GENERAL PROVISIONS

1.) G.R. No. L-3756

SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL SANTISMO ROSARIO DE
FILIPINAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
This is an action to recover the possession of a piece of real property (land and warehouses)
situated in Pandacan Manila, and the rentals for its occupation and use. The land belongs to
the plaintiff, in whose name the title was registered before the war. On January 4, 1943,
during the Japanese military occupation, the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation
by the name of Taiwan Tekkosho for the sum of P140,00, and thereupon title thereto issued
in its name (transfer certificate of title No. 64330, Register of Deeds, Manila). After liberation,
more specifically on April 4, 1946, the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of
America took possession, control, and custody thereof under section 12 of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, 40 Stat., 411, for the reason that it belonged to an enemy national. During
the year 1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under
a custodianship agreement with United States Alien Property Custodian (Exhibit G), and
when it vacated the property it was occupied by the defendant herein. The Philippine
Government made representations with the Office Alien Property Custodian for the use of
property by the Government (see Exhibits 2, 2-A, 2-B, and 1). On March 31, 1947, the
defendant was authorized to repair the warehouse on the land, and actually spent thereon
the repairs the sum of P26,898.27. In 1948, defendant leased one-third of the warehouse to
one Dioscoro Sarile at a monthly rental of P500, which was later raised to P1,000 a month.
Sarile did not pay the rents, so action was brought against him. It is not shown, however, if
the judgment was ever executed.
Plaintiff made claim to the property before the Alien Property Custodian of the United States,
but as this was denied, it brought an action in court (Court of First Instance of Manila, civil
case No. 5007, entitled "La Sagrada Orden Predicadores de la Provinicia del Santisimo
Rosario de Filipinas," vs. Philippine Alien Property Administrator, defendant, Republic of the
Philippines, intervenor) to annul the sale of property of Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its
possession. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in the action. The case
did not come for trial because the parties presented a joint petition in which it is claimed by
plaintiff that the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void because it was
executed under threats, duress, and intimidation, and it was agreed that the title issued in
the name of the Taiwan Tekkosho be cancelled and the original title of plaintiff re-issued; that
the claims, rights, title, and interest of the Alien Property Custodian be cancelled and held for
naught; that the occupant National Coconut Corporation has until February 28, 1949, to
recover its equipment from the property and vacate the premises; that plaintiff, upon entry of
judgment, pay to the Philippine Alien Property Administration the sum of P140,000; and that
the Philippine Alien Property Administration be free from responsibility or liability for any act
of the National Coconut Corporation, etc. Pursuant to the agreement the court rendered
judgment releasing the defendant and the intervenor from liability, but reversing to the
plaintiff the right to recover from the National Coconut Corporation reasonable rentals for the
use and occupation of the premises. (Exhibit A-1.)

The present action is to recover the reasonable rentals from August, 1946, the date when
the defendant began to occupy the premises, to the date it vacated it. The defendant does
not contest its liability for the rentals at the rate of P3,000 per month from February 28, 1949
(the date specified in the judgment in civil case No. 5007), but resists the claim therefor prior
to this date. It interposes the defense that it occupied the property in good faith, under no
obligation whatsoever to pay rentals for the use and occupation of the warehouse. Judgment
was rendered for the plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum of P3,000 a month, as
reasonable rentals, from August, 1946, to the date the defendant vacates the premises. The
judgment declares that plaintiff has always been the owner, as the sale of Japanese
purchaser was void ab initio; that the Alien Property Administration never acquired any right
to the property, but that it held the same in trust until the determination as to whether or not
the owner is an enemy citizen. The trial court further declares that defendant cannot claim
any better rights than its predecessor, the Alien Property Administration, and that as
defendant has used the property and had subleased portion thereof, it must pay reasonable
rentals for its occupation.
Against this judgment this appeal has been interposed, the following assignment of error
having been made on defendant-appellant's behalf:
The trial court erred in holding the defendant liable for rentals or compensation for the
use and occupation of the property from the middle of August, 1946, to December 14,
1948.
1. Want to "ownership rights" of the Philippine Alien Property Administration did not
render illegal or invalidate its grant to the defendant of the free use of property.
2. the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring the sale by the plaintiff to
the Japanese purchaser null and void ab initio and that the plaintiff was and has
remained as the legal owner of the property, without legal interruption, is not conclusive.
3. Reservation to the plaintiff of the right to recover from the defendant corporation not
binding on the later;
4. Use of the property for commercial purposes in itself alone does not justify payment of
rentals.
5. Defendant's possession was in good faith.
6. Defendant's possession in the nature of usufruct.

In reply, plaintiff-appellee's counsel contends that the Philippine Allien Property

Administration (PAPA) was a mere administrator of the owner (who ultimately was decided to
be plaintiff), and that as defendant has used it for commercial purposes and has leased
portion of it, it should be responsible therefore to the owner, who had been deprived of the
possession for so many years. (Appellee's brief, pp. 20, 23.)
We can not understand how the trial court, from the mere fact that plaintiff-appellee was the
owner of the property and the defendant-appellant the occupant, which used for its own
benefit but by the express permission of the Alien Property Custodian of the United States,

so easily jumped to the conclusion that the occupant is liable for the value of such use and
occupation. If defendant-appellant is liable at all, its obligations, must arise from any of the
four sources of obligations, namley, law, contract or quasi-contract, crime, or negligence.
(Article 1089, Spanish Civil Code.) Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all,
because it entered the premises and occupied it with the permission of the entity which had
the legal control and administration thereof, the Allien Property Administration. Neither was
there any negligence on its part. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between
the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho, which had secured the possession
of the property from the plaintiff-appellee by the use of duress, such that the Alien Property
Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed
illegality of the occupation of the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. The Allien Property
Administration had the control and administration of the property not as successor to the
interests of the enemy holder of the title, the Taiwan Tekkosho, but by express provision of
law (Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, 40 Stat., 411; 50 U.S.C.A., 189).
Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff-appellee herein, but a trustee of then
Government of the United States (32 Op. Atty. Gen. 249; 50 U.S.C.A. 283), in its own right,
to the exclusion of, and against the claim or title of, the enemy owner. (Youghioheny & Ohio
Coal Co. vs. Lasevich [1920], 179 N.W., 355; 171 Wis., 347; U.S.C.A., 282-283.) From
August, 1946, when defendant-appellant took possession, to the late of judgment on
February 28, 1948, Allien Property Administration had the absolute control of the property as
trustee of the Government of the United States, with power to dispose of it by sale or
otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner. (U.S vs. Chemical Foundation [C.C.A. Del.
1925], 5 F. [2d], 191; 50 U.S.C.A., 283.) Therefore, even if defendant-appellant were liable to
the Allien Property Administration for rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of the
plaintiff-appellee, the owner, but to the United States Government.
But there is another ground why the claim or rentals can not be made against defendantappellant. There was no agreement between the Alien Property Custodian and the
defendant-appellant for the latter to pay rentals on the property. The existence of an implied
agreement to that effect is contrary to the circumstances. The copra Export Management
Company, which preceded the defendant-appellant, in the possession and use of the
property, does not appear to have paid rentals therefor, as it occupied it by what the parties
denominated a "custodianship agreement," and there is no provision therein for the payment
of rentals or of any compensation for its custody and or occupation and the use. The Trading
with the Enemy Act, as originally enacted, was purely a measure of conversation, hence, it is
very unlikely that rentals were demanded for the use of the property. When the National
coconut Corporation succeeded the Copra Export Management Company in the possession
and use of the property, it must have been also free from payment of rentals, especially as it
was Government corporation, and steps where then being taken by the Philippine
Government to secure the property for the National Coconut Corporation. So that the
circumstances do not justify the finding that there was an implied agreement that the
defendant-appellant was to pay for the use and occupation of the premises at all.
The above considerations show that plaintiff-appellee's claim for rentals before it obtained
the judgment annulling the sale of the Taiwan Tekkosho may not be predicated on any
negligence or offense of the defendant-appellant, or any contract, express or implied,
because the Allien Property Administration was neither a trustee of plaintiff-appellee, nor a
privy to the obligations of the Taiwan Tekkosho, its title being based by legal provision of the

seizure of enemy property. We have also tried in vain to find a law or provision thereof, or
any principle in quasi contracts or equity, upon which the claim can be supported. On the
contrary, as defendant-appellant entered into possession without any expectation of liability
for such use and occupation, it is only fair and just that it may not be held liable therefor. And
as to the rents it collected from its lessee, the same should accrue to it as a possessor in
good faith, as this Court has already expressly held. (Resolution, National Coconut
Corporation vs. Geronimo, 83 Phil. 467.)
Lastly, the reservation of this action may not be considered as vesting a new right; if no right
to claim for rentals existed at the time of the reservation, no rights can arise or accrue from
such reservation alone.
Wherefore, the part of the judgment appealed from, which sentences defendant-appellant to
pay rentals from August, 1946, to February 28, 1949, is hereby reversed. In all other
respects the judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall be against the plaintiff-appellee.

