimitiveand
definedconcepts:
9.1.24Wholeandpartpartlyconcretepartsandpartlyabstractpartsareatthebottomofeverything.Theyaremostfundamentalinourconceptualsystem.Sincethereis
similarity,therearegeneralities.Generalitiesarejustafundamentalaspectoftheworld.Itisafundamentalfactofrealitythattherearetwokindsofreality:universalsand
particulars(orindividuals).
9.1.25Wholeandunitythingorentityorbeing.Everywholeisaunityandeveryunitythatisdivisibleisawhole.Forexample,theprimitiveconcepts,themonads,theemptyset,
andtheunitsetsareunitiesbutnotwholes.Everyunityissomethingandnotnothing.Anyunityisathingoranentityorabeing.Objectsandconceptsareunitiesandbeings.

Roughlyspeaking,conceptsandsetsareunitieswhicharealsowholesmonadsareunitiesbutnotwholes.Itisbettertoleavethedistinctionbetweenunitiesand
wholesinthebackground.
Gdeldoesnotstateexplicitlythatobjectsandconceptsmakeupthewholerealmofbeings,althoughitis,Ibelieve,convenientatleastinthepresentcontextto
assumethattheydo.Histerminologyisnotalwaysconsistent.Onceforinstance,heproposedalistof"idealobjects"consistingofconcepts,values,andsets.Hewas
undoubtedlyusingthewordobjectsinthesenseofbeings.Iaminclinedtothinkthathegenerallyconstruedvaluesasspecialcasesofconcepts.Inanycase,Gdel
didnotspecifytheplaceofvaluesinhisontologicalscheme.
9.1.26Concepts.Aconceptisawholeaconceptualwholecomposedoutofprimitiveconceptssuchasnegation,existence,conjunction,universality,object,(theconceptof)
concept,whole,meaning,andsoon.Wehavenoclearideaofthetotalityofallconcepts.Aconceptisawholeinastrongersensethansetsitisamoreorganicwhole,asa
humanbodyisanorganicwholeofitsparts.

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Gdel'slistofprimitiveconceptsseemstoconsistonlyoflogicalconcepts.Idonotknowwhetherheregardedtheprimitiveconceptsofmetaphysicswhateverthey
areasprimitiveinthesamesense.
9.1.27Objects.Monadsareobjects.Sets(ofobjects)areobjects.Asetisaunity(orwhole)ofwhichtheelementsaretheconstituents.Objectsareinspaceorclosetospace.Sets
arethelimitingcaseofspatiotemporalobjectsandalsoofwholes.Amongobjects,therearephysicalobjectsandmathematicalobjects.Puresetsarethesetswhichdonotinvolve
nonsetobjectssothattheonlyUrelementintheuniverseofpuresetsistheemptyset.Puresetsarethemathematicalobjectsandmakeuptheworldofmathematics.

TheaboveformulationisbasedonGdel'sscatteredobservations.Hereaditshortlybefore4January1976andcommentedextensivelyonmymanuscriptQ,which
includedthispassage.Althoughhetookittobefaithfultowhathehadtoldme,InowbelieveIoversimplifiedsomeoftheambiguities.Itseemstomethatnatural
numbersarealsomathematicalobjectsandthattheyarenot(reducibleto)setsandIdonotthinkthatGdelwishedtodenythis.Therelationbetweenphysical
objectsandmonadsisambiguous.ClearlyGdeltakesmonadstobeobjects,eventhough,asfarasIknow,hedoesnotmentionmonadsinhispublishedwork,but
speaksofphysicalbodiesorphysicalobjects.Intheabovepassage,monadsandphysicalobjectsseemtobeidentified.AsIunderstandit,physicalobjectsarea
specialcaseofmonadsorarereducibletomonads,andsoobjectsconsistofmonadsandmathematicalobjects.Onemightevensaythatphysicalobjects,inGdel's
publicphilosophy,correspondtomonadsinhisprivatephilosophy.
Inotherwords,objectsincludemonadsandnaturalnumbersaswellassetsofobjects.Inanycase,Gdeldidnotstateexplicitlythattheseobjectsinanyofthe
alternativespecificationsjustsuggestedaretheonlyobjects.Heprobablyalsoleftopenthequestionofwhetherpuresetsaretheonlymathematicalobjects
contrarytowhathesaidonsomeotheroccasions.
9.1.28Itisimportanttohaveacorrectterminology.Theessenceofaconceptisdeterminedbywhattheconceptiscomposedof,butbeingawholeisnotsodetermined.Asetisa
specialkindofwhole.Setsareunitieswhicharejustthemultitudebutgenerallywholesaremorethanmultitudeswhicharealsounities.Thatiswhysetsarealimitingcaseof
wholes.Awholemusthaveparts.Amonadisaunitybutnotawholebecauseitisindivisible:itisonlyanuneigentlich[improper]whole.Primitiveconcepts,likemonads,are
unitieswhicharenotwholes,becausetheyarenotcomposedofparts.

IdonotknowwhatsortsofthingstheprimitiveconceptsofmetaphysicswouldbeforGdel,norhowheintendedtolookforthem.Occasionalhintslikethe
followingdonottellusverymuch.

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9.1.29Forceshouldbeaprimitiveterminphilosophy.
9.1.30Thefundamentalprinciplesareconcernedwithwhattheprimitiveconceptsareandalsotheirrelationship.Theaxiomaticmethodgoesstepbystep.Wecontinuetodiscover
newaxiomstheprocessneverfinishes.Leibnizusedformalanalogy:inanalogywiththesevenstarsintheGreatBearconstellation,therearesevenconcepts.Oneshouldextend
theanalogytocoverthefactthatbyusingthetelescopewe[now]seemorestarsintheconstellation.

9.2OnMethodology:HowtoStudyPhilosophy
IndifferentcontextsGdeloffereddiverseadviceonhowoneistostudyphilosophyandcommunicatephilosophicalthoughts.Heemphasizedtheimportanceof
abstractionandgeneralization,observationandselfobservation,knowingwhattodisregard,theaxiomaticmethod,appreciatingthefundamentalplaceofeveryday
experience,rememberingthatwehaveonlyprobableknowledgeandthatwecannotexplaineverything,andsoforth.Occasionallyhespokeaboutthenecessary
qualitiesandpreparationsforthepursuitofphilosophy.Intermsofpresentation,hevaluedbrevityandseeingratherthanarguing.Heappliedhismethodologicalideas
tothetaskofreportingourdiscussions,notablywhenhecriticizedoneofmyattemptsmanuscriptQfromDecember1975toreporthisviewson"objectivismof
setsandconcepts."
Ihavefoundithardtoorganizethesescatteredandvaguelyrelatedobservationsonmethodologyinaperspicuousmannerandcanonlylistthemarbitrarilyundera
fewgeneralheadings.
Inconnectionwiththequalitiesandpreparationsnecessaryfortheseriouspursuitofphilosophy,Gdelsaid:
9.2.1Philosophersneed:(1)goodtasteinsomesolidsubject(2)[familiaritywiththefundamentalsofthephilosophical]tradition(3)generalgoodtaste.
9.2.2Myworkistheapplicationofaphilosophysuggestedoutsideofscienceandobtainedontheoccasionofthinkingaboutscience.
9.2.3Everydayknowledge,whenanalyzedintocomponents,ismorerelevant[thanscience]ingivingdataforphilosophy.Sciencealonewon'tgivephilosophyitisnoncommittal
regardingwhatreally[is]there.Alittlebitofscienceisnecessaryforphilosophy.Forinstance,Platostipulatesthatnooneunacquaintedwithgeometryistoentertheacademy.
Tothatextent,therequirementiscertainlyjustified.

Sincethinkingisultimatelyanindividualactivityanditsaimistoseethingsasclearlyasonecan,itisimportanttogetridofdistractionsandtodisregardwhatisnot
essential.Themainthingistoobservewhatiswithinyourself:

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9.2.4Philosophicalthinkingdiffersfromthinkingingeneral.Itleavesoutattentiontoobjectsbutdirectsattentiontoinnerexperiences.(Itisnotsohardifonealsodirects
attentiontoobjects.)Todeveloptheskillofintrospectionandcorrectthinking[istolearn]inthefirstplacewhatyouhavetodisregard.Theineffectivenessofnaturalthinking[in
thestudyofphilosophy]comesfrombeingoverwhelmedbyaninfinityofpossibilitiesandfacts.Inordertogoon,youhavetoknowwhattoleaveoutthisistheessenceof
effectivethinking.
9.2.5Everyerroriscausedbyemotionsandeducation(implicitandexplicit)intellectbyitself(notdisturbedbyanythingoutside)couldnoterr.
9.2.6Don'tcollectdata.Ifyouknoweverythingaboutyourself,youknoweverything.Thereisnouseinburdeningyourselfwithalotofdata.Onceyouunderstandyourself,you
understandhumannatureandthentherestfollows.Itisbetter[inthestudyofphilosophy]torestrict[yourview]totheindividualthantolookatsocietyinitially.Husserl's
thoroughlysystematic[beginning]isbetterthanKant'ssloppyarchitectonic.

UndoubtedlytheseideasarerelatedtoHusserl'sphenomenologicalmethod.Butitishardtoknowhowoneistolearnandapplytheadvice.Itisnoteveneasytosee
howGdelhimselfappliedtheadviceinhisownwork.
E.HlawkarecallsseeingGdelatworkinthedepartmentlibraryinthe1930sinVienna.HewasstruckbythefactthatGdelcustomarilyspentagreatdealoftime
onthesamepage,undoubtedlytryingtounderstandthematerialverythoroughly.Thissuggestsasenseofwhathemeantbypayingattentiontoselfknowledgeor
introspection,asensewhichiseasytograsp:selectasmallamountofimportantmaterialandtrytounderstanditthoroughly.Similarly,manyofushavehadthe
experienceoffindingthatourmostfruitfulworkislikelytocomefromreflectingonwhatisalreadyinourminds.Moreover,weoftenrealizethatextraneousfactors
haveprejudicedourthinking.
Theinterplaybetweenourselfknowledgeandinputfromoutsideustakesawidevarietyofforms.Intheprocessofliving,weconstantlyrespondtowhathappensto
usandinusthroughcertainactivitiesofthemindwhichhavetheeffectofmodifyingconsciousnessandbehavior.Intheprocessofeducation,forexample,our
responsestowhatwearetaughtmayincludedoingproblemsandtakingexaminations.Howwellwedodependsinpartonourabilitytothinkwithconcentrationand
persistence.
Gdel'sconcentrationonabrieftextinvolvesmorethinkingaboutthesamematerialthancanbedonebysomeonewhoreadsthetextquicklyanddoesnotreturnto
it.Gdelspentmoretimeinselfobservationthanmostofusdo,lookinginwardorattheinside.Generally,ourthinkingfocusesonbothinsideandoutsidematerial,
butatleastinphilosophynew

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insightcomeprincipallyfromlookinginward.AcrudeinterpretationofGdel'sadviceistosaythattheratioofinputtoreflectionshouldbesmall.
Gdel'sownmannerofthinkingandworkinginvolvedthoroughlydigestingandreflectingontheavailablematerialtakingadvantageofanunusualabilityto
concentrateandgettotheheartofaproblem.Helocatedthecrucialconceptssuchasarithmeticaltruth,provability,set,ordinalnumberandachievedaclear
graspofthem.Heknewwhattodisregard,therebysimplifyingthedatatobeexamined.Andsoheproceeded.Therestofusmayconsciouslytrytofollowthis
practice,withlesserorgreatersuccess,accordingtoourability,training,andluck.Yetitishardtoseehowonecanextracta"systematic"methodfromtherelatively
successfulpracticeofothersor,even,fromone'sown.
Eventhoughhisbestknownworkisinscienceorcloselyrelatedtoscience,Gdelbelievedthateverydayexperienceismoreimportantforphilosophythanscienceis:
9.2.7See5.3.4.
9.2.8See5.3.3.

Gdelconsidersgeneralizationandidealizationtobeimportantcomponentsofthestudyofphilosophyandrecommendsapracticeofmakinguninhibited
generalizations,whichunderlinesandfollowsfromhisrationalismandoptimism.
9.2.9Wecandistinguishintuitivegenerality(andconcepts)fromblindgenerality(andconcepts).Wehavealsoabstractintuition.Allblindgeneralityisabstract,butnot
conversely.
9.2.10RationalismisconnectedwithPlatonismbecauseitisdirectedtotheconceptualworldmorethantowardtherealworld.[Compare9.4.20.]
9.2.11Whileweperceiveonlyaninfinitelysmallportionoftheworld,thereismoreintentionalfactualknowledge.Inhistoryandpsychology,wehave[known]onlyasmallpartof
reality.Eventhelawsofphysicsmaynotbethelawsofthewholephysicalworld.Theremaybeanotherclosedsystemofcausalconnectionsinwhichotherlawshold.
9.2.12Neverusetermsinaqualifiedsenseunlessyouspecifyit[thequalification]animportantexampleisthetermexistence.

AsIreportedelsewhere,existenceinitsweakestandbroadestsenseisforGdeltheclearandcorrectconceptofexistence.Statement9.2.12concernsnotjustthe
communicationofthoughtsbutalsotheactivityofthinking.Gdelis,Ibelieve,recommendingthatweworkwithphilosophicalconceptsintheirunqualifiedsenseas
muchaspossible.

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9.2.13Inphilosophyweshouldhavetheaudacitytogeneralizethingswithoutanyinhibitions:[to]goonalongthedirectiononthelowerlevelandgeneralizeindifferent
directionsinauniquelydeterminedmanner.

Gdelmentionedasanexamplehisowngeneralizationfromourcompletesuccessinsomepartsofmathematicstohisrationalisticoptimism.Itseemstomethathis
implicitgeneralizationofobjectivisminmathematicstoobjectivisminmetaphysicsisyetanotherexample.However,asweknow,uninhibitedextrapolationanduseof
analogyarenotoriousforproducingincompatiblegeneralizationsinsituationswhereoursharedbeliefsareaninsufficientbasisforchoosingbetweenthem.
9.2.14Theessenceofmathematicsisthatitconsistsofgeneralizations.
9.2.15Insciencewegeneralize.Mathematicsdescribespossibilitiesofwhichonlyafewhavebeenrealized.
9.2.16Wehaveclearpropositionsonlyaboutasmallpartofthephysicalorthemathematicalworld.Yetwetalkaboutallphysicalobjectsandintegers.Theproblemisthesame
withtheconceptofallhumanbeings:Howcanwemakegeneralassertions?Onlybygeneralizationandidealization.
9.2.17Generallyabetterphilosophyismoreabstract:thatiswhyKant'sisbetterthanRussell's.

OnceIaskedGdelaboutthesaying"truthisalwaysconcrete."Hereplied:
9.2.18Thisgeneralizationcangivenosatisfactoryexplanationofmathematics.

Generalizationandabstractionarecloselyrelatedtoidealization,whichinteractswithourintuition(asillustratedaboveinsection7.1).Indeed,wearriveatallour
primitiveconceptsbyidealization.
9.2.19Whatdoesidealizationmean?Itisthewayyouarriveatsomeconceptswithdifferentdegreesofabstractnessitisnotthecauseoftheconcepts.Youreachnewprimitive
conceptsbyit.Allprimitiveconceptsareidealizations.
9.2.20Ifonegivesupallidealizations,thenmathematics,exceptthepartforsmallnumbers,disappearsevenmathematicsuptotenmillion.Consequentlyitisasubjectivematter
whereonewishestostop.Forthepurposeofseeingthatobjectivismistrue,itissufficienttoconfineone'sattentiontonaturalnumbers.Inprinciple,wemaygetthesenumbers
byrepetitionsofobjects.

Theoldestandmostfamiliarexampleofidealizationisundoubtedlytheuseofidealfiguresingeometry.OnceGdelcitedwithapprovalthefollowingfamous
statementfromBook6ofTheRepublic:
9.2.21Anddoyounotknowalsothatalthoughthey[thestudentsofgeometry,arithmetic,andthekindredsciences]makeuseofthevisibleformsandreasonaboutthem,theyare
thinkingnotofthese,butoftheidealstheyresemblenotof

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thefigurestheydraw,butoftheabsolutesquareandtheabsolutediameter,andsoon?Theformswhichtheydrawormake,andwhichhaveshadowsandreflectionsinwaterof
theirown,areconvertedbythemintoimages,buttheyarereallyseekingtobeholdthethingsthemselves,whichcanonlybeseenwiththeeyeofthemind.

Othercentralexamplesofouridealizationincludethelawofexcludedmiddle,anynaturalnumber,therealnumbers,andthearbitrarysets.OnceGdelgaveabrief
characterizationofwhatisinvolvedinidealizationandprovidedthreeexamples:
9.2.22Inthedescriptionofthewayweenvisagewhatcouldbedoneweidealizebydisregardingtheimprecisioninwhatisactual.Kantdidthisindescribingourgeometrical
intuition.Realnumbersareanidealizationofthefinitesetsandsequences.Thelawofexcludedmiddleissomethingweimagineinordertoincreaseourcapability.

Whenweidealize,wealwaysgeneralizeourintuitionfromactualcasestoanalogousones.Ifwefindotherwaysofapprehendingtheanalogouscases,weendowour
generalizedintuitionwithadditionalcontentandmayalsobeledtomodifyittosomeextent.ThefollowingobservationbyGdelseemstousethisideatocharacterize
thechangeinourconceptionofphysicalspacewhichresultedfromEinstein'stheoryofrelativity:
9.2.23PhysicshaseliminateditsformerdependenceonsomeofthemoregeneralintuitionssuchastheacceptanceonintuitivegroundsthatspaceisEuclidean.

Atvarioustimes,Gdelmadeanumberofscatteredobservationsaboutintuition:
9.2.24Toapplyapositionbeyonditslimitofvalidityisthemostviciouswayofdiscreditingit.Thisisalsotrueoftheemphasisonintuition:appealingtointuitioncallsformore
cautionandmoreexperiencethantheuseofproofsnotless.Whileappealtointuitioncontinuestobenecessary,itisalwaysastepforwardwhenanintuition(orpartofit)is
replacedandsubstantiatedbyproofswhichreduceittolessidealizedintuitions.
9.2.25Intuitionisnotsounreliable.Oftenamathematicianfirsthasanintuitionthatapropositionisprobablytrue,andthenprovesit.Ifallconsequencesofapropositionare
contrarytointuition,thenstatisticallyitbecomesveryimplausible.
9.2.26Thescienceofintuitionisnotprecise,andpeoplecannotlearnityet.Atpresent,mathematiciansareprejudicedagainstintuition.Settheoryisalongthelineofcorrect
analysis.
9.2.27Thewayofhowweformmathematicalobjectsfromwhatisgiventhequestionofconstitutionrequiresaphenomenologicalanalysis.Buttheconstitutionoftimeandof
mathematicalobjectsisdifficult.[Compare9.5.8below.]

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9.2.28Intuitionisdifferentfromconstructionitistoseeatoneglance.
9.2.29Therangeofintuitionisnarrowerthantheplausiblebutbroaderthantheintuitivelyevident.

Insection7.1,indiscussingPlatonisminmathematics,ImentionedGdel'sbeliefinourfallibilityandalsointhepriorityofobjectivity.Inowlistsomeofhis
observationsonthesetwotopics:
Fallibleknowledge.Inthefirstplace,likemostofus,Gdelbelievesthatwehavenoabsoluteknowledgeorcertaintyandthatneitheraprioriknowledgenor
intuitionisinfallible.Itis,Ibelieve,desirabletotakethisrecognitionoffallibilityforgrantedininterpretinghisviews.Hesaid,forinstance,asImentionedbefore,that
hewasgladtoseethatHusserlalsorecognizesthepossibilityoferror.
9.2.30Aprioriknowledgeisnotinfallible.Inmathematicsweare[generally]wrongatthebeginningbutthenwedevelop[towardwhatisright].
9.2.31Eventhoughfinitarynumbertheoryappearsevidentlyconsistenttous,itneednotbeconsistentitmightbethatthereareonlyfinitelymanyintegers.Whatisintuitively
evidentneednotbetrue.
9.2.32Wehavenoabsoluteknowledgeofanything.Toacknowledgewhatiscorrectinskepticismservestotakethestingoutofskepticalobjections.Noneofusisinfallible.
BeforetheparadoxesDedekindwouldhavesaidthatsetsarejustasclearasintegers.
9.2.33Thereisnoabsoluteknowledgeeverythinggoesonlybyprobability.
9.2.34Oneconjecturesonly[that]thereissomeprobableintuitionnotexactcalculationtodeterminetheaprioriprobabilitythishassomethingtodowithbeingunprejudiced.
Probableknowledgedefinesacertainwayofproceeding.Inthelastanalysis,everyerrorisduetoextraneousfactors:reasonitselfdoesnotcommitmistakes.
9.2.35Wehavenoabsoluteknowledgeofanything.Therearedegreesofevidence.Theclearnesswithwhichweperceivesomethingisoverestimated.Thesimplerthingsare,the
moretheyareused,themoreevidenttheybecome.Whatisevidentneednotbetrue.In1010isalreadyinconsistent,thenthereisnotheoreticalscience.

Atthesametime,Gdelhasadifferentnotionofabsoluteknowledgeknowledgethatisfeasibleandappliestocentralandstableconceptualachievements.Hesees
thiskindofabsoluteknowledgeasthehighestidealofintellectualpursuit.HisfavoriteexampleisNewtonianphysics.
9.2.36TheNewtonianframeisakindofabsoluteknowledge.Itisapsychologicalphenomenon.Inthissenseabsoluteknowledgeistheframeorbackboneor

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axiomsystemofagoodtheory.ThebackboneofphysicsremainsinNewtonism.Experiencefillsinthegapsafterabsoluteknowledgeisobtained.Bypurethought,saysthe
Newtonianscheme,wereachtheframe.Afterwardsonecaninterpret,forinstance,thesurfacetensionofaliquid.Psychologyisdifferentfromphysicsinpsychology,youdon't
know.
9.2.37TheNewtonianschemewasobtainedaprioritosomeextent[compare9.5.2].Approximatelyspeaking,EinsteinfilledsomegapsinNewton'sschemeandintroducedsome
modifications.ItwasabiggerchangetogofromparticlestofieldtheoryaspecificationofNewton'sphysicsmadeitintoacontinuum[physics]justbeyond[thetheoryof]
elasticbodies.

Objectivityandobjects(priorityofobjectivity).Accordingtoawidelycurrentpolicy,itispreferabletoputobjectivity(thekinoffact,stateofaffairs,truth,
proposition,propositionalcognition)beforeobjectstheexistence,nature,andknowledgeofmathematicalobjectsareconsideredinitiallyonlyonthebasisofour
discussionofmathematicaltruthandknowledge.Thisis,Ibelieve,alsoGdel'schoice,atleastinhisdiscussionswithme.
Bytheway,thereisafamiliarambiguityinouruseofthewordobject.Whenitmeanssubjectmatter,allsortsofthingsfactsinparticularcountasobjects.The
wordobjectcanalsobeunderstoodmorenarrowlyIfollowFregeandGdelindistinguishingobjectsfromconcepts,andsoItakeitthatamoreinclusiveterm
say,being,entity,thingiscalledfor.Incontrastwithobjects,Gdelassociatesconceptscloselywiththeobjectivityofconceptualrelationships.
9.2.38Inconnectionwithourfreedominmathematics,thereissomethingwecannotchange:whenwedefineconcepts,wecannotassumetheoremsaboutthem.Alsointhe
physicalworld,whatyoudefineasobjectsisuptoyou(e.g.,atoms,etc.)but,once[theyare]defined,theirrelationsaredetermined.Onlynaturalconceptsexist:theyare
objectiverelationships.
9.2.39Objectivityisabifurcationofthereal,aweakersenseofthereal.

Iinterpretthiscommentascontrastingobjectivitywithobjectsandconcepts:objectivity(orobjectivism)requiresonlyabifurcationofpropositionsintotrueandfalse,
accordingtothelawofexcludedmiddleinvolvingaweakersenseofrealismthanthestrongerpositionwhichassertsthatcertainparticularobjectsandconceptsare
real.
Thisinterpretationseemstobesupportedbythefollowingmoreexplicitobservations:
9.2.40Outofobjectivitywedefineobjectsindifferentways.Facedwithobjectivity,howtosingleoutobjectsisyourownchild.Is[a]cloudanobject?Inphysicsobjectsare
almostuniquelydeterminedbyobjectivity,ifyouwanttodoitinthe''natural"way.Butnotreallyunique:theremaybesomedifferentwaywe

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don'tknow[yet]whichismorefruitful.Itismoreprobablethatnaturalnumbersareuniquelydeterminedbyobjectivity.
9.2.41Themostnaturalwayofstatingobjectivism[inmathematics]istheonebyBernaysinarecentlecture:Thenumberofpetalsisjustasobjectiveasthecolorofaflower.
9.2.42Confineyourattentiontoobjectivity.
9.2.43Thereisalargegapbetweenobjectivityandobjects:giventhefactofobjectivity,theremaybeotherpossibilitiesofselectingobjectswhichwedon'tknowyet.

AsIseeit,whenweacquireandaccumulatebeliefs,acrucialandpervasiveelementthatmakesknowledgepossibleisourawarenessofandsearchfor"repetitions"
thatservetolinkupcertaindifferentbeliefs,enablingustonoticethatthebeliefsareaboutthesamethingortomaintainourattentiononthesamething.Thissameness
neednotfocusonsomethingsubstantialorentirelydeterminate,butingeneralrequiresonlysomefluidelementasameansoftyingupcertainbeliefsmoreorlessina
bundle.Asweacquiresuchbundlesofmoreandclearerbeliefs,theobjectsorentitiesbecomemorefixedanddistinctforus.
9.2.44Everythingisaproposition.
9.2.45Tounderstandapropositionwemusthaveanintuitionoftheobjectsreferredto.Ifweleaveouttheformulationinwords,somethinggeneralcomesinanyhow.Wecan't
separatethemcompletely.Onlyapicturemeansnothingitisalwaysthecasethatsomethingistrueofsomething.

Itseemstomethatthe"them"inthiscontextcouldmean"thesomethinggeneralandwhatitisabout"(bothofwhichmaybesaidtobecomponentsofthe
proposition),or''thepropositionanditscomponents"or(perhaps,moreambiguously,"thepropositionandwhatitisabout").Moresignificantly,however,Gdelis
asserting(ifIunderstandhimrightly)thatwealwaysseesomethinggeneraltobetrueofsomethinggeneral.Hence,thefundamentaldistinctionbetweentheuniversal
andtheparticular(betweenconceptsandobjects)isadistinctionwithintherealmofthegeneral.
Statement9.2.45wasmadeinthecontextofcontrastingintuitionwithproof.Onthisoccasion,Imentionedmyopinionthat,inpractice,wedonotusetheidealized
distinctionbetweenintuitiondereanimmediateprehensionofsomeentityandintuitiondedictoanimmediateprehensionthatsomerelationholds.Gdel
agreed.Immediatelybeforestatement9.2.45,hesaid:
9.2.46Intuitionisnotproofitistheoppositeofproof.Wedonotanalyzeintuitiontoseeaproofbutbyintuitionweseesomethingwithoutaproof.Weonly

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describeinwhatweseethosecomponentswhichcannotbeanalyzedanyfurther.Wedonotdistinguishbetweenintuitiondereanddedictotheoneiscontainedintheother.

9.3SomeGeneralObservationsonPhilosophy
InDecemberof1975IsenttoGdelamanuscriptentitled"QuotationsfromGdelonObjectivismofSetsandConcepts"(referredtoinChapter4asfragmentQ),
onwhichhecommentedextensively.Hewascriticalofthismanuscript,butalsoinformativeabouthisviewsregardingwhatisimportantinphilosophyandhowit
shouldbeperceivedandpresented.
9.3.1Thetitleshouldbe"Gdel'sFrameworkforDiscussingtheFundamentalAspectsofMathematics"or"SetsandConceptsontheBasisofDiscussionswithGdel."With
yourtitle,youshoulduseonlyquotationseventhequotationsactuallyusedoftenareincompleteandleaveoutthecontexts.Itshouldbealistofquotations,eachofwhichisto
beintelligibleandcompletebyitself.Thecontentiscorrectbutnotveryinteresting.Theordercouldbewrongindeed,itischaotic.Acleardispositionismissing.Itis
disorganizedanddoesn'tgivetheimpressionoffollowingalineofthought.
9.3.2Itisamistaketoargueratherthanreport[describe].Thisisthesamemistakethepositivistsmake:toproveeverythingfromnothing.Alargepartisnottoprovebuttocall
attentiontocertainimmediatelygivenbutnotprovable(primitive)facts.Itisfutiletotrytoprovewhatisgiven(primitive).Thereisacleardistinctionbetweenjustselecting
assertionsandarrangingalistofquotationswhichpointtoalineofthought.
9.3.3Oneideaistomakeacollectionofrealquotationswhichareselfcontained.Ontheotherhand,ifyouwishtoreproducetheconversations,youshouldpayattentiontothree
principles:(1)includeonlycertainpoints(2)separateouttheimportantandthenew(3)payattentiontoconnections.
9.3.4Wheninformal,lessdisturbing.
9.3.5Itismoreappropriatetopresentmyideasas"remarks"or"discussionswithGdel."Therealworldmayhappentobeonewayoranother.

Gdelrecommendedselfobservation,orintrospection,asanimportantmethodinphilosophyanotionatthecenterofHusserl'sphenomenology.Theperceptionof
concepts,asexplainedinChapter7,ishismainexampleofselfobservation,andhespokeaboutitincommentingonmymanuscriptQ:
9.3.6Thepurposeofphilosophyisnottoproveeverythingfromnothingbuttoassumeasgivenwhatweseeasclearlyasshapesandcolorswhichcomefromsensationsbut
cannotbederivedfromsensations.Thepositivistsattempttoproveeverythingfromnothing.Thisisabasicmistakesharedbytheprejudicesofthe

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time,sothateventhosewhorejectpositivismoftenslipintothismistake.Philosophyistocallattentiontocertainimmediatelygivenbutnotprovablefacts,whichare
presupposedbytheproofs.Themoresuchfactsweuncover,themoreeffectiveweare.Thisisjustlikelearningprimitiveconceptsaboutshapesandcolorsfromsensations.Ifin
philosophyonedoesnotassumewhatcanonlybeseen(theabstract),thenoneisreducedtojustsensationsandtopositivism.[Comparetheoverlappingformulationin5.4.1.]

Thisisalsowhyintuitioninimportant,asweseefromthefollowingobservations:
9.3.7Toexplaineverythingisimpossible:notrealizingthisfactproducesinhibition.
9.3.8Tobeovercriticalandreluctanttousewhatisgivenhamperssuccess.Toreachthehighestdegreeofclarityandgeneralphilosophy,empiricalconceptsarealsoimportant.

Statement,9.3.7isreminiscentofWittgenstein'sobservation(1953:1):"Explanationscometoanendsomewhere."
Whenaconceptoramethodorapositioniseithermisusedorappliedbeyonditsrangeofvalidity,ittendstobediscredited.Itisimportanttoapplytheappropriate
conception:onethatisneithertoobroadnortoonarrow.One'sattitudeshouldbecriticalbutnotovercritical.Eventhoughthesewellwornreminderssoundemptyin
theabstract,theyarehelpfulinpracticeespeciallywhencurrentopinionhappenstodeviatefromthegoldenmean.Itisthenusefultorethinkwhetheroneisapplying
therightconception.
Forexample,thepositivists,asGdelandIbothbelieve,haveintheirphilosophymisappliedlogicandtheaxiomaticmethod,andtheconceptsofanalysisand
precisionaswell.Becauseofthis,IwasinclinedtoquestiontheemphasisonclarityandprecisionandsaidsointhedraftofFromMathematicstoPhilosophy.
Gdel,however,disagreed.
9.3.9Analysis,clarityandprecisionallareofgreatvalue,especiallyinphilosophy.Justbecauseamisappliedclarityiscurrentorthewrongsortofprecisionisstressed,thatisno
reasontogiveupclarityorprecision.Withoutprecision,onecannotdoanythinginphilosophy.Metaphysicsusesgeneralideas:itdoesnotbeginwithprecision,butrather
workstowardprecisionafterwards.

InthedraftofMP,Iwrote:"Theword'theory'involvesvariousassociations,manyofwhicharelikelynottobeappropriatetophilosophy."Gdelcommented:
9.3.10Philosophyaimsatatheory.Phenomenologydoesnotgiveatheory.Inatheoryconceptsandaxiomsmustbecombined,andtheconceptsmustbepreciseones.Genetics
isatheory.Freudonlygivesasketchofadevelopingtheoryitcouldbepresentedbetter.Marxgiveslessofatheory.