2.) G.R. No. L-4089

ARTURO PELAYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
MARCELO LAURON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a
complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella setting forth that on or about the 13th of
October of said year, at night, the plaintiff was called to the house of the defendants, situated
in San Nicolas, and that upon arrival he was requested by them to render medical
assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child; that therefore, and
after consultation with the attending physician, Dr. Escao, it was found necessary, on
account of the difficult birth, to remove the fetus by means of forceps which operation was
performed by the plaintiff, who also had to remove the afterbirth, in which services he was
occupied until the following morning, and that afterwards, on the same day, he visited the
patient several times; that the just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was
P500, which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason therefor; that for
said reason he prayed that the judgment be entered in his favor as against the defendants,
or any of them, for the sum of P500 and costs, together with any other relief that might be
deemed proper.
In answer to the complaint counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation therein
contained and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in
consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if
on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay their was
accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, he prayed that the defendants be
absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
The plaintiff demurred to the above answer, and the court below sustained the demurrer,
directing the defendants, on the 23rd of January, 1907, to amend their answer. In

compliance with this order the defendants presented, on the same date, their amended
answer, denying each and every one of the allegations contained in the complaint, and
requesting that the same be dismissed with costs.
As a result of the evidence adduced by both parties, judgment was entered by the court
below on the 5th of April, 1907, whereby the defendants were absolved from the former
complaint, on account of the lack of sufficient evidence to establish a right of action against
the defendants, with costs against the plaintiff, who excepted to the said judgment and in
addition moved for a new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to law; the
motion was overruled and the plaintiff excepted and in due course presented the
corresponding bill of exceptions. The motion of the defendants requesting that the
declaration contained in the judgment that the defendants had demanded therefrom, for the
reason that, according to the evidence, no such request had been made, was also denied,
and to the decision the defendants excepted.
Assuming that it is a real fact of knowledge by the defendants that the plaintiff, by virtue of
having been sent for by the former, attended a physician and rendered professional services
to a daughter-in-law of the said defendants during a difficult and laborious childbirth, in order
to decide the claim of the said physician regarding the recovery of his fees, it becomes
necessary to decide who is bound to pay the bill, whether the father and mother-in-law of the
patient, or the husband of the latter.
According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by
quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in the code or in
special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts have
legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their
stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)
If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and spouses
are mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of
them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is under the
unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health
may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized;
the party bound to furnish such support is therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees
of the medical expert for his professional services. This liability originates from the abovecited mutual obligation which the law has expressly established between the married couple.
In the face of the above legal precepts it is unquestionable that the person bound to pay the
fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law
of the defendants during her childbirth, is the husband of the patient and not her father and
mother- in-law, the defendants herein. The fact that it was not the husband who called the
plaintiff and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar to the fulfillment of the said

obligation, as the defendants, in view of the imminent danger, to which the life of the patient
was at that moment exposed, considered that medical assistance was urgently needed, and
the obligation of the husband to furnish his wife in the indispensable services of a physician
at such critical moments is specially established by the law, as has been seen, and
compliance therewith is unavoidable; therefore, the plaintiff, who believes that he is entitled
to recover his fees, must direct his action against the husband who is under obligation to
furnish medical assistance to his lawful wife in such an emergency.
From the foregoing it may readily be understood that it was improper to have brought an
action against the defendants simply because they were the parties who called the plaintiff
and requested him to assist the patient during her difficult confinement, and also, possibly,
because they were her father and mother-in-law and the sickness occurred in their house.
The defendants were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any legal
provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence of any contract entered into between
them and the plaintiff from which such obligation might have arisen.
In applying the provisions of the Civil Code in an action for support, the supreme court of
Spain, while recognizing the validity and efficiency of a contract to furnish support wherein a
person bound himself to support another who was not his relative, established the rule that
the law does impose the obligation to pay for the support of a stranger, but as the liability
arose out of a contract, the stipulations of the agreement must be held. (Decision of May 11,
1897.)
Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the
obligation that devolves upon the husband to provide support, among which is the furnishing
of medical assistance to his wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it
does not appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff physician,
for which reason it is obvious that the former can not be compelled to pay fees which they
are under no liability to pay because it does not appear that they consented to bind
themselves.
The foregoing suffices to demonstrate that the first and second errors assigned to the
judgment below are unfounded, because, if the plaintiff has no right of action against the
defendants, it is needless to declare whether or not the use of forceps is a surgical
operation.
Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

3.) G.R. No. L-13602

LEUNG BEN, plaintiff, vs. P. J. O'BRIEN, JAMES A OSTRAND and GEO. R. HARVEY,
judges of First Instance of city of Manila,defendants.

This is an application for a writ of certiorari, the purpose of which is to quash an attachment
issued from the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila under circumstances
hereinbelow stated.
Upon December 12, 1917, an action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila by P. J. O'Brien to recover of Leung Ben the sum of P15,000 alleged to have been
lost by the plaintiff to the defendant in a series of gambling, banking and percentage games
conducted ruing the two or three months prior to the institution of the suit. In his verified
complaint the plaintiff asked for an attachment, under section 424, and 412 (1) of the Code
of Civil Procedure, against the property of the defendant, on the ground that the latter was
about to depart from the Philippine islands with intent to defraud his creditors. This
attachment was issued; and acting under the authority thereof, the sheriff attached the sum
of P15,000 which had been deposited by the defendant with the International Banking
Corporation.
The defendant thereupon appeared by his attorney and moved the court to quash the
attachment. Said motion having dismissed in the Court of First Instance, the petitioner,
Leung Ben, the defendant in that action, presented to this court, upon January 8, 1918 his
petition for the writ of certiorari directed against P. J. O'Brien and the judges of the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila whose names are mentioned in the caption hereof. The
prayer is that the Honorable James A. Ostrand, as the judge having cognizance of the action
in said court be required to certify the record to this court for review and that the order of
attachment which had been issued should be revoked and discharged. with costs. Upon the
filing of said petition in this court the usual order was entered requiring the defendants to
show cause why the writ should not issue. The response of the defendants, in the nature of
a demurrer, was filed upon January 21, 1918; and the matter is now heard upon the
pleadings thus presented.
The provision of law under which this attachment was issued requires that there should be
accuse of action arising upon contract, express or implied. The contention of the petitioner is
that the statutory action to recover money lost at gaming is that the statutory action to
recover money lost at gaming is no such an action as is contemplated in this provision, and
he therefore insists that the original complaint shows on its face that the remedy of
attachment is not available in aid thereof; that the Court of First Instance acted in excess of
its jurisdiction in granting the writ of attachment; that the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and that consequently the writ
of certiorari supplies the appropriate remedy for his relief.
The case presents the two following questions of law, either of which, if decided unfavorably
to the petitioner, will be fatal to his application:
(1) Supposing that the Court of First Instance has granted an attachment for which there is
no statutory authority, can this court entertain the present petition and grant the desired
relief?
(2) Is the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming an obligation arising from
"contract, express or implied?"

We are of the opinion that the answer to the first question should be in the affirmative. Under
section 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction by the
writ of certiorari over the proceedings of Courts of First Instance, wherever said courts have
exceeded their jurisdiction and there is no plaint, speedy, and adequate remedy. In the same
section, it is further declared that the proceedings in the Supreme Court in such cases hall
be as prescribed for Courts of First Instance in section 217-221, inclusive, of said Code. This
Supreme Court, so far as applicable, the provisions contained in those section to the same
extent as if they had been reproduced verbatim immediately after section 514. Turning to
section 217, we find that, in defining the conditions under which certiorari can be maintained
in a Court of First Instance substantially the same language is used as is the same remedy
can be maintained in the Supreme Court of First Instance, substantially the same language
is used as is found in section 514 relative to the conditions under which the same remedy
can be maintained in the Supreme Court, namely, when the inferior tribunal has exceeded its
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. In using
these expressions the author of the Code of Civil Procedure merely adopted the language
which, in American jurisdictions at least, had long ago reached the stage of stereotyped
formula.
In section 220 of the same Code, we have a provision relative to the final proceedings
in certiorari, and herein it is stated that the court shall determine whether the inferior tribunal
has regularly pursued its authority it shall give judgment either affirming annulling, or
modifying the proceedings below, as the law requires. The expression, has not regularly
pursued its authority as here used, is suggestive, and we think it should be construed in
connection with the other expressions have exceeded their jurisdiction, as used in section
514, and has exceeded their jurisdiction as used in section 217. Taking the three together, it
results in our opinion that any irregular exercise of juridical power by a Court of First
Instance, in excess of its lawful jurisdiction, is remediable by the writ ofcertiorari, provided
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; and in order to make out a case for
the granting of the writ it is not necessary that the court should have acted in the matter
without any jurisdiction whatever. Indeed the repeated use of expression excess of
jurisdiction shows that the lawmaker contemplated the situation where a court, having
jurisdiction should irregularly transcend its authority as well as the situation where the court
is totally devoid of lawful power.
It may be observed in this connection that the word jurisdiction as used in attachment cases,
has reference not only to the authority of the court to entertain the principal action but also to
its authority to issue the attachment, as dependent upon the existence of the statutory
ground. (6 C. J., 89.) This distinction between jurisdiction to issue the attachment as an
ancillary remedy incident to the principal litigation is of importance; as a court's jurisdiction
over the main action may be complete, and yet it may lack authority to grant an attachment
as ancillary to such action. This distinction between jurisdiction over the ancillary has been
recognized by this court in connection with actions involving the appointment of a receiver.
Thus in Rocha & Co. vs. Crossfield and Figueras (6 Phil. Rep., 355), a receiver had been
appointed without legal justification. It was held that the order making the appointment was
beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and though the court admittedly had jurisdiction of the
main cause, the order was vacated by this court upon application a writ of certiorari.
(See Blanco vs. Ambler, 3 Phil. Rep., 358, Blanco vs. Ambler and McMicking 3 Phil. Rep.,
735, Yangco vs. Rohde, 1 Phil. Rep., 404.)

By parity of reasoning it must follow that when a court issues a writ of attachment for which
there is no statutory authority, it is acting irregularly and in excess of its jurisdiction, in the
sense necessary to justify the Supreme Court in granting relief by the writ of certiorari. In
applying this proposition it is of course necessary to take account of the difference between
a ground of attachment based on the nature of the action and a ground of attachment based
on the acts or the conditions of the defendant. Every complaint must show a cause of action
some sort; and when the statue declares that the attachment may issue in an action arising
upon contract, the express or implied, it announces a criterion which may be determined
from an inspection of the language of the complaint. The determination of this question is
purely a matter of law. On the other hand, when the stature declares that an attachment may
be issued when the defendant is about to depart from the Islands, a criterion is announced
which is wholly foreign to the cause of action; and the determination of it may involve a
disputed question of fact which must be decided by the court. In making this determination,
the court obviously acts within its powers; and it would be idle to suppose that the writ
of certiorari would be available to reverse the action of a Court of First Instance in
determining the sufficiency of the proof on such a disputed point, and in granting or refusing
the attachment accordingly.
We should not be understood, in anything that has been said, as intending to infringe the
doctrine enunciated by this court in Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin (25 Phil. Rep., 245),
when properly applied. It was there held that we would not, upon application for a writ
of certiorari, dissolve an interlocutory mandatory injunction that had been issued in a Court
of First Instance as an incident in an action of mandamus. The issuance of an interlocutory
injunction depends upon conditions essentially different from those involved in the issuance
of an attachment. The injunction is designed primarily for the prevention of irreparable injury
and the use of the remedy is in a great measure dependent upon the exercise of discretion.
Generally, it may be said that the exercise of the injunctive powers is inherent in judicial
authority; and ordinarily it would be impossible to distinguish between the jurisdiction of the
court in the main litigation and its jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction, for the latter
is involved in the former. That the writ of certiorari can not be used to reverse an order
denying a motion for a preliminary injunction is of course not to cavil. (Somes vs. Crossfield
and Molina, 8 Phil. Rep., 284.)
But it will be said that the writ of certiorari is not available in this cae, because the petitioner
is protected by the attachment bond, and that he has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
appeal. This suggestion seems to be sufficiently answered in the case of Rocha &
Co vs. Crossfield and Figueras (6 Phil. Rep., 355), already referred to, and the earlier case
there cited. The remedy by appeal is not sufficiently speedy to meet the exigencies of the
case. An attachment is extremely violent, and its abuse may often result in infliction of
damage which could never be repaired by any pecuniary award at the final hearing. To
postpone the granting of the writ in such a case until the final hearing and to compel the
petitioner to bring the case here upon appeal merely in order to correct the action of the trial
court in the matter of allowing the attachment would seem both unjust and unnecessary.
Passing to the problem propounded in the second question it may be observed that, upon
general principles,. recognize both the civil and common law, money lost in gaming and
voluntarily paid by the loser to the winner can not in the absence of statue, be recovered in a
civil action. But Act No. 1757 of the Philippine Commission, which defines and penalizes

several forms of gambling, contains numerous provisions recognizing the right to recover
money lost in gambling or in the playing of certain games (secs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11). The original
complaint in the action in the Court of First Instance is not clear as to the particular section of
Act No. 1757 under which the action is brought, but it is alleged that the money was lost at
gambling, banking, and percentage game in which the defendant was banker. It must
therefore be assumed that the action is based upon the right of recovery given in Section 7
of said Act, which declares that an action may be brought against the banker by any person
losing money at a banking or percentage game.
Is this a cause arising upon contract, express or implied, as this term is used in section 412
of the Code of Civil Procedure? To begin the discussion, the English version of the Code of
Civil Procedure is controlling (sec. 15, Admin. Code, ed. of 1917). Furthermore it is
universally admitted to be proper in the interpretation of any statute, to consider its historical
antecedents and its juris prudential sources. The Code of Civil Procedure, as is well known,
is an American contribution to Philippine legislation. It therefore speaks the language of the
common-law and for the most part reflects its ideas. When the draftsman of this Code used
the expression contract, express or implied, he used a phrase that has been long current
among writers on American and English law; and it is therefore appropriate to resort to that
system of law to discover the appropriate to resort to that system of law to discover the
meaning which the legislator intended to convey by those meaning which the legislator
intended to convey by those terms. We remark in passing that the expression contrato
tracito, used in the official translation of the Code of Civil Procedure as the Spanish
equivalent of implied contract, does not appear to render the full sense of the English
expression.
The English contract law, so far as relates to simple contracts is planted upon two
foundations, which are supplied by two very different conceptions of legal liability. These two
conceptions are revealed in the ideas respectively underlying (1) the common- law debt and
(2) the assumptual promise. In the early and formative stages of the common-law the only
simple contract of which the courts took account was the real contract or contract re, in
which the contractual duty imposed by law arises upon the delivery of a chattle, as in
the mutuum, commodatum,depositum, and the like; and the purely consensual agreements
of the Roman Law found no congenial place in the early common law system.
In course of time the idea underlying the contract re was extended so as to include from one
person to another under such circumstances as to constitute a justa cuas debendi. The
obligation thereby created was a debt. The constitutive element in this litigation is found in
the fact that the debtor has received something from the creditor, which he is bound by the
obligation of law to return or pay for. From an early day this element was denominated
the quid pro quo, an ungainly phrase coined by Mediaeval Latinity. The quid pro quo was
primarily a materials or physical object, and its constituted the recompense or equivalent
acquired by the debtor. Upon the passage of thequid pro quo from one party to the other, the
law imposed that real contractual duty peculiar to the debt. No one conversant with the early
history of English law would ever conceive of the debt as an obligation created by promise. It
is the legal duty to pay or deliver a sum certain of money or an ascertainable quantity of
ponderable or measurable chattles.

The ordinary debt, as already stated, originates in a contract in which a quid pro quo passes
to the debtor at the time of the creation of the debt, but the term is equally applicable to
duties imposed by custom or statute, or by judgment of a court.
The existence of a debt supposes one person to have possession of thing (res) which
he owes and hence ought to turn over the owner. This obligation is the oldest conception of
contract with which the common law is familiar; and notwithstanding the centuries that have
rolled over Westminster Hall that conception remains as one of the fundamental bases of the
common-law contract.
Near the end of the fifteenth century there was evolved in England a new conception of
contractual liability, which embodied the idea of obligation resulting from promise and which
found expression in the common law assumpsit, or parol promise supported by a
consideration. The application of this novel conception had the effect of greatly extending the
filed of contractual liability and by this means rights of action came to be recognized which
had been unknown before. The action of assumpsit which was the instrument for giving
effect to this obligation was found to be a useful remedy; and presently this action came to
be used for the enforcement of common-law debts. The result was to give to our contract law
the superficial appearance of being based more or less exclusively upon the notion of the
obligation of promise.
An idea is widely entertained to the effect that all simple contracts recognized in the
common-law system are referable to a singly category. They all have their roots, so many of
us imagine, in one general notion of obligation; and of course the obligation of promise is
supposed to supply this general notion, being considered a sort of menstruum in which all
other forms of contractual obligation have been dissolved. This a mistake. The idea of
contractual duty embodied in the debt which was the first conception of contract liability
revealed in the common law, has remained, although it was detained to be in a measure
obscured by the more modern conception of obligation resulting from promise.
What has been said is intended to exhibit the fact that the duty to pay or deliver a sum
certain of money or an ascertainable quantity of ponderable or measurable chattles which
is indicated by them debt has ever been recognized, in the common-law system, as a true
contract, regardless, of the source of the duty or the manner in which it is create whether
derived from custom, statue or some consensual transaction depending upon the voluntary
acts of the parties. the form of contract known as the debt is of the most ancient lineage; and
when reference is had to historical antecedents, the right of the debt to be classed as a
contract cannot be questioned. Indeed when the new form of engagement consisting of the
parol promise supported by a consideration first appeared, it was looked upon as an upstart
and its right to be considered a true contract was questioned. It was long customary to refer
to it exclusively as an assumpsit, agreement, undertaking, or parol promise, in fact anything
but a contract. Only in time did the new form of engagement attain the dignity of being
classed among true contract.
The term implied takers us into shadowy domain of those obligations the theoretical
classification of which has engaged the attention of scholars from the time of Gaius until our
own day and has been a source of as much difficulty to the civilian as to the common-law
jurist. There we are concerned with those acts which make one person debtor to another

without there having intervened between them any true agreement tending to produce a
legal bond (vinculum juris). Of late years some American and English writers have adopted
the term quasi-contract as descriptive of these obligations or some of them; but the
expression more commonly used is implied contract.
Upon examination of these obligations, from the view point of the common-law
jurisprudence, it will be found that they fall readily into two divisions according as they bear
an analogy to the common-law debt or to the common law assumpsit. To exhibit the scope of
these different classes of obligations is here impracticable. It is only necessary in this
connection to observe that the most conspicuous division is that which comprises duties in
the nature of debt. The characteristic feature of these obligations is that upon certain states
of fact the law imposes an obligation to pay a sum certain of money; and it is characteristic
of this obligation that the money in respect to which the duty is raised is conceived as being
equivalent of something taken or detained under circumstances giving rise to the duty to
return or compensate therefore. The proposition that no one shall be allowed to enrich
himself unduly at the expense of another embodies the general principle here lying at the
basis of obligation. The right to recover money improperly paid (repeticion de lo indebido) is
also recognized as belong to this class of duties.
It will observed that according to the Civil Code obligations are supposed to be derived either
from (1) the law, (2) contracts and quasi-contracts, (3) illicit acts and omission, or (4) acts in
which some sort ob lame or negligence is present. This enumeration of sources of
obligations and the obligation imposed by law are different types. The learned Italian jurist,
Jorge Giorgi, criticises this assumption and says that the classification embodied in the code
is theoretically erroneous. His conclusion is that one or the other of these categories should
have been suppressed and merged in the other. (Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Spanish
ed., vol. 5 arts. 5, 7, 9.) The validity of this criticism is, we thin, self-evident; and it is of
interest to note that the common law makes no distinction between the two sources of
liability. The obligations which in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well as those
arising ex lege, are in the common la system, merged into the category of obligations
imposed by law, and all are denominated implied contracts.
Many refinements, more or less illusory, have been attempted by various writers in
distinguishing different sorts of implied contracts, as for example, the contract implied as of
fact and the contract implied as of law. No explanation of these distinctions will be here
attempted. Suffice it to say that the term contract, express or implied, is used to by commonlaw jurists to include all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source
in delict, or tort. As to these it may be said that, generally speaking, the law does not impose
a contractual duty upon a wrongdoer to compensate for injury done. It is true that in certain
situations where a wrongdoer unjustly acquired something at the expense of another, the law
imposes on him a duty to surrender his unjust acquisitions, and the injured party may here
elect to sue upon this contractual duty instead of suing upon the tort; but even here the
distinction between the two liabilities, in contract and in tort, is never lost to sight; and it is
always recognized that the liability arising out of the tort is delictual and not of a contractual
or quasi-contractual nature.
In the case now under consideration the duty of the defendant to refund the money which he
won from the plaintiff at gaming is a duty imposed by statute. It therefore arises ex lege.