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9.3.11See5.3.11.

Insection7.5IconsideredGdel'sconceptionoftheaxiomaticmethod.HeobviouslyhadabroaderconceptionoftheaxiomaticmethodandaxiomatictheorythanI
wasusedto.Forinstance,heregardedNewtonianphysicsasanaxiomatictheoryindeedthemodelforthepursuitofphilosophybutIwasundertheimpression
thatphysicistshadlittleinterestintheaxiomaticmethod.SowhenIwrote,"Asortofminorparadoxisthefactthatphysicistsgenerallyshownointerestin[formal]
axiomatization"(MP:18),Gdelsaidinresponse:
9.3.12MaxBorn,JohnvonNeumann,andEugeneWigneralldophysicswiththeaxiomaticmethod.
9.3.13Thelackofinterestofphysicistsintheaxiomaticmethodissimilartoapretense:themethodisnothingbutclearthinking.Newtonaxiomatizedphysicsandtherebymadeit
intoascience.

Inthe1970sIwasmuchconcernedwiththedirectsocialrelevanceofphilosophy.OccasionallyGdelcommentedonthisconcernofmine:
9.3.14Leibnizmayhave[had]sociallyrelevantphilosophicalviewswhichhedidnotpublishor[were]destroyedbecauseofthechurch.Moreover,itwouldbebadifevilpeople
gottoknowthemandusethemonlyforpracticalpurposes.Evilpoliticianscouldusethem.TheviewsofWronski[J.HoeneWronski]areobscure.
9.3.15Practicalreasonisconcernedwithpropositionsaboutwhatoneshoulddo.Forexample,stealingdoesnotpay.Willistheoppositeofreason.Thisworldisjustforusto
learn:itcannotbechangedintoparadise.Itisnottruethatonlygoodmenareborn.Itisquestionablethatitispossibletoimprovetheworld.
9.3.16Learntoactcorrectly:everybodyhasshortcomings,believesinsomethingwrong,andlivestocarryouthismistakes.Topublishtruephilosophywouldbecontrarytothe
world.

OnceIsuggestedtoGdelthatphilosophyhavingtodowithhumanrelationsismoredifficultthanpuretheory,andhereplied:
9.3.17Rulesofrightbehaviorareeasiertofindthanthefoundationsofphilosophy.
9.3.18Strictethicsiswhatoneislookingfor.Thereisadistrustinourcapabilitytoarriveatthis.Actuallyitwouldbeeasytogetstrictethicsatleastnoharderthanotherbasic
scientificproblems.Onlytheresultwouldbeunpleasant,andonedoesnotwanttoseeitandavoidsfacingittosomeextentevenconsciously.

Inresponsetomystatementthat"Thereisaproblemofmakingaprofessionintoasatisfactorywayoflife.Thisproblemisspeciallyacutewithregardto
philosophy"(MP:360),Gdelcommented:

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9.3.19Thequestionishowtocarryontheprofession.Theintrinsicpsychologicaldifficultiesinpursuingphilosophytodayasaprofessionareunavoidableinthepresentstateof
philosophy.Ontheotherhand,manyofthesociologicalfactors[whichcausethissituation]maydisappearinanotherhistoricalperiod.
9.3.20Philosophyismoregeneralthanscience.Alreadythetheoryofconceptsismoregeneralthanmathematics.Itiscommontoconcentrateonspecialsciences.Todo
philosophyisaspecialvocation.Wedoseethetruthyeterrorwouldreign.Theworldworksbylawsscienceisanextensionofapartialappreciationofthisfact.
9.3.21Truephilosophyisprecisebutnotspecialized.Itisnoteasytobuilduptherightphilosophy.Ifoneconcentratesonphilosophyfromthebeginningofone'scareer,there
willbesomechanceofsuccess,Kantneverintendedtopublishthetruth,butjustanarbitrarypointofviewthatisconsistent.[The]earlyMiddleAgeswereatimeappropriatefor
philosophy.

Gdelmadesomecommentsonthepositionofsubstantialfactualism,whichIproposedinMPandwhichIhadrenamedathissuggestion.Hesaidhehadbelieved
inasimilarapproachinhisyoungerdays.Healsosuggestedanadditiontoaheading:"Introduction:APleaforFactualism":
9.3.22Addafter"factualism"thespecification"asamethodinphilosophy."
9.3.23Thereisnodefiniteknowledgeinhumanaffairs.Evenscienceisveryheavilyprejudicedinonedirection.Knowledgeineverydaylifeisalsoprejudiced.Twomethodsto
transcendsuchprejudicesare:(1)phenomenology(2)goingbacktootherages.
9.3.24Otherswillcallfactualismabias.Historicalphilosophyisinparttrueandshouldbeappliedtothefactsofthesciences.Itcontainssomethingtrueandisdifferentfromthe
scientificattitude.Positivistsrejecttraditionalphilosophy,whichispoorlyrepresentedbythem.

Gdelagreedwithme,Ithink,inbelievingthatfactualism,asheunderstoodit,wassufficienttoshowtheinadequacyofthepositivisticposition.Buthewantedmore.
Overtheyears,IhavethoughtmoreaboutbothGdel'sviewsandmyown.InthenextchapterIoutlinewhatItaketobetheagreementsanddisagreementsbetween
us.
CentraltoGdel'smethodologyistheplaceoftheanalysisorperceptionoffundamentalconceptsIhavereportedaboutthisinsection7.3above,especiallyin
generalobservations7.3.20to7.3.23.
9.4TheMeaningoftheWorld:MonadologyandRationalisticOptimism
Inourdiscussionsinthe1970sGdelmademanyfragmentaryobservationsonmonadology,Hegel'ssystemofconcepts,andtheseparationofforce(orwish)and
factasthemeaningoftheworld.Inowbelievethathe

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takesthesethreelinesofthoughttobealternativeapproachestothesamegoal.HealsorelatestheseideastohisontologicalproofoftheexistenceofGod,discussed
aboveinChapter3.Moreover,inadiscussionwithCarnapon13November1940,herecommendedthatweattempttosetupanexacttheoryusingsuchconcepts
asGod,soul,andideas(Ideen)andspokeofsuchatheoryasmeaningful,liketheoreticalphysics(RG:217).Thissortofthingis,Ibelieve,thekindofmetaphysics
Gdelhasinmindwhenhesays,"PhilosophyasanexacttheoryshoulddotometaphysicsasmuchasNewtondidtophysics"(MP:85).
The"separationofwishandfact"isanambiguousphrase.Accordingtooneinterpretation,itistherecommendationthatwekeepourwishesseparatefromour
investigationofthefacts,notallowingourwishestodistortourvision.Thephrasethenformulatesafamiliarwarningtoguardagainstourprejudices,andsocanbe
readasamethodologicalprinciple.Iam,however,concernedherewithGdel'suseofthisphraseinaspecialcontext,acontextwhichsuggeststhattheword
separationmeansdiscrepancy,gap,ordistance.Gdelmeantthephrase,Ithink,todescribethegrossphenomenonthat,mostofthetime,westrivetosatisfyour
wishesbecausetheactualsituationdoesnotagreewithwhatwewishfor.
InOctoberof1972Gdelassertedthatoneofthefunctionsofphilosophyistoguidescientificresearchandthatanotheristoinvestigate"themeaningoftheworld."
InNovemberof1975heofferedthesuggestiveobservationthatthemeaningoftheworldistheseparationofforceandfact.Wishis,accordingtoGdel,forceas
attributedtothinkingbeings:realizingsomething.If,asLeibnizandGdelchoosetosay,theworldconsistsofmonadsandeverymonadhaswishes(orappetition),
wemayalsosaymorestrikingly:
9.4.1Themeaningoftheworldistheseparationofwishandfact.

Ihavelongponderedoverthisstimulatingaphorism.Thewordmeaning,Ibelieve,standsherefor"thereasonwhyathingiswhatitis."Theworlddevelopsasthe
separationofwishandfactanddrivesthemonadstochangetheirstates,therebyrealizingtheworldasitis.Itseemscleartomethatthequestforasystematic
explicationofaphorism9.4.1maybeviewedasasuccinctcharacterizationofthetaskofwhatGdeltakestobemetaphysics,orfirstphilosophy.Morespecifically,
heapparentlyhasinmindthesortofthingexemplifiedbytheLeibnizianmonadology.Indeed,hesaid,inMarchof1976,thathisownphilosophy,ortheory,isa
monadologywithacentralmonad,namely,God.
UndoubtedlyitwasforseveraldecadesamajorwishofGdel'stodevelopsuchaLeibnizianmonadologyandtodemonstrateconvincinglythatitisatruepictureof
theworld(andis,asLeibnizandGdelbelieve,goodformankind).Muchhadtobedone,however,toovercomethe

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wideseparationofthis"wish"(foradevelopedmonadology)fromthe"fact"astowhatknowledgewasthenavailabletoGdelor,is,indeedavailableatpresentto
humanityasawhole.Itis,asweknow,importanttoknowwhatweknowandtoavoidwishfulpresumptions,toseparateourwishfromthefactastowhatwecan
justifiablyclaimtoknow.
Inthisparticularcase,mostofustodayareinclinedtothinkthatneitherLeibniznorGdelhasofferedconvincingreasonstobelievethata"monadology"a
Leibnizianpictureoftheworldcanbedevelopedfarenougheventobeconsideredplausible.Weareinclinedtosaythattheirwishforsuchaphilosophyhasso
coloredtheirjudgmentinselectingandevaluatingevidencethattheyunjustifiedlyseeitsfeasibilityasafact.Thisseemstobeagrandexampleofthefamiliar
phenomenonofwishfulthinking,whichresultsfromournaturaltendencytopermitourwishtoprejudiceourjudgmentof(whatisorisnot)fact.
Gdelsays,asIhavejustmentioned,thathisownphilosophyagreesinitsgeneraloutlinewiththemonadologyofLeibniz:thathistheoryisamonadologywitha
centralmonadthathisphilosophyisrationalistic,idealistic(intheontological,nottheepistemological,sense),theological,andoptimisticandthatthesecharacteristics
areinterlinked.Hecontrastshisidealisticphilosophywithmaterialisminthatitseesmindasrealandmatterassecondary.Hisviewincludesconceptualrealismasa
part,whichassertstheabsoluteandobjectiveexistenceofconcepts,inthePlatonicsense.Thisrealistdoctrineiswhatisoftencalledobjectiveidealism.
AccordingtoGdel:
9.4.2Withregardtothestructureoftherealworld,LeibnizdidnotgonearlyasfarasHegel,butmerelygavesome"preparatorypolemics"someoftheconcepts,suchasthatof
possibility,arenotclearintheworkofLeibnizLeibnizhadinmindabuildupoftheworldthathastobesodeterminedastoleadtothebestpossibleworldforLeibnizmonadsdo
notinteract,althoughC.Wolffandotherssaythat,accordingtoLeibniz,theydo.

LetmeinserthereabriefexpositionofwhatiscommonlytakentobetheLeibnizianview.AccordingtoLeibniz,theactualworldconsistsofaninfinitenumberof
individualsubstances,whichhecalledmonads,orunits.Thesearesimplesubstancestheyhavenoparts,noextension,andnoform.Thestatesofamonadarecalled
perceptions,andthetendencytogofromstatetostateiscalledappetition.Thosemonadswhoseperceptionsarerelativelydistinctandareaccompaniedbymemory
aresouls.Soulsthatarecapableofreasonandscience,which"raiseustoaknowledgeofourselves"arecalledspiritsorminds.Amaterialobject,orabody,isa
wellfoundedphenomenon,whichresultsfromourconfusedperceptionofanunderlyingaggregateofmonads.Itrepresentsrelativelyclearlytheactualfeaturesof
thatmonadicaggregate.Oneofthemonadsisthecentral

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monad,orGod.Animportantfeatureofthemonadsisthateverymonadhasaninnerlife,orconsciousnessinsomeform.
WhatGdelactuallysaidabouttheseparationoffactandwishisquitebriefandcryptic.MuchofwhatIhavetosayisaconjecturalinterpretationwhichresultsfrom
myfascinationwiththeidea.Tome,thefollowingfoursentencesappeartoconveythecoreofhisposition:
9.4.3Themeaningoftheworldistheseparationoffactandforce.Wishisforceasappliedtothinkingbeings,torealizesomething.Afulfilledwishisaunionofwishandfact.The
meaningofthewholeworldistheseparation(andtheunion)offactandwish.

Thefollowingthreeparagraphsaremyinterpretationofthesesentences:
Ifwerestrictourattentiontophysicalforce,thephysicalworldiswhatitisbecauseateachmomentthefactofitsstatedisagreeswiththetendencyoftheforceof
eachoftheelementaryparticles,whichproducesthenextstateofthephysicalworld.(Iftherewerenoforceatall,theworldwouldbedeadandtherewouldno
longerbeanyseparationoffactandforce.Suchanunlikelysituationcouldbeseenasthelimitcase,whentherewouldbezeroforceandzeroseparation.)Physics
maybeseenasthestudyofthelawsgoverningthetendencyoftheforceofeachphysicalparticletoovercometheseparationoffact(thecurrentstateoftheworld)
fromits"desired"state.Sincetheforcescontinuetointeract,theunionofaforcewithfactoccursonlywhentheforceofaparticleisspentandtheparticlebecomes
"contented."
Atthesametimewetendtothinkofphysicalforceas"blind"force.Onlyinthecaseofwishdowethinkofanintention(directedtosometarget)oranideal.The
separationofwish(asaforce)fromfactis(moreorless)theseparationoftheidealorthewishfromfact.Ifwecomparewish(orforce)andfacttoappetitionand
perceptionintheLeibnizianmonadology,itisnaturaltoidentifywishwithappetition.Perceptionisthenfactasseenbyamonad.Thereplacementofperceptionby
factyieldsacommonframeofreferenceforallmonads,whichis,however,nolongerfullywithintheconsciousnessofeachmonad.
IseeanaffinityofthisideawiththeviewdevelopedbyGeorgeHerbertMeadinhisPhilosophyoftheAct(1938).Meaddistinguishesfourstagesintheact:the
stageofimpulse,thestageofperception,thestageofmanipulation,andthestageofconsummation.Clearly,impulseandconsummationcorrespondtowishandits
fulfillment.Giventheseparationofwishandfact,onecustomarilytriestoovercometheseparationthroughperceptionandmanipulation.
Gdelmakesseveralothersuggestiveobservationsonthispoint.
9.4.4Forceandfactmustoccuragainandagain,repeatingahugenumberoftimes.

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9.4.5Forceisconnectedtoobjectsandaconceptrepresentsrepetitionofobjects.Thegeneralisthatwhichholdstheindividualobjectstogether.Causationisfundamentalit
shouldalsoexplainthegeneralandtheparticular.
9.4.6Multiplicity(orrepetition)ismathematics,whichdoesnottakeprimaryplaceinthisscheme.

IdonotknowwhatGdelhasinmindinmakingtheseobservationsandsocanonlyoffersomeconjectures.Objectsare,inthefirstplace,themonads,whose
appetitionisforce.Therearerepetitionsofallsortsofthings,fromwhichconceptsarise.Concepts,beinggeneral,arewhatholdthingstogether,inthesensethatwhen
thesameconceptappliestomanyobjects,theseobjectsareconnected.Causationisimportantforattemptstofulfillwishes,sincewelearnthat,inordertobringabout
B,itissufficienttogetAfirst.Hereweresorttothecausal(general)connectionthatsomethinglike(theparticular)Bsucceedssomethinglike(theparticular)A.Gdel
seemstobesayingthat,ifweleaveoutallotherfeaturesinarepetitionandconsidermerelyrepetitionasrepetition,wehavemathematics.Wemayalsointerprethim
assayingthat,ifweconsidermerelyrepetitionsofsuccessionsassuccessions,thenwegetmathematics.
Hemakesthefollowingobservationsaboutwishes:
9.4.7Bydefinition,wishisdirectedtobeingsomething.Loveiswishdirectedtothebeingofsomething,andhateiswishdirectedtothenonbeingofsomething.Theseareexplicit
definitions.
9.4.8Themaximumprincipleforthefulfillingofwishesguidesthebuildingupoftheworldbyrequiringthatitbethebestpossible.Inparticular,[sincetherearesomany
unrealizedpossibilitiesinthisworld,itmustbea]preparationforanotherworld.Leibnizalsogiveshintsinthisdirection.

Gdelbelievesthatforceshouldbeaprimitiveconceptofphilosophy.HesaysthatLeibnizputsmoreemphasisthanHegeldoesonrealdefinitionssoastogetto
higherlevelconceptsfromlowerlevelones.
Gdelseemstorelatetheseparationoffactandforcetothethreecategoriesofbeing,nonbeing,andpossibility(insteadofHegel'sthreeinitialcategoriesofbeing,
nonbeing,andbecoming).
9.4.9Thesisisalwaysareinforcementofsynthesis,thatis,possibility,thatis,forceantithesisisanempiricalfact.Beingintimeistoospecialandshouldnotappearsoearlyasin
Hegel.Acompleteunderstanding[oftheworld]shouldreduceeverythingtotheseelements.HowyougoonmaybedifferentfromHegel.

Interpretation.Beingasthesisencountersitsantithesisin(empirical)fact.Forcebringsforthsomenewpossibility(assynthesis),whichisreinforcedbyanewthesis
(asbeing).Somehowforcebeginsasbeingandturnsinto

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possibilityafterencounteringfact.Factmodifiesforceorwishtogetanewforceorwish.IamnotabletograspwhatGdelhasinmind,althoughitisclearthathe
wantstoputthethreecategoriesofbeing,nonbeing,andpossibility(insteadofbecoming)atthecenter,ascanbeseenfromthenextobservation:
9.4.10IndependentlyofHegel's(particularchoiceof)primitiveterms,theprocessisnotintime,evenlessananalogywithhistory.Itisrighttobeginwithbeing,becausewehave
tohavesomethingtotalkabout.Butbecomingshouldnotcomeimmediatelyafterbeingandnonbeingthisistakingtimetooseriouslyandtakingitasobjective.Itisveryclear
thatpossibilityisthesynthesisbetweenbeingandnonbeing.Itisanessentialandnaturaldefinitionofpossibilitytotakeitasthesynthesisofbeingandnonbeing.Possibilityis
a"weakenedfromofbeing."

Gdelcontinueswithadiscussionoftime.TherelevantpointhereisthatheagreeswithKantinseeingtimeassubjective.(Ifurtherconsiderthequestionoftimein
section9.5.)
GdelseemstosaythatoneworthwhileprojectistoimproveontheworkofHegel,whichwouldbeahelpfulsteptowarddevelopingthesystemofconcepts.In
particular,hestatesthatKarlLudwigMichelet(18011893)providedabetterdevelopmentthanHegeldid.Inthisregard,hementionsMichelet'sDie
EntwicklungsgeschichtederneuestenDeutschenPhilosophie,publishedin1843whenMicheletwasfortytwo,aswellasDasSystemderPhilosophieals
exacterWissenschaft(fivevolumes,187681).
Gdelbelievesthattherearetwophilosophiesin[Soviet]Russia,oneexotericandoneesoteric.Theesotericphilosophy,hebelieves,isauniquesystemfromwhich
alltrueconsequencesarederived.HesaysthatMicheletattemptstoproducethissortofsystemwithhisimprovedversionofHegel'sphilosophy.
GdeloffersthefollowingcommentsonHegel'slogic:
9.4.11Hegel'slogicneednotbeinterpretedasdealingwithcontradictions.Itissimplyasystematicwayofobtainingnewconcepts.Itdealswithbeingintime.NotHegel'slogic
butsomepartsofitmightberelatedtoaproposition(notconcept)producingitsopposite.Forexample,ifAisdefinedasinRussell'sparadox[namely,Aisthesetofallsetsthat
donotbelongtothemselves],"AbelongstoA"producesitsopposite.InHegel,aconditionproducesitsoppositeconditioninhistory:thatisaprocessintime,andtruth
dependsontime.Hegel'sinterpretationislikethefiguresinapuppetshowthesecondbeatsthefirstdown.Intermsoftheunityofoppositesandtheideathatcontradiction
givesdirection,antinomiesreceiveadifferentinterpretation.TheRussellsetbecomesalimitingcaseofasuccessionofbelongingtoandnotbelongingtoitisnolongercircular.

GdelisinterestedinHegel'ssystemofconcepts,butcriticizesHegelontwofundamentalpoints(incontrasttohisagreementwithLeibnizandHusserl).Onepointhas
todowithmeaningfulpredication(renderedparticularly

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explicitbymathematicallogicbutimplicitlyfollowedbyallclearthinking).Theotherpointseemstobetheidealofseeingprimitiveconceptsclearlyanddistinctly(such
asHusserl'sidealof''intuitingessences").Inbothrespects,heconsidersHegeltobedefective.
FromtimetotimeGdeltalkedinformallyaboutmonadology,butitwasoftenunclearwhetherhewasexpoundinghisownviewsorthoseofLeibniz.Itseems
desirabletoreporttheseobservations,eventhoughIdonotfullyunderstandthemandmyreconstructionoftheconversationsmaybefarfromaccurate.Ihavealready
givenGdel'sconcentratedexpositionofthistopicin9.1.8to9.1.11above.Isolatedobservationsincludethefollowing:
9.4.12Inmaterialismallelementsbehavethesame.Itismysterioustothinkofthemasspreadoutandautomaticallyunited.Forsomethingtobeawhole,ithastohavean
additionalobject,say,asouloramind."Matter"referstoonewayofperceivingthings,andelementaryparticlesarealowerformofmind.Mindisseparatefrommatter,itisa
separateobject.Theissuebetweenmonadologyandmaterialismdependsonwhichyieldsabettertheory.Accordingtomaterialism,everythingismatter,andparticlesmovein
spaceandexertforceinspace.Everythinghastobegovernedbymateriallaws.Mentalstateshavetobeaccountedforbymotionsandtheirformsinthebrain.Forinstance,the
thoughtofpleasurehastobeaformofthemotionofmatter.

Inthiscontext,GdelmentionsWilliamHarveyandhisbiologicalconcepts,probablyasaninfluenceonthethoughtofLeibniz.Henotesthatlogicdealswithmore
generalconceptsandthatmonadology,whichcontainsgenerallawsofbiology,ismorespecific.Hespeaksofthelimitofscienceandasks:
9.4.13Isitpossiblethatallmentalactivities(infinite,alwayschanging,etc.)bebrainactivities?Therecanbeafactualanswertothisquestion.Sayingnotothinkingasaproperty
ofaspecificnaturecallsforsayingnoalsotoelementaryparticles.Consciousnessisconnectedwithoneunityamachineiscomposedofparts.

Gdelsuggeststhat:
9.4.14Whenanextremelyimprobablesituationarises,weareentitledtodrawlargeconclusionsfromit.Thefailuretogeneralizesufficientlyisnotconfinedtophilosophy.For
example,thecalculusofprobabilityisnotrightlyapplied,evenineverydayoccurrences.ItwasnotacoincidencethatRobertTaftandJosephStalindiednotlongafter
Eisenhowerhadbecomepresident.[Tomyprotestthatthisseemsratherfarfetched,Gdelsaidthat]forinstance,Eisenhower'spoliciesmighthavebroughtdistresstoTaftand
Stalin.Thereare[lawshavingtodowith]thestructureoftheworld,overandabovenaturalcauses.[Gdelmadesimilarobservationsinhisletterof21September1953,whichis
quotedinsection1.3.]

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Gdelpositsadirectspiritualfieldofforceinwhichweliveanddistinguishesbetweentheexplicitfactorsandaforcewhichisdistinctfromthesumoftheenvironment.
Healsospeaksofaparapsychologicalforceandofacommonforceexistingforagiventimeperiod.
9.4.15AccordingtoaLeibnizianidea,scienceonly"combines"concepts,itdoesnot"analyze"concepts.Forexample,fromthisLeibnizianperspective,Einstein'stheoryof
relativityinitselfisnotananalysisofconceptsbutitisstimulatingforrealanalysis.Itdealswithobservationsanddoesnotpenetrateintothelastanalysisbecauseit
presupposesacertainmetaphysics,whichisdistinctfromthe"truemetaphysics"oftheLeibnizianscience,whilerealanalysisstrivestofindthecorrectmetaphysics.

Towardtheendofsection3.2,IquotedsomepassageswrittenbyGdelinhis"philosophicalnotebooks"in1954.Thefollowingexcerptisofspecialrelevancetothe
problemofdeterminingtheprimitiveconceptsofmetaphysics:
9.4.16Thefundamentalphilosophicalconceptiscause.Itinvolves:will,force,enjoyment,God,time,space.Theaffirmationofbeingisthecauseoftheworld.Propertyisthecause
ofthedifferenceofthings.PerhapstheotherKantiancategoriescanbedefinedintermsofcausality.Willandenjoymentleadtolifeandaffirmationandnegation.Beingnearin
timeandspaceunderliesthepossibilityofinfluence.

IfweleaveouttheconceptofGod,wehavetoaddtheconceptofbeing.Willandenjoyment,combinedwithforce,yieldtheaffirmationofbeing,whichisthecause
oftheworld.Propertiesorconceptscausethedifferenceofthings.Clearlytherearedifferentwaystotrytoexplicatethepregnantsuggestionscontainedin9.4.16.
Insteadofmakingthefutileattempttointerpretthem,however,IturntoanotheroutlineofhisphilosophicalviewpointproducedbyGdel.
ThereisamongtheGdelpapersanundatedbundleofloosepageswrittenintheGabelsbergershorthand,withsomewordsinEnglishmixedin.CherylDawsonhas
recentlytranscribedthesepages,whichwereprobablywrittenaround1960.Thefirstpageisheaded"Philosophicalremarks"andcontainsalistofcategories
apparentlysummarizingwhatGdeltakestobethesubjectmatterofphilosophy:"reason,cause,substance,accidens,necessity(conceptual),valueharmony
(positiveness),God(=lastprinciple),cognition,force,volition,time,form,content,matter,life,truth,class(=absolute),concept(generalandindividual),idea,reality,
possibility,irreducible,manyandone,essence."Ibelievethewordclassheremeanstheuniversalclass(ofallsetsandindividuals)andthattheidentificationofthis
withtheabsoluteharksbacktoanideaofCantor's.

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Onanotherpage,undertherubric"Myphilosophicalviewpoint,"Gdellistsfourteenitemswhichappeartobeanattempttooutlinehisfundamentalphilosophical
beliefs:
9.4.17
1.

Theworldisrational.

2.

Humanreasoncan,inprinciple,bedevelopedmorehighly(throughcertaintechniques).

3.

Therearesystematicmethodsforthesolutionofallproblems(alsoart,etc.).

4.

Thereareotherworldsandrationalbeingsofadifferentandhigherkind.

5.

Theworldinwhichweliveisnottheonlyoneinwhichweshallliveorhavelived.

6.

Thereisincomparablymoreknowableapriorithaniscurrentlyknown.

7.

ThedevelopmentofhumanthoughtsincetheRenaissanceisthoroughlyintelligible(durchauseinsichtige).

8.

Reasoninmankindwillbedevelopedineverydirection.

9.

Formalrightscomprisearealscience.

10.

Materialismisfalse.

11.

Thehigherbeingsareconnectedtotheothersbyanalogy,notbycomposition.

12.

Conceptshaveanobjectiveexistence.

13.

Thereisascientific(exact)philosophyandtheology,whichdealswithconceptsofthehighestabstractnessandthis
isalsomosthighlyfruitfulforscience.

14.

Religionsare,forthemostpart,badbutreligionisnot.

Theseareoptimisticbeliefsandconjectures.Theygofarbeyond"whatispossiblebeforeallnewdiscoveriesandinventions,"asWittgensteinrequiresofphilosophy
(1953:126).UnfortunatelyweknowverylittleofGdel'sreasonsforholdingthem.Undoubtedlythecenterpieceishisbeliefthattheworldisrational.Thiskeybelief
isanempiricalgeneralizationfromhisinterpretationofhumanexperience,butwhatisknownofhisargumentsforitishardlyconvincing.Forinstance,inthe1970s,he
saidtomethingslikethefollowing:
9.4.18RationalismisconnectedwithPlatonismbecauseitisdirectedtotheconceptualaspectratherthantowardthereal[physical]world.Oneusesinductiveevidence.Itis
surprisingthatinsomepartsofmathematicswegetcompletedevelopments(suchassomeworkbyGaussinnumbertheory).Mathematicshasaformofperfection.In
mathematicsoneattainsknowledgeonceforall.Wemayexpectthattheconceptualworldisperfectand,furthermore,thatobjectiverealityisbeautiful,good,andperfect.
9.4.19Theworld(includingtherelationshipsofpeople)asweknowitisveryimperfect.Butlifeasweknowitmaynotbethewholespanoftheindividual.

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Maybeitwillbecontinuedinanotherworldwherethereisnosicknessordeathandwhereallmarriagesarehappyandallwork(everycareer)isenjoyable.Thereisnoevidence
againstthetransmigrationofthesoul.Ifthereisasoul,itcanonlyunitewithabodywhichfitsit,anditcanrememberitspreviouslife.Therearemanytechniquestotrainthe
memory.Averyimperfectlifeofseventyyearsmaybenecessaryfor,andadequatelycompensatedforby,theperfectlifeafterwards.

AsIrecallthisconversation,IexpressedmydoubtsasGdelspoke9.4.19isareconstructionofhisanswerstomyquestionsabouttheperfectionoftheworldand
aboutthefutilityofanotherlifethatdoesnotrememberthepreviousone.Gdelsmiledasherepliedtomyquestions,obviouslyawarethathisanswerswerenot
convincingme.
9.4.20OurtotalrealityandtotalexistencearebeautifulandmeaningfulthisisalsoaLeibnizianthought.Weshouldjudgerealitybythelittlewhichwetrulyknowofit.Sincethat
partwhichconceptuallyweknowfullyturnsouttobesobeautiful,therealworldofwhichweknowsolittleshouldalsobebeautiful.Lifemaybemiserableforseventyyearsand
happyforamillionyears:theshortperiodofmiserymayevenbenecessaryforthewhole.
9.4.21WehavethecompletesolutionsoflineardifferentialequationsandseconddegreeDiophantineequations.Wehaveheresomethingextremelyunusualhappeningtoasmall
sampleinsuchcasestheweightofthesampleisfargreaterthanitssize.Theaprioriprobabilityofarrivingatsuchcompletesolutionsissosmallthatweareentitledtogeneralize
tothelargeconclusion,thatthingsaremadetobecompletelysolved.Hilbert,inhisprogramoffinitaryconsistencyproofsofstrongsystems,generalizedintoospecializeda
fashion.

Inthespringof1972GdelformulatedarelatedargumentforpublicationinmyFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(MP)initheexpressedhisagreementwith
Hilbertinrejectingthepropositionthatthereexistnumbertheoreticalquestionsundecidablebythehumanmind(MP:324325).
9.4.22Ifitweretrueitwouldmeanthathumanreasonisutterlyirrational[in]askingquestionsitcannotanswer,whileassertingemphaticallythatonlyreasoncananswerthem.
Humanreasonwouldthenbeveryimperfectand,insomesense,eveninconsistent,inglaringcontradictiontothefactthatthosepartsofmathematicswhichhavebeen
systematicallyandcompletelydeveloped(suchas,e.g.,thetheoryof1stand2nddegreeDiophantineequations,thelatterwithtwounknowns)showanamazingdegreeofbeauty
andperfection.Inthesefields,byentirelyunexpectedlawsandprocedures(suchasthequadraticlawofreciprocity,theEuclideanalgorithm,thedevelopmentintocontinued
fractions,etc.),meansareprovidednotonlyforsolvingallrelevantproblems,butalsosolvingtheminamostbeautifulandperfectlyfeasiblemanner(e.g.,duetotheexistenceof
simpleexpressionsyieldingallsolutions).Thesefactsseemtojustifywhatmaybecalled"rationalisticoptimism."

Gdel'srationalisticoptimismisanoptimismaboutthepowerofhumanreason.SevenofGdel'sfourteenbeliefsmaybeseenasspecialcasesof

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thiscognitiveorepistemicoptimism:2,3,6,7(averyparticularapplication),8,9,and13.Beliefs4and11havetodowithbeingsthatpossessanevenhigherformof
reason.Ihavediscussedin3.1someofhisreasonsforhisbelief5,inalifeafteroralifebefore,whichisbasedonhisbeliefthattheworldisrational.Belief14
suggeststhepossibilityofagoodreligion,perhapsinthesenseofonethatbenefitsmankindhisontologicalproofispresumablyrelevanttothisbelief.
Gdeldiscussedwithmehisbelief10thatmaterialismisfalseinthecontextofphysicalism(orpsychophysicalparallelism)andcomputabilism(ormechanism),
whichIdiscussaboveinChapter6.
Belief12thatconceptshaveanobjectiveexistenceisGdel'swellknownPlatonism,aboutwhichhewroteagreatdealovertheyearsseveraloftheessays
focusedonthisbeliefhavebeenorwillsoonbepublished.Incontrasttothesearticles,hisdiscussionswithmesuggestamoremoderateformofPlatonismor
objectivismwhich,inmyopinion,iscompatiblewithawiderangeofalternativeoutlooks.Objectivism,whichisoneofthemaintopicsofthisbook,isdiscussedin
Chapters7and8.
AsIhavesaidbefore,Gdelfavoreduninhibitedgeneralization(see9.2.13).Itseemstomethathearrivedatmostofhisfourteenbeliefsbyapplyingthisprincipleto
certaingenerallyacceptedfactsofhumanexperience.Whenthesefactsaremadeexplicit,however,wedo,Ibelieve,seealternativechoices.Inanycase,sinceIam
inclinedtoadherecloselytowhatweknow,Ishallnotspeculateaboutthosebeliefs,giventhatwehavesolittleknowledgeofGdel'sreasonsforholdingthem.
Idonotknowhowthesebeliefsareinterconnected,orhowtheymightconvincinglybesupported.Wemayalsoaskhowonewhopossessesthesebeliefswouldlive
andbehavedifferentlyfromthosewhodonothavethem.Inanycase,itseemscleartomethatwecanneitherprovenorrefutethem,althoughtheyarecertainlyof
interestinwideningtherangeofpossibilitieswecanenvisage.
9.5Time:AsExperiencedandasRepresented
Ifwecontrasttheobjectiverealityofthephysicalworldwiththesubjectiverealmofmyexperience,weseethat,eventhoughmymentalprocessesarenotspatial,they
dotakeplaceintime.Sincemypictureoftheobjectiveworldisultimatelyderivedfrommyexperience,timeoccupiesafundamentalplaceinmylife.
WearenaturallyinclinedtothinkthatIshouldknowbestwhetherIhaveafeverornot,forIknowhowIfeel.Inpractice,however,werelywithmoreconfidenceon
whatisregisteredonaninstrumentthatmeasuresmybodilytemperature.Similarly,whenIwishtoknow,say,whetherIhavesleptenough,Igenerallyrelymoreon
whattheclocksaysthanon

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myownfelling.Thethermometerortheclockcapturesbyobjectivationsomeaspectofmyexperiencewhichcanbecomparedacrossdifferentmomentsinmylife
andcommunicatedintersubjectively.Ontheonehand,objectivationfails,webelieve,tocapturecertainsubtlecomponentsofmyexperienceontheotherhand,Ilive
mylifelargelybyusingthefruitsofobjectivationwhichincludeconspicuouslythosederivedfromscienceandtechnology.
Between1946and1950GdelwroteseveralarticlesontheconceptoftimefromKanttoEinstein.HefoundcertainnewsolutionsforEinstein'sgravitational
equationsandappliedthemtoarguethatourintuitiveconceptoftimeis,asassertedbyKant,notobjective(orobjectivelyrepresentable).(Anextendeddiscussionof
thesearticlesiscontainedinYourgrau1991.)Inaddition,GdelsawEinstein'srelativitytheoryasimplyingarefutationof"Kant'sviewconcerningtheimpossibilityfor
theoreticalscienceofsteppingoutsidethelimitsofournaturalconceptionoftheworld."Igiveadetailedexpositionoftheseideasin"TimeinPhilosophyandin
PhysicsfromKantandEinsteintoGdel"(Synthese,102,:215234,1995.).
Inhisdiscussionswithmeinthe1970sGdelmadesomescatteredbriefobservationsontheplaceoftimeinourexperienceasitrelatestothepursuitofphilosophy.
Theseobservationsaresuggestive,butbynomeansunambiguousforthose,likeme,whohaveonlyaverypartialunderstandingofmanyofthesubtletiesofhis
thoughts.Beforeofferingmytentativeinterpretationsofthem,Ipresentmyreconstruction,fromroughnotes,ofhisrelevantobservations:
9.5.1Thefourdimensionsofspacetimearenaturalforthephysicalworld.Butthereisnosuchnaturalcoordinatesystemforthemindtimeistheonlynaturalframeofreference.
9.5.2TheNewtonianschemewastoaconsiderableextentobtainedapriori.Proportionality,space,andtimewereapriori,whileforce,whichproducesacceleration,wasempirical.
Husserlbelievedthat,byhismethod,onecangetNewton'sschemeorevenabetteroneevenwithoutthescientificknowledgeofNewton'stime.
9.5.3WhatremainsinHusserl'sapproachistheobservationoftheworkingofthemindthisisthewaytomaketheconceptsoftimeandsoforth,clearnotbystudyinghow
theyworkinscience.
9.5.4Weforgethowwearrivedattheconceptoftimeinourchildhoodanddonotknowhowweuseit.Whenwetrytothinkabouttime,ourreasonisformakingcertain
statements,yetourmindisworkingandworkingonnothingatall.Theproblemoftimeisimportantanddifficult.FortwentyfiveyearsHusserlworkedonjustthisoneproblem:
theconceptoftime.[Theperiodfrom1893to1917isindicatedinvolume10ofHusserliana,whichisdevotedtoHusserl'swork

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oninternaltimeconsciousness.]Husserl'sworkontimehasbeenlostfromthemanuscripts.
9.5.5Husserl'sunpublishedworkdoesnotcontainmoreontimethanhispublishedwork.Aswepresenttimetoourselvesitsimplydoesnotagreewithfact.Tocalltime
subjectiveisjustaeuphemismforthisfailure.Problemsremain.Oneproblemistodescribehowwearriveattime.
9.5.6Anotherproblemistherelationofourconceptoftimetorealtime.Therealideabehindtimeiscausationthetimestructureoftheworldisjustitscausalstructure.Causation
inmathematics,inthesenseof,say,afundamentaltheoremcausingitsconsequences,isnotintime,butwetakeitasaschemeintime.
9.5.7Intermsoftime,therearedifferentmomentsanddifferentworlds.[Oneinterpretationofthisremarkistotakeitasareferencetothedifferentworldsdeterminedbythe
spatiotemporalschemesofdifferentobservers.]
9.5.8Insenseperceptionwhatisoriginallygivenisnotlostbutinourexperiencehavingtodowithtimeandmathematicalobjectswelosealargepartofwhatisoriginallygiven.
9.5.9Causationisunchangingintimeanddoesnotimplychange.Itisanempiricalbutnotapriorifactthatcausationisalwaysaccompaniedbychange.Changeissubjective
intheEinsteinuniverse.ForKant,changeistheessenceoftime.
9.5.10Timeisnospecificcharacterofbeing.Inrelativitytheorythetemporalrelationislikefarandnearinspace.Idonotbelieveintheobjectivityoftime.TheconceptofNow
neveroccursinscienceitself,andscienceissupposedtobeconcernedwiththeobjective[allthatisobjective].KantwasbeforeHegel.[Itakethelastobservationtomeanthat,
eventhoughHegelwaslater,heregressedfromKant'scorrectviewoftime.]

IonceaskedGdeltotellmesomespecificimpressiveresultswhichhadbeenobtainedbyusingHusserl'sphenomenologicalmethod,sothatIcouldlearnthemethod
bystudyingsuchexamples.Inreply,hementionedHusserl'sworkontime,butaddedthattheimportantparthadbeenlost.EventhoughGdelusuallypraised
Husserl'swork,hedidoccasionallyexpresshisfrustrationinstudyingit.Ihavearecordofwhathesaidononeoftheseoccasions.
9.5.11Idon'tlikeparticularlyHusserl'sway:longanddifficult.Hetellsusnodetailedwayabouthowtodoit.Hisworkontimehasbeenlostfromthemanuscripts.[Compare
5.3.20.]

ItisclearfromtheabovelistthatIhavenotbeenabletoobtainasatisfactoryreconstructionofGdel'spregnantbutfragmentaryobservationsontime.Twobasic
pointsare,however,clear.(1)Timeissubjective,atleastwhenitisunderstoodinthesenseofourintuitiveconceptofit

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(9.5.9and9.5.10)itistobeclarifiedbyobservingtheworkingofthemind(9.5.3).(2)Clarificationoftheconceptoftimeisfundamentaltothestudyofphilosophy,
whichdependscentrallyonclarifyinghowthemindworks(9.5.1andtheseveralreferencestoHusserl'sapproach)thistaskisverydifficult(9.5.4,9.5.5,9.5.9,and
9.5.11).
Therearesometerminologicaldifficultiesinthesequotations.Suchproblemsaretypicallyhardtoavoidinobservationsthatdealwithfundamentalissuesbutarenot
statedwithinacomprehensivecontext.OnedifficultyisthatGdelcallsitaeuphemismtodescribetimeassubjective(9.5.5).Hemaybeobjectingtotheideathat,
sinceitissubjective,theconceptoftimeistobestudiedin(empirical)psychology,asitiscommonlypursuedtoday.Thetworemainingproblemssuggestedin9.5.5
and9.5.6areindicationsofhisbeliefthattherearespecificdifficultiestobeovercomebeforewecanreachaclearunderstandingofourconceptoftime.Inother
words,heisobjectingtothosewhogiveuptheattempttoclarifyourintuitiveconceptoftime,usingasanexcusetheeuphemismthatitissubjective.Inanycase,while
acknowledgingthatwehavesofarfailedtoattainaclearunderstandingoftheintuitiveconceptoftime,hebelievesitispossibleandextremelyimportantforthe
advanceofphilosophytoreachsuchanunderstanding.
Indeed,accordingtoGdel'sgeneralphilosophicalposition,objectiverealityincludesboththephysicalandtheconceptualworlds,whichwecanknowbetterand
better.Inparticular,Ithink,hebelievesthereisasharpconceptcorrespondingtoourvagueintuitiveconceptoftimebutwehavenotyetfoundtherightperspective
forperceivingitclearly.(ComparehisdiscussionoftheconceptofmechanicalprocedureinMP:8485.)
In9.5.6,Gdelcontrastsourintuitiveconceptoftimewith"realtime"andsaysthattherealideabehindtimeiscausation.Itakehimtobesayingthat,eventhoughour
conceptoftimeisnotobjectiveinthesenseofbeinginherentinphysicalreality,thereisanobjectiverelationthatofcausationwhichliesbehindourideaofareal
orobjectivetemporalstructureofrealityandthatthisrelationmay,somewhatmisleadingly,becalled"realtime."Underthisinterpretationof9.5.6,ournatural
tendencytothinkofthephysicalworldasallofspatiotemporalrealityisaresultofourhabitofassociatingcausationwithtimeandchange.
Observation9.5.9suggeststhatGdelwishestodissociatecausationfromtimeandchange,which,accordingtotheviewsdiscussedinanearliersection,arenot
objective.When,however,wetrytocapturethecausalstructureofthephysicalworldwithoutappealingtotheconceptoftime,westillseemtoneedsomethinglike
matterorphysicalobjectstoserveasthebearersofcausesandeffects.

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IfwebeginwithoneofGdel'srotatinguniverses(withorwithoutclosedtimelikelines)asarepresentationofthecausalstructureofthewhole,completedphysical
worldthatis,assomethingfixedwemay,theoretically,makedowithoutapplyingtheconceptofchangeandtheconceptoftimelinkedtoit.Wewouldstill,
however,bethinkingintermsoffourdimensionalworldpointswhichinvolvearesidueofourintuitiveconceptionofspaceandtime,asembodiedintheschemesof
NewtonandKant.ThissituationmaybewhyGdelcontinuestospeakof"realtime"evenwhileassertingthatcausationistherealideabehindtime.
Theconceptofcausationdoesinvolvetheconceptofsuccessionanditsiteration,whetherornotthesearetemporal.Gdel'sexampleofcausationinmathematics,
mentionedin9.5.6,isprobablyintendedasanillustrationofthefactthatnotallsuccessionsoccurintime.Onceweremovetherestrictiontothetemporal,theorderof
causalsuccessionneednolongerpossessallthepropertiesoftemporalorderasrequiredbyourconceptoftime.Causalsuccessionmaybeapartialorderingorit
maybearelationthatissymmetricorcircular,sothat,withinwhatisorderedbythecausalstructure,itispossibleforAbothtoprecedeBandtosucceedBinthe
relation.Clearly,causaldependenceingeneralmayinvolvemorecomplexrelationsthanlinearlyorderedcausalchains.Whetherornoteffectcanprecedecauseisa
controversialissue,whichiswidelydiscussedintheliterature.
Onthewhole,Gdelseemstofavorthefundamentalperspectiveofseeingobjectivereality,boththephysicalandtheconceptual,aseternal,timeless,andfixed.At
thesametime,hebelievesthatitispossibleforus,atleastpartiallyandstepbystep,togobeyondeveryseeminglynaturalstoppingpointsuchastheKantianrealm
ofphenomenaorappearancesandapproachclosertoobjectiverealityitself.
Ontheotherhand,ourinternalconsciousnessoftimeisanessentialingredientofourexperience,because,asGdelassertsin9.5.1,itistheonlynaturalcoordinate
systemforthemind.Gdel'srepeatedmentionofHusserl'slostworkontimesuggeststhathebelievesthatasatisfactoryunderstandingoftheworkingofourtime
consciousnesswouldbeadecisiveadvanceforphilosophy.Itwouldbeofinteresttoasktherelatedquestion:Whatwouldfollowifwehadsuchanunderstanding?
Gdel'sobservation9.5.2illustrateshisbeliefintheimportantpartwhichaprioriphilosophicalreflectionscanplayinthestudyoffundamentalscience.Inparticular,
eventhoughourintuitiveconceptoftimeisnotobjective,hethinksthatbybeingclearaboutitandabouttheotherconceptsmentionedin9.5.2,wemaybeableto
arriveatsomethinglikeNewton'sfruitfulscheme,orevenabetterone,onthebasisofeverydayexperiencealone.

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Chapter10
Epilogue:AlternativePhilosophiesas
Complementary
Zhizhiweizhizhi,buzhiweibuzhi,shizhiye.(Toknowthatyouknowwhenyoudoknowandknowthatyoudonotknowwhenyoudonotknow:thatisknowledge.)
Confucius,Analects,2:17
Onemaynowask:Whatistoberegardedasthepropercharacteristicofrationality?Itseemsthatitistobefoundintheconceptualelement,whichtranscendsperceivingand
(sensual)imaginingandwhichproducesakindofunderstanding.
PaulBernays,1974
Iwouldliketobeginandendwithaclassificationofwhatphilosophyhastoattendto.Theguidingprincipleis,Ibelieve,todojusticetowhatweknow,whatwebelieve,andhow
wefeel.
HaoWang,1985a
[Aphilosophicalview,]tobeacceptable,mustaccordwithourconsideredconvictions,atalllevelsofgenerality,onduereflection,orinwhatIhavecalledelsewhere"reflective
equilibrium."
JohnRawls,1993

Ontheonehand,thereisawiderangeofphilosophicalbeliefsonwhichweenjoyagreementoratleastpotentialagreement,givenadditionalinformationand
reflection.Ontheotherhand,disagreementisprevalentinphilosophy,despiteitsavowedaimtoaddresswidelysharedconcernsandtopresentviewsbasedon
widelysharablebeliefs.Anaturalapproachtodealingwithphilosophicaldisagreementistobreakupintopartstheprocessofmovingfromsharedaimsanddatato
thecommunicationofaview,andtosearchoutthesourcesofdisagreementateachstageofthisprocess.
Onanygivenissueweasphilosophersaimtosaysomethingsignificantaboutasharedphilosophicalconcernonthebasisofcertainsharableor

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rationalbeliefs,derivedfromwhatwethinkweknoworarecapableofknowing.Initially,weselectasharedphilosophicalconcern,comeupwithaviewaddressedto
it,andthentestthatviewagainstsharablebeliefs.Byrepeatingthisprocessofinventingandtesting,wecansometimesobtainandformulatewhatappearstobea
stableandconvincingview.
Ineachcase,however,theviewmaygoastrayorbeunacceptabletoothersatoneormorelevels.Thoseothersmaynotsharethechosenconcernfindingitofno
interestornotseeingitasaphilosophicalquestion.Ortheymayfailtoseehowtheviewreachedsignificantlyaddressestheconcern.Or,finally,theymaynotshare
someofthebeliefsthatformthebasisoftheview.
Inordertodecomposethedisagreementoveragivenview,wemaytrytodividetheallegedlysharablebeliefsintodifferentcomponents,someofwhicharemore
solidandmoregenerallysharedthanothers,withonecomponentmakingexplicitthereasonsforandagainstextendingtherangeofapplicationfromamoresolid
componenttoalesssolidone.Asaresultwewillbegivenachoiceateachstagebetweenacceptingandrejectingtheextension,andthepointsofdisagreementwill
belocalizedandbroughtoutintheopen.Forinstance,inChapter7IhavetriedtodecomposethedisagreementbetweenPlatonismandconstructivisminmathematics
inthismanner.(ComparealsoWang1991:269273.)
Ofcourse,thewholeissueofphilosophicaldisagreementismuchmorecomplexthanissuggestedbymyidealizedanalysisandmyspecificexampleofPlatonismin
mathematics.Therearevariousconceptionsofphilosophywhichdifferinappropriatemethod,subjectmatter,orcentralconcern,andphilosophersdifferintheir
judgmentsnotonlyovertheplausibilityofanygivenphilosophicalviewbutalsooveritssignificanceandrelevancetotheirowncentralconcerns.
Philosopherstendtoproposeambitiousprogramsandindulgeinuninhibitedassimilationandgeneralization.Itisnotoriouslydifficulttoagreeaboutthefeasibilityand
fruitfulnessofsuchprogramsandgeneralizations.Itisequallyhardtodeterminewhichprogramsandgeneralizationsareappropriatetopresentconditions.
EvenifweconfineourattentiontocomparativelypreciseandmatureissueswithawealthofsharablerelevantbeliefssuchasthatofPlatonisminmathematicsitis
hardtoagreeonwhetherorwhyanysuchissueisimportanttophilosophy.Itisdifficulttodecomposewithoutresiduesuchradicaldisagreementsasthatbetween
GdelandWittgensteinonPlatonisminmathematics.Nonetheless,thesignificanceoftheirphilosophiesandthecentralplaceoftheissueforthembothseemto
illustratetheappropriatenessofmyownextendedconsiderationsofPlatonisminmathematics.Indeed,theseconsiderationsare,Ibelieve,aninstructiveexample,not
onlyforthecommunicationofmyownapproachtophilosophy,butalsoforthecurrentpursuitofphilosophyasawhole.

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InthefirstsectionofthischapterIbeginbyreviewingmyagreementsanddisagreementswithGdel.Severalgeneralobservationsonphilosophicaldisagreementwill
bemadeinthecontextoftryingtodeterminetheappropriatewaytobenefitfromhistoricalphilosophy.InspecifyingtheseveralpointsonwhichIdisagreewithGdel,
IindicatebrieflythealternativesIfavor.
Insection10.4Ifirstconsidertheinitialconstraintsandchoicesofphilosophybyconsideringitsplaceinourlives.Ithentrytospecifyaconceptionoflogicasakind
ofmetaphilosophywhichistobeseenasanadjudicator,achieftool,andaprivilegedcomponentofbothgeneralphilosophyanditsdistinctparts.
First,however,inordertoclarifyandsupportthisconception,Idiscussinsections10.2and10.3someoftheworkofPaulBernaysandJohnRawls.Ifindtheir
viewscongenialandfeelthattheiroutlooksonthestudyofphilosophyarecloseinspirittomyownperspective.
UnlikeGdel,bothBernaysandRawlsadherecloselytowhatweknow.UnlikeWittgenstein,bothofthemconsidercertainsubstantiveknowledgerelevantto
philosophy.Neitherofthemmakesstrongcategoricalstatementsonthenatureofphilosophy.Rather,theyconcentrateonillustratingtheirconceptionsofphilosophy
bycarefulworkintheirchosenareasofresearch.Occasionallytheydomaketentativegeneralsuggestionsonmethodology,whichIfindpersuasiveandwellfounded.
Atthesametime,IalsofindtheboldassertionsmadebyGdelandWittgensteinonwhatphilosophyshoulddoprovocativeandstimulatingtheychallengemeto
reflectonthewaywechooseanapproachtophilosophyappropriatetowhatweknow.
Bernayshasconcentratedmainlyonthephilosophyofmathematicsandmademajorcontributionstothatfield.UnlikeGdel,however,hedoesnotseeitasbasicto
ortypicalofphilosophy.Hisconceptionofrationalitycontraststheabstractscientificrationalityoftheconceptsofmathematicsandphysicswiththerichrationalityof
theconceptsoflife,feelings,andhumaninteraction,includingtheregulativeideaofjustice.Specifically,inconsideringGdel'ssayings,Bernaysemphasizesthe
significanceofgeometricalconceptsandtheimportanceofhavingasenseoftheconceptofconceptdifferentfromthatwhichidentifiesconceptswithindependent
propertiesandrelations.
Rawlsisexceptionalamongcontemporaryphilosophersinhavingchosenasingletopicofresearch,persistedwithit,anddeveloped,withcontinualrefinements,a
substantivetheoryaboutit.Thattopicjusticeasfairnessisofcentralimportanceinpoliticalandmoralphilosophyandhasdirectrelevancetopossible
improvementsinademocraticsociety.Thereare,inmyopinion,lessonstobelearnedfromhiswork,evenforthosewhodonotspecializeinpoliticalandmoral
philosophy.By

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concentratingonabroadlyaccessibleareaofphilosophicalresearch,restrictedyetrich,Rawlsprovidesuswithintimateillustrationsoftheappropriatewaytodeal
withsomeofthebasicconceptsandissuesofphilosophyanditsmethodology.
Hisconceptsofreflectiveequilibriumandoverlappingconsensusaptlycapturetwoofthefamiliarbasictoolsinmethodology.Hiscontrastofconstructivismwith
rationalintuitionism(ormoralPlatonism)complementstherelateddiscussioninmathematicsandbringsoutboththedifferenceandthecontinuityofdifferentpartsof
philosophybyusingatransparentexample.Theseconsiderationsandthetwoaptconceptshelptoclarifytheconceptofobjectivity,whichiscentraltophilosophy.
Rawls'sdistinctionbetweenpoliticalphilosophyandcomprehensiveworldviewsteachesus,byexample,thevalueofdecomposingdisagreementsintodistinct
components,sothat,byconcentratingonsomesignificantpartofthewhole,wecanreplacecontroversybyspecialization,makingitpossibletostudythepartwithout
beingdistractedbyconflictswithintherestofthewhole.Indeed,onceagreementisreachedinonepart,thisagreementusuallyhelpstoresolveconflictsinother,
relatedpartsaswell.
RawlswrotehisfirstbookATheoryofJustice(1971)inthe1950sandthe1960s,whenAngloAmericanphilosophywasdominatedbyaspecialkindof
piecemeallinguisticorconceptualanalysis.Thisbook,asanexampleoffruitfulsubstantivephilosophy,participatedinandstrengthenedtheattempttogobeyondthe
preoccupationwithfragmentaryanalysesofthistype.Moreover,Iventuretoconjecturethathisconscientiouseffortstonarrowtherangeofdisagreementandto
encouragethetolerationofreasonablealternativeviewsexplicitlystatedandimplicitlyexemplifiedbyhisresponsestocriticism,especiallyafter1971mayhave
encouragedthetrendtowardreplacingdebater'scriticismswithconstructivediscussionsinphilosophy.
10.1FactualismandHistoricalPhilosophy:SomeChoices
AsImentionedbefore,indiscussingmymanuscriptofFromMathematicstoPhilosophy(MP)in1971,Gdelmadeseveralcommentsonmyideaofsubstantialor
structuralfactualism.Hesawfactualismasaphilosophicalmethodandsaidthatinhisyoungerdayshehadtakensomethinglikeittobetherightapproachto
philosophy.Hedidnotdenythatthemethodisofvalue,butsaidthatithadintrinsiclimitationsandshouldbeusedinconjunctionwithHusserl'sphenomenological
methodandwithlessonsfromhistoricalphilosophyespeciallyinthepursuitoffundamentalphilosophy.
Inmyopinion,theuseoflessonsfromthehistoryofphilosophyisanintegralpartoffactualismbutphenomenologyisaspecialtypeofreductionism,

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andfactualismisanattempttoavoidthepitfallsofalltypesofreductionism.ForGdel,however,phenomenologyisawaytocarryoutPlatonism,whichis,he
believes,therightview,eventhoughPlatonism,too,isinasensereductive,butacceptablebecauseitisa''reduction"totheuniversal.ItseemstomethatGdel's
strongformofPlatonismisatthecenteroftheseveralmajorpointsonwhichIamunabletoagreewithhim.Beforeconsideringthesepointsofdisagreement,I
proposetodiscussfirstthetaskofusinglessonsfromhistoricalphilosophy.
ItislikelythatGdelhasinmindmoredecisiveandlessdiffuseusesoftheselessonsthanIdo.Asthereportsinthisbookmakeclear,GdelusesPlato,Leibniz,and
Husserlinapositiveway,KantandHegelinamixedway,andpositivismandWittgensteinnegatively.Since,however,Idonothaveasstrongconvictionsashedoes
onmostofthefundamentalissuesinphilosophy,mysituationisclosertothatofabeginnerinphilosophywhotriestolearnfromalternativephilosophiesbychecking
whattheysayagainstwhatwesupposeweknow.
Ourideasdevelopthroughacomplexdialecticofwhatwelearnfromtheoutsideversusourownthoughts.Intheprocess,contingentfactorsinteractwithourmore
andmorefocusedandarticulateaims,selections,reflections,organizations,andinsights.Forinstance,theinterplayofmywisheswithmycircumstancesledmeto
certainviewsandtoafamiliaritywithcertainpartsofhumanknowledge,includingtheworkofcertainphilosophers.Ifoundsomeaspectsofthesephilosophers'work
congenial.Byreflectingonmyagreementsanddisagreementswiththem,Ihavecometounderstandbettermyownviews,aswellassomeofthereasonswhypeople
disagreeinphilosophy.
Everyphilosopherintheprocessofdevelopingaphilosophyofhisorherownusesinonewayoranotherwhatotherphilosophershavesaid.Someexceptional
philosophers,likeNietzscheand,later,Wittgenstein,wishtonegateexistingtrendsandmakeafreshstart.Eventhey,however,developtheiroutlooksbyreflecting
criticallyonprecedingphilosophicalpositions.Mostmajorphilosophers,asweknow,developtheirownviewsbyincorporatingandrespondingtotheirmajor
predecessors.Gdel,forinstance,arguedagainstthepositivistsandconsciouslyrelatedhisownphilosophytothecentralideasofPlato,Leibniz,andHusserl.
PlatorejectedtheviewsandmethodsofthesophistsandextendedtheideasofSocrates.Aristotle,inturn,fullyabsorbedPlato'steachingsanddevelopedan
alternativepositionfullofdisagreementswithhisteacher.Kantbuilthiscriticalphilosophybyreflectingonthetraditionsofrationalismandempiricism.Hegelextended
withoutinhibitiontheidealistichalfofKant'sdualism.Leibnizwasoutspokenlyproudofhisowncapacitytoselectandsynthesizesalientfeaturesofalternativeviews.
Characteristically,hesaid:

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10.1.1Ifindthatmostsystemsarerightinagoodshareofthatwhichtheyadvance,butnotsomuchinwhattheydeny.Wemustnothastilybelievethatwhichthemassofmen,
orevenauthorities,advance,buteachmustdemandforhimselftheproofsofthethesissustained.Yetlongresearchgenerallyconvincesthattheoldandreceivedopinionsare
good,providedtheybeinterpretedjustly(quotedinDewey1888:2526).

Toseparateoutthepartofasystemthatisrightandtointerpretfamiliaropinionsjustlyarewaystolearnfromhistoricalphilosophy.Whenweare,however,faced
withapparentlyconflictingsystemsoropinions,wehavetofindwaystomakealargepartofthemcompatibleinordertoseethateachsideisrightagooddealofthe
time.Sometimesweareabletodetectthattwophilosophersunderstanddifferentlythesameconceptsorwordssuchasexperience,intuition,concept,theory,
fact,observation,theapriori,logic,science,philosophy,andsoforthandhave,therefore,differentattitudestowardthem.
WittgensteinandGdelprovideuswithastrikingexampleoftwophilosopherswhohavedifferentconceptionsofandattitudestowardphilosophy,itssubjectmatter,
method,tasks,andrelevanttools.Insection5.5IreportGdel'scommentsonWittgenstein'sworkandhis(Gdel's)positionthatlanguageisunimportantforthe
studyofphilosophy.ElsewhereIhavediscussedextensivelythecontrastsbetweentheirviews(Wang1987b,1991,and1992).HereIconfinemyselftoabrief
summaryofsomeofthemainpoints.
GdelandWittgensteinagreethateverydaythinkingisofmorefundamentalimportanceforthestudyofphilosophythanscienceis.Theybothbelievethat
psychophysicalparallelismisaprejudiceofthetime(seeChapter6).Bothofthembelievethatscienceasweknowitdealswithonlyalimitedaspectofourconcerns
inphilosophyandinlife.Wittgensteinexpressesthispointthisway:
10.1.2Science:enrichmentandimpoverishment.Oneparticularmethodelbowsalltheothersaside.Theyallseempaltrybycomparison,preliminarystagesatbest.Youmustgo
rightdowntotheoriginalsourcessoastoseethemallsidebyside,boththeneglectedandthepreferred(1980:6061).

HusserlandGdelalsoaspireto"gorightdowntotheoriginalsources."Indeed,Husserldevelopedabroadperspectivetoindicatetheonesidednessofscienceas
weknowitinhisdiscussionofthe"mathematizationofnature"(inLauer1965:2159).ThedisagreementwithWittgensteinisovertherightwaytocarryoutthe
projectoffindingandretracingfromoriginalsources.
ItseemstomethatbothGdeland,later,Wittgensteintrytodealwithphilosophicalissuesbyreducingthemtosomekindofperceptualimmediacyorfundamental
intuitionlocatingthis,ofcourse,atdifferentspots.

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Gdelendorsesthekindofperceptualimmediacy(intermsofintentionalityandintuition)thatiscentraltoHusserl'sphenomenologyheputsspecialemphasisonthe
feasibilityandimportanceofourpowertoseeuniversalconnectionsortohavecategoricalintuition(thuscontinuingandrefiningPlato'stradition).Wittgenstein's
approachismorenovel.Itbeginsandendswiththeperceptualimmediacyofourintuitionoftheactualuseofwordsinagivensituation.Iseethisapproachas
Wittgenstein'swayofpursuingthetraditionalquestforcertaintyinphilosophy.
Thesedifferentchoicesoffocusareassociatedwiththeircontraryattitudestowardtheabstractandtheconcrete,thegeneralandtheparticular,samenessand
difference.Gdelputstheabstractandtheuniversalatthecenterofphilosophyandencouragesuninhibitedgeneralizationsandassimilations.Wittgensteinseesthe
naturalinclinationtogeneralizeasthemainsourceofconfusioninphilosophy.
InanearlierpassageIquotedWittgenstein'sdeclaredinterest,incontradistinctiontoHegel,inshowingthatapparentsamenessconcealsrealdifferences.Twoofhis
relatedobservationsare:
10.1.3WhatRenancallsthebonsensprcoceofthesemiticraceistheirunpoeticmentality,whichheadsstraightforwhatisconcrete.Thisischaracteristicofmyphilosophy
(1980:6).
10.1.4Butassimilatingthedescriptionsoftheusesofwordsinthiswaycannotmaketheusesthemselvesanymorelikeoneanother.Imaginesomeone'ssaying:Alltoolsserveto
modifysomething.Wouldanythingbegainedbythisassimilationofexpressions?(1953:10,14).

Wittgensteinseesthemainforceinoppositiontohislaterapproachtophilosophyinourcravingforgenerality,whichisstrengthenedbytheinclinationtotakescience
asamodel:
10.1.5Thiscravingforgeneralityistheresultantofanumberoftendenciesconnectedwithparticularphilosophicalconfusions.Ourcravingforgeneralityhasanothermain
source:ourpreoccupationwiththemethodofscience.Imeanthemethodofreducingtheexplanationofnaturalphenomenatothesmallestpossiblenumberofprimitivenatural
lawsand,inmathematics,ofunifyingthetreatmentofdifferenttopicsbyusingageneralization.Philosophersconstantlyseethemethodofsciencebeforetheireyes,andare
irresistiblytemptedtoaskandanswerquestionsinthewaysciencedoes.Thistendencyistherealsourceofmetaphysics,andleadsthephilosophersintocompletedarkness
(1975:1718).