Furthermore, it is a duty to return a certain sum which had passed from the plaintiff to the
defendant. By all the criteria which the common law supplies, this a duty in the nature of debt
and is properly classified as an implied contract. It is well- settled by the English authorities
that money lost in gambling or by lottery, if recoverable at all, can be recovered by the loser
in an action of indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received. (Clarke vs. Johnson. Lofft,
759; Mason vs. Waite, 17 Mass., 560; Burnham vs. Fisher, 25 Vt., 514.) This means that in
the common law the duty to return money won in this way is an implied contract, or quasicontract.
It is no argument to say in reply to this that the obligation here recognized is called an
implied contract merely because the remedy commonly used in suing upon ordinary contract
can be here used, or that the law adopted the fiction of promise in order to bring the
obligation within the scope of the action of assumpsit. Such statements fail to express the
true import of the phenomenon. Before the remedy was the idea; and the use of the remedy
could not have been approved if it had not been for historical antecedents which made the
recognition of this remedy at one logical and proper. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten
that the question is not how this duty but what sort of obligation did the author of the Code of
Civil Procedure intend to describe when he sued the term implied contract in section 412.
In what has been said we have assumed that the obligation which is at the foundation of the
original action in the court below is not a quasi-contract, when judge by the principles of the
civil law. A few observations will show that this assumption is not by any means free from
doubt. The obligation in question certainly does not fall under the definition of either of the
two-quasi- contracts which are made the subject of special treatment in the Civil Code, for its
does not arise from a licit act as contemplated in article 1895. The obligation is clearly a
creation of the positive law a circumstance which brings it within the purview of article
1090, in relation with article, 1089; and it is also derived from an illicit act, namely, the
playing of a prohibited game. It is thus seen that the provisions of the Civil Code which might
be consulted with a view to the correct theoretical classification of this obligation are
unsatisfactory and confusing.
The two obligations treated in the chapter devoted to quasi-contracts in the Civil Code are
(1) the obligation incident to the officious management of the affairs of other person (gestion
de negocios ajenos) and (2) the recovery of what has been improperly paid (cabro de lo
indebido). That the authors of the Civil Code selected these two obligations for special
treatment does not signify an intention to deny the possibility of the existence of other quasicontractual obligations. As is well said by the commentator Manresa.
The number of the quasi-contracts may be indefinite as may be the number of lawful
facts, the generations of the said obligations; but the Code, just as we shall see further
on, in the impracticableness of enumerating or including them all in a methodical and
orderly classification, has concerned itself with two only namely, the management of
the affairs of other person and the recovery of things improperly paid without
attempting by this to exclude the others. (Manresa, 2d ed., vol. 12, p. 549.)

It would indeed have been surprising if the authors of the Code, in the light of the
jurisprudence of more than a thousand years, should have arbitrarily assumed to limit the
quasi-contract to two obligations. The author from whom we have just quoted further

observes that the two obligations in question were selected for special treatment in the Code
not only because they were the most conspicuous of the quasi-contracts, but because they
had not been the subject of consideration in other parts of the Code. (Opus citat., 550.)
It is well recognized among civilian jurists that the quasi- contractual obligations cover a wide
range. The Italian jurist, Jorge Giorgi, to whom we have already referred, considers under
this head, among other obligations, the following: payments made upon a future
consideration which is not realized or upon an existing consideration which fails; payments
wrongfully made upon a consideration which is contrary to law, or opposed to public policy;
and payments made upon a vicious consideration or obtained by illicit means (Giorgi, Teoria
de las Obligaciones, vol. 5, art. 130.)
Im permitting the recovery of money lost at play, Act No. 1757 has introduced modifications
in the application of articles 1798, 180`, and 1305 of the Civil Code. The first two of these
articles relate to gambling contracts, while article 1305 treats of the nullity of contracts
proceeding from a vicious or illicit consideration. Taking all these provisions together, it must
be apparent that the obligation to return money lost at play has a decided affinity to
contractual obligations; and we believe that it could, without violence to the doctrines of the
civil law, be held that such obligations is an innominate quasi-contract. It is, however,
unnecessary to place the decision on this ground.
From what has been said it follows that in our opinion the cause of action stated in the
complaints in the court below is based on a contract, express or implied and is therefore of
such nature that the court had authority to issue writ of attachment. The application for the
writ of certiorari must therefore be denied and the proceedings dismissed. So ordered.

4.) G.R. No. L-7089

DOMINGO DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NORTHERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES
INC., ET AL., defendants-appellees.
The facts in this case based on an agreed statement of facts are simple. In the year 1941
the Northern Theatrical Enterprises Inc., a domestic corporation operated a movie house in
Laoag, Ilocos Norte, and among the persons employed by it was the plaintiff DOMINGO DE
LA CRUZ, hired as a special guard whose duties were to guard the main entrance of the
cine, to maintain peace and order and to report the commission of disorders within the
premises. As such guard he carried a revolver. In the afternoon of July 4, 1941, one
Benjamin Martin wanted to crash the gate or entrance of the movie house. Infuriated by the
refusal of plaintiff De la Cruz to let him in without first providing himself with a ticket, Martin
attacked him with a bolo. De la Cruz defendant himself as best he could until he was
cornered, at which moment to save himself he shot the gate crasher, resulting in the latter's
death.
For the killing, De la Cruz was charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 8449 of the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After a re-investigation conducted by the Provincial Fiscal
the latter filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the court in January

1943. On July 8, 1947, De la Cruz was again accused of the same crime of homicide, in
Criminal Case No. 431 of the same Court. After trial, he was finally acquitted of the charge
on January 31, 1948. In both criminal cases De la Cruz employed a lawyer to defend him.
He demanded from his former employer reimbursement of his expenses but was refused,
after which he filed the present action against the movie corporation and the three members
of its board of directors, to recover not only the amounts he had paid his lawyers but also
moral damages said to have been suffered, due to his worry, his neglect of his interests and
his family as well in the supervision of the cultivation of his land, a total of P15,000. On the
basis of the complaint and the answer filed by defendants wherein they asked for the
dismissal of the complaint, as well as the agreed statement of facts, the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte after rejecting the theory of the plaintiff that he was an agent of the
defendants and that as such agent he was entitled to reimbursement of the expenses
incurred by him in connection with the agency (Arts. 1709-1729 of the old Civil Code), found
that plaintiff had no cause of action and dismissed the complaint without costs. De la Cruz
appealed directly to this Tribunal for the reason that only questions of law are involved in the
appeal.
We agree with the trial court that the relationship between the movie corporation and the
plaintiff was not that of principal and agent because the principle of representation was in no
way involved. Plaintiff was not employed to represent the defendant corporation in its
dealings with third parties. He was a mere employee hired to perform a certain specific duty
or task, that of acting as special guard and staying at the main entrance of the movie house
to stop gate crashers and to maintain peace and order within the premises. The question
posed by this appeal is whether an employee or servant who in line of duty and while in the
performance of the task assigned to him, performs an act which eventually results in his
incurring in expenses, caused not directly by his master or employer or his fellow servants or
by reason of his performance of his duty, but rather by a third party or stranger not in the
employ of his employer, may recover said damages against his employer.
The learned trial court in the last paragraph of its decision dismissing the complaint said that
"after studying many laws or provisions of law to find out what law is applicable to the facts
submitted and admitted by the parties, has found none and it has no other alternative than to
dismiss the complaint." The trial court is right. We confess that we are not aware of any law
or judicial authority that is directly applicable to the present case, and realizing the
importance and far-reaching effect of a ruling on the subject-matter we have searched,
though vainly, for judicial authorities and enlightenment. All the laws and principles of law we
have found, as regards master and servants, or employer and employee, refer to cases of
physical injuries, light or serious, resulting in loss of a member of the body or of any one of
the senses, or permanent physical disability or even death, suffered in line of duty and in the
course of the performance of the duties assigned to the servant or employee, and these
cases are mainly governed by the Employer's Liability Act and the Workmen's Compensation
Act. But a case involving damages caused to an employee by a stranger or outsider while
said employee was in the performance of his duties, presents a novel question which under
present legislation we are neither able nor prepared to decide in favor of the employee.
In a case like the present or a similar case of say a driver employed by a transportation
company, who while in the course of employment runs over and inflicts physical injuries on
or causes the death of a pedestrian; and such driver is later charged criminally in court, one

can imagine that it would be to the interest of the employer to give legal help to and defend
its employee in order to show that the latter was not guilty of any crime either deliberately or
through negligence, because should the employee be finally held criminally liable and he is
found to be insolvent, the employer would be subsidiarily liable. That is why, we repeat, it is
to the interest of the employer to render legal assistance to its employee. But we are not
prepared to say and to hold that the giving of said legal assistance to its employees is a legal
obligation. While it might yet and possibly be regarded as a normal obligation, it does not at
present count with the sanction of man-made laws.
If the employer is not legally obliged to give, legal assistance to its employee and provide
him with a lawyer, naturally said employee may not recover the amount he may have paid a
lawyer hired by him.
Viewed from another angle it may be said that the damage suffered by the plaintiff by reason
of the expenses incurred by him in remunerating his lawyer, is not caused by his act of
shooting to death the gate crasher but rather by the filing of the charge of homicide which
made it necessary for him to defend himself with the aid of counsel. Had no criminal charge
been filed against him, there would have been no expenses incurred or damage suffered. So
the damage suffered by plaintiff was caused rather by the improper filing of the criminal
charge, possibly at the instance of the heirs of the deceased gate crasher and by the State
through the Fiscal. We say improper filing, judging by the results of the court proceedings,
namely, acquittal. In other words, the plaintiff was innocent and blameless. If despite his
innocence and despite the absence of any criminal responsibility on his part he was accused
of homicide, then the responsibility for the improper accusation may be laid at the door of the
heirs of the deceased and the State, and so theoretically, they are the parties that may be
held responsible civilly for damages and if this is so, we fail to see now this responsibility can
be transferred to the employer who in no way intervened, much less initiated the criminal
proceedings and whose only connection or relation to the whole affairs was that he
employed plaintiff to perform a special duty or task, which task or duty was performed
lawfully and without negligence.
Still another point of view is that the damages incurred here consisting of the payment of the
lawyer's fee did not flow directly from the performance of his duties but only indirectly
because there was an efficient, intervening cause, namely, the filing of the criminal charges.
In other words, the shooting to death of the deceased by the plaintiff was not the proximate
cause of the damages suffered but may be regarded as only a remote cause, because from
the shooting to the damages suffered there was not that natural and continuous sequence
required to fix civil responsibility.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. No costs.