ThatWittgensteinputstheactualuseoflanguageatthecenterofphilosophyisagoodillustrationofthementalitythat"headsstraightforwhatisconcrete."Since
Gdelbelievesthatwearecapableofintuitionsofconceptualrelations,forhimlanguageplaysonlyaminorrole.Ofcourse,weareoftenmoresureofconcretedetails
thanofgeneralstatements

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aboutthem.Atthesametime,wearealsooftenmoresureofourabstractanduniversalbeliefsnotablyourbeliefsinmathematicsthanofmostofourempirical
beliefs.Itseemstomedesirabletotakeadvantageofbothkindsofevidence.
Inanycase,asIhavesaidbefore(following5.5.9),therelationofmathematicstolanguageseemstoexhibitcertainstrikingpeculiarities,whichinducedBrouwerto
speakof"anessentiallylanguagelessactivityofthemind":
10.1.6Intheedificeofmathematicalthought,languageplaysnootherpartthanthatofanefficient,butneverinfallibleorexact,techniqueformemorizingmathematical
constructions,andforsuggestingthemtootherssothatmathematicallanguagebyitselfcannevercreatenewmathematicalsystems(Brouwer1975:510).

Brouwercontraststheeffectivenessofcommunicationbymeansoflanguageintheexclusivelyintellectualscienceswithitsineffectivenessinmetaphysics:
10.1.7Onlyinthoseverynarrowlydelimiteddomainsoftheimaginationsuchastheexclusivelyintellectualscienceswhicharecompletelyseparatedfromtheworldofperception
andthereforetouchtheleastupontheessentiallyhumanonlytheremaymutualunderstandingbesustainedforsometimeandsucceedreasonablywell.
10.1.8Languagebecomesridiculouswhenonetriestoexpresssubtlenuancesofwillwhicharenotalivingrealitytothespeakersconcerned,whenforexamplesocalled
philosophersormetaphysiciansdiscussamongthemselvesmorality,God,consciousness,immortalityorthefreewill.Thesepeopledonotevenloveeachother,letaloneshare
thesamemovementsofthesoul(1975:6).

Gdelbelievesthatscienceincludingmathematicsandphilosophycaninteractfruitfullyinseveralways.Wittgenstein,bycontrast,seemstohavedevotedagood
dealofefforttostudyingthephilosophyofmathematicsfortheoppositepurposeofcombattingthebadeffectsof"themisuseofmetaphoricalexpressionsin
mathematics"onphilosophy(1980:1).Hebelievesthatphilosophyandmathematicsshouldleaveeachotheralone:
10.1.9Philosophymayinnowayinterferewiththeactualuseoflanguageitcanintheendonlydescribeit.Itleaveseverythingasitis.Italsoleavesmathematicsasitis,and
nomathematicaldiscoverycanadvanceit(1953:124).

GiventhebroaddisagreementbetweenthephilosophicalviewsofGdelandWittgenstein,itistemptingtocomparetheirextendedworkinthephilosophyof
mathematicsasawayofclarifyingthatdisagreementand,perhaps,derivingsomelessonsfromit.Becausetheyareworkingherewithexactlythesamesubjectmatter,
oneisinclinedtobelieveitpossibletoarriveatajudgmentastowhichofthemisthemorepersuasive.

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Inthecaseofsettheory,IaminclinedtothinkthatWittgensteinfailstodojusticetowhatweknow,undoubtedlybecausehewassostronglyconvincedthatset
theoryisbasedonconceptualconfusion(comparethelastpageofhisPhilosophicalInvestigations)thathedidnotdeemitnecessarytostudyitsactual
development.
Inthecaseofthetheoriesofnaturalandrealnumbers,itistemptingtoaskhowWittgensteinwouldrespondtothestepbystepextensionthroughthedialecticof
intuitionandidealizationdescribedinChapter7.Hedid,forinstance,upholdthelawofexcludedmiddleand,atthesametime,asortofconstructivism.The
"dialectical"accounttriestoaccommodatebothpositions.
OnseveraloccasionsWittgensteinconsideredGdel'stheorem,asIhavetriedtoexplicateelsewhere(Wang1991:253259Wang1992:3240).HereIreproduce
onlythoseofhisobservationsonGdel'sworkwhichareeasytounderstandandaccept.
Intheearly1930s,accordingtoR.L.Goodstein,Wittgensteinsaid:
10.1.10Gdel'sresultshowedthatthenotionofafinitecardinalcouldnotbeexpressedinanaxiomaticsystemandthatformalnumbervariablesmustnecessarilytakevaluesother
thannaturalnumbers(Goodstein1957:551).
10.1.11Gdelshowsusanunclarityintheconcept"mathematics,"whichmaybeexpressedbysayingthatwetookmathematicstobeasystem(1938,quotedinNedoand
Ranchetti1983:261).
10.1.12Icouldsay:theGdelianproofgivesusthestimulustochangetheperspectivefromwhichweseemathematics(1941,quotedinibid.).
10.1.13ItmightjustlybeaskedwhatimportanceGdel'sproofhasforourwork.Forapieceofmathematicscannotsolveproblemsofthesortthattroubleus.Theansweristhat
thesituation,intowhichsuchaproofbringsus,isofinteresttous."Whatarewetosaynow?"Thatisourtheme(Wittgenstein1967:388).

Itseemstomethat,inconsideringthephilosophicalviewsofeitherGdelorWittgenstein,itisnecessarytodistinguishtheirgeneralpronouncementsontheaimsand
methodsofphilosophyfromwhatisrevealedthroughtheiractualwork.Inparticular,IfindastrikingdivergencebetweenthepersuasivenessofGdel'smoreorless
finishedworkandwhatIseeastheunreasonablenessofhisspeculations,especiallywhenhesimplyassertshisphilosophicalbeliefsandrecommendstheidealofexact
philosophyortheuseofHusserl'sphenomenologicalmethod.
Itis,ofcourse,acommonexperiencetofindthatthemethodsonehasusedindoingwhatonedoeswellareinappropriatetoanotherproject,and,accordingly,tosee
adifferentmethodasthebestwaytoapproachone'shighestideal.InGdel'scase,however,itisexceptionallydifficulttoattainabalancedunderstandingofhis
philosophyinviewofthebiggap

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betweenhisimportantcarefulworkandhisunconvincinglyboldspeculations.Intryingtosortoutmyagreementsanddisagreementswithhim,Ifinditdifficultto
reconcilethelessonsfromhisfinishedworkwithhisrecommendedmethodfordoingphilosophy.
AsfarasIcandetermine,eventhoughGdelmay,likemanyothers,haveenrichedhisunderstandingofthecomplexityofhumanexperiencebystudyingHusserl's
writings,heachievednosignificantsuccessbytryingtoapplyHusserl'smethod.Hisownspectacularworkwasobtainedotherwise:byapplyingthoroughlythefamiliar
methodofdigestingwhatisknownandpersisting,fromanappropriatereasonableperspectiveandwithexceptionalacumen,intheefforttoseeandselectfromawide
rangeofconnections.Undoubtedly,carefulreflectionpointinginthedirectionofHusserl'smethodplayedaparttoobutonlyincombinationwiththinkingbasedon
materialotherthantheactofthinkingitself.
Gdel'sdeclaredidealofphilosophyasanexacttheoryaimsatdoing"formetaphysicsasmuchasNewtondidforphysics."Wecan,hebelieves,byourintuition
usingthemethodofphenomenologyperceivetheprimitiveconceptsofmetaphysicsclearlyenoughtoseetheaxiomsconcerningthemand,thereby,arriveata
substantiveaxiomaticsystemofmetaphysics,possiblyalongthegenerallinesofamonadology.Theaxiomswillbejustifiedbecausewecanseethattheyareinthe
Platonicconceptualworldobjectivelytruetheirconsequencesaretrueandjustifiedbecausewecanseethattheyfollowfromtheaxioms.
ItisunnecessaryformetosaythatIamunabletosee,onthebasisofwhatweknowtoday,howsuchanidealislikelytoberealizedinfuture.Fromtheperspective
offactualism,Ibelieveweknowtoolittletogiveusanypromisingguidanceinthepursuitofthisgrandproject.Atthesametime,Irecognizethatitmaybe
philosophicallysignificanttotrytodevelopathinnotsubstantivemonadology,as,say,anextensionofanimprovedversionofthesystemofWittgenstein's
Tractatus(comparesection0.2,Introduction).
QuiteapartfrominterpretingandevaluatingthefeasibilityofGdel'sidealofphilosophyasanexacttheory,Iamnotabletosubscribetohisideaofthecentral
importanceofthemethodofphenomenologyinthestudyoffundamentalphilosophy.Therearealsoproblemsabouthowtointerprethisemphasisontheory,the
axiomaticmethod,andtheapriori.Inmyopinion,thesefamiliarideas,althoughusefulinageneralway,generateconfusingcontroversywhentheevaluationofa
philosophicalpositionisconstruedasdependentonadeterminationoftheirexactrangesofapplication.
Thedistinctionbetweentheaprioriandtheempirical,likethatbetweentheinnate(orthehereditary)andtheacquired,pointstosomethingfundamentalthatishardto
delineateinanyunambiguousmanner.We

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wouldliketodistinguishournativementalapparatusforprocessinginformationfromwhatcomestousfromexperience.Yet,moreandmorecomponentsarebeing
addedtoourreceivingapparatus,and,asaresult,bythetimewearematureenoughtotrytoseparatethenativefromthelearned,weareforcedtoresortto
idealizationandextrapolationifwearetoagree,even,thatlogicandmathematicsbelongtotherealmoftheapriori.Asidefromlogicandmathematics,disagreement
prevailsoverwhatisapriori.Undoubtedly,HusserlandGdelincludemuchmore,butIhavenoclearunderstandingoftheirconceptionoftheapriori.
Fromtheperspectiveoffactualism,weareentitledtoappealtoconceptsandbeliefsgroundedonourgrossexperience,orwhatwetaketobegeneralfacts,whether
ornotwechoosetoconsiderthemapriori.Itseemstomethatthetraditionofseekingtofoundknowledgeontheaprioriismotivatedbyadesiretoguardthe
autonomyofthemindastheuniversalbasisandarbiterofallknowledge.However,thesystemofuniversallyavailableandacceptablegeneralconceptsandbeliefsis,
inmyopinion,amoreaccessibleandreliablebasisforthejustificationofourbeliefsthanarethosebeliefswhichfallwithinthehardtodeterminerangeoftheapriori.
Forinstance,ifwetrytodevelopaphilosophicaltheory,thecrucialissueisnotwhetheritsprinciplesareaprioributratherwhethertheyareuniversallyacceptable.
EvenifGdel'sidealofphilosophyasanexacttheorywererealized,wewouldbemoreinterestedintheacceptabilityofitsaxiomsthanintheirapriority.Itseemsto
me,therefore,thatweshouldnotconfineourattentiontolookingforaprioriresultsinphilosophy.Inthisconnection,IagreewithRawlswhen,inpresentinghis
substantivetheoryofjustice,hesays:
10.1.14Theanalysisofmoralconceptsandtheapriori,however,traditionallyunderstood,istooslenderabasis.Moralphilosophymustbefreetousecontingentassumptions
andgeneralfactsasitpleases.Thereisnootherwaytogiveanaccountofourconsideredjudgmentsinreflectiveequilibrium(Rawls1971:51).

Gdelhimselfseemstoenvisageaphilosophicaltheorymorealongthelinesofaphysicaltheory,say,Newton's,thanlikenumbertheoryorsettheory.Itisnotclear
thatherequiresitsaxiomstobeapriori.Inanycase,theaxiomsorprinciplesofatheoryareusuallytobecheckedbytestingthoseoftheirconsequenceswhichhave
afairlydirectcontactwithourintuition.
Inphilosophyweusuallyspeakofsystemsratherthantheories,andfewcontemporaryphilosophiesaredirectlyconcernedwithdevelopingeithersystemsortheories.
Whentherelationbetweenphilosophyandtheoryisexplicitlyconsidered,opinionsdiffer.Forinstance,incontrasttoGdel'sstatementthatphilosophyaimsata
theory,wehavethefollowingstatementsbyWittgensteinandRawls:

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10.1.15Andwemaynotadvanceanykindoftheory.Theremustnotbeanythinghypotheticalinourconsiderations.Wemustdoawaywithallexplanations,anddescription
alonemusttakeitsplace(Wittgenstein1953:109).
10.1.16Iwishtostressthatatheoryofjusticeispreciselythat,namely,atheory.Itisatheoryofthemoralsentiments(torecallaneighteenthcenturytitle)settingoutthe
principlesgoverningourmoralpowers,or,morespecifically,oursenseofjustice.Thereisadefiniteiflimitedclassoffactsagainstwhichconjecturedprinciplescanbechecked,
namelyourconsideredjudgmentsinreflectiveequilibrium(Rawls1971:5051).

WhenGdelthinksofatheory,hehasinmindanaxiomatictheoryorsystembuthisconceptionofanaxiomsystemismoreliberalthanthepreciseconceptofa
formalsystem.Forinstance,concerningWittgenstein'sstatementin10.1.11thatGdelshowstheunclarityoftheconceptofmathematicsasasystem,hewould
probablysaythat,althoughhistheoremshowsthatmathematicsisnotaformalsystem,mathematicscanbecapturedbyanaxiomsystem.Heexplicitlyregards
Newton'stheoryasaxiomaticandheundoubtedlyregardsa"secondorder"systemasanaxiomsystem.Inreplytoaquestionofmine,heoncesaidthatwecanadd
newaxioms:inotherwords,whenwehavecapturedtheessentialaxioms,wehaveanaxiomatictheoryforthesubject,evenifwemaymodifythemoraddnew
axiomslater.Accordingtohisconceptionofaxiomatictheory,hewouldcertainlyregardRawls'stheoryofjusticeassuchatheory.
IknownoprecisedefinitionofGdel'sconceptionofanaxiomatictheoryorsystem.Hismainpointinthisregardseemstomearecommendationthat,instudyinga
branchofphilosophy,thecrucialstepistofinditsprimitiveconceptsandthemainaxiomsaboutthem.Hedeclaresthephenomenologicalmethodtobethecentraltool
foraccomplishingthistaskbut,Ithink,withoutanytangibleevidencetosupportthatdeclaration.ItseemstomethatthewaysbywhichEuclidpresentedgeometry,
Newtondevelopedhisphysicaltheory,Fregeformulatedhissystemofpredicatelogic,Dedekindfoundthenowstandard"Peano"axiomsfornumbertheory,
Cantorarrivedatthemainaxiomsofsettheory,andRawlsobtainedtheprinciplesofhistheoryofjusticeallprovideuswithmoreinstructiveandaccessiblelessons
fortryingtoexecutesuchtasksthandotheteachingsofphenomenology.
Gdelrepeatedlyemphasizestheimportanceoftheaxiomaticmethodinthestudyofphilosophy,evensayingthatitissimplyclearthinking.Idonothavemuch
informationaboutwhathemeanstoincludeundertheaxiomaticmethod.Whenhetalksaboutmetaphysics,heseemstosuggestthatthemainstepinapplyingthe
methodistouseourintuitiontofindtheprimitiveconceptsandtheiraxioms.Still,Iamsurehehasinmindmoreflexibleapplicationsaswell.

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Givenanysetofconceptions,inthesenseofconceptswithassociatedbeliefsaboutthem,wecantrytodeterminewhatthereliablebasicbeliefsabouteachconcept
arewhethersomeoftheconceptscanbedefinedintermsofothersandwhethersomebeliefscanbederivedfromothers.Oftenwefindthatsomeconceptscanbe
definedbyotherconcepts,sothatwecanarriveatasubsetofprimitiveconceptsandconstrueallthebeliefsinthesetasconcernedwiththem.Thosebeliefsinthe
initialsetofbeliefswhichcannotbederivedfromotherbeliefsinthesetarethentakenastheaxioms.
Inthisway,wearriveatonesetoranotherofprimitiveconceptswithassociatedaxiomsfromagivensetofconceptions.Theaxiomsystemdeterminedbysucha
setgivesordertotheoriginalsetofconceptsandbeliefsaboutthemandincludespotentiallyallconceptsdefinablebytheprimitiveconceptsandallpropositions
derivablefromtheaxioms.Oncewehaveanaxiomsystem,wemayconcentrateourattentionontheaxioms,totrytodeterminewhethertheydoindeedagreewith
ourconsideredjudgmentsandrevisethemiftheydonot.Giventherevisedaxioms,theirconsequencesusuallyhavetobechangedtoo,andsowehavetocheck
whetherthechangedconsequencesagreewithourconsideredjudgmentsaccordingtoourintuitiveconceptionoftheconceptsinvolved.Whenthisprocessis
repeated,atsomestagewemayarriveatwhatRawlscallsreflectiveequilibrium(seesection10.3).Inthatcase,wehaveanaxiomsystemwhichprovidesuswith
anorderofourinitialsetofintuitiveconceptionsthatisstablewithregardtoourpresentbeliefs.
Inpractice,weusuallybeginwithacentralintuitiveconceptionofspecialsignificancepoint,line,force,existence,number,set,simultaneity,gene,justice,and
soonandtrytofindaxiomsforthatconceptioninvariousways.Asourknowledgeandintuitiondevelop,wemayfindnewaxiomsorreviseoldones.Sometimes
weneednewinformationfromtheoutside,suchastheexperimentsandobservationsofphysicsandbiology.
Itseemsreasonabletosaythatlookingforandtryingtoordertheconnectionsbetweenconceptsandbeliefsonthebasisofourintuitiveconceptionsaremajor
componentsofclearthinkingandthattheycanbeconstruedaspartoftheaxiomaticmethod,inthesensethattheyareinvolvedintheattempttoarriveatsomeaxiom
systemforasetofconceptions.Butitisnottruetosaythattheaxiomaticmethodis"justclearthinking"inthesensethatallclearthinkingaimsatarrivingatsome
axiomsystem.
10.2SomeSuggestionsbyBernays
LikeGdel,Bernaysconcentratedlargelyonmathematicallogicandthephilosophyofmathematics.ButthephilosophicalviewsofBernaysaremoretentativeand
openendedthanGdel's.

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ItiswellknownthatGdelandBernayshadahighregardforeachother'sphilosophicalviews.Theycorrespondedextensivelyfrom1930on.InHilbertBernays
(1939)BernaysgavethefirstcompleteproofofGdel'stheoremontheunprovabilityoftheconsistencyofaformalsystemwithinitself.In1958Gdelpublishedhis
DialecticapapertohonorBernaysonhisseventiethbirthday.Onseveraloccasionsinthe1950sand1960sheinvitedBernaystovisithiminPrinceton.
InanearlierchapterIquoteGdel'srepeatedpraiseofanobservationonPlatonisminmathematics,whichheattributestoBernays:
10.2.1ThereareobjectivefactsoftheframeworkofourintuitionwhichcanonlybeexplainedbysomeformofPlatonism.Forexample,asBernaysobserves,itisjustasmuchan
objectivefactthattheflowerhasfivepetalsasthatitscolorisred.
10.2.2ThemostnaturalwayofstatingobjectivismistheonebyBernaysinarecentlecture:thenumberofleavesisjustasobjectiveasthecolorofaflower.Notinhispaper"On
PlatonisminMathematics,"whichisamisnomer.

Afewdayslater,IaskedGdelforsomespecificreferencestohisfavoritesayingsbyBernays.Inreply,Gdelsaid:
10.2.3IlikewhatBernayssaysinarecentpaperaboutinnerstructure,possibleidealizedstructure,opendomainofobjectivity,andsuigeneris,differentfromapproximatephysics.

AfterwardsIlocatedthefollowing:
10.2.4Inthemoreabstractrationalityofnaturalsciencewecandiscerntheschematiccharacterofalltheoreticaldescription.Theschematasetupbythetheorieshavetheir
innerstructures,whichcannotbefullyidentifiedwiththeconstitutionofphysicalnature.Wehave,infact,betweentheobjectsofnatureandtheschematicrepresentatives,a
reciprocityofapproximation:theschematadonotfullyattaintheamplemultiplicityofdeterminationofthenaturalobjectsontheotherhand,thenaturalobjectsdonotattainthe
mathematicalperfectionandprecisionoftheschemata.
10.2.5Theinnerstructuresofthetheoreticalschematahaveapurelymathematicalcharactertheyareidealizedstructures.Andmathematicscanberegardedasthescienceof
possibleidealizedstructures.Theseidealizedstructuresandtheirinterrelationsconstituteanopendomainofobjectivityanobjectivitysuigeneris,differentfromtheonewe
havetodealwithinphysicsasnaturalscience,butindeed,connectedwithitinthewaythatbyaphysicaltheorysomesectionofphysicalnatureisdescribedasanapproximate
realizationofsomemathematicalstructure(Bernays1974:603605).

TheseobservationsbyBernaysprovideacharacterizationofmathematicsasthescienceofpossibleidealizedstructuresthroughitsrelationtophysicaltheory.The
mathematicalformulationofphysicaltheoriesis

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schematicinthatitismoreprecisethanphysicalnatureandleavesoutsomeoftheamplespecificitiesofthenaturalobjects.Itdescribesidealizedstructures.
Mathematicscanbeappliedtodescribedifferentidealizedstructures:itstudiesallpossibleidealizedstructures.Thesepossiblestructuresandtheirinterrelation
constituteanopendomainofobjectivitywhichisdifferentfromobjectivityinthefamiliarsenseofbeingtrueofthephysicalworldineverydetail.
Gdel'sinterestinthepositionexpoundedbyBernaysresultedfromhisownconvictionthatitisimportanttorecognizeatleasttheundeniabilityofsomeformof
PlatonisminmathematicsthereisroomforchoicewhenwecometostrongerformsofPlatonisminmathematics,butnobodyhasanygoodreasontoquestionthe
partsonwhichheandBernaysagree.
InDecember1975,IsentBernaysacopyofmymanuscriptQ,whichtriedtosummarizeGdel'sPlatonisminmathematics.Bernaysrepliedtomyrequestforhis
commentsinaletterdated23February1976,andIsentacopyofittoGdelinearlyMarch.Unfortunately,Gdelneverdiscussedtheletterwithme,undoubtedly
becausebythattimehehadbecomefullyoccupiedwithhishealthproblemsandthoseofhiswife.
TheBernayslettersummarizedsomeofhisownviewsandraisedseveralquestionsaboutGdel'spositionasIthenpresentedit:
10.2.6Thequestionstreatedinyourtextseemtomeverydelicate.Iamofcourseinfavourofobjectivisminmanyrespects.YouknowthatIalsoadoptthedistinctionofclasses
andsetsandalsoregardclassesasextensionsofconcepts.
10.2.7ButIdoubtifconceptsareinthesamewayobjectiveasmathematicalrelations.Iaminclinedtocomparetheworldofmathematicalobjectsandrelationswiththeworldof
coloursandtheirrelationsasalsowiththeworldofmusicalentitiesandtheirrelations.Inallthesecaseswehaveanobjectivitywhichistobedistinguishedfromthatonewe
haveinthephysicalreality.Mathematics,accordingtothisview,isakindoftheoreticalphenomenology:thephenomenologyofidealizedformalstructures.
10.2.8Aconceptontheotherhandissomethingoriginallyconceived(moreorlessinstinctively)byamentalbeingwhichhasimpressionsandsensations,conceivedforthe
purposeoforientationandunderstanding.Onceconceptshavebeenintroducedthereresultofcourseobjectiverelationsbetweenthem.
10.2.9AnotherpointIwanttomentionisthatIthinkoneshouldnotoverestimatethephilosophicalrelevanceofthepossibilityofembodyingclassicalmathematicsinsettheory.
Itseemstomethatforconsideringtheintuitivesourcesofmathematicswehavetokeeptotheolddualismofarithmeticandgeometry.Arithmeticalevidenceisthatonewhich
BROUWERwillexclusivelyadmitformathematics.Butthis,Ithink,isanarbitraryandunnecessaryrestriction.

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10.2.10Thereisarichsupplyofconcepts(concerningidealizedstructures)whichisfurnishedbythegeometricalintuition:theconceptsofpoint,curve,surface,connectedness,
contact,surrounding,neighbourhood,generallythetopologicalconcepts.
10.2.11Itmustbeadmittedthatthegeometricalconceptsarenotsofitfordiscursiveuseasthearithmeticalones,andthereforeanarithmetisationofthemisnecessaryyetwe
cannotrequireastrictarithmetisationbutinmanycasesmustcontentourselveswithakindofcompromise.Forsuchacompromisejustthesettheoreticconceptsareuseful.(Itis
toberememberedthatCANTORsettheorystartedfromtheconsiderationofpointsets.)
10.2.12Itseemstomethateventheconceptofthenumberseriesisgeometricallymotivated.Fromthestrictlyarithmeticalpointofviewtheprogressofnumbersisonlya
progressusinindefinitum.Itshouldfurtherberegarded,asIthink,thatthesimplicityandclarityoftheconceptofsubsetdoesnotentailanintuitiveevidenceoftheexistenceof
thepowersetforanyset.Whatitentailsisonlytheexistenceoftheclassofallsubsetsforanyset.Thespecialpassingfromthesetofrationalnumberstoitspowersetis
motivatedforthesakeofarithmetizinggeometry.

ItisclearfromthisletterthatBernaysagreeswithGdelinendorsingsomeformofobjectivismorPlatonisminmathematics,totheextentofbelievingthatin
mathematics''wehaveanobjectivitywhichistobedistinguishedfromthatonewehaveinthephysicalreality"(10.2.7).Thetwoapparentdisagreementsareoverthe
objectivecharacterofconceptsandtheimportanceofgeometry"forconsideringtheintuitivesourcesofmathematics."
Intermsofterminology,itiscertainlydesirabletomakesomedistinctionbetweendifferentusesofthewordconcept.Forinstance,Gdeldrewadistinctionbetween
conceptsandnotionsinhisRussellpaper:
10.2.13[Ontheonehand,onemay]understandbyanotionasymboltogetherwitharulefortranslatingsentencescontainingthesymbolintosuchsentencesasdonotcontainit,
sothataseparateentitydenotedbythesymbolappearsasamerefiction.[Ontheotherhand,onemayconceiveconceptsasrealentities]asthepropertiesandrelationsofthings
existingindependentlyofourdefinitionsandconstructions.Ishallusethetermconceptinthesequelexclusivelyinthisobjectivesense(Gdel1990,hereafterCW2:128).

UndoubtedlyBernayshadinmindabroaderrangeofconceptsthanjustthenotionsinthespecialsensespecifiedbyGdel.Quiteapartfromthedifficultissueof
commonusage,weseemtoneedacategoryofconceptsornotionswhichcorrespondstowhatBernaysconstruesasconcepts.GiventhefactthatIhavelargely
followedGdel'susageofconceptinthisbook,itmightbeconvenienttousethewordnotionforthiscategoryinthepresentcontext.

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ItseemstomethatGdel'scontrastofconceptswithnotionsinhisrestrictedsensewasrelatedtohisinsistenceonrestrictingthesenseofcreationtothatofmaking
somethingoutofnothing.Inbothcases,hewantedtolimittherangeofmentalproductstowhatiscomparativelypoorincontent.Asaresult,amiddlerangewhich
playsanimportantpartineverydayexperienceandphilosophicalthinkingofcreationsandofconceptsofnotionsisleftout.Inmyopinion,bypayingattentiontothe
categoryofconceptsornotionswhichBernayshadinmind,wemaybeabletoattainamoreaccommodatingperspectivethanGdel's.Forinstance,ifweuse
Gdel'sconceptionofconcept(ornotion)andofcreativity,wecannotevenexpressthesignificantandwidelysharedbeliefformulatedsuccinctlybyBernays
(1974:604):
10.2.14[Wecan]ascribetorationalityacreativity:notacreativityofprinciples,butacreativityofconcepts.

ItiseasytoagreewithBernaysthataconceptissomethingoriginallyconceivedbyamentalbeing.ButGdelwantedtosaythat,unlesscertainconceptsare
objective,wecannotunderstandwhy,forexample,weallacceptTuring'scharacterizationoftheconceptofmechanicalprocedures.Atthesametime,wecanatmost
inferonlythatsomeconceptsareobjective,notthatallconceptsare.Gdelseemstosuggestthatallconceptsofphilosophicalsignificanceareobjective.Given,
however,ourexperiencefromthehistoryofphilosophy,thatsuggestionappearstobegthequestion.
Specifically,Gdel'scentralphilosophicalconcernwiththefeasibilityofdevelopinganexacttheoryformetaphysicsseemstodependonhisbeliefthat,sincewehave
succeededprettywellinclarifyingthebasicconceptsofmathematics,weshouldbeabletodothesameformetaphysics.Itseemstome,however,that,foreach
conceptasoriginallyconceivedbyamentalbeing,wecanclaimitisobjectiveonlyifitsatisfiescertainnaturalrequirements:first,itisnotanotioninGdel'srestricted
senseyet,secondly,ourunderstandingofitisseentobeconvergingtoauniquedeterminationofitscontent.Indeed,Gdel'sexamplesofoursuccessfulperceptionof
concepts,reportedaboveinChapter7,dosatisfythesetworequirements.
TheimportanceofgeometricalintuitionforthefoundationsofmathematicsisasignificantideawhichBernayshadalreadydevelopedinhis"OnPlatonismin
Mathematics"(1935).Gdelconsideredthetitleamisnomerbecausethepaperwasconcernedmorewithclarifyingalternativepositionsthanwithcomingoutinfavor
ofPlatonism.Indeed,contrarytoGdel'sview,Bernaysdrewfromthesettheoreticalparadoxestheconclusion:"WemustthereforegiveupabsolutePlatonism"(in
BenacerrafandPutnam1964:277).

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Ifwebeginwithourarithmeticalintuitionofnaturalnumbers,wehaveonlysmallintegers,oratmostarbitraryintegers.ThatiswhybothKorneckerandBrouwer
renouncethetotalityofintegers(ibid.:278).Thefirstpartof10.2.12saysthattheextensiontothistotalityisgeometricallymotivated.LikeGdel,Bernayssawthisas
ajump:
10.2.15Theweakestofthe"Platonistic"assumptionsintroducedbyarithmeticisthatofthetotalityofintegers(ibid.:275).

Itis,however,whenwecometothecontinuumofthetotalityofrealnumbersthatPlatonisticclassicalanalysisborrowsdecisivelyfromourgeometricalintuition.
10.2.16Theideaofthecontinuumisageometricalideawhichanalysisexpressesintermsofarithmetic.[Ontheintuitionisticconception,thecontinuumlosesits]characterofa
totality,whichundeniablybelongstothegeometricalideaofthecontinuum.Anditisthischaracteristicofthecontinuumwhichwouldresistperfectarithmetization.
10.2.17TheseconsiderationsleadustonoticethatthedualityofarithmeticandgeometryisnotunrelatedtotheoppositionbetweenintuitionismandPlatonism.Theconceptof
numberappearsinarithmetic.Itisofintuitiveorigin,butthentheideaofthetotalityofnumbersissuperimposed.Ontheotherhand,ingeometrythePlatonisticideaofspaceis
primordial(ibid.:283284).

AsBernayssaysin10.2.9,Brouwerarbitrarilyandunnecessarilyrestrictedmathematicalevidencetothearithmetical.Whenwetrytodojusticetogeometrical
evidenceaswell,weareledtothepowersetofintegerswhich"ismotivatedforthesakeofarithmetizinggeometry"(10.2.12).Sincegeometryisnotsofitfor
discursiveuseandwearenotabletoattainastrictarithmetizationofgeometry,wehavetoresorttoakindofcompromisesettheoryaccomplishesthistaskquitewell
(10.2.11).
Bernaysdidnotemphasizetheintuitivecharacteroftheiterativeconceptofset,andsowemightconcludethatwehave,inadditiontothearithmeticalandthe
geometrical,alsoakindofsettheoreticalintuition.Hedid,however,characterizethewaywearelednaturallytothepowersetofintegers,byusinganidealizationto
satisfytherequirementthatclassicalanalysisdojusticetoourgeometricalintuition.Notcontentwiththejumpsuggestedin10.2.15,BernaysextendsPlatonismtosets
ofnumbers:
10.2.18Itabstractsfromthepossibilityofgivingdefinitionsofsets,sequences,andfunctions[ofintegers].Thesenotionsareusedina"quasicombinatorial"sense,bywhichI
mean:inthesenseofananalogyoftheinfinitetothefinite(ibid.:275).