5.) G.R. No. L-17133

U.S.T. COOPERATIVE STORE, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE CITY OF MANILA and

MARCELINO SARMIENTO, as Treasurer of the City of Manila, respondents-appellants.

This is an appeal by respondents from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
ordering them to refund to appellee the sums it had paid to the City of Manila as municipal
taxes and license fees for the period beginning July 1957 up to December 1958. The total
amount involved is P12,345.10.
The material facts were stipulated by the parties. Appellee is a duly organized cooperative
association registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 18, 1947 in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 5165 as amended. Its net assets never exceeded
P500,000 during, the years 1957, 1958 and 1959. From the time of its registration it was
under the jurisdiction of the Cooperative Administration Office.
On June 22, 1957 Republic Act No. 2023, otherwise known as the Philippine NonAgricultural Cooperative Act, was approved by Congress, amending and consolidating
existing laws on non-agricultural cooperatives in the Philippines. The two provisions of said
Act which bear on the present case are sections 4 (1) and 66 (1), which read as follows:
SEC. 4 (1) Every cooperative under the jurisdiction of the Cooperatives Administration
Office existing at the time of the approval of this Act which has been registered under
existing cooperative laws (Commonwealth Act five hundred sixty-five, Act Twenty five
hundred eight and Act Thirty-four hundred twenty-five, all as amended) shall be deemed
to be registered under this Act, and its by-laws shall so far as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act, continue in force , and be deemed to be registered under
this Act.
SEC. 66 (1) Cooperatives with net assets of not more than five hundred thousand pesos
shall be exempt from all taxes and government fees of whatever name, and nature
except those provided for under this Act: ... .

Unaware of the exemption provided for in section 66 (1) appellee paid to respondent City of
Manila municipal taxes and license fees in the total amount and for the period already
stated. In May 1959 appellee requested a refund of said amount from the City Treasurer, but
the request was denied. Hence the present suit.
Appellants contend that the exemption under section 66 (1) does not apply to appellee
because the latter was trying business not only with its members but also with the general
public. It may be noted that this fact is not ground for non-exemption from taxes and license
fees. What the law imposes and that under another section (Sec. 58) is a restriction to
the effect that a cooperative shall not transact business with non-members to exceed that
done with members. There is no proof that this restriction has been violated; and in any
case, the law does not provide that the penalty for such violation is the non-exemption of the
cooperative concerned. All that is required for purposes of exemption is that the cooperative
be registered under Republic Act 2023 and that its net assets be not more than P500,000.
On the question of registration, section 4 is clear that every cooperative under the jurisdiction
of the Cooperatives Administration Office existing at the time of the approval of this Act
which has been registered under existing cooperative laws (as is the case of appellee
here) shall be deemed to be registered under this Act.

Appellant next argues that since the taxes and license fees in question were voluntarily paid
they can no longer be recovered, as appellee was presumed to know the law concerning its
exemption and hence must be considered as having waived the benefit thereof. That the
payment was erroneously made there can be no doubt. The error consisted in appellee's not
knowing of the enactment of Republic Act No. 2023, which although passed in Julie 1957
was published only in the issue of the Official Gazette for December of the same year. The
following authorities cited by appellee appear to us to be of persuasive force:
A payment of taxes under a mistake of fact has been held not to be voluntary, and is
therefore recoverable. (51 Am. Jur. 1023)
On principle, a recovery should be allowed where money is paid under a mistake of fact
although such mistake of fact may be induced by a mistake of laws, or where there is
both a mistake of fact and a mistake of law. (40 Am. Jur. 846)
When money is paid to another under the influence of a mistake of fact that on the
mistaken supposition of the existence of a specific fact which would entitle the other to
the money and it would not have been known that the fact making the payment was
otherwise, it may be recovered. The ground upon which the right of recovery rests is that
money paid through misapprehension of facts belongs, in equity , and in good
conscience, to the person who paid it. (4 Am. Jur. 514)

We find no reason to attribute negligence to appellee in making the payments in question,

especially considering that the new law involved a change in its status from a taxable to a
tax-exempt institution; and if it continued to pay for a time after the exemption became
effective it did so in a desire to abide by what it believed to be the law. No undue
disadvantage should be visited upon it as a consequence thereof.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

6.) G.R. No. L-26002

ABELARDO BAUTISTA and ROBERTO TAN TING, petitioners-appellees, vs.
FEDERICO O. BORROMEO, INC., HONORABLE CESAR C. CRUZ, Judge of the
Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal and JESUS BAUTISTA, Deputy Sheriff of
Manila as Special Sheriff, respondents-appellants.
Respondents-appellants seek to overturn the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
of January 6, 1966 granting petitioners-appellees' petition for relief from judgment, setting
aside the July 23, 1965 decision of the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, in Civil Case
1365 and ordering a new trial.
The background facts are as follows:
On September 15, 1964, the Ford truck of petitioner Roberto Tan Ting driven by Abelardo
Bautista, the other petitioner, and the Volkswagen delivery panel truck owned by respondent

Federico O. Borromeo, Inc. (hereinafter called Borromeo) were involved in a traffic accident
along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. In said traffic accident, Quintin Delgado, a helper in
Borromeo's delivery panel truck, sustained injuries which resulted in his instantaneous
death. Borromeo had to pay Delgado's widow the sum of P4,444 representing the
compensation (death benefit) and funeral expenses due Delgado under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
On June 17, 1965, upon the averment that the said vehicular accident was caused by
petitioners' negligence, Borromeo started suit in the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal
to recover from petitioners the compensation and funeral expenses it paid to the widow of
Quintin Delgado.1
At the scheduled hearing of the case on July 23, 1965, neither petitioners nor their counsel
appeared. Borromeo was thus allowed to present its evidence ex parte. On the same day,
July 23, 1965, the municipal court rendered judgment in favor of Borromeo and against the
petitioners in the principal sum of P4,444, and P500 attorney's fees, and costs. Respondents
aver that this judgment has been executed and satisfied.
On August 6, 1965, petitioners received copy of the municipal court's decision.
On August 13, 1965, petitioners moved to set aside the decision. On August 14, 1965, this
motion was denied.
On August 16, 1965, copy of this order of denial was sent by registered mail to counsel of
petitioners. Said counsel did not receive this registered mail and the mail matter was
returned to the court unclaimed. However, said counsel learned of this denial on September
2, 1965 allegedly "in the course of his investigation."
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal dated September 2, 1965. They, however, paid the
appellate docket fee and deposited their cash appeal bond only on September 28, 1965.
Their appeal was consequently turned down by the municipal court, for the reason that the
deposit of the bond and the payment of the docket fee were done after the lapse of the
reglementary period.
Nothing was done by petitioners until October 26, 1965, when they lodged a petition for relief
from the inferior court's judgment in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 2 They there claimed
excusable negligence for the failure of petitioners' counsel to appear in the July 23, 1965
hearing at the municipal court and asserted that they had a good and substantial defense in
that "there was no contractual relationship between the parties, whether express or implied."
They sought preliminary injunction, prayed for trial de novo on the merits. A restraining order
was at first issued by the court; but the prayer for preliminary injunction was eventually
denied.
Respondents' answer contended that the petition for relief was filed out of time; that
petitioners' counsel's failure to attend the hearing of July 23, 1965 does not constitute
excusable negligence; and that the affidavits attached to the petition do not show good and
substantial defense.

Petitioners thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings. No objection thereto was
interposed by respondents. The lower court then rendered the judgment mentioned in the
first part of this opinion.
A move to reconsider failed. Hence, this appeal.
We vote to reverse the lower court's judgment for the following reasons:
1. The petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is unavailable to
petitioners.
A basic precept is that when another remedy at law is open to a party, he cannot sue out a
petition for relief under Rule 38.3 Thus, a petition for relief is not a substitute for appeal. It has
been held that where a defendant could have appealed but did not appeal from the
decision of the inferior court to the Court of First Instance but instead filed a petition for relief,
his petition was inappropriate as it "would amount to reviving his right to appeal which he
had irretrievably lost through the gross inaction of his counsel."4
Here, petitioners learned of the municipal court judgment on August 6, 1965, when they
received a copy of its decision. They moved to set aside that judgment on August 13, 1965.
At that time, a petition for relief could not be availed of because the judgment of the
municipal court had not yet become final. 5 But, on September 2, 1965, petitioners learned of
the court's order of August 14, 1965 denying their motion to set aside. They could have
appealed. Because, nothing in the record suggests that the notices to petitioners to take
delivery of the registered envelope containing the inferior court's resolution denying
petitioners' motion to set aside the decision were ever served on said petitioners. On the
contrary, Teresita Roxas, secretary of petitioners' counsel, in her affidavit dated October 23,
1965, Annex E of the petition for relief, categorically denied receipt of any such notice, thus:
"That I have not received any registry notice corresponding to a registered mail at the Manila
Post Office containing an order by the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, dated August
14, 1965."6
But petitioners did not perfect their appeal to the Court of First Instance on time they paid
the appellate docket fee and deposited their appeal bond only on September 28, eleven (11)
days late. Clearly, their failure to seasonably appeal was through their own fault.
And, when they did file a petition for relief on October 26, 1965, it was way beyond the sixtyday period from August 6, 1965, the time they first learned of the judgment to be set aside,
as required by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
We accordingly, rule that petitioners' petition for relief must fail.
2. Petitioners failed to make out a case of excusable negligence for counsel's nonattendance at the July 23, 1965 hearing.
Their counsel, Atty. Leopoldo V. Repotente, Jr., explains his failure to attend the hearing in
this wise "he relied on the assurance of his associate, Atty. Lucenito N. Tagle, that the
latter will attend to the case for him since on that same date he (Atty. Repotente) had

another case before the City Court of Quezon City." In his sworn statement, Atty. Tagle in
turn stated that he was unable to attend the hearing despite his promise to do so because, in
his own words, "when I transferred to my new office at A & T Building, Escolta, Manila, the
record of this case was misplaced, mislaid or otherwise lost by my helpers and was not
among those turned over to my possession" and "it was only a few days after the date of
hearing on July 23, 1965, that I found the record of this case in one of the drawers of my
table in my former office and it was only then that I realized my failure to attend the hearing
on July 23, 1965, ... ."
We cannot view such negligence of petitioners' two attorneys as excusable. There was no
plausible reason for Repotente to entrust the hearing of the case to another lawyer. His lame
excuse was that he requested Tagle to attend the hearing of said case for him because he
had another hearing at the City Court of Quezon City. This is unworthy of serious
consideration. For, as respondents aver and this is not denied by petitioners the
hearing of July 23, 1965 before the municipal court was set in open court during the initial
date of hearing held on July 1, 1965 after Atty. Repotente consulted his calendar. When
Repotente agreed in open court to set the trial of the case for July 23, 1965, it may very well
be presumed that his other case in Quezon City was not yet calendared for hearing. He
could not have, in good faith, agreed to set the case for hearing on the day on which he had
another previously scheduled trial. Further, he failed to notify his clients of the hearing set for
July 23, 1965; they also failed to appear thereat. Certainly, Repotentes' inadvertence cannot
be labeled as excusable.
Nor may Atty. Tagle offer as excuse the fact that the record of the case "was misplaced,
mislaid or otherwise lost." This is a stereotyped excuse. It is resorted to by lawyers in order
to win new trial of the case and thereby move farther away the day of reckoning. To be
remembered is that the life of each case is in its record. If the record of the case was
misplaced, mislaid or lost, he should have nevertheless attended the scheduled hearing and
requested for a postponement by reason thereof. But he did not. Appropriate it is to recall
here that a prudent lawyer keeps a separate record or diary of hearings of cases he handles
and of his professional engagements. A lawyer's schedules of hearings intended as
reminder are not noted by the lawyer in his record of the case. That would be useless for
the purpose.
There is then no excusable negligence to which the petition for relief can cling.
3. Even on the merits, petitioners' case must fall.
Borromeo paid the widow of its employee, Quintin Delgado, compensation (death benefit)
and funeral expenses for the latter's death while in the course of employment. This
obligation arises from law Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 7 The same law
in its Section 6 also provides that "[i]n case an employee suffers an injury for which
compensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be
optional with such injured employee either to claim compensation from his employer, under
this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in accordance with law; and in case
compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the employer who paid
such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured employee
to the right of recovering from such person what he paid: ..."8

It is evident from the foregoing that "if compensation is claimed and awarded, and the
employer pays it, the employer becomes subrogated to and acquires, by operation of law,
the worker's rights against the tortfeasor."9
No need then there is to establish any contractual relationship between Quintin Delgado and
herein petitioners. Indeed, there is none. The cause of action of respondent corporation is
one which does not spring from a creditor-debtor relationship. It arises by virtue of its
subrogation to the right of Quintin Delgado to sue the guilty party. Such subrogation is
sanctioned by the Workmen's Compensation Law aforesaid. It is as a subrogee to the rights
of its deceased employee, Quintin Delgado, that Borromeo filed a suit against petitioners in
the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 10
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the appealed decision of January 6, 1966 under review is
hereby reversed and the petition for relief is hereby dismissed.
Costs against petitioners-appellees. So ordered.

7.) G.R. No. L-21676

VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET AL., respondents.
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CA-G.R. No. 27561-R,
entitled "Vicente Aldaba, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, versus Cesar Aldaba, et al., defendantsappellees", affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No.
41260.
When Belen Aldaba, a rich woman of Malolos, Bulacan, died on February 25, 1955, she left as
her presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar Aldaba.
Belen Aldaba was childless. Among the properties that she left were the two lots involved in this
case, situated at 427 Maganda Street, Santa Mesa, Manila.
Petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, respectively, lived during
the last war in their house in Malate, Manila. Belen Aldaba used to go to their house to seek the
advice and medical assistance of Dr. Vicente Aldaba. When the latter's house was burned during
the liberation of Manila in 1945, Belen Aldaba invited Dr. Aldaba and his daughter, who was then
a student in medicine, to live in one of her two houses standing on the lots in question, and the
Aldaba father and daughter accepted the offer of Belen and they actually lived in one of those
two houses until sometime in 1957 when respondent Emmanuel Bautista filed an ejectment case
against them in the city court of Manila. Dr. Vicente Aldaba continued to act as a sort of adviser
of Belen and Jane, after becoming a qualified doctor of medicine, became the personal physician
of Belen until the latter's death on February 25, 1955.
On June 24, 1955, the presumptive heirs Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba, executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties left by the deceased Belen Aldaba, by virtue of
which deed the two lots in question were alloted to Cesar Aldaba. Subsequently, on August 26,
1957, herein respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, the latter being a grandson of

Estanislao Bautista by his first marriage, executed a deed whereby the two lots that were alloted
to Cesar Aldaba were ceded to Emmanuel Bautista in exchange of the latter's lot situated at San
Juan, Rizal. By virtue of the deed of extra-judicial partition and the deed of exchange, Transfer
certificates of Title Nos. 1334 and 1335, respectively, covering lots Nos. 32 and 34 now in
question both in the name of Belen Aldaba, were cancelled by the Register of Deeds of
Manila, and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel
Bautista were issued in lieu thereof.
Emmanuel Bautista then required Dr. Vicente Aldaba to vacate the lots in question and, upon the
latter's refusal, filed an ejectment case against him in the City Court of Manila. Without awaiting
the final result of the ejectment case, herein petitioners filed, on August 22, 1959, a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 41260, against herein
respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista and the Register of Deeds of Manila, alleging
that they had become the owners of the two lots in question, and praying that the deed of
partition entered into by Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba be declared null and void with
respect to Lot No. 32, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1334, and lot No. 34 covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No 1335; that said lots be declared the property of therein plaintiffs
(herein petitioners); and that the Register of Deeds of Manila be ordered to cancel TCT Nos.
49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel Bautista and in lieu thereof issue two new TCTs in
the name of therein plaintiffs.
After hearing, the court a quo rendered a decision dismissing the complaint, and declaring,
among others, that if the deceased Belen Aldaba intended to convey the lots in question to
Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, by way of donation, the conveyance should be considered a
donation inter vivos, for the validity of which a public instrument was necessary pursuant to
Article 749 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads as
follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF both complaint and counterclaim dismissed; the Court holds
Emmanuel Bautista to be the absolute owner of the property in question, land and
improvement, but with the right of plaintiffs to stay until they should have been
reimbursed of P5,000.00 but without any obligation, until such reimbursement, to pay any
rental unto defendant Emmanuel Bautista. No pronouncement as to costs.
From this decision, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter court
rendered a decision, on June 21, 1963, raising from P5,000 to P8,000 the amount to be
reimbursed to plaintiffs-appellants, but affirming in all other respects the decision of the lower
court. Herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the
Court of Appeals, they forthwith filed the present petition in this Court.
Before this Court, petitioners now contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance; (2) in holding that the donation, as found by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, was a simple donation inter vivos and not a donation "con causa
onerosa and so it was void for it did not follow the requirements of Article 749 of the Civil Code;
(3) in not holding that the property in question had already been donated to herein petitioners in
consideration of the latter's services; (4) in not declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners of
the property in dispute; and (5) in considering testimonies which had been stricken out.
The errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated, We are going to discuss them together.

Petitioners contend that petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba had rendered services to
the deceased Belen Aldaba for more than ten years without receiving any compensation, and so
in compensation for their services Belen Aldaba gave them the lots in dispute including the
improvements thereon. It is the stand of petitioners that the property in question was conveyed to
them by way of an onerous donation which is governed by Article 733, and not Article 749, of the
Civil Code. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code an onerous donation does not have to be done by
virtue of a public instrument. The petitioners point to the note, Exhibit 6, as indicating that a
donation had been made, which note reads as follows:
June 18, 1953
Jane,
Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na
iyan ay sa inyo.
Belen A. Bautista.
Petitioners maintain that the note, although it could not transmit title, showed, nevertheless, that
a donation had already been made long before its writing, in consideration of the services
rendered before the writing and to be rendered after its writing. And the donation being with an
onerous cause, petitioners maintain that it was valid even if it was done orally. Petitioners further
maintain that if Exhibit 6 labors under some ambiguity, this ambiguity is cured by Exhibit 7, which
reads as follows:
June 27, 1956
Dear Nana Tering,
Narito po ang notice tungkol sa amillaramiento na pagbabayaran diyan sa
lupa at bahay na kinatatayuan ninyo. Sa Malolos po ito tinanggap. Ang
pagbabayaran po ng Inkong ay bayad na.
Gumagalang,
"Cely."

The addressee, Tering, was the wife of Dr. Vicente Aldaba, and the sender, Cely was the
wife of respondent Emmanuel Bautista. This note, petitioners argue, proves that
respondents had recognized the ownership of the petitioners of the house and lot, for,
otherwise, Cely should have sent the notice of real estate tax to respondent Cesar Aldaba, to
whom was alloted the property in question by virtue of the extra-judicial partition.
Respondents, Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, on the other hand, contend that the
evidence of the plaintiff does not disclose clearly that a donation had been made.
Respondents point out that the note, Exhibit 6, as worded, is vague, in that it could not be
interpreted as referring to the lots in question, or that which was given therein was given for
a valuable consideration. And finally, respondents contend that if the property had really
been given to petitioners, why did they not take any step to transfer the property in their
names?

The Court of Appeals, in its decision, made the following findings and conclusions:
(1) The note Exhibit 6 did not make any reference to the lots in question, nor to the
services rendered, or to be rendered, in favor of Belen. The note was insufficient is a
conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence of a donation with onerous
cause. This note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention to donate.
(2) There is no satisfactory explanation why from 1945 to 1955, no notarial document
was executed by Belen in favor of petitioners who were educated persons. The reason
given was "extremada delicadeza" which reason the Court of Appeals considered as
unsatisfactory.
(3) The evidence regarding the value of the services (P53,000.00) rendered by
petitioners (father and daughter) to Belen does not improve the proof regarding the
alleged donation. If petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property was not
sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could have presented their claims
in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if none was
instituted.