Gdelwouldprobablynotdisputetheclaimthatgeometryisoneoftheintuitivesourcesofmathematics.Itislikelythat,forhim,whatis

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essentialingeometryforstudyingthefundamentalissuesinthephilosophyofmathematicsisabsorbedintosettheory.Suchabeliefwouldindicateachoiceonhispart,
withouthavingtodenythephilosophicalrelevanceofgeometryonsomelevelinconsideringthefoundationsofmathematics.
Inhisessayonrationality,Bernaysfurtherelaboratesthecontributionsofgeometrytorationality.Clearly,theclarificationofourconceptionofrationalityisacentral
concernofphilosophy.InthisconnectionIfindsomeofthethingsBernayssayssuggestiveandcongenialandwouldliketobringthemtowidernotice.
Tobeginhisdiscussion,Bernaysgaveasortofdefinitionofrationality:
10.2.19Onemaynowask:Whatistoberegardedasthepropercharacteristicofrationality?Itseemsthatitistobefoundintheconceptualelement,whichtranscendsperceiving
and(sensual)imaginingandwhichproducesakindofunderstanding(Bernays1974:601).

Bernaysdistinguishesabstractscientificrationalityfromrationalityinawidenedsense,toincludealsoprescientificrationality.Underthesetwoheadingsheconsidersa
numberofmajor"casesofrationalitybroughtaboutbytheformationofconcepts."
Abstractscientificrationality,accordingtoBernays,includes:(1)aclearunderstandingoftheprimitiveconceptsofpredicatelogic(2)theuseofabstractconceptsin
purearithmeticandalgebra(3)thewayweconceive"idealfigures"ingeometry(4)theformationofconceptsintheoreticalphysics(5)acriticalattitudetowardthe
regularitiesinnatureandapositiveleadingideatheideaofnaturallaw.Under(3)hementionsathreefoldsignificanceofgeometricalconcepts:(a)experimentallyfor
thephysicsofspace(b)theoreticallyforgeometryasadomainofpuremathematics(c)intuitivelyforaphenomenologicaltheoryofintuitivespatialrelations
(ibid.:602,605n.20).
ComparingBernays'swithGdel'sperspective,weseethattheconceptsornotionsofsettheoryandconcepttheoryareconspicuouslyabsentinthislist.Inplaceof
(2)and(3),Gdelconcentrateshisattentionontheconceptsofnumbertheoryandsettheory,assigningtogeometryandtheabstractconceptsofalgebraanauxiliary
placeinhisreflectionsonthefoundationsofmathematics.AsIseeit,Gdelneednotdenythathistoricallywehaddevelopedtheconceptsofsettheoryasawayto
accommodateasynthesisandanextensionofourarithmeticalandgeometricalintuitionsbutthecrucialpointforhimwasthebeliefthatwedohaveintuitionsaboutthe
conceptofset,whichis,moreover,moresubstantivethantheabstractconceptsofalgebraandcleanerthangeometricalconcepts.
Bernaysmentionedfourtypicalexamplesofprescientificrationality:(1)thefundamentalstockofconceptscontainedinourbackgroundknowledge

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forallempiricalinvestigationsofknowledge(2)theconceptoflife(3)conceptsforunderstandingfeelingsandmotives(suchaswanting,wishing,love,pride,
ambition,jealousy,shame,anger)(4)conceptsfordescribingmeaningfulintersubjectiverelations(suchascommunication,agreement,promise,order,obedience,
claim,privilege,duty).
Inconnectionwiththeconceptsofgroup(4),Bernaysmadeseveralpregnantobservationsontheconceptofjustice,whichseemtometospecifyaresearchprogram
ofthetypepursuedextensivelyandcarefullyinRawls'stheoryofjusticeasfairness.
10.2.20Someoftheseconceptsareconnectedwiththeregulativeideaofjustice,whichisaprominentelementofrationality,andwhichagainconstitutesadomainofobjectivity.
Ananalogycanbemadebetween,ontheonehand,therelatednessofatheoreticalsystemofphysicstothedomainofphysicalnaturethatitapproximatelydescribesand,onthe
other,therelatednessofasystemofpositivelawtoanintendedobjectivityofjusticetowhichitapproximatesinalowerorhigherdegree(ibid.:604).

ItseemslikelythatBernaysincludedtheconceptsofmetaphysicsunderthevaguecategory(1)of"theconceptscontainedinourbackgroundknowledge."Explicitlyof
theconceptsingroup(3)butimplicitly,Iamsure,ofallfourcategoriesoftheconceptsofprescientificrationality,Bernaysasserts:
10.2.21Bytheseconceptsadistinctkindofunderstandingisachieved,whichinsomerespectscannotbereplacedbyanystructuralexplanation,however,elaborateitmaybe
(ibid.:603).

ThedifficultwordstructuralinthiscontextseemstometobeintimatelyrelatedtoGdel'sconceptionoftheaxiomaticmethodandBernays'sownconceptionof
mathematics"asthescienceofpossibleidealizedstructures."Ifmyinterpretationof10.2.21agreeswithBernays'sintention,heimplies,contrarytoGdel'sbelief,that
metaphysicscannotbefullytreatedbytheuseoftheaxiomaticmethod.Mostofus,Ithink,agreethatsuchaconclusionisareasonableinferencefromourhistorical
experience.
10.3SomeLessonsfromtheWorkofRawls
MyconcernwiththeworkofRawlsisprimarilythatofanoutsiderwhofindsinstructivetheexplicitandimplicitmethodologicalideasitcontains.Giventhislimited
concern,Ihavestudiedonlyasmallpartofhisworkand,consequently,donotpossessanythinglikeafullunderstandingofhisactualmethodology.Icanonlyhope
thatmyinterpretationofitisofsomesignificance,evenifitfailstocaptureallhisintentions.
OfspecialinteresttomeareRawls'sideason:(1)theconceptofobjectivity(2)hisconceptionofreflectiveequilibriumandduereflection(3)

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thecomparisonofmoralphilosophywiththephilosophyofmathematics(4)therelationofmoralandpoliticalconstructivismtorationalintuitivismormoralPlatonism
and(5)waystonarrowtherangeofdisagreement,inrelationtotolerationandpluralism.
FormorethanfourdecadesRawlshasdevotedhimselftothedevelopmentofhistheoryofjusticeasfairness.Hebegantocollectnotesaroundthefallof1950.In
1971,afterproducingaseriesofarticles,hepublishedhisATheoryofJustice,whicharousedagooddealofresponse.Hecontinuedtorefinehistheory,publishinga
numberofarticlestoreportonhisworkinprogress.Ofthesearticles,hesaidina1991interview:
10.3.1WhatIammainlydoinginthesearticles,asInowunderstand,havingwrittenthemyoudon'talwaysunderstandwhatyou'redoinguntilafterithashappenedistowork
outmyviewsothatitisnolongerinternallyinconsistent.Toexplain:toworkoutjusticeasfairnessthebookusesthroughoutanideaofawellorderedsocietywhichsupposes
thateverybodyinthesocietyacceptsthesamecomprehensiveview,asInowsay.Icametothinkthatthatsimplycanneverbethecaseinademocraticsociety,thekindof
societytheprinciplesofthebookitselfrequires.That'stheinternalinconsistency.SoIhadtochangetheaccountofthewellorderedsocietyandthisledtotheideaof
overlappingconsensusandrelatedideas.Thisisreallywhatthelaterarticlesareabout.

In1993RawlspublishedhisPoliticalLiberalism,inwhichhedevelopsthesenewideassystematically.Accordingtothe1991interview,hewasworkingatthattime
onarelatedbook,tentativelyentitled"JusticeasFairness:ABrieferRestatement."Concerninghisdecisiontospendhistimeafterpublishinghisoriginalbookin
1971tryingtoarticulatetheideaofjusticeasfairnessmoreconvincingly,hesays:
10.3.2I'mnotsurethat'sthebestthingtohavedone,butthat'swhatIhavedone.I'mamonomaniacreally.I'dliketogetsomethingright.Butinphilosophyonecan'tdothat,not
withanyconfidence.Realdifficultiesalwaysremain(1991:44).

Rarelyisaphilosopherwillingandabletopersistsoconcentratedlyandfruitfullyonaspecialtopicevenoneasrichandimportantasjusticeasfairnesswhich
appearstobefarremovedfromwhataregenerallyregardedasthecentralissuesoffundamentalphilosophy.Inmyopinion,however,Rawls'schoiceofand
adherencetothissubstantiveandintimateproblemhaveledtosignificantilluminationofsomeofthegeneralissueswefaceinthestudyofphilosophy.Theresulting
thoroughtreatmentseemstometoprovidemuchfoodforthought,evenforthosewhohavelittlefamiliaritywithpoliticalphilosophy.Itisanexamplethatstimulates
reflectionontheramificationsattendantontryingtoinvestigateanyphilosophicalproblemseriously.
Forexample,Ifindinthisworksimilaritiesto(anddifferencesfrom)myownattempttoclarifytheobjectivityofmathematics,todecomposethe

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disagreementbetweenconstructivismandPlatonisminmathematics,andtostrengthentherelationbetweenmathematicallogicandthephilosophyofmathematics.It
seemstomeusefultostudybothmoralphilosophyandthephilosophyofmathematicswithaviewtonarrowingtherangeofdisagreementwithinthem.Doingso
providesuswithcomplementaryillustrationsofwaysoflinkingpersistentphilosophicalcontroversiesmorecloselytowhatweknowincontrasttotheusualmutual
criticismslimitedtoahighlevelofgenerality.
AtonepointRawlsdistinguishedmoralphilosophywhichconsiderssuchproblemsastheanalysisofmoralconcepts,theexistenceofobjectivemoraltruths,andthe
natureofpersonsandpersonalidentityfrommoraltheory,whichisapartofmoralphilosophyandwhichisthestudyofsubstantivemoralconceptions.Rawls
questionedthehierarchicalconceptionofmethodologyexpounded,forexample,byMichaelDummett(1973,1981:666)whichviewsmoralphilosophyas
secondarytometaphysicsandthephilosophyofmind,whichare,inturn,seenassecondarytoepistemologyandthetheoryofmeaning.Inparticular,Rawlsurged:
10.3.3Moraltheoryis,inimportantrespects,independentfromphilosophicalsubjectssometimesregardedaspriortoit.Eachpartofphilosophyshouldhaveitownsubject
matterandproblemsandyet,atthesametime,standdirectlyorindirectlyinrelationsofmutualdependencewiththeothers.Thefaultofmethodologicalhierarchiesisnotunlike
thefaultofpoliticalandsocialones:theyleadtoadistortionofvisionwithaconsequentmisdirectionofeffort(Rawls1975:21).
10.3.4Justasthetheoryofmeaningaswenowknowitdependsonthedevelopmentoflogicfrom,let'ssay,FregetoGdel,sothefurtheradvanceofmoralphilosophydepends
onadeeperunderstandingofthestructureofmoralconceptionsandoftheirconnectionswithhumansensibilityandinmanyrespects,thisinquiry,likethedevelopmentoflogic
andthefoundationsofmathematics,canproceedindependently(ibid.:2122seealsop.6).

IshareRawls'sfeelingthattheunexaminedbeliefinmethodologicalhierarchieshasledtoagreatdealofmisdirectionofeffort.In10.3.4hedrawstwoflexible
analogies:(1)thefurtheradvanceofmoralphilosophywilldependonthedevelopmentofmoraltheory,justasthecurrenttheoryofmeaninghasdependedonthe
developmentoflogicand(2)justaslogicandthefoundationsofmathematicshavedeveloped,inmanyrespects,independently,socanmoraltheory.Theseanalogies,
Ithink,callforsomeelucidation.
Rawlsundoubtedlyhadinmindhistheoryofjusticeasatypicalexampleofmoraltheory.Itseemsreasonabletosaythathistheoryisindeedlargelyindependentof
alternativecomprehensivemoralphilosophies,especiallyinlightofhiscontinuedefforttoclarifyideassuchasthatof

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overlappingconsensus.Idonotknowwhetherhewouldnowprefertochangethetermmoraltheory,buttheintentionseemscleartome.Onenaturalquestionis
whyRawlsmatchedmoralphilosophywiththetheoryofmeaningratherthanwiththephilosophyofmathematics.Anotherquestioniswhetherlogicistobe
distinguishedfromthefoundationsofmathematicsalabelthathasitsfamiliarambiguity.
Forinstance,in1939TuringgavealecturecourseandWittgensteinaclassatCambridgebothentitled"TheFoundationsofMathematics."Turing'scoursewason
mathematicallogic,butWittgensteinexplicitlyexcludedthattopicatthebeginning,referringtomathematicallogicas"aparticularbranchofmathematics."Inorderto
borrowaconvenientterminologyforadistinctionIwouldliketomake,Iproposetodistinguishthefoundationsofmathematicsfrombothmathematicallogicand
thephilosophyofmathematics.
Tobeginwith,Icomparemathematicstotherealmofourconsideredjudgmentsonmoralmatters.Inbothcases,thereisaclosecontactwithourintuitions,which
provideuswiththedataandthetoolforourstudyofmoraltheoryandthefoundationsofmathematics,aswellasofmoralphilosophyandthephilosophyof
mathematics.Forinstance,forFrege,Russell,HilbertandGdel,thestudyofmathematicallogicwasintimatelyrelatedtotheirinterestinthephilosophyof
mathematics.Itakethismixedtypeofworkasbelongingtothesubjectofthefoundationsofmathematics,whichImatchwithmoraltheory.Inthissense,thepartin
Chapter7concernedwiththedialecticbetweenintuitionandidealizationmaybesaidtobelongtothismiddlesubjectanditcan,inmanyrespects,proceed
independentlyofcomprehensivealternativephilosophiesofmathematics.Indeed,itscontentseemstometosharewithRawls'stheorythedesirablecharacteristicof
beingclosetowhatbelongstotheoverlappingconsensus.
Onadifferentlevel,Iwouldholdthat,justasthedevelopmentoflogicandthefoundationsofmathematicsfromFregetoGdelplayedanimportantpartinarrivingat
thetheoryofmeaningaswenowknowit,sofurtherdevelopmentofmoraltheory(inthesenseofRawls)andofthefoundationsofmathematics(inmysense)may
helpusarriveatamoresubstantiveandbetterstructuredepistemology.
Forthepresent,itiseasiertosaysomethingdefiniteabouthowfurtheradvanceofmoralphilosophyandthephilosophyofmathematicsdepend,respectivelyand
perhapsalsoconjointly,onworkonmoraltheoryandthefoundationsofmathematics.Forinstance,inbothcasestheworkimprovesourunderstandingoftherelation
betweenconstructivismandPlatonism(orrationalintuitionism)inmathematicsandinmoraljudgments.
Inabstractterms,bothmoralphilosophyandthephilosophyofmathematicsfacetwoapparentlyelusivebasicquestions:(1)Inphysicswetalk

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aboutthephysicalworld,whichwebelievetobesolidandtoexistindependentlybutwhatarewetalkingaboutinmathematicsorinmakingmoraljudgments?(2)
Howisitpossibletodiscoverwhatistrueaboutissuesinmoralityandmathematics,sinceweseemtoappealaswedonotinphysicsmerelytothinkingor
reasoningaboutthem?Inotherwords,inbothcasesweface(1)theontologicalquestionofsubjectmatterorgroundsoftruth,and(2)theepistemologicalproblemof
justifyingourbeliefandexplainingouragreement(ordisagreement)byappealingtothepossibilityofsomesuitablecontactbetweenusandthesubjectmatter.
Giventheseproblems,itiseasytoseewhyconstructivismis,inafundamentalway,moreattractivethanPlatonism,sinceweareinclinedtobelievethatweknowwhat
weconstruct.Incontrast,Platonismseemstohavetoprojectfromtheobservedobjectivity(inthesenseofintersubjectivesharability)toanobjectiverealityandthen
facetheproblemofitsaccessibilitytous.However,atleastinthecaseofmathematics,wehavelearnedthroughexperiencethattherearemanysharableandshared
beliefswhichdemonstrablygobeyondwhatcanpossiblybejustifiedonthebasisofconstructivism.Asaresult,wehavetochoosebetweenexcludingthosebeliefs
andfindingsomeotheraccountoftheiracceptability.AndPlatonismisthefamiliarproposalonthesideoftoleration.
InitiallyRawlsseemstosuggestthathistheory,byconstructingtheprinciplesofjustice,refutesmoralPlatonism(1971:39):"Arefutationofintuitionismconsistsin
presentingthesortofconstructivecriteriathataresaidnottoexist."Laterhedistinguishespoliticalconstructivismfrommoralconstructivism,suchasKant's,and
emphasizesthataconstructivistpoliticalconceptioniscompatiblewithallreasonablecomprehensiveviewsincluding,inparticular,moralPlatonismorrealismor
rationalintuitionism.
10.3.5First,itiscrucialforpoliticalliberalismthatitsconstructivistconceptiondoesnotcontradictrationalintuitionism,sinceconstructivismtriestoavoidopposingany
comprehensivedoctrine.
10.3.6Thereasonsuchaconceptionmaybethefocusofanoverlappingconsensusofcomprehensivedoctrinesisthatitdevelopstheprinciplesofjusticefrompublicandshared
idealsofsocietyasafairsystemofcompetitionandofcitizensasfreeandequalbyusingtheprinciplesoftheircommonpracticalreason(Rawls1993:90).

RawlscontrastshispoliticalconstructivismwithbothrationalintuitionismandKant'smoralconstructivism,toindicatethatitiscompatiblewithbothviewsandthatit
hasanaccountofobjectivitywhichissufficientforasharedpublicbasisofjustification(ibid.:90116).Formypurposeofcomparingtherelationbetween
constructivismandPlatonisminmathematicswiththecorrespondingrelationinmorality,Imatchpolitical

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PlatonismwhichrestrictsrationalintuitionismtothepoliticalrealmasRawlscontrastspoliticalwithmoralconstructivismwithPlatonisminnumbertheory,which
restrictsPlatonisminmathematicstothetheoryofnumbers.
Rawlsseemstosuggestthat,asfarasweknow,eventhoughpoliticalPlatonismandpoliticalconstructivismhavedifferentconceptionsofobjectivityortruth,theylead
tothesamecollectionofobjectiveortrueconsideredpoliticaljudgments,atleastwithrespecttothesenseofjusticeofthosereasonablepersonswholiveinawell
ordereddemocraticsociety.Ifsomethinglikethisistrue,constructivismhas,asIsaidbefore,aclearadvantageoverPlatonismintheapplicableuniverseofdiscourse.
Incontrast,intherealmofnumbertheory,weknowthat,eventhougheveryjudgmentonthepropertiesandrelationsofnaturalnumbersthatisjustifiable(orobjective
ortrue)constructivelyisalsoobjectivelytrueaccordingtoPlatonism,therearejudgmentsthataretrueforPlatonismbutnotforconstructivism.Thatiswhy,inorderto
narrowtherangeofdisagreementbetweenconstructivismandPlatonisminnumbertheory,wehavetoafteragreeingthatthejudgmentswhicharebothPlatonically
andconstructivelytruehaveahigherdegreeofclarityandcertaintythanthosewhichareonlyPlatonisticallytrueconsiderthenaturalnessandtheacceptabilityofthe
extensionswhichleadusfromconstructivetoPlatonisticnumbertheory,fromthepotentialtotheactualinfinite.
Ofcourse,asRawlsemphasizes(1993:118),giventhemanyobstaclesinpoliticaljudgment,evenamongreasonablepersons,wewillnotreachagreementallthetime,
orperhapsevenmuchofthetime.Inthisrespect,numbertheoryiscertainlydifferent:webelievewecanreachagreementallthetime,atleastifwedistinguish
explicitlybetweenconstructivelyandPlatonisticallytrue.Thisdifferencesuggeststomethatreflectionsonnumbertheoryandonpoliticaljudgmentsarehelpful,in
differentways,toourphilosophicalinvestigations:thephilosophyofnumbertheoryservesasaprecise,idealmodel,andpoliticalphilosophyasawidelyaccessible,
richmodeltoillustrate,inarestricteddomain,thecomplexityofphilosophygenerally.
Forexample,wemaycompareRawls'sspecificationoftheessentialsofaconceptionofobjectivity(1993:110116)withGdel'semphasisontheaxiomaticmethod.
Inconsideringmathematicalreasoningandjudgment,werarelyquestiontheirobjectivityatleastinthesenseofintersubjectiveagreement.Yetpeopleoftenquestion
theobjectivityofmoralandpoliticalreasoningandjudgment.Inthisregard,objectivityinphilosophysharesmorefeatureswiththelatterthanwiththeformer.Atthe
sametime,theobjectivityofajudgmentinmathematics,asinmorality,isindependentofhavingasuitableexplanationwithinacausalviewofknowledge.Inthis
connection,Rawlssays:

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10.3.7HereIshouldaddthatIassumethatcommonsenseknowledge(forexample,ourperceptualjudgments),naturalscienceandsocialtheory(asineconomicsandhistory),and
mathematicsare(orcanbe)objective,perhapseachintheirownappropriateway.Theproblemistoelucidatehowtheyare,andtogiveasuitablysystematicaccount.Any
argumentagainstobjectivityofmoralandpoliticalreasoningthatwould,byparallelreasoningappliedagainstcommonsense,ornaturalscience,ormathematics,showthemnotto
beobjective,mustbeincorrect(ibid.:118).

IfwecomparetheconceptionofobjectivityofpoliticalconstructivismwiththoseofPlatonismandconstructivisminnumbertheory,weseethattheformerbringsout
thefullrangeofthecomplexityofpossibleconceptionsofobjectivityinamoreexplicitmanner.Inthecaseofnumbertheory,wehaveaxiomsystemsforbothclassical
andconstructivistnumbertheory.Wearetemptedtosaythatajudgmentinnumbertheoryisobjectiveorcorrectifandonlyifitisprovableintheaxiomsystem,and
thatwecanseethattheaxiomsandtherulesofinferenceoftheaxiomsystemareindeedobjectiveandcorrect.
Indeed,wemayalsobeinclinedtosaythatwecanseethattheprinciplesofRawls'stheoryofjusticearetrue,sothatajudgmentinthattheoryisobjectiveorcorrect
ifandonlyifitfollowsfromtheseprinciples.However,asRawlsindicates,muchmoreisinvolvedinthiscasethanaconceptionofobjectivitybasedonanidealized
interpretationoftheaxiomaticmethod.Inthefirstplace,wedonotarriveattheprinciplesofjusticebyananalysisorby''intuitingtheessence"oftheconceptof
justice.Asamatteroffact,wedidnotarriveattheaxiomsofnumbertheoryinthiswayeither.
Itseemstomethatgenerallyineverydomain,fromtheconceptofnaturalnumbertothatofjustice,eachofusbeginswithcertaininterrelatedfirmbeliefswhich,we
assume,aresharedbyotherswhoaresimilarlysituatedinanappropriateway.Thesebeliefsorjudgments,whicharepresumedtobecorrectorobjective,arethe
initialdatafromwhichwetrytoforgeaconceptionofobjectivityfortherelevantdomain.
Ineverydomainwemakeconsideredjudgmentsatalllevelsofgenerality.Inordertoarriveatsomesortofsystematizationofourconsideredjudgments,wereflectat
eachstageontherelationsbothbetweensuchjudgmentsandbetweenthemandourintuition.Inthisprocesswecontinuallymodifyourconsideredjudgmentswitha
viewtofinding,eventually,asetofconsideredjudgmentsinreflectiveequilibrium.
Inthecaseofnumbertheory,webelievewehavereachedsuchastateand,moreover,organizedtheconsideredjudgmentsinelegantaxiomsystemsoneforthe
Platonisticviewandonefortheconstructivistview.Inthecaseofthetheoryofjustice,wehavenotreachedsuchaconclusion.Ineverycase,wedevelopa
conceptionofobjectivitywhich

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servesasaframeworkofandaguidetoourquestforastablesystemofpresentandfutureconsideredjudgments.
AsRawlsindicates,allconceptionsofobjectivitysharecertaincommonfeatures.Eachproposalspecifiesaconceptionofcorrectjudgment,togetherwithits
associatedpublicnorms,bywhichwecanevaluatetheconclusionsreachedonthebasisofevidenceandreasoningafterdiscussionandduereflection(ibid.:110,112,
121).Inparticular,itimpliesacriterionfordistinguishingtheobjectivefromthesubjectiveviewpoint.Theultimatecourtofappealistheintuitionofeverysuitably
situatedpersonandthebeliefthatagreementcanultimatelybereachedinamajorityofcasesfortheconsideredjudgmentsandtheirsystematization,whetherweuse
Platonism(rationalintuitionism)orconstructivismastheintermediatelink(ibid.:112).
Generally,asweknowfromexperience,therearecontroversiesoverphilosophicalandpoliticaljudgmentswhichourcontinuedeffortshavefailedtoresolve.Wefeel
thattwoormoreincompatiblejudgmentsmaysometimesheregardedasobjective,asfaraswecandetermine.Inthissense,objectiveneednotalwayscoincidewith
true,since,bydefinition,incompatiblejudgmentscannotallbetrue.Forthisreason,anotheressentialfeatureofaconceptionofobjectivityisthat,asRawlsexpresses
it,
10.3.8Weshouldbeabletoexplainthefailureofourjudgmentstoconvergebysuchthingsastheburdensofjudgment:thedifficultiesofsurveyingandassessingallthe
evidence,orelsethedelicatebalanceofcompetingreasonsonoppositesidesoftheissue,eitherofwhichleadsustoexpectthatreasonablepersonsmaydiffer.Thus,much
importantdisagreementisconsistentwithobjectivity,astheburdensofjudgmentallow(ibid.:121compare5458).

Rawls'snotionofreflectiveequilibriumaptlycapturesafundamentalcomponentofmethodologywhichmanyofushavegropedafter.Heelaboratesthisnotion,and
therelatednotionofduereflection,invariouscontexts,includinghistwopublishedbooksandabookmanuscriptinpreparation(seeRawls1971:4851,index
1993:indexandforthcoming:section10,chap.1).Eventhoughheconfinesmanyofhisobservationstotheirapplicationtopoliticaljudgmentsrelatedtotheconcept
ofjustice,itisclearthatmostarealsoapplicabletojudgmentsinvolvedinmanyareasofphilosophicaldiscussion.
ForRawls,consideredjudgmentsarethosegivenwhenconditionsarefavorabletotheexerciseofourpowersofreason.Weviewsomejudgmentsasfixedpoints,
judgmentsweneverexpecttowithdraw.Wewouldliketomakeourownjudgmentsbothmoreconsistentwithoneanotherandmoreinlinewiththeconsidered
judgmentsofothers,withoutresortingtocoercion.Forthispurpose,eachofusstrivesforjudgmentsandconceptionsinfullreflectiveequilibriumthatis,an
equilibriumthatisboth

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wideinthesensethatithasbeenreachedaftercarefulconsiderationofalternativeviewsandgeneralinthesensethatthesameconceptionisaffirmedin
everyone'sconsideredjudgments.Thus,fullreflectiveequilibriumcanserveasabasisofpublicjustificationwhichisnonfoundationalistinthefollowingsense:no
specifickindofconsideredjudgment,noparticularlevelofgenerality,isthoughttocarrythewholeweightofpublicjustification.
AsIunderstandtheseobservations,Ifindthemagreeableindeed,theyseemtoexpressmyownbeliefsbetterthanIcan.Itisnotcleartome,however,thatGdel
wouldalsofindthemcongenial.Someofhisassertionssuggestthatforhimtheweightofjustificationisprimarilyorultimatelycarriedbyourperceptionoftheprimitive
conceptsofadomain,withsufficientclaritytodeterminethecorrectortrueaxiomsaboutthemasstableconsideredjudgmentswhichdefinetherangeofthe
conceptionofobjectivityandtruthinthisdomain.Sometimes,however,forexample,inhisCantorpaper,healsospeaksofanothercriterionforthetruthofaxioms,
namelytheirfruitfulness(CW2:261,269).ItispossiblethatGdel'sappealtoourintuitiontocapturethecorrectaxioms,ascontrastedwithuseofreflective
equilibrium,isamatterofemphasisforthesakeofrecommendinghisbeliefthatweshouldinthefirstplaceconcentrateonthefundamentalinphilosophy.
SinceGdelisinfavorofHusserl'smethodology,andwehaveavailablemoreextendedwrittenconsiderationsofthematterbyHusserl,oneobviousideafortryingto
understandGdel'sviewistostudyHusserl'sworkdirectly.
DagfinnFollesdalhasrecentlypublishedanessay(1988)inwhichheanalyzesthemethodofreflectiveequilibriumandusesquotationsfromHusserltoshowthat
Husserlacceptedthismethod.Wemight,therefore,stretchapointtoinferthatGdeltoocanbeinterpretedasacceptingthismethod.Quiteapartfromthiselusive
taskofinterpretation,IfindFollesdal'sassimilationofwhatarecommonlyregardedasdistinctapproachestophilosophysomewhattenuous.Mymaindiscomfortis
withhischaracterizationanddistinctionofdiversemethodologies.Forexample,incommentingon"theuniversallyacceptedviewthatHusserlwasafoundationalist,"
heasserts:
10.3.9ThereareexcusesforthisinterpretationinHusserl'sownwritings.Husserloftenwritesasifheheldthatwecanattainsomeinfallible,absolutelycertaininsightfromwhich
therestofourknowledgecanbebuiltupinaCartesianfashion.
10.3.10ThewayIinterpretHusserl,hisseeminglyfoundationaliststatementsaremeresurfaceappearances.Ishallnowarguethatfarfrombeingafoundationalistheisonthe
contrarya"holist"andhasaviewonjustificationverysimilar

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tothatwhichhasbeensetforthbyNelsonGoodman,JohnRawls,andothers[e.g.,W.V.Quine(1951)],andwhichIwillcallthe"reflectiveequilibrium"view(Follesdal1988:115,
119).

Follesdalseemstoidentifyfoundationalismwiththeverystrongviewthatwecanattaincertaininfallible,absolutelycertaininsightsfromwhichallourknowledgecan
bebuiltup.Inthissense,Gdelwas,ashehimselfemphasized,definitelynotafoundationalist.WecanalsoagreethatHusserl'smatureviewwasnotfoundationalistin
thissense.Nonetheless,mostofusfeelthattherearemajorcomponentsinHusserl'sandGdel'srelatedapproachestophilosophywhicharedifferentfromthoseof
mostphilosopherswhoarenotfoundationalistsinthisstrongsense.Inmyopinion,thisnegativecharacteristic,becauseitissoinclusive,isnotofmuchhelpin
distinguishingdifferentpositions.
AccordingtoFollesdal,Husserl,Goodman,Rawls,andQuineareall"holists"whoholdthe"reflectiveequilibrium"view.Butthisgroupingseemstometoconceal
severalcrucialdifferenceswhichareimportantforone'sapproachtophilosophy.Forexample,Quine'spragmaticholismisassociatedwithakindofgradualism,
whichisillustratedbyhisassertion:"Butinpointofepistemologicalfootingthephysicalobjectsandthegodsdifferonlyindegreeandnotinkind''(Quine1951,cited
inFollesdal1988:119).Incontrast,IprefertousethetermqualitativefactualismtodescribeRawls'sapproachandmyown.Inotherwords,IbelievethatRawls
agreeswithmeinrecognizingtheimportanceofqualitativedifferencesinthestudyofphilosophy.
AnotheressentialtaskistoreconciletheviewofRawlswiththeavowedlyaprioriapproachofHusserlandGdel.ElsewhereinthepresentworkIhavemadesome
tentativeobservationsaboutthedifficultnotionoftheapriori.Inthisconnection,FollesdalgivesanilluminatingexplicationofHusserl'sconception:
10.3.11Also,Husserlcharacterizesinallhiswritingsphenomenologyasastudyoftheapriori.ThismakesitnaturaltoassimilatehimtoKantandKant'sfoundationalism.
However,Husserlmeanssomethingdifferentwith"apriori"thandoesKant.ForHusserl,theaprioriisthatwhichweanticipate,thatwhichweexpecttofind,giventhenoema
wehave.Phenomenologystudiesandattemptstocharttheseanticipations,butasweknow,ouranticipationsoftengowrong,ourexperiencesturnoutdifferentlyfromwhatwe
expected,andagainandagainwehavetoreviseourviewsandourexpectations(Follesdal1988:115).