The conclusion of the Court of Appeals, as well as that of the trial court, that there was no
onerous donation made by Belen Aldaba to petitioners is based upon their appreciation of
the evidence, and this Court will not disturb the factual findings of those courts.
lawphi1.nt

The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a disposition of the property in
question made by the deceased Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note,
Exhibit 6, considered alone, was, as held by the Court of Appeals, confirming the opinion of
the lower court, only an indication of the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the
petitioners the property occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. The note, in fact, expressed that the property was really intended
for the petitioners, "talagang iyan ay para sa inyo." If the property was only intended for
petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the property had not yet been disposed of in their
favor. There is no evidence in the record that such intention was effectively carried out after
the writing of the note. Inasmuch as the mere expression of an intention is not a promise,
because a promise is an undertaking to carry the intention into effect, 1 We cannot,
considering Exhibit 6 alone, conclude that the deceased promised, much less did convey,
the property in question to the petitioners. That the note, Exhibit 6, was only an indication of
an intention to give was also the interpretation given by petitioners themselves, when they
said in their memorandum, dated February 2, 1960, in the lower court 2 thus:
Legally speaking, there was a contractual relation created between Belen Aldaba and the
plaintiff since 1945 whereby the former would give to the latter the two parcels of land,
together with the house standing thereon, upon the rendition of said services. This fact
can be gleaned from the note (Exh. "6", Plaintiffs) which in part says: TALAGANG IYAN
AY PARA SAINYO

We have said that Exhibit 6 expressed only the intention to donate. Let us suppose, for the
sake of argument, that previous to the writing of the note there had already been a
disposition of the property in favor of the petitioners. This disposition alone, would not make
the donation a donation for a valuable consideration. We still have to ask: What was the

consideration of such disposition? We do not find in the record that there had been an
express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would pay for the
services of the former. If there was no express agreement, could it not be at least implied?
There could not be an implied contract for payment because We find in the record that Jane
did not expect to be paid for her services. In the memorandum of counsel for the petitioners
in the trial court We find this statement:
For all she did to her aunt she expected not to be paid. 3

When a person does not expect to be paid for his services, there cannot be a contract
implied in fact to make compensation for said services.
However, no contract implied in fact to make compensation for personal services
performed for another arises unless the party furnishing the services then expected or
had reason to expect the payment or compensation by the other party. To give rise to an
implied contract to pay for services, they must have been rendered by one party in
expectation that the other party would pay for them, and have been accepted by the
other party with knowledge of that expectation. (58 Am. Jur. p. 512 and cases cited
therein).

In the same manner when the person rendering the services has renounced his fees, the
services are not demandable obligations. 4
Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the services of petitioners constituted a
demandable debt, We still have to ask whether in the instant case this was the consideration
for which the deceased made the (alleged) disposition of the property to the petitioners. As
we have adverted to, we have not come across in the record even a claim that there was an
express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would give the
property in question in consideration of the services of petitioners. All that petitioners could
claim regarding this matter was that "it was impliedly understood" between them. 5 How said
agreement was implied and from what facts it was implied, petitioners did not make clear.
The question of whether or not what is relied upon as a consideration had been knowingly
accepted by the parties as a consideration, is a question of fact, 6 and the Court of Appeals
has not found in the instant case that the lots in question were given to petitioners in
consideration of the services rendered by them to Belen Aldaba.
We find, therefore, that the conditions to constitute a donation cum causa onerosa are not
present in the instant case, and the claim of petitioners that the two lots in question were
donated to them by Belen Aldaba cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.

8.) G.R. No. L-36840

PEOPLE'S CAR INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.
COMMANDO SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY, defendant-appellee.

In this appeal from the adverse judgment of the Davao court of first instance limiting plaintiffappellant's recovery under its complaint to the sum of P1,000.00 instead of the actual damages
of P8,489.10 claimed and suffered by it as a direct result of the wrongful acts of defendant
security agency's guard assigned at plaintiff's premises in pursuance of their "Guard Service
Contract", the Court finds merit in the appeal and accordingly reverses the trial court's judgment.
The appeal was certified to this Court by a special division of the Court of Appeals on a four-toone vote as per its resolution of April 14, 1973 that "Since the case was submitted to the court a
quo for decision on the strength of the stipulation of facts, only questions of law can be involved
in the present appeal."
The Court has accepted such certification and docketed this appeal on the strength of its own
finding from the records that plaintiff's notice of appeal was expressly to this Court (not to the
appellate court)" on pure questions of law" 1 and its record on appeal accordingly prayed that" the
corresponding records be certified and forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court." 2 The trial court
so approved the same 3 on July 3, 1971 instead of having required the filing of a petition for review of
the judgment sought to be appealed from directly with this Court, in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act 5440. By some unexplained and hitherto undiscovered error of the clerk of court,
furthermore, the record on appeal was erroneously forwarded to the appellate court rather than to this
Court.
The parties submitted the case for judgment on a stipulation of facts. There is thus no dispute as
to the factual bases of plaintiff's complaint for recovery of actual damages against defendant, to
wit, that under the subsisting "Guard Service Contract" between the parties, defendant-appellee
as a duly licensed security service agency undertook in consideration of the payments made by
plaintiff to safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from theft, pilferage, robbery,
vandalism and all other unlawful acts of any person or person prejudicial to the interest of
(plaintiff)." 4
On April 5, 1970 at around 1:00 A.M., however, defendant's security guard on duty at plaintiff's
premises, "without any authority, consent, approval, knowledge or orders of the plaintiff and/or
defendant brought out of the compound of the plaintiff a car belonging to its customer, and drove
said car for a place or places unknown, abandoning his post as such security guard on duty
inside the plaintiff's compound, and while so driving said car in one of the City streets lost control
of said car, causing the same to fall into a ditch along J.P. Laurel St., Davao City by reason of
which the plaintiff's complaint for qualified theft against said driver, was blottered in the office of
the Davao City Police Department." 5
As a result of these wrongful acts of defendant's security guard, the car of plaintiff's customer,
Joseph Luy, which had been left with plaintiff for servicing and maintenance, "suffered extensive
damage in the total amount of P7,079." 6 besides the car rental value "chargeable to defendant" in
the sum of P1,410.00 for a car that plaintiff had to rent and make available to its said customer to
enable him to pursue his business and occupation for the period of forty-seven (47) days (from April
25 to June 10, 1970) that it took plaintiff to repair the damaged car, 7 or total actual damages incurred
by plaintiff in the sum of P8,489.10.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant was liable for the entire amount under paragraph 5 of their
contract whereunder defendant assumed "sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch
hours" by its guards, whereas defendant contended, without questioning the amount of the actual

damages incurred by plaintiff, that its liability "shall not exceed one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos
per guard post" under paragraph 4 of their contract.
The parties thus likewise stipulated on this sole issue submitted by them for adjudication, as
follows:
Interpretation of the contract, as to the extent of the liability of the defendant to
the plaintiff by reason of the acts of the employees of the defendant is the only
issue to be resolved.
The defendant relies on Par. 4 of the contract to support its contention while the
plaintiff relies on Par. 5 of the same contract in support of its claims against the
defendant. For ready reference they are quoted hereunder:
'Par. 4. Party of the Second Part (defendant) through the
negligence of its guards, after an investigation has been
conducted by the Party of the First Part (plaintiff) wherein the
Party of the Second Part has been duly represented shall assume
full responsibilities for any loss or damages that may occur to any
property of the Party of the First Part for which it is accountable,
during the watch hours of the Party of the Second Part, provided
the same is reported to the Party of the Second Part within
twenty-four (24) hours of the occurrence, except where such loss
or damage is due to force majeure, provided however that after
the proper investigation to be made thereof that the guard on post
is found negligent and that the amount of the loss shall not
exceed ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS per guard post.'
'Par. 5 The party of the Second Part assumes the responsibility
for the proper performance by the guards employed, of their
duties and (shall) be solely responsible for the acts done during
their watch hours, the Party of the First Part being specifically
released from any and all liabilities to the former's employee or to
the third parties arising from the acts or omissions done by the
guard
during
their
tour
of
8
duty.' ...
The trial court, misreading the above-quoted contractual provisions, held that "the liability of the
defendant in favor of the plaintiff falls under paragraph 4 of the Guard Service Contract" and
rendered judgment "finding the defendant liable to the plaintiff in the amount of P1,000.00 with
costs."
Hence, this appeal, which, as already indicated, is meritorious and must be granted.
Paragraph 4 of the contract, which limits defendant's liability for the amount of loss or damage to
any property of plaintiff to "P1,000.00 per guard post," is by its own terms applicable only for loss
or damage 'through thenegligence of its guards ... during the watch hours" provided that the
same is duly reported by plaintiff within 24 hours of the occurrence and the guard's negligence is
verified after proper investigation with the attendance of both contracting parties. Said paragraph
is manifestly inapplicable to the stipulated facts of record, which involve neither property of