Ifindthisexplicationoftheaprioriattractiveandhelpful.ItisverylikelythatGdelalsoadoptedthisconception.Indeed,onemightwishtosaythatthisapproachto
theapriori,withitsattempttochartouranticipations,isaformoffoundationalismmorereasonablethanFollesdal'sstrongversion.Howeverthatmaybeandhowever
wearetoapplythe

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apriorielementinHusserl'ssense,suchaviewisdifferentatleastintermsoftheactualassertionsinwordsfromthatofRawls,whosaysexplicitly:"Theanalysis
ofmoralconceptsandtheapriori,howevertraditionallyunderstood,istooslenderabasis"(1971:51).Ofcourse,itispossiblethatRawlsdoesnotincludeHusserl's
conceptionoftheaprioriinthisstatement.
TounderstandHusserl'simportantconceptionoftheapriori,wehavetograsphisdifficultnotionofthenoema.AccordingtoFollesdal,"Thenoemaisastructure.
Ourconsciousnessstructureswhatweexperience.Howitstructuresitdependsonourpreviousexperiences,thewholesettingofourpresentexperienceanda
numberofotherfactors"(Follesdal1988:109).Itseemstomethat,intheseterms,thethinkingprocessisasuccessionofthinkingactssuchthatIhaveanoemaat
eachmomentanduseitsaccompanyingapriorielementinmyconsciousnesstodirectmyselftoobtainadditionaldatafrominsideandoutsidemymindsoastoarrive
atmynoemaatthenextmoment.Inthisprocess,IgofrommynoemaandmyapriorioutlookatonemomenttothoseIexperienceatthenext.
Inthiswayitbecomesclearthattheapriorielementisinescapableandplaysacentralpartinallthinking.WhatdistinguishesHusserl'sapproachfromotherscannotbe
justtherecognitionofthisfact.Ratherhisphenomenology,asthestudyoftheapriori,concentratesonclarifyingthegeneralfeaturesofthisapriorielementand
chartingthefundamentalstructureofwhatweanticipate.Incontrast,mostphilosophers,likemostpeople,donottrytostudysystematicallytheprocessofstructuring
whatweexperiencetoarriveatthenoema.Ratherwemakeuseofthenoemaandtheaprioriwithoutattemptingtoexaminesystematicallywhatgoesoninthe
bottomregionofthem.Itseemshardtoarguethatmanyofusare,unknowingly,usingHusserl'smethodforhewasnothimselfhappywiththewayhisavowed
followerswereusingwhattheysupposedtobehismethod.
Inmyopinion,Rawls'sconscientiousefforttodistinguishhispoliticalconceptionofjusticefromcomprehensivedoctrines(1993:13,175)providesaninstructive
illustrationofhowwemaybeabletocarryouttheattractiveideaofseparatinganddecomposingdisagreementssoastoreachagreementthroughanoverlapping
consensusonsomeimportantissues.Hisdiscussionontheburdenofproof(ibid.:5462)makesexplicitsomemajorreasonswhyreasonablepersonsmaydisagreeon
certainissuesdespitetheirsincereeffortstounderstandoneanother.Itis,therefore,reasonabletobetolerantinsuchcases.Moreover,tolerationis,forRawls,a
politicalvirtue,andoneofthevirtuesimportantforpoliticalcooperation(ibid.:194,157).

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Inthepursuitofphilosophy,itisgenerallydesirabletohavemorecooperationandtonarrowtherangeofdisagreement.Onewaytoapproachthisidealistotryto
decomposedisagreements,withaviewtobringingtolight,ontheonehand,certainpartswhichcanbeseentosuggestpromisingresearchproblemsand,ontheother
hand,otherpartswherewecan"explainthefailureofourjudgmentstoconvergebysuchthingsastheburdensofjudgment."Ifwecanseeandcommunicate
convincinglythatallorsomeofthecomponentsofanimportantdisagreementareofoneortheotherofthesetwotypes,weshallhavenarrowedtherangeof
disagreementandincreasedthefeasibilityofcooperation.Moreover,withregardtothepartsofourdisagreementswhichareseentobeofoneofthetwotypes,we
havegoodreasontoadoptanattitudeofopenmindednessortoleration.
Thereis,ofcourse,athirdtypeofdisagreement,whichistypicallydivisiveandwhichoccurswhenoneormoreofthepartiesmisjudgethediscrepancybetweenwhat
theyknowandwhattheythinktheyknow.Insituationswherewebelievewefaceadisagreementofthistype,Rawlssuggestsproceedinginthefollowingmanner:
10.3.12Yetdisagreementmayalsoarisefromalackofreasonableness,orrationality,orconscientiousnessofoneormoreofthepersonsinvolved.Butifwesaythis,wemustbe
carefulthattheevidenceforthesefailingsisnotsimplythedisagreementitself.Wemusthaveindependentgroundsidentifiableintheparticularcircumstancesforthinkingsuch
causesofdisagreementareatwork.Thesegroundsmustalsobeinprinciplerecognizablebythosewhodisagreewithus(ibid.:121).

10.4ThePlaceofPhilosophyandSomeofItsTasks
Afundamentalfactoflifeisourawarenessofgapsbetweenourwishesandtheirconsummationandofconflictsofwishesbothbetweenourowndifferentwishes
andwiththewishesofothers.Ifallwisheswereautomaticallyconsummated,therewouldbenogapbetweenwishandfact,noneedtoexertourselves,noconflicts,
andnodisagreements.Iftherewerenoconflictsofwishes,theconsummationofanywishwouldbeofpositivevalue.
Asitis,weareconstantlyawareofagapbetweenawishanditsconsummation,whichmaybeeasyorhardorimpossibletobridge.Wehaveotherwishestoo,and
othershavetheirownwishes.Touseourresourcesandeffortstomaximizesatisfactionandminimizedisappointment,wemustselect,arrange,andmodifyourown
wishesandeventhoseofothers.Todosoweneedtoknowtherelevantfactsabouttheobjectivesituation,includingfactsaboutourselvesandaboutotherpeople.

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Valuesevolve,throughakindofconsensus,asguidesforusinourselectionandarrangementofourwishes.Theyarebasedonourevolvingknowledge(or,rather,
beliefs)aboutfacts,andtheyaimtobridge,oratleastnarrow,thegapbetweenwishandfact.Generallywelearntochooseamongvaluesinordertosimplifythetask
offindingallthecomplexfactsrelevanttotheconsummationofourvariouswishes.Occasionally,exceptionalpeoplecomeupwithinfluentialvaluesystemswhich
summarizehumanexperienceinmoreorlessnovelandconvincingways.
Mostofthetime,mostofusareprimarilyconcernedwithlocalproblemswhicharisefromthelimitedcontextsofourdailylives,whichmayincludeworkingasa
memberofsomeprofession.Philosophyisnotaloneintryingtobecoherentandcomprehensible(orcommunicable)whatdistinguishesitfromotherpursuitsisits
ambitiontobecomprehensive,tolookatthemostuniversalinitsfullrichness.Giventheambiguityofthisambitionanditsformidablerangeandremotenessfromwhat
wereallyknow,itisnotsurprisingthatphilosophytakesmanydifferentshapesithasbeensplitintomanyspecializedpartsandexhibitsnoclearpatternof
accumulationofitsfruits.
Itisclearthatweareallconcernedwiththeinterplayofknowledgeandaction,ofwishandfact,andofdesireandbelief.Thegapbetweenwishandconsummation
producesinusanawarenessofthegapbetweenwhatweknowandwhatweneedtoguideustoactinsuchawaythatwecanconsummateourwish.Knowledgeis
theprimarytooltoaidusinthispursuit.Freud,forexample,speaksofthefrequentconflictsbetweentherealityprincipleandthepleasureprinciplewealllookfor
knowledgethatwoulddecreaseoreliminatesuchconflicts.
Thatiswhytheidealofphilosophyasaguidetoactionisattractive.ReligionsandgranddoctrinessuchasMarxismalsoofferusworldviewsthatproposetoguideour
actionsbylinkingthemtocertainpromisedfuturestates.Wedonotknow,however,thatthepromisedstateswillindeedmaterialize,orwhatactionsaretherightones
undermanycircumstances.Moreover,itishardtofindwaystotestobjectivelywhetherthebeliefsofferedtousareplausibleornot:weseenowaytodeterminewhat
factsdecisivelysupportordisturbthebeliefthatcertainhumanlypossibleactionswillleadtothedesiredfuturestates.InChapter3IhavediscussedsomeofGdel's
ideasonphilosophyasacomprehensiveguidetoaction.
Onefamiliarapproachinphilosophyistopostponethetaskofseekinguniversalguidanceforactionleavingitinthebackgroundandtodirectourattentioninstead
tothegeneralconcernforattainingatrueimageoftheworldinthought.Inthistaskweareimmediatelyfacedwiththegapbetweenmindandtheworld,betweenthe
innerandtheouter.

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Wecannothelpseeingthingsthroughourownconceptualorinterpretiveschemes.Itisasthoughwearealwayswearingglassesthatdistorttosomeextentwhatwe
areseeing.Whenwethinkabouttherelationbetweenourthoughtsandtheworld,wecanthinkonlyaboutourthoughtsabouttheworld,aboutourthoughts,and
abouttheirinterrelations.Forinstance,thedistinctionbetweenmindandmatterisinthefirstplaceadivisioninexperience,inthought.Inthissense,wheneverwethink
ortalkabouttheworld,thereisanimplicitqualificationthatwerefertotheworldasseenbyus.Itisinevitablethatwetendtodisregardthisqualificationmostofthe
time.
Whenweareremindedofit,however,webecomeawareofaconflictbetweentwosensesofsomeofthemainwordsorconceptsinphilosophysuchasworld,
truth,knowledge,certainty,object,thought.Wemaybesaidtohavebothanordinaryperspectivethatdropsthequalificationandanextraordinaryonethat
attendstoit.Whatunderliesthissenseofconflictmightbecalledthehomocentricpredicament,whichseemstocorrespondtowhatissometimesspokenofasthe
problemoftranscendence.Itistakenseriouslyinhistoricalphilosophy.Kant,forexample,answerstheproblembyhisdualismHegelandHusserlstrivetobypassit
byabsorbingrealismintotheirversionsofidealism.
Thiscollectivetheoreticalpredicamentofthespeciesisrelatedtotheegocentricpredicamentofeverypersonandtheethnocentricpredicamentofevery
communityorassociationorsociety,theconsequencesofwhichwetrytoovercomeinpracticebydevelopingwaystocommunicatewithoneanotherandtoreach
mutualunderstanding.Clearlysuchattemptsareimportantforresolvingorreducingdisagreementsandconflictsbetweenindividualsandbetweengroups.
Thehomocentricpredicamentisoneindicationthat,ifweareinterestedinthewhole,theinnerandthemindaremoreaccessibletousthantheouterandtheworld.
Thatis,Ibelieve,thereasonwhywepaysomuchattentiontologicandthepowerofthemindinphilosophy,asillustratedbytheextendeddiscussionsdevotedto
thesetopicsinthisbook.Logicinthebroadsensetriestocapturewhatisuniversalwithintheinner,ofwhichmathematicsconstitutesanintegralpartthatis
conspicuouslystableandpowerful.Thepoweroftheminddeterminesthelimitsoftheinnerandthedimensionsofthegapbetweenitandtheouter.Onefruitful,and
lesselusive,approachtothedelimitationofthepowerofthemindistocompareitwiththepowerofbodiesandcomputers.
Thegapbetweenawishanditsconsummationcanbebridgedonlybyappropriateactions,whichrequiretheappropriateapplicationofpowerorstrength,which,in
turn,usuallydependsonthepossessionofappropriatebeliefs.Welearnfromexperiencethatourbeliefsoftendonotagreewithwhatturnsouttobethecase.This
kindofexperiencegraduallyleadsus

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tothenotionofconfirmedbelief,thencetotheconceptofknowledge,whichisanidealizedlimitcaseofbetterandbetterconfirmedbeliefs.Theattempttostudy,
systematicallyandglobally,thegapbetweenbeliefandknowledgeis,asweknow,thecentralconcernofepistemology,orthetheoryofknowledge,whichhas
becomeafundamentalpartofphilosophyfromDescarteson.
Philosophyasdiscourseandconversationuseslanguageandwordsasitsprimary,orevenexclusive,vehicleinwayswhicharesimilartobutalsodifferentfromthose
ofscience,fiction,poetry,andhistory.Theuseofwordstoexpressandcommunicatethoughtsencounterstheproblemsthatarisefromthefamiliargapbetween
seeingandsayingbetweenwhatIseeandwhatIsay,aswellasbetweenwhatIsayandwhatyouseethoughwhatIsay,afterhearingorreadingitandthinking
aboutitonthebasisofthepartsrelevanttowhatisinyou.Scienceandliteraturesolvethisproblemindifferentways,withdifferentadvantages.
Thestagefromseeingtosayingispartofthemovefrompresentationtorepresentation.Thestagefromsayingbyonetoseeingbyanotherispartofcommunication,
whichproducesapresentationinonethrougharepresentationbyanother.
Saying,however,isonlyonewayofcommunicating.Thecomplexrelationbetweenpresentation(intention)andrepresentation(expression)leavesroomforshowing
onething(saytheuniversalorthewhole)bysayinganother(saytheparticularorapart).Literature,forinstance,triestoshowtheuniversalbysayingtheparticular
similesandmetaphorsshowonethingbysayingsomethingelseaction,tone,andgesturecanbeshowninadramaorfilmbuttheycanonlybesaidortoldinanovel
(seeBooth1961:chaps.1and8).
Theinterestincommunicationbylanguageshiftsourattentiontotheunderstandingofwhatissaidasapreconditionfordeterminingitstruthfromthejustificationof
belieftotheclarificationofmeaning.Thesubjectiveandfluidcharacterofthecontentofseeingstimulates,forthepurposeofassuringcommunicationofwhatis
intended,adirectappealtotheconnectionbetweenwordsanddeeds,tobypasstheinterferencefrompassingthroughthemental.Theattentiontotheactualuseof
wordsintheworkofthelaterWittgensteinisanillustrationofthistendency.
Bybeingconcernedwiththewhole,philosophyhoversoverthelimitsofthoughtandlanguage.Werepresenttheworldinourthoughtsandthenrepresentourthoughts
inlanguage.Weunderstandanother'sthoughtthroughwhattheotherpersonsays,withthehelpofanimperfectlysharedcorrelationbetweenlanguageandreality.Itis
naturaltoconsiderthelimitsofthepowerofthoughttocapturereality,aswellasthelimitsofthepoweroflanguagetocapturethoughtorrealityandtocommunicate
thoughtbetweentwosouls.Indeed,thelimitsofthoughtarea

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centralconcernofKant'sphilosophy,andWittgensteinoftenconsiders,implicitlyandexplicitly,thelimitsoflanguage.
Seeingthingsclearlyhasvalue,because,onthewholeandinthelongrun,aswelearnfromexperience,ithelpstoseethingsclearly.Whenawishisnotautomatically
consummated,welookforpossiblecoursesofactionthatarelikelytosucceed.Forthispurpose,itisusuallynecessarytoknowcertainrelevantfactsthatis,whatis
thecase.Thebeliefthatacourseofactionispossibleandwillleadtothedesiredoutcomedependsonthebelief,basedonexperience,thatcertainthingsare
repeated.Acrucialpartofthisbeliefisthesocalleduniformityofnature:thesameeffectfollowsthesamecause.
Inotherwords,webelievenotonlythattherearerepetitions,butalsothattherearerepetitionsofsuccession.Agreatdealofoureffortinscienceandeverydaylife
isdevotedtothetaskoflearningimportantandrelevantrepetitionsofsuccession.Atthesametime,weareinclinedtothinkthatnotwoconcretethingsareentirelythe
same.Indeed,Leibnizhasaprincipleoftheidentityofindiscernibles:"Thereisnosuchthingastwoindividualsindiscerniblefromeachother.Twodropsofwater,
ormilk,viewedwithamicroscope,willappeardistinguishablefromeachother."
Whatarerepeatedarenottheindividuals,butcertainotherthings,knownvariouslyasproperties(orattributes)andrelations,forms,concepts,universals,andso
forth.Ourcentralconcernwithrepetitionisthereasonwhyabstraction,idealization,modeling,andsoonaresoimportantinlife.The"problemofuniversals"ismuch
discussedinphilosophy:whethertheyexistindependentlyoftheindividuals,whethertheyaremental,howtheyarerelatedtotheindividuals,andsoforth.
Ourgreatinterestintherepetitionsofsuccessionisprobablythefundamentalreasonwhymathematicsissoimportant,formathematicsatitscenterisconcernedwith
theformoftherepetitionsofsequencesofevents,ofcausalchains,andofchainsofmeansandends.Whenweseethatasequenceofeventsleadstoadesired
outcome,wetrytoproducearepetitionofthefirstmemberofthesequencewiththeexpectationthatthedesiredlasttermofitwillalsoberepeated.Inthewordsof
Brouwer,
10.4.1Propertomanisafacultywhichaccompaniesallhisinteractionswithnature,namelythefacultyoftakingamathematicalviewofhislife,ofobservingintheworld
repetitionsofsequencesofevents,i.e.ofcausalsystemsintime.Thebasicphenomenonthereinisthesimpleintuitionoftime,inwhichrepetitionispossibleintheform:"thingin
timeandagainthing,"asaconsequenceofwhichmomentsoflifebreakupintosequencesofthingswhichdifferqualitatively.Thesequencesthereuponconcentrateinthe
intellectintomathematicalsequences,notsensedbutobserved(1975:53).

Fromthisperspective,wegainareliablebasisforclarifyingtheapparentmysterythatmathematics,preciseandlargelyautonomous,hasturned

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outtohavesuchwideandrichapplicationsinthestudyofimpreciseempiricalphenomena.Atthesametime,theprecision,clarity,andcertaintyofknowledgein
mathematicsprovideuswithamodelandanidealforthepursuitofknowledge.Consequently,reflectionsonthenatureofmathematicsareusefulinphilosophyby
supplyinguswithtransparentexamplesofgeneralissuesinthephilosophyofknowledge,suchasconstructivismandrealism.
Thecontrastbetweenthediscoveryviewandtheconstructionviewofmathematicsmaybeseenaspartofthegeneralissuebetweenrealismandantirealism(in
particular,positivism).Themathematicalworldisintroducedasananalogueofthephysicalworld.Whetherorinwhatsensethemathematicalworldexistsisa
controversialmatter.Incontrast,fewofusdoubtthatthephysicalworldisreal.Atthesametime,therearealsodisagreementsovertherelationbetweenour
knowledgeofthephysicalworldandwhatistobetakenasitsrealsituation.Forinstance,onewayofcharacterizingthefamousdebatebetweenEinsteinandNiels
BohrontheinterpretationofquantummechanicsistosaythatEinsteinisarealistandBohrisanantirealist.
Moregenerally,thehomocentricpredicamentmentionedaboveremindsus,notonlyofthefactthatourpresentknowledgeoftheworldisveryincomplete,butalsoof
thepossibilitythatthereisagapbetweenrealityasitisandwhatisknowablebyus.Weknowthatthereismuchwedonotknowwedonotevenknowhowmuch
ofrealitywecanknowinprinciple.Knowledgeispartoflifeand,inthefirstplace,adistillationfromourbeliefsandattitudeswhich,togetherwithourdesiresand
feelings,determineswhatwedounderdifferentcircumstances.Whatisknownorknowableismorerelevanttoourconsciouseffortsinlifethanwhatisrealbutnot
knowablebyus.Wewouldliketobelieve,buthavenoconclusiveevidenceforbelievingthatwhatisrealisalwaysknowablebyus.
Kantdistinguishestheknowableworldofphenomenaforthelargelyunknowableworldofnoumena(orDingansich).BuddhismandTaoism,eachinitsownway,
takerealitytobesomethingunsayable,somethingnotcapturablebylanguageandthought.Atthesametime,theyaremuchconcernedwithsayingthingsaboutthereal
asitis,withaviewtohelpingustounderstanditinordertoattainoursalvation.Clearlytherearealternativewaystoconstruewhatisreal,andtheveryattemptto
describerealityasitisbypropositionsimposesalimitationontheextenttowhichitcanbecaptured.
Ifweconfineourattentiontopropositionalknowledge,therelationbetweenwhatisrealandwhatisknowableiscommonlydiscussedintermsoftherelationbetween
thetrueandtheknowable.Inotherwords,ournaturalinclinationistoadoptwhatiscalledthecorrespondencetheoryoftruth:weconsiderapropositionptrue
whenitcorrespondstowhatis

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thecase,thatis,toafactintheworldthiscorrespondencetoafactistheconditionunderwhichpistrue.Butinordertoconnectthisconditiontoourknowledge,we
alsofacetherelatedquestionoftheconditionsunderwhichweknowthatpistrue.
Giventhistheoryoftruth,the(physicalormathematicalorwhatever)worldembodiestherealandanchorsourconceptoftruth.Since,however,therealmaybe,for
allweknow,lessaccessibletousthantheknowable,wemayalsochooseeithertousetheconceptoftheknowabletoanchoranddefinetheconceptoftruth,orto
usetheformersidebysidewiththelatter.Forinstance,inthecaseofmathematics,itiscommontoidentifytheprovablewiththeknowable.Ifwewerealsotoidentify
thetruewiththeprovable,therewouldbenopropositionsthataretruebutnotprovable.Gdel'stheoremshowsthat,forprovabilitywithinanyformalsystem,there
alwaysaresuchpropositions.Butwedonotknowwhethertherearesuchpropositionsforourunrestrictedconceptofprovability.Indeed,bothHilbertandGdel
conjecturethatalltruemathematicalpropositionsareprovable.Since,however,wedonothaveagoodunderstandingoftheunrestricted,or"absolute"conceptof
provability,wetendtoretaintruthasaseparateconceptanduseittomeasurethepowerofbetterarticulated,restrictedconceptionsofprovability.
Eventhoughtheconceptsofreal,true,andknowableallarehighlyabstractandsubjecttoalternativeexplications,therearecertaincharacterisicsoftherealandthe
truewhicharecommonlyaccepted.Considerthefamiliaridentificationoftherealwiththephysicalworld.Weseethisworldasconsistingofphysicalobjectswhich
havecertainpropertiesandrelations.Givenanyobjectsandpropertiesandrelations,webelievethateitheranobjecthasapropertyornot,butnotboth,andthat
eitherseveralobjectsstandinarelationornot,butnotboth.Asaresult,whenwetrytodescribetherealbymeansofpropositions,webelievethat,forevery
propositionp,eitherporitsopposite(itsnegation,itsdenial),notp,istrue(theprincipleofexcludedmiddle),butnotboth(theprincipleofnoncontradiction).We
believethatbothprinciplesholdforthereal,regardlessofourcapabilitytoknowineachcasewhetherpornotpisinfacttrue.
Ifwechoosetoreplacetheconceptoftherealbytheconceptoftheknowable,thenitispossibletoask,foreachproposedconceptionoftheknowable,whetherthe
twoprinciples(ofnoncontradictionandofexcludedmiddle)remaintrueforallpropositions.Forinstance,itmaybethattheprincipleofexcludedmiddleremainstrue
forallsimple(inonesenseoranother)propositionsbutnotforallcomplexpropositions.Itmaybethat,forcertainpropositionsp,neitherpnornotpisknowable
thisisBrouwer'spositionwithregardtomathematicalpropositions.Onefamiliarwayofinterpretingthe"measurementproblem"inquantummechanics

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istosaythatwecannotknowboththepositionandthemomentumofaparticleatagiveninstantt.Consequently,iftherealisnothingbuttheknowable,eitherthe
positionorthemomentummayhavetwodifferentvaluesatt.
Anaturalchoiceistorequireofourconceptoftheknowablethat,foreverypropositionp,wearecapableofknowingeitherpornotp(tobetrue).Iftherearethings
whichappeartobepropositionsbutdonotsatisfythiscondition,wemaysaythattheyaremeaninglesspropositionsorpseudopropositions.Forinstance,thelogical
positivistsidentifythemeaningfulwiththeverifiableandthefalsifiableandconsidermetaphysicalpropositionstobemeaningless.
Asiswellknown,itisdifficulttodesignasufficientlybroadandprecisenotionofverifiabilityorfalsifiabilitytocoveralltheintendedcasesand,atthesametime,to
retainadistinctiveposition.Forinstance,accordingtoCarnap,Einsteinoncesaidtohim:"Ifpositivismwerenowliberalizedtosuchanextent,therewouldbeno
longeranydifferencebetweenour[namely,thepositivists']conceptionandanyotherphilosophicalview"(Carnap:963:38).Thisexampleillustratesafamiliardifficulty
withphilosophy:viewsareoftensovaguethatwearenotabletoseewhetherorhowtheyareconnectedwithdefiniteandrecognizabledisagreements.
Whensuchconnectionsareimpliedorasserted,wehaveanopportunitybothtounderstandthephilosophicalviewsbetterandtocheckthem,withmoreconfidence,
againstourownbeliefs.Forinstance,thedifferentviewsofEinsteinandBohrontheinterpretationofquantummechanicsgiveusalinkbetweenspecificscientific
projectsandtheirdifferentgeneraloutlooks.Gdelbelievesthathisdiscoveryviewofmathematicsplayedafundamentalpartinhelpinghimtoaccomplishsomuchin
logic.Hiselaborationofthisbeliefmaybestudiedwithaviewbothtounderstandingwhathisrelevantdiscoveryviewisandtoevaluatinghowmuchhisbeliefmaybe
seenasevidenceforsuchadiscoveryview.
WemaysaythatPlatonisminmathematicsisrealisminmathematics.Inviewoftheabstractcharacterofmathematicalobjects,realisminmathematicsisnotaswidely
acceptedasphysicalrealism,sincefewofuswoulddoubtthatthephysicalworldisreal.However,asphysicsitselfbecomesmoreandmoreabstract,thefundamental
constituentsofthephysicalworld,suchasthegravitationalfieldandtheelementaryparticles,becomemorelikemathematicalobjectsthanfamiliarphysicalobjectsof
thetypeexemplifiedbytablesandchairs.Nonetheless,physicsisrelatedtothephysicalworldinadifferentwaythanmathematicsis.Thedifferencebetween
mathematicsandphysicsisalsorevealedthroughthehistoryofthetwosubjects:developmentofphysicaltheoriesconsistsofrefinementsandradicalchangesofview
(revolutions)onthesamesubjectmatter

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(namely,space,time,andmatter),whereasadvancesinmathematicshavemainlytakentheformofexpansionofitssubjectmatter.
10.5AlternativePhilosophiesandLogicasMetaphilosophy
Inhiscourseontheelementsofphilosophy,C.D.Broadbrieflycharacterizedonemethodofphilosophyas''Kant'scriticalmethodwithoutthepeculiarapplications
Kantmadeofit."Wittgensteincommentedonthismethodinhis19311932lectures:
10.5.1Thisistherightsortofapproach.Hume,Descartesandothershadtriedtostartwithonepropositionsuchas"Cogitoergosum"andworkfromittoothers.Kantdisagreed
andstartedwithwhatweknowtobesoandso,andwentontoexaminethevalidityofwhatwesupposeweknow(Lee1980:7374).

Tobeginwithwhatweknowtobesomaybetakenasacharacterizationoffactualism.Inordertoexaminethevalidityofwhatwesupposeweknow,wehaveto
locatecertainfixedpointsfromwhichwecanapproachthetaskofdistinguishingthevalidpartsofwhatwesupposeweknowfromtherest.Itconformswellwithour
ordinaryconceptionoflogictosaythatthefixedpointsthatserveasinstrumentsforexaminingvalidbeliefsarewhatconstitutelogic.Itmay,therefore,beasserted
that,accordingtothisapproach,logicoccupiesacentralplaceinphilosophy.Thetaskistoclarifythisconceptionoflogicandconsiderhowitistobeemployedinthe
studyofphilosophy.
Inordertoservetheirdesignatedpurpose,thefixedpointsthemselveshavetobelongtothevalidpartsofourbeliefs.Factualismsolvesthisproblembyidentifying
themwithourconsideredjudgmentsinreflectiveequilibrium,onthebasisofourpresentknowledge.Theapplicationoflogictophilosophyincludesboththe
developmentofpositivephilosophicalviewsonthebasisoflogicandtheadjudicationofalternativeviews.Forexample,todecomposeadisagreementistobreakit
intopartsthatcanthenbecheckedagainstthefixedpointsaphilosophicalviewcanbediscreditedbyshowingthatitfailstodojusticetowhatweknoworthatit
assumesasknownthingswedonotknow.
Toexaminethevalidityofbeliefsistodistinguishbetweenanddeveloptheappropriateattitudetowardknowledgeandignorance.Thetaskoflocatingand
applyingthefixedpointsisintimatelyconnectedwithourquestforcertaintyandclarity,which,asweknowfromexperience,should,ideally,satisfyappropriate
requirementsthatareneithertoostrongnortooweak.
Weconstantlyfacetheproblemofnotpossessingtheknowledgenecessarytorealizethepurposeathand.Anappealtounjustifiedbeliefssometimesdoesleadtothe
desiredresult,butis,aswehavelearnedfrom

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experience,likelytofail.Thetaskofseparatingknowledgefromignorance,ortheknownfromtheunknown,is,initsdistinctcontextsandforms,clearlyacommon
concern.Arelatedtaskistofindtheappropriatebalanceofconfidencewithcaution.The"naturalattitude"istypicallyignorantofourignorance.Tocorrectthis
complacency,philosophytendstodemandsomuchfromknowledgethatitoftendeniesthatwepossessknowledgeevenwhenwedo(totheextentthatknowledgeis
possibleatallorissufficientforthepurposeathand).
Socratesinterpretstheoracle'sanswerthat"nooneiswiserthanSocrates,"bygivingasthereason:"IknowthatIhavenowisdom[knowledge],smallor
great"(Plato,Apology:21).Asadvice,thisstoryishelpfulinthatitencouragesustocultivatethephilosophicalhabitofremindingourselvesthatwehaveanatural
tendencytoadheretounexaminedbeliefs.If,however,theimplicitrecommendationweretakenliterally,onewouldbeatalosswhenactionsanddecisionsdependon
apresumptionofknowledge.Confuciusismorejudicious:"Toknowthatyouknowwhenyoudoknowandknowthatyoudonotknowwhenyoudonotknow
thatisknowledge"(Analects,2:17).Inmyopinion,theattempttofindandcommunicatethisknowledgeofourknowledgeandignorancemaybeseenasadefinition
ofphilosophywhichagreesquitewellwithmuchoftheactualhistoryofphilosophy.
Anappropriateappreciationoftheextentanddegreeofourignoranceoffersconstraintsaswellasopportunities.Awarenessofignorancecanactivatetheinstinctto
overcomeitandyieldtheopportunitytousetheopenspaceunoccupiedbyknowledgeforspeculations,conjectures,hypotheses,andsolutionsofopenproblems,as
wellasotherinterplayofknowledgewithignorance.
Weapproachtheidealofbeingbothjudiciousandoriginalwithdifferentmixturesofcautionandconfidence,inwhichamajorpartisplayedbythefeltconclusiveness
ofourviewsandtheirdistancefromthespiritofthetime.Confidenceismoreorlessafreegifttoasolidcitizenofthecommunityofideas,whichispervasiveinthe
"village"whereheorsheworks(atleastifthevillageispowerfulandconfident).Atthesametime,inphilosophy,thisgifttendstobeaccompaniedbythedangerof
parochialism,althoughopinionsdifferonwhatisparochialandwhetheritisagoodthing.Eachphilosopherhasanevolvingbutmoreorlessconsistentthresholdthat
separatesthethoughtsheorsheconsidersmeaningfulfromtheothers.Theassertability,correctness,andsignificanceofthesethoughtshavemuchtodowiththe
individual'slinebetweenknowledgeandignorance,aswellaswiththewayheorshecurrently,andinarticulately,fitstogetherallpartsofthehumanexperience.
In1929JohnDeweypublishedhisGiffordLecturesTheQuestforCertainty:AStudyoftheRelationofKnowledgeandAction,inwhichhecriticized

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"philosophy'ssearchfortheimmutable"andrecommendedthe"naturalizationofintelligence."Itisobviousthatthesearchinphilosophyandscienceisforobjective
certainty,notjustsubjectivecertainty.Theconceptofcertainty(intheobjectivesense)stands,however,inneedofclarification,aswecanseebytakinginto
considerationtheskepticalposition,whichdeniesthepossibilityofoureverpossessingsuchcertainty.
Duringthelastyearortwoofhislife,WittgensteinstudiedtheconceptofcertaintythefruitsofthisstudywereafterwardpublishedinhisOnCertainty(1969).From
theperspectiveofthisstudy,Dewey'scriticismofphilosophy'ssearchfortheimmutablemaybeseenassayingthatitisaquestforanonexistentkindofcertainty.This
studymayalsobeseenasaremarkablythoroughclarificationofwhatItaketobeamissinglinkbetweentheaimofepistemologyandthetraditionalaprioriapproach
toit.
Weseetheworldthroughourconcepts.Eventhoughwemayimproveourconceptualscheme,weareboundtoitateachstage.Thisbondage,orrelativity,isthe
sourceofourfeelingthatwehavenoabsoluteknowledgeofanything.Butinreallifewedonotdealwith(absolute)certaintyinsuchanidealsense.Thatiswhywe
findskepticismidleand,inpractice,selfrefuting.
Theneedtoclarifytheconceptofcertaintyillustratesthecloseconnectionbetweenthequestforcertaintyandthequestforclarity.Wethinkofunderstandinga
propositionasapreconditionforknowingittobetrue.Clarityisessentialtounderstandingandtoknowledgeandthetheoryofknowledge.AsHusserl,Wittgenstein,
andGdelallrecognize,therearekindsanddegreesofcertaintyandclarity.Forinstance,mathematicalpropositionspossessadifferentkindofcertaintyandclarity
fromempiricalpropositions.Calculationswithfinitenumbershaveahigherdegreeofclarityandcertaintythanpropositionsinvolvingtheinfinite.Andsoon.The
relationbetweenpropositionsandconceptsofdifferentkindsanddegreesofclarityandcertaintyis,inmyview,amajorconcernofphilosophy.
Oneheuristicguidetothedevelopmentoflogicasmetaphilosophyistheidealofbeingabletoseealternativephilosophiesascomplementary.Thefactthat
disagreementsandconflictingviewsaboundinphilosophyisagiven.Sincetheconceptsofphilosophyareoftenimpreciseandhavebroadsignificance,the
particularitiesofeachphilosopherarehardtoexclude.Forinstance,individualphilosophersareaffectedbyandresponddifferentlytothespiritoftheirtimes.
Conceptionsofandattitudestowardreligion,art,scienceandtechnology,traditionandinnovation,feelingandintellect,certaintyandclarity,participationand
distancing,samenessanddifference,theformalandtheintuitive,andsoondifferfromphilosophertophilosopher.Theseconceptionsandattitudesallplaysomepart
ineach

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person'sworldviewandgeneralphilosophy.Becauseitishardtorenderthesefactorsexplicitandarticulate,thecommondesiretohaveothersshareourpointofview
suggeststheapproachofpresenting,atleastinitially,onlytheconclusiveanddefinitepartsofourthoughts.
Inasense,logicistheinstrumentforsinglingoutthedefiniteandconclusivepartsofourthoughts.Anditistemptingtosuggestthat,withinphilosophy,suchpartsall
belongtologic.Inanycase,accordingtothetraditionofincludingunderphilosophyonlypurelyaprioriconceptsandbeliefs,onemightaswellidentifyphilosophy
withlogic.Iaminclinedtothinkoftherangeoflogicasconsistingofallthoseconceptsandbeliefswhichareuniversallyacceptableonthebasisofourcommon
generalexperiencewithouthavingtodependonanyspecialcontingentexperience.Butsuchaconceptionofthelogicalisasdifficulttorenderclearanddefiniteas
theconceptoftheapriori.Itry,therefore,inthefollowingdiscussion,toproposeamoreorlessexplicitspecificationoflogicinthissense.Itwill,however,beclear
thatmytentativesuggestionsareonlyfirststepstowardcapturingthisvaguelyfeltnaturalconceptionofthelogical.
Anaccessiblestartingpointforme(oranyone)istobeginwiththecollectionofmyownconsideredjudgmentsinreflectiveequilibriumandtrytoisolatethelogical
partswithinit.Aninstructiveexampleistoconsiderwhatisinvolvedintryingtousemyownconvictionstoaccomplishthesignificantaimofdecomposing
philosophicaldisagreements.
Becauseeachphilosophyissuchacomplexwebofbelief,itisoftendifficultformetoattaintheidealofacompletedecomposition,evenformyself,ofdisagreements
betweentwophilosophers,thatis,(a)toisolatethosepartsoftheirphilosophicalviewswhichIcanseeastrueoratleastcompatibleand(b)toanalyzetheremaining
partssoastolocatetheirconflictingbeliefsinawaythatallowsmetojudgewhichsideisrightbecauseIhaveboiledthemdowntobeliefsonwhichIdohave
consideredconvictions,proorcon.
Ourphilosophicalbeliefsareanintegralpartofourwholeoutlookonthings,andtheydependuponourtotalexperience.Theyareintricatelyconnected,andthey
touchtheintuitionsorconsideredconvictionsinreflectiveequilibrium(ondifferentlevelsofgeneralityandclarity)oftheauthorandthereaderatvarious(sometimes
different)points,positivelyornegatively.Theidealisforthereadertoagreewiththeauthor'sbeliefsatthesepointsofcontactandthentoextendtheagreementtoall
theotherbeliefsbywayoftheirconnectionswiththesefixedpoints.Ontheotherhand,ifonefindscertainpointsofdefinitedisagreementwiththeauthor,onehasa
basefromwhichtochecktheotherbeliefsbyexaminingtheirconnectionswiththesefixedpoints.

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Whenaphilosophy,saySpinoza'sEthics,ispresentedasanaxiomsystem,itistheoreticallysufficienttojudgethewholebyevaluatingjusttheaxiomsandtherulesof
inference,sincetherestissupposedtofollowautomatically.Inpractice,mostofustrytounderstandSpinoza'saxiomsbyfindingfixedpointsamongtheir
consequences,eventhoughtheaxiomaticordermakesitsomewhateasiertochecktheinterconnections.Inanycase,itseemsclearthattheaxiomaticmethodis
seldomexplicitlyusedinphilosophy.
Inphilosophy,thefundamentalbeliefsasaxiomsorconclusionsoftencannotbeexpressedbothbrieflyandprecisely,andtheconnectionsareoftennotintheform
ofexactinferences.ThedialogueformusedbyPlato,Leibniz(inhisessayonLocke'swork),Berkeley,and,later,Wittgenstein(inadisguisedform)seekstospread
outboththefixedpointsofcontactwithintuitionandtheformulationoftheconclusions.Mostphilosopherscommunicatetheirideasbyusingsomemixtureof
deductions,dialogues,andlooselyinterconnectedmonologues.
Perennialphilosophicalcontroversiesusuallyinvolvedifferencesforwhichwearenotabletofindasufficientnumberofstablefixedpointstosettle.Thedecomposition
ofdisagreementsbyfixedpointsishelpfulinsuchcases,narrowingtherangeofdisagreementandisolatingissuesonwhichwehavemoresharedbeliefs.In
distinguishingpoliticalphilosophyexplicitlyfrommoralphilosophy,Rawlsseemstobeconsciouslydecomposingourmajordisagreements.Whenwechoosetodeal
firstwithacomparativelyprecisespecialcaseofageneralproblem,wearealsoinstinctivelydecomposingit.Forinstance,thelargeissuesofPlatonismandmind's
superiorityovercomputersareconsideredinthisbookmainlythroughthespecialcaseofmathematicalthinking.
Fromabroaderperspective,wemayalsoseethedevelopmentofthesciencessuchasphysicsandbiologyfrompartsofphilosophyasguidedbyournaturaldesireto
isolateproblemswehavelearnedtohandleandtomakethedisciplinesthatstudythemasautonomousaspossible.Mathematicallogichasdevelopedinthisway
underthedecisiveinfluenceoftheattemptsbyFrege,Brouwer,andHilberttodealinaprecisemannerwiththeirphilosophicalconcernsoverthefoundationsof
mathematics.Theattemptatprecisionisawaytolocateandextendtherangeofsharedbeliefsandtomakethatrangeautonomous.
Icanthinkofseveralwaysoftryingtodecomposeaphilosophicaldisagreement.Oneguidingprincipleistolookforsituationsinwhichdifferentanswers,supposedly
tothesamequestion,areinfactdirectedtodifferentquestions.Twophilosophersmayemploydifferentconceptionsorusagesofthesamecrucialconceptorword.
Differentattitudestowardthespiritofthetimeandtowardconceptssuchassciencemayleadtodifferentchoicesofconceptionandevidence.Anotherguiding
principleis

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tostriveformaximaluseoftheintuitionsderivedfromwhatweknow.Forinstance,thebeliefinclassicalmathematicsmaybedecomposedintodifferentpartssothat
onecanmovefromsomeagreeduponpart,bynaturalextension,tootherparts.Orperhapsonemayfindthatthedisputedissue,saypoliticalliberalism,actually
belongstotheagreeduponpart.Oncethedisagreementislocalized,thereremainsthetaskofadjudicating,say,thedifferentconceptionsandattitudes,ataskin
whichweexpectlogictobeuseful.
Logicasanactivityofthoughtdealswiththeinterplay,orthedialectic,betweenbeliefandaction,theknownandtheunknown,formandcontent,ortheformalandthe
intuitive.Forthispurpose,itisusefultoselectandisolatefromwhatistakentobeknownauniversalpartwhichmaybeseen,fromasuitablymatureperspective,to
remainfixedandwhichcanthereforeserveasinstrumentthroughoutallparticularinstancesoftheinterplay.Itseemsnaturaltoviewsuchauniversalpartasthecontent
oflogic.
Eventhoughitseemstomereasonabletoacceptthisvaguecharacterizationoflogic,itfails,initsapplication,todetermineonceandforalltherangeoflogic.There
arealternativeanswerstothequestion:Whatistoberequiredoftheconceptsandthepropositionsofthisuniversalpart?Differentchoicescanbeandhavebeen
madewithrespectto(a)thekindandthedegreeoftheircertaintyanduniversality,and(b)thedegreeofprecisionandsystematiccharacteroftheircodification.These
differentchoices,whichhaveoftenbeenlinkedtothedifferentconceptionsofapriority,necessity,andanalyticity,haveledtothedifferentconceptionsoflogicinthe
historyofphilosophy.
Whatisatstakemaybeconstruedasadeterminationoftheuniversalreceptiveschemeofthehumanmind,whichistocapturetheunderlyingintersectionofthe
diverseschemesactuallyemployedbyhumanbeings,whicharepresumedtobepotentiallyconvergent.Aconvenientstartingpointistheinteractivedevelopmentof
eachagent'spictureoftheworld.InhisOnCertainty,Wittgensteincharacterizestheoriginofthispicturethus:
10.5.2Thechildlearnstobelieveahostofthings.I.e.itlearnstoactaccordingtothesebeliefs.Bitbybitthereformsasystemofwhatisbelieved,andinthatsystemsomethings
standunshakablyfastandsomearemoreorlessliabletochange.ButIdidnotgetmypictureoftheworldbysatisfyingmyselfofitscorrectness.No:itistheinherited
backgroundagainstwhichIdistinguishtrueandfalse(1969:144,94).

Aswegrowanddevelop,wedo,consciouslyorunconsciously,trytosatisfyourselvesofthecorrectnessofourindividualpicturesoftheworldbylearningfrom
experience.Indeed,thestudyofphilosophyaimsat

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arrivingatapictureoftheworldthatwillsatisfyusofitscorrectness.Andinthispursuit,logic,withitsidealofcapturingthethingsthatstandfastinallreasonable
systemsofbeliefs,occupiesadistinguishedplaceasthebasisandinstrumentfororganizingourownpicturesoftheworldandadjudicatingalternativepictures.
Logic,inthissense,triestofindandapplythesharablefixedpointswithintherangeofwhatwesupposeweknow.Wecanbeginonlywithourownfixedpointsand
trytoisolatethoseamongthemwhichwebelievetobesharable.Forexample,Ihavenodoubtthatmathematicsbelongstothesharablepart.OnceIproposea
systemofwhatItaketobethesharablefixedpoints,othersmaydisagreeandwishtoaddorsubtractfromitcertainthings.Whenthisprocessiscontinued,we
maysometimesreachaprovisionalsysteminreflectiveequilibriumforallormostreasonableagents.
Logicinthissensemayincludecertainempiricalpropositionsthatarederivedfromourgrossexperienceandbasedonwhatwetaketobegeneralfacts,eventhough
insomecaseswemightdisagreeoverwhichtoincludeorexclude.Tothisextenttheconceptionoflogicsuggestedhereisdifferentfromthetraditionalone,which
excludesempiricalpropositions.Wittgenstein,forinstance,asserts:
10.5.3Iwanttosay:propositionsoftheformofempiricalpropositions,andnotonlypropositionsoflogic,formthefoundationofalloperatingwiththoughts(withlanguage)
(1969:401).

Iamproposingtoidentifythepropositionsoflogicwiththosewhich"formthefoundationofalloperatingwiththoughts,"ratherthanbeginningwiththestipulationthat
noempiricalpropositionscanbelongtologic.Inparticular,Ibelievethatlogicincludesmathematicsandmathematicallogicasweknowthem,aswellasallthe
propositionsintendedbyWittgensteinintheabovecomment.
Iamtemptedtoincludewithinlogiccertainprincipleswhicharenotnecessarilytruecomewhatmay,butratheraretruecomewhatmaywithinawiderangeof
allowedforsurprises(seeWang1985a:5758)suchas:the"principleofnecessaryreason":theremustbespecialreasonsfordifferencessamenessimpliessameness
andthe"principleofprecarioussufficiency":whatsurvivesinnatureandinliferequiresonlythesatisfactionofcertainminimalconditionsratherthananyabstractly
optimalconditions.Clearly,theuseofsuchprinciplesineachinstancedemandscarefulconsiderationoftherelevantfactorsthatsupplytheconvincingdetailed
evidenceandarguments.
Mymaininteresthereistoconsiderlogicastheinstrumentfordecomposingandresolvingphilosophicaldisagreements.Giventheconceptionoflogicbasedon
sharablefixedpointsofdifferentsystemsofbelief,itis

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possibletointroducealsoaconceptionoflocallogic,whichembodiesthesharablefixedpointsofthebeliefsystemsofthemembersofagroup.Forinstance,when
Rawlsconjecturesthatjusticeasfairnesscangainthesupportofanoverlappingconsensusinafamiliartypeofsociety,wemayviewtheoverlappingconsensusas
partofthelocallogicofsuchasociety(Rawls1993:15).
Weconsiderabeliefobjectivewhenitissharablebyanappropriategroup,orwhenitissharablebyallhumanbeings,orwhenitistrueintheidealsenseof
correspondingtowhatisthecase(inobjectivereality).Ontheonehand,weareinclinedtothinkthatthesubjectivecomponentistheultimatebasisofjudgmentwhich
isdirectlyaccessibletoeachofus.Ontheotherhand,theintersubjectivecomponentis,inpractice,alessfluidandmorereliableguidetotheformationofour
consideredjudgments,becauseoftheintimateinvolvementofthinkingwiththeuseoflanguage,whichisbasicallyanintersubjectivemedium.Indeed,theemphasison
whatweknowratherthanwhatIknowimplicitlyacknowledgestheprimacyoftheintersubjectiveintryingtodeterminethecontentoflogicandtodecompose
philosophicaldisagreements.
Inthissense,whenItrytoimprovemypictureoftheworldbysatisfyingmyselfofitscorrectnessortoreplacesubjectivebeliefsbyobjectivebeliefs,theegocentric
predicamentisalesstroublesomeproblemthantheethnocentricandhomocentricpredicaments.Moreover,inthepursuitoftruth,muchofthetimewearestrivingfor
objectivity,thatis,forbeliefsthatareexpectedtoenjoystableuniversalagreement,potentiallyifnotactually.Indeed,astheworkofRawlsillustrates,intersubjective
agreementwithinasuitablegroupisoftenoffundamentalpracticalimportance.
Thesloganaboutrespectingfactsis,inpractice,arecommendationtorespectandfullyexploitwhatweknowfromouractualcumulativeexperience.IbelieveIcan
singleouttwoguidingprinciples:thatof"limitedmergeability"andthatof"presumedinnocence."Theseprinciplesaremeanttoindicatetwogeneralwaysinwhich
wecanbegintoshowourrespectforfactsandmovefromblindtoconsideredrespect.ItisprobablethatthereareotherprinciplestowhichIalsoappealbutfailto
seedistinctlyenoughtoformulate.
Thefirstprincipleisanattempttogetattheasymmetricalrelationbetweenhavinglessexperienceandhavingmore.OnefamousappealtothisrelationisMill's
observationinUtilitarianism:"Oftwopleasures,iftherebeonetowhichalloralmostallwhohaveexperienceofbothgivenadecidedpreference,irrespectiveofany
feelingofmoralobligationtopreferit,thatisthemoredesirablepleasure"(1863,nearthebeginningofChapter2).Thedifficultieswiththisprinciplehavebeen
discussedextensivelyintheliteratureitislikely,however,thatthecomparisonofbeliefsfacesfewerproblemsthanthecomparisonofpleasuresdoes.Iwouldlike

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tofindsomesuitablyqualifiedanaloguewithregardtoourknowledgeandignorance.
Oneobstacletothesatisfactoryformulationofsuchaprincipleisthedifficultyoffindingaformthatwouldenjoyareasonablemeasureofbothplausibilityand(feasible
andbroad)applicability.Onesolutionistoprovidetwoalternativeforms:
ThePrincipleofLimitedMergeability(PLM).Oftwoconflictingbeliefs,iftherebeonetowhichalloralmostallwho(1)understandor(2)areawareofallthe
reasonsforbothofthemgiveadecidedpreference,irrespectiveoftheirotherviews,thatisthebetterjustifiedbelief.
Alternatives(1)and(2),bothambiguous,functionondifferentlevels.Forexample,withregardtomostofthemathematicalpropositionsbelievedtobe(knowntobe)
trueorfalse,PLM(1)issufficienttoassureusthatthesebeliefsarebetterjustifiedthantheiropposites.InordertoapplyPLM(2),thephrase"allthereasonsfor"has
tobetakenwithalargegrainofsalt.Ifwetakeconstructivismandobjectivismasthetwoconflictingbeliefs,wemayseeBrouwerandWittgenstein,onthesideofthe
former,togetherwithBernaysandGdel,ontheotherside,asamongtheselectfewwhosatisfy(2).Ifweconfineourattentiontothemorviewthemas
representativeofalargergroupdefinedby(2),wehavetoconcludethatasimpleapplicationofPLMtotheconflictfailstoresolvetheissue.Indeed,thediscussionin
Chapter7isanattempttoexaminemoreclosely"allthereasonsforbothbeliefs,"withaviewtobreakingthemupandrestructuringtheminsuchawaythatPLM(1)
andPLM(2)havemoreroomtointeract.
ThereisinPLM(2)animplicitrestrictiontotheviewsoftheexpertsonagiventopic,whichisnotunreasonable,atleastfortopicsonwhichoneislargelyignorant.
Philosophy,however,ismoreoftenconcernedwithtopicsonwhichoneisnotsoignorant,andsodependenceonexpertsismorelimitedandlessdirect.For
example,weareinclinedtothinkthatbothEinsteinandNielsBohrknewallthereasonsforthetwoopinions(namely,satisfactoryandnotso)onquantumtheory.As
iswellknown,theirpreferencesweredifferent.IfweapplyPLM(2)tothiscase,wewillreachtheconclusionthat"satisfactory"is(atpresent)thebetterjustified
opinion,seeingthat"almostall"goodtheoreticalphysicistsdecidedlypreferiteventhoughlessaggressivelysoinrecentyears.However,thissortofconsensusisof
littledirectusetophilosophy,which,ifitistodiscusstheissue,ismoreconcernedwiththereasonsforthetwoopinions.Ontheotherhand,ifwhatisneededisonly
theanswertoaquestion,anappealtotheconsensusofexperts,ifthereisone,isrational.
Thereasonsforabelief(suchasobjectivism)areofdifferentkinds.Roughlyspeaking,eachreasonconsistsoftwoparts:whatisassertedasafactandwhatistaken
asaconsequenceofthisfact.Forexample,in

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Gdel'stwoletterstome(inMP:811),heassertsandconvincinglyexplainsthathis"objectivisticconceptionofmathematicswasfundamental"toallhismajor
workinlogic.Thecontentofwhathesaysisabeliefwhichmaybeevaluatedasthereportofafact.Itishardtodoubtthatinhisowncasetherewasindeedsucha
connectionbetweenhisobjectivisticconceptionandhisresults.Butwhatcanweinferfromsuchafact?Whatiseasiesttoacceptisthat,incombinationwithother
circumstances,thisconceptionhelpedGdeltoobtainimportantresults.Thisfact,althoughitcertainlylendscredencetotheconception,doesnotproveits"truth"(as
anecessarycondition).Moreover,whatisthis"conception"?
Itseemsclearfromthisexample,whichmaybeseenasinvolvinganapplicationofPLM(2),thatweareconcernedwithempirical,probabilisticconsiderations.
Gdel'sletterspointouttouscertainconnectionswedidnotseesoclearlybefore,therebyaddingtothedatainfavorofobjectivism,onwhichthereismore
agreement.Similarly,bypointingoutthatweareallcertainthatweaccepttruebeliefsaboutsmallnumbersandthatweallmakethe"bigjump"totheinfinite(see
section7.1),wecanreducesomewhattherangeofapparentdisagreement.Ineachcase,alternativechoicesremainastowhatconsequenceswearewillingtoassert.
InEuthyphro,Socratesasks,"Whatsortofdifferencecreatesenmityandanger?"Inreply,hedistinguishesdifferentkindsofdifference.Differencesoveranumberor
magnitudesoraboutheavyandlightdonotmakeusenemiestheyaresettledbyarithmeticormeasuringoraweighingmachine.Differencesthatcauseangercannot
bethusdecidedfor"theseenmitiesarisewhenthemattersofdifferencearethejustandtheunjust,goodandevil,honorableanddishonorable."
TheexcitementovertheissueofPlatonismhasmuchtodowiththelargelyimplicitassociationofPlatonismwithmattersofgoodandevil.Thatassociationlends
importancetothemorerestrictedissueofPlatonisminmathematics,whichcanalsobeconsidered,initiallyatleast,moreorlessseparatelyfromitslinktothebroader
conceptionsofPlatonismingeneral.Clearly,thediscussionofthisissueinthepresentworkaimsatsortingoutandarrangingmoreeasilyresolvabledifferencesin
ordertoreducetherangeofthosewhichcreate"enmityandanger."Themoredefinitediscussionsare,inparticular,directedmainlytotheeasiertaskofexamining
Platonisminmathematics.Goingbeyondthisrestrictiontomathematicsseemstocallforconsiderationsofamorecontroversialsort.
AsIsaidbefore,giventhehomocentricpredicament,thereisasenseofcertaintyaccordingtowhichwecanneverattainknowledgethatisabsolutelycertain.Ifwe
failtomodulateourinclinationtowardseekingclear,finalsolutions,wearenaturallyledtosomeformofskepticism.Theretrospectivetaskofphilosophytoexamine
thevalidityofwhatwesuppose

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weknowislargelyaninternaldialecticwithintherealmofourbeliefs.Theprincipleofpresumedinnocenceisawaytodojusticetothisfactand,atthesametime,
guardagainsttheresignationofskepticism.
Thisprinciplemaybeseenasamethodoffaith,incontrasttothefamousmethodofdoubt.Theideais,ofcourse,afamiliarreactiontotherepeatedfailuresofthe
methodofdoubt.Philosophyiscomparedtoalawcourt,and''whatwesupposeweknow"iscomparedtothedefendant.Theprinciplesaysinbothcases:oneis
presumedinnocentunlessprovedguilty.Obviouslythemethodofdoubtsaysthatoneispresumedguiltyunlessprovedinnocent.Moreexplicitly:
PrincipleofPresumedInnocence(PPI).Whatwesupposeweknowispresumedtobetrueunlessprovedotherwise.Insteadof"whatwesupposeweknow,"we
mayspeakmorebrieflyof"whatwebelieve,"whichalsoincludesourattributionofdifferentdegreesofcertaintyandcentralitytodifferentbeliefs.Asweknow,
certaintyandcentralityoftendonotgotogether.Ourfamiliarquestisforwhatis,toahighdegree,bothcertainandcentral.Buttheconceptofcentralityisambiguous
andrelativetothepurposesonehasinmind.Ifphilosophyistosearchforcomprehensiveperspicuity,tolocatewhatiscentraltothispurposeisitselfaproblemwith
alternativesolutions.Forexample,itishardtodenythateverydaybeliefsarecentralinthesenseofbeingfundamentalyettheyarenotoriouslydifficulttomanage(in
thesenseofgivingthemenoughstructuretoseehowourotherbeliefsare"basedon"them).
IthinkoftheprincipleofpresumedinnocenceasanantidoteoracorrectivemeasuretowhatItaketobeanexcessiveconcernwithlocaloruniformclarityand
certainty.Forexample,accordingtothisoutlook,Ineednotpaytoomuchattentiontoskepticism(abouttheexternalworld,otherminds,thepast,induction,etc.)or
trytoeliminateminds,concepts,andsoforth.
Idonotmean,ofcourse,thatweshouldacceptallbeliefsonfaith,butratherthatweshouldtrytoreflectonthemwithaslittleprejudiceaspossibleandwithdue
respectforsuchcommonlysharedbeliefsasthatkillingiswrong,Beethoven'smusicisbeautiful,mathematicalbeliefsaregenerallycertain,andsoon.Justasalaw
courtwouldwhilepresuminginnocencetrytofindallavailableevidenceagainstthedefendant,PPIisnotarecommendationtowithholdcriticalscrutiny.
Nonetheless,PPIisnotneutralclearlythereisadecisivedifferencebetweenpresumingthatagivenbeliefistrueandpresumingthatitisfalse.
IwouldliketoseethediscussionofPlatonisminmathematicsinChapter7asaninstructiveexampleofsomefeaturesofwhatIenvisageasageneralapproachto
philosophy.Itillustratestheapplicationoftheprinciplesoflimitedmergeabilityandpresumedinnocencetotheextentthat,onthebasisofthesetwoprinciples,the
tentativeformofPlatonismin

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mathematicsformulatedthereisthemostreasonablepositionrelativetowhatweknow.
ItillustratesthedesirabilityofconcentratingonaspecialcaseofalargeissuesuchasPlatonismonwhichwehaverelativelydefinitethingstosay.Itrecognizesthe
epistemologicalpriorityofourknowledgeofobjectivityinthesenseofintersubjectivesharabilityoverourknowledgeoftruthandobjects.Byisolatingandrelatinga
fewdomainsofdifferentdegreesofclarityandcertainty,itillustratestheprocessofenlargingtherangeofintersubjectivesharabilitythroughadialecticoftheformal
andtheintuitive.
Inmyopinion,anappropriatedialecticbetweentheformalandtheintuitiveisacharacteristicfeatureofeffectivethinking.Mathematicsandmathematicallogicare
importantinthisregardbecausetheyprovideuswithamodelandaframeofreferencefortheinterplaybetweentheformalandtheintuitive.Theideaoflogicas
metaphilosophyaimsatuncoveringandalsoaddingothercomponentsoftheframeofreferenceweimplicitlyuse.
Theintuitiveiswhatisobtainedbyintuition,andintuitionisimmediateapprehension.Apprehensioncouldbesensation,knowledge,orevenmysticalrapport.
Immediateapprehensionoccursintheabsenceofmediationbyinference,byjustification,byarticulation,bymethod,orbylanguageandthought.Thebasicambiguity
oftheintuitivecomesfromwhatwasavailablebeforethemomentofinsight.Intherudimentaryform,theintuitiveiswhatcomeswithease,whatisfamiliarandpartof
commonsense.Therangeoftheintuitiveincreasesaswegrowandaswethinkmoreandmore.Theformalistheinstrumentbywhichweextendtherangeofthe
intuitiveandtherangeofpersonalandpublicknowledge.Popularexpositionaimsatmakingcertainformalandtechnicalmaterialintuitive.Inlearningasubject,wego
throughtheprocessoftransformingtheformalintotheintuitive.Anadvancedformofintuitionistheendofaprocessbywhichoneallowsfactsandideastofloat
arounduntilsomeinsightmakessenseofthem,usuallyinaccordancewithaprechosengoal.
Whenwetrytoseeorperceiveorgraspsomethingbythinking,theformalhelpsusbygivingformtodifferentpartsofthedata,therebyenablingustohaveabetter
commandofthematerial.WilliamJamesdistinguishesknowledgebyacquaintancefromknowledgeabout,andRussellsimilarlydistinguishesknowledgeby
acquaintancefromknowledgebydescription.Theformerisintuitivethelatterisamixtureoftheformalandtheintuitive.Asweincreasetherangeofthelatter,we
alsoincreasetherangeoftheformer.Theformerismoreintimateandrichincontent,butthelatterismoreobjective,public,andcommunicable.
Formsandconceptsareuniversals,amongwhichwords,spokenorwrittenorimagined,arethemostregularinthesensethatinstancesofthe

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samewordcan,inprincipleatleast,beidentifiedwithoutambiguity.Thatiswhythinkingintermsofwordsoftenenjoysagreatermeasureofclaritythanthinkingin
termsofideas.Wemaysaythatinwordstheformalandtheintuitiveconverge.However,asweknow,oncewecometothemeaningofwords,aswemust,
ambiguityreappears.
Theparadigmofthedesiredconvergenceoftheformalandtheintuitiveiscomputation.Computationcan,asHilbertemphasizes,beconstruedasmanipulationof
concretesymbolswhoseshapeisimmediatelyclearandrecognizable.Concreteintuition(orAnschauunginKant'ssense)issufficientfordealingwithsuch
manipulationofsymbols.Consequently,computationisaremarkablytransparentandunivocalregionofthinking.Incomputationwehaveanattractivefocusandbasis,
whichisnotonlyofintrinsicinterestbutalsothegatewaythatleadsusfromtheconcretetotheabstractandfromthefinitetotheinfinite.Moreover,therangeof
computationispotentiallysorichthat,particularlywiththeconspicuousprevalenceofcomputerstoday,itisnotsurprisingthatpeoplearedebatingthechallenging
questionofwhetherallthinkingisnothingbutcomputation.
Computationisalsoatthecenterofmathematics.Inmathematics,wemovefromcomputationtothepotentialinfiniteandthentothedifferentstagesoftheactual
infinite,withdecreasingtransparency,clarity,andcertainty.Wehavebynowagoodunderstandingofwhatisinvolvedintheseveralstepsofexpansion.Wecansee
hereasubstantiveandcleanexampleoftheoperationofthedialecticoftheintuitiveandtheformal,intheformofadialecticofintuitionandidealizationidealization
beinginthiscasetheroadleadingtotheformal.Afterwehaveobtainedagoodcommandofcomputation,whichisnecessarilyfinite,weextendtherangetothe
potentialinfinitebyidealization.Wethenextendourintuitiontothepotentialinfinite,andtheprocessofexpansioncontinues.
Byreconstitutingthebroaddomainofmathematicsthroughthisprocessofexpansionstagebystage,asIhavetriedtodoinChapter7,weareabletolocatethe
pointsatwhichalternativeviewsonthefoundationsofmathematicsbegintodiverge.Wethengainabettergraspofwhatandwhyalternativechoicesaremadeat
thesepoints.Inthisway,thedisagreementsbetweenconflictingviewsaredecomposed,sothatwehaveaclearerviewofwhatisinvolvedineachcase.Moreover,as
wefamiliarizeourselveswithournaturaltendencytoextendfurtherandfurtherwhatwesee,webegintoappreciatethepossibilityofareasonableconceptionoflogic
whichbothconformstooneofthetraditionalintentionsandisbroadenoughtocontainmathematicsasaproperpart.
AfurtherextensionoftherangeoflogicistheFregeGdelconceptionoflogicasconcepttheory(discussedinChapter8).Because,however,wedonotatpresent
haveanythinglikeagoodunderstandingevenofthe

Page374

backboneofsuchaconcepttheory,wecannotyetincludeitinlogic,construedasrestrictedtotheuniversalpartofwhatweknow.Atthesametime,thisattemptto
extendlogicbeyondsettheorycontinuesalongthedirectionoflimitinglogictowhatcanbepreciselysystematized.Iseethisasasomewhatarbitraryrequirement.On
theotherhand,ifwerestrictlogictowhatweknowandremovetherequirementofformalprecision,thentheextensionoflogicbeyondmathematicsandmathematical
logicposesthecentralproblemwhichIhavecharacterizedasthequestforlogicasmetaphilosophy.AsIseeit,thisquestisfulfilledindifferentwaysbyKant's
transcendentallogic,Hegel'sscienceoflogic,Husserl'sconceptionofintentionality,andWittgenstein'sconceptionoflogicinOnCertainty.WhileIcannotacceptany
oftheseasfinal,Ibelieveanadequatedevelopmentoftheideaoflogicasmetaphilosophy,towardwhichIhaveofferedsomesuggestions,representsanidealworth
pursuing.
Gdel'sconfidentphilosophicalviewsinparticular,hisinsistenceontheobjectivityofmathematicsservedhimingoodstead,andbenefitedmankind,forthey
providedthegroundworkforhisspectacularmathematicalresults.Hisbeliefinunlimitedgeneralization,ontheotherhand,ledhimindirectionswhereIandmany
otherscannotfollowhim.Incontrast,mytwomethodologicalprinciples:theprincipleoflimitedmergeabilityandtheprincipleofpresumedinnocence,seemtometo
providethebasisonwhichtobuildaproductivephilosophicalconsensus.