plaintiff that has been lost or damaged at its premises nor mere negligence of defendant's
security guard on duty.
Here, instead of defendant, through its assigned security guards, complying with its contractual
undertaking 'to safeguard and protect the business premises of (plaintiff) from theft, robbery,
vandalism and all other unlawful acts of any person or persons," defendant's own guard on duty
unlawfully and wrongfully drove out of plaintiffs premises a customer's car, lost control of it on the
highway causing it to fall into a ditch, thereby directly causing plaintiff to incur actual damages in
the total amount of P8,489.10.
Defendant is therefore undoubtedly liable to indemnify plaintiff for the entire damages thus
incurred, since under paragraph 5 of their contract it "assumed the responsibility for the proper
performance by the guards employed of their duties and (contracted to) be solely responsible for
the acts done during their watch hours" and "specifically released (plaintiff) from any and all
liabilities ... to the third parties arising from the acts or omissions done by the guards during their
tour of duty." As plaintiff had duly discharged its liability to the third party, its customer, Joseph
Luy, for the undisputed damages of P8,489.10 caused said customer, due to the wanton and
unlawful act of defendant's guard, defendant in turn was clearly liable under the terms of
paragraph 5 of their contract to indemnify plaintiff in the same amount.
The trial court's approach that "had plaintiff understood the liability of the defendant to fall under
paragraph 5, it should have told Joseph Luy, owner of the car, that under the Guard Service
Contract, it was not liable for the damage but the defendant and had Luy insisted on the liability
of the plaintiff, the latter should have challenged him to bring the matter to court. If Luy accepted
the challenge and instituted an action against the plaintiff, it should have filed a third-party
complaint against the Commando Security Service Agency. But if Luy instituted the action
against the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff should have filed a crossclaim against the
latter," 9 was unduly technical and unrealistic and untenable.
Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer's car, which had
been entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in making good such
damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and indemnify it for such
undisputed damages, which had been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts of
defendant's security guard in breach of their contract. As ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code,
"obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and
should be complied with in good faith."
Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court's view, that "under the Guard
Service Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant" since the customer could
not hold defendant to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with defendant.
Such an approach of telling the adverse party to go to court, notwithstanding his plainly valid
claim, aside from its ethical deficiency among others, could hardly create any goodwill for
plaintiff's business, in the same way that defendant's baseless attempt to evade fully discharging
its contractual liability to plaintiff cannot be expected to have brought it more business. Worse,
the administration of justice is prejudiced, since the court dockets are unduly burdened with
unnecessary litigation.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and judgment is hereby
rendered sentencing defendant-appellee to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P8,489.10 as and

by way of reimbursement of the stipulated actual damages and expenses, as well as the costs of
suit in both instances. It is so ordered.

9.) G.R. No. L-8171

EMILIO MANALO and CARLA SALVADOR, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
ROBLES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., defendant-appellant.
Robles Transportation Company, Inc., later referred to as the Company, is appealing from
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, civil case No. 2013, ordering it to pay
plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife, Clara Salvador, the sum of P3,000 with interest at 12
per cent per annum from November 14, 1952 plus the amount of P600 for attorney's fee and
expenses of litigation, with cost.
The facts involved in this case are simple and without dispute. On August 9, 1947, a taxicab
owned and operated by defendant appellant Company and driven by Edgardo Hernandez its
driver, collided with a passenger truck at Paraaque, Rizal. In the course of and a result of
the accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an eleven year old, causing him
physical injuries which resulted in his death several days later. Edgardo Hernandez was
prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence and after trial was found guilty of the
charge and sentenced to one year prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P3,000, in the case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay costs. Edgardo Hernandez served out his sentence but failed to
pay the indemnity. Two writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of
the indemnity, but both writs were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff who certified that
property, real or personal in Hernandez" name could be found.
On February 17, 1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara Salvador, father and
mother respectively of Armando filed the present action against the Company to enforce its
subsidiary liability, pursuant to Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Company filed its appearance and answer and later an amended answer with special
defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint unless and until
the convicted driver Hernandez was included as a party defendant, the Company
considering him an indispensable party. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, holding
that Hernandez was not an indispensable party defendant. Dissatisfied with this ruling, the
Company filed certiorari proceedings with the Court of Appeals, but said appellate court held
that Hernandez was not an indispensable party defendant, and consequently, the trial court
in denying the motion to dismiss acted within the proper limits of its discretion. Eventually,
the trial court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant Company to pay to plaintiffs
damages in the amount P3,000 with interest at 12 per cent per annum from November 14,
1952, plus P600 for attorney's fee and expenses for litigation, with cost. As aforesaid, the
Company is appealing from this decision.

To prove their case against the defendant Company, the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the
decision in the criminal case convicting Hernandez of homicide through reckless
imprudence, the writs of execution to enforce the civil liability, and the returns of the sheriff
showing that the two writs of execution were not satisfied because of the insolvency of
Hernandez, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in his name. Over the objections
of the Company, the trial court admitted this evidence and based its decision in the present
case on the same.
Defendant-appellant now contends that this kind of evidence is inadmissible and cities in
support of its contention the cases of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Company (52 Phil.,
586), and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric decided by this tribunal in the case of Martinez vs.
Barredo (81 Phil., 1). After considering the same two cases now cited by appellant, this court
held that the judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant
and offended party, is binding upon the party subsidiarily liable.
The appelant also claims that in admitting as evidence the sheriff's return of the writs of
execution to prove the insolvency of Hernandez, without requiring said opportunity to crossexamine said sheriff. A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law and forming part of official records, and
is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. (Rule 39, section 11 and Rule 123, section
35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff's making the return need not testify in court as to the facts
stated in his entry. In the case of Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil., 151 citing Wigmore on
Evidence, this court said:
To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving private documents an
exception is made with reference to the method of proving public documents executed
before and certified to, under the land of seal of certain public officials. The courts and
the legislature have recognized the valid reason for such an exception. The litigation is
unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed, the occasion in which the
officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are
numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in
which testimony is not needed from official statements, host of official would be found
devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witness in court or delivering their
depositions before an officer. The work of Administration of government and the interest
of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence.

And this Court added:

The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trust with accuracy and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they
do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken of their
public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree
of caution as the nature and circumstances of each a case may appear to require.

The appellant also contends that Article 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code were
repealed by the New Civil Code, promulgated in 1950, particularly, by the repealing clause
under which comes Article 2270 of the said code. We find the contention untenable. Article
2177 of the New Civil Code expressly recognizes civil liabilities arising from negligence

under the Penal Code, only that it provides that plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act of omission of the defendant.
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act of omission of the
defendant.

Invoking prescription, appellant claims that the present action is barred by the Statute of
Limitations for the reason that it is an action either upon a quasi delict, and that according to
Article 1146 of the New Civil Code, such action must be instituted within four years. We
agree with the appellee that the present action is based upon a judgement, namely, that in
the criminal case, finding Hernandez guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence and
sentencing him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P3,000, and,
consequently may be instituted within ten years.
As regards the other errors assigned by appellant, we find it unnecessary to discuss and rule
upon them.
Finding the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
10.) G.R. No. L-4920
FRANCISCO DIANA and SOLEDAD DIANA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.
BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION CO., defendant-appellee.
The present appeal stems from a case originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna wherein plaintiffs seek to recover from defendant as a party subsidiarily liable for the
crime committed by an employee in the discharge of his duty the sum of P2,500 as
damages, plus legal interest, and the costs of action.
The appeal was originally taken to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to this
court on the ground that it poses merely a question of law.
Plaintiffs are the heirs of one Florenio Diana, a former employee of the defendant. On June
21, 1945, while Florenio Diana was riding in Truck No. 14, belonging to the defendant, driven
by Vivencio Bristol, the truck ran into a ditch at Bay, Laguna, resulting in the death of
Florenio Diana and other passengers. Subsequently, Vivencio Bristol was charged and
convicted of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence wherein, among other things, he
was ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000. When the
decision became final, a writ of execution was issued in order that the indemnity may be
satisfied but the sheriff filed a return stating that the accused had no visible leviable property.
The present case was started when defendant failed to pay the indemnity under its
subsidiary liability under article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was filed on
October 19, 1948 (civil case No. 9221).

On December 13, 1948, defendant filed a motion to dis- miss on the ground that there was
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause (civil case No. 8023 of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna) in which the same plaintiffs herein sought to recover
from the same defendant the amount of P4,500 as damages resulting from the death of
Florenio Diana who died while on board a truck of defendant due to the negligent act of the
driver Vivencio Bristol. This first action was predicated on culpa aquiliana.
On December 16, 1948, plaintiffs filed a written opposition to the motion to dismiss. On
February 3, 1949, the lower court, having found the motion well founded, dismissed the
complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs; and their motion for reconsideration
having been denied, plaintiffs took the present appeal.
The only question to be determined is whether the lower court correctly dismissed the
complaint on the sole ground that there was another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause under Rule 8, section 1(d) of the Rules of Court.
The determination of this issue hinges on the proper interpretation of Rule 8, section 1 (d)
which allows the dismissal of a case on the ground that "there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause." Former Justice Moran, commenting on this
ground, says: "In order that this ground may be invoked, there must be between the action
under consideration and the other action, (1) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being found on the same facts; and (3) the identity on the two preceding
particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicatain the action under
consideration." [I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, (1952), p. 168.].
There is no doubt with regard to the identity of parties. In both cases, the plaintiffs and the
defendant are the same. With regard to the identity of reliefs prayed for, a different
consideration should be made. It should be noted that the present case (civil case No. 9221)
stems from a criminal case in which the driver of the defendant was found guilty of multiple
homicide through reckless imprudence and was ordered to pay an indemnity of P2,000 for
which the defendant is made subsidiarily liable under article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
while the other case (civil case No. 8023) is an action for damages based on culpa
aquiliana which underlies the civil liability predicated on articles 1902 to 1910 of the old Civil
Code. These two cases involve two different remedies. As this court aptly said: "A quasidelict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict
or crime. * * *. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi-delictos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing
dam- ages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code (Barredo vs. Garcia and Al- mario, 73 Phil., 607). The other
differences pointed out between crimes and culpa aquiliana are:.
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts
in which 'any kind of fault or negligence intervenes. (P. 611, supra.).

Considering the distinguishing characteristics of the two cases, which involve two different
remedies, it can hardly be said that there is identity of reliefs in both actions as to make the
present case fall under the operation of Rule 8, section 1(d) of the Rules of Court. In other
words, it is a mistake to say that the present action should be dismissed because of the
pendency of another action between the same parties involving the same cause. Evidently,
both cases involve different causes of action. In fact, when the Court of Appeals dismissed
the action based on culpa aquiliana (civil case No. 8023), this distinction was stressed. It
was there said that the negligent act committed by defendant's employee is not a quasi
crime, for such negligence is punishable by law. What plaintiffs should have done was to
institute an action under article 103 of the Revised Penal Code (CA-G.R. No. 3632-R). And
this is what plaintiffs have done. To deprive them now of this remedy, after the conviction of
defendant's employee, would be to deprive them altogether of the indemnity to which they
are entitled by law and by a court decision, which injustice it is our duty to prevent.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and the case is hereby remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.