Page375

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Page381

Index
A
Apriori,19,149,302,316,319,332333,351352,364
Husserland,351
Absolutism,170171
absoluteknowledge,169170,171,302303,363,370
absoluteprovability,187188,289,270,302,359
Husserl's,169171
Ackermann,W.,272,281285
Action,16,101103,110111,121127,311313,354,355356
Afterlife,10,104111,312,316317
Chineseconceptionof,109110
Spinoza'sconceptionof,109110
AmericanPhilosophicalSociety,80
Analysis,210,219,251,301,338,340
predicative,219
Anschauung,12
Anschluss,29
Aristotle,14,103104,173,235,327
notionofcause,120
notionofvalidity,266
Politics,104
Aristotelianrealism(inmathematics),77,223
Arithmetic,72,73,74,159,334,340
intuitionist,72,73,86
Artin,E.,33,86
Atomism,20,105,108,233,235
Austria,25,45,46,67
Authority,103
Axiom(s),267,244.SeealsoZermeloFraenkelsettheory
oforder,264265
Axiomaticmethod,13,168,244246,264265,290,293,306,332,333335,342,348.SeealsoLogicPhilosophy,asarigorousscience
graspingnewaxioms,157
andphysics,307
B
Bach,J.S.,4
Balas,Y.,271
Baumgarten,170
Berkeley,G.,365
Bernays,P.,xiii,15,33,79,89,133,267,304,325,335342,369
onBrower,337,340
onconcepts,337339
''flower"statementofobjectivism,212,304,336,337
andGdel,336
onjustice,342
mathematicsasscienceofidealizedstructures,336337
onrationality,325,339341
reviewofGdel'sproofoftheconsistencyofCH,249250
settheory,281
Biology,20,191193,217,294,314
Bions,146,291292
Blanshard,B.,141142,145
Bohr,N.,175,358,360,369
Boone,W.,33,34
Boreldeterminacy,253
Born,M.,307
Brain,6,12,152,183,189,190193,205208,314
andcomputers,193,198.SeealsoNeuralism
BreakingtheCode(Broadwayplay),3
Broad,C.,361
Broch,H.,33

Page382

Brower,L.,14,15,98,145,188,213214,220,250,337,340,357,359,365,369
influenceonGdel,72,86,251(seealsoIntuitionisticlogicIntuitionisticmathematics)
mathematicsaslanguageindependent,181,330
urintuition,14,224225,229,357
Buddhism,101,103,169,358
Butler,S.,63
C
Cantor,G.,15,175,248249,261263,276,282,315,334
settheoryof,15,269,338
CantorNeumannaxiom,259264
Carnap,R.,15,30,32,33,75,7779,83,163,172,174175,223,309,360
influenceonGdel,70,71,72,79,172,178,223
andtheTractatus,180
Categorytheory,139
Categories(metaphysical),119,166,167,171,225,227228,229,312,313
Cauman,L.,xiii,xvi
Cause,6263,119,120,312,315,321322.SeealsoConcepts,conceptofcause
andchange,320,321
mathematical,120,320,322
andtime,357
Certainty,370
differentlevelsof,3,22,158,210,212217,239,300,363,371373
versusprobableknowledge,170,290,291,302303
Change,12,119,320,321
Cherniss,H.,11
China
undercommunism,123125
philosophyin,125127
Christianity,121122,150
Choice(axiomof),72,85,86,88,245,251,261
Chomsky,N.,98
Church,A.,33,73,84
andsettheoreticparadoxes,268,278
Clarity,306,363
differentlevelsof,3,158,210,216,363,372,373
Class,270,274276,278,337
universal,315
Closureprinciple,280
Cohen,P.,33,74,86,87,89,209,251252
Computabilism,1213,183,184189,226,288.SeealsoMind,andmachines
andconsciousness,189,314
anddevelopment,199201,208
incompletenessresults,184187
andtheintellectuallifeofthespecies,207
neural,205208
physical,205208
Turing,138,194202
Completeness(ofpredicatelogic),72,73,82,83,266
andSkolem,134,240241
Complexity,72,73
Comprehension(axiomof),257,259,281
Computability,373.SeealsoConcepts,ofcomputabilityMechanism
andpartialfunctions,203205
Turing,184,194,232,235,236237,339
Computers.SeealsoComputabilism
andbrain,193,198
connectionsbetweenGdel'sworkand,56
andmind,3,4,8,13,78,147
Concepts,9,1011,1314,16,17,141,149,158,166,167,267,269280,295297,303,312,313,315,316,337339,363.SeealsoEmptyconcept
ofabsoluteproof,187188,270,359
acquisitionof,13,138,149(seealsoPerception)
ambiguousconcepts,234235,236
analysisof,237,288,315
ofbeing,295,315
ofcause,120,139,294
ofclass,270,276
ofcomputability,232,235,236237,268
ofconcept,187188,267,268,270,272,274,276,277,278,325
ofcontinuum,234,236
ofdemonstrability,268269
ofdefinability,268269
deepenourinsightbyphenomenology,157
distinguishedfromKantianideas,268269
distinguishedfromsets,235,273280
empirical,306
evolutionofconceptscomparedwithdevelopmentoffictionalcharacters,138
existencecompatiblewithpositivism,173
fundamentalphilosophicalconcepts,59,119,120,150,158,237,244,272,288,290,294,295297,300,315,332,334,335

Page383

hierarchyof,278
innateideas,149
misuseof,306
andnotions,338
pureconcepts,17,278
selfapplication,278280
ofset,74,225,253,267,270,274,276
sharpeningof,138,158,205,232237
ofvelocity,233,236
Concepttheory,9,17,156,247,266,267268,373374,278
andtheparadoxes,272273,278280
axiomsof,272,277278
primitiveconceptsof,272,277278
Confucius,103,110,362
Confucianism,112,122
Consciousness,314
unityof,314
Consistency
absolute,82,83
ofchoiceaxiom,72,86,88
ofclassicalarithmetic,86
relative,82
ofourthought,156,187189
Constructibility(axiomof),86,245,251,262,263
Constructiblesets,55,72,85,144,241,251
Constructivism,19,22,152,215,219,345349.SeealsoFinitarymathematicsIntuitionistmathematics
andHilbert,250251
moral,3457
political,22,3469
asnotsyntactical,145
Continuumhypothesis,31,32,34,42,55,70,72,7374,80,8587,89,144,177,242,248253,262263
Booleanmodels,8687
relativeconsistencyof,85,219,241,262,281
andexpandinguniverse,263
Creation,14,77,186,221225,339
BrowerandRiemann'sviewof,224225
versusdiscovery,210,221232,358
D
Davis,M.,3
Dawson,S.,315
Decidability(ofpredicatecalculus),73
Dedekind,R.,15,159,161,261,302,334
Democritus,20,105,233,235
Descartes,R.,10,14,55,116,170,293,356,361
Determinacy,axiomof,245,261
Dewey,J.,362363
Dialectic,16,365.SeealsoHegelofintuitionandidealization,210,331,345,373
Diderot,109
Dostoevski,F.,44
Ducasse,C.,145
Dummett,M.,344
E
Economics,75
Einstein,A.,xi,19,20,43,61,76,88,289,315
ondiscoveryinphysics,224
andGdel,xii,2,7,36,37,39,52,5460,61,88,143
andpositivism,174,175,176,360,369
andquantummechanics,55,58,175,311,358,369
relativity,177,237,301
religionandafterlife,112,121,146,152
onscience,19
andtime,289,319,320
EinsteinPrize,32,48
Eisenhower,D.,43,51,52,53,59,314
Emotions,170171,298
Empiricism,69,78,159,162,164,172
Emptyconcept,17
Emptyset,17
Enzenberger,H.,3
Erdos,P.,33,87
Escher,M.,4
Euclid,169,264
Euclideangeometry,88,126,148,264265,334
EuropeandAmerica,4445,46
Europeanphilosophy,10,14
Everdayknowledge,165166,171,177,297,308
Existence,150,167,295,299
actual,232
Existentialism,98
Experience,332333,363
presupposesconcepts,138139
Extension,16
Extensionality(axiomof),257,275
Extensionalization,281
F
Factualism,165166,308,326327,332,333,361
Fact,308313(seealsoForce)
Feigl,H.,33,40,83

Page384

Finitarymathematics,1213,72,73,82,89,214215,217219,230,240241,250251
andKantianintuition,217218
inphysics,138,205207
FitzPatrick,P.,97
Floyd,J.,xiii
Follesdal,D.,350352
Force,120,294,297,308310,311313.SeealsoWishFact
Forcing,86,251252
Foundation(axiomof),257
Foundationsofmathematics,214,345,365
Frank,P.(Einstein:HisLifeandTimes),43,44
Freedom,63
Friedman,H.,253
Frege,G.,9,14,15,1617,72,220,227228,247,262,276,303,334,345,365,373
Freud,S.,132,167,306,354
FungYulan,112,126
Furtwangler,P.,33,69,84
G
Gabelsbergershorthand,xi,28,96,136,164,315
Generalrecursivefunctions,72
Generalization,299300,314,317,318,324,329
Geometry,9,13,77,102,144,171,233,264265,288,300,338,339,340341
Gentzen,G.,84,86
God,8,10,8788,102104,106108,111112,119,120,288,290,294,309311,315.SeealsoMonadology,centralmonad
ontologicalproofofexistence,87,97,113121,146,309,318
Gdel,A.,26,2930,34,36,37,40,41,42,4651,65,133,143
Gdel,K.,15
andtheafterlife,104111,121,312,316317
attitudetoworkof,56,6465,152
bibliographiesofworkpreparedbyhimself,9094
collectedworksby,3,72,74,90,118,155,164,252
contributiontologicof,2,5,7074
workoncontinuumproblemof,31,32,34,42,55,65,71,72,7374,80,8487,89,151,177,241,249251,251253,262
deathof,34
"DecisionProcedureforPositivePropositionalCalculus,"9798
onthedevelopmentofachild'smind,157,159161
distinctionbetweenreligionandoccultism,108
Einsteinpapersandworkontimeof,31,55,65,76,88,97,98
onfame,56
GibbsLectureby,7,3132,7677,88,97,133,145,184185,186,187,211,221223
healthof,25,26,30,3342,50,65,85,88,150151
idealismof,8,288,289,290,310
immigrationof,2930,31,37,143
onimperialism,147
interestineconomicsof,75
interestinpoliticsof,30,39,44,5154,146
interestandworkinphysicsof,8,12,58,6869,76,82,98,177,289,319
interpretationofintuitionisticlogicof,31,34,71,72,86,89
"IsMathematicstheSyntaxofLanguage?"(paper),77,97
"LectureonPolynomialsandUndecidablePropositions,"98
letterstomotherandbrother,5,26,32,33,36,4246,104,105111
lifeinrelationtoworkof,61,6281
marriageof,30,4651(seealsoGdel,A.)
useofmathematicsinphilosophyby,15,76,77,233,288,370
onmethodology,10,297305(seealsoAxiomaticmethodGeneralizationIntrospectionMonadologyPhenomenologyRationaloptimism)
"ModernDevelopmentoftheFoundationsofMathematicsintheLightofPhilosophy,The"(paper),155161,289290
notesandunpublishedpapersof,90,9499,136137,140,164,315316
paperonBernaysby,7,31,32,76,81,86,8889,218,336
paperonCantorby,7,31,76,80,209,226,230,242,253,268,269,270,278,350
paperonCarnapby,7,32,76,7779,88,130,163,164,174,214215,223
paperonRussellby,7,31,76,231,255,258,268,269,270,275,278,338

Page385

philosophicalpracticeof,12,79,155,162,166,290,316
andphilosophy,xi,12,5,89,19,20,59,6970,7681,143,155182,324,325(seealsoPhilosophy)
PlatonismandObjectivismof,6,6970,7681,85,121,125,134,145,172,288,294
prejudicesofthetime,5,83,121,132,156,305306
"PresentSituationintheFoundationsofMathematics,The"(paper),172
religion,27,51,58,88,106107,112121,143,146,148,152,316,318
reputationof,89
Steinitztheorem(simplifiedproofof),97
"TheoremonContinuousRealFunctions,"97
valueofphilosophy,119
WilliamJamesLectures(Harvard),132
Gdelnumbering,241
Gdel,M.(mother),xii,27,28,29,32,33,43,46,4850,105
Gdel,R.(father),27,28,29
Gdel,R.(brother),26,27,28,29,32,33,35,65,143
Gogol,44
Gomprez,H.,33,69,82
Goodman,N.,351
Goodstein,R.,331
Grandjean,B.,70
Greekphilosophy,10
Grossi,M.,xiii
H
Hadamard,J.,161
Hahn,H.,33,73,75,79,82,84,85,163,172,178,223
Hallet,M.,248
Hardy,G.,15
Hartshorne,C.,138,141,145,146
Harvard(honorarydegreefrom),51
Harvey,W.,314
He,Zhaowu,xiii
Hegel,F.,xi,14,16,17,75,98,141,170,225,237,265266,295,308,310,312313,327,355,374
andintuition,168
logicofasalternativetomonadology,294
logicofasgeneratorofnewconcepts,313
synthesisin,149
ontime,320
andWittgenstein,181182,329
Heidegger,M.,167,171
Heisenberg,W.,175
Henze.H.,3
Herbrand,J.,84,142,240
Heyting,A.,280
Hilbert,D.,15,72,73,78,84,98,213215,240,345,359,365,373,374
his"consistencyproofforsettheory,"85
andconstructivism,250
attemptedproofofCH,85,141,177,249251
ontheinfinite,84,98,249
onintuition,12,217218
programof,12,20,78,82,156,158,317
HilbertAckermann,72,82
History,148,151152
Hlawka,E.,298
Hodges,A.,3
Hofstadter,D.(Gdel,Escher,Bach),34
Hsei,Shermin,xiii
Hume,D.,175,361
Husserl,E.,xi,14,98,143,154,159161,162171,256,288,298,327,328,332,333,355
CartesianMeditations,81,96,164
CrisisofEuropeanScience,The,164
difficultyofunderstanding,142,168
andGdel,7,8,55,61,71,80,88,172,290,291,293,302,327,332
andHegel,265166
andHeidegger,167
Ideas,81,142,164,166,168
TheIdeaofPhenomenology,170
andintuition,156,313314
FormalandTranscendentalLogic,164
LogicalInvestigations,80,96,164
noema,352
andreflectiveequilibria,350352
ontime,168,319320
I
Idea(Kantian),188,268269
Idealization,14,141,158,216220,229230,256,258,260,273,300
largejumps,213217,220,256,258
FregeandRussell'slogicalidealizations,220
idealizedstructures,336337
Idealists(modern),12
Idealism,74,141,157,168,310
Identity,16
Ideology,122123

Page386

Incompletenessresults,23,12,72,7879,8384,179,241242,271,331,336,359
philosophicalsignificanceof,156,184190
againstcomputabilism,184187
Independance.SeeChoiceConstructibilityContinuumhypothesis
Implicationism,214215
Infinity,191,213220,248,258,363
actual,73,213,215,373
axiomof,86,144,256,269,281,285
potential,12,73,213,215,218,373
InstituteforAdvancedStudy,xiii,25,29,31,34,36,40,45,56,81,86,88,137
Introspection,168169,171172,292,305
Intuition,5,12,14,164,165,168,264265,292,301302,304305,306,340,372
categorial,164,165,216
concrete(orKantian),12,73,164,217218,220,256,373
thegiveninmathematics,225,227
intuitiveoverview,220,256,258259,260,280
andlogic,217
mathematicalvs.perception,226227
mathematician'sprejudiceagainst,341
andproof,304305
ourreal,212,216220,225232,244
spatial,233
Intuitionisticlogic,87,89,218219,359
Intuitionistmathematics,72,73,86,89,188,213215,218219,230,280,340.SeealsoBrowerConstructivism
anddemonstrability,152
Islam,148
J
James,W.,162,372
Jensen,R.,261
Justice,343346,348
K
Kafka,F.,45
Kahler,E.,33
Kang,Hongkuei,xiii
Kant,I.,xi,8,10,14,41,59,76,88,103,138139,143,149,155,157,164,165,166,168,170,171172,182,289,290,298,301,308,322,327,351,355,
357,358,361,374
categories,171,225,229
andchange,12
moralconstructivismof,22,346
andontologicalargument,117
relativitytheory,61,87
andRussell,300
synthesis,225
time,289,313,319,320
Kennedy,J.,5354
Kleene,S.,33,84
Knowledge,11,12,302,354,356,358360,361,362374
fallibilityof,3,210
verifiability/falsifiability,360
Kohler,E.,26
Knig'slemma,82
Kreisel,G.,26,27,33,47,51,133
Kripke,S.,138
Kronecker,L.,145,340
L
Langer,S.,98
Language,75,168,177,180181,210211,271272,329,356357,368,372373
inabilitytocapturerealityof,358
andmathematics,181,211,330
Largecardinalaxioms,86,245,281
Lattimore,J.,41
Lawofexcludedmiddle,209,217,243,301,303,331,359
Lawofnoncontradiction,359
Lewis,C.,15
Leibniz,G.,xi,14,55,63,71,75,76,87,98,116,130,163,164,168,171,275,297,307,317,327328,357,365.SeealsoMonadology
identityofindiscernibles,275,357
monadism,6,7,148,288,291292,294,309315
principleofsufficientreason,63,105,108,120
religion,112,113
science,237
universalcharacteristic,87,201202,316
Lenin,V.,30
Lifeasbeautiful,316317
Lifeforce,192193
Literature,125127
Locke,J.,55,130
Logic,1520,82,169,180181,247,264269,333,355.SeealsoAxiomaticmethodConcepttheoryDialecticPhilosophySettheory
axiomsasrulesofthought,73,266,267,268
andconcepttheory,268
differentlogics,218219
empiricalpropositions,367

Page387

inductivelogic,151,266267
andintuition,217
locallogic,367368
connectionwithmathematics,18,73
asmetaphilosophy,2223,361,363374
andmonadology,9,191,294
andtheparadoxes,270273
developspositivephilosophicalviews,361
scopeof,17,18,73,145,264269,366,373374
andsettheory,268
subjectmatterof,274,366
comparedtozoology,245246
Logicalconstants,16
Logicaltruth,16,17
M
McCarthy,J.,51,53
Mach,E.,175
Mahlocardinals,280,281
MaoTseTung,124,143
Martin,D.,253
Marx,K.,62,103,122,143,306
Marxism,101,122125,354
Materialism,8,138,157,158,173,289,292,310,314,316
andmechanism,206
andspace,292
Mathematics,211,239,300,316,345,358,372,373.SeealsoConstructivismFinitarymathematicsIntuitionisticmathematicsMathematicalobjectsSettheory
classicalvs.otherforms,214215,218219
extensionsof,229230
asidealizedstructures,218,335337,342
induction,215
andlanguage,330
relationtologic,18,73,247,264265,267268
andmultiplicity,312,357
asperfect,317
philosophyand,1415,155159,161,330331,358
andphysics,207,230232,245246,288,360361
subjectmatterof,274,346,357
asthesyntaxoflanguage,7679,174175,223
unchangeabilityofmathematicalfacts,151,238
andtheworld,18,151,336337,357358
Mathematicallogic,19,169,173174,264265,345,365,372
Mathematicalobjects,149,231,254,296,301,310,337.SeealsoClassesNumbersSets
Mead,G.,311
Meaningoftheworld,149,308318
Mechanism,9,73,78,138.SeealsoComputabilityMinds,andmachines
inbiology,189,192193
andmaterialism,206
inphysics,205208
Menger,K.,67,26,30,33,51,67,70,74,75,84,143,145,179
Measurablecardinals,axiom,263,281,283,285
Michelet,K.,147,313
Mill,J.,57,156,174,368
Mind,1112,149,157,159161,354355
thedynamicnatureofthemind,191,199202
whetherithasfinitelymanystates,193196,197202
andmachines,3,4,8,12,13,73,78,183208,226,288
inmonodology,294,314
problemoftranscendence,355
Modallogic,82
Modeltheory,19,82,87,141
Monadology,79,10,87,148,166,170,288,290,291292,295297,308314,316,332.SeealsoLeibniz
centralmonad,10,309,310,311(seealsoGod)
andlogic,9,191,294
Moralphilosophy,344345
Moraltheory,344346,348
Monk,R.,xiii
Montgomery,D.,33,36
Morgenbesser,S.,xiii
Morgenstern,D.,48
Morgenstern,O.,33,39,57,59,67,75,89,135,140,143,252
Morse,M.,33,41
Myrvold,W.,xiii
N
Nagel,E.,andNewman,J.R.(Gdel'sProof),3
NapoleonBonaparte,122,147
Natkin,M.,33,40
Nature,120,295
Neitzsche,F.,43,327

Page388

Neuralism,183,189193,314.SeealsoMinds,andmachines
Neurath,O.,75
NewtonI.,6,10,20,55,68,167,288
Newtonianphysics,145,302303,319,322
Nobeling,G.,33,75
Nominalism,77,78,271
Notions,14,338339
NotreDame,29,30,31,67
Numbers,161,209220,256,300,302,304,331,340,347,348
thecentralplaceofnumbertheoryinobjectivism,3,4,210217,238,256,300,363
finitarynumbertheory,214215,217219
andgeometry,338
intuitionistnumbertheory,214215,217219
natural,161,209220,273274,296,340
real,212,215,216,301,338,340
O
Object,17,141,235,255,294297,303305,312
Objectivereality,11,23,171172,225,226,229,231232,243,254,260,262,273,322
contrastedwithactualism,232
Objectivity,243,303305,347349,368
Objectiveviewpoint,72,81.SeealsoPlatonism
roleinmathematics,81,85
Oneandthemany,254,260262
Oppenheim,P.,33,36
Oppenheimer,R.,237
Ordinalrecursions,138
P
Parmenides,12
Paradoxes,160162,180,268,269,302,313,339
BuraliFortiparadox,84
andbankrupcy,270273
ofselfapplicableconcept,278280
distinctionbetweenextensionalandintensional,269272
intuitionism,279280
liarparadox,8283,271
asproofofPlatonism,238,271,273
relationtologicandmathematics,156,248
Richard'sparadox,83
semantic,270273
settheoretic,268,269,278
Wang's,213
Parsons,C.,xiii,220,248
Pascal,B.,55,56,113
Pasch,M.,264
Pierce,C.,15
Penrose,R.(TheEmperor'sNewMind),3,4
Perception.SeealsoIntuition
Phenomenology
Senseexperience
ofconcepts,12,13,138,149,194,205,210211,232237,238239,292,314,339
inmathematics,209,210,226232,238239,245,350
organforperceivingabstractimpressions,233,235
requirescategories,226228
Phenomenology,98,156,157161,162,164171,288,298,301,305,306,320,326327,329,331332,334,351352.SeealsoHusserl
Perception
Philosophy,18,59,82,154,167,191,265266,323374
andaction,102103,110111,121127,354,355356
adjudicationbetweencompetingphilosophies,2223,323374
Chinese,103,109110,125127,169
anddifferentworldviews,121127,156158,162164,289,326,363364
historyof,326,327328
metaphysics,166167,306,339
purposeof,102103,173,353361
asarigorousscience,164,167,171,233,244,288,293294,306,309,315,316,332,333334,339
andscience,1920,125127,165166,191,237,297,322,330
tendencytomaterialism,173
twodifficultiesindoing,153154
Physics,217,303,307,311,360361.SeealsoNewtonianphysics
Quantummechanics
Relativitytheory
asaxiomaticsystem,307
finitary,138,205207
andmathematics,207,288
Physicalism
aboutthemental,183,190193
Place,C.,41
Plato,1011,14,15,103,130,163,164,166,173,288,293,297,327,365
Republic,The,300
Platonism,xii,5,8,9,11,15,2123,125,186,209246,271,299,316,324,327,336338,340,345349,360,370

Page389

differentcharacterizationsof,242244
degreesof,212,211221,229230,239
fruitfulness,83,85,134,151,172173,175176,219,239242,251252,350
andGdel,6970,7678
influenceonmathematics,85
andobjectivism,209,211,231232
andpolitics,125
reasonsfor,209,221224,231232,237246,249
Poincar,H.,15
PolyaWeylwager,139,140
Positivism,6970,138,154155,164,223,239,244,264,271,289,305,306,308,327
hampersscienceandphilosophy,172174
notionofmeaning,360
andphilosophy,175177
Possibility,312313
Possibleworld,10,17,120
Powell,W.,285
Power,103,150
Powersetaxiom,257258,259
Pragmatism,162
Predication,16,168,265,293,313314
Predicatelogic,1617,266268,274,277,334,341.SeealsoCompleteness
Predicativity,219220
Predicavism,214215,219
Principleofassumedinnocence,370374
Principleoflimitedmergeability,368370
Properclass,262,275,276
Properties,120,278.SeealsoUniversals
causeofchange,119
negativeandpositive,87,113118
simple,117118
Propositions,169,304,358360
atomic,16,
complex,16
Provability(formal),72,83,359
intuitive,72
Psychologism,77
Q
Quantummechanics,20,55,58,358,359360
Quine,W.,2,15,51,133,223,351
andsettheoreticparadoxes,268,278
R
Ramifiedhierarchy,85
Rampona,J.,3738,41,50
Ramsey,F.,15,267
Rationality,266,325,341342
Rationaloptimism,89,102,151,185,207,239,316318,327
Rationalism,162,164,266,288,310,316
andPlatonism,299
worldasrationallyordered,105108,316
Rawls,J.,14,1819,2122,127,154,246,325326,333,334,335,342353,365,368
Reason,143,266,307,317,318
Recursiveness,142
Regularity,axiomof,278
Reflectionprinciple,280281
Reflectiveequilibrium,348353,364
Reinhardt,W.,285
Relativity,20,87,88,301,319,320
general,55
special,55,175177
Religion,111112,143,266,316,354
Replacement,axiomof,248,257,258259,281
Representations,141,291292,356.SeealsoLanguage
Riemann,G.,224
Robinson,A.,33,240
Rockefeller,honorarydoctorate,142144,145
Roosevelt,F.,51,52,59
Rosser,J.,84,133
Rotatinguniverses,88,98,322.SeealsoGdel,hisinterestandworkinphysicsRelativitytheory
Rothberg,H.,41
Royce,J.,141,143
Rucker,R.(InfinityandtheMind),3
Russell,B.,14,15,173,220,245246,255,269,345,372
andKant,300
religionandafterlife,121
Russia,147
Russiansecretphilosophy,147,148,313
S
Schilpp,P.,7,77,79,130,163
Schimanovich,W.,26
Schlick,M.,30,33,69,70,75,79,131,163,172,178,223
Schopenhauer,A.,104,178
Science,159161,167,237,315,328,329.SeealsoBiologyPhilosophy,andsciencePhysics
notdetached,169
developingfromphilosophy,191,365
andeverydaythought,165166,297
andphilosophy,19

Page390

Scott,D.,33,87,113
Scott,W.,122
Seelig,C.,57
Selfreference,4,139,187,272,274,278
Senseexperience,11,12
Set,17,139,141,144,148,254,267,269,277,295,296.SeealsoClassConceptsEmptysetMathematicsOneandthemany
Ackermann'ssystem,281285
arbitrary,144,301
andclasses,276277
andconcepts,235,273280,288
iterativeconceptionof,238,255259,263,270,276,277,340
andnumbers,141,254,256,337
andnumbertheory,243,281
asphysical,252,270
pure,17,277
rangeofvariability,220,256
universeofsets,259264,282285
Settheory,9,17,19,74,139,148,214220,248253,255263,266268,270,273,331,334,340341,374.SeealsoConcepttheoryContinuumhypothesis
LogicMathematics
introducingaxioms,74,80,219220,231,248,252253,262263,280285
powerset,220,338,340
predicative,219
Sheldon,H.,141142,145
Skepticism,212,291,306,363,370,371.SeealsoCertainty
Skolem,T.,82,134,240
histheorem,133,269
Socialism,30,58
Socrates,362,370
Souslin'shypothesis,261
Space,119,177,236,292,294,315,319,361.SeealsoEuclideangeometryGeometry
Spector,C.,33
Speedfunctions,138
Spinoza,14,15,55,58,88,109110,112,116,120121,141,146,152
Ethics,12,109110,112,121,365
Spiritualworld,88,152,315,316
Squareaxiom,252
Stalin,J.,43,314
Stein,H.,xiii
Steinitztheorem,97
Stevenson,A.,51,52,53,59
Straus,E.,54,58
Strictfinitism,213215,230
Subjectivity,368,370
Subjectivenatureofexperience,149,318319,330,354355,363,368
Suddenillumination,169170,290,293
Husserl's,169170,293
Sufficientreason,6263,105,108,120
Synthesis,226
Kantian,254
T
Taft,R.,43,314
Takeuti,G.,33
Taoism,101,103,109,112,358
Tarski,A.,33
Tate,W.,41
Taussky,O.,28,35,70
Tennenbaum,S.,33,135
Tierney,H.,xiii,xiv
Tieszen,R.,xiii,170
Time,88,119,168,220,289,294,301,313,315,318322,361
andcause,320,321
andourexperience,322
Gdel'sworkon,71,88,319
realtime,168,320,321
subjectivityof,12,61,168,319320,321
Theology,9,162163,288290,316
Thirring,H.,33
Toledo,S.,218
Trotsky,L.,30
Truman,H.,51,52
Truth,23,8283,242,358359
Turing,A.,3,15,51,73,133,179,232,345
Turingmachines.SeeComputability
U
Ulam,S.,84,262
Unconcious,161,167,226
oftheuniverseofsets,281
Unifiedfieldtheory,55,57,60
Uniformity,357
Unity,295296
Universal,10,12,178,295,357
Unrestrictedgeneralization,9,13,16,77,102,233,288.SeealsoGeneralization
Universalquantification,16,150,301
V
Validity,16
Varney,J.,41
Veblen,O.,29,33,36,67
ViennaCircle,40,6970,71,75,79,82,163,178

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Vietnamwar,5354,145147
vonBismark,O.,44
vonGoethe,J.,40,68
vonKahler,A.,47
vonNeumann,J.,33,74,8384,262,265,307
vonSchelling,F.,98,168,170,293
vonWright,G.,xiii
W
Waismann,F.,75,83
Wald,A.,33
Wald,G.,75
Wallace,H.,51,5253
Wallas,G.,151
Wang,H.
''ConcerningtheMaterialistDialectic,"147
conversationswithGdel,129152
hisfriendshipwithGdel,33,8182,132152
FromMathematicstoPhilosophy,xi,7,81,131,132,135136,138,140,141,143,144,146,170171,183184,187,193195,247248,317,326
andGdel'sviews,2023
interestinMarxism,123,147,149
interestinphilosophy,125
"LargeSets,"81,131,147,248,281
quotationsfromGdel,149,305306
ReflectionsonKurtGdel,xi,26,82,113
Skolempaper,131,134
"SomeFactsaboutKurtGdel,"81,8289
"TwoCommandmentsofAnalytic
Empiricism,"163
Wang,Quinghe,xiii
Wang,Sianju,xiii,5,74
Wang,YiMing,xiii,105
Webb,J.(Mechanism,Mentalism,andMetamathematics),4
Weber,M.,112
Weibel,P.,26
Weil,A.,2
Wheeler,J.,2
Whitehead,A.,15,141142
Whitney,H.,33,34,51
Wholeandpart,295296
Wigner,E.,307
Will,119,120,167,294,307,315
Wish,308,354
Wittgenstein,L.,xi,14,18,64,65,79,111,130,131,154,174,191,306,316,325,327,334,345,361,365,367,369
hisworkcomparedwithGdel's,84,142,143,151,153,177182,324,327331
andlanguage,154,356357
OnCertainty,18,363,366,374
andreligion,105,113
RemarksontheFoundationsofMathematics,179
andscience,19
Tractatus,10,118,163,178,179,180,223,332
Wolff,C.,170,266,310
World
beauty,151
imperfection,316
tendencytodeteriorate,150
worldviews,366367
Wronski,C.,98,307
Wu,Reiyuan,xiii
Y
Yale(honorarydegreefrom),32
Yourgrau,P.,xiii,xvi
Yuting,Shen,125,137
Z
Zermelo,E.,83,84
ZermeloFraenkelsettheory,86,87,251,253,259